IISS Shangri La Dialogue 2023 by International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 20TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 2–4 JUNE 2023

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 20TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 2–4 JUNE 2023

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

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Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chapter 1 Keynote address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Chapter 2 First plenary session The United States’ leadership in the Indo-Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Chapter 3 Second plenary session Building a stable and balanced Asia-Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Chapter 4 Third plenary session Resolving regional tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Chapter 5 Fourth plenary session Asia’s evolving maritime security order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Chapter 6 Simultaneous special sessions Session 1 Security implications of cyber and technological competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Session 2 Challenges of Asia-Pacific military capability development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Session 3 Nuclear dimensions of regional security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Session 4 Balancing Asia-Pacific minilateralism and ASEAN centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Session 5 Managing Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Session 6 Defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Chapter 7 Istana reception and dinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Chapter 8 Fifth plenary session China’s new security initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Chapter 9 Sixth plenary session New partnerships for Asia-Pacific security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Chapter 10 Seventh plenary session Developing models for cooperative security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Chapter 11 The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Appendices I. Selected digital engagement and media coverage of the 2022 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue . . . . . . . 74 II. Selected IISS publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

FOREWORD

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

with 42 government ministers present. On the side-

held its 20th annual Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in

lines of the summit, there were hundreds of meetings

Singapore from 2 to 4 June 2023, marking two dec-

involving government delegations, with IISS facilitat-

ades of Asia’s premier defence summit. This report

ing over 120 of them. We also organised our annual

gives an account of the Dialogue’s on-the-record pro-

SEAYLP, where 37 young leaders from around the

ceedings and the discussions of the Southeast Asian

region and beyond discussed pressing security ques-

Young Leaders’ Programme (SEAYLP).

tions with senior officials and played a full part in the

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the IISS

Dialogue’s debates.

began to examine various geopolitical tensions in

As ever, the IISS is grateful to the Singapore govern-

the Asia-Pacific region. Having noted the lack of an

ment for its support for the SLD process. This includes

established forum for defence ministers, the IISS

the annual IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting,

convened 14 defence ministers and 160 delegates in

which will next convene from 21 to 23 January 2024.

Singapore for the first Asia Security Conference in

We would like to thank the following lead com-

May 2002. This forum would later become known as

mercial sponsors for their financial support for

the Shangri-La Dialogue.

the

Dialogue:

Airbus,

BAE

Systems,

Boeing,

Over the past two decades, the strategic dynamic

Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies. We

in the Asia-Pacific region has developed rapidly.

also extend thanks to principal sponsors Amazon

But whatever topics that have dominated in any

Web Services, Babcock International Group, EDGE

particular year, the SLD has provided a consist-

Group, Microsoft and Rolls Royce, as well as prime

ent forum to develop bilateral and multilateral

sponsors Accenture and Maxar Technologies and

defence discussions, while also using IISS research to

main sponsors Asahi Shimbun, Planet Labs and ST

inject useful insights into broader strategic debates.

Engineering. The Shangri-La Hotel generously spon-

These characteristics were on show during this

sored the Dialogue’s opening dinner.

year’s SLD, beginning with an excellent keynote

The IISS will further develop these partnerships,

address by Australian Prime Minister Anthony

and make new ones, with the shared aspiration of

Albanese. The summit then featured an expanded

advancing regional security dialogue and cooperation

programme of seven plenary sessions and six spe-

through the SLD process. We look forward to welcom-

cial sessions, providing an array of opportunities for

ing delegates to Singapore for the 21st IISS Shangri-La

defence ministers, senior officials and high-ranking

Dialogue from 31 May to 2 June 2024.

military personnel to discuss critical and emerging security issues.

Sir John Chipman KCMG,

The 2023 Dialogue welcomed 571 delegates, more

IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

than half of whom were from governments or the

James Crabtree,

armed forces. Forty national delegations attended,

IISS–Asia Executive Director

Foreword

INTRODUCTION

The 20th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2023

other than to create the best possible environment for

marked a special anniversary for Asia’s premier secu-

engagements both public and discreet, and to inject

rity summit. As Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony

useful freshness into the strategic debate.’ As has been

Albanese noted in his opening keynote address: ‘For

traditional, the IISS did not suggest a single overarch-

two decades, this highly respected forum has brought

ing theme for the summit. However, there were several

together experts in both defence and diplomacy, long-

topics that were prominent throughout discussions.

standing recognition that building peace, security and

Growing tensions between China and the United

stability depend on both strategic capability and dip-

States was one such topic. Sino-American relations have

lomatic capacity, reinforcing each other.’

worsened steadily since the last SLD, notably follow-

As in earlier iterations, the IISS worked to ensure

ing former speaker of the US House of Representatives

that this year’s SLD remained an open and inclusive

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Last

forum for regional discussion, providing a useful

year’s summit featured a bilateral meeting between

platform for participants regardless of regional or

China’s then-defence minister General Wei Fenghe

geopolitical positions. The Dialogue provided a

and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, raising

mechanism for transparency, inviting governments

tentative hopes for renewed military dialogue. These

to outline defence priorities and describe immediate

hopes proved hard to realise and a bilateral meeting

security concerns. The SLD also maintained its role

between Secretary Austin and his Chinese counterpart

as a forum where defence leaders could develop new

General Li Shangfu did not take place. However, the

channels of communication and cooperation through

two leaders’ speeches were examined closely for signs

the bilateral and other meetings that took place.

of possible avenues to reduce regional tensions. The ongoing war in Ukraine was a second major theme. Oleksii Reznikov attended the SLD for the first

AN EXPANDED AGENDA

time as part of his first trip to Asia as Ukraine’s defence

To mark the Dialogue’s 20th anniversary, the IISS

minister. ‘This war and its results are important not

designed the most comprehensive and diverse agenda

just for Ukraine and Europe, but also for the whole

in the summit’s history. Our agenda was built around

world, including the Asia-Pacific region,’ he noted in

the traditional series of themed plenary sessions, pro-

the Dialogue’s Special Session 5. ‘The main question

viding defence ministers with the opportunity to speak

of this war is: Will the world we live in be governed by

to fellow security decision-makers as well as select

the rule of law or by the rule of violence?’

experts, business leaders and commentators. We also

Other European speakers also mentioned the war,

included an expanded programme of six special ses-

including Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative

sions, providing delegates with a more intimate setting

of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the

to discuss issues in greater depth in a roundtable format.

European Commission, and Estonian Prime Minister

As Sir John Chipman KCMG, IISS Director-General

Kaja Kallas. ‘My own country went through Russia’s

and Chief Executive, noted in his opening remarks: ‘The

colonisation for almost half a century, up until 1991,’

IISS has no agenda of its own in convening this Dialogue

Kallas noted in her remarks. ’It is multilateralism and

Introduction

(From left) Major-General (Retd) Haji Awang Halbi bin Haji Mohd Yussof, Minister of Defence II, Brunei; Teo Chee Hean, Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, Singapore; Brigadier-General Filomeno da Paixão de Jesus, Minister of Defence, Timor-Leste; and Andrew Little, Minister of Defence, New Zealand

(From left) Helena Carreiras, Minister of Defence, Portugal; Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US; Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence, Canada; Kajsa Ollongren, Minister of Defence, Netherlands; Boris Pistorius, Minister of Defence, Germany; Sir John Chipman KCMG, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive; and Pål Jonson, Minister for Defence, Sweden

strong alliances that are yet another stronghold of

supremacy,’ Dr Ramos-Horta added. Pio Tikoduadua,

defence, especially for small states,’ she added.

Fiji’s Minister for Home Affairs and Immigration,

The role of middle and smaller powers in regional

who also holds the island nation’s defence portfolio,

security was the third prominent theme of SLD 2023.

used his remarks to discuss the security challenge of

In his keynote address, Albanese argued for a world

climate change, demonstrating how the SLD platform

in which such nations have ‘a seat at the table and are

can shine a spotlight on issues of strategic importance

able to make a contribution to their collective security’.

to smaller nations. ’Geopolitical tensions and rivalries

General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto, Minister of

across the globe are spilling into the Pacific region, my

Defence of Indonesia, provided one prominent

island home,’ he noted. ‘While some nations are in dis-

example of middle-power diplomacy by propos-

putes over their maritime boundaries, we in the Pacific

ing a peace plan to conclude the Ukraine war. He

risk being left with nothing even to dispute over,’ the

also used his speech in the third plenary session to

minister stressed.

call for a demilitarised zone and a United Nationsbrokered referendum.

The importance of communication and dialogue was a fourth and final theme of the Dialogue. This was

A range of other middle powers were represented

a point noted by Albanese in his keynote address, and

at the summit, most prominently from Europe, the

he stressed the importance of multilateralism in times

Middle East and Southeast Asia. From the latter, Dr

of rising tensions. ‘When relations are strained, bilat-

José Ramos-Horta, President of Timor-Leste, pro-

eral talks can sometimes be reduced to a list of topics

vided a thoughtful address where he noted the lack

to avoid,’ he argued. ‘Multilateral forums … provide

of attention given to poverty alleviation in security

a new perspective, placing points of tension in the

dialogues. ‘Global challenges are not met with ade-

broader context where they belong. They safeguard

quate preventative soft-power strategies and action,’

our capacity to argue constructively,’ Albanese said.

he noted. ‘Hard-power tools available to the mightily

Sino-US relations were understandably at the fore-

rich of the world are not lawfully applied because the

front of such discussions, not least because of the risk

powers that could make a difference between war and

of accidental escalations in the absence of functional

peace are too busy squandering resources in narrow,

communication channels. As Singapore’s Defence

selfish rivalries, each bent on regional influence and

Minister Dr Ng Eng Hen stated in the closing plenary

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

session: ’No country, I think, wants war, but our working assumptions and scenarios must be that unplanned incidents can occur.’ He added: ‘Close encounters, some mere metres apart, have occurred between US and Chinese ships and planes on and over the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait. Channels of communication, both formal and informal, must exist so that when these unplanned incidents occur, those channels can be used to de-escalate and avoid conflict.’

ENHANCED PARTICIPATION Besides an expanded programme, the 20th Shangri-La Dialogue featured an expanded array of ministers. While there were 553 delegates in SLD 2022, this year there were 571 of them, more than half of whom were

Boris Pistorius, Minister of Defence, Germany; and Kajsa Ollongren, Minister of Defence, Netherlands

senior personnel in government or the military. The Dialogue was structured around a core group of participating nations, with various delegations

ministers, with 30 cabinet ministers represented, along

invited this year as regular members of the SLD process:

with 18 chiefs of defence. Despite their bilateral issues,

Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,

the continued participation of China and the US was

Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,

especially welcome. Secretary Austin’s second appear-

Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan,

ance demonstrated Washington’s ongoing focus on

the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore,

regional diplomacy. China’s delegation this year was its

Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, the

largest since Beijing first participated in the SLD in 2007,

United Kingdom, the US and Vietnam. In addition, the

and the latest where the defence minister led China’s del-

Dialogue welcomed delegations from 15 guest nations:

egation. General Li’s speech this year signalled Beijing’s

Austria, Bahrain, Estonia, Fiji, Israel, Lithuania, Mexico,

welcome continued commitment to the SLD process.

the Netherlands, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,

The 20th SLD provided platforms for several newly

Sweden, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Ukraine.

appointed ministers. Besides General Li of China, other

Of these nations, four — Estonia, Mexico, Portugal and

top defence officials attended the SLD for the first

Ukraine — attended the Dialogue for the first time.

time, notably Hamada Yasukazu, Japan’s Minister of

In total, the IISS this year welcomed representa-

Defense; Dr Pål Jonson, Sweden’s Minister for Defence;

tives from 40 guest governments, with 54 nationalities

Andrew Little, New Zealand’s Minister of Defence;

represented amongst the total pool of delegates. The

Boris Pistorius, Germany’s Minister of Defence; Oleksii

Dialogue is also an important gathering place for inter-

Reznikov, Ukraine’s Minister of Defence; and Ben

national institutions, with the Association of Southeast

Wallace, the UK’s Secretary of State for Defence. Josep

Asian Nations (ASEAN), the EU, the International

Borrell Fontelles from the EU and Pio Tikoduadua of

Committee of the Red Cross, NATO and the Five

Fiji also attended the SLD for the first time.

Power Defence Arrangements represented this year.

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue is primarily a ’track one’

Although traditionally a gathering for defence min-

meeting, where speaking roles are given to government

isters, the SLD this year welcomed several heads of

figures and the focus remains on facilitating intergovern-

government, notably Prime Minister Albanese, President

mental diplomacy. Nonetheless, the Dialogue also brings

Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Kallas. The Dialogue

together many high-level non-government participants,

retained a strong core participation from regional defence

including business figures, experts and commentators.

Introduction

This year, we welcomed over 60 delegates from academia and think tanks. The SLD also played host to more than 300 journalists representing more than 20 nations and 40 media outlets. Overall, the delegate male-to-female ratio at this year’s Dialogue was around three to one, as in previous years. The gender balance amongst experts and researchers at SLD 2023 as delegates was around 40% female and 60% male. This year’s composition of the SEAYLP was 21 women and 16 men.

A NEXT STEP IN THE PROCESS Australian Prime Minister Albanese noted the ongoing value of the SLD process in his keynote address: ‘By bringing together leaders and analysts from across the Indo-Pacific, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and founding Dialogue partners such as

(From left) Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Singapore; Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister, Australia; and Sir John Chipman KCMG, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

Australia, this gathering emphasises the value of frank and constructive discussion, as well as making it clear

31 May to 2 June 2024. In preparation, from 21 to

that preserving peace and security is not a task that

23 January 2024, we will hold the 12th Shangri-La

any one of us can shoulder alone.’

Dialogue Sherpa Meeting, which will convene in

The IISS looks forward to making further pro-

Singapore senior defence officials and military offic-

gress on this task as the Shangri-La Dialogue process

ers from participant countries to discuss the region’s

continues. We will now move forward to organ-

developing security issues and shape the agenda for

ise the 21st Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore from

the next Dialogue.

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

CHAPTER 1

KEYNOTE ADDRESS Friday 2 June 2023, 20:00 SPEAKER Anthony Albanese Prime Minister, Australia

Keynote address

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese began

that a breakdown of communication that led to con-

by noting that prosperity in the Indo-Pacific is driven by

flict, whether in the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere, would

´shared opportunity’ and the region’s stability ‘can only

reverberate throughout the world.

be secured through collective responsibility´. He warned

Albanese recognised that the Sino-Australia rela-

that ´peace, prosperity and stability can never be taken for

tionship is constrained by the two countries having

granted´, citing the increased nativism, the war in Ukraine

fundamentally different systems of government,

and the ‘biggest conventional military build-up since the

values and worldviews. He noted the critical impor-

Second World War´ in the Indo-Pacific.

tance of sovereignty to uphold the rules-based order:

The prime minister argued against fatalism, suggest-

´Sovereignty that confers on every nation the right to

ing that the ´fate of our region is not preordained´. Instead,

determine its own destiny, to enjoy freedom of action

Australia and its regional partners should play an active

and policy independence´. This would enable all

shaping role. Albanese cautioned that peace must be ´built,

countries to ´pursue opportunities for [their] people

pursued, defended and upheld´. That is why Australia is

without fear of coercion or retribution´.

´investing in [its] capability and investing in [its] relation-

Albanese further underlined the critical impor-

ships, strengthening [its] deterrence and [its] diplomacy

tance of the alliance with the US. He stated that this

and bringing both to [its] presence in this region´.

relationship has ´always been a bond of shared values´,

Albanese identified ´guardrails´ as central to efforts

adding that Australia has been active in helping build

to ensure a peaceful regional order. He emphasised his

the regional architecture upon which stability rested.

support for United States President Joe Biden’s efforts

He noted the appointment of Australia’s first Special

to establish ´reliable and open channels of communi-

Envoy for Southeast Asia to drive Australia´s new

cation´ between China and the US. Albanese warned

Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040.

