Nongqai Vol 15 No 8

DIE SKAKEL – THE LINK

https://link.storjshare.io/s/jwmo2v3cck5giqdcxrf3ceouklaa/nongqai/Nongqai%20Vol%2015%20N o%208.docx

Klik op die skakel om oop te maak en af te laai. Click then on the link to open.

1642: THE NIGHT WACTH: AMSTERDAM

Rembrandt

van Rijn

The Night Watch - An early form of Policing – the roots of which were brought to the Cape of Good Hope from The Netherlands by Jan van Riebeeck in 1652. He also brought the Roman Dutch Law to the Cape.

ELEKTRONIESE BEDIENING: HOE OM ANDER MENSE TE BEÏNVLOED

Pastoor Koot Swanepoel (082-041-9123)

“.. wees altyd gou om te luister, nie te gou om te praat nie, en nie te gou om kwaad te word nie. As jy kwaad is, kan jy nie doen wat God wil hê nie.”

Jakobus 1:19 NLV

Jy het nie 'n towerkunsie nodig wanneer dit daarby kom om ander mense te beïnvloed en 'n impak op hulle te hê nie. Die Bybel gee jou die formule - hier is dit:

1) Probeer om aandagtig te luister. Die waarheid is dat mense nie omgee hoeveel jy weet, totdat hulle weet hoeveel jy omgee nie. Hulle is geneig om dit wat hulle hoor deur hulle eie lewenservarings, voorkeure en die spesifieke probleem waaroor hulle tans tob, te filtreer. As jy dus wil hê dat mense moet luister as jy praat, moet jy aandagtig na hulle luister.

2) Moenie te veel sê nie. As jy geneig is om te veel of te vinnig te praat, is hier drie wenke vir jou: a) Stop. Hou op praat. Haal asem. Tel tot tien. Verskoon jouself vir 'n paar minute. b) Oefen om nie ander mense in die rede te val nie. Laat die ander persoon toe om dit wat hy of sy besig is om te sê, klaar te maak. c) Vra jouself af hoekom jy so baie praat. Is dit onsekerheid? Angstigheid? Die behoefte aan beheer? Die begeerte om te beïndruk? Die rede hoekom so baie van ons probeer om ander mense te oortuig, te beïndruk en te beheer is omdat ons dit moeilik vind om God te vertrou om dinge vir ons te laat uitwerk. Dra slegs die boodskap oor en vertrou God om die res te doen.

3) Hou jou woede in toom. As jy die eerste twee beginsels implementeer, behoort jy die derde beginsel maklik onder die knie te kry. As jy hierdie beginsels jaar na jaar beoefen sal jy, wanneer jy aan die einde van jou lewe kom en daarop terugkyk, bly wees dat jy God se Woord en Sy wysheid ernstig opgeneem het.

Sielskos: Ef 4:17-6:24; Luk 6:27-36; Ps 79; Spr 17:24-26 Met liefde.

Oorkonde aan mnr JP Botha

Mnr Johan Botha is ‘n gemeenskapsleier en hy dien sy omgewing in die Sinoville Brandbestrydingsvereniging (SBBV). Hy help ook landswyd met die vestiging van brandbestrydingsverenigings. Hy is ‘n SAW-veteraan. Hy is ouditeur van beroep en is die Nongqai Trust se ouditeur. Die trustees van die Nongqai Trust bring graag hulde vir sy onbaatsugtige diens aan die gemeenskap en die SAPS en Tshwane Brandweer.

WELCOME & FOREWORD | VOORWOORD & WELKOM

Hennie Heymans

• Welcome

A hearty word of welcome to the August-issue of Nongqai. We thank our contributors of photos and articles, and we thank you, our readers. The magazine could not exist without you, the reader.

• Sad News

It is with sadness that we report that one of our stalwarts, Jan (Basjan) de Klerk passed away. We will surely miss him. He was our archivist, he helped with our website, and was our liaison with Academia. We say: Rest in Peace – Salute, (More elsewhere in this edition.)

• The South African who helped end apartheid with encryption and inspired a Hollywood movie (Operation Vula)

I clearly remember the morning during 1979 when we received the news that three “political” prisoners escaped from the Pretoria Prison. I was the desk officer who attended to their activities. They were Messrs Jenkin, Lee and Moumbaris. This month we are publishing, with permission, a story by Jan Vermeulen on the matter. This was a shocking incident.

• Durban

I am Durban born and bred and lived there from birth in 1946 right up to 1971. I must confess that I love the history of “old” Durban and Natal. My grandparents were Boers from the Free State. As children they were incarcerated in British Concentration Camps during the Anglo Boer War. I love the history of the Anglo Boer War, and I also love our South African military history. My father was a young Free Stater, and he joined the SSB and from there joined the SA Police. The Police sent him to Durban and that is how I landed in Durban.

• Natal Mounted Police

At my mother’s knee I learnt the Gospel and on my father knee we “read” The Nongqai together. My father told me many “police stories” and when we were on our way somewhere, he always pointed out what happened there in the past. At one stage he had a Station Commander, Head Constable George Geoffrey

Clarke. Mr Clarke was the son of the Chief Commissioner of the natal Police, Col JW Clarke. One day, I had the surprise of my life: A Mr Clarke phoned me and came to see me. He brought along a wealth of historical data. He was the son of the late Head Constable Clarke and grandson of the Chief Commissioner. What an interesting and enriching experience. He gave me a copy of Col Clarke’s memoirs. The memoirs can only be published 100 years after the death of Col Clarke. One day I will publish it.

• Durban Borough Police | Durban City Police

Growing up in Durban I regularly saw members of the DCP. From my father I heard stories of the Durban Borough Police (later the Durban City Police.) They were a model Police Force – very disciplined and decent men. In my young days the Union Jack was still visible and flown from the City Hall. Members of the DCP were not proficient in Afrikaans.

One day I was on duty and dressed in mufti. I was stopped for speeding. I spoke only in Afrikaans and the Constable could not speak Afrikaans. I pretended not to understand English and said in Afrikaans let’s go to the Police Station to get an interpreter. He just let me go!

The DCP were fully fledged policemen – they enforced the law as well as byelaws. The DCP was a great asset to the people of Durban and assisted the SA Police wherever they could. Two members of the SCP were decorated with the SAP Medal for combatting Terrorism.

• Policing in Durban

Originally the DBP investigated all cases in the borough of Durban. The Natal Police policed on the outside of the borough. After Union and during 1913 the SA Mounted Riles / SAP were stationed outside the borough. However, the SAP’s CID investigated cases of e.g. murder and – if I remember correctly serious crimes – the CID of the SAP investigated ‘serious cases’ e.g. of theft where the value exceeded £5-00-00. After 1913 the SA Mounted Rifles policed all stations outside the borough while and the SAP consisted of a District Commandant, CID and court ushers. The DBP were also doing duty as Water Police in the Harbour later the SAP took over this function.

In my time we had the South African Police, the Durban City Police, the SA Railways Police and the “Water Police”, (the SA Railways Police took over Water Police duties from the SAP during c1935.)

We also had Military Police at Natal Command. When Durban was visited by warships e.g. from the United Kingdom or America, the SAP would work together with the Shore Patrols. We all worked in harmony.

• Assupol

Our renowned ASSUPOL – formerly the South African Police Provident Fund founded more than a 100 years ago has been sold. “The Competition Commission has given Sanlam the green light to acquire Assupol in a deal that will cost the life insurer an estimated R6.5 billion”. (Daily Investorhttps://dailyinvestor.com/business/60809/big-south-african-insurer-gets-go-ahead-for-r6-5-billiondeal/?source=newsletter )

Thanks Barry Taylor in Thailand for the news snippet!

• 1914: The SAP Provident Fund

Two snippets from my archive:

• End

Please enjoy this magazine which offers a rich selection – sit back and relax, enjoy the photos and read only that which interest you – the reader. Greetings

TROU TOT DIE DOOD TOE: DIE FIASKO VAN DIE PIERRE STEYN-ONDERSOEK (deel 2)

Reeks deur genl JV van der Merwe

Die saak is daarna op ʼn vergadering bespreek waar onder andere mnr. De Klerk, mnr. Kobie Coetsee, mnr. Hernus Kriel, Minister van Wet en Orde, mnr. Eugène Louw, genl. Kat Liebenberg, genl. Pierre Steyn en ek teenwoordig was. Daar is besluit dat die Polisie die ondersoek sal oorneem en dat dit regstreeks onder toesig van die prokureur-generaal van Transvaal, dr. Jan d’Oliveira, sou geskied.

Ek het lt.genl. Johan le Roux, hoof van die Polisie se Misdaadinligtingsdiens, aangewys om die verdere ondersoek te hanteer. Sy ondersoek het bevestig wat ek aanvanklik gedink het, naamlik dat genl. Steyn se verslag uitsluitend gegrond was op inligting van die Direktoraat van Teeninligting van die Weermag en meeluister-inligting van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens. Die sogenaamde “bronverslae” van die Direktoraat van Teeninligting het geen feite bevat oor hoe, waar en wanneer die oortredings sou plaasgevind het nie, net beweringe. Die meeluister-inligting van Nasionale

Intelligensie is nie behoorlik getranskribeer nie, maar bloot opgesom en in die proses is uitlatings en kommentaar so vermeng dat die feite moeilik onderskei kon word.

Die werksverdeling tussen Nasionale Intelligensie en die veiligheidstak van die Polisie het bepaal dat eersgenoemde inligting oor moontlike misdrywe onverwyld vir verdere ondersoek aan die veiligheidstak beskikbaar moes stel. Hulle het dit egter nie in hierdie geval gedoen nie. Gesprekke wat waardevolle getuienis kon gewees het as die regte prosedure gevolg was, was nou nutteloos. Daar is geen ag geslaan op die bepalings van die bewysreg nie

Ná die polisie-ondersoek is ʼn vergadering in Kaapstad onder voorsitterskap van min. Coetsee belê. Die vergadering is onder andere bygewoon deur die hoofde van die Weermag, Polisie, die direkteurgeneraal van Justisie, die hoofde van die inligtingsgemeenskap en die prokureur-generaal. Laasgenoemde het sonder om doekies om te draai die hele proses as ʼn fiasko bestempel. Met die uitsondering van een moontlike diefstalgeval waar ʼn Weermaglid ʼn voertuig in Botswana verkoop het, was daar geen geloofwaardige getuienis dat enige misdryf gepleeg is nie. Ek het daarop gewys dat Nasionale Intelligensie se versuim om die veiligheidstak onmiddellik by die ondersoek te betrek toe daar sprake van moontlike misdrywe was, waardevolle getuienis verlore laat gaan het en enige moontlike vervolging verongeluk het.

As lid van die veiligheidstak het ek gou geleer dat die hantering van informante ʼn moeilike taak is. Dit moes met groot omsigtigheid en deeglikheid gedoen word. Die meeste informante het inligting teen vergoeding verkoop of in ruil vir die een of ander guns. Dit was noodsaaklik om meer as een informant te gebruik om inligting te kontroleer. As ʼn informant gereeld inligting verstrek het wat aan die hand van ander inligting betroubaar bevind is, is aan hom of haar ʼn sekere status toegeken.

Informante het nie geskroom om feite so te verdraai dat ʼn onskuldige voorval sinister voorgekom het nie. Tydens my loopbaan het ek weinig werklik betroubare informante teëgekom. Die meeste informante se inligting moes versigtig geëvalueer word om die kaf van die koring te skei. Onervare hanteerders is maklik mislei.

Terwyl ek hoof van die veiligheidstakke in Suidwes (Namibië) was, het ʼn bekende bruin politikus my vertel hoe hy en ander met vals inligting geld uit Nasionale Intelligensie gemaak het. ʼn Lid van Nasionale Intelligensie het hom genader om as informant op te tree. Hy het ingewillig, maar deur die vrae van sy hanteerder gou agtergekom dat ander informante oor dieselfde saak verslag gedoen het. Die politikus het toe besluit om ’n strik vir sy hanteerder te stel. Tydens vertroulike samesprekinge met ’n klein groepie mense het hy doelbewus sekere dinge kwytgeraak. Nie lank daarna nie het sy hanteerder hom oor sy uitlatinge ondervra. Die politikus het toe dadelik geweet

wie die ander informante is. Hy het hulle almal bymekaargebring en aangekondig: “Kêrels, ek weet julle werk vir Nasionale Intelligensie. Ek ook. Kom ons maak geld.” Hulle het toe die verskaffing van inligting sorgvuldig beplan. Feite is vernuftig verdraai en die een het die ander gestaaf. Hul vergoeding is verhoog en almal het breed geglimlag.

Tydens die ontleding van die inligting waaroor genl. Steyn beskik het, het dit duidelik geblyk dat die verslae wat van informante ontvang is, nooit die toets van behoorlike evaluering sou slaag nie. Daar is nooit bepaal hoe die informante die inligting bekom het nie, watter inligting op feite berus het en watter inligting bloot hoorsê of dalk versin is nie. Dit was nutteloos as getuienis.

Dit het my verbaas dat mnre. De Klerk en Coetsee, albei ervare advokate, met al die regshulp tot hul beskikking aan die hand van sulke onbewese inligting kon handel. Hulle het hulle skuldig gemaak aan die mees flagrante verontagsaming van basiese regsbeginsels. Die audi alterem partem-reël is nooit toegepas nie en die Weermaglede het nooit kans gekry om hul kant van die saak te stel nie. Geen prima facie-getuienis is aan hulle voorgelê nie.

Dit wil voorkom of mnre. De Klerk en Coetsee onder politieke druk geswig en ʼn oordeelsfout begaan het. Dit het ongelukkig verreikende gevolge vir 23 lede van die Weermag gehad. Die aangewese en eenvoudige uitweg sou gewees het om die beweringe uit die staanspoor aan die prokureur-generaal voor te lê en die saak daarna volgens sy aanbevelinge te hanteer. Niemand sou ʼn vinger na mnr. De Klerk kon gewys het as hy aangekondig het dat hy die saak na die prokureur-generaal verwys het en dat verdere optrede in oorlegpleging met laasgenoemde sou geskied. Dit is die basiese beginsels van ons reg en trouens die reg van enige beskaafde land.

Genl. Kat Liebenberg het hom in ʼn moeilike posisie bevind. Anders as in die geval van die Polisie het die Staatspresident wye bevoegdhede oor die Weermag gehad. Genl. Liebenberg kon beswaarlik op die steun van mnr. Eugène Louw staatmaak en nog minder op mnr. Kobie Coetsee reken. Hy moes magteloos toekyk hoe lede van die Weermag slagoffers van politieke opportunisme word en hoe hul loopbane vernietig word.

Ek het later uit ʼn betroubare bron verneem dat ʼn lid van die Goldstone-kommissie wat op die DKIkantore toegeslaan het, vooraf per telefoon gevra het dat die DKI gewaarsku moet word dat lede van die Goldstone-kommissie onderweg is om op hul lêers beslag te lê. Dit is egter nie bekend of die DKI enige lêers verwyder of vernietig het nie. Ek wonder of adv. Torie Pretorius, onder wie se leiding die klopjag plaasgevind het, en die ander lede wat betrokke was, bereid sal wees om ʼn poligraaftoets te doen om die waarheid te bepaal.

JAN DE KLERK

HBH

Jan de Klerk het ons hierdie maand ontval en dit is ‘n geweldige skok vir ons hier by Nongqai. Hoe het ons vriendskap begin?

Ek was besig om Jonathan Pittaway te help met ‘n boek oor Koevoet. Wyle genl Hennie Westraat, toe in Hermanus woonagtig, reël toe vir ‘n besoek aan ‘n afgetrede lid van die Mag wat in die tweede wêreldoorlog geveg het en in Kaapstad woon. Ek het Kaapstad besoek en ‘n wonderlike storie by die Oom gekry en ons het die storie in Jonathan se boek en in die Nongqai gepubliseer. Papier is geduldig.

Jare later kontak Jan de Klerk vir my en ons gesels. Hy vertel toe dat die Omie wie se verhaal ek gepubliseer het, sy Vader se beste vriend was en dat diè twee saam tydens die tweede wêreldoorlog geveg het. Ek por toe vir Jan aan om sy Vader se storie aan te stuur. Die resultaat was Nongqai Vol 14 No 8A – ‘n Spesiale Uitgawe oor sy Vader, majoor JS de Klerk.

Nongqai Vol 14 No 8A – majoor JS de Klerk

Luit Jan de Klerk – later dosent in polisiekunde.

Jan het vir ons gespesialiseerde artikels geskryf en ek het sommige, met sy toestemming, na dr James Myburg – redakteur van PoliticsWeb – verwys wat sy artikels gepubliseer het. Jan het algaande meer en meer betrokke geraak by Nongqai en was ons argivaris – hy kon enige woord in enige Nongqai opspoor bv: SAP-depot / SAP-kollege of SAP (VT); hywas ook skakel met Akademia. Beide instansies het hulle innige meegevoel teenoor Jan se familie uitgespreek. Ek wil ookmy innige meegevoel met sy gade, Susan, en ander familielede uitspreek. Ek sal hom vreeslik mis! Hy het die tydskrif “Die Generaal” ook op ISSUU in die regte chronologiese volgorde geplaas.

LUITENANT JAN ERASMUS DE KLERK (POLISIE-WETENSKAPLIKE)

Riana Ferreira

Jan Erasmus de Klerk word op 16 Julie 1956 in Montagu gebore. Op 18 maande verloor hy sy ma aan pankreaskanker en moet sy pa John, sy belowende polisieloopbaan opsy skuif om twee minderjarige kleuters te akkommodeer. Nadat sy pa weer trou, vestig die gesin hulle vir Jan se hoërskoolloopbaan in Bellville.

Jan is ‘n ywerige Voortrekker en sy liefde vir skryf word reeds op ‘n jong ouderdom geprikkel toe hy ‘n onderhoud met die Kommissaris van Polisie, genl. Gideon Joubert (1972) vir ‘n Voortrekker-kenteken in Joernalistiek moes voer.

Jan matrikuleer in 1974 aan die Hoërskool D.F. Malan in Bellville en sluit daarna by die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie aan. Hy was die derde agtereenvolgende geslag wat hierdie loopbaan kies. Hy voltooi twee universiteitsgrade in kriminologie. Hy dien op verskillende dorpe en afdelings in die polisie en doen ook diens op die Ovambo-grens tydens terroriste aanvalle.

Uit sy eerste huwelik word twee kinders gebore, Vezmé en Jano.

Jan tree uit as ‘n offisier en word ‘n dosent in Polisiewetenskap aan die Universiteit van Venda. Tydens hierdie loopbaan neem hy namens die nuwe regering leiding met die stigting van Gemeenskapspolisiëringsforums in Limpopo.

Toe hy uit die universiteits se diens “getransformeer” word, begin hy ‘n besigheid in Port Elizabeth wat hy en sy tweede vrou, Susan, vir bykans 21 jaar bedryf het.

Sy liefde vir skryf en geskiedenis laat hom een van die vertakkings van die De Klerk-familie navors. Hy publiseer dan ook ‘n gedetailleerde boek met die familiegeskiedenis. Hy help ook sy swaer met die navors en skryf en druk van boeke oor aalwyne en bye. Sy liefde vir die Anglo-Boereoorlog het gelei tot ‘n groot versameling skaars boeke oor die onderwerp. Hy skryf ook verskeie goed nagevorste artikels vir politicsweb.co.za

Die afgelope jaar was hy nou betrokke by Nongqai. Hy het hom veral toegespits op die totstandkoming van die Nongqai blog. Baie jare se werk en inligting is geïndekseer en geargiveer ir almal wat belangstel in die werkinge van die veiligheidsmagte en intelligensie instellings van ouds. Hy het toegewyd en ywerig daaraan gewerk en ‘n hoogtepunt vir hom was dat vanaf 26 Maart 2024 Akademia se mediasentrum die Nongqai-argief huisves. Hy was baie beskeie oor sy werk, maar mag sy nagedagtenis geëer word daardeur.

Groot was die skok toe pankreaskanker (net soos by sy moeder) by hom vroeg in Julie 2024 gediagnoseer word. Hy sterf op Woensdag 7 Augustus, slegs twee weke na sy 68ste verjaarsdag.

Die foto: Aan die linkerkant, staan my suster se man, Ferdie du Preez. Met sy aftrede het hy die rang van Kolonel gehad (ek weet Jan wou nog bitter graag sy storie vertel het), hy het 'n honneursgraad in strategiese studies ontvang met internasionale politiek en staatsleer as hoofvakke. In die middel is ons pa, John Stephen de Klerk, en regs my broer. Jan het op daardie stadium ‘n graad in Polisiekunde

ontvang en op 'n later stadium sy honneurs. Die foto is geneem Mei 1984. Enkele dae voor my pa se afsterwe. Groete uit die Langkloof.

AGT MAANDE IN MALI.

Piet “Walk Tall” van Zyl is een van die SAP se “Ysters” – hy was ook ‘n Springstofdeskundige in die ou Oos-Transvaal se veiligheidstak. Hy het ook deelgeneem aan Operasie Rachel in Mosambiek. Nongqai het hom gevra om sy herinnering in Mali met ons lesers te deel. Baie dankie Piet – u samewerking word opreg waardeer. Ons hoop om weer van u te hoor. Baie dankie -

Piet “Walk Tall” van Zyl

Goeienaand Brig. Hennie, Jammer ek is laat met die versoek maar baie besig hier by Beetleloop. Hier is ‘n paar foto’s soos versoek na my 8 maande met Heritage Oil in Mali. Ek was die Sekuriteitskonsultant vir Heritage Oil en het sowat 200 Mali troepe gehad wat ek kon ontplooi om die soektog na olie veilig en vlot te laat verloop.

Vroue met al hul ware om op die mark in Gao te ruil. Let op die bokvel waterhouers onder die donkie.

Besoek aan een van die beveiligingspunte bokant ons kamp tydens my daaglikse stap.

Saam met die troepe in die mees onherbergsame wêreld. Skroeiend warm.

Toearegs met hul kamele op trek. Daar was ongeveer 200 kamele in die trek

Ontmoeting met een van die hoofleiers in Gao area in Mali.

Teebreek met my 4x4 bestuurder en die troepe op die grond.

My oornag slaapplek tydens ‘n besoek aan die seismiese span. Vuurtjie en n miljoen sterre om te pluk.

Toearegs te voet op pad water toe. Die toneel laat my altyd dink aan die rolprent " Seven against the Sun"

Mooi kleurryke kameel in Bourem dorpie.

Altyd sand tydens ‘bundu bashing’ en hier en daar ‘n groenigheid.

Die klein mannetjie het infeksie opgedoen tydens besnydenis. In ons omswerwings in die gebied het ons altyd gesorg vir penisilline en anti-biotika

Eensame kameel op ‘n duin

Donkies met hul watervoorraad op pad huis toe.

Eensame Toeareg met sy perd en kameel.

Die kind en sy pa in n absoluut onherbergsame gebied raakgeloop.

My Karavaan waarin ek agt maande gebly het. Die foto is geneem net voor ‘n Harmattan stofstorm ons getref het. Die wind het die beskermingsplate gestroop en ek het in die middel van die nag in n bed met rooi woestynsand wakker geskrik.

Walk Tall

MALI

Net om ons lesers se geheue te verfris oor waar Mali geleë is, het on gou op wikipedia geloer en ‘n geredigeerde weergawe geplaas van https://af.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mali

Republiek Mali

Vlag Seël

Nasionale leuse: Un peuple, un but, une foi (Frans vir: "Een volk, een doel, een geloof")

Hoofstad Bamako

12°39′N 8°0′W

Grootste stad Bamako

Oppervlakte

- Totaal

- Water (%)

Bevolking

- 2018-sensus

- Digtheid

BBP (KKP)

- Totaal

- Per capita

BBP (nominaal)

- Totaal

- Per capita

MOI (2017)

Gini (2009)

Geldeenheid

1 240 192 km2 (23ste)

478 841 myl2

1,6

19 329 841[2]

11,7 / km2 (215de) - 30,3 / myl2

2019-skatting

$47,460 miljard

$2 354

2019-skatting

$18,488 miljard

$917

0,427 (182ste) – laag

33,0 – medium

CFA-frank (XOF)

Mali amptelik die Republiek Mali is 'n landingeslote land in Wes-Afrika. Dit het die tweede grootste grondgebied van al die lande in Wes-Afrika. Dit grens aan Algerië in die noorde, Niger in die ooste, Burkina Faso en Ivoorkus in die suide, Guinee in die suidweste, en Senegal en Mauritanië in die weste. Die land se reguit grense aan die noorde strek tot in die middel van die Saharawoestyn, terwyl die land se suide, waar die meeste inwoners woon, die Niger- en Sénégalriviere insluit. Dit het in 'n stadium bekend gestaan as Frans-Soedan, maar is later na die Maliryk genoem. Mali beslaan 'n oppervlakte van 1 240 192 km² en het in 2018 'n bevolking van 19 329 841 gehad. Die hoofstad en grootste stad is Bamako, in die suidweste van die land weerskante die Nigerrivier. Geskiedenis

Die Mandémense vestig hulle in die Sahel (insluitende hedendaagse Mali) en vorm 'n reeks Sahelkoninkryke wat die Ghanaryk, die Maliryk, en die Songhairyk insluit. Timboektoe was 'n sleutelstad in hierdie ryke as 'n buitepos vir trans-Saharahandel en 'n middelpunt vir geleerdheid. Die Songhairyk kwyn onder 'n Marokkaanse inval in 1591. Mali word van 1880 deur Frankryk binnegeval, wat dit as 'n oorsese department van Frankryk annekseer. Die kolonie, wat met tye ook naburige lande ingesluit het, het as Frans-Soedan of die Soedannese Republiek bekend gestaan. In die begin van 1959 word die unie van Mali en Senegal die Mali-Federasie, wat op 20 Junie 1960 onafhanklikheid van Frankryk verkry. Senegal onttrek hom ná 'n paar maande uit die Mali-Federasie. Die Republiek van Mali, onder Modibo Keïta, onttrek hom op 22 September 1960 uit die Franse Gemeenskap. Mali is van onafhanklikheid tot 1991 deur 'n reeks diktators regeer. Anti-regeringsbetogings in 1991 lei tot 'n staatsgreep, 'n tussentydse regering, en 'n nuwe grondwet. In 1992 wen Alpha Oumar Konaré Mali se eerste demokratiese, veelparty- presidensiële verkiesing. Met sy herverkiesing in 1997 druk president Konaré politiese en ekonomiese hervormings deur en beveg korrupsie. In 2002 word hy ná 'n demokratiese verkiesing opgevolg deur Amadou Toumani Touré, wat 'n sleutelfiguur in die demokratiese opstand van 1991 was. In Januarie 2012 het die Toearegs in die noorde van Mali in opstand teen die sentrale regering gekom en vervolgens die onafhanklikheid van Azawad met die hoofstad Gao verklaar. Met behulp van Franse ondersteuning kon Mali die gebied herwin en ná onderhandelinge is dié gebied by Mali heringelyf.

Geografie

Mali word deur land omring en het 'n subtropiese tot droë klimaat. Dit is meestal plat en styg na golwende sandbedekte heuwels in die noordelike vlaktes en savanne om die Nigerrivier in die suide. Die heuwels van die Air Massif en Djado Plateau lê in die noordooste. Die grootste deel van die land lê in die Saharawoestyn, wat 'n warm, stof-belaaide harmattan dynserigheid veroorsaak, wat algemeen voorkom tydens die droë seisoen, en herhaalde droogtes veroorsaak. Die nasie het aansienlike natuurlike hulpbronne, met goud, uraan, fosfate, kaolien, tafelsout en kalksteen wat die meeste ontgin word.

Daar word beraam dat Mali in die natter gedeeltes die potensiaal het om 'n groot rysprodusent te word, maar ontwikkeling van hierdie sektor het nog nie plaasgevind nie. Ander produkte wat van belang is, is grondboontjies, wat op kleiner skaal verbou word.

Twee groot riviere in Mali is die Nigerrivier, wat deur die hoofstad Bamako noordoos tot in die Niger loop, voor dit suid draai deur Nigerië tot in die Atlantiese Oseaan, en die Sénégalrivier wat weswaart vloei tot in Senegal. Die voormalige Maliese hoofstad Kayes is om die oewers van die Sénégalrivier gebou. 'n Indrukwekkende waterval, die Gouina-waterval, kom oos van Kayes voor.

Ekonomie

Mali is onder die armste land ter wêreld, met 65% van die land se grondgebied woestyn of halfwoestyn. Ekonomiese bedrywighede is hoofsaaklik beperk tot die oewergebied besproei deur die Nigerrivier. Ongeveer 10% van die bevolking is nomadies en sowat 80% van die arbeidsmag is betrokke by boerdery of vissery. Nywerheidsaktiwiteite is gefokus op die verwerking van boerderyprodukte. Mali is totaal afhanklik van buitelandse hulpverlening en is blootgestel aan skommelings in wêreldpryse vir katoen, die land se hoofuitvoerproduk.

In 1997 sit die land die suksesvolle implementering van 'n Internasionale Monetêre Fondsaanbevole strukturele aanpassingsprogram voort wat die land help om te groei, diversifiseer en buitelandse beleggings te lok. Mali se volging van ekonomiese hervorming, en die 50% devaluasie van die CFA-frank in Januarie 1994, het ekonomiese groei bevorder. Verskeie multinasionale maatskappye brei goudmynbou-werksaamhede in 1996–1998 uit, en die regering verwag dat Mali 'n belangrike goudprodusent in Afrika suid van die Sahara sal word in die volgende paar jaar. Groot goudmyne sluit SEMOS ('n vennootskap tussen AngloGold Ashanti, Iamgold en die Maliregering) se Sadiola Hill-goudmyn, Yatela-goudmyn in die weste, en Morilla in die sentrale gedeelte van die land in.

Verwysings

1. (fr) Presidency of Mali: Symboles de la République, L'Hymne National du Mali. Koulouba.pr.ml. Besoek op 14 April 2017.

2. (fr) "Mali preliminary 2018 census". Institut National de la Statistique. Geargiveer vanaf die oorspronklike op 18 April 2010. Besoek op 29 November 2018.

3. Jump up to:3,0 3,1 3,2 3,3 (en) "Mali". Internasionale Monetêre Fonds. Besoek op 24 April 2019.

4. (en) "2018 Human Development Report" (PDF). United Nations Development Programme. 2018. Geargiveer (PDF) vanaf die oorspronklike op 15 Mei 2020. Besoek op 24 April 2019.

5. (en) "Mali". Wêreldbank. Geargiveer vanaf die oorspronklike op 9 Oktober 2019. Besoek op 24 April 2019.

Algemeen

• (en) "Mali". Encyclopædia Britannica. Besoek op 1 Mei 2024.

• (en) "Mali". Central Intelligence Agency. Besoek op 1 Mei 2024.

SAP MIDDELBURG (K)

Kol Louis Langenhoven

OPERATION VULA

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WHO HELPED END APARTHEID WITH ENCRYPTION AND INSPIRED A HOLLYWOOD MOVIE

By Jan Vermeulen

(Reprinted with permission)

Former political prisoner and old-school hacker Tim Jenkin co-developed and built an encrypted electronic communications network in the 1980s that became a vital instrument in ending apartheid. Years earlier, Jenkin and two other inmates had escaped from Pretoria Central Prison by reverseengineering the keys of ten separate doors (and some extras) from wood.

Jenkin and university friend Stephen Lee landed in jail after joining the ANC in 1974 and setting off pamphlet bombs with anti-apartheid messaging in Cape Town between 1975 and 1978.

Former ANC spymaster Ronnie Kasrils said in the documentary The Vula Connection that Jenkin held the record for detonating 18 or 19 leaflet bombs in the Cape Town city centre in one day.

He said Jenkin and Lee weren’t the usual intellectual types who joined the ANC as students. They combined brains with industriousness.

Jenkin had the extra advantage of being unassuming and almost withdrawn. “Which is exactly what you want,” Kasrils added.

Unfortunately, the security police soon had the pair under surveillance. They were arrested at 03:00 on 2 March 1978 while moving their printing equipment.

Under legal advice, they pleaded guilty to all charges. Jenkin was sentenced to twelve years in prison and Lee to eight.

Within 18 months, they had broken out. The caper became the subject of the 2020 film Escape from Pretoria, with Harry Potter star Daniel Radcliffe portraying Jenkin.

By early 1980, Jenkin had relocated to London and was assigned to training operatives in the encryption techniques they needed in the field.

The ANC used a simple but effective paper-based one-time pad system for cryptography, which Jenkin trained recruits in.

One-time pad relies on single-use keys that must be pre-generated and issued to a group of communicating parties.

As messages are encrypted and decrypted, the keys are consumed and should not be reused.

Daniel Radcliffe (left) with Tim Jenkin (right) during filming of Escape From Pretoria

While the encryption itself is uncrackable, provided keys are properly randomly generated, one-time pad systems have several other vulnerabilities.

If an adversary gets their hands on the pre-generated keys and are able to intercept every message from then on, they can decrypt them.

