CASALI, MICHAEL A. — WINNICOTT'S TRANSFORMATIONAL METAPHORS: A COGNITIVE-LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

The Institute for Clinical Social Work

WINNICOTT’S TRANSFORMATIONAL METAPHORS: A COGNITIVE-LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Institute for Clinical Social Work in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by MICHAEL A. CASALI

Chicago, Illinois January, 2010

Copyright © 2009 by Michael Casali All rights reserved

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ABSTRACT

This study examined D.W. Winnicott’s construct object usage and related transformational metaphors from a cognitive-linguistic perspective. The paper The Use of an Object was positioned historically among extant theoretical models and employed to investigate the semantic evolution of key Winnicottian concepts.

Biographical accounts revealed core developmental themes which elucidated the conceptual foundations of Winnicott’s ontology and offered alternatives ways to understand the nature and function of his ideas. Overall the findings were congruent with the epistemological stance of “experientialism” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), which is neither objectivist nor subjectivist and corresponds to the notion of psychoanalysis as hovering in the area between positivistic science and hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1970).

Implications for professional development included how the clinician-learner similarly draws on embodied-metaphorical processes within the context of history and personal development.

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For Sherry and Michael

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all who have contributed to this work over past few years: Thayer Linder for the encouragement to pursue the topic and methodology, Marco Casonato and Vito Evola for guidance on the use of conceptual metaphor, and my dissertation committee Barbara Berger, Sherwood Faigen, Dennis McCaughan, and R.D. Shelby for their commentary and feedback during the process.

Finally, a special thanks to my committee chairperson, Jennifer Tolleson, for her support and trust in the ideas that came to fruition in this document.

MAC

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT……………………………………………………….………..iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………..………...v LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………..……….x LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………….………xi

Chapter I. INTRODUCTION/FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM……...…1 General Statement of Purpose and Introduction Definitions of Key Concepts Significance of the Study for Clinical Social Work Statement of the Problem and Objectives

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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Chapter

Page II. LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………..….12 Introduction/Overview Metaphor Basics Metaphor as a Conceptual Tool Metaphor and the Body THERAPY IS A JOURNEY: A Psychoanalytic Application of Conceptual Metaphor Theory Conceptual Blending and Mental Spaces THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS: A Winnicottian Application of Conceptual Blending Theory Science and Meaning: Metapsychology and Clinical Theory Metaphor and Clinical Writing Winnicott in Context: Early Development Winnicott’s Conceptual Style Instinctual Fusion: The Semantic Foundation of Winnicottian Ontology The Use of an Object in Context III. METHODOLOGY………………….. ……………………….……..….82 Description of the Methodology Outline of Analysis IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT………………………………………..…..91 V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS………………………….…….……….....214 Overview Revealed Conceptual Metaphors Winnicott’s Ontology of the Mind Developmental Implications of the Conception of Mind Winnicott’s Ontology of the Self Developmental Implications of the Conception of Self Winnicott’s Ontology of Time Developmental Implications of the Conception of Time

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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued Chapter

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VI. DISCUSSION……………………………..…………………………247 Review of the Methodology Implications for Social Work Limitations of the Study Possible Future Directions

Appendices

A. KEY FINDINGS OF MODERN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN SCIENCES ……………………259 B. PRIMARY CONCEPTUAL (EMBODIED) METAPHORS….………...262 C. METAPHORS OF EVENTS AND CAUSES...…………………………267 D. METAPHORS OF MIND…………………….……………………...…..270 E. METAPHORS OF SELF………………..………………………………..274 F. METAPHORS OF TIME …………………..…….……………..….....…281 G. THE EMBODIED MIND’S CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT: NINE MYTHS ABOUT HUMAN REASON FROM TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY …..………………………….….….....284 H. THE SURGEON IS A BUTCHER BLEND.............................................286 I. “THE BYPASS” BLEND………………………………………………..288 J. THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS BLEND…………………………………290 K. RAPPAPORT & GILL’S (1959) METAPSYCHOLOGICAL POINTS OF VIEW AND ASSUMPTIONS WITH RELATED CONCEPTUAL AND PSYCHOANALYTICALLY-DERIVED METAPHORS……………………………………………......………....292 L. “THE TREE” (Poem by Donald Winnicott)……………..……..……….295

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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued Chapter

Page M. TENETS OF EMPIRICAL VERSUS CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH IN PSYCHOANALYSIS……………………………………………....298 N. EGO PSYCHOLOGY CRITIQUE OF KLEINIAN THEORY AND TECHNIQUE……….……….……………………………………..…..300 O. REVEALED CONCEPTUAL (EMBODIED) METAPHORS ……….305 REFERENCES………………………………………………………..……314

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LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page 1. Definition of Rhetorical Tropes ………………………………………17

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page 1. Conceptual Metaphor Mapping…………………………………...….…26 2. Cross-mappings Between a Journey & Therapy………………….…….29 3. Primary Differences Between CMT & BT……………………………..32 4. How Information That Forms the Blends Is Derived……………..……33 5. Fauconnier & Turner Schema……………………………………..……36 6. Use and Capacity in Relation to Time………………………………....161 7. Winnicottian Conception of Mind & Traditional Western Philosophy..222

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CHAPTER I

FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

General Statement of Purpose and Introduction This study will examine the concept of object usage and its associated metaphors of psychic transformation in the works of Donald Winnicott, using a textual analysis that combines elements of cognitive linguistics and psychoanalysis. Two central constructs of modern cognitive linguistics, conceptual (embodied) metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) and conceptual blending of mental spaces (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), will be utilized to elucidate the semantic foundation on which the construct of object usage is built. In addition, the analysis will examine Winnicott’s personal development in the context of cultural and historical factors to better understand the origins and evolution of his core constructs, as reflected in his unique style of scientific writing. From these examinations a Winnicottian ontology and epistemology with implications for clinical theory and practice will be posited. The study will also provide the opportunity to assess the value of the methodology as a tool for a conducting conceptual research in psychoanalysis (Dreher, 2000), which has as its goal the clarification and systematization of explicit and implicit uses of clinical constructs.

2 The impetus for this study was the introduction to the ideas of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (1999) during my immersion in psychoanalytic theory and its clinical applications as a PhD student. The findings that established the embodied-metaphorical basis of commonly accepted ideas in philosophy raised questions about the semantic basis of concepts in psychoanalysis, whose depictions of the human experience appeared to utilize much of the same conceptual rationale. In general both appeared to be “speaking the same language� in terms of positing the embodied nature of the mind, the mostly unconscious nature of thought, and the metaphorical basis of abstract concepts.

The attraction to cognitive linguistics was also in part a function of a personal background in foreign language study and instruction, which had demonstrated the importance of words, syntax and idiomatic expressions in shaping how experience is conceptualized into a worldview. As a student and instructor, I found that how adult learners uniquely meet the challenge of understanding a new language involves not only rational cognitive processes but also experiential ones related personal development (e.g., anxiety, self-esteem, mastery). It occurred to me that academic and clinical training in clinical social work involves a similar process, in that learners are exposed to what is essentially a new language and ways of thinking about themselves and the world.

Another revelation was that the process of understanding and integrating the meanings of theoretical constructs appeared to not only reveal valuable information about one’s unique learning and developmental processes, but also the nature of the ideas themselves. For novice and seasoned psychoanalytic professionals alike theoretical constructs seemed to take on a life of their own in the minds of different clinicians,

3 providing diverse shades of meaning that expanded, altered, or reified the conceptual territory on which the ideas are based. From a psychodynamic perspective one could say that the clinical constructs become incorporated internal objects and acquire a uniquely subjective status whose elaboration either reinforces or transforms their existing or implied meaning. The learning process involves a continual conceptual navigation of dialectics such as subject-object, internal-external space, conscious-unconscious thought, and internal-external reality, to name just a few. In this way how clinical concepts become uniquely elaborated over time appeared to reveal important insights into human ontology and epistemology, with practical implications for clinical work.

Finally, in terms of the models of the mind which guide practice, I noticed that the way a writer characterizes abstract psychic phenomena has important implications on the lives of those who are influenced by its rationale—patient, clinician, and society alike.

The concepts that are used to depict change from one state to another via constructs of transformation are crucial to the semantic foundation of any clinical theory. That modern cognitive science has demonstrated that reason and truth are not disembodied, universal and dispassionate but rather embodied, experiential, and emotional would seem to add importance to better understanding the experience of those who create and use clinical theories.

Definitions of Key Concepts Cognitive science investigates how human and non-human entities systematically process information using representations (International Encyclopedia of Linguistics, 2003). The field is interdisciplinary in nature and includes linguistics, psychology,

4 computer science, neuroscience, philosophy, biology, and anthropology. Cognitive linguistics is a branch of the cognitive sciences that began in the late 1980’s and is interested mainly in how cognition is related to the way humans understand, create, and use language. Before that time the mind was thought to have a separate module that functioned specifically for the purpose of acquiring and using language. Cognitive linguistics has generally shown that the cognitive mechanisms that are used for language acquisition are the same as those utilized in understanding all phenomena. In opposition to truth-conditional semantics (e.g., the notion that meaning is based on the most literal interpretation of word or ideas), cognitive linguistics views meaning as an outcome of conceptual processes that include what some would conceive of as “figurative” (e.g., metaphor). In general, Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) is representative of the view that metaphor as not simply about words but essentially about thought.

Traditionally metaphor has been thought of as simply a figure of speech and a way to convey similarities between objects and phenomena. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics (1997) defines metaphor as, “A figure of speech in which a word or expression normally used of one kind of object, action, etc. is extended to another” (see Table 1 for more complete description of metaphor and the rhetorical tropes). An example of metaphor as a figure of speech would be, “Achilles was a lion in the fight.” Here the attributes of a lion are used to describe the actions and character of the subject of the sentence. However, metaphor in modern cognitive linguistics is broader and connotes the method by which humans reason about the world through transferring information (based primarily on our embodied nature and somatic experiences)

5 conceptually from one domain of thought (not simply words) to another. The phrase “Our relationship is on the right path” is an example of a conceptual metaphor in that the data used to describe a relationship is not only the word “path” but the larger concept of a journey. This phrase is based on the commonly used conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY (e.g., “I think we might be on the right path, but we’re not there yet”), in which the idea of a journey is projected from what is called the source domain to the target domain of love.1 The notion of an objects moving in space and arriving at destinations is based on sensorimotor experiences beginning in utero and is reinforced throughout life, forming the rationale (via source domains) by which we reason about both simple events and abstract ideas. In this study “metaphor” will be used to connote both its function as a mechanism of our conceptual system (e.g., thoughts) and its application in language (e.g., words). A working definition of metaphor is: the conceptual and linguistic mechanism by which ideas derive meaning and are communicated through association with words and with larger domains of thought.2 Fauconnier & Turner’s (2003) conceptual blending theory (BT) is another idea from cognitive linguistics that seeks to explain the mechanisms by which humans reason about the world. Like Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) theory of conceptual metaphor, it views metaphor as not simply a linguistic event but more importantly as a conceptual

1

The designation in capital letters signifies a conceptual metaphor or the underlying conceptual reasoning upon which language or ideas are based. The transfer of conceptual data from source domain to target domain in the cognitive linguistic literature is depicted as S T. So, in this metaphor the process—called a “mapping”— would written as Journey Love, in that what is used to describe the emotion of love derives from a more basic sensori-motor experience (see Appendix A for a list of Primary Conceptual Metaphors).

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The term “conceptual metaphor” will be used for emphasis in a description or argument to call attention to its more conceptual (versus simply linguistic) nature. However, because conceptual metaphor reveals the built-in system of thought from which language emerges it is always also reflective of spoken and written words.

6 one. However, in conceptual blending the “domains” of conceptual metaphor are replaced with “mental spaces” as a way of characterizing the basis through which meaning is made and communicated. The construct of a mental space allows for more than a one to one correspondence of ideas that is implicit in metaphor (e.g., this is that, this is like that, or this is like that only in this way). In general, BT shows how the mind is able to combine and distill similar and dissimilar aspects of ideas in mental space to produce meanings that go beyond a simple one to one transfer conceptual data. As such conceptual blending reveals our innate imaginative capacities that create potentially infinite meanings from combining different ideas. Among other things it demonstrates our conceptual ability to instantaneously draw inferences between opposing phenomena, automatically including certain elements while omitting others.

For example, combining the words “surgeon” and “butcher” in a mental space automatically renders certain associations of similarity and dissimilarity. However, the statement “That surgeon is a butcher” (see Appendix G for a complete blending account) is unambiguous in conveying the intended meaning concerning the poor quality of the surgeon, even though not all qualities are shared between the entities. In particular, a surgeon and a butcher’s role related to the purpose of their respective crafts are diametrically opposed (one is to save life the other to end it). In this way conceptual blending is better suited than conceptual metaphor in accounting for the underlying conceptual processes that go into deciphering that statement, largely because it accounts for dissimilar as well as similar qualities that are projected to create meaning. In general, conceptual blending is better equipped to account for more abstract conceptual

7 phenomena, especially novel ideas that inherently transcend typical conception of reality based on conceptual (embodied) metaphor.

Finally, transformational metaphors are defined as those theoretical constructs that depict psychic change from one mental state to another. Though object usage will be the main metaphor of transformation under consideration, the study will examine others whose meaning is crucial for a more complete semantic understanding, including Winnicott’s own (e.g., transitional space and phenomena, true and false self, destruction) as well at those of Freud (e.g., fusion) and Klein (e.g., projective identification, depressive position).

Objectives of the Study Modern cognitive science has shown that metaphor is not simply a poetic device useful only as an “affair of style” or “an ornament of discourse” but rather the primary construct on which not only language but thought itself is based (Franke, 2000). CMT— also referred to as embodied metaphor theory—has challenged traditional Western philosophical notions of reason as disembodied and based on a literal “autonomous faculty” applied to objectively knowable objects in the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999)3.

It follows that conceptual metaphor needs to be accounted for in any discussion of how meaning is achieved and how knowledge is transmitted, as well as how physical experience and conceptual processes coalesce to shape human ontology and epistemology. A central thrust of modern cognitive linguistics is to examine topics such as the relationship between universal symbolism and person meaning, literal and abstract

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See Appendix A for the key findings of modern cognitive science with implications for psychological theory and practice.

8 thought, and conscious and unconscious processes, themes long critical to psychoanalysis and clinical social work.

As evidenced in Lakoff & Johnson’s groundbreaking work Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (1999), a multitude of a priori epistemological assumptions pervade both philosophy and the modern sciences.

These findings have ramifications for psychoanalysis, whose core theoretical constructs (e.g., metapsychology) have strong roots in 19th century science and philosophy. The empirical results establishing the embodied-metaphorical (versus disembodied and transcendent) basis of core ontological concepts such as mind, self, time, and causation suggest that like philosophy many constructs in psychoanalysis are grounded in similar disembodied assumptions about the nature of reality (Borbely, 2008). Though the body is ubiquitous in psychoanalytic conceptions of the mind, there has not been a systematic appraisal of how built-in conceptual processes based on the findings of conceptual metaphor plays a role in the creation and understanding of clinical constructs that guide psychoanalytic theory and practice. This study is designed to investigate one central idea—object usage—and its relationship to other theoretical constructs as a way of beginning to understand the implications of modern metaphor research for psychoanalysis. Because the central findings of modern cognitive linguistics which reveal the embodied basis of reason, the mostly unconscious processing of mind and thought, and the metaphorical nature of abstract concepts are generally in line with the main tenets of psychoanalysis, an additional objective is to uncover how each model can augment the other in terms of how humans conceive and express their unique realities.

9 Additional questions related to objectives for the study surround the implications for theory and practice that are raised with the recent findings of modern metaphor theory. For example, how does the human embodied mind, based primary on metaphor, alter our understanding of how motivation, behavior change, and psychic causality are represented in theoretical constructs? How do psychoanalytic theoreticians and practioners explicitly or implicitly use conceptual metaphor for conveying clinicallyderived truths? For clinician-readers of theory, what is it about certain linguistic conceptualizations of human experience that makes intuitive sense and has practical value in the realm of psychotherapy? How might a clinician-reader’s own development in the context of sociocultural and historical factors play a role in the conceptualization and utilization of clinical constructs? Do the tools of modern cognitive linguistics aid in better assessing the validity and usefulness of clinical theories? To begin to answer these questions the clinical constructs that underpin theories of psychotherapy need to be scrutinized using the recent findings from the cognitive sciences. The primary epistemological construct posited by Lakoff and Johnson (1999), experientialism, which is neither objectivist nor subjectivist, will be applied in this study to Winnicott’s idea of object usage and its supportive constructs of psychic transformation.

The main objectives of this study are: 1. To identify the primary conceptual (embodied) metaphors and separate but related elements of conceptual blending on which the Winnicottian concept of object usage and other related constructs of transformation are based;

10 2. To analyze, in turn, how Winnicott’s constructs of transformation contribute to an understanding of embodied metaphors and conceptual blending; 3. To propose a Winnicottian ontology and epistemology as revealed through the cognitive linguistic examination using embodied metaphors and conceptual blending; 4. To investigate how personal and historical factors contribute to an understanding of Winnicottian constructs of transformation and his particular use of language to describe them, and 5. To test the usefulness of the proposed methodology as a way of examining psychoanalytic concepts.

Significance of the Study for Clinical Social Work Drawing on the many of same conclusions reached by psychoanalytic theory, like the ubiquity of unconscious mental processes, the embodied nature of the mind, and the metaphorical basis for abstract thought (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), modern cognitive linguistics can offer an alternative lens to more closely examine the relationship between psychoanalytic theory, language, and clinical practice. Using conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending to reveal the semantic structure of clinical constructs of change is commensurate with the basic psycholinguistic foundations of psychoanalysis—in particular, the relationship between language and subjective meaning in the context of more universal forms of symbolism. Additionally, by applying a cognitive-linguistic lens to the phenomenon of transformation as it is conceived in clinical concepts such as object

11 usage, this study will additionally contribute to psychoanalytic scholarship by offering an alternative method for understanding the relationship between metapsychology and clinical theory, or more simply how clinical social workers understand and integrate more abstract theoretical constructs into clinical practice (Klein, 1975). In a closely related way this study also has implications for how clinicians translate experiential treatment data into words, via case notes, more formal evaluations, and professional publications (Ogden, 2005).

Though not specifically geared toward investigating the multitude of variables involved in learning psychoanalytic constructs, this study also has important implications for how social workers conceptually encounter, understand, and elaborate the meaning of clinical concepts. Specifically, in terms of psychoanalytic learning and development, a linguistic examination of theoretical and clinical writing can be one way to elucidate the processes involved in “cognitive learning� that is part and parcel of the overall experiential processes involved in professional psychoanalytic development (Ekstein & Wallerstein, 1958; Fleming & Benedek, 1983;). An ongoing task in clinical development is the ability to continually navigate and combine the realms of abstract theory with the practical usage of clinical concepts. Along those lines, the theory of conceptual metaphor and the epistemological stance of experientialism fit closely with the idea of psychoanalysis as hovering in an intermediate area between positivistic science and hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1970). Applying modern metaphor theory and the related position of experientialism to Winnicott’s psychoanalytic constructs of transformation and their application in clinical writing is also one way to test the level of conceptual congruence between theory and practice.

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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction/Overview The literature review will begin with an overview of conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending, the two main constructs from cognitive linguistics that will be used to elucidate Winnicott’s constructs of transformation. Since these ideas are likely new to most clinical social workers, a brief application of the ideas will be provided with respect to a set of psychoanalytically-derived constructions that have relevance for an understanding of object usage. In general the literature review will assume a basic understanding of psychoanalytic theory and will not attempt address major concepts, trends, positioning with respect to other psychological models, critiques of its validity as a method of treatment, etc. However, there will be an account of debates which have taken place in psychoanalysis surrounding the validity and applicability of its foundational metapyschological constructs,4 drawing attention to the larger question of theory as a positivistic science versus an interpreter or communicator of personal meaning (e.g., hermeneutics). A central theme in the discussions has been the extent to

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According to Moore and Fine (1990) metapsychology (“beyond psychology”) specifically refers to the five conceptual vantage points from which psychoanalysis is viewed: dynamic (forces, drives), economic (energy), structural (topography, id, ego, superego), genetic (time), and adaptational (individual in environment).

13 which metapsychological constructs are “metaphorical” and thus not observable, quantifiable and ultimately valid. Besides ramifications for psychoanalysis as a science (Grunbaum, 1983), the metaphoricity of it concepts has also been questions with respect to clinical theory (Klein, 1975). This is background is relevant to this study because cognitive science in general (and CMT in particular) has significantly shifted the position of language vis-à-vis metaphor—in particular, modern research shows that even abstract and complex constructs of science are ultimately related to the mind’s embodiment, which functions primary by way of metaphor. In this way, dichotomies such as subjective versus objective, logical versus rhetorical, and truth versus metaphor are no longer suited to accurately depict the nature of thought and reason. Language is at the core of discussions surrounding science or “truth” versus personal meaning; specifically, how we use words to understand and communicate the nature of events and reality.

The literature review will also include an account of Winnicott’s early development, which provides many clues to the origins of his ideas and manner in which he would ultimately express them. In general this section contextualizes the subjectiveexperiential foundations of the key constructs of transformation under consideration.

Along those lines the review will briefly outline key biographers’ analyses and interpretations of Winnicott’s life story in the context of particular clinical formulations and his unique style of communicating his ideas. Though the literature review will not outline the substantial corpus of Winnicottian thought, it will provide an account of a thread of ideas (e.g., aggression in the context of early development) that lays the groundwork for the textual analysis of the paper on object usage.

14 This section also incorporates some basics of metaphor theory, providing the reader a taste of how conceptual metaphor relates to clinical constructs. It should be noted that many of Winnicott’s core clinical ideas will be covered in the textual analysis section (Chapter 3). Overall, the literature review is designed to provide a basic theoretical, historical, subjective-developmental background to understand and apply ideas related to embodied metaphor and conceptual blending to an analysis of The Use of an Object.

Metaphor Basics “[The] drive towards the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive.” ~Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth

The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines metaphor as: “A figure of speech in which a name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object or action different from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable.” Metaphor is a tool of comprehension and communication that functions in its ability to draw attention to the similarities between objects in the world. Beginning with Aristotle, metaphor has been associated with communicating information by means of analogy or comparison: A metaphor is the application of a noun which properly applies to something else.

The transfer may be from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or by analogy (Aristotle, trans. 1996).

In the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric (2001), Aristotle cites the phrase “the evening of a man’s life” to demonstrate how a time of day can be recruited via analogy to depict a human life stage. This transference or substitution of conceptual material is outlined in the following categories:

15 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

concrete for abstract or abstract for concrete; animate for inanimate or inanimate for animate; non-visual for visual or visual for non-visual; positive for negative or negative for positive; of small for large.

A trope is a figure of speech that involves the figurative extension of the meaning of a word or other expression. Along with metonymy, synecdoche, and irony, metaphor is one of the master tropes that encompass the main categories of figurative language (see Table 1). Tropes provide diverse ways of understanding phenomena, by “rendering the unfamiliar more familiar” (Chandler, 2002). Besides the qualities of the phenomena that it conveys, the structure of tropes themselves have a way of calling attention to aspects of experience would not be revealed by literal language alone. That is, tropes trigger imaginative aspects of the mind that allow for considering words from a wider conceptual perspective. For example, in communicating meaning by using a part to stand for the whole, metonymy directs the reader to consider certain aspects of person or object over others. In the statement “The ham sandwich is waiting for his check” (from Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), the representation of a person as a ham sandwich evokes associations to gustatory habits or tastes as well as qualities of personality. Common uses of metonymy from the mental health work involve the utilization of a time slot or diagnosis to designate a particular person as in, “My three o clock is late” or “The depressive in the waiting room.”

Metaphor had long been thought to be simply an ornamental device of poetry and a “linguistic deviance” (Evola, 2008), less concerned with the literal or objective conception of reality. Undergoing what Franke (2000) called a “renaissance,” metaphor is increasingly associated with the foundations of language and knowledge itself. It has

16 become representative of the four rhetorical tropes and has been increasingly shown to be a key process involved in the making of meaning. Metaphor’s history has always been linked to rhetoric and philosophy, and with what has been called the “linguistic” or “rhetorical turn” of the 20th century has become increasingly accepted in the human sciences as revealing important elements of ontology and epistemology (Cazeaux, 2007; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). As such metaphor is well positioned moving forward as a tool for examining a range of scientific texts—in particular, the examination of theoretical concepts and their relationship to and coherence with broader theories.

Within the area of language study, metaphor has been evaluated within various disciplines and most if not all literary figures and philosophers have weighed in on its validity and utility in representing reality. Certain trends of modern philosophical thought, broadly viewed as Continental Philosophy with roots in late the 19th century method of phenomenology of Brentano and Husserl, would come to view metaphor not simply as a poetic device but also as illustrative of language and ontology itself (Critchley & Schroeder, 1998). From within movements such as semiotics, poststructuralism, existentialism, and hermeneutics, the rise of metaphor has coincided with challenges to scientism and its a priori determination of experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). One common set of assumptions within these positions is the general view of ontology as variable and inseparable from the subjective, historical, and textual context in which it occurs, along with a conception of metaphor as more primary to language and experience itself (Cazeaux, 2007).

Table 1

RHETORICAL TROPES

METAPHOR

*Oxford Dictionary of English Grammar ** Encyclopedia of Rhetoric * The application of a name or descriptive term or phrase to an object or action to which it is imaginatively but not literally applicable (e.g. a glaring error, a loud check).

Concise Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics

Concise Oxford Companion to the English Language

Pocket Fowler’s Modern English Usage

Figure of speech in which a word or expression normally used of one kind of object, action, etc. is extended to another. This may lead to metaphoric change in meaning: thus what is now the normal sense of lousy is in origin a metaphorical extension from the basic sense ‘full of lice’.

In rhetoric a figure with two senses, both originating with Aristotle in the 4c BC: (1) All figures of speeches that achieve their effect through association, comparison, and resemblance. Figures like antithesis, hyperbole, metonymy, simile, are all species of metaphor. Although this sense is not current, it lies behind the use of metaphorical and figurative as antonyms of literal. (2) A figure of speech which concisely compares two things by saying that one is the other. A warrior compared to a lion becomes a lion: Achilles was a lion in the fight. In such usages, the perception of something held in common brings together words and images from different fields: warriors and lions share bravery and strength, and so

(Vis á vis simile) The difference between these two figures of speech, which together constitute a major element of English idiom, is largely one of form. A simile is a fanciful comparison couched in a form introduced by as or like, for example Byron's line The Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold, whereas a metaphor directly equates the image with the person or thing it is compared to: Achilles was a lion in the fight.

Many figurative uses of words (e.g. the mouth of a river, a blanket of fog, music to one's ears) and many idioms (e.g. get the green light, have one foot in the grave, take the rough with the smooth, off the

2. Used by G. P. Lakoff in the 1980s of a general pattern in which one domain is systematically conceived and spoken of in terms of another. E.g. terms directly applicable to war, as one domain, are systematically applied to that of courtship: She was besieged by suitors, I have lost count of her conquests, and so on.

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METONYM(Y)

SYNECODCHE

* A word or expression which is used as a substitute for another word or expression with which it is in a close semantic relationship.

E.g. Whitehall for ‘the British civil service’, the Turf for ‘the racing world’, per head for ‘per person’.

** A metasememe that signifies a relationship of the particular and the general.

Like metonymy, it is constituted by a substitution

Figure of speech in which a word or expression normally or strictly used of one thing is used of something physically or otherwise associated with it: e.g. the Pentagon (strictly a building) when used of the military inhabiting it. This may lead to metonymic change of meaning: e.g. the sense of bureau changed successively from ‘cloth used to cover desks’, first to ‘desk’ itself, then to ‘agency etc. (working from a desk)’.

Defined in the most general sense as any figure based on ‘contiguity’: as such often taken to include e.g. synecdoche opposed in this sense to metaphor as a figure based on ‘similarity’.

Figure of speech in which an expression denoting a part is used to refer to a whole: also, in the traditional definition, vice versa. Hence a term in

the warrior is a lion among men and the lion is a warrior among beasts

wall) can be regarded as metaphors.

Figure of speech which designates something by the name of something associated with it: the Crown substituting for monarchy, the stage for the theatre, No. 10 Downing Street for the British Prime Minister, the White House for the US President. A word used metonymically (crown, as above) is a metonym Metonymy is closely related to and sometimes hard to distinguish from metaphor. It has sometimes been seen as a kind of synecdoche and sometimes as containing synecdoche. Both metaphor and metonymy express association, metaphor through comparison, metonymy through contiguity and possession.

Figure of speech in which an attribute or property is used to refer to the person or thing that has it, e.g. the White House for the American presidency and the Crown for the British monarchy. In the proverb The pen is mightier than the sword, pen and sword, by a process of metonymy, represent the written word and warfare respectively.

In rhetoric, a figure of speech concerned with parts and wholes: (1) Where the part represents the whole: ‘All hands on deck’ (the members

Figure of speech in which a more inclusive term is used for a less inclusive one or vice versa, as in England came out to bat (England

19

IRONY

of contiguities. Synecdoche presents either particular things instead of a whole, or a whole instead of something particular. An example of the former case is the expression “Caesar conquered Gallia,” in which “Caesar” represents the members of the Roman army; an example of the latter is the sentence, “The Americans have landed on the moon,” in which the term Americans denotes only the astronauts involved. ** Irony's general characteristic is to make something understood by expressing its opposite. We can therefore isolate three separate ways of applying this rhetorical form. Irony can refer to (1) individual figures of speech (ironia verbi); (2) particular ways of interpreting life (ironia vitae); and (3) existence in its entirety (ironia entis). The three dimensions of irony— trope, figure, and universal paradigm—can be understood as rhetorical, existential, and ontological.

typologies of semantic change: e.g. flower has by synecdoche the sense ‘plant bearing flowers’. Often treated as a special case of metonymy.

of a ship's crew represented by their hands alone). (2) Where the whole represents the part: ‘England lost to Australia in the last Test Match’ (the countries standing for the teams representing them and taking a plural verb).

more inclusive for ‘the England team’) and a fleet of fifty sail (sail less inclusive for ‘ships’).

Traditionally of a figure of speech in which one thing is said but the opposite is meant: e.g. ‘That's just what I needed!’, said as the tool one is using comes apart in one's hands. Usage in pragmatics or linguistics generally tends to reflect this, but others are also current, in literary studies especially.

In rhetoric, words with an implication opposite to their usual meaning. Ironic comment may be humorous or mildly sarcastic, as for example when, at a difficult moment, an act of kindness makes things worse, and someone says, ‘Well, that's a lot better, isn't it?’ Expressions heavy with irony are often used to drive a point home: ‘I'm really looking forward to seeing him, I don't think’; ‘You're pleased to see me?

Pull the other leg/one (it's got bells on).’ In such usages, irony slides into sarcasm.

In the ordinary use of language irony means primarily ‘an expression of meaning by use of words that have an opposite literal meaning or tendency’.

When we look out of the window at the pouring rain and exclaim ‘What a lovely day!’, we are using a trivial form of irony. Literary forms of irony include (1) dramatic irony, in which an audience is taken into the writer's confidence and is made aware of more than the participating characters know, and (2) so-called

20

2. In general usage, incongruity between what is expected and what happens, and an outcome that displays such incongruity. The sentence adverb ironically is often used to draw attention to it: ‘Ironically, his kindness only made things worse.’ In many instances, ironically serves virtually as a synonym of paradoxically.

3. Wry awareness of life's incongruity and irrationality.

Socratic irony (after the Greek philosopher Socrates, who used it), in which a participant in a discussion falsely purports to be ignorant of a matter in order to elicit a particular response from the other participants.

21 Metaphor as Conceptual Tool The publication of Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) marked a pivotal turning point in the positioning of metaphor as the primary mechanism of human conceptual capacity. Metaphor had still been viewed by many as mostly as a poetic device or a “linguistic event” (Evola, 2008) and not constitutive of meaning itself. With findings that linked it to our core ontological existence—based mainly on our embodied nature—metaphor could be used to examine knowledge claims in science and the humanities. In particular, Lakoff & Johnson’s examination of the semantic roots of common expressions put into serious question the relegation of metaphor to a purely figurative device devoid of any connection with cognition, biology, and meaning. They clearly assert their claims at the outset:

Metaphor is for most people device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish—a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (p.3).

Drawing on the expressions of ordinary speakers, Lakoff and Johnson demonstrated how language, concepts, and the processes that create meaning are metaphorically structured (Coulson, 2001). They posited an epistemology largely based on unconscious perceptual capacities that shape how humans view the world, from understanding ordinary everyday events to abstract concepts of philosophy. From that point on, language in general and metaphor in particular would be increasingly viewed as

22 an outcome of cognitive-semantic processes that are embedded in the experience of inhabiting a body.

A primary way that metaphor functions in speech is by using conceptual information about one idea to understand another. In this way meaning and understanding are largely based on a cross-referencing process between subject areas that are perceived to be more or less similar to one another. Evidence for the ubiquity of metaphor derives from everyday linguistic constructions such as ARGUMENT IS WAR5 (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), in which speakers routinely invoke words associated with war to communicate characteristics of a verbal argument:

ARUGUMENT IS WAR Your claims are indefensible.

He attacked every weak point in our argument.

If you use that strategy, she’ll wipe you out.

They shot down all my arguments.

You disagree? Okay, shoot!

I never won an argument with him.

The range of expressions demonstrates that using war to talk about an argument is not isolated. Various characteristics of a physical battle like attacking, shooting, and defending are readily utilized to convey meanings that we associate with a disagreement.

Importantly, this interchange of language to communicate the idea of an argument points to how it is not really the words themselves, but rather the logical structure that is

5

In the cognitive-linguistic literature, conceptual metaphors are depicted using capital letters to denote their relationship to built-in conceptual structure. As evidenced in Appendix A, B, C and D, conceptual metaphors are written in all capital letters (e.g., THE MIND IS A BOY) when illustrated as the primary heading under which submappings (e.g., Thinking Is Moving) occur. However, submappings can also be primary mappings in other configurations (e.g., THINKING IS MOVING The Mind Is A Body). For clarity, this study will use all capital letters to depict any conceptual metaphor (primary metaphor or derived from primary metaphor) when illustrated without other submappings. When illustrations are provided that do not include submappings but rather describe in narrative form the conceptual relationship to the metaphor, the first letter of each word will only be capitalized.

23 recruited from one domain of meaning to another (Coulson, 2001). In other words the linguistic use of metaphor is an outcome of what has already occurred conceptually, revealing how humans make meaning by virtue of association with perceived similar phenomena. It is through the correlation of certain core bodily experiences with other objects in infancy that our conceptual systems are based.

With the 1999 publication of Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought, Lakoff and Johnson refined aspects of CMT and applied it to the semantic foundations of philosophy. They posited that most if not all theory in the natural and human sciences are built on certain a priori assumptions about central constructs related to time, the mind, the self, events and causes, and morality. The book examined how these ideas central to Western thought held up under the scrutiny of conceptual metaphor. In general Lakoff and Johnson sought to determine whether basic ontological concepts we use to understand existence—both simple everyday events as well as abstract ideas of science—are based on some literal correspondence to an external universal truth or reality or on more internal subjective processes related to conceptual metaphor. These results have important implications for the semantic basis of psychological theories and also how clinicians interpret and use those theories in the treatment process.

To begin to understand the influence and ubiquity of metaphor requires a clarification of its status vis-ĂĄ-vis language and thought. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) point out that that there are four basic myths about metaphor that cloud our ability to understand its pervasiveness. As already mentioned the first is that metaphor is about language only and not about concepts. In other words, many believe that metaphor is

24 simply an embellished way of using words to communicate ideas. What is missing in this conception is that metaphor actually forms the basis of our conceptual systems of thought which guide the manner in which reasoning occurs. A second related myth is that concepts represent real things in the world and must therefore be viewed as literal. It would follow then that metaphor, as only a stylized way of using words, cannot necessarily be associated with what is real or true. In fact, what is metaphorical is often associated with what is imaginary or outright false. A third myth is that metaphor is based on the similarity of opposing ideas, when in fact it functions by virtue of experiences related to inhabiting a body. In particular, the foundation for metaphor is set via sensorimotor experiences in infancy which are then correlated with other events perceived to be similar (see Appendix B). Thus the nature of ideas is not somehow transcendent of experience, but rather derived from interacting with other objects in the world. Last and most importantly is the myth that the structure and function of our physical body and brains has nothing to do with reason. This belief holds that there exists absolute and transcendent and disembodied “truths” that are revealed by virtue of tapping into a system of rational thinking that is somehow separate from our body and brains. A related tenet is that subjectivity is a barrier to comprehending reality and therefore must be eliminated—or at the very least controlled—in order to comprehend that which is true.

Metaphor and the Body One important piece of evidence for the embodied basis of thought and language that forms our basic ontology is the process involved in the formation of conceptual

25 metaphors. From a cognitive linguistic perspective a conceptual metaphor is the outcome of a psycho-linguistic process whereby one conceptual domain (target domain) is understood in terms of another (source domain), as in STATES ARE LOCATIONS (e.g., “I’m not in a good place today”). Source domains relate directly to the physical experience of inhabiting a body and form the basis for understanding more abstract ideas.

In this example, the state or emotion of, say, irritability is the target and is conceptualized using information from the more basic source domain. Because affective states are primary to human experience beginning from the time in the womb, and because as physical entities humans perceive themselves as bounded objects in space, location is used to reflect the more complex phenomenon of feeling or emotion. Overall, the utilization of a location in space to comprehend and communicate states of emotions is one example that demonstrates the embodied nature of thought and language.

As discussed conceptual metaphors are formed by transferring or “mapping” elements from a source domain (based on sensorimotor experiences) to a target domain, as in the statement “I’m feeling down today.” 6 Following is a visual depiction of the mapping of domains that occurs to create the conceptual metaphor SAD IS DOWN:

6

The cognitive linguistic literature depicts a mapping with an arrow form one domain to another. For primary conceptual metaphors the direction proceeds from the source domain to the target domain (S T), as in Down Sad. It is important to note that mappings the underlie metaphor reflect conceptual information stored in long-term memory, not an “on the spot” construction or application of words.

26

SOURCE DOMAIN

TARGET DOMAIN

Location/Directionality

Emotional State

“Down”

“Sad”

Mapping

Figure 1. Conceptual Metaphor Mapping The broader conceptual metaphor in this framework is STATES ARE LOCATIONS, in which the subjective experience associated with a state of mind is equated with existing below or above some imagined point in space. From this construction is derived the corresponding metaphors SAD IS DOWN (“She’s been under the weather for two weeks”) and its counterpart HAPPY IS UP (“They’re on a high since winning the lottery”). This correlation of space and emotion is related to such physical experiences as bodily slumping, sensations of heaviness, or the eyes pointing downward when one is depressed. The construction SAD IS DOWN is considered “unidirectional” because linguistic and conceptual elements are projected only from source to target, and not vice versa.7 In other words the position in space signifying “down” informs the

7

Conceptual blending will be shown to involve a bi-directional flow of conceptual information.

27 understanding of feeling sad, but sadness does not in any way add to the conception of being in a low spatial position.

The correlation of experience that forms the basis for conceptual metaphors has been found by Christopher Johnson (as cited in Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) to be related to the co-occurrence of pre-verbal perceptual processes and interaction with objects in the environment. This “conflation” involved in early learning was determined to form the basis for conceptual metaphor. Specifically, Johnson’s work on conflation found that prior to the ability to utilize primary conceptual metaphors in speech certain perceptual experiences become associated with common events in the environment. For example, KNOWING IS SEEING comes from the repeated experience of finding out about objects by being able to have them in one’s visual sight (e.g., peek a boo).8 From this comes an expression such as “I don’t see the relationship between those variables,” demonstrating that the nature of knowing is informed by the physical capacity of vision. The list of primary conceptual (embodied) metaphors in Appendix B shows the direct correlation of sensorimotor domains of experiences with meaning.

The “embodied mind” is how Lakoff and Johnson (1999) characterize the nature and function of the human conceptual system as based on the same neurological mechanisms that are involved in ordinary perceptual and motor processes (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile, and movement). These sensorimotor systems form the foundation for what and how humans are able to experience the world—the self, others, objects, events, etc. How we reason, then, is based not on some amorphous ability that exists apart from

8

From a neurological standpoint such experiences are stored in neural networks and activated when experiencing similar events.

28 our biology (e.g., “faculty psychology”), but rather on the particular form and function our bodies possess. In general, the embodied mind is posited in cognitive science via findings in the field of “neural modeling” and is generally concerned with how the human perceptual system conceives basic categories (e.g., color) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).

Lacking the findings of modern cognitive science, the traditional philosophical theories on which psychoanalysis is primarily based did not take into account human reason is not disconnected from the most basic bodily capacities that we share with other animals (see Appendix G for the a priori assumptions about reason and reality upon which Western Philosophy is based).

A Psychoanalytic Application of CMT Casonato (2001) outlines a number of psychoanalytically-derived constructions based on primary (embodied) conceptual metaphors. Overall, the paper shows how tenets of CMT can be applied to understanding the semantic roots of commonly used (though often implicit) metaphorical concepts in psychoanalysis. A central discussion in the paper centers on how depictions of therapy (e.g., transference, therapeutic alliance) draw on many of the same conceptual elements love relationships. Drawing on Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) LOVE IS A JOURNEY, Casonato posits THERAPY IS A JOURNEY as a primary way aspects of the treatment relationship are understood in terms of a love relationship. In this schema the ubiquitous sensorimotor experience of intentionally moving through space to and from objects in order to meet needs, complete tasks, reach goals, etc. is used to depict the qualities of an intimate relationship. The following outlines the relationship or cross-mappings between a journey and therapy:

29

Source (Journey) ---------------------------------- Target (Therapy) Travelers

Participants

Vehicle

Therapy Relationship

Journey

Events in the Relationship

Distance Traversed

Progress Made

Obstacles

Difficulties

Travel Decisions

Relationship Decisions

Destination

Goals of the Relationship

Figure 2. Cross-Mappings Between a Journey & Therapy From these correspondences come statements such as “The therapy is at an impasse,” “I think we’re headed in the right direction” and “It’s been difficult, but you’ve come a long way.”

The paper additionally examines other ways love is conceptualized using metaphors that are often similarly applied when conceptualizing therapy. For example, LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE describes how individuals are attracted to each other as in, “He felt electricity when he first met his therapist” or “They (the relationship) have great energy.” LOVE IS A PATIENT reveals how love is thought of in terms of health status as in “That is a sick relationship,” “She has a healthy marriage,” or “The therapy is on its last legs.” In an interesting irony, love and the therapy relationship can also be equated with being mentally imbalanced, as in LOVE IS MADNESS (e.g. “I’m crazy about her” or “She raves about her therapist”). Finally, LOVE IS WAR is conveyed

30 through such constructions as “She fled from his advances” and “She is known for her many conquests.”

The idiomatic expressions above reveal the ubiquity of conceptual metaphor in how we conceptualize relationships and love, in personal relationships and in a therapeutic context. Tracing the origins of metaphor back to common sensorimotor (embodied) experiences is fairly straightforward in such constructions. However, conceptual metaphor is also involved in the shaping of the more complex ideas that form the basis of metapsychology and related clinical theory in psychoanalysis. Along those lines, conceptual metaphor will be similarly shown to be related to more abstract concepts guide theory and practice, most notably related to conceptions of mind, self, time, and causality.

Conceptual Blending A related cognitive-linguistic framework that is rooted in CMT is called “conceptual blending theory” (BT) or “conceptual integration” of mental spaces (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner, 1996). Like CMT, BT attempts to describe the basic mental operations which reflect the underlying cognitive processes at work in creating meaning. Each model also views metaphor as more than a literary device disconnected from biology and cognition, and thus not simply a “literary event” but a “conceptual phenomenon” (Coulson & Oakley, 2000; Evola, 2008). BT and CMT differ, however, in how they characterize the nature and function of the processes that go into what are considered “metaphorical,” or less than purely literal language constructions. In general,

31 BT is thought to be better suited to account for language constructions that draw on information that is both metaphorical and literal.

BT can be thought of as supplementing CMT in that it can account for constructions that utilize primary conceptual metaphorical data but whose ultimate meaning cannot be completely explained by the more concrete and unidirectional transfer of information from a source to a target domain (e.g., DOWN SAD). One important way it accomplishes this by incorporating source and target information (based on embodied metaphor) into its main input category called “mental spaces.” That is, in the BT model mental spaces include conceptual data that comprises both the basic sensorimotor experience (e.g., “source data” related to space, objects, time, etc.) and its uses in language constructions (e.g., “target data” reflecting the complete meaning as in “I’m feeling down today” or “She’s on a high”). So, while for CMT the complete or finite meaning is established in target domain, for BT the source and target are inputs that lead to additional meaning(s) in the “blended space.” A corollary is that blended space is more fluid than a target space, in that it meanings that are an outcome of the combined data from mental spaces are one variation of infinite possibilities (e.g., “partial” with respect to the potential whole). The illustration below reveals some primary differences between CMT and BT with respect to the quality and flow of information from source to ultimate meaning:

32 Model CMT

BT

Source (Input) Source Domain

Target

Meaning

Target Domain

In Target

(Sensorimotor Experience)

(Embodied Metaphor)

(Finite)

Mental Spaces

Blended Space

(Sensorimotor Experience + (Similar & Dissimilar Embodied Metaphor) Qualities)

In Blend (Part of Infinite Meanings)

Figure 3. Primary Differences Between CMT & BT

A related quality of BT that sets it apart from CMT is that instead of drawing information from two spaces in a unidirectional manner (e.g., from source to target, S T), it utilizes a four-space model of conceptual integration in which information flows in more than one direction. By having more than one input space a broader range of data can be drawn on to utilize in the blended or “emergent” space. “Generic space” represents the information that the mental space inputs already have in common. These are typically broad categories like role, subject, goal, or means to arrive at the goal. The inputs—characterized in BT as “mental spaces”—account for how information simultaneously flows in a bidirectional manner between domains of ideas. In an important way, bidirectional and multi-source input frames allow for both similar and dissimilar elements of a word, idea, or metaphor to be incorporated into the final meaning. As a result, BT can account for the processes that form the basis of more abstract and complex meanings. The diagram below (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) illustrates how information that forms the blend or “emergent” meaning is derived:

33

Figure 4. How Information That Forms the Blend Is Derived The nature and function of mental spaces determines many of the differences between BT and CMT, and it also sheds lights on the more imaginative capacities that form the basis of the human conceptual system. In contrast to source and target domains, mental spaces generally describe the more fluid and less static quality of the human representational system, accounting for how particular elements of ideas are included or discarded when creating meaning (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). A mental space is a “partial” representational structure that contains “small conceptual packets constructed as we talk, for purposes of understanding and action” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p.101).

Though essentially built-in to our neurological hardware and a product of evolution, conceptual blending is highly imaginative and allows for the capacity to comprehend and create an infinite number of language constructions. As such, BT can be a useful construct with which to analyze clinical constructs of transformation that often involve complex relationships between basic ontological categories such as time, space, objects,

34 as well as the more immediate conceptual constructions created by the free association of patients in clinical treatment.9 A prototypical example of how CMT struggles to account for more abstract and nuanced constructions commonly used in speech and writing is “That surgeon is a butcher” (see Appendix G for a complete mapping). Though the statement is obviously metaphorical (e.g., not literally true), CMT and its unidirectional source to target domain depiction is not equipped to explain how humans are able to easily compute the implied meaning. Specifically, directly transferring (e.g., mapping) information from the source domain (butcher) to the target domain (surgeon) does not account for the primary meaning of the statement—the incompetence of the surgeon (Grady, Oakley, and Coulson, 1999). That is, a butcher is not inherently incompetent or incapable of successfully performing the task of animal butchery. One main distinction that allows the blend to function is that a butcher and surgeon share similar roles (e.g., cutting flesh), though their goals are diametrically opposed (e.g., killing versus healing). It is basically the projection of similar roles into a space with conflicting goals (e.g., the operating room) that allows the blend to function. The value of BT is that it demonstrates how

9

With respect to characterizing the treatment process, both CMT and BT have direct and indirect implications. In general, CMT would be a way of understanding a patient’s thought processes with respect to more universal categories of metaphor based on sensorimotor experience (e.g., HAPPY IS UP, RELATIONSHIPS ARE PATHS, INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS, etc.). In contrast, BT is better suited to explain emergent meanings that go beyond more basic one to one correspondence of relationship between ideas. For example, CMT might better account for the statement “Our relationship is on the rocks” (STATES ARE LOCATIONS), while BT is better suited to explain the implied and nuanced meanings inherent in that statement (e.g., how disparate emotions and experiences go into the status of the relationship).

35 humans are capable of utilizing similar and dissimilar qualities of ideas to draw coherent meanings.10 How is the human conceptual system able to instantaneously perform such seemingly complex operations to arrive at shared meanings? Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (1999) posit that conceptual blending is based on three main processes: 1. Composition; 2. Completion; 3. Elaboration.

Composition involves how information is projected from the content of each input space into the blended space. It involves how information from mental spaces can combine to create a meaning or circumstance (real or not) that was not present in either of the separate inputs. In the above example, the “surgeon” (Agent in Input #1) and “butcher” (Agent in Input #2) merge into one person in blended space. The process that underlies this conceptual process is called “fusion” in that parts of each element are combined to create a separate and unique whole. Completion refers to how the mind is designed to form patterns from disparate sensory elements. In BT familiar qualities of images or ideas that are stored in long-term memory from each input space are projected into the blended space to “finalize” the meaning construction. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) provide the well-known schema from psychology that depicts how humans inherently complete a pattern by inferring that the line runs behind the rectangle: 10

That the human conceptual system is inherently set-up to perform operations to make sense of statements such as “That surgeon is a butcher” is likely not new to clinicians whose central task is to understand how people come to conclusions about themselves and the larger world. How humans instinctively distill disparate and often conflicting pieces of information based on biology, cognition, and experience to make sense of reality is embedded in psychoanalytic metapsychology and clinical theory. Whether accounted for

by BT or CMT, a primary objective of this study is to uncover how concepts of transformation reflect the embodied processes of thought based on metaphor.

36

Figure 5. Fauconnier & Turner Schema In the example blend, completion is demonstrated by how the butcher is “projected” into an operating room, which is crucial to conveying the idea of incompetence. Finally, elaboration involves how one’s imagination “simulates” the qualities of the blend which is capable of continuing indefinitely and creating infinite meanings. Elaboration is associated with how once a meaning scenario is established, it can be projected forward following a number of potential trajectories based on the standards set by the particular blend. Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (1999) conjure an elaboration scenario of the example blend in which after the butcher cuts up the patient, body parts are then packaged as cold cuts.11 The process of elaboration demonstrates how imaginative capacities are central to conceptual blending.

Fauconnier and Turner (2002) provide a blend called “The Bypass” (see Appendix H) which highlights the core elements at work in creating meaning. The ad is calling attention to our collective need to take early education seriously, by raising the standards to match the technical sophistication required to practice in occupations like

11

Another aspect of elaboration involves the application of the “emergent” meaning of the blend in a different (but related) construction. For example, “He’s not a butcher, he’s a surgeon” can be used to describe an overly cautious novice cutting up meat (Grady, Oakley & Coulson 1999).

37 medicine. The blend basically “works” by our inherent ability to project into the future the consequences of one potential path (e.g., composition, completion, elaboration) in which poor education leads to incompetency. In this scenario the age of the children “matches” their future level of competency, as poignantly demonstrated in their depiction as presumably ready to perform an operation! The implied scenario (e.g., not pictured but evoked in mental space) is one in which the children—at their current age and “potential” for learning—are provided an improved quality of education that will lead to enhanced future competency. In this way the blend is set-up in a way that forces the reader to consider the potential effects of not changing education standards, primarily by our inherent capacity to elaborate certain scenarios along a hypothetical path into the future.12 Mental space and its ability to distill and combine similar and dissimilar qualities of ideas is a key process that is not accounted for in CMT.

THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS: A Winnicottian of Application of Conceptual Blending Theory Winnicott’s conceptualization of the aggressive elements of infant development provides a means by which BT can be further elucidated and shown to be involved in the formation of novel constructs of transformation. An examination of the statement “The infant is ruthless” (see Appendix J for complete mapping) demonstrates how blending might be used by conceptual researchers within psychoanalysis (Dreher, 2000). Though the processes of blending which go into an understanding of the ideas are essentially the same, an important quality that sets apart the current example with “That surgeon is a

12

The human ability to mentally transcend time and space will be shown to be a central quality of Winnicottian ontology.