Sir John Chipman KCMG, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister, Australia

Albanese sought to reassure regional partners

Hen´s comment that Australia is not just an Indo-Pacific

that participation in the Quad and AUKUS would

country, but an Asian nation. Would Albanese share

not supplant engagement in the South Pacific, with

this sentiment and how would he define Australia´s

ASEAN and the East Asia Summit, or the G20. He

strategic identity, Dr Graham asked.

described these minilaterals as ´partners, not com-

In response, Albanese argued that Australia values

petitors´ in the existing regional architecture. The

not only its traditional Western alliances, particu-

acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through

larly with the US, but also its relationships with the

AUKUS reflects Australia´s ‘determination to live up

´Pacific family´, of which Australia is a part. Moreo-

to those expectations, to be a stronger partner and a

ver, Australia is a ´strategic partner´ to ASEAN. His

more effective contributor to stability in our region´.

government thus remains committed to maintain-

Albanese´s speech affirmed that Australia’s goal

ing Australia´s formal alliances, while increasing

is not ´to prepare for war, but to prevent it through

its engagement with ASEAN countries and Pacific

deterrence and reassurance and building resilience

Islands nations.

in the region´. He supported an approach to regional security which would make it ´crystal clear that when it comes to any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force, be it in Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea or elsewhere, the risk of conflict will always far outweigh any potential reward´. The speech ended with a commitment that Australia will be engaged in the region as a ´champion for peace and prosperity in the region and the world’, with the goal of playing a meaningful role in developing solutions for shared challenges.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Dr Euan Graham, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Indo-Pacific Defence and Strategy, asked Albanese about Singapore Defence Minister Dr Ng Eng

Dr Euan Graham, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Indo-Pacific Defence and Strategy

Keynote address

CHAPTER 2 The United States’ leadership in the Indo-Pacific

FIRST PLENARY SESSION Saturday 3 June 2023, 08:35 SPEAKER Lloyd J. Austin III Secretary of Defense, United States

FIRST PLENARY SESSION

The United States’ leadership in the Indo-Pacific Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III began

described Washington’s intensification of its plan-

by observing that the presence at the Dialogue of

ning, cooperation and joint training with regional

Ukraine’s defence minister reminded all delegates that

allies and partners, highlighting its ties with Australia,

peace and security can never be taken for granted. He

India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore,

argued that more states in the Indo-Pacific have coa-

South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. Austin discussed

lesced around a shared vision for regional security.

the extensive cooperation and agreements not only

He described this regional vision as one ‘in which all

between the US and its regional allies and partners,

countries are free to thrive on their own terms, with-

but increasingly among those states themselves. In

out coercion or intimidation or bullying’. Austin also

addition to praising AUKUS and the Quad, he under-

highlighted ‘respect for sovereignty, adherence to

lined that ‘we remain staunch supporters of ASEAN

international law, transparency and openness, the free

centrality and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific’.

flow of commerce and ideas, human rights and human

Austin noted that Washington is cooperating with

dignity, equal rights for all states large and small, and

its allies ‘to upgrade our force posture in the region’,

resolving disputes through peaceful dialogue and not

to bring greater regional stability and to ensure that

coercion or conquests’.

countries could freely navigate as permitted by

Austin then shared the ‘vision of a free and open

international law. This mission drives US military

and secure Indo-Pacific’. Its common goals include ‘to

modernisation. He underlined the important activities

deter aggression, and to deepen the rules and norms

in this vein in the South China Sea and highlighted the

that promote prosperity and prevent conflict’. He

binding 2016 ruling in the arbitral tribunal.

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US; and Sir John Chipman KCMG, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

Austin warned that Washington would ‘not be deterred by dangerous operational behaviour at sea

mentioned, Austin underlined the importance of organisational reform and cooperation with industry.

or in international airspace’, and he deplored Beijing’s

Jeffrey Ordaniel, Director of Maritime Programs at

‘alarming number of risky intercepts of US and allied

Pacific Forum, asked about the possibility of arms control

aircraft flying lawfully in international airspace’. He

between the US and China, and the possible involvement

pledged that while Washington does ‘not seek conflict

of regional allies. Austin responded that Washington is

or confrontation’, it would not back down from ‘bul-

‘serious about our commitment to extended deterrence’,

lying’. He emphasised that the US remains ‘deeply

but there have been no developments on arms control

committed to preserving the status quo in the [Taiwan]

with Beijing. ‘As soon as they answer the phone, maybe

Strait’ and argued that ‘conflict is neither imminent

we will get some work done here,’ Austin added.

nor inevitable’. ‘Deterrence is strong today,’ he added.

Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director of the German

Austin underlined the importance of open lines of

Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific Program, asked about

communication between Washington and Beijing,

possible Chinese perceptions that Washington is seek-

emphasising that ‘for responsible defence leaders, the

ing to goad Beijing into using force against Taiwan, and

right time to talk is any time. The right time to talk is

what messages Austin might tell his Chinese counter-

every time. The right time to talk is now’.

part about US objectives in this regard. The secretary responded that the US is trying to do the opposite of goading China into a conflict, and that he would

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

tell his counterpart that Washington’s Taiwan policy

Sir John Chipman KCMG, IISS Director-General and

remains unchanged and will not change unilaterally.

Chief Executive, asked whether emerging technolo-

Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, Associate Professor at

gies such as artificial intelligence, quantum, cyber, and

China’s National Defense University, asked whether

uncrewed vehicles have a particular role in the mission

there is any contradiction between US-led institutions

of deterrence and defence in the Indo-Pacific. Austin

(such as the Quad and AUKUS) and the centrality of

responded that the US is pursuing the capabilities that

ASEAN in the region. Austin responded that AUKUS

support its war-fighting concepts and enable it to be not

promotes ‘greater stability and security’ and ‘provides

only successful in deterring conflict, but also be domi-

a valued and highly capable ally with additional capa-

nant in any future war. In addition to the technologies

bility that I think will be a generational capability’.

First plenary session

Sir John Chipman KCMG, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

Jeffrey Ordaniel, Director of Maritime Programs, Pacific Forum

Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director, Indo-Pacific Program, German Marshall Fund

Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, Associate Professor, China’s National Defense University

Bich Tran, SEAYLP delegate and Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies

François Heisbourg, IISS Senior Adviser for Europe

Veerle Nouwens, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for IndoPacific Defence and Strategy

Demetri Sevastopulo, US–China Correspondent, Financial Times

Austin also said that he is looking forward to having

that his officers are focused on ensuring their forces

additional discussions with Australian and British

were ‘combat credible’.

leaders about AUKUS at the Dialogue.

Veerle Nouwens, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior

Bich Tran, a SEAYLP delegate and Adjunct Fellow

Fellow for Indo-Pacific Defence and Strategy, asked

at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,

how important for the US it is for European countries

asked whether Washington’s cooperation with Viet-

to be engaged militarily in the Indo-Pacific. Austin

nam suggests that [the US] is content for regional

emphasised that ‘we are not trying to create a NATO

states to be communist as long as they are not revi-

in the Indo-Pacific’. However, it makes sense that

sionist. Austin responded that the US does not ‘impose

European countries are interested in maintaining posi-

[its] will on countries’.

tive relations with Asia-Pacific countries.

François Heisbourg, IISS Senior Adviser for

Demetri Sevastopulo, US–China Correspondent

Europe, asked whether senior US military officers

for Financial Times, asked about the need for joint oper-

would continue to make public statements about the

ational war plans with US allies. Austin emphasised

imminence of conflict over Taiwan. Austin repeated

the importance of joint exercises, trust-building and

that conflict is neither inevitable nor imminent, but

increasing interoperability.

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

CHAPTER 3 Building a stable and balanced Asia-Pacific

SECOND PLENARY SESSION Saturday 3 June 2023, 09:30 SPEAKERS Carlito Galvez Jr Senior Undersecretary; Officer-in-Charge, Department of National Defense, Philippines Ben Wallace Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom Anita Anand Minister of National Defence, Canada

SECOND PLENARY SESSION

Building a stable and balanced Asia-Pacific

Carlito Galvez Jr, Senior Undersecretary and Officer-in-Charge, Department of National Defense, Philippines

Carlito Galvez Jr, Senior Undersecretary and Officer-

Ben Wallace, the UK’s Secretary of State for

in-Charge of the Philippines’ Department of National

Defence, said ‘we believe this region offers enormous

Defense, opened the session by cautioning that the

economic opportunity for all’. Speaking of how to

region’s ‘rapid economic growth’ has created ‘new

navigate both the opportunities and challenges pre-

power centres and, along with it, a new era of com-

sented by the ‘epoch-defining rise of China’, and how

petition for wealth and influence’. These tensions are

to create balance and stability in the Indo-Pacific, Wal-

evident in the East and South China Seas, Taiwan

lace laid out three main points.

Strait, Korean Peninsula and across the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan borders.

Firstly, he spoke of ‘upholding international rules and promoting common standards’, in particular

He suggested upholding the rule of law and con-

‘protecting the rights of littoral states in their exclu-

tinuing the ‘pursuit of dialogue and multilateralism’ as

sive economic zones, as well as in the importance of

the way forward to avert the ‘unravelling of the long

upholding the United Nations Convention on the Law

peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific’. Galvez cited the

of the Sea (UNCLOS)’. Next, Wallace argued in favour

2016 arbitration award ‘as not only setting the reason

of ‘backing free trade’, adding that states cannot afford

and right in the South China Sea, but also as an inspi-

to ‘decouple commercially or diplomatically’ and

ration for how matters should be considered by states

that ‘the best resilience comes from diversification,

facing similar challenging circumstances’. He ended his

not from protectionism’. Finally, Wallace stressed the

remarks by quoting Albert Einstein: ‘Peace cannot be

importance of ‘the promotion of our principles and

kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding.’

values … the belief that all nations have the right to

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Ben Wallace, Secretary of State for Defence, UK

chart their own course, instinctive understanding of

cyber security and cyber capacities. Lastly, Anand

the importance of global trade and, above all, a belief

announced that a Canadian general or flag officer

in fair play’.

will, for the second time, serve as the next deputy

Anita Anand, Canada’s Minister of National Defence concluded the session by stating that her

commander of the United Nations Command in the Republic of Korea.

country’s Indo-Pacific strategy ‘seeks to open up new opportunities with North Pacific partners like South Korea and Japan’, adding that Canada ‘believes in

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

ASEAN centrality’. Canada’s strategy is also ‘forth-

Dr Valérie Niquet, Head of the Asia Department at

right’ about the Sino-Canada relationship and Beijing’s

the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, asked

‘increasingly disruptive’ challenges to the interna-

Galvez how he sees the role of Japan in the region.

tional rules-based order. Anand added that Canada

Galvez responded by stating that ‘Japan is a very

will challenge China when it must, while also cooper-

important ally … Japan helped us in three aspects.

ating with China to solve global issues.

One is the peace process in Mindanao … Second is

Anand announced that Canada’s Operation Projec-

also for the modernisation of our coastguard … Japan

tion in the Indo-Pacific will be replaced with Operation

is very important also in our “Build, Build, Build” pro-

Horizon. Canada will also make a series of new com-

gramme because they provided a lot of funds’.

mitments in the region, backed by an investment of

Koshino Yuka, IISS Research Fellow for Security

C$720 million (US$537m). Firstly, Canada will increase

and Technology Policy, asked Wallace what the key

its annual naval deployments in the Indo-Pacific from

areas are in which ‘Japan can make a substantial contri-

two warships to three. Secondly, Canada will work

bution to supporting NATO’s mission in Indo-Pacific

with and learn from partners in the region, such as

and beyond’. Wallace responded that ‘Russia has

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and

Pacific interests,’ underlining Moscow’s ‘aggressive’

Vietnam. Anand said that this endeavour ‘includes

history in the region, and its ‘programme to disrupt or

initiatives to advance women, peace and security

damage, potentially, undersea cables’. Wallace added

initiatives by supporting the meaningful participa-

that ‘if you’re in Japan, obviously, you’re very aware of

tion of women in uniform’. Canada will also launch

Russia’s behaviour’. In that vein, a NATO office in the

new initiatives with military partners to strengthen

Indo-Pacific would be useful for sharing lessons.

Second plenary session

Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence, Canada

Major-General Tang Yongsheng, a former deputy

replied that ‘China’s force has never been extended

commandant of the National Security College at Chi-

to anywhere near Canada for any operation’. Anand

na’s National Defense University, misheard Anand

countered that while Canada hopes to coexist with all

due to a translation error and thought the minister

countries, it cannot ignore China’s efforts to militarise

called China a ‘destructive force’. Major-General Tang

the region, which have led to ‘increasing instability’.

Dr Valérie Niquet, Head, Asia Department, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique

Koshino Yuka, IISS Research Fellow for Security and Technology Policy

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Major-General Tang Yongsheng, former deputy commandant, National Security College, China’s National Defense University

CHAPTER 4 Resolving regional tensions

THIRD PLENARY SESSION Saturday 3 June 2023, 11:30 SPEAKERS General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto Minister of Defence, Indonesia Lee Jong-sup Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea Josep Borrell Fontelles High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; Vice-President, European Commission

THIRD PLENARY SESSION

Resolving regional tensions

General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto, Minister of Defence, Indonesia

General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto, Minister of

zone and a UN-organised referendum in the disputed

Defence of Indonesia, began by stressing the common-

territories. General Prabowo also pledged military

ality of threats to global security and the importance

observers and units for peacekeeping.

of ‘dialogue, negotiations and win-win solutions’ to

Lee Jong-sup, Minister of National Defense of

reduce geopolitical tensions. General Prabowo empha-

the Republic of Korea (ROK), began his address

sised the need for ‘compromise and coexistence’ for

by referring to the rise in tensions in the region

achieving prosperity, referring to the tensions aris-

and to the many uncertainties the international

ing between China, which is becoming again ‘a great

community faces due to the war in Ukraine. Lee

world power’, and the US, which is ‘a preeminent

pointed out North Korea’s continuing nuclear mis-

global power’.

sile programme and the ‘unprecedented frequency

Referring to the Ukraine war, General Prabowo

and intensity’ of Pyongyang’s ‘provocations’. Lee

highlighted the connection between security in Europe

also stated that North Korea violates UN Security

and the Indo-Pacific, especially in relation to rising

Council resolutions and undermines the Nuclear

energy and food prices. To end the conflict, he pro-

Non-Proliferation Treaty.

posed a multipoint peace plan, including a ceasefire,

Given these tensions, Lee referred to the

the creation of a ‘new demilitarised zone’ (DMZ),

strengthening of ROK–Japan and ROK–US–Japan

deployment of a UN monitoring force ‘along’ the

security cooperation as ‘an inevitable measure …

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Lee Jong-sup, Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea

to protect regional freedom and peace’. Lee drew

the ‘war against Ukraine is changing Europe’s role

attention to ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol’s efforts

in security and defence’. He indicated that this

to offer North Korea economic improvement in

transformation also makes Europe ‘a more capable

return for denuclearisation and potential diplomatic

partner for Asia’.

dialogue. Lee called for the ‘international community’s resolute and united strength’ to change ‘the Kim regime’s calculation’.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative of

The session chair, IISS Director-General and Chief

the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and

Executive Sir John Chipman KCMG, stated that,

Vice-President of the European Commission, out-

with regard to conflict, it is ‘absolutely vital to frame

lined his views of the international system as being

the issue properly from the first day’. Describing Rus-

based on a dynamic that is both ‘a bipolarity’ and

sia’s invasion of Ukraine as a ‘Russian imperial war of

‘a multipolarity’, the former reflecting Sino-US

recolonisation’ rather than an invasion of a non-NATO

competition and the latter reflecting the impact of glo-

country could alter how Global South countries per-

balisation. Borrell underscored the ‘direct stake’ that

ceive the conflict. Referencing Borrell’s overview of

Europe and Asia have ‘in each other’s security’ and

global military spending, Sir John Chipman also said

the indivisibility of economics and security, stressing

it is important to analyse how much of the defence

the strengthening of economic links between Europe

expenditure is for ‘vital modernisation’ and how much

and Asia.

is for ‘participation in a competitive arms race’.

