HGA Report 1 Rwandan Genocide 1994 by HKMUN2014

HONG KONG MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2014 Forum: The United Nations Historical General Assembly Issue: Rwandan Genocide 1994 Student Officer (Chair): Brian Wong Point of reference: 30th April, 1994 “The United Nations’ Involvement in the Rwandan Genocide is significant for its insignificance.” - Rwandan Files “We responded conventionally to an unconventional crisis.” - David Scheffer, adviser to the US Representative at the United Nations Description of Committee The Historical General Assembly’s mission is to examine a variety of historical events that have previously affected the United Nations during their peak points or crises. The Rwandan Genocide examined here falls largely during the year of 1994, but can date back to the beginnings of Western colonisation of Rwanda. The point of the committee is not about emulating or replicating historical decisions made by the UN, but to identify more effective (and, in this particular issue, also responsive) solutions than the ones provided by history. Though employing and analysing historical conditions are both crucial processes, the committee ultimately aims to resolve unjustified ethnic violence through a balance of historical awareness and prudent reflection. Historical understanding is essential up to the beginning of the Rwandan Genocide in April 1994, but delegates need not concern themselves over modeling events thereafter.

Context The Rwandan Genocide in 1994 consisted of a mass slaughter of ethnic Tutsis undertaken by ethnic Hulus in the African nation of Rwandan. It is estimated that over 800,000 people were killed; exact death tolls are yet to be determined, though it was argued that over 20% of the nation’s total population perished over the 100 days of bloodshed sparked by the assassination of the Rwandan and Burundian presidents. The event was the result of a long history of ethnic clashes between the minority Tutsis, who had maintained hegemony for centuries, and the majority Hutus, who rose to power in the 1959 rebellion.

Background History

The racial confrontation between the Hutu and Tutsi groups can be back-traced to the underlying ideology of the Hutus, which reasoned that the Tutsi must be resisted at all costs. Large-scale displacement of Hutu in the north was matched by Hutu killings of Tutsi in the south. The invasion of northern Rwanda by a rebel group in 1990 initiated the Rwandan Civil War fought between the French-backed Hutu regime and Ugandanbacked rebels. The rise of the Hutu Power ideology (as epitomised by its “Ten Commandments) further entrenched the fundamental differences between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities. Despite the efforts from various parties, the Arusha Accords in the 1993 under the Hutu president Habyarimana turned out to be but a brief ceasefire prior to the resumption of vehement ethnic disputes in the following year. Popular historiography has often indicated that the Hutus and Tutsis were originally divided by social classes and then into clans. The reformist expansions undertaken by King Rwabugiri from 1853-95 further consolidated the privileged status of Tutsis whilst suppressing Hutu, who were often found enslaved by its rival group. After the 1884 Berlin Conference had assigned the territory of Rwanda to Germany, the imperialist power began a series of policies that effectively left Rwandan monarchy under the control of Germany; that empowered Tutsi chiefs around the nation even further. The Belgian occupation from the early stages of World War I reduced the complex social system to one such that a Tutsi chief controlled all aspects of rule for a local area. Belgian reforms also took place via Tutsi-led land reforms, which transferred grazing areas traditionally controlled by the Hutus to private Tutsi individuals. Little compensation was granted. Belgian colonialism played a significant role in reinforcing the divide between the Tutsi and Hutu peoples. The colonial rule introduced separate ID cards for the two tribes despite their similar backgrounds and cultures: this act only affirmed the preexisting distinction, such that by the time the Belgian rule had concluded, most of the Hutus were left in despondent situations under the control of the influential Tutsi. The infuriated Hutus responded by instigating genocidal massacres against their fellow countrymen, foreshadowing the heavy violence between the two tribes after the departure of the Belgians. The 1950s saw an increase in agitation amongst the Hutu majority, as epitomised by the 1957 “Hutu/Bahutu Manifesto”, which accused the Tutsi minority of holding an unjust monopoly over power in Rwanda. A new republic led by president Kayibanda was established in 1962, characterised by its extreme persecution of many of the former Tutsi leadership cabinets. Most of the educated individuals in the nation fled for refuge in other African countries - such as Uganda. Hutu General Habyarimana usurped power in the 1973 coup, which killed Kayibanda and paved the way for escalating belligerence. Heavy discrimination against the Tutsi ensued in the 1970s. The economic downturn triggered by the collapse of international commodities agreements and erroneous World Bank policies further destabilised Rwanda’s governmental structure, amplifying the social injustice and issues plaguing the country then. The assassination of

