Nongqai Vol 15 No 6A - SAP Veiligheidstak - SAP Security Branch

• How special forces chief 'blew the whistle on

By Cameron Charters

Brig HB Heymans

Hierdie spesiale uitgawe behandel die Veiligheidstak van ongeveer 1961 tot ongeveer 1990. Die bloeitydperk van die Veiligheidstak was veral in die tydperk van 1963 tot 1969 toe genl HJ van den Bergh aan die bewind van sake was. Hy het ‘n nuwe grondslag gelê waarop ons voortgebou het.

Na die arrestasie van die mense by Rivonia en adv Bram Fischer was die land, op veiligheidsgebied, redelik stil en “dinge was onder beheer”. Insurgensie het vanaf 1966 in SWA plaasgevind. Dit is onmoontlik om alles oor die veiligheidstak in ‘n enkele uitgawe te dek, dus word enkele sake van belang hier te berde gebring voordat ons dit vergeet.

Ek was lid van die veiligheidstak en die veiligheidstak wat vandag op die sosiale media aan die leserspubliek bekend gestel word is nie die veiligheidstak wat ek geken het nie. Die veiligheidstak was – soos die ou Handelstak van die polisie – ‘n keurkorps. Offisiere het donker pakke gedra en in die somer kon offisiere ook ‘n safaripak dra. Korrupsie was onbekend.

Alles het soggens by die oggendkonferensie - in die omgang bekend as die Sanhedrin - begin. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie is oor die land versprei – ook in die destydse Suidwes en Rhodesië. Soggens het ons ‘n goeie idee gehad wat in die land plaasgevind het. Ons het ‘n wye spektrum van “politieke misdrywe” hanteer – van ultra-links tot ultra-regs.

Na die SAW se inval in SWA gedurende 1975 en die 1976 (Soweto) onluste het sake vererger. Die veiligheidstak se filosofie was aanvanklik dat die aanslag deur die howe bekamp sou word. Mense is voor die howe gebring en later het sommige hofsake in ‘n media-sirkus ontaard. Geld het die land ingestroom om beskuldigdes se regskoste te dra.

Ons opponent het ook nie meer volgens die sogenoemde “Queensbury Reëls” geveg nie en die stryd heimlik ondergronds – en ook vanaf die buiteland - begin voer. Opgeleide MK-vegters het polisiemanne en hul huise geteiken en van hulle is in voorsprong operasies geneutraliseer.

Ons was in ‘n hewige politieke oorlog gewikkel. Dink maar aan die United Democratic Movement wat die hele land opgesweep het! Die polisiemag was klein en het ook oor ‘n ewe klein begroting beskik. Die politici wat die beleid bepaal het, het nie ‘n benul van politieke oorlogvoering gehad nie.

Die staatspresident was ‘n “weermag-man” en hy en die SAW-generaals het die hoofstryd binnelands en buitelands gevoer. Vergeet van koppe tel! Die stryd was ‘n politieke stryd.

Die polisie was onderbeman maar was baie effektief. Bestudeer gerus die kommissaris-jaarverslae wat in die parlement ter tafel gelê is. Die staatsdienskommissie was die polisie nie baie goedgesind nie en duisende opgeleide polisiemanne het in die privaatsektor ‘n beter heenkome gevind.

‘n Groot las het op die skouers van die klein polisiemag gerus. Die nasionale veiligheidsbestuurstelsel en ander meganismes was soms ontoereikend.

Die polisie was ook deur die politici misbruik – dink maar aan gerapporteerde voorvalle waar die politici die SAP opdrag gegee het om geboue te verwoes ... Net soos mens geleerde mense nodig het in die Forensiese afdeling het mens ook akademici nodig gehad bv strateë, analiste, vertolkers en kenners van kommunisme en politieke oorlog – die stryd is nie net bekamping nie MAAR die stryd moet ook verstaan word. Ek dink nie ons het die stryd behoorlik verstaan en begryp nie.

Met die voorwoord word gepoog om konteks te gee. Ons poging is om balans en konteks te skep.

Dit sal ook die moeite loon om ook na ons opponente te kyk: Hoe het hulle hul eie verdagtes hanteer? Hoeveel dood was daar in hul aanhouding? Onthou ons was in ‘n stryd gewikkel indien ons wandade vergelyk word met ons opponente se wandade, dan is ons wandade ‘n Sondagskoolpiekniek.

Die polisie het nie apartheid geskep nie maar moes noodgedwonge apartheidswetgewing toepas.

Die polisie as primere gesagsorgaan van die staat het saam met die SA Weermag en Nasionale Intelligensiediens verandering in Suid-Afrika bestuur en die klimaat geskep waartydens die onderhandelinge kon plaasvind.

Enkele probleme van die polisiegeskiedkundige:

• Een van ons hoof-probleme is dat mense wat “ons” geskiedskrywing doen is nie noodwendig ons vriende of bewonderaars nie. Baie van ons geskiedskrywers is buitelanders of verkeer in die buiteland. Nog ‘n probleem is: Baie geskiedenis wat aangebied word is nie objektief nie. Dink ook aan onvergenoegde lede se uitlatings. Daar is ‘n gebrek aan balans en konteks. Sommige lede se getuienis voor die WVK (TRC) is ook nie geskiedenis nie. Ooggetuie

verslae word benodig. Talle verdagtes is tydens ondervraging mishandel en tog is daar duisende ander wat glad nie mishandel is nie!

• In Nederlands word polisie as “politie” gespel – voeg die “K” by, en u is by politiek. Waar die hoogste belange van die staat op die spel kom, vind polisiëring noodgedwonge overt of kovert plaas hetsy deur die polisie of sy inligtingsdiens (MI5 MI6, CIA, FBI of destyds KGB) of spesiale mag

• Die polisie word onnodig en onbillik gestigmatiseer sonder dat omringende feite van die aanslag in ag geneem word. Bykans elke land in die wêreld het ‘n sogenoemde “moordbende” in diens. Die “moordbende” is ‘n instrument “of statecraft”.

• Die polisie (of ‘n weermag) kan nie “kies” wat hy wil doen nie. Hy opereer onder gesag van die wet en sy politieke opdraggewer.

• Die reg op selfverdediging: Staat het soos die natuurlike mens, ook die reg om sy belange, homself en sy burgers plaaslik en internasionaal te beskerm Polisie is soms ‘n onwillige deelnemer aan so ‘n stryd – hy dien die stat van die dag. Ander historici sien dit nie so nie.

• Deur propaganda is die polisie reeds erg geteer, geveer en swartgesmeer. Enige billike kommentaar of objektiewe geskiedskrywing word as propaganda afgemaak.

• In sekere kringe is die polisie en meer bepaald die veiligheidstak reeds gestigmatiseer. (Lees bv ons eBoek deur myself en dr WP Steenkamp.)

• Verraad in eie geledere: Ons is vanuit eie geledere deur “sensasionele onthullings” groot skade aangedoen weens onnosele, ondeurdagte of kwetsende optrede deur bevelvoerders.

Ek dink aan onthullings van mense soos Dirk Coetzee, Paul Erasmus en RS186 wat aanvanklik verontreg gevoel het en by ons opponente aangesluit of met hulle geheul het. Baie van die onthullings sal nie die “toets” van ‘n kruisondervraging deurstaan nie. (Sulke inligting is soos die van ‘n vrou wat vir haar man kwaad is en moet met versigtigheid bejeën word.

• Deur “faction” - iets tussen “fiction and fact” - is die beeld van die veiligheidspolisie en genl HJ van den Bergh onberekenbare skade aangedoen en gestigmatiseer. Mense praat vandag nog van die “Tall Assassin” as hulle na genl Van den Bergh verwys. Met die korrekte, objektiewe lens beskou was hy ‘n uitstaande veiligheidsman en deurwinterde speurder. Sien hom in die korrekte tydsgewrig en ja, soos alle mense het hy foute gehad.

• Verskillende interne en eksterne faktore het op lede van die veiligheidstak ingewerk en het ‘n rol in hul uitvoering gespeel. Die polisiegeskiedkundige moet waar moontlik daar interne en eksterne faktore bepaal by die vertolking van die polisie se geskiedenis.

• Is ons tevrede met wat van ons gepubliseer word bv op Wikipedia? Ons moet onsself afvra wat is ons nalatenskap? Wat kan ons daaraan doen? Hoe kan ons, ons beeld verander?

• Ek het al met verskeie akademici gesels en hulle is dit eens met my – ons was “goeie” mense wat kerk toe gegaan het en Saterdae rugby gekyk het. Ja, soos in enige organisasie was daar vrot appels. Maar ons moet die geskiedenis skryf.

My versugting is meet, weeg, beoordeel die polisie met dieselfde meetstokke en gewigte waarmee die SAKP/ANC-alliansie geweeg, beoordeel en beskou word. Doen ‘n vergelykende studie tussen die twee gewese strydende groepe en vergeet van linkse en regse vooroordele.

Vandag nog word baie van ons kollegas aangekla en vervolg.

OPERATION VULA: SA POLICE SECURITY BRANCH

Brig. Christo Davidson

I have been in the SA Police from June 1963 to April 1999 and retired with the rank of Brigadier.

After completing my training in the Police Training College in Pretoria in December 1963 I was posted to Dannhauser in Kwa-Zulu Natal, from there to Nqutu whereafter I was selected for a detective course in 1967. Upon completing that, I was stationed as a detective, first to Newcastle and after that to Dundee, all in Kwa-Zulu Natal until the end of 1971. During this time, I was exposed to investigation of criminal cases of various nature, with the aim of solving the crimes and to bring perpetrators to court in terms of different offences and procedures as prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Act. During this time, I gained a lot of experience in as far as the requirements to gather information and evidence to prove a case in court. On a few occasions I appeared as prosecutor in the local district court leading evidence on behalf of the State.

In January 1972 I was selected to be transferred to the Security Branch of the SA Police and stationed at Newcastle. At that stage in the history the African National Congress, (ANC) the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) as well as the South African Communist party (SACP) and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) were some of the organizations banned in terms of applicable security legislation. It was our duty to determine the whereabouts and movements of members and sympathizers of those organizations and whether any of them contravened any act or provision of the ban and restrictions applicable.

There were a few members/sympathisers of some of these organizations in the Newcastle area, but those persons held a relatively low profile, and we did not encounter serious problems as far as contravention of security legislation was concerned.

During the years that followed, members of those organizations, mainly orchestrated by the military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) started to leave the country illegally to undergo military or revolutionary training in communist countries such as Russia. The aim of this training was to return to the Republic and overthrow the Apartheid government and replace it with a democratic/communist government.

In order to secure the internal safety of the Republic, its citizens, infrastructure and economy the Government realized the need to act swiftly and decisively against the members/sympathisers of these illegal organizations once they returned as trained terrorists. This task was placed squarely on the shoulders of the Security Branch of the SA Police.

Different acts of parliament were already in force in terms of which action could be taken against such terrorists once they were involved in acts of sabotage, treason, murder, violence or any action with the aim of overthrowing the South African government. Quite a number of trained terrorists returned during the late 70-ties and 80-ties and committed a number of acts of sabotage, terror attacks on civilians and government institutions such as the Church Street bombing, economic sabotage on industries such as SASOL, landmines on farm roads killing innocent civilians, murders, etc. Quite a number of civilians as well as members of the armed forces, including th SA Police, lost their lives in these instances.

Investigations into such incidents were conducted by experienced members/investigators of mainly the Security Branch of the police, with the aim of bringing the perpetrators before court in terms of contravention of certain aspects of applicable legislation. Investigation of these cases were time consuming due to the nature of the transgression and various applicable legislation that had to be proved and complied with. Questioning of the arrested person, tracing and questioning of possible witnesses, tracing and retrieving of stacked firearms and explosives, (DLB’s) maps and written instructions of identified targets to be sabotaged, routes for smuggling of illegal armament into the country took place. The majority of these cases were successfully brought before court, evidence was led, and the accused were sentenced to imprisonment, some for long periods of time. The main reason for the successes we had in this regard, is the fact that our investigators were committed to our work, we knew what the legal requirements in terms of applicable legislation were, we were experienced, we worked hand-in-hand with experienced court prosecutors, we had no side-issues or personal agendas.

Legislation was applicable that enabled us as investigators to conduct lengthy investigations, even as long as 180 days, prior to taking the case before court.

One such case was the so-called VULA investigation, where a number of prominent MK/ANC members/operatives were arrested in Durban during July 1990 and interviewed with the aim of gathering the required evidence to take the case to court on charges varying from terrorism, illegal smuggling of fire-arms, landmines, etc. into the country for purposes of arming the masses to achieve the overthrow of the RSA government through revolutionary and armed actions. I was involved in that investigation from day one in the Durban offices of the Security Branch. We were a few investigators and one of the prominent persons arrested, a MK commander was given to me to get as much information as possible from him that could be used in court against himself and the other arrested persons. This MK commander was detained in the police cells at Bellair police station and brought to my office daily for interviewing and investigation. This person was a highly trained terrorist and his family, which I knew, was from Newcastle. We were more than one person in my team interviewing him and he co-operated to a certain extent with us.

Due to the fact that we spent many hours in each other’s company, our conversations sometimes went further than he legal aspects of the cases that he could face. He has stated to me that he does not believe in Christianity as he regards it as fairy tales, but that he thinks Christians are good people, based on his experience of his mother who was involved in her church and a good person to his opinion. I could support that as I knew her, and I told him so.

One day during our interviews, I asked him whether he has given it a thought as to what charges could be brought against him in court.

• Without hesitation he said that he must firstly, be charged with treason,

• secondly for leaving the country illegally and

• underwent military training with the aim of establishing a revolution in the country to overthrow the government,

• smuggling of firearms, landmines etc into the country form Botswana for distribution and use by trained terrorists,

• commanding and managing armed units of MK to place landmines on farm roads in the then Northern Transvaal, now Limpopo, thereby killing several civilians,

• being illegally in possession of arms and ammunition.

When I asked him why he was so sure of the above, his words were: “I am VULA and VULA is treason. Vula is to start the revolution through the armed struggle”. I left the conversation there and he did not elaborate further on what he said.

On another occasion, I one day asked him how he would have treated me should our roles be reversed, me being the detainee and him being the policeman. He looked me in the face for long time and I said to him that before he answers, he must consider the fact that although a detainee,

he sleeps in a clean police cell with a proper bed and bedding, hot and cold shower, toilet and he gets three meals a day, one being the same as what I had from the police single quarters mess, a doctor visits him once a week as well as a judge asking about his treatment. He answered me coldly and said: “If you would have been lucky enough to be alive, you would have been on Robben Island” I left the discussion there and he did not say anything further. We never discussed the topic again. At a later stage, after we received instructions from politicians via our Head Office, that we must proceed to charge this person for being illegally in possession of arms and ammunition. We were not happy with this but had to comply with instructions.

During that evening, after he had been detained at Bellair police station, I and another colleague went to his cell and served him with a warrant for appearance in court the next day for the charges mentioned in the preceding paragraph. He was disappointed and said that it is not what he had expected, taking his position as a commander in MK.

The next day, after lunch, we escorted him to court in Durban. On the way to court, as we walked in the underground passage, I was with him. He was handcuffed and I saw that some tears were rolling from his eyes. When asked what the problem was, he said sadly that he is disappointed with the “minor” charges we brought against him. I asked him why he said so and he replied:” I am a commander in MK. I have sacrificed my life, my career, my family, my wife, my daughter and now you do this to me, it is a disappointment, I need to be charged for what I have told you”. I put my arms around his shoulder and said that life does not always goes the way we expect. He then calmed down a bit and we proceeded in silence to the court room.

When the court hearing started, the prosecutor read the charge against him and asked what he would plea. He obviously pleaded not guilty and applied to be released on bail. For this he had to testify and in that evidence of his he “exposed” his role in the VULA operation with emphasis on his role in the illegal smuggling of arms, ammunition and landmines from Botswana into South Africa. He specifically mentioned that he was a member of the ANC and a Commander in MK, the military wing of the ANC.

Needless to say, the case was postponed for further investigation and his bail application was refused. I then took him back to Bellair police station and the next dayhe was transferred to Westville prison, I never communicated with him again.

Subsequent to this, the case against this MK Commander, as well as all the other VULA operatives who had been arrested by the Security Branch in the meantime at different locations in the country, had been withdrawn in court, no prosecutions took place and none of the evidence we had compiled against them, were submitted in court.

In conclusion I need to say that, not only we as investigators directly involved in the VULA investigation, but members of the Security Branch in general, were disappointed with the fact that

all charges including treason, sabotage, murder, training in revolutionary warfare and many other, were withdrawn due to political influence and pressure. In sharp contrast with cases like this, against trained terrorists being withdrawn or no prosecution even instituted, members of the Security Branch, who only executed their duty in accordance with relevant and applicable legislation at that time in history, are being prosecuted. Is that fair? Were we allowed the opportunity to present this case in court, including evidence such as seized arms, ammunition, landmines, etc., the country would have been made aware of the fact that the famous Rivonia case was, in comparison with VULA, like a Sunday school picnic. The central theme and aim of Operation, VULA (which means” to open”) is outlined in all the documentation we retrieved from the VULA computers and documentation, namely “seizure of power” from the so-called Apartheid government. Today, in hindsight and taking into account the executive political positions some of these former VULA operatives occupy, we can really ask whether they have succeeded in the “seizure of power” through their revolutionary actions or did they just “get” the power?

LILIESLEAF, RIVONIA (AUGUST 1962 –11 JULY 1963)

By Dr Garth Conan Benneyworth Abstract

The police raid on Liliesleaf on 11 July 1963 is understood to be the result of informants within the liberation movements either breaking down in detention or “selling out” and providing information about the farm with its safe house and its people. This paper, while acknowledging that there were informants inside the liberation movements, maintains that this was only a fragment of a kaleidoscope of events culminating in the raid and subsequent Rivonia Trial. Rather it was a covert investigation undertaken since 1962 that resulted in the blow delivered by the combined security agencies, that shattered the underground networks opposing the apartheid state. It was an investigation which relied extensively on the principles of the mythological Greek Trojan horse; it used persons and technology that aimed to undermine and overthrow their opponent, to subvert and defeat it from within, while appearing non-threatening. This paper identifies three Trojan horses. A human spy concealed behind the innocent look of a child who fronted for sinister forces. Electronic warfare deployed by the military and linked to an innocuous caravan park; and finally, a laundry van to deliver the surgical knockout strike. Yet all this subterfuge has eluded the narrative for 53 years.

The build-up, 1963

By June 1963 the state crackdown was relentless. Political organisations, such as the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), together with their activists were under banning orders, restricted from almost all social and political contact with others, rendered incommunicado, detained, driven into exile, or serving prison sentences. The PAC’s resistance had been neutralised, numerous political trials were underway and of the various methods exhibited by a growing security police state, one was increasing brutality.

It became increasingly difficult for the members of the underground to operate. Informants were rumoured to be everywhere and the pressure of living beneath the radar became unbearable. At some point a fatal mistake might be made or the sheer weight of the security apparatus might find a leak in the dyke, bursting through to flood into the underground networks.

Dennis Goldberg recalled that there were two sides to operating in the underground.

“It really was as exciting as I imagined it would be. I was a fulltime revolutionary. I felt invincible: on the brink of something great. There was a constant rush of adrenaline”.1 However, this came with a price. Goldberg recalled living under this terrible strain:

"What happens when you are working underground is that you’re constantly working under the pressure of discovery; you’re constantly having to think about it. It becomes a terrible anxiety. The pressure of being underground, it was wearing and wearing … and you’re forced into making mistakes. This is what the pressure does, it forces you into mistakes. I am talking about the way the security forces pressure you.2

And this is the lesson to be learnt from it, there is always too much to do, you’re always in a hurry, the revolution must happen today, if not tonight, and so you make mistakes. What it plays on is that eventually you become so lonely, you give yourself away … It’s like a boil. That is part of the psychology. That might not necessarily be the whole thing. But we don’t train our people for this, you only learn it when it’s too damn late.3

There was a nuance of change taking place; one that the movement was slow to detect. Some members had become complacent, lulled by a false sense of security, which appeared to be presented by the façade of the safe house. After all, once inside the perceived guerrilla zone, the hostile world lay beyond its boundaries. Rusty Bernstein saw it as “evident that the ‘safe house’ syndrome was at work. Liliesleaf farm seemed to be the easy option for every hard choice. It was after all safe.”4

Kathrada recalled his emotions when he arrived at Liliesleaf:

"I’m living in another world. The comrades here were completely divorced, Soweto was just a few miles from here, they were completely divorced from reality. And drawing up very fancy documents. They had even forgotten that when MK was formed, no one had the idea that MK was going to overthrow the government. At the very most MK was going to be a pressure group. The goal

Lionel 'Rusty' Bernstein - mugshot

remained that MK would be one of the pressure groups together with the political struggle, together with the international pressures, to force the enemy to the negotiation table."5

In 2006, according to Vivien Ezra who owned the front company, Navian Ltd, established by the SACP to purchase Liliesleaf, there were no internal security arrangements within the cells to resist infiltration. 6 Structures just did not exist whereby suspicions could be reported. In short, there was no structured counter intelligence mechanism in use by the underground. 7 Naïve is a persistent word that crept through all the interviews conducted by the author in the period from 2004 to 2006.

Nothing illustrates this better than the fact that although Mandela was captured in August 1962, Liliesleaf continued to be used by the allied organisations, including the SACP, the ANC, MK, members of the Congress Alliance, South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and members of the Indian political organisations, right up until the raid, eleven months later.

Liliesleaf farm - aerial photo taken after the raid, note the thatch roof room top left connected to rear farm quarters and buildings - this room was used by Nelson Mandela. Brenthurst Library.

One would have thought that once South Africa’s most wanted fugitive was captured, these organisations would have tried to put as much distance as possible between themselves and Liliesleaf, given that Mandela had used the farm as his base of operations. He had travelled throughout Africa and the United Kingdom, yet it would appear that no one considered the possibility that his movements might be tracked back to Liliesleaf, or that had he been under surveillance, which he was, thus compromising the farm around August 1962 when captured. Mandela claimed that he concealed a revolver and notebook within the upholstery of the front seat of Cecil Williams’s car before being arrested and taken into custody.8 The hypothesis is that the police found this notebook, which enabled them to investigate his activities in South Africa after his return from Ethiopia. The impending danger was that by using this information the security branch could hone in on Liliesleaf. In fact, it appears that that the underground activities and the use of Liliesleaf by the liberation movement actually increased after August 1962 and continued to do so until the 1963 raid. It is possible that more leaders of the underground and operatives sought shelter at Liliesleaf after August 1962, than at any other time in its history before this date. Walter Sisulu, Raymond Mhlaba, Wilton Mkwai, Andrew Mlangeni, Govan Mbeki and Ahmed Kathrada certainly did, to name but a few. Meetings of MK’s high command, the Secretariat and the SACP’s central committee were held there, and quite possibly also the ANC’s NEC and various MK committees such as those dealing with intelligence, logistics, transport and housing.

Police searching the living room at Liliesleaf farm - main house, police photograph.

It is widely understood that the meeting of the Secretariat on the day of the raid was the last meeting held at Liliesleaf and that thereafter other venues would be used. Some had serious reservations about returning there believing the farm to be compromised. Bernstein was vehemently opposed to returning to Liliesleaf. 9 Other senior leaders, such as Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba and Wilton Mkwai no longer stayed there, having moved to Trevallyn, a smallholding near Krugersdorp, purchased shortly before by Denis Goldberg under a fictitious name. Meanwhile, Liliesleaf was to be used solely for accommodating the MK high command and those immediately involved in its functioning.10 However this was not the case for that one fateful meeting. The Logistics Committee was due to meet the night of 11 July 1963. So in fact two meetings were intended at Liliesleaf on the day of the raid. All of those captured during the raid concur that because an alternative venue couldn’t be found, it was agreed to meet at Liliesleaf one last time.

Yet other parallel activities were occurring, such as a scheduled Logistics Committee meeting, planned to take place inside the main house after the Secretariat concluded its business in the thatched cottage. One of its members, Denis Goldberg was already seated in the lounge reading a

book when the veranda door swung open to initiate his capture. Another member, Arthur Goldreich, drove home into the raid with a copy of Operation Mayibuye concealed behind his vehicle’s hubcap. A third, Hilliard Festenstein, walked into the house punctually that night to attend the meeting which never happened – straight into the arms of the police. The chairman of the Logistics Committee, Wilton Mkwai, narrowly avoided capture when approaching the farm as scheduled and saw the raid already in progress. A fifth member, Ian David Kitson, escaped due to a bout of flu which had kept him in bed; while the reasons for Lionel Gay’s non-show remain unknown.

All those at Liliesleaf that day were arrested. The exceptions were six children, three black and three white. Together with other members of the liberation movement who were serving jail sentences or who were arrested elsewhere, those arrested stood trial in what became a watershed moment in South African history. Rivonia.

Leakage

Liliesleaf was leaking. A few weeks before the raid some MK members had visited the farm and were arrested. It was a matter of time before the security branch broke them. By July 1963, there were numerous security lapses so it was inevitable that if the police hadn’t already done so, they would soon find the farm. Apart from which, “we were total amateurs. You cannot cross both worlds, indefinitely”. 11

The concept of security had broken down. Too many people were using Liliesleaf. Its numerous visitors included people who were known to the security branch and foreign intelligence agencies, such as Joe Slovo, Ruth First, Jack Hodgson, Bram Fischer, Lionel Bernstein, Harold Wolpe and many others. Lionel (Rusty) Bernstein described this osmosis from the safe house:

"Later people who had been overseas for military training would arrive back in Bechuanaland without any proper planning. The first thing we would know was that they were in Bechuanaland and wanted come back. So we’d bring them back and they would stay for a few nights … Rivonia came into sudden use in a way that had not been foreseen.

So this place became a sort of centre, if you like because Sisulu and Mbeki were the two senior ANC people at large at that time. [Since] both of them were [also]participating on the high command, they began to use it for MK high command activities, both for keeping documents and holding meetings, and they were bringing people to their meetings who were not in the high command, not

living underground and so on. So the place really changed from being a really closely kept secret to being something of a centre."12

Even Thomas Mashifane, the foreman, could sense the inherent danger building up. “What are you folks doing? The way motor cars are coming in and out, the next thing the police are going to come.” 13 No one was prepared to listen. The question is, where others listening with a more sinister intent? Had those with a little more intellect than ascribed to them, applied themselves as opposed to the thuggery displayed by the police? Had the proverbial Mr Plod finally caught up?

Rear view aerial image of Liliesleaf farm - Police photograph post raid, Brenthurst Library.

The central thread that runs through the literature is that the security branch experienced a lucky break when they raided Liliesleaf farm. Starting in 1965, Strydom has it that an informant offered to tell what he knew about activities at the farm yet had only a vague idea where it was. Accompanied by a detective and after driving about the area for some time, he eventually recognised the property.14 Frankel has it that Lt. Van Wyk who led the raid was advised by a colleague that he had an informant with information to sell. Apparently, he knew where to find Walter Sisulu and half a

dozen other important leaders of the Umkhonto high command. For a large payment he would take the lieutenant there.15 According to Frankel the informant took Van Wyk to Liliesleaf, enabling him to plan the raid which he sprung the following day. After the raid the informant received R6 000.16 More recent works, for example that by Smith, have the security branch depicted as a proverbial Mr Plod staffed with bumbling policemen who eventually caught up with the activists.17 If so, who was listening in besides the SAP and its security branch?

This paper will show that at least three parallel lines of investigation by three separate security agencies took place between 1962 and the day of the raid. There could have been other agencies but these remain unidentified. The three agencies were the SAP’s security branch, using its methods of informer recruitment and information collected; Republican Intelligence (RI), using informants and information trading with foreign intelligence organisations (later better known as the National Intelligence Service or NIS); and the South African Communications Security Agency which was linked to the South African Defence Force (SADF).

Investigating Liliesleaf, 1962-1963

There is no doubt that captured operatives gave the police information. Examples include Bruno Mtolo, Patrick Mthembu and Bartholomew Hlapane.18 However, this paper will identify one informer whose role the author uncovered in 2005 by locating this informant’s 1963 statement to the SAP. A copy was provided by the author to the Liliesleaf Trust in 2005 and is included in an unpublished research report to the Trust in 2007.19 All subsequent references to this informant are drawn from the author’s prior work. Within weeks of Nelson Mandela’s capture on 5 August 1962, the security branch had a ten-year-old informant who had access to the farm. His name is George Mellis. His parents owned the Rivonia Caravan Park directly across the road from Liliesleaf. He was the perfect Trojan horse. He could literally breach the sanctity of the safe house undetected, much like the mythical Trojan horse parked outside the gates of Troy. No one gave the boy so much as a second glance when he arrived to play with his friends Nicholas and Paul Goldreich, or wandered around near the outbuildings while covert meetings were underway.

On 5 August 1963, George Mellis made a sworn statement to Sergeant Fourie who commanded the Rivonia police station.

"About a year ago, one day when I was playing in the yard of the Goldreichs’ place, I saw a number of white and Bantu males together in the thatch-roof building next to the main house. These people were talking, and I saw some shaking hands with each other. This seemed strange to me and I told

my parents about it. On some occasions that I went there I saw a lot of cars parked in the yard and one occasion, I took the registration numbers of all the cars parked in the Goldreich yard and handed the numbers I had written down, to the police at Rivonia." 20

Sergeant Fourie forwarded Mellis’s number plate list and his information to the security branch. Mellis tried to elicit further information from his Goldreich playmates whom he joined inside the main house for lunch. On one occasion, he said, “I asked Nicholas about the persons on the premises but Nicholas said that he was not allowed to tell me anything”. 21

In his 1963 statement Mellis identified Walter Sisulu Raymond Mhlaba, Denis Goldberg and Ahmed Kathrada from police photographs. His Goldberg reference is pertinent in that Goldberg first visited Liliesleaf in May 1963. This means that Mellis was spying on Liliesleaf from the time of his first report (about a year before the raidand soon after Mandela’s capture), through to when Goldberg visited Liliesleaf between May and July 1963. Mellis spied right up until the raid.

Photo of Nicholas and Paul Goldreich who befriended George Mellis, this photograph was taken at Liliesleaf farm and is in the private collection of Arthur Goldreich and shared with the author.

Sergeant Fourie assisted the security branch too. In December 1962, Fourie received a summons for a parking offence from the Alberton magistrate’s court which he had to serve on Arthur Goldreich. Fourie held back.

“Aangesien ek bang was dat dit met die ondersoek mag inmeng het ek die lasbrief nie laat uitvoer nie maar het die agterwee gehou [Because I was afraid that it might interfere with the investigation, I did not serve the summons but held it back.]".22

Fourie instructed his policemen that any action against anyone at Liliesleaf, for example serving a summons, should first be cleared with him. No policeman was to go onto Liliesleaf for any reason without prior authorisation, because an investigation was underway. The farm was sanitised from any official physical interruption.

On 14 January 1963, Colonel Hendrik van den Bergh was appointed head of the security branch of the South African Police. His orders were to reorganise the South African security establishment and it was he who created the first national intelligence service, originally known as Republican Intelligence (RI). The government needed an intelligence organisation that could function along the lines of America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). The RI, together with the security branch, were instructed to smash all organised resistance to the minority regime.

According to Gerhard Ludi the RI’s primary focus was the South African Communist Party (SACP). Ludi, one of RI’s first agents, has suggested that the RI identified the SACP as the primary problem confronting the apartheid regime. Ludi has said that the CIA assisted RI and provided intelligence about financial assistance that Russia provided to the liberation movements. The CIA also indicated who the KGB operatives in South Africa might be and pointed out some of the local communists to the RI.23 RI fed intelligence to both the CIA and the SIS on a weekly basis and these agencies reciprocated. This foreign intelligence feed also included information about Operation Mayibuye and Radio Freedom, both implicitly connected to Liliesleaf.24

Ludi related that RI took the approach that, “if one learned about the cores of the Communist Party, one would learn about the why and where and the role the Soviets were playing in this”. 25 Persons of interest who formed their intelligence target were Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Michael Harmel, Lionel Bernstein, Hilda Watts, Harold Wolpe and Ahmed Kathrada. Ludi said that Mhlaba, Bernstein and Harmel would be of particular focus for RI.