Operatives must also adhere to strict operational security protocols, such as destroying decrypted messages, old key pages, and old enciphered messages.

However, the main problem, Jenkin found, was that encryption and decryption was laborious.

“It took so much effort to say so very little and the responses, as few and far between as they were, contained little encouragement and advice,” he said.

“There were only instructions which usually lacked any connection with the reality they were experiencing.”

This quickly demoralised new operatives, and Jenkin said he could see their enthusiasm and activity rapidly die.

In the early eighties, computers were getting cheaper, and Jenkin believed a program to automate the cryptography could solve their communications problem.

Together with new partner-in-crime Ronnie Press, they began work on a system that would eventually become a fully-fledged underground electronic communications network.

“Off to the bookshops and libraries I went to find out about secure encryption algorithms,” Jenkin said.

Toshiba T1000, personal computer of the revolution

“Nothing impressed me very much and all I discovered was that cryptology was an arcane science for bored mathematicians, not for underground activists.”

While he did learn a few tricks they could use, he decided to keep it simple and digitise their existing one-time pad system.

Although their cryptography would remain simple, the whole communications system ended up having a lot more moving parts than just the software, as most of the Internet did not yet exist.

To transmit encrypted messages, they were encoded into a signal that could be played over a regular telephone call and recorded. This was to allow operatives to easily receive messages via public telephones.

The recorded message could then be played back into a computer via a modem and decrypted.

However, keys had to be distributed to the two communicating parties to encrypt or decrypt messages.

For this, Jenkin wrote random data to 1.44MB “stiffy” disks. These keys and the encryption program itself then had to be delivered to operatives in the field.

Tim Jenkin then and now

Enter Conny Braam, head of the Dutch anti-apartheid movement, who found a KLM air hostess sympathetic to their cause.

The hostess, Antoinette Vogelsang, helped smuggle the computers, disks, and other equipment ANC operatives in South Africa needed.

Vogelsang’s role was critical if the system was going to work. Had she provided copies of the disks to the South African authorities, the whole endeavour would have been compromised.

With everything in place, the ANC kicked off Operation Vula.

They infiltrated key leaders like Mac Maharaj, Siphiwe Nyanda, and Charles Nqakula back into South Africa with the ability to communicate with one another and the ANC headquarters in exile. Kasrils would later join them.

In 1989, the system and Operation Vula would achieve its greatest victory re-establishing secure communications between Nelson Mandela in South Africa and ANC president Oliver Tambo in Lusaka, Zambia.

Mandela had been transferred to house arrest as part of negotiations to transition to a democratic South Africa.

However, the apartheid government kept Mandela isolated from the rest of the ANC in the hopes of securing more favourable terms by creating the impression they were negotiating solely with him.

While it was not possible to smuggle a computer and disks to Mandela, messages were relayed in the covers of books.

Mandela’s replies could then be smuggled out, encrypted using the software, and transmitted to Tambo in Lusaka.

“Messages from Mandela became a regular feature and in response there were long memos from Oliver Tambo in Lusaka,” said Jenkin.

“The two were now talking in confidence for the first time since the early 60s.”

Another view of the ANC’s ICT headquarters nicknamed “GCHQ”.

Not visible in the scale image are various antennas sprouting from the roof. One of these was for a high-powered cellphone, used for sending and receiving messages via an electronic answering service (“voice bank”) instead of answering machines. There were three phone lines in the flat: one for personal use, one for incoming Vula messages, and one for outgoing Vula messages. Adding more phone lines would have looked suspicious, so additional phone lines were installed at sympathisers’ homes nearby. These were connected by (illegal) high-powered cordless phones. Aerials on the roof had line-of-sight with those at the other peoples’ homes, so the reception was really good. Sophisticated commercial answering machines were installed that could be controlled remotely via the handsets in “GCHQ”.

In the middle is the main Toshiba T3100 computer. Mounted on the wall are a pair of the incoming and outgoing answering machines. The acoustic modem is the white box under the bottom shelf behind the computer. On the first shelf at left are various radios used to communicate in London. In front, just to the right of the chair, is a home-made acoustic coupler attached to a mobile phone handpiece.

Operation Vula control centre at Ronnie Press’ place.

Operation Vula workshop

Close up view of the equipment

Tim Jenkin at his workstation in London

COMMENTS ON THE ESCAPE FROM PRETORIA CENTRAL

Escape of Political Prisoners: Reasons

Good morning, Hennie

Important aspects of the escape could probably be attributed to factors such as:

1. The Political Prisoners received the same treatment as the rest of the incarcerated.

2. They were required to work and had access to the workshop.

3. Warders were not so carefully chosen and exchanged as in later years so some familiarity could be developed between the prisoners and their supervisors.

All these factors together with possible bribery, cognitive capability and lackadaisical attention by the warders could also have been in play.

Controls were substantially tightened subsequently, and new more sophisticated max prisons built to hold “politicals”.

Greetings,

Deur Hennie Heymans

Ek het van c1965 saam met die volgende lede op SAP King’s Rest gewerk:

Sers WJS “Wessie” van der Westhuizen magsnommer 30320P;

SAP KING’S REST

Hy het eers navrae en ondersoek gewerk toe ek hom ontmoet het, later het hy hom opgewerk as ‘Ou Mof’ se tweede-in-bevel en ander sersante het ondersoek en navrae gedoen. Hy het ‘n goeie sin vir humor gehad. Hy het so ‘n staal-blou Fiat vier-deur motor gery.

Eendag vloek ‘n Engelsman hom en hy sê vir die man dit is in orde dat hy gevloek word, hy neem nie aanstoot nie, solank die Engelsman vir hom – sersant Van der Westhuizen - nie ‘n Engelsman noem nie. Later kom die persoon terug na sers Van der Westhuizen toe en sê: “You know Sergeant nobody has ever insulted me like that!”

Ander keer baklei die Noorweegse matrose by “The Barbeque”. Sers Wessie woon die klagte by. Dit is nag en hulle breek die plek af. Hy stap na die grootste ou toe en sê vir hom dat indien die ou wil baklei, kan hulle twee dit buite kan doen. Die ou het seker vir Wessie kans gesien en almal stap na buite. Wessie is voor en stap by die trappies af en voel in die donker rond en kry ’n halwe baksteen en staan die ou onder die ken daarmee. Die man val grond toe, uit soos ’n kers. Hy sit stilletjies se baksteen weg en sê: “Right whose next?” Geveg oor en een arrestasie vir rusverstoring op gelisensieerde perseel.

‘Sant Wessie vertel ook eendag – voordat ons die Alfa, Bravo, Charlie, Delta spelwyse geïmplementeer het hoe ’n lid een nag oor die radio spel en toe hy “C” moes sê, toe sê die lid: “’C’ soos in Sydenham!”

Hy het my geleer van “Act 10 of 1910 – crouching in a manner ...” Later het ek gehoor ‘sant Wessie is oorlede. Ek sal nooit vir my ou kollegas vergeet nie!!

Ek lees eendag ‘n ou Huisgenoot en lees toe die volgende oor my kollega, sersant Van der Westhuizen:

W. J. S. van der Westhuizen

So is sersant W. J. S. van der Westhuizen van Sydenham, Durban-Wes, op 'n dag na 'n 143 voet diep put ontbied wat oor die dertig voet water bevat. Sowat vyftig toeskouers het reeds om die gat saamgedrom, maar elkeen wou dit liewer aan sy buurman oorlaat om 'n man uit die kake van die dood te red en daarmee helderoem te verwerf! Toe Van der Westhuizen daar aankom, het niemand nog 'n vinger verroer nie.

Hy kon 'n floue hulpgeroep uit die diepte hoor en in die lig van sy flits die omtrekke van 'n mensefiguur in die donker sien hang.

'n Lang tou word dus van 'n naburige klipgroef gehaal en om sy middel gebind, en hy laat hom met behulp van twee kollegas en 'n paar toeskouers wat nou al te gretig was om 'n veilige, ondergeskikte rol te speel in die diepte afsak.

Naby die bodem het 'n Indiër aan 'n ysterstaaf vasgeklou. Hy kon dit beswaarlik nog reg kry om sy kop bo die ysige water te hou, was reeds so swak en uitgeput van ontbering dat hy eike oomblik onder die water kon verdwyn.

Van der Westhuizen knoop die tou los, maak dit om die Indiër se lyf vas, en skreeu vir sy helpers om die man op te trek terwyl hy self aan die ysterstaaf bly hang totdat hulle die tou weer laat sak. ,,Dat daardie Indiër aan die dood ontkom het," moes die Polisiekommissaris later opmerk, ,,is grootliks aan sersant Van der Westhuizen se moedige, flinke optrede te danke."

HELDE WEMEL IN ONS POLISIEMAG1 ‘n artikel deur - Benjamin Bennett

Opmerking: Sersant Van der Westhuizen het my baie staaltjies vertel maar hy het nooit oor die voorval gepraat nie - HBH

Sers ‘Hannie’ Fourie;

Hy was ‘n goeie skut en het eenmaal diens gedoen op ‘n amptelike boot langs SWA se kus om die regulasies tov seevisserye toe te pas.

Sers H C ‘Harry’ Graham:

Hy was ‘n oud-lid van die SA Spoorwegpolisie – as kind het ek en hy dikwels saam bus gery. Sy seun is met genl-maj Herman Stadler se dogter getroud. Genl Herman Stadler vertel my eendag dat Harry Graham onlangs oorlede is.2

Sers D C ‘Danny’ Keyter:

Hy was seun van sersant EE Keyter van Wentworth, hy word saam met my bevorder na sersant. Die heel eerste dag na hy van Benoni af teruggekeer het, waar hy sy meganiesekursus voltooi het, het hy die patrolliewa omgegooi in ‘n systraatjie wat op Marinerylaan uitgeloop het, reg voor die Harcourt hotel.

Hy het later ‘n hondeman geword en was aan die Rand gestasioneer en ek het hom gesoek maar hom nooit weer gekry nie.

1 Huisgenoot 1965-12-24

2 Dit was in 2004.

Sers van Rooyen;

Hy was ‘n konstabel te Seymour en is as sersant met bevordering van Seymour na King’s Rest verplaas. Met vrou en pap baba op die Bluff aangekom en in Crossways Hotel tuis gegaan. Later het ek en my pa hom ‘n kamer in ons woonstel onder die huis aangebied tot hy iets beter kon vind.

Sers Van Rooyen het navrae en ondersoek gewerk. Eendag3 neem ek hom en konst Dirk Bisschoff4 na die Louis Botha-lughawe om ‘n vliegtuig na Port Elizabeth te haal. Hulle moes twee nuwe polisiemotors daar gaan afhaal. Eers het ons per trein na Port Elizabeth gery maar dit het ‘n paar dae geneem. Met die vliegtuig was dit nie w twee uur langs die kus af nie. Laat die aand hoor ons op die nuus dat ‘n vliegtuig, die Rietbok, op pad na Port Elizabeth naby Oos-Londen in die see neergestort het. Gelukkig was my kollegas op ‘n ander vlug!

Konst Degenaar:

Sy voorletters kon C ? M ? gewees het. Hy het by die Van Jaarsveld’s wat voor Dirkie Uys Hoërskool gewoon het, loseer. Toe ek op King’s Rest land werk hy buite en ek binne. Ek kan nie veel oor hom sê nie. Stil ou en heel te maal op sy plek gewees. Hy het nie van die woord ‘skofte’ gehou nie – hy het die woord ‘aflossing’ verkies.

Konst ‘Skepie’ Scheepers:

Later het ek hom raakgeloop toe hy ‘n kaptein te Benoni Meganiese-skool was. Ons het ‘n bruin

Studebaker Champion patrolliewa, SAP 10881, te King’s Rest gehad en hy het altyd op nagdiens die ‘baffles’ uit die wa se uitlaatpyp verwyder en dan het die ‘van’ lekker gebrul. Dan kla die publiek wat naby die stasie woon en gebeur dit maar weer totdat ek eenmaal die “van gebord” het. Dit was maar ‘n klein ongelukkie.

No 32916 Konst D C Uys;

Hy het eers skofte gewerk en toe later ‘raiding5’ op King’s Rest.

Hy was ‘n senior konstabel – sy magsnommer was in die 32xxx reeks. Hy was groot van gestalte en kon seker nie lekker vinnig hardloop nie maar hy het wavragte vol mense gearresteer. Hy het vir my kwaai gelyk. In teenstelling met Uys moes ek altyd

3 Dit was, 13 Maart 1967, volgens Wallis, 2000, p82.

4 Dirk is die seun van die DK lt-kol T M Bisschoff later genl-maj Bisschoff wat langs Maleoskop gewoon het. Hy het ‘n pragtige suster, Ulna, gehad.

5 Misdaadvoorkoming inAfrikaans. Die polisiemanne het maar van ‘raiding; gepraat as hulle misdaadvoorkoming bedoel het.

die manne inhardloop – niemand het sommer nader gestaan as ek hom nader gewink het nie! Sy vrou was ook fors en sy het in die droë goedere kantien6 te Wentworth gewerk.

Eendag maak hy ‘n ligte botsinkie by Bend Store (h/v strate Lighthouse en Armstrong) en die Engelse dame sê verontwaardig vir sers Wessie, wat die botsing bygewoon het, dat Uys ‘n ‘bum driver’ was – ou Wessie het altyd lekker daaroor gelag.

Konst Gert Jooste

Ons was saam op skool – Dirkie Uys - hy was later by Veiligheidstak Maserubrug-grenspos gestasioneer.

Konst Westraat (1967) Hy het in Desember 1967 by King’s Rest begin. Ons was Kersnag 1967 in ‘n interessante voorval betrokke. Ek sal later daaroor skryf.

Konst P C Cattell;

Konst IWC ‘Ivor’ Human (her-indiensneming);

Hy was ‘n “ou” konstabel en het teruggekeer Mag toe, nadat hy eers ‘n tydperk lank as assistent op die SAS se elektriese lokomotiewe was. Hier het hy ‘baie’ geld verdien, maar hy was polisieman in murg en been. Hy was ‘n man vol lewenservaring en het gou ons jong ouens touwys gemaak. Mnr Marais het hom genomineer om ‘n ‘ondersoeker van voertuie’ te word en hy moes ‘n kursus ondergaan. Later is hy speurders toe.

• Ons was maar twee wit lede per aflossing aan diens.

6 Eintlik die polisie se winkel. Die SAP het dit vir sy lede bedryf. Dit was groothandel kosprys plus 5%. Kol (afgetree) Lahner was die bestuurder.

OU SAP KING’S REST SE WYK

King’s Rest-wyk: Aan die linkerkant, teen die see was die walvisstasie (Union Whaling Co) – let op die styl teerpad daarheen. Die walvisstasie was per spoor verbind met die hawe. Wests is regs. Daar was een hotel en ons moes per boot van die “Water Polisie” daarheen of heel te maal om die baai ry, en dan van Punt af met ‘n veerboot na Wests Hotel. Ek het een maal ‘n moord te Wests bygewoon Fotograaf onbekend.

• Die grens tussen King’s Rest en Wentworth wyke (R van Wyk)

Links (noord) van die Cooper-vuurtoring is King’s Rest se wyk en regs (suid) is Wentworth se wyk

1969: BLOUWILDEBEESKURSUS: BOSLUISKLOOF: RUSTENBURG

Fanie Avenant

Sers van Hansen en wyle Piet Bezuidenhout was die instrukteurs – opleiding was in die SAP-kollege en later op ‘n plaas – Bosluiskloof, Rustenburg - dit was in die dae voor Maleoskop. Sers Crous was van Durban en AO Henning was later ‘n offisier in Durban.

DETECTIVE SERGEANT OSCAR ZUNGU: LADYSMITH (1)

Shaun Smillie

Dear Hennie

I hope you are well.

My name is Shaun Smillie, I am a journalist who is working on a story on the Bergville killings of 5 policemen in 1956. I see your really interesting magazine Nongqai covered the incident. What I am interested in and I was hoping you could help, is in finding information about a “native detective” Oscar Zungu, who was based at the Ladysmith police station. Zungu was the detective tasked with tracking down the killers of the 5 policemen and the Zulu speaking newspaper Ilanga in a profile on him referred to him as a top detective.

Now In Nongqai vol 6 No 12 Zungu is mentioned where he was promoted to the rank of sergeant after apprehending the murderers of Rear Admiral Weston in 1951. In the article you asked if anyone had any information about Zungu. I wanted to know if anything came out of that appeal, and if you perhaps have any information about the man, you might be willing to share. Hope you can help regards Shaun

Dear Shaun

I have received no information on D/Sgt Sungu.

I will publish your letter in next month's edition and just maybe somebody might respond. You know members of the Security Forces are fighters and not writers. I would love to receive more info on this gallant detective.

Greetings

Hennie Heymans

DET/SGT OSCAR ZUNGU: LADYSMITH (2)

Shaun Smillie

Dear Hennie

Thank you very much for your response and if you could send out that appeal that would be great. So here is a story I came across regarding D/Sgt Zungu, with a photograph.

It is in Zulu, so I have had to use google translate. What I do know is that he was born in 1898 and was about to retire when the Bergville murders happened. Appeared to have been an interesting character.

I have included the translation, it is not that accurate but it gives a gist of what is being said. Something else regarding the Bergville story, perhaps you would know. On April 1, 1956 detectives from the Ladysmith police raided a homestead in the Bergville area. Is it possible to know what car they would have been driving? Would one particular type and model of vehicle be assigned to South African police detectives back then?

Nice to chat to you regards Shaun

• Translation

The caption for the photograph

This is Mr. Oscar Zungu, Mseshi7 , who is very well known in the above especially in Mnambithi where he is now. We took a photo of him in Bergville, where he was doing his job of tracking down criminals. We feel that he is about to retire. The sun was shining in the morning

On Monday, the same editor was in Nambiti to check the status of the case that is in the news these days. People from Mangwaneni were accused of killing five policemen.

We arrived in Mnambi and we stopped obeying because a law suit was filed in the morning. As soon as we arrived, we ran into Mr. Oscar Zungu detective, a very well-known senior investigator in our country who is retiring after his long and commendable service to the Government. We asked how it was and he said that it was burning while we were talking. He was the one who gave us a hand to another Policeman at the door and he went with us to the Court. He even went to put it in front of the police seats where they saw the people who were charged. They also let us sit well next to him. We say first and foremost, first and foremost, Mother Who is the one who interprets in his sweet and healthy Heaven.

7 Mseshi – a detective - HBH

It is Maqinefika of Nsumi Nguyena fame who interprets in this case. We can see that he was taken from Pietermaritzburg and brought to Mnambathi8 to translate for the people so that they could understand it well because he is a man who speaks our language well and unlike other translators who say they are translating for someone who sees them as if they are accusing him. He heard someone scolding him and whispering to him about his opinion. Mr. RR Mayne is like that, after all, he is Maqinefika.

This is the one who writes down all the words spoken in the Court by hand, he says that he was a hort-had.

testifying in Msomi's case.

The white investigator who we see as if he is the one in charge of the case that we had and on the side of Nqavini Msomi refused to take the pictures of the people while their case is still being heard and the witnesses said that they are really affected by the gala. And then we arranged the witnesses well, all the women and men, and we said we were going to take pictures.

8 Mnambathi – Zuluname for Ladysmith - HBH

Dear Shaun

Thank you very much for enriching our common history - each man (in history) is important and should be remembered for service rendered!

Thank you for helping to complete the puzzle!

Greetings

Hennie Heymans

I really hope we could get more information on Det/Sgt Oscar Zungu who by all accounts was a remarkable detective – HBH.

WACHTHUIS: POLLEYS DEURLOOP

In president Paul Kruger se tyd was die Transvaal Hotel en Polleys (Polleys Deurloop) waar Wachthuis in Pretorius-straat staan.

The beginning of Polleys Arcade in Pretorius Street – where the former SAP HQ was situated

Wachthuis Schoeman-straat – Veiligheidshoofkantoor

Wachthuis -

Security Branch Head Office – Pretoria – Schoeman Street

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE: PLATOON 5 LADIES: 40 YEAR REUNION

Via Col Logan Govender

(Source – Post on Facebook, “Police Legends” – Colonel Val Reddy)

Today Troop 5 of the South African Indian female police officers held their 40-year reunion in Durban. The event was well attended by 14 lady police officers. The planning committee did an excellent job in organizing the event.

The meals were catered for us by TSD. I opened the event prayer thanking the Lord for bringing us safely through 40 years and asked the Lord to grace us with His presence. Every police officer gave a short history of their career within SAPS. Everyone, of us shared the positives and the negative that affected us.

The general negative was the lack of promotion afforded to Indian females on merit within KZN. There were many positive of being proud Blue Bloods. Loving our uniforms...being proud of serving with integrity...studying and achieving our degrees and diplomas. Some of us went on early retirement...one went on full pension . a few medically boarded with only two of our troop mates still in service. These two were applauded ...congratulated and honoured with a bouquet of flowers. A candle lighting ceremony was held in honour of our fallen colleague's and our family members that passed on. Many individual gifts were shared amongst the Troopies and were received with great delight.

A decadent cake was cut by us all, celebrating our 40-year achievement and toasted with champagne. Lunch was delicious and there were lots of talk on how we rushed home from work to cook for our families amidst lots of laughter. We received a call from our instructor Mona from Korea congratulating us. that was so special

Some of us met a few of our troop mates after 40 years. There was so much to catch up with. It was an awesome reunion...we plan to do it again and again.

We served our country with pride and have no regrets retiring. Many of are still involved in community work. Once a Blue Blood, Always a Blue Blood!

“The Nation which forgets its defenders will itself be forgotten” – Calvin Coolidge

Let us acknowledge and honour those who serve

Logan Govender

VOERTUIE LEEN

Barry Taylor

Hier is ‘n storie uit die verre verlede toe die SAP - nie die SAPS - was en daar nog goeie en bekwame lede was In 1979 was ek die Sekuriteitsbestuurder op Elandsrand Goudmyn. Die myn was so 20km van Carletonville geleë naby die Potchefstroom – Johannesburg-pad.

Op die stadium was die sekuriteitskantore nog in aanbou en was ons’ tydelik in ‘n ou huis op die plaas gewees. Die huis was oorspronklik die huis waar oud-pres Paul Kruger tuisgegaan het as hy van Pretoria na Potchefstroom gereis het. Ons het verskeie voertuie gehad wat maar almal Bakkies was wat net soos die SAP se voertuie gelyk het. Daar was ook ‘n baie goeie verhouding met die polisie te Fochville en die VT te Potchefstroom gewees Die VT het gereeld elke week kom verslae haal wat ons van bronne gekry het, wie die opstokers op die myn was en wie ons betaal het vir inligting.

Die ASO wat die ASO vir Wes-Transvaal was, was ‘n brigadier wat ek geken het van my dae as speurder in Pretoria. Hy was van Pretoria, waar hy op ‘n plot gewoon het met verskeie diere oa skape, en hy is verplaas na Kimberley en toe kort daarna na Potchefstroom Hy bel my eendag en sê vir my hy wil my spreek oor ‘n voorval en daag toe die volgende dag op Hy vertel my toe dat hy van die skape gaan haal het en die vrou wat die plot by hom gehuur het was vies oor iets wat hy en sy vrou gedoen het teenoor haar. Sy het toe hy die skape laai daarna ‘n verslag ingesit nogal by polisie-hoofkantoor, en gesê hy het met ‘n polisievoertuig daar aangekom om die skape te laai. Ek vra toe vir hom wat se voertuig het hy gebruik en hy sê ‘n “Dodge Van” van die voertuigtak Die voertuig was so ‘n roomkleur gewees. Ek sê vir hom: “Maar dit is geen probleem want daar is ‘n presiese kleur Dodge van by Western Deep Levels (WDL) se honde-afdeling” en hy moet sê hy het daardie voertuig gebruik. Ek het later die dag WDL toe gery en die hondeman gaan sien, ‘n ex-polisie hondeafrigter en vertel hom van die probleem Hy onthou toe dat hy die voertuig vir die brigadier gebring het na my kantoor en hy is toe teruggeneem na WDL. Die volgende dag het ek die voertuig teruggebring na sy kantoor en hy het gelet daar was ‘n paar honderd km meer op die meter gewees. Ek het ook intussen met ‘n Polaroid-kamera ‘n foto van die voertuig geneem So ‘n paar weke later bel ‘n kolonel van polisie-hoofkantoor vir my en vra of hy my kan kom sien en ek reël toe ‘n afspraak met hom en ‘n paar dae later daag hy daar op Hy deel my toe mee dat hy ‘n klagte teen die brigadier ondersoek wat onwettig ‘n Polisievoertuig gebruik het om skape van Pretoria na Potchefstroom te vervoer. Hy wil toe weet wat weet ek van die saak want die Brigadier het gesê ek het inligting oor die aangeleentheid. Ek moet sê ek kon geen aanvoeling vir die man kry

- hy was ‘n regte “reëls en regulasie”-man. Ek vra hom toe wat se voertuig was dit en hy sê ‘n Dodge polisiebakkie. Ek sê toe vir hom hy kan maar koffie drink want die vrou is deur die mis en het ‘n vals klagte gelê. Hy vra toe vir my hoe kan ek so ‘n bewering maak want dit is ‘n ernstige aangeleentheid. Ek sê toe ek sal ‘n verklaring aflê dat die vrou nie die waarheid praat. Het hy dalk die registrasie nr. van die voertuig? Hy sê sy het nie die registrasienommer geneem want sy het die voertuig as ‘n polisiebakkie herken. Ek haal toe die foto van die bakkie uit my laai en vra of dit die bakkie is en hy sê toe: “Dit is die bakkie”.

Ek sê toe kyk gerus na die registrasienommer en jy sal sien die bakkie is geregistreer in Carletonville en dit is ‘n myn-bakkie wat ons gebruik om die honde te vervoer. ‘Ek stel toe sommer so ‘n verklaring op en toe vra hy my of die mynbestuurder toestemming gegee het om die voertuig te leen aan die brigadier? Ek meld dat die brigadier die voertuig geleen het en die volgende dag teruggebring het en ek het hom teruggeneem na Potchefstroom. Ek het hom toe gesê dit is my besluit wie die voertuie mag gebruik solank soos die persoon ‘n lisensie het. Toe vat hy ‘n vet kans en vra of die bakkie die myngebied mag verlaat?

Ek deel hom toe mee dat die voertuig kan enige plek in SA gaan solank ek toestemming gee daarvoor. Ek sê toe vir hom hy het nou net geld en tyd gemors oor iets wat hy my oor die telefoon kon bespreek het en ek kon die verklaring aan hom gepos het.

Ek het hom tot die foto van die bakkie gegee as ‘n aandenking en sê toe vir hom vir al die ure wat die brigadier en sy manne werk kla hulle sowaar oor ‘n voertuig wat skape laai. Ek was mos nie meer in die Mag nie en hak toe sommer af, dat die klerke op HK van die kolonelle tot die konstabels, gerus oor ander dinge kan bekommerd wees Die brigadier het nooit weer iets van die voorval gehoor nie Hy is ook al lankal oorlede wat ‘n wonderlike man was hy gewees ek mis hom vandag nog. As daai Kolonel maar geweet het hoeveel keer het die polisie die helikopter van Vaal Reefs "geleen" vir werk waarvoor hulle nie ‘n sent betaal het nie. Groete.

1929: EXPERIMENTAL SAP UNIFORM: KHAKI FOR FOOT POLICE

Lt-Col William Marshall (SANDF Ret)

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE: PASSING ON OF STALWART: DETECTIVE CAPTAIN BARNEY NADASEN:

1949-07-8 - 16 AUGUST 2024

Col Logan Govender (Source Facebook, SAP Legends by Colonel T (Aurry) Pillay)

Photograph 01

Colonel T (Aurry) Pillay and his dear wife Des

Admin regrets to announce the passing of late Detective Capt Barney Nadesan of SAP, SAPS Sydenham and Durban Areas.

An Old School Officer, who attended basic training at Wentworth, numerous Detective Courses and the real deal Officer’s course in Paarl Academy. I was honoured to be his batchmate there and he mentored me in all aspects of Policing.

They don’t make them like this anymore. Safe in the Arms of Lord Jesus.

Colonel T (Aurry) Pillay

“The Nation which forgets its defenders will itself be forgotten” – Calvin Coolidge

Let us acknowledge and honour those who serve

Logan Govender

• Funeral Notice next page

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE: PASSING ON OF STALWART: CAPTAIN ANDRE VAN WYK: 13 AUGUST 2024

(Source Facebook, SAP Lede by Captain Mike Van Zweel)

Photograph 01

Captain Andre Van Wyk, late

My oud mentor by Brixton Moord & Roof is oorlede 13 Augustus 24. RIV Kaptein André van Wyk.

Dankie vir jou bydrae in my leerskool van speurder wees Kaptein (Spyker) soos al om bekend, wou nooit die rede vir sy bynaam aan my openbaar nie.

Jy was ‘n dinamiese man wat ons altyd bederf het met n heerlike snoek ‘oppi kole’, myself verwonderd gelaat met jou kennis van kriminele, goeie Kaapse wyne en my Dad se kennis gedeel in Cycads. Jy was in my oë een van die beste offisiere wat ek in my loopbaan geken het, toneel

uitwysings, bekentenisse afneem, ek kan amper ‘n boek skryf. Ek salueer U Kaptein van Wyk

PS. Sal ook nooit vergeet jou sakboekie was die agterkant van n pakkie 30 sigarette (Gunston) en in jou kantoor was 'n groot karton doos vol en gedateer en ‘gefile’. Dit was

uitsonderlik, en ek en jy het menigte antwoorde daar gevind

RIV my Kaptein.

Captain Mike Van Zweel

“The Nation which forgets its defenders will itself be forgotten” – Calvin Coolidge

Let us acknowledge and honour those who serve

Logan Govender

KLIPTOWN DETECTIVE BRANCH PHOTOGRAPH: NONGQAI VOL 15 NO 7

Marthinus de Lange (Austria)

I just want to say thank you to both Detective Sergeant Pillay and Colonel Govender for the photo on page 18 of last month’s Nongqai.

I knew Warrant Officer P. Buys, the individual seated second from the left (Sergeant P Buys) in the bottom row of the photograph.

After his retirement and until 1993, Oom Piet worked as a “special” at Roodepoort SAP Enquiries and Investigations Branch. He was an old school policeman who knew the job very well, very correct and always properly dressed in a jacket and tie. Oom Piet was also always quick with a joke and had great stories about his time in the police and in Soweto. But he was also a very kind man, with a heart of gold, who once helped me during a very difficult time in my life. I often think of him. Thank you both for the memories.

Kind Regards

Front row, left to right, Detective Constables S Bharat; S Singh; Warrant Officer BK Pillay; Constables Moetsele; Mazibuko; Tsele; Mhlongo; Make

Second row, left to right, Detective Constables Dhlamini; Mathobela; Majija; Buthelezi; Simelane; Ngobese; Constables Erik; Wade; Govender.

Third row, left to right, Detective Constables Appoo; Mhorwana; Ndaba; Mathebula; K Ramaloo; Tshabalala; S Pillay; Constable Mabaso.

Seated, left to right, Detectives Warrant Officer D Coetzee; Sergeant P Buys; Lieutenant Nic Olivier; Warrant Officer Augustine; Sergeant Van Brakel; Constable Hebert.

Seated on the ground, left to right, Detectives Sergeant Makhachkala; Constable Seotjie.

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE: UTHUKELA DISTRICT AWARDS

CEREMONY: 5 SAI MILILITARY BASE HALL: FRIDAY, 2024-08-08

Via Col Logan Govender

(Source Post by Ladysmith Herald on Facebook and Captain N Mahadow)

South African Police Service Honours the Best in Blue

The South African Police Service (SAPS) hosted its inaugural uThukela District Awards ceremony at the 5SAI Military Base Hall on the evening of Friday, August 2. This event marked the first awards ceremony of its kind within the uThukela district. The Military Base Hall was transformed into a red-carpet affair, as officers swapped their daily uniforms for stylish formal evening wear.

District winners will represent their stations at the national level. Police officials told the Ladysmith Herald that the evening was dedicated to praising and honouring officers who have gone above and beyond the call of duty. A special award was given to Lt. Col. CF Moola and his son, Mo Moola, who received a standing ovation for their heroic efforts. The father-and-son team saved seven passengers from a burning, mangled wreck.

The following nominees were awarded in various categories.

