THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
The International Institute for Strategic Studies Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 2pg | UK www.iiss.org
Š September 2019 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
Editor Dr William Choong
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
Contributors Henry Boyd, Siow Boon Chia, Nick Childs, Virginia
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
Comolli, Michael Elleman, Dr Bastian Giegerich, James Hackett,
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
Dr Tim Huxley, Alexander Neill, Meia Nouwens, Sarah Raine
from the Institute.
Editorial Jessica Watson, Jill Lally Production and Design Carolina Vargas
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Hobbs the Printers Ltd, Hampshire.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies is an independent centre for research, information and debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content. The Council and Staff of the Institute are international and its membership is drawn from over 90 countries. The Institute is independent and it alone decides what activities to conduct. It owes no allegiance to any government, any group of governments or any political or other organisation. The IISS stresses rigorous research with a forward-looking policy orientation and places particular emphasis on bringing new perspectives to the strategic debate.
Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chapter 1 Keynote address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Chapter 2 First plenary session The US vision for Indo-Pacific security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Chapter 3 Second plenary session Korean security: the next steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Chapter 4 Third plenary session Asia’s evolving security order and its challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Chapter 5 Simultaneous special sessions Session 1 Security implications of regional infrastructural development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Session 2 Strategic interests and competition in the South Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Session 3 Defence-industrial development: balancing self-reliance and collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Session 4 Cyber-capability development: defence implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Session 5 Mechanisms for enhancing maritime security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Session 6 New patterns of defence cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38 40 42 44 46 48
Chapter 6 Istana Reception and Dinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Chapter 7 Fourth plenary session China and international security cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Chapter 8 Fifth plenary session Preventing conflict in contested domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Chapter 9 Sixth plenary session Ensuring a stable and resilient region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Chapter 10 The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Appendices I. Selected press coverage of the 2019 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 II. Selected IISS publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
FOREWORD
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) held
with Canada’s defence minister and the commander of the
its 18th annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore from
US Indo-Pacific Command.
31 May to 2 June 2019. We are delighted to present this
As ever, discussions and debate at the Dialogue
report, which summarises the Dialogue’s open proceed-
reflected the regional security issues at the forefront of con-
ings, including all plenary and special sessions. The full
cern for defence establishments and the non-government
transcripts of these sessions are available on the IISS web-
expert community alike. The key topics discussed included
site. This report also includes a section on the Dialogue’s
the security roles of the United States and China; the next
Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme (SEAYLP).
steps for Korean security; the challenges for Asia’s evolv-
The 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue – which opened with
ing security order; the prevention of conflict in contested
a keynote address from Singaporean Prime Minister Lee
domains; the security implications of regional infrastruc-
Hsien Loong – provided defence ministers, senior defence
tural development; and strategic interests and competition
officials, high-ranking military staff and other distin-
in the South Pacific.
guished delegates from Asia-Pacific national-security
The IISS is grateful to the government of Singapore for
establishments with an invaluable opportunity to examine
its continuing support for the Shangri-La Dialogue process
and discuss current and developing security issues affect-
in 2019. Under the terms of the memorandum of under-
ing the region. The 2019 Dialogue involved 599 delegates,
standing agreed by the IISS and Singapore’s Ministry of
approximately half of whom represented governments
Defence in 2018, Singapore’s support for the Shangri-La
and armed forces. A total of 41 countries sent delegates,
Dialogue will be extended to 2024. As part of this process,
27 of which have been regular annual participants in the
the seventh IISS Fullerton Forum: Shangri-La Dialogue
Dialogue. Fourteen governments that are not regular
Sherpa Meeting was convened successfully in January 2019
participants were also represented. The Comprehensive
and provided valuable input for the IISS as we devised the
Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, the European Union, the
agenda for the 2019 Dialogue.
International Committee of the Red Cross, NATO and the
We also thank the following commercial lead spon-
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat also sent high-level del-
sors for their additional, vital financial support for the
egations. In 2019, there was again a strong United States
Shangri-La Dialogue: Airbus Group, BAE Systems, Boeing,
congressional delegation including four senators and five
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. We also extend our
members of the House.
thanks to principal sponsors General Atomics Aeronautical
The 2019 Dialogue provided a venue for more than 200
Systems and Rolls-Royce, as well as main sponsors Asahi
bilateral, trilateral, mini-lateral and multilateral meetings
Shimbun, Booz Allen Hamilton, Maxar Technologies and ST
among government delegations. Acting US Secretary of
Engineering. The Shangri-La Hotel generously sponsored
Defense Patrick Shanahan hosted an informal meeting with
the Dialogue’s opening dinner. The IISS looks forward to
his Southeast Asian counterparts. Singapore’s Minister for
developing these partnerships, and making new ones, with
Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen convened two roundtables for par-
the shared aspiration of advancing regional security dia-
ticipating ministers. The IISS hosted an opening ministerial
logue and cooperation through the Shangri-La Dialogue
reception for national delegation leaders, and also organ-
process over the years to come.
ised the fourth annual SEAYLP, which again provided an opportunity for a new generation of strategists to discuss
Dr John Chipman CMG,
some of the most important security questions of the day.
IISS Director-General and Chief Executive
SEAYLP 2019 involved 39 Young Leaders, who benefited
Dr Tim Huxley,
from events on the Dialogue’s sidelines including meetings
Executive Director, IISS–Asia
Foreword
5
INTRODUCTION
The IISS convened the first Shangri-La Dialogue
Shangri-La Dialogue has come to be seen interna-
in 2002 to fulfil the evident need for a forum where
tionally as a vital Asia-Pacific security institution,
the principals of the region’s national defence estab-
providing governments with the opportunity not only
lishments – together with their counterparts from
to explain their defence and security concerns, and to
the United States and other Western countries with
publicise their defence policies, but also to develop
important security interests in the Asia-Pacific –
their bilateral and other contacts with each other. The
could engage in dialogue aimed at building mutual
Shangri-La Dialogue has helped to cultivate a sense
confidence and fostering practical cooperation. Since
of community among the security establishments of
then it has become, as US secretary of defense James
regional countries and of other powers with significant
Mattis said at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, ‘the
stakes in the Asia-Pacific. Governments, the expert
best opportunity for senior officials to meet’ and
community and the media have increasingly viewed
‘share perspectives’. Speaking at the 2019 Shangri-La
the substance and tone of exchanges at the Dialogue
Dialogue, Australia’s minister of defence, Senator
as important indicators of the state of the region’s
Linda Reynolds, said that the summit provided an
security.
‘invaluable opportunity’ for countries to ‘renew existing connections and to develop new ones’. a key participant state to deliver a keynote address at
THE NEED TO PRESERVE STRATEGIC STABILITY
the opening dinner of the Shangri-La Dialogue. This
The IISS has always sought to ensure that the
year, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
Shangri-La Dialogue’s agenda is comprehensive
delivered the address, which focused on the impor-
given the vast geographical extent of the region with
tance of the bilateral relationship between China
which it is concerned, the diversity of participant
and the US for regional and international security,
states and the broad spectrum of security challenges
and the need for both of them to cooperate on global
in the region. There is no predetermined overarching
challenges and issues of mutual interest. He also
theme for each year’s Dialogue. Instead, the agenda
put the dangers of Sino-US competition into sharp
consistently reflects what the Institute sees as the most
relief, and emphasised the need for small states to
important contemporary and emerging security con-
retain agency amid such competition by promoting
cerns in the region. There is always some thematic
regional integration and strengthening multilateral
continuity from one year’s Shangri-La Dialogue to the
institutions.
next, but in 2019 two major themes were pre-eminent:
It has become a tradition for a political leader from
Originally known as the Asia Security Summit, the
the need to manage Sino-US competition in the inter-
Shangri-La Dialogue remains the only annual meet-
ests of strategic stability, and the related debate about
ing for Asia-Pacific defence ministers together with
the rules-based regional and global order, including a
permanent heads of defence ministries and military
‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy.
chiefs. A parallel meeting convenes intelligence chiefs
The issue of Sino-US rivalry and competition was
from selected regional and extra-regional states. The
the subject of Prime Minister Lee’s keynote address.
Introduction
7
Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore; Harjit Singh Sajjan, Minister of National Defence, Canada; and Senator Linda Reynolds, Minister of Defence, Australia
Tea Banh, Minister of National Defence, Cambodia; General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China; and Patrick M. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of Defense, United States
His masterful exposition at a time of ructions in the
ister of national defence and state councilor, General
Sino-US relationship was timely, particularly given
Wei Fenghe, assured regional countries that Beijing is
Singapore’s status as both a strategic partner of the
not seeking an all-out conflict with the US over trade.
US and a close economic partner of China. Noting that
Using rhetoric reminiscent of Mao Zedong, he stressed
the Washington–Beijing bilateral relationship is cur-
that China ‘will keep the door open’ to negotiations
rently the ‘most important’ in the world, Lee pinned
with Washington – but if the US wanted to fight, China
the fundamental problem between the two powers
‘will fight till the end’.
on a ‘mutual lack of strategic trust’, while issues such
The issue of Sino-US competition spilled over
as trade and cyber security could be resolved if dealt
into the debate about the character and nature of
with on ‘their own merits’. China, as well as the rest of
regional order. At the 2018 Dialogue, the FOIP concept
the world, needs to adapt to the reality that Beijing has
emerged as a significant focus for discussion. In 2019,
‘shifted the strategic balance and the economic centre
this debate intensified. The US Department of Defense
of gravity of the world’, he said. The prime minister
timed the release of its Indo-Pacific Strategy Report to
recommended that the US forge a ‘new understanding
coincide with Shanahan’s speech on the opening day
that will integrate China’s aspirations within the cur-
of the Dialogue. Echoing the points made by his pre-
rent system of rules and norms’. For its part, Beijing
decessor, James Mattis, at the 2018 Dialogue, Shanahan
should adopt an ‘enlightened and inclusive view’ of its
said that Washington’s blueprint for the Indo-Pacific is
national interests, he said.
based on ‘respect for sovereignty and independence
Sino-US tensions were on display in subsequent
of all nations’; the ‘peaceful resolution of disputes’;
sessions at the Dialogue. Speaking during the first ple-
‘free, fair and reciprocal trade’; and ‘adherence to
nary session, Acting US Secretary of Defense Patrick
international rules and norms, including freedom of
Shanahan suggested that the ‘greatest long-term
navigation and overflight’.
threat’ to the rules-based global order comes from
Other countries’ defence ministers echoed this
actors who seek to undermine it, such as by deploying
approach to the Indo-Pacific. Japanese Minister of
advanced weapons to disputed areas, using influence
Defense Takeshi Iwaya argued that the main pur-
operations and exploiting weak economies for their
pose of the FOIP strategy is to ‘consolidate the rule
own benefit. Speaking the following day, China’s min-
of law in order to foster peace and stability, as well
8
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
as economic prosperity, among regional countries’. Australian Minister of Defence Reynolds said that the ‘similar principles’ underlying various countries’ visions and concepts for the Indo-Pacific should be ‘a cause for optimism’. Florence Parly, French minister of the armed forces, noted that the assessment of the dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region set out in her ministry’s May 2019 Indo-Pacific strategy paper is ‘not particularly uplifting’. There is growing strategic competition, she said, and multilateralism and its core values, such as sovereign equality, non-interference and the respect of borders, are receding. Parly echoed the call made by President Emmanuel Macron in 2018 for an ‘Indo-Pacific axis with France, India and Australia as its backbone’. China, however, presented an alternative vision of regional security. Noting the US perspective on
Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS; Penny Mordaunt, Secretary of State for Defence, UK; and Ron Mark, Minister of Defence, New Zealand
the Indo-Pacific, General Wei cautioned that any such perspective needs to ‘take into account the common
Pacific’; ‘Defence-industrial development: balanc-
security and interests of regional countries’. He
ing self-reliance and collaboration’; ‘Cyber-capability
stressed that no approach to regional security should
development: defence implications’; ‘Mechanisms
be based on military blocs, or ‘undermine the interests
for enhancing maritime security’; and ‘New pat-
of others’. He expressed ‘firm opposition’ to ‘the wrong
terns of defence cooperation’. A total of 28 panellists,
words and actions of the US on Taiwan and the South
including
China Sea’.
Mongolia’s minister of defense; the secretary-general
Myanmar’s
national
security
adviser;
On the Dialogue’s opening day, Acting US
of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat; the deputy
Secretary of Defense Shanahan spoke on ‘The US
defence ministers of Malaysia and Russia; and the
vision for Indo-Pacific security’. The second plenary
commanders of US Indo-Pacific and US Cyber com-
session, ‘Korean security: the next steps’, featured
mands, all made opening remarks which were
Republic of Korea (ROK) Minister of National
followed by candid discussions with participating
Defense Jeong Kyeong-Doo; Japanese Minister of
delegates.
Defense Takeshi Iwaya; and Federica Mogherini, the
On the Sunday morning of the Dialogue, China’s
European Union’s High Representative for Foreign
General Wei spoke in the fourth plenary session on
Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the
‘China and international security cooperation’. General
European Commission. The third plenary session,
Ngô Xuân Lich, Vietnam’s minister of national defence;
‘Asia’s evolving security order and its challenges’, fea-
Major-General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana, Philippine
tured Malaysian Minister of Defence Haji Mohamad
secretary of national defense; and Australian Minister
Sabu; United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence
of Defence Reynolds took the floor in the fifth plenary
Penny Mordaunt; and French Minister of the Armed
session on ‘Preventing conflict in contested domains’.
Forces Parly.
In the sixth and final plenary, ‘Ensuring a resilient
That afternoon, IISS directing and senior staff
and stable region’, the speakers included Indonesian
chaired six special sessions delving into more specific
Minister
contemporary security challenges: ‘Security impli-
Ryacudu; New Zealand’s Minister of Defence Ron
cations of regional infrastructural development’;
Mark; and Singaporean Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng
‘Strategic interests and competition in the South
Hen.
of
Defense
General
(Retd)
Introduction
Ryamizard
9
HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATIONS Since the IISS established the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, the pressures on the time and attention of defence ministers, military chiefs and the most senior national-security officials in the Asia-Pacific region have increased unrelentingly as the substantive challenges
to
national
and
regional
security
have become more complex and unyielding. The inauguration of other high-level regional defence forums has also put additional pressure on their time and attention. These forums include the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and its offshoot, the ADMM–Plus – an annual event involving the defence establishments of eight ASEAN dialogue partners as well as those of the ASEAN member states. Other security conferences have also been established to serve essentially national objectives;
General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China; and Major-General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana, Secretary of National Defense, Philippines
these include the Xiangshan Forum organised by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Seoul
Even at the first Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002,
Defense Dialogue and India’s Raisina Dialogue. It is
the defence establishments of many Asia-Pacific
striking, though, that governments have consistently
countries were represented at a high level, with
maintained – and in many cases strengthened – their
defence
involvement in the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, which
equivalents from 14 countries participating. In 2019,
has become a recurrent fixture in the calendars of
of the 27 regular participant countries represented at
defence ministers and other military principals across
the Dialogue, 20 sent delegations led by full ministers:
the Asia-Pacific and beyond.
Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, France,
ministers,
deputy
ministers
or
close
Such has been the regional and international
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar,
appeal of the Shangri-La Dialogue that total delegate
New Zealand, the Philippines, the ROK, Singapore,
numbers have increased since its inception in 2002,
Thailand, Timor-Leste, the UK, the US and Vietnam.
when there were about 160 delegates. This number
Other high-ranking officials, including defence chiefs
increased to 250 in 2006, 330 in 2010, 451 in 2014
and military personnel, led the delegations from
and 602 in 2016. These rising delegate numbers
Bangladesh, Fiji, Germany, Sri Lanka, Sweden and
resulted from sustained efforts by the IISS to increase
Switzerland. Government representatives from 14
participation by senior officials concerned with
other countries in Europe, the Middle East, Latin
security matters in foreign ministries and national-
America and the South Pacific also participated. The
security secretariats, and to expand the representation
EU, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organisation,
of women, media and businesses among delegates.
the International Committee of the Red Cross, NATO
In 2017, the IISS decided to invite fewer delegates
and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat also sent
and to further strengthen the selection criteria –
high-level delegations.
subsequently, 487 participated. However, demand
Certain key participant countries, including
for delegate places was such that numbers soon rose
Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand,
again: in 2018, 565 delegates attended. In this year’s
the ROK, the UK, the US and, of course, host-nation
2019 Dialogue, participation increased to almost 600
Singapore have, since the Dialogue’s early years,
delegates, bringing numbers close to the peak seen
sent strong delegations almost always led by full
in 2016.
ministers or their equivalents. Other governments
10
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
have strengthened their contingents over time, and
benefit from the opportunity to explain and clarify its
it was notable in 2019 that Vietnam’s delegation
defence posture to a wide audience at a time when
included its minister of national defence, deputy
many in the US and the Asia-Pacific are expressing
minister of national defence and deputy minister of
concerns about Chinese policies.
public security. European interest in the Dialogue
The Shangri-La Dialogue has consistently provided
has grown. In 2018, the UK’s secretary of state for
a platform from which participant countries’ defence
defence, Gavin Williamson, emphasised Britain’s
ministers and other principals can clarify and
commitment to regional security cooperation and
elaborate on their countries’ positions on the most
its robust support for the rules-based international
important regional security topics of the day. This, in
order. In 2019, his successor, Penny Mordaunt, led
turn, has led to the development of a unique culture
the British delegation after taking office only four
of frank and open debate. The Dialogue has also
weeks beforehand. In 2018, French Minister of the
been a unique venue for proposing and advancing
Armed Forces Parly called for countries to uphold
defence initiatives in spheres as diverse as maritime-
international law in the South China Sea. In 2019,
security cooperation against piracy in the Malacca
she stressed her country’s commitment to the Indo-
Strait; the strategic and safety implications of regional
Pacific region and its determination to contribute to
states’ growing submarine capabilities; the regional
regional security.
proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and
As is always the case, there was intense interest
the regional security architecture. In 2018, Singapore’s
among other participating governments, the expert
defence minister, Dr Ng Eng Hen, unveiled a series
community and the media regarding the level of
of initiatives that the city state planned to pursue
participation by China. China first sent official
during its chairmanship of the ADMM. In 2019, the
representation to the Dialogue in 2007. In 2011, General
tradition of countries clarifying their positions and
Liang Guanglie, then-minister of national defence,
advancing defence initiatives continued. Admiral
led the PLA delegation and spoke in a ‘solo’ plenary
Philip Davidson, commander of the US Indo-
session. From 2012–18, China was not represented
Pacific Command, announced the US expansion of
at the same high level. While the PLA emphasised
a programme to help South Pacific states to improve
its continuing recognition of the importance of the
their intelligence sharing. All five defence ministers
Dialogue and its wish to continue benefiting from the
from the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
opportunity to explain China’s defence posture there,
countries reaffirmed their commitment to the FPDA,
from 2014–16 Beijing’s representation was at the level
and agreed to ensure the partnership’s relevance in
of deputy chief of the General Staff Department. In
areas such as counter-terrorism, maritime security and
2017, the PLA was in the midst of an extensive and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
intense military-reform process. Nevertheless, the
Defence ministers and officials in the region have
Chinese delegation – which was led by Lieutenant-
increasingly found benefit in using the Shangri-La
General (Retd) He Lei, former vice-president of the
Dialogue as a venue for private bilateral, trilat-
PLA Academy of Military Sciences, China – expressed
eral and multilateral meetings. In 2019, the IISS was
China’s positions through speaking roles in special
aware of more than 200 bilateral and multilateral
sessions and interventions in plenary question-and-
meetings in the Shangri-La Hotel, and there were
answer sessions. In 2018, China’s delegation was
almost certainly many others. The detailed content
again led by Lieutenant-General He. However, it
of such meetings is, naturally, usually confidential.
is significant that in 2019 the Chinese delegation
Nevertheless, governments have sometimes divulged
was led by the aforementioned Minister of National
details of their substance in public statements. At
Defence General Wei (concurrently a state councillor).
the 2019 Dialogue, the US and Singapore reaffirmed
This demonstrates Beijing’s willingness to engage at
their bilateral defence ties, saying that they welcomed
the highest level in the Shangri-La Dialogue, and to
the renewal of their bilateral 1990 memorandum of
Introduction
11
understanding, which enables the US armed forces to use facilities in Singapore. The long-standing tradition of the ministerial roundtable – a feature of the Dialogue since its inception in 2002 – continued in 2019, when Singapore’s minister for defence hosted two roundtables for his ministerial counterparts. Discussions included the US–China relationship, the challenges of instability on the Korean Peninsula, and the danger of terrorism and returning foreign fighters. In 2019, Singapore facilitated an informal meeting that included Acting US Secretary of Defense Shanahan, Singaporean Minister for Defence Dr Ng and his Southeast Asian counterparts.