Borrell continued with an overview of the rise

Delegates posed various questions to Gen-

in global, European and Asian military spending

eral Prabowo on his proposal to end Russia’s war

before focusing on Russia’s war against Ukraine.

against Ukraine and the situation in Myanmar.

He called for a ‘just peace’, contrasting this with

On the former, Rym Momtaz, IISS Consultant

an undesirable ‘peace of the cemeteries, the peace

Research Fellow for European Foreign Policy and

of the surrender’. Borrell drew attention to how

Security, asked General Prabowo whether ‘saying

Third plenary session

Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, EU; Vice-President, European Commission

we shouldn’t put blame on any side’ in his address

Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International

drew an equivalence between the invader, Russia,

Peace, as well as Dr Jimbo Ken, Managing Director

and the invaded, Ukraine. Hoang Thi Ha, Senior

of the International House of Japan and a professor at

Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic

Keio University’s Faculty of Policy Management, asked

and Political Studies Programme at the ISEAS-

about the US–ROK Washington Declaration of April

Yusof Ishak Institute, asked about the minister’s

2023, while Togashi Mariko, IISS Research Fellow for

plan for a DMZ in his proposal. On the Myanmar

Japanese Security and Defence Policy, asked Lee how

conflict, Min Zin, Executive Director of Myan-

sustained improvement in ROK–Japan relations can be

mar’s Institute for Strategy and Policy, and Aaron

ensured. Lee drew attention to the defence and security

Connelly, IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian

element of the Yoon administration’s new Indo-Pacific

Politics and Foreign Policy, asked questions on how

strategy and emphasised the importance of a ‘future

Indonesia could contribute to conflict resolution

oriented’ relationship with Japan built on trust.

and the democracy transition in Myanmar. General

On the links between European and Asian security,

Prabowo denied drawing an equivalence between

Dr May-Britt Stumbaum, Team Lead on Asia-Pacific

invader and invaded, saying that he is interested

Security at the Centre for Intelligence and Security

in ‘conflict resolution’ and citing the region’s

Studies at the Bundeswehr University Munich, asked

experience of conflict in Vietnam and Cambodia.

whether Europe might contribute militarily during

Regarding Myanmar, General Prabowo emphasised

a Taiwan contingency. Dr Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS

that ASEAN has not accepted the ‘authoritar-

Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, asked Borrell

ian [activities] and lethal actions’ of the country’s

whether the EU would seek to project ‘a harder form

military regime and drew attention to Indonesia’s

of security power’ after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

example of democratisation.

Borrell replied that the Ukraine war has not changed

Topics of questions for Lee included deterrence, the

the nature of the EU, emphasising that the organisation

ROK’s foreign policy and relations with Japan. Ankit

could not engage with Russia as it had done after Mos-

Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy

cow’s annexation of Crimea because this had failed.

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Sir John Chipman KCMG, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

Rym Momtaz, IISS Consultant Research Fellow for European Foreign Policy and Security

Hoang Thi Ha, Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator, Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Min Zin, Executive Director, Myanmar’s Institute for Strategy and Policy

Aaron Connelly, IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and Foreign Policy

Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Dr Jimbo Ken, Managing Director, International House of Japan and Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University

Togashi Mariko, IISS Research Fellow for Japanese Security and Defence Policy

Dr May-Britt Stumbaum, Team Lead, Asia-Pacific Security, Bundeswehr University Munich

Dr Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia

Third plenary session

CHAPTER 5 Asia’s evolving maritime security order

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION Saturday 3 June 2023, 14:45 SPEAKERS Hamada Yasukazu Minister of Defense, Japan Dr Pål Jonson Minister of Defence, Sweden Pio Tikoduadua Minister for Home Affairs and Immigration, Fiji

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION

Asia’s evolving maritime security order

Hamada Yasukazu, Minister of Defense, Japan

Opening the discussion, Hamada Yasukazu, Japan’s

and Defense Buildup Program. However, Hamada

Minister of Defense, discussed change from when

also underscored the importance of defence diplomacy

he last spoke at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2009,

at international forums and increased collaboration

when non-state actors were the imminent challenge.

among allies. He highlighted that the defence authori-

Now, he said, state competition and conflict have

ties of Japan and China have maintained a maritime

re-emerged. He explained that ongoing unilateral

and aerial communications mechanism and, since

attempts to change the status quo by coercion are

2023, a ‘hotline’. He said Japan aims for deterrence and

under way in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the

dialogue, not rivalry and conflict.

maritime arena.

Dr Pål Jonson, Sweden’s Minister of Defence, set

Hamada argued that Russia’s aggression against

out his country’s decision to end its long neutrality and

Ukraine has underscored the need for unity to prevent

seek NATO membership because of concerns about

confrontation in the Indo-Pacific. The conflict has also

Russia and Sweden’s recognition that while NATO

highlighted the importance of keeping sea lanes free,

supports its partners, it also defends its allies. Dr

open and stable. He pointed to threats from ballistic

Jonson underscored the close links between the EU and

missile launches, maritime infringements in the East

the Asia-Pacific, including through trade, and there-

and South China Seas, as well as threats in the under-

fore the importance of the Asia-Pacific’s waterways.

water domain.

Upholding the rule-based international order, includ-

Japan is addressing security challenges through its National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

ing the Asia-Pacific maritime security order, requires unity, cooperation and a long-term perspective.

Dr Pål Jonson, Minister of Defence, Sweden

Dr Jonson pointed to the challenges to freedom

Pacific states risk being left behind. Intense global

of navigation in the Black Sea, the High North and

competition may be threatening collective maritime

the South China Sea, which he said are unparalleled

security and stability, he said, but more pressing for

since the end of the Cold War. Sweden, he argued, is a

the Pacific are threats like climate change, illegal unre-

strong supporter of the Law of the Sea, increased mari-

ported and unregulated fishing, transnational crime

time domain awareness and freedom of navigation.

and – as he put it – nuclear threats. Tikoduadua also

He also highlighted the EU’s increased focus on pro-

called for action on climate change which he argued is

tecting critical infrastructure in the maritime domain.

essential to address global challenges and ensure sus-

According to Dr Jonson, Sweden and the EU need

tainable development.

to work together with the US, Canada and other global partners. He added that the EU and the Asia-Pacific face increasingly similar security threats and need to

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

cooperate and build partnerships. He pointed to Swe-

Robert Ward, IISS Japan Chair, asked how Japan would

den’s defence cooperation on underwater, air-defence

develop its defence-industrial base, to which Hamada

and sensor capabilities. Innovation and joint capabil-

replied that this is a matter of discussion in the context

ity-building are other areas for increased cooperation.

of the current restriction on defence exports. The min-

Pio Tikoduadua, Fiji’s Minister for Home Affairs

ister said Japan would nurture its defence industry,

and Immigration, continued the theme of the global

balancing support from and for companies, including

maritime significance of the Pacific. He stated that

those struggling to generate profits.

the ocean is a maritime highway for two-thirds of the

Senior Colonel Qi Dapeng, Director at the

world’s trade transits. The people of the Pacific are an

National Security College at China’s National

ocean people, he added. However, illegal fishing and

Defense University, asked if NATO expansion and

environmental biodiversity degradation related to cli-

containment of Russia have failed and whether

mate change have harmed fish stocks, coral reefs and

efforts to contain Beijing risk failure. Dr Chong

natural ecosystems. He argued for collective responsi-

Ja Ian, Political Science Associate Professor at the

bility to focus on these areas.

National University of Singapore, asked the Japa-

Tikoduadua argued that the Pacific has become

nese defence minister how Tokyo would balance

an arena for strategic power competition and small

credible deterrence with credible reassurance. Bill

Fourth plenary session

Pio Tikoduadua, Minister for Home Affairs and Immigration, Fiji

Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees, asked about

through sovereign decisions by individual states.

Japan’s developing force posture on the southern

There may be negotiations on Ukraine, he said, but

islands and Japan’s role in a Taiwan contingency.

only if and when the Ukrainian people decide.

On China, Hamada responded that Japan is devel-

Reinhard Bütikofer, Member of the European

oping many collaborative relationships, but insisted

Parliament, asked about the EU’s role over Taiwan,

this is not about fighting. On Japan’s defence plans,

while Kym Bergman, Editor of Defence Review Asia,

he said there have been decisions to enhance capa-

asked if the AUKUS agreement would sideline

bilities, but these remain in a defensive context,

Swedish–Australian security relations. Dr Jonson

and there continue to be debates over how to deal

responded that the EU may focus in the Asia-Pacific

with missiles and whether to have a counter-attack

on industrial base capabilities and assets, innovation

capability. There also remain efforts at diplomacy.

and connectivity. On Sweden and Australia, he said

On NATO and Ukraine, Dr Jonson said NATO is

he is hopeful for the future, including on defence-

involved in enlargement not expansion, and this is

industrial ties.

Robert Ward, IISS Japan Chair

Dr Chong Ja Ian, Political Science Associate Professor, National University of Singapore

Senior Colonel Qi Dapeng, Director, National Security College, China’s National Defense University

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Bill Emmott, IISS Trustees Chairman

Reinhard Bütikofer, Member, European Parliament

Kym Bergman, Editor, Defence Review Asia

Keleni Seruvatu, SEAYLP delegate, Director of Multilateral Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fiji

Dr Asyura Salleh, Co-founder, GAIA Alliance

Keleni Seruvatu, a SEAYLP delegate and Direc-

Dr Asyura Salleh, Co-founder of the non-profit

tor of the Multilateral Affairs Bureau in Fiji’s Ministry

GAIA Alliance, asked how Fiji can balance its defence

of Foreign Affairs, raised concerns about the secu-

and security policy as a small Pacific Island state amidst

rity risk of proposed water discharges from nuclear

increasing major-power engagement. In response,

plants. On water discharge from Japan’s Fukushima

Tikoduadua said the island states’ strength lay in their

nuclear plant, Hamada insisted there has been sig-

solidarity through, for example, the Pacific Island Forum.

nificant information sharing and discussion with the

At the same time, he argued, smaller states’ voices are

International Atomic Energy Agency to try to provide

left out of discussions on their own priorities, including

reassurance before the discharge.

the damage being done by others to their waters.

Fourth plenary session

CHAPTER 6

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSIONS Friday 2 June 2023 SPECIAL SESSION 1 Security implications of cyber and technological competition

SPECIAL SESSION 2 Challenges of Asia-Pacific military capability development

SPECIAL SESSION 3 Nuclear dimensions of regional security

SPECIAL SESSION 4 Balancing Asia-Pacific minilateralism and ASEAN centrality

SPECIAL SESSION 5 Managing Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific security

SPECIAL SESSION 6 Defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean region

SPECIAL SESSION 1

Security implications of cyber and technological competition

IISS CHAIR

Opening the special session, Okano Masataka raised

Dr Bastian Giegerich IISS Director of Defence and Military Analysis

three key issues to deal with cyber and technological competition. Firstly, there are challenges arising from grey-zone competition and hybrid warfare that

OPENING REMARKS

require a whole-of-government response. Secondly,

Okano Masataka Deputy National Security Advisor, Cabinet Secretariat, Japan

there is the growing role of the private sector and

Avril Haines Director, National Intelligence, United States

ensure that cyber security is autonomous and sustain-

Brigadier-General Edward Chen Defence Cyber Chief, Singapore

threats, share awareness of potential threats, attribute

Žilvinas Tomkus Vice-Minister of National Defence, Lithuania

reduce dependency on specific countries.

public–private cooperation to respond to cyber attacks. Okano further stated that Japan’s goal is to able. Thirdly, there is the role of diplomacy to reduce malicious activities and establish open standards to Avril Haines began by addressing the serious security implications of supply-chain disruptions, including those of key technologies, driven by global and regional events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war. She stressed the importance of promoting resilience by cooperating with the private sector and understanding adversaries’ intentions and practices around key technological supply chains. On

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Okano Masataka, Deputy National Security Advisor, Cabinet Secretariat, Japan

Avril Haines, Director, National Intelligence, US

Brigadier-General Edward Chen, Defence Cyber Chief, Singapore

Žilvinas Tomkus, Vice-Minister of National Defence, Lithuania

cyber, Haines explained that the US has tackled cyber

stressed the need for public–private partnerships and

attacks against critical infrastructure by improving

interactions between military and non-military sectors,

the private sector’s cyber-security posture, height-

while citing examples the Singapore Armed Forces

ening awareness as well as sharing best practices

have been involved in.

and information. She further stated that the rapid

Žilvinas Tomkus concluded the session by remind-

pace of the development and proliferation of new

ing delegates that the Ukraine war has revealed the

technologies such as artificial intelligence requires

need for countries to prepare their conventional military

cooperation with partners on global technology and

capabilities against a full-scale military attack. From the

cyber developments. However, trust and the ability

Baltic perspective, cyber and technological warfare is not

to comply with rules will be the basis for such coop-

the number one priority. On cyber and emerging tech-

eration, Haines noted.

nologies, he stated that the Ukraine war has showcased

Brigadier-General Edward Chen continued the

the private sector’s role in wartime; the need for a wide

discussion by offering his perspectives on the impact

range of cyber capabilities, kinetic and non-kinetic; and

of AI at the technical and operational levels. He stated

the need to involve various sectors, including individual

that governments need to rethink three paradigms:

hackers and civil–military cooperation, to respond to

‘threat, terrain and partnership’. On threats, he noted

cyber attacks. Tomkus also noted that artificial intelli-

that generative AI allows even non-state actors to

gence and emerging technologies are not solutions, but

threaten society through deep fakes, which overwhelm

‘enablers’ in war and that success depends on the abil-

‘our ability to discern truth from fiction’. Regarding ter-

ity to incorporate them into existing and new military

rains, General Chen stated the need for governments to

capabilities. He also cautioned that the varying states

experiment with these new technologies in a safe and

of technology development amongst countries makes

controlled environment. Like other panellists, he also

cooperation difficult.

Special session 1

SPECIAL SESSION 2

Challenges of Asia-Pacific military capability development

IISS CHAIR

General Andres Centino kicked off the discussion

Dr Euan Graham IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for IndoPacific Defence and Strategy

by noting that the Philippines’ external security environment has changed significantly. Therefore, its military-modernisation priorities have shifted away from internal security towards external defence,

OPENING REMARKS

especially in the areas of maritime security and the

General Andres Centino Chief of Staff of Armed Forces, Philippines

integration of emerging technologies. Despite the chal-

General Angus Campbell Chief of Defence Force, Australia

opportunities to strengthen partnerships, alliances

General Yoshida Yoshihide

tries enhance their military capabilities, it is essential

Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Self-Defense Forces, Japan Admiral Linda Fagan Coast Guard Commandant, United States

lenges associated with these objectives, Manila sees and regional mechanisms. However, as regional counto foster transparency, build trust and engage in meaningful dialogue to prevent miscalculations and unintended escalations. General Angus Campbell continued the session by arguing that a wide range of new military capabilities and the use of coercive statecraft is reshaping the region. Australia, he noted, does not question the right of any nation to modernise its military. However, such efforts must be transparent and accompanied by reassurances. Australia views deterrence delivered through

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

General Andres Centino, Chief of Staff of Armed Forces, Philippines

General Angus Campbell, Chief of Defence Force, Australia

General Yoshida Yoshihide, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Self-Defense Forces, Japan

Admiral Linda Fagan, Coast Guard Commandant, US

strong partnerships and enhanced defence capabilities

Yoshida concluded by noting that situational aware-

as essential to a sustainable regional balance of power.

ness in all domains is crucial to deny any changes to

General Campbell concluded his remarks by noting

the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific.

that while regional military capability development

Admiral Linda Fagan concluded the special session

presents a range of challenges and opportunities, ‘trust

by noting that maritime security is essential to a free

… takes years to grow and moments to lose’.

and open Indo-Pacific. She argued that constabulary

General Yoshida Yoshihide expressed his concern

services, whether provided by the coastguard, navy,

about possible unilateral acts to change the status quo

or fisheries service, are the best solution to deter illegal

in the Indo-Pacific by force. One of the key lessons from

activities through strong maritime governance. No one

the war in Ukraine, he argued, is the importance of

nation, however, can solve maritime-governance chal-

developing situational awareness in different domains,

lenges alone. She highlighted three key roles of the US

including the outer space, cyber, cognitive, mari-

Coast Guard in this regard: coordinating and aligning

time and air domains. The Japan Self-Defense Forces

maritime capacity-building efforts with partner needs;

is currently working on realising its cross-domain

developing strong institutions ashore that offer ‘legal

operations while seeking to strengthen collaboration

finish’ to maritime law enforcement; and listening to

with allies, like-minded nations and partners. General

partners’ needs.