Admin Employee of the year level 1-4

Foreman NS Dubazane

Ladysmith

Admin Employee of the year level 5-7

CAC PGM Ntshingila

Besters SAPS

Admin Employee of the year level 8-12

Captain CM Struwig

Uthukela District

Vispol & Operations Employee of the year level 5-7

Sergeant TG Maqethuka

Wembezi SAPS

Vispol & Operations Team of the year

Captain R Ramlutchman

Captain BS Magasela

Warrant Officer MS Radebe

Sergeant S Dubazane

Ladysmith SAPS

Medium Risk Member of the year

Constable TA Mtsusha

Ekuvukeni SAPS

Detective and Forensic Services Employee of the year level 5-7

Sergeant MI Ntuli

Estcourt SAPS

Detective and Forensic Services Employee of the year level 8-12

Captain N Mahadow

Estcourt SAPS

Detective and Forensic Services Team of the year

Sergeant BX Zwane

Sergeant BL Mazibuko

Sergeant MK Mabaso

Constable SC Dube

Ladysmith SAPS

Women of the year Sgt PX Radebe

Sportsman of the year

Constable SPM Mungroo

Van Reenen SAPS

CPF of the year

Dr MSM Mazibuko

Ladysmith

Ladysmith STES

District Commissioners Special Awards

Lt Col NP Shange

Lt Col CF Moola

M Moola

@South African Police Service

“The Nation which forgets its defenders will itself be forgotten” – Calvin Coolidge

Let us acknowledge and honour those who served

Logan Govender

NUWERWESTE, ANDERSOORTIGE POLISIËRING

Deur brigadier Fanie Bouwer

Ons ouer geslag het die ervaring van polisiëring in ál sy fasette gehad tot en met 1994.

Deesdae, so 30 jaar later, is ons ouer manne en vroue in ons wysheid net in 'n soort van waarnemingsfase, in die sin dat ons lees en hoor oor gebrekkige polisiëring, erg-stygende misdaadstatistieke en natuurlik ook die daaglikse, onverkwiklike kaperjolle van misdadige elemente binne die SAPD.

Die misdaadsituasie in die RSA het die laaste 3 dekades drasties ten slegste verander.

Daar is verskeie redes wat mens kan voorhou. Een is, is dat die bevolking van sowat 43 miljoen na ongeveer 65 miljoen gestyg het. Persentasiegewys is dit 'n vermeerdering van sowat 51.1%.

Die mannekrag van die SAPD het van ongeveer 100 000 gestyg na omtrent 190 000. Dit verteenwoordig ongeveer 90%.

Met lg. syfers in gedagte, weet ons dat met die aanloop van die 2010 Sokker-wêreldbekertoernooi, was die voorwaardes vir indiensneming oorboord gegooi. So het letterlik honderde onbevoegde,

selfs kriminele elemente in die proses lede van die SAPD geword. Dieselfde swak keuring het daarna jaarliks plaasgevind.

Ek wil vervolgens enkele kousale faktore a.g.v. die indiensnames van persone hierbo genoem, asook ander aspekte onder die loep neem.

Die gevolge van swak keuring het mettertyd, tot vandag toe, negatiewe gevolge vir die polisie gehad. Ten eerste was baie van die kandidate totaal onbevoeg, terwyl die met 'n kriminele streep hulle posisie steeds misbruik om ook misdaad gepleeg. So lees ek net nou die dag dat van die rowers wat deur polisielede dood geskiet was, en een 'n lid van die polisie was.

Ek dink ek kan op hierdie tydstip onomwonde sê dat hoë getalle polisielede, met sulke elemente hierbo genoem tussen-in, geen of min impak op gewone polisiewerk gaan hê nie. Dalk bewys die praktyk dit inderdaad vir ons deesdae.

In die pre-1994 era het ons met die minimale aantal lede stasies en speurtakke bestuur. Daar was deurlopende lede ook weg met grensdienste.

Ek onthou ons goeie oplossyfers en aanvaarbare, self lae voorkomssyfers van misdaad baie goed. Ek hoef nie uit te brei oor al die destydse redes daarvoor nie, behalwe om te sê dat dit die gevolg was van professionele bestuursaktiwiteite.

Ek wil herhaal wat ek eenkeer op 'n vergadering doerdie tyd op 'n senior provinsiale vergadering gesê het. My woorde was: "Dit maak nie saak wat in die provinsie gebeur nie - ons het die vermoë en die kapasiteit om enigiets wat mag voorkom, te polisieer en te onderdruk". Hierdie sterk geloof in ons vermoëns was 'n algemeen aanvaarde houding, met rede.

Ek wil nou aanskuif na die hede en kortliks verwys na nuwe misdaadtendense wat ons nie eintlik geken het nie.

Eerstens dink ek aan die selfversekerde konstruksie-mafias wat oral 30% van bouprojekte se kostes eis; die taxi-mafias en die steels van honderde kilometers se spoorlyne, net om drie te noem.

In die pre-94 jare het selfs kriminele gedink dat om die staat se spoorlyne te steel, 'nie die regte ding was om te doen nie'. Die rede vir hierdie soort van misdade deesdae, is tweeledig - dit is bloot omdat die polisie onbevoeg is en, tweedens, omdat die kriminele nie respek vir die polisie het nie en selfs glo dat hulle nie gevang sal word nie.

Polisiëring was destyds gedoen met 'n formidabele speurdiens (wat intussen ontman is) en 'n uniformtak wat met deurlopende, sinvolle misdaadvookomings-aktiwiteite die kriminele gesamentlik òf gevang het òf verhoed het om misdade te pleeg.

Ek let deesdae op dat die polisie andersoortige metodes aanwend in 'n poging om misdaad hok te slaan in plaas van die gewone, daaglikse polisie-aktiwiteite soos toentertyd.

Die een is padblokkades met sekere intervalle, selfs gelei deur 'n provinsiale kommissaris. Die vorige kommissaris in Gauteng was nogal lief om die leiding te neem. Dan was daar talle arrestasies, meesal minderwaardig. Dan het ek altyd gewonder watter persentasie daarvan suksesvol deur die howe geprosesseer word?

Intussen is die sg. Operasie Shanela al reeds meer as 'n jaar aan die gang. Indrukwekkende arrestasiesyfers word dan bekend gemaak. Ek en ander het twyfel oor die geloofwaardigheid van dié syfers, omdat ons vermoed dat alle stasies se daaglikse arrestasiesyfers tydens gewone, daaglikse werksaamhede, ook in die poel van syfers bygesit word.

So terloops: net kort voor die verkiesing wou Bheki Cele nie die misdaadstatistieke bekend maak nie. Hy het geweet dat dit - in weerwil van Operasie Shanela - steeds baie sleg was en hy bang was sy party verloor stemme as gevolg daarvan.

In KZN lees ons weer dat die polisie daar 'n ander strategie volg, naamlik om die rowers en ander geweldenaars eerder met 'n goed-opgeleide span polisieskutters dood te skiet. Alhoewel menseregte-entiteite en ander individue vraagtekens hieroor het, is dit egter na mý mening 'n aanvaarbare strategie indien hulle poog om binne die bepalings van die Wet dié take uit te voer.

Ek het al telkemale oor die ou speurdiens se strukturering en prestasies geskryf. En hoe dinge nou daarin uitsien - een wat volgens talle verslae, nié presteer nie en, wat binne die huidige strukture aan die agterspeen suig.

Dit alles dan gesê, is die logiese vraag wat dan by mens opkom: Is die nuwerwetse en andersoortige metodes in misdaadvoorkoming wat party polisiehoofde deesdae van stapel stuur dalk die kumulatiewe effek van, eerstens, die lae gehalte lede en offisiere tot hulle beskikking, gekoppel met die feit dat hulle nie die voorreg het om saam met 'n formidabele speurdiens in tandem te werk nie? Ek reken so.

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE COLLEGE: LEADERSHIP COURSES: CANDIDATE OFFICER’S COURSE: 1981-08-24 – 1981-09-11

(Source – Family of Lieutenant-Colonel Fred A Pautz)

Officer Identified:

Third row, from left to right, 6th FA Pautz, late, (Lieutenant-Colonel, former Commander of the Dog Squad, Mountain Rise, Pietermaritzburg. – [LG])

“The Nation which forgets its defenders will itself be forgotten” – Calvin Coolidge

Let us acknowledge and honour those who served

Logan Govender

OLD DURBAN POLICE STATIONS

Col Logan Govender

The Berea Police Station. Year unknown. Posted on Facebook by Mr Yusuf Mia on “Durban and surrounds, history and stories.

Photograph 01

The Old Berea Police Station of the Durban Borough Police

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE, BEREA: STATION COMMANDER & STAFF: APRIL 1963

Photograph 02

Station Commander and Staff, SA Police, Berea, April 1963

(Source family of Warrant OffIcer Patrick Pakkiri Soobiah)

Members Identified:

Front row: front left to right, 2nd I/Constables SP Pakkiri, late (Warrant Officer. He passed on at the age of 89 years old {Born 19 April 1933 – Home to be with Lord 15 May 2022}. I learnt from a family member that he drove his motor vehicle till the end. - [LG]); 13th Indian/Constable Papiah (He was apparently a stalwart of SA Police, Unit 2, Chatsworth.

Let us acknowledge and honour those who served Logan Govender

Photograph 03 Warrant OffIcer Patrick Pakkiri Soobiah

Image 04 Notice of his Home Calling

“The Nation which forgets its defenders will itself be forgotten” – Calvin Coolidge

DURBAN: BOROUGH POLICE | CITY POLICE | GEMEENTELIKE POLITIE | STADSPOLISIE

Darryn Newcombe

Aandiens in die stadstuin voor die stadsaal

Nota:

Vriende, die Durban Gemeentelike Politie, later die die Durban Stadspolisie, was selfs ouer as die voormalige SA Polisie. (Hulle was selfs in die Strafproseswet vermeld as Vredesbeamptes en hulle het die pligte van ‘n polisiemag vervul.) Met die nuwe Suid-Afrika het die stadspolisie ‘n metropolisie

geword. As voormalige lid van die SA Polisie in Durban kan ek net getuig dat hierdie klein polisiemag ‘n uitstekende en uiters proffesionele mag was. Hulle het verkeer en polisiepligte vervul ten einde Durban ‘n beter plek vir inwoners en vakansieganghers te maak. Nongqai salueer die ou Durban Stadspolisie - HBH.

1909: Durban Borough Police: Police Station: Musgrave Rd

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICE SOUTHERN AFRICA AND ANTECEDENT POLICE FORCES IN SOUTH AFRICA

1756: POLICE CAPE: ‘’HET BURGER WACHTHUIS”: GREENMARKET SQUARE

The old Wachthuis is on the right. [Photo via Martin Greshoff on Facebook.]

NATAL (MOUNTED) POLICE: ORGANIZATION & STAFF

THE LAST CHIEF COMMISSIONER: COL JW CLARKE

Kol JW Clarke – die hoof-kommissaris van die “Natal Police” en stigter van die maandblad “The Nongqai” gedurende 1907.

SERGEANT: NATAL POLICE

1880: TROOPER NATAL MOUNTED POLICE

A May (Artist)

CONSTABLE: WATER POLICE: NATAL POLICE

Richard van Wyk

REPUBLIKEINSE POLISIEMAGTE IN SUID-AFRIKA | REPUBLICAN POLICE FORCES IN SOUTH AFRICA ZAR

OFS

ZUID-AFRIKAANSE REPUBLIEK: ZARPS

Zetef du Plessis

ZARPS: GEHEIME POLITIE : ARTHUR NEWHAM

Telegram: Salisbury na Pretoria

POLISIESIELKUNDE

METAFORIESE BEELDE VIR BEPAALDE SIELKUNDIGE BEGRIPPE DEEL Il

Dr Coert Mommsen

(Volgende maand sal opvolgartikel verskyn)

RSA: INTELLIGENSIE | INTELLIGENCE

DIE ONTWIKKELING VAN ‘N EIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INTELLIGENSIEKUNDE (TWAALF): SUID-AFRIKA SE GROOTSTE SPIOENASIESKANDAAL

Henning van Aswegen

In dieselfde jaar waarin die Sentrale Komitee van die Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunistiese Party by Rivonia planne gesmee het vir ’n rooi revolusie, begin die vlootoffisier Dieter Felix Gerhardt in

Simonstad en Londen ’n spioenasieloopbaan wat Suid-Afrika onberekenbare skade berokken. Toe Gerhardt met sy spioenasie-aktiwiteite teen sy eie land en die Suid-Afrikaanse Vloot begin het, was dr. H.F. Verwoerd nog die premier van ’n land wat slegs twee jaar tevore ’n ten volle soewereine republiek geword het. Waar die ANC en SAKP ’n bloedige en gewelddadige revolusie teen die staat beplan en byna uitgevoer het, het Gerhardt gewetenloos die SA Vloot gerysmier en sy kollegas in die SA Weermag en KRYGKOR aan die Russe uitverkoop.

Dieter Felix Gerhardt het in 1954 as seekadet by die Suid-Afrikaanse Vloot aangesluit, en sy loopbaan as Russiese spioen in 1963 begin. Terwyl sommige historici Gerhardt as die suksesvolste spioen in Suid-Afrika se geskiedenis beskou, meen ander dat hy die land se grootste verraaier is. Ten tyde van sy arrestasie in ’n hotelkamer in New York op 8 Januarie 1983 het hierdie vlootkommodoor reeds twintig jaar lank ononderbroke vir die Russiese Militêre Intelligensiediens, die GRU, gespioeneer. Gedurende hierdie tydperk het Gerhardt nagenoeg 400 000 bladsye uiters geheime Suid-Afrikaanse, Britse, Israeli- en NAVO-dokumente aan die Russe verkoop. “The information Gerhardt passed on to the USSR concerned NATO weaponry and battle formations, British naval weapons including missiles, the French Exocet missile system and the entire military structure of the Simon’s Town naval base, where he served as commanding officer,” aldus Pike. Gerhardt het inligting rakende die bevelstruktuur, totale magsvermoë en die slagorde van die SuidAfrikaanse Weermag (SAW) aan die Russe voorsien. Dit het inligting ingesluit rakende die identifikasie, sterkte, bevelstruktuur en skikking van die personeel, eenhede en toerusting van die SAW.

Die GRU se voorganger, die Cheka, is in 1918 deur Leon Trotsky, Wladimir Lenin se Minister van Buitelandse sake, net na die 1917- Bolsjevistiese rewolusie in Rusland gestig. Die Cheka het tydens sy 18 bestaansjare ’n reputasie van wreedheid en genadeloosheid gehad en is daarom in 1942 met die GRU vervang. Die GRU is die Russiese staatsdepartement wat verantwoordelik is vir militêre spioenasie-operasies, teenspioenasie en ook militêre strategie tydens oorlogvoering. Net soos die KGB (die Sowjet-era se Russiese Komitee vir Staatsveiligheid), het die GRU uit hardekwas kommuniste bestaan wat “siloviki” genoem is. Tydens die Koue Oorlog het die GRU oor meer personeellede as die KGB beskik.

Dieter Gerhardt se grootwordjare en opvoeding (hy is in 1935 gebore) het min leidrade oor sy latere spioenasiebedrywighede gegee. Sy Duitse ouers was middelklas en ondersteuners van die Nasionale Party in Suid-Afrika. Gerhardt se vader, Alfred Edgard Gerhardt, is gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog deur die Smuts-regering gearresteer en as Duitse ondersteuner na die Koffiefontein-interneringskamp gestuur. Sy internering het van Gerhardt senior ’n verbitterde man gemaak wat tot egskeiding van sy eggenote Julia gelei het. Gerugte van motordiefstal het Alfred

Gerhardt genoodsaak om ’n familievriend, die latere adm. S.C. Biermann, te nader om te help dat die jong Dieter in 1954 as seekadet deur die Vloot aanvaar is. Dieter Gerhardt was sosiaal onhandig en lank vir sy ouderdom, wat aan hom die bynaam “Jumbo” van sy klasmaats besorg het. Aan die einde van sy opleiding as seekadet ontvang Gerhardt die Swaard van Eer as beste student op die kursus. Gerhardt is na die Royal Naval Engineering College in Plymouth, England, gestuur vir verdere opleiding, ’n besondere voorreg en eer vir jong Suid-Afrikaanse vlootpersoneel, en daarna ook na Siprus en Ysland. Tydens sy verblyf in Engeland ontmoet en trou Gerhard met Janet Coggin, toe 21 jaar oud.

Vladimir Vetrov, die KGB-agenthanteerder wat vinger na die spioene Dieter Felix Gerhardt en Ruth Johr gewys het.

Tydens hierdie nuwe hoofstuk van sy lewe word Dieter Gerhardt ’n spioen. Janet Coggin het veertig jaar later tydens ’n onderhoud gesê dat die jong Dieter Gerhardt gewild was onder sy vriende en ook dat haar familie van hom gehou het. Ná die geboorte van hul dogter, Annemarie Julia, het die Gerhardt’s na Suid-Afrika teruggekeer om hulle in Simonstad en daarna Noordhoek te vestig. Hul tweede dogter, Ingrid, is in 1960 hier gebore. In haar boek The Spy’s Wife skryf Coggin dat Gerhardt tydens hul huwelik aan haar gebieg het dat hy ’n Russiese spioen was en dat sy geskok was deur sy onthulling.

Die joernalis Jonathan Ancer skryf in Betrayal: The secret lives of apartheid spies (2019) dat Gerhardt in 1966 tydens ’n besoek aan Newlands, aan die voete van Tafelberg, teenoor Coggin gebieg het dat hy ’n Russiese spioen is. Coggin het Gerhardt daarvan beskuldig dat hy haar as medespioen probeer werf het en dat sy geweier het om saam te speel. Coggin het hierna ’n wrewel

teenoor haar eggenoot ontwikkel en met hul drie dogters na Engeland teruggekeer en daarna in Ierland gaan bly. In 1967 is Coggin en Gerhardt geskei. Volgens Coggin is Gerhardt ’n egoïs, “a traditional apartheid-accepting South African” vir wie geld en nie ideologiese oortuiging nie sy spioenasiebedywighede aangevuur het. Coggin het gesê dat sy onbewus was van die afmetings en omvang van Gerhardt se spioenasie-aktiwiteite en dat sy aangeneem het dat hy net oor ambisieus was.

Tydens ’n onderhoud het Gerhardt beweer dat hy in 1960 op 25-jarige ouderdom lede van die Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunistiese Party (SAKP) genader het, omdat hy teen apartheid gekant was. Hierdie aanspraak van Gerhardt is met ’n knippie sout deur lede van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens se ondersoekspan geneem, omdat lede van die Veiligheidspolisie in 1963 self nie mooi geweet het wie al die leiers van die kommunistiese beweging in Suid-Afrika was nie. Gerhardt was in Simonstad, terwyl die kommunistiese leiers meesal in Johannesburg woonagtig was. Gerhardt kon nie die dag en datum onthou waarop hy kwansuis met die SAKP vergader het nie, ook nie plek en omstandighede van die kontak nie. Gerhardt kon ook nie verduidelik hoe hy geweet het wie om te kontak nie. Gerhardt het aan die ondersoekers gesê dat hy sy deel wou doen in die stryd teen apartheid en dat Bram Fischer, leier van die SAKP, sy boodskap aan lede van die Russiese Militêre Intelligensiediens deurgegee het. Gerhardt kon nie verduidelik waarom die kommuniste sy geloofwaardigheid as dienende vlootoffisier wat wou spioeneer, aanvaar het nie. Gerhardt se aansprake dat hy vir ideologiese redes vir die Russe gespioeneer het, is deur ’n voormalige hoof van teenspioenasie as “a bullshit story” afgemaak. Voordat hy aan die deur van die Russiese Ambassade in Londen geklop het, het Gerhard eers die Amerikaners genader en gevra of hy vir hulle kan spioeneer. Toe die Amerikaners sy versoek van die hand wys, het Gerhardt die Russiese Ambassade in Londen genader wat hom eers met wantroue en agterdog bejeën het. In die intelligensiekunde word so ’n koue benadering ’n instap-agent genoem en gewoonlik wys intelligensiedienste so ’n persoon die deur. Dit was slegs nadat Gerhardt ’n tweede keer met ’n aktetas vol gesteelde geheime dokumente by die Russiese Ambassade opgedaag het, dat die Russe begin besef dat hulle moontlik ’n meevaller op hande het. Van hierdie dokumente het planne van Britse vlootmissielsisteme en opleidingsmateriaal bevat. Die Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) se beamptes in die Amerikaanse Ambassade in Londen het die pot mis gesit met Gerhardt. As hulle sy aanbod om te spioeneer aanvaar het, kon hulle namens Westerse lande die enorme latere skade wat Gerhardt as Russiese spioen aangerig het, vermy het. “Gerhardt had extensive knowledge of South Africa’s defence strategy, the country’s ties with Britain, the USA and NATO and South Africa’s nuclear programme, which was developed with American assistance.” Die skrywer en militêre kundige Al J. Venter skryf: “For many years South Africa was regarded as the responsible

party for the Southern flank of NATO – a very real arrangement, although it was never formalised –and the South African government made full use of the unspoken special relationship as its isolation deepened.”

Gerhardt was ’n spioen wat in die skoot van die Russiese Militêre Intelligensiediens geval het. Die feit dat Gerhardt betaal is, dat hy geld ontvang het vir die produk wat hy aan die Russe gegee het, maak van Gerhardt se verduideliking dat hy gekant was teen apartheid ’n doodskisstorie. Vir die Russe was Gerhardt ’n onverwagte geskenk en hulle het hom in 1963 met die kodenaam “Felix” (sy middelnaam) as spioen aangestel. Dit was drie jaar nadat die Direktoraat Militêre Intelligensie (DMI) in die SAW gestig is, dieselfde jaar as wat Republikeinse Intelligensie (RI) as afdeling in die Veiligheidspolisie gestig is en ses jaar voor die stigting van die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid.

Gedurende sy spioenasieloopbaan het Gerhardt die kodename en skuilname Pilyatsky B. Felix, Felix en DFG gebruik. ’n Voormalige hoof van Suid-Afrika se hoofdirektoraat teenintelligensie het tydens die Gerhardt-ondersoek sy verbasing uitgespreek oor die onprofessionaliteit van die GRU om een van Gerhardt se regte name ook as skuilnaam te gebruik. Nadat die Russe sy aanbod om inligting te verkoop, aanvaar het, het Gerhardt fluks 18 maande lank Britse vlootgeheime gesteel wat die Russe gou-gou laat besef het dat hulle nou ’n waardevolle militêre spioen op hande het. Na afloop van sy vlootopleiding in Engeland het Gerhardt op ’n lang skivakansie na Switserland vertrek, maar hy het in der waarheid na Rusland gereis om opleiding in spioenasietegnieke en -metodes te ontvang. Die GRU het Gerhardt geleer hoe om klein spioenasiekameras te gebruik, hoe om film te ontwikkel en mikroskopiese negatiewe van die films te maak sodat dit deur ’n normale posbus versend kan word. Die GRU het Gerhardt aan sy nuwe agenthanteerder, Gregori Sjirobokof, voorgestel wat Gerhardt geleer het hoe om morsekode te gebruik, agtervolgings- en teenagtervolgingstegnieke te gebruik en hoe om ’n poligraaftoets te slaag. Om sy identiteit te beskerm, het die GRU meervoudige foto’s van Gerhardt geneem in verskillende vermommings, sodat dit vir vals paspoorte en reisdokumente gebruik kon word.

“The Soviet Union’s interest in South Africa’s nuclear power development was Gerhardt’s primary instruction and intelligence gathering request from the GRU. South Africa’s development of nuclear weapons at Pelindaba en Velindaba west of Pretoria, was Gerhardt’s biggest and continuing intelligence gathering instruction from his Russian masters for his 20 years as a spy,” aldus Ancer.

“During his spying career, Gerhardt photographed manuals of secret NATO and South Africa military weaponry, wrote confidential reports on South Africa’s nuclear development programme and political situation, including economic and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign relations.”

In 1968 kry Gerhardt ’n tweede hanteerder by, kol. Vitali Sjlikof (kodename Vitai Sjlikov, Shlykov, Mikhael Nikolayev, Nikolaief), wat hom van nuwe vals identiteitsdokumente en paspoorte voorsien.

Gregori Sjirobokof Gerhardt se eerste hanteerder, is in die GRU bevorder en van 1970 was Sjlikof Gerhardt se enigste hanteerder. Saam het Gerhardt en Sjlikof ’n legende ontwerp (’n dekkingstorie, ’n liegstorie) wat Gerhardt in staat sou stel om te lieg dat hy ’n Israeliese spioen is, sou die SuidAfrikaners hom vastrap en ondervra. Gedurende die sestigerjare was Israel ’n vriend van SuidAfrika, daarom het Gerhardt en Sjlikof aan so ’n liegstorie gedink. “In court, an account like that would have looked very different from espionage for the Soviet Union,” het Gerhardt later aan ondersoekers van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens (NI) gebieg. Sonder Gerhardt en Sjlikof se medewete het ’n lessenaarbeampte in Brittanje se buitelandse intelligensiediens, die Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), begin agterdogtig raak oor die moontlikheid van ’n Westerse militêre spioen, omdat inligting begin opduik het dat die Russe oor sekere Noord-Atlantiese Verdragsorganisasie (NAVO)-dokumente beskik. Hoewel Suid-Afrika nie formeel en amptelik lid was van NAVO nie, het hierdie militêre alliansie tog geheime militêre inligting met die SuidAfrikaners gedeel. Suid-Afrika is deur NAVO en Westerse lande beskou as ’n bastion en vriendelike land aan die suidpunt van Afrika, wat Westerse belange in die geval van oorlog sou onderskraag en verdedig. Stadig maar seker het die Britte na ’n spioen in eie geledere begin soek, maar glad nie vermoed dat die spioen ’n Suid-Afrikaanse vlootoffisier kon wees nie.

Terwyl hy in 1969 op ’n skivakansie in Switserland was, ontmoet Gerhardt by die luukse skioord, Klosters vir Ruth Johr, ’n Switserse burger. Nege maande later, op 15 September 1969, trou Gerhardt en Johr in Switserland. In ’n latere onderhoud sê Gerhardt die volgende oor Ruth Johr: When we met, I told her my views about the apartheid regime. Before the wedding, I learned about her family background and her views, and I knew that the struggle against apartheid was in line with her opinions. Nevertheless, we – Gregori Shirobokov and I – decided to let her in on the secret in stages. Each time I would unravel another part of the picture until I told her the whole truth.

* In DIE BURO: Genl. Lang Hendrik van den Bergh en die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid, wat deur Imprimatur Uitgewers gepubliseer word, is daar ware Suid-Afrikaanse spioenasieverhale wat die waarde van agente en spioene illustreer, en ook die enorme skade wat hulle somtyds aanrig, onder die soeklig plaas. Die enigste werklike meetinstrument van die sukses van ’n spioenasiediens is die mate waarop hy of sy die geskiedenis beïnvloed het, of nie. Die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid het ’n invloed op die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis gehad en verdien om onthou te word. Indien enige van ons lesers oor relevante inligting oor die ontwikkeling van spioenasie in Suid-Afrika, beskik, word u hartlik uitgenooi om enige inligting en foto’s aan henningvanaswegen55@gmail.com., te stuur.

* Die artikelreeks Intelegere bevat 982 bronverwysings en voetnotas, wat op aanvraag van die skrywer bekom kan word. ‘n Verkorte weergawe van die verhaal van Dieter Felix Gerhardt en Ruth Johr verskyn in die boek Spioenmeesters, wat op Amazon verkrygbaar is.

* Word in die volgende Nongqai vervolg.

* Voorafbestellings vir DIE BURO kan by Imprimatur Uitgewers geplaas word.

Kommentaar deur Redakteur

Admiraal Gerhardt se rekord is uitgevee, hy is weer as admiraal in die SA Vloot aangestel. Nongqai volg die Audi Alteram Partem-reël en die artikel is aan hom voorgelê. Hy lewer soos volg kommentaar:

Dear Hennie,

Have read the chapter 12 as requested. It is very much the same as that previously published in your magazine. My comments in response from and to the Nongqai article remain as before

Interesting to me is his failure to direct any criticism of the Apartheid state and its oppression of the majorities of its own citizens of colour not to mention murder, displacement etc as illuminated by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission or the fact that Nelson Mandela requested my return to SA after my release from Pretoria Maximum in August 1992. Also, the fact that my previous rank was restored after my return to SA. I see the chapter as just another attempt to try and legitimize the Apartheid regime by Van Aswegen - No doubt the chapter will appeal to some “bitter eindes” of the SA public,

Publish as you wish - I understand Van Aswegen’s desire for a modicum of sensationalism and to try and justify the Apartheid regime by certain Western countries who supported the Apartheid regime for decades: Simply stated “Black lives did not matter!” Seemingly the opposite to the thinking of the Apartheid bully boys and their fellow travelers abroad.

Greetings

Dieter

INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY: A PRACTITIONER’S VIEW

Johan Mostert

This essay contains some random notes on the delicate interaction between intelligence producer and the national consumer, specifically the cabinet. Special attention will be given to the nature of intelligence advice. The author, as head of interdepartmental intelligence production, was intimately involved in the production of intelligence for several years. Comments are provided by a South African scholar of intelligence, Dr. Wilhelm Bernhardt.

Even though this essay was written several years ago, it contains material which may be of interest to historians as well as current practitioners. Many of the views express the thinking of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in the previous intelligence dispensation. Dr. Bernhardt was recently requested to provide comments from an academic perspective. He provides valuable insight on the current legislation and White Paper on Intelligence.

Johan Mostert

Intelligence advice

Views on the role of intelligence in advising policy formulation or monitoring are often nebulous. There is general agreement in the literature on intelligence that the purpose of intelligence is to assist government in the formulation and execution of policy, but exactly how this function is to be discharged is unclear. These notes attempt to provide some points for consideration.

The traditional position was that intelligence and policy formulation are operating in different spheres and “never the twain shall meet”. It was held that intelligence should deliver its “objective” product to the policymaker and, in order not to be contaminated (loose its independence) by policy issues and debates, return to its splendid isolation, although within “hearing distance” from policy making to obtain feedback. It was up to the policy formulator to request additional intelligence if needed; the two functions were to operate separately to eliminate undue mutual influence.

This view has been challenged in recent reflections on the role of intelligence and the current approach is that intelligence and policy should not only be closer located but that the two should exist in a constant interactive relationship. The respective functions should still retain their distinctive roles but should cooperate more dynamically. It was foreseen that the realities of the different worlds may create tension but that it would not be an adversarial relationship but one where creative tension will lead to the formulation of the best possible course of action for government.

An earlier view of the role of intelligence was that intelligence should provide the decision-maker with a broad coherent picture of a security situation or event and leave it to him/her to derive meaning from the facts. A later approach was that intelligence should provide the decision-maker with an

interpretation (assessment) or estimate of a situation with an indication of possible/probable future trends (forecasting). A more recent trend is that the purpose of intelligence is not to predict the future, but to help the policymaker shape the future. This may seem like a small modification but actually represents a significant change in the mindset of the analyst.

An intelligence veteran, Doug MacEachin, depicts the role of intelligence very aptly when he compares the role of intelligence to that of a scout in relation to a football coach. “The job of the scout is not to predict in advance the final score of the game, but to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent so that the coach can devise a winning game plan. Then the scout sits in a booth with powerful binoculars, to report on specific vulnerabilities the coach can exploit.”

The role of intelligence in policy formulation is therefore to:

• inform government by providing a clear picture of the security dimension of the situation upon which solid decision-making can be based.

• warn government about the security obstacles in the way of achieving its objectives;

• predict possible/probable future developments (various scenarios); and

• advise government on opportunities to exploit the vulnerabilities of the adversary or competitor and the security consequences (results) of policy intervention in the area under consideration.

When advising government, intelligence should never be tempted to cross the boundary between its own unique function and that of policy formulation and execution. Even though intelligence cooperates closely with the policy developer and implementer, it retains its own integrity and rules of the game. It remains true to its calling of advising on the security dimension of the affairs of state and acts in a real sense as conflict adviser to government. It is forever playing devil’s advocate to government; it represents the opposition; it informs government of the moves and countermoves or potential countermoves of the opposition (outlining the consequences of government’s intervention).

On matters of policy advice, intelligence never acts in a descriptive manner. It does not tell the policy formulator what to do; what plan to adopt to deal with issues or situations. It provides its best estimate on what the future may hold (enabling the policy formulator to think meaningfully about the future) and advises on security consequences that may result from government decisions. Intelligence provides advice, not prescriptions. Intelligence identify and defines the situation/problem; the policy-maker designs policies and strategies to deal with it.

There are real dangers involved when intelligence attempts to venture into the field of policy advice (advising on what to do). Objections to intelligence becoming part of policy prescription, are the following:

• The subject matter of intelligence represents the entire range of the security spectrum (military, political, economic, societal, and environmental). There are government departments responsible for dealing with each aspect. Experience has shown that if intelligence prescribes policy options in areas where these departments have a line functional responsibility, they will take offence and object in the strongest terms. Intelligence may be arrogant and persist and thereby win the battle, but the war will continue for a long time into the future. Practical examples are available to show that intelligence has not succeeded in winning this war in the long run. It is also not in the interest of good governance for intelligence to create a situation whereby line functionaries are antagonised by the prescriptive behaviour of a department which does not have a policy formulation function. If intelligence, even though it may be in the best position to prescribe in a specific situation, persists in being prescriptive to such an extent that it antagonises another department, it may in the long run become counter-productive. It may raise opposition simply for the sake of opposition. That is the way bureaucracies operate. Intelligence should be sensitive to that if it wants to operate effectively. It must be able to read the mind of own forces as well as it reads the opposition. This aspect seems somewhat trivial on the surface, but in real life has created debilitating problems in the past.