ENRICHING DISCUSSIONS AT THE DIALOGUE The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has remained above all a
Teo Chee Hean, Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, Singapore; and General (Retd) Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, Indonesia
Track One intergovernmental meeting. Nevertheless, from the first Dialogue onward participation by non-
participation by legislators with strong defence,
governmental delegates has animated and enriched
security and foreign-affairs interests and expertise. In
the proceedings, particularly through the questions
2019, a particularly strong US congressional delegation
that such delegates pose to ministers and other speak-
comprised four senators and five members of the
ers in plenary and special sessions. In 2019, the IISS
House of Representatives. Senator Cory Gardner,
continued efforts to ensure a strong and diverse cohort
chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific
of non-government delegates. The Southeast Asian
and International Cybersecurity Policy of the US
Young Leaders’ Programme (SEAYLP), which the IISS
Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, spoke in a
established in 2016, again helped to ensure that there
special session.
were many new faces among that cohort. A separate section in this report provides details of the highly successful 2019 SEAYLP.
LOOKING FORWARD
In 2019, the IISS again ensured that the media
Answering a question at the end of the sixth and
was well represented among the delegates, includ-
final plenary, ‘Ensuring a resilient and stable region’,
ing widely followed bloggers on regional defence and
Singapore’s Minister for Defence Dr Ng stressed the
security, as well as respected newspaper columnists.
importance of adopting a position of realism while
In addition, the press corps at the 2019 Dialogue com-
working optimistically in making efforts to preserve
prised more than 500 journalists. There was again a
the current global order. Appreciating Dr Ng’s com-
diverse selection of private-sector delegates from the
ments, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive
region and beyond. The IISS will continue to replen-
Dr John Chipman said that this could be a ‘mantra
ish the ranks of non-governmental delegates, and
that many of us can apply to our own strategic atti-
to increase their diversity, with the aim of further
tudes’. Dr Chipman also noted that there was a risk
expanding awareness of the Shangri-La Dialogue in
of the existing order breaking down into ‘two or three
the wider expert, media and business communities.
hermetically sealed geopolitical, geo-economic ecosys-
Since the first Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, at which
tems’. Therefore, he said, delegates at the Shangri-La
then-senator Chuck Hagel led a strong, bipartisan US
Dialogue would need to work to ‘ensure that that risk
congressional delegation, the IISS has encouraged
does not occur’.
12
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Tea Banh, Minister of National Defence, Cambodia; General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China; and Patrick M. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of Defense, United States
Marillyn Hewson, Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin; Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS; and Senator Linda Reynolds, Minister of Defence, Australia
The 19th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue will be held
Meeting, which will convene senior defence officials
in Singapore from 5–7 June 2020. In the interim, on
and military officers from participant countries in
19–21 January 2020, the IISS will hold the eighth IISS
Singapore in advance of the next Dialogue.
Fullerton Forum: The Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa
Introduction
13
14
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
CHAPTER 1
18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
KEYNOTE ADDRESS Friday 31 May 2019, 20:00 SPEAKER Lee Hsien Loong Prime Minister of Singapore
Keynote address
Introducing the keynote address by Singapore’s Prime
that China will continue to ‘grow and strengthen’; that
Minister Lee Hsien Loong, IISS Director-General and
it is ‘neither possible nor wise’ to prevent this; and that
Chief Executive Dr John Chipman noted that, during
the country has its own ‘legitimate interests and ambi-
his 15-year tenure, Lee had strengthened the city
tions’. The US would have the most difficult adjustment
state’s ‘reputation for strategic thinking’.
to make, and this should involve ‘forging a new under-
The prime minister started by saying that the ‘world
standing that will integrate China’s aspirations within
is at a turning point’, with globalisation under siege.
the current system of rules and norms’. Washington
However, he pointed to the historical experience of
and Beijing would need to work both together and with
Southeast Asia as a way of providing perspective on
other countries to revise the global system.
the region’s contemporary strategic plight, and empha-
Lee observed that, in the meantime, there are
sised that the US–China bilateral relationship ‘is the
‘stresses and strains’ between the US and China over
most important in the world today’. China’s economic
multiple issues, notably trade. He argued that it was
growth has ‘shifted the strategic balance and the eco-
important to treat the trade dispute ‘on its own merits’
nomic centre of gravity of the world’, he said. Beijing
and to avoid using trade rules for ulterior purposes,
and the rest of the world need to ‘adapt to this new
which could lead to ‘a more divided and troubled
reality’. China has an important stake in upholding the
world’. However, this is ‘starting to happen’, he said,
present rules-based international system, and should
as attitudes on both sides harden. The ‘fundamental
take ‘an enlightened and inclusive view of its long-term
problem’ is the ‘mutual lack of strategic trust’ between
interests’. Nonetheless, other countries need to accept
the two countries. There is no ‘irreconcilable ideo-
Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore
16
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS
logical divide’ and China has extensive links with the
nearly all that had been negotiated’, resulting in the
rest of the world, so a confrontation between the two
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
powers would be unlike the Cold War. But, if deterio-
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which additional
rating relations do result in a conflict, where would
countries are now interested in joining. The prime
this end? The prime minister argued that ‘a prolonged
minister expressed hope that the larger and more
period of tension and uncertainty would be extremely
inclusive Regional Comprehensive Economic Partner-
damaging’, particularly because serious international
ship (RCEP) could be finalised during 2019. He went
challenges such as those from North Korea, nuclear
on to say that regional cooperation is not only about
proliferation and climate change could not be man-
trade and pointed to the way that, ‘despite its limita-
aged
Domestic
tions’, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
pressures will complicate efforts by American and
(ASEAN) has ‘deepened ties and kept the peace’
Chinese leaders to avoid ‘extreme outcomes’; many
among its members.
without
US–China
engagement.
Americans have ‘lost confidence in globalisation and
New concepts and platforms for regional coop-
multilateralism’, while Beijing cannot ‘appear to suc-
eration include China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
cumb to Western pressure’. Ultimately, however, ‘it is
which ‘Singapore supports’ and sees as ‘a construc-
in the interests of both the US and China to reach an
tive mechanism’ for positive Chinese engagement
accommodation and to persuade their domestic pub-
with Asia and beyond. However, Lee also said that
lics to accept it’.
‘the BRI must be open and inclusive and must not
According to the prime minister, Singapore and
turn the region into a closed bloc centred on a single
other small states ‘can do little to influence the big
major economy’. While deepening their links with
powers, but we are not entirely without agency’. Small
China, Asian countries also need to expand their ties
countries can ‘work together to deepen economic
with the US, Europe and Japan. The prime minister
cooperation, strengthen regional integration and build
similarly noted that while several countries have pro-
up multilateral institutions’. Lee referred specifically
posed forms of Indo-Pacific cooperation, Singapore’s
to the need to construct regional – or ‘pluri-lateral’
‘consistent’ attitude is to ‘support regional cooperation
– agreements. Although the US withdrew from the
initiatives which are open and inclusive’. Such initia-
proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Singapore
tives should not ‘create rival blocs, deepen fault lines
and other remaining members agreed ‘to preserve
or force countries to take sides’.
Keynote address
17
In conclusion, Lee emphasised that US–China
in the security sphere. However, he added, ‘to actively
relations will ‘define the tenor of international
avoid taking sides actually also requires actively not
relations for years to come’. Singapore hopes that the
being pressured to take sides’.
two powers will ‘find a constructive way forward’
Shawn Ho, from Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School
that will allow them to cooperate on issues of mutual
of International Studies, asked whether Singapore
interest and global challenges. Noting that some have
shared Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Moham-
argued that compromise is impossible, and even that
ad’s view that there was no need for concern over
the Beijing–Washington clash is a contest between
Huawei’s potential to use its 5G technology for spying.
different civilisations and ideologies, the prime
He also asked, specifically, whether Singapore would
minister said that it is ‘neither reasonable nor realistic’
use the Chinese company for its own 5G network.
to expect all countries to adopt the same cultural
Replying at some length, Lee said that Singapore
values and political systems. After all, he added,
was ‘in the process of defining and selecting our 5G
‘humankind’s diversity is its strength’.
system’, stressing that a resilient telecommunications system is ‘the backbone of the economy’. However, ‘it is quite unrealistic to expect 100% security from any
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
telecoms system’, and other considerations include
Following Prime Minister Lee’s address, Lieutenant-
cost, reliability, growth potential and vendor diversity.
General (Retd) He Lei, former vice-president of the
In the long term, there need to be ‘established rules’
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy
and agreements on cyber behaviour; in the mean-
of Military Sciences, asked what the US and China
time, ‘each country will have to weigh the options,
should do to avoid confrontation and conflict, and
the uncertainties, and will have to make its own
how smaller countries could avoid taking sides
choice’.
between the two powers. Lee responded by saying
Dr Chung Min Lee, Chairman of the IISS Advi-
that Beijing and Washington needed to engage ‘at the
sory Council, asked what the prime minister’s
top level’ and to agree that both sides need to ‘adjust’.
advice would be to the Chinese leadership if they
Once that context is established, the two sides could
wish to ‘increase their comfort level’ with Southeast
discuss ‘specific issues’ on their merits, resolving them
and East Asian countries. Lee replied that this ‘is a
‘one by one’. Small countries, he said, should try to
challenge that every big country faces’, and quoted
maintain and develop relations with both sides, even
the first prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew’s
Lieutenant-General (Retd) He Lei, former Vice-President of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, China
18
Shawn Ho, Associate Research Fellow, Regional Security Architecture Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Dr Chung Min Lee, Chairman of the Advisory Council, IISS; Senior Fellow, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
aphorism that ‘when elephants fight, the grass is
peace’. ‘There is something to be learnt from the US
trampled; when elephants make love, the grass
experience in Asia’, the prime minister concluded.
also suffers’. But major powers, he said, cannot rely
Drawing the keynote address to a close, Dr John
on force – they need the legitimacy that only ‘soft
Chipman thanked the prime minister ‘for your sup-
power’ can provide. He pointed to the ways in which
port to the IISS, for the Shangri-La Dialogue process
the US has won friends in Asia through a ‘breadth of
and for the goals that we have set ourselves for seri-
spirit’ and ‘generosity’ in its policies, allowing coun-
ous dialogue here that you have so effortlessly and
tries in the region ‘to grow, prosper and compete in
fluently championed’.
Keynote address
19
20
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
CHAPTER 2 The US vision for Indo-Pacific security
FIRST PLENARY SESSION Saturday 1 June 2019, 08:35 SPEAKER Patrick M. Shanahan Acting Secretary of Defense, United States
FIRST PLENARY SESSION
The US vision for Indo-Pacific security
Patrick M. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of Defense, United States
Acting US Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan
access much of these technologies and benefit from the
reaffirmed
to
compounding effects of US investments and progress’.
the Indo-Pacific’. He discussed US ties with the
No nation could ‘go it alone’ in this developing ‘shared
region, defence modernisation and Washington’s
security order’, and ‘no nation can or should dominate
regional
the Indo-Pacific’.
the
vision.
United
States’
According
to
‘commitment
Shanahan,
the
Indo-Pacific is the Pentagon’s ‘priority theatre’. The
US
National
Defense
Strategy
lays
Shanahan described the principles underpin-
out
ning Washington’s blueprint for the ‘Free and Open
Washington’s defence objectives and efforts, and
Indo-Pacific’ as respect for the sovereignty and inde-
the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report – released by the
pendence of all nations; peaceful dispute resolution;
Pentagon concurrently with Shanahan’s address –
free, fair, and reciprocal trade and investment; and
illustrates regional implementation. The region would
adherence to international rules and norms, includ-
benefit, Shanahan said, from the October 2018 Better
ing freedom of navigation and overflight. He said that
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development
while the region has seen significant economic growth,
(BUILD) Act, prioritising low- and middle-income
security and economics are interdependent, and the
states. The Defense Department is modernising,
US does not want any regional state to have to ‘choose
underpinned by innovation and new technology, thus
or forego economic relations with any partner’.
enabling strengthened alliances and new partnerships.
Shanahan said it was important to call out dis-
‘Partners who pursue inter-operability with us as part
ruptive actors and take a stand against challenges,
of a regional security network will’, he said, ‘be able to
including those on the Korean Peninsula; attacks by
22
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Patrick M. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of Defense, United States; and Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS
militants; and the ‘greatest long-term threat’ from
unique challenges in this theatre’. Before outlining US
actors seeking to undermine the rules-based interna-
regional military ties, he said that increased funding
tional order. Examples of the latter include deploying
would enable improved US capabilities and postures,
advanced weapons to militarise disputed areas; using
including accelerating the forward presence of land
influence operations; exploiting weak economies for
forces and stationing ‘some of our highest-end, most
political and economic benefit; and ‘promoting state-
capable assets in the Indo-Pacific’. Shanahan also
sponsored theft of other nations’ military and civilian
noted that the region’s size and complexity neces-
technology’. We cannot, he said, ‘continue to look the
sitated the ‘greatest degree of cooperation’ and that
other way as countries use friendly rhetoric to distract
the US is ‘up to the challenge’. More states are taking
us from unfriendly acts’.
part in combined military exercises with the US; in the
In Washington’s Indo-Pacific vision, partners
last two years, there has been a 17% increase in global
could find security and prosperity as part of a net-
participation in these exercises, which have benefited
work of interconnected peoples, economies and
the region. As an example, he highlighted the May
security relationships. It is, Shanahan said, in China’s
2019 La Pérouse quadrilateral maritime exercise in the
interests to have a cooperative relationship with the
Indian Ocean, involving naval forces from Australia,
US, ‘but behaviour that erodes other nations’ sover-
France, Japan and the United States. Who else, Shana-
eignty and sows distrust of China’s intentions must
han posited, could ‘bring together militaries otherwise
end’. He stressed that the US stood against a ‘myopic,
separated by three oceans and 9,000 kilometres?’
narrow and parochial view of the future’ and supported a ‘free and open order that has benefited us all, including China’.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Shanahan said that the Pentagon is focusing on
Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS associate fellow, asked if the
preparedness, and strengthening partnerships and a
BUILD Act was ‘too little, too late’, given China’s pro-
regional security network. Although the US is not seek-
gress in developing its Belt and Road Initiative. Yoichi
ing conflict, ‘we know that having the capability to win
Kato, senior research fellow at the Asia Pacific Initia-
wars is the best way to deter them’. Many investments
tive, asked whether the US would adjust aspects of its
in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence,
strategy documents to avoid a strategic face-off with
hypersonics and directed energy are ‘aimed at the
China. Dr François Heisbourg, IISS senior adviser
First plenary session
23
Dr Lynn Kuok, Senior Research Fellow, University of Cambridge; Visiting Scholar, Paul Tsai China Center; Associate Fellow, IISS
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Major-General Xu Hui, Commandant, International College of Defense Studies, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University
for Europe, asked what Washington could do to build
On the question of trust, he said that it is important
or rebuild trust with Beijing. Bonnie Glaser, senior
to recognise where there are disagreements; ‘trust is
adviser for Asia and director of the China Power Pro-
built by working on projects and being shoulder to
ject at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
shoulder’. Shanahan described how he presented Chi-
asked how military communications with China should
nese Minister of National Defence and State Councilor
improve. Major-General Xu Hui, commandant of the
General Wei Fenghe with a book detailing ship-to-ship
International College of Defense Studies at the People’s
transfers of oil in the area near China, saying ‘this is
Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University,
an area where you and I can cooperate’. Respond-
asked how Shanahan would use his corporate experi-
ing to Glaser, he said that frequent communication
ence with Boeing to improve the US–China relationship.
could help not only prevent incidents but also identify
Shanahan responded that the BUILD Act comple-
opportunities for cooperation. Finally, Shanahan said
ments many other US measures in the region. The only
that during his experience at Boeing, China ‘was our
adjustment the US would make to its strategy would be
biggest customer and biggest competitor’ – opportu-
‘to do more of it’, and discussions with Chinese coun-
nity exists, but has ‘to be grounded in norms and rules
terparts would include how to enhance cooperation.
and communication’.
Dr François Heisbourg, IISS Senior Adviser for Europe
24
Yoichi Kato, Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Pacific Initiative
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
CHAPTER 3 Korean security: the next steps
SECOND PLENARY SESSION Saturday 1 June 2019, 09:30 SPEAKERS Jeong Kyeong-Doo Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea Takeshi Iwaya Minister of Defense, Japan Federica Mogherini High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Union; Vice-President, European Commission
SECOND PLENARY SESSION
Korean security: the next steps
Jeong Kyeong-Doo, Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea (ROK) Minister of National Defense
plete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the
Jeong Kyeong-Doo began on an optimistic note, stat-
creation of a permanent peace regime, the reduction
ing that Seoul has found ‘a ray of hope within the
of military tensions and the mitigation of the risk of
seemingly insurmountable clouds of war’, and that
war. The defence minister did not provide a definition
inter-Korean relations have improved during the
of ‘denuclearisation’. Instead, he cited the implemen-
pursuit of ‘diplomatic solutions aimed at solving the
tation of the Comprehensive Military Agreement
nuclear threat’.
