The International Relations Review Fall 2013

Lebanon: Where do we go now?

Building the World Cup and the Role of the Kafala System

Special Report: Faces of Violence

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Index

PHOTO CREDIT: SARAH FISHER (DAILY FREE PRESS STAFF), COM ‘15

FACES OF VIOLENCE, p. 21–30 From terrorist attacks to protests, the public often sees dissidents resort to forceful tactics in their conflicts against established governments.

21 Behind Words: The Shaping of Language Through Violence

Terminology has changed with the classification of violence. The word “terrorist” now only describes certain types of crime, depending on the motive of the crime and who the perpetrator is.

By Gabriel Gomez, CAS ‘15

3 Briefings 4 The Ethicality of Microfinancing in the Least Developed Countries Microcredit institutions seek to help people improve their lives in developing nations.

However, this goal faces challenges amid the realities of operating the institutions, which can end up hurting growth.

By Krystian Zawodniak, CAS ‘16

26 The Israeli-Palestinian Crisis

Israeli-Palestinian relations are still affected by conflict of the West Bank barrier, national recognition of Palestine and political actors looking to gain power. These issues must be considered if Israel and Palestine’s relations are to improve.

By Victor Vuong, CAS ‘17

7 Victims in the Rome Statute System

The Trust Fund for Victims provides justice and relief that is otherwise withheld from in the Rome Statute System. The Trust Fund has the potential to improve the system but is held back by funding and lack of recognition.

By Sarah Blair, CAS ’14

28 Brazil’s Favela Security Policies

Brazil, a BRIC country with the potential to become a world power, is trying to resolve existing security issues in its favelas. Drug gangs, violent crimes and corruption are some of the focus points as it prepares for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.

By Wilaene E. Gonzalez, CAS ‘14

9 Building the World Cup and the Role of the Kafala System

The selection of Qatar to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup has quickly become a nightmare for Nepali workers. A byzantine worker sponsorship program and government hostility to foreign workers has left many Nepali workers stranded in Qatar in slave like conditions and far from home.

By Jason Feinman, CAS ’14

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12 Photo Essay: The Effects of Poaching in Africa

Wild animal species populations have been declining for decades, mostly due to endangered habitats, limited food resources and, of course, poaching. This photo essay illustrates some of the most commonly poached animals in Africa.

Photos by Valeria Giachetti, CAS ’16

14 The Theory of Power Inflation

Many believe that American power in international politics is declining, but this may just be a misconception. The image of decline may be attributed to a theory called power inflation.

By Eric Kashdan, CAS ’14

15 Global Governance of Environmental Migrants

Climate change will be the primary cause of displacements throughout the world. While the International Organization on Migration and the UN High Commissioner on Refugees handle emergencies, no framework exists for migrants fleeing because of the slow decay of their environment.

By Shannon Johnson, CAS ‘14

17 Yet Another Divided World

The vastness and importance of the internet poses new challenges for states to develop legal institutions governing it. Several cases show the development of legal precedent in reaction to new technology.

By Young Woo Nam, CAS ‘14

19 Where’s My Job?

Modern globalization is associated with the outsourcing of jobs from developed nations to developing ones. Outsourcing can be economically beneficial for comparative advantage, despite the view that it hurts local economies in developed countries.

By James Sundquist, CAS ’14

32 Lebanon: Where do we go now?

Hezbollah’s growing power has undermined the Lebanese political system and exacerbated the Syrian Civil War. Now the surge of refugees is costing the Lebanese even more.

By Mano Sakayan, CAS ‘15

Photo Credit: Myrna Jreige, CAS ‘15 The Beirut Souks is a major commercial district in Beirut Central District and is Beirut’s largest shopping area.

35 Guantánamo

40 Democratic Peace Theory

38 American Exceptionalism in the International Arena

43 Editorial

The United States’ continued operation of Guantánamo Bay highlights a deeper problem within the legal structure of the War on Terror. Until the legal murkiness surrounding terror suspects is cleared up, the United States will continue to hold them indefinitely, even if Guantánamo closes.

By Jason Feinman, CAS ’14

American exceptionalism is often discussed in the international community. The idea that America is unique or superior to other countries has been a traditional attitude within America., yet this idea’s merit is questionable and is increasingly debated.

By Numan Aksoy, CAS ’16, COM ‘16

The Balkan conflicts demonstrate that culture, rather than the rise of democracy, may provide the most logical explanation for the apparent success of the democratic peace theory.

By Alexandra Fox, CAS ’15

A recent, tentative nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran could set the stage for further deals, but has angered many on both sides.

Negotiators need to block out noise from politicians and the public, and they must remain vigilant during the coming talks to capitalize on a rare diplomatic opportunity.

By Vincent Jordan (Layout Editor), CAS ’15

Submit to the IR Review The IR Review accepts essays and photos from students, faculty and other members of the Boston University community.

Find out how to submit on page 29 or visit us at irr.buiaa.org.

Fall 2013

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Briefings Somalia

The Somali parliament voted Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon out of office on December 2. He lost the confidence vote 184-65 and was in office for fewer than 14 months.

Shirdon refused to put President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s favored candidates into the cabinet and it is likely that Mohamud’s supporters are behind the vote. Mohamud has one month to appoint a new prime minister, who then needs to be confirmed by Parliament.

Afghanistan

The Taliban has taken the responsibility for the increasing number of attacks against aid workers.

According to UN officials, Afghanistan has become the most dangerous country for non-governmental organizations to participate in relief work. In November, 237 attacks were made against aid workers with 36 fatalities.

The Taliban has admitted to recent cases, in spite of their policy against attacking humanitarian workers.

Germany

After the Bundestag held elections on September 22, the traditional coalition between “the Union” and the Free Democrats collapsed. After talks with the Green Party over Europe’s debt crisis and Germany’s nuclear phase-out failed, Merkel settled on a coalition with the Social Democrats. A poll of the SDP members will confirm the agreement on December 15—and when it will, the grand coalition will boast an absolute majority of 80 percent of the seats in Parliament.

The coalition has settled on a minimum wage, a lower retirement age, a halt on tax increases and opposition of a “debt union” within the Eurozone.

Elections scheduled for next month are being billed by the opposition as a referendum on Maduro’s performance since taking over from Hugo Chávez last year.

Ukraine

China

Demonstrations have plagued Ukrainian streets after President Viktor Yanukovych declined to sign a deal with the EU. The deal would have allowed for the country to create a closer relationship with the EU. While the government is struggling to progress in Western ideals, a bigger revolution by the restless people is feared.

Mexico

A canister containing the radioactive material cobalt-60 was stolen in Mexico City while on its way to a disposal site near Tijuana. After a two-day hunt, the cobalt-60 was found and contained by authorities. Although the public was not at risk for radioactive exposure, experts say the thieves will likely die from radioactive poisoning because of their close proximity to the toxic material.

Venezuela

Following a recent increase in inflation, Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro has launched an “economic offensive” against shop owners accused of selling goods above their government mandated prices. He dramatically slashed the prices at appliance chains nationwide, which triggered a run on shops by Venezuelans hoping to buy cheap goods. Inflation has continued to rise and the country is experiencing shortages of basic consumer goods.

In late November, China tested their “killer” stealth drone, flying it successfully over Chengdu in southwestern China. This test launch confirmed China’s initiative to expand their air defense zone over the East China Sea which is said to also include islands owned by Japan. According to Chinese officials, the drones will be used to monitor maritime activities over the East and South seas and settle any territorial disputes with neighboring countries. Japan and China both claim to own these islands, and China’s air defense zone announcement has augmented the tension between these two pacific nations.

South Africa

South Africans and world leaders gathered in the FNB Stadium in Johannesburg Tuesday to honor the memory of former South African president Nelson Mandela. The antiapartheid activist died on December 5 after a long battle with lung-related illnesses. He was 95.

Mandela has been honored for his fight against racial oppression and defiance of white minority power. After long-term imprisonment, Mandela was elected as the first black president of South Africa in the country’s first multiracial elections in 1994. He fought for civil rights, democracy and, most importantly, peace.

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The Ethicality of Microfinancial Institution Regulations in the Least Developed Countries

By Krystian Zawodniak, CAS ‘16

Photo Credit: Fareesa Hasan, CAS ‘14

Locals navigate a riverboat in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is has one of the world’s fastest growing economies and is expected to grow at the same rate in the near future.

The quintessential microcredit story revolves around the Indian, Bangladeshi, or other impoverished low-savings/ capital woman, who receives a small loan and increases her production to repay the loan and eventually hire more workers. The critic’s rebuttal of microcredit will retell the same story, but with the woman committing suicide because she cannot make her loan repayments. Because of either misusing the investment money or failing to find profitability in their investments, microfinance practices are prone to failures on return of investments. The difference between success and failure

is not only in determining the seriously credit-deficient households, but also in selecting households that understand management of loan repayment and household financial stability. Profitable household factors are necessary for microcredit institutions in order to pay dividends on the capital received from investors. Microfinance institutions must pay look for households that can produce profit with a loan Therefore, households that have inadequate knowledge of how to manage their finances and profit from their loans are the responsibility of the microcredit institutions that pick them as candidates.

The institutions however, do not take responsibility for the causes of microcredit failures and the reportedly congruent debt-related suicides. This compounding failure is the result of the ethical flaws in microcredit institutions, where profit and growth as institutions are more important than the success rates of the borrowers.

All microcredit institutions reviewed have lending policies that field workers must use when choosing candidates in local offices. One study between 1998 and 1999, highlighted the different policies that institutions pursued in Bangladesh, the most well

Fall 2013 known of microcredit success areas.1 There is an “ethical-empowerment” push among these lenders to focus on borrowers who are uneducated, poor and landless. The ethical drive is part of the NGO mission to benefit the area, but their lending limits are based on their profitability. Grameen Bank, the largest of microcredit banks in Bangladesh, had 7.4 million taka (about $95,000)in operating costs in 2012 for their lending program, with net profits of 1.5 million taka (about $19,300).2, 3 The largest of these operating costs come from human development in the poorer areas.4 The large amount of human interaction between the borrower and the field worker facilitating the loan, along with education from the field worker for the population receiving the loan, facilitate a better chance of return on the loan, but are also expensive for the business to create for a $200 loan.5 As part of their ethical obligations to develop poorer areas, these costs cannot be reduced.

Institutions in developed countries, in the opinion of Mark Hudson, follow a general rule of thumb to limit the amount of credit accessible. “It is not access to credit that matters but the amelioration of the borrowers' background characteristics that will make them more acceptable to lenders. When borrowers will be empowered, they will more likely be eligible for credit.”6 To the microcreditors, the investment in the background characteristics of the borrowers must be less than the return on the loan and therefore requires an overview to understand why it is ethically flawed. The basic procedure is to set up a community building in the center of the village, or use a previously established one to unify the community.7 The field worker is required to teach basic economic principles to the community and explain reasons to repay the loan.8 When there is no collateral in the developed economic sense, and no constant contact from the field worker, the ownership and policing of the multiparty loan is then leveraged upon the community, where the community is the enforcement mechanism for borrowers to return loans.

Success rates of this theory vary greatly by case. In some cases, borrowers might be still unaware of the economic

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Photo Credit: Fareesa Hasan, CAS ‘14

People crowd around a market in Bangladesh. The urban areas of Bangladesh, such as Dhaka and Chittagong, are the main drivers of economic growth in the country.

purposes of a loan and have little small business experience, making profitable business hard to create. Mokbul Moshed Ahmad’s study in Bangladesh found that contrary to the community driven pressures that businesses tried to create, the community aided certain borrowers who didn’t use their funds to invest.9 Some borrowers take their loans and invest in consumable goods for the short term.10 Repaying parts of their loan, the borrowers without an actual business became indebted to other community members, who ironically might be borrowing from the same institution or other institutions.11,12 Critics will argue that programs are designed so that field workers help borrowers spend their money properly, accompanying them to a cattle sale or to a warehouse to buy the proper equipment and at a fair value.13 However, field workers do not follow the progress of borrowers every step of the way since they are required to visit multiple areas during their work to maximize efficiency.14 Multiple studies have also found

that institutions that facilitate loans in low to zero capital areas had returns and growth only from borrowers who have had experience in small business beforehand.15 This could be mediated by further investment into a household’s education, but the “efficiency” of the field workers leaves the villagers without this guidance.16 The result is a poorly educated individual, spiraling further and further into debt without understanding the consequences.

The loan and the infrastructure to facilitate the loan are marginal in comparison to the amounts of investment circulating through an entire institution like Grameen Bank. But because every program has to be equal in all areas, field workers are required to meet the same quotas throughout the region regardless of whether or not the loan spurs new growth. Competition with entry of profitable developmental banks has left some institutions to desperation to reach their quotas. This stress is passed on to the field workers, who actually collect the repayments. Institutions claim to stick to the education and helping process for

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Photo Credit: Fareesa Hasan, CAS ‘14

Although Bangladesh has one of the world’s fastest growing economies, 25 percent of the population of Bangladesh lives under $1.25 a day.

“people-first” lending systems, but they are limited in how much they will go out of their way to do it. Institutions are committed to the dual responsibility of both boosting social welfare and growing as institutions. As long as the latter value outweighs the former, scholars continue to consider how to replace these selfinterested NGOs for the future.

One suggestion has been the expansion of angel investors, groups of investors who are more interested in the growth of social welfare than profit.

One of the recent winners of The 2012 European Microcredit Research Award emphasized the benefit of “microangels” (angel investors who pool their money for microcredit/microfinance initiatives) who place “both the level of

formal education of the entrepreneur and the previous experience where proposed and considered ‘of little importance’ by the respondents.”17 The idea has research behind it, but only if the investors cling to their ethical ideals all the way through to profitability of the borrower.

Without these beliefs, micro-institutions would destroy local economies just as the microfinance institutions do as well.

Even with the existence of angel investors, not all of them are committed to micro-finance, and not all of them would be willing to sacrifice so much for borrower growth. Between this and the spiraling debt caused by micro-banks and institutions, credit expansion into lowincome areas will never actually increase local economic growth of societies in

all situations. The continued collapse of local economies will destroy longterm growth opportunities for investors, and possible backlash by governments.

Government intervention has already been noted in India for credit bubbles that have been spurred, another ethical problem with investors chasing after profits.18 The problems facing future governments are whether to risk stemming growth from foreign investment by promoting regulation or to risk financial loss and collapse under unregulated investment strategies. And if you regulate, how does a government make an investment institution ethically responsible for the education of poorer nations?