• Intelligence may compromise the integrity of its product if it prescribes policy options which go awry. The question may well be asked by members of the policy formulation community whether the intelligence base can be trusted if the policy advice of intelligence did not work out.

• Furthermore, if the policy advice failed, the intelligence practitioner may (and experience has shown that it occurs in real life situations) be tempted to justify its policy prescription instead of providing an objective or non-partisan evaluation of why things went wrong. This urge to justify one’s proposals is one of the strongest reasons why intelligence should not become involved in policy formulation. It creates a bias in the mind of the intelligence practitioner.

• Just as the HUMINT collector can fall in love with his source, so a policy advisor can fall in love with his/her policy/strategy/plan. If an analyst becomes involved in policy prescription, he/she may “fall in love” with the plan and manipulate intelligence in such a manner that it supports the favoured policy option. This is a dangerous development.

The mind-set of an analyst differs from that of the policy advisor. The intelligence analysts must speak truth to power, no matter how unpalatable it is to the decision-maker. Intelligence focuses on identifying problems. Intelligence focuses on present realities and developments into the future. The policy formulator attempts to rescue the decision-maker from predicaments by providing advice on methods to deal with it in a pro-active manner. Policy formulation focuses on solutions Policy focuses on a desired future and the means to achieve it. It is the creative tension between the two functions in the policy formulation process that guarantees the best results, but on condition that each maintains its own identity.

Some understood the previous Minister for Intelligence [minister Lindiwe Sisulu] to mean that intelligence should participate in the formulation of policy proposals and recommendations when she exhorted the intelligence community to “be at the centre of Government”. This is wrong. For intelligence to be in the centre of government, means to act as security (conflict) advisor to allsectors of Government. That means that intelligence should be present when all cluster committees (the centre of decision-making) of Government meet in order to provide the policy makers with a security perspective on whatever executive policies they are developing. What happens if the line functional department clearly does not know how to properly handle a specific matter, and the intelligence structures have the required expertise available? This happens frequently. Would it be expected of intelligence to sit back and say that the theory of intelligence does not allow intelligence to be policy prescriptive? This is obviously ridiculous. If the intelligence practitioner has done proper research on a particular topic and developed expertise in that field, his or her knowledge and insight must be utilised to deal with the matter. The question is: How should intelligence deal with it as intelligence and not as policy developer?

The correct route for intelligence is to adhere to the doctrine that intelligence provides intelligence advice, not policy advice. But what does it entail in practice? Intelligence advice implies more than merely the delivery of intelligence estimates in which opportunities based on the vulnerabilities of the opposition already serves as advisory pointers. Advice is something, a function, in addition to estimating. What then is intelligence advice when engaged in assisting policy formulation in addition to providing advice in the form of estimates?

In the first instance, as already pointed out above, intelligence has the obligation to advise the policy formulator about the possible/probable actions or counteractions of the opposition/competitor. This means the vigorous participation of intelligence in the formulating process where intelligence acts as the “enemy”. A best option policy will emerge from the dialectical discourse between intelligence and policymaker

The second instance occurs where the decision-maker directly requests intelligence to provide the answer to the problem. “You have outlined the problem and know exactly what is going on, why don’t you tell us what to do?” is a frequent demand. Intelligence cannot escape situations like this. In such a case intelligence must refer to the language of an advisor. Instead of responding with a policy prescription, intelligence should reply by outlining the various options open to the decisionmaker based on the trends outlined in the estimate, weigh them against each other, and advise him/her that given the prevailing circumstances, he/she may consider option A as the most feasible course of action to deal with the vulnerabilities of the opposition. It is important to keep in mind that intelligence should concentrate on the security dimension, in other words the opposition in security context, because party political considerations may also come into play which the policymaker must take into account but which is not the concern of intelligence if it does not have security implications. Intelligence has no business advising the decision-maker on non-security matters. Intelligence is therefore not telling the decision-maker what he/she should do (prescribing), but to advise about the feasibility of options.

Intelligence advice may at times sail close to the wind as far as policy prescription is concerned, but the important aspect is that it must not be seen to transgress on the line functional responsibilities of executive departments (which have policy advisory functions). Turf protection and subsequent battles are guaranteed outcomes in the long run. Intelligence must also take care that its advice is framed in language which does not show any bias. A non-partisan approach must always be reflected in intelligence advice. It must always also be phrased in a manner which leaves the choice of option (the final decision) open to the policy advisor or decision-maker. Intelligence must not after a recommended act failed be accused of providing the wrong advice (policy advice). It will impact negatively on the status of the intelligence product. This is, however, not a way of copping out as intelligence is sometimes accused of doing. It is merely protecting the integrity of its line function.

It has happened on occasion that the intelligence document is simply provided with a new letterhead of an executive institution and forwarded to the authorities as a final recommendation. This should never happen. Intelligence must always phrase its documents in a manner befitting intelligence and be rewritten in a different (policy) language by the executive institution if it becomes a policy proposal or recommendation.

Exceptions to the above approach must be seen as rare events and should be avoided as far as possible. It has happened in the past and may happen in future that intelligence practitioners will be requested to provide policy advice or proposals because of their evident expertise. When he/she

does that, it must be realised that they are doing it not as an intelligence operative. They must be fully aware that they are engaged in another discipline, which is not intelligence.

April 2009

Mr. Mostert was head of the Branch National Interpretation (BNI) of the Secretariat of the State Security Council (SSSC) 1987 - 1989

Comments on Intelligence and Policy: Wilhelm Bernard

The relationship between intelligence and policy is complex, often controversial, deeply nuanced, and seemingly irretrievably entangled in uncertainty.

Interestingly, and perhaps purposefully, there is no reference in the National Strategic Intelligence Act, or any of its subsequent amendments, to policy, policymaking or policy formulation. Instead, the emphasis is primarily put on the identification of threats, the provision of warning and on the transmission of departmental intelligence. Note that although none of the afore-mentioned specifically references policy, although all the afore-mentioned can theoretically include policy.

Contrary to the relative silence of the Act on this matter, the preceding White Paper contains multiple references to the relationship between intelligence and policy. In this respect, the following quotes are quite instructive:

• Intelligence is a product “...supportive of the policy- and decision-making processes pertaining to the national goals of stability, security and development”.

• “Modern intelligence can thus be described as "organised policy related information"

• “The relationship between intelligence and policymaking is a dynamic, reciprocal one. Intelligence is but one tool in the successful implementation of domestic and foreign policy”.

• “...for the intelligence organisation to operate optimally, and to the benefit of the policymaker, intelligence must be valued and nurtured as an instrument of policy.”

• For intelligence to be relevant it must “...provide the policymakers, timeous, critical and sometimes unique information to warn them of potential risks and dangers. This allows the policymakers to face the unknown and best reduce their uncertainty when critical decisions must be made.”

• “...the intelligence community will have to interface with other institutions of society engaged in strategic research, in order to promote integrated analysis which is supportive of policy making.”

Based on the above, the authors of the White Paper therefore apparently clearly intended a relationship between the post-apartheid intelligence structures and policy, albeit within very specific parameters. See for example the clear delineation above of intelligence products that must only support policy and decision-making processes in as far as national goals pertaining to stability,

security and development are concerned, and the reminder that intelligence is only relevant in the policy environment if it warns policymakers about potential risks and dangers. The inclusion of these parameters in the White Paper appears to reflect a concern about the potential misuse of intelligence by policymakers as policy, in the end, is and remains a political prerogative, with political objectives, and political gains. The objective of curbing the temptation to misuse intelligence for political purposes must therefore have weighed heavily on the minds of the original authors of the White Paper on Intelligence. In fact, in the section dealing with the “Basic Principles of Intelligence”, the White Paper unequivocally (and unfortunately without further explanation) quite strongly references the “Principle of the separation of intelligence from policy making”. In an apparent further measure to increase the distance between intelligence and policy, the White Paper also prescribed that the NICOC “will act as the key link between the intelligence community and policy-makers”, but that it will only advise the government on policy relating to the conduct of intelligence at national, regional and local levels” – in other words, not on policy in general, but on policy that affect the conduct of intelligence.

The article lists 4 functions of intelligence in relation to policy formulation: To inform, to warn, to predict and to advise. As long as the focus of such activity is on threats and potential threats arising from a national security perspective, one cannot disagree with these roles. In a constitutional democracy, the element of focus is therefore critically important when considering the relationship between intelligence and policy. Intelligence should only bring security thinking to policy. This implies a narrow, and specific focus, with constant vigilance against overstepping. This caveat is especially relevant in the context of domestic intelligence, where opposition to policy can very easily be mistaken a threat, and advice to government “...on opportunities to exploit the vulnerabilities of an adversary or competitor” could very easily be construed as the provision of intelligence on any democratic opponent of the government-of-the-day. It is therefore also very dangerous, and actually unacceptable, to compare intelligence in an unqualified manner to “the opposition”, and to prescribe that it must inform government “...of the moves and countermoves of the opposition”. Such actions are only possible once ‘the opposition” has clearly been qualified as a national security threat, by definition excluding political opponents following mom-securitised paths to oppose or frustrate policy. Intelligence can, and may never be, the government-of-the-day’s devil’s advocate when it comes to policy. It should not point out weaknesses in policy, nor engage in ‘dialectical discourse’ on the perceived strengths of any policy. It’s one and only function is to inform, warn, predict and advise on threats and potential threats, as per its legally assigned mandate.

To conclude: Should an intelligence analyst know government’s policy direction on any given matter by heart? To this question the answer can only be a resounding ‘yes’. Should the analyst

warn, inform, predict and advise government on the security dimensions of its chosen course of action? Again, the answer is ‘yes’. Should it do anything more than this? No, not under any circumstances. It is not the responsibility of an intelligence analyst to play any form of devil’s advocate, to point out weaknesses, or to tell government that it is pursuing the wrong, a weak or a poor policy, unless those issues have the potential, or are actually, contributing to the emergence of a national security threat.

12 August 2024

Dr. Bernhardt is an independent researcher on intelligence

COL HC ‘MANIE’ BREDEL: AN EARLY SECRET SERVICE OFFICER IN THE ZAR

CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE

SA’S ROTTEN SECURITY ORDER

William Saunderson-Meyer | 02 August 2024

William Saunderson-Meyer writes on the curious case of the 95 Libyans

JAUNDICED EYE

All is not well in South Africa’s security establishment. The question to be asked is whether the fault lies with that well-known malaise public service indolence, disinterest, and lack of training and application or whether there is something more sinister in play.

Recent events have shown that our national intelligence gathering structures the State Intelligence Agency (SIA), the military, the police, and the Financial Intelligence Centre collectively appear to be in an abysmal state of dysfunction and malfunction. At least as worrying, if the problem proves not to be a system failure, then the most likely other explanation is that President Cyril Ramaphosa’s government has been playing dangerous political games.

Last week, the absence of meaningful border control by SIA, the SA Police Service (SAPS), and the first-line security checks conducted by Home Affairs were exposed in a bizarre incident.

A group of 95 Libyan nationals, allegedly working for one of the numerous renegade groups battling for control of that country’s unstable unity government, were arrested in Mpumalanga at what SAPS describe as an illegal military training base. Media reports link the men to Libyan General Khalifa Haftar, who is working with Wagner Group the private military group that operates as a surrogate for the Russian government in Africa to protect Russian commercial interests while maintaining plausible deniability in public.

Libyan and British reports say that the men were training to be deployed as elite “special forces” for Haftar’s militia. Haftar’s men have been accused by human rights organisations of war atrocities against civilians in Libya: unlawful killings, torture, sexual violence, and forced displacements. Wagner Group, on its part, not only has its finger in the juicy pie of Libya’s oil and gold deposits, the largest in Africa, but uses Haftar’s networks to smuggle narcotics and to traffic migrants, including in our southern African neck of the woods.

The base, just outside White River, is legally registered as a private security training facility. However, according to the police, it had been operating undetected for four months as a military training camp for the Libyan group, which had entered South Africa on genuine visas.

To be hosting a group of mercenaries who are in cahoots with a foreign power which is rampaging through the continent and destabilising fellow African Union member states, is a diplomatic embarrassment for the South African government. Almost as embarrassing is the fact that the exposure of the clandestine training camp was inadvertent. It had nothing to do with good intelligence gathering at home or abroad, or an alert SAPS noticing the unexplained presence in the neighbourhood of armed, swarthy men speaking a foreign language and behaving suspiciously.

The camp was exposed when White River residents complained to SAPS that the men were swaggering about the taverns causing trouble, including alleged sexual molestation. Since then, the Mpumalanga police have stated that robbery and rape cases had increased in the policing area where the camp is situated. Some of the crime victims had stated that their attackers looked like “Asian or Indian” men.

There are two explanations for what happened here, the first being a cascade of intelligence failures.

It’s common knowledge that the SIA has been floundering for many years. Instead of directing its energies against South Africa’s foreign foes, the agency has reportedly been riven by competing African National Congress factions spying on one another and undermining each other. SAPS criminal intelligence, too, is in dire straits. Once, during the National Party years, a fearsomely efficient information-gathering network relying on a massive web of informants, it has since collapsed.

The other explanation is more ominous, that this was an approved covert project, sanctioned at the highest level by the ANC government and occurring with the full knowledge and cooperation of the SIA, military intelligence, police criminal intelligence, and the Department of Home Affairs. It became public accidentally, through the actions of Mpumalanga police officers who were ignorant of the wider, embarrassing ramifications of their well-intentioned actions.

What lends credence to this scenario are media reports and photos of the raid on the camp. This was not the kind of textbook operation by the Public Order section of SAPS backed up by the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) that one would expect when taking on almost 100 armed mercenaries. Instead, it was carried out by a squad of lightly armed SAPS officers, who one suspects rocked up to the camp’s front gates to question a gaggle of wannabe rent-a-cops.

As pertinently, how plausible is it that SIA and SANDF intelligence were unaware that a local, legally registered private security company was negotiating with military groups in one of Africa’s most

fractured yet important countries? Negotiating, nogal, with a group linked to the controversial Wagner Group, Russia’s ruthless cat’s paw and the scourge of Western interests in Africa.

And could it really be that the vetting procedures of Home Affairs are so inadequate that an application by 95 young Libyan men for entry visas, containing what the department now describes as “misrepresentations”, rang no alarm bells? As improbably, that the final decision on this mass application was never referred up the executive food chain to the director-general of the department and the Minister of Home Affairs, as well as sideways to the SIA and SAPS.

Let’s put it another way. If 95 strapping, young American men turned up at our consulate in Washington DC purporting to want to travel to White River to spend six months learning the finer points of security training, what chance in hell would they have had of getting permission without there being an exhaustive investigation involving every branch of the South African security establishment, into their potential motives?

Furthermore, permission would not be forthcoming given the potential diplomatic fallout of providing such paramilitary training without the matter being canvassed at the Cabinet level and, most likely, informally with the ANC’s alliance partners, the SA Communist Party and union federation Cosatu.

Militating against an intelligence failure is the fact that the security establishment is a very active political player on the home political stage, with its loyalties divided between the pro- and antiRamaphosa factions. In 2021, despite many warning signs, the SIA and its satellites managed to remain studiously oblivious to the impending riots that broke out in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in July that year, triggered by the jailing of former President Jacob Zuma. The riots, which Ramaphosa described as an insurrection masterminded from within the ANC, left at least 354 people dead and caused R35 billion in direct property damage.

Lindiwe Sisulu, a former Minister of Intelligence for three years under President Thabo Mbeki and, despite her unconcealed hostility to Ramaphosa a member of his Cabinet until March, dropped a further SIA-related bomb this week. She nonchalantly told a press conference that while she was in office there was wholesale surveillance of journalists.

“We were responsible for ensuring that the integrity of information and the individual’s information was dealt with. We had very regular meetings with the media and we, ourselves, were exposed to a lot of information. We bugged everybody, essentially.”

It was a startling admission that the government is illegally conducting wholesale surveillance on the entire media and, presumably, politicians and other citizens. However, our media, obsessed as it is

at present with exposing cabals of supposedly racist schoolchildren, took the news in its stride. They’re probably painfully aware that aside from a dwindling band of investigative journalists who rely on foreign philanthropy to survive, the pickings for the SIA spies will likely be very thin in most newsrooms.

Equally disinterested was Ramaphosa’s office. Responding to half-hearted calls for an inquiry, Presidency spokesperson Vincent Magwenya emphasised there was nothing to be seen here. “With respect to claims of ‘bugging of everybody’, such actions would have been unconstitutional and illegal. Perhaps the former minister will take some time to reflect on the veracity and implications of her comments.”

Well, that’s okay then, sighed the media with relief. Our government would never do anything illegal.

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/sas-rotten-securityorder?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=71ec47522aEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_08_04_03_49&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-71ec47522a%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D

QUESTIONS REMAIN OVER LIBYANS RECEIVING MILITARY TRAINING –

PIETER GROENEWALD

Pieter Groenewald | 31 July 2024

There are many questions hanging over the military training that 95 Libyans reportedly received at a private training camp near White River in Mpumalanga, especially because government appears to be ignorant.

During a police raid conducted last week, 95 Libyan citizens who reportedly received military training under the guise of security training were arrested.

This follows the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) putting South Africa on the grey list of countries that are failing to take decisive action against money laundering and terrorism last year.

I recently posed several questions in Parliament about the military training that foreign groups are reportedly receiving in South Africa, particularly in the Eastern Cape. Each question was met with a negative answer.

The White River incident offers irrefutable proof that it is indeed the case, and government could have something to hide.

After the unrest in KwaZulu-Natal in July 2021, the FF Plus warned that the country's intelligence services are not up to standard and should be overhauled. That obviously has not yet happened.

Allowing foreigners to receive military training in South Africa, especially if they could possibly be tied to terrorism, seriously jeopardises the country's territorial integrity.

According to a report by the Daily Maverick on 28 July 2024 (Libyans arrested at SA security training firm linked to group which once tried to topple UN-backed Tripoli government), the 95 people in custody apparently have ties with a group trying to destabilise Africa.

If the matter is not clarified soon, the people of South Africa could demand that heads roll. South Africa simply cannot be allowed to turn into a training base for international terrorist groups endangering citizens' lives.

Issued by Pieter Groenewald, FF Plus leader and minister of correctional services, 31 July 2024

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/questions-remain-over-libyans-receiving-militaryt?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=47065bcaf7EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_07_31_08_30&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-47065bcaf7%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D

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MILITARY HISTORY: ZULU WARRIORS

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Group of Bengal Lancers at the Remount Depot Kroonstad.

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BERG-EN-DAL MONUMENT

Kol Rudi van Wyk

Die Berg-en-Dal monument net buite Belfast is opgerig ter herinnering aan die soldate waaronder ń klompie ZARP (Zuid Afrikaansche Republikeinse Politie) lede wat gesterf het tydens die slag van Berg en Dal (Dalmanutha) vanaf 21 tot 27 Augustus 1899.

Die monument is op 29 Augustus 1970 onthul deur Adv BJ Vorster

Rifle Brigade: Berg-en-dal

PAUL KRUGERHUIS: WATERVAL-ONDER

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grafte naby Paul Krugerhuis Waterval Onder

UNION DEFENCE FORCE: LT-GEN J MITCHELL BAKER: READING THE NONGQAI

• James Mitchell Baker

Nongqai did some research on Gen Mitchell Baker and found the following:

Nico Moolman

Biographical information

Roles Competed in Olympic Games

Sex Male

Full name James• Mitchell Baker (-Mitchell-Baker)

Used nameJames• Mitchell Baker

Born 14 February 1878 in Stirling, Scotland (GBR)

Died 14 December 1956 in George, Western Cape (RSA)

NOC

Biography

South Africa

Born in Stirling, Scotland, James Mitchell Baker was a career military man who served with the Union Defence Force in South Africa. Baker was also an athlete who ran in the marathon at the 1908 London Olympics but did not finish the race. He was a member of the Pretoria team that won the 1907 Transvaal Cross Country Championships. Unfortunately, because he was still on his way home from the London Olympics, he could not help them retain the Transvaal Cross Country Championship in 1908.

After studying at Stirling High School and Glasgow University Baker joined the Army in 1899, serving in the South African War. In 1902 he resigned his Imperial commission and joined the Transvaal service, serving in South West Africa, Egypt, and France during World War I. In 1916 Baker, who had reached the rank of major, was decorated with the Distinguished Service Order by King George V in his Birthday Honours. By 1919 Baker was a lieutenant-colonel and was made a Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) for “valuable services rendered in connection with the War” in the King’s Birthday Honours. He was also an ADC (aide-de-camp) to both King George V and King George VI.

Baker initially retired in 1933 before being re-employed during World War II. He became a majorgeneral in 1944, and finally a lieutenant-general in 1947, before retiring for good in 1948.

https://www.olympedia.org/athletes/75296

UNION DEFENCE FORCE: 6 SA ARMOURED DIVISION

Lt-Col WS Marshall (Ret)

6th South African Armoured Division in the Italian Campaign (Part 1)

Beginning

The idea of a South African Armoured Division was born out of the chaos of the Western Desert Campaign, the Officers in the 1st and 2nd South African Infantry Divisions felt the need for their own armour instead of depending on other Commonwealth Armoured Units.

The formation of two strong Armoured Divisions was first discussed between Lt Gen G. E. Brink and Prime Minister (Field Marshal) J.C. Smuts in April 1941. At that point time, South Africa was struggling to maintain the manpower needed to sustain the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions in the field due to the political divisions in the Country. The 3rd South African Infantry Division was based in South Africa and provided the pool from which reinforcements were drawn to supplement the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions. A re-organisation committee met for the first time in May 1942 to discuss the armour option, it was decided to send three Infantry Battalions for armour training in August 1942, but the plan was rudely interrupted when Rommel launched his attack on the Gazala line in late May 1942.

Nine days after the final El Alamein offensive the South African Divisions were pulling back to regroup. The plan was for the 1st Infantry Division that was withdrawn to Quassasin and that its 1st Brigade would return to South Africa to regroup with the 7th Infantry Brigade in Madagascar to form the 1st South African Armoured Division and the 1st Infantry Divisions, 2nd and 3rd Brigades would

Above: Maj Gen William Henry Evered Poole, Commander 6 SA Armoured Division

remain in Egypt to form the 6th South African Armoured Division, which would replace the 2nd Infantry Division that had been captured at Tobruk in June 1942. By late December 1942 the South African Chief of Staff was having doubts about the ability of South Africa to field two Armoured Divisions.

Above: A graphic showing the basic organisation of 6 SA 6 SA Armoured Division using brigade emblems.

By January 1943, the Allied leadership had decided at the Casablanca Conference to pursue the war by invading Sicily. A motion was also put forward in the South African parliament to enable South Africans to fight anywhere in the world. Surprisingly, very few soldiers were keen to carry on fighting outside of Africa, in one of the keenest Battalions only 52% opted for world-wide service. The invasion of Sicily reduced the need for the number of Armoured Divisions as compared to those needed in the Western Desert. This, together with further manpower shortages led to plans for the 1st South African Armoured Division being abandoned, with only the 6th South African Armoured Division being considered viable. All the 1st South African Infantry Division Brigades were returned to South Africa for re-training and amalgamation with other Units to form the 6th South African Armoured Division. The 6th South African Armoured Division was officially formed in South Africa on 1 February 1943 with Maj Gen William Henry Evered Poole as its Commander. It sailed for Port Tewfik in the Suez on 30 April 1943 as a two-brigade division (The 11th Armoured Brigade and 12th Motor Brigade with supporting elements).

South African Units

RDLI - Royal Durban Light Infantry

NMR - Natal Mounted Rifles

DROR - Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Rifles

RLI - Rand Light Infantry

RB/RPS - Regiment Botha/Regiment President Steyn

PR - Pretoria Regiment

PAG - Prince Alfred’s Guard

SSB - Special Service Battalion

ILH/KimR - Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley Regiment

RNC - Royal Natal Carbineers

FC/CTH - First City/Cape Town Highlanders Regiment

WR/DLR - Witwatersrand/De La Rey Regiment

Above: Units and their abbreviations of the 6 SA

Training

The 6th South African Armoured Division started their training in the desert at Khataba, North West of Cairo and was focused on tank operations and integrating the Rhodesian elements into the Division. In addition, the lack of manpower had forced the amalgamation of numerous units. The period of training was finally concluded by a series of training exercises, “Exercise Cape Town” being the first from 1-3 December 1943 for the 11th South African Armoured Brigade and “Exercise Durban” from 5-7 December 1943 for the 12th South African Motorised Brigade.

Training was concluded with “Exercise Tussle” as a British Ill Corps operation finishing on 21 January 1944 and on 23 January 1944 the division moved to Helwan. By now, the 6th South African Armoured Division had been in Egypt for months due to indecision related to its role.

But on 3 March 1944, the 6th South African Armoured Division was instructed to move to Palestine and the advance parties left on 7 March 1944. However, on 12 March 1944 this movement order was countermanded, and the 6th South African Armoured Division was instructed to move to Italy. One year after arriving in the Middle East, the 6th South African Armoured Division embarked from

Armoured Division

Alexandria between 14 and 16 April 1944 to arrive in Taranto, Italy on 20 and 21 April 1944 and concentrated in the Altamura-Matera-Gravina area.

The Division landed in Italy at Taranto, Italy on 20 and 21 April 1944

Arrival

The 6th South African Armoured Divisions regrouping was still in progress after they disembarked at Taranto, when the 12th South African Motorised Brigade with Artillery and Support elements under Brig R.J. Palmer were detached from the 6th South African Armoured Division, and ordered to move to the S. Elia area, a mountainous sector of the line North of Cassino in preparation to relieve the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade. The 12th South African Motorised Brigade came under the command of the 2nd New Zealand Division in the British X Corps. The 12th South African Motorised Brigade took over the sector on 6 May 1944, and relinquished it on 23 May 1944. The 12th South African Motorised Brigade held these positions until after the fall of Monte Cassino and the breakout from the Anzio beachhead, when they were withdrawn and reunited with the division. The 12th South African Motorised Brigade were the first South African troops to enter combat in Italy.

Advance after Rome

Above:

On 20 May 1944, the 6th South African Armoured Division was brought up to a full complement of three Brigades, when the 24th Guards Brigade was put under their command. The Brigade commander was to be Brig A. F. D. Clive who had been a Senior General Staff Officer to the British Military Mission in South Africa earlier in the war.

Above: Maj-Gen WHE Poole, MC (right) is met by Brig AFL Clive, DSO of the 24th Guards Brigade on 26 Sept who was to form the third brigade of the Division.

At the end of May 1944, the 6th South African Armoured Division having formed part of the British Eighth Army’s Reserve concentrated at S. Agata.

The 6th South African Armoured Division was moved forward and attached to the Canadian I Corps. The break-out from Anzio was complete, and the US Fifth Army was driving on to Rome. The 6th South African Armoured Division was ordered to advance along Highway 6 and fought its first action as a division on 3 June 1944, when the 24th Guards Brigade took Piglio and the 12th South African Motorised Brigade entered Paliano.

The 6th South African Armoured Division advanced with the Tiber River to the East and Lake Bolsena to the West at a rate of 10 miles (16 km) per day, outstripping their flanking Units. So, after Rome had been taken by the Allies on 4 June 1944, the 6th South African Armoured Division was ordered to move up the Via Casalina to take over the spearhead of the of British Eighth Army’s British XIII Corps. On 6 June 1944, the 6th South African Armoured Division, now in the British XIII Corps, and on the extreme left of the British Eighth Army front, passed through Rome. The 11th

Above: A M4 Sherman and M3 Stuart wrecks of 6 SA Armoured Div tanks next to the road.

South African Armoured Brigade under Brig J.P.A. Fürstenberg took the lead, screened by tanks of the NMR/SAAF (Natal Mounted Rifles/South African Airforce Regiment), the 6th South African Armoured Division’s reconnaissance regiment. By night, forward elements had reached Civita Castellana, and the advance continued towards Viterbo. It was a bold thrust, aimed at taking advantage of the Germans confusion. The 6th South African Armoured Divisions advance North towards Bagnoregio and onwards to Florence, was delayed by demolitions North of Viterbo, where a blown bridge was covered by German infantry and three Tiger I E tanks. With both field and medium guns heavily shelling enemy targets, 2/8 Troop of 8th Field Squadron under Lt M.P. Pearse began construction of a culvert while under fire but had to withdraw to defensive positions for a while when a Tiger I E approached.

Then when it became obvious after dark that the newly constructed crossing would not stand up to continual use by tanks, 2/8 Troop had to put a Bailey bridge inside it. Sappers of 12th Field Squadron relieved the exhausted men of 8th Field Squadron on 9 June 1944. It was after midnight on 9 June 1944 that a bridgehead was established over the Acqua Rossa.

At first light on 10 June 1944 “C” Squadron, NMR moved up to establish contact with the enemy defence line running North of the Acqua Rossa bridgehead, where the enemy brought down heavy mortar fire on the ILH/KimR (Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley Regiment) and SSB (Special Service Battalion). Passing through on reconnaissance at 08:00, the leading NMR tank (under Lt. H. Butcher) came under fire and was knocked out with the entire crew all being killed. Another tank soon went the same way, also a victim to an enemy anti-tank gun, before an SSB Squadron was ordered up to their assistance and knocked out the enemy gun.

Heavy resistance was coming from the German 356 Infantrie Division, which had recently arrived from Genoa under Generalmajor Hans von Rohr. The freshly committed German Division was still raw but it was supported by elements of 4 Fallschirmjäger Division, 3 Panzergrenadier Division, 362 Infantrie Division and 26 Panzer Division.

Instead of passing the 24th Guards Brigade through the bridgehead as intended, Maj Gen. W.H.E. Poole now ordered the 11th South African Armoured Brigade in with the SSB leading, though the 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA, who was not yet in position to give covering fire. Brig J.P.A. Furstenberg appreciated the main German axis of withdrawal on the immediate front was along Route 2, which meant that the South African Armoured Brigade on the enemy’s left flank. He decided to turn the flank by ordering the SSB to advance right flank forward. The Rhodesians of “C” Squadron, SSB were at breakfast when the call came for support.

Mess tins, plates and mugs were abandoned with contents unfinished as the men raced to their tanks. The squadron was in the lead along the road and had covered barely a kilometre when its tanks were sprayed with machine-gun fire.

They had struck the enemy anti-tank screen South of the railway running across their line of advance. shellfire. Without waiting for reconnaissance or artillery support Lt Col C.E.G. Britz boldly decided to move on in the same formation, with “A” Squadron, SSB forming a firm base on high ground on the right flank as the NMR tanks withdrew from the action. “C” Squadron, SSB moved forward against heavy anti-tank fire from guns of all calibres from 20 to 88 mm, backed by some 50 to 60 Spandau machine-guns sited in houses and trees, and from several Nebelwerfers.

Part of “A” Company, ILH/KimR rode into the attack on the back of the tanks. While two troops of “A” Squadron, SSB held firm base, the rest of the Squadron were ordered right and forward, to take up hull-down positions from which they put down heavy fire on the enemy’s left flank to such good effect that the German infantry broke and were mown down as they tried to get away. “C” Squadron had been brought to a halt, but Lt Col C.E.G. Britz ordered “B” Squadron round in a wide left hook which ran into anti-tank fire. This was silenced by superb marksmanship on the part of the South African and Rhodesian tank gunners, before the SSB turned machine-guns on the enemy infantry, who broke and fled.

Lt Col C.E.G. Britz reckoned that the enemy was holding with a strength equivalent to a brigade with two battalions up and one in reserve, supported by divisional as well as regimental anti-tank guns. All SSB tanks except his own command tank had been committed, and they were rapidly replenished, with truckdrivers displaying great courage in coming right forward in their open vehicles

Above: M4 Sherman tank in a harbour area

under fire. C” Company, ILH/KimR was winkling out enemy remnants hiding among the cornfields, hedges and farmhouses, and artillery forward observation officers at last came forward to report to Lt Col C.E.G. Britz.

Above: The M4 Sherman tank fitted with the 75mm gun would become the standard tank of the division.

From 11h45 the guns of the 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA (South African Artillery) were engaging numerous targets, including enemy infantry who were effectively pinned by airburst. Anti-tank guns to the right, in the area of Grotte S. Stefano, were knocked out by fire from 7/64 Field Battery’s 25pdr guns, and the 7/23 Medium Regiment’s 5.5” howitzers brought down fire with devastating effect shortly before midday. In less than two hours artillery fire had knocked out five 88mm, sixteen 50mm anti-tank guns, three machine-guns, a Panzer IV, four Panzer III’s and many infantry soldiers.

“B” Company, ILH/KimR joined “C” Company with the SSB at 14h30, while “A” Company swept the slopes towards Celleno village, beyond the enemy’s prepared positions, which followed the steep bank of the railway line running east to west through Grotte and some 4500m South of Celleno.