Habyarimana in April 1994 triggered the violent mass killings of Tutsis and their sympathisers. Planned by the Hutu Akazu, the genocide was led by the national government and military, as well as the two Hutu military groups “Interahamwe” and “Impuzamugambi”. The former was a larger and more politically driven militia than the latter, which often drew its recruits from the youth. The Hutu government encouraged Rwandans to murder all Tutsis in the country.

Definitions of Key Terms and Acronyms Genocide is defined as the planned destruction and annihilation of an ethnic, racial, or national group through direct violence or generating conditions that result in the group’s inability to survive or reproduce. Hutus and Tutsis are the two primary ethnic groups in Rwanda, with the Hutus taking up the majority of the population; the Tutsis as the minority. At the time of the genocide, 85% of Rwandans were Hutus; 14% were Tutsis, with the remaining 1% mostly composed of Twa, a minor ethnic group. The Arusha Accords were five sets of general protocol agreed upon in Arusha, Tanzania on August 4, 1993 by the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front rebel force. The US-France-African Union-organised talks began in July 1992 and concluded in June 1993. Juvenal Habyarimana was the third President of the Republic of Rwanda, and whose rule was characterised by extreme prejudice against the Tutsi in favour of the Hutu majority. His assassination served as the trigger for the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. The RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) was founded in Uganda as a political movement with the aims of achieving the repatriation of exiled Tutsis and reforming the Rwandan government through means such as political power-sharing. The RPF mainly comprised Tutsi exiles in Uganda. The UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was installed as a peacekeeping mission to monitor the peace negotiations between the RPF and the Rwandan Government in 1993. Within two weeks of the outbreak of the genocide, UNAMIR was reduced in size by 90% - barely enough to maintain stability in the central areas of the capital.

Important Individuals and Groups A key issue in the retrospective evaluation of the Rwandan Genocide is the identification of responsible parties. The following consists of a few agents that have been considered as being consistently involved in the massacre.

The Rwandan government played an active role in organising the killing. The 30,000strong Rwandan troops comprised representatives from many major neighbourhoods. Weapons such as AK-47 assault rifles and grenades were mostly available without limits or paperwork. Soldiers were prompted by strong propaganda and government efforts to “kill without remorse”. A 2000 article from The Guardian accused the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, of leading the supplying of weapons to the Hutu regime in 1994. The newspaper suggested that “As Minister of Foreign Affairs in Egypt, Boutros-Ghali facilitated an arms deal in 1990”, which in turn provided the regime with the ammunition and technology it required to carry out its atrocities. In accordance with the testimony of the Rwandan Prime Minister Kambanda, the genocide was regularly discussed amongst the then cabinet of the state, including highranked officials such as Colonel Bagosora and General Bizimungu. The compulsory segregation of the two groups by local Burgomasters and mayors acted as signs that the regime could verify through violent threats. Family groups were exploited by the regime to institutionalise mass killings throughout the rural areas. The news media also reportedly played a key role in fuelling the killings on a local scale; similarly, the strikingly apathetic international media turned a blind eye to the misconstrued events in the country. The state-owned newspaper initiated an anti-Tutsi campaign in October 1990, producing leaflets that encouraged the masses to “complete the social revolution of 1959” through politically organised communal violence. The high illiteracy rates during the time of the genocide meant that oral communication was the predominant means through which the regime successfully mobilised a large amount of its population over a short period of time. It would appear that some of the media institutions put in place by international agencies, with the purpose of promoting an informed population in Rwandan, in fact worked counter-intuitively in suppressing other aspects of human rights. It has been advocated that international development agencies must be highly sensitive to specific political-cultural contexts when striving for democratic progress in nations with unstable governance and constant feuds.