All citations for essays in the Fall 2013 edition will appear on the IR Review website. For more information, visit irr.buiaa.org.

Fall 2013

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Victims in the Rome Statute System: The Potential of the Trust Fund for Victims

By Sarah Blair, CAS ‘14 While the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its role in the indictment and prosecution of war criminals is a popular topic among policymakers and academics alike, comparatively little attention has been given to its sister organization, the Trust Fund for Victims. The Trust Fund is one of the least controversial yet most overlooked aspects of the international justice system established by the Rome Statute and it embodies the key principle that sets the ICC apart from prior international criminal tribunals: an institutionalized concern for the welfare of victims of grave crimes.1 Coupled with procedural measures that allow for an unprecedented degree of victims’ participation in trial proceedings, the Trust Fund’s mandate to deliver reparations and material support to victims contributes to a holistic justice system that embraces elements of both restorative and retributive justice.

Only recently has international awareness of the Trust Fund increased, with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary William Hague’s ardent championship of its cause and the August 7, 2012 reparations order against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).2 There has never been a more opportune moment for civil society, state parties, the ICC and the Trust Fund itself to capitalize on this momentum to bring the focus of the Rome Statute system to victims rather than perpetrators.

Doing so will serve to benefit the entire Rome Statute system and most importantly, the victims themselves.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted on July 17, 1998, and entered into force on July 1 2002. The Statute, which has since been signed and ratified by a total of 122 states, established and defined four core international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.3 The Statute also established the International Criminal Court to indict, prosecute and sentence alleged perpetra-

tors of these crimes.4 Although the idea of individual criminal responsibility for gross human rights violations has existed in mainstream international politics since World War II, the ICC is the first permanent international criminal tribunal and the first effort to take significant measures to offer reparation to victims of crimes that occurred under its jurisdiction.5 This belief that justice should strive to both punish perpetrators and set matters right with the victims of their crimes gave rise to the Trust Fund for Victims.

Taken alone, the International Criminal Court is an overwhelmingly retributive justice mechanism, with the core mission of punishing perpetrators and bringing an end to the culture of impunity that has long surrounded the commission of international crimes.6 Although the Court’s central activity of indicting and prosecuting alleged perpetrators plays a critical role in changing the international climate to deter future crimes, the prosecution of high-level political and military leaders in The Hague—thousands of miles away from where their alleged crimes occurred—often has little meaning to the victims who suffered at their hands.7 For political and practical reasons, the Court tries only high-level individuals for very specific crimes (for instance, ordering a certain massacre). Unfortunately, this means that victims often must watch as the foot soldiers who raped them, tortured them, abducted them and killed their family members, walk free. In situations such as Northern Uganda, where up to 95 percent of the population in certain regions was displaced by 30 years of intermittent conflict and virtually every civilian was in some way a victim, not all crimes can feasibly be punished—an issue compounded when forced recruitment, particularly of children, blur the lines between victims and perpetrators.8 Further, prosecutions are often one-sided and crimes committed by certain parties

of the conflict go unacknowledged.9 Although a victim may gain some satisfaction from knowing that perpetrators have been punished, retribution alone fails to meet the needs of individuals who have suffered physical and psychological trauma and the loss of livelihoods and property. In the fragile, under-developed states in which the vast majority of international crimes occur, victims often lack welfare, social security and health and property insurance. Therefore, when they suffer harm, they have no means to access life-saving care or recover property that they lost.10 In such situations, both symbolic reparation (formal apologies or guarantees of non-repetition) and material reparation and restoration ( cash or inkind payments, medical care, or the return of stolen property) play an important role in bringing a different type of justice— restorative justice—directly to those who need it most.11 The Trust Fund for Victims was established for precisely this purpose, yet there are legal and logistical obstacles that make it difficult for the majority of victims in ICC situation countries to receive adequate reparation. The first lies in the word “victim” itself. Rule 85 of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence defines individual victims as “natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”.12,13 Yet in order for an individual to be recognized as a victim eligible to receive reparation, he or she must have suffered harm as a direct result of a specific crime that has been brought before the Court.14 These “victims in the legal sense” are a small minority of all those affected by the widespread violence characteristic of the situations under ICC investigation.

Even if a victim should qualify, the delivery of reparations is conditional on the arrest, conviction and subsequent reparations order of the perpetrator. This may take decades, if it happens at all. Finally, a convict who is ordered to pay reparations will rarely have enough resources to provide adequate money or services to the hundreds or thousands of victims who may have applied, leaving it up to the Trust Fund to pay reparations from its tiny reparations reserve of 1.8 million euros.15,16 In order to circumvent these obsta-

8 cles and meet the urgent needs of all victims—not just those legally eligible for reparation—the Trust Fund for Victims was given an ambitious dual mandate to implement Court-ordered reparations and to provide physical and psychological rehabilitation or material support to victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.17 The “assistance mandate,” as the second component is called, gives the Trust Fund the flexibility to provide critical, often life-saving assistance to victims who cannot afford to wait for decades on the slim hope that they may receive reparation.18 Funded by voluntary contributions and partnered with international NGOs and local civil society organizations (CSOs), the Trust Fund supports various projects that provide reconstructive surgery, prosthetic limbs, psychosocial therapy, livelihood assistance, and more to victims in Northern Uganda and Eastern DRC.19 Notably, the Trust Fund seeks to provide assistance to all victims of crimes under ICC jurisdiction, not only those who suffered from crimes that have been brought before the Court. Thus, the Trust Fund has the potential to reach a vast number of victims who would otherwise never have access to justice through Rome Statute mechanisms—and to reach these individuals in a timely, meaningful manner.20 It is important to understand that the work the Trust Fund does is not synonymous with the international development and humanitarian assistance that often floods into affected regions in the aftermath of armed conflict. While development or humanitarian aid may be offered in any area that is poor or has experienced a disaster, Trust Fund assistance is necessarily and causally linked to the past violation of an individual’s fundamental human rights. To suffer harm as a direct result of another human being’s unlawful actions—and, in many cases, of a government’s inactions—causes powerful psychological repercussions and a loss of trust far more profound than those caused by accidental harm.21 Reparations and other forms of re dress therefore address more than just the tangible harm and loss suffered by victims: they offer symbolically significant recognition that a victim’s situation is the result of a wrong and can even pro-

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Graphic CREDIT: Anbita Siregar CAS ‘16

Countries with investigations open in relation to the Rome Statue. Many of the Rome Statues cases are located in those African nations that have experience turmoil in the recent past.

vide a sense of “vindicative satisfaction” for the victim.22 Thus, Trust Fund assistance is not so much aid as it is justice: an internationally led attempt to set matters right not just because the victim has suffered, but because he or she has suffered wrongly.23 This critical distinction is the link that connects the countless victims to whom criminal prosecutions mean little with the international justice system established through the Rome Statute.

As the International Criminal Court continues to come under fire from policymakers and academics opposed to the way it has implemented the Rome Statute, the Trust Fund’s victim-oriented focus offers

the potential to radically alter the way the Rome Statute system is viewed internationally. One major accusation against the ICC is that the Court has a pro-Western, anti-African bias, on account of the fact all eight situations currently under investigation are located in Africa.24 A second criticism is that indictments are selective and politicized, for within each situation only a handful of alleged perpetrators are tried—often not representative of all of the parties that may have committed atrocities.25 Whether or not there is truth to these claims, particularly the former, is hotly disputed. What cannot be disputed—yet is largely ignored by both supporters and

Fall 2013 critics of the ICC—is the fact that for each situation opened by the Court, there is the potential not just to punish a handful of perpetrators but also to help hundreds or thousands of victims through the restorative justice processes of the Trust Fund.

Until the Trust Fund receives wider international recognition and substantially more funding, the extent to which it can fulfill this potential is limited. But should the international community— policymakers, academics, civil society, the media—choose to conceptualize the Rome Statute system as one designed to bring justice to victims rather than to bring perpetrators to justice, the negative attitudes surrounding the Court could be reevaluated.26 Rather than punishing African leaders, any future African situations investigated by the Court could be seen as an attempt to bring justice to African victims. Even if the Court must remain selective in its prosecutions, the Trust Fund’s dual mandate ensures that the Rome Statute’s ideals of bringing justice to all victims of crimes under its jurisdiction are not compromised.

Although a complete reconceptualization of the Rome Statute system to

9 bring the international spotlight to victims rather than perpetrators will not be easy, recent developments have begun to pave the road for change. On August 7, 2012, the ICC made its first-ever reparations order against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the only individual to have been convicted by the Court since its creation.

Although an appeal is still in progress, the international community is watching as the Trust Fund prepares to implement its reparations mandate for the first time— shifting the focus from Lubanga himself to the victims of his crimes. Furthermore, UK Foreign Secretary William Hague has proven to be a vocal champion of the Trust Fund’s cause. Since he assumed office in 2010, the UK has contributed £1.5 million to the Trust Fund, and Hague himself advocated for the Fund at the 2013 G8 Summit and through an International Criminal Court strategy paper that calls for “[refocusing] the debate on the needs of victims” and “[urging] voluntary contributions to the ICC’s groundbreaking mechanism, the Trust Fund for Victims, to help victims rebuild their lives.”27, 28 Hague’s efforts led to the April 11, 2013 G8 Declaration on supporting vic-

Building the World Cup and the Role of the Kafala System

By Jason Feinman, CAS ‘14

Qatar is an oil and natural resource rich nation situated in the Arabian Peninsula. It has quickly developed a media presence that dwarfs its territorial size. Qatar is set to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022 and the world is watching. But the attention is not so much due to Qatar’s position atop the list of the world’s richest countries by GDP per capita, nor its inclusion on the United Nations list of countries with very high human development. It is due to its consistent mistreatment of migrant workers used to build the structures that will host the World Cup in less than a decade.1 The large majority of migrant workers in Qatar come from Nepal, but some estimate thousands of them will never make it home.

The excessive heat and unsanitary living conditions waiting for them in cities like Doha, which frequently see temperatures well over 38°C (approximately 100°F), may end up taking their lives. As allegations of gross worker mistreatment come to light, it becomes increasingly evident that the World Cup will be built by what some are calling “modern day slavery.” The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) estimates nearly 4,000 migrant worker deaths before the first whistle is blown in 2022.2 What if anything can or should be done about the situation?

The International Monetary Fund estimates Qatar’s 2012 GDP per capita at $106,393.56, making it one of the richest

tims of sexual violence, “[calling] on the international community, including the G8, to increase their efforts to mobilise funding, including to programmes such as the ICC Trust Fund for Victims and its implementing partners.”29 On International Justice Day in 2013, marking the 15th anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute, civil society organizations led by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court called for a renewed focus on the needs of victims of grave crimes rather than solely on the punishment of perpetrators.30 The Trust Fund for Victims plays an important role in connecting a wide range of victims to the Rome Statute system: its dual mandate ensures that even those unaffected by criminal prosecutions and reparations orders may still benefit from the restorative justice processes laid out in the Statute. Yet until the international perception of the Court shifts to reflect a victim-oriented focus, the Trust Fund’s limited funding and visibility will prevent it from making a full impact both on the lives of victims and on the public image of the entire Rome Statute system.

countries in the region.3 By comparison, Nepal has a GDP per capita of only $623.62, one of the poorest countries.4 By World Bank estimates, almost 25 percent of Nepal’s GDP is derived from remittances from foreign countries.5 One major contributor to these payments is the outsourcing of Nepali workers to foreign countries as sources of manual labor. Approximately 400,000 Nepalis are expected to work in other countries this year in construction or domestic labor. Exact numbers of Nepali workers going abroad to find work are unknown and an open border with India only complicates migration calculations further.6 Remittances are a core portion of the Nepali economy. The Qatari World Cup is a project in need of a massive labor force that Nepal is able to provide. But the human cost of this labor is steep.

Nepali workers are typically placed in Qatar by a recruitment agent. Prospective workers pay a fee to the recruitment agent whose job is to locate and secure them a position where they earn money, which is often sent back to their families in Nepal.7 Occasionally, workers are unable to pay the

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agents out of their own savings and must take loans out to make the necessary payments.8 This sort of investment drives Nepali workers further into debt before they even begin to work. The Nepali government set a limit that prospective workers can not pay recruitment agents more than 70,000 rupees. But workers often end up paying much more.9 Although recruitment agents may promise prospective workers jobs with high salaries when they initially sign their contract, they frequently change the terms of the agreement after it is too late for workers to turn back.

Sometimes workers not only lose the wages they were promised through the recruitment agency, but also find themselves stripped of their rights and freedoms.

Human Rights Watch estimates that Qatar has a population of 1.7 million, of which only 225,000 are citizens. Of the remaining population, 1.2 million are estimated to be migrant workers, which make up 99 percent of the private sector workforce.10 Nepalis make up 40 percent of these migrant workers.11 ITUC General Secretary Sharan Burrow stated, “Workers are not able to speak freely as, under the strict visa sponsorship system, employers retain their passports and they are not allowed to change jobs or leave the country without the employer's permission.”12 While they are working legally in the country, running away from their job without their

“Migrant workers come to Qatar seeking a steady source of income for themselves and their families.

But what they often come to find is the harsh reality that comes with being a foreign worker.” employer’s permission to try and seek other work would make them illegal workers. This structure of migrant worker policy is referred to as the kafala system. Punishment for fleeing an employer can include both imprisonment and deportation. In order to ultimately leave Qatar, workers “must obtain an exit visit from their sponsors,” but “some [workers] said sponsors denied them these visas.”13 Besides being stripped of rights, employers frequently withhold pay from workers for weeks or even months at a time. Nepali workers run the risk of not only being paid a different amount from what they were initially promised, but having to wait lengthy periods of time before that payment is ever delivered. Qatari law sets no minimum wage for migrant workers and deprives them of the right to strike or form unions.14

At least 44 Nepalis have died in Qatar due to working conditions.15 The Nepali

embassy released documents detailing these deaths between June 4 and August 8, some of the hottest months of the year. Qatari World Cup architect Hassan al-Thawadi insisted that the government would look into the issue of worker mistreatment and asserted that the World Cup would not be “built on the blood of innocents.”16 There are only a scant 150 labor inspectors present in Qatar to ensure that labor laws and regulations are met and being enforced.17 Following the reports, British trade union GMB sent letters to British companies helping to build World Cup structures urging them to “ensure that their Qatar-based employees, regardless of their nationality, and their sub-contractors' employees enjoy terms and conditions within globally accepted standards of 'decent work'.” They also stated that workers “are treated little better than slaves and live in unacceptable squalid accommodation.”18

Join the Conversation Wednesdays at 7:30 p.m. in SMG Room 208.