Above: The M7 Priest tank with the 105mm main gun was the main mobile artillery piece of the division, until problems arose with ammunition logistics while under command of the British, whey would then be replaced by the Sexton with the 25pdr main gun.

Working in close co-operation with the tanks, ILH/KimR cleared the approaches to Celleno through a thickly wooded area studded with enemy machine-guns and Panzerfaust anti-tank posts.

Above: More M4 Sherman wrecks on the road, the nature of the terrain would dictate that the division would lose a large number of armoured vehicles.

Wiping out enemy pockets was a dangerous and slow process, and in order not to lose the momentum of the attack Lt Col C.E.G. Britz decided to keep the tanks moving. Dismounting from the Sherman tanks, “B” and “C” Companies, ILH/KimR kept working with the armour, whose “C” Squadron now advanced under the railway line and immediately met anti-tank fire from guns sited in depth along the road, and with Infantry opposition from Panzerfausts, Spandau’s and snipers.

With the railway atop a high embankment, it was impossible to cross it anywhere except where the road ran beneath the line, but “C” Squadron got through and made firm on high ground running across the road about 180 meters North of the railway. Having driven through the wooded area cleared by ILH/KimR, the tanks acted as artillery and very effectively shelled Celleno before the infantry moved in. South African Units RDLI - Royal Durban Light Infantry NMR - Natal Mounted Rifles

With “A” Squadron, SSB in right rear and “B” Squadron, SSB in left rear North of the bridgehead, the SSB had hardly formed up for the attack before they came under heavy. With “C” Squadron firm beyond the railway line, “B” Squadron passed through, carrying men of ILH/KimR on the backs of

the tanks again as they made for high ground North of Celleno. Fighting with every weapon at its disposal, the Squadron got one troop on to high ground North-West of the village and overlooking it, and “C” Squadron then moved up on the right into an area which had to be cleared of determined German tank hunting parties and snipers by ILH/KimR, who were brought up by “A” Squadron and SSB reconnaissance tanks.

While Lt Col R. Reeves-Moore’s men of ILH/KimR fought their way towards the outskirts of Celleno, their mopping-up developed into an attack on the village itself, and the SSB moved more tanks on to higher ground northeast of it, thus holding the area while the Infantry prised the Germans out. In farmhouses scattered around about 10 large buildings which looked like schools, German remnants had good cover and resisted bitterly, but they were unable to hold back the men of ILH/KimR, who took many prisoners and inflicted heavy casualties.

Above: A M4 Sherman with the name of the Prime Minister “Jannie” Smuts on the side

By 20:00 that night the SSB tanks had run out of petrol and ammunition, but the enemy’s fire had died down. Brig J.P.A. Furstenberg ordered Lt Col C.E.G. Britz not to continue the advance until the divisional artillery could come into action further forward to search the wooded country ahead. It was decided not to hold the ground occupied at the end of the day, and as the SSB tanks withdrew to replenish and to rest their crews, many of whom had not eaten since the previous night, they took the ILH/KimR men out with them to a position about 3 km south, to wait for the 24th Guards Brigade to pass through and continue the advance the next morning.

During the action at Celleno, Brig J.P.A. Furstenberg ordered PAG (Prince Alfred’s Guard) to cover the SSB’s right flank, with support from 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA, whose guns effectively engaged the enemy. The PAG moved up the Viterbo-Bagnoregio Road, and by 12h30 on June 10th, 1944, it had reached a point about 11 km North of Viterbo, with “A” Squadron and the Reconnaissance Troop searching for a crossing over the River Malone. “B” Squadron, coming up from reserve, crossed the river but was pinned by anti-tank fire. “A” Squadron was already moving along sunken lanes only some 1370 meters from Grotte when enemy anti-tank guns scored hits on five tanks, three of which burned out. “C” Squadron covered “A” Squadron’s left and “B” Squadron moved up to take over from “A” Squadron but was halted by anti-tank fire, some of which was from a range of only 180 meters.

Above: The standard artillery gun was the British 5,5inch gun.

No further progress in this sector was possible without Infantry support, but casualties were inflicted on the enemy and 28 prisoners were taken. Though it had just come under command of the 24th Guard Brigade, the PR (Pretoria Regiment), at 18h00 that day was ordered to move immediately for a shoot in support of 11th South African Armoured Brigade, and from turret-down positions plastered the Celleno-Grotte area with high explosive rounds. The Battle of Celleno culminated as South Africa’s first victory in the Italian Campaign. The 11th Armoured Brigade had suffered a total of 53 casualties, but it had severely mauled the German 356 Infantrie Division.

A year prior to the battle, however, the 6th South African Armoured Division was still training in the desert expanses of Khataba. Under-equipped, under-strength, and unsure of their future, the 6th South African Armoured Division was able to turn themselves into a capable, armoured, fighting force within less than a year. It was a confident and vigorous action which went far to justify Field Marshal H.R.L.G. Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis words the previous day: “South Africans are the spearhead of the advance”.

The 11th Armoured Brigade’s success spread through the whole 6th South African Armoured Division and on 11 June 1944, the advance was continued in heavy rain. The 24th Guards Brigade with PR tanks under their command took the lead and ran against a strong enemy position at Bagno Regio. A divisional attack on 12 June 1944, failed to achieve its purpose, but the position was taken on 13 June 1944, after a skilful flank march by the RNC (Royal Natal Carbineers).

The 12th South African Motorised Brigade took over the lead and on 14 June 1944, and with heavy and confused fighting around Bagnoregio, the FC/CTH (First City/Cape Town Highlanders Regiment) entering the vitally important road junction of Orvieto.

Demolitions had greatly hampered the advance, despite the indefatigable work of the three engineer squadrons (8th Field Squadron, 12th Field Squadron and 17th Division Field Park Squadron). Now poor roads and bad weather further slowed down the advance to the Trasimeno Line. The 6th South African Armoured Division took Orvieto, having advanced 75 miles (121 km) in 10 days. However, their daily rate of advance had been slowed considerably by consistently being in contact with the enemy. On 19 June 1944, the 6th South African Armoured Division came up against the Trasimeno Line, of which Chiusi was the main strong point in the divisional sector. The ILH/KimR of the 11th Armoured Brigade had been stopped by the German 4 Fallschirmjäger Division on their first attempt to enter Chiusi, but by 26 June 1944, the town had been taken as a result of an attack by two British divisions on the 6th South African Armoured Division’s right. During this attack on Chiusi, “A” Company, FC/CTH was leading the attack up the terraces around the town. The night of 21 June 1944 saw “A” Company surrounded by strong German infantry elements closely supported by tanks.

After sustaining heavy losses, “A” Company’s surviving members were forced to surrender by noon on 22 June 1944. The 24th Guards Brigade after heavy fighting supported by tanks of the PR, took Sarteano on 25 June 1944.

Credits: J.C. von Winterbach, Scott Sutherland, Mike Bersiks, Rex Barret and Barry Cooper, W.S. Marshall.

SOUTH AFRICA’S TOP MILITARY MEDALISTS

By Peter Dickens

on August 1, 2024

So, talking Olympics, but in a military context, who are South Africa’s greatest medalists?

Unfortunately we have to separate this into two sub categories as the National Party in 1948 decided that anyone fighting for the British under the banner of the “South African Union” was somehow “British” (so too their medals - the “Commonwealth” bit to these decorations mattered not a jot to the Nats) and anyone fighting for the 'White' Apartheid “Republic” they brought about in 1961 was somehow more “South African” - and they created a whole new set of medals in paramount to the “British” ones - declaring them as "foreign" medals - which meant a simple peacetime SADF ’Skiet medal” (shooting proficiency medal) would be more senior than a Commonwealth decoration for wartime gallantry.

Naturally this caused a lot of distress for our WW1 and WW2 veterans at the time, some refusing to allow basic service medals to precede their hard-earned combat medals - and it also caused lots of confusion. True, the Nationalists had to change them as South Africa was kicked out/left the British Commonwealth, no choice - but they did not have be sinister and give paramountcy over the Commonwealth medals.

Adding to this confusion is the current ANC dispensation who took the position in 2003 that medals awarded by the Apartheid Republic were for “Apartheid soldiers” and they created a whole new set to replace them for SANDF soldiers of a “democratic” South Africa - one thing they did right is they did not make them "paramount" to the SADF medals which maintain seniority (which the Nats did not do). To say this is a messy subject would be an understatement.

We also need to understand who is the South African with the “most” medals - like an Olympian who has won the most medals of any category - Gold, Silver or Bronze as opposed to the South African who has won the “highest” medals for gallantry- again like an Olympian who has won the most “gold” medals.

Now to announce the winners:

The winner of the “most” medals i.e. the most decorated South African of the “Union” period is ….

Field Marshal Jan Smuts - here’s his rack:

Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts OM, CH, DTD, ED, PC, KC, FRS

• Order of Merit (OM) - British and Commonwealth (WW2)

• Order of the Companions of Honour (CH) - British and Commonwealth (WW1)

• Dekoratie voor trouwe Dienst (DTD) - ZAR Republic (Boer War 2)

• Efficiency Decoration (ED) - South Africa (Interwar and WW2)

• Privy Council (PC) - British and Commonwealth

• King's Counsel (KC) - a legal appointment post nominal

• Fellowship of the Royal Society (FRS)

• Bencher of the Middle Temple - a legal appointment

• South African Republic and OFS War Medal - ZAR Republic (Boer War 2)

• 1914/15 Star (WW1)

• British War Medal 1914 - 1918 (WW1)

• Victory Medal (WW1)

• General Service Medal

• King George V's Jubilee Medal - 1935

• King George VI's Coronation Medal - 1937

• 1939 - 1945 Star (WW2)

• Africa Star (WW2)

• Italy Star (WW2)

• France and Germany Star (WW2)

• Defence Medal 1939 - 1945 (WW2)

• War Medal 1939 - 1945 (WW2)

• Africa Service Medal 1939 - 1945 (WW2)

• Order of Merit (U.S.A.)

• EAME Campaign Medal - U.S.A.(WW2)

• Order of the Tower and Sword for Valour, Loyalty and Merit (Portugal)

• Grootkruis van die Orde van de Nederlandsche Leeuw - Netherlands (WW2)

• Grand Cordon of the Order of Mohamed Ali (Egypt)

• Grand Cross of the Order of the Redeemer - Greece (WW2)

• Grand Cross of the Order of Léopold II - Belgium (WW2)

• Croix de guerre - Belgium (WW1)

• Légion d'honneur Croix de Commandeur - France (WW1)

• La Grand Croix de l'Ordre de L'Etoile Africane Ster - Belgium (WW2)

• King Christian X Frihedsmedaille 'Pro Dania' - Denmark (WW2)

• Aristion Andrias Gold Cross - Greece (WW2)

• Albert Medal of the Royal Society of Arts

• Woodrow Wilson Peace Medal

36 Total

Smuts is unique in the sense that his two Boer War Republican medals pre-date his Union medals.

Field Marshal Jan Smuts and ribbons

The winner of the “highest” medals i.e. the highest decorated South African of the “Union” period is …. Captain Andrew Beauchamp-Proctor - here is his rack:

Captain Andrew Beauchamp-Proctor VC, DSO, MC & Bar, DFC

Captain Beauchamp-Proctor

• Victoria Cross (WW1)

• Distinguished Service Order (WW1)

• Military Cross and Bar (WW1)

• Distinguished Flying Cross (WW1)

• 1914 - 1915 Star (WW1)

• British War Medal (WW1)

• The Victory Medal (WW1)

More on these medals on this link: https://samilhistory.com/.../south-africas-own-ww1.../

Captain Beauchamp-Proctor is not unique in the sense that all his highest medals were earned whilst fighting in British military constructs as a South African Union citizen - which was perfectly acceptable then.

The South African winner of the “most decorated" South African in the “South African Republic” SADF period is ..... General Bob Rogers - here is his rack:

General Bob Rogers SSA, SM, MMM, DSO, DFC & Bar

General Bob Rogers

• Star of South Africa (SSA) (South Africa)

• Southern Cross Medal (SM) (South Africa)

• Military Merit Medal (MMM) (South Africa)

• Korea Medal (South Africa)

• Pro Patria Medal (South Africa)

• Good Service Medal, Gold (30 Years - South Africa)

• Good Service Medal, Silver (20 Years - South Africa)

• Union Medal (South Africa)

• Distinguished Service Order (DSO) (WW2)

• Distinguished Flying Cross and Bar (DFC and Bar) (WW2)

• 1939–45 Star (WW2)

• Africa Star (WW2)

• Italy Star (WW2)

• War Medal 1939–1945 - Mentioned in Dispatches (WW2)

• Africa Service Medal (WW2)

• Distinguished Flying Cross (USA)*

• Air Medal Bronze with Oak Leaf Cluster (USA)*

• Order of Military Merit (Korea) (Chungmu cordon) with Gold Star

• United Nations Service Medal for Korea

• Korean War Service Medal

• Grand Star of Military Merit (Chile)

• Army PUC Presidential Unit Citation (USA)*

*American awards issued to 2 SAAF Squadron members under their command in the Korean War.

23 Total

Note: General Rogers’ medal set are a combination of SADF (Republican) and UDF (Union) medals and decorations, and like Smuts some foreign ones too.

The winner of the “highest decorated” South African in the SADF “Republic” period is …. Major Arthur Walker - here is his rack:

Major Murray Walker

Major Murray Walker HCG & Bar, SM

• Honoris Crux (Gold and Bar) - South Africa

• Southern Cross Medal - South Africa

• Pro Patria Medal - South Africa

• Southern African Medal - South Africa

• General Service Medal - South Africa

• Good Service Medal Bronze - South Africa

• Zimbabwean Independence Medal 1980 - Zimbabwe

• General Service Medal - Rhodesia

• United Nations Medal (Mozambique - United Nations)

Major Walker is unique in that won the Honoris Crux Gold (HCG) twice - the only South African to have a “Bar” to an HCG.

Overall Winning Medalists

So, of these four great medalists - who are the winners of the “most” and the “highest” given the grade and total sweep of the medals on offer - the answer:

Field Marshal Jan Smuts is the overall winner of the “most decorated South African”.

Simply because he has more decorations and medals (36) than Bob Rogers (23).

Andrew Beauchamp-Proctor is the overall winner of the “highest decorated South African”.

Simply because he has a Victoria Cross (VC) and his raft of decorations for gallantry serve to qualify it further - his DSO, two MC and DFC, putting him ahead of the other South African VC recipients -

the highest gallantry award for the SADF was the “diamond” Honoris Crux (HCD), it was meant to be on the same level as a VC (albeit not the same as the VC is a standalone, there is graded degree of bravery as there is with a HC set)- and nobody ever received a “diamond” Honoris Crux (HCD) in any event, it was never awarded, and no one ever will, it has been discontinued.

Of the new SANDF “Highest” decoration is the Nkwe ya Gauta – Golden Leopard - it replaced the Gold Honoris Crux (HCG) and like the HC set it is part of graded gallantry decorations going up in importance and there is no “diamond” Leopard - whereas the Victoria Cross is still a standalone decoration and has no equivalent - so Beauchamp-Proctor still remains the “highest” decoratedand will remain such well into our living memory. So far there have been 3 recipients of the Nkwe ya Gauta – Golden Leopard - all of them posthumous.

Please note this is not meant to degrade any one over the other - all four of these men are great South Africans.

SA DEFENCE FORCE:

OPERATION MEEBOS AND THE RECOVERY OF A RUSSIAN T34/85 FROM XANGONGO ON 9 AUGUST 1982 FOR THE SOUTHERN

AFRICA MEDAL

By Dr Anthony Turton

The Light Horse Regiment contingent of 10 Armoured Car Squadron at the Xangongo Bridge on 9 August 1982 when the radio signal was received that a Puma had been shot down at the Mui River. Major Hylton Marks is kneeling on the left. (Photo Credit: Cpl Eric Prinsloo)

Dedicated to the Light Horse Regiment Association

Operation Meebos and the Recovery of a Russian T34/85 from Xangongo on 9 August 1982 for the Southern Africa Medal

Dr Anthony Turton

Introduction

The recovery of a Russian T34/85 tank from Xangongo took place during Operation Meebos. The recovery was executed on the overall instruction of General Constand Viljoen, by members of 10 Armoured Car Squadron, doing a three-month border camp. This was part of a comprehensive deception plan designed to discourage FAPLA from retaking Xangongo and Ongiva, both captured by the SADF during Operation Protea, by creating a de facto presence on the ground. 2 Light Horse Regiment has a direct interest in this operation, because of a deployment of one squadron of ACF members, to 10 Armoured Car Squadron from 9 July 1982 to 30 September 1982, under the command of Major Hylton Marks. A member of Charlie Squadron 61 Mech (Callsign 35 – Tpr Patrick Quirk), who was directly involved in the recovery of the Puma shot down on 9 August 1982, at the objective known as Smelling Rat, later served with 2LHR. For these two reasons, 2LHR has a direct involvement with the tank recovery operation, but the story has not apparently been captured for posterity. This short paper lays the foundation for a more detailed analysis of the event. The tank in question was later stripped of all copper cables, which were melted to form part of the Southern African Medal, replicating a tradition by the British Army. The T34/85 is on display at an SANDF museum. Operation Meebos was planned by the OC Sector 10, and executed by various units, to prevent FAPLA from recapturing Xangongo and Ongiva held by the SADF since Operation Protea (23 August to 2 September 1981). This provided the opportunity for the execution of General Viljoen’s order to recover a Russian tank shot out during Operation Protea.

The T34/85 tank at Forte Roçadas where it had been shot out during Operation Protea. The recovery commander was the Technical Services Corps Sgt Major standing to the left of the tank. Standing on the tank from left to right are Tpr Paul Roos, Cpl Anthony Turton and Sgt David Gadd-Claxton. On the right are the support troop element from Light Horse Regiment. (Photo credit: Cpl Eric Prinsloo).

Operation Protea as Precursor to Operation Meebos

23 August 1981 – Operation Protea begins.

24 August 1981 – Xangongo is captured by Battle Group 40.

25 August 1981 – Battle Group 20 captures all designated positions south of Xangongo. Battle Group 10 crosses the bridge over the Cunene at 09h00 and enters Xangongo. An Alouette gunship is shot down at Mongua so Combat Team Mamba is tasked to capture the town.

26 August 1981 – Battle Groups 20 and 30 depart Xangongo to advance on Ongiva.

27 August 1981 – Battle Groups 20 and 30 assault Ongiva.

28 August 1981 – Civilians begin to ransack the town of Ongiva, so Battle Group 20 distributes food to calm the people.

30 August 1981 – Battle Group 20 begins to prepare the captured materiel for transport back to Ondangwa.

31 August 1981 – Xangongo and its bridge is handed over to UNITA.

2 September 1981 – Operation Protea ends with 831 KIA for PLAN/FAPLA, with 25 captured, while the SADF lose 10 KIA and 64 wounded.

In summary, Operation Protea clears Cunene Province of PLAN/FAPLA forces. Brig Witkop Badenhorst, Officer Commanding Sector 10, and his Chief of Staff Col Joep Joubert, decide to maintain the status quo, effectively shifting the northern border of Sector 10 to the Techamutete –Casinga line. For this reason, a TAC HQ is established at Ongiva from 1981 to 1984, to act as the logistics and operational base of Sector 10. During Operation Meebos, Col Joubert is promoted to OC Sector 10, enabling Brig Badenhorst to be redeployed elsewhere. Col Jan Pieterse is appointed as the Commander of Operation Meebos, and he is stationed at Ongiva.

General Roland de Vries writes as follows on the 61MVA website, reflecting on his time as Officer Commanding 61 Mech during Operation Meebos. “The SADF intended to keep the area in dispute unspoiled by FAPLA whilst the hunt for SWAPO continued relentlessly”. For this reason, 61 Mech was on permanent call-up by Sector 10 during Operation Meebos, as were other units which included:

- 32 Battalion (32Bn) under the command of Commandant Deon Ferreira. Their task is to search and destroy SWAPO and prevent FAPLA from recapturing Xangongo from Cahama. This is accomplished by Operation Handsak.

- 1 Parachute Battalion (1 Para) under the command of Commandant James Hills. Their task is to search and destroy SWAPO and prevent FAPLA from recapturing Ongiva from Techamutete and Cuvelai. This is accomplished by Operation Makro.

- 10 Armoured Car Squadron, based at Oshakati, under the command of Major Eddie van Jaarsveld. Their task is to support where required, and to create a diversion where needed. It must be noted however, that after Operation Protea, General Constand Viljoen, Chief of the SADF, expressed an interest in recovering a T34/85 tank from Xangongo to become part of the Southern Africa Medal9. This medal is awarded to members of the SADF for service in military operations in Southern Africa and Southwest Africa between 1 April 1976 and 21 March 1990. It was discontinued in 1994. In so doing, Gen Viljoen noted that the original British Victoria Crosses (VC’s) were made from a copper cascabel captured at Sebastopol during the Crimean War (1854-1856). The notion of recovering a T34/85 tank from Xangongo thus took root after Protea, and merely needed an opportunity to be converted into a designated task. This occurred during Operation Meebos, when a diversion was needed to maintain confusion in FAPLA as to the true intentions of the SADF.

The water tower in Ongiva shot out by Lt Toffie Grové HC of Battle Group 20 (61 Mech) during Operation Protea. (Photo credit: Anthony Turton in Shaking Hands with Billy).

9 Southern Africa Medal - Wikipedia

The Rationale of Operation Meebos

Gen Roland de Vries notes that in 198210, FAPLA was intent on retaking Xangongo and Ongiva, both lost during Operation Protea. For this reason, Operation Meebos was planned. The 61 MVA Website states the following:

“The aim of Operation Meebos was to prevent FAPLA from re-occupying to towns of Xangongo and Ongiva. The secondary aim was to pinpoint and destroy enemy headquarters and caches, and to disrupt its logistical routes”.

“FAPLA was moving stealthily south from Techamutete and Cuvelai to occupy a hastily prepared offensive position at Evale. The enemy was steadily and cautiously making their way back to capture Ongiva.”

Gen de Vries goes on to note that Operation Meebos was designed to be an aggressive, pre-emptive continuous dislocation of FAPLA/PLAN forces. Therefore, there were several deception operations implemented in the form of sequential ground and air attacks, focusing on PLAN forces in the Mupa, Cuvelai and Techamutete areas. A large FAPLA force consisting of the 11th Brigade was located at Techamutete, with a squadron of T54/55 main battle tanks (MBTs), so electronic surveillance constantly monitored their disposition.

Gen de Vries notes that in a tactical sense, Operation Meebos was similar to what Erwin Rommel had written regarding the vastness of the northern desert. “He (Rommel) would have enjoyed Angola”, writes de Vries11

Gen de Vries notes that, “FAPLA had already made their offensive moves toward the recapture of Xangongo and Ongiva in December 1981 and were beaten off quite easily. It was expected that they would try once again, probably much harder the second time around”.

Map of the area of operations for Meebos and Protea (not drawn to scale).

Historic Timeline for Operation Meebos

Gen de Vries notes the two missions for the SADF forces operating out of Ongiva at that time:

- Deny FAPLA the initiative to recapture Xangongo.

- Maintain an aggressive search and destroy capability against PLAN.

25 May 1982 – Operation Yahoo ends with 156 PLAN insurgents KIA, and 17 SADF KIA with 44 wounded and 5 civilians killed. This sees the first tactical engagement by PLAN intent on successfully ambushing a Ratel, indicating an aggressive phase of infiltration by a force willing to engage SADF armour.

9 July 1982 – One squadron of Active Citizen Force (ACF) soldiers from 2 Light Horse Regiment (2LHR) start a tour of duty in 10 Armoured Car Squadron with initial training at Oshivelo. The 2LHR commanding officer is Major Hylton Marks. On the same date Colonel Roland de Vries, Officer Commanding 61 Mech, receives orders from Brigadier Witkop Badenhorst (Officer Commanding Sector 10) to prepare for an offensive operation.

11 July 1982 – Colonel de Vries issues his orders12 to 61 Mech sub-units based at Omuthiya. These orders state the following:

- 61 Mech to launch deception operations from 13 July 1982 to an end date anticipated in August.

12 Secret: Order 309/1 Operation Meebos dated 11 July 1982.

- 61 Mech to prevent the capture of Xangongo and Ongiva by FAPLA’s 11th and 19th Brigades.

- 61 Mech to dominate the line from Ongiva to Xangongo east of the Cunene River.

- The enemy is to be confused by movements, radio chatter and live fire by various entities east of the Cunene River as part of a coordinated strategy.

13 July 1982 – 61MVA moves to Ongiva at the start of Operation Meebos. They engage in intensive live fire training in part to attract the interest of FAPLA. Charlie Squadron under the command of Captain Chris du Toit is detached to Colonel Pieterse at the TAC HQ and moves to Ongiva.

18 July 1982 – The main force of 61 Mech moves to Xangongo for live fire training. Captain Jan Malan is in command of Alpha Company and Captain ‘Vissie’ Visser is in command of Bravo Company.

19 July 1982 – Sierra Battery from 61 Mech under the command of Major Chris Roux moves to Ongiva.

21 July 1982 – SAAF attack Cahama.

22 July 1982 – 32 Bn Recce Wing identify a SWAPO force at Mupa. This triggers an air assault by Alouette gunship, followed by an airdrop of infantry. In the ensuing engagement 18 PLAN fighters are KIA.

24 July 1982 –Sierra Battery marries up with 61 Mech at Xangongo. Intensive live fire training continues.

27 July 1982 – 61 Mech is declared battle ready and leaves Xangongo for Mongua, as part of the deception operation. They initially travel by road and then suddenly veer off into the bush, when they disappear under cover of the forest, and move into their designated position further north. Colonel De Vries is airlifted by helicopter to Oshivelo where he receives his final orders. He returns to his unit in the field. PLAN EA HQ is located at Mupa, so the FAA moves to a position 25 km east of Mupa.

30 July 1982 – 61 Mech links up with 32 Bn at the FAA 25 km east of Mupa after encountering the FAPLA force at Mupa. 32 Bn Recce Wing locates a PLAN base at the Calonga River 21km west of the Cuvelai/Techamutete road. This is code named Smelling Rat. The HAA is located 18 km east of Cuvelai.

31 July 1982 – The plan is to insert stopper groups from 1 Para by C130/160 aircraft north of Smelling Rat, while two companies from 32 Bn are trooped in by Puma from Ongiva. but the HAA is attacked by heavy FAPLA D70 artillery fire. Radio intercepts confirm that FAPLA is exhausting

their own ammunition supply. TAC HQ moves to a new HAA to avoid incoming artillery and the planned airdrop of 1 Para is cancelled.

1 August 1982 – the HAA is relocated furthernorth adjacent to the Cuvelai river while radio intercepts continue to monitor FAPLA.

2 August 1982 – A SAAF airstrike by Mirage is followed by Alouette gunships that encounter 14,5 anti-aircraft and RPG7 fire. The first assault wave of 32 Bn is inserted, followed by the second wave from 1 Para. A fierce firefight ensues with one member of 32 Bn KIA and 2 wounded. PLAN loses 144 KIA. Many weapons are captured.

3 August 1982 – Radio interceptions indicate that FAPLA intends to replenish the artillery ammunition shot out on 31 July from a stockpile in Cuvelai. A plan is devised by 61 Mech to insert an ambush team by Puma, placed alongside the road from Cuvelai to Techamutete that the convoy would have to take, tasked to destroy the convoy. This combat team is led by Captain Jan Malan. Radio intercepts indicate panic in the FAPLA base, with one message stating the officer in charge of the keys to the ammunition store had fled. The logistics convoy is eventually dispatched with the necessary ammunition.

4 August 1982 – the FAPLA convoy is successfully ambushed at 05h30 by the 61 Mech team. This is immediately followed at 08h00 by an air attack by Alouette gunships destroying 20 logistics vehicles and capturing two. This brings a period of calm while forces regroup, so 61 Mech remained close to the Techamutete/Cuvelai road.

6 August 1982 – 61 Mech redeploys to a new FAA 10 km further to the north. A combat team from 10 Armoured Car Squadron under the command of Major Hylton Marks departs from Ondangwa for Ongiva via Santa Clara and Namacunde. Their task is to link up with a Tiffy recovery team at Ongiva and make their way to Xangongo to recover a T34/85 tank shot out at Xangongo during Operation Protea. They are also tasked to find a second vehicle – possibly a road grader – but exact details are not given to the troops during their briefing. The troops are mostly unaware of high-level operational details given the prevailing secrecy.

7 August 1982 – the 10 Armoured Car Squadron combat team departs from Ongiva for Xangongo, stopping off at Mongua to show its presence. During this part of the operation an unmarked Red Cross vehicle joins the back of the convoy, and is almost shot out by 23B, as no orders had been

received to warn anyone that this would occur13. The destination is Forte Roçadas, a military structure on the Cunene River built during the First World War14

A mortar defensive position inside Forte Roçadas. Seen left is Tpr Bossie Bosman (23A) and Tpr Paul Roos (23B). (Photo credit: Anthony Turton in Shaking Hands with Billy).

8 August 1982 – The 10 Armoured Car Squadron combat team links up with a Special Forces operator and determines that the one vehicle to be recovered (road grader?) cannot be located. There is an indication of previous strafing by the SAAF as shot out logistics vehicles are clearly evident. That part of the mission is abandoned, and attention is diverted to the recovery of the T34/85 tank.

9 August 1982 – The recovery of the T34/85 tank at Xangongo is successfully executed by the 10 Armoured Car Squadron team, who move to the bridge across the Cunene where they wait out the rest of the day in readiness to return to Ongiva the next day. 61 Mech is in position east of the Cuvelai/Techamutete road, and eight Pumas are ready for trooping. A PLAN base is located by 32 Bn Recce Wing north of the Mui River and west of the Techamutete/Cuvelai road. Trooping of 32 Bn and 1 Para by Puma helicopters begins as combat teams are inserted. The first flight comes over 61 Mech and a PLAN detachment en route to the LZ north of the Mui River. The second flight of four Pumas comes in at 15h00, following the Mui River, and the PLAN anti-aircraft artillery site

13 Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy: The Private Memoirs of Anthony Richard Turton. Durban: Just Done Publications. http://www.shakinghandswithbilly.com https://www.amazon.com/Shaking-Hands-Billy-Private-Memoirsebook/dp/B07Q6ZFQMW

14 German campaign in Angola - Wikipedia

responds with a blistering rate of fire. A Puma is shot down and Alouette gunships are also attacked when they respond to the ground fire. A group of 30 PLAN fighters approach the downed Puma and an Alouette gunship takes fire as it reports around 100 PLAN fighters in the area. A radio signal is sent out to the nearest units capable of responding. 61 Mech responds immediately and the force from 10 Armoured Car Squadron based at Xangongo is placed on standby. The Alouette gunships maintain their presence until 61 Mech arrives. As 61 Mech arrives on the scene, Lt Dewald Weideman gets out of his Ratel 90 to assess the situation and detonates an anti-personnel mine. The area is cleared by combat engineers, and the bodies are recovered. KIA are three SAAF air crew and 12 paratroopers, some of which had been mutilated by the PLAN fighters.

The T34/85 tank loaded on a transporter behind 23B. Sitting left in the image are elements of 1 Para based at Xangongo. (Photo credit: Cpl Eric Prinsloo).

10 August 1982 – Once the area is secure the Puma is recovered by 61 Mech. Another PLAN base is located 30km north of Cuvelai. Members of 32 Bn and 1 Para are trooped in at 11h00, and a heavy firefight ensues, resulting in 116 PLAN KIA, with two captured and no further loss to the SADF forces. The 10 Armoured Car Squadron force located at Xangongo is stood down from its standby

role as a reserve force and departs for Ongiva with the recovered T34/85 tank on a lowbed. Once again, an unmarked Red Cross vehicle attaches itself to the rear of the convoy, and is almost shot out, this time by 23A, who has lost VHF radio contact with the rest of the convoy, and thus makes the decision not to fire on his own.

11 August 1982 – 61 Mech moves east of the Techamutete/Cuvelai road as Meebos begins to wind down. The 10 Armoured Car Squadron combat team departs Ongiva to escort the recovered T34/85 tank to Ondangwa.

15 August 1982 – A media announcement is made about Operation Meebos, breaking the silence that had prevailed until then. This announcement was necessary as it was impossible to justify the loss of life that occurred on 9 August when the Puma was shot down. Operation Meebos results in 345 KIA for PLAN, and 29 KIA for the SADF.

25 August 1982 – 61 Mech is released from its obligations as Operation Meebos ends. They return to Omuthiya by road from Ongiva to Santa Clara and then onto Ondangwa.

30 September 1982 – The squadron from 2 Light Horse Regiment ends its tour of operational duty at 10 Armoured Car Squadron.

The 2LHR personnel tasked by 10 Armoured Car Squadron to perform a reconnaissance patrol out of the 61 Mech base at Omuthiya towards Etosha Pan prior to the tank recovery mission as part of the overall deception strategy being implemented. (Photo Credit: Cpl Eric Pronsloo).

