Universidade Federal do ABC Comissão Acadêmica Aline Guarnieri Gubitoso Caroline Rosa de Souza Glenda Cristina G P R Negrini Mariana Marques de Vasconcelos
Comissão Imprensa Kevin Rossi Freitas Lara Silva Obana Lucas Landin Mylena Cristina Bueno Leão Natália Borrasca Pereira
Comissão Estrutural Carmem Jocas Fernando Santiago Moraes da Rocha Gabriel Scombatti Mariana Boscolo Xavier
Tesoureira Mylena Cristina Bueno Leão
Secretário Geral Guilherme Oliveira Lourenção
INDEX
INTRODUCTION
1
NUCLEAR ENERGY
2
COLD WAR: THE ARMS ANS NUCLEAR RACE
6
CRISIS’ BACKGROUND
8
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
21
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PERCEPTION
29
CHRONOLOGY BEFORE CRISIS
35
CHRONOLOGY OF THE CRISIS
35
BIBLIOGRAFY
35
INTRODUTION On October 22 President Kennedy made a nationally televised speech informing the American people of the discovery of the Soviet Union’s ballistic missile installed in Cuba with power to reach the American territory and his consequent decision to impose quarantine in the U.S to prevent further Soviet weapon shipments from landing. This strategy wasn’t well received by Soviet Union that already had a lot of American’s missiles in Turkey and Italy targeted to their territory. As a result, the entire world became anxious about a probable nuclear war. Thereby the Security Council of United Nations made an emergency session yesterday (October 25) to discuss Cuba’s crisis. However as both ambassadors of Soviet Union and United States didn’t progressed in a resolution, the First Commission of the General Assembly calls the Delegates of Brazil, Egypt, India, Soviet Union and United States to a meeting on October 26 and 27 hoping that this time the discussions will finally act to avoid any possibility of another war.
1
NUCLEAR ENERGY1 Before the Second World War, several countries were seeking nuclear development - particularly the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia (USSR after 1917) and the US - and during this period there was an intense information exchange about the various discoveries that occurred since the nineteenth century. However, when the war breaks out, the exchange of information stops and a strong race for weapons starts - since the one who first got the bomb would basically win the War. The US was the country with the greatest advantages: (1) the war didn’t occur on its territory; (2) several scientists from Europe arrived in the country (especially from Germany, where they were persecuted for being Jewish), since the country, at that time, was the major industrial and economic center of the world and (3) the entrance of the country in the war in late 1941 only accelerated the development of the army industry. All this advantages together helped in the nuclear development. The beginning was marked by a close collaboration with British and French physicists, who have moved to Canada and the United States. From a certain point, however, when the Americans realized they could alone solve its nuclear problem, there was a sudden break in the collaboration, which produced, mainly in the English, indignation and constraints. So, the US was the first country to develop a plutonium bomb, tested on July 16, 1945, in Alamogordo Desert (New Mexico). On August 6, 1945, the country launched an uranium bomb on Hiroshima (Little Boy), and three days later, they launched another plutonium bomb on Nagasaki (Fat Man) - besides determining the end of World War II, they have also shown great power.
1
Chapter based on the book A Evolução do Controle de Armas Nucleares: Desarmamento e Não Proliferação (2006) by Marco Antonio Saraiva Marzo and Silvio Gonçalves de Almeida.
2
After this explosion, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR quickly decided to develop their nuclear weapons in order to match the US military power. The Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb on August 29, 1949, in the region of Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan (which, at the time, was part of its territory) (ROMENDIK, 2014). This broke the US monopoly on this type of weapon, in the middle of the Cold War scenario, which lead to an acceleration of research in the area, until in November 1, 1952, the US tested on the atoll of Enewetak in the Marshall Islands, its first hydrogen bomb (Ivy Mike operation) - with a detonation power of 10.4 megatons. Less than a year later, on August 12, 1953, the USSR also tested its first hydrogen bomb, Joe-4 in a tower in the fields of Kazakhstan tests (central Siberia) - with a detonation power of 400 kilotons which, despite having a smaller capacity than the US, had the great advantage of being smaller and being able to be transported and released by an aircraft (COELHO, 2016). On March 1, 1954, the US held the detonation of its first hydrogen bomb that could be launched by aircrafts in an operation known as Castle Bravo, in the atoll of Bikini, with power of 15 megatons, which caused serious problems to the environment and people living in the near area (COELHO, 2016). And from then on, the arms race between the US and USSR, typical of the period, has continued and generated many technological advances very quickly. The UK and France, since the breakup of cooperation with the United States, had to bear all the costs of this development by themselves and considering that at the end of World War II both had the economy, the infrastructure and the social relationships destroyed, this was a great challenge. The United Kingdom was the first between the two countries to be able to do it. They began to carry out the development of their first atomic bomb in January 1947; in 1948, they also built their first nuclear reactor and the locations for the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Their first test came on October 3, 1952, on the
3
islands of Montebello (Australia) - the Hurricane bomb had the detonation power of 25 kilotons. After the US and the USSR reached the hydrogen bomb in 1954, Churchill decided that the country should proceed to also attain it and in November 8, 1957 they had their first successful detonation on Christmas Island in the Pacific, with a detonation power of 1.8 megatons. Since then, the United Kingdom returned to develop its nuclear power in cooperation with the US (COELHO, 2016). On the other hand, France had a slower development and its nuclear program only started from the 1950s, led by General Charles de Gaulle. His first test Bleue Gerboise occurred on February 13, 1960 in Reggane in Algeria - a plutonium bomb with detonation capacity of approximately 65 kilotons. With the continued arms race increasingly fierce between the US and USSR, in October, 1961, occurred the detonation of the "most powerful thermonuclear bomb ever created by man" (COELHO, 2016), that belonged to the USSR and became known as "Tsar Bomb", with a power of 58 megatons - leaving clearer than ever the potential for global mass destruction. Thus, the world atomic scenario until the beginning of the Missile Crisis, in October 1962, counted with 4 countries possessing nuclear devices and three of them, including the US and the USSR, with highly powerful hydrogen bombs. Below follows a timeline of the tests and detonations:
4
DATE
EVENT
July 16, 1945
First US nuclear bomb test
August 06, 1945
Detonation of the Little Boy bomb on Hiroshima
August 09, 1945
Detonation of the Fat Man bomb on Nagazaki
5
August 29, 1949
First USSR nuclear bomb test
October 03, 1952
First UK nuclear bomb test
November 01,1952
First US hydrogen bomb test
August 12, 1953
First USSR hydrogen bomb test
March 01, 1954
Detonation of the US bomb Castle Bravo
November 08, 1957
First UK hydrogen bomb test
February 13,1960
First France nuclear bomb test
October 30, 1961