38 butcher” is that comprehending the complete meaning of the statement requires familiarity of aspects of psychoanalytic theory. As such the statement and related constructs that derive meaning from it are thus termed a “psychoanalytic-derivatives.” 13 Historically, aggression as a primary force in early psychic development is an idea inherited directly from Melanie Klein, while the broader idea of the “fusion” of erotic and aggressive impulses is a cornerstone of Classical theory (Freud, 1961).14 For Winnicott the quality of “ruthlessness” characterizes the infant at the stage of “preconcern” (1945), or pre-depressive position, in the context of instinctual fusion. The underlying construction THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS implies that certain qualities and manifestations of early development are a function of built-in aggression, which is posited as the primary force in his conception of mind (e.g., AGGRESSION IS A FORCE). In line with his British object relations tradition, aggression is a force that comes to assume various roles with respect to psychic advancement and thus it characterization as purely negative or positive (or psychically stagnating versus generative) does not adequately capture its complete conceptual quality.

In general the statement “The infant is ruthless” is metaphorical in that ruthlessness is literally associated being devoid of pity or compassion, qualities that are typically assigned to more cognitively mature persons. Similar to the “That surgeon is a butcher” conceptual blending is better equipped to deconstruct the semantic foundations

13

The implication is that the information required in the “inputs” of mental space is beyond that which is available to ordinary speakers or readers. In this way all theoretical constructs within specialized fields similarly build on established ideas that become the foundation (e.g., paradigms) of future meaning.

14

The idea of the fusion or aggressive and erotic energy will be shown to play a significant role in the construct of object usage, Winnicott’s last major statement on development.

39 of the statement. One of the ways Winnicott linguistically sets-up this idea is by using a word (“ruthless”) that has a connotation that transcends the barriers of time, in that it forces the reader to “age” the child in ways reminiscent of “The Bypass.” On the surface assigning ruthlessness to an infant is an extreme notion, though the experience it creates in the reader (e.g., dissonance) assists in drawing out new ways of thinking about the subject.

Juxtaposing in mental space similar and dissimilar elements of aggression and love, the reader is forced to consider aspects of ideas that go beyond their most obvious meanings. In the blend, erotic aspects of aggression (e.g., “I hate (really) love you”) and aggressive aspects of eroticism (e.g., “He loves her to death”) already present in the cognitive unconscious and long-term memory, are tapped into automatically.15 Blending aids in the process, drawing out more subtle qualities of these ubiquitous concepts whose meanings are easily reified in everyday usage. In terms of “composition” and “completion” leading to emergent meanings, part of what is projected into blended space is an infant that is capable of possessing both emotional qualities—one (love) that is usually taken for granted and the other that is less often considered (aggression). The elements from each input space are fused into a complete entity that possesses these “dual” qualities (e.g., loving and hating).16 With respect to “elaboration” these new

15

An important element that is present in long-term memory with respect to aggression is its relationship to primitive energy. That is, even those who would not posit aggression as a primary psychic force would agree that raw energy contains a quality that acts on behalf of the organism without regard for secondary consequences. As a neutral energy, aggression is inherently a-motivational and a driving force in nature (e.g., metamorphosis, evolution). So, the position being taken here is that Winnicott’s larger meaning with respect to aggression in early development depends on the capacity of the embodied mind (via blending) to discard the more intentional (motivational) aspects of aggression and project into the blended space those elemental qualities associated with raw emotional energy (e.g., motility).

16 Because aggression is not typically considered an element of infancy, the “emergent” infant in the blend can be characterized as adult-like, reminiscent of ‘The Bypass.”

40 features of the infant can be projected forward in a way that various possible scenarios can play out in the mind of a reader-clinician. One path with respect to theory and practice is considering how a psychic system in which both love and aggression are of equal value plays a role in development and the characterization of object relationships.17 In general, BT provides an alternative lens through which to examine the foundation of meaning. It demonstrates the inherent human capacity to combine, distill, and elaborate meanings based on ideas that arise in mental space. One relevant implication for the current study is that writers and readers of theory are continually implementing aspects of blending when conceptualizing and integrating ideas. The same processes are occurring in a parallel way in the treatment setting, where ideas related to a developmental history and current object relations are subjected to mental space of both participants in an effort to create new and “emergent” meanings. With respect to modern metaphor theory, a goal of all treatment, as well as theory building, is to expand and make more fluid the conceptual vantage points from which a patient or reader views reality.

17

That is, if aggression is viewed as a force (itself or along with love) it must be considered within the larger frame of instinctual development (not simply a “reaction” to the reality principle or unmet needs).

This feature would not of course be new to adherents of object relations theory, but certainly to those who never considered that aggression can play a generative role in development or that there can be destructive elements of love. It should be pointed out that unlike the relatively universal agreement with respect to the meaning of “That surgeon is a butcher,” the blend under consideration as a theoretical statement does not assure a similar consensus. From a theoretical point of view, what is taken for granted in “generic space” (e.g., LOVE IS A FORCE or AGGRESSION IS A FORCE) and thus within the inputs (“mental spaces”) varies considerably from model to model.

41 Science and Meaning: Metapsychology and Clinical Theory Over the years metaphor has been discussed within psychoanalysis in the context of two main areas: its correspondence to Freud’s psychological concepts of the mind (e.g., metapsychology) and its general use in the treatment setting. In contrast to the utilization of metaphor in the clinical setting, where there seems to be a general consensus as to its ubiquity and usefulness in the deconstruction of patients’ unique meanings (Hymer, 1997; Carveth, 1984; Arlow, 1979), the discussions related to metapsychology essentially question the scientific validity of core constructs based on their metaphorical nature (Gill, 1988; Wurmser, 1977; Schafer, 1976; Klein, 1975; Kubie, 1947).18 From a linguistic perspective these debates have centered on whether words used to describe mental processes (e.g., ego, libido, drives, energy, etc) reflect actual phenomena or whether they are abstractions based on reified notions of the mind. Proposed solutions have ranged from positioning metapsychology within a broader levels of philosophical abstraction (Waelder, 1962) to abandoning it completely and making a conscious effort in the treatment setting to use language that does not impose an a priori model of mental experience (e.g., Shafer’s “action language”).19

18

To be clear the consensus surrounds the general use of metaphor in communicating and understanding elements of the treatment process in general (e.g., the patient’s story and its relationship to larger meanings) but not the necessity to view metapsychological constructs as a sine qua non of those understandings. It is generally the overvaluation of these constructs that has been questioned by detractors.

19

Waelder’s (1962) schema posits metaphychology as the fifth of six levels of philosophical abstraction upon which psychoanalysis rests: 1) Observation; 2) Interpretations; 3) Generalizations (e.g., diagnosis); 4) Clinical theory (e.g., application of theoretical concepts like transference, defense, regression, etc); 5)

42 A movement in the United States that came to fruition in the 1970’s proposing alternatives to the strict application of metapsychological concepts to treatment came primarily from analytically trained psychologists, most notably students of David Rapport whose work (1959, 1951) centered on deconstructing the semantics of metapsychology.20 In particular, the work of Gill (1976), Klein (1975), and Shafer (1976) was generally an exercise in tightening the gap between metapsychology and clinical work, bringing hermeneutics more centrally into the equation in psychoanalysis (Gedo, 2007).

Like similar discussions in the human sciences, the main questions came to essentially focus on epistemology and whether it is possible to accurately depict not only the form, structure, and functional aspects of the mind, but also its ultimate relationship to ontology and meaning (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Searle, 1997). In general this attention to metapsychology spawned a renewed attention to the manner in which language and personal meaning coalesce, which has its roots in the origins of psychoanalysis and Freud’s attempt to marry science and hermeneutics.

Discussions of the relevance and utility of metapsychology is relevant to this study because it centers on examining language and the conceptual basis on which theory and practice are based.

Metapsychology or higher-level clinical theory (e.g., psychic energy, drive force, cathexis, eros, etc.); 6) “Beyond metapsychology” or philosophical considerations (e.g., metaphysics).

20

The deconstruction of psychoanalytic metapsychology has close parallels to Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) examination of philosophy. See Appendix I for a brief conceptual overview of Rappaport & Gill’s (1959) overview of metapsychology and related conceptual metaphors.

43 Freud’s endeavor to map the mind was from the beginning suffused with ideas from philosophy, neurology, and psychology, and it appears he was acutely aware of the inherent difficulties in reconciling these broad areas of thought into a comprehensive model of human mental functioning (Gedo, 2007). An early dilemma involved how to fit into the experimental science of the day the data he collected on hysteria and the etiology of what he would call the neuroses.21 One finding was that processes of the human mind cannot be completely understood in terms of the rational principles of causality on which science viewed natural phenomena. In particular, mental processes (e.g., a symptom) are the embodiment of the individual’s past history and current interpretation of that history, which may or may not reflect objective truth or reason. Subjective factors such as wishes, desires, and cultural prohibitions are involved in the unique form that symptomatic thoughts and behaviors take. The findings required taking seriously the manner in which people attributed meaning to experiences, thereby combining the realms of positivistic science with that of rhetoric or narrative (Cohler & Galatzer-Levy, 2007). In general, his early findings on the psychological foundations of neurosis led him to position his theory more in the realm of the humanities rather than science. Home (1966) summarizes the inherent difference between science and meaning in the context of how psychoanalysis views psychological symptoms:

21

Cohler & Galatzer-Levy (2007) characterize this quest as the “neuroscience of meaning” which has close parallels to the findings of modern cognitive linguistics; that is, the relationship between neural structure and meaning. Modern attempts to combine brain science with psychoanalysis are numerous (Basch, 1976, 1981, 1985; Gedo, 1991, 2007; Palombo, 2001, 2006).

44 That the symptom has meaning, if it is neurotic, is Freud's basic discovery, the basic insight which opened up the way to an understanding of functional illness and the principles of psycho-analytic treatment. It is not surprising that, in the excitement of so great a discovery and one that opened up such vast new territories, Freud should have overlooked the logical implications for theory of the step he had taken. Those implications are however very great, for in the mechanistic medicine of Freud's time, as in all organic medicine of our own day, the symptom is logically regarded as a fact and a fact is regarded as the product of causes [emphasis not in original]. In this, medicine simply follows the practice of chemico/physical science and the canons of thought which are exemplified with special clarity in physics. In discovering that the symptom had meaning and basing his treatment on this hypothesis, Freud took the psycho-analytic study of neurosis out of the world of science into the world of the humanities, because a meaning is not the product of causes but the creation of a subject [emphasis not in original]. This is a major difference; for the logic and method of the humanities is radically different from that of science, though no less respectable and rational, and of course much longer established.

The above discussion points to the primary semantic difference on which positivistic science and hermeneutics are based. From a conceptual-metaphorical viewpoint both science and the humanities draw primarily on the Event Structure Metaphor (Appendix B) and Metaphors of the Mind (Appendix D), whereby causation is conceived as an object’s arrival at a destination via forced movement through space.

However, each utilizes the formula in different ways. In the world of physical science, the force that imparts motion (CAUSES ARE FORCES) to arrive at the “location” or truth (IDEAS ARE LOCATIONS) is based on transcendent reason (REASON IS A FORCE), completely disconnected from the experience of the individual. The symptom, as a “fact” or product of the cause or force of reason, must be seen as similarly disconnected from experience because it is based on a phenomenon that disavows the embodied mind as the source of reason (e.g., that reason is at its core built on early sensorimotor experiences as understood by metaphor). This rationale, then, by its very nature creates and reinforces the misguided notion that the mind and body are separate, thus disconnecting the individual from what is actual felt experience.

45 Home asserts that the underlying conceptual rationale in the humanities is based not on “facts” as the products of disembodied “causes,” but rather on meaning as the creation of “subjects” In this model meaning is not a product of a cause, but rather is the cause (e.g., MEANINGS ARE CAUSES) or force (e.g., MEANINGS ARE FORCES) that creates how phenomena (e.g., “subject matter”) are understood. The implication is that because meaning is inherently embodied and based on sensorimotor (versus transcendent) experience, all thought, behavior, motivation, intentionality, etc. are subject to its processes. Therefore, a symptom—like any other phenomenon that is essentially a manifestation of an embodied reality—is ascribed meaning and as such comes to reveal aspects of the logic on which its reasoning is based. In treatment, the symbolic reenactment of past traumas would be one way that the meaning or logic of symptoms are made manifest. In general, meanings— as the outcome of a lifetime of sensorimotor “learning” through metaphor—impose a certain conceptual structure on experience and thus can be thought of as the ongoing creation of unique themes (e.g., “subjects”) that are always based one’s embodied subjecthood.

The following is an overview of the semantic foundation of causation in positivistic science versus hermeneutics vis-à-vis the Location Event-Structure Metaphor: Scientific Mapping of Causation States Are Locations •

Objects exist in a hypothetical position in space

Changes Are Movements •

Object’s movement from one position to another signifies change

46 Causes Are Forces • •

Object’s movement attributed to a force Force is based on reason (disembodied, transcendent)

Causation Is Forced Movement •

Reason is the force that propels object from one location to another (why movement occurred)

Purposes Are Destinations • • •

Forced movement of object through space leads to arrival at location of “truth” or “fact” Location of “truth” or “facts” universal, transcendent, and disembodied (e.g., subjectless) Facts (e.g., symptoms) derive from antecedent causes and forces

Hermeneutic Mapping of Causation States Are Locations •

Objects exist in a hypothetical position in space

Changes Are Movements •

Object’s movement from one position to another signifies change

Causes Are Forces • •

Object’s movement attributed to meaning, based on the embodied mind Meaning is embodied and based on real experience and mental hardware (e.g., experientialism)

Causation Is Forced Movement •

Force (meaning) that moved object is reason for object movement (why movement occurred)

47 Purposes Are Destinations • • •

Forced movement of object through space leads to arrival at location of “experiential” truth Experiential truth is neither completely subjective not objective (see Appendix A) Subjective facts derive from meanings attributed to experience NOT disembodied causes or facts Much of the criticism of psychoanalysis has rested on its presumed lack of

experimental verification and the implied acceptance of its epistemology by its practioners (Cohler & Galatzer-Levy, 2007). Positivistic science’s requirement of subjecting claims of truth to verifiable hypotheses using the experimental method challenges the hermeneutic view of reality, significantly limiting the value of personal experience in the conception of reality. Critiques from within psychoanalysis (Eagle, 1986) as well as from a philosophy of science point of view (Grunbaum, 1983) have challenged its validity as a science. From these points of view psychoanalysis should not be content with seeing itself as a hermeneutic science but rather seek to establish a “natural science of the soul” (Dreher, 2000), based on verifiable experimental tenets. The general assumption is that until shown otherwise, the nature of its core concepts are “metaphorical” (e.g., false or not proven) in nature and thus not reflective of a universal reality.

Inherent in the worldview is the notion that truth is transcendent and somehow divorced from individual experience, which directly follows from a belief in a disembodied mind (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Such beliefs discount or do not take into consideration the key findings of modern cognitive science (see Appendix A).

48 Despite claims of unscientific foundation of psychoanalysis there have been, there have been quantitative studies and related models that have empirically tested clinical hypotheses within the treatment setting (Dreher, 2000; Fonagy & Target, 1996; Kächele & Thoma, 1993; Luborsky & Spence, 1978; Wallerstein, 2001). Detractors assert that such work is tainted by inherent suggestibility in the treatment setting, in particular, the interpretive nature of gathering data and drawing conclusions (Gedo, 1997). There is inherent difficulty in proving the validity of abstract concepts and ideas such as transference, libido, and psychic determinism. Along these lines, Dreher (2000) suggests that adequately accounting for such a comprehensive and dynamic theory like psychoanalysis additionally requires “conceptual” research that examines the nature of its main constructs and their particular use in writing and practice. The goal of conceptual research is generally to investigate the historical context of a concept’s origin and its evolution through time in the context of diverse understandings and uses, testing the logical consistency and coherence concepts.

Two examples of such work cited by Dreher (2000) are Back to Freud’s Texts by Grubrich-Smitis (1996) and The Patient and the Analyst (1992) by Sandler, Dare, and Holder. The current study in which the historical origins of object usage and related transformational metaphors are examined using a methodology of modern cognitive linguistics is a similar example of conceptual research.

49 Metaphor and Clinical Writing The task of illuminating primordial phenomena has been characterized as more suited for poets, painters, and philosophers rather than scientists who must explain data in more logical and systematic ways through language. The presumption is that at more subtle levels the nature of being becomes ineffable and revealed only through more abstract mediums of communication and that experience is something that “happens in spite of language” (Foster, 2007). Beginning with Freud psychoanalytic writing has been as well concerned with characterizing elemental experiences of mental life, though for the dual purpose of ameliorating as well as understanding the human condition. Freud was considered one of the best German writers of his day and his work navigated between the worlds of science and art (Jauregui, & Méndez, 2002). He also thought of himself as much as a philosopher as a scientist. His use of metaphors (e.g. archeology and themes from Classical literature) to portray his psychological theory are well known. In one way, the literary history of psychoanalysis can be viewed as a portrayal of the human condition from a hermeneutic vantage point of science and meaning. How psychoanalytic writing serves the dual purpose of unifying and communicating scientific and subjective truths remains an issue (Atwood & Stolorow, 1993).

Psychoanalytic social work clinicians are similarly involved in creating their own unique literary rendition of existential experiences (Ogden, 1997). Attempting to convey in words the meaning of psychic events that occur in the course of a treatment can be a daunting task. Despite theoretical orientation, clinicians must conceptually and linguistically account for intrapsychic processes within the patient and within themselves, as well as what occurs intersubjectively within the “analytic space” between them. This

50 requires a continual conceptual navigation of the apparently opposing worlds of theory and practice—e.g., cognitive and affective experience—and the related ability to use clinical ideas in a way that communicates the unique phenomena of the treatment. The quest of writing in ways that do not reify theory is a skill that begins in clinical training and continues, along with practical technique, on a developmental path into professional maturity (Spence, 1990).

Though not specifically geared toward investigating the multitude of variables involved in learning psychoanalytic constructs, this study has important implications for how social workers conceptually encounter, understand, and elaborate the meaning of clinical concepts. Specifically, in terms of psychoanalytic learning and development, a linguistic examination of theoretical and clinical writing in the context of metaphor can be one way to elucidate the processes involved in “cognitive learning” that is part and parcel of the overall experiential processes involved in professional psychoanalytic development (Ekstein & Wallerstein, 1957; Fleming & Benedek, 1984). An ongoing task in clinical development is the ability to continually navigate and combine the realms of abstract theory with the practical usage of clinical concepts. Along those lines, the theory of conceptual metaphor and the epistemological stance of experientialism (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) fits closely with the idea of psychoanalysis as hovering in an intermediate area between positivistic science and hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1970). Applying modern metaphor theory and the related position of experientialism to Winnicott’s psychoanalytic constructs of transformation and their application in clinical writing is one way to test the level of congruence between theory and practice, a goal of conceptual research.

51 Winnicott in Context: Early Development Born in1896 and living until 1971, Donald Woods Winnicott lived a long and prodigious life. The youngest of three children raised in the English countryside, his second wife Clare portrayed his childhood setting as idyllic and fostering the imaginative capacities that would suffuse his professional work.22 At age 14 he was sent to boarding school, and by 1920 he had served in the Royal Navy as a medial officer and completed a medical degree. It was during his medical training that he came across Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams, presumably in response to a sudden inability to recall his dreams (Rodman, 2003). Winnicott would enter analysis in 1923 with James Strachey (the same year he married his first wife Alice Taylor) and a few years later become a candidate in the British Society.23 He graduated in 1934 and shortly after became qualified as a child analyst. Winnicott would be supervised in child cases by Melanie Klein and in the mid- 1930’s began making written contributions on topics related to psychoanalysis.24 His career as a psychoanalyst and writer on human development would span the next five decades.25 Over the years biographers and commentators have mined events of Winnicott’s formative years for clues that might help explain his contributions to psychology,

22

See D.W.W: A Reflection (C. Winnicott, 1989).

23

Rodman (2003) notes that Ernest Jones founded the London Psycho-Analytical Society in 1913 but decided to dissolve it when one member came to avow the ideas of Carl Jung. Theoretical divisions would become the hallmark of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, which Jones subsequently established in 1919.

24

Ibid. At Klein’s request Winnicott later analyzed her son Eric. Winnicott’s membership paper was The Manic Defense, presented to the British Society in 1935.

25

Ibid. Winnicott worked as a pediatric consultant at Paddington Green Children’s Hospital from 1923 to 1963. Prior to his psychoanalytic training, Winnicott wrote and presented papers on the importance of mothering in the emotional health of the baby. In 1931 Clinical Notes on Disorders of Childhood was published, which was mainly focused on general pediatrics.

52 especially his unique style of blending original thought with extant psychoanalytic theory (Rodman, 2003; Abram, 1996; Kahr, 1996; Goldman, 1993; Phillips, 1988). Historical and cultural factors have been advanced, including, among others things, the status of women and motherhood in patriarchal Victorian England, the independent spirit of his early Wesleyan faith, the influence of British Empiricism and the blending of art and science of the Romantic poets, and the impact of living through a World War in young adulthood. The often contentious milieu in which Winnicott professionally developed and worked within the British Society has also been extensively examined. However, interpreting the meaning and impact of his status within his family system has probably received the most attention in terms of locating the seeds of his unique account of human ontology and epistemology.

Winnicott was the youngest (by 5 and 6 years) and only male of three children born to 34 year old Martha Woods Winnicott and 44 old Frederick Winnicott.26 His father owned a family business dealing in hardware and also served in a number of civic capacities, including being elected mayor of the town twice.27 Rodman (2003) generally describes his mother Martha as typical of the times, basically a secondary figure in a patriarchal household. Clare Winnicott (1989) described his mother as “vivacious and

26

Ibid. His sisters Violet and Kathleen never married and toward the end of their lives knew virtually nothing of their brother’s professional standing or contributions.

27

Ibid. Frederick was knighted in 1924 for his community service. His father was not educated and likely had learning difficulties, which may have prevented him from seeking the Parliament. By all accounts the family was financially “comfortable” though the Winnicott’s may have been viewed as lower middle-class due to Frederick’s status as a “shopkeeper.”

53 outgoing . . . and able to show and express her feeling easily (p.5).28 A paternal uncle lived nearby, and Winnicott and his cousins (three male and two female) were raised like siblings (C. Winnicott, 1989). The family home and rural surroundings provided opportunities for both relatedness and solitude. Clare Winnicott’s depiction of the family atmosphere was generally one of love, stability and predictability, themes central to his writing on optimal child development.

The overvaluation of the mother-infant relationship in Winnicott’s writing brings into focus his own experiences that form the conceptual basis of his core theoretical ideas.29 Among the implications of these early experiences are the particular nature of his psychodynamic formulations and manner in which he communicated them in writing. In general two key dynamics have emerged in the historical analysis of his mother Martha as an influence: her possible depression and her perceived asexual nature.30 Regularly cited with respect to the former is a portion of a poem, “The Tree” (see Appendix J) in which Winnicott’s early perception of his value and role vis-á-vis his mother was revealed:

28

Ibid. Accounts by Winnicott himself and others call into question this general characterization. In particular, her lively outward manner and gesticulations (see note on “clapping” by Rodman, 2003, p. 383) may have revealed a depression and inner deadness.

29

In cognitive linguistic terms the process of conflation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) that underpins the formation of primary conceptual metaphors can be said to occur mainly in the context of early intimate relationships, like that of the mother-infant.

30

See Rodman (2003) for a discussion of the “idealization of the sexless woman” that was fostered by English Protestantism.

54 Mother below is weeping weeping weeping Thus I knew her Once, stretched out on her lap as now on dead tree I learned to make her smile to stem her tears to undo her guilt to cure her inward death To enliven her was my living. 31 The lines reveal associations to experiences that would become conceptualized in constructs such as the “holding environment,” the “spontaneous gesture,” and “impingement,” as well as overarching themes of reliability and predictability. The relational stance he found himself in would seem to provide a valid clue as to the origins of his originality, namely as an emotional provocateur who came to deem himself as omnipotent and capable of (and responsible for) imparting life. The poem points to a precarious balance that Winnicott perceives he was forced to strike, not only to “resurrect” his mother but to preserve her fragile state through mothering of his own.32

31 Among uses of enliven cited in the Oxford English Dictionary is to “diversify agreeably” which provides an alternative conceptual angle from which to view Winnicott’s theorizing and means of communicating it.

In contrast to portraying his conceptual stance in terms of, for example, compliance versus non-compliance (Newman, 1995) or theory versus anti-theory (Fogel, 1992), the idea of making an object more diverse better captures how ideas exist in a potential space, thus rendering them malleable and revealed in different ways but never absolute.

32

Phillips (1988) cites the importance of Winnicott’s identification with Christ and his sufferings on the cross (“tree”) as part of his broader identification with the feminine, possibly fueled by his father’s egocentrism, strictness, and emotional distance. Phillips notes an interest in the novel King Jesus, written in 1946 by Robert Graves, a well-known expert on Hebrew religion and mythology and the Gnostic gospels with whom Winnicott corresponded. In this semi-historical novel, Jesus is presented as a prophet who after coming to “destroy the power of the Female” as represented in the pre-Jehovah Great Mother Goddess in the end sacrifices himself for the feminine cause.

55 As discussed, Winnicott’s writing style can be similarly said to have a provocative quality that aims to enliven or evoke and the experience of the reader (Ogden, 2001).

Rodman (2003) notes that along with obvious the absence of the father figure, the asexual portrayal of the mother comprises a significant gap in Winnicott’s theorizing that is revealing of his early development. 33 Overall, the patriarchal tenor of the times, characterizations of his mother Martha’s “inhibited” nature and his father’s emotional aloofness are generally portrayed as forming the basis for his clinical portrayals of sexuality as well as his own sexual identity.34 Along those lines, Winnicott’s first marriage to Alice Taylor was suspected to be unconsummated and to have revealed more general struggles to express himself in an intimate fashion.35

33

Goldman (1993) characterizes the often cited omission of the father as “overstated” in that Winnicott primary concern was the infant and the immediate caregiving environment, which in certain ways precluded the figure of the father. Also, Rodman (2003) notes that the form of Methodism the family adhered to, Wesleyanism, promoted in turn of the century Britain an ideal of middle-class women as sexless “blushing young maidens.”

34

Winnicott confided to Marion Milner (Rodman, 2003) that his mother was over-stimulated by breastfeeding, and as a consequence he was prematurely weaned. A related effect may have been the actual fact or his perceived notion that his mother needed to see him as a girl.

35

Ibid. She was four years his elder and emotionally unstable. Described as similarly eccentric she and Winnicott shared musical talents and were able to express themselves through that medium. They were however not successful at expressing intimacy and the eventual turmoil of the relationship (reportedly never overtly conflictual) was thought to have led to at least two of Winnicott’s heart attacks and their eventual divorce in 1948. Winnicott reportedly waited until his father’s death to leave the marriage, though he met and had a sexual affair with his second wife Clare by this time. It has been pointed out that his relationship with Clare coincides with a creative turning point in his writing.

56 Winnicott’s physical characteristics, demeanor and even voice were considered feminine, which possibly reinforced a sense of being female (e.g., mother to his mother) and the related belief that was or needed to be unthreatening.36 His clinical constructs related to the authentic encounter with an object in the context of an “unimpinged” (e.g., solipsistic, sterile, or under-stimulated) environment is among the different ways he might have revealed his inability to act decisively in response to erotic stimulation. Based on what is known of his early object relationships, this was most likely not a learned reaction to having been the recipient of extensive stimulation, but rather the perceived effect on love objects of his instinctual desires and needs.

Later in his career Winnicott would more directly explore states of mind he associated with masculinity and femininity which most likely reflected factors in his own early development. In The Split-Off Male and Female Elements Found in Men and Women (1966), he drew primarily on the case of a man who viewed himself as a woman.

What Winnicott ultimately posited was that essential elements of personality could be divided up into male “doing” and female “being.” In general, the activity associated with masculine activity can be linked to the manner in which the first “not-me” object is encountered. That is, in a properly managed caregiving environment activity is used to spontaneously meet the object for the purpose of transforming the subject into a world of

36

Ibid. It is not clear to what extent if at all Winnicott dealt with his own sexuality in his two analyses.

Winnicott’s first analyst, James Strachey, was married and had homosexual liaisons but there is no evidence that this led to a discussion of this topic. Masud Khan, a patient and later editor of Winnicott’s works, was perhaps one of his closest confidantes in the latter years of his life (the treatment lased from 1951 to 1966). A reportedly strikingly handsome man Winnicott would come to cross many professional boundaries in their relationship. Rodman notes that their collaboration outside the treatment interestingly began around the time he met Clare Winnicott, which may be viewed as a defensive maneuver against heterosexual love and/or an opening-up of homosexual impulses.

57 shared reality. In situations that go awry this masculine energy can become split-off with corresponding effects related to inhibition based on prematurely exposed separateness.

He notes that while the male element “presupposes separateness,” the female characteristic of “being” is more akin to that which is more fundamental to the human organism (e.g., the bodily container where ideas and physical objects are incorporated and projected) and the realm of “object relating” (e.g., a pre-differentiated state). Viewed from this perspective, the complications of his early relations with his mother in addition to certain noticeable characteristically feminine qualities may have among other things heightened his sensitivity to and interest in gender-related qualities of primary psychic processes.

Like most fathers, Frederick Winnicott seems to have loomed large in his son’s emotional world. Rodman (2003) describes him as a man of immense local import and as having a certain personal flare.37 Frederick is said to have taught young Donald to read the bible and allowed him the freedom to interpret its meaning in his own way. Clare Winnicott (1989) wrote that he was “slim and tallish and had an old-fashioned quiet dignity and poise about him, and a deep sense of fun” (p.5). Despite an apparent capacity for humor, there is evidence that there was also a more serious and prohibitive side to Frederick Winnicott. In what is possibly on of his earliest memories cited in his autobiographical notes (C. Winnicott, 1989), Donald reported that when he was 3 years

37

Ibid. A childhood friend of Winnicott believed Frederick was often “overdressed.” He was an exemplary civic figure who provided a number of functions which benefitted the community. Of this Rodman writes: “The survival of so much documentation of Frederick’s good deeds and personal prominence suggests that he was an overpowering, narcissistic presence for his son” (p. 17).

58 old he smashed the face of his sisters’ doll “Rosie” because his father would incessantly tease him about it: Rosie said to Donald I love you Donald said to Rosie I don’t believe you do In Winnicott’s account he was relieved that his father did not respond at all harshly and mended the doll’s face. He would come to laud his father for this act of “reparation” and ability to tolerate his aggression. However, according to Goldman (1993) this assessment may have been “disingenuously benign” and downplaying the way his father may have been thwarting of his masculinity.38 Events later in Winnicott’s development would seem to show that Frederick had strict and prohibitive side. Along these lines, Rodman (2003) generally characterized the underlying tone in the family as consisting of “severe strictures on disruptive behavior” (p. 20).39 Clare Winnicott recounted that when Donald was 9 years old he came to the conclusion that he was “too nice” which preceded a phase in which he struggled in school with grades and poor behavior (Rodman, 2003). At age 12 the young Donald, under the influence of negative peers, used the word “drat” which is apparently the reason his father decided to send him to boarding school.

38

Goldman (1993) cites Adam Phillip’s (1988) assertion that Winnicott’s view of the incident is “narrowly oedipal, not fully acknowledging the degree to which Sir Frederick was threatening Donald’s burgeoning personality” (p. 41). Goldman goes on to say that the young Winnicott’s destruction of the doll can be simultaneously viewed as a symbolic “crushing” of his “confusing masculinity.”

39

If so, this would have existed in opposition to the outgoing, humorous, and fun-loving atmosphere characterized by Clare Winnicott (1989). Among other things it raises questions about the meaning that “playfulness” served in the family system; that is, whether such demonstrations were completely “spontaneous” acts or ones suffused with the need to cope with other inhibitions, prohibitions, and anxiety.

59 Winnicott wrote that he was appreciative of his father’s gesture, as it probably reinforced for him a sense of his father’s power and willingness to act on behalf of his masculinity.40 To that point Donald had been tended to primarily by females, with seemingly little significant interaction with his father. Subsequent incidents later in life point to an emotional distance and inability confide in his father with important personal life matters. For example, while away at school Donald would use his childhood friend Jim Ede to convey to his father his decision to become a doctor and not enter the family business (Rodman, 2003).41 Though there would be life-long correspondence between father and son the tenor of the letters suggests a formal relationship often focusing on finances, which was a lifelong struggle for Donald.42 Further evidence pointing to the emotional distance and lack of trust in this relationship is that he waited until the death of his father to fully consummate his divorce with Alice Taylor. In general the portrayals of Donald and his father reveal a gulf in their relationship that was never quite mended.

Their history suggests a unacknowledged, displaced, or denied aggressive energy that likely found its way in Winnicott’s later conceptions of aggression (e.g., as a more benevolent life force versus a annihilator or as part and parcel of finding reality itself).

40

Winnicott wrote, “So my father was there to kill and be killed, but it is probably true that in the early years he left me too much to all my mothers (e.g., Martha, sisters, nanny, governess). Things never quite righted themselves” (In, C. Winnicott, 1989, p. 8).

41

Rodman (2003) reminds the reader that this essentially left his father without a successor. He writes: “Did Donald feel hostility to his father threatened to show through in the revealing of the simple fact that he wanted to be a doctor? Was it the news: ‘I am not like you are, Father’? And was it also: ‘Look, Father, I can’t face you with this, can’t bear your hurt. Nothing between us has prepared us for this moment of parting’?” (p. 32).

42

Ibid. Frederick assisted his son financially even when Donald was an established professional with income. Perhaps this was the one way that they were able to give and take more freely with each other.

Interestingly, there are reports of Winnicott presumably forgetting to pay for a consultation with Ernest Jones, and continually being in arrears with his two analysts James Strachey and Joan Riviere. This points to what Rodman (p. 97) calls Winnicott’s struggle to “spend one’s goodness” which was a lifelong theme and one which was apparently softened in his relationship with Clare Winnicott.

60 In summary, Winnicott’s early development reveals certain emotional crises that would be revealed in the nature and function of his core theoretical constructs of transformation. Though this study is not designed to systematically investigate all the potential ramifications early life experience had on his unique conception of psychoanalysis, the textual analysis will developmental factors in the context of the formulation of his final notable theoretical construct “object usage.”

Winnicott’s Conceptual Style Winnicott’s unique clinical concepts and writing style offer the opportunity to examine the relationship between language and ontology, a central concern of philosophy and psychoanalysis alike (Ricoeur, 1970). Ogden (2001) deems Winnicott the “one great English-speaking writer” within psychoanalysis whose style is geared toward creating experience versus establishing well-defined conclusions. Through “playing” with language Winnicott seems to have understood both the power of language to create meaning, as well as its inherent limitations and imprecision in conveying more ineffable experiences. The mother-infant dyad is the primary lens through which deeper realities of human existence are uncovered. A hallmark of Winnicottian style is the revelation of ontology through the seemingly mundane depiction of a child’s day to day existence, using plain and ordinary language that a reader can easily grasp and identify with.

Developmental advancement is explicitly linked to the corresponding level of understanding it allows via the symbolic elaboration of experience (e.g., reality-based thinking as finding of “not-me” object). The emergence of any developmental capacity is

61 viewed not only for what it allows the child to think or do, but also for what it reveals about more basic experiences and meanings of existence.

The characteristic Winnicottian conceptual vantage point which merges elements of development (e.g., symbolic capacities that increasingly allow for participation in “shared reality”—objectivity) with that of ontology reality places him squarely in the realm of the continental philosophy and its quest to link language with ontology (Cerveaux, 2007). The unique writing style he employs to uncover deeper meanings through aligns him with Wittgenstein, who similarly grappled with language and its ability to reveal the metaphysical (Horn, 2005). Winnicott’s “solution” was to juxtapose the ambiguity and expansiveness of language with everyday events of development to depict the more basic qualities of experience. Part of his inventiveness lay in utilizing the primal realm of the infant-mother matrix to reveal key elements of existence itself, thereby extending ontology to an “experiential field of psychic experience” (Fogel, 1992). His approach to language and ontology made Winnicott a “transitional” figure in terms of propelling psychoanalysis into more of a developmentally-based two-person psychology (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Winnicott’s use of constructs of transformation as a way to both depict early human existence and reveal certain truths about psychic development offers an opportunity to “test” the limits of language as a tool for uniting science and meaning.

Despite essentially elaborating a new phenomenology Winnicott was not a theorybuilder, which presents interesting challenges to any attempt to systematize his writing (Goldman, 1993). Nevertheless, the psychic phenomena he elucidated, and the way he attempted to describe it, provide a novel vantage point from which to examine the

62 broader relationship between language and meaning. Winnicott’s prose style has been described as not only “interdependent” but “inseparable” from the very ideas he sought to elucidate, with meaning being transmitted as much or more via the “experience” of reading than from a pure intellectual comprehension of the words (Ogden, 2001). His prose and conceptual style have also been characterized as closely reflecting his personality: “quixotic” (Goldman, 1993), “elliptical” (Kwawer, 1998), “pixieish” (Fogel, 1992), and “non-compliant” (Newman, 1995).

Winnicott encountered the often cantankerous intellectual milieu of the British Psychoanalytic Society by remaining distant from the fray, though subtly challenging entrenched ways of thinking through his conceptual play with words and ideas. In this way, the environment provided the raw material to hone his style as a dialectician and synthesizer of ideas (Ogden, 1985). As will be shown, it also brought clearly into focus life-long struggles with reconciling loving and hating qualities in the context of selfassertion: specifically, meeting the need for his unique subjecthood to be recognized through “spontaneous” acts of while not damaging those who were the recipients of his “gestures.”

Instinctual Fusion: The Semantic Foundation of Winnicottian Ontology This section will highlight one strand of ideas on psychoanalytic psychic development, as a way to review certain core Winnicottian concepts relevant to this study and to more generally contextualize and focus the remainder of the literature review. It will also provide a glimpse of how methodological framework under consideration in this study functions with respect to deconstructing psychoanalytic concepts of transformation.

63 For this exercise the construct of “fusion” and associated processes related to libidinal and aggressive impulses will be examined in terms of its original conceptualization and elaboration over time.

The concept of aggression (and the closely related idea of destruction) is an example of a psychoanalytic derivative that Winnicott utilizes in much of his work to posit his formula of psychic functioning and transformation. As a metaphorically based linguistic derivative from an established field of study, aggression and destruction will be shown to possess similar and dissimilar connotations with respect to ordinary usage—that is, the terms draw both on established frames of meaning and ones unique to psychoanalysis, creating a semantic tension in the paper The Use of an Object. Among other things, this review points to how the reading of a text inherently involves a conceptual navigation based on the writer’s utilization of expected and unexpected meanings, based on embodied notions of time, space, objects, causation, etc.

Within psychoanalysis aggression is generally associated with Freud’s instinctual theory, or more basically erotic (or loving) and aggressive impulses within the context of sexual development. 43 It is typically associated with the id and death instinct, though it can also be utilized for adaptive purposes when ego functions are successful in counterbalancing aggression’s purely selfish and destructive motivations. For example, qualities such as assertiveness, initiative, and goal-directed activity have at their core elements of generative aggressive energy. Moore & Fine (1990) note that from a dynamic perspective, aggression can be used as a defense against libidinal conflicts (e.g., prohibitions, guilt) or contrarily defended against by libidinal impulses (e.g., fantasies,

43

See Melnick (1997) for a critique of Freud’s psychosexual theory using elements of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) early perspectives on metaphor.

64 wishes). Therefore, the manifestation of aggression or love does not in itself indicate the ultimate motivation of the instinct within the larger scheme of psychic functioning. Their broader function and meaning is always embedded in the writer’s larger theoretical scheme based on unique configurations of conceptual metaphor.

Laplanche & Pontalis (1973) write that fusion was originally used by Freud in his final instinct theory to depict the balance of forces between erotic and aggressive impulses in a given behavior or symptom. Sadomasochism is the prototypical example of how seemingly opposing qualities of instincts are inherent in any behavior or thought. In this as in any other mental phenomenon, eroticism and aggressiveness are prevalent at any given moment to more or less of a degree, with fusion a connoting a balance and defusion an incomplete process of fusion. In general though these impulses are viewed as having equal status, aggression is always more or less implied by Freud to be the cause of a move away from fusion—that is, libido is defined by its ability to “bind” and aggression serves to “undo connections.” Defusion is best typified by the psychic mechanisms of displacement, isolation, and undoing involved in the obsessional neuroses. While Freud does not posit a specific formula for the achievement of fusion, the implication is that that bringing unconscious forbidden wishes, thoughts, etc. into conscious awareness alleviates the excessive manifestation of either instinct.

Taking the preceding outline of fusion from theoretical-historical perspective, the following basic mapping using key related primary conceptual metaphors can be posited: States Are Locations • •

Love “binds” and is close (e.g., fusion) Aggression “repels” and is far away (e.g., defusion)

65 Changes Are Movements • •

Instinctual (drive) force toward or away from pleasurable or hated object Cathexis as psychic attraction to objects

Causes are Forces • •

Based on dynamic (force) or economic (energy) metapsychological viewpoint Force and energy influenced by particular stage of development (embodied location of erotogenic zone as represented psychically)

Purposes are Destinations • •

Force or energy as arriving at the location of the object Cathexis as “occupation” of object Embedded in these conceptualizations of instinctual energy are a number of

metaphors that provide a semantic frame of reference for the reader of a psychoanalytic text. As mentioned, THE MIND IS A BODY (Appendix C) is a primary embodied metaphor in Western thought that basically pervades all depictions of mental activity.44 In terms of the conceptual elements drawn upon the with respect to instinctual activity and fusion AGGRESSION IS SELFISH, AGGRESSION IS DEATH, AGGRESSION IS DESTRUCTION, and AGGRESSION IS DEFENSIVE describe the less productive qualities of aggression that are more common to ordinary language usage. In terms of its more adaptational aspects, AGGRESSION IS SELF-ASSERTION, AGGRESSION IS PURPOSEFUL ACTION, and AGGRESSION IS GENERATIVE ENERGY are drawn upon to describe the less obvious elements of aggression that form the basis for other psychic qualities. With respect to the fusion of libidinal and aggressive impulses, FUSION IS BALANCE and DEFUSION IS IMBALANCE point to the paradigm of homeostasis on which the construct is essentially based. In general, the idea that balance

44

The metaphor primarily allows mental activity to be depicted in terms of bodily activity (e.g., movement of objects within a confined space).

66 is related to optimal functioning (e.g., BALANCE IS HEALTH) is deeply rooted in the sensorimotor experience of human existence from birth (see Appendix A for Primary Metaphors). FUSION IS THE CREATION OF GENERATIVE AGGRESSION reveals the transformational properties associated with attaining a state of balance in the homeostatic system of the embodied mind.

Winnicott would come of age professionally in a theoretical milieu that took seriously the more purely destructive elements of early instinctual life. Specifically, Klein (1935, 1946) would elaborate on Freud’s sadistic elements of psychic functioning (e.g., death instinct) and position aggressive processes within a larger scheme of psychic development (e.g., paranoid-schizoid position and depressive positions). In her scheme libidinal and aggressive impulses were not inherently positive or negative, in that both are capable of generative or debilitating effects on the psyche. In addition, anxiety came to represent more than simply harnessed libido as a response to an external (societal) prohibition against sex, but rather as internal conflict (e.g., based on phantasy) between the instincts themselves (Hinshelwood, 1989).

For Klein the resulting depressive and persecutory anxiety that is part and parcel of emotional development involves aggressive energy (e.g., to ward off threatening objects and to greedily incorporate desired objects). The fusion of loving and aggressive impulse for Klein occurs with the onset of the depressive position, in which related images of the inherent goodness and badness of objects are reconciled. Aggression is also relevant for its position with respect to the reality principle, an aspect of theory that Winnicott draws upon considerably on in his conceptualization of object usage.

Specifically, Winnicott (1969) highlights how for Freud aggression is generally a reaction

67 to the onset of the reality principle, whereas for Klein it is more specifically projective processes (suffused with aggressive energy) that form the basis for the capacity to perceive reality.

Primary Aggression Aggression always played a significant role in Winnicott’s depiction of infant development. As a clinical construct it was prevalent in the British Society from the time he entered psychoanalytic training, and it would be reinforced in his supervision with Melanie Klein from 1935-1940 (Rodman, 2003). Early on in his writing Winnicott (1939) spoke of “primary aggression” as related to instinct and also part of “appetite.” He would highlight the necessity of a responsive caregiving relationship as the primary means by which the child develops the capacity to integrate inborn or “unintentional” aggression, positing the presence of more extreme (“actual”) aggression (e.g., anti-social tendencies) as marking the absence or failure of the facilitating environment. The term “destruction” would over time be the concept Winnicott used to denote both normal and pathological enactments of aggression. Overall, Abram (1996) summarizes four central areas in Winnicott’s theory of aggression: 1. The task of fusion; 2. The need for opposition; 3. The need for reality of the external object feel real, and 4. The need for an object rather than pleasure.

In a 1939 paper Winnicott would lay down his primary conceptual viewpoint on aggression that would remain intact throughout his writing. His position would take into

68 account the actual manifestation of aggression (e.g., the infant feeding situation) as well as the fantasies that both the infant and mother have about destruction and preservation.

The fusion of erotic and aggressive impulses and their relocation to fantasy—in part out of a need to protect the loved object, a Kleinian idea—is a central precept in the construct of object usage that would be written 30 years later. In 1939 Winnicott writes:

If it is true then, that the infant has a vast capacity for destruction it is also true that he has a vast capacity for protecting what he loves from his own destructiveness, and the main destruction must always exist in fantasy (emphasis not in original). And the important thing to note about instinctual aggressiveness is that although it soon becomes something that can be mobilized in the service of hate, it is originally a part of appetite, or some other form of instinctual love. It is something that increases during excitement, and the exercise of it is very pleasurable. Perhaps the word greed conveys more easily than any other the idea of original fusion of love and aggression, though the love is confined to mouth love.

Winnicott’s Formula of Fusion In Winnicott’s various depictions of psychic functioning, the interaction and reconciliation of aggressive and loving impulses is a central concern. Aggression is prevalent from birth in the form of “ruthless love,” which he posits as akin to primary motility or spontaneity that occurs in the infant’s initial unintegrated state. What was in 1939 “primary aggression” later becomes equated with “life force”, which is converted to “aggressive potential” through opposition from the environment. Winnicott (1950-54) writes: The aggressive impulses do not give any satisfactory experience unless there is opposition. The opposition must come from the environment, from the Not-Me which gradually comes to be distinguished from the Me . . . in normal development opposition from the outside brings along the development of the aggressive impulse (p.215).

69 The external (“not me”) object will be the vehicle through which reality is found and objects are recognized as whole (e.g., stage of concern) and separate. He would later describe that this achievement occurs within an environment reminiscent of “primary maternal preoccupation” (1956), in which the psychic state of the mother becomes mostly merged with that of the infant. Among other things, the mother must experience, tolerate, and ultimately survive the aggressive emotions of the infant in a way that closely parallels the integration is simultaneously occurring for the child. For Winnicott the instincts and environment always exist in a symbiotic relationship, with each contributing significantly to the state of the other. A common related theme is that there always exists a precarious balance between opposition from the environment and the natural unfolding of instinctual processes. Though not attempting to quantify in any technical way an optimal level of opposition required, the significant outcome to be evaluated is whether or not raw (“ruthless”) forms of aggression are transformed into generative ones:

The complication is that the amount of aggressive potential an infant carries depends on the amount of opposition that has been met with. In other words, opposition affects the conversion of life force into aggressive potential. Moreover, an excess of opposition introduces complications that make it impossible for the existence of an individual who, having aggressive potential, could achieve its fusion with the erotic (p. 216).

To solve the problem of what happens to the original “ruthless” aggression, Winnicott merges the well-know metaphor THE MIND IS A CONTAINER with the established psychoanalytic construct of fantasy. In his schema fusion is accomplished via the successful transfer of ruthless aggression to containment in unconscious fantasy, where it will from that point on reside and serve as the foundation for generative forms of self-assertion. Opposition from the environment is crucial in this process, with too little

70 (e.g., unresponsiveness) or too much (e.g., impingement) derailing optimal development.

In general, the paper The Use of an Object deals with treating individuals who have not been able to transform purely aggressive energy into productive potential. To summarize, a basic mapping on fusion using aspects of the Location Event Structure Metaphor (see Appendix B) can be posited: Winnicott’s Fusion of Erotic and Aggressive Instincts The Mind is a Container •

Psychic elements reside in a hypothetical space conceived of as mind

States are Locations • •

Love is close and binds Aggression is far away and repels45

Causes Are Physical Forces •

Life force based on love and generative forms of aggression (motility)

Changes are Movements • •

Life force travels through space to seek opposition in environment Fusion transports “ruthless” aggression to space associated with fantasy

Purposes are Destinations • • •

45

Life force arrives at location of object Location is “subjective” in object relating Location is “objective” or shared in object usage

Though Winnicott ultimately turns this conception on its head, this is the typical conception of aggression as conceived in related primary conceptual metaphors (e.g., “His anger pushed her away”). This is one of many examples of how he utilizes both expected and unexpected meanings of words to draw out novel or expanded ways of viewing reality.

71 Health is Integration • •

Integration is fusion of erotic and aggressive impulses Fusion leads to reality-based thinking, empathy (stage of concern), self-object differentiation

Difficulties are Impediments to Integration • • •

Excessive opposition (impingement) No opposition (isolation) Lack of survival (destruction from infant’s point of view)

(Internal) Integration is External Containment •

Holding, responding, attending, surviving The fusion of erotic and aggressive impulses would play a central role in

Winnicott’s later conception of object usage, where destructive processes place the object outside the subject’s area of omnipotence and contribute to the ability to view objects as whole and real.46 Fusion is seen as a developmental achievement and is a foundational construct contained in his other constructs of transformation (e.g., transitional objects, holding, playing). In his conception aggression generally takes on a more explicitly productive role, and is among other things the central means of attaining integration and viewing the world realistically. Typical of his style, Winnicott borrows words and ideas with established meanings and alters them (often without acknowledgment) for his own purposes. For example, by directly linking aggression to motility and “life force” it essentially becomes the main vehicle through which fusion occurs. In this way, it is

46

As will be shown Winnicott’s more positive or useful conception of aggression can be viewed as tied to his early family experience—specifically, the combination of external restrictions on displaying anger and his need to protect his fragile mother (Rodman, 2003). Among the related dilemmas he faced was how to assert himself in a way that allowed his primary object to be responsive and ultimately survive. That aggression would become for him a creative versus destructive psychic process can be traced to both his earliest interactions with his mother and related oedipal dynamics that took the form of squelching his inherent male power.

72 aggression (not love) which is directly responsible for binding and integration (e.g., AGGRESSION IS BINDING, AGGRESSION IS INTEGRATION, etc). By expanding the meaning of an accepted theoretical construct, Winnicott taps into a novel way of viewing aggression and conceiving of its relationship to development and the treatment process.

Ruthless Love, Fusion, & Stage of Concern In Winnicott’s 1954-55 paper The Depressive Position in Normal Emotional Development (1975), he coins the term “stage of concern” as a depiction of the achievement of whole object status that marks conceptual differences with both Klein and Freud. The main shift involves an alteration in the conceptual vantage point of the transformative phenomena under consideration, basically from a unidirectional field of experience to a bidirectional one. Specifically, the environment is posited as a critical feature in the integration of erotic and aggressive impulses, characterized metaphorically as MOTHER IS ENVIRONMENT. Offshoots of this central metaphor involving biological processes are used to describe the attainment of the depressive position or stage of concern. For example, MOTHER IS EMOTIONAL NOURISHMENT conceptually utilizes her actual provision of food to describe her other role as provider of affective sustenance. Her ability to perform an emotional function is described as a process akin to digestion, resulting in MOTHER IS A BODYILY ORGAN and MOTHER IS A CONTAINER. In these conceptualizations the mother “holds” the child both physically and emotionally. He writes: In terms of environment: the toddler is in a family situation, working out an instinctual life in interpersonal relationships, and the baby is being held

73 by a mother who adapts to ego needs; in between the two is the infant or small child arriving at the depressive position, being held by the mother, but more than that, being held over a phase of living. It will be noted that a time factor has entered, and the mother holds a situation so that the infant has the chance to work through the consequences of instinctual experiences; as we shall see, the working through is quite comparable to the digestive process, and is comparably complex.

The mother holds the situation, and does so over and over again, and at a critical period in the baby's life. The consequence is that something can be done about something. The mother's technique enables the infant's co-existing love and hate to become sorted out and interrelated and gradually brought under control from within in a way that is healthy.

Below is a basic schema outlining the relationship between embodied metaphors and Winnicott’s depiction of psychic functioning and transformation.