Discussion

The Light Horse Regimental Association has an interest in this story, because the Southern African Medal worn by so many of our veterans contains metal recovered from the T34/85 tank. Ironically, some members of the Light Horse Regiment team that were directly involved in the recovery, have never received the Southern African Medal to which they are entitled. This paper is presented with the hope that this travesty may be rectified by a thorough interrogation of the official records locked in the SANDF archives.

2LHR Troop 23 serving as part of 10 Armoured Car Squadron during the training phase at Oshivelo around 10 July 1982. Sitting left to right Tpr Willa Bouwer (23), Lt Gerard Back (23), Sgt David Gadd-Claxton (23A). Kneeling left to right Tpr Manny Barragero (23C), L Cpl Pottie Potgieter (23B), Tpr Riaan Lambert (23). Standing left to right Cpl Anthony Turton (23B), Cpl Eric Prinsloo (23C), Tpr Bossie Bosman (23A), Tpr Paul Roos (23B), L Cpl Andrew Brink (23A). (Photo credit: Cpl Eric Prinsloo).

The 2LHR personnel that were involved in the recovery of the T34/85 are as follows: Major Hylton Marks – Squadron Commander 20. His crew’s names are not known to the author. Lt Gerard Back – Troop Leader and Crew Commander 23 (Eland 60) (a veteran of Operation Protea). Sgt David Gadd-Claxton – Crew Commander 23A (Eland 90). Cpl Anthony Turton – Crew

Commander 23B (Eland 90). Cpl Eric Prinsloo – Crew Commander 23C (Eland 60). Cpl China (surname unknown) – Support Troop Section Leader. L/Cpl Andrew Brink – Driver 23A. L/Cpl Lennie Rogers – Gunner 23C (a veteran of operation Savanna). Tpr Bossie Boshoff – Gunner 23A. Tpr Paul Roos – Gunner 23B (a veteran of operation Savanna). Tpr Mannie Barragero – Driver 23C (a veteran of operation Savanna). Tpr Pottie Potgieter – Driver 23B (a veteran of Operation Protea). Tpr Riaan Lambert – Gunner 23 (a veteran of Operation Protea). Tpr Willa Bouwer – Driver 23. The names of the Support Troop section under the command of Cpl China are unknown to the author, but their photograph is shown elsewhere in this paper.

Conclusion

Operation Meebos was a complex endeavour, designed specifically to prevent FAPLA from retaking the towns of Xangongo and Ongiva, while simultaneously degrading PLAN capacity to infiltrate guerilla forces into the so-called Triangle of Death in what was then SWA. This was made more challenging by the rotation of national servicemen and ACF personnel in and out of theater, a factor that continued to play a role to the end of the Bush War. A distinct element of the operation was the capacity of the SADF to coordinate the actions of different combat units, to mislead, locate and destroy the enemy. Secrecy was upheld until the large loss of life occurred on 9 August 1982, at the objective known as Smelling Rat on the Mui River, after which it became necessary for the SADF to make a public statement. For this reason, many of the troops involved in different parts of the operation remain ignorant of the bigger picture. In the context of this paper, the important point is that Light Horse Regiment played a defined role, for which the historic records are incomplete. The T34/85 tank that was recovered from Ongiva, honoured the commitment made by General Constand Viljoen, when copper cables were recovered and smelted to create the Southern Africa Medal now worn proudly by many SADF veterans. It is hoped that this paper will fill in some of the missing pieces of the Light Horse Regimental history, and possibly trigger a review of members of the regiment who are eligible for, but have never been awarded, their Southern Africa Medal.

Under the Crossed Flags.

The terrain around Forte Roçadas on the Cunene River is ideally suited to the type of mobile warfare perfected by the SADF and aptly demonstrated during Operation Meebos. The bridge is the road to Cahama (see map) that FAPLA would have had to advance along in its planned recapture of Xangongo.

During the media release on 15 August 1982 this poster was distributed to manage morale after the losses incurred on 9 August along the Mui River in Angola. It stands in the author’s office as a constant reminder of their sacrifice.

ARMY SIGNALS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE STORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CORPS OF SIGNALS AND ITS ANTECEDENTS

Compiled and edited by Walter V. Volker INTRODUCTION

The process of collecting and capturing memories into a common theme is an arduous process, especially if justice is to be done to reflect the gravity of the subject matter. We all, in some form or other, are inadvertently involved in this pursuit as our memories are held in the yellow and faded photographs that we keep in the old cigar box, in the medals we so carefully store up, in the plaques that we engrave and display in some prominent and public square, in the Roll of Honour we keep updated, but also in such elusive forms as our own fading thoughts or in the stories we tell – which are savoured for the moment and soon partially, if not completely, forgotten. It is also often true of military events, that the most important events are never documented, or if they are, locked under the greatest levels of secrecy and inaccessibility. The true facts are, alas, seldom revealed. The voices, so clear and firm a short few years ago, slowly fade away, and are silent; the last remembrances of the dead are swallowed up forever. If not captured in some way, these memories will also disappear forever, like a flower in the field, and “it’s place will remember it no more…”

The reason for taking the recording of the collective memory of the South African Corps of Signals (SACS) – despite a very full work schedule – upon myself, is threefold; firstly, because it’s a story worth being told. The SACS has a heritage it can be proud of and it is one from which many lessons can be learnt, and in which many soldiers and other South Africans have served and are still serving with distinction and dedication. The achievements, with limited resources, are just as impressive. The second reason is more on a practical level. When Cliff Lord from New Zealand contacted me, a few years back requesting any information on the SACS to include in his overview of Commonwealth countries’ signals corps, I was embarrassed to say that we had very little to offer that was comprehensive and covered the important aspects of the achievements during its history. All that was available was the “Black Book” volume produced by the SADF Documentation Services

– which was mostly in Afrikaans and stopped at the end of the second World War. The third reason is on a personal level. I served as a signals officer during my national service and subsequent citizen force period and was associated with the SACS for almost a decade from 1981 onwards. During this time, I came to appreciate the people, the culture of dedication and loyalty, the expertise and the achievements of this part of the South African Army. My view was: if no one else was willing or able to put this together, then I should do it myself. Here I must immediately add, however, that my role was mainly that of researcher, recorder, compiler, translator and editor – there are only few sections of the book that I can claim as being fully my own authorship.

After deciding to take on this project, my starting point was then to develop a framework, one which would eventually serve as a table of contents. In this I was very ably assisted by Maj Gen Gerrit Murphy, who drafted the very first outline for me. Next was the process of identifying and locating already published works. Here the already published work by the SADF Documentation Services (No 4 in the so-called “Black Book” series) came in very handy. Next came a number of unithistories, which were more difficult to track down, and were often incomplete, incorrect or not up to date. The most important source of new information, though, came directly from the signallers themselves. This was the most productive and enjoyable part of this mammoth undertaking – speaking to people who had been involved themselves, many for their whole working careers – who were willing to give of their time, share their memories, their photos, documents and some even writing bits and pieces for me. Most I had the privilege of meeting in person, others only via the telephone or by email. All, however, with a few exceptions, were willing to assist.

This history is NOT an academic study, but is intended to be a popular, easy to read book despite its intimidating size – with the target audience being mainly current or ex-members of the SACS or broader military community or interest groups in South Africa. If I’m fortunate, the audience might even extend cross the oceans. I have limited my references to what would be useful in identifying and giving recognition to the source, without distracting with numerous notes and further references to “prove” a possible contentious point. I have also, wherever possible, inserted personal experiences and anecdotes relating to that aspect of the history. This will hopefully help to make it more “real”, interesting and provide a sense of reality, emotion and personal involvement – not just sharing a collection of dry facts. To quote Sir John Fortesque in this regard:

“Regimental History is not, if rightly understood, a mere catalogue of dry facts. It is, and should be, the record of past experience alike in failure or success, not only for the maintenance of regimental spirit for that alone is of enormous importance, but for the

guidance and instruction of both officers and men against the day when it will be their duty to uphold the honour of their regiment and their country upon the field of action”

The scope of the history includes the full spectrum of communications and electronic warfare (EW) in all their various aspects - static, mobile and tactical communications; local, national and regional; passive and active EW, and also from command-and-control telecommunications at the higher command levels, down to tactical radios at the lowest levels. Where relevant, management, strategy, information technology and broader technology issues are also addressed.

The focus is mainly on Army signals – however, within the context of the broader security forces communications role, both in South Africa and in the region of the African sub-continent. This is to give the reader a better perspective, as Army signals did never and could never operate in isolation. For an even broader context, broader developments within the Union Defence Force, South African Defence Forces, and its successor, the SA National Defence Force, are also frequently referred to, as are some of the crucial political, socio-economic and regional developments wherever they have relevance.

The main focus of this work is more on the post-WW II period, and in this respect, this book is probably unique. The history of signals up to that point has been recorded in various ways, in both English and Afrikaans; this is the first attempt to cover the whole spectrum up to the present day, in English – which will make it accessible to international readers as well.

It is important for readers to take note that this history is not an official or authorized history of the South African Corps of Signals. Any statements of fact or interpretation made are therefore purely those of the particular author, or where applicable, me. No attempt was made to ensure “political correctness” (as it changes from time to time), or to sanitise the contents in order to make it more acceptable to past or present interests. Wherever possible, sensitivity to the maintenance of security and protection of currently sensitive material or locations has been maintained. Some of the most recent material is just not available for disclosure, while for documents in the archives after the 1975 cut-off date, special declassification needed to be obtained. The main advantage of writing an unofficial account is that one is less fettered by numerous real or imagined risks of embarrassment or undue disclosure of what might be deemed to be sensitive in one way or another. Obviously, the contrary is also true – an officially authorized history could open other avenues, which might be accessible to a private effort such as mine was.

Terminology used during some parts of this account might, in the modern context, be regarded as inappropriate or politically incorrect. Especially the use of the word terrorist, instead of freedom fighter or guerilla, might be considered to be inappropriate to describe the efforts of SWAPO/PLAN, the ANC/ MK etc during the Border War period. This is a valid view; however, the history is written from a particular perspective (that of the SADF in this case), and in that sense will also reflect the paradigm of the day. To try to “sanitise” and strip it of this reality after the event, would be inappropriate. Other chapters have been written to reflect the efforts of the “other side”, although a similar level of access to material or people in these organisations was difficult to obtain.

This volume represents the first of a trilogy which jointly provides a comprehensive – although by no means exhaustive - overview of the history of the South African Corps of Signals and its precedents. The titles of the three volumes are:

1. ARMY SIGNALS IN SOUTH AFRICA. The Story of the South African Corps of Signals and its antecedents.

2. SIGNAL UNITS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CORPS OF SIGNALS AND RELATED SIGNAL SERVICES

3. 9C – NINE CHARLIE! ARMY SIGNALLERS IN THE FIELD. The Story of the Men and Women of the South African Corps of Signals, and their Equipment.

In terms of the contents of this first volume in the series, Parts I to XI are essentially a chronological history of army signals in South Africa from before the first Boer War up to the present day. This is followed by Part XII, which covers heraldic and ceremonial matters. The rest of the book is made up of further reference material and appendices.

Despite its length, major themes which, though important, were not covered at all in this history, included those of sports activities and achievements – purely because of space restrictions. Also in these undocumented fields of endeavour the SACS can boast of a proud track record.

My hope is that you, the reader, will find something of interest in this book – hopefully the whole spectrum that is covered, but if not, at least some aspects of the broad canvas that has been coloured in during the course of my endeavours.

Walter Volker, Pretoria, South Africa, 2010

SOUTH AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH WAR CASUALTIES BURIED ACROSS THE WORLD – PART SEVENTY-SEVEN.

Captain (SAN) Charles Ross (SA Navy Retired)

South Africans participated in almost every war theatre during the First and Second World Wars. According to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Casualty Data Base 7 290 (includes 607 unknown) First World War casualties and 9 986 (includes 84 unknown) Second World War casualties are buried in 1 207 cemeteries. In contrast, 2 959 First World War and 2 005 Second World War casualties are commemorated on 48 memorials. This does not include the more than 2 700 South Africans who were not recently commemorated by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. A new memorial to commemorate these South Africans is being constructed in the Gardens in Cape Town and should be completed by November 2024.

• Caestre Military Cemetery – France

• Cambrai Memorial, Louverval - France

Caestre Military Cemetery was opened in mid-April 1918 by the Australian Corps and troops of the 9th (Scottish) Division. It was used until September 1918 for the burials of casualties sustained during the German offensive. The cemetery now contains 190 Commonwealth burials of the First World War and five German war graves. The cemetery was designed by W H Cowlishaw.

Eight South African casualties of World War

One are buried in this cemetery.

The CAMBRAI MEMORIAL commemorates more than 7,000 servicemen of the United Kingdom and South Africa who died in the Battle of Cambrai in November and December 1917 and whose graves are not known.

Sir Douglas Haig described the object of the Cambrai operations as the gaining of a 'local success by a sudden attack at a point where the enemy did not expect it' and to some extent they succeeded. The proposed method of assault was new, with no preliminary artillery bombardment. Instead, tanks would be used to break through the German wire, with the infantry following under the cover of smoke barrages.

The attack began early in the morning of 20 November 1917 and initial advances were remarkable. However, by 22 November, a halt was called for rest and reorganisation, allowing the Germans to reinforce. From 23 to 28 November, the fighting was concentrated almost entirely around Bourlon Wood and by 29 November, it was clear that the Germans were ready for a major counter attack. During the fierce fighting of the next five days, much of the ground gained in the initial days of the attack was lost.

For the Allies, the results of the battle were ultimately disappointing but valuable lessons were learnt about new strategies and tactical approaches to fighting. The Germans had also discovered that their fixed lines of defence, no matter how well prepared, were vulnerable.

The Cambrai Memorial was designed by Harold Chalton Bradshaw with sculpture by Charles S. Jagger. It was unveiled by Lieut-General Sir Louis Vaughan on 4 August 1930.

The memorial stands on a terrace at one end of LOUVERVAL MILITARY CEMETERY. The chateau at Louverval, was taken by the 56th Australian Infantry Battalion at dawn on 2 April 1917. The hamlet stayed in Allied hands until the 51st (Highland) Division was driven from it on 21 March 1918 during the great German advance, and it was retaken in the following September.

Parts of Rows B and C of the cemetery were made between April and December 1917 and in 1927, graves were brought in from Louverval Chateau Cemetery, which had been begun by German troops in March 1918 and used by Commonwealth forces in September and October 1918.

The cemetery now contains 124 First World War burials.

Five South African casualties of World War One are buried in this cemetery.

• Canadian Cemetery No.2, Neuville-St. Vaast – France

The cemetery was established by the Canadian Corps after the successful storming of Vimy Ridge on 9th April, 1917 and some of those buried in the cemetery fell in that battle or died of wounds received there, though the majority of the graves were made later for the burial of the dead recovered from surrounding battlefields and from isolated graves which were transferred into the cemetery over a period of years after the Armistice.

The cemetery covers an area of 10,869 square metres and is enclosed by low walls of coursed stone.

There are nearly 3,000, 1914-18 war casualties commemorated in this site. 29 Canadian soldiers buried at the time in the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade Cemetery, Givenchy-en Gohelle and the Canadian cemetery near Gunner's Crater, Givenchy-en-Gohelle but whose graves are now lost are commemorated by special

memorial headstones, inscribed to this effect with the additional quotation, "Their Glory shall not be blotted out".

Two unknown South African casualties of World War One are buried in this cemetery.

• Caudry British Cemetery – France

Caudry town was the scene of part of the Battle of Le Cateau on the 26th August 1914, and from that date it remained in German hands until the 10th October 1918, when it was captured by the 37th Division. It had been a German centre for medical units, and during October 1918 and the following five months the 21st, 3rd, 19th and 49th Casualty Clearing Stations passed through it. The British Cemetery (originally called the German Cemetery Extension) was begun in October 1918 by the New Zealand Division and carried on by the Casualty Clearing Stations.

It was completed after the Armistice by the concentration of graves from the German Cemetery and from the following cemetery:- AUDENCOURT BRITISH CEMETERY, which lay between the villages of Audencourt and Beaumont, in the middle of fields. It was made by the Germans after the Battle of Le Cateau, and Plot 1 contained the graves of 66 soldiers from the United Kingdom (mainly of the 2nd Royal Scots and the 1st Gordons) who fell in that battle. Plot II was made in the middle of October 1918 when the place was captured and contained the graves of 18 soldiers from the United Kingdom and four Germans. The bodies of two French soldiers and one Italian were removed to other burial grounds after the war.

There are now over 700, 1914-18 war casualties commemorated in this site. Of these, over 50 are unidentified and special memorials are erected to four soldiers and one airman from the United Kingdom known to be buried among them. Another special memorial records the name of a soldier from the United Kingdom, buried in FONTAINE-AU-PIRE Communal Cemetery, whose grave could not be found. The cemetery covers an area of 2,770 square metres and is enclosed partly by a rubble wall.

Three South African casualties of World War One are buried in this cemetery.

• Chocques Military Cemetery – France

Chocques was occupied by Commonwealth forces from the late autumn of 1914 to the end of the war. The village was at one time the headquarters of I Corps and from January 1915 to April 1918, No.1 Casualty Clearing Station was posted there. Most of the burials from this period are of casualties who died at the clearing station from wounds received at the Bethune front. From April to September 1918, during the German advance on this front, the burials were carried out by field ambulances, divisions and fighting units.

The groups of graves of a single Royal Artillery brigade in Plot II, Row A, and of the 2nd Seaforth’s in II D, and III A, are significant of the casualties of the 4th Division at that time. The big collective grave in VI A contains the remains of 29 soldiers of the 4th King's Liverpool Regiment killed in a troop train in April 1918. The stone memorial in IA is placed behind the graves of eight men of the 3rd Squadron, RFC, killed in a bomb explosion on the aerodrome at Merville in March 1915. After the Armistice it was found necessary to concentrate into this Cemetery (Plots II, III, IV and VI) a large number of isolated graves plus some small graveyards from the country between Chocques and Bethune.

Chocques Military Cemetery now contains 1,801 Commonwealth burials of the First World War, 134 of them unidentified. There are also 82 German war graves, 47 being unidentified.

The cemetery was designed by Sir Edwin Lutyens.

Four South African casualties of World War One are buried in this cemetery.

SOUTHWEST AFRICA|NAMIBIA: WOLF I AND WOLF II SERIES: MINE PROTECTED VEHICLES (MPV): SWAPOL COIN

Compiled by Wolfgang Witschas

Introduction

The Wolf Mine Protected Vehicle (MPV), was developed for use by the SWA Police Counterinsurgency Unit (COIN) as a successor to the South African Casspir. There was also a need for a faster, more agile variant of the Casspir. The Wolf series which is based on the South African Casspir design is a testament to the company's capabilities in producing specialized vehicles for various applications. Its mine-protected design makes it an ideal solution for operations in

challenging environments. The Wolf Mine Protected Vehicle (MPV) is a notable product of Windhoeker Maschinenfabrik (WMF) Pty Ltd of then SWA/Namibia a renowned engineering company in SWA/Namibia with a rich history dating back to 1939, WMF has since its inception specialised in heavy engineering, steel fabrication and automotive engineering. The Wolf was designed and manufactured by Hannes Kögl*, son of the then then owner, Hertha Bertha Kögl.

WMF designed and manufactured its first MPV in 1977. Since then, WMF continually developed capabilities of excellence in this challenging engineering field. Some of these developments were undertaken in close collaboration with internationally recognised experts, whilst others were concluded through the company’s own research, development and testing programmes.

Development of the Wolf Series

The extensive operational experience gained in the operational area of SWA/N with the SAP Casspirs by Koevoet or "Ops K" since 1980 has been incorporated in the Wolf's design with specific regard for the harsh terrain and the demanding operational conditions. The design had been tailored to suit the particular needs of the SWA Police COIN Unit in respect of anti-mine protection and armour protection for the crew and passengers.

The Wolf series vehicles are highly capable and versatile, exceling in cross-country operations on various terrain types, including hard surfaces and sandy regions, making them ideal for operations in South West Africa (SWA)/Northern regions. Their powertrain provides:

• Exceptional mobility at high speeds

• Ample power reserve to handle challenging terrain like sand and heavy bush

• Phenomenal range, enabling fast and long-range follow-up operations

• Elimination of the need for a tanker/bowser

Maintenance has been simplified, and the design allows for rapid component replacement after a mine detonation, with the ability to replace a complete axle unit in as little as two hours in the field.

1983 during the ongoing border war saw the introduction of the Wolf. The vehicle became known as Wolf Mk l and the prototype was nicknamed "Tie-Rod" which took only six weeks to build and delivered to Koevoet. It was fitted with a MAN 240 HP engine.

The Wolf l was not a successful fighting vehicle. There was something wrong with the balance and it was underpowered. Koevoet asked for changes and an engineer came from Germany to assist. Eventually all its original teething problems were sorted out on the production line of WMF in Windhoek. The upgraded version of the original Wolf l was named Wolf ll. The Wolf ll was completed within three months in 1983 and production commenced in 1984.

The Wolf ll received a much more powerful Diesel turbo intercooler engine, the MAN 365 HP. The bonnet was modified to accommodate a bigger radiator and intercooler. The Wolf ll was named Wolf ll Turbo and now was a very powerful MPV - even more powerful than the Casspir - and it could bundu bash as an equal with the SADF Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) despite that being a 6 X 6 and the Wolf ll a 4 X 4.

When the SWA/N interim government was established in 1986 there was an increase accent on products made in the country. This resulted in an emphasis on the Wolf ll and in all 136 were built and supplied to Koevoet.

Of particular note is that fact that all WMF vehicles are built on standard, commercially available MAN (Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG) (German) automotive components. This ensures not only vehicle reliability, but also cost-effective world-wide logistic support through the existing MAN dealer network.

Wolf l

Wolf ll

Design

There aren't manyplans or detailed drawings available for the Wolf IITurbos, but a 3D reconstruction was created by Sigmund Hentze using ZBrush and 4R8, which gives a good impression of the vehicle's design. Based on this reconstruction, it seems that the Wolf II Turbos share some similarities with the Casspir, but with some key differences:

• Shorter chassis: The Wolf II Turbos have a shorter chassis compared to the Casspir.

• Rear compartment windows: The Wolf II Turbos have slanted forward rear compartment windows, whereas the Casspir's windows are straight framed.

These differences give the Wolf II Turbos a distinct appearance compared to the Casspir. It's interesting to note that the 3D reconstruction was able to capture these details and provide a good understanding of the vehicle's design.

Specifications:

Crew: 1 driver & 10 troops

Engine:

Wolf ll Turbo

Transmission:

16 speed with splitter; permanent 4 X 4 drive; selective transfer case lock; differential lock on rear axle, high and low range

Suspension: Leave springs; hollow-spring shock absorbers

Weight: 14,2 Tonnes fully equipped

Wheels: 16.00 - 20 18 ply tyres

Fuel: 610 litres

Water: 200 litres

Performance:

Road speed: 120 km/h

Cruising speed: 90 km/h

Off Road speed: 90 km/h

Road range: 2000 km

Off-road-range: 1600km

Gradient: 27° Side Slope

Armaments:

1 X Twin mounted 7,62 mm MG4s on a co-axial pintle mount behind the driver and co-driver position with protection shield or

1 X 12.7×99 mm (.50 Browning) machine gun on a co-axial pintle mount behind the driver and codriver position - or in combination with a 7,62 mm MG4, with protection shield or

2 X 12.7×99 mm (.50 Browning) machine gun on a co-axial pintle mount behind the driver and codriver position with protection shield

1 X 20 mm Hispano cannon on a co-axial pintle mount behind the driver and co-driver position with protection shield

Wolf ll Turbo

After Independence of Namibia: 21 March 1990

After Namibia gained independence from South Africa in 1990, the Windhoeker Maschinenfabrik (WMF) was nationalized by the Namibian government and became a state corporation. This process was completed by 1998, and the company became a subsidiary of the Namibian Defence Force, with (ret.) Major General Ben Kadhila as its director.

As the main supplier for the Namibian army, WMF was responsible for producing and maintaining various military vehicles, including:

1. Wolf I

2. Wolf II

3. Wolf Turbo II (14 tons)

4. WerWolf Mk I (10 tons)

5. WerWolf Mk II (17 tons)

6. WerWolf Mk III

7. Wolf 6x6 recovery vehicle

8. WerWolf Mk II 6x6 recovery vehicle

These vehicles were likely used for various military purposes, such as transportation, logistics, and recovery operations. The nationalization of WMF and its subsequent management by the Namibian Defence Force ensured that the country had a reliable source of military vehicles and expertise, contributing to its national security and defence capabilities.

* Note by Compiler

Compiler had met the designer and manufacturer of the Wolf family of MPVs, Hannes Kögl, when both were still at school in Windhoek during 1971. I knew that his grandfather and his mother owned the company Windhoeker Maschinenfabriek (WMF). At the end of 1974 our paths parted until February 1976 when we both were South African Police (SAP) Student Constables at the Police Station in Windhoek. In July that year we spend six months at the SAP College, Platoon 75 of 1976, K Company. Our paths again parted in 1977. During the 1980s it became knowledge that Hannes Kögl was busy at WMF with designing and building Mine Resistant Vehicles for the SWA Police (SWAPOL) & SWA Territorial Force (SWATF). He passed away in 2023 after his retirement living in Swakopmund Namibia.

Hannes Kögl Platoon 75 of 1976 K Company

"This article is dedicated to Hannes Kögl for his contribution to build the perfect Mine Resistant Vehicle (MPAV) The Wolf ll Turbo"

Comments by Compiler:

There is currently no information available about the performance and operational deployment of the Wolf II Turbos, especially after Namibia's independence. The fact that WMF introduced the Werewolf family of MPVs in 1995, around the time the company was acquired by the Namibian government, might have contributed to the lack of publicly available information.

The Wolf II Turbos were manufactured from 1984 to 1995 and were exclusively used by SWAPOL COIN during that time. However, specific details about their performance, deployment, and operational history might be scarce due to various reasons, such as:

1. Classification: Military information is often classified, making it difficult to access. 2. Limited documentation: Records from the time might be incomplete, lost, or not publicly available.

3. Changing priorities: After Namibia's independence, the focus shifted to new projects and initiatives, potentially leaving older systems like the Wolf II Turbos with limited documentation. References:

Google:/https://www.armyvehicles.dk/wolf.htm

Google:/https://tank-afv.com/coldwar/South_Africa_tanks.php

Books:

South African Arms & Armour: A concise guide to armaments of the South African Army, Navy and Air Force Helmoed -Römer Heitman; Pages: 64 to 65

The Covert War: Koevoet Operations Namibia 1979 – 1989

Peter Stiff Galago Books: 2004; Page: 190

Photos: Book: Koevoet Jim Hooper

Google:/https://www.zbrushcentral.com/t/south-african-police-mine-protected-vehicle-wolf-turboii/206923

Twin 12.7×99 mm (.50 Browning) machine gun

SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES: RHODESIAN BUSH WAR (with extracts from Operation Lighthouse, van Tonder & Wall, self-published, Derby, 2020)

Gerhard van Tonder (UK)

The so-called Pfumo reVanhu arose out of the internal political settlement of 3 March 1978. Also known as Umkonto wa Bantu in Matabeleland, this auxiliary ‘army’ was, on face value, made up of former insurgents who had surrendered under a general amnesty initiated by the interim government.

However, as Operation Favour, a programme that enjoyed part-funding from certain Arab states, gained momentum, it was soon evident that most of this new force Security Force Auxiliaries (SFA) was made up of raw recruits.

In February 1978, Special Branch endorsed the concept of surrendered insurgent cadres being employed to “seek out and destroy ZPRA terrorist groups and those ZANLA groups who have not responded to the surrender call”.

ZIPRA guerrillas after the 1979 ceasefire.

However, Special Branch cautioned there was a possibility that this “could become the nucleus of private armies to either [Ndabaningi] Sithole or [Abel] Muzorewa”. Groups could also “degenerate into bandit gangs whose activities became purely criminal”. The prime function of the interim Muzorewa government was “to bring about a ceasefire without prejudice to the security of the State”.

In a propaganda exercise, local Rhodesian media proclaimed the success of Op Favour.

By the mid-1970s, Internal Affairs rural district administrative centres became more and more reliant on some form of armed protection. The need for such protected sub-offices (PSOs) for administration and security purposes was met in the eastern half of the country by the presence of protected villages (PVs), but in Matabeleland, where the movement of people was far less restrictive, strategically situated garrisoned PSOs were the norm.

Chiefs and headmen were moved closer to these PSOs, some by compulsory evacuation and others voluntarily. Only Chief Mabhikwa in Lupane and Chief Menyezwa in Nkai remained near their traditional homes, but both were provided with government-sanctioned auxiliaries and tribal militiamen for protection.

District Commissioners in these areas had to increasingly rely on paramilitary forces, initially their own District Security Assistants (DSAs), and then towards the end of the conflict, auxiliary forces. However, northern Matabeleland would see two distinctly different types of auxiliaries. Within the traditional Ndebele-speaking districts such as Nkai, Lupane and Shangani, auxiliaries were recruited from within their respective communities. They displayed no obvious political loyalties.

On the eastern fringes of the province, bordering Gokwe, the auxiliaries were the SFA of Bishop Muzorewa, deployed during the build up to the internal settlement elections in April 1979. Most regarded them as the armed wing of Muzorewa’s party, the UANC, with the sole mission of ensuring that the bishop would win the election.

ZAPU president Joshua Nkomo inspects his ZIPRA cadres.

This ‘private army’ was almost totally made up of Shona-speaking individuals, an intentional strategy to try to negate the strong ZIPRA influence in the area. They were ill-disciplined and very often violent, dubbed dzagudzagu by the amaNdebele tribespeople, a Shona word meaning ‘without direction’.

Several ZANLA guerrillas of the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole ZANU faction, who had been trained in Uganda and Libya, joined the SFAs as they found themselves in a position that was dangerous for them. They were thus used as the basis of a new unit within the Rhodesian army, under the command of HQ Special Forces, but funded by the Prime Minister’s Office and administered by the BSAP Special Branch. The opportunity was used to recruit and train more men from the civilian sector, and all were then deployed as soldiers in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) as an effective means to protect their own homes.

In 1979, the units started being funded by the Ministry of Defence, and towards the end of the bush war, auxiliaries protecting PVs came under the control of District Commissioners. By this time, the numbers in the SFAs had risen sharply to close on 20,000, with the majority showing allegiance to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia prime minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

Heavily armed ZANLA guerrillas on the move.

Nick Baalbergen, seconded from Intaf as a platoon commander with the SFA, gives an indepth run-down of the formation and structure of the SFAs, from its origins as a concept with which to bolster rural militia-based security:

The ‘Pfumo reVanhu’ officially had its origins in 1978, but going back even further to 1973, when both the police Special Branch and Intaf had considered the idea of a locally recruited, village-based militia, which would ultimately be responsible for their own security. The District Commissioner Sipolilo, at that time, had gone so far as to draft details of the proposed militia in a paper on the subject. He had also established a small pilot unit, which unfortunately did not succeed.

Early in 1978, the police Special Branch again revived the idea of a villagebased militia, with a pilot scheme being introduced into the Msana TTL, Bindura district. The small contingent first introduced into Msana was comprised of former insurgents and former members of various Rhodesian military and para-military units. All were originally from the Msana area. They were under the leadership of one Comrade Max, widely believed at the time to be a former insurgent he was in fact a former Selous Scout.

This initial core contingent quickly recruited and armed additional members from the local Msana community. By March 1978, they had doubled their initial

numbers and were given the responsibility for the security of the Msana TTL. The original concept, having been proven by the success of the pilot scheme, was now being considered for other tribal areas through the country.

These theoretically apolitical new units were named the ‘Interim Government Forces’, a short-lived phase, as political affiliations dominated tribal life. A couple of months later, in June 1978, the Interim Government Forces was renamed the ‘Security Force Auxiliaries’ (SFA), reflecting the reality of many individual units with divergent political affiliations.

Concurrently, the network of protected villages was being dismantled as the tribal population returned to live in their original kraal locations. The Security Force Auxiliaries were made responsible for the security function at local level.

The ‘Security Force Auxiliaries’ then transitioned into the ‘Pfumo reVanhu’ in early 1979.

The composition and recruitment of the Pfumo reVanhu was largely along political lines, individual units being reflective of their political affiliations. The major internal political parties all claimed to have their own politically aligned components within the Pfumo reVanhu.

By 1978, the Rhodesian government saw the value of the unit, which up until this time had deployed in their typical half-civilian, half-uniform gear, and had kept their old Soviet-bloc weapons.

One of the first priorities while deployed, was to see that the April 1979 elections went well. The SFAs had an influence on the outcome of the elections and Muzorewa’s United African National Council (UANC) gained many seats. However, there were claims of irregularities and the war did not appear to be coming to a close, despite the results of the elections in which everybody in the country had participated. The Robert Mugabe faction of ZANLA and Joshua Nkomo’s ZIPRA continued their own war against the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government.