Detonation of the USSR Tsar Bomb
October 16, 1962
Missile Crisis began
COLD WAR: THE ARMS AND SPATIAL RACE2 The Cold War military balance was marked at the beginning by the U.S. nuclear monopoly. However this changed when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon with years ahead of U.S.’ assumptions. So, because of U.S.’ fear of Soviets’ future nuclear capacity to achieve the United States territory, the Americans and its allies from NATO looked for an increase of their conventional forces. By the time the Korean War settled (June 1950), President Harry Truman implemented a massive conventional and nuclear military buildup both at home and in Western Europe through the National Security Council’s NSC-68 report. While the next administration, Eisenhower’s, promoted the New Look defense strategy that was based in a massive retaliation as the only way to deter the Soviet Union. So any Soviet’s aggression would result in a U.S.’s nuclear response. And then, when Kennedy became president, U.S. stated the new doctrine of flexible response as the basis of its national security policy. Since the context was of the premier Khrushchev’s prohibiting of Western access rights to West Berlin. The Kennedy’s flexible response was the rise of tactical nuclear weapons along with a reconstruction of conventional forces in NATO’s countries. By the way, this shift flexible response influenced a lot on the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis. So during the second half of the 50’s, the international scenery went marked by the competition between United States and Soviet Union to control influence areas in all world. Although this competition has taken the face of a “pacific coexistence”. Mostly because of the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the consequent Nikita Kruschev’s ascension that resulted in internal changes inside U.R.S.S there was a
2
Chapter based on the book Cuban Missile Crisis: the essential reference guide (2012) by Priscilla Mary Roberts.
6
recognition that this conflict could hardly end by military means, considering as a lethal power to the humanity under the principle of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Thereby Kruschev promoted the beginning of an internal liberalization – so called “no stalinization” – along with a new strategy in dislocating the conflict between the superpowers of military plan to the economical and technological areas. As a consequence the dispute between U.S. and U.R.S.S. especially on arms race meant a great impulse to special exploration and result in great scientific and technological headway besides the important discoveries. An example was the effort that resulted in the soviet satellite, Sputnik, launched in 1957 as the first artificial satellite to enter orbit by an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Nevertheless it also meant that the U.R.S.S. would have the capability to direct missile attack at the United States. With that the world was surprised by the demonstration of the initial superiority of URSS in terms of special technology – it was the top of Kruschev’s new politics. One week later, they launched Sputnik 2, with the dog Laika, the first living been to go to space. In 1958, the USA reacted with the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), responsible for the American spatial program. Still in this year the first American artificial satellite VGFD, Explorer 1 was launched. As from 1960’s, the main objective of spatial travels was sending man to the space. The URSS was the head of this race again when, in april 12 (1961), Iuri Gagarin went to the space in the special capsule Vostok 1. The trip took 1h48 and went through 40.000 km around Earth in only one orbit. In 1962, the Americans send John Glenn to the Space. So the URSS won the first stage of the special race. The American special project was accelerated by the perception that the U.R.S.S. would be wining this race. With this in mind, the Americans took the leadership although the Soviet’s progress was bothered by the interruption of the project.
7
The Soviet’s project started with Soyuz 1 spaceship, was overpast by the Americans’s and reached lunar soil in July 20 (1969), when the lunar module Eagle, from Apollo 11, landed with Neil Armstrong. The following sentence by this astronaut became famous in the history of 20th century: “A small step for man, but a huge step to the main kind”. In the 50’s, the U.S. and U.R.S.S. publicly announced the interest in launching satellites that would increase the quantity of information about Earth. Despite of this success, Kennedy feared that go to the moon meant to spend a lot of money and the American citizens would see the special program only as a waste of it. Thereby Kennedy continues his public promotion of NASA also in a speech in the day before his death, when he sad that “this nation throw it self to space, and we don’t have a choice besides keep going in this way. Any difficult will be conquered”. His speeches were as well about a declaration of race against U.R.S.S. which meant that the United States needed to be always ahead of the Russian advances and never work together. On the other side, the deepening of afro-asia decolonization also contributed to the Cold War as an alteration in the international system. Since the birth of dozens of new independent states in Asia and Africa resulted on the outbreak of a new category of nations that were interesting for theses superpowers as influence areas. The expression “third world countries” began to being used to designate this distinct group of “developing countries”, that were mostly ex colonies with a historical evolution and economical development stage in progress. It is important to realize that Latin America also were part of the Third Word and an important space for United States’ influence.
8
CRISIS' BACKGROUND3 In order to understand what was the “Cuban Missile Crisis” is important to bear in mind that after World War II the United States internationalist strategy masked a drive for political and economic world domination at the dawn of the new nuclear era and based on liberalism. At the same time, the Soviet Union also looked for an expansion of its socialist influence around the world. These two completely different visions of what the main structure of power should be ended up resulting in the Cold War. Although neither the USA nor the USSR acted towards an actual war, there was a building tension between them due to several reasons, but special attention should be paid to the “Berlin situation” and the “Operation Mongoose” launched by the USA against Fidel’s Cuba. That being said, analyzing Cuba’s role in the Cold War might give an idea of the dimension of the problem raised in 1962. After taking on the power in Cuba (1959), Fidel Castro started to choose a certain path that displeased Eisenhower’s government: he executed former’s president supports, waffled on setting a date for free elections, seized American property without compensation, suppressed freedom of expression and political opposition and the most severe issue – Cuba became more dependent on Soviet military and economic assistance – which was unacceptable for the USA considering its politics towards Latin America and therefore, the administration started a plan to sabotage and destabilize the new Cuban regime and to assist Cuban dissidents in creating a government in exile. This already delicate situation was aggravated when was discovered in 1960, that a U-2 American spy plane was being used by Eisenhower to spy on Soviet Union. Beyond the discomfort caused by the fact on the international community, Nikita Khrushchev
3
9
Chapter based on the book The Making of the Cuban Missile Crisis (2005) by Sheldon M. Stern.