You don’t have to be an international relations student to join the conversation at Global Insights, hosted by the Boston University International Affairs Association. From poaching in Africa to the role of the media, there’s always something to talk about.

Participants are also encouraged to suggest topics for Global Insights meetings, buiaa.org/members.

Fall 2013 FIFA leaders absolved themselves of any responsibility amongst allegations of migrant worker death and mistreatment. At a news conference in Zurich, FIFA President Sepp Blatter stated, “The workers' rights will be the responsibility for Qatar and the companies – many of them European companies – who work there. It is not FIFA's primary responsibility but we cannot turn a blind eye.

Yet it is not a direct intervention from FIFA that can change things…We have plenty of time concerning Qatar but it is 2022, it is in nine years.”19 The ITUC released a statement in response declaring, “FIFA’s offer of only a ‘courtesy visit’ to the emir of Qatar is totally inadequate and fails to put in place any plan to stop more workers dying.”20

Blatter is correct that FIFA cannot force Qatar to change their policies. However, Blatter and FIFA appear to be more concerned with the safety of players competing in the World Cup during the summer of 2022 than the thousands of workers who will be working in the very same conditions for the next eight years. While FIFA has publicly debated moving the World Cup to the wintertime months to ensure player safety, they have done little to urge the Qatari government to change their policies regarding migrant workers.

The kafala system has been well established in Qatar for years. In the face of such a predisposition for human rights abuses, it must be asked why Qatar was awarded the World Cup in the first place. How large of a role politics and economics played in awarding the 2022 World Cup to Qatar is not specifically known, but without question they did play a role. Prior to the FIFA vote in December 2010, the United States was the favorite to host the World Cup. The final round of voting came down to the United States and Qatar, with Qatar receiving 14 of the possible 22 votes, securing them the role as hosts.

Even though President Blatter stated in April 2010 that he believed “The Arabic world deserves a World Cup” and threw his support behind Qatar, to many the result came as a shock.21 During an interview with German magazine Die Zeit in September 2013 about the voting process, Blatter stated “Yes, definitely there were direct political influences.

European leaders recommended to their voting members to vote for Qatar because they have great economic interests with this country.”22

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Graphic CREDIT: Anbita Siregar CAS ‘16

Countries with investigations open in relation to the Rome Statue. Many of the Rome Statues cases are located in those African nations that have experience turmoil in the recent past.

The World Cup could be a lucrative opportunity for construction companies across Europe. Qatar plans to build nine new stadiums and remodel three existing ones in the years leading up to 2022. Estimated total costs at 4 billion dollars for all stadium construction efforts.23 British companies have a substantial niche of contract awards. A $4 billion contract was awarded to British engineer Arup under the direction of British architect Zaha Hadid to build the necessary stadiums.

Construction services company Balfour Beatty secured a $1.6 billion contract to build motorways throughout the country. Engineer group WSP has been hired to build an “airport city” linking the Hamad International Airport to the city of Doha.24 When all is said and done, billions of dollars will flow from Qatar to construction companies across Europe.

Mistreatment of workers in Qatar did not begin with construction of World Cup facilities. Many of the policies regarding migrant workers are codified into Qatari law.

Treatment of workers is a byproduct of a kafala system which resembles modern day

slavery more than it does voluntary migrant labor. Migrant workers come to Qatar seeking a steady source of income for themselves and their families. But what they often come to find is the harsh reality that comes with being a foreign worker. Qatar is not the only country in the Persian Gulf region that implements a kafala system. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain all have adopted similar policies in regards to migrant workers.25 The World Cup will draw even more attention to Qatar and the Gulf region. This month long event will take millions of hours of preparation, but may also cost thousands of lives along the way. Unfortunately, the economic incentives for countries like Qatar, Nepal, and Britain seem to outweigh the human cost of their policies. Qatar can continue to be an example of an economically successful Gulf country, while Nepal and Britain receive substantial monetary influx into their economies. Somewhere in the middle of the battle between economics and ethics, are the migrant workers leaving home in search for a better life.

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The International Relations Review

The Effects of Poaching in Africa

Elephants are considered by many reports to be the most poached animal in Africa because of the ivory trade. However, they are not the only animals in Africa under threat of endangerment or even extinction because of poaching.

In December, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) released a report stating that local populations of African elephants could become extinct in the next few years if poaching is not immediately stopped. Against these countries’ best intentions, the sale of ivory has continued to soar endangering the lives of countless elephants.

Photo Credit: Valeria Giachetti, CAS ‘16

Fall 2013

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The report suggests that levels of poaching, particularly in response to the ivory trade, started to increase dramatically in the mid-2000s. In 2012 there was an estimated elephant poaching rate of 7.4 percent.

Hippo meat is considered a delicacy in many African nations and their teeth is prized by poachers. It is estimated that the overall hippo population crashed by an estimated 90 percent.

Uganda’s lion population has fallen by 30 percent in the past 10 years. The bushmeat trade also impacts the survival of lions in Africa as their prey is getting killed off and they often get caught in hunting traps themselves.

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The International Relations Review

The Theory of Power Inflation

By Eric Kashdan, CAS ‘14

Photo CREDIT: Eric Kashdan, CAS ‘14

The Capitol building in Washington, D.C. Many hold the opinion that U.S. power in the world has waned over the past decade.

Contrary to popular opinion, the United States of America is not on the decline - at least not yet. Pundits and politicians alike seem to revel in a ceaseless barrage of rhetoric, shouting about “the end of the American century,” fearfully proclaiming “the rise of China” and lamenting the tragic “fall of the U.S.” These campaigns distract from the truth, however, for the United States certainly faces a plethora of significant problems, but a fall off the world stage is not yet one of them. Advocates of American declinism see the rise of countries like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and assert that the U.S. is losing its role as a global leader with the emergence of new major players. This is a flawed perception though, born out of a phenomenon called power inflation.

To explain this theory, one should note that power itself cannot be easily defined or quantified. So how does one measure and compare military versus economic power?

Militarily, many label Japan as a weak state, but it certainly has serious sway in the decision-making of international economics.

How then can it be deemed weak when its interests are reflected in the world and its goals are often achieved? Experts like Steven Lukes, author of the seminal book Power: A Radical View, describe the phenomenon, in

part, as the ability to influence the behavior and decision-making of another actor.1 How can different instances of compulsion be equated when different circumstances allow different actors to achieve more or less with the same tactics? For example, China can urge North Korea to come to a negotiating table, as can the United States, but Pyongyang is much more likely to respond to the calls of Beijing than Washington. Does this mean China has more power than the U.S.?

In that one instance, perhaps yes – at least more power over North Korea. That does not mean however, that the U.S. has fallen because it was not able to achieve the same feat in one situation. As David Baldwin expresses in Paradoxes of Power, the entire concept is relative.2 Thus, rather than compare power itself, the objective bases of power represent more fitting variables to measure. These are the features of political, economic, and military capacity that are used by an actor to achieve a certain end. They can include money, trade balances, technology, armed forces, cultural persuasion (i.e. soft power) and more. These are the facets of a state than can be objectively measured and compared.

They are, thus, the basis of the power inflation theory.

Power inflation is a term used to describe the situation in which a political ac-

tor’s power seems to be relatively decreasing, in response to an increase in the amount of power bases present in the general system.

The specific idea is that United State’s power level is not declining, but instead, the American rate of growth for its bases of power simply lags behind the rate that power bases in general are growing in the contemporary world. As a result, many believe America’s power is declining, when in fact it is not.

Other nations are just rising up, producing inflation that makes existing power seem less valuable.

GDP growth is typically a good measure of how well an economy is doing, and could also be considered a reflection of how major bases of power are developing. The most recent data reveals that the U.S. is expected to have a 3.6 percent annual growth rate in 2013.3 That is not too bad, particularly when most estimates predicted it to be significantly lower. The United States is therefore meeting the levels of achievement needed to maintain its current bases of power. It is not falling or contracting, it just seems so when compared to the many other nations that are growing faster. China is of course the highest, posting a GDP growth rate of 7.8 percent for 2012.4 Other BRICS are doing well too though, with Russia and India posting growth rates more than 3 percent each.5 These countries are all definitively building their bases of power, emerging in their respective regions as major players as a result. These statistics do not mean that the BRICS are approaching the same objective level of power bases as the United States, however. The U.S. economy still remains the single largest in the world.6 The American military still receives the most funding and the most advanced technology, accounting for 41 percent of global defense spending in 2012 alone.7 U.S. Industries are still major leaders in global innovation, ranking among the top 5 most competitive in the world.8 The United States is about to experience a boom in shale gas production, as recently developed fracking capabilities grant access to a new massive wealth of natural resources at home.9 This will certainly boost both economic and military bases of power for the United States, likely generating increased growth rates in the future. The United States therefore remains strong. It has enough bases of power to keep providing for its own prosperity, and to maintain its role in the world. In many areas, the U.S. is even growing. Its current rate of growth is

Fall 2013 simply being outpaced by other nations. It is because of the BRICs, as well as other emerging states across the globe, that many people in the U.S. adopt a pessimistic view of declinism. These developing actors keep adding, at impressive rates, to the general amount of power bases in the international system. As a result, power inflation occurs, and the relative value of America’s own bases of power is perceived to fall. When objective facts are taken into account, however, the U.S. still stands strong, at least for now.

Without a doubt, the emerging nations will keep growing. If the United States manages to achieve this too, then power values might

15 inflate, but America will keep its lead.

The real problem for the U.S. actually lies in its increasing internal dysfunction. If it cannot get its own house in order, it will not be able to sustain a rate of growth that can keep it at the top. If America remains politically divided, allows harmful sequestration to continue, and fails to make critical investments needed to build its bases of power, its growth will slow; the gap between it and other states will close. At that point, the U.S. may have to face a reality in which it is not the major world power anymore. It will certainly remain a great one, able to exert influence in a variety of ways, but it will

Global Governance of Environmental Migrants: An Analysis of IOM and UNHCR Activities

By Shannon Johnson, CAS ‘14 Annual changes in the environment have historically caused migration. However, recent studies show that climate change will continue to have an unusual effect on environments and communities through flooding, rising sea levels, droughts, short and heavy rain periods and rising temperatures. As the climate alters the environment and communities, migration becomes an even greater issue. In 2009, UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres predicted that climate change would become the primary cause of population displacement domestically and internationally.1 There are already monumental impacts of climate change on rural fields in Africa and small island states.

The international organizations that focus the most on issues related to environmental migration are the International Organization on Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR).

These organizations cover emergency cases of climate change induced natural disasters or refugees across national borders, however there is no normative framework to protect migrants fleeing because of slow degradation of their environment or the economic consequences of the environment.

The various aspects of climate change are increase of natural disasters, storms, flooding, rising temperatures, rising sea

levels and shorter and more extreme rainfall. These can become causes of internal and international migration.2 While climate change and environmental stress have obvious consequences for sectors of agriculture and create food security issues, these environmental changes also severely indirectly affect the economy. Adaptation strategies are then implemented to combat environmental degradation, but when they fail, migration is likely to take place as a measure of last resort. IOM’s 2010 case study on the state of Mauritius and its neighboring island Rodriguez, shows how climate change has affected and will continue to affect small island states, leading populations to migrate. The sea level rose an average of 3.5 mm/year over the past five years, a gross increase from previous annual measurements.3 Mauritius has also experienced decreasing steady rainfall and an increase in flash floods.4 These environmental changes due to climate change are adversely affecting the economies of Mauritius and Rodriguez. These flash floods carry fertilizer from the sugar cane industry to the ocean and the islands are at a greater risk of landslides.5 Fishing has significantly decreased in this region as a result.6 Tourism is the islands’ main source of income and will likely be affected in the near future as Mauritius’ beaches degrade.7,8

not play the game at its own singular level.

According to the framework on hegemonic shifts outlined by Robert Gilpin in War and Change in World Politics, as the BRICS rise regionally, the U.S. may then have to accept a systemic change in the international order.10 The balance of power could redistributed to multiple leading anchors, each in their respective spheres of influence. If this occurs, America’s ability to accept or reject this outcome will then determine peace or conflict, respectively. Should the United States get its act together and do what needs be done though, it should keep growing, maybe even breaking the bounds of power inflation.

Because most agricultural lands, human settlement and critical infrastructure are located close to the shoreline of small island states, they are particularly vulnerable to detrimental damage caused by rising sea levels.9 The change in precipitation patterns also threatens small islands’ access to freshwater, which is already strained and heavily dependent on fresh rainfall.10 Small islands generally have limited adaptive capacity due to lack of financial resources and institutions.11 Migration becomes an alternative where adaptation fails and communities are forced to migrate. Other particularly vulnerable groups to climate change likely to experience environmentally induced migration are rural, agricultural communities in sub-Saharan Africa.

The UNHCR conducted a 2012 case study where they interviewed refugees at three camps in Ethiopia and Uganda to analyze how climate change influenced their decision to migrate, which eventually led to their status as refugees.12,13 Shifts in weather patterns have caused food security issues as the crops failed and livestock died, eventually leading to famine.14 Like Mauritius, even those who were not farmers were indirectly affected by the declining economy in these communities.15 A familiar trend was seen in these societies. The male of the household migrated to the city to find work where the rest of the family would join after they could no longer sustain an agricultural livelihood.16 These migrant families faced violence and persecution in urban areas, causing them to flee their native country.17 As climate change threatens to drastically alter ecosystems, more similar cases of environmental migrants are sure to pose a global governance problem.