Liaison between the apartheid regime and other regimes in Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies was improved and intelligence sharing became the established modus operandi. Cooperation with the Portuguese extended into their Angola and Mozambique colonies and surveillance reports were provided to government about the movements of known South African communists such as Ruth First, Hillary Plegg, Ben Turok, V.W. Mkwai, Moses Mabida, Julius Baker

and P. Beyleveldt who were travelling through Portuguese controlled territories.26 The Portuguese assisted the SIS in monitoring MK activities. In 1961 Portuguese Naval Intelligence transmitted an intelligence report to SIS that Ghana was recruiting South Africans for political, military and sabotage training and supplying funds to SouthAfrican anti-government groups.27

Documents photographed at Liliesleaf in one of the out buildings - Police photograph. Ludi claimed that RI was, “instrumental in pin pointing Rivonia through the radio”. 28 This was the radio transmitter linked to Walter Sisulu’s Freedom Day, Radio Freedom broadcast on 26 June 1963. It is important to note that this broadcast did not occur at Liliesleaf although the radio equipment was tested there. Ludi claims that one of his agents was an electrical engineer; he was connected to the SACP transport manager who knew someone who ran a dry cleaning operation and whose vans were used to transport underground operatives around the country. This link to a dry cleaning van is another Trojan horse. Someone connected to the underground structures used a vehicle like this one, and inside the van lurked an RI agent. This also shows that the routines at the farm were already under surveillance. They were understood, mapped and logged; a Trojan horse disguised as an innocuous laundry van was the modus operandi when the knockout blow was delivered.

The agent met the go between at a bus terminus where he was tied up and blindfolded inside the van. Driven to Liliesleaf he was shown the radio and commented, “This is the most antiquated piece

of rubbish I’ve seen in my life.” He couldn’t do anything with it, but the information assisted RI who now knew that somewhere in that area:

"There was a place where things were happening and I believe that after we fed that information to the police that they then started driving … patterns in that area looking for something they thought must be happening there and that’s how they actually found Rivonia, plus of course somebody also gave them information."29

Who gave the police information is a moot point – informants or another process? While the role of the security branch and RI is known, what is not known is the role of the SADF and its electronic warfare capabilities in locating Liliesleaf. Research and development into electronic warfare began in the early 1950s in response to SACP underground radio broadcasts. By the early 1960s their direction-finding technology was on par with the British and Americans.

In about 1955/56, the Radio Section of the engineers’ section of the general post office (GPO) was tasked to assist the SAP to locate the source of Radio Freedom broadcasts that transmitted on short-wave wavelengths. The SACP transmitted on Sunday evenings at 20h00 for 15 minutes. The Radio Act No. 3 of 1952 stipulated that a conviction could only result if the police caught the perpetrators in the act of broadcasting. 30 As the SAP and the Union Defence Force (later the SADF) had no direction-finding capability to comply with this stipulation of the Act they turned to the GPO. The Derdepoort Radio Station based at Hartebeesfontein farm near Pretoria was given the task. Having no direction finding equipment they then developed their own.31

Transmissions were identified as coming from Natal. They then built a mobile direction-finding facility and installed it in GPO vans and undertook the search. After nine months the operation halted without success. During early 1956 the transmissions resurfaced in the Johannesburg/Pretoria area. Each transmission came from a different location thus requiring greater mobility. Derdepoort’s technicians developed man-pack equipment which could be carried while walking. The SAP flying squad drove these operators (known then as chase teams). Three vehicle mounted direction finding units and five man-pack units were deployed. Included in the chase teams were technicians from Derdepoort station. The security branch supported the operation. 32 On Sunday 12 August 1956, they identified 363 Berea Street Muckleneuk, Pretoria and raided the house, seizing the transmitter and other equipment along with a pre-recorded taped broadcast. The four accused were convicted of violating the Radio Act No.3 of 1952, a relatively minor offence, and sentenced to a fine of ₤50 or six months in jail. 33

Following this the engineers’ section acquired more sophisticated equipment to facilitate their direction-finding methods. In 1958, they imported the Adcock System from the USA, the most advanced of its kind at the time. Located at Derdepoort, this static system included an all-round direction finding capability. 34 Cooperation on direction finding operations between the GPO and SAP was not unusual for this era. Britain’s Security Service MI5, used British post office technology in its counter intelligence operations, both in the United Kingdom against Soviet agents and operations, and also during military operations against independence movements in its colonies, such as in Cyprus.35

The role of the SADF and South African Communications Security Agency

In 1960/1961 the SADF established an overarching telecommunication function, the South African Communications Security Agency (SACSA). SACSA fell under the directorate of telecommunications, and its director was accountable to the prime minister at the time, H.F. Verwoerd. SACSA’s duties were enabling secure and un-compromised communications between all government departments. This included all arms of the SADF, the Department of Foreign Affairs, military attaches abroad, and between the SAP and its agents. 36

During 1963, SACSA played a key role in locating and spying on Liliesleaf. On 1 April 1963, Captain Martiens Botha was transferred to defence headquarters Pretoria to work for the chief telecommunications officer. Included in this small team was Captain Mike Venter of the South African Air Force (SAAF) who was proficient in Morse code. One of his duties was monitoring radio transmissions that the authorities deemed as subversive. Venter detected suspicious Morse code messages inside the country and showed them to Botha. Venter’s information was reported to the security branch and to RI. 37

SACSA borrowed a direction-finding vehicle from the post office telecommunications section and pinpointed the location to within a few blocks of where the transmitter was located. This was enabled because, according to Captain Venter, the Morse code transmitter burst its signals more than once from Liliesleaf. SACSA then searched for visibly suspicious equipment such as antennas on properties in the area. Liliesleaf had two lightning conductors next to the main house. 38

SACSA observed and noted all these activities. Mary Russell and her husband lived in the Rivonia Caravan Park directly opposite the Rietfontein Road entrance into Liliesleaf. After the 1963 raid, Russell later shared her observations with her family, saying that, she “knew something was going on across the road”. 39 In 2005, Russell’s nephew, Gavin Olivier, shared this account with the author.

According to Olivier, Russell was an avid birdwatcher and used binoculars to observe the birdlife from her veranda. Prior to the raid, she saw postal workers standing on ladders erected against telephone poles along Rietfontein Road, working on the telephone lines. For Russell, it was odd that they stood atop for long periods of time and used binoculars. Russell recalled what she described as “mysterious bread delivery vans” parked inside the caravan park several times a week for the entire day. Strange, she said, “we don’t have a shop that sells bread in the caravan park.” 40 Yet there they were opposite the driveway into Liliesleaf. Paul Goldreich also recollected men working on telephone cables outside the farm.41

The view of Liliesleaf farm in the valley to the left taken from the caravan park by Mary Russel (photographing a shrike) and the road and telephone lines on which the bakery van operated.

July 1963 was a cold winter, yet shortly before the raid, from at least May 1963, Denis Goldberg recalled there being a single caravan inside the park. Its presence made him feel uneasy.

"There was only one caravan there most of the time, and this area was so far out of Jo’burg, it was deep countryside … And there was this caravan park, which was bare red earth with what I remember as one caravan. A very sleepy police station around the corner. I believe they said they watched the place, this is what I am basing it on … it would have been the obvious thing." 42

The Trojan horse was literally across the road, parked inside a caravan park owned by the Mellis family, who were actively assisting this investigation. There is other evidence of electronic surveillance activity, all intersecting towards July 1963. In 2005 the author interviewed an individual who wished to remain anonymous. This person claimed that in 1963 he had supplied the security branch with RM 401 hearing aid microphones together with long life batteries which lasted about a month. The microphones and their batteries fitted into a human ear, making them ideal for covert listening. These bugs could be disguised and planted anywhere and were small enough to be inserted into a pen and worn by an informant during a conversation; three or four such devices fitted into a matchbox. The microphone and transmitter worked at low frequencies, and the range was as much as 1⁄2 km to a listening station located within a line of sight.

The receiver for these devices was very powerful. The signal did not need to be very strong and the microphone did not require a large opening, a pin hole would suffice, as in a standard hearing aid.

The listening station required a sizable aerial, about one metre in length. It could be erected in a tree; run along telephone wires; concealed inside a roof; or tucked out of sight inside a caravan. It could even masquerade as a car aerial if parked nearby.

If inserted inside a building then transmission distanced would be reduced and to compensate for this, some type of aerial would have to be attached to boost the transmission. An option was a shortwave radio, working at 10 MHz, providing there was a good receiver on the receiving end. If the transmitter was outdoors the range would increase and the only limitations would be caused by background noise. These transmitters picked up sound in an entire room, and the next room as well. The bug could be concealed in a light switch and fitted by an electrician or plumber. It could be hidden beneath a car or anywhere else and camouflaged to resemble any type of contextual object. Lightning or electrical activity did not affect its performance.

Police purchases began with a phone call to check for available stock; followed by a visit from two plainclothes policemen. Payment with was cash and no receipt was required. Prior to the raid, as many as 1 000 units may have been supplied. When news of the Liliesleaf raid broke, the salesperson thought, “So that’s where all our microphones were going! Damn sure in my own mind – bloody hell, so that’s where our microphones went!” 43

Surveyor General map of Rivonia

In 2004 the author uncovered additional tangible evidence of a surveillance operation. In 1961 the surveyor general updated the cadastral maps and the Rivonia area was aerially re-photographed to produce maps in 1962. Each photographic contact sheet covers a vast area and nothing distinguishes a particular property from the next unless the sheets are significantly enlarged. The

next photographic series dates to 1964. The author scanned the sheets depicting Liliesleaf in the 1961 and 1964 mapping process in high resolution. One of these sheets revealed a trace of the SACSA direction finding andelectronic warfare operation. (None of the 1964 photographs reflect any tampering). Three microscopic red dots and a pencil cross (x) emerged when a high resolution electronic scanner was used. Two red dots are on a neighbouring property. One red dot marks the approximate centre of Liliesleaf farm and the pencil cross on the sheet marks the dirt driveway leading into Liliesleaf, directly across the road from the caravan park. 44

Tampering on the surveyor general cadastral map of the Rivonia area to show sophisticated electronic triangulation intelligence and X marks the spot on the Liliesleaf driveway.

Someone involved in this investigation examined this contact sheet and made the markings before returning the sheet assuming that the microscopic tampering would remain invisible. Not only was the SADF proficient in electronic warfare. The technical skills of the SAAF, the second oldest air force in the world, were on par with its international counterparts. In combat operations in Africa, Madagascar and Europe during the Second World War, the SAAF made extensive use of aerial photo reconnaissance. Nor were their skills of electronic warfare neglected in the post-war years.

In 1957, the SAAF acquired the Avro Shackleton MR Mk3 which it used for long range maritime patrolling and naval surveillance operations. 45 Between 1962 and 1964 the SAAF acquired 16 Mirage IIIC fighter aircraft from France, followed by four Mirage RZ fighter reconnaissance

aircraft. 46 In late 1963, SAAF took delivery of the Canberra B (I) Mk 12 heavy bomber and photo reconnaissance aircraft from Britain. It was adding to and upgrading its technological capacity. Consequently, in 1962 to 1963 the only agency with the technical skills capable of identifying targets from aerial photographs of Liliesleaf was the SAAF.47

Thursday 11 July 1963

A meeting on Saturday 6 July 1963 to discuss Operation Mayibuye at Liliesleaf deadlocked. The plan was not approved and it created deep divisions within the Secretariat and amongst members of the SACP’s Central Committee. The plan had to be either approved by the political structures, which did not happen, or be sent back for further work. However, the next part of the problem was a practical one: where could the Secretariat meet and when? The matter had to be speedily resolved, yet the issue of a venue was becoming contentious and downright dangerous.

Denis Goldberg's mugshot after his arrest and one his drawings on the working of a grenade recovered from Liliesleaf farm, evidence used in his trial.

There were a number of people who did not want to return to Liliesleaf. According to Goldberg:

"They had earlier taken the decision not to bring people who were not living underground to the place where others were living in hiding. Too many people had been to Liliesleaf farm. The security risks were great. We urgently needed a different place and the task of buying somewhere new was given to me because I could legally buy property." 48

A number of the senior leaders, such as Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba and Wilton Mkwai no longer stayed at the farm, having moved to Trevallyn, a smallholding near Krugersdorp, recently purchased by Goldberg under a fictitious name and which was to be used solely for accommodating members of the MK high command and those immediately involved in its functioning. 49 Goldberg later wrote that “the last meeting of the High Command at Liliesleaf was one too many”. 50 Goldberg remembered:

"They didn’t have time to arrange a new venue, so we had to come back here, knowing that it was dangerous to come here. The decision had been taken, no more meetings at Rivonia. Yet we had one more, because of the pressure of Rusty’s house arrest."51 Kathrada recalled:

Ahmed Kathrada after his arrest - JHB Fort.

"A number of us started feeling uneasy about the continued use of the Rivonia farm. We were well aware that the need-to-know principle had not applied to Liliesleaf for some time, and that far too many people – one of whom was Bruno Mtolo, a saboteur from Durban and leader of the Natal branch, had visited the farm. But there was no avoiding one final meeting in Rivonia. In the days leading up to this crucial gathering, I became more agitated and afraid. The only person who I could share my views with was Walter Sisulu, whose views coincided with my own."52

As for Bernstein, he was not in favour of holding the meeting there. He had lost faith in Liliesleaf as an uncompromised venue:

"I don’t even remember who convened the meeting. I know I didn’t want to go to it. I was afraid of the place. It was Hepple who persuaded me. [He said] “Okay, you don’t want to go to this place, just this one last time”. Famous last words.53

The next issue was the timing of the meeting. Which day might be appropriate? Thursdays were delivery days. Produce from the butcher and grocer were delivered; dry cleaning collected and dropped off; cars came and went – these goings-on were an established routine. Because these activities had doubled up as a screen for meetings before, Thursday it would be. However, these routines were known and identified, all watched and listened to inside the Trojan horse parked innocently in the caravan park.

Nothing untoward happened during the day except for Bob Hepple’s encounter with an unidentified individual which alludes to a covert investigation.

"On the morning of the 11th July, a man came to my chambers. He was an Indian. I had never met him before. And he said to me, “I have got a message for Cedric from Natalie.” Now I knew that I regularly received letters addressed to me at my chambers. Inside was an envelope sealed from Natalie for Cedric. And I knew these were for the leadership and I would deliver them personally to Liliesleaf Farm. And I wondered what was going on because Cedric was the codename for the centre and Natalie was the code name for the Natal district. And I knew these names on letters would come to my chambers addressed me. I would open them …and would take them over. Who was this guy? I had no knowledge of him. I fobbed him off. I said I don’t know what this is about but I’ll look into it and see. So I realised he was bringing some message. But I didn’t know if he was genuine, he could have been a police spy. And I was deeply suspicious. I feigned ignorance and said I have to go out now and sent him away and said come back to me tomorrow morning. My idea being to make enquiries if anyone knew what this was about. So the result, I was very worried and it was one of the things when I did go there that afternoon that I was worried about. So on my route there I was extremely nervous, I kept thinking maybe I am going to be followed." 54

This encounter unnerved Hepple. According to him there were already suspicions that the CIA had had a hand in Mandela’s capture. For what reason and by whom was this visitor sent? 55 Hepple told Kathrada about his suspicious visitor and Kathrada confirmed that he too had received a garbled message from someone who mentioned Cedric. After ten minutes of exchanging pleasantries, the six took their seats inside the thatched cottage, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Walter Sisulu, Lionel Bernstein, Bob Hepple and Ahmed Kathrada. Their agenda was to discuss the impact of the 90 days arrests and to continue the discussion on Operation Mayibuye.

Walter Sisulu after his arrest - JHB Fort

Bernstein held the Operation Mayibuye document on his lap so that he might refer to it and started his critique. No sooner had he commenced when they observed a dry-cleaning van, bearing the logo Trade Steam Pressers through a rear window driving down the driveway. It drove up and parked next to the house. Bernstein looked out the window and exclaimed. “Oh my God, I saw that van opposite the police station this afternoon!” 56 The Trojan horse was in position. Perfectly timed and synchronised to the exact moment that the meeting started. Certainly, no coincidence. Coordinated by another Trojan horse parked inside the caravan park and listening in. Suddenly the rear doors of the dry-cleaning van opened, disgorging the security branch police with their attack dog. While the raiders encircled the main house, Govan Mbeki snatched the Mayibuye plan from Bernstein and tried to burn it but without matches it was useless. Mbeki then shoved the plan into the stovepipe chimney.

Mbeki, Sisulu and Kathrada leapt through a rear window but were immediately caught. The remaining three hoped to bluff their way out. Detective Kennedy opened the door and rushed inside. “Stay where you are. You’re all under arrest!” 57

Arthur Goldreich after his arrest - JHB Fort

The three were then escorted outside. Hepple recalled that by this stage the place was piling up with police and dogs. This suggests that the dry cleaner’s van was the initial probe – the Trojan horse. Once it had breached the gates and parked inside, its occupants would disgorge to secure the buildings while the main body, already in position on Rietfontein Road would then swoop in and overwhelm the farm, while securing the perimeter.

Earlier, in the lounge, Goldberg looked up to see Lt Van Wyk swing open the veranda door and step inside, only metres away from where he sat. Goldberg leapt from his chair, grabbed his coat which contained his notes about weapons manufacture and manufacturing quotations which he had received – and made a desperate dash to reach a toilet to flush them away. Intercepted by another policeman entering through the kitchen he was overpowered in the entrance hallway and arrested. “It was a disconcerting moment. Actually what I thought was, oh shit, we’ve been caught." 58

Govan Mbeki after his arrest - JHB Fort

The suspects and farm labourers were handcuffed inside the dry cleaner’s van. At about 17h50 Arthur Goldreich drove down Rietfontein Road in his Citroen. 59 When he drew level with the entrance gate he noticed two men wearing the hallmark raincoats of plain clothes policemen, standing beneath a tree in the caravan park, talking to each other. It wasn’t raining and they weren’t relieving themselves.

"And my first thought was special branch, and my second thought was I am late. I can’t just drive by. Then the third thought of mine was how come the guy who’s supposed to be guarding the gate is not there … and I came down the driveway, there were trees on either side and from behind the trees came some police and some dogs. And they jumped on the motor car, and the guy with a pistol in his hand put the pistol to my head, and I heard someone shout, “moenie skiet nie!” So I switched off the engine and rolled down and came in towards the garage." 60

Arthur’s car ground to a halt. He got out, hands raised above his head. 61 At around 18h00 after each captive had been shown the contents of the outbuildings, Bernstein and Hepple joined Mbeki inside the laundry van. Goldberg was then brought out of the house, four policemen climbed into the van and the Trojan horse drove them off. Having breached the gates of the safe house the Trojan horse left with its captives handcuffed inside, facing the horrors ahead, fearing the worst, potentially a death sentence. Passing the solitary caravan parked in the red dirt of the park. Into the dark. The Rivonia Trial followed.

Arthur Goldreich, looking very worried and Detective Warrant Officer Carel Dirker. By law Goldreich had to be made witness to the search.

Colonels Van den Bergh and Klindt arrived after sunset. Arthur Goldreich was taken into the main bedroom for a one-on-one monologue delivered by Van den Bergh. Among other things Van den Bergh said:

“The trouble with you, Goldreich, and the trouble with all of you, is you’re amateurs. You always have and you always will underestimate your enemy. And that’s why you’re in the shit." 62

Colonel H.J. Van den Bergh

Liliesleaf and all that was linked to it was captured. The Rivonia Trial followed and after that more arrests and trials until the internal networks were neutralised. A blow most certainly, yet not one which was terminal to the forces of liberation. In the 53 years since the raid the focus on what led to the raid has always been on the security branch. These accounts claim that the SAP, assisted by informants from within the movement, were able to raid Liliesleaf and were lucky to have achieved the success that they did. Kathrada later wrote that the police had the farm under surveillance for some hours before the raid. However, according to him the no one had ever found out the truth:

“ … every version that has been bandied about over the years is based on nothing more that speculation." 63

The author concurs with Kathrada’s statement. Starting with Strydom in 1965 and weaving through into the recent past with Frankel, popular notion has it that an informant or informants “gave up” the farm to the security branch and fed their information to Lt. Van Wyk who, on receiving it, literally sprung the raid the following day. In a massive twist of fate and coincidence, good luck for some and horrific luck for others, in a single swoop the raid netted prominent leaders connected with MK, the ANC and SACP, together with a haul of documentary and other evidence. This smashed the leaders of organised resistance to the apartheid regime in one massive lucky break, all a result of informants. The security branch pulled it off all on their own. So, the story goes. This article demonstrates that to be a fallacy.

By means of an inter-agency investigation into Liliesleaf, this paper outlines some of the complex ways in which the combined security services used a range of techniques and tactics in an attempt to destroy armed opposition to apartheid. One agency was the security branch; its investigations commenced weeks after Nelson Mandela was captured, and later in 1963, the RI and the SADF joined the probe, which led eventually to an operation culminating in the raid. The hypothesis is that information in Nelson Mandela’s notebook and other sources enabled the security branch to identify Liliesleaf. Evidence of the investigation by the security branch soon after Mandela’s arrest is seen in the actions of the first Trojan horse, a young boy, George Mellis, who was able to observe events from within. He was the perfect spy; he passed on information to the Rivonia police station; no one gave him so much as a second glance. However, he would have been carefully handled both by his parents and the security branch, given that he was a minor. Additional evidence of a security branch investigation in 1962, assisted by the Rivonia police station, was the matter of holding back a summons to be served on Goldreich. By December 1962 a determined investigation was underway, so much so that the police sanitised the farm and there were instructions that no policemen were to enter the property.

Mellis’s parents owned the caravan park which offered an ideal position from which to conduct surveillance. A caravan was the second Trojan horse, innocuous on the outside yet filled with electronic equipment, it listened into conversations held at Liliesleaf via hearing devices and telephone line interceptions. Operated by SACSA the timing of the raid could be carefully calculated, which indeed it was. In position during the weeks leading up to the raid, they also detected the Radio Freedom transmitter being tested when it was switched on. The predictably of activities on a Thursday were all observed and calculated. This Trojan horse in turn linked to other SADF technologies of direction finding, electronic warfare and aerial reconnaissance. Evidence of this was

provided by those who saw the “postal workers” equipped with binoculars working on the telephone lines. Postal vans and bread delivery vans were seen parked in the caravan park. They were being covertly used by the SACSA. The contact sheets in the surveyor general’s office bear evidence of aerial target identification and the only organisation with the requisite skills to undertake this task, was the SAAF.

The final deception was the third Trojan horse, a laundry and dry cleaning van. Prior to the raid at least one RI spy had accessed the premises in a similar van, so the tactic of using a laundry van to breach the safe house was the ideal choice. Like the mythological Trojan horse which breached the gates of Troy, it was driven inside the farm to disgorge the policemen and their dogs.

In conclusion this paper demonstrates that there was far more to the raid than what has been written about it since that fateful day. It was not merely a police strike. Key roles were played by the SAAF and electronic surveillance was carried out by the SACSA in the state’s offensive against MK. This challenges the commonly held view that the military was not involved in the counter-insurgency operations of 1962 1964. In conventional accounts of the period, the South African military only became involved in counter insurgency when P.W. Botha gained political ascendancy and together with General Magnus Malan, made the notion of Total Onslaught the apartheid government’s strategic doctrine. This paper shows just how heavily involved the military and the security agencies were against MK soon after its formation in 1961.

Written and

Researched

by Dr. Garth Conan Benneyworth

References

Bernstein, L., Memory against Forgetting (Penguin, London, 1999).Dingake, M., Better to Die on One’s Feet (South African History Online, Cape Town, 2015).

Ellis, S., External Mission: The ANC in Exile (Johnathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2012).

Frankel, G., Rivonia’s Children (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1999).

Goldberg, D., The Mission: A Life for Freedom in South Africa (STE Publishers, Johannesburg, 2010),

Hepple, B., Young Man with the Red Tie: A Memoir of Mandela and the Failed Revolution: 19601963 Jacana Media, Johannesburg, 2013).

Kathrada, A., Memoirs (Zebra Press, Paarl, 2004).

Mandela, N.R., Long Walk to Freedom (Abacus, London, 1994).

SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa Volume 1 (1960-1970) (Zebra Press, Cape

Town, 2004).

Smith, D.J., Young Mandela (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2010).

Strydom, L., Rivonia Unmasked (Voortrekkerpers, Johannesburg, 1965).

Volker, W., Army Signals in South Africa: The Story of the South African Corps of Signals and its Antecedents (Veritas Books, Pretoria, 2010).

Volker, W., Signal Units of the South African Corps of Signals and related Services (Veritas Books, Pretoria, 2010).

Wright, P., Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (Heinemann, Melbourne, 1987).

Footnotes

1. D. Goldberg, The Mission: A Life for Freedom in South Africa (STE Publishers, Johannesburg, 2010), p 99. ↩︎

2. Liliesleaf Archives, Rivonia (hereafter LL), INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, conducted by G. Benneyworth, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎

3. LL, INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎

4. L. Bernstein, Memory against Forgetting (Penguin, London, 1999), p 249. ↩︎

5. LL, INT 4, Interview with Ahmed Kathrada, conducted by G. Benneyworth, Liliesleaf, 2005. ↩︎

6. Much of the literature (for example Ellis), has it that Arthur Goldreich was the owner of Liliesleaf farm. See S. Ellis, External Mission the ANC in Exile (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2012), p 33. Goldreich was the nominal tenant who rented the property from Navian Ltd. The lease was drawn up by R Sepel. See LL, G. Benneyworth of Site

Solutions© “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered – Rivonia Recovered” (All Rights Reserved, Site SolutionsTM), pp 40–41. ↩︎

7. LL, INT 6, LOT 2 (a-k), Interview with Vivien Ezra, conducted by G. Benneyworth, Liliesleaf, 2006; LL, G. Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, p 137. ↩︎

8. N.R. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (Abacus, London, 1994), pp 372–373 ↩︎

9. Bernstein, Memory against Forgetting, p 254. ↩︎

10.A. Kathrada, Memoirs (Zebra Press, Paarl, 2004), p 156 ↩︎

11.LL, INT 3, LOT 4, Notes 1, Interview with Bob Hepple, conducted by G. Benneyworth, Cambridge, 2005. ↩︎

12.SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1 (1960–1970) (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2004), p 142. ↩︎

13.LL, INT 2, Interview with Ahmed Kathrada, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎

14.L. Strydom, Rivonia Unmasked (Voortrekkerpers, Johannesburg, 1965), pp 17–19. ↩︎

15.G. Frankel, Rivonia’s Children (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1999), p 29. ↩︎

16.Frankel, Rivonia’s Children, p 25. ↩︎

17.D.J. Smith, Young Mandela (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2010), p 276. ↩︎

18.M. Dingake, Better to Die on One’s Feet (South African History Online, Cape Town, 2015), pp 67–69. ↩︎

19.LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, pp 142–143. ↩︎

20.National Archives of South Africa (hereafter NASA), NAN 52, Box 8, MS 385.23, George Mellis, Statement, 5 August 1963. ↩︎

21.NASA, NAN 52, Box 8, Vol. MS. 385.23, George Mellis, Statement, 5 August 1963. ↩︎

22.NASA, NAN 52, Box 8, MS 385.23, Sgt Christiaan Fourie, Station Commander Rivonia, Statement, 23 September 1963. ↩︎

23.LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, Appendix C, Interview with Gerhard Ludi. ↩︎

24.LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, Appendix C, Interview with Gerhard Ludi. ↩︎

25.LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, Appendix C, Interview with Gerhard Ludi. ↩︎

26.NASA, BLM, Box 22, Vol. 2, File 442. ↩︎

27.National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter NAUK), DO 195, 2, SECRET, “Ghana’s Relations with the Union of SA”, 29 July 1960–1962. ↩︎

28.LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, Appendix C, Interview with Gerhard Ludi. ↩︎

29.LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, Appendix C, Interview with Gerhard Ludi. ↩︎

30.W. Volker, Army Signals in South Africa: The Story of the South African Corps of Signals and its Antecedents (Veritas Books, Pretoria, 2010), pp 226–227. ↩︎

31.Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 227. ↩︎

32.Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 227. ↩︎

33.Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 228. ↩︎

34.Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 229. ↩︎

35.P. Wright, Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer, (Heinemann, Melbourne, 1987), p 154. ↩︎

36.W. Volker, Signal Units of the South African Corps of Signals and Related Services (Veritas Books, Pretoria, 2010), p 534. ↩︎

37.Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 534. ↩︎

38.Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 534. ↩︎

39.Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 534. ↩︎

40.Gavin Olivier, discussions with the author, 2005 and 2006; and LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, pp 144–145. ↩︎

41.Paul Goldreich, email to author, 11 March 2007. ↩︎

42.LL, INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎

43.Anonymous source. ↩︎

44.Department of Land Affairs, Surveyor General, Mowbray, Cape Town South Africa, copy of original contact sheets, 1961–1964, as obtained in 2004. ↩︎

45.This article is available on the website of the contemporary South African Air Force at http://www.saairforce.co.za/the-airforce/aircraft/60/shackleton-mr-3 Accessed 12 December 2016. ↩︎

46.This website article focuses on Dassault Mirage jet aircraft for Microsoft Flight Simulator and Combat Flight Simulator. At http://www.mirage4fs.com/slides15.html Accessed 12 December 2016. ↩︎

47.See http://www.saairforce.co.za/the-airforce/aircraft/28/canberra-bi12 Accessed 12 December 2016. ↩︎

48.Goldberg, The Mission, pp 109–110. ↩︎

49.LL, INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎

50.Goldberg, The Mission, p 109. ↩︎

51.LL, INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎

52.Kathrada, Memoirs, p 156. ↩︎

53.SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1 (1960-1970), p 142. ↩︎

54.LL, INT 3, LOT 4, Notes 1, Interview with Bob Hepple, Cambridge, 2005. ↩︎

55.B, Hepple, Young Man with the Red Tie: A Memoir of Mandela and the Failed Revolution, 1960–1963, at https://www.amazon.com/Young-Man-Red-Tie-Revolution-ebook/dp/ B00EZM7PUW/ref=mt_kindle?_encoding=UTF8&me Accessed 24 March 2017. ↩︎

56.LL, INT 3, LOT 4, Notes 1, Interview with Bob Hepple, Cambridge, 2005 ↩︎

57.LL, INT 3, LOT 4, Notes 1, Interview with Bob Hepple, Cambridge, 2005. ↩︎

58.LL, INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎

59.NASA, NAN 52, Box 8, MS 385.23, Detective Warrant Officer C.J. Dirker, Statement, 12 August 1963. ↩︎

60.LL, INT 2, Interview with Arthur Goldreich, conducted by G. Benneyworth, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎

61.LL, INT 2, Interview with Arthur Goldreich, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎

62.LL, INT 2, Interview with Arthur Goldreich, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎

63.Kathrada, Memoirs, p 161. ↩︎

• DR. GARTH CONAN BENNEYWORTH MA (HERITAGE STUDIES), PHD (HISTORY)

Garth Benneyworth is a historian on Southern Africa’s military history within the global context. His work is internationally recognised for contributing to a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of conflict, and its impact on history and society

He pioneered the first archaeological excavations on the South African War (18991902) black concentration camps, after identifying 13 historical terrains across the country. Garth obtained his first degree, a MA from the University of the Witwatersrand in 2002 and later a PhD from the University of the Western Cape (2017). His consultancy curated and built museum exhibitions including the Nelson Mandela National Museum. Chief Albert Luthuli Museum, Liliesleaf Museum, the Magersfontein Battlefield Museum, and Voortrekker Monument, amongst others.

Two recent books are: WORK OR STARVE, Black concentration camps and forced labour camps in South Africa, 1901-1902; and THE BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN Victory and defeat on the South African veld, 10-12 December 1899.

Since 2017, Garth has been Chairperson of Council for the War Museum of the Boer Republics. In 2014, he led the development of Heritage Studies at Sol Plaatje University and is a Senior Research Associate at the University of Johannesburg. His passions include battlefield research, military history, archaeology, writing and travelling to new and varied destinations.

Rivonia: ‘n Uittreksel uit:

AGENTE EN KONTRAKAGENTE

Henning van Aswegen

Sien Nongqai Vol 15 No 5 vir die volledige artikel.

“Sowat drie maande voordat die Veiligheidstak op Liliesleaf toegeslaan het, ontvang die polisiekantoor op Rivonia hul eerste leidraad met ’n telefoonoproep van ’n parate 76-jarige oud-speurder, Paul Maré. Maré, wat in 1910 by die SAP aangesluit het en in 1938 afgetree het, woon op die aangrensende kleinhoewe en sy huis op ’n heuweltjie bied ’n goeie waarnemingspunt op sy bure se luukse huis. Op 18 April 1963 blaas saboteurs ’n spoorweg-gereedskapstooropdie treinspoortussenBooysens en New Canada in Johannesburg op, maar vyf van die agt word summier deur die SAP in hegtenis geneem. Drie van die saboteurs ontsnap in ’n paneelwa en stop kort na die ontploffing by ’n ou, ongebruikte waterput langs die teerpad wat by Paul Maré se plaashuis verbyloop. Die gesoute oud-speurder het die spulletjie só sit en kyk en besluit dat hul optrede hoogs verdag is en toe die Rivonia-polisie geskakel. Die paneelwa met sy drie Indiër-passasiers is onmiddellik weer fort en die polisie kon by nadere ondersoek niks in die waterput kry nie.