(Soviet premier) cancelled plans for a summit in Paris and withdrew an invitation to the president to visit the USSR. A year later Khrushchev began to praise the Cuban revolution for its anticolonialism and anti-imperialism character, letting clear the support of the Soviet Union and the world socialist movement. At the same time, Eisenhower broke diplomatic relations with Cuba and the dichotomy between the “free world” and the “communist world” was more evident than ever, creating a potentially explosive situation between the United States, Cuba and Soviet Union. When Kennedy’s elected president he approved Eisenhower’s plan to use CIA to train anti-Castro exiles to attack Cuba, hoping to conceal USA’s participation behind an independent action by internal guerrillas against Castro. According to Sheldon, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said “Don’t worry about this. It isn’t going to amount to anything” (SHELDON, 2005, p.15). The consequences of this plan can be seen in the Cuba’s Bay of Pigs situation on April 1961, when USA conducted air strikes in Cuba’s territory but didn’t achieve its goal. As a matter of fact the whole operation was a fiasco and lead to a massive disapproval of the international community that obligated Kennedy to assume personal responsibility on the case, which only made him authorize the creation of “Operation Mongoose” to undermine the Cuban regime and economy with covert operations and sabotages. In 1962, a full economic embargo was implemented against Cuba and Latin American nations were pressured to break relations with the country and expel it from the Organization of American States. Because of that Soviet Union stated to sell oil and other necessities to Cuba as well as buying Cuban sugar. Khrushchev also sent financial and military help, since he believed that it was extremely important to have a communist ally strategically close to the U.S.A.
10
The political situation was also very complicated between USA and USSR since 1961 due to Khrushchev’s declarations that Kennedy’s administration was immature and vulnerable, especially after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Such statement was met with the Kennedy’s recommendation to proceed with the deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy in hopes that the Soviet government would then respect American toughness in Berlin and Cuba as an island located ninety miles from the southern tip of Florida. However, Khrushchev was concerned that USA moves, including the covert operations in Cuba would cause a shift in the balance of power, introducing Mao’s China in “the game”. He also wasn’t content with the fact that the American missiles in Turkey could reach the USSR with rather facility while the Soviet missiles would take almost half an hour to reach the USA. That was his main motivation to suggest deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba alongside with the possibility to protect Castro’s communist revolution and reduce the nuclear imbalance of power in strategic weapons. According to Sheldon “with forty missiles staring at Florida, day and night, no general in the Pentagon would again dare consider a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union or an attack on Cuba” (SHELDON, 2005, p.19). Khrushchev sent a delegation to Cuba to make the arrangements that included a five-year agreement for the defense of Cuba with the installation of nuclear missiles under Soviet control. The negotiations started in July in Moscow and were only assigned in August 1962 as the Treaty on National Cooperation for the Defense of the National Territory of Cuba in the Event of Aggression. But Khrushchev wanted to wait until all the missiles were installed and operational to publicly announce the defense treaty and the presence of Soviet nuclear-capable weapons on Cuba. To the Soviet leader, Kennedy would accept the missiles as a counterweight to the American missiles in Turkey and Italy.
11
This initiative named Operation Anadyr (1962) resulted in a secret large military and naval force installed on Cuba, equipped with nuclear-capable weapons, since Prime Minister Fidel Castro expressed that a substantial conventional military assistance of the Soviet Union was inadequate against United States’ intentions (ROBERTS, 2012). Then between June and October 1962, Soviet troops and equipment were secretly shipped to Cuba. In spite of Soviet’s discretion, in August 1962, the American Senator Kenneth Keating charged the construction of an offensive nuclear missile basis in Cuba and President Kennedy went to make sure that that wouldn’t be a problem for the country, making it clear that he would not accept a missile basis in Cuba and would defend the American interests in the Caribbean no matter the cost and that would be a serious issue. Due to this Khrushchev tried to accelerate the construction of all the equipment and arm forces in Cuba. Even with the tension getting higher, the first Soviet missiles were delivered covertly to Cuba along with nuclear warheads with “over twenty times the explosive power that was dropped by Allied bombers on Germany in all of the Second World War”. It’s interesting to notice that Khrushchev took the risk with Cuba because he worried that USA nuclear superiority would make the USSR vulnerable to atomic blackmail while Kennedy viewed the crisis in a black-and-white Cold War spectrum that made sense to most Americans that truly believed that a nuclear war against the Soviet Union was inevitable.
ANNEX: Doctrine and Course of Containment (2012) by Priscilla Roberts “Fundamental controlling U.S. Cold War strategy, designed to prevent further expansion of Soviet power. As relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
12
deteriorated in the months after World War II ended, in February 1946 the administration of President Harry S. Truman requested George F. Kennan, counselor in the U.S. embassy in Moscow and a Soviet expert, to explain the rationale behind Soviet policies. In perhaps the seminal document of the Cold War, Kennan replied with the 8,000 words “Long Telegram”. He stated that, since Soviet antagonism toward the West arose from the need of Russian rulers to justify their oppressive domestic rule as essential to combat hostility from foreign powers, Western states could do little to alter Soviet policies. Instead, they must adopt policies of “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment”, firmly resisting attempts to expand Soviet influence while awaiting internal changes to the nature of Soviet government. Kennan’s telegram, circulated throughout the higher echelons of the U.S. government, and his subsequent article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” published in the influential quarterly Foreign Affairs, quickly became definitive documents of U.S. Cold War strategy. From then until the early 1990s the word “containment” described the underlying U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Kennan, who returned to Washington to head the newly created Policy Planning Staff, charged with the long-range planning of U.S. foreign policy, soon deprecated the increasingly military emphasis of containment, subsequently claiming he had envisaged that the United States would rely primarily upon peaceful economic and cultural counterpressure to check Soviet expansion. In a March 1947 address (the “Truman Doctrine” speech), President Harry S. Truman publicly pledged to assist any country where democracy was threatened either externally or internally by communism, simultaneously extending substantial economic and military aid to both Greece and Turkey, and some months later announcing the massive
13