IOM and UNHCR have been involved in research, operations and policy advocacy to aid environmentally induced migrants in vulnerable situations. Both came out with

16 distinct statements and intents towards environmental migrants, especially in light of the impact of climate change. IOM was established after World War II to help European governments resettle uprooted people from the war and has specific experience in relocation due to manmade and natural disasters.18 Its mission is to assist in meeting operational challenges of migration management, advance understanding of migration issues, encourage social and economic development through migration and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.19 IOM has no legal protection mandate like a UNestablished commission, but its activities still aim to protect the human rights of migrants.20 In the context of climate change or environmentally induced migration, IOM has been involved in policy and policy dialogue, research, operational activities and partnerships. Its three main goals are to prevent forced migration, provide assistance and protection to affected populations where forced migration does occur and facilitate migration as an adaptation strategy to climate change.21 In terms of policy, IOM seeks to implement disaster risk reduction strategies, provisions for vulnerable groups, systematic approach to temporary protection for environmental migrants, urban planning and relocation schemes.22,23 Operationally, IOM tackles climate change migration by aiding those displaced by natural disasters by providing emergency shelter, logistics, health and protection or early recovery.24 IOM responded with medical care and shelters after Cyclone hit Myanmar. They also activated a cluster system during a particularly dangerous hurricane season in Haiti and coordinated camps and management after floods in Nepal’s Koshi Valley.25 UNHCR also has an interest in environmental migration although they have a different mandate and experience. UNHCR was also first established to help with the uprooted people from WWII.26 Unlike IOM, UNHCR is a result of a UN legal mandate and is comprised of governments to provide the legal foundation for helping refugees.27 According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is someone who “owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”28 In other words, the UNHCR legal mandate was specifically designed for migrants who were forced to leave their nation; it does not include internal or voluntary migrants. UNHCR acknowledges the challenges of environmental migrants, but because of

The International Relations Review the limited definition of a refugee, they have limited operational capabilities to assist these migrants.29 In a 2009 press release, UN High Commission for Refugees António Guterres confirmed that a “protection gap” could result for people who must leave their uninhabitable homeland but do not meet the strict legal definition of a refugee.30 Environmental migrants can be situated into three key categories: gradual degradation or natural disaster, domestic or international migration and forced or voluntary.31 There is currently no normative framework that accounts for the protection of all environmental migrants. UNHCR and IOM take responsibility for certain groups of environmental migrants, but they both leave gaping holes of protection. IOM has been a leader in identifying the gaps in the protection for environmental migrants. IOM has put together a working definition of environmental migrant to encompass the complexity of the issue. “Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory or abroad.”32 This definition covers the broad range of environmental migrants irrespective of their status as internal or international, sudden or gradual onset, voluntary or forced, for temporary or permanent reasons. This definition is not internationally accepted and has no legal bearing.

IOM’s approach for the protection of an environmental migrant is necessary but not entirely sufficient. They offer background knowledge and policy options that are plausible solutions for many environmental migrants but their operational work is largely focused on communities that are victims to natural disasters and emergency situations, with no protection for communities impacted by the gradual changes in the environment.

Furthermore, UNHCR’s legal mandate can only directly help those migrants who are fleeing into another state because of “being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”33 Senior Advisor to the Director in the Division of International Protection in UNHCR Jose Riera, considers there to be three main gaps in current environmental migration issues: knowledge, capacity and law.34 He argues that there needs to be more research on how people cope with climate change, at what point they decide to move away, how environmental migrants compare to other refugees and the role of adaptation.35 Ben Glahn, author of “‘Climate refugees’? Addressing the international legal

gaps – Part II” argues that international law as a sole policy to improve the situation of environmental migrants is unwise.36 An international legal framework is all but impossible to establish because of the issues with causality. There is no consensus on the term “climate change” and the causes of migration are difficult to define. UNHCR is also highly unlikely to change its definition of a refugee to include environmental migrants because of the number of governments that would have to agree. Glahn suggests looking for regional and national solutions to specific challenges and cites Jane McAdam, Director of International Refugee and Migration Law Project at the University of New South Wales in Australia, as saying “International law is not necessarily going to provide solutions on the ground.”37 Both UNHCR and IOM could serve as secretariat for regional or bilateral consultations because of their knowledge of environmental migration.38 The Nansin Initiative, a pledge by Norway and Switzerland to work with UNHCR to fill in legal gaps and identify good practices, presents one plausible approach for the future of regional consultations.

Specific policies can and should be obtained at national and regional levels to aid environmental migrants. As Riera suggests, governments should include ‘environmental migrants’ in the official state immigration and asylum policy.39 There is currently no immigration option to migrate for environmental reasons. Specific rights and protections should be acknowledged for sinking island migrants and bilateral agreements should be established to help facilitate their migration.

Urban planning also becomes essential because many migrants move to the city when rural, agricultural life is not sustainable. Bilateral policies could also include temporary protection for environmental migrants, such as the United States’ Temporary Protected Status (TPS) where immigrants “are temporarily unable to safely return to their home country because of ongoing and temporary conditions” and are given work permits.40 There should also be policies to prevent migration with disaster risk reduction, adaptation measures and capacity building, especially for states of limited resources.41 IOM and UNHCR acknowledge the rising problem of environmental migrants. Unfortunately there is no normative framework for the protection of environmental migrants.

Due to the difficult nature of constructing international hard law to protect environmental migrants as well as the legal complexities of causality, soft law and bilateral agreements for specific cases are the most feasible and currently the only ways to protect environmental migrants.

Fall 2013

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Yet Another Divided World A Chronicle of the Establishment of International Laws for Internet Regulation

By Young Woo Nam, CAS’14 International governance of the internet has become an extreme challenge to states in exercising their jurisdiction, extraterritoriality and sovereignty. Such difficulties arise from its unique composition, dubbed a "cyber-structure.” Indeed, unlike other dimensions of space such as the sea, land and airspace, the internet is an artificial structure constructed by sets of technological standards and codes.

State involvement in regulation of the internet has been minimal. Though, this relatively new and innovative medium of telecommunication has given significant challenges to states in exercising their domestic jurisdiction, compelling them to take further initiatives to control this new medium. Despite these challenges, there have been numerous cases of state involvement in establishing regulatory legal framework of the internet, demonstrating the efforts taken by states to create a cohesive body of law.

Although there is no established international treaty or law regulating, standardizing or administering the internet, one of the first international agreements pertaining to this rising new medium of communication was the International Telecommunication Regulations of 1988 (ITR-1988).

Prior to ITR-1988, rapid technological developments and emerging problems from the lack of international legal framework regarding data protection and international regulatory policy, compelled states to hold a consensus-based international regulatory conference against the rise of unforeseeable telecommunication technology. In 1982, states gathered at the International Telecommunication Convention in Nairobi and developed a consensus "to establish […] a broad international regulatory framework for all existing and foreseen new telecommunication services.” Along with theoretical, academic and practical questions came

the Morris Worm incident. A few weeks prior to the opening of ITR, the Morris Worm virus attacked and effectively shut down the U.S. DARPA-NSF network, giving empirical evidence for the need of global infrastructure protection.

Having witnessed the first dramatic failure of computer-based telecommunication infrastructure and its significant damages thereof by a single set of malicious codes, member states of ITR-1988 agreed to the need for such protection.

This led to adopting a "just-in" proposal by the USSR, which was later incorporated into the treaty as Article 9.1b. The article obligates countries to "avoid technical harm to the operation of the telecommunication facilities of third countries.”

Since 1988, states have implemented the principles adopted from ITR-1988 into their individual jurisdiction, enacting relevant legislation to protect telecommunication infrastructure in pursuant of Article 9.1b in ITR-1988. States, however, left the internet with relatively minimal regulation, resulting in having no single authority controlling it entirely. Rather, a number of private nongovernmental actors became the driving force for creating technical, and moral standards concerning the use of the internet.

For example, the private organization, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has been "charged with the allocation and administration of domain names since 1998.”

World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), on the other hand, takes the lead role in formulating standards and protocols in the area of World Wide Web. As public participation on the internet drastically increased after access opened to it in the early 1990s, states have noticed changing effects and impacts the internet has brought to different

aspects of their governance.

States have consistently attempted to obtain, increase and exercise their influence and control over the internet through intergovernmentalism, mainly the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Through state sponsorship, the ITU, however, has not been able to gain responsibility for regulating the Internet’s infrastructure.

Internet regulation libertarians advocate for minimal to non-regulation by states. Their position claims state that intervention is impossible due to the absence of geographically defined state sovereignty, jurisdiction and territoriality.

Many of the criticisms against state involvement in internet regulation, either directly or by intergovernmental organizations like the UN, specifically the ITU, come from their relative lack of legitimacy in representing the actual users of the internet. Scholars have pointed out that the dynamic and ever-changing nature of the internet makes it difficult for something as static and fixed as law, either domestic or international, to handle it.

On the other hand, another group of scholars rebutted libertarian arguments regarding the internet being free from geographic borders. They argued that state intervention into internet regulation was necessary, and even good, given the legitimacy derived from governments representing the interests of their people.

Several states have exercised their ability to regulate the internet by imposing various means of censorship, notably China’s restriction of various social media and particular search results sensitive to the regime. National regulation of the internet is feasible and even legitimate, as states are compelled to protect their interests from potential threats that may stir its national identities.

A landmark case involving extraterritoriality on the internet was Yahoo!

Inc. v. La Ligue contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme and L'Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France (hereafter referred as "Yahoo! v. La Ligue contre le Racisme et L'antisemitisme et al."). Two French civil societies and interest groups sued Yahoo! Inc. for offering the sale of Nazi memorabilia through the Yahoo! Auction website, which was opened and ac-

18 cessible in France. Such sale of controversial products are considered illegal under French domestic law. The French Court ruled in favor of La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'antisemitisme et al., and ordered Yahoo! France to block access to French users.

Against the French Court's ruling, Yahoo! instead took the case to a California Court, which initially resulted in the rejection of the French Court's initial jurisdiction over contents uploaded by

The International Relations Review Countering such measures, Google instead decided to disable YouTube Korea's comment and video uploading features. However, South Korean users were still able to use the features as YouTube websites in other settings were still offered to Korean users without any block or configuration. Though YouTube's decision to shut down its features related to membership managed to escape further national scrutiny by South Korean authorities, its action served as a bypass of

among states and other relevant actors concerns the balance between freedom of speech and protection against harmful contents. On one hand, in upholding Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states have duties to safeguard the freedom of speech in the internet. On the other hand, some states are also bounded by their laws, values or even national interests to take action against certain activities on the internet.

“The effective closure of Megaupload.com has established an empirical case whereby a website, along with its content, may effectively be taken down overnight.”

Yahoo! The U.S. Court of Appeals, nonetheless, reversed the decision and ordered Yahoo! to comply with the French Court's decision. The case confirmed that in transnational disputes in which conflicting values clash, "it is not the place of the country of the information provider but the place of the recipient that governs the situation.”

The relationship between states and transnational corporations (TNCs), often referred to as multinational corporations (MNCs), in relation to the activities of the latter in the internet remains yet another problematic area of national sovereignty and jurisdiction. A battleground between MNCs and states is seen in YouTube's temporary freeze of video commenting and uploading in the Republic of Korea.

Domestic national law requires websites having daily unique visitors of more than 100,000 to have "real-name verification" based on the unique number assigned to each South Korean citizen, so the South Korean authorities ordered YouTube Korea to implement a verification method.

This, however, met with opposition from YouTube's parent corporation, Google, as it regarded the move as a threat to free speech as individuals uploading videos or leaving comments could be traced once their identification was linked with their respective real names.

South Korean domestic law, an act proving "considerable difficulty in determining what relationships there may be between global internet activities and local national law.”

One of the most recent cases of states exercising extraterritoriality comes from the United States' pursuit of shutting down Megaupload.com. Operating outside of U.S. territory, Megaupload. com served as a file storage website. The United States argued that much of the data stored and distributed by the website included copyrighted materials and that the founder, Kim Dotcom, and other key administrators knowingly let such data be distributed without any penalty.

Despite the website operating outside U.S. jurisdiction, the United States managed to stop the service’s operation by seizing the server and database in conjunction with foreign law enforcement.

The effective closure of Megaupload. com has established an empirical case whereby a website, along with its content, may effectively be taken down overnight. At the same time, however, it also raised concerns that such aggressive action carried out without due process may serve as a precedent for arbitrary treatment of a particular online community by governments.

Another area of contention

State intervention and regulation of the internet also appear in the form of legal restriction and liability imposed on intermediaries, "private corporations which provide services and platforms that facilitate online communication or transactions between third parties.”

In essence, all of the cases aforementioned, except the Megaupload Case, are cases directly arising from the freedom of speech issue. The international legal framework that would establish regulation of the internet and cyberspace is still a long way away: "The WCIT-12 controversy produces fragmentation in international law on international telecommunications, which could adversely affect business conditions, planning, decision making and other practices in this sector.”

As can be seen from a few selected legal cases, states have been actively involved in exercising their influence, jurisdiction and control over the internet.

Most of these have been focused on the activities taking place in cyberspace.

While the codification of international law regulating the internet seems far from reality, governments around the world will soon be forced to intervene due to growing imperatives to ensure legal clarity.

19

Where’s my job?

Managing Outsourcing Fears

By James Sundquist, CAS ‘14 The integration of markets, the heart of globalization, implies heightened competition for all players involved. While holding the promise of greater opportunity, competition also threatens established economic arrangements. Perhaps nowhere does this cause more concern than in labor markets: What does globalization mean for wages and jobs in industrialized countries? Will entire industries be offshored? How can Western workers ever compete with a faceless mass of Indian and Chinese workers?

What should be done?

The standard economic answer is that gains from trade make both parties better off: cheaper goods more than make up for the loss in income and workers are redistributed from uncompetitive to growing, competitive business sectors. Government intervention is usually seen as “protectionist” and diminishes total welfare. However, economics also recognizes the existence of structural unemployment, the permanent decrease in employment and wages among workers whose skills are no longer demanded, such as American textile workers.

Political economy recognizes that structural unemployment, which can result from global competition, demands a government response.

In democracies, ignoring those hurt by economic competition can result in political backlash against economic openness and those in power, as most vividly demonstrated during the Great Depression. Using the example of executive pay, Pepper Culpepper confirms that contemporary democracies can still move quickly to restrict economic behavior if their constituents form a negative conception of it. Whether this comes in the form of compensation and retraining, effectively insuring workers (as suggested by Daniel Drezner) or proactive efforts to head it off (as suggested by Suzanne Berger), the role for government cannot be denied. The “gains from trade” argument will not suffice to convince voters not to take action against a perceived offshoring threat because, as reported by Bruce Stokes,

American and European publics already understand that argument and place a greater emphasis on job security anyway. At the end of the day, people still matter in political economies.