Timeline of Events 1987 The Rwandan Patriotic Front was established in Uganda by Tutsi refugees fleeing the Hutu Rwanda. July 1990 Habyarimana agreed as the condition for Western aid to introduce multi-party democracy to the nation. October 1990 The military wing of the RPF invaded Rwanda in an attempt to seize control of the country. A ceasefire was called for in March, 1991.

1991-1992 The Rwandan army began training and enlisting civilians through the military group Interahamwe. Throughout this period Tutsis were massacred in various locations across the country; opposition was suppressed. February 1993 An offensive was launched by the RPF, which resulted in persistent fighting for several months between French peacekeeping forces and the rebels. July 1993 The radical radio RTLM (â&#x20AC;&#x153;One Thousand Hills Free Radio and Televisionâ&#x20AC;?) began propagating hate speech against Tutsus and moderate Hutus. August 1993 The Arusha Accords were agreed upon following months of negotiations between Habyarimana and the RPF. Refugees were allowed to return; a coalition HutuRPF government was to ensue. April 1994 The Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated in his plane moments before landing at the Kigali International Airport. Hutu radicals began killing their political opponents. April 9 1994 The Gikonda Massacre marked the first clear sign of a genocide occurring in Rwanda, as hundreds of Tutsi were killed in the Missionary Catholic Church. April 15-16 1994 The Nyarbuye Roman Catholic Church Massacre saw the killing of thousands of Tutsis by gunfire and clubs. April 18 1994 The Kibuye Massacre resulted in the deaths of over 60,000 Tutsis. April 21 1994 The United Nations reduced its forces in Rwanda to only 270 troops. Over 100,000 civilians had died, as estimated by the IRC. April 28-29 1994 250,000 Tutsis fled to the neighbouring Tanzania. Delegates, you are required to debate this issue in synchronisation with historical events only up to the date of April 30, 1994. Beyond this point, it is up to you to redirect the flow of history through careful deliberations and discourse.

Positions of Member Nations and Other Bodies Belgium As the last colonial power in Rwanda, Belgium was aware of the genocidal plans of the Habyarimana regime. Half of the initially deployed 800 troops in 1993 were Belgian, with the Belgium regime warning the UN of the possibility of a massacre. In response to the assassination of the Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and the

murder of the ten Belgian protectors assigned to her family, Belgian refused to actively participate in UNAMIR activities apart from demanding an extension from the UN of its mandante in order to evacuate the 1520 nationals in the nation. On a whole, Belgium’s intentions of intervening in the Rwandan Genocide were minimal in cases where its own nationals’ welfare was not threatened. France France openly supported the Habyarimana regime against the RFP rebels, through methods such as training and arming Rwandan troops in their brutalisation of the Tutsis. On April 8, 1994, France launched Operation Amaryllis to facilitate the evacuation of 1500 westerners. The operation refused to evacuate threatened Rwandans, even those who were employed by the French. The active role of France in the UNAMIR was shadowed by the accusations that through knowingly supporting a genocidal group that did not hesitate to express their genocidal intentions, the French regime was in fact favouring the launching of the genocide. Overall, the nuanced stance of France must be treated with great prudence, for it clearly stood for two very contradictory positions during the genocide. The United States Dissuaded by its defeat at the intervention in Somalia that had occurred one year earlier, the US refused to provide aid to Rwanda. President Clinton and his UN Ambassador Albright consistently rejected action. US Documents released in 2001 and 2004 suggested that the Clinton administration intentionally concealed its awareness that Rwandan was undergoing genocide in order to justify its apathetic response. The US refused to officially acknowledge the occurrence of a genocide, despite the fact that the president had been informed of a “final solutions” to kill all Tutsis prior to the peaking of the slaughter. United Nations The United Nations and the international community shared the US’ reluctance to characterise killings as a “genocide” in order to delay intervention. In January 1994, the Canadian Lieutenant General Dallaire telegrammed the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, stating that a senior military trainer from the government had issued instructions to provoke the UNAMIR into using force. This would provide the Interahamwe with an excuse to engage the Belgian troops, killing Belgian citizens and deterring Belgium from further intervention. The violence during the Genocide proved too “risky” for the UN to provide assistance. The UN-mandated Operation Turquoise provided a “safe zone” for Hutu refugees in the southwest. Yet such efforts were clearly insufficient to prevent the deaths of over 500,000 people. In 2000, the UN branded its response to the Rwandan genocide a “failure”.