Marshall Plan or European Recovery Program to assist with Europe’s economic rebuilding. By 1950 prominent civilian and military officials sought to expand U.S. defense budgets substantially, considering this essential to enable the country to meet increasing international obligations, including member- ship in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) West European security pact, it had assumed, and to counter the recent Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons and the establishment of a communist state in mainland China. Various State and Defense Department representatives, led by Paul H. Nitze, Kennan’s successor on the Policy Planning Staff, argued that, should war break out, the United States lacked the military resources even to fulfill its existing commitments. Implicitly, they endorsed the 1947 Truman Doctrine. The planning paper NSC-68, which they drafted and delivered to Truman in April 1950, demanded massive enhancements in U.S. conventional and nuclear military capabilities, including substantially enhanced U.S. troop contributions to NATO forces in Europe, stating, “Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of “containment” . . . is no more than a policy of bluff”. NSC-68 envisaged increasing the existing $13.5 billion U.S. defense budget to anywhere between $18 and $50 billion, recommendations the economyconscious Truman initially rejected. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 proved crucial to both the implementation of NSC-68 and the effective globalization of the Cold War, broadening its initial primarily European focus. U.S. defense spending soared in Europe as well as Asia, reaching $48 billion in fiscal 1951 and $61 billion the following year, and after the armistice it still remained far higher
14
than previously. In June 1950 the United States had 1,460,000 military personnel, of whom 280,000 were stationed abroad; four years later the totals were 3,555,000 and 963,000 respectively. The Mutual Security Program, instituted in 1951, furnished military assistance to a wide array of U.S. clients and allies. By the late 1950s the United States had established numerous additional security pacts, including the Rio Pact covering Latin America, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, the ANZUS defense pact with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral treaties with South Korea, Japan, and the Republic of China on Taiwan. Covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency often ensured that any new overseas government unsympathetic to the United States proved short-lived, as in Iran, Guatemala, and later Chile. Despite rhetorical pronouncements in the 1950s by the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower that the United States would “roll back” communism in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, in practice, after Communist Chinese intervention balked U.S. efforts to “liberate” North Korea in autumn 1950, U.S. strategy sought primarily to prevent further communist gains, particularly in countries undergoing decolonization, that were often perceived as subjects for U.S.-Soviet competition. In the late 1950s and early 1960s this outlook led successive U.S. presidents to in- crease incrementally aid to the southern portion of Vietnam, where communist takeover by the north threatened the existing regime. After 1975 the effective U.S. defeat in this costly conflict, the greatest military humiliation in U.S. history, led the United States to avoid further large-scale interventions, relying instead upon surrogates, such as anti-Soviet guerrilla forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Exploiting the Sino-Soviet split, from the early 1970s onward U.S.
15
leaders differentiated between Chinese and Russian communism, using each socialist big powers distrust of the other to win concessions for the United States. U.S. military strategy in the 1950s relied heavily on nuclear weapons because they could inflict far greater casualties at much less cost than conventional forces - a policy termed the “New Look” whose potential to risk nuclear war over relatively minor issues aroused heavy criticism. In the 1960s U.S. strategic thinking emphasized flexible response, enhancing both conventional and counterinsurgency capabilities. The expansion of the United States international commitments did not preclude efforts from the mid-1950s onward to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union that would prevent an accidental war and place ceilings on ever more expensive and destructive nuclear weapons. These attempts, culminating in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties of 1972 and 1979, demonstrated the fundamentally cautious nature of U.S. military strategy. Alarmed by what he perceived as increasingly assertive Soviet foreign policies of the 1970s, during the 1980s President Ronald Reagan initially increased U.S. defense budgets dramatically, adopted a firmly anti-Soviet posture, and announced the development of a new antimissile shield that would render the United States invulnerable to Soviet attack. By the late 1980s, growing economic weakness led to the collapse of both the Soviet Union and the Soviet empire, which many Americans interpreted as validating the premises of the containment strategy adopted over 40 years earlier. As the 21st century began, no other strategic paradigm had yet attained similar intellectual dominance in the conceptualization of U.S. post– Cold War policy” (ROBERTS, 2012).
16
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS4 Since August 1962 John McCone (CIA director) was concerned about the reports of unusual quantities of Soviet military equipment arriving in Cuba alongside with some rumors that these included nuclear warheads. Because of that on October 1962, U-2 missions over Cuba were finally approved U-2 and that resulted in several flights taken between October 14 and 15 to collect photographic data of the island. As a result, an U-2 spy plane captured clear images of missile sites near San Cristobal, Cuba. The analysis of these images by National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) revealed the existence of nuclear-capable missile sites in Cuba for the intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and the medium-range
ballistic
missiles (MRBMs). They also
reported
that
the
missile installations could be operational within two weeks. Although there was no evidence that nuclear warheads arrived in Cuba. On morning
the
following
October
16,
president John F. Kennedy heard about the confirmation of the Soviet nuclear missiles' presence in Cuba by photographic evidence, obtained in U-2 reconnaissance planes. Threatened, the president summoned a secret Executive Committee (ExComm) with 18
4
17
Chapter based on the book Defining Moments The Cuban Missile Crisis (1965) by Laurie Collier Hillstrom.
top advisers to debate about how they should react to Khrushchev’s secretive tactic. Never before the Soviets had nuclear power with capacity to achieve the United States. But U.R.S.S. could then obtain this by placing medium-range missiles in Cuba. So the Soviets would eliminate this
U.S.
similar
advantage strategy
by
as
a the
American missiles in Turkey an Italy. Because
of
uncertainty
that
reconnaissance
revealed
the the all
existing installations and the calculation of U.S. military that these missiles would increase Soviet nuclear striking force against the continental United States by 50%, it was clear that this soviet's tactic scared then a lot. The information about this crisis soon reached the New York Times' journalists and other media outlets. So to avoid this publication, Kennedy personally asked several newspapers to wait twenty-four hours before announcing this. In the meantime, the president sought to inform all members of the U.S. Congress, their world leaders allies, U.S. ambassadors, the United Nations Security Council and the Organization of American States. Thereby on the next day, October 22 (one week after the confirmation of Soviet nuclear power's presence in Cuba), president Kennedy made a nationally televised speech informing the American people of their discovery of Soviet Union ballistic missile
18
installed in Cuba and his consequent decision to impose quarantine in this country to prevent further Soviet weapon shipments from landing.
Under these conditions, any missile in Cuba with the western hemisphere as target would be considered an act of war against the United States since the U.R.S.S. action was unacceptable to U.S. national and world security. This report turned the entire world anxious to see how this confrontation between the Cold War rivals would end up.