A key process involves the mother’s activity of “holding” and metabolizing emotional energy through processes akin to “digestion,” which draw on primary metaphors common to Western thought (e.g., THE MIND IS A BODY, ACQUIRING IDEAS IS EATING). The scheme illustrates how closely the mother is involved in the very sensorimotor experiences which form the basis for conceptual metaphor and how she also becomes the subject of metaphors of transformation: 1. Sensorimotor Experience: Living in an enclosed space Primary Metaphors: States Are Locations, Relationships Are Enclosures, Similarity Is Closeness, Intimacy Is Closeness Winnicottian Metaphors: Mother Is Space, Mother Is Environment, Mother Is Object Related Themes: Subjective and objective space and objects, transitional space, location of cultural experience, primary maternal preoccupation

74 2. Sensorimotor Experience: Being physically held Primary Metaphors: Affection Is Warmth, Help Is Support Winnicottian Metaphors: Mother Is Container, Mother Is Warmth, Mother Is Support Related Themes: Holding, containment, support, integration

3. Sensorimotor Experience: Grasping (or possessing) objects in space Primary Metaphors: Understanding Is Grasping, Purposes Are Desired Objects Winnicottian Metaphors: Holding Is Understanding, Possession Of Transitional Object Is Reality Related Themes: Breast, spatula game, transitional object (e.g., blanket, teddy) 4. Sensorimotor Experience: Eating/Drinking Primary Metaphors: Communication Is Feeding, Acquiring Ideas Is Eating, Good Ideas Are Healthy (Good Tasting Food), Bad Ideas Are Harmful (Bad Tasting) Food Winnicottian Metaphors: Mother/Breast Is Emotional Nourishment, Mother/Environment Is Impingement, Mother/Environment Is Noxious, Feeding On The Self (“Me”) Is Noxious, Feeding On The Nutritious Other (“Not-Me”) Is Healthy, Survival Is Digestion Related Themes: Feeding (actual and emotional), metabolism of ideas via digestion, survival The outline points to the semantic-linguistic origins of key emotional functions that the mother/caregiver comes to represent in Winnicottian thought. It points to how the mother’s physical provision of physical care closely coincides with her emotional functions in the context of the infant’s emerging conceptual metaphorical system.

Specifically, from a conceptual metaphorical perspective, it is clear from the outline that the mother is intimately involved in events that comprise the infant’s “conflation” of learning (Grady, 1997)—that is, how early sensorimotor experiences develop the foundation of the human conceptual system based on metaphor.

75 The mother’s continual presence in close physical space, her physical handling of the infant, breastfeeding, and overall tending correspond Winnicottian constructs such as the subject object as it occurring in states associated with “object relating” (1969), “primary maternal preoccupation” (1956), and the well known idea that “There is no such thing as an infant.” In broader terms these ideas are associated with well-known conceptions in psychoanalysis that portray the infant’s under-developed view of externality as undifferentiated such as “primary narcissism” (Freud, 1914), “symbiosis” (Mahler, 1968), and “selfobject” functioning (Kohut, 1977).

Inherent in all these conceptions is that the accurate conception of reality is a developmental milestone that is associated with both emotional and cognitive elements of the infant’s experience. In sum, overall the mother is significant for not only what she does on a physical and emotional level, but also what she comes to represent in terms of an object in the infant’s emerging categories of uniquely conceived notions of reality visà-vis metaphor.47 A related point evident in these depictions of the infant and mother with respect to conceptual metaphor is that the function and nature of the primary metaphors themselves closely parallel that of the mother in Winnicott’s depiction of early development. That is, metaphors communicate reality based on embodied, concrete and reified notions of time, space, and objects, which are coincidentally the same functions the mother actually provides (e.g., actual functions) and represents (e.g., symbolic functions). The nature of 47

One significant point is that CMT does not consider the variability of experience based on early object relationships that leads to a potential variety of meanings of primary metaphors. For example, the subjective meanings associated with primary metaphors related to space (e.g., INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS) or physical support (e.g., HELP IS SUPPORT) can take on radically different forms based on an adequate versus inadequate caregiving experience.

76 what she provides and represents can be thought of as mirroring the more mature conceptual system of the infant, which from the point of view of the transformational constructs such as object usage exists in statu nascendi.48 It could be said then that the mother—as the temporary “embodiment” of reality for the infant—comes to assume not only emotional functions via the provision of physical ones, but that of metaphor itself. In this way MOTHER IS METAPHOR could be posited to convey the practical array of functions she serves as well as the more transcendent ideas she comes to represent. With respect to Winnicott’s clinical theory, the utility of his constructs of transformation lay in his ability to position the mother as both real and metaphorical, with each stance contributing and enhancing the other in dialectical tension.

From a historical perspective it was Melanie Klein who provided the basic template for the bodily depiction or anthropomorphization of psychic processes that Winnicott would elaborate on throughout his career. From a conceptual metaphorical vantage point it could be posited that object relation theory provides the ultimate depiction of embodied metaphors as applied to psychology, in that it applies most literally the qualities and vicissitudes of physical objects, space, time, etc. to mental life.

The validity and utility of utilizing embodied-metaphorical notions of reality for depicting the mental apparatus has long been discussed in psychoanalysis (Gedo, 1997; Gill, 1988; Melnick, 2000; Schaefer, 1976), though not directly with respect to the current findings of modern metaphor theory. Along these lines, any evaluation of psychoanalytic theory or technique would seem to require taking into consideration

48

Modern developmental constructs from psychology such as affective attunement, reflective function, and mindsharing convey in different but related ways how the caregiver functions as an interpreter or bridge between physiological and emotional phenomena in the context of embodied metaphor (e.g., symbolism).

77 conceptual metaphor, not simply as a way that humans subjectively make meaning of themselves and experience, but also how metaphor itself makes meaning out of us (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).

Object Usage in Context Winnicott’s transformational metaphor object usage is suitable concept to study the relationship between modern metaphor theory and psychoanalysis for its positioning within Winnicottian thinking, as well as for its historical and clinical value. First, because the central paper on object usage was among the last written in his long career, it provides a favorable conceptual vantage point from which to examine Winnicott’s more advanced thinking in relationship to all the other key ideas that came before it. Object usage can be viewed at the very least as an outgrowth of earlier clinical constructs, if not as a culmination of the transformational metaphors that preceded it (Goldman, 1993).

Also, like other constructs in his schema (holding environment, playing, transitional space), object usage sought to depict the non-interpretive aspects of cure, which, importantly, foreshadowed the modern “relational turn” in psychoanalysis (Mills, 2005).

Overall, an examination of the conceptual-metaphorical basis of object usage—in the context of other historically-positioned transformational constructs (both his own and others)—falls directly within the realm of conceptual research (Dreher, 2000).

Winnicott’s conceptualization and writing style in The Use of an Object is reminiscent of previous works and is illustrative of the way he approached clinical ideas (Goldman, 1993). His prose presents a formidable challenge as well as a unique opportunity to test the value of embodied metaphor and conceptual blending as tools for

78 bridging the gap between science and meaning. The questions concerning Winnicottian constructs and his un-systematized manner of thought were highlighted when the paper was publicly read by Winnicott in 1968 to the New York Psychoanalytic Society. The reactions to it provide a snapshot in time of how this idea was received by a divergent theoretical perspective and culture within psychoanalysis. Many of those immediate responses encapsulate what would later become common criticisms to Winnicott’s style and language as his work became better known on the American continent (Goldman, 1993, Ogden, 2001). Similar to many of his constructs of change and his writing style in general, object usage takes into account a wide variety and complexity of clinical data without positing specific formulas or the exact relationships between ideas with which it co-exists (Slochower, 1991). The reader is left to essentially fill-in many details, such as just how the therapist “survives” the destructive attacks reminiscent of object relating and facilitates the transformation to object usage.

Another common reaction to Winnicott’s style is the allegation that his schemas are simply different ways of depicting already formulated clinical constructs, and that he essentially “sidesteps” his theoretical differences by minimizing or ignoring them (Greenburg & Mitchell, 1983). For example, one criticism by a respondent to the paper questioned whether the phenomenon he describes as “object relating” is simply narcissistic object relationships and identification (Goldman, 1993). Overall, Winnicott’s writing and personal style of relating (e.g., outwardly self-effacing but insidiously provocative and rebellious) were capable of provoking strong reactions, revealing among other things how personality and “human” factors (e.g., not purely intellectual) influence how concepts within a field of study evolve over time. In this way, just as Winnicott’s

79 writing and way of thinking challenged traditional scientific approaches to describing psychic functioning typified by American ego psychologists—whose core members were Austrian and German émigrés with roots in the more systematized thinking reminiscent of analytic philosophy—it similarly provides a test for modern metaphor theory and its ability to deconstruct meanings in ways that take into account but go beyond objectivist truth considerations.

Another familiar criticism which presents an opportunity to examine the usefulness of modern metaphor theory as it relates to psychoanalysis is Winnicott’s unique employment of words in defining a his clinical constructs (Goldman, 1993; Ogden, 2001; Slochower, 1991) Winnicott’s casual utilization of everyday words such as “use” or “destroy” in his clinical conceptualization is often viewed as vague and leading to unnecessary ambiguity. One explanation for his less conventional use of language was that Winnicott was avowedly more a natural observer than a systematizer of grand themes (Goldman, 1993; Greenburg & Mitchell, 1983; Guntrip, 1975). His conceptual style has been described as “anti-theory” (Fogel, 1992) and “non-compliance” (Newman, 1995), which provides a unique challenge in attempting to organize the foundations of his thought. His writing style has also been described as more akin to poetry (Ogden, 1999, 2001) and influenced by the Romantic emphasis on subjectivity and its contact with reality (Newman, 1997). These influences are atypical for scientific writing and theorizing, but contribute to both the appeal of Winnicott’s ideas as well as struggles one can have in pinning them down.

Perhaps one such appeal of Winnicott’s writing style is manner in which he is able to account for a wide range of information and experience utilizes divergent ways of

80 knowing. For example, the more free-flowing and unstructured nature of his ideas contain a corresponding depth and breadth that represents both abstract phenomena (e.g., metapsychology) as well as practical and experience-near depictions of being (e.g., “using”, “survival”, “playing” etc.). In particular, Winnicott’s more open and nondogmatic style creates an intellectual space where a reader is invited to explore the continuum of potential meaning. His unique use of language—according to Ogden (2001) more poetic than scientific—is uniquely suited to create in the reader unique experiences which reveal nuanced meanings of psychoanalytically-derived constructs. In a significant way, Winnicott’s writing style, thinking process, and specific concepts of transformation are emblematic of the inherent nature of metaphor itself —that is, as a vehicle that simultaneously points towards both hidden and obvious meanings by the simple juxtaposition of like and dissimilar ideas (Franke, 2000). Systematizing that which is seemingly not capable of being systematized (e.g., the connections between language, thought, and biology) is essentially the task of modern cognitive linguistics, and Winnicottian thought in general and object usage in particular provide a unique opportunity to test its value as a bridge-builder between science and meaning.

Lastly, not only do certain central precepts contained in object usage and its associated metaphors of transformation provide a connection to early psychoanalysis, they also foreshadow clinical trends that would take root in the decade following Winnicott’s death, providing an opportunity to examine how history and language contribute to meaning and clinical utility. For example, the idea that non-interpretive mechanisms involved in a developmentally-oriented two person psychology (e.g., “holding environment”) can affect change would be further elaborated in the self

81 psychology, intersubjective and relational movements that continue to prosper within psychoanalysis, a phenomenon coined the “relational turn� in psychoanalysis (Mills, 2005). Thus, a conceptual-linguistic analysis of object usage can not only provide a historically relevant account of the ideas that formed a Winnicottian ontology as it evolved from early psychoanalytic thought, but also an intellectual vantage point out of which more modern notions of the psychoanalytic change process emerged.

82

CHAPTER III

METHODOLGY

Description of the Methodology The methodology for this study is a hybrid model using modes of textual analysis from linguistics and from psychoanalytic conceptual research (Dreher, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Pragglejazz Group, 2007). The primary strategy of examining the raw text is taken from Pragglejazz Group (2007), wherein spoken or written words are systematically analyzed for metaphorical constructions. The designers coin their approach the “metaphor identification procedure” (MIP), and its stated intent is to provide researchers from various fields of study a reliable and flexible technique for uncovering metaphor in both written and oral language. This methodology is explicitly an alternative to what the authors deem as overly prescribed techniques of investigating language via “isolated constructed examples,” reminiscent of linguistic approaches, as well as experimentally-manipulated responses common in psychological research. The primary intent of capturing “metaphors in the wild” parallels in significant ways qualitative approaches (e.g., grounded theory) in the human sciences as well as psychoanalytic modes of clinical data collection.

83 The MIP approach uses each word as a lexical unit of analysis (e.g., The / therapist / is / on / the / phone /) which is designed to uncover metaphorical usage at its most basic level (e.g., even definite articles and prepositions like “the” and “on”). The authors term this a “maximal approach” where a broad range of words is examined for relationships to metaphor. Because this level of analysis is beyond the current scope—in that transformational constructs or ideas are the primary focus of investigation—this study essentially uses compete phrases as lexical units from which to identify metaphorical constructions. Also, though MIP identifies metaphoricity on a word to word basis, it does not relate metaphorically-determined words’ relationship to broader conceptual metaphorical constructions (e.g., STATES ARE LOCATIONS, HAPPY IS UP, SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS) which is a primary goal of this study. As such, this study broadens the scope of MIP by incorporating methods from conceptual metaphor theory.

The background for determining a construct or phrase’s relationship to conceptual metaphor is taken primarily from the work Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999). Though the current study does not seek to establish the empirical rationale for each metaphorical usage, it does reveal the correspondence between transformational constructs and established categories of conceptual metaphor. In other words, categories of conceptual (embodied) metaphors as set forth by Lakoff and Johnson are taken for granted as essentially reflecting the humans’ built-in conceptual system—which as discussed is neurologically constructed and itself based on metaphor. The determinations with respect to categories of embodied metaphors are made in the “Related Conceptual Metaphor” section of the analysis. Specifically, this study utilizes primary conceptual metaphors

84 (Appendix B), as well as more specific Metaphors of Causes and Events (Appendix C), Metaphors of Self (Appendix D), and Metaphors of Time (Appendix E) as templates from which to examine transformational metaphors as well as related language usage.

Other relevant language constructions (e.g., non-theoretical metaphorical constructs, pertinent language style or syntax) will be considered for their relationship to embodied metaphor and broader relevant meanings. Such examinations include the personal (e.g., subjective Winnicottian) and theoretical-historical (e.g., psychoanalytic) context from which the language usage emerges.

The historical-psychoanalytic context from which the metaphors of transformation emerge will be examined in the “Theoretical-Contextual Meaning” portion of the analysis, which begins each section of text under consideration. Though no specific methodology exists for making exact determinations, the utilization of similar concepts (e.g., “cathexis,” “breast,” “destruction”) and explicit or implied references to other theoretical ideas (e.g., Freud’s “fusion,” Klein’s “depressive position,” and Bion’s “psychotic core”) will primary be used as a means of drawing distinctions and conclusions. Concepts or ideas that emerge more directly from existing constructs of psychoanalysis are termed “psychoanalytically-derived metaphors.” These share a similar function to conceptual metaphor in that both serve as templates from which other ideas emerge.49 This linguistic analysis of theoretical constructs is generally in line with

49

That is, similar to any field of study, psychoanalytic ideas emerge from established conceptual metaphors based on our built-in neurological/conceptual systems. However, these concepts have come to assume varied and nuanced meanings based on various writers’ conceptions, uses, and theoretical trends over the years. For example, “countertransference” is a psychoanalytically-derived metaphor that can be traced to primary metaphors such as THE MIND IS BODY, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, and CHANGE IS MOTION THROUGH SPACE (e.g., projection, incorporation, identification). So, when one is utilizing the term it must always be viewed with respect to: 1) The embodied conceptual metaphors from which it emerges; 2) Its original meaning and usage (e.g., Freud’s conception as a therapist’s transference), and; 3)

85 methodological propositions from within psychoanalysis research, which seek to differentiate conceptual versus empirical perspectives of experimentation Dreher (2000).

Dreher (2000) provides a distinction between “empirical” and “conceptual” research methodology which has implications for this study (see Appendix J for more complete overview). She identifies examples of empirical research studies in psychoanalysis as those which examine the therapeutic process and outcomes, using transcribed sessions, questionnaires, and coding systems for analyzing data. In contrast, and in line with the current study, conceptual research is defined as systematic attempts to optimally clarify the explicit and implicit use of concepts in theory and practice. These approaches are concerned with the logical consistency and coherence of the concepts with respect to other theoretical models and ideas. In general, studies that deal with the conceptual origins of constructs that guide theory and practice inherently are more focused on the process (e.g., in this study’s case, embodied metaphor) of how we establish semantic relationships between ideas. Unlike strict empirical methodologies (e.g., cognitive-linguistic approaches, experimental psychology) the manner in which ideas come to have conceptual coherence and utility, for both writer and reader of the text, necessarily brings into play subjective and historical influences on meaning construction. Dreher terms such research models the “philosophical analysis of concepts” and posits the following as the primary objectives: 1) The investigation of the historical context of a concept’s origin; 2) The history of a concept viewed against the changes of psychoanalytic theory; 3) The current use of a concept in clinical practice, and; 4) A

Its current or particular nuanced meaning and usage (e.g., countertransference as data). Implicit in this methodological analysis of the idea of object usage and other transformational metaphors are these three levels of conceptual scrutiny.

86 critical discussion and, possibly, formulation of a suggestion for a different use of the concept (2000, p. 16).

Elements of the above methodology will be applied to the text of The Use of an Object. Besides the main objective of uncovering the semantic foundations of core Winnicottian constructs of transformation, the analysis is also designed to demonstrate the application of an analysis that draws from cognitive linguistics and psychoanalysis. In the process its value as a methodology for analyzing other theoretical and clinical texts can be assessed.

Outline of Analysis Text Details 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Title: The Use of an Object: Source: International Journal of Psychoanalysis (PEP Archive) Mode: Written Date: 1969 Genre, Register: Professional Journal Length of Text: 3,984 Words

Readership Assumed for Text Advanced students and professionals trained in psychoanalytic theory and practice.

87 Description of Sections Theoretical-Contextual Meaning This is primarily related to three mainstream psychoanalytic ideas available at the time of publication.50 For this study the models of psychoanalytic schools under consideration are: Classical Freudian (PS1), Ego Psychology (PS2), and Kleinian British Object Relations (PS3). One purpose of this section is to contextualize Winnicott’s ideas within the larger frame of psychoanalytic theory. Of the three schools Winnicottian ideas are most closely related to those of Melanie Klein (PS3), by whom he was trained and whose ideas formed the cornerstone of the British Society that both were a part. In general all of Winnicott’s clinical concepts can be seen as embedded in Kleinian ideas, as direct derivations or as points of departure. The PS2 model is important because it provides a contrasting view of psychoanalysis as it evolved on a separate continent with a different set of socio-historical influences. It is also significant because members’ public responses to Winnicott’s presentation of the paper on object usage in 1969 to the New York Psychoanalytic Society provide a unique historical snapshot of how the ideas were received conceptually. Along those same lines, this contextual examination is on a practical level designed to provide a hypothetical simulation of a clinician-reader’s conceptual processes at work in the reading of a text. Though the comparative aspect of this section will not provide a complete analysis of theoretical concepts, it will focus on broad themes that might be triggered by the ideas encountered in reading the paper.

50

A major psychoanalytic viewpoint noticeably absent from this section is the “interpersonal” model of Henry Stack Sullivan, Clara Thompson, and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, among others. Though the larger Winnicottian emphasis on the environment and on the actual nature of the therapist as subject bears close resemblance to the interpersonalist school, the decision was made omit it from direct analysis. The two main considerations were limiting the scope of theoretical comparisons for readability and the relative lack of intellectual contact between the British School and Interpersonal Psychoanalysis.

88

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts For each section of text in which transformational concepts are used, the constructs under consideration will be cited and basic definitions provided. This category of analysis is designed to provide the more literal interpretation of words in the metaphorical constructs under consideration. In general “basic” here denotes that which is most easily understood vis-à-vis common usage, putting value on the concrete nature and historical longevity of a word’s meaning. To aid in this process definitions will be taken from Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners of American English (2002), a corpus which provides contemporary meanings based on ordinary usage. Where relevant the historical uses of words or expressions will also be provided using the Oxford Concise Companion to the English Language (2005). In a section under analysis where no new construct is being examined, “not applicable” will be indicated.

Related Conceptual Metaphors Winnicott’s constructs of transformation that comprise the idea of object usage will be examined using Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) primary categories of conceptual metaphor (Appendix B, C, D, and E). In some instances the connections drawn will be illustrated using linguistic mappings with a narrative for clarity and ease of comprehension. In addition, when relevant to the overall understanding of the key transformational concepts as revealed in the text, other metaphorical constructions and stylistic uses will be discussed in terms of their conceptual-metaphorical foundations and

89 implications. In most instances a concept or idea’s semantic relationship to psychoanalytically-derived metaphors will be shown in this section.

As discussed, these metaphorical constructions reveal more than merely the writer’s particular ornamental use of words, but more importantly they reflect the underlying system of human thought itself.

Lexical Unit Decisions Though each word in the text will be examined for its metaphorical versus more literal usage, the main purpose of this analysis is to uncover the conceptual metaphors that underpin the core theoretical constructs of transformation in the paper. Therefore, as mentioned, not every metaphorical usage in the paper will be identified, but rather those constructions that most directly contribute to gaining an understanding of the primary construct—object usage. For example, “put forward” in the first sentence of the paper is metaphorical (IDEAS ARE OBJECTS) but would not be considered since it does not add to the central idea. However, when deemed to be relevant to an understanding of the main theoretical constructs under consideration, similar metaphorical constructions (e.g., “evolution of my work” in Line 5) and other word use, style, etc. will be taken into account and addressed in the Conceptual Metaphor and Commentary sections.

Primary Resources Used The discussion of theoretical-contextual meanings at the beginning of each section of analysis will be primarily based on the following: The Language of Winnicott: A Dictionary of Winnicott’s Use of Words (Abram, 1996); A Dictionary of Kleinian

90 Thought (Hinshelwood, 1991); Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts (Moore & Fine, eds., 1990); and; The Language of Psychoanalysis (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973).

Coding Decisions for Text In line with American Psychological Association’s (2002) standards and recommendations for dissertations, the text under consideration will be presented in its original form with no additional markings (e.g., bold, italics, underlining).51 Therefore, all italicized words in the text are from the original. The determinations and related rationale (e.g., metaphoricity, theoretical relevance, significance to broader understandings, etc.) will be reflected in each section of the analysis. Each sentence of the text will be numbered for ease of referencing the text in the four analysis sections.

Finally, as mentioned, for clarity the designation PS1, PS2, and PS3 will be used to identify Classical Freudian Theory, Ego Psychology, and Kleinian Theory respectively.

51

An omission is the last paragraph in which Winnicott summarizes in outline form the main findings of the paper. This was deemed redundant and not included in the analysis.

91

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT

Text and Analysis, Lines 1-3 1. In this paper I propose to put forward for discussion the idea of the use of an object.

2. The allied subject of relating to objects seems to me to have had our full attention.

3. The idea of the use of an object has not, however, been so much examined, and it may not even have been specifically studied.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning of “Object” and “Object Relating” An object in classical psychoanalytic thought (PS1) is generally related to tangible entities (people, things) or mental representations of psychologically significant phenomena. In Freud’s instinct theory objects are impersonal and more important as the entities through which drives achieve their aim—energy discharge and pleasure—than as sources of emotional sustenance. Objects are both the source of attraction and the entities to which sexual aims are directed. An object’s status as the main source of early dependency also contributes to the intensity with which it is sought and also to its overall importance relative to the infant. The superego is essentially an internalized object that represents parental and societal demands. Internal objects are thought to be comprised of

92 both real and imagined characteristics of external objects.52 Generally, how an object becomes significant as a target of drives is related to its meeting of dependency needs (anaclisis) and its level of idealization as achieved through (narcissistic) identification.

Internalization and introjection are psychic processes involved in identification and thus related to the importance of an object.

In ego psychology (PS2) objects generally correspond to (PS1), though certain elaborations and emphases are made. In general, object representations refer to the ego’s internal depiction of the object that roughly begins at the stage of object permanence or object constancy. This more stable relation with the object is thought to occur once the infant goes beyond viewing the mother as merely need-satisfying and corresponds with its transformation as permanently available intrapsychically to the infant. Object relationships (real people) are given more emphasis than in (PS1) or (PS3), in line with the importance in ego psychology of maintaining mature (e.g., not dependent, cold, hostile, etc.) connections as part of an overall goal of positively adapting to one’s surroundings.

A Kleinian (PS3) view of object relations is significant for positing objects as existing from birth, being imbued with a uniquely phenomenological (versus

52

Moore and Fine (1990) note that “object relationship” is used to depict interactions between real people (two subjects) whereas “object relations” generally signifies how one subject represents objects psychologically or internally. The Kleinian concept “internal object” is an example of the more subjectively imbued object relation, though it connotes more a sense of concreteness and anthropomorphism than mere mental representation. Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) point out that the conception of an object in psychoanalysis is at its core in line with traditional philosophy and epistemology: an object as a concrete and separate entity that is perceived by a knowing subject. In addition, our general view of reality comes from the notion of objects (e.g., “objectivity”) and is related to attempts to accurately perceive tangible things in the world. As discussed, conceptual metaphor theory has discovered that an object is a primary construct used for conceiving of human ontology related to cause and effect, the mind, and the self, among other things.

93 mechanistic) quality, and for being felt by the subject as having a real physical existence (e.g., inside or outside the body). As such objects can exist intrapsychically as physical or mental, internal or external, good or bad, and part or whole. Unconscious phantasy, the mental equivalent of physiological experience, is the foundation of all mental activity and thus plays an important role in how an object is ultimately viewed. In the Kleinan formulation, mental representations, as viewed in (PS1) and (PS2), are less concrete and more akin to secondary manifestations or symbols related to memory. The infant’s experience of internal objects, on the other hand, are more closely related to phantasies about physiological processes as function of imagining that entities exist in the body, which in turn contribute significantly to how other objects are perceived and experienced.

The psychic development from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position marks an increased ability to view objects more accurately, with more empathy, and as whole versus in parts.

Basic Meaning of “Use”, “Object”, and “Relating” Use (noun) implies the putting of a thing or person to a given purpose so as to accomplish an end.53 Object (noun) implies a thing that can be seen or touched; a material thing that occupies space.54 Relate (verb) implies making a connection between two different things.55

53

Contemporary definitions of use (n): 1) the act of using something; 2) a way of using something; 3) the right, opportunity, or permission to use something; 4) the ability to use part of your body or mind; 5) meaning of a word or a way of speaking or writing a word. Expressions: to be of use, come into/go out of use, have its/your uses, it’s/there’s no use, make use of, what’s the use?

54

Contemporary definitions of object (n): 1) a thing you can see or touch that is not alive an usually solid; 2) something you plan to achieve; 3) the person or thing that something happens to or that people have a

94 Related Conceptual Metaphors The idea of interacting (e.g., using and relating) with tangible objects in the world (e.g., items, utensils, people, etc.) is ubiquitous and comprises the primary rationale for human ontology and epistemology. As embodied beings from conception, we are essentially objects located in space who exist in a world of other tangible and mental objects.56 Johnson’s work on conflation in early learning (as cited in Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) demonstrates that the perception and manipulation of objects contributes significantly to how we come to conceptualize both physical and psychic phenomena (see Appendix B for Primary Conceptual Metaphors). Physical objects are part of the infant’s world from birth, and they are interacted with using all five senses. In general, modern developmental research shows that infants learn from the combination of perception and action, especially through the exploration of their environment (Rochat, 1999). Objects used in these early learning processes can be animate or inanimate and part of the body (e.g., fingers, toes), within the body (e.g., inside of the mouth), or external to it (e.g., pacifier, toys).

particular feeling about; 4) Linguistics – A noun pronoun of phrase that is affected in a direct or indirect way by the action of a verb. Expressions: no object (“Money’s no object”), the object of the exercise (purpose for doing something).

55

Contemporary definitions of relate (v): 1) to show or make a connection between two different things; 2) to tell someone something that has happened or what someone has said. Expressions: Relate to (to be about something or connected with something or to be able to understand a situation or the way someone feels and thinks).

56

The dual quality of consciousness itself contributes to the division between subject and object, which also leads to the ability of a subject to relate to parts of itself as objects. The relation of a person to the self has a long history in philosophy and has been found to be built on conceptual metaphors (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 267-289). From Freud onward the basic conception the self or ego in psychoanalysis essentially utilizes the same conceptual metaphors (see Metaphors of Self in Appendix E), with elaborations essentially only shifting its vantage point, function, and relationship to other internal and external objects.

95 Though not yet defined in the paper, in this brief introduction “object,” “using,” and “relating” conjure conceptual references to THE MIND IS A BODY, THINKING IS OBJECT MANIPULATION, and OBJECTS ARE PURPOSES. As discussed, implied in all characterizations of the mind in psychoanalysis is the notion that objects exist in the contained (bodily) space of the mind (see Appendix D for Metaphors of Mind). The experience of interacting with physical objects in the world (e.g., computers, forks, people) is used to depict what occurs psychologically (e.g., object relationships). From these ubiquitous physical experiences also come judgments about the motivational elements involved in mental functioning. In other words, because physical objects serve certain primary functions related to meeting needs (e.g., food, warmth, comfort) and performing tasks (e.g., eating, writing, grooming), the same criteria is applied to explain mental acts. For example, because physical objects are handled and utilized for achieving a goal, mental objects are assigned similar roles and purposes. From this come expressions such as “Let’s toss that idea around” (THINKING IS OBJECT MANIPULATION) and “He has not grasped the complex formula (OBJECTS ARE PURPOSES).

That Winnicott chooses to represent a clinical-developmental idea with words that reflect one of the most elemental concepts used to understand our whole existence is significant (see Appendix C for Location Event-Structure Metaphor and Object EventStructure Metaphor). The vicissitudes of objects in space (e.g., a location) is the primary way humans not only understand basic feeling states and other everyday events in the world, but it is also how more abstract ideas are constructed. A wide range of potential meanings come into play when words basic to ontology (e.g., object, use, hold, play, etc.)

96 are used in non-specific ways, which is a hallmark of Winnicottian style. The ubiquity and essential nature of the words contained in his key constructs of transformation broadens the range of potential meanings that they can come to assume. Over the years critiques of this style range from viewing it as evasive, provocative, or facile on one hand and mystical and revealing on the other. Apart from the deciphering the ultimate meaning or the utility of his style, what is clear is that this way of incorporating language leaves broad gaps or spaces which are left to be filled-in by the individual reader.

Commentary In the first paragraph of the paper the concepts of object usage and object relating are introduced. A reader of the day would most likely have theoretical associations triggered by the terms “object” (in “use of an object”) and “object relating.” Object relationships and associated terms have a long history in psychoanalysis and in the British School of which Winnicott was a part. The complete construction of the concept “use of an object” is new, and it possibly evokes ideas both related to past theory (Winnicott and others) as well as basic (literal) meanings outlined above. As evidenced by its numerous definitions and related expressions, the noun “use” covers a wide range of ground semantically (e.g., relating to the user, that which is used, the process of being used, the purpose of use, rights (legal) related to use, religious rites, and even sexual exploitation). It is from these possible meanings that the reader might here begin to consider other ways of conceiving the nature of relating to an object, prompted by Winnicott’s allusion in Line 1 to the unexamined nature of the idea he is about to put forth.

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Text and Analysis, Lines 4-5 4. This work on the use of an object arises out of my clinical experience and is in the direct line of development that is peculiarly mine.

5. I cannot assume, of course, that the way my ideas have developed has been followed by others, but I could like to point out that there has been a sequence, and the order that there may be in the sequence belongs to the evolution of my work.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning Though still not defined Winnicott generally relates that his proposed construct of the use of an object is the outcome of a personal and professional process. Those versed in his writings would be generally familiar with his tendency to provide a subjective account of his discoveries—specifically, how the uncovering of theoretical-clinical ideas is always contextualized within his own developmental processes.57 By doing this Winnicott highlights the importance and reality of the clinician-reader’s subjecthood, as well as the mutually reinforcing nature of the subject-object-environment which will be found to be central to the idea under consideration. In a general sense none of the three psychoanalytic models under consideration expressly consider the therapist’s subjectivity, nor do they put as much emphasis on the child’s environment as they do on internal psychic processes. Along those lines an informed reader of the time might also associate to how Winnicott’s status as an “Independent” in the British School is being

57

This more personal account and style in professional writing is in direct opposition to the scientific stance of American ego psychologists (PS2), many of whom European émigrés steeped in analytic philosophy and the scientific method.

98 asserted here.58 This could prompt thoughts of past divergences of opinion he had with Klein on such topics as the importance of the environment in early infant development and the significance and meaning of infant aggression. Similarly, “line of development” might evoke Anna Freud’s take on the emotional processes of early childhood. Overall, Winnicott generally shared with Anna Freud and ego psychologists the view that the environment was instrumental in building the psychic organization in which object relations existed, in direct contrast to the Kleinian notion that the infant is born with a set of predetermined structures that recognized and fantasized about objects like the mother (Rodman, 2003).

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not Applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors Metaphorical constructions used in this paragraph related to the “development” of “ideas” (IDEAS ARE OBJECTS) and the “sequence” and “evolution” of Winnicott’s professional work are worth noting. The depiction of development as a “line” (a path with a particular sequence of steps) is related to the conceptual metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, in which achieving a goal is understood through the experience of transporting oneself to a desired place. “She’s feeling a bit better, but she’s not quite there yet” is an example of how well-being is related to arriving at a destination. From

58

Winnicott had by this time written much to distinguish certain aspects of his theory (e.g., generative nature of aggression, importance of the environment) from the Kleinian camp. Also, the “Controversial Discussions” might be one of many such divisions within the School that could be evoked here.

99 this one could conceive of DEVELOPMENT IS A PATH as describing the process of physical and emotional maturation. Implied in all ideas of development is the notion that there are unhealthy and healthy paths. One function of a theory is to set down the conditions that facilitate a successful course toward optimal development.

In general Winnicott similarly utilizes the DEVELOPEMNT IS A PATH mapping, though here and in other writing he characterizes the “journey” towards a destination as seemingly more important than the arrival. In Winnicott’s writing “arriving” is often quite mundane and anticlimactic (almost as if it were a forgone conclusion all along), while the “journey” holds all the important and exciting details.

This is perhaps part of his larger preoccupation with that which occurs “in between” (transitional object and phenomena) what is typically conceived of as more tangible and notable events and objects (Rodman, 2003). Emphasizing the sequential processes that underpin significant developmental outcomes is characteristic of his thinking and also relates to his imaginative conception of time to reveal nuances in experience.59 The primary metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS is another way we conceive of ideas related to development. A healthy or unhealthy state is depicted as a location in space (“I’m close to being out of my depression, but I’m worried one more comment from him will send me over the edge). Arriving at destinations that reflects locations in space and the attainment or manipulation of objects are primary ways we conceptualize subjective experiences (see Appendix C for Location Event-Structure Metaphor and

59

The paradox of the child “creating” the object that was waiting to be created first alluded to in his paper on transitional objects and (later) in the current paper is one such illustration of altering our typical conceptual sequence of time (see Metaphors of Time in Appendix F). Winnicott is essentially highlighting the notion that future events are not simply outcomes of antecedent actions, but also related to causes of yet to be experienced phenomena.

100 Object Event-Structure Metaphor). In a parallel way achieving the psychological state associated with object usage will be shown to be the outcome of a developmental process related not to the transportation of oneself to a destination, but rather the psychological placement (e.g., movement) of the therapist (e.g., object) outside the subjective area (e.g., location/space) of omnipotence.

Commentary As pointed out by Ogden (2002) Winnicott is masterful at using his style of writing to convey an experiential component of an idea he is proposing.60 By reminding the reader that his discovery of object usage is an outcome of a personal and professional process, he seems to be demonstrating how each person must similarly arrive at this important destination representing true subjecthood in a unique way—one that is “peculiarly” (Line 4) or experientially theirs.61 Among other things, he is laying the groundwork for shifting in his characteristic way the commonly accepted logic and order of developmental events. In this case he is highlighting how the forces which propel development do not manifest in a uniform way, but rather form a template from which each individual experiences its elements in unique ways. Part of the variety of experience will be shown to related to how the element of time vis-à-vis transient states of mind

60

“Because style and content are so interdependent in Winnicott's writing, his papers are not well served by a thematic reading aimed exclusively at gleaning ‘what the paper is about.’ Such efforts often result in trivial aphorisms. Winnicott, for the most part, does not use language to arrive at conclusions; rather, he uses language to create experiences in reading that are inseparable from the ideas he is presenting, or more accurately, the ideas he is playing with” (Ogden, 2001, p. 299).

61

The syntax in section reinforces the idea of the importance of personal experience and individuality in Winnicottian thought: The personal pronoun “my” is used four times and the possessive pronoun “mine” once.

101 plays a role in shifting the commonly understood unidirectional flow of energy from past to present, object to object, subjective state to objective state, to name a few.

A related idea inherent here and in other Winnicottian papers is the notion that the process (e.g., directionality) of differentiation (from objects) and unification (with objects) is complex. Attempts to depict such abstract psychological phenomena challenge our typical conceptual schemas for cause and effect, especially depictions that view forces as unidirectional and unimpeded by other factors.62 Winnicott’s emphasis on “sequence” (mentioned twice in Line 5 along with the redundant concept “order”) points toward what will be a central thrust of his argument: that object relating is a developmental process that precedes object usage and is thus only a marker and not the final destination on the path to full psychic realization. The processes involved in attaining the status object usage—in particular the caregiver or therapist’s qualities ability to “survive”—must be made manifest to both subjects (the emerging subjecthood of the infant and established subjecthood of the caregiver) in order to accurately perceive oneself and others. However, one related inherent paradox of Winnicottian ontology that will be further demonstrated is that discovery is always “re-discovery” (e.g., conflation of time states) and “mutual discovery” (e.g., self and object, self and other self). These more subtle and complex conceptions of time, self, and reality test not only the viability of a practioner’s clinical repertoire, but also the limits of embodied metaphor as a viable tool of conceptual research.

62

Ogden (2001) cites the “paradox” of progressing from an undifferentiated to a differentiated state as a function of “living an experience together,” pointing to the idea that psychic separation is an outcome of unity. However, one could also view if from the perspective of separation/differentiation creating unity, in that what is “experienced together” in a psychological sense is still separate from the point of view of the infant. For Winnicott the environment and individual organism always contain forces that are both interdependent and mutually exclusive.

102 In terms of technique and professional development, “evolution of my work” (Line 5) alludes to the notion that the capacity to be used is in a parallel way an outcome of his coming to understand the importance of surviving clients’ attacks.63 Survival is also closely related to the biological idea of evolution, and along with “sequence” and “order” connotes a certain logical process that Winnicott views as inherent in human development. The use of “evolution” may prompt the reader to consider that the phenomenon he is describing is at its core related to natural laws (e.g., Darwin’s “survival of the fittest”).64 Evolution is also importantly concerned with an individual organism’s environment as crucial for development, which is a central preoccupation for Winnicott throughout his writing.

Text and Analysis, Lines 6-1265 6. My work on transitional objects and phenomena which followed on naturally after 'The Observation of Infants in a Set Situation' is fairly well known.

7. Obviously the idea of the use of an object is related to the capacity to play.

8. I have recently given attention to the subject of creative playing.

9. This is near to my present subject.

10. Then also there is a natural development from my point of view along the line of the concepts of the holding environment, this facilitating the individual's discovery of the self.

11. Arising out of failure in this area of the facilitating environment can be seen the whole subject of the development of character disorders associated with the

63

Over his career Winnicott had written extensively on the intensity of working with psychotic and borderline patients. Viewed from this perspective, this paper is a final statement of his position on transference, countertransference, and technique.

64

See Phillips (1988) for the role of Darwin’s theory in his early professional development, especially Winnicott’s interest in “gaps” of knowledge.

65

This paragraph does not appear in this paper as published in Playing and Reality (1971) and Psychoanalytic Explorations (1989).

103 setting up of various kinds of false self, these representing failures of selfestablishment and self-discovery.

12. All this makes sense, for me, of the special focus that there is in my work on what I have called transitional phenomena and the study of the minute details that are available to the clinician that illustrate the gradual build-up of the individual's capacity to play and the capacity to find and then to use the 'external' world with its own independence and autonomy.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning of “Transitional Object” (and “Phenomena”), “Holding Environment,” “Playing,” and “False Self” The compounds transitional object and transitional phenomena were clinical constructs introduced in the seminal paper Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena (1951). According to Abram (1996) it was the first idea in psychoanalysis to account for what exists psychically in the location between a subject and object.

Transitional phenomena are related to hypothetical psychic space that occurs between subject and object (“me” and “not me”), internal and external reality, and inner and outer in a physical sense. Similarly referred to by Winnicott as an intermediate area or potential space, transitional phenomena play a crucial role in the perceptual development of the infant from a psychic state characterized as merged with the environment to eventual whole and separate unit status.66 A transitional object can be a tangible item (e.g., blanket, doll, etc.) used by the infant to represent inner experiences and to aid in actual and perceived emotional separation from important love objects. It also stands for individuals in the external world, most notably a mother or caretaker. Winnicott posits that from the point of view of the infant, a transitional object does not exactly indicate that the child is employing

66

See Rochat (1999) for a modern developmental account that demonstrates self-differentiation as a function of proprioceptive capacities present from about three months of age.

104 symbolism, which requires more advanced cognitive capacity marked by ability to conceive of objects as separate from the experiencing subject. Its importance lays more its status as an item belonging to (e.g., a possession) the infant. It does, nevertheless, provide a window into similar elements and processes that will soon come to comprise formal symbolism and the closely related topic of conceptual metaphor.

Transitional phenomena and objects will be shown to play a crucial role in the attainment of object usage. A view from PS1 and PS2 would hold that the processes being described in the construct transitional phenomena are related to the oral phase of libidinal development. These can be said to represent how the infant’s experiences with the primary love object are sought to be maintained through displacement onto external substitutes. Potentially occurring both before and after the achievement of object constancy, fears of loss of or abandonment by the love object are dealt with the use of a transitional object which is called upon in times of distress. Ideas of the day that were emerging from infant developmental research adopted by PS2 might characterize these elements as related to the process of differentiation and individuation that originate in states of symbiosis and progress through stages in which the mother is viewed ambivalently (Mahler, 1968).

Views of internal objects from PS3, which account for their more concrete and anthropomorphic nature, do not directly account for that which exists in the space between objects, between a subject and object, or between subjective and objective reality.67 However, the key psychic processes (e.g., projection, introjection, splitting of

67

In Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena Winnicott writes: “It is interesting to compare the transitional object concept with Melanie Klein's concept of the internal object. The transitional object is not

105 the ego and object) involved in development from the paranoid-schizoid to depressive position can be said to generally occur in the territory of Winnicott’s transitional phenomena, in part because all psychic processes in PS3 involve unconscious phantasy which encompasses physical and mental object phenomena. For Klein the central outcome of healthy development is the ability to differentiate oneself from other “whole” objects, to have the capacity for concern (Winnicott’s “ruth”), and to be able to conceptualize and tolerate loving and hating aspects of other objects (Winnicott’s “fusion”). For this to occur, the infant must have (and perceive) a “good” internal object that is both loving and protecting. Generally, with such assistance the infant is able to master the fear related to the pull from “bad” persecutory objects.

The PS3 construct of unconscious phantasy can be more directly viewed as existing in the psychic realm of transitional phenomena. As essentially the ground of all psychic phenomena that links biological impulses with thought processes (most importantly through imagined relationships between objects thought to physically exist in body) unconscious phantasy like transitional phenomena plays a crucial role in making meaning of embodied experiences through symbolic or metaphorical processes as manifested through behavioral elaboration (e.g., play in children).68 The anthropomorphic

an internal object (which is a mental concept)—it is a possession. Yet it is not (for the infant) an external object either” (p. 9).

68 The construct of unconscious phantasy and the broad range of phenomena it came to represent would be bring about debates on metapsychology and the difference between “science” and “meaning.” Similar debates around language use in describing metapsychological versus clinical phenomena would occur some three decades later in the United States (see Gill, 1988). In the British School some believed that unconscious phantasy’s depiction as both the built-in psychic structure as well as the meaning derived by the subject from utilizing those very mechanisms deluded its usefulness (Hinshelwood, 1989). Modern cognitive science has shown that our conceptual systems are based on our biology (embodiment) and that viewing form or structure as completely distinct from experience is a difficult proposition (Turner & Fauconnier, 2002). Akin to the findings of embodied metaphor theory, Hinshelwood (1989) posits that Klein’s philosophical position reflected “interactionism” or the notion that mind and body (including brain) are mutually influential, as evidenced by embodied expressions concerning the experience of discomfort or

106 nature of psychic functioning put forth by Klein is supported by cognitive science’s discovery of the embodied basis of our conceptual systems (see Appendix B).

Christopher Johnson’s findings (as cited in Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) involving the “conflation” processes of learning supports the idea that there exists from birth a rudimentary capacity to symbolize biological experiences by conceiving objects as existing in space, both inside and outside the container of the body. This can be seen in the view that the infant attempts to cope with various biological states such as hunger via the existence of internal “good” and “bad” objects as later reflected in such expressions as: something “gnawing” at one’s insides,” having a “lump” in one’s throat” or “butterflies” in one’s stomach (Hinshelwood, 1989; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).

Winnicott’s holding (or facilitating) environment is a key concept in his depiction of human development that also has implications for treatment. The “environment” is essentially comprised of those individuals (most often mother) and events related to the care of the infant. For Winnicott the holding environment it is a prime determiner of the eventual emotional health of the child. His oft-quoted statement “There is no such thing as an infant” reflects the undifferentiated nature of the infant-mother-environment matrix, both from the point of view of an objective observer as well as from the pre-subjective state of the infant. It is within a successful holding environment that the child’s state is transformed from one amorphously merged with its surroundings to subjectively separate. For Winnicott a successful holding environment includes early on the mother’s

anxiety (e.g., “butterflies” in one’s stomach). Moreover, modern developmental research has shown that from birth the infant’s conceptual system is an outcome of mutually influential and inseparable process involving sensory experiences and mental operations (Rochat, 1999). Many expressions reflecting the conflation of psychic and somatic experiences is based on the MIND IS A BODY metaphor (see Appendix D).

107 capacity for intense emotional attunement (primary maternal preoccupation) and overall “good enough” practical care.

From PS2 perhaps the closest related construct is Hartmann’s (1939) “average expectable environment” which depicts the hypothetical conditions in the child’s surroundings that will produce a reasonable level of physical and psychological development. In a more indirect way Benedek’s (1959) notion of the inter-relationship between mother and infant as expressed through mutual drive satisfaction and Mahler’s (1968) work on the symbiosis stage that precedes individuation are also related. In PS3 the environment is generally viewed as the mother (and in particular the breast), whose importance is measured not as much by her actual actions or intentions, but rather by the infant’s interpretation of internal events based mainly on physical sensations. The vicissitudes of the external environment can contribute to distortions as well as alleviate anxiety, contributing to the overall psychic set-up of “good” and “bad” internal objects.

Posited as occurring in the realm of transitional space, Winnicott’s construct of playing essentially involves the external or behavioral elaboration of internal psychic processes that are at early stages related to making meaning of inner and outer reality. As a developmental function, the ability to play is a milestone and points the way toward more mature forms of self structure, creativity and imagination. As such Winnicott would come to conceive of effective therapy as a form of playing reflected in the un-impinged (“good enough”) overlapping of two subjectivities. Ideas from PS2 might conceive of such phenomena as related to the ego functions designed to cope with and adapt to immediate psychic circumstances and to accurately perceive reality, with as little interference as possible from libidinal or aggressive id impulses (Moore & Fine, 1990).

108 Parallel implications for therapy from a PS2 viewpoint are associated with Hartmann’s (1939) idea of an “average expectable environment” that is designed to help the patient foster the capacity to adequately perceive reality and to cope with external stressors. In the realm of child treatment Anna Freud’s approach similarly supported adaptable ego functions in a way that some perceived as more educational than analytic.69 In contrast, the PS3 view generally views children’s “play” as synonymous with adult free association and dreams. One of its primary functions is to enact internal mental conflicts in an attempt at mastering anxiety-filled experiences. According to this view, the clinical material revealed by play demonstrates the anthropomorphic nature of psychic contents and points toward the importance of objects as existing in space as the foundation of conceptual understanding.

The false self in Winnicott’s theorizing is related to defense (“caretaker self”), forming out of a need to protect the person’s core or true self. The false self can range in its level of health or dysfunction, though its characteristic function involves intellectualization and symbolism in the service of compliance and compromise with the environment. The true self is thought to exist from birth, reflecting the essence of what it means to feel “real.” It is nurtured mainly by the mother’s ability to tolerate and make meaning of the infant’s omnipotence, as manifested in her acceptance of spontaneous gestures.

69

Anna Freud began her career as a teacher. See Grosskurth (1986) for accounts of the Controversial Discussions related to theory and technique as applied to children. Winnicott, like the Kleinians, did not distinguish between the “play” of children versus adults, nor did he propose a distinct method based on the age of the patient (Winnicott, 1962).

109 In general the PS2 depiction of the ego similarly focuses on its adaptive or maladaptive functioning capacity in relation to the environment. Like Winnicott’s ideas of the true and false self, the ego is also involved in the accurate perception of reality. In relation to objects, ego defense mechanisms are designed to protect against the loss of the object, its love, its disapproval and/or punishment via castration. In contrast, in PS3 the process does not directly involve protecting the self or ego, but the object itself. The mind inherently seeks to preserve that which it deems capable of providing security. This depiction calls attention to the more indirect ways that the ego seeks to survive and provides a glimpse into the earliest processes that come to compromise empathy.

Basic Meanings of “Transition,” “Capacity,” “Play,” “Holding,” “Facilitating,” “Environment,” and “Self” A transition (n) describes the process of passing from a condition, stage, or form to another.70 Capacity (n) involves the ability to do something or hold something in space.71 Play (v) is related to having fun or taking an active role in a game or sport.72 Holding (noun or adj.) is associated with physical the act of being supported, carried, or contained by another object.73 Facilitating relates to the ability to make something

70

Contemporary definition of transition (n): 1) the process of changing from one situation, form, or state to another. Transitional (adj.): temporary, or in the process of changing from one situation, form, or state to another (a transitional government).

71

Contemporary definition of capacity (n): 1) the amount of something that can be put in a container or the number of people that a place has room for; 2) the ability to do something; 3) the amount of goods a company can produce or the amount of work it can do.

72

Contemporary definitions of play (v): 1) to take part in a sport or game; 2) to make music or sound; 3) to have a part in a play; 4) the act (usually children) of doing something enjoyable; 4a) to pretend to be someone else.

73

Contemporary definition of hold (v): 1) to carry; 2) to stop something from moving; 3) to put arms around something; 4) (to be able to) contain; 5) to have; 6) to continue in same state; 7) to keep or stop

110 manageable.74 An environment (n) is a place or situation in which humans exist.75 Something false (adj.) is not true or something made to look real which is not.76 Self (n) is the conscious identification of one as distinct from other people.77

Related Conceptual Metaphors This section essentially provides an outline of Winnicott’s central theorizing leading up to the paper on object usage. Transitional phenomena and transitional objects are foundational constructs in the overall structure which will be central to an understanding of his new construct of object usage. As a tangible object that represents both inner and outer psychic processes—and experienced through the physical space of a bodily container—transitional objects and transitional phenomena cover a wide range of experience. These ideas provide a unique window into the early conflation of infant experience that forms the foundation of conceptual metaphor. Because transitional phenomena describe the rudimentary processes involved in the acquisition of basic selfobject differentiation as a part of a larger capacity to accurately perceive reality and

something; 8) to not lose to opponent; 9) to believe; 10) to organize and event; 11) to wait on telephone; 12) to position part of body; 13) to have quality or feeling; 14) to keep having feeling.

74 Contemporary definition of facilitate (v): to make it possible or easier to for something to happen.

75

Contemporary definition of environment (n): 1) the place in which people live and work, including all the physical conditions that affect them; 1a) the conditions and influences in which people carry on a particular activity; 1b) computing the system that a computer or computer program operates in. 2) the natural world, including the land, water, air, plants, and animals, especially considered as something that is affected by human activity.

76

Contemporary definition of false (adj.): 1) not true; 2) made to look like something real (ARTIFICIAL); 2a) not real and intended to trick people; 3) based on a mistake or on wrong information; 4) not showing what you really feel or intend (INSINCERE).

77

Contemporary definition of self (n): who you are and what you think and feel, especially the conscious feeling of being separate and different from other people.

111 symbolize, it essentially provides an account of how and why certain embodied metaphors come to be central to our conceptual systems. As an actual object that a child utilizes for physical and emotional comfort, the processes associated with a transitional object can be said to relate to at least a handful of primary metaphors which form the basis for more abstract thinking. For example, a transitional object such as a teddy can be held closely by the child for comfort, warmth, and overall intimacy, reflecting the primary metaphors AFFECTION IS WARMTH and INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS. On an emotional level identification processes are perhaps reflected in SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS in which the teddy-child is imagined to be a love object to the self-mother.