SFAs, armed with G3 rifles, on parade

In August, the SFA Rear HQ was situated at the Imperial Tobacco Company at Msasa for a rear headquarters, and at the same time the AQ staff, MT and the ordnance depot moved to the new site, leaving only the command, operational and liaison staffs at KGVI Barracks.

A central training school was set up at Domboshawa on the north-eastern outskirts of Salisbury to give formal training to all members. Instructors were detached from various arms of service to ensure a high standard of training, drawn from the army, BSAP, Guard Force, air force and Intaf.

Discipline was high on the list of priorities. Standard infantry training was given, and recruitment was aimed at the 18–45 age group. Very few people were found unacceptable for training, although the older recruits sometimes struggled to keep up.

Seventeen different types of courses were run, including Senior Staff Orientation, Liaison Officers, Detachment and Unit Leaders, Junior Leaders, Area Administrators, Trackers, Basic Recruits, Re-training of Detachments, Envoys, Advanced Envoys, Drill and Weapons Instructors, Radio Operators, Basic Administration, Q Accounting, Troop Medical Orderly, Drivers and Intelligence.

The SFAs worked very closely with Intaf and plans were made to put them under command of that ministry. However, the logistics and admin were just too big and, by and large, the SFAs remained with the army.

The creation of the unit was difficult to accept by the European community, who were extremely suspicious of the integrity of the soldiers. However, they were eventually accepted once the units were deployed in their respective areas where they proved that they could do the job on the ground. This fear was eventually allayed when the units achieved successes in the field.

In fact, there is information which indicates that the enemy were also extremely worried that Pfumo reVanhu was being used as a mouthpiece of the government to spread the word of peaceful one-man one-vote elections. A booklet was issued to many soldiers of Pfumo reVanhu, which laid out the message to be given to the people in order to standardise the efforts to gain peace.

Pfumo reVanhu deployed against ZANLA, and were often involved in skirmishes that led to casualties on both sides. ZANLA realised that Pfumo reVanhu was a real threat, so went out of their way to try and neutralise the threat by attacking Pfumo reVanhu soldiers whenever they could.

From June to December of 1979, several successful engagements with the enemy had taken place and 66 guerrillas were killed and another 93 captured. SFA losses for this time period were 98 killed in action or vehicle accidents, a further 100 were wounded or injured.

L–R: Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole, Joshua Nkomo.

District Commissioner Peter Williams developed a very close and satisfactory working relationship with a formation of SFAs deployed to Mount Darwin. These individuals were largely made up of those who had taken advantage of the amnesty that Operation Favour offered, and therefore of mixed political persuasion and loyalties. He describes this experience:

Operation Favour, which I have previously referred to, commenced in my district, and Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs), as they had been named, were deployed under their detachment commander Cornatious Mashave into the Chesa African Purchase Area, setting up a base in the keep of an old PV on the road between my PSO at Nyamahoboko and Rushinga.

They included former terrorists, together with supporters of Muzorewa’s UANC party, and had been trained by personnel seconded from the army, and had been armed with eastern European-bloc weapons. Mashave told me he hoped to reestablish some of the services formerly provided by the Chesa Council, such as clinics and cattle dipping. He also wanted to increase the size of his forces by recruiting locally. He claimed he, and many of his men, were former members of ZANU forces.

JOC Hurricane intended to follow this deployment with one in the Chiswiti TTL. Should the activities of the SFA be successful, and should the re-establishment of councils be achieved, it would be a feather in the cap for the interim government, while also releasing Intaf from some of its security responsibilities.

The training of SFA by the army and my training wing continued at Karanda, northeast of Mount Darwin itself, and I or a DO gave lectures on civil administration and local government. Upon completion of training, the members were deployed to the groups located in Chesa, and in Chiswiti at Kaitano and Mukumbura, the latter right on the Mozambique border.

Following the success of the UANC in the national elections, more of their followers joined the SFA ranks. They were keen to learn, but found it difficult to understand the concept of council taxes and the need to pay for services. They had been told by their political leaders these would all be free.

It was in Chiswiti where some success was being achieved in the improvement of schools and clinics, with material that I was able to provide, and with finding staff to run these services for which I arranged payment and materials.

The army drew up scales of pay for members of the SFA and became responsible for their payment. They were issued with a brown uniform [nutria brown] which, I think, was the familiar South African Defence Force fatigues and combat dress. Their weapons, originally of Eastern-bloc origin, were replaced with Western or NATO weapons, mainly G3 7.62mm rifles.

Mt Darwin DC Peter Williams, holding bespoke FN, and Bishop Muzorewa (wearing dog collar) arrive at a protected village.

I attended meetings in Salisbury, one addressed by Prime Minister Muzorewa on our future and the amnesty, and others at Head Office and at JOC Hurricane, regarding the training of SFA and their deployment into PVs as the protection force in place of Guard Force. Whilst the SFA nationally would remain under command of the army, those trained by Intaf at Karanda and deployed into PVs would fall under my command, although the army would be their paymaster. This would require careful management.

Intaf had built the PVs and trained a force of DSAs for their protection. Guard Force was then formed to take over. However, the DSAs recruited by Intaf and personnel recruited by Guard Force were apolitical, whereas those being recruited into the ranks of the SFA were UANC supporters, including turned terrorists. I foresaw disciplinary problems.

I had previously met Felix Karikodzi, the area commander of the SFA in the northeast. He was a competent person, well orientated and one with whom I formed a good relationship. He was a former terrorist whose history I did not enquire into. He was assisted in Mount Darwin by Kloppers, a detachment commander.

Together, we set up a procedure whereby sections of twenty SFAs, each with its own commander, would, upon completion of training at Karanda, be deployed to the PVs to take over from Guard Force. At the same time, I would deploy five DSAs under an NCO, who would be in overall command, into these PVs with the SFAs, to man the office and radio communications. I then toured the district with Felix, as I

Guerrillas loyal to Bishop Muzorewa seek reassurance for their safety.

affectionately remember him, where we informed the DSAs and SFAs of their new role.

At Army Headquarters, however, major issues with certain elements of the SFA came to a head in July 1979. These were returned guerrillas still in the operational areas and not any of the largely volunteer SFA members under Intaf’s wing. Combined Operations (Comops) launched Operation Exhibit to address the increasingly volatile situation, stressing the need for “reorientation and retraining” at the SFA Central Training School, Domboshawa. A clear command structure was deemed essential, so an emphasis was placed on senior staff orientation courses before companystrength deployments.

Attention was drawn to “a considerable degree of ill-discipline. . . approximately 80 members of the SFA, nearly all UANC [Muzorewa], are held pending criminal charges”. Incidents of misconduct included rape, murder, theft, indiscriminate discharge of weapons including at vehicles and plots to conduct urban terrorism in Salisbury.

Early on Friday, 20 July, ZANU (Sithole) party offices in Salisbury were raided by elements of Special Branch. There was a simultaneous launch of Operation Exhibit in the Hurricane, Thrasher, Repulse, Grapple and Salops operational areas by the respective JOCs. According to Comops statistics, of the 1,717 targeted dissident SFA members, 1,228 were detained, 274 sent for training, 184 killed and 31 unaccounted for.

In a memorandum to the National JOC on 14 August 1979, following criticism of the wisdom of the operation, the commander of Comops came out in defence of the Op Exhibit outcome. All JOCs had been “clamouring for action to be taken” because of the growing threat to security and law and order from certain elements within the SFA. Inter alia, the commander’s memo stated:

To my knowledge, no objections were raised by SF HQ at the time NATJOC made the decision, or during the planning and orders stage. In fact the distinct impression was gained that they were relieved to have the problem taken out of their hands.

COMOPS intention as to the future of the detained SFAs was that they should be locked up and the keys thrown away for the foreseeable future. Any implication that in following NATJOC’s decision, we acted in a fit of pique and on the spur of the moment locked these people up without worrying about the future is incorrect.

These people are a danger to the establishment and in the present security climate it would be folly to release them, the prison population figures notwithstanding. There may be a case, however, for consideration to be given to releasing some of those who are detained merely because they elected not to serve in the SFA and who have no record of criminal activity.

A protected village in the Operation Hurricane area.

SECOND WORLD WAR VEHICLES IN NAIROBI

Col David Reeve (Kenya Police Archive)

Hennie,

Not police, but military. These vehicles may be from South Africa – do you know anyone who could identify them please?

Thanks Regards

David

- Photos attached

• Lt-Kol William Marshall (SAW – afgetree) berig

Hennie

Foto's is baie klein en onduidelik:

No II Issue park - front row: Morris CS8 15 cwt utility 2nd row: Bedford QL 3ton 4 X 4 troop carrying truck

No 2 Tyre Section - Bedford QL 3ton 4 X 4 troop carrying truck

No 8 Convoy Park - Bedford QL 3ton 4 X 4 troop carrying truck

No 7 Staff car - Ford 21A Deluxe Sedan 4 door military model 1942.

Meeste foto's het maar 'n kombinasie van die bogenoemde voertuie in.

Hoop dit help

Groete

William

EIETYDSE POLISIEGESKIEDENIS | CONTEMPORARY POLICE HISTORY

MKHWANAZI’S TOUGH POLICING IN KZN

Phumlani M. Majozi | 02 August 2024

Phumlani Majozi on the SAPS commissioner's war against crime in the province Famed economist Thomas Sowell of the Hoover Institution once said, “If you are not prepared to use force to defend civilization, then be prepared to accept barbarism.” It is one of my favourite quotes by Sowell. It’s spot on. It's a quote that every South African leader should familiarize themself with.

South Africa is mired in a crisis of violent crime – the levels of violent crime that cannot be found in other emerging markets. During President Cyril Ramaphosa’s first term in office, homicide rates skyrocketed in South Africa – from 35 per 100,000 people when Ramaphosa took power in February 2018, to 45 per 100,000 people today. These statistics are evidence that Ramaphosa failed to drastically reduce violent crime in South Africa during his first term in the Union Buildings.

In Botswana, our neighbours, the homicide rate is 11 per 100 000 people. In Namibia it’s 13 per 100 000. In Kenya, it’s 5 per 100 000. In Egypt, it’s 1 per 100 000. In Mauritius, it’s 3 per 100 000. In China, it’s 0.5 per 100 000. In India, it’s 3 per 100 000. Stunningly different from South Africa, and these are all developing nations. The source of the data is Our World in Data.

In August last year, the then spokesperson of Action Society, Ian Cameron, said that more people were being murdered in South Africa than in war-torn Ukraine. Ian was correct.

In war-torn Ukraine, daily death is about 45 people. Contrast this to South Africa, where 86 people are murdered daily. What a dismissal, catastrophic failure by our leaders!

On Mkhwanazi’s policing style

The comments above lead me to my opinion on policing style of Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, the police commissioner of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). The man is hard at work hunting down criminals.

Mkhwanazi is now being chastised by some for his confrontation and shootings with violent criminals in KZN. In the past year, KZN has had a series of shootings between the police and criminals, leaving criminals dead.

The shootings prove that criminals choose war and are prepared to die for their cause. They shoot the police because they want to kill the police and get away with their criminal deeds. The view by some South Africans that the police should be soft on violent criminals who are trying to kill the police is absurd. The police men and women are also human beings, with spouses and families. Should they really prioritize the lives of criminals shooting at them? This view makes zero sense.

Part of the problem – and it's a problem in many democracies around the world – is the widespread thinking that criminals are people who lack the ability to make rational decisions. Untrue.

This thinking poses grave danger to communities. Criminals are also rational, make choices to achieve maximum payoffs. Being a criminal does not mean that you are mentally disabled. What it means is that you have chosen criminal activities. You had alternatives and then you opted for crime, because crime produces a higher payoff for you.

When criminals shoot at the police during an encounter, they are shooting to kill and it’s a choice they've made. In that circumstance it’s appropriate for the police to shoot back. Actions have consequences. South Africa's violent crime can only be reduced by strong law enforcement.

When President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador took power in June 2019, he inherited a country run by gangs. El Salvador was one of the dangerous countries in the world. In his words, commenting on Haiti’s violence and collapse of the state this year, Nayib said, “We saw similar images in El Salvador a few years ago. Gangs bathing with the skulls of their victims.”

There was no way Bukele was going to succeed in in the fight against violent criminals in El Salvador were he soft on criminals.

Bukele realised from the beginning that achieving safety in El Salvador would take a war against criminals. Last year, El Salvador’s homicide rate fell by 70%. What an achievement!

Mkhwanazi should be supported by every South African. Herman Mashaba, leader of Action SA, has commended Mkhwanazi. Hopefully the commendation will motivate Mkhwanazi to keep up the good work. Other provinces should copy Mkhwanazi’s strategy on policing.

What has been fascinating to watch is the positive public reaction to Mkhwanazi’s handling of violent criminals in KZN. Judging by what I see in the media, people want Mkhwanazi to continue with his policing style.

The positive reaction is not surprising. Millions of South Africans, including me, have been affected by crime. We have had traumatic experiences.

Fighting crime effectively will help restore South Africa's reputation that has been tarnished around the world. The safety of South Africans must come first.

What I find problematic with Mkhwanazi though, are his views on gun control laws. Mkhwanazi believes stricter gun control laws will curb crime in South Africa.

In my book Lessons from Past Heroes, I argue that more gun control laws are not needed in South Africa, and are no solution. We already do have stricter gun laws, the government just needs to be effective in enforcing them. There should be no goal to disarm law-abiding citizens – the goal must be to disarm criminals. Law-abiding citizens have the right, must have the right, to defend themselves.

The next commendation to Mkhwanazi should come from President Ramaphosa. It would be a good gesture, showing that his ‘government of national unity’ wants safety for South Africans and does not tolerate crime.

Phumlani M. Majozi is author of a new book “Lessons from Past Heroes” and a macroeconomist and political analyst. He’s the host of The Phumlani Majozi Show on YouTube. Subscribe to his show here: Phumlani M. Majozi - YouTube.

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COMMITTEE

POLICE

Malatswa Molepo | 05 August 2024

Chairperson says strong checks and balances provided for by IPID can allay concerns of extrajudicial killings

Police Committee chairperson addresses concerns about increased incidents of police shootings

2 August 2024

The Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Police, Mr Ian Cameron, has noted concerns about the rise in the number of people shot and killed by police recently, especially in KwaZulu-Natal.

“While we accept that the police are entitled to use reasonable force, as per section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, we are of the view that strong checks and balances provided for by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) can allay concerns of extrajudicial killings. It is on this basis that we argued strongly for an increase in the IPID budget when we considered the budget and will continue to advocate for more resources when the adjustment appropriation is considered,” Mr Cameron said

Despite this, the Chairperson highlighted that the police operate in a precarious and dangerous environment that often necessitates the use of force. In this context, police should be enabled to use reasonable force necessary in self-defence. The legislated checks and balances should be a counterbalance to the concerns raised by many.

The Chairperson also highlighted that protection of the police should also be central in the broader debate, especially in the context of increasing attacks on police officers. “As people raise concerns, they must also consider the greater threat to police officers that led to the death of Warrant Officer Sthembiso Mazibuko, Constable Donay Phillips, Constable Ashwin Pedro, Constable Okaetse Mandindi and Sergeant Kedimetse Masilo and 39 South African Police Members killed in the line of duty in the last financial year alone,” Mr Cameron emphasised.

Furthermore, Mr Cameron emphasised that some of the concerns can be averted by enhanced communication by both the South African Police Service and IPID. “Inadequate information feeds into the frenzy that SAPS is disproportionately using force. The SAPS and IPIDmust strive to provide substantial information, especially after investigations, to allay any public perception and to ensure accountability,” Mr Cameron said.

In addition, the adoption of technology such as body cameras for police will lead to greater accountability and will provide the necessary evidence of attacks on police.

Moreover, the Chairperson has called on the SAPS management to strengthen measures to curb the prevalence of illegal firearms in our communities because the removal of these firearms will lead to fewer violent crimes.

The Chairperson has urged the police to continue efforts to defeat the scourge of crime in our communities and to use reasonable force when circumstances require it. “Police officers must protect themselves when there is need; there should not be a question about that,” Mr Cameron said.

Issued by Malatswa Molepo, Media Officer, Parliament, 2 August 2024

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SAPS MEMBERS’ MENTAL HEALTH SHOULD BE PRIORITISED – COMMITTEE

Ian Cameron | 06 August 2024

The Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Police, Mr Ian Cameron, has learned with shock the sad news of the passing of South African Police Service (SAPS) Anti-Gang Unit Member Sergeant Raoul Murray, who took his own life last week. The tragic suicide highlights the need for enhanced employee health and wellness initiatives within the SAPS to assist officers to cope more effectively with the challenges in their operational environmental.

“It is tragic that a dedicated officer, at only 38 years of age, can take his own life, robbing his family of a loved one and the country of a respected law enforcement official. The South African Police Service must do more to enhance the broad psycho-social assistance to its members to reduce suicide in the SAPS,” Mr Cameron emphasised.

The death of Sergeant Murray comes directly after the Portfolio Committee on Police emphasised its concerns about the lack of adequate employee health and wellness interventions for SAPS members. The committee was briefed by the SAPS senior management that the entire SAPS structure has only 621 employed health and wellness employees, servicing about 187 278 personnel within SAPS.

“In the context of the high crime rate, especially violent crimes, SAPS members are faced with gruesome scenes that are bound to have a negative impact on their mental health. Resilience building and general support care should be a central pillar of the work of SAPS to ensure the mental wellbeing of officers expected to fight crime effectively,” Mr Cameron said.

SAPS management also informed the committee that 33 suicides occurred within the SAPS in the 2019/20 financial year, 30 in the 2020/21 financial year and 39 in the 2021/22 financial year. Furthermore, 38 homicide–suicide incidents occurred from 2019 to 2022.

The committee had emphasised during the 2024/25 budget process that the continued disregard of this important element has a direct impact on the morale and effectiveness of SAPS members and their ability to fight crime.

“In a country encountering high crime statistics, it is a moral requirement that foot soldiers are broadly capacitated to effectively deal with crime. Without the adequate psycho-social support, members will be exposed to unmitigated mental stress that could lead to suicide. This must be urgently addressed,” Mr Cameron said.

While the Chairperson acknowledged that the SAPS has partnerships with non-governmental organisations, faith-based organisations and health professionals linked to POLMED and GEMS medical aid schemes, the committee urged SAPS management to consider strengthening internal employee health and wellness programmes to ensure that the well-being of members is prioritised.

The committee has committed to championing the plight of SAPS members to ensure that proactive employee health and wellness interventions are implemented.

Issued by Malatswa Molepo, Parliamentary Communication Services, 6 August 2024

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Regan Thaw

Premier Alan Winde and Western Cape Minister of Police Oversight and Community Safety Anroux Marais have welcomed the swift action by South African Police Service (SAPS) members in an intelligence-driven operation in Khayelitsha that prevented a planned cash-in-transit robbery.

Premier Winde commended the SAPS, “I am very grateful no police officers or innocent members

of the public were harmed while conducting this operation. This is proof that when coordinated, intelligence, and evidence-based policing are implemented, violent crime can be prevented, and we can make inroads in our efforts to fight crime. However, I am deeply concerned about the calibre of weaponry the suspects were allegedly armed with. I shudder to think of the bloodshed that would have been caused had they been used in our communities. I implore the SAPS to prioritise its investigation to determine exactly where these weapons originated from.

We must work closer together and do everything possible to take all illegal weapons off our streets to make our communities safer.”

The Premier lauded SAPS members for making 5 arrests as well as seizing improvised explosive chargers, and 13 firearms, among them seven AK47s, and two R5 rifles.

“We must determine where they got their hands on these weapons,” Premier Winde reiterated.

He added, “Organised crime syndicates have been warned: your reign of terror over innocent, lawabiding residents must end.”

“I commend the police on a well-planned and executed operation in Khayelitsha. The arms and ammunition confiscated will no longer be used to terrorise our people. I trust that the suspects who were taken into custody will be able to provide further information which will assist detectives in their probe,” Minister Marais said.

She congratulated Western Cape SAPS Commissioner Lieutenant-General Thembisile Patekile and his team on this success.

Issued by Regan Thaw, Media Liaison Officer, Office of the Premier, 6 August 2024

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SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE: SPECIAL TASK FORCE: FIRST POLICEWOMAN

(Source – Post on Facebook by “Police Legends” – Colonel T (Aurry) Pillay and “Herald Live”) SAPS celebrates first policewoman's selection for Special Task Force

10 August 2024

HENDRIK HANCKE Senior reporter

Photograph 0

Colonel T (Aurry) Pillay and his wife Des

Photograph 02

A 32-year-old female cop has become the first woman to successfully complete the elite Special Task Force selection training programme. Her identity has been withheld for security reasons.

Image: Supplied

A 32-year-old woman has become the first female police officer to successfully complete the elite Special Task Force's selection training programme.

While her identity has been withheld for security reasons, the SAPS chose Women's Month to celebrate this tough-as-nails trailblazer.

“Today we introduce the nation to the first female police officer in the history of the organisation who successfully completed the elite Special Task Force selection training programme without any amendments made to suit females,” Lt-Col Amanda van Wyk said on Friday.

“Completing the intensive and rigorous 18-month-long training programme is no small feat as it is designed to test one's physical capabilities, endurance and mental strength.

“Many police officers would apply to join this elite unit with only a few that ultimately pass all the phases and complete the training programme.”

The female officer was one of only 11 members of a selected group of 36 group who were bestowed with task force parachute wings last year by national police commissioner Gen Fannie Masemola.

“As an operational [task force] operator, she is trained to a high level of skill in weapon proficiency, advanced paramilitary rural tactics, advanced tactical policing for high-risk incidents, hostage release tactics in a variety of high-risk incidents, as well as the ability to deploy operationally by parachute into rural environments,” Van Wyk said.

She said the candidate knew from a young age that she was destined to serve people and studied to become a personal trainer while playing rugby.

“Being both a fitness fanatic and an adrenaline junkie, her life naturally gravitated towards a career in law enforcement, and she joined the service in 2012. She admits that at first, she doubted she would be able to complete the [task force] training, but she says that she soon realised that where your mind takes you, your body will follow.

“The operator fondly refers to her colleagues as her 'brothers' and describes their bond as nothing short of camaraderie. She also encourages other women to be their authentic self and never doubt themselves.”

When not abseiling in to save lives, the operator spends her free time by staying fit, writing poetry and is studying towards a Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree in psychology.

“I always wake up with a smile on my face, even when I get woken up in the early hours of the morning to attend to a high-risk situation. My job excites me because the higher the risk, the higher the reward,” she said.

The Special Task Force, established in 1976, is the only paramilitary unit in the SAPS and falls under the specialised operations component, which is led by a female commander, Maj-Gen Nonhlanhla Zulu. Together with other units and components, they report to the organisation’s first female deputy national commissioner for policing, Lt-Gen Tebello Mosikili

The elite unit's mandate includes responding to and providing operational support in high-risk incidents including terrorism, hostage incidents and rescue missions.

TimesLIVE

(Source - South African Police Service Media)

The National Commissioner of the #SAPS, General Fannie Masemola praises SAPS Special Task Force operator following her interview on eNCAnews earlier today.

The member is the only female police officer to have successfully completed the #SpecialTaskForce training programme without any amendments to the training to suit females. She is also the only female police officer that is currently serving in the Special Task Force (STF) unit as an operational member.

The SAPS will continue to empower and recognise women within the organisation. The STF selection criteria is very stringent and those who are selected, must prove their mettle throughout their intensive and rigorous training.

The Special Task Force Unit was established in 1976. Its mandate includes responding and providing operational support only to high-risk incidents which include terrorism and hostage related incidents, rescue missions amongst a host of other high risk matters. #SpecialTaskForce #Taakies

#BestOfTheBest #WomenInPolicing #WomensMonth

“The Nation which forgets its defenders will itself be forgotten” – Calvin Coolidge

Let us acknowledge and honour those who served

NO JUSTICE FOR CRIME VICTIMS – MMUSI MAIMANE

Mmusi Maimane | 14 August 2024

BOSA leader says 165 000 criminal dockets closed and abandoned in Easter Cape since 2018

No justice for victims as 165 000 criminal dockets closed and abandoned in Eastern Cape since 2018

14 August 2024

Every day, criminals assault communities across South Africa, ignoring the law and no longerfearing law enforcement. Their actions leave innocent citizens terrorized and traumatized in their homes, streets, schools, and workplaces.

This boldness stems from the fact that our Police Service is so under-resourced, underfunded, and undertrained that there's little chance of criminals being apprehended.

As a result, communities have become crime hotspots and ganglands, drug dealers target young children outside their schools, and the country suffers from the highest rape statistics in the world and a murder rate that rivals countries at war. The people are not receiving the protection they need.

Here in Motherwell, gun violence is on the rise as criminals continue to terrorise communities.

Logan Govender

In April, the Chair of the Alex Matikinca Business Leadership, Mthetheli Jola, was murdered in an alleged hit here in Motherwell.

In May, a local SAPS Lieutenant Colonel and his wife were shot outside their home here in Motherwell.

In June, a young woman named Nelly Xeke was murdered on the night of her birthday here in Motherwell.

In July, a triple murder of the three Coka brothers happened here in Motherwell.

We are joined by members of this community who are victims of such heinous acts. It is time for justice for these victims and the countless others

Victims open cases yet nothing happens. The criminal justice system is losing the fight to apprehend, charge and jail offenders.

In the Eastern Cape alone, since the beginning of 2018, 164 919 dockets have been closed, in effect ending any investigation into those charges.

These include: Murder (8593); Attempted murder (3427); Assault GBH (10703); Aggravated robbery (18 499); Residential robbery (6124); Rape (8123); Sexual assault (504); Carjacking (5857); Nonresidential burglary (26 619); Residential burglary (74 923); and Kidnapping (485).

It is for this reason that citizens don’t trust the police and the criminal justice system. Three quarters of South Africans do not trust the police, according to the most recent data provided by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). As of 2021, just 27% of citizens stated they trusted the police, down from 47% two decades before.

To tackle this, a multi-faceted plan that combines long-term strategies with immediate interventions is required. The focus is on professionalizing the South African Police Service (SAPS), decentralizing law enforcement, and revitalizing the criminal justice system.

To rebuild trust through accountability, improved leadership, and the removal of corrupt members, the following must be implemented:

Expand SAPS capacity at the station level by recruiting and training 120,000 new officers.

Ensure adequate funding and resources for effective response and prevention actions – including doubling the budget of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to R10 billion.

Establish smaller regional and municipal police forces with a focus on community trust and collaboration.

Forge partnerships with private laboratories for forensic support and creating a national electronic forensic database.

Mandate the digitalization of all dockets for transparency and accessibility.

-Establish a National Criminal Investigation Directorate to pursue and prosecute the top 100 most violent criminals.

Our commitment is not just about numbers and statistics, it's about building a South Africa where every citizen feels safe and satisfied with the criminal justice system.

Issued by Roger Solomons, BOSA Acting Spokesperson, 14 August 2024

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CLOSURE OF OVER 5M DOCKETS SHOCKING – EFF

Leigh-Ann Mathys

Fighters say most disturbing is the revelation that 68.75% of dockets stolen from SAPS stations were open cases of rape and sexual assault

EFF condemns the closure of over 5 million dockets 13 August 2024

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are outraged by the shocking revelations that more than five million dockets have been closed without resolution since 2018, with 61,740 of these being rape cases. This appalling statistic is a glaring indictment of the systemic failures within the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the broader criminal justice system.

Most disturbing is the revelation that 68.75% of dockets stolen from SAPS stations were open cases of rape and sexual assault, all of them in Limpopo, further highlighting the profound ineffectiveness and corruption entrenched in our law enforcement agencies.

This is an outright betrayal of justice. Rape victims and survivors in South Africa are living in terror, afraid to report the violence they endure because they know the system is rigged against them. They already fear being dismissed, humiliated, or even targeted by the very authorities meant to protect

them, as so often happens when they report to the police. This systemic failure, where victims voices are silenced, serves only to embolden perpetrators and perpetuate the cycle of violence. By closing these rape cases, the government has unleashed the 61,740 potential rapists into our communities, creating an environment for them to become serial predators. This is not just negligence; it is the deliberate endangerment of lives. These rapists, unchecked and unpunished, roam our streets with the knowledge that they will not pay for their horrendous crimes. This lack of resolution in investigating rape cases, and the police's deliberate disappearance of cases, is not merely a reflection of poor policing but is emblematic of the violent patriarchal culture that continues to plague our society. Men, including those within the police force, cover for each other, protect perpetrators, and in many instances, are the perpetrators. The protection and harbouring of rapists by their families, religious institutions, political parties, the government, and employers remains alarming.

During the budget votes for the Ministry of Police, we highlighted that crime statistics have long shown us where crime hotspots are and the nature of how these crimes occur, it is simply a matter of our intelligence systems strategizing adequately and applying resources accordingly. In our debate, we strongly informed the Minister of Police that the current budget allocation for crime prevention is grossly inadequate, arguing that crime prevention must be prioritised as a central program within the department. By doing so, we would not only reduce crime rates but by default decrease the number of cases requiring investigation and prosecution.

It is only the EFF who will robustly provide oversight and hold the DA-ANC government accountable for enabling a policing and justice system that protects criminals.

Issued by Leigh-Ann Mathys, National Spokesperson, EFF, 13 August 2024

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/closure-of-over-5-million-dockets-shocking-eff?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=ec1766ceacEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_08_13_04_12&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-ec1766ceac%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D

DISMISSAL OF MZWANDILE TIYO FROM SAPS WELCOMED – IAN CAMERON

Ian Cameron | 13 August 2024

Chairperson says this is a major step in removing undesirable elements within police

Dismissal of Mzwandile Tiyo a major step in removing undesirable elements within SAPS 13 August 2024

The Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Police, Mr Ian Cameron, has welcomed the dismissal of the head of crime intelligence in the Western Cape, Mr Mzwandile Tiyo, from the South African Police Service (SAPS).

“The dismissal of Tiyo is tangible proof that misconduct of any form will not be accepted within the service. This is the first step in regaining credibility in the eyes of the community and will assure the people that SAPS will conduct their work ethically and within the code of conduct,” Mr Cameron said.

The dismissal follows a Section 34 inquiry to establish his fitness to hold office following allegations that he lost both a laptop and a firearm and used crime intelligence resources to find the people who had stolen them and assaulted them. “It is unacceptable that a law enforcement officer unilaterally abused state resources to hide their misdeeds. The fact that the state assets were stolen at a tavern point to sheer disregard for the office he holds,” Mr Cameron emphasised.

Mr Cameron called for the completion of the criminal investigation and prosecution to ensure that justice is served and that the rule of law reigns.

The portfolio committee is steadfast in its belief that one of the first pillars in repositioning the SAPS is the removal of rogue and unethical police officers who negatively impact on the credibility of the police. “This is a good start, and we hope many similar actions will be taken against other officers that operate outside of the code of conduct and the law,” Mr Cameron concluded. The Chairperson congratulates the Minister of Police for actual implementation of the promises he made when he delivered the 7th administration’s priorities.

Issued by Malatswa Molepo, Media Officer, Parliamentary Communication Services, 13 August 2024

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/dismissal-of-mzwandile-tiyo-from-saps-welcomed co?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=ec1766ceacEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_08_13_04_12&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-ec1766ceac%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D

MURDER FOR NOTHING

William Saunderson-Meyer | 16 August 2024

William Saunderson-Meyer writes on the SAPS' extraordinary inability to investigate the most serious of crimes

JAUNDICED EYE

SAPS: Time for a post-Cele change of strategy

For obvious reasons, murder is the most heinous of crimes. The deliberate taking of another’s life shrieks eternally for resolution.

Resolution, in turn, involves the State determining who was responsible and exacting punishment. Woe is the country where people can be killed with impunity. South Africa is such a country.

Over the past five years, the SA Police Service (SAPS) has closed meaning thrown in the investigatory towel on almost 77,000 murder dockets. Since there were approximately 115,000 murders in those five years, that means SAPS has simply given up on two-thirds of the murders committed between 2018 and 2023.

These dismal figures were this week provided by Police Minister Senzo Mchunu, in response to a parliamentary question by the Democratic Alliance. In all, 5.4 million case dockers were closed over the five-year period, including 40,000 attempted murders and 62,000 rapes.

In contrast, in most Western democracies, it is extremely rare for a murder case to be closed except by the identification of a suspect, their arrest, trial and conviction. Although a protracted and initially unsuccessful investigation may become inactive or a “cold case”, these are periodically reviewed with the view to identifying shortcomings in the original investigation and finding new paths, often using new technologies, to break the case.

In the United Kingdom, even when cases are closed, the police have a statutory obligation to review unsolved cases at regular intervals.

In South Africa, it’s a fact of life that only a small proportion of serious crimes are investigated and solved. Not only is SAPS absolutely terrible at crime prevention, but when crimes are committed, it’s equally hopeless at solving them. Solve rates for all crimes have dropped precipitously. In 2012, SAPS was able to solve 34% of the murder cases opened, but it has been falling steadily and by last year this was down to 12.4%.