The choice for a temporary quarantine (until Khrushchev dismantle and remove the missile installations) had two objectives: (1) to avoid questions about the legitimacy of the blockade in the international law or as an act of war, and (2) to show of military strength without an directly attack as a incentive to Soviets' work for a peaceful resolution. The Americans still continued to be concerned with Soviets' choice for retaliation with a new blockade around West Berlin or a nuclear response if the nuclear warheads
19
were already in Cuba. Because of this Kennedy also decided to prepare for a possible military confrontation by moving military troops and weapons to Florida and the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Besides he increased the level of U.S. armed forces readiness to defense condition 3 (DEFCON 3), as 5 means peace and 1 implies war, that resulted in American B-52 bombers armed with nuclear warheads in the air. By October 23 the U.S. naval blockade was in place with nearly two hundred ships and on the next day, October 24, they were prepared to intercept and search for Soviet offensive weapons in all vessels approaching Cuba. On the other side, only a few hours before the U.S. blockade was already to act, the ship Aleksandrovsk had landed in Cuba with nuclear power. As a result of Kennedy’s speech and letter, Khrushchev responded by saying in a letter that he had no intention of respecting the quarantine since it was a violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space that implied in an act of aggression. This reaction made president Kennedy raise the U.S. armed forces alert level to DEFCON 2, one step to war. Whereas U.R.S.S. decided to order their ships to turn around before they reached the quarantine by the risk of losing their nuclear weapons to the United States. As the situation didn’t seem to move towards peace negotiations, the forty member states of the United Nations (UN) approved a resolution calling upon Kennedy and Khrushchev to avoid war at all costs which means for UN Secretary general, U Thant, that the United States should remove the blockade and the Soviet Union should stop its arms shipments to Cuba. So then they could work toward finding a diplomatic solution. Therefore on October 25 the UN Security Council held an emergency session to discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis.
20
ANNEX: Confrontation at the United Nations (1965) by Laurie Collier Hillstrom “On October 25, the UN Security Council held an emergency session to dis- cuss the standoff over Cuba. U.S.-Soviet tensions reached new heights at this meeting when U.S. ambassador Adlai Stevenson angrily confronted Soviet ambassador Valerian Zorin about the Cuban missile sites. Before this time, Stevenson was widely known for his calm, intellectual approach to political issues. When he attended ExComm meetings, for instance, Stevenson had emerged as one of the main supporters of negotiating a deal with Khrushchev and Castro — a position that most other members of the group considered weak. “I know that most of those fellows will consider me a coward for the rest of my life for what I said today,” he acknowledged, “but perhaps we need a coward in the room when we are talking about nuclear war". Stevenson’s forceful performance before the UN Security Council thus came as a surprise to critics who believed he was not tough enough to stand up to the Soviets. With the world watching the proceedings on television, Stevenson opened the discussion by demanding that his Soviet counterpart admit the existence of offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. “Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the USSR has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?” Stevenson thundered. “Yes or no don’t wait for the translation — yes or no”. Zorin attempted to evade the question. “I am not standing in the dock of an American court,” he replied, “and I will not answer at this stage”. Stevenson kept pushing the Soviet representative. “You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no”, he
21
declared. “You have denied that they exist, and I want to know if I have understood you correctly”. Once again, Zorin refused to answer. “You will receive your answer in due course" he said. “Do not worry”. But Stevenson was ready to expose the Soviet deception. “I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that is your decision”, he stated. “And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room”. With dramatic flair, Stevenson then unveiled a series of detailed, before and after U-2 spy plane photographs of Cuba that proved the existence of Soviet missile installations. “We know the facts, and so do you, sir, and we are ready to talk about them”, Stevenson concluded. “Our job here is not to score debating points. Our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. And if you are ready to try". (Hillstrom, 1965, p.55-57).
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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PERCEPTION5 At this point, the Cold War with the nuclear hecatomb was a constant fear all over the world, no matter with who a country was allied. Especially because the Missile Crisis was the first time when the world feared a World War III. It was the moment that Cold War almost became a “Hot” War and all the nations feared how it would end up, especially the Latin American's and European's. That moment put all the foreign policies of both hegemonic countries in a perspective that could bring both a real war by their use of intimidation and détent policy. So with President Kennedy's speech on October 22 and its decision to apply a sea block to Cuba, as response to the offensive, countries all over the world discovered about the crisis that would affect them even if indirectly. Soon enough they began to have an opinion (although it could be a neutral one) and posture about it. The "allies" of United States of America were the NATO states in West Europe, but Latin American countries also had an important and fundamental participation. Regarding U.S. allies, most of them considered the U.S.A. hostility toward Cuba excessive after its revolution, mostly concerning about the U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba and the end of the diplomatic relations. Which meant that the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan thought it was counterproductive the consequent Cuban inclining toward the communist bloc rather than the Britain as this country was impelled by U.S. to refuse to sell Hunter warplanes or other arms to Castro. The Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was also reluctant to endorse U.S. policies toward revolutionary Cuba. So this country refused to end trade or break diplomatic relations with Cuba and also rejected the membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). Similarly Japan didn't close its embassy in Cuba as the United 5
Chapter based on the book Cuban Missile Crisis: the essential reference guide (2012) by Priscilla Mary Roberts and on the bulletin The Cold War International History Project about The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50 (2012) by James G. Hershberg e Christian F. Ostermsnn.
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States imposed because of Cuba's revolution, although its largest ally was the United States. Nevertheless when the Cuban missile crisis began, CIA informed the British officials on the developing crisis, some time before president Kennedy asked to his old friend Sir David Ormsby-Gore, the British ambassador in Washington, whether he preferred the U.S. air strikes against Cuban missile bases or the U.S. imposition of a naval blockade, which was the chosen option by Ormsby-Gore and president Kennedy. Kennedy informed Macmillan, President Charles de Gaulle of France, West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the North Atlantic Council of his response to the Soviet missiles in Cuba with the blockade to prevent any further Soviet weapons shipments to reach Cuba. Although these man had some reservations over the blockade's legality and fears for an escalate to fullscale war, Macmillan and de Gaulle offered their support. However, President de Gaulle wasn't happy by the way U.S. officials informed about the crisis rather than consulting. This intensified his conviction that French policy should be more independent of both NATO and the United States, which influenced the development of its own independent nuclear deterrent. This situation was worse with the Canadian government that refused to participate in the blockade of Cuba or to provide the access to Canadian armed forces since Diefenbaker was angry by the omission of President Kennedy in notify the country before taking any action during the crisis. So the Cuban Missile Crisis also encouraged an anti-American tendency among U.S. allies despite its compliments as a relief with the peaceful resolution of the crisis. Probably because they were conscious that some attitudes of the U.S. like an invasion of Cuba could easily bring Soviet retaliation against West Berlin and the escalation of the dispute into a full-scale nuclear conflict.