As perhaps the prime item of physical and emotional security at a certain stage of development, PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS reflects how transitional objects are intensely sought after by the child, at times to the exclusion of even the mother. In a parallel way, the purpose or “desired” outcome of possessing a transitional object is achieving “independence” and “autonomy” which will be later linked to achieving object usage status.

Based on the brief outline provided above which encompasses key Winnicottian constructs of transformation, a preliminary metaphorical mapping can be devised to contextualize the ideas that will form the foundation for the object usage paradigm. Using aspects of the Event Structure Metaphor (Appendix C), which is an account of how humans conceive of cause and effect, the following mapping based on the self and reality is one way to conceptualize the key constructs in this section:

112 FINDING THE TRUE SELF IS FINDING THE EXTERNAL WORLD States Are Locations • • • •

The infant exists in undifferentiated psychic (narcissistic) space Transitional space is potential space because of the possibility for transformation toward differentiation, self-realization, objective perception of objects, etc.

Transitional space is exists hypothetically in-between a merged/undifferentiated state and a separate unit state Transitional space contains or coexists with the infant’s innate capacities for creativity, illusion, and playing, all manifestations of the True Self

Attributes Are Possessions • •

A healthy functioning infant “possesses” a transitional object, which reflects past states of pleasure and security from a caregiving object (transfer of time) A possession also reflects current interaction with the environment and to “finding” externality itself (unfolding or creation of time)

Changes Are Movements • •

Psychic movement reflects innate curiosity and exploration of objects that represent “not me” as well as those that are part of “me” A transitional object stands for both “me” and “not me” and reflects the internal status of external objects.

Causes Are Forces • •

Motility—a generative form of aggression akin to a life force—is designed to move toward fusion of libidinal and aggressive force Fusion is associated with reality-testing and uncovering the True Self

Causation Is Forced Movement •

•

In health, instinctual forces (libidinal and aggressive) are transformed in transitional space and allow movement from narcissistic/object relating space into object usage space (shared reality, bi-directionality, whole and separate objects, birth of subjectivity) Developmental stagnation is inability to move outside narcissistic/object relating space (movement is auto-contained, unidirectional, and reflects merged state—no subjectivity)

113 Purposes Are Destinations •

•

Purposes related to transitional objects and phenomena include finding the “location” of externality and ultimately of the True Self, which is often “hidden”

by False Self protection through compliance Finding the authentic version (its “nature”) of the object will be shown to be part of finding reality itself

Means Are Paths •

Paths reflect the “developmental line” or “sequence” leading from undifferentiated to differentiated states—part to whole objects, unidirectional to bidirectional causation, no-time to time

Difficulties Are Impediments to Motion • •

False Self compliance keeps the True Self hidden (e.g., prohibits movement to location of True Self) In treatment the therapist’s collusion with the False Self (e.g., treating “psychotic core” as neurotic, self-defensive interpretations designed to diffuse or avoid aggressive energy, etc.) reinforces impediments to arriving at True Self location

Freedom of Action Is the Lack of Impediments to Motion •

•

•

False Self compliance is main impediment (e.g., alteration or inhibition of self to meet environmental demands, overvaluing “reason” versus “experiencing,” viewing adaptation as compliance via “self-control”) True Self elements like “spontaneous gestures” and “ playing” reflect lack of impediments or transcendence of them (e.g., revelation of “essential” elements of self that may include controlled and non-controlled aspects, “experiencing” or engaging of environment and being known is valued over controlled-reason).

The presence of an adequate “holding environment,” sufficient “primary maternal preoccupation,” and overall lack of impingement allow for freedom of movement in space

Long-Term Purposeful Activities Are Journeys •

Development is a “path” from undifferentiated to differentiated states, from subjective objects to objects more objectively perceived, and from False Self to True Self functioning

114 Commentary The above mapping based primarily on the Location-Event Structure Metaphor delineates the conceptual foundation on which many Winnicottian constructs of transformation are based. It reveals much of the rationale that informed his clinical technique and which pointed toward his larger depiction of human ontology and epistemology. As such it also provides a scheme and context from which to analyze, understand, and contextualize other psychoanalytic constructs, both from a theoretical and clinical perspective. Winnicott generally spends the remainder of the paper positioning object usage into this established paradigm of psychic functioning and transformation.

Perhaps the main conceptual attribute that sets Winnicott’s overall schema of transformation apart from others is the notion of transitional phenomena and the related idea of transitional or potential space. By positing a psychic-conceptual area that not only exists in-between the subject and object, but whose function is primary in connecting the two areas through metaphorical or symbolic processes, Winnicott prompts the reader to consider alternative ways of conceiving cause and effect. For example, in typical depictions of cause and effect, (e.g., STATES ARE LOCATIONS, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATION, etc.) locations or destinations are generally given primary importance and are conceived of as more solid, tangible, and separate (things in themselves). In certain important ways for Winnicott the causative elements occur not simply by virtue of arriving at location (e.g., “I’m not quite there yet”), but also by the subject’s experience and interaction with object-phenomena occurring “in-between” locales, where more rudimentary psychic processes are unfolding. From a conceptual perspective, the

115 connotation of the word “transition” draws the reader away from absolutes (e.g., arriving at a solid location) and more toward the nature of events in progress or in statu nascendi.

Among other things this activity requires the reader to consider that causation as externally understood and depicted is an outcome of what has already occurred with this hidden and less quantifiable area of transitional space.78 In a similar way, unlike other psychic accounts that put more emphasis on forces (e.g., aggressive and libidinal energy, projective and introjective mechanisms) as existing for the most part independently of externality (e.g., intrapsychically in auto-contained spaces), for Winnicott forces are always considered as part and parcel of the environment in which they function. The nature of the environment is itself a force as manifested in the quality of the facilitating environment. Along those lines the environmental object is important not necessarily as a separate and unique entity whose nature emerges once “arrived at” (PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS) or “possessed” (PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OR POSSESSED OBJECTS), but rather for what it comes to represent as being already present in the child. Though ultimately aided by the actual externality of the object (e.g., in the attainment of reality-based thinking) the self already contains all the necessary elements for achieving purposes in the environment. As a microcosm of

78

Though not commonly viewable or known from the perspective of externality, transitional space still depicts objects as existing in and arriving at recognizable locations via motion. In other words, the basic causative structure that defines the relationship between objects is essentially the same as in nontransitional space. However, one key difference is that the nature of the concept as representing a less than solid and ethereal realm where key processes of transformation occur requires the reader to expand their conceptual vantage point and consider another dimension or layer of existence. This additional realm is in important ways both part and not part of external reality, both in terms of it spatial positioning as both in and out of recognizable space and in its time-based and timeless nature.

116 that which exists externally, discovery for a Winnicottian self is thus always essentially re-discovery.

The depictions related to “finding” the self as a function of finding externality reflected in the conceptual mapping have important implications for object usage and also demonstrate Winnicott’s inventive use of writing to communicate a complex transformational experience. In this case he combines the atemporal quality of transitional space with the commonly accepted sequence of time inherent in our ideas of causation (see Appendix F for Time Orientation Metaphor) to draw attention to the experience of the infant in relation to the environment. Specifically, in depicting the object as always there “waiting to be created” (Line 59) for the infant, Winnicott abruptly and unexpectedly shifts the focus from the point of view of the infant (subject) to that of the observer (object), paralleling for the reader the “sudden” nature of discovery that similarly takes place for the infant when reality is encountered for the first time.79 To the outside observer the object was present all along, but to the infant it appears magically and is perceived to have been given it existence by the infant. Winnicott also uses temporality to reflect the incomplete nature of the infant and the “missing” time that is filled in by the presence of the object. To the infant-subject in an undifferentiated state, there is the feeling of “no time” and there is no other object. To the object-observer, there was a past, is a present, and can be a future, and there have always existed two subjects. It is only through the combined vantage points of both subject and object that time is

79

A more complete systematization of time as it relates to subject and object will be provided later. It is mentioned here because a more expansive conception of time is required to fully understand the idea of transitional phenomena, a key concept upon which object usage is based.

117 completely accounted for. It can be said then that for the infant, time, like subjectivity, comes into being with its creation of the object.

Text and Analysis, Lines 13-21 13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

20.

21.

What I have to say in this present paper is extremely simple.

Although it comes out of my psychoanalytical experience I would not say that it could have come out of my psychoanalytical experience of two decades ago, because I would not then have had the technique to make possible the transference movements that I wish to describe.

For instance, it is only in recent years that I have become able to wait and wait for the natural evolution of the transference arising out of the patient's growing trust in the psychoanalytic technique and setting, and to avoid breaking up this natural process by making interpretations.

It will be noticed that I am talking about the making of interpretations and not about interpretations as such.

It appeals me to think how much deep change I have prevented or delayed in patients in a certain classification category by my personal need to interpret.

If only we can wait, the patient arrives at understanding creatively and with immense joy, and I now enjoy this joy more than I used to enjoy the sense of having been clever. 19. I think I interpret mainly to let the patient know the limits of my understanding.

The principle is that it is the patient and only the patient who has the answers.

We may or may not enable him or her to be able to encompass what is known or become aware of it with acceptance.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning The paragraph deals mainly with clinical technique and its implication for psychoanalytic treatment. A position is staked out on the nature of the borderline personality configuration and how, for Winnicott, commonly accepted techniques with such patients lead to a mutual deprivation of experience. Overall, a PS1 and PS2 classification of a borderline personality disorder or a borderline personality organization relates to the psychological and behavioral symptoms and phenomena that are thought to occur between neurotic and psychotic levels of functioning. Treatment approaches for the

118 most part consisted of analyzing and confronting through interpretation the transference resistances that occur in the therapeutic relationship. Interestingly, though, when this paper was published new ideas were emerging about the nature of borderline phenomena which included alternations in technique.80 Theory and technique in PS3 related to borderline phenomena per se is not as clearly delineated as it is in PS1 and PS2.81 Kleinian theory would see the manifestations of borderline functioning as falling into the realm of the paranoid-schizoid position, not really distinguished from other character organizations. In contrast to the characterization of drives as the main forces in accounting for borderline phenomena, Klein understood the nature and function of anxiety as a central task. In general, PS3 technique involved from the outset of treatment direct interpretations of primitive psychic states (especially the negative transference) for the purpose of modifying anxiety.82 These deep interpretations of pre-oedipal material would be in direct contrast to the modifications of

80

Kernberg (1966, 1967, 1968, & 1969) had begun to re-formulize PS1 and PS2 conceptions of borderline phenomena to include ideas from British Object Relations, including the meaning and function of egosplitting and aggressive processes (See Appendix N for a section of the 1969 paper which provides a historical account of PS2’s status vis-á-vis both Kleinian theory and significant portions of Winnicottian thought). Significant differences in terms of technique included preventing a full transference neurosis to develop and the idea that interpretation is not the only vehicle used to arrive at the transference resolution.

Because the nature of the therapeutic alliance is different, the “expressive” psychotherapy he recommended included not only dealing directly with negative transference but also allowing for certain adjustments in technique (e.g., frequency of session, between hour contacts, providing practical advice). The adjustments were meant to on the one hand contain “transference acting out” and on the other provide alternative opportunities for the patient to express emotions.

81

Borderline phenomena became more elaborated in the 1970’s and 1980’s, included under the broader term “pathological organization” (Hinshelwood, 1991).

82

Ogden (1986) characterizes primitive psychic experience as conceived by Klein as based on “deep structure,” a construct from renowned linguist Noam Chomsky. The idea conveys the basic notion of the conceptual structure on which the embodied mind and conceptual metaphor is based. While not discounting the influence of environmental influences on development, it highlights the parameters of human psychological experience as a function of biological givens. Unconscious phantasy is one such vehicle through which human biology is manifested psychologically.

119 more classical treatment being proposed by Kernberg (1968), which included limiting regression and certain efforts to preserve a positive transference for the purpose of the therapeutic alliance.

Basic Meanings of Transformational Concepts Not Applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors Transference in this section is discussed in the context of motion through time, revealing the underlying work of the Event-Structure Metaphor. If unimpeded by unnecessary interpretations trust in the therapeutic process grows and transference evolves into creativity, which is for Winnicott one of the ultimate signs of emotional health. From a conceptual metaphor standpoint one could posit TRANSFERENCE IS A JOURNEY, in which the desired destination is creativity and joy for both patient and therapist. The related submapping INTERPRETATIONS ARE IMPEDIMENTS describes how the path to creativity and joy is blocked. In particular what is interfered with by the “making” (Line 16) of an interpretation is not only the transference itself, but also the underlying “natural process” (Line 15) that for Winnicott connotes the ground of experience.83 In contrast, for PS1, PS2, and PS3 it is successful interpretation (especially

83

Here the therapist’s “creativity” (e.g., to create or make) is paradoxically viewed as a premature imposition of subjectivity in a realm where none is able to exist. In this way primary existence can be said to be not only subject-less but also knowledge-less, in that cause-effect rationality is not what “encompasses” (Line 21) experience. Therefore, for Winnicott interpretations communicate understanding to the patient not by the transmission of knowable phenomena from one entity to another, but rather by revealing and reinforcing the ubiquity and power of the natural processes of psychic existence.

120 of negative transference) that plays a key role in transporting the patient toward more reality-based functioning.

Commentary A 1969 reader might find Winnicott’s preliminary assertions about technique intriguing, confusing, or both. Whereas the protocol of the day called for direct confrontation via the interpretation of negative transference—and with new ideas emerging that expanded the repertoire of therapist’s activity—Winnicott here seems to be proposing a more passive stance. He is portraying interpretation as an interruption or intrusion on what is viewed as the inherent process of the transference relationship. One may initially wonder just what he does do if not interpret overtly, which was one crucial factor that set the therapeutic endeavor apart from typical relationships. For example, how do individuals who functions on the cusp of reality really have “answers” (Line 20) or posses anything that might extricate themselves from such a confusing and painful existence? What is the “technique” (Line 14) that was not available to him early in his career that he now possesses?

Again the use of language is put into service as a way of conveying a key clinical point. Specifically, for both the patient and therapist time is an important factor in the development of the capacity to become aware of the psychic phenomena that Winnicott is setting forth. In Lines 14 and 15 the experience of time is expressed by the length of the sentences (46 words in Line 14 and 48 words in Line 15) as well as the repetition of certain words and ideas. Besides the direct reference to time in “two decades,” “psychoanalytic experience” is stated twice as well as the verb “wait,” all of which call

121 attention to an experience of temporality.84 In essence what Winnicott proposes the therapist do in relation to the patient’s words and experiences parallels that which the reader must do with the text: patiently and non-reactively absorb the words in a way that does not rob them of their potential meanings. The capacity he is describing here is one of creativity—one that takes time to master but once achieved is accomplished without reference to time.85 Lastly, the patient’s “encompassing” of the “known” (Line 21) is a curious way of describing one of the consequences of unimpeded time, in that knowledge is typically conceived of conceptually as an object being seen (KNOWING IS SEEING) or possessed (KNOWING IS GRASPING). To encompass involves encircling or surrounding a persons or things on all sides, often with the intent of protection.86 This depiction calls attention to the abstract quality of transitional space in which objects are less concrete and thus cannot be fully engaged with (e.g., seen, felt, heard, etc.) but rather only loosely contained at a distance. The idea of protecting knowledge (as conceived as an object) could be thought of as parallel to the child-subject’s stance toward a transitional object (e.g., the intense hanging on to the first “not me” possession). That is, the transitional

84

The shear effort required to read Lines 14 and 15 aloud poignantly demonstrates the ability of the text to transmit a sense of time by seeming to slow it down.

85

Paradoxically, the intense focus on time in this section simultaneously calls attention to the timelessness of transitional space. Part of the “natural process” that is interrupted by interpretation is the atemporal state of primary experience. In this way interpretation can be said to attempt to create or impose time into a state where is cannot exist. In this way TIME IS AN IMPEDIMENT might be proposed to describe the blocking of the creative processes that function in transitional space.

86

Encompass, v. 1. To encircle as a ring or girdle; to surround, bound on all sides. 2. a. Of persons: To surround, form a circle about, whether for protection, in attendance, or with hostile intent.

122 object is protected not only for the purpose of the emotional comfort and security it brings as a representation of the caregiver as a physical entity, but also importantly for what it symbolizes in terms of the more mature knowledge and related psychological functions that the caregiver possesses. In this way the child could be said to cling tightly and guard the transitional object for its potential as a link to the more mature adult world of reality.

Text and Analysis, Lines 22-25

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By contrast with this comes the interpretative work which the analyst must do and which distinguishes analysis from self-analysis.

This interpreting by the analyst, if it is to have effect, must be related to the patient's ability to place the analyst outside the area of subjective phenomena.

What is then involved is the patient's ability to use the analyst, which is the subject of this paper.

In teaching, as in the feeding of a child, the capacity to use objects is taken for granted, but in our work it is necessary for us to be concerned with the development and the establishment of the capacity to use objects and to recognize a patient's inability to use objects, where this is a fact.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning This paragraph qualifies earlier statements that seemed to question the utility of interpretation. Here Winnicott is on the surface aligning with mainstream technique and the view of interpretation as a cornerstone of the psychoanalytic endeavor. A main theoretical statement of the paper comes in Lines 23 and 24, and it is communicated without fanfare or the use of technical language. Though not detailing the processes involved in the “ability to place the analyst outside the area of subjective phenomena” and how “to use the analyst” the ideas would likely evoke associations to certain core

123 metapsychological viewpoints. In general a PS1 and PS2 perspective places the area of subjective phenomena in the psychic realm of primary narcissism, a contained pre-object world associated with the libidinal investment in the ego or self.87 A PS3 view would characterize this area as related to the paranoid-schizoid position and associated with projective and introjective processes of a mostly fragmented and incohesive ego. The area in PS3 is not completely objectless as in PS1 and PS2, though objects (self and other) have not yet attained whole status.

The last sentence in this section draws an analogy between the capacity to use the therapist and the processes of teaching and feeding, two ideas that could easily be linked with psychoanalytic theorizing of the day. In relation to feeding, the breast in PS3 is a central construct and is related to part-objects of infancy and the processes of the paranoid-schizoid position. The breast is significant for its designation as the first object which the infant imbues with anthropomorphic and functional qualities such as loving and hating, feeding and poisoning, giving and withholding, etc. Teaching or the educational quality of therapy could be tied to the child technique of Anna Freud and more generally to the importance of ego functions in PS2. In particular the focus on the ego a mediator of reality-based thinking and the need to bolster its adaptational qualities could come to mind.

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Moore and Fine (1990) note that narcissistic processes were around this time becoming more associated with self-esteem (e.g., with the work of Kohut and Kernberg) which includes the capacity for selfregulation. Modern developmental constructs related to affect-regulation draw heavily on the conception of the self as in or not in control (see Metaphors of Self in Appendix E).

124 Basic Meanings of Transformational Concepts Not Applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors The motion of objects as existing in the internal space of the self versus the external space of the analyst forms the semantic basis for Winnicott’s key theoretical statement in Line 23 and 24. The Locational Self (see Appendix E) is used to characterize the process of “self-analysis” (Line 22) that is described here.88 Implied in the portrayal of “self-analysis” is the notion that the psychic processes relegated to the objectless spaces of narcissism are of limited or no benefit, specifically in terms of the organism’s quest to acquire more mature forms of functioning. Sensorimotor experiences of infancy that result in the SELF IS A CONTAINER metaphor are drawn on to call attention to this self-contained or separate psychological state. In this configuration that which exists in the space of the self is under the control of the self, while phenomena outside this locale are beyond its influence. In this way, the subject can only remove that which exists in self-space, which cannot be the object itself but only a perception of the object. Later, Winnicott will posit that this removal of the representation of the object from the

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The metaphors of the self in English as posited by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) focus largely on two paradigms that depict the quality of its character: the control of the self and the existence of multiple selves.

An important implication of the first construction is that once under control, the self (analogous with person or subject) is ostensibly more free to function in different ways (e.g., act, be acted upon, feel, etc.).Though utilizing both renditions of the self, Winnicott’s overall conception highlights aspects of the Essential Self Metaphor over those that focus on its control (The Physical Object Self). In his view it is “compliance” by the False Self—not the self’s status as being in or out of control—that is the impediment to True Self functioning. In the formulation false self compliance is ultimately related to attempts to protect the true self, though it also leads to its unnecessary isolation in auto-contained realms of object relating.

125 subjective space creates the capacity for objectivity, which is also related to finding the true self and externality itself.

The Internal Causation Metaphor of the Self (Appendix E) sheds further light on this key theoretical statement and also provides the conceptual foundation for other processes involved in object usage that will soon be described. The conceptual metaphor SELF CONTROL IS FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT highlights the need of a self to displace obstructionary objects as a means of achieving control. In this case the self’s narcissistically imbued idea of the object can be viewed as threatening a sense of control, which is in turn related to distorting the view of the true self and also preventing the capacity for objectivity. Objectivity or reality-based thinking is achieved with the finding of the external object in what is considered space external to the self, as depicted in the infant’s first “not me” possession of a transitional object.89 A preliminary conceptual account of the key theoretical statement and later accounts of object usage using Metaphors of Self is:

The Self Is A Container •

The self resides in psychic space

The True Self Is The Subject or Essence • • •

89

True Self represents a pure vantage point that reveals reality as reflected in the organism’s essence In contrast, the False Self is reactionary and does not fit the essence False Self compliance can lead to distorted view of reality and isolation

In Winnicott’s depiction this technically occurs in transitional space which is neither completely external nor internal. However, conceptually transitional space can be said to be more external to completely internal space characterized by early narcissistic processes.

126 The True Self Is Hidden In Subjective (Narcissistic) Space • • •

In infancy the True Self in the process of being (first) found in “no time” Later the True Self becomes hidden or protected by the False Self Contact with the False Self causes time to begin

Perceptions In Narcissistic Space Are Distortions And Obstacles • •

“Seeing” (knowing) is unidimensional and confined to subjective space Distorted perceptions prevent movement toward external (shared) space

Removing Obstacles Is Being Able to See From Both Inside And Outside • • •

Broader perceptual vantage point allows for objectivity or reality Objectivity or reality as multi-dimensional awareness Multi-dimensional awareness is seeing from multiple vantage points at once

Removing Obstacles Is Being Able To Move Into Other Space • •

Wider space allows for moving into other object space Freedom of contact with other objects expands space and vantage point

Finding Other (“Not Me”) Objects in Other Space Is Finding Reality and True Self • • •

Internal contact with external elucidates and transforms elements of both Reality as blend of internal and external, self and other, time and no time Finding reality also involves blending of past and present: every genuine encounter with the other reflects first “finding” of the True Self in infinite time

Commentary The paragraph lays out the basic technical argument for the paper: The capacity to use the therapist is a foundational element of the treatment process, and the quality of the therapist’s technique either will or will not produce therapeutic-developmental advancement.90 Winnicott communicates this fact in both obvious and subtle ways. After calling into question its apparent usefulness in the last paragraph, he concedes that interpretation is inevitable but implies that its value must be judged not on how well it

90

The word “use” occurs three times in Line 25, reinforcing the repetitive quality of basic infant caretaking (e.g., holding, feeding, changing) and the therapeutic relationship (e.g., listening, containing, interpreting).

127 makes sense to the therapist or a theory, but rather on how well it allows the client to utilize the treatment process by tapping into elements of their true self. In particular, by positing interpretation by another subject as that which sets psychoanalysis apart from “self-analysis” (Line 22)—a solipsistic and ultimately inauthentic act by the patient—the text is covertly prompting the reader to consider aspects of interpretation that might be prone to similar fates in the auto-contained space of the therapist. In other words, an interpretation that does not transcend the psychic space that is cut-off from the therapist’s own subjecthood reinforces in the patient the therapist’s status as a subjective object in the patient’s narcissistic space. Thus, in order “to place the analyst outside the area of subjective phenomena” (Line 23), the raw elements which form the foundation of interpretations must similarly evolve beyond the realm associated with object relating and achieve the status of object usage. This points to the importance of viewing interpretation as part and parcel of the therapist’s own psychic transformational processes, and not as somehow disconnected from that which is transpiring for the patient. One implication is that because basic elements of clinical technique mirror that of development, they must seek to reinforce those naturally occurring processes that lead toward psychic advancement. In broad terms, Winnicottian technique seeks to make available those aspects of the therapist (and technique) that reflect essential or true self status.

Text and Analysis, Lines 26-40 26.

27.

It is in the analysis of the borderline type of case that one has the chance to observe the delicate phenomena that give pointers to an understanding of truly schizophrenic states.

By the term 'a borderline case' I mean the kind of case in which the core of the patient's disturbance is psychotic, but the patient has enough psychoneurotic organization always to be able to present psychoneurosis or psychosomatic

128

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disorder when the central psychotic anxiety threatens to break through in crude form.

In such cases the psychoanalyst may collude for years with the patient's need to be psychoneurotic (as opposed to mad) and to be treated as psychoneurotic.

The analysis goes well, and everyone is pleased.

The only drawback is that the analysis never ends.

It can be terminated, and the patient may even mobilize a psychoneurotic false self for the purpose of finishing and expressing gratitude.

But, in fact, the patient knows that there has been no change in the underlying (psychotic) state and that the analyst and the patient have succeeded in colluding to bring about a failure.

Even this failure may have value if both analyst and patient acknowledge the failure.91 The patient is older and the opportunities for death by accident or disease have increased, so that actual suicide may be avoided.

Moreover, it has been fun while it lasted.

If psychoanalysis could be a way of life, then such a treatment might be said to have done what it was supposed to do.

But psychoanalysis is no way of life.

We all hope our patients will finish with us and forget us, and that they will find living itself to be the therapy that makes sense.

Although we write papers about these borderline cases we are inwardly troubled when the madness that is there remains undiscovered and unmet.

I have tried to state this in a broader way in a paper on classification.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning Whereas the previous put forth the rationale upon which successful technique should be judged (e.g., whether it leads to a reality-based view of the therapist as real and separate), this paragraph is a broad statement on personality organization in the context of treatment viability and expectations. In particular Winnicott calls attention to the tenuous nature of successfully treating borderline personality and the ways patients and therapists cope with its often ultimate ineffectiveness. Kernberg (1968) outlined the various positions both from a PS1 and PS2 on the analyzability of those considered in the

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“It is not a very great thing to fail in psychoanalysis. The awful thing is to go on with psychoanalysis after it has failed� (Quoted from Rodman, 2003, p. 210).

129 borderline range of personality functioning, similarly calling attention to the challenges of modifying such ingrained character organizations. In what amounts to process similar to that of the false self, Kernberg provides an account of the core defensive processes that impede successful treatment.92 In particular, in his schema compromise formation (in the borderline situation based on acting out), like Winnicott’s false self processes, inhibits regression and the formation of a neurotic transference.

Winnicott’s reference in Line 27 to the “core” psychotic nature of a borderline personality organization comes directly from Bion’s 1957 paper, Differentiation of Psychotic and Non-Psychotic Personalities. In contraindication to PS1 and PS2, Bion posits that psychotic personalities do contain neurotic elements (including reality testing) that are less obvious because they are split-off via projective identification processes.93 Also, unlike other PS3 depictions Bion views all personalities as passing through both the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, albeit it in different fashions. In general, viewing the personality as containing neurotic, borderline, and psychotic elements would indeed seem to make the process of treatment more complex, as Winnicott is suggesting.

92

“Many patients with borderline personality organization do not tolerate the regression within a psychoanalytic treatment, not only because of their ego weakness and their proneness to develop transference psychosis, but also, and very predominantly, because the acting out of their instinctual conflicts within the transference gratifies their pathological needs and blocks further analytic progress.

What appears on the surface as a process of repetitive "working through" is in reality a quite stable compromise formation centered in acting out of the transference within the therapeutic relationship” (Kernberg, 1968).

93

“…I do not think real progress with psychotic patients is likely to take place until due weight is given to the nature of the divergence between the psychotic and non-psychotic personality, and in particular the role of projective identification in the psychotic part of the personality as a substitute for regression in the neurotic part of the personality. The patient's destructive attacks on his ego and the substitution of projective identification for repression and introjection must be worked through. Further, I consider that this holds true for the severe neurotic, in whom I believe there is a psychotic personality concealed by neurosis as the neurotic personality is screened by psychosis in the psychotic, that has to be laid bare and dealt with” (Bion,1957).

130 Basic Meaning of Transformational Concept Not Applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphor The term “borderline” (Line 26) is a metaphorical description of those psychic processes and the personality organizations that lay in the territory between neurosis and psychosis.94 It draws conceptually on the primary metaphors STATES ARE LOCATION, THINKING IS MOVING and THE MIND IS A BODY to account for the shifts in mental states as associated categories of psychic functioning.95 From these configurations we get such statements as: “He’s regressing into psychosis” or “The patient’s object relations indicate she is in the neurotic range of functioning.” In this context to “collude” (Line 28) essentially means to perceive the patient as occupying an incorrect space, while in reality a more significant part of the personality (the psychotic part) is hidden or “undiscovered” (Line 39). To be able to “meet” (Line 39) another’s madness requires that both are present and accounted for in the same psychic space.

These metaphorical constructions of the mind have important implications for clinical theory and the extent to which they reveal the embodied nature of thought and language. For example, Bion’s (1957) and other Kleinians’ more subjective depictions of objects clearly demonstrate the ubiquity of spatial metaphors in the depiction of psychic processes. The vicissitudes of objects via projective and introjective processes are described from the experiential standpoint of the subject, rendering them more concrete

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Moore and Fine (1990) relate that the term was introduced by Robert Knight (1953).

Klein’s depiction of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive “positions” similarly draw on these spatial metaphors of the mind.

131 and real. Because objects are conceived of in their more embodied versus disembodied form, they call attention to the somatic-conceptual foundations on which metaphors are based. Though criticized for conflating subjective and objective phenomena, the account is clearly in line with the empirically founded stance of “experientialism” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).96 Winnicott’s utilization of words that reflect basic human ontology (e.g., object, use, holding) in abstract his characterizations of psychic processes similarly reflect the embodied nature thought and language.

Commentary This paragraph is the most straightforward so far, in that the literal uses of words communicate the intended meanings. This directness parallels a central statement about therapy and how it is to be viewed in the context of broader experiences. For Winnicott therapy should be a mutative process that brings practical outcomes that serve the client versus a ritualistic “way of life” (Line 38) that may not really change anything. He is proposing honesty between the parties in this regard, valuing it over any illusions that would minimize a failure of therapy to live up to its promises.97 In this regard in Line 38

96

These criticisms of PS3 are reminiscent of debates in psychoanalysis surrounding metapsychology versus clinical theory, as well as related differences between objective science and subjective experience. It also calls attention to questions of epistemology, which has important implications for clinical practice. One quandary created by the findings of modern metaphor theory (e.g., “experientialism”) is that it blurs the lines between subject and objective truth, the literal and the figurative, and thought and language (see Appendix A for implications of modern metaphor theory on the human sciences).

97

His experiences of having had many patients commit suicide may be relevant here. His editor and patient Masud Khan would take his life in 1989. Rodman (2003) suggests that Winnicott was likely not able to directly communicate his inability to help Khan, likely resulting in the “awful” situation of continuing analysis despite its failure. The bitter manner in which the therapy eventually did end supports this hypothesis.

132 he utilizes the metaphor LIFE IS THERAPY to make his point that life itself, not therapy, is ultimately the impetus for transformation.

Text and Analysis, Lines 41-46 41.

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It is perhaps necessary to prevaricate a little longer to give my own view on the difference between object-relating and object-usage.

In object-relating the subject allows certain alterations in the self to take place, of a kind that has caused us to invent the term cathexis.

The object has become meaningful.

Projection mechanisms and identifications have been operating, and the subject is depleted to the extent that something of the subject is found in the object, though enriched by feeling.

Accompanying these changes is some degree of physical involvement (however slight) towards excitement, in the direction of the functional climax of an orgasm.

(In this context I deliberately omit reference to the very important aspect of relating that is an exercise in cross-identifications. This must be omitted here because it belongs to a phase of development that is subsequent to and not prior to the phase of development with which I am concerned in this paper, that is to say, the move from self-containment and relating to subjective objects into the realm of object-usage).

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning In general the subject’s encounter with an object in PS1 involves the instinctual process of attaining satisfaction via the aim as indicated by a particular erotogenic zone.

As mentioned earlier the nature of the object has no importance other than its ability to provide pleasure, though early object relations do form a template for later attractions and substitutions. In PS2 the status of object relating as a function of the instinctual process becomes secondary to revealing ways the subject uniquely interacts with the object, especially the ego defense mechanisms that are called upon in the larger process of personality formation. In neither PS1 nor PS2 is there anything equivalent to a

133 “depletion” of the self that is mentioned in Line 44, which is in line with Freud’s original economic viewpoint and the related depiction of cathexis as a utilizing only free or available psychic energy.98 Also, the overall characterization is from an objective standpoint, not accounting for the quality of change that might be occurring for the subject.

Line 44 relates a hallmark PS3 proposition on the effects of projective identification on the subject.99 Unlike PS1 and PS2, this depiction implies that the energy transferred in object relating is taken from the self and necessarily involves splitting (of the self) and a change it its state. Also, like other PS3 theorizing descriptions of psychic processes do not simply provide an objective account, but also take into consideration the subjective state of the self that results from projective and incorporative processes (e.g., “feeling” and “excitement”).

Basic Meaning of “Cathexis” Cathexis is a psychoanalytically-derived word translated in the Standard Edition from the German “Besetzung” and is most closely associated with the word “occupation” in English (Moore and Fine, 1990). Cathexis is a concentration of psychic energy on some particular person, thing, idea or aspect of the self. It generally describes the attraction and interest psychic energy has to objects.

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In other words, psychic energy can only be added and not diminished from the organism.

Both Klein and later Bion were instrumental in pointing out how projective processes inherently lead to fragmented self (Hinshelwood, 1991). Though Winnicott does not distinguish here, Bion (1959, 1962) had posited two forms of projective identification: “normal” and “abnormal” (Hinshelwood, 1991). Normal would imply a simple communication of a state of mind, whereas abnormal is an attempt to getting rid of a painful state by injecting it into someone else, in part to control the object.

134 Related Conceptual Metaphors Winnicott returns to the idea of object relating, here providing an account of what occurs within the subject when an object is encountered. He does this by using the Essential Self Metaphor (see Appendix E) in which the self is depicted as three potential entities. In English the Essential Self Metaphor is necessary in order to account for any depiction of a self relating to or reflecting on itself. Winnicott sets up a dual self system here—a subject and a self—to describe the interaction and relationship between the two when projective processes are operating. Here the subject is deemed in control of the self in that it “allows alterations to take place” (Line 42), which Winnicott associates with the transfer of energy in the process of cathexis. The resulting depletion of the self by the projective identification process can be characterized using elements of the EventStructure Metaphor:

PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION IS DEPLETION OF THE SELF The Mind Is A Body •

The subject, self and objects exist in a bodily container

States Are Locations •

Paranoid-Schizoid (PS) space = anxiety, dread, persecution

•

Depressive (D) space = empathy, concern, love and hate

Changes Are Movements •

Intrusion into and from object and self; also, to and from PS and D

Causes Are Forces •

Projection and introjection as based on Death Instinct; energy from self is expelled

135 Causation Is Forced Movement •

Part of self evacuated or “depleted” by projection; the ego is split

Actions Are Self Propelled Movements •

Self expels objects associated with painful feelings; part of ego then thought to reside in object

Purposes Are Destinations •

Projective material reaching/arriving at the object, both for communication and for evacuation of painful feelings; identification occurs

Means Are Paths •

Projection and introjection are necessary parts of the path to (ego) development

Commentary The depiction of the self in the context of projective and introjective processes generally summarizes an important component of PS3 theorizing that sets it apart from PS1 and PS2. Among other things it demonstrates how conceptual vantage points (inner versus outer or subjective versus objective) can reveal the various qualities of similar psychic processes. It shows also the ubiquity of conceptual metaphors and how important notions of mind and self are built on very basic depictions of a body as existing in space.

The above conceptual mapping points to how theorizing utilizes existing conceptual structure to elaborate ideas, such as the tripartite version of the self in the Essential Self Metaphor. Winnicott will utilize this split nature of the self in his broader characterization of object usage.

136 Text and Analysis, Lines 47-50 47.

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Object-relating is an experience of the subject that can be described in terms of the subject as an isolate.

When I speak of the use of an object, however, I take object-relating for granted, and add new features that involve the nature and the behaviour of the object.

For instance, the object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections.

It is this, I think, that makes for the world of difference that exists between relating and usage.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning This paragraph provides an account of object relating from the point of view of the experiencing subject. In Line 48 the “subject as an isolate” points to the PS1 and PS2 depiction of the objectless state of primary narcissism from which it must emerge to encounter a shared reality of separate subjects. In its original sense, projection is a defense mechanism which involves identifying in the external world the source of an intolerable feeling or thought of a subject.100 Projective mechanisms are viewed as diminishing the capacity for accurately perceiving objective reality, in part because they are involved in the ego’s process of distinguishing between subjective and objective phenomena. Differences in theory regarding projection basically involve the timing of its emergence and its ultimate impact on differentiating internal and external reality. Anna Freud’s view is generally representative of PS2, which posits the ego as responsible for deciphering reality despite the presence of projective and introjective mechanisms. In

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Freud first conceived of projection in relation to paranoia and later in phobias (Moore & Fine, 1990). Its complementary mechanism, introjection, related to the oral instinct, is depicted as part of the same overall process. Abraham connected projection with the phantasy of expelling something anally, an idea that Klein would utilize in her theorizing (Hinshelwood, 1991).

137 contrast, PS3 views projection and introjection as the very processes that determine internal and external reality.101

Basic Meaning of “Projection” To project (verb) involves externalizing a thought or image so that it appears to have an objective reality.102

Related Conceptual Metaphors Projection is a key construct used in the psychoanalytic conception of psychic processes and is related to other ubiquitous mechanisms such as displacement and transference of psychic energy. It is also critical in the “embodied mind” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), in that mappings from a source to target domain involve the transfer (e.g., projection) of conceptual material based on bodily experiences (e.g., KNOWING IS SEEING in which knowing something seeing that something). As such all conceptual metaphors can be thought of as representative of (in one way or another) and related to the psychoanalytic concept of projection, as it is perhaps the most fundamental process involved in the meaning making process and of ontology itself. Among other things, the metaphorical basis of projection in particular and perception in general points to how

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See Hinshelwood (1991) for a detailed description of the various uses of projection in Kleinian theory.

Broadly, they are: 1) to describe general perceptual capacity; 2) involvement with expulsion of conflict; 3) relation to identity; and; 4) relation to translocation of the ego into other objects.

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Contemporary definition of project (verb): 1) To calculate how big something will become in the future using information that is available now (forecast, predict); 2) To stick out past the edge of a surface or something; 3) To send an image to a screen or other surface; 4) To give people an idea that someone or something has particular qualities; 5) To imagine that an emotion you feel is also being felt by someone else, especially without realizing you are doing this; 6) To plan something; 7) To throw something.

138 dependent humans are on conceptions of our bodily natures to impart reasoning about reality.

One question that arises in the discussion of projection from the various psychoanalytic models involves the role it plays in the objective perception of reality.

Along those lines, how might modern metaphor theory account for the semantic rationale upon which the models base its usage? In its more literal and original usage by Freud as the transfer of unwanted feelings or ideas into the external world (e.g., as in paranoia), projection is related to PROJECTION IS EVACUATION, PROJECTION IS MOVEMENT, and PROJECTION IS DISTORTED SEEING (e.g., “not seeing” correctly). These constructions are loosely based on the Event-Structure Metaphors (Appendix C) CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS and CASUES ARE FORCES, in which projection is the means by which undesirable elements of the psyche are transported into external objects. The vicissitudes related to projection lead to an inaccurate view of reality, related to the primary metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. While conceptions of projection within PS3 can include the more classical notions above, in its more expanded use come PROJECTION IS FEELING (e.g., via identification and incorporation of projected material), PROJECTION IS SEEING (e.g., that which perceives objects versus that which only distorts them), and PROJECTION IS THE MOVEMENT (SPLITTING) OF THE EGO INTO OTHER OBJECTS (e.g., the notion that psychic transfer necessarily involves ego transfer). This last distinction of projection as the vehicle through which the ego is transported into another’s space creates a complication in the clear perception of “the nature and behaviour of the object” of Line 48. That is, comprehending the essential nature of an object requires a conceptual vantage

139 point which transcends the unidirectional (e.g., self or ego-suffused) and atemporal (e.g., no time = no space, no separate object, no movement, etc.) views of object relational space. In other words, accurate perception involves the absence of self in other objects (e.g., ACCURATE PERCEPTION IS A LOSS OF SELF) and a conception of multidimensional time that brings into focus the movement of elements of the self into other objects (e.g., TIME IS THE CREATION OF SPACE, TIME IS MOVEMENT IN SPACE (INTO AND OUT OF SELF-SPACE), MOVEMENT IS THE SEPARATION OF SELF AND OBJECT). In general, the PS3 view of ego-splitting involved in perception points to larger questions of the dual nature of reality.

As evidenced above, projection is the key process involved in the apperception of reality. Among other things it calls attention to the way ego structure is built into the organism’s conception of itself and the external world. It simultaneously points to the limitations of language and its propensity to conceive of reality as necessarily split or dual in nature (e.g., subject-object, time-no time, space-no space, etc). It brings into focus the existential question reminiscent of Winnicott’s emerging infant: Do we create reality or is it always there creating us? Additionally, just what do our mature perceptual systems, based essentially on our embodied nature, reveal about reality? For example, do they simply impose and reinforce a false separation of the self from other objects and externality itself by reifying the concrete (e.g., bodily) over the ephemeral? Along those lines, Is the embodied mind and its elaboration in language a culprit in creating the illusion of a dual world or can it be deconstructed and used to reach beyond the material?

140 Commentary The paragraph is further laying the foundation for the more complete rendition of object usage. Specifically, Winnicott is saying that the idea he is proposing is not associated with purely subjective interpretations of reality, but rather with selfdifferentiated phenomena in which two subjects exist. In Line 49 “take for granted” might be a subtle way of reinforcing an earlier statement relating an overemphasis in psychoanalysis on narcissistic processes, while simultaneously conveying that certain aspects of the post-symbiotic world (e.g., of other subjects of equal status) he is describing have been undervalued or neglected. This language can also be read as downplaying or diminishing object relating, thereby bolstering the importance of object usage.103 For Winnicott psychic phenomena are ultimately judged on how well they allow for the more authentic contact with reality, always taking into account the bidirectional interplay between internal and external elements.104 There is a sense in his writing that the attainment of reality or truth must intentionally—and often seemingly overzealously—involve not only recognition of the other, but the inclusion of a distinctly separate subject to make it complete.105 In this way psychic differentiation for Winnicott

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Based on the use of “take for granted” as applied to a person—to neglect or not reciprocate in kind.

Accordingly, the realm of object relating is depicted as a neglected space, rather bleak and desolate. As such the space in which the isolated subject resides is filled only with illusions (“bundle of projections” Line 49).

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The balance he attempts to strike between self and other in the context of spontaneity, genuineness, and the shared recognition of reality is a precarious one. While on the one hand he portrays authentic existence as deeply individual (e.g., a subject unique creative capacity, spontaneous gestures, capacity to be alone) and ultimately hidden from even the experiencing subject (e.g., True Self), on the other there is always the sense that these processes require another subject’s complementary reinforcement of such (presumably) subjective givens to reach full elaboration.

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Winnicott’s need to have others accept his “spontaneous gestures” comes to mind here (Goldman, 1993). Not feeling understood and valued as a separate “subject” was a personal and professional area of sensitivity that coincidentally played out in his presentation of this very paper to the New York

141 somewhat paradoxically involves the taking in of something foreign to create that which is genuinely subjective. In cognitive linguistic terms the bringing together of unquantifiable elements from one domain to another to produce something unique is associated with the processes of conceptual blending and less with conceptual metaphor.106

Text and Analysis, Lines 51-52 51.

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If I am right in this, then it follows that discussion of the subject of relating is a much easier exercise for analysts than is the discussion of usage, since relating may be examined as a phenomenon of the subject, and psychoanalysis always likes to be able to eliminate all factors that are environmental, except in so far as the environment can be thought of in terms of projective mechanisms.

But in examining usage there is no escape; the analyst must take into account the nature of the object, not as a projection, but as a thing in itself.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning The central statement here is related to the range or scope of psychic phenomena taken into consideration in theorizing and in practice. Winnicott essentially accuses that the field has chosen the solitary subject as the main focus of investigation, in part because it more readily allows for theoretical coherence and ease of explication. Even when external factors are considered it is done so in a way that part of the subject suffuses

Psychoanalytic Society. Interestingly, despite his apparent yearnings to be accommodating and taken seriously Winnicott was often accused of misrepresenting others’ characterizations of ideas in his writing, suggesting insensitivity and even overt rejection of others as professionals and as individual “subjects.”

106

Metaphor can be said to be less imaginative than conceptual blending in that it is involved with drawing parallels between existing and established associations (e.g., this is that—LOVE IS A JOURNEY).

Essentially nothing new comes into being, but rather elements are transferred from one conceptual domain to another. Blending involves incorporating indeterminate aspects of two or more phenomena that results in a possibly infinite emergent conceptual outcomes. In other words, the qualities that become associative and meaningful are not determined until they are put together in a subject’s mind in a unique act of creation.

142 qualities of the environment (e.g., projection processes). In terms of how this myopic viewpoint played out in clinical theory, Winnicott asserted that the object-analyst as a “thing in itself” (Line 52) had been seemingly ignored. For example, in Freud’s original conception, the analyst was somewhat illusory figure that served as a repository for the patient’s displaced feelings and thoughts for early childhood figures. Though the eventual goal of treatment was to be able to view and relate to the therapist as a real person, this representation of the analyst (e.g., transference) was reinforced by technique (e.g., “blank screen” and rules such as abstinence). As in PS2 that followed, Freud would come to view the ego as the psychic structure which ultimately allows the subject to perceive reality.107 PS2 technique sought to align the therapist with the ego’s adaptive functions, though the conception of the therapist as a subject was for the most part non-existent.

Metaphors such as the “analyzing instrument” (Fleming & Benedek, 1983) highlight a more technical view of the therapist, who is portrayed as valuable for mechanistic versus personal qualities.108 PS3’s view of reality is more mutable and subjective, based primarily on the processes of projection and introjection. The external world in the paranoid-schizoid position is more distorted as it is perceived through the veil of persecutory anxieties.

107

One of the dilemmas of this and other conceptions of reality in psychoanalysis is how the ego or mind— an entity comprised of built-in structure as shaped by uniquely subjective processes such as projection, fantasy, identification, conflict, etc.—is able to come to accurately represent that which exists in the world.

Resulting stances in psychoanalysis range from viewing reality as necessarily subjective and relative based on the inherent nature of our minds, to positing a fixed world or concrete object that can objectively known by the removal of self-distorting elements (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973). The finding of modern cognitive science reveal that “experientialism”— which is neither completely subjective nor objective—best describes human epistemology (see Appendix A for overview findings of cognitive linguistic with implications for the human sciences).

108

The construct “analyzing instrument” is attributed to Otto Isakower. From this one could conceive of THE THERAPIST IS A MACHINE.

143 With the attainment of the depressive position the fear for the survival of the self becomes a concern for the fully recognized loved object, which is now sought to be incorporated. The accurate appraisal of the external world comes about as incorporation of good objects increases and projection of fearful objects decreases. In general, like PS1 and PS2, the subjective qualities of the analyst are themselves not viewed as important vis-á-vis the accurate perception of reality.

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors The therapist’s need to take into consideration the “nature of the object” (Line 52) as a “thing in itself” points to long-held notions of essences in philosophy. In this conception what is considered most innate or inherent is what is deemed true or real.

Winnicott’s discussion of the essence of objects follows the Essential Self Metaphor (e.g., “I just wasn’t I myself that day”) in which the object is divided into parts which delineate its real and unreal qualities.109 As mentioned, the False Self is an obstacle that prevents the manifestation of the True Self and thus keeps hidden the essential quality of the individual (THE FALSE SELF IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO (FINDING) THE TRUE SELF). For Winnicott a related barrier to seeing an object’s essence is the inability or unwillingness to transcend the solipsistic realm of object relating, pointing to the “ease”

109

This and other metaphors of the self work conceptually because any object is a subject from its own vantage point (e.g., in relation to other objects).

144 (Line 52)—and perhaps even joy—in existing in “isolated” (Line 47) states. It can be posited, then, that the false self colludes to maintain such modes of functioning by “eliminating” (Line 51) the possibility for a more genuine association with the environment and by tapping into the inherent desire to be alone.110 In Line 52 Winnicott seems to imply that like the patient the therapist must work to “escape” the inclination to remain in isolated states, which is reinforced by viewing externality as simply a function of “projections” and not as manifestations of that which is real.111 One broader implication is that when therapy does not to a sufficient degree take into account the bidirectional field of reality (e.g., mutual recognition of “shared reality” as evidenced through separate subjecthood), it reinforces the tendency in both the patient and therapist to remain in isolated realms of existence. An implied and complicating factor that is that one achieved, states of mind reflective of object usage do not function completely separate from those of associated with object relating; rather, they forever exist in dialectical tension and are mutually reinforcing.

110

In The Capacity to Be Alone (1958) Winnicott writes that there is an aspect of solitude that is—like object usage—a development milestone fostered by the presence of a reliable object. Therefore, modes of solitude associated with the realm of object relating might be viewed as under-developed attempts to establish a genuine tie to an object. Developmental maturation involves the introjection of a reliable object which from that point on exists as part of the subject, creating a permanent dyadic psychic space and buffer against existential (versus external and concrete) loneliness. To Winnicott the capacity to be alone occurs not in complete solitude but rather in another’s presence, one whose characteristics as a separate subject are taken into account. From this perspective could be posited LONELINESS IS UNITY, in which the essential qualities of both subject and object are enlivened in each other’s presence. In the therapeutic realm such states are utilized in the service of remediation or growth in patients who possess this ability, and strived for in situations where the capacity to be alone is absent. In the context of Winnicott’s larger theoretical configuration, it can be said that pre- object usage modes of solitude in the therapist are recruited by the patient’s False Self to create the illusion of psychic unity.

111

In other words to view externality as exclusively a function of projection eliminates the possibility of considering more experiential ways of knowing, importantly ones that require a wider conceptual vantage point that takes into account both subject and object. In this way projection keeps separate modes of experience that require a move beyond self-referential reasoning.

145 Commentary This short paragraph is on the surface a proposal to expand the therapeutic field of inquiry to include elements of externality that had to that point been ignored in theorizing. By considering the nature or essence of objects Winnicott is also attempting to integrate a traditional philosophical conception of the self into a psychoanalytic model of the mind. The exercise calls attention to the complex and multi-dimensional processes involved in perception. In this instance the implication is that in object usage the subject and the object are required to view each other from a conceptual vantage point in which the shared versus “isolated” existence of each is accepted. However, implicit in apprehending the essential nature of an object as a “thing in itself” requires an acceptance of both its externality as well as its independent or intrapsychic existence. In other words, while the accurate apprehension of the nature of an object requires viewing qualities that transcend simple projection material, it does not negate the fact that intrapsychic processes (related to and including object relating states) continue to be part of one’s essence. So, it seems that an inherent “new feature” that characterizes the perceptual capacity in object usage is the ability to accept (e.g., “take for granted”) the subject’s more internal existence while also simultaneously transcending it by considering its externally manifested or shared qualities.

This complexity points in part to the limitations language imposes in our conception of essences, in that the inherent qualities of a self are viewed spatially and thus conceptually separate from its more external traits (e.g., the hidden quality Winnicott’s True Self). In general the embodied mind promotes a conception that nothing external to the self is able to infringe on its essence, thus reinforcing an inherent split in

146 the self (e.g., Multiple Self Metaphor). An implication is that the self as an observer is conditioned from early in life to view reality from conceptual vantage points that segment and reify space in a way limits a more fluid and multidirectional field of inquiry.

Therefore, Winnicott’s decision to utilize conceptions of mind and causality based on the Essential Self Metaphor in a way limits a broader depiction of objects by setting-up a conceptual space that is segmented and inhabited by impenetrable elements, paradoxically reminiscent of realms of object relating.112

Text and Analysis, Lines 53-56 53.

54.

55.

For the time being may I leave it at that, that relating can be described in terms of the individual subject, and that usage cannot be described except in terms of acceptance of the object's independent existence, its property of having been there all the time?

You will see that it is just these problems that concern us when we look at the area which I have tried to draw attention to in my work on what I have called transitional phenomena.