The Great Depression marked a transformation in the nature of political economy: economic adjustment could no longer be forced on suffering workers without political consequences. Organized business and labor interests, combined with the expansion of franchises in many developed nations, made classical adjustment methods like the transfer of specie politically impossible. Attempts to continue orthodox economic policies in the face of this new political reality changed governments around the world as nations turned to new ideas such as Keynesianism or Fascism.1 Ever since, governments have been unable to ignore economic pain felt by their constituency for fear of electoral defeat.

The Depression also illustrated the reversibility of globalization. Most memorably symbolized by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the turning away from globalization was even sharper in European countries that pursued autarky.2 Under political duress from workers desperate for relief and unconfident in old ideas, global economic integration proved easily reversible. Accommodating the pain of depressed wages and massive unemployment thus became a prerequisite not only for political survival but for the existence of a free trade regime.

The Depression makes for a dramatic example, but the sensitivity of politics to economic arrangements is not limited to cataclysmic events, nor has it diminished in the postwar era of victorious globalization.

As Pepper Culpepper explains in Quiet Politics and Business Power, governments still move swiftly to remedy perceived economic wrongs once they gain political salience.

Even arcane topics can achieve salience by means of the availability heuristic, a cognitive shortcut used to estimate the frequency of an event by the ease with which exam-

ples are called to mind.3 Culpepper demonstrates the power of the availability heuristic with the example of executive compensation, an esoteric topic that for many years escaped significant regulation by virtue of its political irrelevance.4 However, Culpepper uses newspaper coverage of the topic to demonstrate that public interest surged and remained high in the United States in the wake of the Enron scandal and in France following the financial crisis of the late 2000s.5 Through the availability heuristic, the public in the United States and France began to associate astronomical levels of executive compensation with fraud and “golden parachutes,” and successfully pressured their governments to rapidly expand regulation of executive compensation.6 In the area of international trade, a negative availability heuristic already exists:, “offshoring.” In the popular imagination, globalization means moving jobs from high-wage countries to low-wage ones, benefitting corporate profits at the expense of workers in developed countries. This narrative gets voiced even by respected channels, such as John Kerry’s attacks on “Benedict Arnold CEOs” during his 2004 U.S. presidential campaign.7 Potentially, this heuristic could be used to bring pressure on the governments of industrialized countries to restrict the internationalization of business.

The Bush Administration steel tariffs represent a limited instance of this, but a stronger heuristic could lead to a sharper turn away from globalization.

Daniel Drezner suggests calming fears of “The Outsourcing Bogeyman” with the traditional method of using the benefits generated by competition to compensate those harmed by it. Specifically, he advocates expanding the scope of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program to aid more types of displaced workers and the creation of insurance policies by firms to compensate employees affected by offshore outsourcing.8 This second option particularly appeals to Drezner, because it does not require government intervention and could cost “as little as four or five cents per dollar saved from offshore outsourcing.”9 Although not nearly as concerned with preserving governments’ policy autonomy as the “embedded liberalism” solution embodied in the Bretton Woods system and described by John Ruggie, Drezner’s recommendation operates on similar lines as it pursues openness while seeking to mitigate the pain of adjustment.10

20 Despite calling outsourcing a “bogeyman,” Drezner still supports a policy response.

Drezner’s recommendation carries all the more weight because it comes in spite of his doubt that offshoring poses a serious threat to U.S. workers and his strong belief in the economic and political case for free trade.

He estimates that “close to 90 percent of jobs in the United States require geographic proximity,” that outsourcing affects “less than 0.2 percent of employed Americans” annually and that technological advances largely explain the decline in American manufacturing.11 At the same time, “outsourcing business processes overseas is comparative advantage at work,” stimulating the growth of competitive sectors and bringing important political benefits, such as deepening Mexico’s commitment to democracy.12 These arguments could be used to dismiss fears of offshore outsourcing, but Drezner advocates analgesic measures anyway, underscoring his recognition of the power of democratic politics over economic arrangements. However, there is a flaw in Drezner’s assumption that resistance to globalization comes merely from the frictionally unemployed seeking to shift blame for their struggles. He writes, “The problem of offshore outsourcing is less one of economics than of psychology,” but structural unemployment represents a real economic problem to those afflicted by it.13 Globalization might indeed be most vulnerable to attack at the bottom of the business cycle, but attributing all resistance to cyclical nervousness ignores the real economic pain felt by those that globalization permanently hurts when industries leave one country for another. Suzanne Berger agrees “policies that would cushion the risks of change for individuals can be compatible with… economic openness” and supports measures like those suggested by Drezner, but goes further in arguing that with targeted investment, firms and governments can prevent structural employment from occurring in the first place.14 In contrast to Drezner’s enthusiasm for comparative advantage, Berger fights the perception that “sunset industries” must inevitably disappear from rich economies.

Drawing on analysis of Italian apparel companies, she explains that even labor-intensive industries can flourish in high-wage economies by building on core competencies and investing in innovation.15 In addition, greater risks, lower productivity and

The International Relations Review longer lead times make offshore production less cost-effective than commonly imagined.16 Since the extinction of certain jobs is not preordained, she recommends proactive, not protectionist, policies to preserve them.

Berger targets education as an area ripe for government investment to protect the competitiveness of American workers. She observes that although the flexible U.S. labor market benefits its competitiveness by encouraging risk-taking, it discourages investment in worker training.17 This invites action by the government to ensure workers have marketable skills, as it already does.

Expanding this investment could make the labor force more productive and more competitive. Although a government action, it provides individuals with the means to support themselves, aligning it with the interests of those who advocate market-based solutions. Rather than having to cushion the structurally unemployed, government money could be spent to head off the problem by providing individuals with the education needed to compete.

Berger also advocates for greater government investment in innovation and basic research. She notes the closure of central corporate research laboratories, such as Bell Labs, and falling federal expenditures on nondefense research with dismay and as undermining the foundations of a successful, globally competitive economy.18 Particularly in a business environment marked by increasing modularization, the public sector seems a sensible means of supporting the type of basic research formerly undertaken by vertically integrated firms.19 In doing so, government improves the competitiveness of domestic firms, promoting growth that can cushion structural unemployment or even prevent industries from declining.

But are these measures absolutely necessary? If the availability heuristic poses a danger to openness and prosperity, wouldn’t it be cheaper to change the public’s cognitive biases than to spend in counteracting structural unemployment? Barry Stokes’ work on public opinion of trade policy suggests otherwise. He obliquely confirms the relevance of the availability heuristic, writing that people “are more likely to have sentiments… than to have strong opinions” on trade and its impact.20 In untangling public sentiments towards trade, he finds that people understand the gains from trade economic argument but still prioritize job security. Ninety percent of Americans and 72

percent of Europeans agreed a free-market economy is more beneficial, and 73 percent of both groups “believed that freer trade leads to lower prices and more product choices.”21 Despite this, less than half of Americans and Europeans think they personally benefit from international trade.22 This likely derives from a common belief among Americans that “freer trade cost more jobs than it created” and that offshoring significantly contributed to the high levels of unemployment following the 2008 crash.23 If workers understand the arguments for trade but still believe it harms their employment prospects, explaining the arguments again is unlikely to change attitudes. Furthermore, workers in high wage countries make a distinction between trade with similar developed countries and “unfair” trade with countries such as China.

Although it is impossible to determine the precise mix of cultural fears, competitive threats from cheap labor and reports of genuinely unfair trading practices that influence perceptions of China, polling finds that more than half of Americans eager to get tougher on economic issues with China.24 The case for free trade will have little appeal when the public believes the other side competes unfairly. Thus, government efforts to alleviate structural employment appear to be the only protection against pressure to close off trade with developing economies, which frequently use tactics that seems “unfair,” such as industrial policy.

“Unfair” competition and other economic realities of globalization will provoke some degree of political backlash against openness. The same individuals making up national labor markets also make up their nation’s electorate. When the offshoring heuristic convinces enough of them that globalization threatens their well-being, they have the capacity to quickly raise barriers to economic integration.

Because intellectual efforts to combat this heuristic are unlikely to succeed, globalization must reconcile its costs with its benefits. The true cost of globalization, structural unemployment, may either be insured against or prevented. Although many would like to see this handled by the private sector, government has the proper incentive to manage unemployment. Governments chartered to serve their people should do exactly that.

Fall 2013

Special Report: Faces of Violence

Photo Credit: Sarah Fisher/Daily Free Press Staff, CAS ‘15

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The International Relations Review

Behind Words: The Shaping of

By Gabriel Gomez, CAS ‘15 In the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings and the unprecedented manhunt that led to the capture of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, MSNBC aired an interview that discussed the distinction between a criminal and a terrorist in the legal system of the United States.1 By referring to the incoming charges on Tsarnaev and his future court battles, the newscaster illustrates to the audience the interpretations Tsarnaev’s alleged actions according to the legal system.

Was it a national security threat or a domestic crime? Was it a terrorist attack plotted from overseas or a Cambridge-bred sinister design? Was there a political message or an aimless desire for carnage? Either way, the debate surrounding the bombings leaves more questions than answers, more lines to be drawn about American perceptions regarding ethnicity, political motives and terrorism.

In spite of the unknowns, a pivotal theme in the aforementioned interview is language, which turns out to be thoroughly studied by the acolytes and scholars of the poststructuralist theory in international relations. This theme can be seen at the close of the MSNBC interview when the discussion hints to the assumptions that are commonly made through language and done so many times mistakenly—conceptions of the word “criminal” as a domestic label and “terrorist” as alien. By taking into account such assumptions and the different distinctions made through language in legal systems and international relations, it can be seen that terminology deeply affects security, power, and the interplay between states and non-state actors across the globe.

Indeed, the distinctions between ‘terrorist’ and ‘criminal’ is not just a simple issue of semantics. Destructive incidents like the Boston Marathon bombings show the power language has as a political tool to justify categorization and discrimination against individuals, groups or factions.

Given the uniqueness of the case, the U.S. legal system juggled for a while with

Fall 2013

Language through Violence

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The International Relations Review

Photo CREDIT: Sarah Fisher/Daily Free Press Staff, CAS ‘15

The bombing left the Back Bay area of Boston shaken as police swarmed the area surrounding the Boston Marathon finish line and runners and spectators tried to reach loved ones. As details unfolded about the suspects, many raised questions as to whether the bombing should be considered a terrorist attack or a domestic crime.

the different aspects of the Boston Marathon bombings to consolidate either a criminal or a terrorist prosecution for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The case is as rare as it gets: a 19-year-old student from University of Massachusetts Dartmouth was allegedly influenced by his brother to plant two pressure cooker bombs in the world-renowned Boston Marathon that killed three people and wounded many more, plus ambushing and killing an MIT police officer three days later.

Aside from establishing whether the pressure cookers were weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or if the alleged plotters visited Jihadist websites, prosecutors had to take into account that this man was not some Islamist militant who entered the United States with a long-planned attack in mind. Because he grew up in the country and integrated with other Americans, Tsarnaev’s case does not fall neatly into existing categories due to his ethnicity, faith and especially his nationality since he happens to be an American and a Kyrgyzstani citizen. If Tamerlan Tsarnaev – Dzhokhar’s late brother and the alleged mastermind behind the bombings – was in fact the one with political motivations who influenced his younger sibling to act as an accomplice, how is Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s presumably malleable personality, faulty mental machinations and irrational actions different from Adam Lanza, the Sandy Hook Elementary

killer, and other shooters who are called criminals?

The same can be deduced about the Fort Hood gunman, former U.S. Army Major and psychiatrist Nidal Malik Hasan who mass murdered 13 people, mostly soldiers, and wounded 32 more. In the same way the administration led by President Barack Obama addressed the Boston bombings, Hasan’s doings were ardently defined as a terrorist attack by many, including most notably U.S. Sen. Joe Lieberman and Gen. Barry McCaffrey. Hasan’s prosecutors, however, differed from the “terrorist attack” view of the shootings and followed the Department of Defense and other federal law enforcement agencies in classifying the Fort Hood massacre as an “act of workplace violence.” For those who wanted Hasan to be charged for terrorism, the implications of such classification failed to reflect the evidence of his contacts with Islamic militancy and his radicalization that surfaced.

Consequently, this disagreement over the language used to refer to the massacre drove the survivors and victims’ family members to demand a change of classification in a lawsuit in November 2011 against the federal government. Regardless of the classification legal battle, Hasan was found guilty on all charges that made him eligible for the death penalty on August 23 and then sentenced to death by lethal injection

on August 28. Despite the outcome of the case, some facts still call for further analysis. Contrary to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who was naturalized, Hasan was born and raised in the U.S. He had served in the army since 1988, and was a practicing Muslim. It is still debatable whether Hasan was a domestic threat or the product of a foreign one, but his surviving victims want his actions to be deemed as ‘terrorism’ with all the consequences the term might entail. However, it is highly possible that Hasan’s sentence would have had the same outcome if his actions were initially classified as acts of terrorism.2 Arguably, the debate over the classification of his shooting rampage reflects how the American public perceives terrorism – that is, that terrorism is dealt with more severity and causes a greater deal of alarm and media coverage than a domestic crime.

Across the Atlantic, there is also an exemplary case regarding the definition of terrorism on the domestic or foreign threat basis. In plain daylight, on a busy London street, two men hacked an off-duty British soldier to death in an attempt to behead him.

This case is quite small in scale if compared to that of Hasan or of the Tsarnaev brothers, yet it was very telling about the use of language. Soldier Lee Rigby was murdered in front of several pedestrian witnesses as he returned to his barracks by two alleged jihadists, Michael Adebowale and Michael

Fall 2013 Adebolajo, who did not hesitate to declare their motives for the killing to the first cameras at the murder site. With blood-tainted hands and still in possession of the meat cleaver used to murder Rigby, Adebolajo articulated in local accent the reasons why they killed him, with the telltale rhetoric pertaining to Islamic radicalism.3 The case rapidly spread past London commuters and sparked outrage nationwide. The British people, with Prime Minister David Cameron at the helm, refused to call the death of their soldier by a meat cleaver a petty crime, but digested the news as a historical crime.

Overnight, Rigby’s death became a terrorist attack in the public eye, the most recent one after the London suicide bombings of July 7, 2005. Following the apprehension of Adebolajo and Adebowale, Cameron summoned an emergency national security meeting, Queen Elizabeth visited the barracks where the late soldier was stationed, the Muslim Council of Britain condemned the attack and reactions to Rigby’s murder echoed everywhere – particularly in the West – as the United Kingdom mourned the death of a soldier at the hands of starkly labeled terrorists. Even French President François Hollande who was meeting Cameron at the moment of the incident, had some words to give on the matter, citing a parallel case where three off-duty French soldiers and four Jewish civilians were murdered by a French-Algerian gunman in Toulouse and Montauban in 2012.