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About all, over Latin America, the possibility of nuclear war made the countries; at first agree with U.S. about the quarantine and a possible military invasion on the island. Moreover, the United States already had a mutual defense treaty with 19 Latin American governments (the Rio Pact) since 1947, alongside with the accordance to oppose communism within the Western Hemisphere between OAS members6, even though this countries affirmed the principle of nonintervention in the letter of the creation of organization. Beyond that, the U.S. also had a financial aid program with private investment and free trades since March 1961 to Latin America's counties, called Alliance for Progress, for social and economics reform to prevent and contain communist-inspired revolutions and the appearance of a “second Cuba” in the region. Thereby the naval quarantine by the Kennedy administration was done under OAS auspices, with a resolution on October 23. Probably because the UN couldn't act effectively because of the contended for power between communist and Western as was clear in the Security Council’s meeting on October 25. In this way, General Assembly was the stage for discussions and confrontations of the Cold War, while the Security Council couldn't approve many resolutions because of the power of veto that the great potencies had (they were divided in Western powers like Britain, France, and the States and the socialist world, especially represented by Soviet Union). So it was not a surprise that United Stated made a lot to accomplish the approval of Organization of American States to this sea block even though it wasn’t legal on the International Law. On the other side, some Latin American countries didn't totally agree with U.S. since Mexico and Brazil refused to break relations with Cuba or to neutralize Fidel Castro’s revolution. Thereby these countries abstained in OAS resolutions that sanctioned the use
6
But it was approved only with one-vote margin for the statement declaring Marxism-Leninism incompatible with the American system. So the United States could in fact exclude Cuba’s government from attending OAS meetings and participating in the body's activities.
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of armed force against Cuba to enforce the “quarantine” and condemnation of the Cuban regime at the OAS during the crisis. Their refusal was based on the reaffirmation of the principle in foreign policy of the non-interference in internal affairs of other countries. Complementary, Mexico and Brazil’s diplomacy acted to avoid an escalation of tension of a crisis that would amplify the Western Hemisphere’s hysterical fears about Cuba. The Mexicans provided more of a conditional support for the U.S. and reactive waiting rather than the neutrality that was shown by the Brazilians. Mostly because Brazil’s ambassador in the United Nations presented the country’s idea of a scheme to “denuclearize” Latin America as a way to deal with the crisis over nuclear missiles in Cuba, which would be accepted by the Americans due to the Soviet missile in Cuba. So Brazil, during João Goulart’s government, came up with a possible Cuba’s “neutrality” to avoid any conflicts West-East that could be dangerous to Latin America and asked to the island’ government temperance to solve this situation. But, as long as more countries of these regions decided to not be allied directly with none of both nations, they started to ask for a solution in diplomatic terms, which would avoid another war. This position was the most common one between the countries of NonAligned Movement (NAM). Moreover, this was an opportunity to participate against what these countries most feared and had warned as a result of the ideological polarization and division of the world into two antagonistic military alliances with nuclear powers. So NAM countries could demonstrate their active engagement on global affairs and for the peaceful resolution of crises as a chance for the nascent movement to promote and consolidated itself. In this Cuban's situation, the Non-Aligned Movement was guided by Yugoslav that was determinated to not be left on the sidelines. Then President Tito tried to promote the
26
UN as the only legitimate forum for the resolution of this and similar crises because of the possibility of the Third World voice in there. On the other side, there was the alliance between
Fidel
Castro
and
the
Khrushchev
principally by the Cubans' fear of a military invasion of
U.S.
and
the
U.S.S.R.'s
strategy
to
counterbalance the power of U.S. forces and guarantee the revolutionary Cuba government’s legitimacy. Under this reality, the "allies" of Fidel Castro and Khrushchev mostly were the counties on Warsaw Pact (East Europe) that received orders from Moscow to raise their Arm Forces' combat readiness, but other socialist countries like China also acted as allies. For an example, this relation influenced the Hungarian government to condemn the U.S. moves toward the independence of Cuba, as well as the loyal communist Poland to also endorse Moscow’s decisions and actions alongside with the support of revolutionary Cuba against the threat of “imperialist” aggression. But an especial ally of Warsaw Pact was Czechoslovak because of the frequently exchanged visits and openly signed agreements between this country and Cuban leaders, like secretly negotiated extensive arms transfers of the Soviet-bloc arms to Havana. Moreover, the People's Republic of China enthusiastically supported the Soviets, only because of the country discredited in the peaceful coexistence with imperialism and that was the Soviet foreign policy's direction. But the good relation with Cuba was also a reason for Chinese alliance, since this country had already sent military technology to Cuba in the past.
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So it published laudatory editorials in their state-controlled press. In return, Khrushchev supported China in the concurrent Sino-Indian War. That's why a Pravda editorial on the Sino-Indian conflict looked to side with Beijing. Although China was in competition with the Soviet leaders, including an influence over Cuba and the legacy of its revolution.
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CHRONOLOGY BEFORE CRISIS Nikita Khrushchev becomes leader of the Soviet Union following the death of March 27, 1953 Joseph Stalin (HILLSTROM, 1965). Fidel Castro begins crusade to oust American ally Fulgencio Batista from Cuban July 26, 1953 leadership (GEORGE, 2013). The Korean War ends when the two sides sign a cease-fire agreement reinstating July 27, 1953 the original borders of North and South Korea (HILLSTROM, 1965). The Soviet Union and its allies form the Warsaw Pact for their mutual defense May 14, 1954 (HILLSTROM, 1965). Castro and his rebel followers return to Cuba and launch the Cuban Revolution May, 1956 (HILLSTROM, 1965). Nikita Khrushchev warns West: “We will bury you” in a speech to Western November 18, 1956 diplomats (GEORGE, 2013). The Soviet Union launches Sputnik, the first manmade satellite to orbit Earth October 4, 1957
(HILLSTROM, 1965). Fidel Castro takes power in Cuba after a long struggle against Batista (GEORGE,
January 9, 1959 2013). Castro visits the United States, but President Dwight D. Eisenhower refuses to April 15, 1959 meet with him (HILLSTROM, 1965). The United States forges an agreement to place Jupiter missiles in Turkey October 28, 1959 (HILLSTROM, 1965). Central Intelligence Agency begins planning means to overthrow Castro January 8, 1960 (GEORGE, 2013). Belgium’s La Coubre delivers arms to Cuba, explodes in Havana’s harbor. More March 4, 1960 than 100 die in blast (GEORGE, 2013).