Special session 2

SPECIAL SESSION 3

Nuclear dimensions of regional security

IISS CHAIR

Opening the special session, General Sahir Shamshad

William Alberque IISS Director of Strategy, Technology and Arms Control

Mirza observed that nuclear weapons have a unique

OPENING REMARKS General Sahir Shamshad Mirza Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Pakistan Andrew Little Minister of Defence, New Zealand Kim Gunn Special Representative, Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea Angus Lapsley Assistant Secretary-General, Defence Policy and Planning, NATO

role in the Asia-Pacific given that multiple states possess this capability and because it is the only region where such weapons have been used. He noted that the number of nuclear-weapons states and their sometimes-overlapping relationships present a unique and complex security challenge requiring advanced command and control and clear lines of communication, especially in crises. The general added that rearmament, rather than arms control, has become the new normal in the region and that new security arrangements will inevitably involve a nuclear dimension. Considering this risk, he observed that dialogue should be increased at every level to resolve disputes and reduce the risk of conflict. Reflecting on New Zealand’s most recent defence assessment, Andrew Little identified climate change and increasing geostrategic competition as principal challenges to regional security, the latter of which poses a risk of nuclear miscalculation. He underscored

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Pakistan

Andrew Little, Minister of Defence, New Zealand

Kim Gunn, Special Representative, Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

Angus Lapsley, Assistant SecretaryGeneral, Defence Policy and Planning, NATO

that New Zealand’s policy toward nuclear disarma-

gain international respect and divert domestic atten-

ment is unambiguous and guided by the belief that

tion from economic hardships. In response to North

their use is immoral. Little noted that New Zealand

Korea’s intransigence, the international community

has ratified multiple disarmament treaties, but it

must continue to condemn North Korea’s coercive

recognises that it cannot entirely avoid geostrategic

behaviour, strengthen conventional deterrence and

competition. Because of this, New Zealand is mod-

cut off sources of illicit finance while continuing to

ernising its armed forces and places a high value in

pursue dialogue with Pyongyang.

its multiple security partnerships. Little also observed

Angus Lapsley characterised NATO as a defen-

that countries would be more able to focus on shared

sive and nuclear alliance and stated that stability,

challenges if nuclear weapons were not an issue.

predictability and transparency are the hallmarks of

Kim Gunn reminded delegates of North Korea’s

a responsible nuclear power. He stated that NATO

ballistic- and cruise-missile testing regime as well as

has successfully deterred nuclear use in the Euro-

North Korea’s nuclear-weapons doctrine, identifying

Atlantic region, but that Russian nuclear signalling

both as threats to regional security and in violation

since its invasion of Ukraine has been unprecedented

of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. North

and irresponsible. Lapsley said that NATO has not

Korea’s satellite-launch vehicle programme poses a

responded to every Russian provocation as doing so

threat to all Asian nations, he said, as a failed launch

would legitimise their actions. While the Alliance has

could potentially crash within national borders or

no plans to expand beyond the Euro-Atlantic region,

territorial waters. Considering North Korea’s contin-

he reminded participants that NATO is global in con-

ued development of nuclear weapons, Kim observed

text and that threats like China’s and North Korea’s

that this programme is likely an attempt to offset

nuclear and missile programmes are international

Pyongyang’s

and interconnected.

conventional

military

weaknesses,

Special session 3

SPECIAL SESSION 4

Balancing Asia-Pacific minilateralism and ASEAN centrality

IISS CHAIR Aaron Connelly IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and Foreign Policy

Sidharto R. Suryodipuro Chair, ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting; Director General for ASEAN Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia

OPENING REMARKS

Dr Kao Kim Hourn began by emphasising that

Dr Kao Kim Hourn Secretary-General, ASEAN Jan Adams Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia Loren Legarda Senate President Pro Tempore, Philippines Pornpimol Kanchanalak Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand Anne-Marie Trevelyan Minister of State (Indo-Pacific), Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, United Kingdom

ASEAN’s long history of partnering with external powers should not be conflated with engaging in balance-of-power politics. He described the bloc as a centripetal force pulling partners toward collaborative engagement on the basis of inclusiveness, transparency and cooperation. Dr Kao highlighted ASEAN’s decades-long track record of working closely with diverse partners like the US, EU, China, and South Korea. He also described ASEAN as a non-reactionary, forward-looking bloc with a vision up to 2045. Dr Kao concluded by expressing his organisation’s readiness to work with a growing list of interested parties, insisting that ASEAN centrality is here to stay. Jan Adams reflected on ASEAN’s history, noting how the bloc emerged from an era of conflict and

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Kao Kim Hourn, SecretaryGeneral, ASEAN

Jan Adams, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia

Loren Legarda, Senate President Pro Tempore, Philippines

Pornpimol Kanchanalak, Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand

instability to become an enduring central institution

security. She reaffirmed the UK’s support for multilat-

in the region. She stated that Australia unequivocally

eralism, but recognised that smaller groupings can be

upholds ASEAN centrality, seeing no tension between

effective in pushing forward key issues more quickly.

or need to balance centrality with emerging minilater-

What is important for the UK is that these initiatives

als. Rather, Australia views regional architectures as ‘a

are guided by a shared vision and respect for the prin-

web of groupings’ pursuing a shared vision and goals,

ciples of openness, sovereignty and international law.

with ASEAN at the centre.

Sidharto R. Suryodipuro views ASEAN centrality

Loren Legarda welcomed minilateral arrange-

as drawn from geographic, economic and diplomatic

ments as an opportunity to bring together like-minded

commonalities that have merged to forge a common

partners in a way that supplements and compli-

identity, with the aim of avoiding historical trau-

ments ASEAN initiatives. Senator Legarda stressed

mas. Straddling one of the world’s most strategic

that ASEAN’s pre-existing mechanisms and tools can

waterways, ASEAN is the only open and inclusive

help minilaterals succeed. By embracing minilaterals,

mechanism available to address the region’s security

ASEAN can benefit from the advantages that emerg-

dilemmas. Sidharto posed the question as to how

ing regional architectures offer while simultaneously

deterrence in the Indo-Pacific might be achieved at a

reaffirming its centrality and guiding role.

lower level of armament. In addressing this issue, he

Pornpimol Kanchanalak echoed Legarda by

stipulated a need for maritime dialogue among major

asserting that minilateralism and multilateralism are

powers, suggesting that ASEAN serve as a facilitator.

not mutually exclusive and can be complimentary and supportive. She insisted that ASEAN centrality is not threatened by minilateralism, but noted that the organisation’s performance in responding to emerging regional architectures matters for its future. Pornpimol also contended that ASEAN’s endeavor to help solve the Myanmar conflict necessitates its role as a multilateral hub in the wider Indo-Pacific. Anne-Marie Trevelyan reflected on the UK’s deepening commitment to the Indo-Pacific, underscoring how ASEAN serves as a clear and welcome guide for London’s regional engagement. Trevelyan highlighted the success of minilaterals in driving solutions to complex challenges, like climate change and maritime

Anne-Marie Trevelyan, Minister of State (Indo-Pacific), Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, UK

Sidharto R. Suryodipuro, Chair, ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting; Director General for ASEAN Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia

Special session 4

SPECIAL SESSION 5

Managing Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific security

IISS CHAIR

Oleksii Reznikov set out the significance of the

Dr Lynn Kuok IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for AsiaPacific Security and Co-editor of Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment

Ukraine war for the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s weap-

OPENING REMARKS Oleksii Reznikov Minister of Defence, Ukraine Cui Tiankai Former vice-minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Andi Widjajanto Governor, National Resilience Institute, Indonesia Kajsa Ollongren Minister of Defence, Netherlands

onisation of cyberspace, energy, food, media, migrants, religious organisations and other domains are threatening global stability and welfare. Even before the 2022 invasion, Russia had posed a threat to freedom of navigation, which undermined the security of food, energy, resources, critical raw materials and minerals. The minister contended that Russian success in the Ukraine war would embolden repressive regimes such as Tehran that are supporting Moscow. An ‘alliance of responsible nations’ is needed to show that aggression does not pay and so prevent a dangerous precedent from being set. Reznikov called for continued military, humanitarian and political support, and for the closing of sanctions loopholes. He rejected outside mediation to end the war – though venues such as the Shangri-La Dialogue could help facilitate a post-war settlement after Russia’s defeat. Cui Tiankai emphasised the interdependence of European and Asian theatres and noted the damaging effects of the Ukraine war on global food prices.

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Oleksii Reznikov, Minister of Defence, Ukraine

Cui Tiankai, former vice-minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China

Andi Widjajanto, Governor, National Resilience Institute, Indonesia

Kajsa Ollongren, Minister of Defence, Netherlands

This demands joint work on a new, more cooperative

Kajsa Ollongren argued that Europe and Asia

approach to security. Cui drew a contrast between

have a stake in each other’s security. Security rests

Europe’s ‘mismanagement’ of security, reflected in

on trust, which can be gained through consistent and

the outbreak of the war, and a more successful Asian

transparent cooperation. This is especially impor-

approach based on respect for core interests, consul-

tant in maritime security, as free trade depends on

tation and economic cooperation. Cui also suggested

the accessibility of the seas to all. Ollongren stressed

that Europe could learn from the ‘Asian ways’ of man-

that managing cyber security, hybrid threats and

aging regional issues. He expressed his opposition

economic resilience demands closer cooperation,

to the idea of an ‘Asian NATO’, and to the Alliance’s

particularly to address the rapid development of arti-

extension into Asia.

ficial intelligence in military affairs. The Netherlands

Andi Widjajanto noted that narratives of globali-

recently organised an international conference with

sation have suddenly been thrown into reverse. The

South Korea on this issue. Countries should also

world is entering an age of ‘global disconnectivity’

strengthen resilience through capacity building

characterised by decoupling, de-risking and rival con-

and by creating a shared understanding of respon-

nectivity projects. Indonesia is projected to have the

sible behaviour. They can enhance dialogue by

world’s fourth-largest GDP by 2050, but its economic

participating in joint exercises, increasing inter-oper-

plan, based on the assumption of global integration

ability and conducting officer exchanges, Ollongren

and supply chains, needs rethinking. Indonesia is now

added. While Europe now needs to pay closer

looking towards minilateral arrangements, notably

attention to its own defence, it will cooperate more

with Argentina, Brazil, India and South Africa, rather

deeply with the Indo-Pacific to deepen trust and

than global ones.

enhance stability.

Special session 5

SPECIAL SESSION 6

Defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean region

IISS CHAIR

Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamoud Al Busaidi

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury IISS Senior Fellow for South and Central Asian Defence, Strategy and Diplomacy

opened the session stating that Indian Ocean security

OPENING REMARKS Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamoud Al Busaidi Foreign Minister, Oman Vikram Misri Deputy National Security Advisor, India Admiral John Aquilino Commander, Indo-Pacific Command, United States Sagala Ratnayaka Chief of Staff to President and National Security Advisor, President’s Office, Sri Lanka Admiral Pierre Vandier Navy Chief of Staff, France

depends on collaborative approaches. Cooperation to enforce the rule of law is essential for maritime security. Solving collective maritime problems requires emphasising operational security, the minister said. Few states, if any, have the capacity to conduct effective ocean-wide policing without the cooperation of other navies. Oman’s Duqm port will be a global meeting point. This open port reflects Oman’s fundamental values of good neighbourliness, openness and outward-focused pragmatism. Vikram Misri continued the session by explaining that the Indian Ocean, the ‘other’ key constituent of the Indo-Pacific construct, is where geography defines great-power contestation: choke points can theoretically be controlled in certain situations. India seeks broad-based cooperation beyond defence, as described by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue address. India is often the first responder to crises and aims to be a regional net

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamoud Al Busaidi, Foreign Minister, Oman

Vikram Misri, Deputy National Security Advisor, India

Admiral John Aquilino, Commander, Indo-Pacific Command, US

security provider, Misri asserted. Near New Delhi, the

and AUKUS foster cooperation, yet there are concerns

Indian Ocean International Fusion Centre is a major

that they may turn into military alliances, Ratnayaka

platform for maritime-domain-awareness information

argued. Sri Lanka, which abstains from alliances, will

sharing. For India, preservation of peace and security

chair the Indian Ocean Regional Association in late

and the possibilities of development are indivisible

2023, just as constructive dialogue needs prioritising.

from the need to adhere to law, observe norms and

Admiral Pierre Vandier said that as security issues

respect rules. India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative

gain importance, France considers Indian Ocean coop-

and the Colombo Security Conclave demonstrate

eration a strategic and vital commitment. Effective and

that regional security is a task primarily for littoral

efficient defence cooperation hinges on inter-operabil-

countries. Defence cooperation requires sustained

ity, which cannot be simply decreed. Rather, it must be

engagement to strengthen communications and inter-

worked on daily to enable seamless cooperation and

operability, Misri concluded.

dialogue. France commits to cooperation through its

Admiral John Aquilino insisted the Indian Ocean

regionally stationed domestic forces and forces deployed

is critically important for its global linkages. He

for long missions, Vandier stated. France’s military exer-

concurred with Oman that securing free and open

cises with partners prioritise operational effectiveness.

lanes in the Indo-Pacific requires adherence to the international rules-based order. Security challenges threaten all of us. Joint operations can help preserve the rules-based order and continued prosperity. The US Indo-Pacific Command takes actions to preserve the rules-based order, operating and exercising with all, the admiral stressed. Sagala Ratnayaka said that US–China competition compels New Delhi to checkmate Beijing’s moves, changing the relatively peaceful region into a key arena of politico-military play. Therefore, the challenge is recognising and integrating the interests and involvement of regional and extra-regional power combinations. Major powers should address their military interests away from the region. The Quad

Sagala Ratnayaka, Chief of Staff to President and National Security Advisor, President’s Office, Sri Lanka

Admiral Pierre Vandier, Navy Chief of Staff, France

Special session 6

CHAPTER 7 Istana reception and dinner

CHAPTER 8 China’s new security initiatives

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 4 June 2023, 08:35 SPEAKERS General Li Shangfu State Councilor and Minister of National Defense, China

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION

China’s new security initiatives

General Li Shangfu, State Councilor and Minister of National Defense, China

General Li Shangfu, China’s State Councilor and

ASEAN centrality and strategic autonomy as well as a

Minister of National Defense, outlined his country’s

UN-centred international system.

new security initiatives. This was General Li’s first

‘Some country’ is also expanding its military

attendance at the Shangri-La Dialogue following his

footprint, exacerbating the ‘arms race in the region

appointment in March as State Councilor and Minister

and transferring nuclear-weapons technologies to

of National Defense. It was also his first public address

a non-nuclear state’, the latter a reference to China’s

to an international audience.

displeasure with AUKUS. US progress in develop-

Although General Li’s speech did touch on Bei-

ing further minilaterals with like-minded Indo-Pacific

jing’s new Global Security Initiative and its vision for

countries gained a further mention, as General Li

peace and security, he began his remarks by outlin-

made a comparison to the Cold War, with two blocs

ing a long list of complaints directed against ‘some

confronting one another and certain countries trying

country’, which is believed to be the United States.

to build NATO-like alliances.