Twee weke na hierdie voorval blaf Paul Maré se honde hom om twee-uur die nag wakker en vanuit sy sitkamervenster sien hy ’n motor wat met ligte aan in die teerpad naby sy huis parkeer. Die hoek waarteen die motor geparkeer was, sowel as etlike ouens wat in die hoofligte staan en arms swaai, het Maré laat besef dat alles nie pluis was nie. Dit het vir Maré gelyk of die armswaaiers die een of

ander teken terugontvang het en almal het in die motor gespring om verder met die pad af na Liliesleaf te ry.

Die derde leidraad was afkomstig van ’n swart informant wat deur kapt. Jack van Heerden gewerf is en inligting oor die ANC/SAKP se terreurveldtog aan die Veiligheidstak deurgegee het. Die informant bewys sy betroubaarheid deur vooraf waarskuwings en inligting te voorsien wat waar bewys word en tot die arrestasie van drie van die Booysens-New Canada-bomplanters lei. Van Heerdenseinformantrapporteerop2 Julie1963dathyweet waarRadioFreedomseondergrondse radiostasie is en waar Walter Sisulu skuil, waarop Van Heerden die inligting aan lt. Willem (W.P.J.) van Wyk, die offisier in beheer van die sabotasie-ondersoekafdeling van die Veiligheidstak in Johannesburg, stuur. Van Wyk is ’n paar interessante byname deur sy kollegas om die nek gehang; eers ”Biesiesvlei” van Wyk, en later “Rivonia” van Wyk. Die informant het selfs nog verder gegaan. Hy het beweer dat hy geweet het waar die ondergrondse hoofkwartier van die ANC en die Kommunistiese Party was. Gerard Ludi, RI se infiltrasie-agent in die SAKP, sê in sy boek, The Communistisation of the ANC, dat hierdie informant ’n kontrakteur was wat werk aan die plaashuis op die Liliesleaf-kleinhoewe gedoen het. Lt. Van Wyk het dadelik met sy direkte bevelvoerder, kol. George Klindt, gekonsulteer en nadat ook kol. Hendrik van den Bergh genader is, is besluit dat lt. Van Wyk hierdie derde wenk met omsigtigheid moes hanteer. Van Wyk het tereg vermoed dat die plaas waarvan die informant gepraat het, die ondergrondse hoofkwartier van MK was, van waar opdragte uitgereik is vir die sabotasiedade en terreurveldtog van die ANC/SAKP.

Daar was egter ’n probleem met die informant se leidraad, omdat hy gerapporteer het dat Walter Sisulu sy Radio Freedom-uitsendings vanaf ’n plaas in Rivonia doen en dat hy daar saam met ’n “caretaker” bly. Die informant kon nie Liliesleaf se lokaliteit presies identifiseer nie, omdat hy net een keer daar was. Hy het nie geweet dat die “caretaker” eintlik Arthur Goldreich was, wat die luukse huis by Michael Harmel gehuur het nie. Goldreich het saam met sy vrou en twee jong kinders in die huis gewoon, terwyl die res van die huis en buitegeboue deur die ANC/SAKP as hoofkwartier van hul georganiseerde subversie gebruik is. Die informant het wel onthou dat daar bottelproppies op die hek van die kleinhoewe geplak was om saans die skyn van motorligte te weerkaats en dat van die bottelproppies makeer het. Weke lank het hierdie informant saam met lt. Van Wyk en sers. Kleingeld in die Rivonia-omgewing rondgery op soek na die Liliesleaf-kleinhoewe en die muur met die bottelproppies.

Die vierde leidraad het van die nuwe Amerikaanse eienaar van ’n huis met ’n tuinwoonstel in Parktown, Johannesburg gekom. Die woonstel is deur Arthur Goldreich gehuur voordat hy en sy gesin na Liliesleaf in Rivonia verhuis het. Die dame het met die skoonmaak van die tuinwoonstel op ’n klomp ou kommunistiese tydskrifte en radio-onderdele afgekom en terstond die polisie in kennis gestel. Die Veiligheidstak het onmiddellik twee ondersoekbeamptes vanaf The Grays-polisiestasie

na die perseel gestuur. Goldreich se vingerafdrukke is op die radio-onderdele gevind en hy is as die huurder geïdentifiseer. ’n Lasbrief vir Goldreich se inhegtenisname is uitgereik en sy foto is aan SAP-lede gesirkuleer. Die probleem was die ouderdom van die foto, want Goldreich het op hierdie foto sonder sy kunstenaars-bokbaardjie verskyn wat later sy uitkenning by Rivonia bemoeilik.

Die Veiligheidspolisie het in Rivonia van die ANC/SAKP se planne in die wiele gery en sodoende verhoed dat dit voortgaan deur toe te slaan op die kommunistiese hoofkwartier op ’n kleinhoewe net buite Johannesburg. Op bevel van die Sentrale Komitee van die SAKP het die kommunis Michael Harmel die kleinhoewe Liliesleaf, in die Rivonia-woongebied van Johannesburg, onder die vals naam van Jacobson aangekoop. Die prokureur Harold Wolpe en sy vrou Ann-Marie, mede-SAKPlede, het die papierwerk en oordragdokumente vir die vals transaksie voorberei en by die Johannesburgse Aktekantoor ingedien. Liliesleaf het as die ondergrondse hoofkwartier van die Kommunistiese Party en die opperbevel van MK in Suid-Afrika gedien en is spesifiek met die doel van subversie aangekoop. Vandag is die 11,33 hektaar Liliesleaf maklik bereikbaar, maar in 1962 was die gebied tussen Johannesburg en Pretoria meer afgeleë en kon dit as verlate graslande beskryf word. Boonop was die luukse opstal agter bome, bosse en ’n plantasie versteek, met dennebome aan beide kante van die lang oprit na die huis en buitegeboue. Lt. Van Wyk en sy manne het blou oorpakke aangetrek, hulself en twee paneelwaens as bou-kontrakteurs vermom, maar verskeie kere by die perseel verbygery sonder om te besef dat die verlate huis die plek is waarna hulle soek. Die informant kon Liliesleaf eers op 3 Julie 1963 behoorlik identifiseer en daarmee was RI en die Veiligheidstak oortuig dat hulle die regte plek beet het. Lt Van Wyk, sy bevelvoerder kol George Klindt, Mike Geldenhuys en die hoof van die Veiligheidstak, lt.- kol. Van den Bergh, het saam besluit om die Liliesleaf-plaashuis eers onder waarneming te plaas – vir ’n lang en senutergende agt dae”

KLOPJAG OP RIVONIA

So onthou luit-genl A van H Beukes:

Brig. Willem (Biesiesvlei) later (Rivonia) van Wyk se “misstap”

Lt.kol. Biesiesvlei van Wyk (foto), destyds my afdelingsbevelvoerder, het aan my bevestig dat Lang-Hendrik van den Bergh baie daarop gesteld was om opspraakwekkende inligting aan die media te openbaar.

Dit was bekend dat Van den Bergh ‘n klein groepie lojale joernaliste oor ‘n tydperk geïdentifiseer het wat altyd bereid was om sy persverklarings te publiseer. So het hy sy statuur, nasionaal en internasionaal, as knap veiligheidsman en spioenmeester uitgebou.

Tydens die klopjag op die Rivonia-landgoed het die destydse lt. Van Wyk en sy span ondersoekbeamptes, waaronder speursers. Carel Dirker, die landgoed deeglik deursoek met inbegrip van verskeie buitegeboue waarin verskeie van die High Command-lede fisies tuisgegaan het.

Van Wyk het die toneel sporadies verlaat om sy afdelingsbevelvoerder, lt.kol. Tiny Venter, vanaf die naaste telefoon in te lig met die vaste geloof dat Van den Bergh dadelik deeglik ingelig sou word.

Van den Bergh is van die basiese feite ingelig. Die polisie was egter nie bewus van die geweldige aard en omvang van hul sukses met betrekking tot Operasie Mayibuye nie. Van Wyk en sy span ondersoekbeamptes het intussen die toneel deeglik gefynkam en bewysstukke op versteekte plekke ontdek en aangeteken. Hierdie modusoperandi was van wesenlike belang tydens die latere verhoor van Mandela en sy genote.

Intussen het van die lede van die SAKP/ANC-opperbevel die media in kennis gestel waarna die media op die Lilliesleaf-landgoed in Rivonia toegesak het. Van den Bergh weet intussen slegs van die minder opspraakwekkende feite. Hieroor het hy en Van Wyk swaarde gekruis. Van Wyk, wie ná die klopjag as Rivonia van Wyk herdoop is, was ‘n briljante en skrander speurder. Hy het jare later teenoor my genoem dat die Rivonia-saak hom ernstig benadeel het en daarom is sy bevordering na die rang van generaal nooit gunstig oorweeg nie.

1963: KLOPJAG TE RIVONIA

HBH

Gedurende Julie-1964 vind ons uitpaseringsparade plaas. In die kollege lees ek elke dag die koerante en lees van die sogenaamde “Rivonia-verhoor” wat in die paleis van justisie verhoor word. Ek oordink alles en dink daar lê vir ons in die algemeen en vir die SA Polisie in die besonder, moeilike dae voor. (Gedurende

1960 het ek die Pondolandse-opstand as ooggetuie van die SA Polisie se optrede eerstehands ervaar.) Veral wat ons gehoor en gelees oor Uhuru en mnr Harold MacMillan se befaamde “Winds of Change”-toespraak was benoude leesstof Ek kan nog as kind, die berig in die Daily News onthou. Neem kennis van die volgende aanhalings:

“The wind of change is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. …/…

As a fellow member of the Commonwealth it is our earnest desire to give South Africa our support and encouragement, but I hope you won't mind my saying frankly that there are some aspects of your policies which make it impossible for us to do this without being false to our own deep convictions about the political destinies of free men to which in our own territories we are trying to give effect.” (Bron https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_of_Change_(speech))

Van kleintyd het ek baie gelees en ek was verstom dat dr Verwoerd nié behoorlik kennis geneem het van die nuwe wêreldorde wat na 1945 internasionaal tot stand gekom het nie (Ek dink ons het begin regmaak vir “skiet”, nie vir “skik” nie.) Dit is eers adv Vorster, lt-genl Keevy, lt-kol Van den Bergh en maj Mike Geldenhuys van RI wat ‘n nuwe wending ingeslaan het van dialoog met Afrika. (Die eerste drie genoemdes het saam vakansie by die polisie se rusoord, Port Edward, vakansie gehou en strategieë bespreek. Volgens een van my kollegas (brig JA du Preez) moet die rol van die kommissaris, lt-genl JM Keevy, nie buite rekening gelaat word nie. Hy het Republikeinse Intelligensiediens (RI) tot stand laat kom. (Let op die euforie – ons het ‘n eie republiek gekry in 1961.)

Gedurende 1970 word ek ‘n lid van die veiligheidstak en gaan gedurende Junie/Julie 1970 op ‘n veiligheidskursus. Ons word voorgelig oor ANC en Rivonia. Maj “Rivonia” van Wyk lewer sy weergawe van die gebeure te Rivonia en AO Dirker spreek ons toe oor die hantering en getuieniswaarde van dokumente in strafsake.

In die vroeë 1970’s is ek na die Raad op Atoomkrag gesekondeer en by die Uraanverrykingskorporasie (Ukor) geplaas. Hier is my eweknie lt-kol WPJ van Wyk. Hy is ‘n man wat lekker onderhoudend kon gesels en hy was nie bang om oor geheime sake te praat nie. Ek het hom dikwels op kantoor besoek en lekker met hom gesels. Hy het my weer sy weergawe van die

Klopjag op Rivonia gegee met geen vermelding van die ander getuies, informante of bronne vertel nie. Net die storie oor hoe hulle na die plek gesoek en later gevind het.

Gedurende 2013 raak ek, deur die SAPS-museum, betrokke by die maak van ‘n film oor mnr Mandela se handgeweer: Mandela’s Gun. Hier ek het vir die eerste keer nuwe stories oor die klopjag gehoor. Ek was met die filmspan dwarsdeur die land en het ook Ethiopië besoek waar mnr Mandela opgelei is. Vir ‘n geskiedkundige was dit ‘n wonderlike ervaring. (Spesiale Nongqai Vol 10 No 1A).

Later kom ek in aanraking met die seun van sers P van den Bergh wat my meedeel dat sy Vader betrokke was by die klopjag op Rivonia en dat sy Vader die jonger broer is van genl HJ van den Bergh. Ek publiseer ‘n spesiale uitgawe oor die Honde-eenheid van Johannesburg wat die eerste eenheid, in die land was, om met ‘n patrolliehond-eenheid te spog. Die detail oor Rivonia-klopjag was maar skraps gewees. (Spesiale Nongqai Vol 11 No 12B)

Later kom artikels van dr Benneyworth en Henning van Aswegen aan die lig – ons publiseer die artikels wat ook nuwe inligting bevat. Dit noop my om weer in my argief te krap en te soek wat my kollega, brig JA du Preez, self oor die Rivonia-klopjag rapporteer.

RIVONIA 11 JULIE 1963 – ‘NTOEVAL

(Wyle) Brig JA du Preez (Destyds adjunkhoof van die veiligheidstak)

Kort nadat die ANC/SAKP-alliansie die bestaan van hulle nuutgestigte militêre vleuel, Umkhonto We Sizwe, teen die einde van 1961 aangekondig het, het die veiligheidstak enkele ongestaafde inligting oor die sogenaamde “High Command” of “General Command” bekom. Die aard, samestelling en bevelstruktuur was nooit volkome duidelik nie. Name is genoem maar dit het later geblyk nie absoluut juis te gewees het nie.

Gedurende die laaste dae van Desember 1961 het ‘n agent van die veiligheidstak, Wes-Kaap, inligting verskaf wat op die geheime hoofkantoor van Umkhonto we Sizwe aan die buitewyke van Johannesburg gedui het. ‘n Soektog na die hoofkantoor, veral in die omgewing van “Uncle Charlie”, suid van Johannesburg het niks opgelewer nie. Teen die eerste weke van 1963 het hardnekkige gerugte weer op die bestaan van ‘n geheime hoofkantoor gedui. ‘n Agent uit Kaapstad is na Johannesburg gebring, weer eens sonder sukses. Op 26 April 1963 het genl. (toe lt.kol.) H.J. van den Berg op ’n verslag van dieselfde bron geskryf dat die bron onbetroubaar bevind is en dat die hele aangeleentheid omtrent die sogenaamde geheime hoofkwartier as ongegrond geag moet

word. Die aangeleentheid het nie verder aandag geniet nie. Teen die einde van 1961 en die begin van 1963 het die veiligheidstak oor oorweldigende inligting beskik dat kwekeling-guerrillas die land langs geheime roetes verlaat om militêre opleiding in die buiteland te ondergaan.

Op 1 en 3 Maart 1963 het die destydse Suid-Rhodesiese immigrasiebeamptes 37 opgeleide terroriste wat vroeër op die grens met Noord-Rhodesië onderskep is, by Beitbrug aan personeel van die veiligheidstak oorhandig. Uit hierdie groep is waardevolle inligting in verband met die beweging van kwekeling-terroriste en die roetes wat hulle gebruik, ingewin.

Gedurende die nag van 25 Maart 1963 het maj. Fred van Niekerk, koördineerder van ondersoeke in Transvaal, hom met sy manskappe in die omgewing van groot Marico bevind, wagtende op ‘n groep ANC-ondersteuners wat uit die omgewing van die Witwatersrand in kombi’s onderweg na Botswana en verder noordwaarts vir militêre opleiding was.

In daardie stadium het die vertrek van persone uit die Republiek na Botswana wat nie binne twaalf maande verder wou gaan nie, nie ‘n reisdokument vereis nie. Militêre opleiding in die buiteland was ook nog nie strafbaar nie. Toe een van die manskappe van die majoor wou weet wat ‘n moontlike aanklagte teen die groep, wat ingewag is, kon wees, het hy op kenmerkende besadigde manier en na aanleiding van ‘n bekende leeu-storie geantwoord. “Daar moet ‘n boom wees”. Hierdie opmerking het die ore van genl. H.J. van den Bergh bereik en sou by probleemoplossings deel van sy filosofie word.

Die inligting oor die groep was nie verkeerd nie en 57 swart passasiers is uit die kombi’s gehaal. 56 het verduidelik dat hulle na Francistown vir ‘n sokkerwedstryd onderweg was. Die 57ste passasier het gesê dat hy as “spectator” die groep vergesel.

Uit die ondervraging van hierdie groep is waardevolle inligting bekom in verband met die ANC/SAKP strukture wat met die gewapende stryd gemoeid was. ‘n Landwye klopjag genoem “operasie twee ure in die môre” is georganiseer. Die klopjag het talle aanhoudings tot gevolg gehad. Enkele belhamels, onder andere Ronnie Kasrils van Durban het die net ontduik en het die land uitgevlug. Onder hierdie groep was ‘n vertroueling van Winnie Mandela en een van die organiseerders om voornemende vryheidsvegters uit die land uit te neem. Hy is in Johannesburg aangekla maar sy verdediging het in die hof aangevoer dat hy een van ‘n identiese tweeling is en die man wat waarskynlik vir hierdie misdrywe verantwoordelik was, nie in die beskuldigde bank is nie. Hy is vrygespreek en ontslaan. Teen die einde van Junie 1993 is dieselfde persoon op nuwe inligting ingevolge die 90-dae klousule vir ondervraging aangehou. Kort na sy aanhouding het hy uit die plek van sy aanhouding vir om ‘n onderhoud met die ondersoeker van die vorige saak gevra. In die afwesigheid van die betrokke beampte het lt. J.P. van Wyk, voorheen bekend as Biesiesvlei Van Wyk, waarna hierdie saak verdoop is tot Rivonia van Wyk, aangebied om as plaasvervanger op te

tree. Die aangehoudene se aanbod was eenvoudig, Walter Sisulu, wat op R6 000 borg uit was en die borg en gunste van die staat verbeur het, het ondergronds geopereer. Sy skuilplek sal teen ‘n vergoeding van R6 000 verraai word die Staat kon niks verloor nie, aldus die aangehoudene.

Aanvanklik is gemeen dat die eis te groot is maar na beraadslaging met hoofkantoor is besluit om die aanbod te aanvaar. Volgens die bron moes die skuilplek van Sisulu en ook die hoofkantoor van die ANC/SAKP iewers in die noordelike voorstede van Johannesburg wees. (Rivonia). Om agterdog uit te skakel moes gedurende die nag gesoek word. Van Wyk, sy helpers en die bron het vir nagte die omgewing van Rivonia gefynkam, maar te vergeefs. Die man kon net nie meer die plek vind nie.

Daar is gesoek na ‘n padteken met die woord Rivonia op. Keer op keer is daar verby die teken waarvan die eerste twee letters ontbreek het, dus “_ _ vonia”, gery. Na meer as nog ‘n week se soekery sou nog ‘n laaste poging aangewend word.

Onbewustelik is die omgewing die nag van 9 en 10 Julie van ‘n ander kant af genader. Die bron het skielik die omgewing erken en Rivonia het in die duister voor Van Wyk en sy helpers gelê, letterlik en figuurlik in die duister want niemand het kon droom wat daar ontdek kon word nie.

Van Wyk het hom gehaas om aan sy bevelvoerder van die Witwatersrand, kol. George Klindt, bekend te maak. Na verdere beraadslaging met hoofkantoor is daar ondeurdag en oorhaastig beplan om die landgoed, Lilliesleaf Farm, Rivonia, gedurende die aand van 11 Julie 1963 te bestorm.

Ondeurdag! Niemand het geweet wat ‘n ondersoekspan op die landgoed kon aantref nie. Die bron het gesê hy weet waar Sisulu hom bevind. Sy skuilplek was in die ANC/SAKP se hoofkantoor op Lilliesleaf Farm, maar wat het dit beteken? Wie en wat sou nog gevind kon word? Was Sisulu of enigeen van die vername leiers van die opstand bewegings daardie aand op die landgoed. Hoe goed sou die terrein beskerm wees? Sê nou maar Van Wyk en sy kollegas het hulle in masjiengeweervuur vasgeloop? Die besluit om met ‘n dosyn of wat man toe te slaan was voorwaar ‘n risiko. Tog soos die noodlot wou hê het alles vir Van Wyk en sy makkers, ook vir Suid-Afrika in daardie stadium goed afgeloop. Die topbestuur van die rewolusionêre aanslag sou daardie gekose aand vir eers van die toneel verwyder word. Suid-Afrika is in elk geval vir bykans ‘n verdere drie dekades tyd gegun om ‘n ander strategie te bereik om die land se politieke probleme op te los.

Inligting van ‘n lid van die CIA wat deur sers. Vorster van die veiligheidstak, Pietermaritzburg, gevang is en gedurende Desember 1962 tot vyf jaar gevangenisstraf weens onwettige land verlaat en sy aandeel aan onrus van die vorige jare gevonnis is, het hom toe reeds in die gevangenis bevind.

Die oorwegende inhoud van die dokumente en publikasies, insluitende die dokument getiteld: “Operation Mayibuye” het ook ‘n beplande omverwerping deur aanwending van geweld deur die bestaande orde, gedui.

Die bron van die inligting wat tot die klopjag en die daaropvolgende aanhoudings aanleiding gegee het, het sy ooreengekome vergoeding van R6 000 gekry. ‘n Tjekrekening is in sy naam by Volkskas geopen en die geld gedeponeer. Dit het nie lank gehou nie.

Intussen het die veiligheidstak landswyd aan die werk gespring en alle tersaaklike getuienis in verband met die ANC/SAKP terreurdade van die vorige paar jaar bymekaargemaak en aan kapt. (soos hy toe was) Van Wyk van die veiligheidstak Witwatersrand gestuur wat met bekwame helpers soos onder andere AO Carl Dirker, sers. Kennedy, konst. W. Nell, ‘n dossier Marshallplein ROM 638/7/63 vir die finale besluit aan die Prokureur-generaal, adv. Rein, voorberei het.

Die verdagtes is ingevolge artikel 17 van die Algemene Regs wysigingswet nommer 37 van 1963 vir ondervraging aangehou.

Wolpe en Goldreich het egter op 11 Augustus1963 uit die Marshallplein-polisieselle saam met twee ander aangehoudenes op sensasionele wyse ontsnap nadat ‘n konst.. Greef omgekoop is. Hy het nooit die omkoopgeld ontvang nie en is tot sesjaar gevangenisstraf virsy aandeel in die ontsnapping gevonnis. ‘n Groot soektog is op tou gesit na die voortvlugtendes wat vermom as priesters Swaziland bereik het. Alles was moontlik gedoen om die ontsnaptes aan te keer. Hulle sou per ligtevliegtuig van Swaziland noordwaarts geneem word. Met die vlieënier is gereël dat hy op ‘n voorafbepaalde landingstrook in ‘n buurstaat vir brandstof-inname sou neerstryk. Die betrokke landingstrook se naam was met witgeverfde kalkklippe aangedui. In dieselfde omgewing op SuidAfrikaanse grondgebied was ‘n soortgelyke landingstrook. Voor die dag van die vlug is die kalkklippe van die Suid-Afrikaanse landingstrook verwyder en gepak om dieselfde naam uit te beeld. Intussen het die voortvlugtendes egter van vlieënier en vliegtuig verander. Toe weer van hulle verneem is, het hulle reeds veilig in Francistown aangekom om daarvandaan verder noordwaarts uit te wyk. Die prokureur van Transvaal, adv. Rein, het intussen die lywige dossier met ‘n aangewese, dr. Percy Yutar en sy span, oorweeg. Hoogverraad was die aangewese aanklagte maar gedagtig aan die fiasko met die Hoogverraad saak van 1956 is teen so aanklag besluit. Die aanklagte sou sabotasie, aanhitsing en ander minder ernstige oortredings soos bevordering van die oogmerke van kommunisme wees.

Volgens getuienis was die plasies Lilliesleaf Farm, Mountain View en Travallyn in die omgewing van Rivonia deur die “High Command” van Umkhonto we Sizwe vir hulle guerrillastryd gebruik met hoofkantoor te Lilliesleaf Farm.

Die “High Command” het sewe tipes ontplofbare toestelle beplan, naamlik:

• 48 000 anti-personeelmyne

• 210 000 handgranate

• petrolbomme

• pypbomme

• “syringe”-bomme

• “Thermite”-bomme en

• Bottel of “Molotov Cocktails”

Om hierdie hoeveelheid plofbare toestelle te vervaardig, sou onder andere nodig wees:

• 144 ton ammoniumnitraat

• 21 ton amoniumpoeier en

• 15 ton swartpoeier

Genl. Van den Bergh het gereël dat plofstofdeskundiges die uitwerking van die resepte vir ploftoestelle prakties met skouspelagtige gevolge toets.

Die dokument “Operation Mayibuye”, wat deur adv. Yutar as “blue print for chaos, revolution and ultmate red control” beskryf het, het voorsiening gemaak vir onderverdeling van die land in vier afsonderlike streke. Buitelands-opgeleide guerrillavegters sou op ‘n regte oomblik oor die land of see by ongeveer 7 000 plaaslik-opgeleide vegters aansluit. Die 7 000 vegters sou soos volg geplaas word:

• Oostelike Provinsie – 2 000

• Natal en Zoeloeland – 2 000

• Noordwes-Transvaal - 2 000 en

• Noordwes-Kaap - 1 000

Dr. Yutar met sy span regsgeleerdes het op 29 Oktober 1963 vir die eerste keer met die Staat teen Nelson Mandela en 10 ander voor regter-president Quartus de Wet in die Paleis van Justisie, Pretoria, verskyn. Adv. Bram Fischer, leier van die Kommuniste in Suid-Afrika en self soos dit later geblyk het, een van die Rivonia-medepligtiges en sy uitgelese regspan het vir die aangeklaagdes

verskyn. Na besware teen die klagstaat aangeteken is, het die hof op 4 Desember 1963 met ‘n gewysigde klagstaat in sitting gegaan. Nou is 193 in stede van die aanvanklik 222 gevalle van sabotasie die aangeklaagdes ten laste gelê en met sy openingsrede en aanbieding van getuienis begin. In sy openingsrede het dr. Yutar die hof verseker dat die polisie hom nooit voorheen met ‘n beter voorbereide en sterker saak belas het nie.

Die staat het 173 getuies, 250 dokumente as bewysstukke ingedien, terwyl die verhoor 96 hof dae in beslag geneem het. Talle staatsgetuies het uit vrees vir intimidasie onder kodename verskyn –daar was mnr. x tot z en y en andere. Twee getuies is vir elke beweerde handeling geroep soos vir ‘n aanklagte van Hoogverraad. Die relaas van die hof gebeure het 250 000 woorde beslaan. Dr. Yutar se betoog teen die einde van die verhoor het 500 bladsy beslaan terwyl die verdediging se betoog oor vier hof dae gestrek het.

In ‘n vroeë stadium van die verhoor is die aanklagte teen beskuldigde Bob Hepple teruggetrek nadat hy uit eie beweging aangebied het om vir die Staat teen sy makkers te getuig. Hy het egter van sy nuutgevonde vryheid gebruik gemaak om die land te verlaat en sodoende nie te getuig nie. Aan die einde van die Staat se saak is Kantor by gebrek aan afdoende getuienis, deur die regter vrygespreek.

Op 11 Junie 1964, elf maande na die klopjag, het die hof uitspraak gegee. Bernstein is onskuldig bevind terwyl die ander agt aangeklaagdes skuldig bevind en tot gevangenisstraf vir die natuurlike duur van hulle lewens gevonnis is. Die regter het nie sy redes wat 72 bladsye beloop het, vir sy bevinding in die hof gelees nie en het slegs ongeveer vyf minute geneem om sy vonnis uit te spreek.

Tydens die verhoor en wel teen Januarie 1964 het die veiligheidstak ‘n komplot om die voorsittende regter en die hoofaanklaer dr. Yutar om die lewe te bring, ontbloot. Shumi Ntuli is in besit van ‘n petrolbom en die name en adresse van die regter en dr. Yutar gevind. Hy moes bevriend raak met die huisbediendes van die twee here en sodoende ‘n geleentheid skep om sy planne tot uitvoer te bring. Hy is later weens hierdie poging skuldig bevind en gevonnis.

Die uitspraak van regter De Wet het ‘n einde gebring aan een van die mees opspraakwekkende verhore waarby die veiligheidstak tot hede betrokke was.

Die verstommendste van die gebeure in verband met die Rivonia-ondersoek, is die feit dat die ganse veiligheidstak, insluitende die ervare ondersoekers nooit vir Bram Fischer by die “High Command” se sameswering betrek het nie. Dit dui onteenseglik op een feit en dit is dat die veiligheidstak in al sy pogings om die vyand te infiltreer nie suksesvol was nie. Agent Ludi, agent Q018, het wel die kommuniste tot op selvlak, waar Bram Fischerook bedrywig was, binnegedring. Hy het selfsMoskou

besoek. Wat in die hoër strukture van die komplot en bedryf was, het ‘n geslote boek geblyk te wees. Toeval en die aanwending van die 90 dae-klousule het grootliks tot die val van die “High Command” bygedra.

In sy afsluitings betoog het dr. Yutar na die optrede van die veiligheidstak verwys en onder andere gesê publiek dank aan die veiligheidstak vir hulle bekwame optrede verskuldig is. Waarskynlik is ‘n bloedbad voorkom.

SECURITY BRANCH (SOUTH AFRICA)

Wikipedia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Security Branch

Badge of the South African Police (Dis nie die SAP se “regte” kenteken nie!)

Service overview

Formed 1947

Dissolved April 1991

Type Security police

Jurisdiction South Africa

Status Defunct

Headquarters Wachthuis, Pretorius Street Pretoria, South Africa

Parent service South African Police

The Security Branch of the South African Police, established in 1947 as the Special Branch, [1][2] was the security police apparatusof the apartheid state in South Africa. From the 1960s to the 1980s, it was one of the three main state entities responsible for intelligence gathering, the others being the Bureau for State Security (later the National Intelligence Service) and the Military Intelligence division of the South African Defence Force.[3] In 1987, at its peak, the Security Branch accounted for only thirteen percent of police personnel,[4] but it wielded great influence as the "elite" service of the police.[2][5][6]

In addition to collecting and evaluating intelligence, the Branch also had operational units, which acted in neighbouring countries as well as inside South Africa, and it housed at least one

paramilitary death squad, under the notorious Section C1 headquartered at Vlakplaas. It is also well known for recruiting askaris (informants, double agents, and defectors), and for the systematic[6] use of torture and numerous deaths in its detention facilities. Branch officers carried out the murders of Ruth First, Ahmed Timol, the Pebco Three, and The Cradock Four, among many other antiapartheid activists; Steve Biko died in Security Branch custody after being severely beaten by officers.[7][8][9] Famous Branch investigations include those leading to the 1956 Treason Trial, the 1963 Rivonia Trial, the 1964 Little Rivonia Trial, and the 1990 Operation Vula trial. It also carried out "Stratcom" disinformation and "dirty tricks" operations which some have likened to a "propaganda war" against the African National Congress [6]

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) found that the Security Branch engaged in "massive and systematic destruction of records" in 1992 and 1993, following an instruction from head office in 1992.[10] As a result, the details of many of the Branch's operations remain unknown or uncorroborated. Several former members, though a small proportion of the overall staff complement, submitted amnesty applications to the TRC and testified at length about the Branch's involvement in extrajudicial killings and other human rights violations.[11]

History[edit]

1947–1950s: Suppression of communism[edit]

The Branch was established as the Special Branch of the South African Police (SAP) in 1947 under the command of Hendrik Jacobus "Fly" du Plooy.[1][2] Du Plooy, who headed the Branch until he was replaced by Willem Carl "Sampie" Prinsloo in 1954, said that he was asked to use the Branch "to combat Communism more actively."[1] The Branch became the leading agency in the administration and enforcement of the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 upon its enactment in July.[1] Because the Act defined communism remarkably broadly – as more or less any form of subversion – the Branch thus secured a broad role in political matters and matters of national security. Perhaps the most famous application of the Act is the prosecution of Nelson Mandela and 155 other anti-Apartheid activists during the 1956 Treason Trial, which followed a series of investigations, raids, and arrests by the Security Branch.[12]

1960s–1980s: Expansion[edit]

As Minister of Justice and Prime Minister, John Vorster presided over the expansion of the Security Branch

The early 1960s in South Africa were characterised by an intensification of political repression, following the Sharpeville massacre; the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the establishment of their military wings, Umhonto weSizwe (MK) and Poqo; and the beginning of the armed struggle, including a year-long sabotage campaign by MK.[13] At this time, the Security Branch had a modest staff complement of about 200 officers, of whom about half were black.[1] In 1963,[1][14] however, Hendrik van den Bergh was appointed commanding officer of the Branch, and it hardened and expanded during his tenure.[15][16] The SAP's budget increased significantly in subsequent years, with much of the increase absorbed by the Branch.[6] By 1964, all four floors of the Compol Building in Pretoria, which previously had housed the broader SAP, were occupied by the Branch's national headquarters.[17] The Branch's surveillance capabilities improved in the 1960s, and it interrogated a large number of political detainees during the first half of the decade.[18] With the blessing of Minister of Justice John Vorster, van den Bergh set up a special unit, known as the "Sabotage Squad," to monitor and interrogate anti-Apartheid activists. The Sabotage Squad was a forerunner to later Branch units: it was during this period that the Branch secured its enduring reputation for brutality and torture, with Branch interrogators like Theunis "Rooi Rus" Swanepoel gaining notoriety among activists.[6][19] Joe Slovo contrasted the Branch officers of this era and beyond with earlier security police in South Africa, who he said were "gentlemanly" by comparison.[1][20] It was later established that several Security Branch officers, including Swanepoel, received training in interrogation techniques in foreign countries, including in France, which was known for having used torture extensively during the Algerian War of Independence.[6]

Only months after van den Bergh's appointment, the Branch orchestrated the raid on Liliesleaf Farm which led to the Rivonia Trial.[14][21][22] It is uncertain exactly what intelligence led the Branch to conduct the raid, but it probably had an informant inside the ANC.[23] The same week, Van den Bergh told the Sunday Times that the Branch had "virtually smashed" the country's various subversive political organisations: "All that remains are the remnants, who will be rounded up in time."[24] At the trial, defendant Elias Motsoaledi told the judge that Branch officers had "assaulted" him during interrogation.[25]

Also early in his tenure as commanding officer, Van den Bergh founded Republican Intelligence, South Africa's first covert national intelligence service and a direct offshoot of the Security Branch –many Branch officers were transferred to staff it. By 1969, Republican Intelligence had been replaced by the Bureau for State Security, which van den Bergh left the Branch to run.[26][27]

Enabling legislation[edit]

The Internal Security Act of 1982 gave the Branch extensive powers.