(CMA), which serves as an initial but concrete step
In his view, the three inter-Korean summits and
toward permanent peace. Under the CMA, the two
two US–North Korea summits altered the security
Koreas have ceased military aggression in all domains
dynamics on the Korean Peninsula by ‘boosting con-
including land, air and sea since November 2018. The
fidence and easing tensions between the two Koreas’.
Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) is currently undergoing
The changed security situation provided the necessary
‘actual demilitarisation’, with the withdrawal of ‘all
diplomatic space for the pursuit of a peaceful resolu-
guarded posts installed at key points within the DMZ’.
tion of the nuclear issue.
The ROK government, according to Jeong, will
Jeong focused his remarks on the progress real-
maintain the momentum of ROK–DPRK dialogue
ised during the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and the
generated by the summit talks ‘within a framework
Pyongyang Joint Declaration, where ROK President
agreed upon by the international community’, and
Moon Jae-in and Democratic People’s Republic of
will adhere to all United Nations Security Council
Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong-un agreed on the com-
(UNSC) resolutions. In parallel, Seoul will continue its
26
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Takeshi Iwaya, Minister of Defense, Japan
efforts to create a ‘peace cooperation community’ and
remains unchanged. Tokyo demands the ‘complete,
an ‘economic cooperation community’ to foster a more
verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement’ (CVID) of
vibrant and peaceful peninsula. The defence minister
all Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction and bal-
concluded with a plea to ‘hold on to this once-in-a-life-
listic missiles of all ranges in accordance with relevant
time opportunity for denuclearisation’.
UNSC resolutions.
Japanese Minister of Defense Takeshi Iwaya began
Iwaya also emphasised the importance of two
his remarks by welcoming the strong US commitment
mutually enforcing approaches: the reinforcement of
to the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy.
international surveillance and the individual efforts
Japan sees tremendous value in the FOIP concept and
of regional countries to fully implement sanctions.
its role in consolidating ‘the rule of law in the Indo-
He stressed that Japan would continue to work on
Pacific’ that fosters ‘peace and stability, as well as
strengthening Japan–US and Japan–US–ROK coop-
economic prosperity’ in the region.
eration, such as through joint exercises in particular to
While supportive of the diplomatic efforts of the
enhance ballistic-missile early-warning capability. The
ROK and the US, Iwaya offered a different policy
robust deterrent inherent in the presence of the US in
approach, one that emphasises robust deterrence and
Northeast Asia remains vital to regional stability.
enhanced implementation of UN sanctions against
Federica Mogherini, European Union High Repre-
North Korea by all states within the region and
sentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and
beyond. At the same time, the door would be held
Vice-President of the European Commission, declared
open for the nuclear disarmament of Pyongyang and
that Asian security ‘matters to Europe’. In her view,
peace on the Korean Peninsula.
the EU has made tremendous progress on its commit-
Iwaya reminded everyone that there has been ‘no
ments to work more closely than ever with countries
essential change’ in North Korea’s nuclear and missile
belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian
capabilities. North Korea maintains several hundred
Nations (ASEAN), ‘not only politically and economi-
operational ballistic missiles that have the entire terri-
cally, but also on security, including on the military
tory of Japan within range. The minister went further,
level’. Mogherini cited as examples the EU’s partici-
describing North Korea’s launch of short-range ballis-
pation in a recent multinational naval exercise and
tic missiles the previous month as a clear violation of
security agreements the Union has established with
relevant UNSC resolutions. Japan’s position, he said,
the ROK, New Zealand and Australia.
Second plenary session
27
Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Union; VicePresident, European Commission
The high representative also said that Europe has
that the inter-Korean talks and the US–North Korea
maintained a consistent policy regarding North Korea,
talks are linked to one another, with both sets of talks
stating her belief that lasting peace on the Korean
only progressing if they ‘advance in parallel’.
Peninsula is possible, even if unlikely. She added that
The high representative closed by promising that
solutions must be peaceful and diplomatic, and that
the EU is ready to contribute more to Asian security,
the denuclearisation of Pyongyang must be complete,
whether by reinforcing tougher sanctions on North
verifiable and irreversible.
Korea; offering European expertise in nuclear nego-
Mogherini praised ROK President Moon for his
tiations; crafting a monitoring and verification system;
leadership and courage in exploring possible ways for-
or providing reassurance and security guarantees to
ward with the DPRK, and applauded the US decision
North Korea if it denuclearises and strives for a lasting
to engage in summitry with Pyongyang. She noted
peace on the peninsula.
Stephen Biegun, Special Representative for North Korea, US Department of State
Ankit Panda, Senior Editor, The Diplomat
28
Tadashi Maeda, Governor of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
William Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
range ballistic missile (SRBM). Ankit Panda from the
Most of the questions focused on the effectiveness of
Diplomat asked whether the SRBM launch was a hostile
sanctions and the difficulties associated with denu-
act under Seoul’s interpretation of the CMA. William
clearisation. Stephen Biegun, special representative
Emmott, chairman of the IISS trustees, echoed the senti-
for North Korea at the US Department of State, noted
ment of scholars of both non-proliferation and of Korea,
that ‘there may be no issue of national security upon
questioning whether the chances of denuclearisation
which the US and the EU are more closely aligned than
were ‘approximately zero’.
the strategic risks that come from nuclear weapons on
Jeong said that across all domains – air, land and sea
the Korean Peninsula’. He credited the contributions
– North Korea is acting ‘within the boundaries of the
made by China and Russia in pursuing the shared
CMA’, and that some policy changes are expected with
goals of peace and stability on the peninsula and the
regard to Pyongyang. Iwaya was more direct, stress-
elimination of nuclear weapons there.
ing that the SRBM launch was ‘in violation’ of relevant
Tadashi Maeda, governor of the Japan Bank for
UNSC resolutions. On the chances of denuclearisation,
International Cooperation, asked why Seoul had taken
Mogherini cited Nelson Mandela: the issue ‘always
days to report the launch of a North Korean short-
looks impossible until it is done’.
Second plenary session
29
30
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
CHAPTER 4 Asia’s evolving security order and its challenges
THIRD PLENARY SESSION Saturday 1 June 2019, 11:30 SPEAKERS Haji Mohamad Sabu Minister of Defence, Malaysia Penny Mordaunt Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom Florence Parly Minister of the Armed Forces, France
THIRD PLENARY SESSION
Asia’s evolving security order and its challenges Haji Mohamad Sabu, Minister of Defence, Malaysia
Malaysian Minister of Defence Haji Mohamad Sabu
intra-regional lens, with overlapping border claims,
observed that the Asia-Pacific’s geopolitical landscape
the mass movement of refugees and internal conflicts,
has changed tremendously in recent years. Should
such as the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar – a
smaller states be forced to take sides amid ‘the rea-
conflict that has now taken on security and strategic
lignment and restructuring of middle powers’ foreign
dimensions beyond the country’s borders. Finally, the
and security policies’, he said, this would have ‘det-
third involves risks and emerging trends in the region,
rimental implications on economic development and
including maritime violence, terrorism and cyber
nation-building’. One of the biggest challenges is the
security. In the South China Sea, for example, major-
region’s complex security dynamics, particularly
power rivalry has aggravated tensions which could
given competition over natural resources, overlapping
lead to major conflict, potentially involving member
claims on ‘strategic hotspots’ and competition in the
states belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian
South China Sea.
Nations (ASEAN).
Mohamad placed the Asia-Pacific security order
Mohamad said that countries ‘need to rise above
into three ‘categories of outlook’. The first is geopo-
tighter regional security cooperation’ not by being
litical competition, primarily due to the uncertain
reactive, but by working strategically together. Strong
relationship between the United States and China – a
collaboration would increase inter-operability and
relationship that will shape the stability of the region
capability in facing common threats, and Malaysia, he
and particularly Southeast Asian countries. The
said, will play its part by participating in efforts to find
second sees the future of Southeast Asia through an
solutions to various global issues.
32
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Penny Mordaunt, Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom
UK Secretary of State for Defence Penny Mordaunt
Defence Arrangements (FPDA), and will ‘deploy to
started her address by underscoring Sir Stamford
Thailand for exercise Panther Gold, using the 2,000
Raffles’s decision 200 years ago to create a free port
Gurkhas and Armed Forces personnel based in Brunei
in Singapore – a testament to how ‘lasting success
and the region’.
depends on a win–win approach’. Given the series of
French Minister of the Armed Forces Florence
threats facing the Asia-Pacific, including terrorism,
Parly opened her plenary speech by noting that France,
malicious cyber activity and Norths Korea’s nuclear-
in ‘a bit of competition’ with the UK in 2018, has sent
weapons programme, countries across the region
more assets to the Indo-Pacific. While her predecessor
need to protect and strengthen the rules-based order.
Gavin Williamson had argued about whether it was
To achieve prosperity and stability, she said, all states
two or three naval vessels a year, Parly said that she
should choose a future in which shared standards –
has ‘upped my game’ by coming to Singapore with a
‘whether they are in the maritime environment, in
full carrier strike group, featuring an aircraft carrier,
cyberspace or in human-rights law’ – drive success
destroyers, tankers, 20 Rafale fighter jets, E-2C Hawk-
and growth.
eye airborne early-warning aircraft and helicopters.
Mordaunt stressed that the UK is committed to
She highlighted French President Emmanuel Macron’s
being a reliable partner, and that its engagement
2018 speech in Australia, during which he ‘made a
across the region is underpinned by support for global
case for an Indo-Pacific axis with France, India and
values such as human rights, democracy and respect
Australia’, involving cooperation with other regional
for the rules-based international order. ‘Global Brit-
(and European) countries. The carrier strike group has
ain’, she added, has seen the Royal Navy maintain
participated in the campaign to eradicate the Islamic
‘an almost unbroken presence in the region over the
State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) in Syria, taken part
last 12 months’. This will continue and also feature
in exercises with the Indian Navy and participated
the first operational deployment of the Royal Navy’s
in exercises with the Australian and Japanese navies.
new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, in a couple
Parly described this as ‘policy in action’. In the coming
of years’ time. London will build on its relationship
days, the minister said it would also participate in
with ASEAN, and deepen alliances with regional part-
joint exercises with the Singaporean navy.
ners such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand and India.
Parly said that regional cooperation ‘is more nec-
The UK will continue to exercise with the Five Power
essary than ever, given Asia’s evolving security order
Third plenary session
33
Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, France
and its challenges’. She said that France has just pub-
of greater European contributions in the Indo-Pacific.
lished its Indo-Pacific strategy document, in which
Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, research professor at the
Paris has identified five priorities. Firstly, it will pro-
Indonesian Institute of Sciences, asked Parly about the
tect its sovereign interests, nationals and territories.
tensions between ASEAN centrality and the increased
Secondly, it will continue to contribute to regional
involvement of extra-regional powers. Major-General
security through military and security cooperation
(Retd) Zhang Yingli, professor at the People’s Lib-
with countries such as India, Australia and Malay-
eration Army (PLA) National Defense University in
sia, among other key partners. Thirdly, it will seek to
China, asked Parly whether the code of conduct for the
preserve the ‘free and open access to maritime lines
South China Sea, which is currently being negotiated
of communication’, particularly in the South China
between China and ASEAN, will play an endur-
Sea. Fourthly, it will contribute to stability through
ing role in maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific.
multilateral action – sparticularly to combat nuclear
Sophia Yan, China correspondent for the Daily Tel-
proliferation. In reference to countries that have
egraph, asked Mordaunt what assurances the United
sought to solve the North Korean problem by falling
Kingdom can give to assuage concerns about Huawei
‘in love with Kim Jong-un’, Parly said that France will
building 5G networks in the country. Aaron Con-
support ‘love among nations’ and diplomatic efforts in
nelly, IISS research fellow in Southeast Asian political
the hope that they achieve ‘complete, verifiable, irre-
change and foreign policy, asked Mohamad whether
versible nuclear disarmament’. Finally, France will
the US and China ‘really play equal roles in creating
seek to mitigate the risks of climate change and coop-
tensions in the South China Sea’.
erate with as many partners as possible.
Parly responded by stating that France has sought to convince – and has convinced – other European powers that the Indo-Pacific is a key area. The best
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
combination for the region, she said, is to assert
The three speakers answered a variety of questions,
ASEAN centrality while allowing other significant
ranging from Europe’s involvement in the Indo-
powers to play major roles. With regard to the South
Pacific, to freedom of navigation and cyber security. Dr
China Sea code of conduct, the minister said that while
Liselotte Osgaard, senior adviser at the Danish Minis-
France supports it, Paris would not consider any fait
try of Foreign Affairs, asked Parly about the prospects
accompli to be in accordance with the United Nations
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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Dr Liselotte Osgaard, Senior Adviser, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Research Professor, Indonesian Institute of Sciences
Major-General (Retd) Zhang Yingli, Professor, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University, China
Sophia Yan, China Correspondent, Daily Telegraph
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On the
not become an issue of power competition between
issue of 5G networks and cyber security, Mordaunt
China and the US, but that the imperative is increased
responded that the UK would not compromise on its
diplomacy. Malaysia, he added, cannot fight with
security, nor its security relationships with key part-
ships from the Chinese Coast Guard sent into Malay-
ners. Mohamad said that the South China Sea should
sian waters; engagement and diplomacy are necessary.
Third plenary session
35
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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
CHAPTER 5
18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSIONS Saturday 1 June 2019 Session 1 Security implications of regional infrastructural development Session 2 Strategic interests and competition in the South Pacific Session 3 Defence-industrial development: balancing self-reliance and collaboration Session 4 Cyber-capability development: defence implications Session 5 Mechanisms for enhancing maritime security Session 6 New patterns of defence cooperation
SPECIAL SESSION 1
Security implications of regional infrastructural development
CHAIR
This first special session explored regional infrastruc-
Dr Lynn Kuok
ture development in the Asia-Pacific and its potential
Senior Research Fellow, University of Cambridge;
security implications. U Thaung Tun stressed that
Visiting Scholar, Paul Tsai China Center; Associate
infrastructure development is a priority for the region,
Fellow, IISS
considering the rise of emerging markets and economies. Myanmar sees infrastructure projects as part of
OPENING REMARKS
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as fundamental
Enkhbold Nyamaa
to its growth, and will take full advantage of opportu-
Minister of Defense, Mongolia
nities such as the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor while maintaining a flexible security posture to lever-
U Thaung Tun National Security Advisor; Union Minister, Ministry of
age Beijing’s rise. Although Myanmar accepts that the
Investment and Foreign Economic Relations, Myanmar
BRI serves China’s geopolitical and strategic interests, he added that the Marshall Plan did the same for the
Tadashi Maeda Governor, Japan Bank for International Cooperation
US. Enkhbold Nyamaa emphasised that Mongolia’s future largely depends on China, although, due to the
Dr Lanxin Xiang Director, Centre of One Belt and One Road Studies,
country’s geographical location, Russia will also play
China National Institute for SCO International
an important role in developing Mongolia’s infrastruc-
Exchange and Judicial Cooperation
ture. He also said that infrastructure connecting the three countries would be mutually beneficial. According to Dr Lanxin Xiang, the so-called ‘debttrap diplomacy’ is a conspiracy created by the United States, one which is neither fair nor accurate. While
38
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
U Thaung Tun, National Security Advisor; Union Minister, Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations, Myanmar
Dr Lynn Kuok, Senior Research Fellow, University of Cambridge; Visiting Scholar, Paul Tsai China Center; Associate Fellow, IISS
Tadashi Maeda, Governor of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Enkhbold Nyamaa, Minister of Defense, Mongolia
Dr Lanxin Xiang, Director, Centre of One Belt and One Road Studies, China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation
American discourse claims that China traps host coun-
tionship with the US, with which it has also signed
tries in debt, Xiang stated that ‘it might not be China
a memorandum of understanding on the ‘Free and
“trapping other countries”, it could be the other way
Open Indo-Pacific’ vision. According to Maeda, no
around’, whereby China is ensnared by debt that
single country can be a lone actor in the region, and
cannot be repaid. Bad loans, he said, are the result of
thus collaboration and cooperation will be key.
Chinese state-owned enterprises still lacking the nec-
The audience questioned the panel about China’s
essary skills and discipline to pursue international
level of policy coordination for the BRI and whether
projects. The real challenge, he added, is for China to
China could multilateralise the project in terms of
work with foreign partners on benchmark projects.
pooling capital and evaluation. Xiang responded by
This would help Beijing to discipline its own financial
saying that the BRI has the involvement of China’s
system. Tadashi Maeda said that Japan was initially
‘highest level’ of leadership above that of the State
sceptical of the BRI; now, Tokyo will cooperate with
Council. He added that while Beijing ‘never liked mul-
China in certain projects and is hopeful that it will
tilateralism for a long time’, since then the country has
become a multilateral effort. Nevertheless, Japan will
‘discovered’ multilateralism, which is now ‘consid-
continue to be careful to maintain a balanced rela-
ered an important asset for China’s external relations’.
Special session 1
39
SPECIAL SESSION 2
Strategic interests and competition in the South Pacific
CHAIR
The panellists in the second special session all agreed
Sarah Raine
that countering the effects of climate change is the key
Consulting Senior Fellow for Geopolitics and Strategy,
priority for the South Pacific. United States Indo-Pacific
IISS
Commander Admiral Philip Davidson highlighted the close cooperation between the US and many of
OPENING REMARKS
its regional and international partners, and said that
Dame Meg Taylor
combatting illegal and unreported fishing, environ-
Secretary-General, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Admiral Philip Davidson Commander, US Indo-Pacific Command
mental degradation, human trafficking and economic development is Washington’s top priority. To address those challenges, he said, Washington has increased its regional presence; strengthened its capacity-building
Frances Adamson Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
efforts; offered military, scientific and technological
Australia
support to local partners; promoted private US invest-
Alice Guitton
ments and trade deals; and delivered development
Director-General, International Relations and
aid to Pacific Islands. Representing the latter, Dame
Strategy, Ministry of the Armed Forces, France
Meg Taylor welcomed the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue as an opportunity for Pacific Islands states to have their voices heard. Too often, she said, while a growing number of traditional and non-traditional actors turn their attention to the South Pacific, members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) are left out of strategic dis-
40
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Dame Meg Taylor, Secretary-General, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
Alice Guitton, Director-General, International Relations and Strategy, Ministry of the Armed Forces, France
Frances Adamson, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia
Admiral Philip Davidson, Commander, US IndoPacific Command
Sarah Raine, Consulting Senior Fellow for Geopolitics and Strategy, IISS
cussions regarding the region. Taylor also stressed that
the needs of local countries. Guitton also stressed that
climate change was the single greatest threat to security
France is a nation of the South Pacific, as illustrated
and development in the region, and lamented that not
by its permanent military presence in New Caledonia
enough was being done to reduce carbon emissions.
and French Polynesia, and its EEZs in the region; it is
In response to the demand for support by Pacific
also committed to addressing illegal fishing, illegal
Islands states, Frances Adamson stressed that Aus-
trafficking at sea, natural disasters and climate change.
tralia has increased its efforts. The recent establishment
During
the
ensuing
discussion,
participants
of the Office of the Pacific within Australia’s Depart-
debated questions on the possible pitfalls of securitis-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade is just one indicator
ing climate risks, as well as the role of China as a key
of Canberra’s commitment. The desire to tackle cli-
partner and lender to many Pacific Islands states, and
mate change, protect exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
speculated as to whether China is building a military
and deliver prosperity – rather than geostrategic com-
base in Vanuatu. Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo,
petition among nations – drives Canberra’s efforts,
research fellow at the Institute of War Studies, Acad-
she added. Competition, however, can produce posi-
emy of Military Science of the People’s Liberation
tive outcomes, argued Alice Guitton, provided that
Army (PLA), dismissed such speculation, saying that
it occurs within a context of transparency, non-inter-
Beijing has only one overseas military base in Djibouti
ference and respect for sovereignty, and in line with
and none in the Pacific.