Other Groups China and Russia openly opposed the involvement of the UN in what was perceived as an internal affair. Dallaire was criticised for suggesting that the UN should seize weapons from the Hutu militants; the UN responded to the general’s demands with great inefficiency. Canada, Ghana, and the Netherlands offered support for the UNAMIR mission, although the Security Council refused to grant the mission the mandate to intervene. Notwithstanding insistent demands from the mission’s leaders, the peacekeeping force’s requests for permission to end the genocide were denied; its capacities greatly limited.

Potential Issues The Issue of Efficient Response Throughout most of the genocidal period in Rwanda, diplomats viewed the situation in Rwanda as a two-sided regional conflict between the Rwandan regime and the Tutsi-led insurgents. The Arusha Peace Agreement provided a false impression that failed to cohere with reality. The international investments in the peace agreement made it the wrong target of focus in the majority of discussions on Rwanda. Deadlines were missed; casualties were ignored; rising ethnic tensions were swept aside in order to “maintain the integrity of the agreements”. The international community was clearly detached from the happenings in Third World Africa, failing to take heed of the Burundi massacre that saw the slaughtering of over 50,000 Tutsis and Hutus in 1993. A key problem that delegates must therefore is the construction of an efficient and responsive framework that can deal with crises of such scale effectively - possibly through significantly increasing transparency and cutting through bureaucratic diplomacy. There is no single solution to an international crisis, but a specific platform facilitating international collaboration can be a valid starting point. The Issue of Military Intervention The international community lacked the backing and authority to intervene in Rwanda. Delegates must consider the extent to which military intervention is justified in cases where regimes have clearly failed and are even actively persecuting their own populations. In response to the 1994 cable from Canadian General Romeo Daillaire, the American, French, and Belgian governments responded conventionally by instructing the general to discuss his concerns with the Rwandan President. Expecting Habyariana to feedback accurately was a clear mistake that suggested that the United Nations should perhaps have investigated the arms caches and should have been more sensitive to the political killings in February 1994 as signs of a genocide-to-be. On the other hand, excessively vigorous intervention would have possibly catalysed the genocide. As such, delegates should carefully consider how military action could have aided or hindered the Rwandan genocide.

The Issue of Ethnic Conflicts Many diplomats have argued that the term “genocide” is a highly politicised word frequently employed as a political tool to attack nations with policies that fail to conform with international standards. The fact that it might stand for different notions to different countries played a large role in delaying international relief efforts during the Rwandan Genocide. Devising a common protocol that defines both the word “genocide” itself, as well as a set of necessary actions that must be taken immediately, is a key concern that delegates must address. Delegates should also be aware of the United Nations’ previous response (or lack thereof) towards the Cambodian Khmer Rouge, which carried out an equally, if not more so, atrocious genocide that resulted in the deaths of over 8 million Cambodians.

Questions for Debate “Is it right for the international community to intervene when regimes are removing the most essential of all human rights from their people?” is a question whose multi-faceted answer must be broken down into several labels: principles, practicalities, and sustainability. Where countries have failed their social contracts and basic obligations to their citizens, is it morally justified for the United Nations to intervene? To what extent should the intervention be carried out? In the specific case of the Rwandan genocide, how must the United Nations balance the interests of the major powers and the welfare of the Rwandan people? Must intervention always be the last resort? Where the lives of foreign troops and personnel’s troops are endangered, is a pull-out the only viable option? Delegates must examine the possibility of further violence arising from international intervention, as well as the fact that a foreign peacekeeping force may not be sufficiently knowledgeable to counter the Rwandan regime. Could direct confrontation ever be a better alternative to peace negotiations? Or are discussions and diplomacy the only genuine solution to a fundamental conflict? The Rwandan genocide had a long-lasting impact on its victims. What can the United Nations do in order to achieve reconciliation? Or is reconciliation not the solution that is most applicable? Delegates must comprehend how the United Nations should respond to crises in the Developing World, where imposed democracy may be undermined by political or social instabilities. Nations must face reality and devise solutions that can uphold the basic tenets of international relations: human rights.