From the 1960s onward, the Suppression of Communism Act was supplemented with a host of security legislation which expanded the Branch's powers.[28] Detention without trial in nonemergency situations was allowed, for up to twelve days, from 1961.[29] Thereafter were introduced the following:

The General Law Amendment Act of 1962 broadened the definition of sabotage and extended the Minister's power to impose banning orders;

The General Law Amendment Act of 1963 allowed SAP officers to detain suspects without a warrant, and without access to a lawyer, for up to ninety days. In practice, detainees could be held indefinitely without trial, because the 90-day period could be renewed if further interrogation was deemed necessary;

Section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act of 1966 provided for short-term "preventive" detention for up to fourteen days (also renewable); and

The Terrorism Act of 1967 provided for indefinite detention without trial in solitary confinement for the purposes of interrogation.[30]

The Internal Security Act of 1982 consolidated and extended the provisions in these and other laws and remained in effect, with some amendments, until the democratic transition. Police also had remarkably extensive powers of search and seizure. In this legislative environment, the Branch was often able to detain people in poor conditions without the knowledge of their families or lawyers, and it is suspected to have been responsible for numerous forced disappearances [31][32][33][34]

1990s: Democratic transition[edit]

Harms Commission[edit]

In November 1989, Butana Almond Nofomela, a black Branch officer, caused a scandal when he alleged on death row that he had belonged to one of five death squads operating under the Branch out of Vlakplaas farm, later revealed to be the headquarters of the Branch's Section C1 (see below). He claimed that the Branch had brutally killed anti-apartheid activist Griffiths Mxenge in 1981, and that he had participated in or witnessed other extrajudicial killings committed by the Branch.[35] His claims were corroborated in the Vrye Weekblad by the Section's former commanding officer, Dirk Coetzee, and by David Tshikalange, another Branch officer.[36][37][38] Adriaan Vlok, Minister of Law and Order, denied the allegations and said they were part of a plot to undermine the security police "to make it easier to bring about... a Communist state."[37] By the end of the month, the McNally Commission, led by Tim McNally, Attorney General of the Orange Free State, had investigated and submitted to President F.W. de Klerk a report which discounted the allegations.[6][39][40]

In January 1990, however, under mounting pressure from civil society, de Klerk appointed Judge Louis Harms to investigate the allegations, under the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders, better known as the Harms Commission. The commission's terms of reference were broad: to inquire into political murders and political violence committed in South Africa "with political aims," and it investigated the Civil Cooperation Bureau as well as the Security Branch squads at Vlakplaas.[41][42] Its report, released in November 1990, was "famously vacuous":[40] it did not name any specific units or officers as participants in death squads, and it was denounced by anti-apartheid groups as a whitewash.[41][43][44] Meanwhile, sometime in 1990, the Branch sent a parcel bomb to Coetzee in Lusaka. Officers sent the parcel under the name of Bheki Mlangeni, a human rights lawyer who had represented several clients during the Harms Commission, but Coetzee was suspicious and returned it to its ostensible sender in Johannesburg. Some months later, in February 1991, it exploded, killing Mlangeni.[45] Another Section C1 operative who testified at the commission, Brian Ngqulunga, was killed by his handlers at Vlakplaas in July 1990.[6]

Tugela River mouth, where Durban officers killed two ANC activists in 1990.

Operation Vula[edit]

The Security Branch achieved its last major public triumph in July 1990, when its Durban division uncovered Operation Vula. Operation Vula was an ANC project which sought to smuggle arms and activists into the country and to establish an underground network linking domestic activist structures with the ANC in exile. It was initiated in 1986 but, controversially, had continued to operate despite the resolutions of the May 1990 Groote Schuur Minute [6][46] At a raid in Durban, the Branch found evidence of the operation, including communications between underground structures and the ANC headquarters in Lusaka. A series of arrests followed, and at least eight operatives were charged with terrorism, although they were later indemnified.[47] Among those arrested were Pravin Gordhan, Mac Maharaj, Billy Nair, and Siphiwe Nyanda [47][48][49] Two ANC operatives detained in July, Charles Ndaba and Mbuso Shabalala, were missing until 1998,[50] when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) found that they had been arrested and killed by the Security Branch and their bodies thrown in the Tugela River [6][51] According to the testimony of a Branch officer, Ndaba and Shabalala were killed after refusing to turn on the ANC.[52] The officer also claimed that Ndaba had previously been a Branch informant, but the ANC denied this and portrayed the Branch as having stumbled upon Vula by chance.[47][53]

Demise

In April 1991, the Security Branch was effectively reabsorbed into SAP structures. It was merged with the Criminal Investigation Department of the SAP into a new Crime Combatting and Investigation (CCI) unit, the Branch-derived side of which was designated the Crime Information Service. During the merger, the Branch was restructured and functions reallocated.[4][6] However, the CCI was placed under the command of Basie Smit, the outgoing commander of the Branch, and the Branch's organisational and command structure was reportedly little changed.[54] It was during this period that officers systematically destroyed the Branch's records.[10]

Later revelations[edit]

Inkathagate and Goldstone Commission[edit]

In 1991, the Weekly Mail broke the so-called Inkathagate scandal, revealing that the Security Branch, on behalf of the state, had provided R250 000 in covert support to ANC rival Inkatha Freedom Party and R1.5 million to its trade union, the United Workers' Union of South Africa [55][56] The funding was paid directly to a secret account of Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi.[57] According to one document leaked by a Branch officer, the support was designed to be used to "show everyone that [Buthelezi] has a strong base."[58] The scandal was highly inflammatory, arriving as it did during a tense phase of the negotiations to end apartheid and amid severe political violence between ANC and Inkatha supporters, which the ANC alleged were being

stoked by a state-aligned "third force." It led to Vlok's demotion from the Ministry of Law and Order.[59][60][61]

The Goldstone Commission, established in October 1991 to investigate political violence in South Africa, published a 1994 report containing evidence that members of the Security Branch, especially members of the former Section C1, sold weapons to Inkatha between 1991 and 1994. By then, C1 had been redesignated C10 under CCI, and was ostensibly responsible for investigating illegal trafficking in weapons.[62][20] Goldstone Commission investigators also found that, during the inquiry, the head of the C-Section had ordered the destruction of all documentation relating to SAP's relationship with Inkatha.[6] According to the Mail & Guardian, the Commission advised President F. W. de Klerk to give "urgent attention" to the former Security Branch, which it had found to be the principal branch of the SAP implicated in "criminal and despicable actions."[63] The report of the Steyn Commission – written in 1992, partially leaked in 1997, and declassified in 2006 –confirmed that the Branch had smuggled AK-47s to Inkatha from outside South Africa.[64][65][66]

Truth and Reconciliation Commission[edit]

When the TRC was set up to investigate human rights violations during Apartheid, several former Security Branch officers submitted applications for amnesty and testified. The TRC implied that this was partly due to Eugene de Kock, the prolific commander of operational unit C1 at Vlakplaas from 1985. He was one of the first people to submit an amnesty application, and he proved eager to disclose in detail the crimes of the Branch and the names of officers involved. About half of the amnesty applications from former Security Branch officers were in relation to incidents involving de Kock,[31] and, of the eighty-one former Branch officers who submitted applications, forty-seven had been based in C1.[6] Much of what is known about the Security Branch was revealed or proved for the first time during the TRC hearings. By the time the hearings began, the SAP had been formally disbanded and reconstituted as the South African Police Service.

Organisational structure[edit]

The Compol Building in 1938

The Branch's national headquarters were in Pretoria, at the Compol Building (also called the New Government Building) from November 1963 and then at Wachthuis from 1967.[17] There were nineteen regional Security Branch divisions, including divisions for the WItwatersrand (headquartered in Johannesburg at John Vorster Square), the Western Transvaal (headquartered in Potchefstroom), the Eastern Transvaal (Middelburg), the Northern Transvaal (Pretoria), the Far Northern Transvaal (Pietersburg), the Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth), Border (East London), the Western Cape (Cape Town), the Northern Cape (Kimberley), the Orange Free State (Bloemfontein), the West Rand (Krugersdorp), the East Rand (Springs), Port Natal (Durban), Natal (Pietermaritzburg), Northern Natal (Newcastle), and Soweto. Each division had its own branches, several of which, in the north of the country, were at border posts, where the Branch could monitor the movements of exiles.[31] There was also a division for Oshakati in what was then South West Africa

In the 1980s, the Branch had 14 sections, many of which had their own regional units or divisions, and which included research desks for the ANC, PAC, and South African Communist Party (SACP).[6][67] Several sections were renamed and redesignated during the 1991 restructuring.[4][6] In the 1980s, however, the sections were the following:[4][6]

Sections A: Information collection

Section B: Informants

Section C: Anti-terrorism

Section D: State property

Section E: Detainees

Section F: Inter-departmental and research

Section G: Foreign intelligence

Section H: Secret funds

Section J: Liaison to the State Security Council and its joint management centres

Section K: Inspectorate

Section L: Database and information centre

Section M: Namibia

Section N: Technical

Section O: Training

The best known of these sections, the C-Section and G-Section, are notable primarily for their prominent role in countering resistance to apartheid.

C-Section: Anti-terrorism[edit]

The C-Section of the Security Branch, founded in 1979, was nominally its "anti-terrorism" unit, and housed its counterinsurgency and counterintelligence activities, with almost exclusive focus on the domestic anti-apartheid movement.[5][4] The TRC called it the "special forces" of the Branch.[6]

C1: Operations (Vlakplaas)[edit]

Main article: Vlakplaas

Disposal of corpses at Vlakplaas

...[A] shallow grave was dug with bushveld wood and tyres. The two corpses were lifted onto the pyre and as the sun set over the Eastern Transvaal bushveld, two fires were lit, one to burn the bodies to ashes, the other for the security policemen to sit around, drinking and grilling meat. [Dirk Coetzee explains] 'Well, during the time we were drinking heavily, all of us, always, every day. It was just another job to be done. In the beginning it smells like a meat braai, in the end like the burning of bones. It takes about seven to nine hours to burn the bodies to ashes. We would have our own little braai and just keep on drinking.'

Pauw, The Heart of Darkness, ch. 11

The operational arm of C-Section was Section C1, sometimes known by the name of its headquarters at Vlakplaas [68] It was based on a similar counterinsurgency model used successfully by the Selous Scouts in Rhodesia (itself allegedly partly funded by a special account of the Security Branch)[31] and then by Koevoet in South West Africa, which the Security Branch had helped establish (see below). [6][20] Many of the white officers at C1 were drawn from Koevoet or the SAP Special Task Force, and many had specific counterinsurgency experience or specialised training, such as in explosives.[31]

C1 was responsible for the "rehabilitation" of terrorists: it housed activists who had been "turned" –usually under torture, but sometimes voluntarily – and recruited as police informants, known as askaris.[4][69] The informants usually returned to their political organisations and infiltrated further into anti-apartheid networks as double agents, gathering intelligence for the Branch. Initially, they were treated as informants and were paid from a secret account; later, they were officially, though covertly, recruited as SAP constables and paid a police salary.[31] Some – most famously Joe Mamasela and Tlhomedi Ephraim Mfalapitsa – defected entirely and became full-time Branch officers.[70][71] The use of askaris seems to have resulted in considerable tactical successes,[6][2] but perhaps more significant were the internal divisions it wrought within liberation movements. These divisions are exemplified by the spate of necklacings in the late 1980s and by cases like that of Stompie Seipei, whose throat was cut after he was falsely accused of being a police informant.[6] Allegations and rumours that certain politicians spied for the Security Branch or for other intelligence agencies during apartheid are not uncommon even in post-apartheid South Africa.[72][73][74][75][76][77][78]

Section C1 also housed a notorious paramilitary death squad, which killed dozens of anti-apartheid activists, many of them former informants or people who had refused to become informants.[6][31][79][80] In the late 1990s, Eugene de Kock testified at length about killings and other illegal acts committed by the unit, which he commanded from 1985 to 1993.[6] In 1996 he faced criminal prosecution and was sentenced to 212 years and two life terms, though the TRC granted him amnesty for the several crimes it found to have been politically motivated.[81][82]

C2: Research[edit]

Section C2, headed in the 1980s by Martin Naudé, identified, monitored and interrogated activists. Its intelligence was often used to capture activists, with an eye to interrogating them and recruiting them to C1 as informants.[4] C2 maintained the infamous "Terrorist Album," a large album of photographs of suspected anti-apartheid activists, which informants were encouraged to peruse.[2][4][83][84]

C3: TREWITS[edit]

See also: State Security Council

What did they think we were collecting all this information about addresses, cars, movement for? To send Christmas cards?

Former member of TREWITS on its target-identification and operational applications[6] Also under the command of the C-Section from 1986 and designated Section C3 was the highly secretive Teen Rewolusionêre Inligting Taakspan (Counter-Revolutionary Intelligence Task Team, best known as TREWITS).[4] Though housed within the Branch, TREWITS was a subcommittee of the State Security Council (SSC),1 and also contained representatives of the National Intelligence Service and of the Military Intelligence and Special Forces branches of the South African Defence Force (SADF).[6][31][26] It was formed to coordinate and assess operational information, primarily in reference to liberation movement bases (especially ANC and MK bases)[26] in neighbouring countries. In practice its primary function was target identification.[6][20] Former Security Branch head and Police Commissioner Johan van der Merwe confirmed that TREWITS existed, but denied that it had evolved to include targets inside South Africa, as claimed by other former Branch officers.[6] It was established in September 1986, moved into its own offices in Pretoria in January 1987, and was disbanded in 1992.[6] Its existence was not public knowledge until the TRC hearings.[85]

G-Section: Foreign intelligence and Stratcom[edit]

See also: Craig Williamson

1 Nooit!

Under the leadership of Piet Goosen and Craig Williamson, the G-Section of the Security Branch carried out operations outside South Africa, like C-Section with a focus on anti-apartheid activism and thus on South African activists in exile.[4] Section G1 was responsible for foreign intelligence, Section G2 for Strategic Communications, and Section G3 for counterespionage.[6] Its intelligence network in Africa (the "Africa Desk") was based in Malawi and focused on Zambia and Tanzania; in Europe, the network was sometimes based in London and sometimes in Brussels.[6] One of the objectives of the Section was the infiltration of ANC and other anti-apartheid structures abroad[4] –it was revealed at the TRC that an anti-apartheid group in Spain in the 1980s had been set up at Williamson's suggestion, funded by the G-Section, and headed by a Branch agent.[6][86] Other activities of the Section in foreign countries included:

The assassinations of Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon;[4][6]

The 1982 burglaries of the ANC, PAC, and SWAPO London offices;[6] and

The 1982 bombing of the ANC's London offices.[4][6]

G2: Stratcom[edit]

Housed in the G-Section (and in the D-Section after restructuring in the early 1990s)[67] was the Branch's Stratcom unit, so named after the Strategic Communications Branch subcommittee ("Tak Strategiese Kommunikasie," TSK; best known as Stratcom or Stratkom) of the SSC. In January 1985, the SSC through this subcommittee approved a new policy, also commonly referred to as Stratcom, which entailed the intensification and coordination of the intelligence services' disinformation activities.[20] The SSC subcommittee, which included representatives of the National Intelligence Service and SADF Military Intelligence as well as the Security Branch, was reorganised for this purpose, and in subsequent years the Security Branch set up its own dedicated Stratcom unit, which reported to the Minister of Law and Order and to the Stratcom subcommittee of the SSC. From 1989 to 1990, the Branch's Stratcom unit was run by Vic McPherson.[87][67] Historian Stephen Ellis said of the projects pursued under the Stratcom policy (an assessment that the TRC agreed with):[6]

Although these projects were in theory concerned with the dissemination of information and disinformation, many involved blackmail, libel and manipulation of such a mischievous type that, in situations of acute unrest, they could lead to murder and other bloodshed.[20]

In some cases, measures were taken to perpetuate the myth that a victim who had been killed was still alive… [B]efore being killed by the Northern Transvaal Security Branch in 1986, Patrick Mahlangu was forced to write his family a letter which was then posted in Botswana, thereby creating the illusion that he had gone into exile. His family believed this and eagerly awaited his return in the early 1990s.

Report of the TRC, vol. 6

Elsewhere, the TRC defined Stratcom as "a form of psychological warfare waged by both conventional and unconventionalmeans."[31] According to former Branch officers, Stratcom had both "hard" and "soft" sides.[31] The "soft" operations involved propaganda and disinformation (see below), and general "dirty tricks," especially harassing and intimidating activists "by damaging their property; constant and obvious surveillance; making threatening phone calls, and firing shots at houses or throwing bricks through windows."[31] These were already fairly routine for the Branch by the 1970s, but later were formalised and coordinated under the Stratcom unit and selected more strategically for political impact. For example, in July 1988, after the government had failed to have Cry Freedom banned – it was a film about the death of Steve Biko in Security Branch custody, and the Cabinet worried it would be "inciteful" – Minister of Justice Adriaan Vlok authorised an operation in which officers placed dummy explosives in cinemas around South Africa, to provide a pretext for seizing and banning the film.[31] Typical Stratcom activities for which officers subjected amnesty applications to the TRC included: graffiti, fake pamphlets, pouring paint remover over vehicles, disrupting protest gatherings though the use of stink bombs or teargas, theft, threatening phone calls, blackmail, framing, assault, slashing of car tyres, bricks through windows, loosening wheel nuts and bolts of vehicles, firing shots at houses, and arson and petrol bomb attacks on vehicles, homes and buildings.[31] "Hard" Stratcom involved "active measures," especially so-called contramobilisation (see below) [31] At the TRC, Vlok conceded both that Stratcom had been official state policy and that it had been illegal and unlawful.[6] Hard Stratcom, he said, was an artefact of the late80s shift in national security policy towards stricter internal counterinsurgency measures, necessitated by intensifying internal resistance to apartheid.[31]

Activities[edit]

Interrogation and torture[edit]

Most people who told the Commission they had been detained said also that they had been subjected to some form of assault or torture associated with detention… Extreme torture such as electric shocks or suffocation frequently resulted in loss of bladder or bowel control. Detainees found this painfully degrading; they were disgusting to themselves. Some individuals gave in under the duress of torture and gave evidence against their own comrades. Often these detainees would remain silent after they were released because of feelings of intense remorse and guilt and their belief that when their beliefs were tested they were found wanting.

Report of the TRC, vol. 2

The Security Branch had access to all political detainees in the system,[10] including those arrested by other elements of the security services.[6] In the north of the country, many were detained in Johannesburg at the Gray's Building or, from 1968, at John Vorster Square police station, where

the Branch had offices on the top two floors.[1][22][88] Infamously, the lifts in John Vorster Square only went up to the ninth floor, and detainees on their way to interrogation were walked up the staircase from the ninth floor to the tenth floor.[89] The Branch used interrogations not only to extract information from detainees but also with an eye to "turning" them and recruiting them as permanent agents.

Officers recorded Neil Aggett's health as "good" in the weeks before his death in detention

Allegations that the Branch subjected detainees to torture first surfaced in the early 1960s, and escalated as a series of deaths in custody was reported.[6] The TRC later concluded that all branches, offices, and levels of the Security Branch had used torture "systematically," both as a means of obtaining information and as a means of terror, usually with the knowledge and probably the condonation of senior officers.[6] Effectively permitted by the law to prolong detentions indefinitely, officers frequently interrogated activists for weeks or months at a time, often combining different methods over that period. Methods of torture included prolonged solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, dangling detainees from the window, beatings, and electric shock.[6] Also common were psychological threats and intimidation, especially with interrogators claiming that the detainee's peers had already informed on him.[6][90] These interrogation methods were also used by units of the Branch stationed in neighbouring countries, especially on SWAPO activists in Owamboland and Oshakati in what was then South West Africa [6]

In relation to the Security Branch "particularly but not exclusively," the TRC further found that a considerable number of deaths in detention occurred, either as a direct result of torture or as a consequence of a situation in which the circumstances were such that detainees were induced to commit suicide.[6]

Prominent deaths in custody following detention and interrogation by the Security Branch include those of Neil Aggett, Ahmed Timol, and Steve Biko. In 2017, a second inquest found that Timol had died after members of the Branch pushed him out a window or off the roof at John Vorster Square.[91] The verdict in a second inquest into Aggett's death is currently pending.[92]

Surveillance[edit]

From its establishment, a central mandate of the Security Branch was to investigate and gather intelligence about suspected opponents of the state, both for the purpose of prosecution and for the purpose of guiding and justifying the imposition of banning orders under the Suppression of Communism Act and later legislation.[93][94] According to the TRC, the justifications it provided were often "flimsy."[6] The Branch intercepted private mail and telephone calls and physically surveilled suspected anti-apartheid activists.[67] For example, Soweto Security Branch officers testified that Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, the wife of Nelson Mandela, had been subject to constant electronic surveillance by phone taps and bugs, and that Jerry Richardson – a member of her Mandela United Football Club, and famously the killer of Stompie Seipei – had been a police informant.[6]

Propaganda and disinformation[edit]

Under Stratcom, the Branch pursued disinformation campaigns to tarnish the credibility of antiapartheid activists, to sow internal divisions in the anti-apartheid movement (or even provoke internecine violence), and to cover up its own officers' involvement in various crimes. More than once it attempted to frame activists as police informants.[31] Stratcom's activities in relation to media propaganda appear to have grown out of initiatives and networks established by the government in the 1970s and publicly exposed in the 1978 Information Scandal [95][96] McPherson, the former head of Stratcom at the Branch, claimed that the Branch nurtured a network of "friendly" journalists, some of whom were paid Branch informants.[67] At the TRC, he announced that he had provided the Commissioners with a confidential list of journalists who had been "friendly" with, sporadically on the payroll of, or regularly on the payroll of the Security Branch.[67] This list might well have been unreliable – the one name McPherson disclosed at the hearing he later withdrew when the journalist in question, Fred Bridgland, strenuously denied the allegation.[67][97] However, the revelations about Stratcom, and the list of friendly journalists in particular, have occasionally been revivified in postapartheid South Africa, through accusations that certain individuals were or remain "Stratcom agents."[98][99][100]

Winnie Madikizela-Mandela was targeted by Stratcom

Winnie Madikizela-Mandela[edit]

Along with Peter Mokaba and Chris Hani,[101] Winnie Madikizela-Mandela was apparently a central target of the Security Branch's "concerted disinformation campaign against the ANC and the South African Communist Party."[6] Officers from different divisions disagreed about whether MadikizelaMandela had been targeted,[6] but some – among them McPherson and Paul Erasmus – testified to the TRC at some length about attempts to tarnish Madikizela-Mandela's reputation as a means to damaging the credibility of the ANC and of her husband. Under Operation Romulus, the Stratcom unit fed intelligence on Madikizela-Mandela – including about the murder of Stompie Seipei and her alleged affair with Dali Mpofu – to national and international media.[67][87][102]

One of the most prominent post-apartheid "Stratcom" scandals occurred in 2018 when a clip of Madikizela-Mandela was released posthumously as promotional material for the documentary Winnie. In the clip, Madikizela-Mandela claims that prominent liberal journalists Anton Harber and Thandeka Gqubule-Mbeki "actually did the job for Stratcom" while working at the Weekly Mail during apartheid.[103][104] The Weekly Mail was in fact the newspaper which broke the Stratcom story in 1995.[105] When the Economic Freedom Fighters repeated the claim, Harber and GqubuleMbeki successfully sued for defamation.[106] The South African National Editors’ Forum has expressed concern about the political exploitation of Stratcom as a means to undermining the media.[107][108]

Sabotage[edit]

The Security Branch was responsible for the 1987 bombing of COSATU House, the Johannesburg headquarters of the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); the 1988 bombing of Khanya House, the Pretoria headquarters of the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference; and the 1988 bombings of Khotso House, the Johannesburg headquarters of the South African Council of Churches and United Democratic Front (UDF).[6][109][110][111] The TRC found that

the attacks had been "authorised at the highest level."[31] Indeed, Vlok, then the Minister of Justice, testified that he had personally authorised the attacks on COSATU House and Khotso House, in the case of the latter to fulfil State President P. W. Botha's request that the building should be rendered "unusable."[31] The Branch carried out numerous other attacks on buildings housing civil society organisations, political groups, and their leaders,[6][51] including the 1982 bombing of the ANC's London offices.[4]

Extra-judicial killings[edit]

The Security Branch was responsible for extrajudicial killings, especially of anti-apartheid activists (see below). The TRC concluded that its officers had carried out many political assassinations, "frequently with the authorisation or involvement of senior Security Branch personnel."[6] The Branch carried out some very prominent assassinations, such as those of Griffiths Mxenge,[6] Ruth First,[4][6] and the Cradock Four.[112] It used gunshots, various kinds of explosives, and, in at least one case – that of Black Consciousness activist Siphiwe Mthimkulu – thallium [6] In 1989, the Branch also carried out the attempted murder of Frank Chikane, at Vlok's instruction, by lacing his underwear with a nerve agent.[113][114] Targets were sometimes killed in or abducted from neighbouring countries, especially Swaziland, and were often ambushed based on information obtained from the Branch's informants.[4][6]

Southern Africa in 1973

Koevoet[edit]

Main article: Koevoet

In 1976,[6] during the Border War, the Security Branch launched "Operation K," which evolved by 1979 into what was known as Koevoet ("Crowbar").[115] Koevoet was a counterinsurgency unit in South West Africa, based in Oshakati and Rundu, and undertook both operational and intelligence-gathering activities, primarily against SWAPO and its armed wing. Louis le Grange, then South African Minister of Law and Order, called it "the crowbar which prises terrorists out of the bushveld like nails from rotten wood."[6][116] It worked very closely with SADF, and on some accounts was a joint operation with SADF,[117] but, in its early years, was formally located under the Security Branch.[26] Its founding commander, Johannes "Hans" Dreyer, was a senior Branch officer; many other personnel were drawn from the Branch; and many of its black members were recruited through Branch networks in Ovamboland [4] In 1985, the unit was transferred to the South West African Police,[4][118] and before that it had already attained a degree of autonomy from the SAP (and even from SADF, whose operations it was supposed to be supporting).[117] However, in 1983, a significant number of Branch personnel had been withdrawn from Namibia and transferred from Koevoet to Section C1, the Branch's new internal counterterrorism operations unit, whose organisational culture acquired resemblances to that of Koevoet (see above). Among those transferred from Koevoet was Eugene de Kock, who commanded C1 from 1985.[4]

Other cross-border activities[edit]

Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, the PAC and ANC were highly active in neighbouring active countries, where they were in exile from repression within South Africa and accommodated by sympathetic regimes or opposition parties. The Security Branch was thus involved in several operations outside South Africa. It had a close working relationship with regimes in Swaziland, Malawi, and (after 1986) Lesotho – along with SADF's Military Intelligence division, it set up a joint security task force with representatives of the Basotho police and defence force.[6] In one notable example of Branch activity outside South Africa's borders, the Branch was involved in target identification for the SADF's 1985 raid on Gaborone.[31] Several Branch officers applied for amnesty from the TRC for their roles in gathering intelligence for and planning the raid, and they testified that they had attended planning sessions with SADF as representatives of the Branch's national office and of several of its regional divisions.[6]

Contra-mobilisation[edit]

From the mid-1980s, the SSC grew to emphasise the principle of "contra-mobilisation": counterpropaganda to mobilise popular opposition, especially among "moderate blacks," to the liberation movements, especially the ANC, and to sow and exploit internal divisions within those movements.[6][31] The state's role in contra-mobilisation necessarily had to be concealed, so it

provided covert logistical, political and financial support to what the TRC called "surrogate forces."[6] As early as 1985, the SSC through Stratcom sought to exploit conflict between the ANCaligned UDF and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) – a memo was circulated with a list of possible themes that could be used, such in a covert pamphlet campaign, to further entrench divisions between the groups.[6] The state's contra-mobilisation policy eventually escalated to the point that security forces were willing to actively facilitate violent conflict between factions of the antiapartheid movement. SADF seems to have been the main player in implementing contramobilisation efforts along these lines, but the Security Branch was the key channel through which SAP sponsored and participated in any such efforts, and did play a role.[6][20] For example, one Branch officer claimed that, amid the political violence of the early 1990s, the Alexandra Security Branch routinely attempted to inflame tensions between the ANC and Inkatha in Alexandra, including by driving through the township at night firing guns "randomly" and naming ANC members to Inkatha.[31]

"Inkathagate" concerned Security Branch funding for Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha

Apart from provoking conflict, the security forces facilitated it by providing support to the groups involved – specifically, the TRC noted, groups opposed to the ANC and its allies, the UDF and Mass Democratic Movement.[6] In the mid-1980s, the Branch collaborated with Reverend Mzwandile Maqina, whose group AmaAfrika was involved in the UDF-AZAPO violence in the Cape, though Maqina was later handed off to Military Intelligence.[6] The Branch also supported Inkatha-aligned vigilantes, such as the A-Team in Durban, from 1985 at the latest.[6][119] Later, in another example, several members of Section C1 of the Branch admitted to having provided arms for the Ciskei and Transkei coups plotted by SADF under Operation Katzen. The weapons were channelled through a private company which was ostensibly under contract with the anti-ANC Oupa Gqozo but was in fact a SADF front.[31] C1 head Eugene de Kock and others claimed that the provision of arms had been authorised by the commander of the C-Section and by the head of the

Branch itself.[31] Indeed, the provision of arms and funds was probably the Branch's biggest contribution the political turmoil of the democratic transition of the early 1990s. As revealed during the Inkathagate scandal, the Branch had materially supported Inkatha-aligned groups since at least 1986, when it provided covert funding for Inkatha's establishment of the United Workers' Union of South Africa as a competitor to the ANC-aligned COSATU.[6][57] Later, in the early 1990s and by then operating under the CIC, the Branch, especially C1, supplied arms seized in Namibia to Inkatha. Some officers also testified to having provided Inkatha with weapons training.[31]

Some members of the security forces also supported the white right wing with information, arms, and training.[6] However, in the early 1990s, there was also apparently a Stratcom operation, known as Operation Cosmopolitan, under which the Security Branch infiltrated right-wing groups like the Boere Weerstandsbeweging with the aim of persuading them to accept a peaceful democratic settlement.[6][31]

Commanding officers[edit]

While at the Branch, Gen Mike Geldenhuys received a 1976 SAP Medal for "services toward the prevention and combating of terrorism" ("dienste ter verkooming en bestryding van terrorism")

Era Commanding officer Ref.