Special session 2
41
SPECIAL SESSION 3
Defence-industrial development: balancing self-reliance and collaboration
CHAIR
The third special session focused on emerging
Dr Tim Huxley
defence-industrial capability in the Asia-Pacific and
Executive Director, IISS–Asia
the associated challenges of balancing domestic industry and international collaboration. Senator
OPENING REMARKS
Liew Chin Tong started by outlining the current
Senator Liew Chin Tong
Malaysian government’s development of a Defence
Deputy Minister of Defence, Malaysia
White Paper, which describes the defence industry as ‘a catalyst for the economy’. Realistically, he said,
Greg Moriarty Secretary of the Department of Defence, Australia Lieutenant-General (Retd) Agus Widjojo Governor, National Resilience Institute, Indonesia
self-reliance will be limited and selective, focusing, for example, on producing parts of aircraft rather than full aircraft. Greg Moriarty described Australia’s focus on industry as a fundamental part of defence
Andrea Thompson Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
capability and highlighted the importance of keeping
Security, United States Department of State
public opinion onside. He stressed that while paying a premium for a first-rate domestic product is seen
Jan-Olof Lind State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Sweden
as acceptable, settling for second best in order to procure locally is not. Lieutenant-General (Retd) Agus Widjojo noted that although self-reliance is an ideal for many states, it requires time, proper planning and copious research and development (R&D) funding for implementation. He observed that the question of self-reliance versus
42
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Senator Liew Chin Tong, Deputy Minister of Defence, Malaysia
Greg Moriarty, Secretary of the Department of Defence, Australia
Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS–Asia
Lieutenant-General (Retd) Agus Widjojo, Governor, National Resilience Institute, Indonesia
Andrea Thompson, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, United States Department of State
Jan-Olof Lind, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Sweden
collaboration was not zero-sum, but that geopolitics
ventures between the government and industry in
should be kept in mind when assessing potential col-
major defence programmes. Nonetheless, he noted
laborative partners. From the supplier perspective,
the continuing dependency on international partners
Andrea Thompson explained the role of US arms
for technology, the importance of innovation and
sales as part of a wider pattern of collaboration with
the danger of stagnation inherent in the pursuit of
allies and partners, including long-term relationships
national champions.
that feature training exercises and the compatibility
The question-and-answer session built on the
of systems. She highlighted that the speed of tech-
issues raised by the speakers and highlighted addi-
nological change often outpaces the acquisition and
tional challenges for defence-industrial policy. Key
policy process, noting the 2018 reform of the US Con-
concerns raised were the need to develop absorption
ventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy. Jan-Olof Lind
capacity for new technology, tensions between threat-
explained the Swedish experience of moving into the
driven procurement and industrial-base sustainment,
international market following the end of the Cold
and the dangers of corruption in the procurement
War, retaining capability in key sectors with joint
process.
Special session 3
43
SPECIAL SESSION 4
Cyber-capability development: defence implications
CHAIR
Discussion during this session ranged from the poten-
Dr Kori Schake
tial benefits and risks of cyberspace to national and
Deputy Director-General, IISS
international responses. For the United States, General Paul Nakasone said achieving a secure and free inter-
OPENING REMARKS
net requires international effort. The US achieves this by
General Paul Nakasone
‘defending forward’, for example growing partner capa-
Commander, US Cyber Command; Director, National
bilities to defend electoral processes. New technologies,
Security Agency; Chief, Central Security Service
he said, ‘distinguish today’s great-power competition from decades ago’ and empower malign actors, there-
Agung Nugraha Acting Deputy for Protection, National Cyber and
fore offering both potential and risk. Dependence on
Encryption Agency, Indonesia
technology demands responsible behaviour, General
David Koh Tee Hian
Nakasone concluded, and the US aims to promote an
Deputy Secretary, Special Projects; Defence Cyber
internet based on the rule of law and internationally
Chief, Ministry of Defence, Singapore
accepted norms. Agung Nugraha also highlighted
Air Commodore John Maas
the opportunities and risks from new technology,
Senior Military Advisor, Common Security and
saying that social-media platforms could be misused
Defence Policy, European External Action Service
to threaten national security ‘by means of terrorism’. A
Senior Colonel Xu Manshu
new challenge is to promote the positive use of social
Professor, Research Center for Crisis Management,
media while building resilience, he said, while interna-
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense
tional cooperation is vital in building cyber capability. David Koh Tee Hian said that commercial and
University, China
security interests are converging, particularly in
44
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
General Paul Nakasone, Commander, US Cyber Command; Director, National Security Agency; Chief, Central Security Service
Air Commodore John Maas, Senior Military Advisor, Common Security and Defence Policy, European External Action Service
David Koh Tee Hian, Deputy Secretary, Special Projects; Defence Cyber Chief, Ministry of Defence, Singapore
Dr Kori Schake, Deputy Director-General, IISS
Agung Nugraha, Acting Deputy for Protection, National Cyber and Encryption Agency, Indonesia
Senior Colonel Xu Manshu, Professor, Research Center for Crisis Management, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University, China
cyber capability. Meanwhile, malicious cyber actors
to maintain strategic restraint. She proposed four
are more likely to strike civilian rather than military
confidence-building measures: a notification mechanism
infrastructure. Partnerships are vital across government;
on cyber policies so as to ‘better understand’ strategic
with industry and the civil sector; and with technologists
intentions; establishing diversified communications
and academia. Air Commodore John Maas said that the
links; joint academic research ‘to deeply understand the
European Union promotes the view that international
concerns and common ground’; and preventing new
law – and in particular, the UN Charter – also applies
risks from emerging technology.
in cyberspace, and supports non-binding voluntary
Issues raised during the question-and-answer
norms of responsible behaviour and cyber confidence-
session included technical points about national per-
building measures. While the traditional approach
ceptions, policies and capabilities, and international
to the challenge of cyber security focuses on defence
norms of behaviour. Cyber capability enables competi-
capabilities, the EU seeks to craft an ‘effective response’
tion and conflict below the threshold of war, said David
from ‘a regulatory point of view’. Senior Colonel
Koh, while Senior Colonel Xu said that it is hard to dis-
Xu Manshu said that cyber capability acts as a force
tinguish offence and defence in cyberspace – but, when
multiplier, and the arms race in cyberspace has now
two sides have enough capabilities to launch a cyber
begun. Cyber capabilities complicate conflict, and, with a
attack, ‘the one who has a strong resilience will survive
risk of kinetic retaliation, militaries have a responsibility
or succeed’.
Special session 4
45
SPECIAL SESSION 5
Mechanisms for enhancing maritime security
CHAIR
From the outset, there was consensus between pan-
Rahul Roy-Chaudhury
ellists on the significance of the maritime space for
Senior Fellow for South Asia, IISS
the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Major-General Dang Quang Minh argued that cooperation on mari-
OPENING REMARKS
time security requires a combination of bilateral and
Major-General Dang Quang Minh
multilateral efforts, with the Association of Southeast
Director-General, Institute for Defence
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers’ Meeting
Strategy, Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam
(ADMM) and ADMM–Plus playing important roles.
Rear Admiral Alan Goh
Rear Admiral Alan Goh emphasised the need to invest
Group Chief (Policy and Strategy), Ministry of
in practical confidence-building measures, including
Defence, Singapore
the ASEAN–China maritime exercise in October 2018
Senior Colonel Zhou Bo
and the planned ASEAN–United States maritime exer-
Director, Security Cooperation Center, Office for
cises. For Beijing, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo suggested
International Military Cooperation, Ministry of
that the overall situation in the Asia-Pacific is secure,
National Defense, China
but that some external powers have persisted in their
Admiral Tim Fraser Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom
conduct of military activities at sea and in the air, while ‘differences in the interpretation of international law by states and in domestic law increase the risk of accidents and conflicts’. He also said that China and the US should cooperate on the issue of freedom of navigation. Neither wants a conflict at sea and one side should not impose its own interpretation of international law
46
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Major-General Dang Quang Minh, DirectorGeneral, Institute for Defence Strategy, Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam
Rear Admiral Alan Goh, Group Chief (Policy and Strategy), Ministry of Defence, Singapore
Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Senior Fellow for South Asia, IISS
Admiral Tim Fraser, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom
Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, Director, Security Cooperation Center, Office for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of National Defence, China
on the other. Admiral Tim Fraser said that the United
to include coastguard and civilian ships, but Admi-
Kingdom sees the region as one of tremendous oppor-
ral Fraser called for a comprehensive approach. In
tunity but also one facing challenges, and that there
response to a question on how sincere the negotiating
needs to be better information sharing and more done
parties are about agreeing a new code of conduct in
to build trust. ‘We can also learn from other areas
the South China Sea, Admiral Goh argued that three
within the region’ and beyond, he said, citing efforts
years was a realistic time frame for such an agreement.
by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to organ-
In response to a challenge to China’s position on the
ise their maritime patrols, and the Combined Maritime
interpretation of the international law at sea, Senior
Forces (CMF) in the Middle East, as examples.
Colonel Zhou said that many countries have different
In the subsequent question-and-answer session,
interpretations. It was argued that Beijing’s efforts to
the issue of maritime-domain awareness was raised.
prevent the internationalisation of the South China Sea
Admiral Fraser suggested that in the Asia-Pacific, as
have failed, while the significance of the Indian Ocean
a vast region that probably needs more than one set
was also raised. Senior Colonel Zhou responded by
of arrangements, information proliferation is a good
saying that the Indian Ocean is very important to
thing and arrangements will probably evolve over
China, not least because of energy imports, and that
time. Senior Colonel Zhou rejected the idea of extend-
any efforts to restrict China to within the first island
ing the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)
chain would not work.
Special session 5
47
SPECIAL SESSION 6
New patterns of defence cooperation
CHAIR
This session explored how various types of defence
Dr Bastian Giegerich
cooperation evident in the region are developing, and
Director of Defence and Military Analysis, IISS
whether inclusive and exclusive modes of cooperation are ultimately compatible. Colonel-General Alexan-
OPENING REMARKS
der Vasilyevich Fomin stressed Russia’s emphasis on
Colonel-General Alexander Vasilyevich Fomin
inclusive multilateral security cooperation, which he
Deputy Minister of Defence, Russia Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach Chairman, NATO Military Committee General Angus Campbell Chief of the Defence Force, Australia General Koji Yamazaki Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces Major-General Ci Guowei
contrasted with what he referred to as the promotion of ‘military political blocs’ by multiple international actors through ‘Indo-Pacific strategies’. He also gave credit to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as ‘the cornerstone of security systems in the Asia-Pacific’. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach said that NATO, ‘the strongest military alliance in history’, has created partnerships with countries that ‘share the same values’
Chief, Office for International Military Cooperation,
not only in the Euro-Atlantic area but also in the Asia-
Central Military Commission, China
Pacific, including Australia, Japan, Mongolia, New
Senator Cory Gardner
Zealand and South Korea. General Angus Campbell
Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific
noted that Australia seeks ‘an Indo-Pacific with ASEAN
and International Cybersecurity Policy, Committee on
at its heart’ and does not want ‘states undermining the
Foreign Relations, United States Senate
rules-based order’. To these ends, he said, Australia is deepening its engagement and partnerships with its neighbours.
48
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Colonel-General Alexander Vasilyevich Fomin, Deputy Minister of Defence, Russia
Major-General Ci Guowei, Chief, Office for International Military Cooperation, Central Military Commission, China
Dr Bastian Giegerich, Director of Defence and Military Analysis, IISS
General Koji Yamazaki, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, Chairman, NATO Military Committee
General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force, Australia
Senator Cory Gardner, Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific and International Cybersecurity Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate
General Koji Yamazaki spoke about Japan’s active
tion between major countries for defence cooperation’,
contributions to regional and international security. In
‘an open, inclusive architecture’ for such cooperation
practical terms, Japan contributes to the UN Project for
and ‘practical cooperation in non-traditional security’.
Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities (RDEC);
Senator Cory Gardner emphasised the significance of
provides capacity-building assistance to Southeast Asian
the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which he
countries; takes ‘concrete measures’ to operationalise
described as ‘a blueprint for the future US policy in the
the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ vision; and has joined
Indo-Pacific’, and said that the US ‘has always been and
multilateral efforts to monitor ship-to-ship transfers by
will always remain a Pacific nation and power’ which
North Korea. Major-General Ci Guowei pointed out
will ‘never hesitate to protect our allies’.
that defence cooperation in the region included not only
The question-and-answer session focused on the
‘US-led major alliances’, but also organisations such
significance and acceptability of the ‘Free and Open
as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) that
Indo-Pacific’ concept. Another important question
‘adhere to the principle of non-alignment with open
raised was whether ‘ASEAN centrality’ could be used
membership and multilateral mechanisms’, including
as the basis for building a regional security architecture
the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM–
that could more effectively bridge the divide between
Plus), the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) and the Beijing
the US alliance system on the one hand, and the Chi-
Xiangshan Forum (BXF). He proposed ‘positive interac-
nese and Russian perspectives on the other.
Special session 6
49
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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
CHAPTER 6 Istana Reception and Dinner
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The Shangri-La Dialogue
53
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The Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
CHAPTER 7 China and international security cooperation
FOURTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 2 June 2019, 08:40 SPEAKER General Wei Fenghe Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China
FOURTH PLENARY SESSION
China and international security cooperation General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China
Chinese Minister of National Defence and State
a ‘narrow and exclusive’ view of the world turns one
Councilor General Wei Fenghe opened his speech by
blind to potential partners, where only enemies can
describing humanity as at a crossroads, and President
be seen – a self-fulfilling prophecy. As an example of
Xi Jinping’s vision for peace and cooperation toward
‘win–win cooperation’, General Wei highlighted the
building a shared future for mankind as ‘the right
recent second Belt and Road Forum for International
path’. He warned that there are many destabilising
Cooperation in Beijing, in which more than 150 coun-
factors challenging this vision, and at the outset of his
tries had participated.
speech expressed firm opposition to the formation of
Referring to China’s recent Conference on Dia-
military blocs and US comments on Taiwan and the
logue of Asian Civilizations, General Wei dismissed
South China Sea. Calling for an inclusive approach
any theory of a clash of civilisations, lamenting past
to regional security, General Wei cited a number of
tragedies such as slavery, colonisation and the Holo-
global hotspots including the persistent threat from
caust. The Chinese people, the minister observed, had
terrorism, instability in the Middle East and the ref-
experienced the cruelty of war and Beijing remains
ugee crisis in Europe, questioning the root cause of
committed to peace and global security. General Wei
such problems.
rejected the ‘China threat theory’ as hype, which, he
Rejecting confrontation, exclusiveness, zero-sum behaviours and prejudice, General Wei criticised what
suggested, comes from misunderstanding, prejudice ‘or even a hidden agenda’.
he interpreted as US unilateralism and protectionism
On the 70th anniversary of the founding of the
amid the backlash against globalisation, warning that
People’s Republic of China (PRC), General Wei said
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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Pehin Datu Lailaraja Major-General (Retd) Dato Paduka Seri Haji Awang Halbi bin Haji Mohd Yussof, Minister of Defence II, Brunei; and General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China
that China has never ‘invaded any other country’ and
Nations (ASEAN) and deepened friendships with its
would not ‘seek hegemony or establish spheres of influ-
neighbours, including India.
ence’. The PRC, he said, was committed to peaceful
On the question of Taiwan, General Wei compared
development, as enshrined in the constitution of both
it to Abraham Lincoln’s safeguarding of the integrity
the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the state.
of the United States: like the US, China is indivisible as
and ‘will be reunified’. He warned Taiwan’s ruling
entirely for self-defence purposes, General Wei said
Describing
China’s
military
development
Democratic Progressive Party that no attempt to split
that the country’s ‘active defence’ strategy incorpo-
China would succeed, and that foreign intervention
rates ‘defence, self-defence and post-strike response’.
would be doomed to failure, while condemning US
China’s defence expenditure, he said, is ‘reasonable
interference in Taiwan through the former’s domes-
and appropriate’, while the People’s Liberation Army
tic law. He warned that underestimation of the PLA’s
(PLA), as ‘the people’s force’ led by the CCP, is dedi-
resolve would be ‘extremely dangerous’. China, the
cated to safeguarding China’s national sovereignty
minister stated, makes ‘no promise to renounce the
and would not yield one inch of the country’s ‘sacred
use of force’ in safeguarding national unity.
land’. The PLA, the minister stated, would not seize
Depicting an improved security situation in the
anything from others but is not afraid to confront and
South China Sea, General Wei questioned who is
defeat any enemy that risks ‘crossing the bottom line’.
threatening stability there, and who would benefit
The commitment of the PLA to safeguarding
from such a deterioration of security? He also asked
regional and global security, said General Wei, is dem-
whether extra-regional countries should have a role
onstrated by its active support of UN peacekeeping
in the security of the region and whether Chinese
operations, for which it provides the largest troop con-
construction on South China Sea islands could be
tribution among the permanent members of the United
characterised as militarisation.
Nations Security Council. In promoting bilateral and
On North Korea, General Wei affirmed China’s
multilateral security cooperation, the China–Russia
commitment to denuclearisation and constructive
‘comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination
role in promoting peace talks. The minister pressed
has been running at a high level’, he noted. Beijing has
for the early resumption of Washington–Pyong-
also strengthened a sense of shared destiny with coun-
yang dialogue, advocating a dual-track approach to
tries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian
denuclearisation.
Fourth plenary session
57
On the 40th anniversary of the establishment of
the South China Sea. He also tackled some controver-
Sino-US diplomatic ties, General Wei said that, despite
sial questions, defending China’s handling of the 1989
setbacks, the relationship has been growing steadily.
Tiananmen Square incident as ‘correct policy’ to pre-
The minister described military relations between
vent political turbulence. The minister also applauded
China and the US as ‘generally stable’, and, while Bei-
his government’s counter-terrorism policies in Xin-
jing’s door was open for discussion on the trade war,
jiang when asked about the presence of re-education
China was nevertheless prepared to ‘fight till the end’.
camps there. Furthermore, he denied links between
He affirmed the importance of communication in the
telecommunications company Huawei and the Chi-
military-to-military relationship, insisting that the US
nese military.
follow ‘the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win–win cooperation’.
Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS associate fellow, questioned the sincerity of the minister’s dismissal of Chinese
Finally, General Wei asserted that China’s achieve-
expansionism in the light of reclamation activities
ments over the last 70 years are not a windfall, but
within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
due to the Chinese people’s ‘hard work, wisdom and
Rufino Lopez, deputy director-general of the Philip-
bravery’. According to him, President Xi’s leadership
pines’ National Security Council, asked how China
at the core of the CCP has brought political stability,
could permit the destruction of the marine environ-
social cohesion and steady economic growth toward
ment and the endangerment of food security.
realising the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation.
In response, General Wei insisted that limited
The PLA, concluded the minister, was ‘ready to work
defence deployments on the reclaimed islands in the
with the armed forces of other Asia-Pacific countries’
South China Sea are legitimate since they are part of
to safeguard regional stability.
Chinese territory. Again, the minister questioned the nature of militarisation, stressing that Beijing has built these facilities in response to an increased threat and
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
to improve the living conditions of those stationed on
General Wei answered a broad range of questions on
the islands. He declared that China could not respond
issues such as China’s active-defence strategy, its bilat-
to such muscle-flexing demonstrated by others in the
eral relationship with India and its approach to arms
region using ‘handguns’, and therefore it is ‘legiti-
control. His lengthiest responses, however, focused on
mate’ for China to deploy military assets there.
Dr Lynn Kuok, Senior Research Fellow, University of Cambridge; Visiting Scholar, Paul Tsai China Center; Associate Fellow, IISS
58
Rufino Lopez, Deputy Director-General of the Philippines’ National Security Council
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
CHAPTER 8 Preventing conflict in contested domains
FIFTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 2 June 2019, 09:30 SPEAKERS General Ngô Xuân Lich Minister of National Defence, Vietnam Major-General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana Secretary of National Defense, Philippines Senator Linda Reynolds Minister of Defence, Australia
FIFTH PLENARY SESSION
Preventing conflict in contested domains
General Ngô Xuân Lich, Minister of National Defence, Vietnam
Vietnamese Minister of National Defence General Ngô
for a code of conduct in the South China Sea – the key
Xuân Lich acknowledged that the increasing geopo-
focus of which should remain the prevention of risk
litical significance of the Asia-Pacific has intensified
and conflict. He also highlighted the role of the Asso-
strategic rivalry among major powers, a rivalry that
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence
reaches across different fields of activity. The causes
Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM–Plus) platform in
of this are primarily rooted in changing balances of
encouraging defence cooperation between ASEAN
power and a tendency to ignore the legitimate inter-
countries and external partners. If additional countries
ests of lesser powers. It is therefore important, he
express their wish to join the platform, Vietnam would
said, to define ‘ways to handle’ strategic competition,
support ADMM–Plus expansion, the minister said.
including adherence to international law, respect for
Philippine Secretary of National Defense Major-
national independence and sovereignty, and peaceful
General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana stated that a ‘seismic
attempts at confidence building and conflict resolution.
geopolitical shift’ is under way, not only in the ‘mate-
The minister suggested that great powers bear bigger
rial balance of forces’ in the Indo-Pacific but also in
responsibility in this respect, for ‘setting a good exam-
the ‘conception of the emerging regional order’, some-
ple in international relations’, than do lesser powers.
thing which has been driven by China’s re-emergence
General Lich observed that the South China Sea
as a major global player. There is a danger, he said,
holds both the latent potential for conflict as well as
that countries may untether their ‘networks of eco-
huge potential economic benefits. Vietnam, he said,
nomic interdependence’ and sleepwalk into conflict.
values the progress made by parties in the negotiations
Therefore, it is vital to further strengthen and institu-
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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Senator Linda Reynolds, Minister of Defence, Australia
tionalise confidence-building measures, particularly in
building infrastructure in partnership. Reynolds high-
the South and East China seas. The minister noted that
lighted Australia’s capacity-building initiatives for Fiji,
ASEAN plays a very helpful role in promoting such
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu as examples, and
confidence-building measures, citing as examples the
observed that the country’s multinational exercises are
multilateral Malacca Straits Sea Patrols and efforts
growing in sophistication and complexity, presenting
between the Philippines and Indonesia to settle their
an important opportunity to deepen defence coopera-
maritime-border disputes. From the perspective of the
tion in the region.
Philippines, no single power should exercise ‘unilateral control over vital arteries of global trade’. Senator
Linda
Reynolds,
Australian
minis-
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
ter of defence, opened by arguing that trust and
Dr Masashi Nishihara, president of the Research
transparency are both assets at times of ‘profound
Institute for Peace and Security, asked whether
transformation of global economic and political influ-
ASEAN countries are doing enough to promote the
ence’ in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. It is worrying,
freedom of navigation, and whether ASEAN govern-
she said, that trade and investment are being used as
ments should voice a stronger statement of support
tools to build strategic influence. Hard-won rules and
for freedom-of-navigation operations conducted by
norms, underpinning security and prosperity in the
the US, UK, France, Australia and others. Dr Pang
region, are being eroded. However, the emergence of
Zhongying, distinguished professor of international
Indo-Pacific visions and concepts are a cause for opti-
relations at the Ocean University of China and Macau
mism, creating opportunities to build an open and
University of Science and Technology, asked Reyn-
peaceful region ‘where economic and security ties
olds whether there was a road map to include China
are being continually strengthened’. From Australia’s
in the Indo-Pacific strategies and concepts that are
point of view, such a vision should have ASEAN ‘at
emerging in Australia and the US. Dr Rommel Ban-
heart’ and include ‘a fully engaged United States’.
laoi, chairman of the Philippine Institute for Peace,
However, the minister said that to deal with chal-
Violence and Terrorism Research, enquired whether
lenges facing the region, deliberate collective action by
the panellists felt that there has been significant pro-
all countries is required; examples include military-to-
gress in the negotiations for a code of conduct in the
military activities, military training and education, and
South China Sea. Dr Kori Schake, deputy director-
Fifth plenary session
61
Dr Masashi Nishihara, President, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Dr Pang Zhongying, Distinguished Professor of International Relations at the Ocean University of China and Macau University of Science and Technology
Dr Rommel Banlaoi, Chairman, Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research
Dr Kori Schake, Deputy DirectorGeneral, IISS
general of the IISS, asked whether the three speakers
long run, and the Philippines’ position remains that a
could think of any international norms that they felt
code of conduct would be to the advantage of every-
needed to be changed or adjusted, perhaps to accom-
body. Lorenzana suggested that China should show
modate China. Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS associate fellow,
its ‘responsibility as a major power’ by not using its
asked Lorenzana if a Philippine initiative to conduct
might to force decisions in the South China Sea. On
joint exploration with China in a certain area would
joint exploration, he responded that the agreement
be tantamount to a concession that China has legiti-
with China is that any joint exploration would not
mate claims to the area involved.
give Beijing jurisdiction over the area. In fact, he said,
General Lich responded by explaining that the
the prevailing sentiment of Philippine negotiators for
most important issue regarding freedom of naviga-
this proposal is that issues of sovereignty or jurisdic-
tion was to uphold international law, and that ASEAN
tion should not be discussed. Reynolds suggested that
countries and China are exerting ‘maximum effort’
the peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with
to bring negotiations on a code of conduct for the
international law and without coercion, are important
South China Sea to a successful conclusion. He noted
elements of Australia’s vision for an open, inclusive
that the agreed timeline for that conclusion would be
and stable Indo-Pacific, as are open markets that facili-
within three years, or even less. Lorenzana argued
tate greater economic integration. In addition, she said,
that freedom-of-navigation operations were impor-
a crucial building block of such a vision is a sustained
tant, but not enough to keep the South China Sea free
US regional presence, as well as China’s ‘leading role’
and open – cooperation from Beijing is required in the
in the way such principles are strengthened.
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IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
CHAPTER 9 Ensuring a stable and resilient region
SIXTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 2 June 2019, 11:30 SPEAKERS General (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu Minister of Defense, Indonesia Ron Mark Minister of Defence, New Zealand Dr Ng Eng Hen Minister for Defence, Singapore
SIXTH PLENARY SESSION
Ensuring a stable and resilient region
General (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu, Minister of Defense, Indonesia
The final plenary session focused on the necessary
Indonesia. The minister calculated that, with Indone-
steps to ensure a stable and resilient region, with
sia as host to the world’s largest Muslim population,
regard to the threats and challenges highlighted during
even if only 0.5% of the country’s 200 million Muslims
previous sessions. Indonesian Defence Minister Gen-
became ISIS supporters and sympathisers, this would
eral (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu started his remarks
still translate to approximately one million people.
by describing the critical role of the Association of
The mismanagement of the Rohingya refugee prob-
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in regional stability
lem would create an obvious opportunity for ISIS, he
and security, which he said has laid the foundations
said, and therefore cooperation to resolve it is vital.
for realising regional prosperity. Outlining notable
General Ryacudu said that all elements of Indonesian
threats facing the region, the minister also highlighted
society are being mobilised in the fight against ter-
the spread of terrorism and separatism, natural disas-
rorism through Indonesia’s concept of ‘state defence’
ters, climate change and disease outbreaks, as well as
(bela negara).
cyber crime and drug trafficking.
Emphasising the importance of close cooperation
However, General Ryacudu noted that the region
within ASEAN, the defence minister also presented
also faces the ‘non-physical threat’ of a ‘mindset of
examples of Indonesia’s joint operations, such as tri-
radicalism’, encouraged by Islamic State (also known
lateral cooperation with Malaysia and the Philippines.
as ISIS or ISIL) fighters returning from the Middle East
For example, maritime patrols in the Sulu waters have
to the region. The consequences of this have already
been successful in significantly decreasing incidents of
been seen in terrorist attacks across several regions of
piracy there.
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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Ron Mark, Minister of Defence, New Zealand
New Zealand’s Minister of Defence Ron Mark
between the two leading economies and militaries of
explained his country’s perspectives on achieving a
the world’. Nevertheless, this is what is coming to pass.
strong and resilient region across four key themes.
The challenge for both the US and China, Dr Ng
The first is the importance of tackling global chal-
argued, is to offer an ‘inclusive and overarching moral
lenges, such as climate change, through collective
justification for acceptance by all countries, big and
action. The second is understanding the motivations
small, of their dominance beyond military might’.
and outlooks of individual nations, and the transpar-
Regional acceptance of American or Chinese domi-
ent communication of these in order to reduce the risk
nance would diminish if ‘America First’ or China’s rise
of misunderstanding and miscalculation. The third is
were perceived to be against the national interests of
building people-to-people links, including the devel-
other countries or the collective good, said the minis-
opment of ‘more mature political partnerships with
ter. Even if the existing global order is imperfect, it has
Pacific Island countries and institutions’. Alongside
nonetheless ‘ensured peace and progress these past
the Pacific Islands Forum, the minister cited as exam-
70 years’. It would be ‘an egregious folly to throw this
ples the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting
baby out with the bath water’.
(SPDMM) as well as an agreement between France,
Dr Ng also highlighted the potential of the Belt
Australia and New Zealand to coordinate disaster
and Road Initiative – with at least US$700 billion com-
reconnaissance and relief assistance in the Pacific. The
mitted, it is now seven times the size of the Marshall
fourth and final theme is the importance of an agile
Plan – and warned against the shift to adopt tariff and
and relevant contemporary global security architec-
technological barriers, and their potential impact on
ture, and the collective rules underpinning it.
the multilateral trading system, especially in the face
Singaporean Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen,
of slower economic growth.
mirroring the strategic overview offered by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong during his keynote address two days earlier, began by reflecting on developments
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
in Asia since the inception of the IISS Shangri-La Dia-
Many questions focused on ASEAN and the role of
logue (SLD) back in 2002. With reference to the United
smaller countries in managing rising US–China ten-
States and China, year after year, said Dr Ng, speakers
sions. Dr Tim Huxley from IISS–Asia challenged the
at the SLD ‘had cautioned against this outright rivalry
narrative of ASEAN unity as presented by Indone-
Sixth plenary session
65
sia’s defence minister; noting ASEAN differences over
the Indonesia Institute of Deliverology highlighted the
the South China Sea and the management of Roh-
plight of the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang and asked
ingya refugees, he asked what more could be done to
about the responses of governments in the region.
improve ASEAN effectiveness. Dr Nick Bisley from
In response, General Ryacudu again highlighted
La Trobe University asked what lesser powers in the
the link between the handling of Rohingya refugees
region could do to support economic openness in
and ISIS’s campaign to recruit new members in the
the face of Washington–Beijing trade tensions, while
region, emphasising his support for the UN in man-
Reinhard Bütikofer, co-chair of the European Green
aging this. Mark reiterated his concerns about rising
Party in the European Parliament, asked what lesser
tensions, including in the South China Sea, and the
powers could do to rein in the damaging effects of
dangers of miscalculation; he also gave a sneak pre-
hegemonic competition.
view of New Zealand’s Defence Capability Plan, to be
Other questions focused on exploring national
published on 11 June 2019. Dr Ng reminded delegates
policies in more detail. Aaron Connelly, IISS research
about what is at stake and emphasised Singapore’s
fellow in Southeast Asian political change and foreign
commitment to maintaining the current system; multi-
policy, asked about the impact of Indonesia’s bela negara
lateral trade arrangements, for example, are important
programme in fighting Islamist radicalisation, and
not only for economic health but for security too. Small
questioned the wisdom of a defence ministry running a
states need to continue to persuade bigger states that
political-indoctrination programme. Fika Fawzia from
there is a reason to preserve the global order.
Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS–Asia
Aaron Connelly, IISS Research Fellow, Fika Fawzia, Indonesia Institute of Southeast Asian Political Change Deliverology and Foreign Policy
66
Dr Nick Bisley, La Trobe University
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
CHAPTER 10 The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme
The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme Menna Rawlings, Director-General, Economic and Global Issues, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, with the Young Leaders
The fourth Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme
Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the United
(SEAYLP) convened its largest and most diverse cohort
States Embassy in Singapore. The programme was
of strategic thinkers and policymakers at the 18th IISS
also supported by two corporate sponsors: Google and
Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD). The 39 Young Leaders rep-
OUE Limited.
resented 21 nationalities, and featured for the first time
The Young Leaders were actively engaged in dis-
an increased extra-regional presence including China
cussions during the SLD, offering sharp and critical
and India. They were drawn from the expert commu-
interventions during question-and-answer sessions.
nity, government, business and the media, and almost
Following Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s keynote
half were female. The SEAYLP delegates participated in
address, Shawn Ho, associate research fellow at the S.
a special agenda of exclusive meetings with ministers
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, asked the
and senior officials in addition to the main SLD, and
prime minister for Singapore’s view on the issues sur-
were hosted by the French Navy on board the flagship
rounding 5G technology and the considerations for
aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. The 2019 programme
the selection of network-infrastructure providers.
was funded by the Australian Department of Foreign
In the second plenary session, Andrea Berger, a
Affairs and Trade; the British High Commission
senior analyst at the Canadian Privy Council Office,
in Singapore; the High Commission of Canada to
questioned the panel on greater multilateral coop-
Singapore; the European Union; the Embassy of Japan
eration for engagement with the Democratic People’s
in Singapore; Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the
Republic of Korea (DPRK), particularly on cyber issues.
Republic of Korea’s (ROK) Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Ankit Panda, senior editor at the Diplomat, asked ROK
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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Andrea Berger (centre) and other Young Leaders speaking with Menna Rawlings
Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-Doo about recent
The Young Leaders also made their presence felt
North Korean short-range ballistic-missile launches
during the Dialogue’s special sessions. Dr Merve
and whether they contravened the September 2018
Seren, assistant professor of international relations at
Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA). Dr Jeffrey
Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, asked US Under
Ordaniel, assistant professor of international security
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
studies at Tokyo International University, questioned
Security Andrea Thompson about the challenges
Malaysian Defence Minister Haji Mohamad Sabu on
faced by Washington in improving countermea-
Malaysia’s stance on freedom-of-navigation opera-
sures against the increasing capabilities of non-state
tions in the third plenary session.
armed groups. Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, from the
SEAYLP delegates also asked General Wei Fenghe,
Australian National University, asked special-session
China’s minister of national defence and state coun-
panellists for their opinions on the utility of the Code
cilor, several questions during the fourth plenary
for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) for coast-
session. Dr Saira Basit, vice dean of the Norwegian
guard and civilian maritime vessels in the South and
Defence University College, asked him about China’s
East China seas.
regional role. Pham Anh Khoa, chief executive officer of Yola, raised the question of China’s commitment to a legally binding code of conduct between the
EXCLUSIVE EVENTS
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
The programme commenced with a meeting between
China in the South China Sea.
the Young Leaders and Menna Rawlings, director-
During the fifth plenary session, Marvin Salazar,
general of economic and global issues at the British
Philippines’
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Rawlings reflected
National Security Council, asked Australian Minister
on her experience as the UK’s high commissioner to
of Defence Senator Linda Reynolds how she intended
Australia in forming her views on opportunity and
to advance Australia’s interests in the South China
growth in the Asia-Pacific. She emphasised the United
Sea. In the sixth plenary session, Fika Fawzia of the
Kingdom’s increased regional diplomatic engagement,
Indonesia Institute of Deliverology asked how gov-
including
ernments in the region should respond to the plight of
ambassador to ASEAN and the appointment of a UK
the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.
trade commissioner in Singapore.
national-security
specialist
at
the
the
appointment
of
The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme
the
first
British
69
Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ discussion with Admiral Philip Davidson, Commander, US Indo-Pacific Command
IISS Director-General Dr John Chipman welcomed the Young Leaders to the summit and described how
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, who encouraged them to foster peace and security in their careers.
strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific drove the estab-
On the SLD’s third day, the Young Leaders
lishment of the SLD. Urging the group to engage in
met Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of the
discussions with ministers during the plenary ses-
US
sions, he emphasised that the SEAYLP is an integral
Recalling his engagement with SEAYLP 2018 dele-
part of the SLD and its core mission is to nurture young
gates during his first days in command, he remarked
strategists.
that regional peace and prosperity required the com-
Indo-Pacific
Command
(USINDOPACOM).
Subsequently, IISS Deputy Director-General Dr
mitment of countries in the region to a rules-based
Kori Schake led a discussion for SEAYLP delegates
international order, reflected in Washington’s ‘Free
with Canadian Minister of National Defence Harjit
and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) concept. The admiral
Singh Sajjan. Drawing upon his experience in the
emphasised high levels of US foreign direct invest-
military, the minister encouraged the Young Leaders
ment in the region and expanding US–ASEAN ties,
to be mindful of their ‘ripple effect’ and to develop
and commended the Young Leaders in serving their
their situational awareness. He further outlined
respective nations.
Canada’s defence priorities, emphasising adherence to a rules-based global order.