This country has ‘willfully interfered in other coun-

He presented China’s contribution to the region

tries’ internal affairs’ and ‘incited colour revolutions

and the world as positive, fair and inclusive, citing

and proxy wars in different regions’ without deal-

China’s contributions to global and ASEAN trade, as

ing with the consequences. General Li underscored

well as the successes of the Belt and Road Initiative.

the need for mutual respect for each other’s strategic

The development of the People’s Liberation Army

autonomy and right to development. According to

(PLA) has also allowed China to contribute to peace

the minister, China opposes hegemony and supports

because its approach towards global governance

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

includes respecting the ‘legitimate security concerns

countries have disrupted the peace in the name of free-

of other countries’. Beijing is also committed to facili-

dom of navigation, General Li maintained.

tating peace in international crises, General Li noted.

The speech ended with a direct reference to the

China’s position paper on the political settlement of

Sino-US relationship and its global significance. For

the Ukraine crisis received a special mention, as did

the bilateral relationship to work and stabilise, the

China’s role in Afghanistan and the recent consen-

minister pointed out that the US ‘needs to act with sin-

sus reached between Saudi Arabia and Iran. China’s

cerity, match its words with deeds and take concrete

commitment to regional security architectures and

actions together with China’.

deepened

military-to-military

cooperation

were

noted, with references to Beijing-led groups such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

General Li urged countries in the region to ‘make

The night before General Li’s speech, news outlets

wise choices by standing on the right side of history’

reported that a PLA vessel nearly collided with a

as opposed to hedging. To anyone who impinges on

US destroyer in the Taiwan Strait. Several delegates

China’s core interests, he referenced a well-known

raised questions about the incident in the context of

Chinese song: ‘When friends visit us, we welcome

China’s vision for regional security. Meia Nouwens,

them with fine wine. When jackals or wolves come, we

IISS Senior Fellow for Chinese Security and Defence

will face them with shotguns.’

Policy, asked General Li to explain how this behaviour

Regarding Taiwan, General Li targeted the Demo-

supports China’s desire for peace and stability, and

cratic Progressive Party for seeking independence for

why Beijing continues to refuse US requests to engage

the island as well as trying to ‘erase the Chinese iden-

in military-to-military communication and establish

tity of Taiwan and … hijack public opinion’. He accused

crisis communications.

‘some major power’ (believed to be the US) of violat-

Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director of the Indo-

ing its promises by selling arms to Taiwan, providing

Pacific Programme at the German Marshall Fund,

military training and upgrading exchanges with the

asked if Beijing should resume mechanisms like the

island. Taiwan’s status was described as the result of

Military Maritime Consultative Agreement. The min-

the Chinese civil war producing ‘weakness and chaos’.

ister replied that UNCLOS must be observed, but

In the South China Sea, though the situation is stable

freedom of navigation and innocent passage are being

thanks to ‘regional countries’ efforts’, extra-regional

used as pretexts for ‘provocation’.

Meia Nouwens, IISS Senior Fellow for Chinese Security and Defence Policy

Sir John Chipman KCMG, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director, Indo-Pacific Programme, German Marshall Fund

Commodore Jay Tristan Tarriela, Deputy Chief of Staff, Human Resource Management, Philippine Coast Guard

Fifth plenary session

On re-establishing high-level communication chan-

advantage of. In response to a different question, how-

nels, General Li noted that ‘we have our principles

ever, the minister noted that his mission was to engage

on communication’. When IISS Director-General and

in defence diplomacy and that he had already met

Chief Executive Sir John Chipman KCMG asked for

with defence officials from 11 countries at the Shangri-

clarification, General Li replied that China has ‘codes

La Dialogue.

for encounters at sea and in air’, but questioned why

When asked by Dr Tim Huxley, IISS Senior Adviser,

incidents only seem to occur near China. The minis-

and Dr Michael Fullilove, Executive Director of the

ter then referenced a Chinese saying, ‘mind your own

Lowy Institute, about military lessons from the war in

business’, to note that future problems can be avoided

Ukraine and Russia’s weak performance to date, the min-

if everyone ‘take[s] good care’ of their own territories.

ister deflected the issue to say that his ‘focus is on military

Several participants from the region challenged

diplomacy’ and could not give a ‘highly professional

General Li’s claim that China has not been a destabi-

answer’ to questions concerning ‘combat and practices’,

lising actor. Commodore Jay Tristan Tarriela, Deputy

given he has ‘not spent a lot of my time on those areas’.

Chief of Staff for Human Resource Management in

During Sir John Chipman’s closing remarks, Gen-

the Philippine Coast Guard asked why China calls for

eral Li interjected to make his own final remark – that

dialogue but acts confrontationally. Hoang Thi Ha,

he looked forward to more in-depth exchanges with the

Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political

scholars who asked questions, and to discussing security

Studies Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Insti-

and development issues with others. General Li shared

tute, asked why China’s behaviours are not anchored

his hope ‘that we can better understand the opinions

in UNCLOS. The minister did not answer other than

and positions of us and different countries so that you

to state that UNCLOS must be observed, but not taken

will also be able to better understand China’s position’.

Hoang Thi Ha, Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, ISEAS-Yusof Institute

Dr Michael Fullilove, Executive Director, Lowy Institute

Dr Tim Huxley, IISS Senior Adviser

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

CHAPTER 9 New partnerships for Asia-Pacific security

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 4 June 2023, 09:30 SPEAKERS Dr José Ramos-Horta President, Timor-Leste Kaja Kallas Prime Minister, Estonia Boris Pistorius Minister of Defence, Germany

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

New partnerships for Asia-Pacific security

Dr José Ramos-Horta, President, Timor-Leste

Dr José Ramos-Horta, President of Timor-Leste,

policy’. The South China Sea ‘should be … free of

bemoaned the ‘leaderless’ status of global govern-

permanent military facilities’ and the UN Conven-

ance. He decried the lack of concerted action and the

tion on the Law of the Sea should apply, he added.

lack of attention on matters essential to the Global

He also reiterated Timor-Leste’s strategic interests

South, including access to water and food, as well

in joining ASEAN.

as disinterest in the financial health of impoverished

Kaja Kallas, Prime Minister of Estonia, stressed

countries. He also stressed that the level of Official

that ‘security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-

Development Assistance (ODA) remains below the

Atlantic area are inseparable’. She noted that the UN

declared intentions of developed countries and the

Charter and international law and norms, ‘includ-

needs of the Global South. The president called for

ing territorial integrity and sovereignty’, are at stake

Global South countries to take greater responsibility

in Ukraine. Drawing on the history of her country

for their own development.

and her family, Kallas described Russia’s invasion of

Turning to global security, Dr Ramos-Horta noted

Ukraine as ‘a continuation of a colonialist land-grab

that China’s interests ‘are intertwined with’ those of

policy’ pursued by the Soviet Union and now Russia.

the rest of the world. He urged renewed Sino-US

She decried the current war, highlighting the human

engagement, notably to quell tensions on the Korean

and economic costs for Ukraine. She called for uphold-

Peninsula, and called on ‘outside powers’ to refrain

ing truth as ‘an important line of defence’ and stressed

from statements and actions that run contrary to

that ‘debunking myths is necessary to tailor a global

the ‘clearly established reality of [the] One China

response to stop Russia conquering its neighbours’.

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Kaja Kallas, Prime Minister, Estonia

Kallas then outlined the purpose of NATO, stating

stability and prosperity. This achievement, as well as the

that the Alliance exists to protect its members from

rules-based order, are now threatened by the Russian

Russia rather than threaten it. Noting that Sweden and

aggression in Ukraine.

Finland have applied for NATO membership because of Russian aggression, she refuted any accusation of Alliance expansionism and escalation. For small states

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

like Estonia, ‘multilateralism and strong alliances’

Dr Ben Schreer, IISS–Europe Executive Director, asked

offer a form of defence, the prime minister contended.

how the EU and individual EU member states such as

Reiterating the importance of international law, she

Germany can enhance their credibility as global secu-

said she supports the objective of ‘a free, open, inclu-

rity actors in the Indo-Pacific. Pistorius replied that

sive and rules-based Indo-Pacific order’, as well as

‘We should not try to make [the] European Union a

greater cooperation between the EU and ASEAN.

military alliance.’ He also said that ‘What we need is

Boris Pistorius, Defence Minister of Germany,

close cooperation with NATO and we need close coop-

described how geopolitical and economic changes

eration between the members of the European Union

have compelled his country to rethink its global

and members of NATO.’

engagement, noting that Berlin had spent ‘too long’

Dr Bastian Giegerich, IISS Director of Defence

focusing on its economic relations while overlooking,

and Military Analysis, asked what outcomes could be

in relative terms, geopolitical developments in regions

expected from the upcoming NATO Summit in Vilnius.

like the Indo-Pacific. He stressed Germany’s goal to

Kallas answered that ‘[Estonia supports] Ukraine’s

develop political, defence and economic relations with

path to NATO membership. Everybody understands

ASEAN countries, citing the deployment of a German

it can’t happen while the war is going on, but we need

frigate in the Indo-Pacific in 2021 as an example. In

clear wording that is more than Bucharest.’

addition, he called for respect of the freedom of navigation and UNCLOS.

Matsubara Mihoko, Chief Cybersecurity Strategist at the NTT Corporation and IISS Associate Fellow

Pistorius also said that Germany’s close engage-

for Cyber and Future Conflict, asked about Estonia’s

ment with American, European and international allies,

experience with cyber attacks and the protection of

as well as its commitment to democracy and multina-

critical infrastructure. Kallas answered that Estonia

tional cooperation, is the foundation for Germany’s

has invested in resilience and cyber security since the

Sixth plenary session

Boris Pistorius, Defence Minister, Germany

2007 Russian attacks. Ukraine has learned from Esto-

alliance, not an offensive one. She rejected the idea

nia’s experience, which explains why it has been able

that NATO threatens the sovereignty or territorial

to sustain its cyber infrastructure. Kallas also noted

integrity of other nations and can be blamed for the

that the cyber aspect of the Ukraine war may outlast

current instability.

the conventional one, and this necessitates permanent attention on that aspect of the conflict.

Justin Baquisal, a SEAYLP delegate and Strategic Intelligence Analyst at Pinkerton, asked how

Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, Research Fellow

small countries can contribute to their security. Kallas

at China’s Academy of Military Sciences, noting that

stressed the importance of lessons- and information-

a military alliance such as NATO needs enemies,

sharing, as well as connectivity among like-minded

asked why the security situation in Europe and

small countries to prepare against external threats.

Asia-Pacific has deteriorated into division and con-

Dr Asyura Salleh, Co-founder of the GAIA Alli-

frontation. Kallas retorted that NATO is a defensive

ance, asked about Timor-Leste’s priorities once it joins

Dr Ben Schreer, IISS–Europe Executive Director

Matsubara Mihoko, Chief Cybersecurity Strategist, NTT Corporation and IISS Associate Fellow for Cyber and Future Conflict

Dr Bastian Giegerich, IISS Director of Defence and Military Analysis

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, Research Fellow, China’s Academy of Military Sciences

Justin Baquisal, SEAYLP delegate and Strategic Intelligence Analyst, Pinkerton

Dr Asyura Salleh, Co-founder, GAIA Alliance

Alastair Gale, Asia Security Correspondent, Wall Street Journal

Syahredzan Johan, SEAYLP delegate and Member, Malaysian Parliament

ASEAN. Dr Ramos-Horta answered that the grouping

order and followed UNCLOS, ‘Timor-Leste would be

has been central to the country’s stability and devel-

a victim’.

opment since 1999 and that Timor-Leste would be a

Syahredzan Johan, a SEAYLP delegate and a

stable and supportive member of ASEAN and ‘should

Malaysian Member of Parliament, asked how smaller,

not be a burden and headache for ASEAN’.

impoverished countries of the Global South can col-

Alastair Gale, Wall Street Journal’s Asia Security

lectively influence rich nations to increase their

Correspondent, asked about US–China tensions and

contributions to the former. Dr Ramos-Horta noted

the potential implications for Timor-Leste. Dr Ramos-

the gap between the stated intentions of G7 coun-

Horta recounted how Timor-Leste and Australia

tries and the reality of stagnant or declining ODA.

solved their maritime boundary dispute by resorting

He mentioned as an example that only 30% of money

to UN mediation and to UNCLOS. He remarked that

pledged toward the support of Ukrainian refugees

if they had not upheld the international rules-based

has been provided.

Sixth plenary session

CHAPTER 10 Developing models for cooperative security

SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 4 June 2023, 11:30 SPEAKERS General Tea Banh Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of National Defence, Cambodia Richard Marles Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Defence, Australia Dr Ng Eng Hen Minister for Defence, Singapore

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

Developing models for cooperative security

General Tea Banh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, Cambodia

General Tea Banh, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Min-

in Myanmar to resolve an issue that has been harm-

ister and Minister of National Defence, identified the

ing ASEAN’s credibility and centrality. He also urged

COVID-19 pandemic and ‘regional and global secu-

more collaboration on climate change, especially

rity issues’ as challenges. He highlighted the need to

amongst major industrialised countries.

collectively work to end the Ukraine war, stating that

Richard Marles, Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister

Cambodia ‘opposes the use of force by one country

and Defence Minister, rejected the view that the Rus-

against another, state separation, and occupation of

sian invasion of Ukraine is an issue for Europe; rather,

a sovereign state’. The general urged an end to the

Moscow’s use of force to ‘impose its will’ on Kyiv

bloodshed through negotiations. He expressed Cam-

may foreshadow future conflicts ‘in a post-hegemonic

bodia’s support for political solutions to ‘end this war,

world’. Marles maintained the importance for global

such as China’s 12-point initiative’.

security that Vladimir Putin’s gambit fails and that

On Sino-US rivalry, Cambodia does not want the

‘the costs of military aggression far outweighed any

South China Sea to remain tense, nor does it want

perceived benefit’. In this regard, Marles argued for

China or the US to decline because this would create

collective investment. He also highlighted how China

risks for the region and the world. On the issue of

is engaging in the largest conventional military build-

Ream Naval Base, General Tea Banh promised trans-

up since the Second World War without an explanation

parency, but urged understanding of countries’ needs

of a strategic purpose. While expressing how Australia

to modernise militarily for national interests and

values ‘productive’ relations with China, he under-

regional peace. He urged trust among stakeholders

scored the importance of transparency. Finally, Marles

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Richard Marles, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Australia

assured the audience of Australia’s commitment to

countries to take sides, the history of great-power

ASEAN centrality. However, smaller groupings can

rivalry suggests that worsening Sino-US relations may

complement the bloc’s role in regional security.

force difficult choices upon individual states. Dr Ng

Dr Ng Eng Hen, Singapore’s Defence Minister,

concluded his speech by recognising that the Shangri-

expressed concern over the ‘geopolitical turmoil’,

La Dialogue exemplifies countries’ desire for peace,

not least because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the

even as they strengthen their defence capabilities.

‘unlawful invasion of Ukraine by Russia’. While global military spending will rise further in the coming decade, he acknowledged that this alone is not nec-

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

essarily a sign nor source of instability and that an

Ambika Vishwanath, a SEAYLP delegate and Founder

‘adequate’ defence budget deters aggression. How-

Director of the Kubernein Initiative, asked what Cam-

ever, Dr Ng warned that cooperation and a strategic

bodia would like to see from regional and Western

framework of engagement and mutual restraint is nec-

partners on climate change and whether Australia

essary to reduce risk of conflict. Critically, the minister

would bring its experience on environmental security

underscored the importance for stability of non-mili-

to Southeast Asia, South Asia and the western Indian

tary domains like trade and finance. He observed that

Ocean. General Tea Banh replied that climate change is

the US is out of the Comprehensive and Progressive

‘related to the advanced industrial countries’. Marles

Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, while China

maintained that, under his government, Australia is

has applied to join and is already part of the Regional

making ‘credible’ progress towards ‘net-zero emis-

Comprehensive Economic Partnership. However, Dr

sions by 2050’. He noted Australia’s role in amplifying

Ng welcomed the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework,

the stories of small Pacific Island countries that will

describing it as an important signal of the US commit-

bear the brunt of climate change first.

ment to investing in this region’s economies.