1940s Hendrik Jacobus du Plooy [1]

1950s Willem Carl Prinsloo [1]

1960s Hendrik van den Bergh [6]

P.J. "Tiny" Venter [6]

1970s Mike Geldenhuys [6][120]

C.F. Zietsman [6]

1980s Johan Coetzee [4][31]

Frans Steenkamp [4]

Stanley Schutte [31]

Johan van der Merwe [4][31]

1990s Basie Smit [4]

Du Plooy, Geldenhuys, Coetzee, and van der Merwe all went on to serve as national Commissioner of Police.[121]

Notable members[edit]

Several Security Branch agents are household names because they made extensive disclosures in TRC hearings, in criminal trials, or in the press, usually in the mid-to-late 1990s. Others, especially known askaris and those who carried out interrogations of detainees, had attained a reputation among anti-apartheid activists well before then. Well-known former members include:

Gideon Nieuwoudt[10]

Craig Williamson[6]

Eugene de Kock[4]

Dirk Coetzee[6]

Paul Erasmus[122]

Butana Almond Nofomela[36][37]

Joe Mamasela[70]

Charles Sebe[6]

Harold Snyman[9]

Olivia Forsyth

List of killings carried out by the Branch[edit]

Below is a non-exhaustive list of killings known to have been carried out by the Security Branch.

Unless otherwise specified, the Branch's responsibility for the killings listed was established by Security Branch members who confessed their own involvement, especially in amnesty applications to the TRC. The list therefore does not include killings which the Security Branch is merely alleged to have carried out, or even killings which the TRC found the Branch responsible for without receiving corroboration from participants in the act.[a] Most recently in the case of the Cradock Four,[112] there has been and remains considerable mystery and contestation around the question of the level at which certain killings were authorised, and whether, for example, the State Security Council sanctioned or ordered them.[6][31]2

2 Nie in ‘n duisend jaar nie – HBH

Killings known to have been carried out by the Security Branch hide

Ahmed Timol 1971 Pushed from window during interrogation[b]

Oupa Ronald Madondo

Shot dead

Griffiths Mxenge 1981 Stabbed by C1

Gcinisizwe Kondile 1981 Shot dead

Isaac Moema 1981 Shot dead

Peter Dlamini

Vuyani Mavuso

Jabulile Nyawose

Petros Nyawose

Killed by a car bomb

Ruth First 1982 Killed by a letter bomb

Siphiwe Mthimkulu 1982 Abducted and shot dead (known as the Cosas Two)

Topsy Madaka

Zandisile Musi

Fanyana Nhlapo

Eustice Madikela

Ntshingo

Mataboge

Jeanette Schoon

Katryn Schoon

Japie Maponya

Batandwa Ndondo

Cedric Dladla

Joseph Mazibuko

John Mlangeni

Samuel Lekatsa

Killed by explosives in an entrapment operation (known as the Cosas Four)

Killed by a letter bomb

Abducted and killed by C1

Killed while being abducted or arrested

Killed by modified mines and hand grenades supplied by an askari in an entrapment operation ("Operation Zero Zero")

Killings known to have been carried out by the Security Branch hide

Name of victim Year Method Ref

Humphrey

Tshabalala

Johannes Mazibuko

Hogseo

Lengosane

Qaqawuli Godolozi

Abducted, beaten, and strangled (known as the Pebco Three) [6] Champion Galela

1985

Sipho Hashe

Shadrack Sithole

Mobongeni Kone

Assen Thimula

Mzwandile Hadebe

Shadrack

Maphumulo

Matthew Goniwe

Sparrow Mkhonto

Fort Calata

Sicelo Mhlawuli

Jameson

Mngomezulu

Themba Mlifi

Mandla Mxinwa

Zanisile Mjobo

Zola Swelani

Godfrey Miya

Christopher Piet

1986

Ambushed while being transported by Sithole, an askari [31]

1985

Abducted and shot and/or stabbed (known as the Cradock Four) [6][112]

1985

Abducted and died during severe torture [6]

1986 Killed in an entrapment operation (known as the Gugulethu Seven) [31]

Killings known to have been carried out by the Security Branch hide

Name of victim Year Method

Zabonke Konile

Rooibaard

Geldenhuys

Elliot Sathege

Abraham Makolane

Samuel Masilela

Thomas Phiri

Matthews Lerutla

Sipho Sibanyoni

Morris Nkabinde

Jeremiah Ntuli

Stephen Makena

Jeremiah Magagula

Jimmy Mabena

Samuel Ledwaba

Zakias Skosana

Obed Mokhonwana

Mabuso Malobala

Abram Makulane

Ngemane Mafid

Jeffrey Hlope

Russel

Mngomezulu

1986

Drugged and burned in a joint SADF entrapment operation (known as the Nietverdiend or Mamelodi Ten)

1986

Shot dead in a joint SADF entrapment operation (known as the KwaNdebele Nine)

1986 Shot dead by C1 (known as the Chesterville Four)

[127][6]

Name

Muntuwenkosi

Dlamini

Russel Mthembu

Sandile Khawula

Sipho Stanley Bhila

Jeffrey Sibiya

"Mpho"

Stanza Bopape

Sibusiso Ndlovu

Elias Gift Matjale

Amanzi Vilakazi

Glen Mgoduka

Amos Faku

Desmond Mpipa

Xolile Sakati

Phumelo Moses Nthelang

Killings known to have been carried out by the Security Branch hide

Name of victim Year Method

Mbuso Shabalala

Ref

Bheki Mlangeni 1991 Killed by a parcel bomb intended for Dirk Coetzee [45]

Goodwill Neville

Sikhakane 1991 Shot dead [6]

^ Steve Biko is therefore not listed because the officers involved in his death, though they applied and were refused amnesty for their roles, continue to maintain that Biko was injured in a scuffle.[9]

^ Established in a 2017 inquest.[91]

^ The date is contested; some Branch officers recall that Mabotha was killed in 1992.

See also[edit]

Bureau of State Security

History of South Africa (1994–present)

Rhodesian Bush War

Angolan Civil War

Jimmy Kruger

Civil Cooperation Bureau

Tripartite Alliance

Bisho massacre

Boipatong massacre

Arms trafficking

References[edit]

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68.^ Jansen,Anemari(2015-06-01). "'Abyssofinhumanity'" IOL.Retrieved 2021-11-25.

69.^ Pauw, Jacques (2017-12-14). Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins. Jonathan Ball Publishers. ISBN 978-1-86842-893-9.

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77.^ "MacMaharajdismisses claimsthat Nyandawas an apartheid spy" Youtube.201908-13.

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90.^ First, Ruth (2009). 117 Days: An Account of Confinement and Interrogation Under the South African 90-Day Detention Law. Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-310574-9.

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92.^ Forbes, David (2021-07-12). "Death in apartheid detention: Verdict eagerly awaited after Neil Aggett inquest ends" Daily Maverick. Retrieved 2021-11-25.

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94.^ "Newspaper clips, 1955-1956" (PDF). Historical Papers Research Archive. Wits University. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 November 2021.

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96.^ Lewin, Hugh (1980-05-02). "More Dirty Tricks". New Internationalist. Retrieved 2021-11-28.

97.^ "Security cop apologises to Bridgland for "informer" smear" SAPA. 1997-11-28. Retrieved 2021-11-27.

98.^ Herbst, Ed (2018-05-21). "The 'Stratcom' accusation: An analysis". The Media Online. Retrieved 2021-11-29.

99.^ "Pauw wrote 'Stratcom' report due to 'close relationship' with Gordhan - EFF" The Citizen. 2019-07-14. Retrieved 2021-11-29.

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101. ^ "Stratcom's Paul Erasmus says he was sent out to destroy Winnie Mandela & the plan succeeded" EWN. Youtube. 2020-04-27.

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105. ^ Brümmer, Stefaans (1995-06-29). "The dirty tricks campaign to trash Winnie". The Mail & Guardian. Retrieved 2021-11-27.

106. ^ Madisa, Kgothatso (2020-01-25). "EFF issues apology for Stratcom remarks" Sowetan. Retrieved 2021-11-27.

107. ^ Khoza, Amanda (2018-04-20). "Sanef slams Independent Media group's 'Stratcom' smear of journalists". News24. Retrieved 2021-11-27.

108. ^ Maverick, Daily (2018-04-13). "Unsubstantiated smear campaigns put journalists at serious risk – SANEF" Daily Maverick. Retrieved 2021-11-27.

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113. ^ "Apartheid-eraministerpleadsguiltyinpoisonunderweartrial". theGuardian. 2007-08-17. Retrieved 2021-11-27.

114. ^ Gordin, Jeremy (2007-07-22). "The source of Chikane poison revealedclaim". IOL. Retrieved 2021-11-27.

115. ^ Harmse, Kyle; Dunstan, Simon (2017-02-23). South African Armour of the Border War 1975–89. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4728-1744-0

116. ^ "Leash the dogs of war" The Economist. 2015-03-19. ISSN 0013-0613 Retrieved 2021-11-25.

117. ^ Jump up to: a b Bolliger, Lennart (2021). Apartheid's Black Soldiers: UnNational Wars and Militaries in Southern Africa Ohio University Press. ISBN 978-08214-2455-1

118. ^ Nowrojee, Binaifer (1993). Divide and Rule: State-sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya. New York: Human Rights Watch. pp. 17-26. ISBN 978-1564321176.

119. ^ Leslie, Robyn; Khan, Sameena (2015-07-26). "Apartheid policing: The Section 29 inquiry of Frank Sandy Bennetts" Daily Maverick. Retrieved 2021-11-29.

120. ^ Burns, John F. (1978-07-22). "South Africa moves to discipline police" The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2021-11-26.

121. ^ "Commissioners of the Former South African Police (1913-1994)" South African Mirror. Retrieved 2021-11-25.

122. ^ Smith, Janet (2020-02-20). "Inside the Security Branch: Torture between brandy and boerewors" The Mail & Guardian. Retrieved 2021-11-25.

123. ^ Ho, Ufrieda (2021-11-17). "Posthumous honour of bravery for Sizwe Kondile, one of South Africa's forgotten heroes". Daily Maverick. Retrieved 2021-11-30.

124. ^ Jump up to: a b "Outrage over amnesty for apartheid killer". the Guardian. 2000-06-13. Retrieved 2021-11-30.

125. ^ "Life and times of a youth activist: the murder of Siphiwo Mthimkhulu" SABC News. 2015-06-11. Retrieved 2021-11-30.

126. ^ Forbes, David (2020-09-21). "Maverick Citizen Op-ed: Time for justice for the Cosas 4: How the police blew up '4 kids with an idea' in 1982". Daily Maverick. Retrieved 2021-11-25.

127. ^ Dlamini, Penwell (2019-12-19). "The last of the Mamelodi 10 apartheid victims is being exhumed in Winterveld". Sowetan. Retrieved 2021-11-30.

128. ^ Jump up to: a b c d "Amnesty decision AC/2001/112". Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 2001. Retrieved 2021-11-30.

129. ^ "Motherwell Four killer loses appeal". IOL. 2008-09-30. Retrieved 2021-1130.

130. ^ Bechoo, Ishani (2000-04-12). "Ex-cop tells how ANC members were killed". IOL. Retrieved 2021-11-30.

Further reading [edit]

• Bizos, George (1998). No One to Blame?: In Pursuit of Justice in South Africa. David Philip. ISBN 978-0-86486-319-5

• Dlamini, Jacob (2015). Askari: A Story of Collaboration and Betrayal in the Anti-apartheid Struggle. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-027738-3.

• Dlamini, Jacob (2020). The Terrorist Album: Apartheid's Insurgents, Collaborators, and the Security Police. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-91655-5

• Ellis, Stephen (1998). "The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force". Journal of Southern African Studies 24 (2): 261–299. ISSN 0305-7070

• Erasmus, Paul (2021). Confessions of a Stratcom Hitman. Jacana Education. ISBN 9781-4314-2962-2.

• First, Ruth (2009). 117 Days: An Account of Confinement and Interrogation Under the South African 90-Day Detention Law. Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-310574-9

• Laurence, Patrick (1990). Death Squads: Apartheid's Secret Weapon. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-014937-1.

• O'Brien, Kevin. (2010). The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-89282-0

• Pauw, Jacques (2017). Into the Heart of the Whore: The Story of Apartheid's Death Squads. Jonathan Ball Publishers. ISBN 978-1-86842-895-3

• Sanders, James (2006). Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service. John Murray. ISBN 978-0-7195-6675-2.

• Shaik, Moe (2020). The ANC Spy Bible: Surviving Across Enemy Lines. Kwela Books. ISBN 978-0-624-08896-7

External links[ edit]

• "In detention", Chris van Wyk's poem about deaths in Security Branch detention

• "I gave the names", by Adrian Leftwich

• A Window on Soweto, memoir of Joyce Sikakane (see pages 59–65)

• Former police officers debate the Security Branch's legacy

• Records of the Harms Commission Categories:

• Apartheid government

• Anti-communism in South Africa

• Defunct organisations based in South Africa

• Organisations associated with apartheid

• Defunct South African intelligence agencies

• Defunct law enforcement agencies of South Africa

• Secret police https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Branch_(South_Africa) – afgelaai op 25 April 2025.

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REPUBLICAN INTELLIGENCE

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Republican Intelligence (RI) is a defunct South African intelligence organisation that was established in the early 1960s after South Africa became a republic, albeit, outside the Commonwealth of Nations (from 1961 to 1994) and ties with British intelligence had become weaker due to the system of Apartheid. Republican Intelligence was later replaced by the South African Bureau for State Security (BOSS) in 1969.

Background [edit]

Prior to South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth and the creation of the Republic of South Africa on 31 May 1961, there was no effective intelligence service in the country.[1]: Chp1  Prior to 1961, intelligence, if and when required, had been provided by British intelligence, after 1961 any remaining links between them ended.[1]: Chp2

The British authorities squashed any chance of an early national intelligence service, based on MI5, being created in 1938 as they feared that it would be infiltrated by nationalist Afrikaners, the Ossewabrandwag and Nazi sympathisers.[1]: Chp2  Colonel Pierre de Villiers, Chief of South African Police and the countries liaison with MI5, approached MI5 in 1938 in an attempt to set up a security organisation based on the latter.[2]: 218  They refused believing they were solely responsible for monitoring security in the Union and when intelligence gathering was reorganised in 1940, with internal security remaining the prerogative of the SAP now under Colonel Baston and not military intelligence, MI5 input with the SAP declined regarding the SAP as being corrupt and inefficient and some in elements, anti-British3 [2]: 218–9  Basic intelligence was provided by the Detective Branch of police and a fledgling intelligence unit in the Union Defence Force (UDF).[1]: Chp2

During the Second World War, the UDF formed the Department of Military Intelligence whose focus was on the white nationalists and Nazi sympathizers while an Intelligence Records Bureau was formed to collect, record and disseminate information fed to it by South African government organisations and British and colonial intelligence services.[1]: Chp2  In September 1940, the Defence Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship of Denys Reitz, reported their concerns about the confusion, overlapping of information and delays when it came to the collection and distribution of intelligence.[2]: 215  He suggested the creation of an organisation to centralise the collection, analysis and distribution of intelligence.[2]: 215  Headed by Colonel Lenton weekly meeting were held and attended by representatives for censorship, intelligence, SAP, railway police, treasury, immigration and customs.[2]: 215

By 1948, the National Party of nationalist Afrikaners had won the election and by the early 1950s, the first apartheid laws were introduced in South Africa.[1]: Chp2  MI5, seeing the new governments anti-communist credentials, initially thought of establishing a new intelligence service in South Africa styled on its own structure as it had done with ASIO in Australia, but had second thoughts fearing it would be used to suppress and oppress opposition in the country.[1]: Chp2

What was recommended instead was the formation of a Special Branch within the South African Police later to be called the Security Branch. This branch would be responsible for internal security and the gathering of intelligence freed from criminal investigation.[1]: Chp2

The beginning of the sixties in South Africa was a turbulent time beginning with the Sharpeville Massacre which led to the anti-apartheid organisations of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) being banned and with that their departure from passive resistance and declaring the beginningsof the 'armed struggle'. A year later in 1961, the ANCformed their armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and begun their sabotage campaign in December the

3 Ons het spesiale uitgawe oor oorlogtydse veiligheidshoof kol JJ ‘Bul” Coetzee die lig laat sien – HBH.

same year while left-wing white radicals such as the African Resistance Movement begun bombing.[1]: Chp1  These events saw the need for a more effective intelligence service than could be provided by the Security Branch of the South African Police.[1]: Chp1

Formation [edit]

In 19604 , Hendrik van den Bergh was appointed as the Head of the Security Branch.[1]: Chp1  By 1963, he would form the Republican Intelligence a secretive offshoot of the Security Branch.[1]: Chp2  It would become bogged down in internal security matters and could not become an effective external intelligence gathering and analysis organisation.[1]: Chp2  RI was initially based in Johannesburg before eventually moving to the Wachthuis, police headquarters in Pretoria.[3]: 42  Reporting to Van den Bergh, overall command of RI lay with Brigadier P.J "Tiny" Venter while the day-to-day running of RI was conducted by Mike Geldenhuys [3]: 68–9  Most recruits for the new organisation had their origins in South African Police's Security Branch, with the recruits resigning from their previous positions and re-employed in front-organsisations in the main South African cities.[3]: 27  Apart from offices based in South Africa, RI had stations based in overseas South African embassies such as Washington, London, Paris and Vienna.[3]: 42

Demise of Republican Intelligence [edit]

During the middle of 1968, the South African cabinet approved the implementation of a centralised security service and on 28 August of the same year, General Hendrik van den Bergh was instructed to start planning the new organisation.[1]: Chp2  It aimed at gathering intelligence on internal and external threats and provide national security intelligence.[1]: Chp2  On the 1 October 1968, LieutenantGeneral Hendrik van den Bergh, Deputy Police Commissioner and Head of the Security Branch, was promoted to General5 and then appointed as Security Advisor to Prime Minister John Vorster [4]: 436  Attached to the Prime Minister office, he would be in command all security and intelligence chiefs in the country including the military, and reported only to Vorster.[4]: 436  He would set about forming the Bureau for State Security and merging some of RI's personnel into the new organisation drawing others from military intelligence and the security branch of the police.

References [edit]

1. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o O'Brien, Kevin A (2011). The South African intelligence services: from apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005. Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Taylor and Francis. ISBN 978-0-203-84061-0

4 Nee 1963 – HBH.

5 Nee – rang was luitenant-generaal – HBH.

2. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e Fedorowich, Kent (March 2005). "German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence in South Africa and Mozambique, 1939-1944". The Historical Journal. 48 (1): 209–230. doi:10.1017/S0018246X04004273 JSTOR 4091684 S2CID 162653419 | – via JSTOR (subscription required)

3. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Swanepoel, Petrus Cornelius (2007). Really Inside BOSS: A Tale of South Africa's Late Intelligence Service (and Something about the CIA). South Africa: Piet Swanepoel. pp. 202 ISBN 9780620382724 RI.

4. ^ Jump up to:a b Hepple, Alex (October 1969). "South Africa's Bureau for State Security". Royal Institute of International Affairs. 25 (10): 436–439. JSTOR 40394202 | – via JSTOR (subscription required)

Further reading [edit]

• O'Brien, Kevin A (2011). The South African intelligence services: from apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005 (Kindle ed.). Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Taylor and Francis. ISBN 978-0-203-84061-0.

• Swanepoel, Petrus Cornelius (2007). Really Inside BOSS: A Tale of South Africa's Late Intelligence Service (and Something about the CIA). South Africa: Piet Swanepoel. ISBN 9780620382724.

Kommentaar deur HBH

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_Intelligence - afgelaai op 25 April 2024.

• Genl HJ van den Bergh is eers op 13 Januarie 1963 aangestel as veiligheidshoof.

• Genl Van den Bergh se korrekte rang is luitenant-generaal

• Mnr (maj) MCW Geldenhuys was die hoof van RI wat in Johannesburg gesetel was.

• Mnr (luit) PC Swanepoel was hoof van RI in SWA.

Via Tubby Myburg

WAS NIE

Kapt Deon Stidwell

Die winter van 2001 het vroeër gekom as normaal en die koue temperature het Pretoria reeds Mei-maand laat bibber. Met 31 Mei oppad, wat die veertigste herdenking van die Republiek van SuidAfrika sou wees, was daar ‘n onsekere gevoel rondom die “Ou SA” se geskiedenis onder baie Pretorianers, hoofsaaklik as gevolg van die onsekerhede wat die nuwe ANC-regering teweeg gebring het.

En Pretoria is ook ‘n stad propvol geskiedkundige plekke waaronder Kerkplein, die Voortrekkermonument, die Uniegebou en dan ook Strijdomplein van die belangrikste geskiedkundige bakens van Pretoria was.

Strijdomplein was geleë op die suid-oostelike hoek van die blok was Van der Waltstraat en Kerkstraat in die middestad kruis. Dit was redelik sentraal in Pretoria en die befaamde Staatsteater was aangrensend aan die ooste kant van die plein. Suid van die plein was die groot ABSA gebou, wat vir lank die hoogste gebou in Pretoria was totdat die nuwe Reserwebank gebou is. Strijdomplein was ‘n gewilde plek vir kantoorwerkers om veral middagete daar tyd te verwyl, want die plein was ruim en oop met sitbankies. Daar was ‘n standbeeld van spelende perde wat ‘n groot waterfontein versier het. Dit het rustigheid versinnebeeld.

Die grootste en belangrikste rolspeler van die plein was egter ‘n pragtige groot kopbeeld ter ere aan JG Strijdom, wat die eerste Minister van Suid-Afrika vanaf 1954 tot 1958, was. Hierdie beeld was in ‘n semi-sirkel omring met ‘n reuse koepel wat soos ‘n beskermende hand oor die borsbeeld gehang het. Die koepel het net op ‘n paar plekke kontak met die grond /plaveisel gemaak en daar was ‘n hoë boog tussen hierdie punte. Hoog genoeg dat mens daar onder kon deurloop. Onder die beeld was die ondergrondse parkeergarage wat onder andere Staatsteater besoekers van parkering voorsien het.

Soos dinge maar in Suid-Afrika gaan, was die meeste van hierdie plekke ook kontroversieel in eie reg, gegewe die geskiedenis van die land. So was daar dus maar altyd ook bekommernisse dat hierdie plekke moontlik teikens kon wees vanuit linkse en regse politieke groeperinge wat natuurlik negatiewe gevolge in die algemene samelewing sou kon gehad het. Veral in ‘n tyd van politieke oorgang soos waar ons onsself daardie jare nog bevind het.

Ek was gesetel by die Springstofeenheid, Pretoria en op 1ste roep bystand vir die week. Op die 31ste Mei 2001 het ek het ongeveer 05:00 ‘n oproep van Pretoria Radiobeheer ontvang wat my versoek het om my te haas na Strijdomplein aangesien die plek vermoedelik aangeval was met ploftoestel of meer as een toestel.

Toe ek op die toneel aankom, het dit reeds begin lig word. Die Pretoria Sentraal brandweer en Pretoria Nooddienste was op die toneel, die paaie was reeds versper en die gebied behoorlik bewaar. Ek het brig Eben McLaren by ‘n Njala aangetref wat oorhoofs in beheer van die toneel was en by hom aangemeld.

Die foto wys hoe die stene en teëls afgevlieg het van die koepel af. Met die eerste voorligting van brig McLaren het hy nie ‘n geheim daarvan gemaak dat daar groot druk uit hoë vlakke is om sou gou as moontlik te bepaal wat presies gebeur het nie. Die meeste aanwesiges het presies gedink wat ons almal gevrees het, dat die Koepel en die beeld met springstof aangeval is.

Ek was begroet met ‘n chaotiese toneel. Dit het inderdaad, gegewe die skade, tipies soos ‘n bomtoneel gelyk. My eerste gewaarwording was dat die hele koepel inmekaar gestort het en in puin gelê het. Net die podium waarop die kopbeeld was, was sigbaar. Die kopbeeld self was nie sigbaar nie. Daar was ook reuse gate in die plaveisel oor die plein en langs die kante van die plein wat ineengestort het na die ondergrondse parkeer terrein. Een van die senior-brandweermanne het my vergesel tot aan die agterkant van die koepel waar daar etlike honderde stukke stene en teëls verstrooi gele het, wat tipies soos ‘n ontploffingstoneel gelyk het. Die teëls en stene het losgekom van die koepel en suidwaarts en n entjie weg, tot so 30-meter, van waar die koepel was, geval.

Ons het daarvandaan om beweeg na die Staatsteater toe en in die ondergrondse parkeerarea in beweeg. Toe was dit duidelik dat die ondergrond van hele plein aangewend word as die parkeer area vir die Staatsteater. Daar was etlike voertuie wat plat geval en vernietig is deur die dak (van die plein) wat plek-plek ineengestort het. Ons het toe ook die stukkende kopbeeld van ‘n entjie verder in die ondergrondse parkering teëgekom. Die beeld was stukkend, maar nadat ek dit ondersoek het, het ek tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat nie aan springstof blootgestel was nie. Daarna is ons terug na die plein self.

Met my ondersoek op die oppervlakte van die plein, het ek sorgvuldig na ‘n moontlike punt van detonasie begin soek soos ‘n krater, brandmerke ens, maar kon niks kry nie. Ek kon geen brokstukke, stukkende mure of plaveisel kry wat gelyk het asof dit aan springstof blootgestel was nie. Nadat ek niks van dit kon kry nie, was dit belangrik dat ek toe terugvoer moes gee aan die

toneelbevel daaroor. Natuurlik was die 1ste vraag van brig McLaren af wat het dan gelei tot die insident?

My ondersoek het net daar verander van om ‘n detonasie of ‘n bomvoorval te bewys, na ‘n situasie waar ek bewyse moes kry waarom dit NIE ‘n bomvoorval was nie. Die koepel was naby die hoeke van die plein met lang kabels ge-anker om die koepel te stabiliseer en anker. Hierdie kabels was weer in groot betonblokke, omtrent die grootte van ‘n motorvoertuig vasgemessel in die hoeke van die plein. As ek vandag moet terugdink, sou ek raai dat daar sekerlik minstens 10 kabels was wat elkeen niks dunner as 150mm elk was nie. Wat egter opvallend was, was dat die kabels by die beton anker wat aan die Van der Waltstraat se kant was, afgebreek het. Die anker het driekwart uit sy posisie opgestaan asof dit uit die beton getrek was. Ek het dieselfde by die Staatsteater se anker waargeneem. Die anker aan die staatsteater se kant was vorentoe getrek en het op ‘n voertuig gelê, wat natuurlik plat was.

Uit dit wat ek kon waarneem, kon ek met vertroue die volgende gevolgtrekking maak: Omdat dit baie koud (kouer as normaal) was die vorige nag, het die kabels as gevolg van die koue temperatuur ingekrimp. Dit het die koepel stadig vorentoe getrek en het uiteraard baie spanning op die koepel, die kabels en die ankers teweeg gebring. Dit het gelei dat van die kabels uiteindelik gebreek en losgekom toe die ankers lig uit hul posisies uit. Die ankers waar die kabels van gebreek het, het weer gedeeltelik terug gesak in hul beton posisie in. Die resultaat was dat met skielike ontspanning van die kabels, die koepel agteruit geskiet (omtrent soos ‘n kettie wat gelos word) en die koepel het teruggeval, wat aanleiding gegee het tot die groot aantal teëls en stene wat agter die koepel gelê het. Die koepel het toe in duie gestort aangesien dit te ver terug beweeg het.

Die gate in die plaveisel was almal beton blaaie wat aan die ankers gekoppel was en dit is beslis ook moontlik dat die dak, waar die ankers was, van die ondergrondse parkering agv die spanning ook terselfdertyd ingegee het.

Ek het die FWL HK6 versoek om metallurge na my toe te stuur. Beide het saam met my die kabels ondersoek en was ook van mening dat die kabels eenvoudig gebreek het. Ten einde seker te maak het ek op verskeie van die hierdie kabels en plekke waar die ankers uit die grond geskeur het, monsters geneem om te toets vir enige mikroskopiese springstof reste, wat toe ook negatief getoets het. Die grootte van die toneel het die ondersoek moeilik gemaak aangesien ek deurentyd aspekte wat ek by een punt waarneem, met die ander punt moes gaan vergelyk. Ek het ongeveer ses ure alleen op die toneel gewerk, en soos dit mos maar gaan, net voor ek klaar was het lt kol Dries Joubert op die toneel opgedaag om my te help.

6 Forensiese wetenskap laboratorium – Hoofkantoor.

Waar dit feitlik 100% die taak van ‘n bomopruimer is om ‘n toneel te ondersoek om te bepaal hoe en wat gedetoneer het, het ekmyself op hierdie toneel bevind om te bewys dat daar NIE n ontploffing was nie. Maar gegewe die situasie in die land daardie tyd, was dit nodig.

GIANT STRIJDOM STATUE SMASHED.

Pretoria - A massive, sculptured head of prominent apartheid leader JG Strijdom was virtually destroyed in a building collapse in central Pretoria early on Thursday morning.

The sculpture on Strijdom Square tumbled into a hole as an underground parking garage collapsed.

"The monument is virtually demolished," said a Sapa reporter from the scene.

"There is a hole where the monument used to be."

All that remained were sculptured horses on a plinth alongside the Strijdom head.

Fire Brigade spokesman Johan Pieterse said the head could not be seen from the side of the square. It appeared to be broken in two.

A huge wall behind the monument buckled as a result of the collapse.

The collapse came on the 40th anniversary of what would have been "Republic Day" under the apartheid regime - marking the day South Africa left the Commonwealth to continue its pursuit of racial segregation policies.

Two homeless people were injured in the collapse of the underground parking garage, believed to be under the nearby State Theatre, which apparently caused the statue to topple. They were rushed to hospital.

Pretoria - 'n Massiewe beeld van die hoof van die voormalige premier, adv JG Strijdom is vroeg Donderdagoggend feitlik vernietig in 'n bouval in sentraal Pretoria.

Die beeldhouwerk op Strijdomplein het in 'n gat ingetuimel toe 'n ondergrondse parkeergarage ineengestort het.

“Die monument is feitlik gesloop,” het ’n Sapaverslaggewer van die toneel gesê.

"Daar is 'n gat waar die monument was."

Al wat oorgebly het, was perde-beelde op 'n voetstuk langs die Strijdomkop.

Johan Pieterse, woordvoerder van die brandweer, sê die kop kon nie van die kant van die plein af gesien word nie. Dit het gelyk of dit in twee gebreek is.

'n Reusagtige muur agter die monument het as gevolg van die ineenstorting gebuig.

Die ineenstorting het gekom op die 40ste herdenking van wat "Republiekdag" sou gewees het onder die apartheidsregime - die dag waarop Suid-Afrika die Statebond verlaat het om sy strewe na rassebeleid voort te sit.

Twee hawelose mense is beseer tydens die ineenstorting van die ondergrondse parkeergarage, vermoedelik onder die nabygeleë Staatsteater, wat die standbeeld glo laat omval het. Hulle is na die hospitaal gehaas.

The homeless people had taken shelter in the garage overnight, police said - adding they did not believe there were any additional people trapped in the rubble.

A Tembisa man, Vusi Mahlangu, who was at work at a nearby hotel, heard the noise of the garage collapsing at about 4.40am and called the police.

The two injured people - a man and a womanwere taken to the Pretoria Academic Hospital and Kalafong Hospital.

The garage roof, believed to be under the State Theatre, collapsed at ground level, leaving a hole in the above ground square.

A building housing offices of the ABSA banking group on the southern side of the square, as well as the State Theatre on the eastern side, were closed to workers on Thursday morning as officials checked to see if the structures were safe. – Sapa 31 May 2001

Die hawelose mense het oornag in die motorhuis geskuil, het die polisie gesê en bygevoeg dat hulle nie glo dat daar enige bykomende mense in die puin vasgekeer is nie.

'n Man van Tembisa, Vusi Mahlangu, wat by 'n nabygeleë hotel by die werk was, het omstreeks 04:40 die geraas van die motorhuis hoor ineenstort en die polisie ontbied.

Die twee beseerdes – ’n man en vrou – is na die Pretoria Akademiese Hospitaal en Kalafonghospitaal geneem.

Die motorhuis se dak, vermoedelik onder die Staatsteater, het op grondvlak ineengestort en 'n gat in die bogrondse plein gelaat.

’n Gebou wat kantore van die ABSA-bankgroep aan die suidekant van die plein behuising, asook die Staatsteater aan die oostekant, was Donderdagoggend vir werkers gesluit terwyl amptenare nagegaan het om te sien of die strukture veilig is. – Sapa 31 Mei 2001

https://www.news24.com/news24/giant-strijdom-statue-smashed-20010531

STRIJDOM SQUARE MASSACRE

Wikipedia

On 15 November 1988, white supremacist Barend Strydom carried out a shooting spree at Strijdom Square in central Pretoria, killing eight people and injuring 16 others. Seven of the victims were black, while one was Indian. Strydom was later convicted and sentenced to death for the attack but was released from prison as a political prisoner by F. W. de Klerk in

Op 15 November 1988 het die Barend Strydom 'n skiettog by Strijdomplein in sentraal Pretoria, uitgevoer, waartydens agt mense dood is en 16 ander beseer is. Sewe van die slagoffers was swart, terwyl een Indiër was. Strydom is later skuldig bevind en ter dood veroordeel vir die aanval, maar is in 1992 deur F. W. de Klerk as politieke gevangene uit die tronk vrygelaat en in

1992 and amnestied by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1994.