The third day of the programme included an exclusive breakfast discussion with Dr Vivian
In addition to the SLD’s main agenda, the Young
Balakrishnan, Singapore’s minister for foreign affairs,
Leaders were offered several more exclusive engage-
who highlighted the agency of small countries within
ments. They met Federica Mogherini, the European
the context of great-power rivalry and the challenges
Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
of the new technological revolution. He also stressed
Security Policy and Vice-President of the European
the need to invest in educational systems, digital
Commission, who emphasised closer cooperation
infrastructure, and research and development. The
between Europe and Asia on security and defence.
subsequent question-and-answer session focused on
High Commissioner of Australia to Singapore Bruce
an increasingly fractured world order caused by digi-
Gosper hosted the Young Leaders at an evening recep-
tal disruption, increased political polarisation, and
tion at his residence, and introduced the group to
the importance of the agency of smaller nations and
Frances Adamson, secretary of Australia’s Department
multilateral organisations.
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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ discussion with Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; and Vice-President, European Commission
SEAYLP LUNCHEON AND SEMINAR
Klykoom, senior associate at Vriens & Partners; Ross
Following the conclusion of the summit, the Young
Young, Google’s head of government affairs and public
Leaders attended a luncheon where Deputy Minister
policy in New Zealand; and Seng Pan, senior vice-
for Political Affairs Yoon Soon-gu, of the Foreign
president and head of government relations at Telenor
Ministry of the ROK, discussed ASEAN–ROK rela-
Myanmar. The session was chaired by Dr Lynn Kuok,
tions. Yoon stressed the ROK’s legal obligation not
IISS associate fellow and SEAYLP alumnus.
to develop nuclear weapons and the need to balance security with other national interests. He also elaborated on the ROK’s experience as the first country to
VISIT TO FRENCH AIRCRAFT CARRIER
commercialise 5G technology. In his closing remarks,
A highlight of the programme this year was the visit to
the deputy minister underscored ASEAN’s value as a
the French Navy’s flagship aircraft carrier, Charles de
mediator among competing powers and its important
Gaulle, at Changi Naval Base on Sunday 2 June 2019,
role in upholding a rules-based order.
where the French Ministry of the Armed Forces hosted
The fourth and final day of the programme featured
the SEAYLP delegation for a tour. The Young Leaders
the 2019 SEAYLP seminar on social-media responsi-
gained a better understanding of the operations of a
bility and human security. Conducted off the record,
carrier strike group and were familiarised with the
the seminar comprised three speakers: Punyaphan
French Navy’s formidable capabilities.
The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme luncheon with Yoon Soon-gu, Deputy Minister for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme
71
Dr Kori Schake, Deputy Director-General, IISS; Harjit Singh Sajjan, Minister of National Defence, Canada; and N. Lynn McDonald, High Commissioner of Canada to Singapore
Following the tour of the ship, Commander of
and that maritime security requires nations’ concerted
Task Force 473 Rear Admiral Olivier Lebas hosted
efforts to prevent the erosion of freedom of access and
a special discussion with Alice Guitton, the direc-
transit. Young Leaders asked her about ways to main-
tor-general for international relations and strategy
tain the rules-based international order in the region,
at the French Ministry of the Armed Forces. Guitton
the future of the Sino-European relationship and the
stressed France’s commitment as a resident power
bifurcation of the technological sphere, particularly
to the security of the Asia-Pacific and to upholding a
regarding 5G mobile networks. In the evening, the
rules-based international order. She underscored the
SEAYLP participants were invited to join a reception
need for confidence-building measures in the region,
on board.
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IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
APPENDICES
18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019
I. Selected press coverage of the 2019 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue II. Selected IISS publications
APPENDIX I
Selected press coverage of the 2019 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Washington Post 4 June 2019
The United States is talking a big game in Asia, but China is moving fast This past weekend, as Asia’s top national security leaders convened in a Singapore hotel to discuss how to manage the region’s delicate national security dynamics and avoid conflict, Chinese officials nodded along with the rest. Simultaneously, across the region, the People’s Liberation Army took a huge step to advance its military expansion. The contradiction perfectly illustrates how the United States is talking big in Asia while Beijing is moving quickly to change the facts on the ground. The Shangri-La Dialogue, run by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is the highest profile security-themed conference in Asia each year. The plenary sessions feature top defense officials and leaders from more than 20 Asian countries. The hallways are filled with generals, admirals, government officials, lawmakers, think tank experts – and even a few journalists. While the conference was under way, a U.S. defense official confirmed to me, the PLA tested a new submarinelaunched ballistic missile that drastically expands China’s worldwide nuclear deterrence capability. The message was clear: Beijing is not just talking – it’s acting to change the status quo. Acting defense secretary Patrick Shanahan, a keynote speaker at the conference, delivered a nuanced speech that called out China for some of its bad behavior but offered a constructive tone overall. ‘I say now that China could still have a cooperative relationship with the U.S. It is in China’s interests to do so,’ he said. ‘China can and should have a cooperative relationship with the rest of the region too, but behavior that erodes other nations’ sovereignty and sows distrust of China’s intentions must end.’
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Shanahan preached fair competition and promised enduring U.S. commitment to a rules-based order in the region. The United States and China are not in a ‘face-off,’ and the two big countries can work together to solve their issues, he said during a Q-and-A. He also called out China for its military coercion, predatory economics and malign influence operations abroad. Democratic senators at the conference praised Shanahan for his even-handedness, which will surely help him in his bid for confirmation. But several regional officials told me they had heard a similar message from U.S. defense secretaries in the past. So why, I asked Shanahan, should the region believe the United States’ commitment this time around? His response: The Trump administration is finally resourcing an aggressive ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ and calling out Beijing’s bad behavior. Experts said Shanahan did a reasonably good job of projecting a balanced message. But he fumbled at times, such as during his Q-and-A when he said there is no U.S.– China ‘trade war.’ Also, there was nothing really new in his speech or the 64-page ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’ he released to go along with it. Chinese Minister of National Defense and State Councilor Gen. Wei Fenghe made no attempt at balance or nuance when he gave his own keynote speech at the conference. He launched a full-on assault on U.S. policy and defended everything the Chinese government has ever done, including the Tiananmen Square massacre, the mass internment of Uighur Muslims and China’s militarization of the South China Sea. Wei claimed China has never sent troops into another country (Vietnam?) never bullied other countries (Taiwan?) and called the United States the aggressor in the region. ‘If the U.S. wants to talk, we will keep the door open,’ he said. ‘If they want a fight, we will fight till the end.’ Wei’s speech showed China feels strong and comfortable enough to openly say obviously false things and defend even its worst actions without shame or hesitation, said François Heisbourg, senior advisor for Europe at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. ‘Wei does not give a fig for what anybody outside China thinks about
what he says and what China does,’ Heisbourg said. ‘That is our new normal.’ The most interesting speech of the conference was given by Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. He took a neutral stance, calling on both Beijing and Washington to avoid a conflict that would impact the region’s smaller nations. ‘When elephants fight, the grass is trampled; when elephants make love, the grass also suffers,’ he quoted his father Lee Kuan Yew as saying. Several U.S. officials and experts told me they were dismayed by Lee’s ‘false equivalence’ of U.S. and Chinese actions in the region. Lee seemed to implicitly criticize the Trump administration’s more confrontational approach to China. That reinforced the sense that the region was more afraid of Chinese actions than reassured by U.S. rhetoric. ‘Countries have to accept that China will continue to grow and strengthen and that it is neither possible nor wise for them to prevent this from happening,’ Lee said. ‘The U.S., being the preeminent power, has the most difficult adjustment to make.’ In past years, Southeast Asian countries stood with the United States in defense of the international order that China is threatening, but this year those countries just wanted to stay out of it, said Gordon Flake, chief executive of the Perth USAsia Centre at the University of Western Australia. ‘In other years, we were talking about the region as a whole and this time we are just back to a pissing match between the two giants,’ he said. ‘That’s understandable, but it’s unfortunate.’ Regional allies see a Trump administration that withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a U.S. president that didn’t attend major Asian diplomatic summits last year, and a State Department with no assistant secretary for East Asia. In Singapore, the administration hasn’t even nominated anyone to be the U.S. ambassador. In reality, there is still a gap between the U.S. strategy in Asia and the resources needed to make it work. The Trump administration must do more to bring allies and partners along. Smaller countries are not yet sold on confronting Beijing, while Chinese government engagement and pressure is felt everywhere. Asian countries must not be forced to choose between the United States and China. But it’s China that is pushing them to make that choice. The United States’ job is to help small nations preserve their freedom and sovereignty so they don’t see siding with Beijing as their only option. The Trump administration must step up its engagement in Asia – and not just when it’s time for a big conference. ©Washington Post Reprinted with permission
Wall Street Journal 1 June 2019
U.S. Will Face China’s Behavior in Asia Directly, Defense Secretary Says ‘It’s not about being confrontational. It’s about being open and having a dialogue.’ SINGAPORE – In his first major public appearance in Asia, acting Defense Secretary Pat Shanahan said the U.S. would no longer ‘ignore Chinese behavior’ in the Asia-Pacific region, calling its activity a ‘tool kit of coercion.’ Speaking at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore, Mr. Shanahan also said that, despite China’s militarization of disputed islands in the South China Sea, its alleged attempts to conduct cyberattacks on other nations and its engagement in ‘predatory economics and debt-for-sovereignty deals,’ he wanted a better military-to-military relationship. ‘I think in the past people have tiptoed around’ Chinese activity in the region, the acting defense secretary told the audience during the question-and-answer period after his remarks. ‘It’s not about being confrontational. It’s about being open and having a dialogue.’ In describing China during his address before defense leaders in Asia, Mr. Shanahan said that ‘perhaps the greatest long-term threat to the vital interests of states across this region comes from actors who seek to undermine, rather than uphold, the rules-based international order.’ But later on in his 45-minute speech, Mr. Shanahan said there were areas where China ‘could still have a cooperative relationship with the United States,’ such as counter-piracy and enforcing United Nations sanctions on North Korea. A day earlier Mr. Shanahan held a 20-minute meeting with his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of the conference. He said he gave the Chinese defense minister a book of images of ship-to-ship transfers of oil near China, a common way that North Korea has allegedly skirted sanctions. ‘China can and should have a cooperative relationship with the rest of the region, too. But behavior that erodes other nations’ sovereignty and sows distrust of China’s intentions must end,’ Mr. Shanahan said. ‘Until it does, we stand against a myopic, narrow and parochial vision of the future, and we stand for the free and open order that has benefited us all – including China.’ Historically, China has defended its activities in the region, saying it is providing economic support to other Asian nations through infrastructure projects. It has also denied involvement in cyberattacks and said it is a victim of such activity. Later on Saturday, one of the most senior military officers in China’s delegation at the summit said Beijing
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welcomed Mr. Shanahan’s commitment to stabilizing military relations but strongly objected to his ‘mistaken’ remarks on the South China Sea and on Taiwan. In his speech, Mr. Shanahan had reasserted a U.S. commitment to provide Taiwan – a democratic island that Beijing sees as part of its territory – with weaponry to defend itself. He also said that any resolution of the issue should occur ‘in the absence of coercion.’ Maj. Gen. Shao Yuanming, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, reiterated Beijing’s longstanding position that Taiwan is an ‘inseparable’ part of China, which he said ‘must be unified.’ ‘If anyone tries to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military will pay any price to resolutely defend the motherland’s integrity,’ he told a news briefing. He also restated China’s longstanding position that it has indisputable sovereignty over all South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters, and that the U.S. is destabilizing the region with its naval patrols in the area. ‘Freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea is absolutely not a problem,’ he added. Still, he ended the briefing on a more upbeat note, saying that Mr. Shanahan’s meeting on Friday with his counterpart, Gen. Wei Fenghe, had been ‘positive and constructive’ and that the Chinese side would work to improve military ties. Mr. Shanahan said in his morning presentation that while the U.S. enjoys strong relationships in the region, allies need to share more of the burden. The Trump administration has long pushed for European nations to invest 2% of their gross domestic product in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, calling the U.S. contributions to the alliance unfair. ‘We are investing in you, and with you. And we need you to invest further in yourselves,’ Mr. Shanahan said. ‘We need you to invest in ways that take more control over your sovereignty and your own ability to exercise sovereign choices.’ In response to his meeting with Gen. Wei Mr. Shanahan said he saw ‘a lot of potential’ in the military relationship between the two countries. Yet he also described China’s buildup on disputed islands in the South China Sea as ‘overkill’ if intended as a defensive measure. A speech by Gen. Wei scheduled for Sunday could overshadow the U.S. acting defense chief, who has been in the job since Jan 1. Gen. Wei hasn’t attended the conference since 2011. Mr. Shanahan made only a passing reference to North Korea in his prepared remarks, as talks between the two nations have stalled. ‘We acknowledge that North Korea has neared a point where it could credibly strike regional allies, U.S. territory and our forward-deployed forces. North Korea
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remains an extraordinary threat and requires continued vigilance,’ he said. ©Wall Street Journal Reprinted with permission
Financial Times 2 June 2019
Asian ministers warn US–China tensions raise risk of war Lessons of past recalled as Beijing and Washington talk tough at security forum The growing dispute between the US and China on trade and technology is increasing the risk of military conflict or outright war in Asia, a region that hosts some of the world’s most dangerous geopolitical flashpoints, south-east Asian defence ministers cautioned at a security forum on Sunday. The warnings at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the annual Asian defence summit, came as China at the weekend stepped up its counter-offensive against the US in their trade war, announcing an investigation of delivery group FedEx and a potential blacklist of foreign companies or individuals considered ‘unreliable’. ‘With the untethering of our networks of economic interdependence comes growing risk of confrontation that could lead to war,’ Delfin Lorenzana, defence minister of the Philippines, said on Sunday at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual security conference in Singapore. ‘Our greatest fear, therefore, is the possibility of sleepwalking into another international conflict like world war one.’ Ng Eng Hen, Singapore’s defence minister, echoed concerns that the heightened divisions could erupt into war. ‘I don’t think that scenario is so minuscule that it won’t happen,’ he said. ‘When [the] US imposed restrictions on the sale of parts by US companies to Huawei, they subsequently found out that there were many, many companies in the US that were affected,’ he told the Financial Times. ‘To us, that interdependency is not only good economically but good for security. Because if we’re so economically interdependent, then the price of conflict is very high.’ China hawks in the administration of US president Donald Trump are increasingly pushing for a full ‘decoupling’ of the country’s technology supply chain from China, last month placing telecoms equipment maker Huawei on a blacklist restricting it from doing business with US companies. Asia is riddled with unresolved geopolitical disputes ranging from Beijing’s claims on Taiwan and the standoff between North Korea and South Korea, which remain technically at war, to the South China Sea, where China
has built up a number of reefs and shoals in international waters into artificial islands and has installed missiles. Beijing has also used its coast guard and maritime militia, backed up by navy vessels, to deny Philippine fishing boats access to contested land features in the region traditionally controlled by Manila. In Singapore, Patrick Shanahan, acting US secretary of defence, described China – without naming it – as ‘the greatest long-term threat to the vital interests of states across this region’, arguing that Beijing was destabilising Asia with a ‘toolkit of coercion’. But he also sounded a conciliatory note, saying: ‘China could still have a co-operative relationship with the United States.’ The attendance of General Wei Fenghe, the first Chinese defence minister to attend the conference since 2011, had raised expectations that Beijing might try to counter anxiety among its neighbours over its rapidly growing naval and air might and its sometimes aggressive use of those capabilities. But while Gen Wei appealed at the forum for peace, openness and ‘win–win co-operation’ and claimed that China was not threatening anyone, his speech was generally hawkish. ‘As for the recent trade friction started by the US, if the US wants to talk, we will keep the door open. If they want a fight, we will fight, we will fight till the end,’ Gen Wei said. Gen Wei reiterated China’s longstanding threat of invading Taiwan and refused to acknowledge neighbours’ concerns over the military build-up in the South China Sea. Several Asian countries, including some US allies such as the Philippines or nations that have more limited security co-operation with the US such as Singapore, have long fretted that the increasingly open rivalry between Washington and Beijing might force them to choose sides. Those fears took on much greater urgency this year. Mohamad Sabu, Malaysia’s defence minister, said there would be ‘regional anxiety if smaller nations would be forced to take sides – one that has detrimental implications on economic development and nation-building’. ©Financial Times Reprinted with permission
The Economist 6 June 2019
Asian countries fear China but many won’t side with America Asian countries may not like China’s hectoring, but they have their qualms about America, too What do you buy the Asian defence minister who has everything? How about a ‘beautiful’ photo-book of North Korean ships illegally transferring oil at sea? Patrick
Shanahan, America’s acting defence secretary, presented the collection of grainy aerial shots to his Chinese counterpart, General Wei Fenghe, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual gathering of military bigwigs in Singapore from May 31st to June 2nd. It was an emollient gesture in fractious times. When Banyan asked Mr Shanahan what he planned to say to General Wei in private, the answer was not a tirade about Huawei or the South China Sea. Instead Mr Shanahan said he was ‘excited’ to explore areas of cooperation. North Korean sanctions-busting – which often occurs in Chinese waters – was top of the list. Such collaboration would show that America and China could ‘compete in a constructive way’. On June 1st the Pentagon published its plans for that competition in an Indo-Pacific strategy. At its heart was the idea of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP), a nebulous concept conceived by Japan and enthusiastically taken up by the Trump administration. In essence, FOIP is a rulesbased rejoinder to China’s vision of spheres of influence, gunboat diplomacy and murky loans. ‘No one nation can or should dominate the Indo-Pacific,’ said the Pentagon in its report. Mr Shanahan’s notion of responsible competition – in contrast to the no-holds-barred clash of civilisations favoured by some of his head-banging colleagues – is laudable. It is also savvy. Asian states are likelier to sign up to FOIP if they are persuaded that America is not spoiling for a fight. But on both counts – stabilising the relationship with China, while rallying partners to push back against it – America has an uphill task. Start with the olive branches. General Wei did not so much ignore them as snap them into pieces. ‘Arise, all those who do not want be enslaved,’ he thundered in his speech on June 2nd, quoting China’s national anthem. ‘Let us build the new Great Wall with our flesh and blood.’ He warned that China’s army was ‘not afraid of sacrifice’ and that ‘we make no promise to renounce the use of force’ against Taiwan. One might think that such bluster would send Asians rushing to sign up to FOIP and into America’s arms. In some cases, it has. Narendra Modi will deepen defence ties with America in his second term. Japan is beefing up its armed forces and sending its navy into the South China Sea. Officials from America, Australia, India and Japan – the ‘Quad’ – now confer routinely, most recently on May 31st. All pay lip service to the idea that the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), a club of ten mostly smaller powers, should be at the core of FOIP. The problem is that not all in ASEAN are sold on the idea. For one thing, many are unconvinced that America will truly stick around, as the costs of any war with China grow over time. So why risk China’s ire? ‘The Chinese coast guard is bigger
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than Malaysia’s warships,’ lamented Malaysia’s defence minister. Mr Shanahan did his best to assuage these concerns. He pointed out that the Indo-Pacific was America’s ‘priority theatre’, with four times as many American forces as any other American military command. America’s freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea were also growing more routine: unusually, there were two in May alone. But muscle is only half of it. The larger issue is that Donald Trump’s unpredictably incendiary foreign policy sits uneasily with the principles of FOIP. Tensions with Iran are pulling America’s attention back to the Middle East. The compulsive resort to tariffs undercuts a rules-based trading order. Mr Trump’s lack of interest in human rights hardly furthers freedom. And to many in Asia, America’s war on Huawei or its sanctions against buyers of Russian arms or Iranian oil look an awful lot like China’s ‘toolkit of coercion’, as Mr Shanahan put it. That is unfair. An Asian order sculpted by China would be more capricious and suffocating than anything Mr Trump could devise. General Wei’s defence of the crushing of the Tiananmen Square protests – he called it a ‘correct policy’ that gave China the stability to grow richer – was a reminder of the ideological stakes. Australia, India and Japan are on board. Singapore and Vietnam’s sympathies are clear. But most ASEAN countries hate the idea of taking sides, despite widespread misgivings about China’s intentions. Mr Shanahan reckons they will eventually come round: ‘I think they’re building up their confidence.’ ©The Economist Reprinted with permission
Straits Times 22 June 2019
The US and its Shangri-La myths PM Lee’s keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue is a timely and important message to America as the US grows increasingly hostile to China’s rise For many years, ever since they first started to think of China as a potential future strategic rival, America’s foreign policy community members have taken the support of the rest of Asia for granted. They have unquestioningly expected that if China ever did challenge the United States’ position as the primary power in Asia, then its allies and friends in Asia would be only too eager to encourage and support the US in pushing back. They have assumed, indeed, that the more overtly China challenged US strategic leadership, the more eagerly its Asian
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neighbours would support America in resisting Chinese ambitions and preserving the old US-led regional order. And every year this assumption has been fortified and further entrenched at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. For almost 20 years, this annual mid-year talk fest is where Washington’s movers and shakers have come to mix with their Asian counterparts, and to have their assumptions confirmed. Year after year, the message they have taken back to Washington has been that America’s many friends and allies in Asia are just as fully committed to preserving US leadership and supporting American values and objectives in Asia as Americans themselves are. But this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, held earlier this month, was different. One of the region’s most respected voices used the occasion to warn Washington that it could not take regional support for granted in the swiftly escalating confrontation with China that is now unfolding. On the contrary, Washington was told in the plainest terms that its assumptions about Asia are wrong. Now that strategic rivalry with China is no longer a future possibility but a current and urgent reality, Washington was put on notice that Asian countries would not back America in recklessly stoking that rivalry into a new Cold War with China. The authority of this warning was all the greater because it came from none other than the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr Lee Hsien Loong. His keynote speech to the opening dinner offered a brutally frank critique of current trends in America’s policy towards China. Message to the US from a Friend Singapore is not just the Shangri-La Dialogue’s host nation, but one of America’s key friends in Asia. Mr Lee is much admired by US policy elites, and they have long seen his country as not just a close friend but also a de facto ally. Not surprisingly, then, his speech was met with shock, dismay and even, I understand, a measure of incredulity by some US delegates, and it continues to reverberate in Washington policy circles. It remains to be seen whether it will prompt a major rethink among policymakers and analysts there about the wisdom of their current approach to managing what everyone now understands to be the most important bilateral relationship in the world. Ms Bonnie Glaser’s comments on the speech in these pages recently suggest they will not. Ms Glaser, one of America’s most distinguished and influential Asiawatchers, concluded that Mr Lee had drawn a false moral equivalence between Washington and Beijing. She did not address the sustained and tightly argued case made in his speech for a major shift in US policy. Mr Lee’s nuanced and balanced presentation did not spare Beijing, but it raised real and urgent concerns about America’s response. His
key argument was very simple. China’s conduct raises deep anxieties among its neighbours, but that does not absolve the US of responsibility to react prudently and realistically in a way that does not make a bad situation even worse, which is what it is doing now. The talk of a ‘new Cold War’ is no longer just a metaphor but an increasingly accurate description of how America understands its future relations with China. It explains the clear reality that Washington is now set on trying to contain China just as it contained the Soviets – and to contain it not just globally but by denying it any wider regional influence in Asia. What is lacking in Washington is any clear idea of how this can be achieved, and at what cost. He explained that America’s attempt to deny China a bigger role in regional affairs commensurate with its growing wealth and power will not succeed, and risks plunging Asia back into a nightmare of strategic rivalry. The only sensible course is for America to accept China’s rise and learn to live with it. Asians will welcome America remaining a major strategic player in Asia but will not support America in trying to contain China’s legitimate aspirations for wider regional influence. ‘Countries have to accept that China will continue to grow and strengthen, and that it is neither possible nor wise for them to prevent this from happening,’ said Mr Lee in his Shangri-La address. ‘Americans now talk openly of containing China, and to do so soon before it is too late, the way they used to talk about the USSR and the Soviet bloc. This negative view of China has permeated the US establishment.’ But, he warned: ‘In a new Cold War, there can be no clear division between friend and foe. Nor is it possible to create Nato or Warsaw Pact equivalents with a hard line drawn through Asia.’ This is not the first time Mr Lee has sounded a warning to Washington about its approach to China, but it is by far the strongest critique yet offered not just by Mr Lee himself but by any regional leader. And it is clear that he is not alone. His speech has been endorsed even by US allies like Australia, whose Prime Minister, Mr Scott Morrison, said the speech contained ‘many insights that Australia would share’. It is not hard to understand why this is happening now. In the past 18 months, ever since the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy appeared, Washington’s rhetoric about China has become markedly more strident. Much attention has naturally focused on the very worrying trade dimensions of Washington’s growing animosity towards Beijing, but the strategic dimension has been just as striking and may well in the long run prove more serious – because it carries the risk of war – not a trade war, but a real war, and quite possibly a nuclear war.