But this change does not come about automatically, by maturational process alone. 56. It is this detail that I am concerned with.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning Winnicott here summarizes his proposition distinguishing between the realms of object relating and object usage. The word “acceptance” (Line 53) would seem to convey the notion that this process is under the control of the individual subject, though he will

112

This is due in large part to the dilemma inherent in our conceptual systems as limited by our embodied nature. In other words, to call attention to qualities that are not “essential” or readily observable in an object (e.g., mental attributes or processes) requires a splitting of the self into component parts, precisely because we have no other way of conceiving such phenomena outside the perspective that it (the object) and we inhabit containers that exist in some determinable space. Winnicott’s construct of transitional space can be generally viewed as an attempt to transcend embodied notions of space and time. In a similar way the self’s attainment of object usage status will be shown to rely on defying certain reified notions of space and time.

147 soon make the point that the nature and behavior of the object directly influences the subject’s capacity to make this transition. Though external phenomena are considered in PS1, PS2, and PS3, the attainment of objective reality is depicted more as an internal process (based on “maturational processes” Line 55) than on that which occurs outside the auto-contained environment of the self or ego. In terms of his introduction of the element of time in this paragraph, readers familiar with his paper on the transitional object would notice a similar application of the idea that time exists and functions differently based on the conceptual vantage point of the subject.

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors As discussed previously Winnicott’s conception of transitional space is that which links realms of auto-contained and bidirectional states of mind. In Line 53 Winnicott adds to it the concept of time (it is used twice) and draws attention to common logic asserting that objects existing in the present must necessarily have a history in the past, even if they were not perceived by the subject. In the context of his larger depiction, the human conception of time is inherently related to the attainment of object usage in that it requires more than a unidirectional vantage point of reality.113 Viewed in this way transitional space can be conceived as the initiator of time—TRANSITIONAL SPACE

113

The inherent categories of past, present, and future allow for the flow of information, causality, etc. to and from three distinct vantage points.

148 IS THE CREATOR OF TIME—because by allowing for the recognition of the object it is simultaneously creating the existence of time (see Metaphors of Time in Appendix F for the ubiquity of objects in our understanding of time). In other words, time requires the presence of at least one other recognizable and separate object for it to function. One important purpose of transitional space is to connect mental states associated with “no time” with that of “time.” Transformation from object relating to object usage, then, is involved with the simultaneous creation of a separate object and time:

State 1 (“No Time”) Object Relating •

Isolated subject exists in auto-contained space without time

Intermediate State (“Suspended Time”) •

Represented as transitional space and path between states of mind114

State 2 (“Time”) Object Usage •

Subject recognizes object in bidirectional space and time is created

Commentary This section more explicitly introduces the element of time into the depiction of object usage through the idea of transitional space. It calls attention to the dependence our conceptual systems have on objects as a way of understanding everyday ideas such as time and ways Winnicott utilizes certain built-in conceptual limitations to draw key theoretical conclusions. What will be increasingly shown throughout the analysis is his

114

Conceived of in this way transitional space is a psychic connector of time and space reminiscent of wormholes in physics. A wormhole is a hypothetical construct in which dimensions of time and space are thought to be traversed instantly (See pp. 264-265 in Greene, 2003).

149 propensity to manipulate foundational and seemingly reified metaphors in a way that transcends embodied reasoning, prompting the reader to consider more transcendent views of reality. Further examples and discussion of time will be forthcoming in the analysis.

Text and Analysis, Lines 57-58 57.

58.

In clinical terms: two babies are feeding at the breast; one is feeding on the self in the form of projections, and the other is feeding on (using) milk from a woman's breast.

Mothers, like analysts, can be good or not good enough; some can and some cannot carry her baby over from relating to usage.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning The basic analogy in this paragraph is between breastfeeding and therapy.

Breastfeeding in PS1 and PS2 is more strictly involved with satisfying instinctual needs, which in therapy are designed not to be generally gratified. It is the therapist’s alignment with the more mature ego functions of the patient that forms the basis of the therapeutic alliance. In PS3 the breast represents the infant’s first part-object which becomes imbued with positive or negative attributes based on how it is at the moment perceived to be “good” or “bad.” 115 Like PS1 and PS2, therapy from a PS3 perspective would not be conceived as associated with the early caregiving relationship. Its primary function is the

115

Part-objects exist in the paranoid-schizoid realm, and the infant conceives of the object’s nature and intention based on somatic experiences and sensations. However, as a part-object the breast is significant more for what it represents emotionally than for its actual physical characteristics.

150 reduction of anxiety using deep interpretations which included the more aggressive and hostile elements of the transference.116

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors By depicting therapy as synonymous with a breastfeeding and a caregiving relationship—the primary source of the earliest sensorimotor experiences that form the basis of our conceptual systems—a multitude of metaphors are implicated. In terms of the provision of emotional nutrients in Line 57, one could conceive THERAPY IS BREASTFEEDING, THE ANALYST IS A MOTHER, and THE PATIENT IS AN INFANT. Conceived in this way the quality of that which is provided depends on the contents of the treatment-breast and is loosely speaking accomplished through the metaphor EATING IS ACQUIRING IDEAS (see Metaphors of Mind Appendix D).117 Here the implication is that projections fuel an auto-contained cycle in which potential nutrients from the outside are banned and the organism is forced to eat itself. From this

116

The emphasis on the negative transference and in interpreting what is considered the most elemental unconscious psychic material in PS3 are two of the main factors that set it apart from PS1 and PS2. In child therapy, detractors from early on equated these Kleinan “deep” interpretations that called attention to negative transference as harsh and unnecessary. Hinshelwood (1991) points out that Classical technique was designed to maintain a degree of positive transference and thus focused interpretations on instinctual impulses that occurred in the preconscious state.

117

Actually, in Winnicott’s conception it is not knowledge per se that is acquired but rather the psychic capacity for self-other differentiation, which is a crucial ontological achievement. Nevertheless, the implication seems to be that symbolism comes into being with the onset of object usage, in that it requires the ability to conceive of more than one separately existing object.

151 can be conceived OBJECT REALTING IS CANABILISM and THE SELF IS NOXIOUS. In Line 58 Winnicott portrays the therapist’s capabilities using the EventStructure Metaphor (see Appendix C) in which change or causation is associated with forced movement (“carry over” in Line 58) through space. THE ANALYST IS A VEHICLE describes this general function whose quality as “good” or “not good enough” will determine the ultimate success or failure in reaching object usage status.

Commentary Drawing an analogy between the early infant-mother caregiving environment and therapy opens up novel ways of conceiving the overall treatment process. It shifts from a unidirectional, mechanistic and experience-distant focus one that is bidirectional, relational, and more experience-near. In general Winnicott’s ontological metaphors of early life can prompt the reader to consider more elemental aspects of their own experience. Because the foundations of all metaphors on which we base ontology and reasoning are formed in infancy and early childhood, Winnicott’s constructs of transformation and their unique depiction of infant experience also provide insights into how built-in neurological structure interacts with the environment to create our conceptual-metaphorical systems of thought. Though the outcome of this process has been found to create primary metaphors based on our embodied nature that are universal across individuals and cultures, each subject’s biopsychosocial experience and status shapes preferred styles of conceptualizing experience. It here that psychoanalysis in general and Winnicott’s ontological constructs of infancy in particular might begin to fill-

152 in the gap and provide a more varied and nuanced account of how universal metaphors are elaborated in the lives of individual subjects.118

Text and Analysis, Lines 59-60 59.

60.

I would like to put in a reminder here that the essential feature in the concept of transitional objects and phenomena (according to my presentation of the subject) is the paradox, and the acceptance of the paradox: the baby creates the object but the object was there waiting to be created and to become a cathected object.

I tried to draw attention to this aspect of transitional phenomena by claiming that in the rules of the game we all know that we will never challenge the baby to elicit an answer to the question: did you create that or did you find it?

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning The paradox of the baby is a depiction of the child’s first encounter with the first fully recognized object. It is a hypothetical statement about the nature of psychic processes at work surrounding this event. In general cathexis is used in all three models to represent the status of psychic energy relative to other objects. Though itself not a force, cathexis denotes the intensity of a subject’s emotional investment in an object. As such it is a necessary component in the process of recognizing the self in relation to other objects. As mentioned, the general characterization of this process for PS1 is a result of the frustration of instincts and for PS2 the maturation of ego capacities that allow for a more accurate understanding of the self in relation to other objects (e.g., object

118

The individualization of metaphor and universal symbols has from the beginning been a prime quest of psychoanalysis (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). Clinical work from this framework is essentially an examination and deconstruction of a patient’s embodied metaphorical system as it exists vis-á-vis experiences with other embodied objects.

153 constancy). Overall the language used to depict the onset of self-other differentiation is more scientific and reminiscent of Freud’s metapsychological depiction of the human mind. It can be generally characterized as experience-distant, since the conceptual vantage point lay outside the psychic space which is being described.

The achievement of reality status is in Kleinan terms synonymous with the depressive position and the transformation of part-objects into a unified whole. The infant’s subjective view of the whole object signifies a coming together of love and hate in the form of concern for the object’s survival and well-being. It is the absence of the distorting influence of projective processes, designed mainly to keep the infant safe in the paranoid-schizoid position, which ultimately allows the object to be experienced in a new way. In the depressive position introjection of “good objects” replaces the projection of “bad objects” as the central mode of experience. Similar to PS1 and PS2 the linguistic depiction in PS3 of these and other psychic processes utilize metapsychological constructs, but also infuse them with a subjective or phenomenological account. Klein’s writing is rife with depictions that posit how affective and conceptual elements of projective and introjective processes are experienced by the infant.119 The vantage point shifts from inside and outside the conceptual space in which the psychic processes occur,

119

See Hinshelwood (1991, pp. 440-444) for an excellent discussion on Klein’s blending of metapsychological and phenomenological accounts of psychic processes and also on the “mind-body problem” (pp. 350-353). In general the dilemma surrounds the conceptual vantage point from which psychic phenomena are viewed and the corresponding language used to depict subjective and objective phenomena. Modern metaphor theory sheds some light here, demonstrating that all Western conceptions of the mind are in fact metaphorically determined and based on our experience of inhabiting a body. In other words what we consider objective reality is necessarily suffused with embodied-subjective elements (Lakoff and Johnson’s “experientialism”). Hinshelwood aptly characterizes Klein’s attempt to bridge the gap between the biological and psychological through ideas such as unconscious phantasy as “the science of the subjective.” He also points out that Klein’s use of different words to distinguish between phenomenological and metapsychological processes (e.g., “incorporation” as the subjective experience of “introjection”).

154 requiring the reader to identify with aspects of experience of both the subject and the object.120

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors The paradox of the baby is associated with the elements of time and creation, and with it Winnicott makes a key theoretical point and larger ontological statement. He linguistically draws on the ubiquitous human experience of objects existing (or not existing) in space to depict the experience of encountering reality. Utilizing the same structure of time in relation to states of mind as previously evidenced, here Winnicott infuses the element of objects and space to provide an account of the onset of realitybased thinking: Time 1 – Subject View (SV) • •

120

No object or object cathexis; self-cathexis or energetic “occupation” of self; desolate space No time exists

Additionally, these shifting vantage points from inside and outside objects abundant in Klein’s use of language create an experience akin to early infant life. In particular the experience parallels the infant’s early exploration process involving objects (e.g., the nipple, toys, parts of their own body, etc.) which are the first organizers of psychic and physical life. It is from sensorimotor interaction with these objects that forms the basis of a conceptual metaphorical system of thought.

155 Time 1 – Object View (OV) • • •

Subject and object exist in occupied but separate (psychic) space Subject as cathected or non-cathected object Time exists

Time 2 – Subject View (SV) • • •

Recognition of object; cathexis or “occupation” of object Blending of Time 1 (SV) and Time 1 (OV) = creation or finding of object and time Subject “enhanced” by object

Time 2 – Object View (OV) • • •

Subject joins object time and object space Reduction of object space via “occupation” Object experiences being found (not created) by subject The paradox of the infant provides a hypothetical depiction of what can be

conceived of as a timeless (pre-time) and objectless (pre-object) space. Because conceptual metaphors depend on objects as existing in space for all of its foundational semantic structure, including a description of time, Winnicott’s account of this realm of the subjective object as existing in transitional space essentially provides a first hand account of the birth of symbolism and metaphor itself. In this way it supplements conceptual metaphor theory by providing a context from which one can speculate on the qualitative effect this experience has on an emerging conceptual system. A number of questions come to mind: For example, what if anything in the distinctive nature of this first encounter with an object contributes to the quality of one’s unique conceptualmetaphorical system of thinking and experiencing the world? Do objects, space, and time themselves become imbued with subjective shades of meaning that will go on to influence the manner in which conceptual metaphors are utilized in thought and communication? If so, how might these unique qualities be revealed in a more empirical

156 analysis of a text or speech? How can psychoanalysis aid in this effort, in that it is inherently and deeply involved in the deconstruction of psychosomatic experience as revealed through language? These and other questions would seem to require a more thorough analysis using the tools of modern cognitive science as applied to uniquely experienced early sensorimotor experiences.

Commentary The use of paradox is characteristic of Winnicott’s both provocative and playful style of relating his clinical findings. He sets up in Line 61 a mental space of a ritual or “game” in which there are agreed upon protocols which prompt the reader to consider the absurdity of not following the “rules.” Among other things it evokes a humorous image of the infant child being questioned by an investigator about the psychic events that just transpired. The sudden presence of the object here has criminal overtones, with the child needing to “come clean” with the details of its origins. One could imagine an awe-struck child trying to comprehend the enormity of what has just transpired while being asked to articulate something ineffable. For Winnicott this is perhaps the most crucial time in development because the manner in which these experiences are integrated become templates of relating, both to external objects and between the true and false self. In a parallel way he is demonstrating the non-intrusive quality and corresponding freeness of space that must occur in treatment for objects to become usable. The constriction of space created by unnecessary impingement (such as premature or untimely interpretations that derail the natural integration of psychic events) brings to mind conceptual metaphors

157 such as IMPINGEMENT IS A RESTRICTOR OF (POTENTIAL) SPACE, THE THERAPIST IS AN INTERROGATOR, and PREMATURE KNOWLEDGE IS DESTRUCTIVE. Text and Analysis, Lines 61-66 61. I am now ready to go straight to the statement of my thesis.

62. It seems I am afraid to get there, as if I fear that once the thesis is stated the purpose of my communication is at an end, because it is so very simple.

63. To use an object the subject must have developed a capacity to use objects.

64. This is part of the change to the reality principle.

65. This capacity cannot be said to be inborn, nor can its development in an individual be taken for granted.

66. The development of a capacity to use an object is another example of the maturational process as something that depends on a facilitating environment.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning A key statement in this section is that the psychological attainment of reality status requires the presence of certain psychic capacities whose growth to full development is dependent on the quality of the environment. As discussed, to this point psychoanalytic theorizing focused less on the specific nature of the environment as a contributor to the developing infant and more on the built-in structure of the ego as the mechanism by which the self and environment are differentiated. According to PS1 and PS2 what is important at the earliest stages of development is the ego’s capacity to differentiate between pain and pleasure. The nature of the environment is important in only a very broad sense—mainly in its ability to satisfy instinctual urges. How the environment or caregiver experienced and processed the emotional needs was generally not identified. PS3 similarly accounts for the attainment of reality-based thinking as

158 mostly biologically determined. However, though specific responses by caregivers were not laid out by Klein, the implication was that the ability of the environment to contain emotions was important. Bion’s construct of the “container” (1959) and “reverie” (1962) more fully elaborated the function of the caregiver-therapist as an emotional repository and facilitator in the integration of emotions.

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors Winnicott declares that his central argument in the paper (Line 63) is a statement about the relationship between using and the ability to use objects in the world. In typical fashion he deconstructs and rearranges what is ordinarily considered a straightforward event or process, compelling the reader to consider alternative relationships between basic ontological concepts. For example, in Line 63 the verb “use” and the noun “capacity” are presented in a way that the skills and mechanisms that make up the ability must be taken into consideration. That is, the typical employment of “use” presupposes the aptitude to perform the tasks which comprise the utilization of an instrument or object: USING IS BEING ABLE TO USE. For example, “She is using a pencil” implies the ability to grasp, hold, and manipulate the pencil into order to produce words on a piece of paper. The skills which go into performing the action are implied by virtue of engaging in or completing the very action. Because “use” is so central to our embodied nature (e.g., humans as contained objects manipulating and interacting with other

159 objects), it subsumes the most basic elements of human ontology. However, in doing so it also points to the distance language creates in the reader from the more basic sensorimotor elements that comprise everyday actions, disguising the more elemental processes that underlie basic existence. Therefore, it can be said that Winnicott’s particular employment of “use” and “capacity” in Line 63 points to the reification of language and its tendency to disconnect us from our basic nature of being. In doing so this construction also importantly prompts the reader to look backward in time to the more essential and embodied nature of basic concepts and experience. Specifically, the word “capacity” has the effect of halting the forward conceptual movement inherent in the present tense “use.”121 Winnicott produces this backward perspective by indirectly drawing on our conceptual metaphors of time (see Moving Time Metaphor in Appendix F). Specifically, in the Moving Time Metaphor the past is conceptualized as moving away, the present as moving through (or directly past), and the future as moving toward an observer. As living, embodied beings existing in the time-space continuum humans are conceptualized as objects moving toward the future (e.g., “I’m on my way to old age”) and away from the past (e.g., “That memory is behind me). So, by calling attention to the a priori capacities that form the basis for successfully “using” an object, Winnicott creates the effect of slowing the natural forward progression associated with time and space. The reader is forced to go backwards in time to catch up to the past where the determinative processes for the capacity for object usage exist (e.g., a survivable and responsive

121

That is, implicit in capacity is notion of having learned something at a previous point in time. Use, as a present tense verb or noun, implies inherently possessing that capacity to perform an action or function in current time.

160 caregiving environment).122 In a clinical sense this slowing of time can be linked to the open, free-flowing and unimpinged psychic space on which psychoanalysis depends. It is within this space that the patient has the opportunity to either rediscover or create new embodied foundations of experience on which object usage rests. For the therapist this exercise requires a continual navigation of time and space (e.g., analytic space as present elaboration of early caregiving environment) and the consideration of therapeutic interactions not only as outcomes of past events and capacities, but also as future causes of yet to transpire relational events. The following figure summarizes the terms “use” and “capacity” in relation to time:

122

The lines immediately preceding the central statement of the paper (61 and 62) also reinforce the slowing down of time. Specifically, the allusion to fear evokes the experience of time standing still in the face of impending danger. Also, the characteristic Winnicottian reluctance to arrive (“get there” in Line 61) at any static location is here put into the service of creating a sense of elongated time. Read as continuation of the last paragraph (e.g., the paradox of the baby and time), the fear at reaching a conclusion in Line 61 similarly reflects the apprehension with which the infant fully recognizes and embraces the object as other.

In other words, though it marks the beginning of existing in a world of other subjects, it also signifies the “end” (Line 62) of a timeless state that is more closely associated with bodily transcendence and eternity.

161

Time ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Present

Past

Space

Behind

Concepts

In, Around

Capacity (Acquired Skill)

In Front Of

Use/Capacity (Performed Skill)

No Capacity

Capacity to Use = Future Use

No Performance

Therapy Primary Object Used Discovery of Self via Other

Future

No Future Use

Therapist Used

Future Use

Re-discovery of Self via Other

Continual Re-discovery of Self via Others

Primary Object Not Used (1) Therapist Not Used

No Discovery of Self

Impingement/Isolation Non-Survival

Therapist as Subjective Object

Countertransference Pull to Impingement/Isolation

Primary Object Not Used (2) New Response by Therapist

No Use = Object Relating Others as Subjective Objects Others as Neglectful or Persecuting Objects

Object Usage

(Same as Above)

Survival

Helpful Objects

(Same as Above)

“First” Discovery/Creation of Self

Continued Discovery/ Creation of Self via Others

Figure 6. Use and Capacity in Relation to Time

162 Commentary Related to the above outline of time in relation to the capacity to use objects is the question of innate versus environmental influence (Lines 65 and 66) in developing the requisite symbolic capability to accurately perceive reality. Winnicott makes the case that a certain kind of milieu (Line 66, a “facilitating environment”) is necessary to foster the cognitive maturation needed for object usage. This assertion has important implications and parallels for conceptual metaphor theory. Specifically, humans’ built-in conceptualneurological systems depend on experiences with the environment to activate the processes that eventually set down our core conceptual templates based on metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). It is from this group of primary conceptual metaphors that correlations with similar phenomena are made. However, similar to PS1, PS2, and PS3 conceptual metaphor theory assumes an adequately responsive environment in which the earliest sensorimotor experiences become linked with ideas and words. In other words, it does not take into account the variability in the environment’s capacity (e.g., stimulation, responsiveness, “fit,” etc.) to meet the emerging needs of the infant, which, among other things, has implications for how experiences based on embodied metaphor are integrated into the infant’s emerging perceptual system.

What Winnicott is stressing in terms of the quality of the environment the requisite factor in acquiring reality-based thinking has implications for both psychoanalytic and conceptual metaphoric accounts of symbolic development. Indeed, modern developmental research has shown that the responsiveness of the environment affects the quality of the developing infant’s representational systems, as characterized in attachment-related constructs such as “mindsharing”, “reflective function” and

163 “mentalization” (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Palombo, 2006).123 When such systems do not form adequately arrests can occur impacting a potentially wide range of developmental functions, related to the inability to match internal representations based on conceptual metaphor with external phenomena. The disconnection of internal systems of representation and external reality is clearly seen in psychosis where there is a complete collapse of one’s symbolic system. In general, metaphor theory has not as yet begun to distinguish the quality of the early sensorimotor environment as a factor in metaphor formation. It is here that psychoanalytic accounts of the early caregiving environment and modern infant development might fill the gap in conceptual metaphor theory.

Text and Analysis, Lines 67-68 67.

68.

In the sequence one can say that first there is object-relating, then in the end there is object-use; in between, however, is the most difficult thing, perhaps, in human development; or, the most irksome of all the early failures that come for mending.

This thing that there is in between relating and use is the subject's placing of the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control, that is, the subject's perception of the object as an external phenomenon, not as a projective entity, in fact recognition of it as an entity in its own right.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning Previous sections have outlined the various models’ characterization of object relating and object usage, as well as the function and purpose of projection as a 123

There have also been object relational accounts of uniquely configured symbolic systems in the childhood psychoses and autistic disorders that have interesting implications for the embodied foundations of conceptual metaphor theory. In general, Bick’s “skin container” (1968), Tustin’s (1972) “black hole” and Meltzer’s (1975) “adhesive identification” are constructs that generally seek to describe the experience of one’s body as symbolically perceived vis-à-vis other objects in space.

164 mechanism of the ego. A direct account such as the one provided by Winnicott in Line 68 of what occurs “between” states associated with object relating and objects usage is not found in any of the three models. However, all psychoanalytic accounts would generally agree that the transformation of narcissism involves a shift to a wider and more inclusive conceptual vantage point in which objects are viewed as separate and having their own volition and existence.

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors The statement outlining the subject’s ability to place the object outside its own control as a key process in the shift from object relating to object usage recruits conceptual data from Metaphors of Mind (Appendix D) and Metaphors of Self (Appendix E). As discussed, Metaphors of Self involve the characterization of the self as a physical object or container whose character is metaphorically determined by virtue of its: 1. location in space; 2. possession of itself and other objects, and; 3. control of itself or other objects.

These three main factors, based directly on early sensorimotor experiences related to our physical embodiment, are used to draw analogies with the non-physical or psychic phenomena we call self. The status of the self on these measures results in its depiction as:

165 1. in or out of control; 2. having an objective or non-objective viewpoint; 3. having multiple parts or roles, and; 4. revealing or not revealing its core essence.124 Winnicott’s key statement in Line 68 is most related to the self’s control (#1) and conceptual vantage point (#2), though these characteristics in themselves do not account for the complete idea.

Winnicott’s main proposition—that the subject’s placement of the object outside its area of omnipotent control as a means of gaining the capacity to accurately perceive reality—cannot be captured by any one conceptual metaphor. The semantic foundation on which the complete depiction is based combines aspects of Metaphors of Self and Metaphors of Mind. Specifically, from the Metaphors of Self are recruited CAUSING THE SELF TO ACT IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT, SELF CONTROL IS BEING IN ONE’S NORMAL LOCATION, and aspects of the Objective Standpoint Metaphor (see Appendix D). Viewed from these perspectives, the self’s action, as evidenced by movement of the object outside self-contained space, is made possible because it originates in an area where the self is in control (of itself and especially the object). However, in this configuration the status of the self as in control (versus not in control) is not the important point being made, but rather what is accomplished through the use of the self’s control (of another object). The significant outcome of this process is that reality-based thinking is born, largely due to the influence

124

Seen in this way our metaphors used to describe the self are rather limited in scope and depth. Other conceptual metaphorical configurations are required to achieve the richness which is usually ascribed to the concept of the self, especially in disciplines such as psychoanalysis where it is multifaceted and central to the depiction of psychic functioning.

166 exerted by the self to remove the object to an external position that represents objectivity (see The Objective Standpoint Metaphor of Self in Appendix E).125 This idea of removing something to gain understanding is based on the Metaphor of Mind THINKING IS PERCEIVING and its submappings Knowing Is Seeing and Impediments To Knowledge Are Impediments To Vision (e.g., “Her judgment is no longer clouded by cultish thinking,” or “I think see can finally see the light”).

A closer examination of the typical conceptual foundation on which Metaphors of Self are based will reveal that Winnicott makes a subtle but important shift in causeeffect relationship that leads to a novel way of depicting the onset of reality-based thinking. As mentioned, being in control or in possession of oneself or another object in a space that is equated with the self’s typical location contributes to gaining knowledge of the object. For example, KNOWING IS SEEING, SEEING IS TOUCHING, UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, and RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES all point to how physical proximity is crucial in having the influence required to perform the necessary actions that lead to gaining an understanding of the object. In Winnicott’s schema, however, it is the relinquishment of control of the object by virtue of removing it from close proximity that ultimately leads to an accurate understanding of it. In other words, the omnipotence that once held the object captive as part of the self in object relational space is put into service as the main vehicle with which the object is transported into transitional space. Upon arrival the object undergoes a transformation 125

A splitting of the self is implied here though not explicitly stated by Winnicott. Specifically, the object (minus its self-projected attributes) assumes a position in externality that is synonymous with objective thinking. That the self reaches this same position simultaneously would seem to indicate that at least some portion of the self is also transported. In terms of conceptual metaphors, The Scattered Self and Getting Outside Yourself (Appendix E) reflects the idea that the objective interpretation of reality requires the translocation of portions of the self into multiple conceptual vantage points.

167 which includes it becoming beyond the control of the subject, while simultaneously viewed as separate and knowable as a “thing in itself.”

That omnipotence is responsible for bringing about the circumstances under which an object is allowed to exist in its true essence is somewhat paradoxical, in that the word is typically associated with control and the creation of objects in the image of its creator.126 However, because omnipotence is representative of thinking itself in object relational states of mind it must be incorporated in any account that seeks to posit the transcendence of that state. In psychoanalysis omnipotence is generally related to an overvaluation of one’s thought processes vis-à-vis reality. As such it has connotations to irrational or delusional thinking, gratuitous wish fulfillment, narcissism, and destruction.

Here, however, its use is generative and the means by which rational thinking is actually born.

Winnicott’s unique utilization of omnipotence also calls attention to the developmental enfolding of thought, that with the attainment of object usage becomes from that point forward a dialectic between unidirectional and bidirectional states of mind. In particular, his depiction reveals how omnipotent thinking as it occurs in the unidirectional and auto-contained state of object relating becomes transformed and usable for perceiving other points of view in bidirectional and non-contained states of mind.

Viewed from this perspective, omnipotent elements of thinking in actuality form the foundation of more mature thought.127

126

Omnipotence (n), 1b. As an attribute of God, or of a person: the fact or quality of having unlimited or infinite power. Also: the fact or quality of having great power or strength.

127

In other words, self-contained, unidirectional and all-powerful aspects of omnipotent thinking that rule in the realm of object relational space do not completely disappear (see Line 91 for non-destruction of

168 To summarize, the underlying metaphors which comprise the overall idea of omnipotence in relation to the attainment of reality-based thinking are OMNIPOTENCE IS RELINGUSIHING CONTROL, OMNIPOTENCE IS A GENERATIVE USE OF CONTROL, THE BIRTH OF REALITY IS AN OMNIPOTENT ACT OF SELF CONTROL, UNDERSTANDING IS LETTING GO, and KNOWING IS NOT SEEING. From this can be proposed the following schema:

The Paradox of Omnipotent Control in the Acquisition of Reality-Based Thinking State 1 – Object Relating • • • •

Object is undifferentiated and has no unique qualities (omnipotent thinking) Subject omnipotently controls object in self-contained space by making it part of the self Subject knows or understands object by virtue of its close proximity in confined space Object is, however, obstacle to seeing or knowing beyond self-contained space

Intermediate State – Transitional Space • • •

Subject utilizes omnipotence to move object outside self space into transitional space Wider or infinite space allows for new “seeing” to occur “Not seeing” in old ways leads to more accurate view (KNOWING IS NOT SEEING)128

projection material). They can be said to form the basis for a multitude of psychic functions that necessarily require drawing on more primordial elements of pre-subject existence, for the specific purpose of adapting to and optimally functioning in states associated with multiple subjects. Assertiveness, courage, selfcontrol, and genuineness (self-coherence or self-congruity) are just a few processes that recruit omnipotent forces to accomplish their tasks in object usage states of mind. To Winnicott this generative primordial force is related to destruction, which forms the “unconscious backcloth” (Line 155) that underpins human existence.

128

In an interesting parallel from mythology that has an association with psychoanalysis, Oedipus puts out his own eyes upon realizing his wife Jacosta is his mother. Besides the more obvious symbolic connection with guilt, morality, and the general difficulty accepting (“seeing”) a harsh truth, this act also points to the requisite and corresponding embodied effect that is part and parcel of integrating any profound idea. In other words, poignant psychological events are necessarily registered physically, involuntarily or at times self-imposed. In a related way, “not seeing” will be shown in the next section to involve the metaphorical destruction of a part of the self not as attempt to cope with a reality, but the very process that discovers it.

169 •

Paradox of omnipotence: Omnipotent act of relinquishing control and distancing object leads to true understanding and birth of object (reality-based thinking)

State 2 – Object Usage • • • •

Object arrives in object usage space Object no longer under control of subject and no longer exists in subject’s image Omnipotence is transformed and usable for perception in multi-subject states Subject accurately perceives object as separate and real

Commentary As evidenced above, the key statement in Line 68 on the transformation of narcissism is unique for its utilization of omnipotence as a generative concept in the attainment of object usage. This sentence also indicative of hallmark Winnicottian and British Object Relations style in providing a subjective account of an important psychic process. In both instances the effect on the reader is to concretize and bring closer the abstract elements that are typically used in the depiction of psychological change. For example, by using “subject” (Line 68) instead of “ego” here and throughout the text, Winnicott creates a mental space in which the reader can more easily identify with the phenomena that is being portrayed. In general the word subject is conceptually more closely associated with human versus mechanistic attributes of the patient and therapist.

In clinical terms this language promotes, among other things, the drawing of conceptual parallels between two equal human entities. In doing so it reinforces the idea of object usage as representing the birth of reality for the hitherto underdeveloped subject via the more mature subjecthood of the other.

170 Text and Analysis, Lines 69-83 69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

This change (from relating to use) means that the subject destroys the object.

From here it could be argued by an armchair philosopher that there is therefore no such thing in practice as the use of an object; if the object be external, then the object is destroyed by the subject.

Should the philosopher come out of his chair and sit on the floor with his patient, however, he will find that there is an intermediate position.

In other words, he will find that after 'subject relates to object' comes 'subject destroys object' (as it becomes external); and then may come 'object survives destruction by the subject'.

But there may or may not be survival.

A new feature thus arrives in the theory of object-relating.

The subject says to the object: ‘I destroyed you,’ and the object is there to receive the communication.

From now on the subject says: ‘Hullo object!’ ‘I destroyed you.’

‘I love you.’

'You have value for me because of your survival of my destruction of you.'

'While I am loving you I am all the time destroying you in (unconscious) fantasy'.

Here fantasy begins for the individual.

The subject can now use the object that has survived.

It is important to note that it is not only that the subject destroys the object because the object is placed outside the area of omnipotent control.

It is equally significant to state this the other way round and to say that it is the destruction of the object that places the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control.

In these ways the object develops its own autonomy and life, and (if it survives) contributes in to the subject, according to its own properties.

171 Theoretical-Contextual Meaning This paragraph posits destruction as the direct means by which transformation occurs from states associated with object relating to those that reflect object usage. In utilizing destruction in this manner Winnicott is proposing a novel way of conceptualizing the attainment of reality-based thinking, and in the process positions his theory as distinct from the three main models under consideration. The introduction to the idea of destruction in Line 69 is both abrupt and definitive: the preceding text gives no indication of its relevance, though in one short sentence it is deemed the central process involved in using an object.129 The remainder of the paragraph goes to great length to concretize (e.g., the subject’s dialogue with the object) what is a rather complex proposition regarding intrapsychic phenomena.

Though likely not as provocative to adherents and readers familiar with PS3 ideas, for others the effect was shown to be dramatic. Specifically, in terms of PS1 and PS2, the critiques from respondents to his presentation of the paper The Use of an Object at the New York Psychoanalytic Society provide an excellent historical account of how these ideas were received from within a different school of thought. Goldman (1993) cites accounts that outline the effect of that Winnicott’s idiosyncratic use of language had on the audience in depicting this important shift in development. First, he notes that though Edith Jacobson concurred that aggression can have a generative value, she questioned with the constructs of destruction and survival as ways to describe the

129

In general much of the paper to this point has a meandering quality. It has consisted of a very broad outline of Winnicott’s ideas vis-à-vis psychoanalysis, but in typical fashion he had yet to really make a clear point or arrived at the core of his argument. Even Line 63—the proclaimed “thesis” of the paper—on the surface says little and is anti-climactic. In the context of this sudden and definitive statement on destruction, one might view the intended or unintended function of the preceding text as lulling the reader into a disarmed state from which to receive this current statement on destruction.

172 transformation from narcissistic states of mind. Goldman goes on to say that, as Samuel Ritvo commented, the ability to perceive objects as separate from oneself is more effectively conceptualized as the “functional capacity of the ego to tolerate the qualities of delay and lack of gratification, and their accompanying anxiety reduction” (quoted from Milrod, 1968, p. 4). Bernard Fine also questioned the use of destruction (as well as other terms such as “use”) as gratuitous and as ignoring any reference to psychoanalytic theory that came before it. Goldman quotes various statements that challenged the need or validity of using the idea of destruction as the process by which the object becomes separate. Among other things Fine generally posited that it is libidinal elements (not destruction) that join the patient with the therapist and that allow for the containment and transformation of aggression that leads to separate subject recognition. To summarize, Goldman (1993) writes: Jacobson, Ritvo, and Fine were obviously somewhat bewildered by Winnicott’s formulations. They were put off by his personal use of language. They felt that many of his ideas were just another way of stating what could be better described using the vocabulary of narcissistic identifications, libidinal economy, and the functional capacities of the ego. Winnicott’s central proposition regarding the destruction of the object in unconscious fantasy as a prelude to its use seemed to them perplexing, extreme, and unwarranted (p. 209).130

In contrast to PS1 and PS2, the construct of destruction is a cornerstone of Kleinian theory. It is related in general to the death instinct and more specifically to the superego’s aggression directed toward the individual.131 Destruction and the death

130

The respondents’ difficulty with the language reveals significant philosophical differences that underpin the models: ego psychology’s affinity to a stiff and mechanical rationality synonymous with the Enlightenment thought and Winnicott’s more intuitive and experience-based style reminiscent of Romanticism.

131

Klein attributed the guilt and remorse she observed patients as young as two years old to manifestations of the superego. In Freud’s theory, however, the superego did not form until after the Oedipus complex at

173 instinct are also associated with the states of fusion and defusion between loving and aggressive impulses. In states of defusion the tendency is to project aggressive impulses aimed at the self onto other objects. Among other things defusion creates feelings of paranoia toward the object and a distortion of the organism’s ability to accurately perceive objects. Klein’s construct of envy and the attack on a life-giving good object is an example of destruction in action, which is related to splitting and the overall inability to contain states of the inherent ambivalence involved in loving an object.

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors In the configuration put forth in this paragraph, destruction is posited as the process by which the narcissistic perception of the object which maintains it and the yet to be born subject in the realm of object relating is removed. Whereas in PS3 destruction is a manifestation of the death instinct, a harsh superego and an overall state of defusion (which includes a distorted view of reality), for Winnicott the implication is that destruction becomes the main vehicle through which the subject is able to attain realitybased thinking and the capacity to love. From these ideas come DESTRUCTION IS MOVEMENT OF THE OBJECT OUTSIDE NARCISSISTIC SPACE, DESTRUCTION IS THE BIRTH OF REALITY, and DESTRUCTION IS LOVE.

around four or five years of age. Kernberg’s (1969) critique of Kleinian theory (see Appendix N) includes the ego psychology refutation of the death instinct.

174 The idea of unconscious fantasy as a repository for the transmuted aggression associated with the destruction of the subjective object is also novel. In Winnicott’s depiction destruction is directly responsible for the spawning of fantasy itself— DESTRUCTION IS THE BIRTH OF FANTASY. It is within the holding area of fantasy that aggressive elements that might otherwise cause an imbalance or instinctual defusion when encountering objects are contained. As a psychic space unconscious fantasy not only maintains a degree of separation between aggressive and loving impulses, but it is also the area in which the two are joined (see Line 78). As such it is reflective of the dialectical elements of love and hate (ambivalence) that are inherent to human existence.

Using Winnicott’s sequential characterization as outlined in Line 71, the following scheme can be posited with respect to destruction and survival of the object: Subject Relates to Object • •

Diffuse and unintegrated aggression in omnipotent space Concrete depiction of objects: good or bad, loving or hating, etc.

Subject Destroys Object • •

Aggression/destruction consolidated and used to remove object from omnipotent space Object removed from a suspended to a tangible state of existence

Object Survives Destruction • •

Destruction paradoxically leads to birth of both reality and fantasy Ability to love and hate object at the same time (ambivalence) begins

Subject Uses Object •

Fusion of erotic and aggressive impulses leads to capacity to use objects

175 Commentary Destruction is presented in the text in a way that creates an effect paralleling the experience of the emerging subject. In particular, it evokes in the reader the experience of being caught off guard which could be conceived as reminiscent of the subject’s reaction to the sudden shift in consciousness that comes with object usage. Winnicott’s paradoxical and unconventional employment of destruction as a creator of something positive also evokes in the reader a sense of novelty and surprise that might be viewed as akin to the experience of the subject during the birth of reality. The sudden appearance of destruction in Line 69—with no prior warning or preparation in the text—is reminiscent of the astonishment that the subject likely experiences when the object is vacated from narcissistic space and a “new vision” of reality occurs. As alluded to above, the meandering quality of the text and the absence of clear and definitive conclusions have to this point been effective in laying the groundwork for this dramatic effect.

Besides the element of surprise and the atypical use of destruction described above, a dramatic effect is also created in this paragraph by the rather mundane and anticlimatic way this crucial statement can be seen as presented. That is, there is an element of understatement in the way destruction is abruptly inserted in the text, as if the reader should not really question its presence and atypical usage. Nevertheless, the word destruction does conjure images related to the observable effects (e.g., ruins, fragments, disorder) of powerful forces whose presence is anything but unnoticeable. Read in this way Winnicott’s seemingly unobtrusive insertion of destruction points towards its less obvious though important function as a contributor to creative processes (e.g., as that which eliminates or makes room for something new). This portrayal reveals the

176 generative qualities destruction and aggression (e.g., motility) that often go unnoticed in every creative or transformational event.132 Viewed from this perspective, destruction is in actuality quite an ordinary and expectable part of all creation and transformation. In general, the juxtaposition of less noticed elements of destruction with its more obvious effects widens the conceptual range from which meaning can be drawn, revealing both its apparent and more subtle implications.133

Text and Analysis, Lines 84-88 84.

In other words, because of the survival of the object, the subject may now have started to live a life in the world of objects, and so the subject stands to gain immeasurably; but the price has to be paid in acceptance of the ongoing destruction in unconscious fantasy relative to object-relating.

85. Let me repeat.

86. This is a position that can only be arrived at by the individual in early stages of emotional growth through the actual survival of cathected objects that are at the time in process of becoming destroyed because real, becoming real because destroyed (being destructible and expendable).

87. From now on, this stage having been reached, projective mechanisms assist in the act of noticing what is there, but are not the reason why the object is there.

88. In my opinion this is a departure from orthodox psychoanalytic theory, which tends to think of external reality only in terms of the individual's projective mechanisms.

132

In biology metamorphosis is a hormonal process which involves the permanent destruction of morphological structures at the larval stage which result in the transformation into more mature life forms (e.g., tadpole to frog, caterpillar to butterfly). In literature and mythology metamorphosis has a long history as a transformational process, turning divine beings or humans into plants, animals, or inanimate objects.

133

The positioning of destruction in this paper calls to mind questions related to Winnicott’s relationship with his own aggressive qualities. As pointed out he struggled all his life with asserting himself in a way that left him feeling a sense of individuality and power, without damaging those who received his communications. Therefore, if the introduction of destruction is viewed as being delayed, disguised or downplayed, this could simply reflect his typical ambivalence or anxiety about making such an important self-assertion (or more generally “arriving� at a conclusion). It could also point the utilization of this uncertainty to indirectly but distinctly draw attention to the centrality of aggressive elements in creation by understating its arrival on the scene. It is this opaque quality of his writing that is likely most perplexing and frustrating to some and revealing and rewarding to others.

177 Theoretical-Contextual Meaning In this section Winnicott sharpens his position on projection as a process in apprehending objects in the external world. The quality of the object most important to its being usable is its ability to survive, especially during a crucial window of time (Line 86) in which destruction is intimately involved in the creation of reality. The key shift that distinguishes his proposition from the other three models is that for Winnicott projection is only partially responsible for achieving reality-based thinking status (Line 87). In his depiction projection is ontologically limited in its ability to account for a full description of the birth of reality and its implications. In his schema, as set forth in Line 81, projection is more a structural mechanism of perception (“noticing what is there”) than an interpreter of the larger questions of existence (“why the object is there”) that come into being once the organism is transported from the solipsistic space of subjective objects. Exactly what psychic process is responsible for pondering existence is not speculated on here, though the idea of the true self as reflecting the essence of one’s being comes to mind.

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related conceptual metaphors Winnicott again draws on embodied notions of time to provide an account of a rather abstract psychic process. Line 86 frames the temporal elements and how they are to be perceived in order to accurately view what is occurring psychically. First, the

178 process under consideration must occur at an “early stage” of human development (e.g., TIME IS A LOCATION that must be traversed). Second, it is within a more circumscribed moment of time that the psychic elements he has outlined come together to create reality (e.g., TIME IS A SPACE in which the objects of destruction and reality intermingle). By honing in on the precise moment in which the transformation to reality occurs, Winnicott creates the effect of slowing or expanding time in order to more fully appreciate the complexity of what is occurring.134 This effect contributes to revealing not only the confluence of elements that go into the creation of reality, but also the potential and inherent dangers present when powerful instinctual forces are fully exposed during their crucial task of transforming a more primitive state of being. Viewed from this perspective, “ordinary” time can be said to mask the underlying destruction and risk inherent in all processes of transformation. Survival of the object at this crucial moment is paramount and necessary for carrying the subject over to object usage status, because the destructive elements at work require an intensity that necessarily heightens the organism’s sensitivity to its own power.135 In temporal terms, the quality of time complements the intensity that is present in this act of creation, in that it can be said to

134

Line 86 contains 46 words which reinforces a sense of elongated time. The phrase “at the time in process of becoming destroyed because real, becoming real because destroyed” contributes to this expansion of time by revealing the bi-directionality of causes and events. Conceptually it requires creating a mental space in which elements of destruction and reality are infused. Performing this operation necessitates more time than a more straightforward unidirectional account (e.g., destruction as creating reality or reality as evidence of destruction). Also, the use of “process” (connoting something started in the past and continuing in the present) and the repetition of “becoming” (the present progressive form that communicates a range of present time) also elicit a sense of drawn out time. In general the phrase requires the reader to traverse a larger conceptual area (e.g., TIME IS SPACE) that is synonymous with passing time.

135

The implication is that the subject must “not see” and be insulated from fully recognizing the primordial power it possesses. The subject is not capable of interpreting a breakdown (lack of survival) in this process to a cause other than itself, because it is still exists in the symbiotic realm of a unified subjective object.

179 become magnified and suspended in a way that allows for the optimal incorporation and assimilation of a new psychic structure. The following schema summarizes the effect and use of time in relation to destruction and the attainment of objective perception:

Ordinary Time • • •

Reality is attained without respect to destruction Destruction as “hidden” in time The object is real because it is perceived or seen (KNOWING IS SEEING)

Expanded Time • • •

Exposes core destructive elements in the birth of reality Slowed or elongated time“reveals” destruction inherent in all change The object is real because destroyed, destroyed because real (KNOWING IS SEEING AND NOT SEEING)136

The relationship of reality and destruction is another theme put forth in this section that exposes elements of Winnicottian style with implications for conceptual metaphor. As discussed, the effect created by the quality of the text contributes to a consideration of the underlying forces at play in the birth of reality. The wider conceptual space created via the juxtaposition of reality and destruction reveals elements of each that both complement and negate one another, creating a dialectical tension promoting a more nuanced view of this important ontological event. In general, by putting together in mental space basic conceptual elements of destruction and reality, qualities of each that are not ordinarily evident are exposed; in particular, generative qualities of destruction and undetectable or unnoticed aspects of reality.

136

Expanded time allows for a wider conceptual vantage point from which elements of the destroyed (psychic) material that were either eliminated or altered must be taken into consideration. Thus, this necessitates “not seeing” that which was originally present and “seeing” that which emerges from the transformation.

180 One way these less noticeable qualities of destruction and reality are revealed is through the work of the primary metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. In this embodied construction that is ubiquitous to human existence, that which is known (e.g., reality) is typically equated with what can be concretely apprehended visually. However, by positing destruction as an element involved in gaining the capacity to perceive that which is real, qualities of reality that are attained by “not seeing” are exposed. Specifically, because destruction eliminates or alters the material quality of an object—which necessarily causes it to disappear or at the vey least be changed substantially—it prompts the reader to consider elements of the object which are no longer perceptible. From this can be posited KNOWING IS NOT SEEING, whereby that which once existed but has been altered or eliminated by destruction must necessarily not be available to visual awareness (e.g., the amorphous quality of the object as symbiotically merged with the subject, among other things). Overall this construction points to how developmental progression can be conceived as not only the addition new psychic elements, but also the transformation of old ones in a way that can be conceived of as losing a capacity that was once present and functional.137 The following schema represents the conceptual elements related to reality with respect to seeing in Winnicott’s depiction of object usage:

137

This discussion shows the relative limitation of any one primary conceptual metaphor in accounting for more complex and abstract psychic phenomena. In other words, KNOWING IS SEEING or KNOWING IS NOT SEEING provide only a narrow depiction of what is a broader process. As alluded to above, one way of conceiving perception in object usage states is not only as the sudden ability to “see” versus “not see” something that is present (e.g., a real and separate object), but rather a shift in the quality of perception (e.g., “seeing”) that leads to novel conceptualizations.

181 Reality Is Seeing and Not Seeing In Ordinary and Expanded Time Knowing Is Seeing That That Which Is Presently Visible In Ordinary Time (e.g., object as concrete and separate from self) • Knowing Is Not Seeing That Which Once Existed But Was Abolished Or Altered In Expanded Time (e.g., object as formless part of self) •

This calling of attention to the less than obvious qualities of destruction and reality is also promoted in a more general way by their juxtaposition in the text reminiscent of Line 86 (e.g., “in process of becoming destroyed because real, becoming real because destroyed”). Conceptually the juxtaposition invokes in the reader a movement of time which is unorthodox but revealing of the ontological processes under consideration.

As discussed, in the Moving Time Metaphor (Appendix F) time is typically viewed as moving in a unidirectional fashion in relation to an object-observer in space: behind and away representing what we conceive of as “past,” in front of and toward which is connoted with the “future,” and passing directly by or through as the “present.”

However, by invoking elements of the object that span dimensions of time (e.g., the object as currently existing as a function of its past destruction whose elements are no longer visible but still relevant), the subject-reader as object in space is forced to simultaneously “move” in opposite directions (“back” to the past and “forward” to the present) in order to encompass the full description of the object’s current existence. In doing so the subject must itself (e.g., its embodied mind) expand or stretch out to create a vantage point which allows for this bidirectional conceptual movement to occur.

Among other things this exercise creates an existential tension by prompting the reader to consider moving beyond embodied notions of experience, in which the mind as a container (object) is conceived as only able to move in one direction and exist in one

182 location at a time. The text thus requires the reader to challenge the human conceptual bias (based on our embodied form and mind) which necessarily views time as spatially segmented (past, present, and future) and unidirectionally flowing (moving either away, through, or toward). In one way performing this exercise of transcending time and space is reminiscent of the experience of the subject as it is in the process of being born into the realm of object usage and reality. Overall, Winnicott’s continual depiction of the timeless and space less qualities of key transformation processes expose both the possibilities and the limitations imposed by our embodied metaphorical systems in comprehending more abstract psychic processes.

Commentary The juxtaposition of destruction and reality in Winnicott’s account of object usage is reminiscent of his style of invoking semantic qualities of words that typically go unnoticed in ordinary conversation or writing. As outlined above the depictions draw on conventional conceptual metaphors to uncover these less than obvious meanings.

However, conceptual metaphors only go so far in accounting for the complexity of the rather abstract psychic processes being described. As evidenced above, an exclusively conceptual metaphorical explanation requires including in the submapping metaphors that are diametrically opposed to primary metaphors on which meaning is presumably based (e.g., the idea that “not seeing” is related to acquiring knowledge).

This points to the limitations of conceptual metaphor and the need to consider conceptual blending as a tool for establishing the semantic roots of more imaginative and abstract ideas. In certain important ways, Winnicott’s style is more reminiscent of conceptual blending in that he is continually brining together ideas that on the surface

183 appear diametrically opposed, though when combined extract qualities of each that have been seemingly dormant and waiting to be uncovered.138 In this way the process of conceptual blending is reminiscent of transitional phenomena, in that latent psychic elements are brought to life from their suspended state in multi-dimensional and timeless space under certain optimal conditions created by the environment.139

Text and Analysis, Lines 89-94 89.

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I have now nearly made my whole statement.

Not quite, however, because it is not possible for me to take for granted an acceptance of the fact that the first impulse in the subject's relation to the object (objectively perceived, not subjective) is destructive.

The central postulate in this thesis is that whereas the subject does not destroy the subjective object (projection material), destruction turns up and becomes a central feature in so far as the object is objectively perceived, has autonomy, and belongs to 'shared' reality.

This is the difficult part of my thesis, at least for me.

It is generally understood that the reality principle involves the individual in anger and reactive destruction, but my thesis is that the destruction plays its part in making the reality, placing the object outside the self.

For this to happen, favourable conditions are necessary.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning Here Winnicott returns to the themes of projection and the reality principle and positions these ideas vis-à-vis destruction, making a subtle but important distinction with

138

These implications of conceptual blending are reminiscent of the quantum physicist-philosopher David Bohm’s (2003) notion of the material world as simultaneously existing in latent and manifest states. In his conception the primary source of reality derives from the “implicate order,” which holds in “enfolded” or hidden states the multi-dimensional and timeless qualities of particles, energy, and consciousness. What we as embodied organisms are typically able to conceive is the “explicate order,” which is “unfolded” or made manifest to our uniquely human senses. Conceptual blending suggests that certain combinations of ideas joined together in mental space extract from the implicate order qualities that most often go unnoticed in typical realms of embodied perception.

139

For transitional phenomena vis-à-vis object usage the condition required is one of survival of and lack of impingement by the object. In conceptual blending it is the ability to hold in mental space both similar and dissimilar qualities of ideas that allow for the emergence of novel understandings of each.

184 respect to the function and timing of destruction in the process of object usage.

Specifically, he equates the destruction associated with attainment of the reality-based thinking in PS1, PS2, and PS3 as a byproduct (Line 93) of recognizing a world that is not narcissistically motivated. In these characterizations destruction is only a derivative of the frustration involved in coming to terms with reality, itself having no direct influence on the creation or nature of that reality. Alternatively, in his depiction destruction is generative and a key element which leads to the actual making of reality, not by obliterating reality or the means by which it is created (projection) but by simply placing the object outside the area of omnipotence. This construction is reminiscent of past depictions of destruction as akin to motility and its broader tendency toward integration and health. Overall, by positing destruction as generative and by moving it to later in the process (post-object relating) he is making an important distinction between his theory and others of the day.