1994 deur die Waarheids- en Versoeningskommissie amnestie gegee.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strijdom_Square_massacre

BAREND STRYDOM

Deon Stidwell

‘n Interessante ding het voor Barend Strydom se eenman-aksie op Strydomplein gebeur. Ons het ‘n verslag en foto's van sy optrede gekry van ‘n bron. Hy was toe te Parys gestasioneer. As julle kan onthou moes die voorvalleboek (VB) weekliks in Afrikaans en die daaropvolgende week in Engels geskryf word. Hy’t geweier om enigiets in Engels te doen. Hy het ook by geleentheid die AWB-vlag in stede van die ou landsvlag voor die stasie gehys. Daar was ook ‘n paar foto’s in omloop waar hy met koppe van mense in sy een hand vashou en met ‘n mes in die ander hand. Die waarheid dat dit mense wat in ‘n ongeluk onthoof is. Hy het ook verskeie briewe na die kommissaris geskryf, veral om te kla oor die Engels...

BAREND STRYDOM

Genl JV van der Merwe

OP ʼn dag in September 1987 het mnr. Vlok my na sy kantoor ontbied en ʼn foto aan my gewys. ʼn Geskokte foto-ontwikkelaar van Heidelberg het sy persskakelbeampte, brig. Leon Mellet, oor die foto gebel en dit aan hom gestuur. Volgens die ontwikkelaar het ʼn konst. Strydom die negatief ingegee. Op die foto verskyn ʼn blanke polisiebeampte in volle uniform met die onthoofde kop van ʼn swartman in die een hand terwyl hy ʼn jagmes met die ander hand teen die onthoofde se keel hou.

Ek die saak dadelik laat ondersoek en vasgestel dat die polisieman op die foto konst. Barend Strydom van die Nigel-polisiekantoor is. Hy het by ʼn padongeluk wat die polisie ondersoek het, die onthoofde kop opgetel en die foto laat neem. Stappe is dadelik gedoen om konst. Strydom departementeel te laat vervolg met die oog daarop dat hy sielkundig behandel word. Hy het egter ontslag geneem voor die departementele verhoor kon begin.

Op 15 November 1988 het die polisie berig ontvang dat ʼn blanke man wild en wakker op swartmense op Strijdomplein in die middestad van Pretoria skiet. Hy is in hegtenis geneem en dit het geblyk Barend Strydom te wees. Hy het 8 swartmense doodgeskiet en 16 gewond, sommige baie ernstig.

Die Nasionale Party se kongres was in dié stadium in die Pretoriase stadsaal aan die gang en ek het mnr. Vlok oor die voorval gaan inlig. Gedagtig aan die feit dat daar by so ʼn kongres soms onnadenkende dinge gesê word, het ek terloops opgemerk: “Minister, onthou net vir meneer Jimmy Kruger.” Mnr. Jimmy Kruger was Minister van Justisie toe Steve Biko, leier van die swart bewussynsbeweging, in September 1977 in polisie-aanhouding dood is. Mnr. Kruger het in reaksie hierop gesê Biko se dood laat hom koud. Die media het hom verguis oor dié uitlating en dit het sy politieke loopbaan vernietig.

Tydens Strydom se verhoor het dit geblyk dat sy optrede uit haat vir swartmense gespruit het en dat hy inderdaad ernstige afwykings gehad het. Die doodstraf is in Mei 1989 aan hom opgelê, wat versag is tot lewenslange gevangenisstraf toe die doodstraf in 1990 afgeskaf word. In 1993 is hy saam met 175 lede van die ANC, wat almal lang vonnisse gehad het, deur die Staatspresident, mnr. F.W. de Klerk, vrygelaat ingevolge die sogenaamde Record of understanding. (bl 91).

EUGENE TERRE’BLANCHE

Genl JV van der Merwe

“Die bevinding van die kommissie is op 25 Maart 1998 bekend gemaak. Hierin word kritiek uitgespreek op mnr. Lucas Mangope en sy regering, maar veral op mnr. Mangope, die SuidAfrikaanse regering en die Uitvoerende Oorgangsraad, die Afrikaner-Volksfront en genl. Constand Viljoen by name, die AWB en mnr. Eugène Terre’Blanche, die ANC, asook die Polisie. Elkeen is in mindere of meerdere mate vir die geweldpleging aanspreeklik gehou. Dit is opvallend dat die ANC, wat hom daarop toegespits het om die onafhanklikheid van Bophuthatswana te vernietig, en na my mening die onluste in Bophuthatswana ontketen het, die ligste daarvan afgekom het in die kommissie se kritiek.

Eugène Terre’Blanche was ʼn lid van die veiligheidstak voor hy uit die Polisie bedank het. As polisieman het hy hom op die gebied van drama onderskei en hy was ʼn dinamiese spreker. Ek en mnr. Hernus Kriel het in 1993 met hom en lede van die AWB samesprekinge gevoer oor opleiding wat die AWB aan regse ondersteuners wou bied. Dit was egter in stryd met wetgewing wat private instansies verbied het om mense militêr op te lei. Tydens die samesprekinge het mnr. Kriel opgemerk: “Eugène, waarom los jy en die AWB nie julle twak en kom help die Polisie nie?” Terre’Blanche het daarop geantwoord: “Minister, as jy ons nodig het, is ek daar met my stukkende groen onderbroek en al.” Die opmerking oor die onderbroek het verband gehou met beweringe dat hy ʼn verhouding met Jani Allen, ’n rubriekskryfster van die Sunday Times, gehad het. Jani se

woonstelmaat het haar op ’n keer deur ’n sleutelgat afgeloer terwyl sy en Terre’Blanche alleen in ʼn kamer was – net Terre’Blanche se stukkende groen onderbroek was sigbaar”

KONSTABEL EUGENE TERRE’BLANCHE

Foto via Deon Stidwell

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie bestaan uit mense van verskillende rasse en kulture met een gemeenskaplike doel: Om die mense van Suid-Afrika te dien en beskerm. Baie lede is direk van die skool na die polisie, met geen naspeurbare agtergrond nie. Daar was lede wat nooit die kalklig gekom het nie Ander lede was bekend en bemind veral ons befaamde rugbyspelers.

Eugene Terre’Blanche was ‘n Afrikaner-kultuur mens – eers was hy lid van die SAP se kultuur-organisasie bekend as Akpol waar hy in verskeie toneel-opvoerings deelgeneem het. Hy was ‘n demagoog wat ‘n skare kon opsweep. Hy is later op sy plaas vermoor.

Ons moet elke persoon in konteks beoordeel. Ek wens iemand wil ‘n artikel oor Eugene

Terre’Blanche en ander lede skryf soos Piet Rudolph skryf – oudlede wat by verregse bedrywighede bekend geraak het.

SA POLICE EXPLOSIVES UNIT - OPS RACHEL - MOZAMBIQUE

Ben Diedericks

Goeie dag Brigadier

Hierby ingesluit 'n kort beskrywing van OPS RACHEL, deur Ettiene Hennop van Safer Africa en paar foto’s van "cache" wat gelig word, verskeie plofwapentuig, vuurwapens en ammunisie.

Vriendelike Groete

Ben Diedericks

• Ben ongelukkig is daar kopiereg op die boekie deur mnr Hennop – HBH

SPRINGSTOFSEKSIE: VEILIGHEIDSHOOFKANTOOR: BRIEFBOMME

Kol William Marshall (SAW)

KOMMENTAAR BRIEF- EN PAKKETBOMME

Philip Malherbe Lt. Kol. (afgetree)

'N briefbom is 'n klein bom wat as 'n brief- of pakketbom vermom is en deur die pos aan iemand gestuur word. Dit is ontwerp om te ontplof wanneer dit oopgemaak word.

Briefbom

https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/bomb-disposal-gm17860186524378664?searchscope=image%2Cfilm

Pakketbom

https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/bomb-disposal-gm17860186524378664?searchscope=image%2Cfilm

Pakketbom

https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/bomb-disposal-gm17860186524378664?searchscope=image%2Cfilm

Pakketbom, met tydskakelaar, springdoppie en plofstof

https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/bomb-disposal-gm17860186524378664?searchscope=image%2Cfilm

Plofstofdeskundige met bompak

https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/bomb-disposal-gm17860186524378664?searchscope=image%2Cfilm

Toeligting

Alhoewel dit moeilik is om verdagte briewe of pakkette aan die voorkoms te herken kan die volgende help; eienaardige handskrif; gebrek aan elastisiteit; ongebalanseerd, bv abnormale gewig - buite verhouding met die grootte; drade wat tasbaar is of opsigtelik is; sigbare gaatjies; olierige of vetterige merke en eienaardige reuke. Dit is baie belangrik om nie die verdagte brief of pakket te skud, buig of dit onnodig te hanteer nie.

Ander tipe “briefbom” – “anthrax aanvalle – briewe met miltsiektespore”

Laboratorium tegnicitoon ʼn “anthrax”- besmette brief, geadresseer aan Senator Leahy, nadat dit veilig oopgemaak is in November 2001. https://www.google.com/search?q=Anthrax+letters+to+USA+congress+men&sca_esv=0fe0 AI

Die miltsiekte -aanvalle in 2001, ook bekend as Amerithrax ('n kombinasie van "Amerika" en "miltsiekte", uit sy FBI -saaknaam) het in die loop van 'n paar weke in die Verenigde State plaasgevind vanaf 18 September 2001, 'n week na die tereuraanvalle op 11 September. Briewe met miltsiektespore is aan verskeie nuusmediakantore en aan senatore Tom Daschle en Patrick Leahy gestuur, vyf mense dood en 17 ander besmet. Capitol-polisiebeamptes en personeellede wat vir senator Russ Feingold werk, is ook blootgestel. Volgens die FBI het die daaropvolgende ondersoek "een van die grootste en mees komplekse in die geskiedenis van wetstoepassing" geword.[3]

Miltsiekte is 'n ernstige aansteeklike siekte wat veroorsaak word deur gram-positiewe, staafvormige bakterieë bekend as “Bacillus anthracis”. Dit kom natuurlik in grond voor en raak gewoonlik huishoudelike en wilde diere regoor die wêreld. Mense kan siek word met miltsiekte as hulle in aanraking kom met besmette diere of besmette diereprodukte.

Briewe met miltsiektespore is aan verskeie nuusmediakantore en aan senatore Tom Daschle en Patrick Leahy gestuur, vyf mense dood en 17 ander besmet. Capitol -polisiebeamptes en personeellede wat vir senator Russ Feingold werk, is ook blootgestel.

Bruce Ivins, van die outeur briewe het later selfmoord gepleeg.

Wat het die miltsiektebriewe gesê?

Benewens miltsiektepoeier, bevat sommige van die briewe ook dreigende aantekeninge met radikale Islamitiese retoriek, insluitend frases soos "Death to America. Die dood vir Israel. Allah is Groot." 04 Okt 2018

Hoekom het Bruce Ivins miltsiektebriewe gestuur?

Ivins het vermoedelik die aanvalle gepleeg uit 'n angs dat sy toesighouers beplan het om sy miltsiektenavorsing te beëindig en hom weer toe te ken om aan 'n ander patogeen (navorsing oor

siektes) te werk. Volgens hierdie verduideliking het Ivins die briewe gepos om te verseker dat miltsiekte-navorsing 'n prioriteit by die Amerikaanse weermag se mediese navorsingsinstituut bly. Motief

Onbekend; moontlike geestesongesteldheid of verjonging van 'n mislukking miltsiekteentstofprogram by Fort Meade

Bronne:

Plofstowwe Handleiding Plofstofdeskundiges

https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/bomb-disposal-gm17860186524378664?searchscope=image%2Cfilm

https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/amerithrax-or-anthrax-investigation

https://www.google.com/search?q=Anthrax+letters+to+USA+congress+men&sca_esv=0fe0

AI

VLAKPLAAS

Wikipedia

Coordinates: 25°49′3.01″S 28°1′41.44″E

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Vlakplaas

Wikimedia | © OpenStreetMap

Province Gauteng

Country South Africa

Coordinates 25°49′01.3″S 28°01′39.6″E

Area 100 hectares

Section C1 of the Security Branch

"Vlakplaas"

Active 1979–1993

Country South Africa

Type Counterinsurgency unit, paramilitary death squad

Part of Security Branch of the South African Police

Headquarters Vlakplaas, Gauteng

25°49′01.3″S 28°01′39.6″E

Commanders

Notable

commanders

Part of a series on

Apartheid

• Dirk Coetzee (1980–1981)

• Eugene de Kock (1985–1993)

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Category

Vlakplaas (trans. "shallow farm") is a farm 20 km west of Pretoria that served as the headquarters of counterinsurgency unit C1 (later called C10)[1][2][3] of the Security Branch of the apartheidera South African Police. Though officially called Section C1, the unit itself also became known as Vlakplaas. Established in 1979, by 1990 it had grown from a small unit of five policemen and about fifteen askaris to a unit of nine squads.[1]

The unit functioned as a paramilitary hit squad,[4] capturing political opponents of the apartheid government and either "turning" (converting) or executing them. Vlakplaas farm was the site of multiple executions of political opponents of the apartheid government.[5] The unit is known to have carried out the murders of Griffiths Mxenge in 1981 and the so-called "Chesterville Four" in 1986, among many others.[6] C1 officers were also notorious for allegedly routinely defrauding the state, siphoning off government funds to pay agents or for their personal use.[1]

The existence of the unit was revealed after a former member, Butana Almond Nofomela, confessed to his involvement hours before he was scheduled to be executed for an unrelated non-political murder. Nofomela was given a last minute reprieve so he could give up more information.[7][8]

The farm[edit]

The land at Vlakplaas was bought by the police in 1979 and later transferred to the national Department of Public Works. When the police vacated the farm in the mid-1990s, it was left in the hands of a caretaker, named Louis Steyn.[9] In 2001, the government held a traditional healing

ceremony at the farm and announced its intention to transfer the land to the Department of Arts and Culture, in order to turn it into a museum. However, Steyn successfully challenged his eviction in the High Court.[9]

In August 2007, the Department of Science and Technology announced that the farm would be repurposed as a centre for healing. The centre would conduct research into plants used in traditional medicine, and promote collaboration between practitioners of western medicine and traditional healers [10] However, years later, Steyn continued to inhabit the farm. He left in 2012, passing the land on to friends, who in turn passed it on to a Christian ministry, Kuriaké, which used it to establish an addiction rehabilitation centre. The ministry was evicted in June 2014, at which point the government planned to transfer it to the Department of Arts and Culture for use as a heritage site.[9] Commanding officers[edit]

C1 was commanded by:[1][6][11]

• Johannes Jacobus Victor (1979–80)

• Dirk Coetzee (1980–81)

• Jan Carel Coetzee (1982)

• Jack Cronje (1983–85)

• Eugene de Kock (1985–93)

See also[edit]

• Civil Cooperation Bureau

• Bureau of State Security

References[edit]

1. ^ Jump up to:a b c d O'Brien, Kevin (1 September 2001). "Counter-Intelligence for counter-revolutionary warfare: The South African police security branch 1979–1990". Intelligence and National Security. 16 (3): 27–59. doi:10.1080/02684520412331306200 ISSN 0268-4527 S2CID 153561623

2. ^ Gump, James Oliver (2016). The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux. U of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-8453-1

3. ^ Scholtz-Hofmeyr, Renzske (2011). "The farm" (PDF) (MA thesis). Cape Town: University of Cape Town.

4. ^ The Role of Political Violence in South Africa's Democratisation

5. ^ Truth and Reconciliation - The Voice of 'Prime Evil' - BBC News

6. ^ Jump up to:a b Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (PDF). Vol. 2. Cape Town: The Commission. 1998.

7. ^ "Vlakplaas Commander testifies before Harms Commission about secret police killings in 1981 | South African History Online". www.sahistory.org.za. Retrieved 14 July 2023.

8. ^ Schiffrin, Anya. "Exposing apartheid death squads – A trail of murder and terror" City Press. Retrieved 14 July 2023.

9. ^ Jump up to:a b c "State gets Vlakplaas back after 20 years". News24. 20 July 2014. Retrieved 13 December 2021.

10.^ Vlakplaas to become centre for healing - Khumalani

11.^ "Hearing: General Johannes Viktor". Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 1996. Retrieved 26 November 2021.

Further reading[edit]

• Binckes, Robin (2018). Vlakplaas: Apartheid Death Squads, 1979–1994. Pen and Sword. ISBN 978-1-5267-2922-4

• Dlamini, Jacob (2015). Askari: A Story of Collaboration and Betrayal in the Anti-apartheid Struggle. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-027738-3

• Laurence, Patrick (1990). Death Squads: Apartheid's Secret Weapon. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-014937-1.

• Pauw, Jacques (2017). Into the Heart of the Whore: The Story of Apartheid's Death Squads. Jonathan Ball Publishers. ISBN 978-1-86842-895-3

External links[edit]

• Witch Doctors 'cleanse' Vlakplaas

• Vlakplaas proposed as museum

• Vlakplaas and the murder of Griffiths Mxenge https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vlakplaas afgelaai op 25 April 2024.

VLAKPLAAS: DIE BEGIN

Kol Gawie Richter

Die behoefte aan ‘n veilige hawe, ‘n sogenaamde “safe house”, het ontstaan toe ANC militêre opgeleide terroriste gedurende Desember 1968 saam met lede van die Rhodesiese ZANLAterroriste ‘n wit boer en sy vrou op ‘n plaas in Matabeleland vermoor het. Dit het uitgeloop op gevegte met die Rhodesiese Veiligheidsmagte, waartydens ANC-terroriste gedood en gearresteer is. Hierna het lede van die SA Polisiemag in Rhodesië gaan diens doen. Tydens ondervraging van hierdie ANC-opgeleides het dit aan die lig gekom dat verskeie van hulle kamerade vanuit opleidingskampe en basisse gedros en na die RSA onderweg is. Van hierdie uitgewekenes was glo gemartel, uit vrees dat hulle RSA-spioene is.

Uit vrees vir vergelding en weerwraak wou hulle om die dood nie na hulle huise of waar hulle bekend was gesien wees nie. Met die gevolg dat van hierdie mense vir hulle lewe en veiligheid deur sekere lede van ons eenheid heimlik versteek is7 .

‘n Gesindheidsverandering sou plaasgevind het, indien hierdie mense in tronke of gevangenisse opgesluit sou word. Gevolglik is hulle vir die opspoor en uitkenning van militêr opgeleides wat sou insypel, aangewend. Staatsgetuies in politieke sake het ook ‘n probleem geword, omdat hulle gedreig met die dood gedreig was, indien hulle sou getuig. Tydens en met die eerste demokratiese verkiesing is dit dmv die ‘necklace-moorde’ gemanifesteer.

Gevolglik was dit staatsgetuies asook ondersoekbeamptes en geheime agente wat beskerm moes word, waarvoor huisvesting nodig was. Hoewel hierdie behoefte voortgeduur het, het ek eers op XX XX XXXX8 die opdrag ontvang om ‘n plaas so na as moontlik aan Pretoria te identifiseer wat vir die betrokke doel geskik sou wees.

Na besigtiging het die keuse op Vlakplaas, tussen die Schurweberge en Erasmia, geval. Die groot en gerieflike plaashuis het aan meneer Gert Stewart behoort. Hy het op die Rand gewerk en oor naweke groente verbou. Dit sou enige latere suspisies voorkom.

Aanvanklik is Vlakplaas vir boerdery aangewend, terwyl staatsgetuies en drosters vanaf die terroriste opleidingskampe uit Afrika daar geakkommodeer is.

Lekker gelag

Vir die begin het ek twee boerbokke op Hammanskraal gekoop. Dit was twee yslike groot ramme en moes R1 000 stuk vir teeldoeleindes betaal. Een oggend bel die Konstabel wat die plek moes

7 Gawie Richter vertel in ‘n persoonlike onderhoud dat hierdie opgeleide terroriste eers by lede se huise in die bediende kwartiere gebly het. Lede van die V-Tak se vrouens was maar onrustig oor hierdie tydelike reeling. (Onderhoud – Gawie Richter – Hennie Heymans op 11 Febr 2010)

8 Die datum van my opdrag was ongeveer ‘n maand voor die plaas aangekoop is.

oppas en vertel dat die een bok se pens vreeslik opgeblaas is. In daardie omgewing is ‘n tipe “pol” of blaargif wat die diere laat opblaas en dan vrek!! Ek stuur toe vir hom medisyne vanaf Leeuwbrug (Pokon) wat per bottel op ‘n pyp by sy bek ingegee moes word. (Maar Hennie ek sê vir jou ‘n bom as die gemors by die bek uitgeblaas word!) Ek se vir die Mannetjie om mooi op sy hurke regvoor die bok moet staan en die bottel met Pokon in die keel af te gooi.

Na ‘n rukkie bel hy my terug en vloek - jy weet mos hoe stink pensmis – daarna het hy geweet om bokke te behandel – ‘n stink les!

VLAKPLAAS

Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie

Inleiding

Ek het in Pretoria groot geword maar is gedurende 1946 in Port Elizabeth gebore. My eerste skool was Honingneskransskool, dis daar op die Warmbadpad en toe is ek na Andries Pretorius Laerskool en daarna na Langenhoven Hoërskool waar ek gedurende 1964 gematrikuleer het.

Gedurende 1965 is ek na die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiekollege in Pretoria-Wes. Na ses maande het ek uitpasseer en is na Hoofkantoor, Medies: Finansieel, verplaas. Hier ek het vir ’n paar jaar gewerk en het toe aansoek gedoen om ’n polisiemotorwerktuigkundige te word. Ek is toe na die SuidAfrikaanse Polisie Meganiese Skool te Benoni verplaas. Ek het nie baie van die werk gehou nie en na ongeveer vier maande is ek weer na die Mediese Finansiële Seksie te Hoofkantoor verplaas. Ek het begin om ’n regte “Hoofkantoor-Johnnie” te word. Intussen gedurende 1971 is ’n ander lid, ’n regte ‘stasie-haas’, ook na ons seksie verplaas. Hy word toe vir grensdiens genomineer. Hy was al baie op die Grens en was nie baie lus om te gaan nie. Ek het toe aangebied om in sy plek diens te doen.

Ek is toe na die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiekollege gestuur vir ’n ‘grens-kursus’. Die was teoretiese aspekte en baie liggaamsoefeninge was in die Kollege verrig. Soggens 0400 het ons ons teerpale opgetel en daarmee gedraf tot by Koos-Kokkerot se winkel en terug. Van die Kollege is ons na Maleoskop vir die praktiese opleiding. Na voltooiing van my opleiding het ek in Maleoskop agtergebly as ’n instrukteur. Ek het die tipe werk vreeslik geniet. Dit was beter as die kantoorwerk. In daardie tyd was Majoor DNS Erasmus die BO van Maleoskop. Na hom was Jan Brand in-bevel met “Lollo” van Vuuren as die 2de-in- bevel en met Gert Dempers as derde-in-bevel. Later het kolonel Minnie oorgeneem met Jan Brand as sy tweede-in-bevel. Ek het grensdiens in Rhodesië

Wyle Snor Vermeulen

vervul en was eers aan 1 Commando: Rhodesian Light Infantry en later aan 3 Commando: Rhodesian Light Infantry verbonde. In Rhodesië het ek ook ‘n Patu9-kursus suksesvol voltooi. Ek is terug na Groblersdal as instrukteur tot en met 1976.

Spesiale Taakmag

Gedurende 1976 is die eerste lede van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie vir die Spesiale Taakmag gekeur. Ek het aansoek gedoen en het die keuring geslaag. In daardie dae was die bevelvoerder van die Taakmag luit-kol Dries “Krullebol” Verwey en kaptein SJ de Swardt was 2de-in-bevel. Later het majoor LPE “Louwtjie” Malan die 2de-in-bevel geword.

So deur my loopbaan het ek dikwels op die grensdiens gedoen en vir luitenant/kaptein Eugene de Kock van Koevoet ontmoet. As lid van die Spesiale Taakmag het ek baie opknappingskursusse in Ovamboland aangebied en bygewoon. Ekhet Eugene de Kockdeur sersant RoelfPretoriusontmoet wat vir kapt Eugene de Kock goed geken het. As lid van die Spesiale Taakmag het ek ook diens verrig by Koevoet om op hoogte van die nuutste tegnieke te kom. Ek het diens verrig met kaptein de Kock op Zulu Delta. Ek het ook met Frans Conradie van Koevoet saamgewerk. Hier ek het baie gevegsondervinding opgedoen.

Tydens my diens termyn is Suidwes-Afrika het ek baie geleenthede saam met makkers in SAW Spesmagte besoek en gedagtes uitgeruil. Op geleenthede het ons die SAW se voertuigparke betree en voertuie vir die polisie “gesteel” of “bekom”. Hierdie operasies het op eie inisiatief geskied. Ek persoonlik het baie springstof en wapens by die SAW “bekom” en dit vir SAP doeleindes aangewend. Snor: “Verseker het ek die SAW bedonder deur te “bekom’ terwyl ek hulle in die oë kyk het. Ek het springstof, ontstekers, myne, plastiese springstof - ek het seker 3 ton springstof bekom. Seker 90% van die items is gebruik vir opleiding.”

Gedurende ons verblyf in die Noorde van Suid-wes Afrika het ons agter gekom dat die SAW oor groot hoeveelhede Russiese wapens en ammunisie beskik wat ons graag wou hê en graag wou gebruik. Ons polisiemanne het besluit om die SAW van hierdie geweldige “las” te verlig. Ons het slegs Russiese masjiengewere (kal. 7,62 en 14,5 ) bekom en die ammunisie daarvoor aangeskaf. Hierdie wapens het “mooi gewerk – verseker!” Ons het baie keer met ons “kontakte” gereël dat die wagte SAW-wagte besig gehou word terwyl ons ons die voorraad aanvul. Een van my maatjies, die kontakman, het soms die wagte besig gehou of hul vermaan om nie na sekere dele van die voertuigpark te gaan nie of om nie aandag te skenk aan verdagte geluide nie – dan het ons deurgegaan en die oes ingesamel.

Terug in Suid-Afrika is ek eendag na brigadier Wandrag se huis. Hy was oorhoofs in-bevel van die Spesiale Taakmag. Hy was siek in die bed. Ek vir Tannie Dimpels Wandrag gesê ek wil die Brigadier

9 Patu = Police Anti-terrorist Unit (Rhodesia)

sien. Ek het op die bed gaan sit en met hom gepraat. Later het ek soos ‘n kind gehuil en vir hom gesê ek is moeg vir die Taakmag se stories. Ek wil na “C-seksie” te Veiligheidshoofkantoor toe gaan om saam met kapt de Kock te veg. Huilend het ek vir hom gesê ek het 20 jaar oor om te veg!!! Brig Wandrag het toe my verplasing goed gekeur. Ek onthou die dag soos gister - toe ek het met my flentergat-motorfiets by sy huis in Saxbyweg, Eldoraigne, opgedaag het.

Van Spesialetaakmag na Veiligheidshoofkantoor: Gedurende 1985 tot in 1994 was ek lid van “C”-seksie te Veiligheidshoofkantoor.

Gedurende, ek dink dit was, 1983 is kaptein EA de Kock van Koevoet na Veiligheidshoofkantoor verplaas. Ek het met my vriend, kaptein De Kock vir wie ek baie bewondering gehad het, gaan gesels. Ek wou van die Spesiale Taakmag na “C” seksie by Veiligheidshoofkantoor verplaas word. Gedurende 1985 word ek op ses-maande proef by Veiligheidshoofkantoor se “C”-seksie aangestel.

As ‘n oud-Takie was ek baie fiks, ek was ook ‘n skerpskutter, plofstofdeskundige, skuba-duiker, valskermspringer en wapeninstrukteur. Ek was ‘n kundige op westerse- sowel as Oosblok-lande se wapentuig. Ek was ‘n kundige van vuurwapens tot mortiere. In kort ek het alles geweet van “baklei”.

Vlakplaas

Gedurende 1985 het ek te Vlakplaas begin en ek en my span is na Soweto gestuur. Hier moes ons teruggekeerde terroriste opspoor. Ons span was baie suksesvol om hierdie mense op te spoor. My span het uit ongeveer 20 askari’s bestaan. Om naby ons teiken area te wees het ons ‘n ou myn naby Krugersdorp betrek. Ons het daagliks na Soweto en terug gependel. In Soweto het ons met luitenant-kolonel “Sallas”, a/o Frans van Tonder en die latere bekende “Chappies” Klopper geskakel. My span en ek het ook in ander plekke in die RSA gewerk, onder andere in die Transkei. Hier was ons ook besonder suksesvol.

Valskermspring

Ons bevelvoerder, Eugene de Kock het eendag besluit dat ons hele seksie en die askari’s ‘n bietjie opskerping nodig het. Aandag is aan verskeie tegnieke en wapenopleiding gegee, ook moes ons huispenetrasies beoefen. Die Kaptein het besluit dat ons ook moes valskermspring om kameraderie te bevorder.

Adj-off Lionel Snyman en ek moes ‘n spesiale teeninsurgensiekursus beplan waarvan valskerm deel was van die ontwerp. Die kursus het drie weke geduur en is deur luit-kol Eugene de Kock goedgekeur. Die kursus was te Penge-myn aangebied. Ons het as ‘n span na die Penge-myn te Burgersfort-distrik vertrek waar die opleiding plaasgevind het. Hier te Penge, in die ou myn dorpie, is al die oefeninge gedoen. Die finale fase het lang geweer en mortier oefeninge behels wat te Maleoskop aangebied was, teen die einde van die kursus. Ons het die manne opgeskerp in plofstofoefeninge. Deel van die kursus was ‘n basiese kursus in springstof. Te Phalaborwa is ook die

praktiese spring met valskerms gedoen. Persone moes vyf statiese-lyn spronge doen om vir die eenheid se vlerkies te kwalifiseer.

Dave Baker en Martiens Ras het goed gevorder en vir basiese vryval spronge gekwalifiseer. Meeste van die askari’s en ook die skoonmaker, Vaseline, het gespring en vir ‘vlerkies’ gekwalifiseer. Ons het Ou Vaseline as ons ‘mascot’ – of gelukbringer – aanvaar, hy het een sprong suksesvol voltooi. Die manne is ook met sertifikate uitgereik. Ek het meer as 1 200 spronge uitgevoer – later het ek nie meer logboek gehou van my spronge nie. Die eenheid was nooit, so ver ek daarvan bewus was, operasioneel ontplooi nie. Ons het uit staatsfondse twee vierkantige valskerms aangekoop. Baie lede het meer as die vereiste vyf spronge uitgevoer.

Post 1994

Na 1994 het ons eenheid nie meer na terroriste gesoek nie en is op ‘georganiseerde misdaadintelligensie’ gebruik. Ons het toe inligting mbt misdaad ingewin. Hier het ons saam met Ferdie Barnard. Hy is tans saam met kolonel Eugene de Kock in die tronk. Hy is ook betrokke gewees in die Webster-saak. Ferdie Barnard was ook eers ‘n polisieman. Hy het later ’n bron geword en is aangekeer vir besit van vervalste geld. Ons het motordiefstal-, ivoor- en renosterhoringsindikate oopgevlek. (Eugene was toe in bevel van die operasie) Ek het die helfte van die operasie se geld gedra – my deel het R250 000 beloop. Reeds in 1993 het besluit dat die tyd aangebreek het dat ek die Mag moes verlaat. Ek is toe gedurende 1994 agv mediese redes ontslaan. Wanindrukke

Daar is geweldig baie wanindrukke oor ons seksie wat te Veiligheidshoofkantoor gesetel was. Ons het vreeslik hard gewerk en wanneer ons “af” was het ons lekker gespeel. Ons kon partykeer ‘hard’ drink – ek kan amper sê ‘party hou’ was ‘n vereiste-ontspanning! Dit was deel van ons ontlading gewees.

Minister Adriaan Vlok

Minister Adriaan Vlok het gereeld Vlakplaas besoek. Hy het ons spesifiek na suksesvolle operasies besoek en ook teen die einde van die maand wanneer die verskillende spanne teruggekeer het na Vlakplaas. Ons het alle suksesvolle operasies gevier met ‘n paar doppe en ‘n braaivleis – dit was goed vir ons moreel. Mnr Vlok het saam met ons gedrink – hy het ‘n bestuurder gehad. Eendag het mnr Vlok se bestuurder ons kroeg met ‘n das betree. Ons het hom versoek om sy dag af te haal. Hy het geweier. Ons het sy modieuse leer das afgesny en in die kroeg vasgespyker. Dit wil voorkom asof die mannetjie ons met ‘n passie gehaat het!!