With such similar cases in France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, analysts soon began to work on deriving a constant to the attacks. According to British counter-terrorism chiefs, attacks are being increasingly carried out by radicalized individuals, or so-called “lone wolves,” that appear to have no connection with terrorist cells. Cases such as the Fort Hood shooting and the Boston Marathon attack “have raised the profile of the ‘lone wolf’ threat in the West.”4 Perhaps with the recent ‘lone wolf’ cases in mind and addressing the West in particular, Cameron spoke of terrorism as a threat from overseas in the aftermath of Rigby’s murder. As the Prime Minister declared, “the terrorists will never win because they can never beat the values we hold dear, the belief in freedom, in democracy, in free speech, in our British values, Western values.”5 From the point of view of the postructuralist theory of inter-

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Photo CREDIT: Sarah Fisher/Daily Free Press Staff, CAS ‘15

Ambulances and police vehicles packed into the area surrounding the finish line of the Boston Marathon minutes after the bombs went off. The suspects’ background raised questions as to whether the incident should be labeled a terrorist attack, as the Tsarnaev brothers immigrated to the United States and were naturalized as children.

national relations, it is safe to say that the Prime Minister’s words contain a sufficient measure of intertextuality – that is, he omitted certain clarifications from his speech by obviating that his listeners fully understand his underlying posture. In this case, there is no need for convoluted analysis to identify in Cameron’s words his conception of terrorism as foreign and non-Western. In a speech comparable to the Bush-era’s ‘they hate our freedom’ type of rhetoric, Cameron’s is a didactic example on how a consequence of the term ‘terrorism’ claims that a country and its countrymen are all victims of an external and not a home-grown threat, even if in this case, both killers were British-born and late converts to Islam.

Other interpretations underscore the effectiveness of portraying terrorism as a foreign threat to gain support for political agendas with little hindrances. In the words of political scientist Richard Jackson, a consequence of the term ‘terrorism’ is “the construction of a whole new language, or a kind of public narrative, that manufactures approval while simultaneously suppressing individual doubts and wider political unrest.”6 An example of the previous premise could be the expedited development of counter-terrorism policies post-9/11 and the obstacle-saturated legislative battles of the Obama administration to impose more ef-

fective gun restrictions. The former initially mobilized a domestic and overseas agenda uncontested while the latter failed to use the Sandy Hook Elementary mass murder –that is not catalogued as a terrorist attack– as a mean to enforce more gun control. Perhaps with the consequence of the term ‘terrorist’ and not ‘criminal,’ Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Nidal Malik Hasan, Michael Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo are shown to be acting not as nationals of the countries they committed their atrocious acts but first as Muslim radicals who posed a threat to the entire nations in which they resided.

As the 21st century continues, political leaders will likely continue to use the word “terrorism” to their advantage, labeling certain events in such a way to unify the public and pursue political agendas. At its best, political rhetoric can illustrate crime in such a way to draw outrage and raise awareness among factions and world leaders. Nevertheless, it is a term with many gray areas where the definitions and distinctions of the U.S., EU or UN fail to encompass its meaning. Despite the variety of actors in the international relations scenario, the term “terrorism” always finds use in political speeches. It is certainly a powerful tool due to the various consequences of the term, yet it is an ever-changing sword in service to the ideology of the one who wields it.

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The International Relations Review

The Israeli-Palestinian Crisis: New Hope or Just the Same?

By Victor Vuong, CAS ‘17 On October 30, 2013, Israel released another 26 prisoners, as part of its fourstage plan to release 104 Palestinian prisoners - Israel released a first group of 26 prisoners back in August. This effort of goodwill by Israel as it continues a new round of peace talks with Palestine comes after an almost three-year hiatus, which ended following disputes over Israeli settlement construction.

The new round of peace talks have flown under the radar of many, who believe that the talks will eventually reach an impasse like previous talks. It is too early to tell whether the current talks are a success, but these countries need to address several issues if they are to make significant progress, from the construction of the Israeli West Bank barrier and West Bank settlements to the Palestine Liberation Organization’s attempt to gain national recognition for Palestine and the boundaries of a possible separate state and political actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.

One of the more recent controversial issues is the construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinians claim these settlements are Israel’s attempt to push the remaining Palestinians out of the West Bank.

Proponents of the settlements claim that they are part of Israel’s right to establish a homeland. The settlements are so controversial that outside actors have also taken part in the debate. The EU decided in June to end financial assistance to Israeli organizations operating in the West Bank, East Jerusalem or the Golan Heights from 2014. This suggests that the EU supports a freeze in settlement construction as well.

Despite the efforts of Palestine and the EU, a freeze on settlements does not seem likely to come soon, especially since Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has announced new plans for additional settlement construction. The Israeli West Bank barrier has also inflamed tensions between Israel and Palestine. Most of the barrier, which is on or near the boundary

Photo Credit: Maddie Rosenberger, COM ‘14, CAS ‘14

Fall 2013 between Israel and the West Bank, stretches for 400 miles and puts around 10 percent of the West Bank on Israel’s side.

Proponents of the barrier claim that it has increased security, which has led to the decrease in Israeli and Palestinian deaths.

Palestinians argue the barrier proves Israel’s desire to appropriate West Bank land the Palestinians want for a future state. The Israeli Supreme Court ordered the route of the barrier to be altered, which moved the fence barrier off the land of some Palestinian villagers. However, after being relocated closer to an Israeli settlement, it was reinforced as a wall.

Like the settlements, the West Bank barrier does not seem to be going away anytime soon.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which the UN recognizes as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, has fought and, in some cases, succeeded in gaining increased Palestinian national recognition. UN members, most of whom support a Palestinian state, recently voted to increase Palestine’s status from “observer entity” to “non-member observer state” in 2012. With increased recognition, Palestine could possibly bring claims to the International Criminal Court of alleged Israeli crimes, which Israel opposes. Israel claims the PLO’s efforts are hampering peace efforts, but the PLO argues that their actions are justified, because Israel refuses to put a freeze on settlement construction or remove the West Bank barrier.

Before the prisoner release on October 30, Israel launched a strike on two underground rocket launchers in Gaza that sent strikes to southern Israel. In addition, Israel recently destroyed two tunnels that led deep into Israel from the Gaza strip.

This underscores the importance of Hamas and the Gaza strip. Because it controls the Gaza strip, Hamas prevents a full address of all Palestinians, which would include those living in Gaza.

Besides Hamas, Israel also faces obstacles from Hezbollah and Iran. Israel closely monitors Iran, whose potential nuclear capacity is a great concern, should it decide to use this potential capability or give it to terrorist groups like Hezbollah.

Ungoverned areas near Israeli borders in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and other surrounding areas also pose a concern as they might attract terrorists who could threaten Israel’s security. As long as Israel

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Photo Credit: Katrina Trost, CAS ‘14 View of Jerusalem from the Mount of Olives, East Jerusalem. One of the most controversial issues between Palestinians and Israelis is the matter of the partitioning of Jerusalem.

faces threats from groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, it is more likely to continue occupying the West Bank and other issues it believes are critical to its security.

Additional matters of importance are the governments in Israel and Palestine. The government of Palestine, the Palestinian Authority, has to establish its credibility and demonstrate that it is not an extremist organization like Hamas. However, it must also demonstrate that it is a strong negotiator or it will lose legitimacy with the Palestinians. Netanyahu must balance the concerns of his conservative Likud party and the other parties in his coalition government as he continues talks with Palestine.

The strong showing of more centrist party Yesh Atid in Israel’s most recent election in January seems to indicate a rise in more moderate Israelis, but Yesh Atid and the centrist movement is still far from becoming the dominant voice in Israel.

Likewise, there is a growing moderate movement in Palestine. A majority of Palestinians believe a two state solution is the most ideal solution and an even greater majority supports a meeting of Palestinian and Israeli leadership who support a twostate solution.

Solving such problems may greatly improve Israeli-Palestinian relations, but a permanent truce requires the construction

of a Palestinian state. Palestinians, having been displaced by various wars and conflicts, now make up populations in the West Bank, Israel, and Israel’s surrounding Arab countries. Unless the majority of these displaced Palestinians can return to their own state, the conflict between Israel and Palestine will remain.

One of the biggest difficulties when negotiating the possible boundaries for a Palestinian state is the issue of Jerusalem: a majority of Israelis support a united Jerusalem while Palestinians claim East Jerusalem as their holy land and a vital part to any future Palestinian state.

The restart of peace talks is commendable, but issues such as a possible freeze on settlement construction must be addressed if these peace talks are to go further than past negotiations.

Continuing talks can pave the way for improved relations, but both sides must make concessions.

Israel must recognize that Palestinians have as much a right to a state as they do and Palestine must acknowledge that a return of all refugees to their land is likely impossible. It has been a slow process, but an improvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations is evident and will hopefully continue, as both nations seek a path to peace and prosperity.

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The International Relations Review

Brazil’s Favela Security Policies Signs of Good Will or Saving Face?

By Wilaene E. Gonzalez, CAS ‘14 Brazil is considered a country with the potential to become a great power and is currently labeled as a “BRIC”, an acronym for countries that are at a similar stage of advanced economic development. These countries include Brazil, Russia, India and China. With this in mind, Brazil is looking to position itself as a competitive world power in the international community by taking advantage of mega-events, which usually offer middle-income countries the opportunity to influence how they are perceived throughout the world.

In Brazil’s case, these mega-events give the country a chance to present itself as a strong emerging power with added credentials. Brazil’s winning bid to host both the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games has not come without concerns, as many have questioned Brazil’s ability to tackle some problems that threaten its success in hosting these events, primarily in the area of security. Above all, Brazil’s involvement in the favelas has raised questions about whether these efforts are motivated by international pressures and the desire to exert itself as a legitimate world power who can successfully host two mega-events.

A mega-event has seven main characteristics: cultural, commercial and

sportive events of a large scale; dramatic character; popular mass appeal; international significance; notable consequences for the host city or country; major media attention; and discontinuity in the ordinary nature of sports championships.1 Countries have varying reasons for hosting events of this nature, while London’s Summer Olympics presented an opportunity for urban regeneration, China’s 2008 Beijing Olympics provided an opportunity to display Chinese identity, modernity and influence while also legitimizing the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership.2 The term favela as defined by the Instituto Brazileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE) refers to a subnormal agglomerate with a minimum of 51 household units.3 The subnormal agglomerates are in need of essential public services, are urbanized out of the legal standards, occupy or have occupied a third-party property (public or private) and are arranged in a disordered and dense way.4 The Observatoria de Favelas (OB) further defines favelas as a territory where there is a recurring deficiency of state action and formal market investment, where housing is mostly characterized by illegality and self-construction and where great cultural diversity exists. Favelas are typically associated with illegality, violence

Photo Credit: Jatnna Garcia, CAS ‘14

Photo Credit: Jatnna Garcia, CAS ‘14

The sculpture at the Museu de Arte do Rio (MAR), was a project where the children of each favela built and decorated a house resembling his or her own. The sculptures represent the faveladors population.

A sand sculpture in Copacabana beach in Rio, which was erected right before the Pope got there, shows the World Youth Day symbol, the Copacabana beach sidewalk design and the Christ the Redeemer Statue.

and drug gangs and typically have negative connotations.5 With its reputation on the line, Brazil has been working hard to resolve, at least temporarily, issues surrounding favela security. Drug gangs, violent crimes and police corruption are some of the priorities to focus on in the preparation for these megaevents. The rise in violent crime in the favelas is related to the drug-trafficking gangs that first emerged during the 1980s; an issue which has led to the stigmatization of the favelas as an area of dangerous people, violence and crime. The media has had a large role in disseminating the differences between the people from the “hills” and those who were wealthier. Police intentions when suppressing the violence revolving around drug gangs in the favelas have not always been positive. In many cases, police would extort money from traffickers and sell their guns to others. This created a cycle in which the police became a collaborator and contributor to the violence in the favelas. From this division emerged the image of Rio as a “broken city.”

What many people forget is that Brazil was able to win the bids for the World Cup and the Olympics because of its performance in the 2007 Pan-American Games in Rio de Janeiro.6 Rio was successful at cracking down on security issues to ease international concerns and then heightened security policies to suppress violence and crime in the favelas. Brazil’s intentions to better security issues in the favelas have come out of its desire to appease the international community’s concerns for upcoming mega-events, which are important for placing Brazil on the “global power map.”

In 2008, Brazil implemented a public security policy to expel drug dealers through the establishment of the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs). The other half of the security policy includes the BOPE, or the Special Police Operations Battalion, an elite military security force which essentially invades favelas with armored vehicles.

BOPEs have been largely criticized because of their disruption to social order and military style operations.

Now there is a growing power struggle between organized crime rings and the police, displayed by the incident involving a police helicopter that was shot down over a favela just two weeks after the announcement that Rio would host the Olympics.7 These security measures have not come

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The International Relations Review

Photo Credit: Jatnna Garcia, CAS ‘14 An overhead view of Rio de Janeiro, the second largest city in Brazil. Officials in Rio face security concerns as the city prepares to host the 2016 Olympics.

without criticism. People speculate that policing in the favelas has been pushing drug gangs into favelas in other areas – more like putting a Band-aid on the issue rather than tackling it from its roots. Others fear that, like in the aftermath of the 2007 Pan-American Games, they will not see the long-term benefits of their tax contributions, as the investments of a mega-event tend to be primarily meant for “city marketing” at the high levels of international politics. Rather than solving the problems affecting common Brazilians, the results of mega-events fail to benefit the areas that need the most help.

The World Bank report, “Making Brazilians Safer,” says that the situation regarding crime and violence appears to be improving in the rest of the country, but warns that there are significant differences between states, showing the large discrepancies between government authorities.8 Some policies seem to indicate a desire to improve the situation in the favelas, but they have been largely isolated from their more prosperous counterparts with very rigid social class divisions. This became

apparent in 2009 when the Brazilian government announced a program to construct 3-meter-tall concrete walls that would enclose 11 favelas in Rio de Janeiro with the purpose of controlling crime, allowing the orderly growth of the city and the protection the coastal forests by limiting the expansion of informal settlements.9 Critics say this wall is an attempt to fence in the poor favelas from spreading into wealthier neighborhoods and hide the poverty ridden areas so that visitors are not reminded of the issues surrounding them.