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors A primary construction in this depiction involves destruction as it is related to the object, projection material, and reality. One central metaphor that can be derived from the account is DESTRUCTION IS MOVEMENT, in which destructive force is used not to eliminate the object but rather to displace it into an area (transitional space) where it can

185 be transformed.140 In this way the projection material in the realm of object relating is not really eliminated, which allows it to aid the subject in recognizing (not creating) objects in the world of “shared reality” (Line 91).

Commentary The main alteration to theory that Winnicott makes in this section is: (a) changing the nature of destruction from non-generative (e.g., a reaction of frustration) to generative in a core developmental process, and; (b) changing the function of destruction from that which eliminates by virtue of damaging or obliterating object material, to a more affectneutral transporter of the object into transformative space. These novel characterizations of destruction have significant implications for clinical work, in that they promote a more focused and nuanced characterization of the psychological processes involved in the patient’s utilization of the treatment situation. In other words, it requires a wider conceptual vantage point from which to consider semantic qualities of clinical terms (e.g., destruction, projection, reality) that ordinarily have the tendency to become reified in the clinical process and its depiction in writing.

Text and Analysis, Lines 95-105 95.

96.

140

This is simply a matter of examining the reality principle under high power.

As I see it, we are familiar with the change whereby projection mechanisms enable the subject to take cognizance of the object, without projection mechanisms being the reason for the object's existence.

Winnicott will later in the paper make a distinction between this process of destruction and “annihilation” (Line 142) which he conceives of as akin to “no hope.” From this perspective, then, can be posited DESTRUCTION IS HOPE.

186 97.

At the point of development that is under survey the subject is creating the object in the sense of finding externality itself, and it has to be added that this experience depends on the object's capacity to survive.

98. (It is important that this means 'not retaliate'.)

99. If it is in an analysis that these matters are taking place, then the analyst, the analytic technique, and the analytic setting all come in as surviving or not surviving the patient's destructive attacks.

100. This destructive activity is the patient's attempt to place the analyst outside the area of omnipotent control, that is, out in the world.

101. Without the experience of maximum destructiveness (object not protected) the subject never places the analyst outside and therefore can never do more than experience a kind of self-analysis, using the analyst as a projection of a part of the self.

102. In terms of feeding, the patient, then, can only feed on the self and cannot use the breast for getting fat.

103. The patient may even enjoy the analytic experience but will not fundamentally change.

104. And if the analyst is a subjective phenomenon, what about waste-disposal?

105. A further statement is needed in terms of output.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning In this section Winnicott provides the rationale and means by which his depiction of destruction and reality can be understood. Overall, this is accomplished by proposing a separate stage in the process of attaining reality which is moved ahead in time (post object-relating) and which corresponds to a different quality of perception. He uses a foundational construct of psychoanalysis, the reality principle, from which to elaborate his conclusion. In particular, he posits that the elements demonstrating his characterization of the birth of reality in relation to destruction are contained within this well known idea, though the means of perception for conceptualizing it must be altered or put “under high power” (Line 95). In other words, examined more closely one realizes that the perception that was used to simply recognize the external world in object relational states (projection) shifts in function to an interpreter of reality (e.g., “why” the

187 object is there) in states associated with object usage. The shift in the quality of perception required by the reader to view this process from an external perspective is associated with that which is occurring for the subject internally. That is, from the perspective of the reader the putting “under high power” required to comprehend the experience of the subject corresponds to the increased psychic intensity (e.g., “maximum destructiveness”) at work in the subject while acquiring this new quality of perception.

Thus, the “shared reality” (Line 91) that is an outcome of this process for the subject is thus experienced vicariously by the reader vis-à-vis the experience created in the text.

According to Winnicott, the level of force that is required to make this significant change (e.g., not just destructiveness but “maximum destructiveness”) is commensurate with what he deems as the dramatic psychic modification taking place. Here the intensity of destructiveness is equivalent to the expanded level of perception that must be reached in order to attain object usage status (e.g., the ability to incorporate subjective-objective, inner-outer, and past-present elements of perception). This shift in perception—which importantly allows for a new epistemic stance (e.g., subject as “interpreter” of why the object is there)—can be viewed as synonymous with the “birth” of reality, because the ability to interpret or make meaning is itself a “creative” act. That is, interpretation connotes making clear or explicit something that was unformed or hidden, both qualities attributable to creation and birth. This new quality of perception allows the subject entry into the world of “shared reality” in which bidirectional vantage points for viewing existence now exist (e.g., subjective-objective, inner-outer, past-present, etc.). From this point forward subjective perceptions of external reality are suffused with those of

188 considered “objective” (e.g., shared), forming a dialectical tension which comprises what we conceive of as experience.141 The required survivability of the object to aid in this transformation of perception on the surface seems patently obvious, though upon closer examination reveals ontological insights that can go unnoticed. Survival in the sense used by Winnicott is more akin to mutability, or the object’s capacity to transform itself into a vehicle that will carry over subject to object usage status. In particular, the object must allow itself to be seen as both similar and dissimilar to the emerging subject, in a way that is conducive to imparting a wider and more abstract quality of perception.

The object is uniquely suited to this task since at this point in development the object is nearest to representing inner and outer reality—that is, it exists on the cusp of both as positioned in transitional space. As such it is viewed by the subject as representing qualities that simultaneously subsume and go beyond its currently known dimensions of time and space (e.g., me-not me, inner-outer, past present, etc.). The object’s status as a separate physical entity enhances its power, in that it bears the closest resemblance to that which potentially exists beyond the isolated space of which the subject is still a part. In this way the object provides the first tangible evidence for the existence of something apart from the self, and as such it must consummate the process by allowing the subject to utilize its (the object’s) unique position in reality.

In Line 98 Winnicott states that the function of the object as a transporter or talisman in the process of object usage is achieved by surviving and “not retaliating” to the “maximum destructiveness” occurring within the subject. How the object is to be

141

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) would characterize this epistemic stance as “experientialism.”

189 represented by the subject would also seem to require that it be seen as both omnipresent and nonexistent—reflecting the emerging quality of perception by the subject at this point in the transformational process. Perhaps a better characterization is that the object needs to exist in a suspended state available for “unfoldment” or revelation into external reality when required. The object’s appearance needs to occur precisely at the time that corresponds with the subject’s emergence from an omnipotent state. More specifically, it must be viewed as vicariously in statu nascendi or in the process of being born with the subject. In this way the object can provide a temporary but crucial mirror into which the subject projects the raw psychic material associated with object relating while introjecting latent capacities akin to object usage.

What the overall construction suggests is that though the object does not overtly demonstrate mutability (e.g., it does not “do” anything other than exist and allow the self to reflect), it becomes viewed by the subject as simultaneously in the process of psychic transformation. This is possible because the subject still (partially) filters reality via an object relational state of mind in which the self and object are unified; therefore, what the self is in the process of experiencing vis-à-vis the birth of reality is viewed as coming both from within and from without. From the object’s perspective this process can be viewed as a re-experiencing via the emerging subject that which has already occurred in its own development (if it has gone well). These reactions can be viewed through the various lenses of countertransference, revealing points of vulnerability and strength that play a role in its ability to be portrayed the subject as surviving.142

142

The general assumption is that the object has attained object usage status. One issue not addressed in the paper is whether an uninitiated object can carry over the subject into a state that it has not experienced.

190 Basic meaning of transformational concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors The idea that psychic change involves the movement of an object into a new space where it can transformed is communicated using metaphors of embodiment related to force and its effects on the subject and object. In terms of the intensity required to carry the subject over to object usage, Winnicott uses MAXIMAL DESTRUCTIVENESS IS OBJECT VULNERABILITY to connote the quality of force needed to render the object mutable (e.g., putting it in a state or condition to be used) and ultimately movable out of omnipotent space. As discussed above this process is importantly related to the enhancement of perceptual capacity—MAXIMAL DESTRCUTIVENESS IS EXPANDED PERCEPTUAL CAPACITY, in which vulnerability is synonymous with exposing similar and dissimilar qualities of the object that are utilized for psychic advancement. From the perspective of the emerging subject the object is necessarily viewed as weakened but not destroyed, in a way that allows certain aspects of the object to be incorporated and thus assumed. From this follows SURVIVAL IS MUTABILITY whereby the object allows itself to change (e.g., be available in accordance to the needs of the emerging subject). According to Winnicott this is a most crucial period in which the object must never be conceived as striking back, expressed as SURVIVAL IS NOT RETALIATING. An analogy drawn in the last sentences of this section (Lines 102 and 103) again uses breastfeeding to put into context the implications of these processes in the treatment

191 process. In therapy as in development, an un-differentiated object that does not move beyond object relational space cannot reap the “nutritional” benefits of the world of shared understandings. As outlined earlier, OBJECT RELATING IS CANNIBALISM reflects the idea that in such states nothing completely separate from the subject can be incorporated for psychic advancement, because nothing can be conceived as existing outside this auto-contained realm. In Line 102 the subject’s lack of capacity for “getting fat” because it can only “feed on the self” conjures a Dantesque figure that, emaciated and tortured in the realm of Hell, perpetually eats itself (and its own “waste disposal”) in a futile attempt to survive.143

Commentary Winnicott’s utilization of the most basic ontological concepts (e.g., use, object, holding, destruction, etc.) to depict psychic transformation points to both the possibility and limitation of embodied conceptual metaphor as a tool for describing human ontology.

As has been pointed out, most if not all psychic constructions utilize THE MIND IS A BODY, whereby psychological changes are necessarily viewed as involving the forced movement of objects in hypothetical space. In this section a main idea is that a higher level of force (“maximum destructiveness”) is required to achieve the state of mind associated with a separate self and reality-based thinking (e.g., by removing the object from omnipotent space).

143

In Dante’s schema of divine retribution the subject would be suffering in corporeal form the symbolic effects of his or her own unique sin. In Winnicott’s depiction the devastating consequences of being stuck in the world of object relating are derived from no fault of the subject, but rather from a deficit in the environment or caregiver.

192 Though novel and employed in a way that seems to reveal a valid psychic truth, the construction also points to the rather concrete nature of embodied metaphors as a source for depicting psychological experience. It is reminiscent of the primary metaphor MORE IS UP, where a qualitative change in an object or force is made by simply adding more of the same elements to an existing form to characterize its transformation.144 Embodied metaphorical constructions such as these are inherently limiting and can render a hollow depiction of psychic experience.145 These constructions are highly circumscribed (e.g., this is “only” that—more is only up, similarity is only closeness, etc.) and encapsulated (e.g., auto-contained and self-reinforcing) packages of information that necessarily exclude features of experience that do not fit the tightly constructed schema. For example, when attempting to depict phenomena that intrinsically challenges the boundaries of these more concrete either/or formulas (e.g., when more is less, destruction is creative, perception is not seeing, etc.), the writer can be forced to resort to linguistic tactics that have the effect of seeming to favor “style” or “cleverness” over content, especially in scientific or technical writing. Among the risks of pushing the limits of existing conceptual structures through idiosyncratic language include confusion, incoherence, hyperbole, and ultimately misunderstanding.146

144

Among the many related examples in psychoanalysis of using spatial metaphors to depict psychic experience is “depth.” That is, the validity or primacy of a psychic event is measured by its perceived location with respect to a surface barrier, which among others forms PSYCHIC IMPORTANCE IS DEPTH and CURATIVE INTERPREATIONS ARE DEEP. Time as a location in space is also used as a criterion to depict the significance of a psychic event or process, whereby depth becomes synonymous with that which occurs earlier (e.g., “behind”) in development.

145

For example, just what exactly the difference is between the destruction that Winnicott used throughout most of the paper and this extreme form (“maximum”) is, like many of his concepts, not forthcoming.

146

Misunderstanding is a common reaction to Winnicott’s writing, as evidenced by the earlier discussion of the American ego psychologists’ response to the language in this paper. One of the many questions raised

193 One central question inherent in determining the ultimate validity and utility of conceptual metaphor falls into what is commonly called the mind-body problem—that is, to what extent do we view our built-in neurological structures based on metaphor as the ultimate judge in terms of the nature and validity of reality? Or, put another way, does perceptual structure reveal the true nature of tangible objects in the world or does it create them in its own image? According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), modern developmental science shows that the perception of something as the basic color of objects is not exactly objective, but rather a product of our brain’s interaction with elements in the natural environment (e.g., wave lengths, electromagnetic radiation).

Therefore, the capacity for our biologically-based conceptual systems to accurately account for the more ephemeral phenomena of the mind would seem even more daunting. Indeed, in the realm in which psychic transformations occur time and space are even less bound by the rules of embodied reality, which necessarily puts into question the ultimate utility of conceptual metaphor as a tool for depicting most if not all psychological phenomena. While in one way reflecting the inevitability of our embodied status—and making the most of using it to comprehend both physical and psychological reality—embodied conceptual metaphor can be also thought of as the a posteriori introduction of time and space in an attempt to conceive of that which exists beyond those realms. By reflecting what is the most tangible and readily observable forms

with respect to motivations for Winnicott’s writing style is whether it was a genuine attempt to understand the complexity of ideas or a “playfully” provocative, iconoclastic, or outright aggressive way to call attention to the superiority of his ideas. In different ways uncovered in the review of Winnicott’s life and in this analysis, it is perhaps best understood as a combination of both. In any event his style reveals the inherent limitations of language to describe the ineffable.

194 associated with living, embodied metaphor reinforces a limited vantage point of experience which only accounts for a small portion of human experience.

Text and Analysis, Lines 106-117 106.

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In psychoanalytic practice the positive changes that come about in this area can be profound.

They do not depend on interpretative work.

They do depend on the analyst's survival of the attacks, which includes the idea of absence of a change to retaliation.

These attacks may be very difficult for the analyst to stand, especially when they are expressed in terms of delusion or through manipulation which makes the analyst actually do things that are technically bad.

(I refer to such a thing as unreliability at moments when reliability is all that matters, as well as to survival in terms of keeping alive and the absence of the quality of retaliation).

The analyst feels like interpreting, but this can spoil the process and for the patient can seem like a kind of self-defence, the analyst parrying the patient's attack.

Better to wait till after the phase is over, and then discuss with the patient what has been happening.

This is surely legitimate, for as analyst one has one's own needs; but verbal interpretation at this point is not the essential feature and brings its own dangers.

The essential feature is the analyst's survival and the intactness of the psychoanalytic technique.

Imagine how traumatic can be the actual death of the analyst when this kind of work is in process, although even the actual death of the analyst is not as bad as the development in the analyst of a change towards retaliation.

These risks simply must be taken by the patient.

Usually the analyst lives through these phases of movement in the transference, and after each phase there comes reward in terms of love, reinforced by the fact of the backcloth of unconscious destruction.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning Winnicott returns to technical questions related to his schema of object usage, especially related to interpretation and the managing of countertransference. Though his

195 overall position on recognizing the importance of countertransference is generally similar to other extant models (see Counter-transference, 1960), he does make some subtle distinctions in terms of the meanings associated with receiving and responding to transference associated with the birth of subjectivity. For the most part countertransference in PS1 and PS2 at the time was viewed as the therapist’s response to the patient’s transference, as fueled by the therapist’s own unconscious identifications and wishes. Recommended technique in response to such feelings were introspection, empathy, and neutrality, though it was accepted that judgment could nevertheless remain impaired and acting out could occur under powerful psychic pressure. With some exceptions (see Lewis, 1992 for discussion of Harold Searles’ work that anticipated the relational movement) at this time countertransference was still mostly thought to be a hindrance to neutrality and insight versus a tool for understanding.147 With respect to technique, PS1 and PS2 models generally used interpretation more carefully than PS3, interpreting from surface to depth and thus respecting the patient’s defenses and character structure (Kernberg, 1969).

A significant shift in the nature and managing of countertransference came about in the British School in the late 1940’s and into the 1950’s.148 According to Hinshelwood

147

As mentioned, alterations in PS2 technique with borderline patients were under way which included viewing more primitive defenses such as projective identification as contributing to a keener understanding of the patient’s experience. However, more poignant shifts in views of countertransference in ego psychology would begin in the 1970’s with Kohut’s (1971, 1977) more elaborated psychology of the self.

148

According to Wolstein (1983) the roots of a more interpersonal versus a purely id view of the treatment situation that would have implications for countertransference began even earlier in the history of psychoanalysis—in the 1920’s with Ferenzi, Reich, and Rank. Soon after the interpersonalist views of Sullivan, Horney, and Thompson would further the focus on the here and now interactions between patient and therapist, viewing countertransference as not simply as the patient’s irrational distortions of past relationships but also current ruptures based on the therapist’s humanness.

196 (1988) by the time Winnicott wrote his paper on object usage, countertransference had expanded in meaning to include: 1. “normal countertransference” or the process of receiving and identifying with feeling states (patient’s projections) via introjection and then re-projecting these states in the form of interpretation; 2. a specific non-neurotic response to the patient as an accurate indicator of a psychic events (Heimann, 1950); 3.

“normal projective identification” or the transmission of feeling states that are not considered pathological as put forth by Little (1951), Money-Kryle (1956), and Bion (1959);

4. similar to #3, the analyst as “maternal container” in which communications in the form of projective identification are registered and optimally contained and responded to in ways that reduce anxiety and foster psychic integration.

These views generally corresponded to a more active and a deeper interpretation of transference material, which was one notion Winnicott was challenging in this section.

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors A host of embodied conceptual metaphors are contained in this more technical section, centered mainly on interpretation, survival, and reliability in the treatment setting. With respect to the therapist’s stance vis-à-vis destructive attacks related to the

197 birth of subjectivity, SURVIVAL IS THE ABSENCE OF RETALIATION describes the quality of response that must be somehow transmitted to the patient. If and when a defensive reaction does occur it is posited by Winnicott as RETALIATION IS COLUSION WITH A DELUSIONAL THOUGHT, in which the therapist misperceives the generative elements of destruction for its more damaging qualities and uses. A common form that retaliation takes is verbal interpretation, which corresponds to INTERPRETATION IS SELF-DEFENSE, INTERPRETATION IS ROTTEN FOOD (e.g., Line 111 “spoiling the process”) and RETALIATION IS UNRELIABILITY. If retaliation is communicated to the patient it is thought to be more horrific than dying— RETALIATION IS BEYOND DEATH, while survival or non-retaliation is synonymous with love—SURVIVAL AND NON-RETALIATION IS LOVE. Moving forward a dialectical tension or fusion between love and aggression is kept in balance via a “backcloth of unconscious destruction” (Line 117), which might be conceived as DESTRUCTION IS THE MAINTENANCE OF LOVE.

Commentary This section generally deals with certain themes that had occupied Winnicott’s writing for some decades. In particular, the managing of countertransference reactions with respect to powerful forces associated with destruction and primitive emotional states were dealt with in Hate in the Counter-transference (1949), Metapsychological and Clinical Aspects of Regression Within the Psychoanalytic Set-Up (1954), and Fear of Breakdown (1963) to name but a few. Besides purely technical implications, these writings reveal Winnicott’s ongoing struggles with how aggressive elements of his

198 experience could be integrated into his personhood. For example, the idea that verbal interpretation can at times be ineffective or even “dangerous” (Line 113) points to worries about his effects on others that likely began early in his caregiving experience with a depressed mother for whom he came to feel responsible. The larger theme of “doing” versus “not-doing” (or “being”)—both in terms of fear of damaging others and also possibly related to male and female aspects of his sexual identity—also seem relevant here. Another idea is the experience of dread and annihilation that can occur in the process of carrying over a more disturbed patient into a collective realm of reality.

Winnicott generally paints a picture of patient and therapist together (but in separate ways) needing to “risk” (Line 116) arriving at the brink of death in order to achieve their respective tasks.149

Text and Analysis, Lines 118-130 118.

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It appears to me that the idea of a developmental phase involving survival of object does affect the theory of the roots of aggression.

It is no good saying that a baby of a few days old envies the breast.

It is legitimate, however, to say that at whatever age a baby begins to allow the breast an external position (outside the area of projection) then this means that destruction of the breast has become a feature.

I mean the actual impulse to destroy.

Rodman (2003) notes that Winnicott lost many patients to suicide, and his writings are replete with the experience of coping with patients who can (emotionally or physically) “kill” their therapist. It was these patients for whom he believed regression to dependency was the only solution (e.g., worth the “risk”). One such patient coincidentally committed suicide while he was recovering from a heart attack he suffered in New York after the presentation of the paper on object usage. Another was Margaret Little who was reported to have physically attacked him during a psychotic episode (he was also known to hold her hand in regressed moments). Rodman suggests that Winnicott (like others doing similar work) displayed a strand of omnipotence that took the form of believing that he was uniquely suited to treat highly disturbed patients in psychoanalysis, revealing a capacity to also “risk” others’ lives for his theoretical convictions.

199 122.

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It is an important part of what a mother does, to be the first person to take the baby through this first version of the many that will be encountered, of attack that is survived.

This is the right moment in the child's development, because of the child's relative feebleness, so that destruction can fairly easily be survived.

Even so it is a very tricky matter; it is only too easy for a mother to react moralistically when her baby bites and hurts.

But this language involving the breast is jargon.

The whole area of development and of management is involved in which adaptation is related to dependence, apart, that is, from the important detail of relating to the breast.

It will be seen that, although destruction is the word I am using, this actual destruction belongs to the object's failure to survive.

Without this failure, destruction remains potential.

The word 'destruction' is needed, not because of the baby's impulse to destroy, but because of the object's liability not to survive.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning In this section Winnicott directly contrasts his ideas on object usage with key elements of Kleinian theory, in particular the meaning of the breast as both a physical and emotional object in the context of aggressive energy. In PS3 the breast represents the child’s first contact with the figure of the mother. As a part-object existing in the paranoid-schizoid position the breast is given meaning beyond its pure physical functionality, based on the infant’s still immature cognitive capacities associated with broadly “good” or “bad” feeling states. As synonymous with a source of life and a “good object,” it is according to Klein inherently endowed to be an object of destructive attack.150 The infant uses projective and introjective mechanisms to interact with objects like the breast, and as such it becomes an extension of the underdeveloped ego. It is not

150

The prevalence of “primary envy” and the need to destroy good objects is viewed as innate in PS3 thought (Hinshelwood, 1988). A distinction is made, however, between this element of envy from that which is in response to the object’s perceived withholding of something good for itself. In other words, primary envy is the endowed instinctual stance toward “goodness” in general, not an a posteriori feeling state that arises from the perceived intention of the object.

200 until attainment of the depressive position that objects are considered separate and thus in need of protection. It is with this idea that Winnicott’s depiction of removing the object (e.g., breast) from an omnipotent position more closely resonates.

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors With respect to object relationships in the earliest stages of infancy, Winnicott depicts the breast as both similar to other objects and unique in the infant’s emotional and perceptual experience. Like other objects the breast must eventually be viewed as outside the purview of narcissistic control (Line 120), conveyed in DESTRUCTION IS REMOVAL OF THE BREAST FROM OMNIPOTENT SPACE. However, unlike most other objects the breast can actually experience physical aggression via breast-feeding (Line 121) characterized by DESTRUCTION OF THE BREAST IS THE ACUTAL IMPLUSE TO DESTROY. Along with its physical properties and nutritional function, the breast is imbued with meanings via psychological mechanisms (e.g., projection and introjection) associated with pre-differentiated states. Though he does not deny the existence of “inborn aggression” (Line 139) as present in the earliest stages of development (e.g., paranoid-schizoid position), Winnicott does seem to draw the line characterizing these impulses as akin to envy (Line 119). He generally views the more significant processes as occurring on the cusp of emerging emotional states (e.g., from PS

201 to D), when more primitive psychic elements are transformed into mature psychic structure.

For Winnicott the key event in attaining the depressive position is the ability of the caregiver to survive, marking the birth of concern (“ruth”) in which objects are viewed as separate and in need of protection. It is only in cases of non-survival or retaliation that “actual” destruction (Line 121) becomes a feature of emotional (versus physical) strivings for meeting a need. In this way (ACTUAL) DESTRCUTION IS THE OBJECT’S FAILURE TO SURVIVE, whereby the object’s response (not the behavior itself) determines how the action will be characterized by the infant.151 When survival and adequate “adaptation” (Line 127) do occur, the destructive energy assumes a secondary position and is felt by the infant as nothing out of the ordinary (e.g., intention, liveliness, motility, assertion, being, etc). In this way destruction becomes part of the “backcloth” of experience and exists from this point forward in a suspended state, conveyed by SURVIVAL IS POTENTIAL DESTRUCTION. Potential here has a dual meaning—both as “ready” to respond with “actual” destruction (if retaliation or nonsurvival occurs) and as the availability or reserve of unused generative energy.

From the above description emerge two primary developmental pathways with respect to the organism’s striving toward the achievement of separate self status and reality-based thinking vis-à-vis the breast:

151

According to Winnicott (1963) the object’s failure to survive would be related to “primitive agonies” that form the basis for later “fears of breakdown” such as falling forever or returning to an unintegrated state (e.g., “going to pieces”).

202 Pathway 1 – Successful Object Usage Outcome •

Aggressive/destructive energy in the form of motility (a neutral force) manifests physically via events such as sucking, biting, etc.

•

Caregiver-object does not retaliate (Survival)

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Generative aggressive/destructive energy as motility or assertion becomes primary modality for encountering objects (e.g., understanding their nature, intentions, and accurate position with respect to dependency needs)

•

“Potential” generative energy becomes the primary modality available for relating to objects

•

Non-generative (“actual”) aggressive/destructive energy in the form of physical or emotional acts designed to obliterate or annihilate objects or reality become secondary (relegated to unconscious fantasy)

•

“Potential” non-generative energy (e.g., “actual destruction”) relegated to background, though “ready” to be triggered if retaliation, non-survival, or extreme trauma occurs

Pathway 2 – Unsuccessful Object Usage Outcome •

Aggressive/destructive energy in the form of motility (a neutral force) manifests physically via events such as sucking, biting, etc.

•

Caregiver-object retaliates (No Survival)

•

Non-generative (“actual”) aggressive/destructive energy in the form of physical or emotional acts designed to obliterate or annihilate objects or reality becomes primary modality for encountering objects

•

“Potential” non-generative energy becomes primary modality for relating to objects; objects more prone or “ready” to be viewed as persecutory, rejecting, retaliatory, etc.

•

Generative aggressive/destructive energy as motility or assertion is not actualized and thus mainly reinforces or fuels manifestation of “actual” destructiveness

•

“Potential” generative energy is not an available modality for relating to objects; requires repeated experiences of object’s survival under “maximum destructiveness” to ascend to a more primary position

203 Commentary This section has important implications for how clinicians conceptualize more disturbed patients’ strivings for more integrated and reality-based states of mind. In particular, it proposes one way of characterizing and responding to those primitive psychic elements that are associated with aggressive energy. What Winnicott seems to be recommending is a more cautious and passive stance at certain moments when a patient is more regressed, paralleling the unintegrated state of early infancy when “being” must be met with an un-impinged but contained posture. Following the American interpersonalist tradition of Sullivan and in line with contemporaries such as Kernberg and Kohut who were beginning to conceptualize borderline and narcissistic phenomena in novel ways, Winnicott’s idea of object usage represented a shift from more traditional ways (PS1, PS2) of viewing aggression and countertransference phenomena. In general certain of the ideas in this paper would portend the “relational turn” in psychoanalysis that would begin to flower after his death (Mills, 2005).

In terms of specific technique Winnicott left many gaps in his theorizing, presumably not interested or not capable of pinning down in more specific ways examples of his constructs in action. For example, he does not address exactly when (if at all) the therapist is to begin to demonstrate separate self qualities that presumably must enter into the equation in the process of object usage. In a similar way is left out just what from the therapist’s position (beyond the broad process of “collusion”) leads to an inability to survive or a propensity to retaliate, and what can be done to counteract such tendencies. The broad gaps in theorizing are not surprising and can be seen as part and parcel of his personality and writing-intellectual style. The lack of details in terms of

204 applicability would seem to question its viability as a specific clinical approach versus an idiosyncratic style that was uniquely suited to his temperament and professional milieu.

Text and Analysis, Lines 131-139 131.

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The way of looking at things that belongs to my presentation of this paper makes possible a new approach to the whole subject of the roots of aggression.

For instance, it is not necessary to give inborn aggression more than that which is its due in company with everything else that is inborn.

Undoubtedly inborn aggression must be variable in a quantitative sense in the same way that everything else that is inherited is variable as between individuals.

The variations in inborn aggression are slight as compared with the total inheritance of that which can lead to aggressiveness.

By contrast, the variations are great that arise out of the differences in the experiences of various newborn babies according to whether they are or are not seen through this very difficult phase.

Such variations in the field of experience are indeed immense.

Moreover, the babies that have been seen through this phase well are likely to be more aggressive clinically than the ones who have not been seen through the phase well, and for whom aggression is not something that can be encompassed (become ego-syntonic), or can be retained only in the form of a liability to be the object of attack.

This involves a rewriting of the theory of the roots of aggression since most of that which has already been written by analysts has been formulated without reference to that which is being discussed in this paper.

The assumption is always there, in orthodox theory, that aggression is reactive to the encounter with the reality principle, whereas here it is the destructive drive that creates the quality of externality.

Theoretical-Contextual Meaning Here Winnicott makes a case for viewing the environment as significantly more critical to development than inherited biology, especially with respect to aggression and destructive energy. Though acknowledging that variability in “inborn aggression� (Line 132) exists among infants, the quality of the caregiving environment potentially plays a

205 larger role in ultimately determining the extent to which generative and non-generative forms of aggression become manifest. Like the previous section the primary distinction being made is with Kleinian theory, which at this time viewed aggression and sadism as a manifestation of the death instinct and the primary factor in overall development (Hinshelwood, 1988). Generally, in PS3 aggressive instincts and related behaviors (e.g., biting, sucking) are the main vehicle for exploring the world in the earliest stages of development in the paranoid-schizoid position. As such objects become imbued with persecutory qualities that must be met with protective maneuvers (e.g., attack, expulsion, etc), creating a self-reinforcing process that creates danger in the very attempts to mange it. Besides its effects on the perception of objects, instinctual aggression also influences the self in the form schizoid states of mind that attempt to cope with the threat of annihilation that is believed to come from within (e.g., because of the aggressive instincts and behaviors themselves). These schizoid processes are designed to protect the ego by splitting it into parts that can be segregated (e.g., “good” from “bad”) and projected into other objects (e.g., projective identification) for protection. Overall the fusion of instinctual aggression with instinctual love occurs with arrival of the depressive position, though in general PS3 does not specifically describe the attributes of the environment that must be functioning for this transformation to occur.152

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

152

Overall the quality of the caregiving environment is implied in Kleinian theory; specifically, the ability of the caregiver to allow the infant to successfully pass through the pain (e.g., guilt, remorse) associated with the depressive position. Mainly, the caregiver must allow the infant to make “reparation” for the perceived attacks that characterized the earliest states of mind.

206

Related Conceptual Metaphors The idea that each infant is born temperamentally equipped with a quantifiable level of aggressive potential is conveyed in INBORN AGGRESSION IS VARIABLE. A play on words in Line 134 involving heritability forms INHERITANCE IS ENVIRONMENT, in which a word typically used to convey the genetic transmission of physical or psychological attributes becomes synonymous with the infant’s caregiving setting. Along those same lines, the notion that the quality and level of aggression present is a function not of biology but of the response or adaptation by the caregiver is communicated in POTENTIAL VARIABLITY IN AGRESSION IS ENVIRONMENTAL. In terms of how aggression comes to be regulated and tied with libidinal forces in the service of healthy development comes INSTINCTUAL FUSION IS ENCOMPASSED AGGRESSION and UNFUSED AGGRESSION IS POTENTIAL (ACTUAL) DESTRUCTION. These un-fused states are akin to the aforementioned Pathway 2 (Unsuccessful Object Usage Outcome), a scenario in which uncontained aggression leads to modes of functioning that put the organism in the continuous position of warding off assumed persecutors using “actual” destruction.153 In Line 137 the distinction between healthy and unhealthy aggression is conveyed in CLINICAL AGGRESSION IS GENERATIVE.

153

Akin to identification with the aggressor, the subject attempts to neutralize aggression by outwardly manifesting the internal relationship with the persecutory object. The “actual” destructive maneuvers are misguided attempts to move the object outside omnipotent control. As such, the object is paradoxically both the primary source of pain and its only hope for amelioration.

207 Commentary Among other things this section calls attention to foundational ideas of Klein on which many if not all of Winnicott’s theoretical constructs are based. Though in ways highly original, the context from which ideas such as object usage emerged cannot be detached from its ultimate meaning and importance. In general, the above juxtaposition of ideas such as “environmental” and “biological,” and previously cited combinations like “destruction” and “perception,” point to the dialectic nature of ideas that emerged from Winnicott’s decades-long exposure to PS3 ideas. In one sense, within Kleinian theory and in Klein herself Winnicott found a tangible and survivable “object” with which to engage both his clinical ideas as well as his personal strivings for independence and recognition.

The elemental and solid nature of Klein’s constructs such as “destruction,” “envy,” “splitting,” and “incorporation”—and the related ubiquity of visceral words used to describe these processes like “attack,” “bite,” and “evacuate” —provided highly suitable conditions for juxtaposing Winnicott’s more ethereal ideas and temperament.

Not surprisingly, Klein’s personality paralleled the more solid and forcefulness nature of her constructs, which additionally provided Winnicott the continual embodiment of the ideas with which to grapple professionally and personally. In retrospect, it is also significant that certain cornerstone Kleinian concepts related to destruction, reparation, and overall human corporality would touch so closely to the heart of Winnicott’s life story. While serendipitous it is also a testament to the explanatory power and validity of the constructs. It is hard to imagine what form Winnicott’s ideas would have taken had they been nurtured in a different professional milieu. For example, would there have even

208 existed ideas such as “transitional object,” “holding environment,” and “playing” if not for Kleinian ideas related to “position,” “phantasy,” and the infant’s aggressive nature in the context of an anthropomorphized mind? If these Winnicottian ideas would have been forthcoming regardless of his professional milieu, just how different would their meanings be?

Text and Analysis, Lines 140-155 140.

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Let me look for a moment at the exact place of this attack and survival in the hierarchy of relationships.

More primitive and quite different is annihilation.

Annihilation means 'no hope'; cathexis withers up because no result completes the reflex to produce conditioning.

Attack in anger relative to the encounter with the reality principle is a more sophisticated concept, postdating the destruction that I postulate here.

In the destruction of the object to which I am referring there is no anger.

There could be said to be joy at the object's survival.

From this moment, or arising out of this phase, the object is in fantasy always being destroyed.

This quality of 'always being destroyed' makes the reality of the surviving object felt as such, strengthens the feeling tone, and contributes to object constancy.

The object can now be used.

I wish to conclude with a note on using and usage.

By 'use' I do not mean 'exploitation'.

As analysts, we know what it is like to be used, which means that we can see the end of the treatment, be it several years away.

Many of our patients come with this problem already solved—they can use objects and they can use us and can use analysis, just as they have used their parents and their siblings and their homes.

However, there are many patients who need us to be able to give them a capacity to use us.

In meeting the needs of such patients, we shall need to know what I am saying here about our survival of their destructiveness.

A backcloth of unconscious destruction of the analyst is set up and we survive it or, alternatively, we shall become involved in yet another analysis interminable.

209 Theoretical-Contextual Meaning In this final section, Winnicott positions object usage in relation to PS1 and PS2 characterizations of similar phenomena. In general, the psychic processes associated with object usage are conceptualized as occurring before those related to the reality principle.

In particular, the destructive energy that is utilized to counteract narcissistic thinking in Winnicott’s schema is qualitatively different from that which reacts to the realization that the self is diminished in relation to the true omnipotence of reality. In other words, the “attack in anger” (Line 143) is a response to (e.g., “cathexis”) an already separated and thus “reflexive” world, whereas Winnicottian “destruction” is at this phase of development is the very force that is in the process of creating self-object differentiation.

Thus, it is not (generative) destruction but rather “annihilation” (Line 141) that more accurately represents that which is diametrically opposed to the reactionary “anger” upon first meeting reality, in that annihilation is associated with the actual obliteration of the very force (cathexis) that is required to engage or enliven objects. Annihilation thus reinforces an objectless world in which no reflexivity (e.g., “conditioning”) exists.

Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts Not applicable.

Related Conceptual Metaphors Winnicott uses RELATIONSHIPS ARE HIERARCHIES to categorize the nature and qualities of the states of mind associated with object relating, object usage, and the reality principle. DESTRUCTION IS HOPE IN OBJECT USAGE STATES and

210 ANNIHILATION IS NO HOPE IN OBJECT RELATING STATES generally characterize the quality of aggressive energy as it exists in different psychic reams of existence. In drawing comparisons with similar phenomena of PS1 and PS2, Winnicott uses ANNIHILATION ELIMINATES CATHEXIS and ANNIHILATION IS OBJECTLESSNESS to distinguish his conception of destruction from its more typical connotations (e.g., as having no generative qualities). He makes the case for the usefulness of destruction by drawing on DESTRUCTION IS JOY, DESTRUCTION IN FANTASY IS CREATION IN REALITY, and DESTRUCTION IS PERCEPTION (e.g., in that it provides “feeling tone” and “object constancy”). To further distinguish elements of object usage he proposes ATTACK IN ANGER IS POST-OBJECT RELATING ACTIVITY, essentially moving forward in time the processes commonly associated with the reality principle. Finally, he uses PERPETUAL THERAPY IS THE ABSENCE OF AN UNCONSCIOUS BACKCLOTH OF DESTRUCTION to make a larger point that the inability to transport or relegate actual destructive energy to unconscious fantasy leads to the inevitable necessity to enact “actual destruction” which results in “analysis interminable” (Line 155).

Commentary As related above, the final section draws some distinct conclusions with respect to how Winnicott positions object usage within psychoanalytic metapsychology. There are also less obvious implications with respect to the experience of the therapist and the related quest to survive under the conditions put forth in the paper. Specifically, the introduction of two words—“annihilation” and “exploitation”—call attention not only to

211 the internal and external manifestation of object-relational mind states of the patient, but also corresponding countertransference phenomena that can be revealed in the therapist.

One way of looking at what Winnicott has been suggesting throughout the paper is the propensity to respond to primitive states of mind with “no hope” (annihilation) on one hand or with exploitative maneuvers (e.g., ill-timed or self-defensive interpretation) on the other, both of which miss the mark in terms of creating the necessary conditions for psychic advancement. Though not explicit in the formulation, the clinical stance that seems to best fit is that which hovers in-between these seemingly opposing states, in the transitional realm in which time, space, and objects (as we know them) do not exist. One implication is that any overt maneuver that is designed to, say, encourage, motivate, or impart hope, removes the therapist from the transformative position in transitional space.

That is, by assuming the status of a real object the therapist is co-opting the creative process that must proceed from the emerging subject. For Winnicott this is a core consequence of prematurely inserting a quality of reality that cannot yet be integrated by the patient, leading to a paradoxically objectless and “hopeless” state reminiscent of annihilation.154 The above discussion leaves unanswered questions more relevant to modern views of technique; mainly, just when and how, if at all, is the subjecthood of therapist introduced into the process, especially if the object usage status is not forthcoming despite the requisite “survival” (non-retaliation) by the therapist? As has been clear throughout the analysis, Winnicott is a master at transporting his reader to brink of an apparent certainty, only to stop short of completely “arriving” at a definite conclusion.

154

The implication is that premature introduction of an object leads not to annihilation or removal of the object, but a “withering” of the mechanistic impulse and desire to attach to objects (cathexis).

212 The reader is left to fill-in the many gaps by drawing on their own developmental histories, their clinical experiences, and the experiences created by the reading of the text.

One way to attempt to answer the question of subjecthood is to use the tools and implications of cognitive linguistics that have been examined to this point. In a broad sense it could be posited that, akin to embodied metaphor, Winnicott expressly uses the “raw” material of our extant conceptual systems and related language to lay down the general foundation of his clinical arguments. In doing so he both concretizes and vivifies psychic experience through pushing to the limits (e.g., through novel constructions and language using metaphor) the meanings that can be garnered from our embodied vantage points. What is left over (e.g., the definite conclusions that are not drawn), then, can be thought of as beyond the capacity of circumscribed metaphorical considerations, which requires the process of conceptual blending to reveal the answers. As such, this requires a uniquely individual interaction in mental space (e.g., Winnicott’s transitional space) with the words and ideas of the text, in the continuous context of external encounters with patients whose individuality imposes nuances of meaning with implications for technique. Like conceptual blending, this leaves open infinite possibilities as to when and how the subjecthood of the therapist is made manifest, both intentionally and unintentionally (based on the unique perception of the patient as a consequence of the “emerging” meanings generated from the encounter). This would seem to necessarily require the employment of techniques that would on the surface contradict the tenets and formulas put forth in this paper (e.g., untimely interpretation, appearing to not survive, etc.). Subjecthood, like any other psychic experience, must be continually reborn in the context of other subjects—established selves and those in statu nascendi—in transitional

213 space, and thus cannot be confined to formulas that by their very nature reinforce the imposition of actual time and actual space.155

155

Like most other practioners Winnicott likely saw the majority of his patients for relatively few sessions.

This would indicate that he by necessity employed more active techniques that revealed his subjecthood than the ones put forth in this paper. Indeed, his editor Masud Khan recounted: “I am afraid you are misinformed in so far as you say that Winnicott did not do brief or focal therapy with adults. He did, and in a variety of ways. For example, I sent him a number of cases whom he only saw three or four times in three-hour sessions, and who did extremely well. The irony is that in fact Winnicott's long single consultations or a few consultations with adults were much more therapeutically effective than his published very long treatments� (Gustafson & Howard, 1983). Taken at face value, this raises the question as to whether the imposition of time constraints actually freed Winnicott up in ways that revealed more of his subjecthood (e.g., spontaneity, playfulness, etc.) and whether long treatments pulled him in the direction of losing enlivening parts of his self, reminiscent of the quality of attachment to his mother.

214

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Overview The findings of the preceding textual analysis will be organized and discussed with respect to the key objectives of the study. The outline will consist of: 1. A list of the revealed conceptual metaphors associated with key concepts in The Use of an Object; 2. An overview of the revealed conceptual metaphors vis-à-vis three of Lakoff and Johnson’s ontological categories on which philosophy is based—the mind, the self, and time;156 3. A brief review of the revealed conceptual metaphors with respect to the historicity of related concepts within psychoanalysis; 4. A commentary on the employment of notable style characteristics that enhance or detract from implied meanings; 5. Proposed correspondences between key events in Winnicott’s early development and the nature, function, and utilization of the revealed conceptual metaphors; 6. A general evaluation of the methodology and its implications for conceptual research; and, 7. Implications of the findings for clinical practice.

Revealed Conceptual Metaphors Appendix O outlines the revealed conceptual metaphors that underlie the main ideas associated with the text The Use of an Object. They are presented in an inventory

156

Philosophy in the Flesh includes two additional categories: events and causes (causality) and morality.

Causes and events are generally incorporated into the individual sections on mind, self, and time. The analysis of the primary text The Use of an Object did not reveal constructs germane to morality and thus it will not be addressed here.

215 format, with section headings loosely chosen based on the conceptual correspondence to an idea or set of ideas. The metaphors cover a wide range conceptually, and many are employed in different ways depending on the context and the subject matter under consideration. It is evident from the list that there are a variety of ways that the underlying conceptual metaphors from a given text can be configured and shown to relate to different ideas. Though there was no attempt to systematize each revealed metaphor via a complete mapping (e.g., a full account of conceptual origins from which the particular construction derives), each section on outlining basic Winnicottian ontology will provide a more detailed review of the key concepts’ relationship to more basic conceptual categories (e.g., mind, self, and time).

Winnicott’s Ontology of the Mind The textual analysis revealed that like all other Western conceptions of mental functioning, Winnicott draws on the basic formula in which the mind is depicted as akin to a physical body (e.g., container) that exists in a determinable space. In Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) prototype THE MIND IS A BODY, thought processes are conceived as movements (THINKING IS MOVING) and reason is the force (REASON IS A FORCE) that directs thinking/movement from one location to another. Locations represent ideas (IDEAS ARE LOCATIONS) that are arrived at via thought’s movement through space.

Truth or reality, then, is depicted as arriving at or inhabiting a space that corresponds to an accurate application of reason, notably involving utilizing factual statements or

216 words.157 However, though certain basic elements of traditional philosophical depictions of mind are implied in Winnicott’s schema, he reconfigures others on inherited psychoanalytic assumptions—primarily via Freud and Klein—as well his own novel conceptual formulations. In general, like most if not all psychoanalytic theoreticians, his depiction of mental processes is an amalgamation of traditional Western philosophy and psychoanalytic models of the mind.

The analysis revealed that the two central tenets that sets Winnicott’s conceptual style apart from prototypical Western notions of mind and reason: (a) The employment of factors (aggression and destruction) other than pure reason to account for psychic forces, and; (b) The positing of an intermediate area (transitional space) that serves to, among other things, transform or convert primitive psychic material (e.g., ideas) into more mature forms.

That factors other than reason—like instincts and drives which are related to physical, emotional, and unconscious processes—are posited as mental forces is derived from Classical psychoanalytic theory, while the conception of a separate psychological realm (transitional space) wherein key processes of transformation occur was a construct proposed by Winnicott in 1951. In general, Winnicott had used the idea of transitional space as new lens through which extant psychoanalytic ideas (e.g., reality-based though, symbolism, fantasy, part-objects, omnipotence) were re-examined, subjecting them to the

157

In general, Western thought is built on truth conditional semantics which holds that words inherently possess “objective senses” that correspond to referents in the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). It follows that applying the correct words (e.g., factual statements)—whose essence reflects an objective reality— leads to “truth” and hence meaning. In this view, then, meaning is disconnected from anything subjective or based on the experience of inhabiting a body or having a human mind. Rather, truth is arrived at by tapping into a transcendent reason (via “factual” words, statements, propositions, etc.) that exists somehow apart from the experiencing subject.

217 timeless and space-less quality of that realm to expand their meanings. In a similar way, in the current paper under consideration transitional space was shown to play a key role in understanding the relationship between object relating and object usage—in particular, the interrelationship between those processes that result in the transformation to subjecthood (e.g., TRANSFORMATION IS THE CREATION OF TIME AND A SEPARATE OBJECT IN TRANSITIONAL SPACE).

In psychoanalysis the idea found to most closely resemble the basic elements of Western Metaphors of Mind and its relationship to reason is Freud’s structural model e.g., (id, ego, and superego). However, in this conception it is not reason per se but rather instinctual elements (e.g., libido and aggression) and related energy—whose elaboration is made manifest physically via the erotogentic zones—that act as psychological forces in the mind (see Appendix K for Structural Point of View Metaphors). Each psychic structure is essentially a configuration representing an established mode of processing mental activity and is hypothetically depicted as existing in (vertical) space with respect to consciousness (e.g., topography). Reason in this conception is a function of the (mostly) conscious ego, whose primary task is to adapt the organism to the realities of the environment. So, in contrast to prototypical Western thought, in psychoanalysis reason is not a given but a developmental achievement whose status is not viewed as disembodied and transcendent, but rather based processes that involve biology (e.g., physicality and emotionality). In important ways, then, Winnicottian ontology is built on this a priori assumption of an embodied subject whose reasoning ability is associated with experience as revealed through pre-established structures of mind and brain, analogous to

218 “experientialism” and the findings of modern cognitive science (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).158 In terms of the history of concepts, Winnicott inherited from psychoanalysis a model of the mind that had already challenged certain key notions of traditional Western thought (e.g., mental forces as not related to emotion and biology, reason as disembodied and based solely on conscious thought). From the British School he was additionally exposed to ideas that similarly stretched the limits of traditional philosophy. Specifically, under the direct and indirect influence of Klein he would consider an alternative nature and function of aggressive energy with respect to the mind. Specifically, Klein viewed aggression as a separate instinct and force that was intimately involved in the earliest development of the child. She took literally Freud’s death instinct and demonstrated how the management and consolidation of destructive elements of the personality is a significant developmental achievement. Among other findings relevant for Winnicott’s formulations of the mind Klein demonstrated the inherent tendency of the ego to split itself to ward off perceived attacks, as depicted in the phenomenon of projective identification. The ego’s bifurcate capacity (e.g., simultaneously existing in two locations at the same time) along with associated modes of psychic functioning (e.g., paranoid-

158

An inherent and related finding of cognitive science that confirms the basic tenets of psychoanalysis is the mostly unconscious nature of thought and reason, coined by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) as the “cognitive unconscious.” A corollary of the “embodied mind,” it points to how our reasoning ability is organized around a pre-established structure that perceives certain recurrent forms and patterns within sensory phenomena based on the experience of inhabiting a body. As has been pointed out, traditional notions of reason focus on the more conscious and analytical aspects of reason akin to what is now known as “left brain” processes. The cognitive unconscious and its relationship to reasoning can be thought of as the synchronization of both right hemisphere (e.g., unconscious, non-verbal, symbolism, pattern/form recognition, unity of phenomena) and left hemisphere (e.g., conscious, verbal, analytical, differentiation of phenomena) modes of perceiving reality (Schiffer, 1998). From a neurological standpoint, then, the attainment of object usage status (e.g., entering the world of “shared” reality) can be similarly thought of as the successful integration of the mind-brain’s bifurcate modes of experiencing reality, which reveals the more comprehensive qualities of reason.

219 schizoid, depressive) that are similarly capable of transcending space and time, would be among the key ideas inherent in his formula of object usage.159

Alternative Forces In Winnicott’s basic schema of the mind aggression and destruction were established as the primary psychic elements that exert force on the psychological system (see Appendix O for complete list of metaphors utilizing aggression and destruction). In contrast to traditional Western philosophy, wherein REASON IS A FORCE that metaphorically travels (MOVEMENT IS THINKING) along a path to and from locales representative of ideas (IDEAS ARE LOCATIONS), for Winnicott AGGRESSION IS A FORCE and DESTRCUTION IS A FORCE160 characterize the impetus that propels motion within and between psychic locations that correspond to states of mind (LOCATIONS ARE STATES OF MIND), that may or may not contain reason. It is the particular “reasoned” or “reasonless” state of mind (e.g., object usage or object relating) that imparts the quality and characteristics of ideas (STATES OF MIND ARE IDEAS) that are manifest at any point in time. The quality of thinking that this paper was most concerned with involved the patient’s ability to perceive a shared and objectively-based

159

An idea imbedded in object relation theory that Winnicott was exposed to is the notion that modes of experience (via “positions”) transcend fixed points of time (past, present, future) and space (self, other, environmental ground). Conceptually this requires a shift from unidirectional (e.g., past present future) and uni-dimensional (e.g., space as segmented and auto-contained within a self and an object) patterns of cause and effect to multi-faceted ones. Thus, any proposition with respect to psychic causality must take into account these frameworks, which challenges traditional paradigms of Western thought (and conventional thinking). For example, it raised the possibility that a psychic phenomenon is not simply an effect of an antecedent cause existing a circumscribed space (e.g., within only the self or only another object), but also a cause of a yet to be experienced effect in an opposing object (or an effect occurring simultaneously in both objects).

160

In his formulation the two are generally interchangeable, though destruction is connoted as more a manifestation of aggression in action.

220 reality, the ability to perceive one’s subjecthood as separate from others, and the ability to derive generative psychological experiences via a relationship with an object. As such, in conceptual terms, arriving at a concrete “location”— synonymous with prescribed ideas (e.g., universal or disembodied “truths” as derived by reason alone) — is less significant than the mode of experience that is imparted by the ascendant state of mind.161 This appears to partly explain Winnicott’s seeming reluctance to reach definite conclusions as depicted via “arriving” at concrete conceptual locales in space. That is, implicit in his model is the notion that modes of functioning (as dictated by states of mind implicit in the idea of psychic “positions”) transcend space and time and thus always exist in a state of “potential” activation.

In Winnicott’s schema representing mental functioning it was found that the three primary “locations” that represent states of mind are: (a) Object Relating; (b) Transitional Space, and; (c) Object Usage. In general, object relating is associated with omnipotent and narcissistic thought processes, the lack of perceptual differentiation between self and other objects (e.g., subjective object status), and the absence of time. In contrast, an object usage state of mind is associated with the capacity for rational thought which leads to shared perceptions of reality, which coincides with self-other differentiation (e.g., separate self status) and the presence of time. Transitional space is the locational and

161

For Winnicott because reason is not “built-in” to our hardware but is rather a developmental achievement—synonymous with the attainment of an object usage state of mind—it therefore cannot be posited as the force which drives the conceptual system. That much of our psychic existence rests on irrational and unconscious forces that at times fly in the face of reason was key discovery of Freud and implicit in all psychoanalytic theorizing. Modern developmental theory additionally shows that certain neurological deficits can markedly impact reasoning ability. Traditional Western philosophy—and to certain degree modern conceptual metaphor theory—do not explicitly consider: 1) how reasoning is a general developmental capacity and exists on a continuum from person to person, and; 2) how other factors (e.g., anxiety, self-concept, motivation, etc.) impede on the correct application of reasoning from situation to situation.