Generaal Basie Smit het ook Vlakplaas besoek en ons het altyd Chivas Reagal vir hom reggehad. Ek en ou David “Duiwel” Brits het altyd die res van die Chivas Reagal met Coke uitgedrink! Hy en ek was die kelners in die kroeg.

Ek konstateer die volgende as ‘n feit: Ons het nooit gesuip as ons uitgegaan het nie! Dit was ernstig teen kolonel De Kock se reëls. Operasioneel was ons droog. Na operasies kon ons wegbreek!

Soeweniers

Ons het soeweniers geneem - geen vingers of ore geneem nie – ook nie hul geld gesteel nie! Indien daar geld was het aan die lyf van ANC-terroriste het ons dit by die plaaslike veiligheidstak inbetaal.

Tokkie Bezuidenhout

Tokkie Bezuidenhout waarvan daar in Vrye Weekblad geskryf word was ook ‘n askari-polisieman. Tokkie se naam was Tokarev vir sy vyande, maar ons het hom Tokkie genoem. Ek weet nie waar vandaan hy gekom het nie, maar hy was nie ‘n polisieman nie. Ek weet hy was opgelei te Quatro –snaaks eers was hy by die AWB en later by die ANC! Hy het ‘n girlfriend gehad wat van die OosRand gekom het. Hy het iewers aan die Oos-Rand gewoon. Ons was drie weke per slag uit – die ander week was hy huistoe na die Oos-Rand. Ou Tokkie het ook die valskerm-kursus suksesvol voltooi. Hy het goeie gevegsagtergrond gehad en kom valskerms pak.

Hugh Lugg

Hugh Lugg was ook op Vlakplaas ‘n askari. Hy en sy groep het Voortrekkerhoogte per mortiere aangeval. Hy was ook ‘n kenner op mortiere. Hy het ‘n staatsgetuie geword. In hulle groepie was daar friksie agv ‘n vroumens. Hulle is nogal deur ‘n padblokkade waar luit Sakkie Morkel in bevel was!! Lugg was te SAP Moot aangehou en toe is hy as askari na ons oorgeplaas. Steve Bosch was sy ‘hanteerder’. Ek kan onthou dat ‘n landmyn-ontsteker sy hand beseer het. Later, dink ek, is hy na Engeland gedeporteer.

Operasies

Ek het aan die volgende operasies deelgeneem:

• Operasie Vuil in Swaziland

• Kanya Huis opgeblaas en Cosatu Huis opgeblaas.

• Mnr Vlok het ons geluk gewens nadat ons die Roomse Kerk se geboue opgeblaas het. Held

Ek het opgesien na kol Eugene de Kock en naby sy voorskrifte gelewe. Ek weet nie waar die naam Prime Evil vandaan kom nie – ons het hom beslis nie so genoem nie. Hoe kan ons dit omdraai? Merke

Wat handgranate betref het ek te laat geleer dat daar ’n verskil is tussen die SAW en die SAP se handgranate. Die SAP handgranate het ’n merkie op die ontstekingsmeganisme gehad terwyl die SAW handgranate dit nie gehad het nie. Ons het baie van die vyand se ammunisie skadeloos gestel.

• Verbatim afgeneem deur HBH

VLAKPLAAS FOTO ALBUM

Wyle Snor Vermeulen & Lionel Snyman

‘N HISTORIESE EN STRATEGIESE WAARDERING VAN KOL EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: DEEL 1

Brig HB Heymans

Kol EA de Kock is vandag ‘n vry man wat sy skuld aan die mense van Suid-Afrika dubbel en dwars betaal het. Sy voormalige opponente het hom as ‘n vry man uit die gevangenis ontslaan. Dit is nie ‘n feeverhaal om ‘n minderheidsgroep in ‘n multikulturele gevangenisbevolking te verteenwoordig nie. Nongqai het bietjie met kol De Kock gesels en met verloop van tyd sal ons artikels oor hom die lig laat sien. Hy was immers die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie se spesialis teen-terreur operateur

Inleiding

Tussen 1961 en 1994 was RSA in ‘n felle stryd gewikkel, enersyds binnelands aangevuur deur die SAKP en andersyds was ons deel van die Weste en betrek by die Koue-oorlog wat geduur het van 1945 tot 1989. Die ongelyke interne stryd is binnelands en buitelands gevoer met die SuidAfrikaanse Polisie wat die kits-oplossing vir alle probleme was. Die veiligheidstrukture het nie seepglad gewerk nie en was eintlik soms disfunksioneel. Hier dink mens aan die SVR, SSVR, die GBS’e, die IDK’s soos die GVS, KIK, Trewits – en met Vlakplaas vir die sjirurgiese koverte optredes.

Wat militêre teikens betref het die Recce’s van die SAW opgetree. Op die internasionale vlak was Suid-Afrika weens sy binnelandse beleid as ‘n muishond onder die nasies gereken. Die Anglo Boere-oorlog was nie verby nie. Op politieke vlak het die Engelse pers die Afrikaanse Nasionale Party goed geroskam. Baie van die plaaslike Engelse media het in die buiteland uitgeslaan en die politieke temperatuur verder laat styg. Die gevolg is sanksies op meeste lewensterreine: wapens, ekonomie, kultuur en sport. Suid-Afrikaners was in baie lande nie welkom nie.

Blanke Suid-Afrika het ‘n spreekwoordelike laer getrek en die bevolking is bang gemaak en in die laer gehou met temas die “rooi-gevaar, die swart-gevaar, die geel-gevaar, die Roomse-gevaar”, die “ver-regses en die linkses”. Intussen was die oplossing die tuisland-beleid - die onafhanklike state en die nasionale state moes hul eie gebied regeer Daar was plaaslike suksesse maar die SAKPANC-Alliansie was nie daarmee te vrede nie. (Kyk maar net hoe lyk dinge vandag!) Vir die Indiërs en Bruinmense was daar later voorsiening gemaak vir eie meganismes – vir sogenaamde “eie sake” Later was daar die mislukte “drie-kamer” parlement. Die reaksie daarop was mense soos dr Alan Boesak en die UDF.

Die stryd en aanslag het bestaan uit ‘n felle, goed georkestreerde politieke oorlog – een wat ons nie kon wen nie! Die georkestreerde, veel-dimensionele politieke oorlog is binnelands sowel as buitelands gevoer. Die regering het soms desperate pogings aangewend en die polisie is gesien as ‘n “quick fix” -oplossing met onder andere kol De Kock as die “Go to Man”. Die fisiese stryd op die slagveld het ons maklik gewen. Ons het die oorlog gewen maar die politiek verloor.

Die stryd was aanvanklik volgens die sogenaamde “Queensbury Rules” geveg en die bekamping van die aanslag was aanvanklik “hof-gerig”. Op 16 Desember 1961 het die SAKP/ANC-alliansie MK tot stand gebring. Dit was ‘n ondergrondse afdeling wat die SAP(VT) genoodsaak het, om sy bekampingsmetodes aan te pas. Na die klopjag op Rivonia en die arrestasie van adv Bram Fischer – leier van die SAKP – het die land ‘n mate van rustigheid beleef. Geen klagtes van aanranding op lede van die SAKP/ANC-alliansie is gemaak nie. Die insurgensie stryd het op 26 Augustus 1966 in SWA afgeskop.

In “ons operasionele wêreld” was die KGB en GRU ‘n werklikheid, ook was die CIA en MI6 betrap dat hulle op ons spioeneer het. Die KGB het sy 13de afdeling (later afdeling V) gehad. Die Mossad, MI6 en die CIA om ‘n paar te noem het ook van koverte sluipmoord-taktieke gebruik gemaak. Sluipmoord as ‘n gevegsmetode werk nie eintlik nie – dit keer nie ‘n rewolusie nie. Ja, wanneer die vyand se agente oorgrens geneutraliseer word, as hulle op die punt staan om ons mense te kom aanval, uit te wis is van groot waarde.

Ek was ‘n voorstander van die Europese kontinent se manier van polisieer. Die “gewone” siviele polisie dien deurgaans die publiek op grondvlak – hulle beskerm en dien op die tuisfront. Die derde

mag – die gendarmerie, marechaussee of konstabelmag - is ‘n semi-militêre mag wat die staat se hoogste belange dien nl grensbewaking, -beskerming, teen insurgensie en grootskaalse onrus en onluste bekamp. Die twee magte werk afsonderlik, die een werk vir binnelandse sake en die ander mag werk vir die departement van justisie.

Kol EA de Kock

Hy sluit by die SA Polisie aan nadat hy diensplig in die SAW gedoen het. Hier in die SAW het hy, as gretige student, ‘n basiese kennis van krygskuns opgedoen. In die SAW verrig hy gedurende 1967 grensdiens langs die Limpopo-rivier. Hy verrig diens as lid van die SAP in die teen-insurgensie afdeling. Hy was 45 maande in die bos en weer in die SWA-arena van 1977 as stasiebevelvoerder te Ruacana. Word in 1978 oorgeplaas na Veiligheidstak Oshakati met die doel om ‘n Ovambotuiswag gevegsdisipline te leer. Gedurende die laaste week in November 1978 word hy in kennis gestel dat hy verplaas is na Veiligheidshoofkantoor met standplaas Operasie “K” en van 1979 tot 1983 was hy lid van Koevoet. Hy het aanvanklik die insurgente per voet agtervolg – geen gemaklike taak nie.

Eerste Casspir

Later ontvang hy die eerste Casspir wat uitgereik word en hy stel verskeie veranderings voor. Hy vertel dat hy by Swapo “alles geleer” het. Hy het harde, praktiese lesse onder vuur in die veld geleer. Met die verworwe kennis het hy Swapo in die veld – tot hul nadeel – suksesvol aangewend. Met Casspirs het Ops-K, Swapo se beweeglikheid – hul vermoë tot mobiliteit – gekeer. “Toe ons geskuthelikopters aangewend het, het hulle nie raad gehad nie”, vertel kol De Kock..

Vlakplaas

Van die operasionele gebied in SWA word hy na Veiligheidshoofkantoor met standplaas die koverte basis op ‘n plaas genaamd Vlakplaas. verplaas. Hy is gewoond om met spanne anderskleuriges te werk. Aanvanklik is hy gewoond om Swapo te bestry maar moet nou ‘n kopskuif maak om veral die ANC met sy Askari’s en swart polisiemanne bekamp.

Hy neem in ‘n besondere slegte tyd oor – veral na die ontbloting van Vlakplaas met sy sogenaamde “moordbendes”.

(Ek het nie alle wysheid in pag nie, maar ek het by my afdelingshoof gepleit dat daar anders teen kapt Dirk Coetzee opgetree moes word. Die bestuur van veiligheidshoofkantoor het besluit om Dirk departementeel te laat vervolg met die hooflanddros van Pretoria as sy voorsittende beampte. Hy is in afwagting van sy verhoor na die uniformtak verplaas. Wetties was genl Johann Coetzee heel te maal korrek – MAAR – ons het hier te make met ‘n koverte afdeling wat aan geheime operasies deelgeneem het. Soos ons gesien het, het die ontbloting van daardie operasies die staat in ‘n

ernstige verleentheid gestel. Die aangeleentheid kon baie anders tot voordeel van die SA Polisie afgehandel gewees het. ‘n Verdere dwaasheid van die polisie was toe een van die Vlakplaas-mense wat op die punt gestaan het om die doodstraf te kry vir ‘n moord wat hy buite “sy amptelike pligte” gepleeg het, wat aangesê is “om sy pyne maar te vat”. In die dodesel het hy regsadvies gekry en die hele Vlakplaas aangeleentheid het op die lappe gekom. Ek was toevallig in ‘n vliegtuig tussen Heathrow en Schiphol toe ek die berig skok en verbasing lees. My studieveld was strategiese studies en in koverte aksie het ek geleer dat so ‘n aksie “geheim”, “repudieerbaar” en “onnaspeurbaar” moes wees.)

Kol de Kock was dus bevelvoerder van ’n uitvoerende, koverte eenheid. Hy het geen dossiere of leggers tot sy beskikking gehad nie. Hy het vir ‘n aantal jare direk onder die groepshoof van “Groep C” gewerk. Die groepshoof het hom sy opdragte gegee. Hy het werk van uitmuntende aard gelewer te midde van doodsgevaar. Wanneer hy getwyfel het oor ‘n opdrag is gesê: “Dit kom van Bo” of “Van heel bo!”

Ek het kol de Kock leer ken as ‘n eerlike en opregte mense. Hy is ‘n wyd-belese persoon met ‘n diepgaande kennis van terreur, insurgensie, oorlogvoering en geopolitiek in die algemeen.

Die polisie het drie top spioene gehad – kapt Jan Taillard, AO (soos hy toe was) Gerard Ludi en majoor Craig Williamson.

Kol De Kock se medaljes – “Hy is die dapperste onder die dapperes”. In die na-oorlogse periode is kol De Kock een van die mees gedekoreerde polisie-offisiere vir dapperheid in die SA Polisie. Hy is selfs genomineer vir Goue Kruis vir Dapperheid...

Vegters wat hul onderskei het in die tweede wêreldoorlog is baie – die kommissaris van polisie wat tydens die tweede wêreldoorlog ‘n brigadier te velde was, het verskeie medaljes en dekorasies ontvang – hy was genl-maj RJ ‘Bobby’ Palmer (CVO, KPM, DSO met verskeie balkies).

Hy is ‘n briljante strateeg en operateur te velde. Hy moes egter sekere pligte vervul in opdrag van politici – opdragte met agternawysheid wat sinneloos en dwaas was, bv die aanval op die ANC se kantore in Londen. Dit is nie die polisie se taak nie. Wat my opgeval het is dat die politici nie die vaagste benul gehad het van politieke oorlogvoering nie. Wanneer ‘n politikus die polisie of weermag wil aanwend om “sy oorlog” te veg moet hy na sy manne omsien en hul op een of ander manier na die aksie laat vrywaar.

• Wie sal nie die koverte opdrag van ‘n PW Botha of ‘n Nelson Mandela uitvoer nie? Dit is op rekord, ek het al daaroor geskryf, hoe kol HF Trew ‘n koverte aksie teen sy sin moes uitvoer in opdrag van ministers.

POLICE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF APARTHEID: LOSERS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

Iemand het vir my die artikel: Police officers and soldiers of Apartheid: Losers in the New South Africa deur Laetitia Bucaille gestuur Dit is jammer dat ons vandag gesien word as die “verloorders”. Dis juis ons wat die toestand geskep het sodat politici van verskillende politieke oortuigings kon begin met samesprekings en onderhandeling. Ek het die artikel ietwat eensydig gevind. Die artikel kan op Google gelees word. Ek het besluit om nie die artikel te plaas nie, MAAR slegs kommentaar op die artikel deur drie oud-lede van die veiligheidstak te plaas. Ek het die artikel ge-Google en onder meer die volgende gekry:

Police officers and soldiers of apartheid: losers in the new ...

UNESCO Digital Library

https://unesdoc.unesco.org › ark:

Vertaal hierdie bladsy

Police officers and soldiers of apartheid: losers in the new South Africa ; Person as author. Bucaille, Laetitia ; In. International social science journal, LVIII

Police officers and soldiers of apartheid: losers in the new ... Wiley Online Library

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com › ...

Vertaal hierdie bladsy

16 Jan. 2008

Police officers and soldiers of apartheid: losers in the new South Africa. Laetitia Bucaille,. Laetitia Bucaille. Université Victor Ségalen ...

Police officers and soldiers of apartheid: Losers in the new South ...

ResearchGate

https://www.researchgate.net › ...

·Vertaal hierdie bladsy

Like most South African whites the soldiers and police officers who served under apartheid now admit that non-racial democracy is a more legitimate system.

Bucaille, Laetitia Philippine eLib

https://www.elib.gov.ph › results

Vertaal hierdie bladsy

Police officers and soldiers of apartheid: : losers in the new South Africa. by Bucaille, Laetitia; Subject: Apartheid - South Africa; Police officers -

KOMMENTAAR

'n Interessante artikel van 2007 deur Laetitia Bucaille met heelwat relevante argumente en inligting - vir daardie tyd.

Gegewe dat die ideologiese landswette van die tyd deur die wetgewer van die tyd (verkose parlementslede) gekontekstualiseer, opgestel en goedgekeur is, laat die vraag ontstaan waarom empiriese navorsing sedert 1994 so fel op die toepassers van hierdie wette gefokus het.

Ironies dat toe die druk te veel raak, die wetgewers van die tyd meestal Damaskus oomblikke beleef het, verskonings voorgelê en weggestap het van hul gewraakte skeppings. Hulle is toegelaat om in relatiewe gerief en afsondering die gevolge van hul besluite op 'n veilige afstand te beoordeel sonder om deeglike verantwoording vir hul en hul voorgangers se gediskrediteerde ideologieë te doen. Intussen is die toepassers van die ongewilde ideologieë se ondersteunings basis vernietig met die kapitulering en tesame daarmee het hul regverdigingsgronde ook gedisintegreer. Die voetsoldate is weerloos gelaat vir persoonlike openbare blootstelling en vernedering. Moontlik is die tyd ryp vir teoretiese navorsing oor die gevolge van 'n algemene opstand deur die polisie, weermag en intelligensiedienste teen die Nasionale regering van die dag se ideologieë.

Lt Jan de Klerk

Hennie

Die artikel verwys glad nie na die volgende feite nie

- die vryheidstryd het 'n kriminele, gewelddadige, terreurdadige en moorddadige kant gehad. Daarvan getuig die vele amnesties wat ook aan die vryheidstryders toegestaan is sowel as die honderde skuldig bevindings in die howe en Robbeneiland wat vir honderde vryheidsvegters gratis akkommodasie en voedsel voorsien het. Die berugte halssnoer-moorde het in die vergetelheid verdwyn - bo en behalwe die Magoo’s- en Wimpy Bar-bomme

- die vryheidstryd word in die nuwe politieke milieu verheerlik: die klassieke beginsel dat die oorwinnaar die geskiedenis skryf en waarin die misdadige terreur en moorde totaal verswyg word.

- die Veiligheidstak het kriminele gewelddadige en terreur-element van die vryheidstryd bestry primer deur 'n regsstrategie: arrestasie, onderwerping aan 'n billike en regverdige regsproses waarvan die uiteinde was 'n skuldigbevinding en tronkstraf, selfs doodstraf was.

- natuurlik was daar die onkonvensionele en buitegeregtelike strategieë wat in die later jare toegepas was en regtens sowel as moreel onverdedigbaar was/is

- Onsbenodiggoeienavorsing oordie kwantitatiewe getallevan kriminele skuldigbevindings

viz-a-viz die onkonvensionele buite-geregtelike aksie (ek meen dat die NVG die getal ondersoeke wat hulle tans voer stel op +-170) Oorvereenvoudig: 15000 (duimsuig getal) skuldig bevindings en aanhoudings op Robbeneiland teenoor 170 vertel duidelik sy eie storie en konteks.Hoeveelskuldigbevindings is post-1994 van die kriminele rekords geskrap?

- Hoeveel parlementariërs sou nou gediskwalifiseer word op grond van skuldigbevindings van 12 maande en meer sonder die keuse van 'n boete?

-die skryfster hanteer veral die morele afkeurenswaardigheid van die aksies van die statutêre mag lede terwyl daar geen woord is oor die moraliteit van die terreur en moorde van die nie-statutêre magte nie. Dit laat haarself natuurlik ook as moreel bevraagtekenbaar. Die eerlike media en geskiedenis-skrywer het die morele en professionele plig om ook die kriminele en moorddadige geskiedenis van die bevrydingstryd en nie-statutêre magte aan blootlegging en morele afkeur te onderwerp.

Groete

Zirk Gous

Goeiemôre Hennie

Ek het nie veel kommentaar nie en maak slegs enkele opmerkings:

• Moontlik in die vertalingsproses het daar foute ingesluip waar bv verwys word na die 'Crime Investigation Unit' wat later die 'Security Branch' geword het ens.

• Die artikel is baie eensydig en dalk kan die skrywer vergewe word indien dit beoog om slegs na die posisie van sekere elemente in die VM’e te kyk.

• Maar dit krap tog aan my gevoel van ewewigtigheid dat veral die Veiligheidstak uitgesonder word vir sy wandade terwyl die terreur wat hulle beveg het totaal en al onderspeel word.

• Die reaksie van die persone met wie die skrywer onderhoude gevoer het word meesal aangebied as naïef en prentensieus. Die skrywer skep gevolglik 'n baie duidelike beeld van skeptisisme oor die geloofwaardigheid daarvan.

• Of dit die moeite werd is om dit in die Nongqai te publiseer? Ek weet nie. As dit die Nongqai se beleid is om alle relevante artikels tov die VM'e te publiseer kan dit seker geregverdig word want daar is tog ook baie geldige opmerkings. Maar dat dit baie van ons lesers teen die bors gaan stuit, dis gewis en seker.

Dr Johan Burger

Brig

Groete

FILM: 'THE HUMAN FACTOR'

Delve into the shadowy world of espionage with 'The Human Factor', a 1979 thriller directed by Otto Preminger. Based on Graham Greene's novel, this film tells the story of Maurice Castle (Nicol Williamson), a British intelligence officer whose past actions during his stint in South Africa come back to haunt him in London as Castle is swept up in a dangerous investigation involving suspicions of leaking secrets to the Soviets, he must navigate the treacherous waters of loyalty, betrayal, and personal tragedy. The stakes are heightened by his deep love for his South African wife, Sarah (Iman), which complicates his loyalties further. 'The Human Factor' is a gripping tale of moral ambiguity, exploring the complexities of personal and professional integrity. Click to watch now and experience this intense psychological drama that masterfully blends personal conflict with global intrigue.

Comments by HBH

If you have time, look at this British (MI6) movie – Bureau for State Security and “Pretoria” is mentioned (click on link):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lH5d2ByiArQ

This is the movie based on Graham Greene's novel. Excellent cast and director. Of course we're nasties

Wikipedia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

General

Petrus

SSA SED SOO SOE SD

Born 3 March 1928 (age 96)

Smithfield, Free State

Nationality South African

Spouse Yvonne van LeylevId (m. 1952)

BACKGROUND SKETCH; GEN PETRUS JOHANN COETZEE

Johann Coetzee

Country South Africa

Allegiance Republic of South Africa

Branch Republic of South Africa

Service years 1946–1987

Rank General Awards

General Johann Petrus Coetzee SSA SED SOO SOE SD is a South African police officer. He was Commissioner of the South African Police from 1983 to 1987.[1]

Personal life[edit]

Coetzee was born on the 3 March 1928 in Smithfield, Free State. He married Yvonne van Leylevid on 19 January 1952 in Johannesburg and has two children.[2] He has degrees in political science and history.[2]

Career in the police[edit]

Coetzee joined the police on 10 May 1946 in Pretoria[3] at the age of 16.[2] He started his career in the Mounted Police, including as a member of the SA Police Royal Mounted Escort during the 1947 Royal visit to South Africa. Much of his career was spent in the Security Branch, where he co-ordinated the infiltration of anti-apartheid groups such as the South African Communist Party [2] As a young desk officer he recruited South Africa's first secret agent, Gerard Ludi, and as Security Chief he was the mentor of Major Craig Williamson, who had great success in infiltrating the International University Fund.

On 1 June 1983 he was made Commissioner of the South African Police; he was also a member of the State Security Council [2] He retired in May 1987.[4]

While he was Commissioner, the South African Railway Police merged with the SA Police, a fullfledged Forensics branch was established and the SAP got a helicopter fleet.[3]

"After the revolution, he will be my garden boy"

Braam Fischer[5][6]

Braam Fischer, the brilliant advocate who turned underground leader of the Communist Party, was ultimately unmasked by Coetzee, and arrested through the efforts of one of his agents, Gerad Ludi.[3] Brigadiers Roelf van Rensburg and Kalfie Broodryk were the arresting Officers.[3] Awards[edit]

General Coetzee was awarded the South African Police Star for Outstanding Service for the bravery he showed when he walked into the bank, unarmed, to negotiate with the MK Cadres during the Silverton Siege[7][8] in Pretoria in 1981.

• Star of South Africa (1952) (SSA)

• South African Police Star for Distinguished Leadership (SED)

• South African Police Star for Distinguished Service (SOO)

• South African Police Star for Outstanding Service (SOE)

• Southern Cross Decoration (SD)

Truth and Reconciliation Commission[edit]

Coetzee, under cross-examination by George Bizos before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, denied any involvement in several murders and other atrocities committed by the apartheid National Party government.[9] He later applied for amnesty from the TRC in 2000.[10] References[edit]

1. ^ SA Mirror (n.d.). "General PJ Coetzee" South African Mirror.

2. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e Cowell, Alan; Times, Special To the New York (25 July 1985). "Man in the News; Apartheid's Policeman: Johann Coetzee" The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 13 April 2020.

3. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Heymans, Hennie. "General PJ Coetzee" South African Mirror (in Afrikaans). Retrieved 15 October 2022.

4. ^ Staff Reporter (29 May 1987). "Exit the General: But don' think Coetzee's let go his power" Mail and Guardian.

5. ^ Streek, Barry (1982). The S.A. Security Services. Presscuttings supplement. Produced by Barry Streek. p. 68.

6. ^ Sanders, James (2006). Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service (illustrated ed.). John Murray. p. 188. ISBN 9780719566752

7. ^ "Silverton Siege 1980" South African History Online. Archived from the original on 7 July 2014. Retrieved 15 October 2022.

8. ^ "Silverton Siege" South African History Online. Retrieved 15 October 2022.

9. ^ Staff Reporter (11 September 1998). "Coetzee's 'fairy tales'" Mail and Guardian.

10.^ SAPA (2 October 2000). "Dozens seek pardon for slaughter in Botswana" IOL.

PAUL ERASMUS

Wikipedia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Paul Erasmus was a South African Security Police officer who testified to the Goldstone Commission,[1] and later the Truth and Reconciliation Commission about police dirty tricks and violence during the apartheid era [2] This testimony revealed the existence of a unit in the Security Police called STRATCOM (Strategic Communications) that specialised in misinformation and propaganda against opponents of the regime.[3][4] Erasmus also testified on the police efforts to discredit Winnie Madikizela-Mandela by spreading false rumours about sexual affairs and drug use.[5][6]

Before joining STRATCOM, Erasmus had served in the counter-insurgency campaign in Namibia, as part of the Koevoet police unit.[7]

Trashing music industry[edit]

Erasmus appears in a documentary, Stopping the Music: the Roger Lucey Story, in which he explains Stratcom's campaign against South African folk rock guitarist Roger Lucey, which led to banning and disruption of gigs, confiscation of records, and an overzealous campaign against Shifty Records and the South African music industry in general. Erasmus's revelations were published in a biography, which was then extracted by an article in the Mail & Guardian.

Torture as treatment[edit]

Erasmus was a feared interrogator. His methods of persuasion included burning, choking, beating, drowning, and administering electric shocks.[8]

Biography[edit]

Foot Soldier for Apartheid, an unpublished manuscript, has extracts available online.[9][10]

References[edit]

1. ^ David Goodman Reconciliation or Chaos? Mother Jones May/June 1999

2. ^ De Klerk linked to `dirty tricks' to sabotage ANC Washington Times Jul 10, 1995

3. ^ Press release by Paul Erasmus Archived 2007-03-22 at the Wayback Machine African National Congress, 09-09-97

4. ^ Dolley, Caryn (13 November 2021). "Atrocious crimes: Apartheid hitman's brutal confessions serve as a warning for South Africans". Daily Maverick. Retrieved 13 November 2021.

5. ^ Suzanne Daley Winnie Mandela Discredited Herself, Police Official Says New York Times November 29, 1997

6. ^ Winnie Mandela defended by white former agents BBC News 24 November 1997

7. ^ David Goodman and Paul Weinberg (2002) Fault Lines: Journeys Into the New South Africa University of California Press ISBN 0-520-23203-8 p93

8. ^ "Reconciliation or Chaos?" Mother Jones. Retrieved 23 October 2018.

9. ^ "3rd Ear Music Forum - Foot Soldier for Apartheid" www.3rdearmusic.com.

Retrieved 23 October 2018.

10.^ Leonard, Charles. "The day the music died" The M&G Online. Retrieved 23 October 2018.

External links[edit]

• Tuning Into the Enemy - BBC Radio

• Amnesty Hearing - Paul Erasmus 27 November 2000, Truth and reconciliation commission

• Proclamation by the President of the Republic of South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Committee on amnesty (Under section 20 of The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995), Regulation Gazette, No. 7311 No. R. 26, 2002. Government Gazette, Vol. 441, No. 23257, 28 March 2002. Section "XIV Paul Erasmus (identity number 5602145141006), in respect of" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Erasmus - afgelaai op 25 April 22024.

Kommentaar deur HBH

As lessenaar-offisier het ek baie van Paul Erasmus se verslae afkomstig van die afdelingsbevelvoerder, veiligheidstak, Witwatersrand gelees. Hy was ‘n goeie polisieman – anders sou hy mos lankal verplaas gewees het. Ek het ook sy boek gelees. Hy en ‘n bevelvoerder het stry gekry en Erasmus het teen ons gedraai met nadelige gevolge.

Dink ek aan mense wat teen ons gedraai het, besef ek twee dinge:

(1) Ons eie mense het ons die seerste gemaak – daar was ‘n hele paar gewees. Name weerhou.

(2) Die oorsaak van die “draai teen ons” spruit hoofsaaklik uit dissiplinêre probleme. “Kennis is Mag!” Sodra ons eie teen ons draai is dit ‘n verskriklike gevoelige slag vir ons – of altans vir my. Ons kry dan baie seer in so proses!

Piet Croucamp

The first meeting between me and the members of Umkhonto we Sizwe who worked with Fullard was a life lesson in shared humanity. I later tried to convince several ANC members who were aware of the astonishing work of Fullard and her team that they should be nominated for a national order. The realisation of what the missing persons task team meant to so many families could not persuade former deputy director of prosecutions Willie Hofmeyr or then cabinet minister Derek Hanekom to help me. Both said they would come back to me, but never did.

But now I'm suddenly caught in the middle again; there were people who entrusted their lives to me, who wanted to help locate children who were tortured and buried in nameless graves. Some of the information was worth nothing, sometimes it was even more lies. Some of those involved were old and their memories were fading. Only occasionally was there value in such conversations. My disappointment is in my own unenviable position, but my thoughts on the values of justice make my return home to Melville later that evening a haze of which I remember only the complex emotions. These old gunslingers of apartheid were invariably close to the end of their lives; many had already passed the gates of hell. For months, I don't speak to Fullard. I realise she's in an impossible situation. Prosecutions would make it nearly impossible for her to find the graves of her former comrades in the liberation struggle. The agents of apartheid would certainly not be willing to help if prosecutions were on the cards. But justice should never be a negotiable commodity.

Public discussions about the prosecution of the apartheid state's agents who did not apply for amnesty or were rejected flares up sporadically as a political issue; in the NPA it becomes a talking point from time to time. It is highly likely that the political pretence offers false hope to families and further traumatises them; neither will it necessarily result in justice being done.

I try to persuade a “comrade" to talk about the theoretical permutations for and against such prosecutions. Why did this never happen? How did it happen that the ANC and the government showed so little enthusiasm for such prosecutions? In retrospect, the likelihood of prosecutions appears to have disappeared shortly before the arrests in the poisoning case of Frank Chikane by the NPA's then-prosecutor, lawyer Anton Ackermann. Whether there was an official instruction by a politician or an official at Luthuli House is a matter of hearsay, but the truth remains that there was very little drive within the ANC to take the TRC's legacy to its fullest consequences. Reference is sometimes made in the media to a list of 300 cases of people who did not apply for amnesty and should have been prosecuted, but no one knows who came up with this number or where the list is. Former TRC commissioner Yasmin Sooka and a number of non-government organisations have over the last decade quite rightly put a lot of pressure on the ANC and the NPA

to prosecute apartheid operatives who did not apply for or qualify for amnesty from the TRC. Some people in the National Assembly have also called into question the NPA's commitment to prosecution.

Even Sooka hasn't been able to put an exhaustive list of names on the table. TRC researchers could probably scrape together a tentative list of 100 but this was never done officially. And there is no evidence that any more than about 30 families ever asked the NPA to pursue prosecution. The NPA will have to symbolically cherry-pick cases for the sake of political appearances, but the likelihood of justice has probably faded away by now.

A ruling by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bloemfontein in 2021 confirmed that Vusi Pikoli, the former national director of public prosecutions, had made allegations against former president Thabo Mbeki: “Investigations into the TRC were stopped as a result of an executive decision." Mbeki's unconvincing response to Pikoli's claims reads: “During the years I was in government, we never interfered in the work of the NPA." If you ask me, that means: “The chief spoke by saying nothing at all."