Brazil has proven through the success of the 2007 Pan-American Games and its growing economy that it could successfully host two upcoming sporting mega-events: the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. The international community is testing Brazil’s validity as a competing BRIC. No longer is Brazil being viewed solely in terms of democracy and economic growth, but they are now looking to have the international leverage to display its reputation and role within the international community. With the planning of these mega-events in mind, Brazil has cracked down

on security concerns that worried the international community. Nevertheless, Brazil’s true intentions for its current reforms remain questionable.

Although Brazil’s intentions is an issue with no clear answers, its inquiry remains significant in gaining a greater understanding of Brazil’s role in the international community. Many pressing questions remain, particularly whether Brazil’s desire to be considered a legitimate BRIC and global power in the international system has ultimately motivated Brazil’s continued security measures and land ownership reforms in the favelas.

If Brazil successfully hosts these two mega-events it may just be able to prove its position as a BRIC, so long as it continues to make improvements and provide favelados, inhabitants of the favelas, with sustainable solutions to their long lasting issues of security, development and human rights.

Brazil must remember that it will be under public scrutiny well after the Olympic flame is extinguished in 2016 and it is only after this occurs that its ultimate challenges to prove its role in the world will begin.

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The International Relations Review

Lebanon

Where Do We Go Now?

By Mano Sakayan, CAS ‘15

Photo Credit: Mano Sakayan, CAS ‘15

A view of Parliament Square in Beirut.

Lebanon, the pearl of the Middle East, endured a 15-year bloody civil war before coming to an end with the 1989 Taif Agreement. After a decade of relative calm, turmoil started again in 2005 with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in a massive blast that targeted his convoy in one of the busiest avenues of the Lebanese capital. Around 15,000 Syrian forces left Lebanon following the Cedar Revolution.

Many thought that the country managed to finally escape the grip of the Syrian regime after fifteen years of

“occupation” and was now on the path of self-determination. A year later, the summer of 2006 was scarred with the surprising outbreak of a war between Israel and Hezbollah, which brought images of devastation back to the minds of the public who thought that such acts would have now been a thing of the past.

The internal situation worsened with the rise of Shia-Sunni rivalry that culminated in street battles in West Beirut and Tripoli between Shia, Alawi and Sunni militias.

With the end of 2011, the Syrian

uprising had escalated to intense skirmishes between the Free Syrian Army and the regime’s armed forces.

The allies of Syria in Lebanon – mainly Hezbollah, the Amal Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement – watched the events cautiously. Eventually, Hezbollah decided to intervene in the Syrian civil war, helped the Assad regime in its fight against the Syrian rebels and marked a strategic triumph against Sunni opposition forces in the Battle of Al-Qusayr. Assad’s regime was able to partially recover. However,

Photo Credit: Myrna Jreige, CAS ‘15

34 Hezbollah’s reputation in the Arab and Muslim Worlds deteriorated from a group with “support among the Sunni for defeating Israel in a battle in 2006” into a “strictly Shia paramilitary force.”

Both its opponents and allies (chiefly the Free Patriotic Movement) condemned Hezbollah’s unlawful involvement in another country’s internal matters and civil war.

While the Syrian armed conflict is worsening, Lebanon is waiting for the formation of its new government -- a constant hardship for its people.

Following the 2009 elections, it took more than three months for former Prime Minister Saad Hariri to form his cabinet.

In January 2011, Hariri’s government collapsed after the resignation of all ten opposition ministers – they represented Hezbollah and its allies in the cabinet. Consequently, he left the country and decided to reside in Paris until further notice. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon indicted these Hezbollah figures who were allegedly involved in former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri’s assassination. It then took Prime Minister Najib Mikati five months to form a heterogeneous 30-minister cabinet that experienced continuous conflicts and splits. This led to the resignation of Mikati on March 23, 2011 and the appointment of Tammam Salam as Prime Minister-designate by President Michel Suleiman on April 6. Salam has now broken the record with the longest prime minister-designate appointment period.

On one hand, Hezbollah trusts that the Syrian regime’s position is ameliorating little by little and, with the recent Iranian-American rapprochement, any hopes of the Shia organization to concede have categorically faded. On the other hand, the Future Movement led by Saad Hariri holds representation in the government and refuses to see Hezbollah’s authority expand one cabinet after the other. Tensions are undeniably on the rise, especially with Saudi Arabia’s displeasure with the West’s and mainly the United States’ recent openness to Rouhani’s Iran, – its key contender in the region. However, a deal could be brokered at any minute between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and also between Iran and the West at the expense

The International Relations Review

Photo Credit: Mano Sakayan, CAS ‘15

of Beirut’s interests. Several traditional political rivals have initiated talks and negotiations with each other out of fear that their differences will seem absurd and fruitless once their respective regional and global powers force them to reconcile as part of the deal.

In addition to facing the political repercussions of the Syrian uprising, the country has witnessed a massive influx of Syrian refugees through its long borders with its neighbor. More than 800,000 Syrians left their houses and villages and took refuge in the dire conditions of Lebanon’s refugee camps. “The international community must assume its responsibilities towards Lebanon because it is suffering more than any other neighbors from the flow of Syrian refugees,” Mikati stated following his meeting with the head of the United States Agency for International Development. When talking about the dilemma of Syria’s refugees and their distribution in the region, the focus is habitually on Jordan or Turkey. However, of the 1.2 million refugees in the

Cedar nation, 400,000 of them are Palestinians.

In the near future, the country needs all the aid it can receive from Arab states and global powers in an effort to cope with the tragic consequences of the crisis in Syria. The refugees do not only pose social and economic risks but a security menace as well. Suleiman will be leaving office in the spring of 2014. Politicians of both rival camps will have to choose a new president and avoid dropping the republic into a precarious political power vacuum similar to the one that occurred in 2007-2008.

While it is easier said than done, Suleiman’s National Dialogue initiative and National Defense Strategy should thoroughly be followed with the aim of reinforcing the official armed forces and securing the internal situation. In the midst of all the chaos that the region and the country is witnessing, the average Lebanese citizen stands confused and disoriented, wondering where the country is heading.

Fall 2013

35

Guantánamo:

An Idea Beyond the Physical Institution

By Jason Feinman, CAS ‘14

GRAPHIC Credit ANBITA SIREGAR, CAS ‘16

The United States assumed territorial control over the southern portion of Guantánamo Bay under the 1903 Cuban-American Treaty. Over the past decade, hundreds have been detained as terrorism suspects.

As then presidential-candidate Barack Obama campaigned in the months leading up to the 2008 election, one of his frequent promises was to close the military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Five years later, the prison remains open with no signs of shutting its doors anytime soon. Amid a hunger strike in April 2013 involving 100 of the 166 prisoners held at the facility, Obama reaffirmed his commitment to close the prison and appointed lawyers Clifford Sloan and Paul Lewis as State Department and Defense Department envoys, respectively, to Guantánamo.1 Both men are now tasked with finding a way to transfer the 164 prisoners at the facility (two Algerians were transferred to Algeria in August, the first prisoners to be transferred in nearly a year)2 and to devise a plan to close the prison.3 With these announcements, a symbol of America’s post-9/11 counter-terrorism policies may finally be eliminated. However,

Guantánamo remains just that, a symbol.

While closing the prison may be popular domestically and internationally, without significant policy changes it will remain solely a symbolic gesture meant to appease those who do not recognize the deeper problems at hand.

Since January 11, 2002, 779 individuals have been incarcerated at Guantánamo, with a current population of 164.4 As of late June 2013, 46 prisoners held at Guantánamo Bay prison were classified as “indefinite detainees.” Until further notice, these individuals will remain held because they are “considered too dangerous to transfer from the jail but ineligible for trial because of insufficient or tainted evidence.”5 Tainted evidence refers to information that is inadmissible in court because it was obtained under conditions such as waterboarding. Ironically, these are the individuals with the clearest future: they will likely remain detained for the rest of

their lives. The only question left to answer is where they will be held. This is unlikely to be on U.S. soil since Congress, via a bipartisan vote, blocked “the acquisition of a state prison in Illinois to hold captives currently held in Cuba who would not be put on trial.”6 Of the other 118 prisoners, 84 have already been cleared for release and 34 have been or are expected to be charged with crimes. For the 84 cleared for release, the U.S. government has determined that they pose no threat. Yet they remain at the facility because their home countries refuse to take them back or the United States fears that any country willing to take them is too unstable.

They remain in a state of limbo between freedom and incarceration. For the 34 charged or expected to be charged with crimes, their future is murky. Congress “forbid the White House from financing trials of Guantánamo captives on U.S. soil.”7 Congress fears that some prisoners may

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Fall 2013 be acquitted of their charges should they be tried in federal court since some potentially incriminating evidence may be inadmissible.

This leaves military tribunals as the only option going forward. Unlike federal courts, military tribunals can admit evidence such as “reliable” hearsay that can lead to a conviction.8 They also are private, rather than public, and they require a majority decision

37 issues trying to transfer prisoners out of Bagram. Should the Obama administration find another location to transfer the prisoners from either facility, these people would still be bound by governmental policy. Guantánamo and Bagram would be closed, but in every other sense, they would still remain open.

When the Obama administration first

countries, they are left with two main options: leave Guantánamo open in the face of human rights groups calling for its closure or transfer the prisoners to other military locations and close the prison. Neither one solves the problem of holding prisoners for what increasingly seems to be an indefinite length of time. The United States has held thousands of individuals since the beginning of

“Through a combination of Congressional bills, legal jargon and objectionable interrogation techniques, the United States has created a prison. But this is not just a prison in the sense of physical boundaries: it is a metaphorical one stretching to all four corners of the globe.” in rulings, unlike the unanimous decisions required by civilian courts.9 Guantánamo Bay is not the issue, however; the issue is the policy. Through a combination of Congressional bills, legal jargon and objectionable interrogation techniques, the United States has created a prison. But this is not just a prison in the sense of physical boundaries: it is a metaphorical one stretching to all four corners of the globe. It has been constructed of policies seemingly designed to hold an individual perpetually. These policies do not end at Guantánamo’s boundaries.

The United States operates prisons around the world, not to mention CIA “black sites.”

Recently, the United States transferred power of Bagram Prison in Afghanistan (officially known as the Detention Facility at Parwan and unofficially as “the other Guantanamo”) to the Afghani government. However, more than 3,000 prisoners are still there, including many non-Afghans.10 Just as the United States struggles to transfer prisoners out of Guantanamo, Afghanistan is facing similar

took office in 2009, they expressed that “European countries and Persian Gulf states that previously resisted accepting Guantánamo Bay prisoners would be more open to resettling some who are cleared for release or who cannot be sent home because of the risk of torture.”11 At the current rate of release or repatriation, and with the limitations placed on the administration by Congress, moving the prisoners cleared for release or finding a new prison to house those charged does not seem likely. Guantánamo Bay prison is as much a physical location as it is an idea. Ironically, in the midst of fighting a war against an ideology, the United States has created a second abstract cause that now must be defeated. But just like eliminating al-Qaeda cannot eliminate terrorism, simply eliminating Guantánamo Bay cannot eliminate the policies it embodies.

The administration’s plans to close Guantánamo have stalled. Unable to try prisoners in federal court or release them to other

the Global War on Terror, and it has enacted policies which appear quintessentially “unAmerican.” While closing Guantánamo may be a nice talking point, one meant to appease those at home who believe the prison itself is the problem, closing the prison may actually make solving the greater issues at hand more difficult.

While no substantial discourse appears to concern changing the fundamental policies, there is even less of a chance for progress if Guantánamo were to close. As the old adage goes, out of sight, out of mind. Only by charging those inmates currently deemed indefinite detainees, guaranteeing fair trials and allowing prisoners to be held in facilities on American soil can the United States reconcile its actions with the belief system it prides itself on.

Keeping Guantánamo open may be the best way to keep the hopes of this policy change alive. At least then there is a physical prison to remind the government of its metaphorical one.

38

The International Relations Review

American Exceptionalism in the International Arena

By Numan Aksoy CAS ’16, COM ’16 For the past few years in the international community, there has been a dramatic increase in talks of American exceptionalism in intellectual circles.

President Obama recently reiterated his belief in American exceptionalism during his speech at the UN General Assembly.1 However, the idea of American exceptionalism is not a recent phenomenon. Some scholars may argue that this idea emerged in the United States. in the early stages of the post-WWII era, when the country had the world’s strongest military and economy. When the Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution they believed that America would not just be a nation among all nations, but a fundamentally distinguished nation.

Regardless, the fact that people around the world now increasingly debate the notion of American exceptionalism may be sufficient to suggest its downfall.

When discussing America’s exceptionalism, there is a critical point that is almost always neglected or simply unnoticed. The word exceptional can be used in two different ways. American exceptionalism can mean that America is different, even unique compared to other countries. It can also be understood as American superiority over other countries, that somehow America is better. Almost all previous discussions of American exceptionalism were centered on the idea that America is superior to other nations. The United States can still claim certain military, economic, and technological dominance, but America may actually be falling behind other countries because of its supposed “excellence.”

In terms of military expenditure, spending more on the military does not make America any better than other countries. It could even be seen as a bad investment. According to a study

by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), U.S. military expenditure in 2012 was higher than the next 11 countries’ expenditures combined at a shocking $682 billion, with China

Photo Credit: Eric Kashdan, CAS ‘14

following at only $166 billion.2 The prodigious military budget also explains another exception. The United States has over 700 military bases overseas, which is the world’s largest network of foreign military bases. As U.S. military bases drastically increased after World War II, so too did military and CIA interventions.

From the Korean War to the most recent war in Iraq, the United States has engaged

in countless overt and covert military campaigns including continuous drone warfare in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan.

America was also the first country in the world to acquire nuclear weapons.

Although many other countries followed with the development of their own nuclear weapons, America is the only country to have actually used a weapon of mass destruction. When weapons

Fall 2013 are developed, they will be used. As more money flows into the military, more weaponry will be developed and utilized. This results in more wars and an increase in young American lives lost in distant lands. However, American exceptionalism does not end with military prowess.

Proponents of American exceptionalism claim that American freedom and opportunity are what sets the United States apart from other countries.