221 conceptual bridge that connects the previous two psychic regions and is generally involved in the transformation of raw psychic material (e.g., unidirectional, defuse, and non-intentional) into more mature forms (e.g., multidirectional, fused, and purposeful). In general, it is the successful integration of object relating and object usage states of mind in the transitional realm that characterizes Winnicott’s primary statement on development. It was shown that two of the extant psychoanalytic constructs that are both drawn upon and subsumed under this proposed schema of mind is Freudian “fusion” and Kleinian “positions.”

A brief comparison of the revealed schema of Winnicottian conception of mind with that of traditional Western philosophy is:

222 Traditional Western Philosophy

Winnicottian Ontology

THE MIND IS A BODY

THE MIND IS A BODY

Thinking Is Moving

Thinking is Moving

Towards locales that represent ideas

Movement reflects quality of a state of mind

Ideas Are Locations

Locations Are States of Mind

Ideas “things in themselves” status Locations represent truth or untruth reality

Ideas emerge from embodied-conceptual

Reason Is a Force

Aggression/Destruction Is a Force

A priori existence of reason forces

Reason as developmental achievement; may or may not lead to reason

Reason from disembodied/transcendent fusion processes processes

Reason as outcome of successful instinctual Fusion involves physical and emotional

Rational Thought Is Inherent Ability to Tap Into Universal Reason (Reality)

Rational Thought Is Acquired Ability To View Reality from Multiple Vantage Points

Based on truth conditions; correct application of words whose “senses” match transcendent reality

Based on quality of state of mind; words reflect embodied-metaphorical status that may or may not match shared reality

Time and space segmented, reified, universal to all subjects subject

Time and space fluid and based on emergent qualities of unique embodied

Reality is tapping into disembodied self via reason

Reality is the discovery and re-discovery of other subjects in Transitional Space

Locations represent modes of experiencing

Figure 7. Comparison of Winnicottian Conception of Mind & Traditional Western Philosophy The construct of transitional space was revealed as the cornerstone upon which Winnicottian ontology is based. Though it came to integrate and expand many of his preceding constructs, it is in The Use of an Object that transitional space reaches its full

223 potential. In particular, it is in this paper that it becomes directly associated with linking states of mind associated with pre- and post-subject psychic existence, a crucial part of Winnicott’s last and most comprehensive statement on human psychology. Specifically, transitional space was shown to be associated with the process by which primitive psychic elements are transformed in more mature forms, which provided a deeper and more conceptually expansive account of a crucial developmental milestone. It was also shown to be intimately involved in the conception of mind and its relationship to other key existential elements: time, space, self, and cause and effect. As such, it was found to be important not only for how it contributes to psychic development and transformation, but also for what it reveals about the human conceptual system based on embodied metaphor. That is, transitional space and its processes fill-in a gap in metaphor theory by providing the framework for a more subjective and experience-near depiction of the birth of conceptual metaphor (e.g., the conflation of learning that occurs in infancy vis-à -vis sensorimotor experiences with objects).

In general transitional space was shown to derive its conceptual significance from its simultaneous presence in what is ordinarily considered opposing realms of existence.

Because is borders space, time, and the material (e.g., body) and ethereal (e.g., mind, soul), it comes to assume divergent qualities that represent a vast range of conceptual possibilities. In this way it is more akin to conceptual blending than conceptual metaphor, in that takes from the raw existential elements obvious and less than obvious qualities from which to transform them into novel forms. Though the attainment of object usage can be thought of as representing certain more circumscribed and universal transformations of mind (e.g., reality-testing and separate subject status), it also marks the

224 onset of a limitless and unique capacity to create novel meanings based a wider conceptual vantage point. Having consolidated realms of object relating and object usage, the analysis showed how these new emergent capacities are demonstrated in everyday qualities such as self-assertion, empathy, and courage, to name a few.

Another key finding of the analysis is that aggression and destruction are the primary forces that drive psychic momentum in Winnicott’s model of the mind. As discussed, with respect to traditional philosophy aggression/destruction replaces reason as the primary energy that puts in motion the mechanisms of thought. In terms of psychoanalytic conceptions of mind, Winnicott’s formula makes the following alteration to extant theory: 1) the nature of aggression/destruction shifts from non-generative (e.g., a reaction of frustration associated with the onset of reality), and 2) the specific function of aggression/destruction with respect to attaining reality-based thinking and separate object status shifts from that which eliminates or damages object material, to a more affect-neutral transporter of the object into transformative space (e.g., DESTRUCTION IS THE MOVEMENT OF THE OBEJCT OUTSIDE NARCISSISTIC SPACE).

It was further discovered that from Kleinian thought Winnicott inherited the idea that aggression is not simply an impulsive reaction associated with the onset of realitybased thought, but that it is a multi-faceted force or energy that serves various purposes within the system of mind. Specifically, Klein believed that aggressive forces (e.g., death instinct) are as relevant as libidinal ones and thus contribute to the motivation to relate to objects (e.g., AGGRESSION IS BINDING). Thus, while providing the motivation to form connections with objects, aggressive forces and their vicissitudes (e.g., sadism) by their very nature simultaneously interfere with the libido’s smooth progression to full

225 potentiality (e.g., PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION IS DEPLETION OF THE SELF).

The most limiting aspect of aggression with respect to development for Klein is the correspondent anxiety created by the infant’s recognition of its destructive nature and potential. While Winnicott would accept the presence and inherent nature of aggression, he would propose that specific environmental factors (e.g., primarily the provision of care and state of mind of caregiver) influence the level and potentially debilitating effects of aggression and anxiety on development. For example, ENVIRONMENT IS IMPINGEMENT and ENVIRONMENT IS NOXIOUS characterize how external factors play a role in how the infant pre-maturely comes to perceive the “actual” aggressive aspects of their being. MOTHER IS A CONTAINER and MOTHER IS EMOTIONAL NOURISHMENT are among the conceptual metaphors that depict how the environment comes to successfully fuse primitive aggression into its more functional forms (FUSION IS THE CREATION OF GENERATIVE AGGRESSION). In this case the infant is allowed to discover in a more time-sensitive way its “generative” qualities of aggression, while its “actual” forms are suspended in time (e.g., in unconscious fantasy) and only realized as “potential” under extreme circumstances (POTENTIAL VARIABLITY IN AGRESSION IS ENVIRONMENTAL).

Apart from including environmental factors in the formulation of a mental schema, it was found that Winnicott more than any other theorist directly connects aggressive/destructive energy with generative forces and the ultimate advancement into mature modes of psychic functioning. The analysis showed that this is accomplished by drawing on the often less than obvious semantic connotations associated with these concepts. For example, AGRESSION IS SELFISH, AGGRESSION IS DEATH, and

226 AGGRESSION IS DEFENSIVE were found to underlie conventional Western conceptualizations of aggression, even though aggression/destruction is a on a biological level primary means by which organisms undergo transformation (e.g., metamorphosis) related to advanced development. Winnicott implicitly draws on these associations in such constructions as AGGRESSION IS GENERATIVE ENERGY, AGGRESSION IS SELF-ASSERTION, DESTRUCTION IS THE MAINTENANCE OF LOVE, and DESTRUCTION IS HOPE. In general, in Winnicott’s schema opposing qualities of ideas like aggression or destruction are simultaneously posited by setting up a third space which transcends typical either or conceptions of ideas and the notion of positions which similarly allows for a more fluid and less regimented depicted of the minds states and processes.

Possible Developmental Connections with respect to the Conception of Mind The two primary elements which characterize Winnicott’s schema of the mind— the positing of aggression and destruction as forces and an intermediate realm which transforms basic psychic qualities into more mature forms—can be examined conceptually with respect to key experiences in early development. As outlined, from a dynamic perspective early object relationships in the context of his immediate caregiving environment (e.g., mother’s depression and related proneness to overstimulation) and oedipal elements (e.g., father’s prohibitions against his masculinity) were found to be themes of influence that can be applied to understanding his emergent conceptual style.

Though little is known of the specific content of his two analyses, the presumption is that his ideas of psychoanalysis were being formulated in the context of an examination of his

227 early family experiences and the related impact on his modes of perceiving basic ontological categories such as sense of self, the mind, time, and causality. Like all students of psychoanalysis, the introduction to its core concepts is not simply a cognitive exercise, but also one that involves experiential learning or “remembering” the past via the current therapeutic relationship. From the perspective of conceptual metaphor, then, psychoanalytic training provided an examination and recapitulation of the “conflation” of learning (e.g., sensorimotor experiences in the context of inhabiting a physical body) that formed the basis for his unique conception of primary conceptual metaphors. It is from these early experiences that the foundations of his unique conception of human psychology can be further examined, thus filling-in a gap in modern metaphor theory by providing a more subjective account of the origins of metaphor.

That aggression and destruction would become the primary forces on which Winnicott’s model of the mind are calls to mind certain more obvious interpretations as well as those of a more subtle nature. The apparent depressive qualities of his mother and the prohibitive nature of his father likely played an important role in how aggression came to be conceived in his theorizing. A simple and straightforward explanation is that by significantly expanding the meaning of aggression to include generative qualities, Winnicott was giving a purpose and meaning to an emotion that he seemingly spent most of his life avoiding, or at the very least struggling to integrate into his personality.162 Beginning with the experience/memory of being weaned by his mother prematurely, it seems he came to view normative strivings for survival (e.g., feeding) and intimacy as

162

Kleinian notions of aggression that pervaded the British School, as well as the actual bitter contentiousness that played out between its members, provided Winnicott the ample fodder with which to engage his aggression.

228 overbearing and potentially damaging. Prohibitive aspects of his father’s personality appears to have at the very least reinforced the notion that anger or intense emotionality was potentially hurtful to those around him, as evidenced by being sent to boarding school for the rather benign offense of saying “drat.”163 In general, overvaluing aggression may have simply served to indirectly express in words and theorizing what he could not do in reality, while simultaneously assigning it a positive purpose in development.

A related but more subtle interpretation is that aggression/destruction in Winnicott’s model of mind provided an indirect way to continue his role an emotional “provocateur” that seems to have begun in his earliest caregiving environment. As pointed out, his tendency to challenge conventional thought via his conceptual and writing style is well-known (e.g., Fogel’s “anti-theory” and Newman’s “noncompliance). Similarly, the manner in which he altered meanings and uses of basic ontological concepts (e.g., “object,” “hold,” “use,” “destroy”), as well as the way seemingly dissimilar elements in his conceptual constructions were combined to reveal novel associations (e.g., THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS, LONLINESS IS UNITY, DESTRUCTION IS LOVE), are testaments to this provocative stance towards objects and ideas.

As pointed out in the analysis a related trait of this tendency is the manner in which his writing conveys meanings not only by pure semantics, but by also creating an 163

According to Rodman (2003) the extent to which his father’s overt and subtle admonitions with respect to aggression (or apparently any extreme demonstration of emotion other than “playful” joking or sarcasm) were responses to his mother’s depressive states (e.g., attempts to protect her from overstimulation) or contributive or causative of those states is not clear. In any event, it is difficult to see how the combination of factors would not to some extent be interpreted by a young child as somehow associated with questioning basic dependency needs.

229 experience that is akin to the idea under consideration.164 Creating experiences fits with the need to “enliven” objects (e.g., “diversify the objects agreeably”) and thus benignly render them more malleable and, importantly, never absolute (e.g., stagnant, reified). In this way concepts that depict states of mind derive “life” from always changing based on context (e.g., “positions” or realms of experience) in a way that corresponds to his role vis-à-vis his earliest object relationship—to keep his mother alive by rendering her malleable in an attempt to prevent her from complete stagnation or lifelessness (e.g., becoming a “dead tree’).165 Winnicott’s positioning of transitional space as the mechanism by which primary psychic elements are transformed by means of altering our typical conceptions of time, space, and objects can also be viewed through the lens of his early developmental experiences.166 As theoretical concepts go transitional space is stylistically more reminiscent of a mystic’s characterizations of ethereal realms of existence than of concretized portrayals of mind by science (e.g., THE MIND IS A BODY, THE MIND IS

164

Conveying meaning by virtue of experience versus reason points to early influences of his family’s Wesleyan faith (Hoffman, 2004). In general, this idea is linked to traditionally feminine modes of perception (e.g., “being” versus “doing,” right-brain versus left brain, unconscious soul versus animating spirit, etc.) which are reminiscent of pre-verbal object relating realms of experience. Meaning here is derived from more purely somatic experience vis-à-vis symbols, which is more akin to the foundations of conceptual metaphor. This tendency in his writing may also be a remnant of his object relational stance toward his mother—that is, not being able to reach a depressed object through words but only through gestures designed to enliven through experience.

165

Rodman (2003) notes that in his 1949 paper Reparation in Respect of Mother’s Organized Defense against Depression, it is posited that the child’s depression can simply be a reflection of the mother’s condition. In addition, the child’s reparative efforts to relieve the mother’s condition correspond to the perceived lack of effort or ability on her part, which can be thought of as attempt to expand (e.g., “enliven” or make more malleable) her emotional and conceptual stance toward that particular state of mind.

166

The significant finding of the function of transitional space with respect to time is discussed under Metaphors of Time.

230 A COMPUTER).167 Despite its outward depiction, like all psychoanalytic concepts it can be thought of emerging from deeper levels the psyche as the subject’s unique conception of the processes of mind by which various experiences seek to become organized and integrated. Though not as overtly “provocative” in the sense of directly challenging or shifting the meaning of extant psychoanalytic concepts, transitional space is somewhat elusive and difficult to pin down with absolutes which—like his association of aggression and destruction to infancy—can nevertheless render the same effect.168 Generally, in contrast to ramifications related to “keeping alive” an emotionally fragile mother via the generative energy associated with aggression, transitional space as a means of connecting states of mind (e.g., object relating and object usage) call to mind the broader need to “bind” or “fuse” disparate qualities of experience. In this way, besides bridging aspects of time and space which leads to revealing a shared reality, transitional space can also be posited as the means by which both parents (as represented by masculine and feminine ways of being) became organized into his personality.

167

The findings of quantum mechanics have for some time, however, challenged certain traditional dichotomies between the “hard” (e.g., physics, biology) and “soft” (e.g., psychology, philosophy) sciences.

Among the relevant implications is that consciousness, like all matter and energy, is less predicable and definable by our concretized or embodied notions of minds (e.g., THE MIND IS A CONTAINER, TIME IS (UNIDIRECTIONAL) MOVEMENT THROUGH SPACE). Thus, that consciousness is capable of transcending what is ordinarily thought of as impenetrable barriers (e.g., time, space, objects, etc) supports the potential validity of ideas like transitional space, as well as core concepts from psychoanalysis (e.g., transference, projection, incorporation) which similarly involve the dispersal of mind through time and space.

168

That is, while the more overt use of words such as aggression or destruction in describing infancy is an example of one method of “provocation,” another is to depict constructs (like transitional space) in a way that leaves significant gaps that can be similarly frustrating, especially to those keen on the strict systematization of ideas. Both stylistic qualities, however, have a similar effect of expanding the more conventional limits of language and reason by: 1) tapping into less obvious meanings of extant words, and; 2) allowing conceptual space within which both novel and extant meanings are not directly imposed, but rather emerge spontaneously in the mind of the reader. For Winnicott the “experience” of creating meaning is always something very personal which must not be intruded upon by reified notions of words or reality.

231 A related finding was that Winnicott (1966) did explore ways of depicting reality that represented traditionally feminine and masculine styles of experience, more generally “being” versus “doing.” His hypothesis was that the personality has a tendency to “split” or dissociate characteristic qualities along the lines of male and female modes of perception. Though never explicitly assigning these gender-based ways of knowing to his proposed states of mind, certain parallels do exist with implications for the conceptual origin and relationship between transitional space and the object relating-object usage dialectic of thought. That is, object relating as the timeless and spaceless realm where symbolism, formlessness, and a more purely somatic connection (e.g., grounding) with the environment reigns is generally associated with the feminine essence of “being.” In contrast, the masculine realms can be generally thought of as sharing certain qualities with object usage states, especially the creation of “reality” and the corresponding capacity to employ a more disembodied mind/reason to depict experience. One quality of masculine modes of perception involve creating “forms” based on more concrete notions of space and time (e.g., THE MIND IS A BODY, THINKING IS MOVEMENT, etc.) to represent experience. From this point forward in development, experience (e.g., thoughts, feelings, behaviors) can be thought of as the moment to moment relative status of the relationship between object relating and object usage states of mind.

Taking the above hypotheses at face value, it follows that part of what goes into the conceptual foundation of any psychoanalytic construct of transformation is the subject’s experience and interpretation of the processes that go into integrating disparate mind states in the context of the unique qualities of primary love objects. For Winnicott, then, transitional space reveals something of the nature of his stance towards what each

232 parent came to represent psychically, as well as the ultimate “solution” to reconcile any incongruities. In this way one task of his own transitional processes was to make meaning of the relational style that each parent represented vis-à-vis meeting dependency needs.

Among other things this would have had to take into account the over-stimulating and “deadening” effects of his innate strivings on his mother, in combination with his father’s over-powering (e.g., personal “flare” and civic importance as coupled with a prohibitive/sarcastic nature) and aloof stance with respect to his emerging masculinity.

That the general quality of transitional space is more ethereal and less absolute on the one hand suggests an inability to concretize in “form” that which was responsible for carrying him over into a world of shared reality. In this way it is a shadow of something that Winnicott could not fully realize in more conscious and tangible ways. On the other hand the quality of transitional space could also represent more ineffable forms of knowing, whose power lay not in creating form but in its expansiveness and ability to transcend all dichotomies of more concrete experience (e.g., form, no-form, time, no-time, space, nospace, etc.)—be they reflected via the idiosyncrasies of parental personality or in the nature of reality itself. In this way, transitional space as a concept of transformation shares much in common conceptual blending, in that it utilizes embodied notions of form to ultimately go beyond form to create meaning.

Winnicott’s Ontology of the Self The analysis outlined how the prototypical Western Metaphors of Self (Appendix E) involve the characterization of the self as a physical object or container (THE SELF IS A CONTAINER) whose character is metaphorically determined by virtue of its: (a)

233 location in space; (b) possession of itself other objects, and; (c) control of itself or other objects. Like other conceptual metaphors, the Metaphors of Self derive from the quality of early sensorimotor experiences as perceived from inhabiting a physical body. From these experiences the self becomes conceptualized as: 1. in or out of control (of itself); 2. possessing an objective or non-objective viewpoint; 3. possessing multiple parts and roles, and; 4. manifesting or not manifesting its core essence.

The analysis determined that Winnicott mainly utilizes the Essential Self Metaphor—as reflected in his construct of the True and False Self—though aspects of the others assist in determining the capacity to reveal the self’s “essential” quality (e.g., being “in control” contributes to essential self functioning). It also showed how language reflecting our embodiment limits the conception of the self by imposing structures related to space (e.g., containers) and movement (e.g., unidirectional and from locations representative of objects). One noted implication is that as observers—both of our own self and others’—we are conditioned from early in life to conceptualize certain qualities of objects (e.g., one’s “essence”) as existing in some hypothetical space that is autocontained and presumably impenetrable by outside forces (e.g., Winnicott’s True Self). It was posited that this view does not always necessarily reveal the actual quality of objects, but rather the inherent split nature of the self as a function of the embodied mind.

With respect to the transformations involved in the shift from object relating to object usage states of mind, FEEDING ON THE SELF (“ME”) IS NOXIOUS and FEEDING ON THE NUTRITIOUS OTHER (“NOT ME”) IS HEALTHY were found to

234 reflect the need of separate object to derive generative experiences. In terms of the conceptual positioning of the self vis-à-vis reams of experience, THE TRUE SELF IS HIDDEN IN SUBJECTIVE (NARCISSISTIC) SPACE and THE FALSE SELF IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO FINDING THE TRUE SELF revealed a variation on the Internal Causation Metaphor and the Locational Self Metaphor (Appendix E). In Winnicott’s conceptualization, the unstated implication is that the True Self is not in control in that is not able on its own to move outside subjective space (e.g., object relating realm), which is not its “normal” location. The False Self contributes to keeping it hidden, in an effort to protect the True Self from external danger. Also, an indirect manifestation of the True Self’s capacity to be found is contained LONLINESS IS UNITY (from The Capacity to Be Alone), a developmental achievement whereby actual solitude is attained only in the presence of a separate subject.

Winnicott’s conception of self was also found to be related to the perception of reality vis-à-vis the psychic mechanism of projection. In particular, the analysis showed that the ability to accurately perceive the “nature” or “essential” quality of other objects requires a shift in perception that moves the self into a wider conceptual vantage point. It displayed how the timeless, spaceless, and unidirectional qualities of object relating space limit the self to myopic views of other objects. This idea was posited metaphorically as ACCURATE PERCEPTION IS A LOSS OF SELF to describe how psychic maturation inherently involves discarding those aspects of perception that cling to the need to occupy a space that is more auto-contained (e.g., self suffused with object) and atemporal (e.g., no-time as leading to no differentiation or separate object). In general, it was found that accurate perception involves the absence of the “object relating self,” which allows for

235 the emergence of time and thus movement between distinguishable positions occupied by separate objects (e.g., TIME IS MOVEMENT IN SPACE—INTO AND OUT OF SELFSPACE and MOVEMENT IS THE SEPARATION OF SELF AND OBJECT). Overall, the creation of time and separate object space underpin the birth of reality, which for Winnicott is the simultaneous discovery of one’s subjecthood via that of the other.

Possible Developmental Connections with respect to Conceptions of Self Overall the self is not a primary construct and is mostly implied in many of the processes described in The Use of an Object. Its implications do reveal, however, a core tenet of Winnicottian ontology that pervades much of his writing; mainly, his predilection for characterizing subjecthood utilizing the Essential Self Metaphor. For Winnicott one’s essence via the True Self is reminiscent of universal conceptions of the soul as the core of the individual, whose presence is not always evident but is nevertheless a guiding force and associated with unconscious qualities of mind. As such, his conceptions of the self can be seen through the lens of his Wesleyan upbringing, a Protestant faith that views humans as inherently good via their creation in God’s image and naturally endowed toward positive maturation (Hoffman, 2004).169 The idea of innate goodness corresponds to the findings demonstrating the generative qualities of aggression, which Winnicott depicts as a “life force” and thus related to one’s essential qualities reminiscent of the True Self. As such, one’s goodness as reflected in the True Self can be thought of as existing in a state of potential activation—ready to both experience its own essential

169

As a contrast, Hoffman (2003) cites Fairbairn’s Scottish Calvinistic roots—based on a sense of humans as more separated from God through their intrinsic depravity and “bondage to sin”—as related to the innate tendency of the infant mind to be attracted to “bad” objects.

236 nature and to make itself known to other subjects. With respect to the transformation involved in object usage, the initial discovery of the self as it emerges from object relating realms of experience can be thought of as the individual’s first of potentially innumerable encounters with the Essential Self throughout life. For Winnicott, the nature of the environment (e.g., survival, adaptation, holding) and the processes of the mind (e.g., mind states based on object relating and object usage) are mutually reinforcing and together determine the extent to which one’s essence is revealed both to the individual and to the world.

Besides the influence that religious faith likely played in Winnicott’s depiction of the self, family dynamics also shed light on the foundation of this conceptual choice.

Highlighting the idea that there exists an essential part of the self (e.g., the True Self) may simply reflect a general need to erect an impenetrable barrier that he viewed as protecting him from painful memories associated with meeting dependency needs. As a quality of existence that remains pure and beyond the forces of “impingement,” the True Self stands in direct contrast to the False Self which must bear the brunt of coping with reality in part by protecting the True Self from harm. In Winnicott’s case, his relational tendencies characterized as “enlivening through provocation” can be thought of as constituting a part of his False Self, in that they comprised an adaptational element of “compliance” for survival. Thus, emphasizing the existence of an Essential Self as that part that remained unscathed by painful events may have served as a way to make meaning of his modes of relating, while also detaching himself from their less than desirable qualities and ramifications. As discussed, Winnicott would struggle his whole

237 life with sorting out the “genuine” qualities of the individual with those that are learned reactions based on the need to comply with the demands of one’s environment.170 The last finding with respect to the Winnicottian conception of the self is the apparent undervalued depiction of the self as in or not in control (e.g., The Locational Self) in favor of one based on essences (e.g., The Essential Self). Though both characterizations of the self derive from traditional philosophy, the analysis revealed that the Locational Self is more akin to modern psychology and science while the Essential Self is more utilized in more speculative and non-empirical renditions reality. Indeed, the Locational Self was found to be in line with the perceptual, organizational, and adaptational qualities of the ego in PS1 and PS2 (e.g., THE EGO IS SELF, THE EGO IS A REGULATOR, THE EGO IS ADAPTATION), as well as modern developmental constructs like affect regulation. In terms of the more experiential foundations of Winnicott’s conceptual style, it would appear on the surface that there were circumstances in his life that could have easily fostered a need to view the self from the perspective of in or out of control. For example, there is considerable evidence that a significant underlying tone in his family was one of prohibition: against overt forms of comportment (e.g., saying “drat”) as well more subtle ones related to not over-burdening

170

One of the many related questions is the extent to which Winnicott’s lighthearted and playful qualities associated with provocation were not simply reactions to the need to enliven, but also essential or “genuine” personality traits. If viewed as a manifestation of his temperamental style, the quality of his early caregiving relationship can be seen as reinforcing that which was already present and waiting to be come to life in some form. Nevertheless, despite its origin, there are numerous examples in his personal letters and interviews with contemporaries that aspects of this particular relational quality was at least somewhat associated with his being perpetually disappointed by others (and thus possibly seen by him as an undesirable or troublesome trait). For Winnicott this mainly took the form of viewing others as either rejecting or not understanding the nature of his “spontaneous gestures.” It is possible, then, that what he viewed as authentic overtures for connection were suffused with provocative qualities that were experienced as over-stimulating or intrusive, paradoxically creating a sense of “impingement” and correspondingly a detached or “deadened” quality (e.g., like his mother) in others.

238 his depressed mother. Perhaps most revealing in this regard was his memory of being weaned early because his mother’s apparent erotic stimulation.171 Also, in terms of professional experience, he likely saw in his pediatric practice scores of children who displayed chronic dysregulated states that impacted their development. Indeed, he wrote fairly considerably on “anti-social” aspects of the personality which take the form of an incapacity to match one’s emotional and behavior states with the expectations of the environment. Questions remain as to what may have mediated the seemingly conspicuous exclusion the Locational Self in his ontology, as well as how were issues of control vis-àvis were incorporated in the concept of the self.

In terms of environmental influence there is evidence that despite certain prohibitions with respect to emotionality there existed in the Winnicott family a sense of allowing individual members freedom to explore and possess differentiating characteristics. For example, Clare Winnicott (1989) noted that Donald’s father was religious but for the most part left him to his own devices in terms of determining its ultimate truth. This stance is in line with the tenets of the family’s Wesleyan faith, which was reflective of a more “experiential” versus “reasoned” way of knowing God (Kent, 2003). The general tone is that the individual is free and responsible to discover reality through self-initiated action rather than compliance to set of demands. Wesleyanism’s idea of one’s inherent ability to advance spiritually through self-initiated experience—not by the imposition of control of structures that would limit freedom—would find its way into Winnicott’s conception of the child as possessing an innate ability to mature

171

Whether this was an actual event or an example of selective memory is not clear. In the context of later struggles with asserting himself, being “genuinely” known to others, and questions of his masculinity, positing himself as possessing the capacity to “excite” in an erotic way may have among other things served to bolster a general sense of personal disempowerment.

239 responsibly and adapt to the conditions of the environment (Hoffman, 2004). Among the many concepts that reinforce the idea of how the child can benefit from the environment through adaptation without losing part of the self is the idea “going on being.” Overall, it is possible that in the Essential Self Metaphor Winnicott found an affinity with aspects of his early experience in which developmental advancement was measured not only by the ability to maintain control in the face of environmental demands (e.g., False Self compliance), but also in the ability to adapt to it without relinquishing fundamental parts of the self.

The Winnicottian self is generally charged with discovery of reality (and itself) through experience rather than through the rational application auto-regulation. Control, then, is less important in his schema and can be thought of as implicit in the larger process of adaptation, rather than vital to it (e.g., CONTROL IS ADAPTATION).

Though control does show up as part of adaptation his model via False Self compliance (e.g., CONTROL IS COMPLIANCE), the natural tendency of the essential or True Self is to engage the environment through “spontaneous gestures,” which inherently involves abandoning a certain measure of control (TRUE SELF-EXPERIENCE IS A LOSS OF CONTROL) in order to fully experience the environment and itself. For Winnicott, the ultimate success or failure of adaptation (especially in adulthood) is tied not to compliance, but rather to how consistently one’s essence can reveal itself when encountered with circumstances presented by the environment—both ones that restrict the self’s essence by not “surviving” as well as ones that do “survive” and thus more easily allow the True Self’s presence. In general, the ultimate survival of the True Self, then, is not a function of altering itself (ADAPTATION IS ALTERATION) in order to

240 manifest compliance (ALTERATION IS REVEALING A CONTROLLED SELF), but rather by making itself known in its full essence (ADAPTATION IS REVEALING CONTROLLED AND UNCONTROLLED ASPECTS OF SELF) despite the (controlling/surviving) quality of the environment.

The risk of self-exposure, then, is a main element that distinguishes the True Self from False Self functioning. Specifically, for Winnicott the willingness to risk True Self exposure (e.g., via “spontaneous gestures”) always takes precedence over remaining safe (but separate) via control. In this way the schema is empowering, in that it reveals how the individual is capable of managing the elements of control that are inevitable in relating to others. With respect to the self and its correspondent relational stances vis-àvis control, the two main options are: (a) the False Self stance in which the self perceives itself as needing to match the expectations of the environment, represented by CONTROL IS COMPLIANCE and COMPLIANCE IS SURVIVAL, and; (b) True Self stance in which alterations to the self are not viewed as directly necessary for survival, but rather only part of a larger process of experiencing reality as in CONTROL IS ADAPTATION and ADAPTATION IS RISKING (TRUE) SELF-EXPOSURE. The overall goal of the True Self is the extent to which it can allow itself to be known (TRUE SELF SURVIVAL IS BEING KNOWN regardless of the qualities (e.g., expectations) of the environment.172

172

While shifting how the self views control in the context of meeting dependency needs can be simply another way Winnicott avoids an inevitable reality, it also reveals a subtle distinction about the implications of one’s relational stance with respect to self-risk. That is, risking non-compliance via not being in control is associated with punishment, disapproval, or abandonment, while the risk of not revealing the essential part of one’s self can be thought of as associated with non-existence, in a way a more dreadful proposition.

241 Finally, on the surface Winnicott’s personality characteristics would also seem to possess the qualities that would minimize the tendency to view the self primarily in terms of in or out of control. However, besides the more benign “playful” and sarcastic qualities of his personality that are often highlighted, biographers have put forth ample evidence that he was in actuality keenly attuned to the self’s experiences with control. As noted he has been portrayed as intensely independent, overtly and passively defiant, and having a tendency to rebel against any hint of convention (Kahr, 1996; Newman; Rodman, 2003, 1995). These traits point to the more manic qualities of his personality, which are further revealed in certain ritualistic displays of self-invincibility. For example, Rodman (2003) recounts that Winnicott was known to drive his car with his head out of the roof and, until very late in life, ride his bicycle steering with his feet on the handlebars! These tendencies can be viewed as revealing on the one hand his independent spirit in the face of convention, and on the other a more serious oversensitivity to control.173

Winnicott’s Ontology of Time The results of the analysis reveal that Winnicott’s use of time in the depiction of the transformational phenomena surrounding object usage is crucial for a complete understanding. Perhaps more than the ontological implications with respect to the mind and self, his explicit and implicit utilization of time distinguishes his conceptual style

173

Winnicott’s membership paper The Manic Defense (1935) is perhaps revealing of his curiosity with matters that were close to home. It generally reinforces Klein’s idea of mania as a normal reaction to the onset of depressive position, whereby the importance of a good object is denied or not immediately accepted due to dependency fears (e.g., the pain that is part and parcel of love). In his own development, the fragility of his mother may have strengthened this natural hesitancy to renounce the importance of needed objects. With respect to control, manic defenses attempt to master the influence exerted by the loved object by denying the need itself (and thus a portion of reality). One of the paradoxes of mania is that the extreme measures employed to flee from control (and the correspondent “perceived” danger associated with it) usually take the form of being out of control and thus risking “actual” danger.

242 from other psychoanalytic writers. While utilizing notions of time inherited from both Western philosophy and psychoanalysis (e.g., time as movement through space), the construct of transitional space was shown to allow for a broader conception of time (e.g., TRANSITIONAL SPACE IS SUSPENDED TIME, TRANSITIONAL SPACE IS THE CREATOR OF TIME), while also revealing the limitations of purely rational components of language to describe the more complex processes of the mind (e.g., the “no-time” quality of object relating states). Indeed, the findings showed that The Use of an Object conveys meaning as much by the experience created by reading the text as it does by relying on the logical consistency of the concepts and ideas, confirming Ogden’s (2001) appraisal of a key characteristic of Winnicottian style. Time was one such construct whose nature and function with respect to psychic development was built on the experiences of reading the text, and there were examples of how the arrangement and quantity of words contributed to conveying important ideas.

An additional finding in the analysis was how experiences evoked in reading the text with respect to time and related processes reflected the clinical idea of parallel process. That is, the feelings associated with the words corresponded to how the infant and caregiver might encounter the transformation from object relating to object usage, which also provides an account of that which occurs in treatment when dealing issues of “survival.” In this way the text was shown to be able to reflect the transformative processes involved in the concepts by creating a correspondent experience in the reader.

Time was found to be a crucial component that was evoked in order to convey what is involved in the passage from primitive states of mind associated with object relating to more mature ones akin to object usage. Along those lines, besides the impact these

243 stylistic qualities have on the conceptual foundations and ultimate utility of theoretical constructs (e.g., metapsychology), there were also cited implications related to practice (e.g., clinical theory). One clinical example was the how the sense of elongated time evoked in the text paralleled the quality of patience required by the therapist to allow the natural processes of the transference to unfold.

The notion of time—in particular the ability of the mind to transcend certain conventional limitations related to it for understanding theoretical concepts and the meaning of a patient’s behavioral functioning—was also linked to the cognitive process of conceptual blending. The ability of an ordinary reader to understand the message behind the “The Bypass” (Appendix I) was shown to reflect the same capacities of mind incorporated by clinicians in the understanding of core psychoanalytic constructs in reading and in practice. In particular it was suggested that ideas such as transference in which current thoughts and behaviors reflect events from the past are alive in the patient’s current functioning draw on conceptual blending processes. In the context of the “birth” of subjectivity and the ability for the patient to view the “nature” of objects as “things in themselves” inherent in the attainment of object usage, time was shown to be involved in the newly formed capacities of perception. A core implication in The Use of an Object is that the vantage point of the therapist must at once incorporate and transcend conventional notions of time in order to be the vehicle which carries the patient over to object usage. That is, the therapist needs to mirror transitional space itself by “hovering” in between the states of mind associated with time and no-time (e.g., REALITY IS SEEING AND NOT SEEING IN ORDINARY AND EXPANDED TIME).

244 Possible Developmental Connections with respect to Conception of Time The general expansiveness of time created by the birth of reality via object usage can be viewed as reflecting characteristic ways Winnicott attempted to make meaning of important developmental experiences. Transitional space is at the core of his time schema, in that it represents the hypothetical area in which time itself is born and from which all elements of time (e.g., time-no-time, ordinary-expanded time) are perceived.

Besides the aforementioned functions that transitional space may have served vis-à-vis understanding and integrating elements of each parent’s personality, its general function can also be thought of as another way of experiencing his reality-environment in ways that coincide with his distinctive style of engagement. That this aspect of perception (e.g., experiencing multi-directional time) was viewed by Winnicott as a key component of his ontology suggests that it possibly assumed an important position in his more personal meaning-making processes; in particular, how it served to make sense of a world in which he assumed responsibility for the “survival” of others via the mechanism of enlivening.

The ability to perceive time in a multi-dimensional way was referenced as a key process associated with object usage and also a primary function of our inherent cognitive capacities via conceptual blending. Though modern cognitive science has shown that Western conceptions of time are based primary on embodiment (e.g., Time Is Space), conceptual blending reveals our capacity to transcend certain built-in forms when conceiving both everyday scenarios (e.g., “The Bypass”) as well as more abstract ideas associated with theory (e.g., “The Infant is Ruthless”). That is, we routinely “break the laws” of embodiment and CMT, especially when creating novel and more abstract ideas

245 via imagination. These cognitive capacities were posited as intimately involved in how each subject encounters and makes meaning of events of early development, both at the time of experiencing them (e.g., early conflation of learning) as well as later via longterm memory. In Winnicott’s case his unique conception of the birth of subjecthood similarly draws on the perceptual capacities associated with time—in particular the necessity of the presence of a “surviving” object that imparts a sense to time to the emerging infant-subject. A sense of time is also evident in the characteristic relational stance of “enlivening through provocation,” in which repeated attempts to stimulate his dependent objects perhaps reflect his own need to stay alive by continually creating a sense of time. That is, the animation of objects (e.g., going from a state of objectlessness to object status) can be thought of as re-creating the birth of reality and of time.

The analysis showed that transitional phenomena is depicted as existing in multidimensional space, connecting realms associated with object relating (“no-time”) and object usage (“time”) states of mind. Besides ushering in the ability to reason, to accurately perceive a shared reality, and to differentiate the nascent self from others, implicit in the attainment of object usage via transitional space is the ability to perceive time from a wider conceptual vantage point—that is, to occupy a position in which ordinary (e.g., uni-directional) and expanded (e.g., multi-directional) forms are of time are considered. As mentioned, the characteristic Winnicottian relational stance of “enlivening” similarly involves transcending conventional notions of time, in that an implication of brining to life is imparting sense of time. Part of his stance required perceiving objects as deadened, depleted, or isolated, which is synonymous with placing them into a space associated with non-existence and thus no-time. Enlivening, then, can

246 be thought of not only as a way of creating time but also reversing time—sending the object back in time to a point when life (or liveliness) existed. Among other things, the process reveals how time is intimately involved in gratification (e.g., the “doing” and “undoing” of time via objects) and need to maintain object ties.

247

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

Review of the Methodology The methodology for this study incorporated elements of modern cognitive linguistics (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) and psychoanalytic conceptual research (Atwood & Stolorow, 1992; Dreher, 2000). The main purpose of the linguistic portion of the analysis was to elucidate the metaphorical foundations on which object is built, primarily using Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) theory of conceptual (embodied) metaphors. Though conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003) was not utilized as a primary tool of analysis, an overview was provided and it was cited as supplementing CMT, especially when dealing with novel and more abstract ideas. The historical overview of The Use of an Object with respect to Classical Freudian theory (PS1) Ego Psychology (PS2), and Kleinian theory (PS3) utilized the primary metaphors of CMT to draw conceptual distinctions between the transformational ideas under consideration. The developmental implications or possible connections between Winnicott’s family dynamics and the unique configuration of ontology with respect to mind, self, and time were mainly from a point of view in line with Atwood and Stolorow’s (1992) historicalsubjective theorist.

248 The main benefits of combining methodological principles from different fields of study involved the ability to draw on multifaceted viewpoints from which to examine the conceptual origins of the constructs of transformation. The psychoanalytic and cognitivelinguistic modes of textual analysis were found to be complementary in important ways, together allowing for both a more comprehensive and in depth view that could not have been accomplished separately. In particular, the more experience-near and account of early object relationships filled-in a noticeable gap in CMT and BT, by providing a depiction of the early (infancy) conflation of learning on which all conceptual metaphor is based. In this study the combined approach allowed for distinguishing Winnicott’s conceptual style with extant theoretical viewpoints, in part by using his inherited relational stance of “emotional provocateur� as a way to reveal the foundations of his ontology. The methodology demonstrated not only how primary embodied metaphors form the basis for thought and reason, but also how each individual imbues metaphors with shades of meaning based on their own experience.

One of the ways metaphor theory was found to supplement psychoanalysis as a methodology is that systematizes basic qualities of thought and language based on empirical findings from everyday speech. It is able to provide a basic conceptual framework from which more nuanced meanings are derived. That the main findings of modern cognitive science (e.g., the embodiment of mind, the unconscious nature of thought, and the metaphorical basis of abstract concepts) confirm the basic tenets of psychoanalysis allowed for a relatively smooth application of their respective modes of analysis and principles. Cognitive science was shown to have validated what has been long understood by psychoanalytic clinicians: that the nature of reason is not

249 transcendent, but rather the outcome of biopsychosocial processes as elaborated via metaphor or symbolism. In particular, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) primary ontological stance of “experientialism” confirms how the embodied mind uses metaphor to make meaning of itself and its larger reality.

Implications for Social Work The findings of the study provide an alternative way to conceive how constructs that guide practice are taught, understood, and used by clinical social work clinicians.

The analysis showed that the logic on which concepts rely, as well as the linguistic style with which they are presented, are influenced by the interrelationship of built-in patterns of conceptual reasoning and the nature of key developmental events. Because metaphor involves the activation of neural structure that is established in infancy, it constitutes one way of revealing the nature of early object relationships on which psychoanalytic therapy depends. Though individual experiences and unique ways of knowing do not allow clinicians to transcend cognitive structure, categories of thought are imbued with distinctive shades of meaning which can provide a wide and varied range of conceptions about the client, themselves, and the overall treatment situation. Winnicott’s unique writing and conceptual style show that experiences cannot be divorced from the concepts themselves and as such need to be taken into account in the teaching, understanding and utilization of his ideas. Overall, the incorporation of conceptual metaphor in the context of developmental-historical influences can provide both a more accurate and richer depiction of concepts of transformation and the treatment process.

250 Conceptual metaphor theory demonstrated that Winnicott’s constructs of transformation mainly draw their semantic rationale from the paradigms of both traditional Western philosophy and psychoanalysis. Even his most novel concept, transitional phenomena, was shown to depend on inherited conceptual structure from each tradition. In this regard, the study showed that a more complete understanding of clinical concepts can be aided by distinguishing ways in which they correspond to and deviate from larger conceptual categories based on culture, time, and the tenets from within a particular field of study. It was also revealed that though clinical concepts rely heavily on our sensorimotor existence via metaphor, their more abstract nature and function can require a wider vantage point which inherently “breaks the rules” of embodiment (e.g., KNOWING IS SEEING AND NOT SEEING). In general finding ways to incorporate into the teaching process a depiction of how clinical ideas are related to embodiment, as well as how they evolve over time and represent both inherited and new ways of thinking can augment their understanding and use.

In terms of the historical positioning of Winnicott vis-à-vis other models of psychoanalysis, the findings suggest that his ideas and style of communicating them foreshadowed the modern “relational turn” in psychoanalysis. The nature of his clinical constructs highlighted an “experiential field of psychic experience” (Fogel, 1992), which shifted the conceptual vantage point of mental causality from one that is more internally contained to one that is bidirectional and dependent on the mutually influential processes of separate subjects. The idea of object usage demonstrated that the qualities and techniques of the therapist must be viewed from the perspective of their perceived effects on the patient, not simply as detached ideas or processes in themselves. Throughout

251 Winnicott’s writing is the notion that what ultimately constitutes the meaning of therapeutic events must be shared between client and therapist. In a similar way his writing style reflects the intersubjective nature of reality in that an important way it communicates meaning is the way it creates experience in the reader—understanding is always a dialogue between embodied subjects who are in the process creating reality by discovering qualities of their own self via the other. Lastly, his writing and conceptual style reflect the “linguist turn” of the 20th century by demonstrating both the possibilities and limitations of language in expressing the nature of reality.

An implication related to the “linguistic turn” in psychoanalysis involves the positioning constructs of transformation within a developmental-historical context as way of revealing the socially-constructed nature of reality. This study showed the importance of viewing “truths” that come to be accepted in a theory or clinical modality as subjectively and historically situated. Viewing constructs of transformation from the vantage point of the subjective-historical theorist reinforces for the clinician-learner an examination of the similar processes underway in shaping their own unique conception and uses of clinical ideas. Providing a developmental account of the writer from which a clinical paradigm derives demonstrates the how experiences and ideas relevant to therapeutic knowledge and skill originate and are elaborated over time. It shows that the causative factors attributed to transformation are always suffused with subjective qualities, experiences, and perceptions of a particular therapist and patient at a point in time. Taking seriously the subjective quality of accepted clinical “truths” also mitigates against the more limiting aspects of idealization, which can take the form of mimicking a general approach or technique. Indeed, the idealization of theorists, instructors, or any

252 other more advanced clinician is synonymous with early stages of learning and must be transcended in the successful development of the professional self (Ronnestad & Skovholt, 2003).

The study also demonstrated that an analysis of constructs through the lens of the subjective-historical theorist reveals the conceptual origins of metaphor and distinctive ways of viewing reality. Though Winnicott’s concepts of transformation resonate with most clinicians, they in part reflect attempts at “solutions” to intrapsychic dilemmas that are uniquely his own and as such should be viewed as limited to his experience.174 Part of what they represent is an interpretation of early developmental experiences—in particular, the roles he imagined himself to be playing vis-à-vis his primary dependency objects. In general, certain personality components he came to value as signs of emotional health were in part reactions to the particular challenges his family dynamics presented. Though proven over time to be of clinical value, a lack of a subjectivedevelopmental context combined with the apparently clear-cut nature of the concepts can lead to overly simplistic applications of the ideas. Some common examples encountered in the survey of the literature include the overly broad application of ideas such as “playing,” “holding,” or “transitional object” to the therapeutic relationship (or any relationship or setting) without considering their more nuanced meanings.

174

In general taking into consideration those elements of clinical ideas that often go unexamined is a key component of conceptual research. Understanding theoretical or clinical concepts requires differentiating between what Dreher (2000) calls explicit and implicit aspects of theories. The explicit perspective reflects how a theory or concept is more publically expressed in writing and in discourse. The implicit view involves how the ideas exist only in the therapist’s mind and how they influence practical actions. Implicit phenomena, according to Dreher, are not put into words, not discussed, and are not intersubjectively accessible. It is this aspect of Winnicott’s theory, as well as all models, that should be taken into consideration when engaging and using the ideas.

253 A closely related implication involves how learning clinical constructs or techniques in isolation of an objective historical account can contribute to an unsophisticated or inaccurate view of the ideas themselves. In Winnicott’s case, the combination of (until recently) limited historical accounts of his life and a related rendering of his constructs of transformation in their most global form can lead to making faulty assumptions. With respect to how he is portrayed in the literature when aspects of his life are included, most encountered in the research for this study have followed closely Clare Winnicott’s (1989) depiction of an idyllic family setting in Psychoanalytic Explorations. As such, readers not familiar with the details of Winnicott’s life seem to conflate presumed qualities of his personality and his constructs of transformation. That is, to many he is narrowly viewed as embodying the apparently positive, straightforward and commonsensical nature of his ideas (e.g., “playing,” “spontaneous gestures,” “space,” “holding,” etc).175 As outlined in the study such a view belies an underlying complexity of both the concepts and Winnicott himself. In certain ways more than other writers, the nature of his persona and the conceptual style with which his ideas are expressed seem to be open to a wide variety of viewpoints by the clinician-reader.

Though in one way a testament to the value and usefulness of the ideas, this study showed that clinicians can be ultimately best served if they are viewed in context of the

175

One common example of seeing Winnicott in a narrowly benign way is how he is often characterized as somewhat of a passive victim with respect to his colleagues in the contentious atmosphere of the British Society. In most portrayals he is viewed as objectively “independent” and beyond the fray, despite similarly strong and unexamined opinions of his own. An uncritical reader can readily view him as being summarily rejected by the Anna Freud and Melanie Klein groups, contributing to certain idealized view of him as eccentric, intellectually detached, or not really needing collegial validation. While in ways valid and reflecting the strict adherence to theoretical models that characterized that particular professional milieu, most portrays do not specifically take into account ways his style of relating contributed to not being accepted or understood. These views mask the deep need he did likely possess for recognition and the ways he may have contributed to thwarting his ideas being more fully accepted.

254 historical-subjective theorist (Atwood & Stolorow, 1993). In this vein, utilizing more comprehensive biographies such as Rodman’s (2003) can go a long way in providing a more accurate view of the writer and the ideas.

Limitations of the Study The validity of the findings is generally limited by the single-rater design of the textual analysis. As the study demonstrated, even though thought emerges in a universal fashion based on human embodiment each person imbues the emergent metaphors with a unique conceptual quality. This conceptual “bias” can influence the way a metaphorical construction and its implications are depicted. Utilizing a design with multiple raters is one way that differences in metaphoricity can be either reconciled or noted in the analysis (Pragglejazz Group, 2007), providing a potentially richer depiction of the language processes at work in everyday speech and writing.

Though the goal of the current study was not to determine the metaphorical status of each word or expression in ordinary speech (e.g., “He’s running out of gas”), which itself can render different opinions among raters in analyzing certain constructions, it did present a different set of challenges for a single-rater. One challenge was that the nature of analysis called for deconstructing the conceptual rationale on which abstract constructs of theory are based, whose links to basic categories of thought can vary based on usage in the text. That is, while determining the basic conceptual rationale of the key constructs using primary (embodied) metaphors is straightforward, each concept’s more nuanced meanings and relationship to other ideas is complex and would likely render a potential range of interpretations. For example, that Winnicott’s AGGRESSION IS A FORCE

255 draws from The Mind Is A Body, Thinking Is Moving, and Ideas Are Locations would likely not be in question. However, other more extended interpretations like AGGRESSION IS INTEGRATION, DESTRUCTION IS THE MAINTENANCE OF LOVE, and SURVIVAL IS POTENTIAL DESTRUCTION may be viewed differently, based on both linguistic grounds as well as theoretical ones.

Possible Future Directions Potential applications of the combined psychoanalytic-cognitive linguistic model of inquiry are considerable. In the realm of quantitative research, the analysis of therapy sessions could be enhanced by mining transcripts for not only explicit uses of metaphor (e.g., “I’m feeling down today” or “I think therapy is on the right track”), but also for the more foundational elements of meaning that are embedded in the ways both the patient and therapist thinks. Because deconstructing meanings is essentially at the heart of therapy and the transformation process, the model can provide another way of understanding the therapeutic process and the elements of it that are (or are not) change producing. More closely examining the semantic foundations of language as a function of metaphorical thought might assist in determining the nature of impasses, or how meanings within the therapeutic dyad come to be mutually inaccessible as a function of reified ways of thinking, speaking, and ultimately relating. Along those lines, manifestations of the core elements associated with transformation in the treatment setting—transference and countertransference—might be examined from the viewpoint of CMT and BT, potentially elucidating how these processes are related to the conflation of learning that forms the basis for metaphor. This would generally involve examining

256 how early object relationships and subsequent modes of relating are kept alive via one’s conceptual style and nuanced understanding of reality (e.g., mind, self, time, causation) as expressed through language.

A related research application could be examining the emergent conceptual quality of thought and language from the point of view of particular developmental phenomena—in general, how key life events shape the quality of one’s conceptual system vis-à-vis metaphor. As this study demonstrated, Winnicott’s relational stance of “enlivening through provocation” was associated with meeting dependency needs in the context of a primary object viewed as existing on the edge of survival. The quality of the experience was shown to be transmitted conceptually in the way primary metaphors are conceived and utilized in the construction of reality. A particular investigative area might be to determine the extent to which the nature of early object relationships (e.g., attachment, responsiveness, environmental “fit”) influences one’s nuanced conceptual repertoire as viewed through metaphor.176 Indeed, chronic deprivation and other more overt forms of trauma are known to have an impact on the ability to organize experience via the symbolic elaboration of experience (e.g., reflective functioning), an idea with direct implications for metaphor. It is possible that examining language use from a CMT or BT perspective might reveal ways to detect or better understand the nature of early developmental experience. One could conceive of devising a conceptual-metaphorical inventory based on correlating particular experiences with larger ontological viewpoints,

176

The Adult Attachment Interview (Crittenden, 1998; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1996) is an example of connecting early developmental experiences related to the caregiving environment with adult representational schemas. From the perspective of CMT and this study, these schemas can be viewed as emerging from the “conflation of learning” as elaborated in one’s unique conception and use of embodied (primary) metaphor.

257 collected from analyzing ordinary speech (e.g., interviews), writing samples, or through more controlled experimental designs. In terms of research and practice, these profiles might used to better understanding one’s practicing style as well as the way one uniquely conceptualizes basic theoretical concepts.