Reinhard Bütikofer, a Member of the European

Given the centrality of the US–China relationship to

Parliament, asked whether cooperative security

stability and the possibility of unplanned incidents, the

includes an economic component. Marles agreed and

minister urged the building of communication chan-

mentioned trade as a statecraft tool relevant to defence.

nels for conflict de-escalation. He noted that while the

Aun Chhengpor, a SEAYLP delegate and Research

US and China have said that they do not want ASEAN

Fellow at The Future Forum, sought transparency

Seventh plenary session

Dr Ng Eng Hen, Defence Minister, Singapore

regarding the Ream Naval Base controversy. General

‘peace, security and prosperity in the region’. How-

Tea Banh responded that the relatively small base is

ever, discussion is necessary if these minilaterals

required for Cambodian participation in regional

destabilise the region or fuel an arms race. Marles said

security exercises, thereby enhancing the country’s

that Australia has worked hard to provide strategic

maritime capabilities and defending its sovereignty.

reassurance and transparency on AUKUS, which is not

The general also stated that the base will not be open

an alliance. AUKUS, he clarified, is a technology-trans-

to foreign forces.

ferring arrangement, and the Quad is ‘not a security

Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, Associate Professor at

organisation’, but ‘about practical engagement’. Senior

China’s National Defense University, and Aaron Con-

Colonel Zhang also asked about NATO and whether

nelly, IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics

its involvement in the region would intensify con-

and Foreign Policy, asked about the Quad, AUKUS

flict. Marles insisted that the Alliance has contributed

and other minilaterals. General Tea Banh stated that

to Euro-Atlantic peace since 1945 and would not be

Cambodia supports these initiatives if they focus on

‘exported’ into the Indo-Pacific.

Ambika Vishwanath, SEAYLP delegate and Founder Director, Kubernein Initiative

Aun Chhengpor, SEAYLP delegate and Research Fellow, Future Forum

Reinhard Bütikofer, Member, European Parliament

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, Associate Professor, China’s National Defense University

Aaron Connelly, IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and Foreign Policy

Dr Jeffrey Ordaniel, Director, Maritime Programs, Pacific Forum

Robert Ward, IISS Japan Chair

Dr Jeffrey Ordaniel, Director of Maritime Pro-

Robert Ward, IISS Japan Chair, asked about Japan’s

grams at the Pacific Forum, asked whether the

role in regional security. Marles stated that Japan’s

speakers viewed the Ukraine war as a distraction to

new National Defense Strategy is a welcome statement

the US from its priority theatre, the Indo-Pacific, or

about Tokyo’s desire to engage more regionally and

whether it is an issue that the US needs to address

globally. He also applauded the recent rapproche-

to maintain the credibility of American commit-

ment between Japan and South Korea. Dr Ng stated

ments. Marles responded that Ukraine is globally

that Japan’s greatest contribution to the region’s stabil-

relevant as a test of the international rules-based

ity would be ‘to improve its relations with China’. He

order. Dr Ng stated that the US presence in this part

observed that some Asian countries still want Japan

of the world is vital for stability and questioned

to take greater accountability post-World War II, as

the assumption that a ‘superpower or a number of

Germany has done so. Dr Ng suggested that Japan

superpowers’ can handle simultaneous conflicts in

continue reassuring its neighbours on Japan’s militari-

Asia and Europe.

sation and growth and engage in multilateralism.

Seventh plenary session

CHAPTER 11 The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme The first roundtable at the Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

The sixth Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

Analysis. Over the next several hours, the young leaders

returned with its strongest cohort yet of academics,

participated in three roundtable discussions on regional

analysts, journalists, officials and politicians. The 25 del-

security issues held under rules of non-attribution.

egates hailed from all ten ASEAN member states. Seven

IISS Research Fellow for Japanese Security and

additional delegates from Australia, China, India, Japan,

Defence Policy Togashi Mariko moderated the first

the EU and the United States joined the programme as

discussion on ‘Avoiding war in Asia’. Panelists from

guests, and for the second time, SEAYLP featured rep-

Cambodia, Malaysia and the Philippines spoke about

resentation from four island nations: Fiji, Papua New

their respective countries’ approaches to potential

Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. In line

flashpoints in Asia, discussing the relative advan-

with the programme’s longstanding commitment to

tages of balancing and hedging postures. Of particular

gender diversity, 21 of the 37 young leaders were women.

concern amongst participants around the table were

SEAYLP 2023 was funded by the Australian government,

cross-Strait tensions and their implications for rela-

the Special Competitive Studies Project, Google Asia-

tions between the US and China.

Pacific and the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

IISS Associate Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and Foreign Policy Dr Shona Loong moderated the second panel, titled ‘Myanmar: Finding a way forward’.

ROUNDTABLES ON REGIONAL SECURITY

Panelists from Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand

The programme began on the morning of Friday, 2 June

spoke about the challenges of ASEAN diplomacy

with a welcome to the Shangri-La Dialogue given by Dr

toward Myanmar. The other three Myanmar delegates

Bastian Giegerich, IISS Director of Defence and Military

took the opportunity to make interventions from the

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

A SEAYLP discussion moderated by IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security and Co-editor of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, Dr Lynn Kuok

floor regarding the situation in their country, while

of proposed water discharges from Japanese nuclear

others from around the region shared their perspectives

plants during a plenary exchange with Japanese Defense

on their own countries’ positions on the conflict.

Minister Hamada Yasukazu. Ambika Vishwanath

A final panel, moderated by IISS Research Fellow

of India asked what Cambodia’s General Tea Banh

for Security and Technology Policy Koshino Yuka, con-

would like to see from regional and Western partners

sidered the role of governments, businesses and other

on climate change. She also asked Australian Defence

stakeholders in managing technological competition and

Minister Richard Marles whether Australia would bring

security standards for regional prosperity. Panelists from

its experience on environmental security to Southeast

China, Singapore and the US shared their perspectives on

Asia, South Asia and the western Indian Ocean. Finally,

relevant recent developments, including in semiconduc-

Aun Chhengpor of Cambodia sought transparency

tor policy, artificial intelligence and the war in Ukraine.

from General Banh around Ream Naval Base.

PARTICIPATION IN PLENARY SESSIONS SEAYLP delegates asked some of the most important

ENGAGEMENTS WITH SENIOR DEFENCE LEADERS

questions fielded in the plenary sessions. Bich Tran of

SEAYLP delegates had the opportunity for exclusive

Vietnam asked US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin

engagements with senior defence leaders over meals

whether US cooperation with Vietnam indicated

during the Dialogue. Admiral John Aquilino, the

that the Washington is comfortable with communist

Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, held a

political systems but not revisionist ones. Syahredzan

roundtable discussion with delegates over lunch on

Johan, a Member of Parliament from Malaysia, asked

Friday, 2 June, where he spoke about US Indo-Pacific

President Jose Ramos-Horta of Timor-Leste about the

strategy. Delegates also enjoyed discussions with

gap between wealthy and less-developed countries.

Greg Moriarty and General Angus Campbell, the

Justin Baquisal of the Philippines asked Estonian Prime

Secretary of the Australian Department of Defence

Minister Kaja Kallas how small countries could contrib-

and Chief of the Australian Defence Force respectively,

ute to each other’s security. Keleni Seruvatu, Director

over breakfast on Saturday, 3 June, and with ASEAN

of the Multilateral Affairs Bureau in Fiji’s Ministry of

Secretary-General Dr Kao Kim Hourn over breakfast

Foreign Affairs, raised concerns about the security risk

the next day. Finally, Singapore Foreign Minister Dr

The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

The final roundtable moderated by IISS Research Fellow for Security and Technology Policy Koshino Yuka

Vivian Balakrishnan held a roundtable discussion

in an informal setting at a special reception hosted

with delegates over lunch following the conclusion of

by the Australian High Commissioner to Singapore,

the Dialogue on Sunday, 4 June. All sessions were held

Allaster Cox. Secretary of the Australian Department

under rules of non-attribution.

of Foreign Affairs and Trade Jan Adams congratulated the delegates on their selection. On their final day, the delegates travelled to the headquarters of Google

SOCIAL ENGAGEMENTS AND NETWORKING OPPORTUNITIES

Asia-Pacific for a tour of the premises and a closing

After a full day of discussions on weighty issues, on

This year’s young leaders forged new relationships

the evening of Saturday, 3 June, SEAYLP delegates

from across the region and new ideas for collaboration

had the opportunity to continue the day’s discussions

on issues of common concern.

reception following the conclusion of the Dialogue.

Roundtable discussion over lunch with Vivian Balakrishnan, Singapore’s Foreign Affairs Minister

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

APPENDICES

I. Selected digital engagement and media coverage of the 2023 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue II. Selected IISS publications

APPENDIX I

Selected digital engagement and media coverage of the 2023 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue The SLD section on the IISS website

The IISS celebrated the 20th anniversary of the SLD with its global audiences. Convened by the Institute, the world’s media and key opinion formers on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region gathered at the Dialogue in Singapore. Together, they led the news and drove key conversations online, communicating to their readers, viewers and followers the complexities, subtleties and advantages that in-person diplomacy can provide.

DIGITAL ENGAGEMENT HIGHLIGHTS The SLD was much discussed on the internet. Speeches and coverage from the plenary and special sessions – and all the events which happened behind the scenes in Singapore – generated over 6,000 unique mentions on social media over the weekend where the event was held. These social conversations reached nearly 43 million people, with most of the online dialogue happening in the US, the UK, Australia and Asia. Plenary speakers and delegates tweeted and retweeted SLD-related content. We used our IISS YouTube channel to ensure global audiences could watch the plenary sessions live online. In

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

addition, the plenary and special recordings have so far generated over 71,000 views. Our YouTube playlists also include expert opinions to engage our audiences with prime

IISS Flickr account

IISS analysis on the ground in Singapore. The most-viewed videos of the plenary sessions are: • IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2023: Resolving Regional Tensions (over 32,000 views) • IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2023: China’s New Security Initiatives (about 16,000 views) • IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2023: Developing Models for Cooperative Security (about 5,000 views) During the SLD, the IISS website was used as a key communication channel and provided information such as speaker agendas and content related to the Dialogue’s themes and topics. It also offers customised landing pages for the Special Sessions and the Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme. Throughout the event, the website was updated with audio recordings, transcripts and additional information on a rolling basis and promoted via our social media channels. The bespoke web pages were viewed over 52,000 times during the week of SLD 2023. The IISS website also included a link to the IISS Flickr account with highlights from the event.

Our social media and website activities were complemented by special podcast episodes on ‘Japan Memo’ and ‘Sounds Strategic’. Sounds Strategic: • Pre-event: Podcast host Meia Nouwens was joined by IISS experts James Crabtree, Dr Ben Schreer, Dr Lynn Kuok and Aaron Connelly to discuss the SLD’s themes and topics. (Over 2,300 downloads.) • Post-event: Podcast guest host James Crabtree was joined by IISS experts Dr Bastian Giegerich, Dr Nigel Gould-Davies, Dr Evan A Laksmana and Veerle Nouwens to share their reflections and takeaways. (Over 2,500 downloads.) Japan Memo: • Robert Ward, Koshino Yuka and Togashi Mariko interviewed Bill Emmott, Chair of the IISS Trustees; Dr Valérie Niquet, Head of the Asia Department at Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, as well as Dr Jimbo Ken, Professor at the Faculty of Policy Management at Keio

Selected press coverage

University, to gain their insights on key developments in the Dialogue. (Almost 600 downloads.) The IISS blogs highlighted themes and topics of SLD 2023 and have been viewed over 3,000 times. Some of the more popular posts include: • The state of defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean region by Antoine Levesques and Viraj Solanki China’s rivalry with India has become more visible to the island and littoral countries of the Indian Ocean since their relationship soured following violent border clashes in 2020, altering patterns of regional defence cooperation. • US allies in the Indo-Pacific align on China by Veerle Nouwens The mood in Japan and Australia, and to an extent South Korea and the Philippines, has shifted towards acquiring greater deterrence capabilities and deepening defence partnerships within the framework of their alliances with the United States. • The legacy of the war in Ukraine: will a ‘Silk Curtain’ fall? by John Raine Global middle powers will have a key role to play in influencing whether or not the East and West are separated in the post-Ukraine order by a ‘Silk Curtain’. • Southeast Asian states, defence cooperation and geopolitical balancing by Dr Evan A. Laksmana Southeast Asian states are seeking to deepen defence partnerships as part of their ongoing military-modernisation plans but are reluctant to take sides in the increasingly polarised regional political and security environment. • A possible turning point for US–China defence links by James Crabtree The American and Chinese delegations to the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2023 have an opportunity to make modest progress improving bilateral communication mechanisms regarding security and defence issues. • European perspectives at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: a fragmentary or joint approach to the Indo-Pacific? by Ben Schreer A key question to be answered at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2023 is the extent to which European defence ministers and Josep Borrell, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, are able to describe a joint vision and action plan for engagement in the Indo-Pacific. • The growing nuclear dimensions of regional security in the Indo-Pacific by William Alberque

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Nuclear issues are becoming more acute and complex as countries in the Indo-Pacific attempt to navigate the increasingly unbound return of global great-power competition.

MEDIA ENGAGEMENT HIGHLIGHTS A large number of media personnel were present at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, with the IISS proud to accommodate over 40 media outlets from around the world. Over 300 journalists, broadcasters and producers attended the Dialogue to record and observe events. Here follows a selection of news articles and opinion pieces written by media delegates at the Dialogue:

New York Times 3 June 2023

US vows to continue patrols near China and urges nuclear talks The United States pressed Beijing on two fronts this weekend, warning both of the near-term risks of military mishaps and of the looming dangers of a nuclear arms rivalry, prompting a vehement accusation from a Chinese general that Washington was stoking confrontation. In speeches from President Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, on Friday, and Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III on Saturday in Singapore, the Biden administration sought to draw China toward talks on the rising military perils. Mr. Austin also indicated that the United States would keep operating military ships and planes in international seas and skies near China despite recent close calls with Chinese forces, and also keep providing support to Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing sees as its own territory. Both are sore points with China. “We won’t be deterred by dangerous operational behavior at sea or in international airspace,” Mr. Austin told a gathering of military officials and experts at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual meeting in Singapore. Speaking in Washington, Mr. Sullivan laid out Mr. Biden’s ideas to deal with a world in which “cracks in our post-Cold War nuclear foundation are substantial.” Russia has been making more frequent, though usually vague, threats about tactical nuclear weapons and China is building up its nuclear arsenal. Mr. Sullivan said that the United States was modernizing its own nuclear weapons, but that it would not plunge into a race to build more warheads than Russia and China combined. “We’re also ready to engage China without preconditions — helping ensure that competition is managed, and that competition does not veer into conflict,” he said.

Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, in Washington on Friday. He laid out President Biden’s ideas to deal with a world in which “cracks in our post-Cold War nuclear foundation are substantial.“ The tableau of two of Mr. Biden’s most senior officials focusing on the dangers of military rivalry with China illustrated the extent of this geopolitical rift, even as Washington and Beijing reopen discussion on trade and diplomatic issues. China’s recent economic woes were one factor prompting its top leader, Xi Jinping, to take a milder diplomatic demeanor this year, Orville Schell, director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York, said in a telephone interview. “But I don’t think his underlying assumptions about the hostility of our relationship have shifted,” Mr. Schell said. Highlighting that tension, the Chinese military delegation at the Singapore meeting called a news conference after Mr. Austin’s speech to take issue with it. Lt. Gen. Jing Jianfeng from the People’s Liberation Army told reporters that U.S. weapons sales and other support for Taiwan amounted to encouraging independence for the island. “At the same time that the United States is calling for communications and exchanges, it is also harming China’s interests and concerns,” General Jing said. “The Taiwan issue is a core interest for China, and we will not brook any compromise or concessions.” Prospects appear distant for any U.S.-China accord on the issues that Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Austin raised — or even for deep discussion of them. China sees itself as the weaker side, and appears to believe that detailed agreements, whether on arms control or regulating military encounters near its shores, would only help the United States perpetuate its dominance. Opacity, in other words, can work in China’s favor. Beijing is especially angry about increased support for Taiwan and sees withholding dialogue as a way to warn the United States, said Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific Program Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “They want to get our attention,” she said, adding that Beijing may not see value in reviving military talks. “The Chinese — and this has been true for a long time — are really not interested in risk-reduction measures,” she said, “because they think that by maintaining some level of risk, we will be more cautious.” The Shangri-La Dialogue has in its two decades of operation become a venue for military officials from Washington and Beijing to rhetorically spar, but also to hold bilateral discussions aimed at lowering tensions. This year, though, the Chinese defense minister, Gen. Li Shangfu, declined to meet Mr. Austin. The two shook hands during a brief encounter at the forum’s opening dinner on Friday. “A cordial handshake

over dinner is no substitute for substantive engagement,” Mr. Austin said in his speech. He also berated China for what he described as dangerous military maneuvers in international airspace. In late May, a Chinese J-16 jet fighter flew perilously close to a U.S. Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea, according to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Beijing has returned to the table on some issues. China’s commerce minister, Wang Wentao, recently visited the United States, and Mr. Sullivan held talks last month with a senior Chinese diplomat. But the accumulated antagonism between China and the United States over security issues has been harder to overcome. The Chinese defense minister, General Li, who was appointed to his current position in March and will speak at the forum on Sunday, was put under sanctions by Washington in 2018 over buying Russian fighter jets and a surface-to-air missile system. China has said that penalty is the reason for his refusal to meet Mr. Austin. Pentagon officials say that it should not impede talks, and that avoiding or defusing potential crises is made harder by the Chinese military’s unwillingness to communicate. Zhao Xiaozhuo, a senior colonel in China’s People’s Liberation Army attending the Singapore forum, said Washington’s calls for “guard rails” about encounters between military aircraft and ships could be used as an excuse to legitimize American surveillance of China. “Crisis management is a good thing,” he said in an interview, speaking in English. But U.S. military ships and planes were often conducting surveillance near the Chinese coast, he said. “The guardrails that the United States prefers, to my understanding, is to legitimize what the United States has done in its provocative behavior toward China.” Zhao Xiaozhuo, a senior colonel in China’s People’s Liberation Army, speaking to journalists in Singapore on Saturday. “Crisis management is a good thing,” he said in an interview. The administration’s efforts to draw China into arms control talks seem even less likely to succeed anytime soon. Chinese officials have refused to discuss agreements limiting their nuclear weapons expansion. China has about 410 nuclear warheads, according to an annual survey by the Federation of American Scientists. The Pentagon estimates that number could grow to 1,000 by 2030, and 1,500 by around 2035, if the current pace were maintained. If Beijing nears that number, Washington’s two biggest nuclear adversaries would have a combined force of close to 3,000 nuclear warheads. Colonel Zhao, of the Chinese delegation in Singapore, said the U.S. projections of China’s nuclear arsenal had “no basis.” “The number of China’s nuclear warheads, or the quality of China’s nuclear weapons, is far away from that of the United States and that of Russia,” he said, while declining to give his own estimate of its size.

Selected press coverage

Even if China declines any treaty to cap its total nuclear warheads, agreements on transparency and building mutual trust could help limit the risks from its buildup, said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a research group. “Hotline agreements, notifications of launches of missiles — so whenever you’re doing a test or a space launch, notify,” Mr. Alberque said in an interview. “A first step would be: Why don’t you just tell us how many warheads you have?” ©New York Times Reprinted with permission

The Straits Times 3 June 2023

Five-power defence nations in talks to upgrade joint military exercises The defence ministers of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) countries are seeking to upgrade the level of their military drills, as they reaffirmed the value of the grouping amid great power rivalry in the region. Speaking to reporters after an FPDA meeting on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue on Saturday, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said that the annual FPDA exercises are valuable for the countries’ defence forces. “I think the direction in which we’re going in terms of... their evolution is greater complexity in those exercises, looking at ways in which we can understand our respective defence forces better and that we can interoperate at a higher and more complex level,” he said. Singapore’s Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen, who hosted the breakfast meeting – a regular feature at the security forum – said that the upgrading is discussed among the five leaders because of good feedback from their military chiefs. “They wanted to do more. So we have tasked our chiefs to do that,” he said. The FPDA countries – Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Britain – hold regular exercises aimed at building the ability to operate well together, as well as improving the proficiency of their armed forces. In recent years, they have come together for planning exercises, air drills, gunnery firing and manoeuvring drills in the sea. Other than Dr Ng and Mr Marles, the other defence ministers at the meeting were Malaysia’s Mr Mohamad Hasan, New Zealand’s Mr Andrew Little, and Britain’s Mr Ben Wallace. With the growing bifurcation between the United States and China affecting regional stability, Dr Ng noted that the FPDA is not named as an agreement nor an alliance. “Because of that, it is of no threat to anyone, nor is it directed at any single country,” he said, adding that he hopes the FPDA will continue to be a force for stability.

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Mr Marles believes that Australia’s commitment to Aukus – a trilateral security pact with the US and the United Kingdom that features the sharing of nuclear-submarine capabilities with Australia – does not contradict the FPDA’s agenda. Both contribute to the collective regional security, he said. “I don’t think that Aukus cuts across any of the agenda of the FPDA, and... we would say that what we gained from Aukus is an ability for Australia to make a greater contribution to the peace and security of our region, and to the maintenance of a global rules-based order,” he said. Mr Hasan, who was appointed in December, proposed for the FPDA to be “a pathway for greater strategic and defence cooperation” in training and capacity building. He said Malaysia will work closely with FPDA members to pursue cooperation and the strengthening of its defence industry, advancing shared technology and conducting joint exercises. Singapore’s Ministry of Defence said that during the meeting, the five leaders reaffirmed their nations’ commitment to the FPDA and acknowledged the significant progress that it has made since its inception in 1971. They discussed the importance of the FPDA as a constructive and peaceful arrangement, which has served as an anchor for regional security and stability, said the ministry. ©The Straits Times Reprinted with permission

Financial Times 4 June 2023

China rebukes west over military moves after close call in Taiwan Strait China has warned western militaries to stay out of waters and airspace near its borders if they want to avoid dangerous run-ins with the People’s Liberation Army, highlighting the growing risk of unintended conflict in Asia as geopolitical competition grows. The blunt message from General Li Shangfu, China’s new defence minister, followed a near-collision between a Chinese warship and a US destroyer in international waters on Saturday. The Chinese ship cut directly ahead of the US vessel, which was sailing through the Taiwan Strait with a Canadian warship. “Why does this all happen near China’s sovereign waters and airspace? Chinese ships and aircraft never go near other countries’ airspace and waters,” Li said at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security conference in Singapore on Sunday. “The best way to prevent this from happening is that military vessels and aircraft [should] not come close to our waters and airspace. What does this have to do with your

security? Watch your own territorial waters and airspace, then there will not be any problems.” Li spoke a day after US defence secretary Lloyd Austin and Canadian defence minister Anita Anand criticised China for dangerous air incidents at the forum. Austin said the PLA had conducted an “alarming” number of risky aerial intercepts over the South China Sea. Anand, referring to similar interceptions of Canadian military aircraft monitoring the implementation of UN sanctions against North Korea, called China an “increasingly disruptive global power that increasingly disregards international rules and norms”. Those tensions have lent a growing sense of urgency to Washington’s attempts to reopen military dialogue that Beijing has severed after an alleged Chinese spy balloon was brought down in American airspace in February. Li said he met defence leaders from 11 countries in Singapore. But breaking with tradition, Beijing refused US requests for talks with Austin on the sidelines of the forum unless Washington lifted sanctions imposed on Li in 2018 for his role in procuring weapons from Russia. Austin on Saturday called on the PLA to engage with the US military, saying “responsible defence leaders” should be willing to talk at any time. He said dialogue was “not a reward”, a response to China’s frequent calls for the US to amend its behaviour as a prerequisite for talks. Li claimed that communications channels remained open but added that dialogue and exchanges should be based on mutual respect. “If not even that can be guaranteed, there will not be any results,” he said. In his first public interaction with an audience including hundreds of western defence officials, Li stuck to the usual lines of Chinese military diplomacy by pledging Beijing’s efforts to preserve peace and stability while accusing Washington of upsetting regional stability. Chinese defence ministers are much less powerful in the overall security and military bureaucracy than their western counterparts. Although Li, who became minister in March, is a member of the Central Military Commission, the country’s top-level defence leadership, his role is limited to military diplomacy. Echoing increasingly assertive rhetoric from Chinese leader Xi Jinping on China’s role in the global security order, Li said: “China is willing to help build a security order of an even higher standard [and] an even more comprehensive multilateral security order.” He contrasted Beijing’s approach with what he called hegemonic and destabilising tendencies, a swipe at the US, though he did not directly mention Washington in that context. “They are using the pretext of freedom of navigation to conduct navigational hegemony,” Li said. He also lashed out at “foreign forces using Taiwan to contain China”, which he called “the root of creating tension

in the Taiwan Strait [and] the biggest troublemaker in the Taiwan Strait”. Following Li’s speech, the Pentagon said it remained “concerned about the PLA’s increasingly risky and coercive activities in the region”, including those in recent days. “Actions speak louder than words, and the dangerous behaviour we’ve seen from the PLA around the Strait, in the South and East China Seas and beyond really says it all,” said a senior US defence official. ©Financial Times Reprinted with permission

The Korea Herald 4 June 2023

S. Korea, Japan agree to bury hatchet on radar dispute, boost data sharing The defense leaders of South Korea and Japan have agreed to clear a key obstacle that has hindered their bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges since 2018 and to prioritize their efforts to prevent the recurrence of similar military disputes to foster “future-oriented security cooperation.” South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup and Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada held a 40-minute meeting on Sunday on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s top defense meeting, in Singapore. The bilateral defense ministerial meeting marks the first in 3 1/2 years since November 2019 amid ongoing fence-mending efforts. Lee and Hamada specifically committed to stop making an issue of the 2018 radar lock-on dispute that resulted in suspending bilateral exchanges between defense authorities, South Korean officials at the Defense Ministry said. Both sides “agreed to focus on coming up with measures to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future by holding working-level talks to that end,” Lee told reporters after the meeting. The dispute began as Japan first accused South Korea’s Gwanggaeto the Great destroyer of directing its fire-control radar at a Japanese maritime patrol aircraft in 2018. However, Seoul rejected the claim and clarified that the destroyer was engaged in a humanitarian operation to search and rescue a North Korean ship drifting into international waters in the East Sea. Tracking radar, which measures the direction, distance and altitude of a target to strike it from a warship, is considered an aggressive act of preparing for an attack when it is aimed at an opponent. The South Korean military claimed that the Japanese surveillance aircraft repeatedly conducted low-altitude flights

Selected press coverage

that were perceived as threatening toward South Korean warships in December 2018 and January 2019. Since then, Seoul and Tokyo has maintained their respective positions and put the blame on each other regarding the dispute, despite continuing top-down diplomatic efforts to mend ties. Stances of both parties remain consistent at the current moment. But the Defense Ministry on Sunday defended the decision made by the defense ministers, when asked about potential criticism, that both sides have chosen to bury the problem rather than resolve it. “The issue has been raised as a sensitive matter in the defense field. Both sides of South Korea and Japan shared a common understanding that if there is no progress in addressing the issue, it will limit advances in overall defense cooperation,” a senior official, who wished to remain anonymous, said during a closed-door briefing. “Both sides recognized that this issue cannot be resolved by solely categorizing it as a matter of right or wrong,” the official said. Additionally, they “shared the view that adhering to the existing way of discussion would not lead to desirable results.” Future-oriented security cooperation Lee and Hamada agreed to make headway in line with the commitment of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to forge “future-oriented” bilateral relations, the official explained. Seoul and Tokyo will discuss ways to “restore their defense cooperation and exchanges to the level that existed before 2018,” the official added. “The defense authorities of both countries are committed to closely communicating to enhance security cooperation, as the South Korean and Japanese leaders confirmed that the normalization of bilateral relations are on track and agreed to further advance the relationship to a higher level,” South Korea’s Defense Ministry said in a written statement. “Both sides also shared the view that it is crucial for South Korean and Japanese defense authorities to further advance security cooperation between South Korea and Japan and among South Korea, the US and Japan, to build confidence and to enhance exchanges and cooperation at various levels to deter and counter the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea,” it added. With increasing missile and nuclear threats from North Korea, South Korea and Japan have chosen to put the past behind them and strengthen their security cooperation with a future-oriented approach. The meeting notably comes days after North Korea’s launch of what South Korea and Japan considered a longrange ballistic missile under the disguise of a spy satellite, despite repeated warnings from the international community.

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

The launch sparked air raid sirens and alerts calling for evacuations in both South Korea and Japan. The ministry underscored that South Korean and Japanese defense authorities will improve communication to enhance “future-oriented security cooperation” at bilateral and trilateral levels. Upgrade trilateral cooperation Lee, Hamada and US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin also met on Saturday and agreed to upgrade trilateral security cooperation by strengthening information-sharing links and military exercises. The meeting marks the first defense ministerial meeting between the three countries since June 2022, which was also held at the Shangri-La Dialogue. The photo of the three defense chiefs clearly demonstrates how trilateral cooperation has rapidly evolved. In last year’s group photo, the defense chiefs were seen standing at a distance from each other. However, this year, all three were seen symbolically holding hands, with Austin standing in the middle. The three leaders notably agreed to establish and operate a system to share North Korea’s missile warning data in real time within the year. Missile warning data refers to information about the projected launch location, trajectory and anticipated landing location of North Korean missiles. The substantial achievement was made seven months after the initial agreement on information-sharing initiative during the November 2022 summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Specifically, the US Indo-Pacific Command will act as an intermediary under the new information sharing system, a senior official, who wished to remain anonymous, told reporters on Saturday. The US Indo-Pacific Command will connect the current real-time information sharing system between the South Korean military and the US Forces Korea to the real-time information sharing system between the US Forces Japan and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The three defense leaders also committed to regularizing defensive exercises that contribute to strengthening trilateral responses to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and deterring against such threats, including anti-submarine exercises and missile defense exercises. Lee, Austin and Hamada notably acknowledged the significance of enhancing trilateral cooperation in fully enforcing UN Security Council resolutions in the absence of support from China and Russia. To that end, the three agreed to resume maritime interdiction exercises designed to counter North Korea’s illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers. Lee’s rare criticism of China Both Austin and Lee also highlighted the legitimacy of enhancing trilateral security cooperation in the face of

North Korean nuclear and missile threats during their keynote speeches at the Shangri-La Dialogue on Saturday. The meeting was attended by defense ministers and high-level delegates from over 40 countries, including Australia, the United States, China, Japan, Ukraine and the European Union. In his speech, Lee notably made a rare and strong denouncement of China and Russia for failing to fulfill their duty in holding North Korea accountable for its continuous illegal activities, underscoring that North Korea is the “only country that threatens a preemptive attack with nuclear weapons against a specific country.” Lee did not explicitly name China and Russia. But he clearly attributed blame to the veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council for their refusal to take action against North Korea’s ongoing ballistic missile launches. “Some countries are ignoring North Korea’s unlawful behaviors that violate the rules-based order. This creates holes in sanctions against North Korea, passed at the UN Security Council,” Lee said. “And due to objections by countries with responsibilities, despite North Korea’s unprecedented number of missile launches last year, not a single additional UNSC Resolution was able to pass.” The UN Security Council’s 15 members on Friday failed once again to take any action against North Korea’s latest launch as China and Russia openly defended North Korea’s illegal act and criticized the closer alignment among South Korea, the US, and Japan, stating that it has destabilized the region. But Lee held his first meeting with China’s new Defense Minister Li Shangfu, who has also been under US sanctions since 2018, hours after he delivered the speech. But China did not show any response or raise any concerns about South Korea’s closer alignment with the US and Japan, according to South Korean officials. During the 50-minute meeting, Lee utilized the opportunity to emphasize that “North Korea’s nuclear and missile advancements and continuing provocations pose a significant challenge to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region” according to South Korea’s Defense Ministry. “The conversation was meaningful and constructive,” Lee told reporters following the meeting. “I emphasized the constructive role of China in achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and China also acknowledged.” ©The Korea Herald Reprinted with permission

Asia Times 8 June 2023

Shangri-La notebook: Happily, WWIII is not imminent Every year since 2002, barring two Covid-caused cancellations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies has convened the Shangri-La Dialogue, named after the Singapore hotel in which it takes place but nonetheless a name redolent of a Chinese utopia. It is an amazing gathering of defense ministers and senior military officials from all around Asia – more uniforms and gold braid than I have ever seen in any other context – plus the US secretary of defense and equivalents from Canada, Australia and sundry European countries. It is therefore dedicated to helping prevent an Asian dystopia – in other words, a World War Three between the United States and China. Full disclosure: I chair the board of the IISS, which is why I attend every year. Further disclosure: I am currently doing research for a book for IISS on how to avoid World War Three in Asia (not the actual title), so I snooped around this meeting with even greater attention than usual. Here are some observations from the event, in no particular order: Japan For the first time, Japan was the talk of the Shangri-La town for its dramatic 2022 decision to break free of its post-1945 pacifist constitution’s constraints and to expand its defense budget to become the world’s third largest by 2027. This, along with a new National Security Strategy last December that announced a major move toward a much more forward leaning and active military posture, has suddenly made it a major player in the region. In part, this is because, while Japan is allied with the United States, it is not America. It does not spark any public backlash when it starts to provide the Philippines with 10 new coastguard vessels to help protect its islands and fishing grounds against Chinese incursions or provides millions of dollars in grants to help build the Philippines’ military capabilities or negotiates a reciprocal access agreement for each other’s forces in each other’s countries. Moreover, Japan’s economic influence and diplomacy in Southeast Asia, whether in the form of public or private investments or of its leading role in the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) of 11 AsiaPacific nations for trade and investment rules, is regarded far more highly than is the tepid economic outreach of the United States, with its so-called Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (summary: we’ll talk to you about anything other than free trade).