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Khrushchev announces that the Soviet Union has shot down an American spy May 5, 1960 plane in its airspace (HILLSTROM, 1965). May 7, 1960
Soviet Union, Cuba establish diplomatic relations (GEORGE, 2013). Khrushchev denounces the United States and storms out of a summit meeting in
May 16, 1960 Paris (HILLSTROM, 1965). July 8, 1960
President Eisenhower slashes U.S. sugar imports from Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). Soviet Union agrees to buy all Cuban sugar formerly purchased by United States;
July 9, 1960 Khrushchev vows to protect Cuba from U.S. action (GEORGE, 2013). United States places trade embargo on Cuba. Subsequently, Castro nationalizes August 28, 1960 around $1 billion in American investments (GEORGE, 2013). Summer, 1960
Castro nationalizes $850 million in U.S.- owned assets in Cuba (GEORGE, 2013).
September 20, 1960
Khrushchev and Castro meet for first time at United Nations (GEORGE, 2013). Castro denounces U.S. policy toward Latin America in a four-hour-long speech
September 27, 1960 before the United Nations (HILLSTROM, 1965). President Dwight D. Eisenhower announces partial U.S. trade embargo on Cuba October 19, 1960 (GEORGE, 2013). John F. Kennedy defeats Richard Nixon in presidential election. Margin of victory November 8, 1960 among tiniest on record (GEORGE, 2013). December 19, 1960
Cuba and Soviet Union announce alliance (GEORGE, 2013). John F. Kennedy is inaugurated as president of the United States (HILLSTROM,
January 20, 1961 1965). Kennedy receives first briefing on CIA plan to support exiles’ invasion of January 28, 1961 Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). April 4, 1961
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Kennedy gives final approval to details of Bay of Pigs invasion (GEORGE, 2013).
JFK tells reporters U.S. military will not take part in attack on Cuba (GEORGE, April 9, 1961 2013). Kennedy rules out any U.S. military’s role in refugee landing at Bay of Pigs April 12, 1961 (GEORGE, 2013). Flying B-26 bombers, refugees fail to wipe out Castro’s air force. Second round of April 14, 1961 bombing canceled to obscure U.S. involvement (GEORGE, 2013). Roughly 1,400 refugees land near Bay of Pigs. Castro’s remaining air force blocks attempts to establish a beachhead. Castro’s forces kill 114, capture almost 1,200 April 17–18, 1961
(GEORGE, 2013). The CIA-backed Bay of Pigs Invasion fails to unseat Castro’s government in Cuba (HILLSTROM, 1965). Khrushchev tells Presidium he is prepared to take tough action to push Western
May 26, 1961 allies out of West Berlin (GEORGE, 2013). JFK meets with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna. While browbeating June 3–4, 1961 JFK, Soviet leader threatens allied access to West Berlin (GEORGE, 2013). Kennedy speaks to American people about Berlin Crisis, talks about calling up July 25, 1961
additional troops, encourages Americans to prepare home fallout shelters (GEORGE, 2013). East German, Soviet troops build Berlin Wall, stopping flood of East Germans into
August 13, 1961 West Berlin (GEORGE, 2013). Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric releases evidence United States October 21, 1961 has significant lead in nuclear arms race (GEORGE, 2013). October 27, 1961
U.S., Soviet tanks square off at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin (GEORGE, 2013). Soviet Union tests most powerful nuclear weapon ever created—a 50-megaton
October 30, 1961 device (GEORGE, 2013).
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Inspector General’s report blames CIA for misjudging Bay of Pigs issues November 24, 1961 (GEORGE, 2013). December 1, 1961
Castro declares he is a Marxist-Leninist (ROBERTS, 2012). Now under way is Operation MONGOOSE, a U.S. program to use sabotage,
Early 1962 propaganda to undermine Castro (GEORGE, 2013). Meeting in Uruguay, Organization of American States expels Cuba (GEORGE, January 21, 1962 2013). Kennedy issues Executive Order 3447, which places a permanent embargo on all February 3, 1962 U.S. trade with Cuba (HILLSTROM, 1965). April 1962
15 U.S. Jupiter nuclear missiles in Turkey become operational (ROBERTS, 2012). Khrushchev plans to put nuclear missiles in Cuba as counterweight to U.S. missiles
Late April–May, 1962 in European nations, including Soviet Union’s neighbor, Turkey (GEORGE, 2013). May 20, 1962
Khrushchev unveils plan in Presidium presentation (GEORGE, 2013).
May 30, 1962
Castro agrees to accept Soviet missiles (GEORGE, 2013). Soviet
freighters
secretly
begin
transporting
nuclear
missiles
to
Cuba
(HILLSTROM, 1965). July 15, 1962 Over 100 Soviet shipments of troops and military equipment reach Cuba until October (ROBERTS, 2012). U.S. intelligence agencies gather first reports of Soviet missiles in Cuba, wrongly August, 1962 assume weapons are conventional, not nuclear (GEORGE, 2013). August 16, 1962
Miami News reports thousands of Soviet troops are in Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). Maxwell Taylor tells JFK intensive study shows Castro cannot be toppled by Cuban
August 20, 1962 forces alone (GEORGE, 2013),
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Kennedy asks Pentagon to investigate removing Jupiter missiles from Turkey August 23, 1962 (GEORGE, 2013). Omsk departs for Cuba with first of 67 foot medium-range missiles, 264 Soviet August 25, 1962 soldiers (GEORGE, 2013). August 30, 1962
U.S. U-2 plane strays into Soviet air space (GEORGE, 2013). Speaking on Senate floor, New York’s Kenneth Keating claims to have evidence of
August 31, 1962 nuclear missiles in Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). Senators George Smathers, Homer Capehart, Strom Thurmond jointly call for September 2, 1962 action to halt Soviet buildup in Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). JFK issues statement threatening grave consequences if Soviet Union puts September 4, 1962 offensive weapons in Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). Khrushchev hosts Stewart Udall at Petsunda retreat, warns United States cannot September 6, 1962 dominate Soviet Union (GEORGE, 2013). Kennedy asks Congress for authorization to call up 15,000 reservists (GEORGE, September 7, 1962 2013). September 8, 1962
Communist China shoots down U-2 plane over mainland (GEORGE, 2013). TASS calls for end to U.S. provocation over Soviet deployments in Cuba
September 12, 1962 (GEORGE, 2013). In televised news conference, Kennedy states he does not believe Soviet personnel in Cuba represent threat; nevertheless, he repeats warning about September 13, 1962
offensive weapons (GEORGE, 2013). Kennedy warns Khrushchev that he will use military force if necessary to prevent the Soviets from placing offensive weapons in Cuba (HILLSTROM, 1965).