In terms of conceptual research there are ample opportunities to apply the tools of modern cognitive linguistics to psychoanalysis. In line with a key impetus for this study, a more systematized analysis of the basic ideas on which psychoanalysis rests could be done from a CMT or BT perspective. Rappaport’s (1951, 1959) outline of the foundations of metapsychology was one such attempt, though it lacked the empirical findings based on conceptual metaphor. Akin to Lakoff and Johnson’s analysis of core Western philosophical concepts in Philosophy in the Flesh, one can imagine the application of the similar linguistic tools to psychoanalysis as a body of knowledge. Such work might entail the foundational or “Classical” concepts and proceed historically through their various elaborations within the different models or across historical time periods. Similar to the analysis in this study, the basic ontological categories of mind, self, causation, and time could be used as ways to deconstruct concepts and show their level of conceptual coherence. Another possible application could be incorporating elements of CMT or BT into dictionaries of theoretical terms, where the conceptual “etymology” of constructs or ideas could be demonstrated for their semantic rationale and historical context.

These same methodological tools that can be utilized in research could similarly be employed in the teaching and learning of clinical concepts. Applying the CMT or BT to the often abstract nature of metapyschological constructs can help learners deconstruct

258 the basic foundations of the ideas on which their clinical practice rests. It can assist in understanding how the meaning of theoretical constructs draw on established Western notions of ontology (e.g., mind, self, causation, time) as well as parallel views from within the field of study itself (e.g., psychoanalytic derivatives). Along those same lines, clinical supervision in which session transcripts are used could also utilize aspects of CMT or BT to clarify the therapist’s rationale for understanding the therapeutic process using the concepts of psychoanalysis. The model might also be used to more systematically uncover the meanings behind recurrent expressions, themes, or ideas that seem to be relevant to the treatment process. As the textual analysis demonstrated, the model is capable of going beyond simply defining the embodied rationale on which notions of treatment are based (e.g., THERAPY IS A JOURNEY, IMPASSES ARE OBSTACLES ON A PATH, LOVE IS A PATIENT), which in certain ways adds little in the way of uncovering deeper subjective meanings behind those constructions. Indeed, the combined model is suited to use these more basic conceptual categories based on metaphor to arrive at more abstract and nuanced understandings, a key goal in the teaching and learning of psychoanalytic concepts.

259

APPENDIX A

KEY FINDINGS OF MODERN COGNITVE LINGUISTICS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN SCIENCES (From Lakoff and Johnson, 1999)

260 Empirical Findings of Cognitive Linguistics With Respect To Rational Philosophy 1. The mind is inherently embodied: a)

Reason is not disembodied but comes about by virtue of the human brain, body, and bodily experience;

b)

Reason (via our cognitive systems) is built on the same neural and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to move, see, perceive, etc;

c)

Reason is evolutionary and builds on—not replaces—the basic forms of perceptual and motor inference present in “lower” animals;

d)

Thus, reason is thus not “universal” or “transcendent” but based on everyday bodily functioning.

2. Thought is mostly unconscious: a)

Reason is not completely conscious, but mostly unconscious.

3. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical: a)

Reason is not purely literal, but largely metaphorical and imaginative;

b)

Reason is not dispassionate, but emotionally engaged.

Implications for Human Sciences 1. There is no “Cartesian dualistic person” whose mind is separate from body; 2. There is no “Kantian radically autonomous person” whose transcendent reason and absolute freedom can dictate what is moral or immoral; 3. There is no “utilitarian person” for whom rationality is economic rationality. The maximization of utility does not exist; 4. There is no “phenomenological person” whose introspection alone can discover everything about the mind and experience. We do not have direct conscious access to the operation of the cognitive unconscious, and therefore must supplement enquiry with empirical research;

261 5. There is no “poststructuralist person” whose subjecthood is completely decentered and for whom all meaning is arbitrary, totally relative, and purely historically contingent, unconstrained by body and brain; 6. There is no “Fregan person” (e.g., analytic philosophy) for whom thought is separate from the body. That is, there is no real person whose embodiment plays no role in meaning, whose meaning is purely objective and defined by the external world, and whose language can fit the external world with no significant role played by mind, brain, or body. Because a vast range of our concepts are metaphorical, meaning is not entirely literal and the classical correspondence theory of truth is false; 7. There is no “computational person” whose mind is like computer software and can derive meaning from taking meaningless symbols as input, manipulating them by rule, and give meaningless symbols as output. The neural structures of the brain produce conceptual systems and linguistic structures that cannot be adequately accounted for by formal systems that only manipulate symbols; 8. There is no “Chomskyan person” for whom language is pure syntax, pure form insulated from and independent of all meaning, context, perception, emotion, memory, attention, action, and the dynamic nature of communication. Language is not a totally genetic innovation, as it contains aspects of evolution-derived sensory, motor, and other neural systems present in lower animals.

262

APPENDIX B PRIMARY CONCEPTUAL (EMBODIED) METAPHORS (From Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 50-54)

263 Primary Metaphors AFFECTION IS WARMTH Subjective Judgment: Affection Sensorimotor Domain: Temperature Example: “They greeted me warmly.”

Primary Experience: Feeling warm while being held affectionately IMPORTANT IS BIG Subjective Judgment: Importance Sensorimotor Domain: Size Example: “Tomorrow is a big day.”

Primary Experience: As a child, finding that big things, e.g., parents, are important and can exert major forces on you and dominate your visual experience HAPPY IS UP Subjective Judgment: Happiness Sensorimotor Domain: Bodily orientation Example: “I’m feeling up today.”

Primary Experience: Feeling happy and energetic and having an upright posture (correlation between affective state and posture) INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS Subjective Judgment: Intimacy Sensorimotor Domain: Being physically close Example: “We’ve been close for years, but we’re beginning to drift apart.”

Primary Experience: Being physically close to people you are intimate with BAD IS STINKY Subjective Judgment: Evaluation Sensorimotor Domain: Smell Example: “This movie stinks.”

Primary Experience: Being repelled by foul-smelling objects (correlation between evaluative and olfactory experience) DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS Subjective Judgment: Difficulty Sensorimotor Domain: Muscular exertion Example: “She’s weighed down by responsibilities.”

Primary Experience: The discomfort or disabling effect of lifting or carrying heavy objects

264 MORE IS UP Subjective Judgment: Quantity Sensorimotor Domain: Vertical Orientation Example: “Prices are high.”

Primary Experience: Observing rise and fall of levels of piles and fluids as more is added or subtracted CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS Subjective Judgment: Perception of kinds Sensorimotor Domain: Space Example: “Are tomatoes in the fruit or vegetable category?”

Primary Experience: Observing that things that go together tend to be in the same bounded region (correlation between common location and common properties, functions, or origins.

SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS Subjective Judgment: Similarity Sensorimotor Domain: Proximity in space Example: “These colors aren’t quite the same, but they’re close” Primary Experience: Observing similar objects clustered together (flowers, trees, rocks, buildings, dishes) LINEAR SCALES ARE PATHS Subjective Judgment: Degree Sensorimotor Domain: Motion Example: “John’s intelligence goes way beyond Bill’s” Primary Experience: Observing the amount of progress made by an object in motion (correlation between motion and scalar notion of degree) ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE Subjective Judgment: Abstract unifying relationships Sensorimotor Domain: Experience of physical objects Example: “How do the pieces of this theory fit together?”

Primary Experience: Interacting with complex objects and attending to their structure (correlation between observing part-whole structure and forming cognitive representations of logical relationships) HELP IS SUPPORT Subjective Judgment: Assistance Sensorimotor Domain: Physical Example: “Support your local charities” Primary Experience: Observing that some entities and people require physical support in order to continue functioning

265

TIME IS MOTION Subjective Judgment: The passage of time Sensorimotor Domain: Motion Example: “Time flies” Primary Experience: Experiencing the passage of time as one moves or observes motion STATES ARE LOCATIONS Subjective Judgment: A subjective state Sensorimotor Domain: Being in a bounded region in space Example: “I’m close to being in a depression and the next thing that goes wrong will send me over the edge” Primary Experience: Experiencing a certain state as correlated with a certain location (e.g., being cool under a tree, feeling secure in bed) CHANGE IS MOTION Subjective Judgment: Experiencing a change of state Sensorimotor Domain: Moving Example: “My car has gone from bad to worse lately” Primary Experience: Experiencing the change of state that goes with the change of location as you move ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOTIONS Subjective Judgment: Action Sensorimotor Domain: Moving your body through space Example: “I’m moving right along on the project” Primary Experience: The common action of moving yourself through space, especially in the early years of life PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS Subjective Judgment: Achieving a purpose Sensorimotor Domain: Reaching a destination Example: “He’ll ultimately be successful, but he isn’t there yet” Primary Experience: Reaching destinations throughout everyday life and thereby achieving purposes (e.g., if you want a drink, you have to go to the water cooler) PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS Subjective Judgment: Achieving a purpose Sensorimotor Domain: Object manipulation Example: “I saw an opportunity for success and grabbed it” Primary Experience: Grasping a desired object (correlation between satisfaction and holding a desired physical object)

266 CAUSES ARE PHYSICAL FORCES Subjective Judgment: Achieving results Sensorimotor Domain: Exertion of force Example: “They pushed the bill through Congress Primary Experience: Achieving results be exerting forces on physical objects to move or change them RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES Subjective Judgment: An interpersonal relationship Sensorimotor Domain: Being in an enclosure Example: “We’ve been in a close relationship for years, but it’s beginning to seem confining” Primary Experience: Living in the same enclosed physical space with the people you are most closely related to CONTROL IS UP Subjective Judgment: Being in control Sensorimotor Domain: Vertical orientation Example: “Don’t worry! I’m on top of the situation” Primary Experience: Finding that it is easier to control another person or exert force on an object from above, where you have gravity working with you KNOWING IS SEEING Subjective Judgment: Knowledge Sensorimotor Domain: Vision Example: “I see what you mean” Primary Experience: Getting information about an object by grasping and manipulating it SEEING IS TOUCHING Subjective Judgment: Visual perception Sensorimotor Domain: Touch Example: “She picked my face out of the crowd” Primary Experience: Correlation between the visual and tactile exploration of objects

267

APPENDIX C METAPHORS OF EVENTS AND CAUSES (From Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 170-234)

268 Metaphors of Events and Causes

The Location Event-Structure Metaphor States Are Locations (Interiors of bounded regions in space) Changes Are Movements (Into or out of bounded regions) Causes Are Forces Causation Is Forced Movement (From one location to another) Actions Are Self Propelled Movements Purposes Are Destinations Means Are Paths (To destinations) Difficulties Are Impediments to Motion Freedom of Action Is the Lack of Impediments to Motions External Events Are Large, Moving Objects (That exert force) Long-Term, Purposeful Activities Are Journeys Examples: The patient has not been in a good place emotionally (States as locations).

His depression is lifting (Moving from one place to another).

The intensity of the session pushed her to the brink (Forced movement).

He brought himself out of his grief (Self-propelled motions).

The couple’s goal seems to be a long way off (Purposes as destinations).

They are trying to work through the impasse (Difficulties as impediments to motion).

She’s casting off the chains of an unhealthy relationship (Freedom due to lack of impediments).

The patient, in an upbeat mood, stated “Things seem to be really going with me” (Force exerted by large objects) Therapy is moving slowly but seems to be on the right track (Activities are journeys).

The Object Event-Structure Metaphor Attributes Are Possessions Changes Are Movements Of Possessions (Acquisitions or losses) Causation Is Transfer Of Possessions (Giving or taking) Purposes Are Desired Objects Achieving a Purpose Is Acquiring A Desired Object Achieving A Purpose Is Getting Something To Eat Trying To Achieve A Purpose Is Hunting Trying To Achieve A Purpose Is Fishing Trying To Achieve A Purpose Is Agriculture

269 Examples: He has a severe depression. (Attribute as a possession) The dread seems to have suddenly left him. (Change as loss—motion from) The medication gave him tremors. (Change as acquisition—motion to) She kept getting close to the memory, but it remained just out of her grasp. (Purpose as acquiring an object) After having been chronically rejected, the patient savored the opportunity to display her talents. (Purpose as eating) They are shooting for termination within the year. (Purpose as hunting) She believed him to be fishing for a compliment. (Purpose as fishing) The therapist tried to convince the patient of the potential fruits of their labor. (Purpose as agriculture) Duality Larry’s in trouble (States are Locations) Larry has trouble (Attributes Are Possessions)

270

APPENDIX D METAPHORS OF MIND (From Lakoff and Johnson, pp. 235-266)

271 Metaphors of Mind THE MIND IS A BODY Thinking Is Physical Functioning Ideas Are Entities with an Independent Existence Thinking Of An Idea Is Functioning Physically With Respect To An Independent Existing Entity THINKING IS MOVING The Mind Is A Body Thinking Is Moving Ideas Are Locations Reason Is A Force Rational Thought Is Motion That Is Direct, Deliberate, Step-By-Step, And In Accord With The Force Of Reason Being Unable To Think Is Being Unable To Move A Line Of Thought Is A Path Thinking About X Is Moving In The Area Of X Communicating Is Guiding Understanding Is Following Rethinking Is Going Over The Path Again Examples: Her mind was racing. (Thinking as motion) Where are you in your decision to continue treatment? (Idea as location) The social history led her to the conclusion that biology played a role in the patient’s depression. (Reason as a force) His thoughts seemed irrational, as if going in circles. (Rational thought as direct path to locale) He had a hard time following the patient’s narrative. (Communication/understanding as guiding) I thought we should run this by him again. (Rethinking as retaking path)

THINKING IS PERCEIVING The Mind Is A Body Thinking Is Perceiving Ideas Are Things Perceived Knowing Is Seeing Communication Is Showing Attempting To Gain Knowledge Is Searching Becoming Aware Is Noticing

272 An Aid To Knowing Is A Light Source Being Able To Know Is Being Able To See Being Ignorant Is Being Unable To See Impediments To Knowledge Are Impediments To Vision Deception Is Purposely Impeding Vision Knowing From A “Perspective” Is Seeing From A Point Of View Explaining In Detail Is Drawing A Picture Directing Attention Is Pointing Paying Attention Is Looking At Being Receptive Is Hearing Taking Seriously Is Listening Sensing Is Smelling Emotional Reaction Is Feeling Personal Preference Is Taste Examples: I think I see what you mean. (Thinking as perceiving, seeing) They don’t appreciate being kept in the dark. (Communicating as showing) She is blind to her husband’s infidelity. (Being ignorant as unable to see) It seems like they are just not hearing you. (Being receptive to an idea as hearing) Something about that story just doesn’t smell right. (Sensing as smelling)

THINKING IS OBJECT MANIPULATION The Mind Is A Body Thinking Is Object Manipulation Ideas Are Manipulable Objects Communicating Is Sending Understanding Is Grasping Inability To Understand Is Inability To Grasp Memory Is A Storehouse Remembering Is Retrieval (Or Recall) The Structure Of An Idea Is The Structure Of An Object Analyzing Ideas Is Taking Apart Objects Examples: We’ll have to toss that idea around. (Thinking as object manipulation) She can’t seem to get her feelings across to her therapist. (Communication as sending) That interpretation went right past me. (Understanding as grasping) There seems to be many sides to his countertransference. (Ideas as physical objects) The professor deconstructed the concept of binding. (Analyzing as taking apart objects)

273

ACQUIRING IDEAS IS EATING A Well-Functioning Mind Is A Healthy Body Ideas Are Food Acquiring Ideas Is Eating Interest In Ideas Is Appetite For Food Good Ideas Are Healthful Food Helpful Ideas Are Nutritious Foods Bad Ideas Are Harmful Foods Disturbing Ideas Are Disgusting Foods Interesting, Pleasurable, Ideas Are Appetizing Foods Uninteresting Ideas Are Flavorless Foods Testing The Nature Of Ideas Is Smelling Or Tasting Considering Is Chewing Accepting Is Swallowing Fully Comprehending Is Digesting Ideas That Are Incomprehensible Are Indigestible Preparing Ideas To Be Understood Is Food Preparation Communicating Is Feeding Substantial Ideas Are Meat Examples: She has always had an appetite for learning. (Ideas as food & interests in ideas as appetite) That idea is crap. (Bad or untruthful ideas as unhealthy or harmful food) I’ll have to chew on that for a while. (Considering as chewing) She said it felt as though he just rammed that proposal down her throat. (Accepting is swallowing; comprehending as digesting) That statement left a bad taste in my mouth. (Incomprehensible ideas as indigestible) The student thought he should be spoon-fed the ideas. (Communication is feeding) What a juicy story. (Substantial ideas as meat)

THE MIND IS A MACHINE The Mind Is A Machine Ideas Are Products Of The Machine Thinking Is The Automated Step-By-Step Assembly Of Thoughts Normal Thought Is Normal Operation Of The Machine Inability To Think Is A Failure Of The Machine To Function

274

APPENDIX E METAPHORS OF SELF (From Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, pp. 267-289)

275 Metaphors of Self

The Basic Subject-Self Metaphor Schema The Whole Person

People and Entities A Person A Person or Thing A Relationship

The Subject A Self The Subject-Self Relationship

The Physical Object Self

SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT CONTROL A Person A Physical Object Control Noncontrol

The Subject The Self Control Of Self By Subject Noncontrol Of Self By Subject

The Internal Causation Metaphor

SELF CONTROL IS FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT A Person A Physical Object Forced Movement Lack Of Forced Movement

The Subject The Self Control Of Self By Subject Noncontrol Of Self By Subject

BODY CONTROL IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT A Person A Physical Object Forced Movement Lack Of Forced Movement

Examples: I lifted my arm. (Caused my arm to rise)

The Subject The Body (Instance Of Self) Control Of Body By Subject Noncontrol Of Body By Subject

276 I dragged myself out of bed.

He picked himself up off the ground.

CAUSING THE SELF TO ACT IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT A Person A Physical Object Forced Movement Lack Of Forced Movement

The Subject The Self Subject’s Causing Self To Act Failing To Cause The Self To Act

Examples: He’s pushing himself too hard.

They won’t budge on that proposal.

When will she stop sitting on the fence and make a decision?

SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT POSSESSION A Person A Physical Object Possession Loss Of Possession

The Subject The Self Control Of Self Loss Of Control Of Self

Examples: She lost herself in ecstasy.

He does not have a handle on himself.

The therapist suggested that I need to get a grasp on the situation.

TAKING CONTROL OF ANOTHER’S SELF IS TAKING ANOTHER’S POSSESSION A Person A Physical Object Possession Loss Of Possession Some Other Person Taking Possession

A Subject A Self Control Of Self Loss Of Control Of Self Some Other Subject Taking Control Of Self

Examples: The batter really got into (took possession) the pitcher’s head.

That was the whiskey talking (controlling self) yesterday, not me.

277

The Locational Self

SELF CONTROL IS BEING IN ONE’S NORMAL LOCATION A Person Normal Location Being In A Normal Location Not Being In A Normal Location

The Subject The Self Being In Control Of Self Not Being In Control Of Self

The Subject The Self Control Of Subject By Self Out Of Control Of The Self

THE SELF AS CONTAINER A Person A Container Located in Container Not Located In Container Examples: I was beside myself. (Outside self = out of normal control of self) She was really out to lunch during that presentation.

Is he out of his mind?

SELF CONTROL AS BEING ON THE GROUND A Person Being On The Ground Not Being On The Ground Being High

The Subject Being In Control Of The Self Not Being In Control Of Self Euphoria

Examples: She really has her feet on the ground.

He seemed to be floating off during the lecture.

My head is in the clouds.

278 The Scattered Self

ATTENTIONAL SELF CONTROL IS HAVING THE SELF TOGETHER

A Person A Unified Container The Container Fragmented Located In One Place Not Located In One Place

The Subject The Normal Self The Scattered Self Normal Attentional Control Lack Of Attentional Control

Examples: Pull yourself together man!

When is that dissertator going to get it together?

She’s all over the place.

Getting Outside Yourself The Objective Standpoint Metaphor A Person A Container Seeing From Inside Seeing From Outside

The Subject The Self Subjective Knowledge Objective Knowledge

Examples: They need to take a good look at themselves in the mirror.

He better watch what he does.

You need to step outside yourself.

The Social Self Metaphor One Person Another Person Evaluative Social Relationship Examples: Subject and Self as Adversaries: She’s conflicted over the decision.

He’s his own worst enemy.

The Subject The Self Evaluative Subject-Self Relationship

279 She is at war with herself over whom to choose.

Subject as Parent and the Self as Child: She is really good at pampering herself.

I need to wean myself from sweets.

He needs to learn how to mother himself every once in a while.

Subject and Self as Friends: I need to be a better friend to myself.

I like myself.

I like hanging out with myself.

Subject and Self as Interlocutors: I convinced myself to quit smoking.

I debated with myself over whether to go to the party.

I had a talk with myself about the poor performance.

Subject as Caretaker of Self: He takes good care of himself.

She nursed herself back to health.

You should be kind to yourself.

Subject as Master, Self as Servant: I’m disappointed in myself.

I made myself do the long reading.

I told myself that I needed to study more.

The Subject is obligated to meet the standards of the Self: Be true to yourself.

I let myself down.

You are betraying yourself.

The Multiple Selves Metaphor A Person Other People Their Social Roles Being In The Same Place As Being In Different Places

The Subject Selves The Values Attached To The Roles Having The Same Value As Having Different Values

280

Examples: My artist self keeps gnawing at my scientific self.

The gambler in me says let’s take a chance.

She is trying to get back to her spiritual self.

The Essential Self Metaphor Person 1 Person 2 Person 3

The Subject, With The Essence Self 1, The Real Self (Fits The Essence) Self 2, Not Real Self (Doesn’t Fit Essence)

Constraint: The Values Of The Subject Are The Values Of Self 1 Examples: The Inner Self: Self 1 (Real Self) is hidden inside Self 2, the Outer Self, because the Real Self is fragile and shy and does not want anyone to know he is there, or both.

She won’t reveal her real self to anyone.

I retreated into myself after that disappointment.

His cordiality is just a façade.

The External Real Self (Real Me): Self 2, who is awful in some way, is hidden inside Self 1, the Real Self, who is quite nice. But when the Real Self lets its guard down, the Awful Self comes out.

I’m just not myself today.

That wasn’t the real me talking yesterday.

She finally showed the real Sally.

The True Self: All his life, the Subject has been inhibiting Self 2, which is incompatible with the Subject’s Essence. Self 1, which is compatible with the Subject’s Essence, is somewhere unknown, and the Subject is trying to find his “true” Self, the one compatible with his Essence, with who he really is.

She’s getting in touch with herself.

I’m searching for my true self.

She’s found herself as a social worker.

281

APPENDIX F METAPHORS OF TIME (From Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, pp. 137-169)

282 Metaphors of Time

The Time Orientation Metaphor The Location Of The Observer The Space In Front Of the Observer The Space Behind The Observer

The Present The Future The Past

Embodiment and the Time Orientation Metaphor: What we will encounter in the future is ahead of us.

What we are encountering in the present is where we are.

What we encountered in the past is behind us.

The Moving Time Metaphor

Objects The Motion Of Objects Past The Observer

Times The “Passage” Of Time

Embodiment and the Time Orientation Metaphor: What we will encounter in the future is moving toward us.

What we are encountering now is moving by (passing) us.

What we encountered in the past has moved past us.

Combination: The Time Orientation and Moving Time Metaphor The Location Of The Observer The Space In Front of the Observer The Space Behind The Observer Objects The Motion Of Objects (Past The Observer)

The Present The Future The Past Times The “Passage” Of Time

The Moving Observer Metaphor Locations On Observer’s Path Of Motion The Motion Of The Observer The Distance Moved By The Observer

Times The “Passage” of Time The Amount Of Time “Passed”

283

Embodiment and the Moving Time Metaphor: What we will encounter in the future is what we are moving towards.

What we are encountering now is what we are moving by.

What we encountered in the past is what we moved past.

Combination: The Moving Observer and Time Orientation Metaphor The Location Of The Observer The Space In Front Of The Observer The Space Behind The Observer Locations On The Observer’s Path Of Motion The Motion Of The Observer The Distance Moved By The Observer

The Present The Future The Past Times The “Passage” Of Time The Amount Of Time “Passed”

284

APPENDIX G

THE EMBODIED MIND’S CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT: NINE MYTHS ABOUT HUMAN REASON FROM TRADTIONAL PHILOSOPHY (From Lakoff and Johnson, 1999)

285 1. Reality comes divided up into categories that exist independently of the specific properties of human minds, brains, or bodies.

2. The world has a rational structure: The relationships among categories in the world are characterized by a transcendent or universal reason, which is independent of any peculiarities of human minds, brains, and bodies.

3. The concepts used by mind-, brain-, and body-free reason correctly characterize the mind-, brain-, and body-free categories of reality.

4. Human reason is the capacity of the human mind to use transcendent reason, or at least a portion of it. Human reason may be performed by the human brain, but the structure of human reason is defined by transcendent reason, independent of human bodies or brains.

Thus, the structure of human reason is disembodied.

5. Human concepts are the concepts of transcendent reason. They are therefore defined independent of human brains or bodies, and so they too are disembodied.

6. Human concepts therefore characterize the objective categories of mind-, brain-, and body-free reality. That is, the world has a unique, fixed category structure, and we all know it and use it when we are reasoning correctly.

7. What makes us essentially human is our capacity for disembodied reason.

8. Since transcendent reason is culture-free, what makes us essentially human is not our capacity for culture or for interpersonal relations.

9. Since reason is disembodied, what makes us essentially human is not our relation to the material world. Our essential humanness has nothing to do with our connection to nature or to art to music or to anything of the senses.

286

APPENDIX H

THE SURGEON IS A BUTCHER BLEND (Reproduced from Grady, Coulson & Oakley, 1999)

287

GENERIC SPACE

Agent Sharp Instrument Work space Procedure (Goal/Means)

Role: Surgeon

Role: Butcher

Identity of Surgeon Role: Patient MENTAL SPACE Input # 1

Role: Commodity MENTAL SPACE

Identity of Patient Scalpel

Cleaver

Operating Room

Abattoir

Goal: Healing

Goal: Serving Flesh

Means: Surgery

Means: Butchery

Identity of Surgeon Role Butcher Identity of Patient Role Patient (Person) Cleaver? Scalpel? Unspecified Operating Room Goal: Healing

Means: Butchery

Meaning: INCOMPETENCE

BLENDED SPACE

Input # 2

288

APPENDIX I

“THE BYPASS” BLEND (From, Fauconnier and Turner, 2002)

289

Ad from Education Excellence Partnership Website, 2001.

290

APPENDIX J

“THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS” BLEND

291

GENERIC SPACE

Agent Emotion Cultural Beliefs/Expectations Related Embodied Metaphors Intention/Goal

Infant 1

INPUT 1

Infant 2

Love

Hate

Loves instinctively

Does not hate (Or hates only reactively)

LOVE IS WARM LOVE IS SOFT LOVE IS CLOSE

HATE IS COLD HATE IS HARD HATE IS DISTANT

Love attracts and binds

Hate distances and repels

Infant inherent capacity for love and hate Attention called to expanded qualities of (presumably) opposing forces: Erotic aspects of aggression HATE IS LOVE - “I hate (really love) you” HATE IS HOT - “She’s hot under the collar” Aggressive aspects of love LOVE IS WAR - “He conquered her” LOVE IS VORACIOUS - “I love her to death” Implied Blended Meanings: Aggression is generative (means by which accurate perception of separate and lovable object occurs) as a function of the transformation (“fusion”) of love and hate in transitional (e.g., blended) space

BLENDED SPACE

INPUT 2

292

APPENDIX K

RAPPAPORT AND GILL’S (1959) METAPSYCHOLOGICAL POINTS OF VIEW AND ASSUMPTIONS WITH RELATED CONCEPTUAL AND PSYCHOANALYTICALLY-DERIVED METAPHORS

293 1. The Dynamic Point of View (Forces) Definition: The dynamic point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of any psychological phenomenon include propositions concerning the psychological forces involved in the phenomenon.

Assumptions: (a) There are psychological forces; (b) Psychological forces are defined by direction and magnitude; (c) The effect of simultaneously acting psychological forces may be the simple resultant work of each of these forces; (d) The effect of simultaneously acting psychological forces may not be the simple resultant work of each of these forces.

Related Conceptual Metaphors: Causes Are Forces, Change Is Movement, Purposes Are Destinations, The Mind Is a Body, Thinking Is Moving Psychoanalytic-Derived Metaphors: Drives Are Forces, Affects Are Forces, Instincts Are Forces, Forces Are Pleasure-Seeking, Forces Are Pain/Anxiety Avoidant, Forces Are Object-Seeking, Forces Seek Equilibrium, Fusion Is the Equilibrium of Forces 2. The Economic Point of View (Energy) Definition: The economic point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of any psychological phenomenon include propositions concerning the psychological energy involved in the phenomenon.

Assumptions: (a) There are psychological energies; (b) Psychological energy follow a law of conservation; (c) Psychological energies are subject to transformations, which increase or decrease entropic tendency.

Related Conceptual Metaphors: Causes Are Forces (which act on energy), Change is Motion, Similarity Is Closeness, More Is Up, Less Is Less Is Down, Psychoanalytic-Derived Metaphors: Energy Is Quantity, Cathexis Is Energetic Attraction To Objects, Fusion Is Binding (Binding Is Close), Defusion Is Scattering (Defusion Is Far Away) 3. The Structural Point of View (Id, Ego, Superego) Definition: The structural point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of any psychological phenomenon include propositions concerning the abiding psychological configurations (structures) involved in the phenomenon.

Assumptions: (a) There are psychological structures; (b) Structures are configurations of a slow rate of change; (c) Structures are configurations within which, between which, and by means of which mental processes take place; (d) structures are hierarchically ordered.

294 Related Conceptual Metaphors: States Are Locations, The Mind Is A Body, Change Is Motion Psychoanalytic-Derived Metaphors: The Id Is The Location Of Instinctual Energy, The Id Is Pleasure Seeking, The Ego Is The Location Of Organized Activity, The Ego Is A Regulator, The Ego Is Adaptation, The Ego Is The Self, The Superego Is The Location of Internalized Of Parental Attitudes, The Superego Is Conscience, Change Is The Movement Of Forces/Energy From One Location To Another 4. The Genetic Point of View (Individual History) Definition: The genetic point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of any psychological phenomenon include propositions concerning its psychological origin and development.

Assumptions: (a) All psychological phenomenon have a psychological origin and development; (b) All psychological phenomena originate in innate givens, which mature according to an epigenetic ground plan; (c) The earlier forms of a psychological phenomenon, though superseded by later forms, remain potentially active; (d) At the point of psychological history the totality of potentially active earlier forms codetermines all subsequent psychological phenomena.

Related Conceptual Metaphors: Change Is Motion, Lack Of Motion Is No-Change, Time Is Movement, Time Is Location (Behind Is Past, In Front Of Is Future, Beside Is Present) Psychoanalytic-Derived Metaphors: Transference Is Enactment Of Past In Present, Repetition Is Attempt To Master Past, Behavior Is Attempt to Maintain (Past) Object Ties 5. The Adaptive Point of View (Person-Environmental Fit) Definition: The adaptive point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of any psychological phenomenon include propositions concerning its relationship to the environment.

Assumptions: (a) There exist states of adaptiveness and processes of adaptation at every point of life; (b) The processes (autoplastic and/or alloplastic) adaptation maintain, restore, and improve the existing states of adaptiveness and thereby ensure survival; (c) Man adapts to his society—both to the physical and human environments which are its products; (d) Adaptation relationships are mutual; man and environment adapt to each other.

Related Conceptual Metaphors: Relationships Are Enclosures, Similarity Is Closeness, Health Is Balance Psychoanalytic-Derived Metaphors: Adaption Is Health, Adaptation Is Survival, Internal Object Relationships Are Attempts To Maximize Adaptation With External Objects

295

APPENDIX L

WINNICOTT’S “THE TREE” (From Rodman, 2003)

296 “The Tree” Someone touched the hem of my garment Someone, someone, someone I had much virtue to give I was the source of virtue the grape of the vine of the wine I could have loved a woman Mary, Mary, Mary There was not time for loving I must be about my father’s business There were publicans and sinners The poor we had always with us There were those sick of palsy and the blind and the maimed and widows bereft and grieving women wailing for their children fathers with prodigal sons prostitutes drawing their own water from deep wells in the hot sun Mother is below weeping weeping weeping Thus I knew her Once stretched out on her lap as now on dead tree I learned to make her smile to stem her tears to undo her guilt to cure her inward death To enliven her was my living So she became wife, mother, home The carpenter enjoyed his craft Children came and loved and were loved Suffer little children to come unto me Now mother is weeping She must weep The sins of the whole world weigh less than this Woman’s heaviness O Glastonbury

297

Must I bring even these thorns to flower? even this dead tree to leaf?

How, in agony Held by dead wood that has no need of me By the cruelty of the nail’s hatred of gravity’s inexorable and heartless pull I thirst No garment now No hem to be touched It is I who need virtue Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani?

It is I who die I who die I die I

298

APPENDIX M

TENETS OF EMPIRICAL VERSUS CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH IN PSYCHOANALYSIS (From Dreher, 2000)

299 Empirical Research

1. Empirical research in psychoanalysis involves all those research activities that claim to generate and integrate relevant empirical evidence for psychoanalytic theory. (Evidence is interpreted broadly here, more broadly than, for instance, the term “datum”, which usually has a technical meaning and often designates a quantitative measurement, which again results from the operationalization of a concept).

2. Empirical research means all classical case studies produced on a clinicalpsychoanalytic basis—that is, those that have as their basis of evidence the analytic situation between analysand and analyst. The analyst himself processes the data and organizes them.

3. Empirical research also refers to research activities where the basis of evidence comprises only a segment of the analytic situation—for example, tape transcripts—and to activities where other persons participating in the research organize the data in a systemic way (e.g., recent quantitative psychotherapy research). Here researchers go beyond their original data by collecting further empirical data—for example, questionnaires or frequencies from coding systems.

4. Similar procedures exist in research relevant to psychoanalysis, where empirical data are imported from neighboring disciplines—for example, psychology, medicine, or ethnology.

Conceptual Research 1. Conceptual research involves whether the concepts used and the statements derived from them are logically consistent and compatible with other theoretical statements. Such examinations of logical consistency would include formal concept analyses, which are common today in the cognitive sciences.

2. Conceptual research is concerned with the analysis of the use of a concept within a defined conceptual field—as in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy—that is, with the rules of its use in a specific scientific or practical context; this type of research is commonly referred to as the “(philosophical) analysis of concepts.”

3. Conceptual research in psychoanalysis attempts to widen the narrow framework of a clarification of concepts solely determined by logic and is thus more closely related to the (philosophical) analysis of the use of a concept. It has as its focus the central concepts of psychoanalysis (e.g., trauma or transference). Its main concern is the optimal clarification of such concepts while taking into account the latest developments in psychoanalytic research, whereby historical development of a concept and its current use in clinical practice are not neglected.

300

APPENDIX N EGO PSYCHOLOGY’S CRITIQUE OF KLEINIAN THEORY (From Kernberg, 1969)

301 Ego Psychology’s Critique of Kleinian Theory and Technique

Regarding Kleinian Theory 1. The concept of an inborn death instinct, and the concept of such death instinct as being the crucial determinant of anxiety, are rejected as an unwarranted extension of Freud's speculative hypothesis regarding a death instinct, and as a dogmatic statement not backed by any convincing facts.

2. The concept of an innate knowledge of the genitals of both sexes and of sexual intercourse is rejected on the basis of lack of evidence for such inborn knowledge and the contradiction between such elaborate knowledge and the very immature quality of psychic functioning in the first few months of life.

3. Melanie Klein's lack of consideration of biological development, both anatomical and physiological, on the one hand, and psychical on the other hand, is criticized as a general feature of her theory of early development. The stress on constitutional and instinctual factors in her theories, matched with neglect of epigenetic development, is seen as a pseudo-biological orientation.

4. The 'pushing back' of intrapsychic development, especially that of complex relationships between oedipal and pre-oedipal conflicts, into the first few months of life, appears unjustifiable from the viewpoint of the clinical evidence presented. The cases of children analysed from the age of 2 years old on, in which early oedipal material can be found, and relationships between pregenital and genital conflicts, may present a regressive pregenital expression of genital conflicts, a 'retroactive' colouring of early experiences with later material; direct observation of children in the first year of life provides evidence regarding a capacity for anxiety, depression, and probable fantasy formation, but not of the complexity and kind which Kleinian authors accept as facts.

5. Ego-psychological authors criticize the neglect of environmental factors in Kleinian writing, in spite of lip service given to the importance of these factors.

6. Strong criticism is expressed of the lack of consideration of structural differentiation within both ego and superego formation, and the relative neglect of development within all psychic instances. How 'internal objects' are integrated into ego and superego, how later developments differ from earlier ones, how progression, fixation and regression determine an individualized history of psychological development, are neglected within Kleinian formulation.

7. The lack of differentiation of normal from pathological development is criticized, with the implicit equalization of development of neurotic, borderline, and psychotic personality development. Clinically this is reflected in the neglect of differential psychopathology, and of the relationship between diagnosis and treatment.

302 8. The vagueness and ambiguity of Kleinian terminology is criticized as a major stumbling-block preventing clarification of Kleinian theory itself, of internal inconsistencies within that theory, and of the possible relationships between that theory and the mainstream of psychoanalysis.

Regarding Kleinian Technique 1. The application of the same, non-modified psychoanalytic technique to patients with all levels of severity of illness, from neurotics to psychopaths and schizophrenics (Segal, 1967), in itself the consequence of the neglect of descriptive psychopathology by Kleinian authors, is criticized from the viewpoint of overwhelming clinical experience indicating that psychotic patients and a good number of borderline conditions and antisocial personality structures do not respond well to the psychoanalytic approach.

2. The relative neglect of reality in the understanding of the psychoanalytic situation has been criticized, and the related overextension of the concept of transference. This criticism and the following three on this list are especially important regarding the opening phases of a Kleinian analysis.

3. Ego-psychological authors criticize the neglect by Kleinians of the defensive organization of the patient, especially the natural structuring of defences in the early phases of analysis. The premature, 'deep' interpretations of unconscious fantasy and transference manifestations bypassing the defensive structure create the danger of an intellectual indoctrination of patients, in contrast to the natural upsurge of deep, unconscious material when the defences against it are resolved through interpretation.

4. The lack of deepening of the analytic relationship as a consequence of interpreting the same constellation of primitive conflicts again and again, from the beginning of the analysis on, has been pointed out as a consequence of premature transference interpretations and the neglect of advanced ego defences, and especially of the patient's character structure.

5. The combination of a peculiar use of terms related to infantile development, the consistently active behaviour of the analyst, the atmosphere of certainty within which interpretations are given, may determine a special analytic situation as part of some Kleinian analyses in which the patient submits his productions and language to an indoctrinating effect thus, in appearances, confirming the analyst's theories by associations centering on those theories and the language associated with them.

Let us now examine the aspects of Kleinian theory and technique which have been accepted and integrated into the mainstream of psychoanalysis. Some of these aspects have already been mentioned or implicitly acknowledged as part of the ego-psychological critique of the Kleinian orientation.

303

Accepted and Integrated Theory 1. The importance of early object relations both in normal and in pathological development has been generally accepted. The importance of the development of a potential for depressive reaction in the first year of life, and of its fundamental importance for future development, is also generally accepted. The simultaneous development of narcissism and object relationships in contrast to the older model of an objectless stage of development is a definite feature of recent psychoanalytic thinking (van der Waals, 1965).

2. The importance of the defensive constellations described by Kleinians as paranoidschizoid, depressive, and manic has been acknowledged by authors of the egopsychological orientation working with borderline and psychotic patients. Although neglect of later defensive operations (such as repression, reaction formation, and other related defences of the fully developed ego) within the Kleinian orientation, and overemphasis on pregenital conflicts (as the conflicts underlying the defensive operations described in the Kleinian 'positions') are criticized by ego-psychological authors, selective use of the new understandings of early defensive operations provided by the Kleinian orientation has improved the overall diagnostic and therapeutic armamentarium of psychoanalysis (Kernberg, 1966, 1967).

3. The importance of aggression in early development is now generally accepted, although not with the overriding emphasis that Melanie Klein gave to it.

4. There is a general tendency to accept early superego formation, probably starting from the second year of life on, and the importance of early superego structures on early and later psychic development (Jacobson, 1964).

5. The relationships between early genital development and pregenital conflicts, and the influence of pregenital factors on the sexual development of both sexes and on the pathological sexual developments in severe character pathology, have been integrated by many non-Kleinian authors. The presence of oedipal conflicts from the second or third year on has been acknowledged by ego-psychological child analysts (A. Freud, 1951).

Accepted and Integrated Technique 1. The application of classical psychoanalytic technique to children is a generally acknowledged, major contribution of Melanie Klein. Geleerd's acceptance of Klein's viewpoints regarding the Anna Freud–Melanie Klein controversy of the 1920s probably reflects the general attitude of many non-Kleinian child analysts. There is a growing consensus that children are able to develop full-blown transference neuroses (Harley, 1966).

304 2. There is an increasing technical utilization of the new understandings regarding early defensive operations provided by Melanie Klein and her followers. This is especially reflected in the interpretation of splitting of ego states as a defence, in the understanding of negative therapeutic reaction as a possible consequence of unconscious envy, in the focus on projective identification and its relationship to counter-transference, and in the interpretation of omnipotence and devaluation as narcissistic defences (Kernberg, 1968); (Searles, 1963); (Winnicott, 1962).

3. The understanding (if not necessarily management through interpretation) of the above-mentioned mechanisms and other early defensive operations as the predominant problems in the transference development of borderline and psychotic patients has contributed to the increasing diagnostic refinement and therapeutic hopefulness regarding these previously considered unapproachable forms of psychopathology. In this regard, the interest of Searles and other workers from the Sullivanian influenced group in Kleinian concepts is an indirect indication of the relevance of these concepts for the work with regressed patients. In general, the fact that psychotic patients do present transference reactions, a transference psychosis in contrast to the transference neurosis of less regressed patients, is quite generally accepted now (Zetzel, 1967).

4. The focus on regressive features and the activation of early defensive operations in the opening phase of psychoanalysis has been acknowledged as an important contribution from the Kleinian orientation. Zetzel's acceptance that such early determinants of ego development are activated in the opening phase is relevant here.

305

APPENDIX O

REVEALED CONCEPTUAL (EMBODIED) METAPHORS

306 LIST OF REVEALED CONCEPUTAL METAPHORS PAGE

1. Winnicottian Ontology

Aggression AGGRESSION IS SELF-ASSERTION………………………………..……………......65 AGGRESSION IS PURPOSEFUL ACTION………………………………...………....65 AGGRESSION IS GENERATIVE ENERGY………………………………….……….65 FUSION IS THE CREATION OF GENERATIVE AGGRESSION………………..…..66 .

AGGRESSION IS BINDING………………………….………………………….……..72 AGGRESSION IS INTEGRATION………………………………….………….……....72 INBORN AGGRESSION IS VARIABLE…………………………………………..…206 POTENTIAL VARIABLITY IN AGRESSION IS ENVIRONMENTAL………….…206 CLINICAL AGGRESSION IS GENERATIVE………………………………………..206

Annihilation ANNIHILATION IS NO HOPE IN OBJECT RELATING STATES…………………210 ANNIHILATION IS THE ELIMINATION OF CATHEXIS………………………….210 ANNIHILATION IS OBJECTLESSNESS…………………………………………….210

Destruction DESTRUCTION IS MOVEMENT OF THE OBJECT OUTSIDE NARCISSISTIC SPACE…..…………………………………………….………………..……………....173 DESTRUCTION IS THE BIRTH OF REALITY……………………………………...173

307

DESTRUCTION IS LOVE……………………..……….……………………….…….173 DESTRUCTION IS THE BIRTH OF FANTASY………………………….…………174 MAXIMAL DESTRUCTIVENESS IS OBJECT VULNERABILITY….…………….190 MAXIMAL DESTRCUTIVENESS IS EXPANDED PERCEPTUAL CAPACITY………………………………………………………………………….…190 DESTRUCTION IS THE MAINTENANCE OF LOVE………………………………197 DESTRUCTION IS REMOVAL OF THE BREAST FROM OMNIPOTENT SPACE………………………………………………………………………………….200 DESTRUCTION OF THE BREAST IS THE ACUTAL IMPLUSE TO DESTROY…200 (ACTUAL) DESTRCUTION IS THE OBJECT’S FAILURE TO SURVIVE………...201 DESTRUCTION IS HOPE IN OBJECT USAGE STATES…………………….……..209 DESTRUCTION IS JOY……………………………………………………………….210 DESTRUCTION IN FANTASY IS CREATION IN REALITY………………………210 DESTRUCTION IS PERCEPTION……………………………………………………210

Environment INHERITANCE IS ENVIRONMENT……………………………...………………….206 ENVIRONMENT IS IMPINGEMENT…………………………………….…….…….225 ENVIRONMENT IS NOXIOUS……………………………………………...………..225

Fusion FUSION IS THE CREATION OF GENERATIVE AGGRESSION……………………66 UNFUSED AGGRESSION IS POTENTIAL (ACTUAL) DESTRUCTION………….202 INSTINCTUAL FUSION IS ENCOMPASSED AGGRESSION……………………..202

308

Mother MOTHER IS ENVIRONMENT………………………………………………..……….72 MOTHER IS EMOTIONAL NOURISHMENT……………………………..…………72 MOTHER IS A BODILY ORGAN……………………………………………………..72 MOTHER IS A CONTAINER………………………………………………………….72 MOTHER IS SPACE……………………………………………………………………73 MOTHER IS OBJECT……………………………………………………….……….…73 MOTHER IS SUPPORT…………..……………………………………..…….…….….74 MOTHER IS WARMTH……………………………………………………….…….….74 MOTHER IS EMOTIONAL NOURISHMENT…………………………….…………..74 MOTHER IS IMPINGEMENT…………………………………………………….……74 MOTHER IS NOXIOUS…………………………………………………………….…..74 MOTHER IS METAPHOR…………………………………………………………..….76

Object Relating OBJECT RELATING IS CANNIBALISM……………………....………..…………..191 ATTACK IN ANGER IS POST-OBJECT RELATING ACTIVITY………………….210

Omnipotence OMNIPOTENCE IS RELINGUISHING CONTROL……………………………..…..168 OMNIPOTENCE IS A GENERATIVE USE OF CONTROL…………………………168 THE BIRTH OF REALITY IS AN OMNIPOTENT ACT OF SELF CONTROL…….168

309

Perception HOLDING IS UNDERSTANDING……………………………………….…….……..74 PERCEPTIONS IN NARCISSISTIC SPACE ARE DISTORTIONS AND OBSTACLES……………………………………………………………….…….…....125 REMOVING OBSTACLES IS BEING ABLE TO SEE FROM BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE……………..………………………………………………………....126 REMOVING OBSTACLES IS BEING ABLE TO MOVE INTO OTHER SPACE….126 FINDING OTHER (“NOT ME”) OBJECTS IN OTHER SPACE IS FINDING REALITY AND TRUE SELF…………………………………………………….…....126 ACCURATE PERCEPTION IS A LOSS OF SELF……………………………..….…139 USING IS BEING ABLE TO USE…………………………………………………….158 UNDERSTANDING IS LETTING GO………………………………………………..168

Reality POSSESSION OF TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS IS REALITY………….…………..…74 KNOWING IS NOT SEEING…………………………………………………….……179 KNOWING IS SEEING AND NOT SEEING…………………………………….…...179 REALITY IS SEEING AND NOT SEEING IN ORDINARY AND EXPANDED TIME……………………………………………………………………………………180 KNOWING IS SEEING THAT WHICH IS PRESENTLY VISIBLE IN ORDINARY TIME……………...…………………………………………………………………….180 KNOWING IS NOT SEEING THAT WHICH ONCE EXISTED BUT WAS ABOLISHED OR ALTERED IN EXPANDED TIME………………………………..181

Retaliation RETALIATION IS COLUSION WITH A DELUSIONAL THOUGHT……………..197

310 RETALIATION IS UNRELIABILITY………………………………………………..197 RETALIATION IS BEYOND DEATH……………………………………………….197

Self FEEDING ON THE SELF (“ME”) IS NOXIOUS……………………………………...74 FEEDING ON THE NUTRITIOUS OTHER (“NOT ME”) IS HEALTHY……………74 FINDING THE TRUE SELF IS FINDING THE EXTERNAL WORLD……….…….111 THE TRUE SELF IS HIDDEN IN SUBJECTIVE (NARCISSISTIC) SPACE……….125 MOVEMENT IS THE SEPARATION OF SELF AND OBJECT……………….……139 THE FALSE SELF IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO (FINDING) THE TRUE SELF………143 THE SELF IS NOXIOUS……………………………………………………….…..….149 LONLINESS IS UNITY………………………………………………………….…….229

Survival SURVIVAL IS DIGESTION…………………………………………..…………..……74 SURVIVAL IS MUTABILITY………………………………………………..……….190 SURVIVAL IS NOT RETALIATING………………………………………….…..….190 SURVIVAL AND NON-RETALIATION IS LOVE………………………………..…197 SURVIVAL IS POTENTIAL DESTRUCTION…………………………………….…201

Therapy INTERPRETATIONS ARE IMPEDIMENTS…………………………………….…..119 LIFE IS THERAPY……………………………………………………………………131

311 THERAPY IS BREASTFEEDING………………………………………………...….150 THE ANALYST IS A MOTHER…………………………………………………...…150 .

THE PATIENT IS AN INFANT…………………………………………………..…..150 THE ANALYST IS A VEHICLE…………………………………………………..….151 THE THERAPIST IS AN INTERROGATOR……………………….…………….….157 PREMATURE KNOWLEDGE IS DESTRUCTIVE…………….……………………157 IMPINGEMENT IS A RESTRICTOR OF (POTENTIAL) SPACE………………….157 RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES……………………………………………..166 INTERPRETATION IS SELF-DEFENSE…………………………………………….197 INTERPRETATION IS ROTTEN FOOD……………………………………………..197 RELATIONSHIPS ARE HIERARCHIES………………………………….…….……209 PERPETUAL THERAPY IS THE ABSENCE OF AN UNCONSCIOUS BACKCLOTH OF DESTRUCTION…………………………..…………..……….….210

Time TIME IS AN IMPEDIMENT……………………………………………………….…121 TIME IS THE CREATION OF SPACE………………………………………………139 TIME IS MOVEMENT IN SPACE (INTO AND OUT OF SELF-SPACE).…………139

Transitional Space TRANSITIONAL SPACE IS THE CREATOR OF TIME……………………………147 TRANSITIONAL SPACE IS SUSPENDED TIME…………………….……………..148 TRANSITIONAL SPACE IS THE PATH BETWEEN STATES OF MIND…………148 TRANSFORMATION IS THE SIMULTANEOUS CREATION OF TIME AND A

312 SEPARATE OBJECT IN TRANSITIONAL SPACE………………………………….217

2. General Psychoanalytic AGGRESSION IS SELFISH…………………………………………………………….65 AGGRESSION IS DEATH……………………………………………………………...65 AGGRESSION IS DESTRUCTION…………………………………………………….65 AGGRESSION IS DEFENSIVE.………………………………………..………………65 FUSION IS BALANCE………………………………………………………………….65 DEFUSION IS IMBALANCE.………………………………………………...………..65 BALANCE IS HEALTH.……………………………………………………………......66 FUSION IS THE CREATION OF GENERATIVE AGGRESSION…………………... 66 DEVELOPMENT IS A PATH…………………………………………………….….…98 TRANSFERENCE IS A JOURNEY……………………………………………….…..119 PROJECTION IS EVACUATION………………………………………………..……138 PROJECTION IS MOVEMENT………………………………………………….……138 PROJECTION IS DISTORTED SEEING…………………………………………......138 THE THERAPIST IS A MACHINE…………………………………………….…..…142 PSYCHIC IMPORTANCE IS DEPTH…………………………………………….…..192 CURATIVE INTERPREATIONS ARE DEEP………………………………………..192

3. Kleinian Model PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION IS DEPLETION OF THE SELF.…….……...…...133 PROJECTION IS FEELING………………..……………………………..……...……138 PROJECTION IS SEEING……………………………………….………….…….…..138

313

PROJECTION IS THE MOVEMENT (SPLITTING) OF THE EGO INTO OTHER OBJECTS…………………………………………………..………………….….….....138

4. Positivistic Science View A FACT (SYMPTOM) IS THE PRODUCT OF CAUSES…….……………………….44 CAUSES CREATE FACTS………………………………………………………….….44

5. Hermeneutic View MEANINGS ARE CAUSES…………………………………………………………….45 MEANINGS ARE FORCES…………………………………………………………….45

6. General AGGRESSION IS SELFISH……………………………………………………..……...65 AGGRESSION IS DEATH…………………………………………………….………..65 AGGRESSION IS DESTRUCTION…………………………………………….………65 AGGRESSION IS DEFENSIVE……………………………………………….………..65

314

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