Tough Talk But No Clear Plan Just how far US fear and hostility towards China have grown was vividly shown by a major Pentagon report released to coincide with the Shangri-La Dialogue. The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report went much further even than the National Security Strategy in its assessment of China’s ambitions, saying that China ‘seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near term and, ultimately global pre-eminence in the long term’. The claim that China aims not just for regional but for global pre-eminence is extraordinarily important because it directly implies that China does not just threaten America’s leadership position in Asia – it threatens America itself, just as the Soviet Union did. It means the talk of a ‘new Cold War’ is no longer just a metaphor but an increasingly accurate description of how America understands its future relations with China. It explains the clear reality that Washington is now set on trying to contain China just as it contained the Soviets – and to contain it not just globally but by denying it any wider regional influence in Asia. What is lacking in Washington is any clear idea of how this can be achieved, and at what cost. US policymakers and analysts seem to continue to assume, as they have done for so long, that tough talk from the White House and the Pentagon will be enough by itself to make China back off. This kind of thinking lay behind then US Acting Defence Secretary Patrick Shanahan’s tough talk in his address at the Shangri-La Dialogue this year, when he boldly said that Chinese bad behaviour ‘must end’. If only it was that easy. Wiser folk like Singapore’s Prime Minister understand that China’s weight and power in Asia are real and still growing, and cannot simply be brushed aside. They understand that China’s global ambitions and reach are not as broad as Washington now fears, but that its strength and resolve in Asia are much greater than Washington understands. They worry that Americans too readily assume that they can win a new Cold War with China just as they did the old one with the Soviets without understanding all the myriad ways that China is not the Soviet Union. And they fear that these misunderstandings will lead America stumblingly into a confrontation with China which it cannot win and which could easily degenerate into a major war. America needs Asia’s help to avoid that. It needs to be brought to understand that if it wishes to remain strategically significant in Asia at all, it must either engage with China as an equal partner or confront it as a bitter and very powerful rival, and that America’s interests, as well as Asia’s, are much better served by the first of these options. There is a challenge here for other Asian leaders. They need to follow Mr Lee’s example and explain clearly – and publicly – to Washington how they see the future of US–
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China relations and what they would like to see America do. There is also a challenge to the Shangri-La Dialogue and its organiser, the International Institute of Strategic Studies. The institute may have its headquarters in London and a branch office in Singapore, but for some time now, its head and its heart have been firmly set in Washington. Consequently, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become an amplifying echo chamber for complacent American misperceptions about Asia rather than an opportunity to challenge and correct them. Time for Shangri-La to leave the world of make-believe. ©Straits Times Reprinted with permission
Japan Times 2 June 2019
How Japan’s clout is rising in age of U.S.–China tensions As the West’s concerns about China’s dominance on the global stage continue to grow, Japan is increasingly regarded as a balancing force in the region. Perhaps reflecting this geopolitical shift, London-based think tank The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), known for hosting the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore, earlier this month announced the establishment of a ‘Japan Chair,’ a senior position dedicated to researching Japanese defense and foreign policy issues. IISS Director-General John Chipman recently sat down with The Japan Times to discuss Asia’s security situation as the U.S.–China trade war escalates and Japan increases it presence and importance on the geopolitical scene. Below are edited excerpts from the conversation. What are some of the takeaways from this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue? Many were impressed by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsieng Loong’s keynote speech, where he made a great effort to navigate the geopolitical landscape and explained the particular position of small states in the Asia-Pacific – particularly those who do not want to be put in a position of choosing between the United States and China. I think it was interesting that he said that for China’s rising power to be effective, it needs to exert that power with restraint and legitimacy. At the same time, he also pointed out the dangers of finding ourselves in two ecosystems: one led by the U.S. and the other led by China. It was in that context that he said it was important for the stability of the region that other powers were able to operate effectively.
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So I think that set the right tone for the meeting. Also, although acting U.S. Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan listed a number of things that disturb the United States in the region, it helped he didn’t conduct a full-frontal attack on China. Both the U.S. and China showed a degree of restraint. Would you say the escalating trade war is the reason for this? I think a lot of defense ministers – even if it’s not their mandate – did worry about the U.S.–China trade dispute extending for a long period of time. I don’t think anyone felt that trade frictions would materially spill over in geopolitical terms and increase the possibility of conflict. But what the Shangri-La Dialogue did offer was the opportunity for a lot of quiet diplomacy to take place. In particular, the trilateral defense meeting between the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan was important. I felt in watching the informal exchanges between the defense ministers, that a lot of the positive features of Asian diplomacy were in evidence. Once the personal contact became more evident, there was a warming up of relations between the defense ministers that was quite striking. Would you say the Shangri-La Dialogue provided a forum to help build confidence among nations? I think so. There is a lot of work to do, in practical confidence-building measures. For example in the South China Sea, there were numerous references to the efforts to finalize a code of conduct between China and ASEAN. By all assessments, though, we are far away from seeing such an agreed to code that is balanced. There is still an effort on the Chinese side to ensure that there is zero external influence on the way this code of conduct will be carried out in practice. And a couple of the claimant states who have decent relations with the United States don’t want to sign an agreement that makes it impossible for the Americans to have a presence in the South China Sea. So I think the gap has widened. However, it was good that there was a 20-minute bilateral meeting between Shanahan and China’s defense minister, Gen. Wei Fenghe. Both sides expressed a desire to have better military-to-military contacts. My impression was that the U.S. military felt that there had been an appreciable decline in provocative encounters at sea and more professional communication between the Chinese and the American navies. So that has diminished the risks of potentially dangerous incidents happening at sea.
That seems to be one of the major differences compared to last year. Yes, I think that’s right. Twelve months ago, at least the U.S. perception was that the Chinese were deploying near American naval vessels in a way that was not just too close for comfort, but too close for safety. That has now changed. What would you attribute the change to? I would imagine that the cause – of course this is only speculation – is that the Chinese saw there were risks that an accident could occur, and that they could send the political messages they wanted to without maintaining such a close proximity to U.S. ships. The fact that the Chinese sent their defense minister, and that he was confident in asking an array of questions, meant that it sort of settled the mood of the Shangri-La Dialogue a bit. I think that the Chinese side saw that by deploying such a high level official, they were able to get their message across more effectively, which in turn meant that everyone else didn’t have to shout so loud to be heard as well. How did the idea for the IISS Japan Chair come about? We’ve been working on establishing the Japan Chair for a few years. Our efforts accelerated after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gave the keynote address in 2014 at the Shangri-La Dialogue. One of the purposes of having the Japan Chair in London is to help give Europeans a better understanding of the Japanese perspective, not only on regional affairs, but global affairs as well. A second goal would be that while the Japan Chair will of course focus on Japanese strategy and security policies, we also want to regularly share IISS expertise with Japan on other themes and regions that may be of interest to that nation’s government, private sector and experts. The creation of the Japan Chair was funded by the Japanese government. How do you ensure research independence? We are very assertive about our independence. To be transparent, we have a memorandum of understanding with the government of Japan that gives IISS full independence in deciding such things as who will head the Japan Chair, the content of the program, the nature of the analysis, the methodology in which it will be collected and presented and the choices we make about our publications. The trustees of the IISS would not allow us to take money from any government that in any way that constrained our intellectual freedom of action. The point I’ve always made in discussions with all governments is that if you don’t trust us to present objective facts and independent assessments, then you shouldn’t
provide us with your funds. But if you do trust us, then you have to trust our independence. Did Japan’s changing role on the global stage have an impact on the decision to establish the Japan Chair? As Foreign Minister Taro Kono said, when he goes to Europe, he realizes that Russia and China are seen a bit differently there. So it’s also important for Europeans to understand the way Japan looks at Russia and China – which is a bit different, given the economic and geopolitical realities and the territorial questions that continue to persist. Also, ensuring that the European countries, with their four G7 members, are better informed about the Japanese perspective as a G7 nation was also important. On the flip side, how would you describe the European perspective on Japan? Up until six months ago, Europe focused a large portion of its relationship effort on China. On its economic engagement with China, many European countries, including Germany, saw China as a lucrative export destination. The economic relationship with Japan, and the political one that went with it, might not have been so regularly discussed. Recently, though, the EU released a quite strong strategy paper on China that begins to recognize some of the challenges that the union has in dealing with the Asian giant, especially in the wake of the efforts Beijing has made in promoting the Belt and Road Initiative and the so-called ‘16 plus one’ talks with EU countries that some in Brussels viewed as a possible attempt to split the Europeans up. In that broader context, I would remind people Japan is a big economic player that broadly shares the political values of European Union countries. Now, how do we show the Japanese perspective? What we intend to do is to present fact-based analysis of Japanese security policies and make evidence-based assessments of what Japan is seeking to do in developing its strategic personality. We are not intending to be a voice of the Japanese government. The Japanese government can do that for itself very well. But what we want to do is to create more debate about Japan in Europe. Japan used to be criticized for punching below its weight on the international stage. Now it’s being recognized as a player. How do you see the trajectory of Japan’s global role? I would start from the proposition that Japan is still the third-biggest economy in the world. And people sometimes forget that, holding on to a fascination with China’s
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rise. And Japan, especially in the last few years, has maintained a steady state and enjoyed small, but well-managed growth. I do think that Europeans will become more interested in Japan as concerns over China grow. And this is not to incite competition. There’s a growing appreciation that China – though it says it wants a multipolar world system – appears to be working toward a unipolar system in Asia. And what the Europeans will see is Japan helping to guarantee the maintaining of a multipolar Asia. I think that’s the correct way to think about the geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific and the Asia-Pacific. It’s not a question of stopping the rise of China or containing China – it’s about preserving a multipolar system in a multipolar Asia-Pacific region. Europeans are becoming more conscious that multipolarity cannot just be a European thing; It also has to be an Asian thing too. That’s where Japan really fits in and why we always have to remind people of the place that Japan has in that multipolar world. It’s an argument that, in principle, shouldn’t be too difficult for the Chinese, because they like talking about multipolarity as well. ©Japan Times Reprinted with permission
Channel News Asia 5 June 2019
Commentary: The US, China, a security dilemma and a way out in Singapore If there is any bright spot from this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, it’s the realisation that a small country like Singapore can play a useful mediating role with rich insights to give the US and China perspective to their relationship, says China commentator Tom McGregor BEIJING: When two elephants fight, an impasse at some point is bound to happen in the ensuring [sic] struggle. This weekend, defence officials from around the world descended upon Singapore to discuss regional security challenges and geopolitics at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an apt time seeing how frictions over the brewing bilateral tussle between the US and China over trade and technology have risen to a fever pitch. The world’s two richest and most powerful countries were headed for diplomatic confrontation, after the trade truce collapsed last month when Washington raised tariffs
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from 10 per cent to 25 per cent on listed Chinese imports valued at US$200 billion. [The] US President doubled down on the pressure on China when he signed an executive order that indirectly labeled the Shenzhen-based telecommunication equipment manufacturer and smartphone maker Huawei and its affiliates a ‘foreign adversary’, clearing the way for barring the company from US networks and manufacturers. China’s Commerce Ministry responded by raising tariffs on US$60 billion of US imports, blocking US deliveries of LNG and soybeans. Huawei has repatriated US employees working in Shenzhen and pressed on with a lawsuit against the US government, over earlier charges that the National Defence Authorisation Act passed by Congress in 2018, was unconstitutional. There are also threats that China will ban certain US companies from operating in the country. Fireworks in Singapore These tensions set the stage for geopolitical fireworks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. US Acting Secretary of Defence Patrick Shanahan and China Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe gave rousing speeches at the conference that raised the temperature, leaving many members in the audience feeling anxious about the growing split between Washington and Beijing. Although Shanahan shied away from singling out China in most of his speech, he had earlier said before the summit started that he would use his speech to call out China specifically. So his reference to actors who sought to undermine the rules-based order through militarising disputed areas, predatory economics and influence operations seemed targeted at China. Wei meanwhile highlighted that China will fight until the end, if the US wanted a fight. ‘Bully us? No way.’ Wei had also send [sic] a clear and unequivocal signal regarding Taiwan as a red line in the sand for China. ‘No attempts to split China will succeed,’ he added. ‘Any interference in the Taiwan question is doomed to failure. If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs.’ ‘The US is indivisible and so is China. China must be and will be reunified.’ A Commitment to Peace Despite the strong words used by both sides, what went under the radar were the conciliatory remarks in each of their speeches. China is at an inflection point where its focus is to maintain sustainable and inclusive growth, as it begins to grapple with the challenges of being the world’s fastest
ageing country. While it seeks to defend its interests of preserving a conducive international environment for continued development, it also has to be wary about unnecessarily giving into US demands and setting a precedence [sic] inimical to its interests. There are many in China who believe that the US is out to encircle China through a string of alliances and partnerships with countries around China’s periphery and dampen its rise. Despite Wei’s pugnacious speech, he also reaffirmed Beijing’s longheld commitment to peace by saying: ‘China will not attack, unless we are attacked.’ He also highlighted how both sides should ‘promote a China–US relationship featuring coordination, cooperation and stability’. He added: ‘The two sides realise that conflict, or war between them, would bring disaster to both countries and the world.’ Shanahan too highlighted that China has stood with the US as a cooperative partner in pursuit of shared goals in decades past, and both sides have an alignment of interests, ‘from military-to-military dialogues to develop risk-reduction measures, to tackling transnational threats’. Both sides also met bilaterally on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. Worries Remain Still, Taiwan poses a significant flashpoint for both sides, given Chinese sensitivities over what they perceive as Washington’s meddling in its internal affairs and using Taipei to destabilise peace on the Asian continent, following US National Security Advisor John Bolton’s recent meeting with his Taiwanese counterpart David Lee last week. A security dilemma is brewing, in which both the US and China take actions and use words to bolster their position, which inevitably ends up making the other feel less secure. Some Chinese government officials believe the hawkish Bolton best represents US President Donald J Trump’s stance on foreign policy, while Westerners worry hawks in China hold the most influence in Beijing. Both sides are clutching onto misguided viewpoints. US Defence Secretary Shanahan’s subsequent strong words during his Q&A where he mentioned that China had built artificial island [sic] in disputed waters in the South China Sea was also seen as provocative by the Chinese delegation. The Search for Solutions Even when elephants fight, sometimes the grass can make a difference. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was spot on when delivering the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue. He said the ‘fundamental problem between the
US and China … is a mutual lack of trust’ that ‘bodes ill for compromise or peaceful accommodation’. ‘China’s growth has shifted the strategic balance and the economic centre of gravity of the world … China has to recognise that it is in a totally new situation created by its own success. It can no longer expect to be treated the same way as in the past when it was much smaller and weaker,’ he said. At the same time, he highlighted that ‘the rest of the world too has to adjust to a larger role for China. Countries have to accept that China will continue to grow and strengthen, and that it is neither possible nor wise for them to prevent this from happening’. President Trump needs to restore trade talks with China, recognise that both sides have got to work together to rebuild trust and strengthen the international global economy, and rein in elements that might wish to take a harsh stance on China for ideological reasons. Meanwhile, Beijing has to demonstrate it can uphold the principles and standards on trade, technology and intellectual property if President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping do sign a US–China trade agreement in Osaka on the sidelines of the G20 and demonstrate good faith in the lead-up to that meeting. The trade deal can only succeed if both countries follow the rules and guidelines that will be stated in the agreement. If there is any bright spot from this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, it’s the realisation that a small country like Singapore can play a useful mediating role between both sides as a neutral observer that has deep and close ties with both the US and China, and rich insights that gives [sic] both perspective to their relationship. The words used by Prime Minister Lee in Singapore has [sic] provided a face-saving cover for both sides to step back from the brink and break the impasse. What is needed next is for both to accept compromise and allow for concessions in any upcoming trade negotiations. ©Channel News Asia Reprinted with permission
South China Morning Post 4 June 2019
Shangri-La Dialogue shows China and US can get priorities right Talks in Singapore between the two sides as trade and tech wars rage were deemed to be ‘constructive’. Such meetings are necessary to help manage risks and avoid escalation to open conflict American arms sales to Taiwan and the alleged Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea have been ever-