September 15, 1962
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First medium-range missiles reach island (GEORGE, 2013).
Khrushchev gives troops traveling on freighters permission to fire anti-aircraft guns; September 17, 1962
McGeorge Bundy tells senators only 2,700 Soviet “technicians� in Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). U.S. Senate passes resolution authorizing use of force against Cuban aggression
September 20, 1962 (GEORGE, 2013). U.S. reconnaissance spots crates holding nearly obsolete, unassembled IL-28 September 28, 1962 bombers on Soviet ships bound for Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). Cuban newspapers report Cubans will not bow to U.S. intimidation (GEORGE, October 1, 1962 2013). CIA Director John McCone, who believes nuclear missiles may be in Cuba, criticizes handling of Cuba by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary October 3, 1962
of State Dean Rusk. Congress passes joint resolution authorizing use of military force if offensive weapons in Cuba become threat to United States (GEORGE, 2013).
October 4, 1962
First Soviet nuclear warheads reach Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). In House testimony Undersecretary of State George Ball confirms Soviet shipment
October 8, 1962 of surface-to-air missiles to Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). October 10, 1962
Keating alleges six medium-range missile sites in Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). A U-2 flight over Cuba captures incriminating evidence on film. A Gallup Poll shows
October 14, 1962 most Americans oppose military action against Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). Photo analysts examine film, recognize signs of medium-range missile launch sites October 15, 1962 under construction (GEORGE, 2013).
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CHRONOLOGY OF THE CRISIS JFK learns about missiles in Cuba, assembles key advisers in Ex Comm. He orders stepped-up reconnaissance of island. Ex Comm considers surgical airstrike to destroy missiles; air attack on missiles, other Cuban targets; air attacks tied to October 16, 1962 invasion; naval blockade of Cuba. Joint chiefs put pressure behind broad air attacks (GEORGE, 2013). The first ExComm meeting takes place (HILLSTROM, 1965). Military leaders bolster air defenses in southeastern United States. Soviet October 17, 1962
commander in Cuba, Issa Pliyev, becomes aware of increased U.S. overflights, suspects United States knows about missiles (GEORGE, 2013). Reconnaissance update reveals existence of launch sites for intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend air strikes on missiles, other
October 18, 1962
Cuban sites. JFK meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who dishonestly offers assurances Soviet arms in Cuba are purely defensive. Kennedy reads September 4 statement aloud (GEORGE, 2013). Ex Comm establishes separate working groups to explore details of air strike or
October 19, 1962
blockade. Within hours, blockade becomes favored option. Air Force General Curtis LeMay compares possible blockade to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement in 1938 Munich meeting with Adolf Hitler (GEORGE, 2013). Eight Soviet missiles become operational in Cuba. Most Ex Comm members support naval blockade; JFK affirms that decision. Navy alerts Guantanamo to
October 20, 1962 prepare to evacuate civilians. Chinese troops attack Indian troops along shared border (GEORGE, 2013). Commander of Tactical Air Command tells JFK destruction of all missiles unlikely in air strike. JFK calls publishers of New York Times, Washington Post, asks that they October 21, 1962 withhold articles on crisis until he addresses nation. McNamara approves military’s plans for blockade (GEORGE, 2013).
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Military dependents leave Guantanamo. Strategic Air Command (SAC) puts more B-52s in air. JFK briefs former presidents and current leaders of Congress, who October 22, 1962
urge stronger action. Kennedy delivers nationally televised address. U.S. military raises alert level to Defense Condition, or DEFCON, 3. Khrushchev braces for military action. Castro announces island-wide mobilization (GEORGE, 2013). Khrushchev responds with alarm to JFK’s speech. At UN, Adlai Stevenson calls Cuba “accomplice” in Communist drive for world domination. Cuban ambassador
October 23, 1962 Mario Garcia-Inchaustegui describes quarantine as “act of war,” while Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin denies missiles in Cuba (GEORGE, 2013). When quarantine takes effect, most large Soviet ships headed toward Cuba slow, October 24, 1962
stop, or reverse course. SAC raises alert status to DEFCON 2, just one step away from all-out war (GEORGE, 2013). Khrushchev welcomes Acting UN Secretary General U Thant’s proposal for temporary halt in arms shipments to Cuba, simultaneous suspension of U.S. quarantine line. Stevenson and, Zorin engage in verbal warfare at UN (GEORGE,
October 25, 1962 2013). Pope John XXIII broadcasts a message urging world leaders to avoid war at all costs (HILLSTROM, 1965). Castro writes the “Armageddon letter,” in which he encourages Khrushchev to use October 26, 1962 the Cuban missiles against the United States (HILLSTROM, 1965).
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BIBLIOGRAFY GEORGE, Alice L.. The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Threshold of nuclear war. New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2013. 208 p. HERSHBERG, James G.; OSTERMSNN, Christian F.. The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50. The Cold War International History Project. Campinas: Wilson Center, Issue 17/18, 897 p., Fall 2012. HILLSTROM, Laurie Collier. Defining Moments The Cuban Missile Crisis. Detroit: Omnigraphics, 2015. 230 p. MARZO, Marco Antonio Saraiva; ALMEIDA, Silvio Gonçalves de. A Evolução do Controle de Armas Nucleares: Desarmamento e Não Proliferação. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Ciência Moderna, 2006. 244 p. ROBERTS, Priscilla Mary. Cuban Missile Crisis: the essential reference guide. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012. 278 p. STERN, Sheldon M.. The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 238 p.
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