Over the past five years, calculated at a 20% solve rate, that equates to around 23,000 solved cases out of the 115,000 murders that took place over that period. By closing as unsolvable a further 77,000 murders, that leaves only about 15,000 open cases still being worked on.

The iniquitous effect of SAPS’s manipulating its performance statistics can be seen when one extrapolates these “closed docket” rates of 66% to the bigger picture. Approximately 620,000 people were murdered in South Africa between 1994 and the beginning of 2024. (The comparative figure for the same period in the United States, which has a 5.5 times larger population, is 530,000 murders.)

From the parliamentary reply by the Minister, we now know that it’s possible that approximately 415,000 of those murders were simply closed as being unsolvable. No more investigation. No further attempt at achieving justice.

This is political smoke and mirrors. A high percentage of unsolved cases brings critical attention and criticism from the opposition parties. When using overly simplistic quantitative management methods, it’s tempting to just close dockets. Take two-thirds of them out of the equation and the statistics look deceptively better.

Gareth Newham, head of the Justice and Violence Prevention Programme at the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) says the ploy is part of a “serial crisis” in the top management of SAPS. “There’s a lack of clearly articulated objectives and strategies to achieve these.”

Tweaking the murder statistics is not only morally abhorrent to the victims and their families. Newham points out that murder which has increased by 77% in the past dozen years is the prime driver in the key statistics, a proxy for the incidence and distribution of all criminal violence. A mere 12% of SAPS precincts account for 50% of murders and under 3% of precincts account for 20% of murders.

“Using murder as the primary statistic, you can determine what drives killings and other violence in different parts of the country. In the Western Cape it is gang activity, in KwaZulu-Natal it is taxi disputes, illegal mining in Mpumalanga and Free State.”

“If SAPS focused, prioritised, measured, investigated properly, and improved accountability,” says Newham, “their performance could quickly be much improved.”

“Not every murder has a different murderer behind it. About 20% of criminals commit 80% of violence. If you go after that relatively small number of criminals involved in ongoing serious, violent activity, that’s how you reduce murder.

“This is a proven strategy against violent crime internationally and in South Africa. Over a two-year period, Gauteng police focused on fewer than 3,000 known criminals and eventually arrested about 1,000 of them. By doing this, they managed to reduce car hijackings by 32%, home invasions by 20%, and business robberies by 19%,” says Newham.

This is a far more successful strategy, Newham argues, than the high-visibility strategy in high-crime areas of random roadblocks, random searches, and random patrols. This approach delivers 700,000 arrests a year but “90% of those cases don’t go anywhere and, in any case, these are not the serious criminals.”

The other leg to any improvement in the clearance rate is more and better deployment of detecting resources. At present, according to serving police officers I’ve spoken to, much of their expertise is squandered because of the amount of time they are forced to spend on administrative rote work that could be more efficiently and cheaply done by clerical assistants.

The Detective Services personnel are underpaid and overworked. Low morale, fuelled in part by race barriers to promotion, has led to SAPS shedding a third of its detectives over the past half dozen years and now has only 17,000 left. In the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and the Northern Cape more than a fifth of the detectives’ vehicles are inoperable.

DA MP Lisa Schickerling told Newzroom Afrika that the closure of the dockets, although unacceptable, was understandable. Every detective has a case-load of between 300 and 400 cases at any moment, which makes it physically impossible to investigate properly.

She says that a case towards the bottom of the pile might require just a minor action by the investigating detective but because their caseload is growing on a daily basis this is not done. “More often than not, these cases are then closed without proper investigation,” Schickerling says.

As bad as the situation is now, it is set to get worse unless Mchunu sets a different strategic course from that of his useless predecessor, Bheki Cele. “As the system stands now, it is not functioning at all. It is not delivering public safety,” says Newham.

ISS hopes that the new minister will be open to adopting a different approach. “We have the resources, we have the know-how,” says Newham. “But it has to start at the highest management level of SAPS. You have to get the right people in there, give them the authority and the political backing to reform the police.”

It is admirable that ISS’s optimism remains undaunted, despite so many years of seeing its advice ignored. But as with so many other aspects of governance in this country, the momentarily changed circumstances brought about by the Government of National Unity an apparent willingness to let go of old ideological shibboleths, to implement internationalbest practice offers a rare opportunity. One can only hope that SAPS seizes it.

However, this being South Africa, while hoping for the best it’s wise to expect the worst.

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/murder-fornothing?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=f2a71283d2EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_08_18_06_56&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-f2a71283d2%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D

Thomas Walters | 16 August 2024

Thomas Walters says incidents such as these demonstrate need to rethink policing in province

The DA in the Western Cape is deeply troubled by reports of stolen ammunition and weaponry from the Faure Base in Eerste Rivier on Monday.

This theft, which saw items such as a gas launcher, multiple rounds of less-lethal ammunition and several stun grenades go missing, highlights a growing crisis of security within SAPS facilities and cannot simply be seen as an incident of theft.

Sadly, it represents a pattern of supposedly-securely stored weapons finding their way out of SAPS facilities and onto the street.

In January, 15 firearms were stolen from the SAP-13 evidence storage locker within Mitchells Plain SAPS.

That same month, DA parliamentary questions revealed that 1 725 officially-issued SAPS firearms have been stolen between April 2021 and July 2023 – an average of 61 every month.

What is simply unacceptable is the fact that one illegal firearm in the hands of a gang member may claim up to 12 lives on average - a scale of destruction of and within communities that can never ever be accepted as normal.

Incidents such as these demonstrate in clear terms the need to rethink policing in the Western Cape.

The Western Cape Government’s LEAP Officers, in collaboration with the SAPS, have confiscated hundreds of illegal firearms and made thousands of arrests in a landmark effort to reduce violence in some of the Western Cape’s most crime-afflicted communities. But no amount of policing can be successful without a revamp of SAPS’s dangerously outmoded and overly-centralised approach to policing.

While the Western Cape Government remains committed to working with all partners, including SAPS, to make our communities safer, the DA maintains its firm belief that the devolution of policing to capable sub-national governments remains the single most-impactful measure to curb violence. In addition to allowing wider implementation of the Western Cape’s proven methods of tech-enabled and data-led policing, this step would allow the long-awaited implementation of a provincial site for the destruction of illegal firearms.

DA Western Cape spokesperson on Community Safety Thomas Walters says: “It is absolutely unthinkable that the very organisation charged with public safety has had a hand in directly arming violent criminals. This most-recent incident highlights the dangerous lack of security at many SAPS facilities and must be taken as an urgent wake-up call. Efforts to curb violence within our communities can never be successful when our own national police service remains a prominent source of unlawful firearms. The DA calls for a full and urgent investigation into this week’s theft at the Faure Base and will address parliamentary questions on the matter to the Western Cape management of the SAPS.”

Issued by Thomas Walters, DA Western Cape Spokesperson on Community Safety and Police Oversight, 16 August 2024

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DEFENCE INTERNATIONAL | BUITELANDSE WEERMAGTE

OPRUIMING VAN GEVAARLIKE LAND- EN PERSONEELMYNE, BEWEEG NOU NA NUWE TEGNOLOGIE.

Lt-kol Philip Malherbe (afgtr)

Hierdie artikel is vryelik vertaal, saamgestel en geskryf gedurende Julie 2024 deur Philip Malherbe.

ABSTRACT ABSTRAK

Initially, landmine clearance and weapons disposal organization, as auxiliaries, employed persons working with prodders (lengthen stealing with a sharp object in front) to locate suspicious explosive objects underground; trained explosives dogs (excellent senses of smell) harnessed; and/or vehicles with heavy objects in front of them to detonate suspiciously exploding objects. Later, metal detectors were applied –terrorists / countries then used wood/plastic containers to store explosive substances. Nowadays, the latest technology is being harnessed to mitigate the risks.

Aanvanklik het landmyn opruimings- en wapen verwyderingsorganisasie, as hulpmiddels, persone aangewend wat met prodders (langwerpige steel met skerp voorwerp vooraan) om verdagte ontplofbare voorwerpe ondergronds op te spoor; opgeleide plofstof honde (uitstekende reuksintuie) ingespan; en/of voertuie met swaar voorwerpe vooraan aangewend om verdagte ontplofbare voorwerpe te laat detoneer.

Later is metaalverklikkers aangewend – terroriste / lande het daarna hout / plastiekhouers, gebruik om plofbare stowwe in te berg.

Deesdae word die nuutste tegnologie ingespan om die risiko’s te verminder.

Keywords: Sleutelwoorde:

Drones, "Amazon Web Services" (AWS) and satellites. Hommeltuie, “Amazon Web Services” (“AWS”) en satelliete.

Toeligting

Vandag word byna 70 lande en gebiede steeds geraak deur die teenwoordigheid van 110 miljoen landmyne. Hierdie toestelle is om verskeie redes besonder verraderlik. Hulle kan vir baie jare dormant bly, onder die aarde verberg voordat hulle geaktiveer word. As gevolg van hul lae produksiekoste (wat wissel van $3 tot $75 elk), kan diegene wat dit ontplooi, maklik groot hoeveelhede vervaardig. Om dit veilig te verwyder, is egter 'n gevaarlike, tydrowende en duur proses (geskat op $300 tot $1000 per myn).

Wat landmyne uniek gevaarlik maak, is hul onvermoë om tussen vegters en burgerlikes te onderskei. Die onoordeelkundige aard van hierdie wapen, wat dikwels in burgerlike gebiede ontplooi word, lei tot aansienlike ongevalle en langtermyn humanitêre gevolge. Dit veroorsaak nie net lewensverlies en gebreklike ledemate nie, maar verhinder ook gemeenskappe om toegang te verkry

tot grond wat geskik is vir landbou of die bou van hospitale, skole en ander noodsaaklike fasiliteite, insluitend noodsaaklike dienste soos voedsel, water, gesondheidsorg en humanitêre hulp.

Onder die verborge arsenaal wat in die grond ingebed is, is kragtige anti-voertuigmyne wat tenks of groot busse kan vernietig, saam met kleiner personeelmyne wat bedoel is om persone te dood of ernstig te beseer. Daarbenewens is daar geïmproviseerde ploftoestelle en onontplofte myne wat versprei is oor die geaffekteerde gebiede.

In konflik- en na-konflikgebiede is die teenwoordigheid van plofbare besmette gebiede 'n groot gevaar vir beide militêre en burgerlike bevolkings. Die uitdaging is om innoverende oplossings vir afstandverkenning en neutralisering van hierdie gebiede te skep om veilige deurgang vir personeel en hulpherstelpogings te waarborg. Die klem op doeltreffendheid, veiligheid en die vermindering van menslike ingryping is sleutel prioriteite vir hierdie oplossings.

Die blywende teenwoordigheid van landmyne regoor die wêreld beklemtoon die kritieke behoefte aan vindingryke benaderings tot die verwydering en deaktivering daarvan. Die sluipende eienskappe van hierdie toestelle hou 'n konstante gevaar in vir burgerlikes en militêre personeel. Hul onoordeelkundige aard, wat nie in staat is om tussen vegters en nie-vegters te onderskei nie, lei tot verwoestende ongevalle en langtermyn humanitêre gevolge.

"n Gereedskapkas kan nie 'n stukkende voertuig herstel nie – dit vereis 'n werktuigkundige om die regte werktuig vir die regte werk te kies en te gebruik!"

As gevolg van die unieke aard van elke landmynverwante situasie, is 'n standaard of rigiede benadering nie altyd die geskikste oplossing nie. Daarom verstaan ons dat 'n standaard “one size fits all”-oplossing nie gevind sal word nie, aangesien elke landmynverwante probleem uniek is aan elke omstandigheid wat 'n ander en spesifieke oplossing vereis. Hierdie benadering behels 'n deeglike ontleding van die probleem (situasie) en die kreatiewe gebruik van die regte instrument vir die regte werk. Landmyne en on-ontplofte bomme kan dekades lank in die grond bly nadat 'n konflik geëindig het. Elke dag word 13 mense dood of beseer deur hierdie onoordeelkundige wapens. Byna die helfte van burgerlike ongevalle is kinders, met lewensverlies en geaffekteerde ledemate. Dit verhinder ook gemeenskappe om toegang te verkry tot grond wat geskik is vir landbou of die bou van hospitale, skole en ander noodsaaklike fasiliteite, insluitend noodsaaklike dienste soos voedsel, water, gesondheidsorg en humanitêre hulp.

Halo Trust: Land- en Personeelmyne Beveiliging Personeel https://www.google.com/search?q=Hazardous+landmine+clearance+goes+hitech&sca_esv=33f171317715abb5&hl=en&tbm=isch&sxsrf=ADLYWIK8y

Inleiding

Die HALO Trust is die wêreld se grootste humanitêre landmyn opruimings- en wapen verwyderingsorganisasie, Sedert sy stigting in 1988 het hierdie Brits-Amerikaanse liefdadigheidsorganisasie die wêreld se grootste humanitêre landmynklarings- en wapen verwyderingsorganisasie geword. Deur sy wêreldwye werk het HALO, wat staan vir gevaarlike gebiedsondersteuningsorganisasie, byna 14 miljoen landmyne en stukke on-ontplofte artikels in 30 lande en gebiede skoongemaak. Die organisasie het tans meer as 12 000 plaaslik gewerfde personeel van regoor die wêreld in diens. Vir diegene wat vertroud is met die organisasie, is dit geen verrassing dat die groep hoogs aktief in die Oekraïne is nie, gegewe onlangse gebeure. Die skoonmaak van hierdie landmyne is noodsaaklik vir die ekonomiese toekoms van hierdie land. Dit is een van die Wêreld se voorste landbouprodusente en -uitvoerders. Vandag is 'n geskatte 470 000 hektaar prima landbougrond besmet met landmyne - dit is 'n gebied drie keer so groot soos Londen.

Vanaf Angola tot by Ukraine, word pogings aangewend om burgerlikes te beskerm teen dodelike versteekte gevare. Nadat vrede ooreenkomste onderteken is en soldate gebiede verlaat het en huiswaarts gekeer het, is die plaaslike bevolking van oorlogsgebiede steeds angstig. Hul leef steeds in vrees om paaie, voetpaaie en velde te betree wat bestrooi is met land- en personeelmyne.

Operateur

Die ”Humanitarian NGO” se “Halo Trust” (“Hazardous Area Life-support Organisation”) is al die afgelope 30 jaar besig om land-en personeelmyne in oorlogsgebiede op te ruim. Een van die mees gevaarlike humanitêre take in die wêreld. Hulle het nou aangekondig dat hul taak vergemaklik word en vinniger afgehandel kan word.

Die nuutste tegnologie word aangewend om hul taak meer stroombelyn en vinniger te maak. Dit behels die om land- en personeelmyne, ammunisie en ander onontplofbare geprakseerde toestelle wat vir jare agtergelaat is in oorlog geteisterde gebiede, vinniger te identifiseer, onskadelik te stel, te beveilig of te vernietig.

Aanwending van Hommeltuig in Gevorderde Land- en Personeelmyne Beveiliging

https://www.google.com/search?q=Hazardous+landmine+clearance+goes+hitech&sca_esv=33f171317715abb5&hl=en&tbm=isch&sxsrf=ADLYWIK8y Hulpmiddels

Halo wend nou kunsmatige intelligensie en masjienlering aan om hul taak te bespoedig. Hommeltuie word dan aangewend om oorlogrommel, geboue wat deur plofstowwe beskadig is, op te spoor met behulp van satelietbeelde, en met ondersteuning van “Amazon Web Services (AWS”). Daarna word areas geprioritiseer vir ontruiming. In Afrika fokus hulle op die Horing van Afrika, Angola, Mosambiek en Zimbabwe.

Groot gedeeltes van Halo se werk is risiko onderwys, bewusmaking van families, veral kinders en bejaardes, wat naby geteisterde gebiede woon om versteekte gevare te identifiseer, en veilig te bly totdat die gevare vernietig is.

In Angola kan mynvelde tot 18 km lank wees – dan praat ons van een individuele mynveld. Daar is verskillende die tipes, groottes, verskillende metaalomhulsels, wat meer uitdagings verskaf. Baie vermelde myne is langs paaie gelê, wat jou eie veiligheid in gevaar stel om daar by uit te kom. Ander weer is in of langs voetpaaie, in plattelandse omgewings en beboste omgewings en bly dit ‘n teistering. Dit is ook ‘n uitdaging, veral omdat daar geen ou of nuwe kaarte van gebiede is nie. Met die tyd verander die terreine, sand gedeeltes mag in beboste omgewings verander en paaie en voetpaaie is nie meer sigbaar nie.

https://www.google.com/search?q=Hazardous+landmine+clearance+goes+hitech&sca_esv=33f171317715abb5&hl=en&tbm=isch&sxsrf=ADLYWIK8y

Evaluering

Dit verg ‘n redelike poging om die proses te implementeer. Dit wissel na gelang van die spesifieke plaaslike omstandighede en toestande.

Rondom die hele grondvrystellingsproses moet 'n effektiewe inligtingbestuurstelsel wees wat verseker dat: data akkuraat en konsekwent versamel word; gerapporteer word in ooreenstemming met formate en skedules; korrek in databasisse ingevoer word en ontleed word om betroubare ondersteuning aan besluitnemers, kwaliteit moniteerder en ander belanghebbende partye te bied.

Die mees algemene bron van werklik 'harde' inligting is dié wat tydens tegniese bedrywighede gevind word - die ontdekking van werklike gevaar items tydens tegniese opname of opruimingswerk. Die waarde van sulke data kan nie oorbeklemtoon word nie en organisasies wat tegniese opname en klaring doen, moet dit met die grootste sorg en aandag hanteer. Nie net moet besonderhede van 'wat waar gevind is' versamel, aangeteken en gerapporteer word nie, maar owerhede en agentskappe moet verseker dat die inligting ontleed word om tendense, patrone of ander eienskappe te identifiseer wat besluitnemers kan help om geldige, doeltreffende besluite te neem en vertroue in grond te verhoog.

Die term "Verdagte gevaarlike gebied" verwys na 'n gebied waar daar redelike vermoede bestaan van besmetting op grond van indirekte bewyse van die teenwoordigheid van ploftoestelle wat ook geïmproviseerde ploftoestelle en foptoestelle insluit.

Die term "Alle redelike inspanning" beskryf wat beskou word as 'n minimum aanvaarbare vlak van poging om besmette gebiede te identifiseer en te dokumenteer of om die teenwoordigheid of vermoedelik ploftoestelle te verwyder.

Nasionale Vrystelling Proses

Die volgende beginsels geld wanneer 'n nasionale grondvrystellingproses ontwikkel word:

• Gevaarlike gebiede moet verdeel word in vermoedelik gevaarlike gebiede en bevestigde gevaarlike gebiede, gebaseer op die beskikbaarheid en betroubaarheid van inligting en of bewyse indirek of direk vir elke gevaar. Gebiede wat slegs indirekte bewyse van die teenwoordigheid van ploftoestelle aanbied, moet geklassifiseer word as vermoedelike gevaarlike gebiede. Potensieel produktiewe grond wat nie gebruik word nie;

224 Gevonde Wapentuig na opgrawing.

• Mondelinge verslae van plaaslike bevolking / voormalige vegters;

• “DLB” (Dead Letter Boxes) plekke waar voorrade ploftoestelle begrawe is vir latere gebruik, waar die betroubaarheid van sulke rekords oop bly vir twyfel of nie beoordeel is nie;

• Ontleding van ander bekende besoedelingsgebiede, taktiek en historiese bronne;

• Voormalige geveg sones;

• Bewyse uit vorige opnames, nie ondersteun deur direkte bewyse van die teenwoordigheid van besoedeling nie;

• Ploftoestel ongelukke of voorvalle waar die ligging van die gebeurtenis nie akkuraat bepaal kan word nie;

• Direkte getuienis;

• Ploftoestel rekords, waar die betroubaarheid van sulke rekords tydens vorige operasies bevestig is;

• Visuele waarneming van ploftoestelle dele, fragmentasie of kraters;

• Ontploffings tydens brande of deur diere.

Werklikheid

Die hele beveiligings proses is basies soos ‘n legkaart. Nie teen-staande die hulpmiddels, bevind die veldwerkers hul in areas met swak of geen opvangs nie. Histories word metaalverklikkers aangewend – dit is ongelukkig geweldig tydrowend. In gunstige omstandighede word verskillende tipe opsporing, grond-penetrasie radar aangewend. Bronne:

• https://www.google.com/search?q=Hazardous+landmine+clearance+goes+hitech&sca_esv=33f171317715abb5&hl=en&tbm=isch&sxsrf=ADLYWIK8y

• https://www.mineactionstandards.org/standards/07-11/

• https://www.act.nato.int/article/innovation-solutions-landmine-freefuture/#:~:text=Due%20to%20their%20low%20production,%.

SUID-AFRIKA: WETSTOEPASSING

GEREGTIGHEID GESKIED MET TERUGTREK VAN MOORDENAAR MARIUS

VAN DER WESTHUIZEN SE PAROOL

Heloïse Denner

Mediaverklaring uitgereik deur: Heloïse Denner, VF Plus-LP en hoofwoordvoerder: Korrektiewe dienste

15 Augustus 2024

Die VF Plus verwelkom die tersydestelling van die kindermoordenaar en oud-polisieman Marius van der Westhuizen se parool.

Dit is die regte besluit en wys wat ʼn effektiewe minister kan doen om geregtigheid te laat geskied in belang van die mense van Suid-Afrika.

Die korrektiewe toesig-en-paroolhersieningsraad het vandag sy besluit hieroor bekend gemaak nadat die minister van korrektiewe dienste, dr. Pieter Groenewald, onlangs gevra het dat die paroolbesluit oor Van der Westhuizen na die hersieningsraad terugverwys word.

Van der Westhuizen is in 2011 tot 24 jaar gevangenisstraf gevonnis weens die moord op sy drie kinders, Bianca (16), Marius Eben (5) en Antoinette (21 maande). Suid-Afrika se mense is uitgelewer aan hoë vlakke van geweldsmisdaad, ontoereikende strawwe en ondeurdagte paroolvrylatings. In hierdie geval sou dit ook ʼn vergryping van geregtigheid wees om iemand vry te laat skaars dertien jaar ná die koelbloedige moord op sy drie kinders.

Soos in hierdie geval, kan nie net die regte van paroolaansoekers in aanmerking geneem word nie. Daar moet ewe veel gewig geplaas word op die belange van die gemeenskap en slagoffers soos die kinders se ma, Charlotte, wat die aansoek teengestaan het omdat sy vrees vir haar lewe. In Van der Westhuizen se geval is die slagoffer-impakverslag (van mev. Van der Westhuizen) nie eens oorweeg nie.

Die VF Plus doen daarom ʼn beroep op die minister om toe te sien dat die paroolstelsel hersien word sodat almal in die proses regverdig behandel word.

Die VF Plus sou ook wou sien dat daar herbesin word oor strawwe, veral vir gewelds- en seksuele misdrywe, wat soms skokkend ontoereikend is. Dit kom neer op ʼn totale hersiening van die strafregstelsel wat selfs die administratiewe deel insluit.

Verlore dokumente kan byvoorbeeld ʼn groot rol speel in die uitkoms van iets soos ʼn paroolaansoek. Wat straf aanbetref, is Van der Westhuizen byvoorbeeld gevonnis tot 24 jaar gevangenisstraf wat wesenlik verskil van ʼn lewenslange straf van 25 jaar wanneer parooloorweging ter sprake kom. Die publiek ervaar die stelsel wat hom teen misdaad moet beskerm, toenemend as ʼn meganisme wat eerder meehelp om Suid-Afrika in ʼn misdaadparadys te omskep.

Dit moet verander en die regering van nasionale eenheid (RNE) bied ʼn goeie vertrekpunt hiervoor soos die besluit oor Van der Westhuizen illustreer.

BRIEWE | LETTERS

BRIEF UIT OOSTENRYK

Marthinus de Lange

Op die oomblik is dit hoogsomer hier in Oostenryk. Dagtemperature trek om die 37/38 grade.

In die vroeë oggend sit ek op die stoep, langs ons druiwerank. Die hond lê by my voete en snork soos net 'n Bulldog kan. Ons huise is almal op die rand van die woud. Ek kan die woud ruik en die takbokkies in die verte hoor rondbeweeg. Ver bo my kop draai 'n buizerd en soek na sy ontbyt. Ek drink my koffie en geniet die koel oggendlug. Dit is alles amper perfek. Hoekom sê ek amper perfek? Nou ja, wat wil 'n SuidAfrikaner saam met sy koffie hê? Beskuit natuurlik! Man dink terug aan die koue môres op Maleoskop. Die menasie se groot pot koffie en die groot bokse beskuit. Daardie beskuit het ’n mens nog krag gegee om op die skietbaan rond te hardloop met ‘n R1! Nou ja, 'n paar lede het ook skelm beskuit vir die kameel gevoer. Ek twyfel of dit baie gesond was vir die kameel.

Ek was altyd lief vir beskuit. My ouma het haar eie beskuit resep gehad. (Ek het ongelukkig nie 'n kopie nie.) Met karringmelk en rosyne. Dit was te lekker vir woorde. Beskuit in koffie gedoop is maar een van die lewe se klein plesiertjies en ek mis dit! Deesdae eet ek Oostenrykse volkoringhawerkoekies, met rosyne, wat ek in my koffie doop. Isabella rol altyd haar oë as ek dit doen. Die mense hier in Oostenryk doop nou nie hulle koekies in hulle koffie nie. Die Oostenrykers het baie tradisionele gebak wat ongelooflik goed smaak. Maar, nie een van die gebak is soortgelyk aan die beskuit wat ek van Suid-Afrika ken nie.

Mens sou dink dat dit deesdae maklik sou wees om beskuit op te spoor. Die internet het mos internasionale inkopies soveel makliker gemaak. Ongelukkige wyse is dit nou nie so maklik om ordentlike beskuit hier in Oostenryk te kry nie. So van R1’s gepraat: Eintlik is dit makliker om hier in Oostenryk 'n R1 in die hande te kry as om beskuit te koop! As 'n mens die vereiste dokument het (Dis baie maklik om in Oostenryk 'n “Waffenbesitzkarte” te kry) kan jy by enige wapenwinkel instap en DS Arms se semi-outomatiese weergawe van 'n R1 koop. DS Arms bemark die geweer as 'n “R1”, een van hul wapensmede is 'n voormalige SAP-lid. En man kan dit op die selfde dag huis toe neem, sonder enige wagperiode. Al wat mens nodig het is ongeveer 3000 Euro (net 'n bietjie meer as R59 000!) om vir die ding te betaal!

Aangesien daar, in teenstelling met R1s, geen aanvraag vir beskuit in Oostenryk is nie, kan ek beskuit slegs by sommige (Ek sê sommige omdat baie van die winkels nie eers goed na Oostenryk wil pos nie) Suid-Afrikaanse spesialiteitswinkels in die VK, Duitsland en Nederland koop. 'n 500 gram box “Ouma” beskuit kos daar ongeveer 5 Euro. Met posgeld na Oostenryk kos dit alles amper 30 Euro! Dis meer as R590 vir ‘n box beskuit!. Nou ja, vir my doeleindes, skiet 'n 3000 Euro R1 nie 25 maal beter as die 120 Euro .303, wat ek 'n paar jaar terug gekoop het, nie. En ‘n 30 Euro box Ouma beskuit gaan, ongelukkig, nie 15 maal lekkerder smaak as my 2 Euro box Oostenrykse volkoringhawerkoekies nie. Isabella vertel altyd hoe baie sy die kermis koeksisters en Simba se "Smoked Beef" skyfies vermis. Simba-skyfies is ook by sommige van die SA spesialiteitswinkels beskikbaar. Maar met posgeld is hulle ook baie duur. Koeksisters en melktert kan man hier vergeet. Daar is ongelukkig niks van soortgelyke aard hier in Oostenryk.

Om dinge te mis waarvan jy gehou het, is ongelukkig deel van immigreer. Soms leer mens om daar sonder te leef. En soms maak ‘n Boer ‘n plan. Ons het al biltong gemaak terwyl ons in 'n woonstel in Wene gewoon het. Ek het gereeld my eie biltong in Suid-Afrika gemaak en ek was gewoond aan my eie resep. Wildsvleis in Suid-Afrika is anders as die in Europa. Maar ek was ten volle bereid om dit 'n kans te gee. Takbokvleis opgehang in 'n kartondoos! 'n Sogenaamde “Biltong Box”. Die planne daarvoor het ek op die internet gevind. Om die kruie en speserye te vind was 'n bietjie van 'n

228

avontuur. Om nou nie eens van die Worcestersous te praat nie. Maar die eindresultaat het besonders goed gesmaak. En ons het die proses meer as een keer herhaal. Sedertdien het ons ’n plaaslike slaghuis gevind wat biltong maak.

Dalk is dit tyd om een van die vele beskuitresepte, wat ek op die internet sien, uit te probeer. Nie een van ons twee is besonders goed met bak nie. Maar soos ek voorheen gesê het :“‘n Boer maak ‘n plan” en ek wil my beskuit hê!

Groete uit Oostenryk

BRIEF UIT THAILAND

Lt Barry Taylor

Dit is die verskil tussen SA en Thailand.

Hier is die oopbreek van “laundromat” se geld kassies ‘n rede om ‘n artikel in die Nasionale koerante te plaas

Hier in die dorp waar ek woon was daar in die tien jaar wat ek hier woon ‘n diefstal van een motorfiets

- Jin se niggie wat in die een hoofstraat wat deur die dorp loop woon, een aand toe sy lekker getrek was, haar motorfiets in die straat gelaat met die sleutel in en gaan slaap.

Sy is maar ‘n wille meisie en het orals tatoes en was eentyd n "bargirl" in Pattaya. Sy is ook heel mooi. Sy is nou met haar derde man getroud en haar pa se vir Jin hy wens sy dogter was eerder soos sy skoonseun wat ‘n heel “nice” ou is

Die volgende oggend was die fiets weg tot vandag toe.

Ek het die voorreg om ook in die dorp te wees vir die eerste moord in 40 jaar verlede jaar toe ‘n ou sy vrou met ‘n mes doodgesteek het omdat sy ‘n “boyfriend” gehad het. Dit is nou wel ‘n moord maar ek beskou dit nie as ‘n moord soos in SA - soos die plaasmoorde en rowe nie, want die verdagte was bekend en soos die Thais maar doen, het hy sit en wag vir die polisie.

Ek het nou die dag fiets gery na Jin se winkel en toe ek later wou terugry sous dit en ek los my fiets toe daar en vra vir Jin om dit in die restaurant toe te sluit Vier dae later gaan ek om die fiets te haal toe staan dit nog steeds teen dieselfde paal buite die restaurant en toe ek haar vra waarom sy nie die fiets in die restaurant gesit het, het sy gesê dat sy vergeet het

Dit is in die hoofstraat letterlik op die sypaadjie

Wat wel hier gedy is korrupsie, maar dit sal jy nooit uitroei nie ook die mishandeling van vroue en kinders, maar dit is maar die parogiale stelsel van die hele Ooste

In Papu New Guinee is daar letterlik nog kannibale in die woude.

In Maleisië het ek en my ex-vrou eendag in ‘n oerwoud in getrek meer as 5 ure per kano en toe verder geloop vir 2 ure. Daar het ons op n stam afgekom wat die Boesmans laat lyk soos mense met grade, so primitief is hulle.

Dit was uiters interessant

Hulle skiet nog hulle wild met blaaspype, met pyltjies met gif aan en dis dodelike gif wat hulle aanmaak uit die plante

Toe weer die lang trek terug.

As jy nou digte woud wil sien gaan in die woud in. As ‘n paadjie oopgekap is groei hy in ‘n week of twee weer toe Dit laat hierdie woude waar ek woon soos die karoo lyk

Lees maar Wikipedia oor die woud/ Lekker dag

Barry

Prachin Buri

Thailand

• Taman Negara

Taman Negara has a total area of 4,343 km2 and it is one of the world's oldest rainforests, estimated to be more than 130 million years old. Mount Tahan, Peninsular Malaysia's highest point, is within the park's boundaries.

https://thethaiger.com/news/national/thai-man-arrested-for-stealing-from-bangkoklaundrettes?utm_source=Thaiger+Daily+EN&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-0801#google_vignette

HOMMELTUIE

Barry Taylor

Naand brigadier

Hier is nou ‘n interessante video oor die ‘drones’ wat gebruik word in die oorlog in die Oekraine. Ek dink jy sal dit geniet. Oorlog het darem verander oor die eeue.

Barry

Prachin Buri

Thailand

Kyk gerus die video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXE2Pg9CSSA

Kommentaar HBH

Inderdaad nuwe manier van oorlog maak! ‘n Hommeltuig wat $200 kos, kan maklik ‘n tenk wat $2,5M kos eensklaps vernietig. Ek het al verskiet video’s gesien in die oorlog tussen Rusland en die Oekraine waar hommeltuie en landmyne tenks vernietig. Dis ‘n vreeslike oorlog!