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green issues for China and the United States at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore. This year, though, tensions between the sides were raised to new heights by tariff increases and the battle over the Chinese technology giant Huawei. But while defence ministers from the nations were only too aware of the contentious new matters and again raised the old ones, they made a conscious effort to calm hostilities. This is what the two governments and region need; a tacit understanding by their militaries that such talks and meetings are necessary to help manage risks and avoid escalation to open conflict. China’s sending of its highest delegation in eight years, led by Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe, showed the level of concern over the actions of US President Donald Trump’s administration. In contrast, the US presence was somewhat diluted, with Patrick Shanahan still to be confirmed in his position as defence secretary. Still, both took a strong stand on protection of interests, although direct mention of one another was kept to a minimum. For Wei, that meant issuing a warning to ‘external forces’ fostering the idea of independence for Taiwan. China, he said on Sunday, had a ‘legitimate right’ to construct man-made islands in the South China Sea; Shanahan the previous day gave notice to Beijing that ‘behaviour that erodes other nations’ sovereignty and sows distrust of China’s intentions’ should end. Talks between Wei and Shanahan were determined by the sides to be ‘constructive’ and a commitment to positive engagement was reiterated. In his speech to security officials, the acting US defence secretary said that while his country would remain a competitor of China’s, it would cooperate when interests aligned on issues including enforcing United Nations sanctions against North Korea and fighting transnational incidents such as piracy. But as he spoke, a Pentagon strategy report on the Indo-Pacific region was released that hit out at China for ‘eroding the values and principles of the rules-based order’. The US has a challenging task convincing governments in Asia and the Pacific to side with it rather than China given Trump’s erratic actions. Less uncertain, though, is the desire by the nations’ militaries to keep politics from their dialogue and ensure relations remain cordial. Priorities were right in Singapore; although there was posturing, the trade and tech wars were set aside by China and the US so that they could work for a better communications channel to raise issues and improve understanding. ©South China Morning Post Reprinted with permission
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China Military 3 June 2019
China’s wisdom on security cooperation contributes to regional peace, stability SINGAPORE, June 2 (Xinhua) – ‘While striving for common prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, we must respect the core interests and accommodate the security concerns of all,’ said Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe during his speech at the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue on Sunday. ‘We in China do not covet the interests, nor envy the development, of others. However, we shall never give up our legitimate rights and interests,’ Wei added. ‘No country should ever expect China to allow its sovereignty, security and development interests to be infringed upon.’ This was the first time for a Chinese defense minister to attend the Shangri-La Dialogue after eight years. Wei’s honesty, frankness and not shying away from harsh questions gave delegates a good impression, said Li Mingjiang, an associate professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Cooperation Benefits China, U.S. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the United States, and the bilateral relationship has been steadily growing in the past 40 years, despite all the ups and downs, Wei said. ‘The most valuable lesson we have learned from the four-decade-long relationship is that cooperation benefits the two sides while confrontation hurts both,’ the defense minister said. Wei’s speech mentioned the essential part of China’s policy on the United States, that is ‘fighting but not breaking,’ said Li. ‘We’ve seen the fighting, but Wei also emphasized cooperation, which is very important to all, so that regional countries don’t have to choose sides.’ During his speech, Wei noted that the two militaries have agreed on building their relationship into a stabilizer for the overall relations, maintaining regular communication on the strategic level, and managing risks and preventing conflicts. ‘The two sides recognize that military conflicts or even a war between them would bring disasters to both countries and the world,’ he said. ‘It takes two to cooperate, but only one to start a fight.’ Wei’s speech echoed U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan’s remarks a day ealier on building a bilateral military relationship as a stabilizer for the overall relations, said Francois Heisbourg, a senior adviser for
Europe of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). ‘So I think maybe the two militaries have some scope for a degree of maintaining normality in relations. But that will depend on the political development,’ he added. All participating defense ministers and other delegates to the dialogue were glad to hear from Wei that the Chinese military will interact more with the U.S. military and develop a better relationship, said Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen. ‘This is good news for all of us,’ Ng said. ‘From the Singaporean perspective, both sides strengthening interaction will help lower risks and reduce misjudgement for either party.’ Asia-Pacific Security At the event this year, over 600 defense ministers, policymakers and experts from about 40 countries gathered from Friday to Sunday to discuss security issues in the Asia-Pacific. ‘We should respect and accommodate the legitimate security concerns of one another,’ Wei said. ‘China understands and respects the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries, and supports the social systems and development paths they independently choose.’ ‘The minister has systematically elaborated China’s concept on international security order, world peace and stability, regional security and safety, and explained some of China’s specific actions, these have yielded positive results,’ said Li. For one, Wei refuted the allegation that China is militarizing the South China Sea islands and reefs. ‘It is the legitimate rights of a sovereign state to carry out construction on its own territory. China built limited defense facilities on the islands and reefs for self-defense,’ he said. ‘Where there are threats, there are defenses.’ The current situation in the South China Sea is improving towards greater stability, Wei said. Over 100,000 ships sail through the South China Sea each year and ‘none has been threatened.’ Wei talked about progress being made between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries in negotiating the Code of Conduct and ‘we look forward to the outcome of that,’ said Rommel Banlaoi, chairman of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research. However, ‘there are always people trying to rake in profits by stirring up troubles in the region,’ Wei said, adding that in recent years, some countries outside the region have come to the South China Sea to flex muscles, in the name of freedom of navigation. ‘The large-scale force projection and offensive operations in the region are the most serious destabilizing and
uncertain factors in the South China Sea,’ he said. Wei also talked about China’s choices of peace and development, openness and inclusiveness, win–win cooperation, and mutual understanding among civilizations, as well as its commitment to regional and world prosperity and stability. China has been playing an increasingly important role in the Asia-Pacific’s security, and there are different kinds of security mechanisms in the region, said Zhou Bo, director of the Center for Security Cooperation at the Office for International Military Cooperation of the Chinese Defense Ministry. ‘That’s why Wei reiterated that every security mechanism needs to be open, inclusive and transparent.’ ‘We want China to have military capability in order to contribute to the maintenance of world peace. And we also want a strong Chinese military in order to enhance China’s role in peacekeeping efforts worldwide and we want that to happen,’ Banlaoi said. Asanga Abeyagoonasekera, director general of the Institute of National Security Studies of Sri Lanka, said: ‘China’s strategy is an inclusive strategy, trying to bring all nations together and trying to create a shared value.’ Taiwan Question On China’s core Taiwan-related issues, Wei reiterated China’s firm position and warned against any forces’ attempt to split the island from the country. The Taiwan question bears on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and China must be and will be reunified, Wei said, adding that ‘if anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs for national unity.’ The defense minister said no attempts to split China shall succeed, and that foreign intervention in the Taiwan issue is doomed to fail. As for Shanahan’s remarks on Saturday, in which he said the United States will offer necessary support to Taiwan according to the ‘Taiwan Relations Act,’ Wei said, ‘We can find no justifiable reasons for the U.S. to interfere in the Taiwan question by its domestic law.’ Li said Wei’s remarks on Taiwan were firm and tough, and reflected China’s determination that there is no room for compromise on the issue. Wei also made it clear to the United States not to go too far on Taiwan, Li added. Heisbourg noted Wei’s speech was ‘very impressive,’ adding that Wei ‘said twice “at all costs” for national unity. This will be taken seriously by the audience.’ Officially known as the Asia Security Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue has been organized and convened annually by the British think tank IISS and the Singaporean government since 2002. ©China Military Reprinted with permission
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APPENDIX II
Selected IISS publications
The Adelphi series is the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research. Books published since 2013 include:
Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia, Adelphi 460 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2017).
Brendan Taylor, Dangerous Decade: Taiwan’s Security and Crisis Management, Adelphi 470–471 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2019).
Samir Puri, Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups: The Difficulty of Securing Strategic Outcomes, Adelphi 459 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2016).
William C. Potter and Sarah Bidgood, eds, Once and Future Partners: The United States, Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation, Adelphi 464–465 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).
Brian Ganson and Achim Wennmann, Business and Conflict in Fragile States: The Case for Pragmatic Solutions, Adelphi 457– 458 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2016).
James Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader: South Africa’s Continental Role Since Apartheid, Adelphi 463 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018). James E. Doyle, Renewing America’s Nuclear Arsenal: Options for the 21st Century, Adelphi 462 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2017). Ben Barry, Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War, Adelphi 461 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2017).
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Nigel Inkster, China’s Cyber Power, Adelphi 456 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2016). Mark Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Adelphi 455 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2016). Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel, China’s Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad, Adelphi 451 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2015). Jeffrey Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture, Adelphi 446 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2014).
Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air–Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia, Adelphi 444 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2014). Monika Barthwal-Datta, Food Security in Asia: Challenges, Policies and Implications, Adelphi 441–442 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2014). Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, Adelphi 438 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2013). Christian Le Mière and Sarah Raine, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi 436–437 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2013).
The Strategic Dossier series harnesses the Institute’s technical expertise to present detailed information on key strategic issues. Recent publications include: IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2019: Key Developments and Trends (London: IISS, 2019).
Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source of analysis of international security and politicomilitary issues. Articles on South, Southeast and Northeast Asia published between December 2015 and August 2019 include: ‘Hong Kong’s protests’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 24, August 2019. ‘Thailand’s hybrid politics’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 13, May 2019. ‘Tensions in the Taiwan Strait’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 11, April 2019. ‘The India–Pakistan security crisis’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 10, April 2019. ‘The US–China trade war’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 5, March 2019. ‘The second Trump–Kim summit’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 4, February 2019.
IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2018: Key Developments and Trends (London: IISS, 2018).
‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 40, December 2018.
IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2017: Key Developments and Trends (London: IISS, 2017).
‘North Korea’s military power’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 24, August 2018.
IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2016: Key Developments and Trends (London: IISS, 2016).
‘The evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 19, June 2018.
IISS, Missile-defence Cooperation in the Gulf (London: IISS, 2016).
‘Thailand’s political direction’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 12, April 2018.
IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2015: Key Developments and Trends (London: IISS, 2015). IISS, Evolution of the Cyber Domain: The Implications for National and Global Security (London: IISS, 2015). IISS, Regional Security Assessment 2014: Key Developments and Trends in Asia-Pacific Security (London: IISS, 2014). IISS, North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, 2011). IISS, The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of ‘Raúl Reyes’ (London: IISS, 2011). IISS, Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, 2011). IISS, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, 2010). IISS, Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia (London: IISS, 2009). IISS, Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran (London: IISS, 2008).
‘China’s evolving role in African security’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 3, January 2018. ‘The Rohingya crisis’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 36, October 2017. ‘US Afghanistan policy: regional aspects’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 34, October 2017. ‘The Trump administration’s Afghanistan policy’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 23, September 2017. ‘The North Korea crisis’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 31, September 2017. ‘US–China dialogue and the tenuous bilateral relationship’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 21, June 2017. ‘South Korea’s presidential transition and strategic challenges’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 19, June 2017. ‘China–North Korea relations and the 19th Party Congress’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 12, April 2017.
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The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual assessment of military capabilities and defence economics worldwide. Region-by-region analyses cover the major military and economic trends and developments affecting security policy and the trade in weapons and other military equipment. Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons and defence economics. Defence expenditure trends over a ten-year period are also shown. IISS, The Military Balance 2019 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2019).
The Armed Conflict Survey is the Institute’s annual review of political, military and humanitarian trends in current conflicts. IISS, Armed Conflict Survey 2019 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2019).
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s bimonthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs. Recent articles of interest include: Andray Abrahamian, ‘North Korea’s Bounded Rationality’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February–March 2019, pp. 141–160. Nigel Inkster, ‘The Huawei Affair and China’s Technology Ambitions’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February–March 2019, pp. 105–111. Denny Roy, ‘Assertive China: Irredentism or Expansionism?’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February–March 2019, pp. 51–74. Alexander Lukin, ‘The US–China Trade War and China’s Strategic Future’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February–March 2019, pp. 23–50. Nadège Rolland, ‘A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February–March 2019, pp. 7–22. Karl Gustafsson, Linus Hagström and Ulv Hanssen, ‘Japan’s Pacifism Is Dead’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 6, December 2018– January 2019, pp. 137–158. Stephan Frühling, ‘Is ANZUS Really an Alliance? Aligning the US and Australia’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 5, October– November 2018, pp. 191–218. Tricia Bacon, ‘Slipping the Leash? Pakistan’s Relationship with the Afghan Taliban’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 5, October– November 2018, pp. 159–180. Bruce Bennet, James Dobbins, Jeffrey W. Hornung and Andrew Scobell, ‘After the Summit: Prospects for the Korean Peninsula’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 4, August–September 2018, pp. 21–28. Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Kim Jong-un’s Singapore Sting’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 4, August–September 2018, pp. 29–36.
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Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Competing with China’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 3, June–July 2018, pp. 7–64. Nigel Inkster, ‘Chinese Culture and Soft Power’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 3, June–July 2018, pp. 65–70. Andrew B. Kennedy, ‘China’s Innovation Trajectories’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 3, June–July 2018, pp. 71–86. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, ‘India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 3, June–July 2018, pp. 181–194. Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Globalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 7–40. Gordon Barrass and Nigel Inkster, ‘Xi Jinping: the Strategist Behind the Dream’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 41–68. Ben Barry, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Practical Drawbacks and Opportunity Costs’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 75–81. John L. Harper, ‘Cold War in East Asia?’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 6, December 2017–January 2018, pp. 197–204. Michael Elleman, ‘The Secret to North Korea’s ICBM Success’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 5, October–November 2017, pp. 25–36. Christopher D. Kolenda, ‘America’s Generals Are Out of Ideas for Afghanistan’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 5, October– November 2017, pp. 37–46. Tim Huxley and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Trump’s Missing Asia Strategy’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 3, June–July 2017, pp. 81–89. Robert Ayson and Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘Asia’s Diplomacy of Violence: China–US Coercion and Regional Order’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 85–124.
Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review of strategic developments throughout the world. Recent sections of interest include: ‘China: Renewed Ideology, New Foreign Policy’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018). ‘Japan: Abe’s Legacy’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018). ‘DPRK: Desiring Peace?’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018). ‘Southeast Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018). ‘Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018). ‘India and China: Prospects for Accommodation and Competition’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018). ‘Pakistan: Seeking a Strategic Space Between the United States and China’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).
The IISS wishes to thank these sponsors of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2019 LEAD SPONSORS
PRINCIPAL SPONSORS
MAIN SPONSORS
18TH IISS ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Since the inception of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, this unique experiment in multilateral defence diplomacy has involved defence ministers, deputy ministers, chiefs of defence staff, nationalsecurity advisers, permanent under-secretaries, intelligence chiefs and other national-security and defence officials from: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, the European Union, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam. The result has been the growth of the Shangri-La Dialogue into the richest gathering of defence professionals in the Asia-Pacific. The goal of the IISS is to ensure that the Shangri-La Dialogue will continue to serve as the best available vehicle in the Asia-Pacific for developing and channelling astute and effective public policy on defence and security. The IISS, a registered charity with offices in London, Washington, Manama and Singapore, is the world’s leading authority on political–military conflict. It is the primary independent source of accurate, objective information on international strategic issues. Publications include The Military Balance, an annual reference work on each nation’s defence capabilities; Strategic Survey, an annual review of world affairs; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, a bimonthly journal on international affairs; Strategic Comments, offering online analysis of topical issues in international affairs; and the Adelphi book series, the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research. The range of IISS publications, the Institute’s convening power, and its strong international policy perspective make the IISS a key actor in the global strategic and economic debate. ‘In times of upheaval and tensions, it is precisely forums of this kind that not only serve as a chief register of regional geopolitical temperature, but also spell the difference between collectively espousing a path of diplomacy and peace instead of conflict and confrontation.’ Major-General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana, Secretary of National Defense, Philippines ‘For 18 consecutive years, the [Shangri-La Dialogue] has been able to validate its role and prove its significance and gravity in the region, and the wider world, as a tier-one forum for dialogue and global security, providing a platform for participants to share viewpoints and find ways to achieve regional peace, stability and prosperity.’ General Ngô Xuân Lich, Minister of National Defence, Vietnam ‘Events like the Shangri-La Dialogue provide an invaluable opportunity for us all to re-establish and renew existing connections and to develop new ones.’ Senator Linda Reynolds, Minister of Defence, Australia
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