Selected press coverage

China-US The two elephants in the Shangri-La room, China and the United States, essentially engaged in a communications game, vying to assign blame to each other for stirring up regional tensions and for failing to honor international law. Turning to football parlance, my view would be that the United States won the game by about a 5-1 score, with that one Chinese success being a US own-goal for having maintained a deeply pointless set of sanctions on China’s new Minister of Defense General Li Shengfe, for his supposed transgressions in doing business with Russia during a previous role. This handed China a perfect excuse for refusing to accept the US’s proposal of a private one-to-one meeting between General Li and the US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, and made the US look foolish. Nonetheless, the two sat down facing each other at the same table at the conference’s opening dinner; Li accepted Secretary Austin’s offer of a handshake; and Austin accepted Li’s later offer of a mutual toast. The Singaporeans, who pride themselves on maintaining a friendly and apparent equidistance between both sides (even while collaborating pretty deeply with the US military), will have been very happy. The reason why, on my football metaphor, China ended up conceding so many goals is that, in Li’s formal speech and in many of the questions posed to other speakers by the largest Chinese delegation that had ever been sent to this event, the Chinese failed to respect either the interests or the intelligence of the many Southeast Asian countries sitting in the audience. The posture China took was a self-righteous one of claiming to be a great defender of international law, a firm believer in treating other countries with mutual respect and the greatest exponent of “ASEAN centrality” – that is, considering the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to be its main and respected interlocutor. Yet every single senior official or scholar present from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei and many others knew that if anyone were to follow Deng Xiaoping’s exhortation to “seek truth from facts” they would instantly see that China’s own actions show up this posture as hypocritical nonsense. They know that in the South China and East China Seas China violates the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on a daily basis, even while being a signatory to it, and ignores “ASEAN centrality” by trying to pick off member countries one by one. They know that the country that accuses others of “bullying” and “hegemonic” behavior is itself guilty of both. By highlighting this vast gap between its pious rhetoric and its real actions, China made the clearest possible case to countries in the region for maintaining and even enhancing the American military’s presence as a balancing force.

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

‘Hegemonic navigation’ One striking and clear example of China’s domineering attitude was General Li’s use of the phrase “hegemonic navigation.” He used this in an effort to discredit the socalled “freedom of navigation operations” that American and other naval ships practice in the international waters of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. The phrase appeared designed to imply to Southeast Asian nations that the American, Australian, French, British, German, Dutch and Japanese ships sailing in these international waters are somehow seeking to dominate those seas rather than to maintain open international sea lanes. When challenged over recent allegedly dangerous intercepts of American vessels and planes by Chinese ships and fighters, his answer was straightforward: such incidents would not happen if those American ships and planes hadn’t been there, poking their noses in what he clearly considered Chinese business. He also claimed that China never flies or sails close to other countries’ territorial waters, a claim that was clearly news to Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia, let alone Taiwan. The underlying point was clear: China considers that the entire South China Sea belongs to it (in accordance with its notorious “nine-dash line” map), despite all legal rulings to the contrary. The real “hegemonic navigator” was on full display. Substantially for that reason, the clearest trend highlighted by the weekend’s discussions was the considerable progress the Biden administration has made in using its direct security alliances (with Japan, South Korea and Australia) and less formal partnerships (with the Philippines, Singapore and others) to extend its military basing, exercises and logistical network in the region. Far from being considered “provocative” by the region, this latticework of collaboration and, in some cases, deterrence, is considered to be welcome. Philippines The Philippines in particular is now enthusiastic about this expanded American presence, especially as it is coming in partnership with Japan and Australia. The surprising but revealing point about Chinese behavior is that it is so blatant and stubborn: During the 2016-22 presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, who made overtures towards Beijing in the hope of receiving economic rewards for accepting China’s rebuttal of a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the international legal status of atolls and shoals in the South China Sea, China made lots of offers but Filipino officials reckon it delivered on “about 5%” of its promises. Meanwhile, China continued to bully Filipino fishermen and operate freely in Filipino territorial waters. Seduction of

former president Duterte would have been cheap, but China either couldn’t be bothered or didn’t think it needed to. No wonder his successor, Ferdinand Marcos Jr, has swung so firmly towards America and Japan, providing the US military with access to four bases where it can now preposition equipment and supplies, and negotiating the deals with Japan that were mentioned earlier. Ukraine The European star of the Shangri-La Dialogue was undoubtedly Ukraine. Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine’s minister of defense, put up an impressively clear and robust outline of his country’s situation and intentions. When Indonesia’s defense minister, Prabowo Subianto, surprised his own officials by proposing a “peace plan” for Ukraine that involved a demilitarized zone separating Russian-occupied territories from the rest of Ukraine and referendums in those occupied territories, he drew a pointedly disdainful comment by a Vietnamese questioner who resented Prabowo’s claim that Vietnam somehow provided a historical precedent for this idea. It was plain that Prabowo’s “plan” was not resonant even in a region quite prone to the “Why can’t they just talk and be friends?” argument. And then Reznikov neatly skewered Prabowo’s ideas as “a Russian plan.” None of the Chinese officials and scholars present succeeded in convincing attendees that China’s “position paper” on Ukraine had yet come within a million miles of being an actual peace plan. Estonia It was, however, Kaja Kallas, the youthful prime minister of Estonia, who provided the most convincing case for backing Ukraine and for opposing Russian imperialism when she outlined the history of Russian invasion and colonization of her country during the 20th century, involving mass killings, deportations and active replacement of Estonians with Russian settlers – a playbook that, as she pointed out, Russia is following again today in Ukraine.

Her own family history of suffering at Russian hands added further poignancy. One cannot know whether those present who are susceptible to the argument that “NATO expansionism” is somehow responsible for Russia’s decision to invade a non-NATO country will have been persuaded by Kallas to change their minds, but few will have discounted her description of why the small, vulnerable state of Estonia wanted to become a NATO member in 2004 and, following Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, to host a small NATO force inside its borders so as to help deter Russian interference or invasion. Taiwan Naturally, the voice that was not heard was that of Taiwan. But everybody’s mind was on Taiwan and the prospect of a Chinese attempt to coerce the Taiwanese into “unification” through a blockade or full invasion. Li read out the official Chinese line on this: that Taiwan is an internal matter for China in which outside powers should not interfere; that under all past agreements it should be moving towards unification; that China reserves the right to use force if necessary. Rightly, he warned that a superpower conflict over Taiwan (or anything else) would be a global disaster. Yet the general mood was calm. If Ukraine holds lessons for Taiwan it is that an invasion would be hugely costly and risky; that Western willingness to support the victims of an invasion is far greater and more durable than either Russia or China previously imagined; and that the more invading forces need to step over, destroy or circumvent Taiwanese or Western military assets, the riskier and more costly it will get. Moreover, Taiwan is holding a presidential election next January, so it makes sense to wait and see whether the more status quo-oriented Democratic People’s Party retains power or is displaced by the more emollient Kuomintang. Whatever the Chinese equivalent of mañana may be, it is currently the best sort of reassurance available. ©Asia Times Reprinted with permission

Selected press coverage

APPENDIX II

Selected IISS publications

The Strategic Dossier series harnesses the Institute’s technical expertise to present detailed information on key strategic issues. Recent publications include:

James Crabtree and Evan A. Laksmana, ‘The Philippines’ Surprising Veer West’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 3, June–July 2023, pp. 81–89.

IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2023 (London: IISS, 2023)

Barak Mendelsohn and Dominic Tierney, ‘Paper Tiger: The Enemy Image of America’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 3, June–July 2023, pp. 37–66.

IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2022 (London: IISS, 2022) IISS, Arms Sales and Regional Stability: An Assessment (London: IISS, 2022) IISS, Missile Technology: Accelerating Challenges (London: IISS, 2022) IISS, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Assessment (London: IISS, 2022)

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s bimonthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs. Recent articles of interest include:

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Adam Mount, ‘The US and South Korea: The Trouble with Nuclear Assurance’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 2, April–May 2023, pp. 123–140. Lynn Kuok, ‘Asia’s Ukraine Problem’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 2, April–May 2023, pp. 43–51. Andrew B. Kennedy, ‘The Resilience Requirement: Responding to China’s Rise as a Technology Power’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 1, February–March 2023, pp. 115–128. Tony Dalton and Jina Kim, ‘Rethinking Arms Control with a Nuclear North Korea’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 1, February– March 2023, pp. 21–48. Hans Binnendijk and David C. Gompert, ‘Towards Nuclear Stewardship with China’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 1, February– March 2023, pp. 7–20.

Bich Tran, ‘Vietnam’s Strategic Adjustments and US Policy’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 6, December 2022–January 2023, pp. 77–90. George Magnus, ‘The Economic Consequences of Xi Jinping’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 6, December 2022–January 2023, pp. 57–76. James J. Wirts, ‘The Maritime Logic of the Melian Dialogue: Deterrence in the Western Pacific’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 6, December 2022–January 2023, pp. 43–56. James Crabtree, ‘Indo-Pacific Dilemmas: The Like-minded and the Non-aligned’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 6, December 2022–January 2023, pp. 23–30. Jude Blanchette and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘Xi Jinping’s Third Term’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 5, October–November 2022, pp. 61–90.

The Adelphi series is the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research. Books published since 2022 include: Euan Graham, Australia’s Security in China’s Shadow, vol. 61, issue 490–492, (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2023). David Gordon and Meia Nouwens (eds.), The Digital Silk Road: China’s Technological Rise and the Geopolitics of Cyberspace, vol. 60, issue 487–489, (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).

Arming Vietnam: Widened International-security Relations in Support of Military-capability Development (London: IISS, 2023) Henry Boyd, Franz-Stefan Gady and Meia Nouwens, Deterrence Failure in a Cross-strait Conflict: The Role of Alliances, Military Balance and Emerging Technology (London: IISS, 2023). Henry Boyd, Franz-Stefan Gady, Oskar Glaese, Meia Nouwens and Ben Schreer, Taiwan, Cross-strait Stability and European Security: Implications and Response Options (London: IISS, 2022). John Lee, Meia Nouwens and Kai Lin Tay, Strategic Settings for 6G: Pathways for China and the US (London: IISS, 2022). Ben Barry, Bastian Giegerich, Euan Graham and Ben Schreer, The UK Indo-Pacific Tilt: Defence and Military Implications (London: IISS, 2022). Bastian Giegerich, Emile Hokayem and Sharinee Jagtiani, Regional Security and Alliances in the Middle East and the IndoPacific: Implications for European Security (London: IISS, 2022)

The Armed Conflict Survey is the Institute’s annual review of political, military and humanitarian trends in current conflicts. IISS, Armed Conflict Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022)

Jonathan Stevenson, Overseas Bases and US Strategy: Optimising America’s Military Footprint, vol. 60, issue 484–486, (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).

Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source of analysis of international security and politicomilitary issues. Articles on the Indo-Pacific region published in 2022–23 include:

Koshino Yuka and Robert Ward, Japan’s Effectiveness as a GeoEconomic Actor: Navigating Great-Power Competition, vol. 59, issue 481–483, (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).

‘A progressive victory in Thailand’s 2023 general election’, Strategic Comments, vol. 29, no. 12, June 2023.

The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual assessment of military capabilities and defence economics worldwide. Region-by-region analyses cover the major military and economic trends and developments affecting security policy and the trade in weapons and other military equipment. Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons and defence economics. Defence expenditure trends over a ten-year period are also shown. It builds on the Military Balance+ database that provides updates on data and policy throughout the year.

‘Vietnam leadership turnover and foreign-policy implications’, Strategic Comments, vol. 29, no. 5, March 2023.

IISS, The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2023)

The Institute’s research team also publishes free reports and assessments. These extended pieces of analysis are an indispensable resource for those who wish to understand key strategic questions in much greater depth.

‘Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review’, Strategic Comments, vol. 29, no. 9, May 2023.

‘The state of China-Russia cooperation over natural gas’, Strategic Comments, vol. 29, no. 4, February 2023. ‘Japan’s new national-security and defence strategies’, Strategic Comments, vol. 29, no. 01, January 2023. ‘China’s economic rebalancing and “common prosperity”’, Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 39, December 2022. ‘Trade negotiations between Taiwan and the United States’, Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 34, December 2022. ‘Japan’s Economic Security Promotion Act and the implications for businesses’, Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 32, December 2022. ‘Pakistan’s fraught political scene’, Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 31, November 2022. ‘North Korea’s missile activity in 2022’, Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 28, November 2022.

Selected IISS publications

‘Xi’s domestic consolidation of power at the 20th Communist Party Congress’, Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 24, November 2022.

‘The Chinese Communist Party at 100: What domestic and foreign-policy choices face it now?’, Strategic Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).

‘India’s defence transformation’, Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 22, October 2022.

‘India’s Foreign Policy: Towards Multi-alignment and

‘France’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region’, Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 21, October 2022.

of great-power relations?’, Strategic Survey 2022 (Abingdon:

‘The effect of AUKUS on India’s foreign and defence policies’, Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 6, March 2022. ‘China’s 2021 orbital-weapon tests’, Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 3, February 2022.

Minilateralism: How is it navigating the new complexities Routledge for the IISS, 2022). ‘AUKUS: New Capabilities for Old Allies: What are the strategic implications of this path-breaking deal?’, Strategic Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022). ‘The Milk Tea Alliance: What are the prospects for Asia’s online

Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review of strategic developments throughout the world. Recent sections of interest include: ‘China’s Military Modernisation: Will the People’s Liberation Army complete its reforms?’, Strategic Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022). ‘Afghanistan: The Return of the Taliban: What prospects for domestic policy and foreign recognition?’, Strategic Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

activism?’, Strategic Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022). ‘Upheaval in Central Asia: What is driving change in Eurasia’s heartland?’, Strategic Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022). ‘US–China Rivalry in Latin America: Who is winning the geostrategic contest?, Strategic Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).