For context: Mbeki suspended the effective Pikoli in an attempt to prevent the prosecution of national police commissioner Jackie Selebi, and Kgalema Motlanthe eventually fired Pikoli in 2007. Thus, there is enough circumstantial evidence to make Pikoli's innuendo about political interference in the NPA's work credible. But as things stand, there is no black and white on the issue.

A former member of the United Democratic Front explains it this way: Mbeki would probably have preferred that outstanding cases from the past be handled in ways that did not involve prosecution. That the ANC itself had to take responsibility for “human rights violations" before the TRC created an equivalence between apartheid and the liberation struggle that did not sit well with Mbeki. Umkhonto and the ANC's soldiers were slow to adopt the victim narrative. How could a situation have arisen in which they had to apply for amnesty in the same way as apartheid's murderous gangs? They were soldiers in a liberation war, and eventually very few cadres would show up at the TRC to testify how they were detained and tortured. International human rights organisations, pushing the principle of prosecution and justice, created the two categories of “perpetrators" and “victims" but it was a nomenclature that misunderstood and misrepresented the liberation struggle. In South African History Online, Jann Turner relates her search for the murderer of her father, Rick Turner. A search that until that point had only led to grief and astonishment. She met Dirk Coetzee, the former boss of Vlakplaas, in London. After this experience, she writes: “I [still] didn’t know who killed my dad, but after that meeting I cried. I cried because I was shocked to have met a chaotic, half-crazed human being not a cold, calculating monster. I cried with horror at the realisation that we were connected, Dirk and I. We were all too intimately bound up by the violence that he had perpetrated and that my father had fallen victim to. South Africa had screwed us both up."

I was involved in meetings between apartheid's most effective enablers and families looking for children and other loved ones. I arranged the mediation between Eugene de Kock and Marcia Khoza. De Kock admitted to the TRC that he shot and killed Marcia's mother, Portia Shabangu, a member of the South African National Students Congress, in an ambush. Her astonishing words, “I totally forgive you", at their first meeting ripped my heart out of my chest. His words, “I am terribly sorry we have to meet under these circumstances", led to an hour-long conversation between them in my silent presence that I will remember forever. On the way out she said, “We sat so close to each other, we breathed the same air."

It's amazing how the relatives of victims sometimes seemed disappointed when they heard that their children were not killed by some of apartheid's most prominent and well-known perpetrators of violence, the state's angels of death. That their loved ones were sometimes just “collateral damage" was almost unbearable knowledge. How could a son, a soldier, someone so important in his mother's world, die so cruelly yet end up as a footnote in the TRC's final report?

But fiction and reality were often so intertwined that even those with their fingers on the triggers could no longer distinguish between the lie and the truth. Victims met perpetrators and walked away with unfathomable emotions. Turner's description of Vic McPherson is exactly how I remember the apartheid state's old Stratcom boss: “McPherson is a thin man with a whining voice and a shifty, crab-like gait. I’ve met him twice and each time the smell of alcohol on him hit me from several metres away.”

One day McPherson calls me; we meet in a bar somewhere in Pretoria. His clothes are dishevelled, and his health eroded by an ailment of which he does not speak. He has a thick ring file in his slender hands. “Your autobiography?" I ask. “Well, finally the reality and the truth," he replies. In the days that followed, I read his account and inquired about it from acquaintances and contacts who were up to date with McPherson's history. McPherson's facts and the realities don't always make sense. I still know journalists today who worked for McPherson's Stratcom in the Afrikaans media. He mentioned some of those names in his ring file.10

On a later occasion, I was at McPherson's house with government officials and some other obscure characters. The purpose of the meeting was, among other things, to answer questions about the assassination of Swedish prime minister Olof Palme. By this time, McPherson was already an inglorious “village idiot", a petite carcass in a wheelchair, but still insisted on projecting the aura of a cunning, all-knowing operator from the underworld. “If I say who killed Palme, my life is worth nothing, because the murderer lives here in Pretoria." There were other operators with a more credible view of reality in our midst, and among them there was consensus: “Vic is hallucinating."

10 Ek het met dr Piet Croukamp gesels oor Vic McPherson se geskrewe herinneringe. Hy het die herinneringe aan Vic teruggegee en ons dink Vic het die herinneringe toe aan Lappe Loubscher oorhandig vir publikasie. Lappe is intussen ook oorlede. Vic en ek het toe Vic se herinneringe begin skryf tot en met Vic se verplasing na die veiligheidstak, Port Natal. Toe is Vic oorlede. Sy geheue het hom aan die einde baie in die steek gelaat – HBH.

At McPherson's funeral I sat next to Craig Williamson. In the context of the often-surreal statements made at such an event, I must admit that Williamson is one of the most intelligent people I have met. He is said to have had smooth dealings with Palme in the 1970s and 1980s and recruited South Africa's famous spy Olivia Forsyth. Williamson's presence is impressive and as professional as I have ever encountered. Most participants in the liberation struggle with whom I have spoken consider him a terrifying and extremely complex character. In the mutual whispers between me and Williamson in the church where McPherson was “laid to rest", it was clear that he also believed that McPherson's stories and reality may only have shown coincidental similarities. Most of apartheid's gunslingers are now quite old, often on the wrong side of 70 and some even in their 80s. Fullard and her task team's search for the graves and remains of missing liberation fighters is made almost impossible by mortality and the passage of time. So many important people on both sides of the conflict have aged so much. And if those veterans do stand up to explain, there is only circumstantial evidence to help us distinguish between lies and truth.

• Geplaas met toestemming van mnr Max du Preez

May 13, 2024

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Media Statement

Date: 13 May 2024

RE-OPENING OF INQUESTS INTO THE DEATHS OF CHIEF ALBERT LUTHULI, MLUNGISI GRIFFITHS MXENGE AND MR BOOI MANTYI

The Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, Mr Ronald Lamola, MP (Member of Parliament), has accepted and acted on recommendations from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to reopen inquests into the deaths of Chief Albert Luthuli, Mr. Mlungisi Griffiths Mxenge and Mr. Booi Mantyi.

Chief Albert John Mvumbi Luthuli:

Chief Albert Luthuli, a renowned anti-apartheid activist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, tragically passed away on 21 July 1967. The official reports state that he was hit by a train near Gledthrow station. His untimely death led to various speculations and inquiries, but the exact circumstances surrounding the incident remain unclear to this day.

21 September 1967, an inquest was held by the apartheid regime at the Magistrates’ Court in Stanger, in the district of lower Tugela. This inquest found that the cause of death was due to a fractured skull and cerebral According to the court at the time the “evidence did not disclose any criminal culpability on the part of South African Railways and anyone else.”

As a result of representations made to the National Director of Public Prosecutions which brought to the fore that in 1967, the inquest did not consider certain mathematical and scientific principles. This mathematical and scientific report reveal that it is highly unlikely that Chief Luthuli was struck by a train and died because of that.

Considering this information amongst others and the investigation done by the Truth and Reconciliation Unit of the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation, Minister Lamola accepts and agrees that it is necessary and in the interest of justice to approach the Judge President of High Court of South Africa in the KwaZulu-Natal Division to re-open the inquest into the death of Chief Albert Luthuli.

Mr Mlungisi Griffiths Mxenge

On November 20, 1981, the esteemed anti-apartheid activist and African National Congress member, Mr. Mxenge, tragically lost his life under mysterious circumstances. His body, bearing 45 lacerations, was discovered on a sports field in Umlazi, a grim testament to the violence inflicted upon him. In the wake of his death, an inquest in 1983, conducted under the apartheid regime, failed to identify the perpetrators, despite clear signs of foul play, including evidence of surveillance on Mr. Mxenge’s office and the poisoning of his dogs.

A thorough investigation was not done into the death of Mr. Mxenge. The Harms Commission and Truth and Reconciliation Commission revealed that orders to kill Mr. Mxenge came from Vlakplaas head Dirk Coetzee. Dirk Coetzee and his accomplices Nofomela, and Tshikalanga were granted amnesty for the murder of Mxenge.

There is new evidence that certain critical information was not presented to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the initial inquest, although the perpetrators were clearly identified. Minister Lamola accepts that it is necessary and in the interest of justice to approach the Judge President of High Court of South Africa in the KwaZulu-Natal Division to re-open the inquest into the death of Mr Mxenge.

Mr Booi Mantyi

Mr Booi Mantyi was killed in an alleged altercation with members of the South African Police force on 16 June 1985 in the Northern Cape. A formal inquest held in De Aar in 1985 ruled that no one was responsible for the death. A new investigation has revealed that an eyewitness who has not previously testified has been identified. Considering the above, Minister Lamola is of the view that it is necessary and in the interests of justice to request the Judge President of the High Court of South Africa, Northern Cape Division to re-open an inquest into the death of Mr Booi Mantyi.

Minister Lamola, in agreement with the recommendations said, “With these inquests, we open very real wounds which are more difficult to open 30 years into our democracy, but none the less, the interest of justice can never be bound by time the truth must prevail.”

Ends

Enquiries

Mr. Chrispin Phiri

Ministry Spokesperson

In hoofman Luthuli se geval is daar geen misdryf gepleeg nie. Die voormalige spoorwegpolisie het ‘n saak van strafbare manslag deeglik ondersoek. Die hoofman se oë was na bewering sleg en hy is deur ‘n trein raakgery – geen misdaad was vermoed nie. Hy was goed aan die SA Polisie bekend.

NPA DOESN’T KNOW HOW MANY TRC CASES IT SHOULD BE INVESTIGATING

Brett Herron - 06 May 2024

Thirty years after apartheid, and 21 years after publication of the final Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, the NPA is yet to complete the task of identifying apartheid-era operatives who committed heinous crimes for which they should have been prosecuted. The NPA continued to engage the report… It was “an ongoing process”, Lamola said in a written response, issued on Friday 3 May 2024, to parliamentary questions by GOOD Party MP Brett Herron.

The TRC Act provided that where amnesty was not applied for or was not granted, those who failed to get amnesty would be prosecuted. It has been widely reported over the past 10 years, in the media and in affidavits in High Court litigation, that the TRC recommended approximately 300 cases for further investigation. This figure was repeated in the recent opinion by Adv Dumisa Ntsebeza into the NPA’s handling of TRC cases. In his opinion, publicly released two months ago, Ntsebeza, who served as a TRC commissioner and its Head of Investigations, said: "The TRC referred to the NPA some 300 cases of those people who did not apply for or were not granted amnesty. These were mainly South African Police Security Branch or other police officers."

But Lamola said the NPA was “not in possession of a definitive list of cases that were transferred from the TRC”.

Fifty-nine matters had been identified by the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit “by extracting the matters from the TRC Final Report”. The identification of additional matters was “an ongoing process. Currently the total number of identified cases is one hundred and fifty-eight”, Lamola said.

If the TRC referred 300 cases to the NPA but, according to Lamola, 21 years later, the NPA is only aware of about half of them, it speaks to a monumental abandonment of post-apartheid justice. It means that many perpetrators of barbarism in defence of apartheid will never be brought to justice, and that family members of their victims will never have the opportunity of closure.

In his answers to Herron’s questions, Lamola said, of the 159 TRC cases the NPA was aware of, 21 had been finalised and 137 were still under investigation.

“This includes re-opened inquests, and inquests where the appointment of a Judge is awaited to preside over the matter and eight (8) matters which are presently on the criminal court roll.

“As indicated above a complete list of cases was not transferred to the NPA. The NPA is therefore not in a position to answer who received a definitive list of cases.”

In his opinion, publicly released two months ago, Ntsebeza found that the NPA had “failed in its mandate”.

“The consequences of this failure have manifested themselves in the vast number of cases that have now become irredeemable – memories have faded, witnesses have died, perpetrators have died, evidence which should have been archived, has, over time, got lost or destroyed - or both. Against these odds, one has to ask, how it is even possible to realise the national social compact struck with victims and all South Africans – to achieve accountability and justice,” he said.

Issued by Brett Herron, GOOD Secretary-General & Member of Parliament, 6 May 2024

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/npa-doesnt-know-how-many-trc-cases-it-should-bein?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=23ea5a4c4bEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_05_06_05_05&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-23ea5a4c4b%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D

THE PRESIDENCY: ANNOUNCEMENT OF LATEST NATIONAL ORDERS

Phindile Baleni | 24 April 2024

DG says these recognise those who contribute to building a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous SA.

Statement by the Chancellor of the National Orders, Director-General in the Presidency Ms Phindile Baleni on the announcement of the recipients of national orders 23 April 2024

It is my privilege as Chancellor of the National Orders to announce the names of those South Africans and foreign nationals who will be awarded National Orders at an investiture ceremony to be held on Tuesday 30 April 2024.

National Orders are the highest awards that our country, through the President, bestows on our citizens and eminent foreign nationals who have contributed towards the advancement of democracy and who have made a significant impact on improving the lives of South Africans. The National Orders also recognise the contributions made by individuals who contributed and continue to contribute to the building of a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa as envisaged in our Constitution.

His Excellency President Cyril Ramaphosa will bestow on deserving recipients the Order of Mendi for Bravery, the Order of Ikhamanga, the Order of the Baobab, the Order of Luthuli, the Order of Mapungubwe, and the Order of the Companions of OR Tambo.

The Order of Mendi for Bravery recognises South African citizens who have performed acts of bravery.

THE ORDER OF MENDI IN SILVER

• MS MAWILLIAMS KEKANA: For her generosity and courageous act of sheltering freedom fighters during a time where it was illegal to align with revolutionaries. She offered her house as a safe haven for liberation stalwarts against the hostile security police.

• IGNATIUS “IGGY” MTHEBULE (PH): For his gallant fight against an unjust system of apartheid. He is among many lost sons and daughters whose demise in the hands of security police remains unknown as he disappeared without a trace. This was at the height of political upheaval where opposition was brutally silenced. Despite his disappearance, he left an indelible mark of courage and leadership.

• MR MAKHWEZI MCDONALD MTULU (PH): For his excellent contribution to the liberation of the people of South Africa. He responded to the brave call to join the military wing of the ANC forsaking the safety of his home to the fight for freedom and died in the process of executing the armed struggle.

• MR ROBERT ANTHONY BASIL WATERWITCH (PH): For courageously pushing back against the oppressive system of the apartheid government. He ultimately lost his life for the ideals of freedom in the middle of the war against racism and inequality.

• MS COLINE DENISE WILLIAMS (PH): For courageously pushing back against the oppressive system of the apartheid government. She ultimately lost her life for the ideals of freedom in the middle of the war against racism and inequality.

• The Order of Ikhamanga recognises South African citizens who have excelled in the fields of arts, culture, literature, music, journalism and sport.

THE ORDER OF IKHAMANGA IN GOLD

• MS NONTANDO (NONI) HELEN JABAVU (PH): For her excellent contribution in the field of journalism and scholarship on the liberation struggle. Her affinity to history and storytelling through journalism informed and enlightened the nation.

• MR AGGREY KLAASTE (PH): For his exceptional contribution to quality journalism and as a reporter exposing the cruelties of apartheid and encouraging unity among the people of different political persuasions to fight for liberation. He was a nation builder with a vision for an equal and thriving society.

• MR MADALA MUZWAKHE KUNENE: For his exceptional contribution to the arts, especially jazz music, using home-brewed sounds that are unique to South Africa. He has collaborated with some of the best talents in our country.

THE ORDER OF IKHAMANGA IN SILVER

• MR ANGUS GIBSON: For his contribution to filmmaking; he strived to provide a safe haven for black artists at a time when discrimination was normalised and practiced with impunity. His collaborations produced iconic narratives of South African history and youth culture.

• MR EMILE LESTER JANSEN: For his contribution in the field of arts and hip hop culture in South Africa. His artistry and activism formulated a unique lexicon now firmly known as Afrikaap, explaining the African origins of hip hop.

• MS SARAY NKUSI KHUMALO: For being an inspiring way-maker for many women through her quest of summiting seven mountains while raising funds. She inspires every African child to pursue what may seem to be impossible dreams.

• MS SOPHIE MSOZISWA MAHLANGU: For her excellent contribution to the development of indigenous Ndebele arts. Her commitment to passing on knowledge to younger generations is commendable; she has become a bridge connecting generations.

• MS MADOSINI LATOZI MPHAHLENI (PH): For her exceptional service in preserving and elevating indigenous South African musical traditions. In a rapidly changing world, she stood as a guardian of these ancient sounds, ensuring they were not forgotten. Her commitment to passing on her knowledge to younger generations was unmatched, safeguarding the nation's identity and cultural heritage.

• MR TREVOR DUNDAS MWELI SKOTA (PH): For his contribution to the promotion of black African knowledge by his trailblazing work, including a biographical dictionary of notable black figures on the continent. The Order of the Baobab recognises South African citizens who have contributed to community service, business and economy, science, medicine and technological innovation.

THE ORDER OF THE BAOBAB IN GOLD

• MS BLANCHE VALERIA LA GUMA (PH): For her courageous fight for social justice and equality for all South Africans. She lived by the courage of her convictions and fought for the rights of workers and the liberation of the oppressed.

• MS ZUKISWA PATRICIA MATOLENGWE: For her commitment to realizing social justice for the homeless and downtrodden using ingenious means of stokvels for financial empowerment. Her tireless work in providing dignified living space for the homeless is laudable.

The Order of Luthuli recognises South African citizens who have contributed to the struggle for democracy, nation-building, building democracy and human rights, justice and peace as well as for the resolution of conflict.

THE ORDER OF LUTHULI IN GOLD

• MR MXOLISI ‘DICKY’ JACOBS (PH): For his ultimate sacrifice to the struggle for liberation. His life ended defending the principles of a just and equal society. Although his life was cut short, he remains a towering stalwart of the struggle who laid down his life for the liberation of his people.

• MR PETER CYRIL JONES (PH): For his courageous contribution in mobilising communities across the length and breadth of South Africa. He was one of the leading lights advocating for Black Consciousness message of self-reliance, pride and self-affirmation for the oppressed people of our land.

• MR BENJAMIN LANGA (PH): For his ultimate sacrifice for equality and social justice in South Africa. He endured unimaginable pain and remained loyal to the cause until the end. His legacy remains a beacon of light and inspiration to many.

• MR THOBEKILE ‘TOBSY’ MADAKA (PH): For his gallant fight against the oppression of our people. He fearlessly spoke truth to power and eventually gave his life for the democracy of South Africa. He lived by the courage of his convictions and faced the wrath of the oppressive regime.

• MR SIPHIWO MTHIMKHULU (PH): For his gallant fight against the oppression of our people. His fearlessness and leadership belied his age as he boldly confronted the forces of oppression and eventually gave his life for the democracy of South Africa. He lived by the courage of his convictions and faced the wrath of the oppressive regime.

• PROF. HARRY RANWEDZI NENGWEKHULU: For his gallant fight for the liberation of the people of South Africa. He has straddled academia and political activism with a goal of a free South Africa always in his mind and has served as a source of inspiration for many Black Consciousness activists and others.

• MR KENNETH RACHIDI (PH): For his courage to face a repressive government and resist its unjust laws that promoted inequality. He lived by the ethics of Black Consciousness and conscientised many. His activism and vocal opposition to oppression remains a legacy and inspiration to South Africans.

• MS ANNIE SILINGA (PH): For her commitment to the liberation struggle. She played a leading role in some of the liberation campaigns. She continued to campaign against passes at national and local events.

• MS NOKUTHULA SIMELANE (PH): For her incredible bravery in the face of brutal security operatives. She lived by the courage of her convictions and faced the wrath of the oppressive regime. Her ultimate sacrifice for the liberation of all South Africans will remain in the annals of our nation’s history.

The Order of Mapungubwe recognises South Africans who have accomplished excellence and exceptional achievement to the benefit of South Africa and beyond.

THE ORDER OF MAPUNGUBWE IN SILVER

• PROF MULALO DOYOYO (PH): For his enormous contribution to the academia and research in the field of aerospace. His outstanding work continues to open doors. The sciences have been enhanced by his participation and young aspirant scientists looked up to him as a mentor.

The Order of the Companions of OR Tambo recognises eminent foreign nationals and other foreign dignitaries for friendship shown to South Africa. It is therefore an order of peace, cooperation and active expression of solidarity and support.

THE ORDER OF THE COMPANIONS OF OR TAMBO IN SILVER

• MR HUUB BAMMENS THE NETHERLANDS: For his contribution to promoting awareness of human rights violations by the South African apartheid government to the world via Radio Freedom. His technical skills were used to build studios for the liberation movement.

• MS DONNA KATZIN - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: For her innovative thinking in assisting post-apartheid South African business get ethical investments by promoting networking between South African business and American investors.

• MR KEN LUCKHARD - CANADA: For his selfless service for South Africa through antiapartheid activism; he organised a mass disruptive protest against a visiting English cricket team that had links with apartheid sport.

• SIR NICHOLAS STADLEN - UNITED KINGDOM (PH): For his steadfast standing with the South African liberation movement at a time when it was not convenient to do so. He believed in equality and supported exiles as a friend of South Africa.

• MR FULCO VAN AURICH - THE NETHERLANDS: For his contribution to promoting awareness of human rights violations by the South African apartheid government to the world via Radio Freedom. He organized and developed the campaign in the Netherlands to support Radio Freedom.

• MS BRENDA WALL - CANADA: For her selfless service for South Africa through antiapartheid activism; she organised a mass disruptive protest against a visiting English cricket team that had links with apartheid sport.

We congratulate the recipients and call on all South Africans to join us in celebrating these outstanding South Africans and distinguished friends of South Africa.

Issued by Vincent Magwenya, Spokesperson to the President, 23 April 2024

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/names-of-foreign-nationals-to-be-awarded-national?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=319d6f9f8dEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_04_24_05_42&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-319d6f9f8d%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D

ON THE NATIONAL ORDERS 2024

Cyril Ramaphosa | 30 April 2024

President says these are highest accolade bestowed by nation on those who have helped build our nation.

Oration by the Grand Patron of National Orders President Cyril Ramaphosa at the presentation of the 2024 National Orders, Sefako Makgatho Guest House, Tshwane 30 April 2024

- Deputy President Paul Mashatile,

- Ministers and Deputy Ministers,

- Members of Parliament,

- Chancellor of National Orders, Ms Phindile Baleni,

- Members of the Advisory Council on National Orders,

- Members of the diplomatic corps,

- Recipients of the National Orders together with their family members and friends,

- Fellow South Africans,

It is my honour and privilege to present the recipients of this year’s National Orders.

National Orders are the highest accolade bestowed by a country on the men and women, citizens and non-citizens, who have played an invaluable role in building our nation.

Two days ago, on the 27th of April, we celebrated Freedom Day and the victory of the democratic breakthrough that enabled South Africans of all races to cast their votes for the first time.

This year marks 30 years since we attained our freedom.

This would not have been possible without the bravery, fortitude and noble acts of those the preamble of our Constitution recognises as having suffered for justice and freedom in our land. The men and women we honour here today have played an invaluable role in giving birth to the free South Africa that we all enjoy today.

Our nation owes each of them a great debt. By bestowing these National Orders, we want to ensure that their contributions are recognised and spoken of by generations to come.

The recipients of the National Orders are chosen by the South African people themselves. It is the South African people who makes nominations for consideration.

This is most appropriate because the recipients are the heroes and heroines of the entire nation.

The truest test of heroism is that these acts are not done for the sake of name, prestige, fortune or fame.

They are done out of conscience and an unwavering sense of responsibility.

They are born of a burning quest for social justice.

They are anchored in the belief that the achievement of equality and human dignity for all is the highest aspiration of humankind.

The Order of Mendi for Bravery is made to South Africans who have performed acts of great bravery. All this year’s recipients were anti-apartheid activists, and they are being awarded posthumously. They lived at a time when apartheid repression was at its zenith, and they displayed the outmost courage. Their sacrifices will never be forgotten, and their memories live on.

The Order of Luthuli is awarded to South Africans who have contributed to the struggle for democracy, human rights, nation-building, justice and peace.

Several of the recipients of this year’s Order of Luthuli were brutally killed by the apartheid regime. One of them is Ms Nokuthula Simelane, who was abducted and tortured by the apartheid Security Branch. Her remains were never found.

This is a wound that will never heal for her family, like the scars of many other South Africans whose loved ones disappeared during the repressive years of apartheid.

By honouring those fallen heroes with National Orders we are saying that no matter how great the passage of time, they have not been forgotten.

The Order of Ikhamanga recognises South Africans who have excelled in the arts, culture, literature, music, journalism and sport.

In this, the 30th year since we achieved our freedom, we also celebrate the democratic gains we have made in enshrining the principle of a free and independent media.

Among those being honoured today are legendary journalists who were the voice, words and conscience of an oppressed people during the darkest periods in our history. The standard they set for media ethics and freedom are embodied in today’s generation of journalists and media workers.

The Order of the Baobab recognises South Africans who have made a difference in business and the economy, in science, medicine and technological innovation, and in our communities.

As we strive to bring about social and economic transformation in South Africa, we are keenly aware of the importance of every endeavour, be it in business, in science or in innovation, being put in the service of social justice for all.

The recipients of The Order of Mapungubwe displayed excellence in scientific endeavours for the benefit of South Africa and beyond. This year’s recipient undertook valuable research in the aerospace field and set a standard that today’s generation of researchers will strive to emulate for time to come.

Lastly, The Order of the Companions of OR Tambo recognises the great friends of the South African people from beyond our shores, whose sense of moral duty to oppose apartheid saw them undertake acts of solidarity and cooperation in the cause of the liberation struggle.

We honour journalists who helped amplify the voice of the liberation movement abroad, campaigners and fundraisers for the anti-apartheid movement, and activists who played an important role in the sports boycott against the regime.

Congratulations to all who are being honoured today and to their families.

Under the powers vested in me by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), I now confer the Order of Mendi, the Order of Ikhamanga, the Order of the Baobab, the Order of Luthuli and the Order of the Companions of O R Tambo. The recipients shall henceforth be honoured as esteemed Members of the Orders. The people of South Africa salute them all.

I thank you.

Issued by The Presidency, 30 April 2024

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/presentation-of-recipients-of-national-orders2024?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=8282553b27EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_05_01_04_25&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-8282553b27%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D

Some background information on two of the recipients:

• Ignatius “Iggy” Mthebule

Ignatius ‘Iggy’ or ‘Gab’ Mthebule was a student activist and leader associated with the Azanian Student Organisation (AZASO) in 1975. Iggy’s brother, Samuel Mthebule, testified before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and mentioned that Iggy was expelled from University of the North (now Limpopo) in 1976. He was a promising student and even had a black belt in karate. Samuel also said that Iggy had gone into exile in about 1981.

Iggy received military training in Maputo, Mozambique and was sent back home as an underground African National Congress (ANC) operative working mostly in Johannesburg. He was working closely with Joy Harden an apartheid agent who he met while working in Maputo; Iggy had

no knowledge of this. Harden handed Iggy over to the security police at a restaurant in Hillbrow, Johannesburg in January 1987. His whereabouts are still unknown to this day. Mthebule’s story is remembered in an interview by Mac Maharaj on 15 January 2003 for the Nelson Mandela Centre for Memory.

https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/ignatius-iggy-mthebule-remembered

• Ms Nokuthula Simelane

Ms Nokuthula Simelane had become involved with the uMkhonto weSizwe armed wing of the ANC, passing on messages between operatives. She disappeared while deployed on a mission in Soweto, Johannesburg. MK operatives from South Africa all the way to Angola were alerted of her missing status, with leads only appearing 12 years later after a published news article in 1993.

In 1995, it became known that she had been abducted (kidnapped) by members of the Security Branch of the South African Police and was held in illegal, forceful and violent custody on a remote farm in the Thabazimbi area for a period of about five weeks from September-November 1983.

https://unfinishedtrc.co.za/press-release-by-the-family-of-the-late-nokuthula-simelane-nokuthulaaurella-simelanes-case-to-be-revisited-after-39-years/

KOVERTE MISDAAD | COVERT CRIME Inleiding

‘n Koverte aksie is soms niks anders as ‘n “koverte misdaad” nie – noem dit maar koverte oorlogsmisdade – wat deur lede van spesiale magte gepleeg word, en dit kom maar in elke land voor. Die geheime omstandighede waaronder lede opereer skep geleenthede waarin lede ‘n misstap kan begaan of “inisiatief” aan die dag kan lê.

Dink maar daaraan ’n koverte handeling (taak) word goed beplan; is onnaspeurbaar en geheim. Wie sal in elk geval weet as iets bykomend en op eie inisiatief uitgevoer word? Daarom dink ek dis is nodig om soos die Israeli’s presies te verklaar wat gedoen gaan word. Aan die anderkant, al oefen mens die opdrag ‘n honderd keer – is daar altyd iets wat verkeerd loop. ‘n Verkeerde ou op die verkeerde plek... So onwillige slagoffer en ooggetuie kan dan uit die weggeruim moet word?

Die situasie by koverte eenhede is, dit skep sy eie probleme... Hoe hou jy so eenheid voltyds besig? Een van die probleme is lede van veiligheidsmagte skep later vir hulle self werk en dit skep weer sy eie probleme.

Selfs Amerika en Brittanje wat hoogs beskaafde lande is loop dinge ook maar verkeerd. Kyk na die onderstaande teksboek geval – HBH.

• How special forces chief 'blew the whistle on SAS war crimes in Afghanistan': Top officer 'told police soldiers under his command were murdering prisoners of wardespite fears of threats to his family'

By Cameron Charters

Published: 10:39 BST, 5 May 2024 | Updated: 10:47 BST, 5 May 2024

A high-ranking officer in the British special forces told police the SAS were committing war crimes by murdering prisoners in Afghanistan, it emerged today.

Known only as N1466 the officer risked the safety of his family when he claimed 'cancer had infected' a particular unit of the SAS.

Between 2009 and 2013 he was responsible for all SAS overseas operations- meaning he focused on British military activity in Afghanistan.

According to a Sunday Times investigation the officer tipped police off about a safe which held a dossier of evidence from a SAS soldier detailing allegations of murder. The officer's actions caused a massive inquiry with 6,000 classified documents being disclosed by the Ministry of Defence.

A high-ranking officer in the British special forces told police the SAS were committing war crimes by murdering prisoners in Afghanistan, it emerged today (stock image)

Within the files are witness accounts from serving soldiers, emails to Number 10 warning of the crisis, as well as diaries of police investigators.

Foreign Secretary David Cameron was the Prime Minister in the years the allegations relate to. Detectives from the Royal Military Police- which investigates allegations of wrongdoing within the Forces- kept diaries alleging a covering up operation.

Within their notes investigators said weapons were allegedly planted on the bodies of the deceased and a raft of top-secret computer files relating to the SAS were deleted.

Johnny Mercer, Conservative MP and then a defence minister, wrote in emails that he believed the SAS was guilty of wronging during the war.

But a civil servant toned down Mr Mercer's email arguing 'bland is best'.

Mercer is a veteran of Afghanistan and served as a defence minister from 2019-2021.

Johnny

Members of the Afghan Special Forces units CF 333 and ATF 444 – dubbed the Triples – fought alongside the SAS (File image)

The inquiry was eventually shut down- but subsequent stories by The Sunday Times and the BBC put pressure on the government to open up a fresh inquiry.

This is called the Independent Inquiry relating to Afghanistan and documents released from this revealed to the newspaper the decision by N1466 to make his claims.

In the raft of emails, letters and documents released, a lieutenant colonel wrote: 'I find it quite incredible the amount of Bs [Afghan males, Bravos] that [the SAS unit] send back into a building who then decide to get weapons/grenades and engage the [SAS unit] knowing that it will achieve nothing.'

In certain emails relating to a particular raid commanders stopped calling victims EKIA, meaning enemy killed in action- and changed to EJK- extra-judicial killings.

While the Chief of Staff said: 'There appears to be a casual disregard for life, [military] principles and credible reporting.'

SAS raids were often completed late at night and were supposed to target bomb makers and terrorists.

But emails allege civilians were killed and then had weapons planted on them to make it look as though they were combatants.

The Afghanistan Inquiry, chaired by Sir Charles Haddon-Cave, is looking at whether there is any evidence to support claims the British Army unlawfully killed people in Afghanistan between 2010 to 2013.

Sir Charles Haddon-Cave chair of the Independent Inquiry relating to Afghanistan.

A Ministry of Defence spokesperson said: 'We established the Independent Inquiry relating to Afghanistan which is investigating alleged unlawful activity by UK Special Forces during Deliberate Detention Operations between mid-2010 to mid-2013. The MOD is fully committed to supporting the Inquiry as it continues its work.

'It is not appropriate for us to comment on allegations which may be within the scope of the Statutory Inquiry or speculate on outcomes. It is up to the Statutory Inquiry Team, led by Lord Justice HaddonCave, to determine which allegations are investigated.'

Read more:

The SAS murders: how a senior officer exposed a war crime cover-up

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