Therefore 89 other countries are just as exceptional, as they hold the same status as the United States in terms of political freedom and civil liberties.3 One would think that such freedoms are guaranteed for all people, regardless of race, sex or religion. Embarrassingly enough this is not the case for many countries, including the United States As of 2013, America ranks 23rd among 136 countries for women’s economic, political, educational and health equality.4 As America ranks behind countries like Cuba, Nicaragua and Burundi, the alarming realization here is that the gender gap seems only to be worsening. America ranked 17th in 2011, and 22nd in 2012.

Another important issue is the U.S. world standing in income inequality.

Although the United States is the richest country in the world in terms of GDP, distribution of that wealth is by far one of the worst among developed nations.

According to data compiled by the Global Post using the Gini Index the United States has a higher degree of income inequality than almost any other developed country.5 Among 34 countries, the United States ranked 32. Despite the significance of such an economic disparity, it seems all too often ignored within America’s public realm. Yale professor and Nobel Prize winner for economics, Robert Shiller claims that “rising economic inequality in the U.S… is the most important problem.”6 Because of economic inequality, poor social welfare services are a national concern.

A recent Bloomberg study ranked 48 countries with the most efficient healthcare systems. Unsurprisingly, the United States ranked 46th.7 What is exceptional here is not the realization that America ranked behind countries like China, Iran and Libya, but the fact that an entire government shutdown took

39

Photo Credit: Eric Kashdan, CAS ‘14

place in the United States over a proposal for healthcare. Consequences of the poor distribution of America’s wealth coupled with weak social welfare programs ultimately result in an unhappy American public. The 2013 version of the World Happiness Report published by the UN, ranks America at 17.8 Recent revelations of NSA surveillance of U.S. citizens and 35 world leaders on a mass scale through every medium available have only fuelled the growing concern of American power exploitation.9 The misuse of superiority seems to have prevailed once again.

Although America may be superior in

areas like military power, national wealth and spyware technology, it does not necessarily mean that America is better than other nations. Instead it shows that in areas where superiority does exist, America only seems to exploit its power.

Attributing the skewed definition of exceptionalism on a particular country creates further complications. Perhaps President Obama was initially right when he said, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.”10 Conceivably, there is some truth to that.

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The International Relations Review

The Cultural Gap Behind the Democratic Peace Theory

By Alexandra Fox, CAS ‘15

According to the democratic peace theory, democratic countries will never engage in war with each other. Democratic peace theory explains many established political regimes and international policies, but it may be wrongly glorified.

Many democratic countries have certainly been in conflict and have come close to force, and therefore the democratic peace theory seems to hold true. The numerical data given from Oneal and Russett’s article, “The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence and Conflict, 1950-1985,” proved a link between peace and conflict between democratic countries and non-democratic countries. But no evidence suggested why the peace held. The democratic peace theory seemed to overemphasized institutions, as it assumes and oversimplifies the actions of democratic, autocratic or mixed states. These assumptions can be hurtful to a country’s reputation and could end up predicting incorrect behavior.

Samuel P. Huntington’s infamous article on “The Clash of Civilizations” theorized how the democratic peace theory was not the contributing power to peace and conflict, but how the world has given way for countries in particular cultural regions to collide with each other and resent those that do not belong. Cultural differences cause both regime types and wars, yet the theory states that democracy only seems to cause peace. The cultures behind democracies and non-democracies may be the explanation behind the peace theory.

The democratic peace theory is the underlying idea that liberal states will not engage in conflict with each other. Philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote in his essay “Perpetual Peace,” that one of several necessities for permanent peace was a constitutional republic. The idea did not gain popularity until U.S. President Woodrow Wilson entered World War I to establish liberal peace through the establishment of the League of Nations. In 1960, people began to study democratic peace when they

noticed that war often ensued with non-democracies, unlike when non-democracies worked with each other.

Michael Doyle defended liberal peace with the statement, “Alliances founded on mutual strategic interest among liberal and non liberal states have been broken; economic ties between liberal and non-liberal states have proven fragile; but the political bonds of liberal rights and interests have proven a remarkable firm foundation for mutual nonaggression. A separate peace exists among liberal states.”

Owen argued that liberal peace holds itself to be true because, “liberals will trust states they consider liberal and mistrust those they consider illiberal.” He agreed that the political ideologies and the systems within a country cause peace. But several assumptions are made about the democratic peace theory for it to hold true.

Christopher Layne discussed in his article critiquing the theory that, “Relations between Democratic states are based on mutual respect rooted in the fact that democracies perceive each other as dovish, that is, negotiation or the status quo are the only possible outcomes in dispute.”

This raises the question, if other countries were not perceived as “dovish,” would peace during a conflict between democracies be put in jeopardy? Political theorist Michael Doyle explained Kant’s liberalism as a positive notion because, “These international rights of republics derive from the representation of foreign individuals, who are our moral equals,” but sometimes people do not always see eye-to-eye and do not consider their allies as equals even when they claim to be. Liberalism is entirely in the individual’s self-interest to cooperate, but self-interests cannot always be assumed to be pacifist.

Another loophole in the democratic peace theory is the lack of explanation or logic for peace. The democratic peace theory is in fact that, a theory, and while it shows hopeful trends, it does not do much to explain the cause and reasoning behind

itself. David Spiro takes a step back from the peace theory to criticize, “If the absence of wars between democracies is predicted by random chance, that is not to say that chance is a good explanation for war.” The entire reason behind trend and theory development is for the sake of the ability to predict conflict in order to avoid it better. If the empirical evidence behind such a tool for peace is chance, it does not sound too hopeful for future leaders to predict whom their allies and enemies should be. Countries should consider a more concrete and reliable explanation for their policy making and conflict resolutions. What could be an underlying factor behind the so-called success of the democratic peace theory is that the nations at war and at peace have more to conflict over than just political ideologies.

The culture clashes behind recent conflicts speak more than the democratic peace theory. Huntington argues that the clash of civilizations explains the wars, or lack thereof, in recent years. History, language, culture, tradition and religion create distinct sections of the world that silently bind people together. A civilization is a cultural entity, and “a civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of which distinguishes humans from other species.” Religion, in particular, brings people together because it crosses borders and provides identity and commitment that can unite civilizations. People can be half French and half Arab, but they cannot be half Catholic and half Muslim.

These cultural differences promote national identity, but also create animosity for others who do not belong.

Differences do not always lead to conflict, and conflict does not always lead to violence, but differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts. The acknowledgement of people in other differentiating civilizations creates a feeling of civilization consciousness in people, which exaggerates differences and animosities stretching, or thought to stretch, back deep in history. The cultural differences of food and language are not the defining items between civilizations, but the ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, separation of church and state and free markets separate how people

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42

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live and think. Huntington argues that, “a world of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitable a world of double standards: people apply one standard to their kincountries, and a different standard to others.” While Owen and Doyle explained the security behind the democratic peace theory, there are questions that are left un-

genocides over one century.

The Bosnian Serbian government committed murder, rape, unlawful confinement and expulsion, targeting political leaders and intellectuals, among other horrors. Personal property was damaged as well as places of worship and business.

These countries were considered democra-

political systems. The political ideology divide rose from the Russian Communist influence from military presence in the East during World War II, and the democratic champion of the West. Today the cultural divide is Christianity in the West and Orthodox and Islam in the East. Throughout history we can see there was always a di-

“Democracy only seems to cause peace because it neglects the conflicts that cultural differences can stir and similarities can suppress.” answered, particularly those concerning the role of culture in conflict. These failings can be seen through the case studies of the Balkan conflicts from 1912 to 1995.

The Balkan region, which consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Turkey and Slovenia, lived under the Ottoman Empire’s rule until gaining independence in 1912 to 1913. In Turkey, the first known genocide occurred against the Armenian people in 1915. The ethnic conflict was completely devoid of political ideologies. The Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s were fought over ethnic conflicts and border disagreements.

Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia all gained sovereign republic status through these conflicts.

Lasting Cold War policy regulation and ethnic attitudes endured in the region, despite the installation of democracy within the independent countries after the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was dissolved in 1990. Furthermore, the countries in the Balkan area are all defined through different religions. Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam are prominent in these countries. A large Jewish population existed until World War II and the Holocaust, but today there is no significant minority to form a critical mass.

Bosnian Serbs performed an ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims and Croats from 1992 through 1995. Tensions were always high within the region, but it is hard to imagine that the area would see three

cies, but still created disputes over opposing cultural lifestyles. “Balkan peoples live in popularly-governed polities; yet they define themselves primarily not as abstract individuals, but according to religious categories: Serbs are Orthodox Christian, Croats as Roman Catholic, and Bosnians are Muslim. The lack of commonality means no Democratic Peace among these peoples.” These different religions and cultures were all living under the same umbrella of Yugoslavia and had to break out to show that they were neither similar nationalities nor a single unit of thought.

Unfortunately, their independence did not resolve the ethnic tensions in the region. The Balkan states are along a line that Huntington believed separated Western and Eastern Europe. These are fault lines within the world set after the Cold War that were actually the remnants from the 1500s.

The cultural divide starting from Finland heading south, dividing the former Soviet Union countries and through the Balkans shows where the Iron Curtain stood. It also shows the divide from the Holy Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire division.

The countries to the west stimulated Feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and in particular, the Industrial Revolution.

These aspects of history were present to the East of the fault lines, but were not nearly as exposed as the western civilization. The economic divide materialized from the Industrial Revolution. The countries that were not as affected by the industrial boom are less likely to develop stable democratic

vide, but time told what separated the two entities.

The democratic peace theory in itself can help explain the cause for peace and conflict amongst powers in the world.

Liberal peace is theoretically achieved through the notion that democracies do not fight each other. However, as seen in the cases with the Balkans, this theory does not adequately address the role of culture in conflict. A more nuanced approach that more effectively takes culture into account is necessary to understand conflict historically and today. Democracy only seems to cause peace because it neglects the conflicts that cultural differences can stir and similarities can suppress. The Balkans and the dividing cultural line from the split of the Roman Empire shows the importance of how culture spurs different ideologies, economies, religions and other necessities that help build or tear down nations. The relations between western countries and the Middle East have been strained for longer than people have realized. These cultural conflicts only continue to worsen as time and conflict continues. However these differences are not necessarily bad. Culture is such a crucial part of everyday life that it cannot be ignored in international relations.

Cultural differences cause both regime types and wars. Different cultures tend to fight each other and tend to adopt the type of regime that fits each other. As a result, democracy only seems to cause peace. The democratic peace theory holds a lot of potential, but culture is the key contributor to peace and conflict in the world.

Fall 2013

43

Editorial: The Interim Nuclear Agreement and the Long Road Ahead In late November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 world powers—U.S., Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany— struck an interim accord in Geneva to freeze Iran’s nuclear progress in exchange for limited sanctions relief.

After over three decades of diplomatic hostilities with the West, Iran’s relatively moderate President Rouhani entered into negotiations over his country’s controversial nuclear program. The deal has garnered reactions ranging from exultation and praise to labeling the meetings a second Munich, referencing the appeasement of the fascist powers before World War II. But while the deal is indeed an exciting development in the relations between Iran and the West, much of the reaction is so far premature and in some cases unwarranted.

Chief among their complaints, and the one most touted around the cable news sphere, is the fact that the deal allows Iran’s centrifuges to continue to spin. Indeed enrichment will continue, but only up to 5 percent -- lower than the level needed for even a very crude weapon. The stockpile of near-20 percent enriched uranium will be neutralized to 5 percent or below.

The deal says nothing about developing ballistic missile or warhead technology, and should the Iranians choose to simply switch focus for the duration of the deal, they certainly could. Opponents see these facts as evidence of a flawed deal, pointing especially to the continued lowlevel enrichment as conceding the socalled right to enrich.

Supporters of the deal mention that the conditions for Iran essentially freeze its nuclear program for its duration, during which more progress could ostensibly be made diplomatically. Iran, contrary to what many believe, is not gaining much in terms of sanctions relief.

Less than 7 percent of the roughly $110 billion in frozen assets are being released

into an economy that in the past year has been experiencing soaring inflation rates. Furthermore, for the first time, IAEA inspectors will have daily access to nuclear facilities. Under the deal the plutonium route is presumably taken off the table, with all progress at the Arak facility halted and the construction of a reprocessing facility prohibited.

While the importance of the current agreement obviously remains to be seen, the negotiations between the U.S. and Iran so far have the support of both the American and Iranian public, especially among young people. Young Iranians, many of whom see continued conflict with the West as limiting their economic potential in the future, greeted the news of an agreement with optimism.

While the sanctions did little to directly hamper the Iranian nuclear program, the impact on the general economy has been catastrophic, especially among the youth, many of whom cannot recall the origins of the hostility. The American public, on the other hand, while still suspicious of Iranian intentions, is wary of continued conflicts in the Middle East and increasingly seeks diplomatic resolutions in the region. However American support doesn’t come without its own problems.

By facilitating and agreeing to the deal, the United States is sticking its neck out in the hopes that at some point the bomb-making capabilities of Iran will be neutralized. Opposition at home and from its allies in the region, especially Israel, makes any negotiation with Iran difficult. The embellishment that both the supporters and opponents of the deal are pushing does nothing to contribute positively to the situation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama have called the deal a historic mistake and achievement, respectively. Yet the interim agreement is neither. It serves as the bottom rung

of a very unstable ladder, where any number of factors can return the situation to the pre-deal status quo. Neither side has relinquished much of anything, as is suitable for a first-stage interim agreement.

The ultimate function of diplomacy is to achieve the foreign policy goals of the given nation, but in a realistic manner. The goals of the United States and its allies in the region are clear, and to credit of the diplomats who worked on the deal, it’s a step in the right direction.

If other options existed to resolve the crisis, perhaps this deal would look weak and unlikely to bring real change. But there are none.

For years sanctions have been enforced, perhaps with more success recently and to no avail; Iran is still closer today than it ever was to achieving a nuclear weapon. The military option is, of course, still on the table, but the likelihood of action is low at this point as any action would be logistically difficult and likely to only give credit to the argument of hardliners in the country.

In the end, those who would demand Iran cease all enrichment and disable its facilities are simply not being realistic about the situation – Iran has committed to a nuclear program of some kind, regardless of the negative effects on its people.

The time to negotiate is now, not later. But negotiations only work if promises are kept: should the Iranian government disregard, circumvent or renege at a later point on any piece of the deal, the sanctions hammer must come down swiftly and without compromise.

The staff editorial was written by Vincent Jordan, CAS ‘15. For more information about the IR Review editors, visit irr.buiaa.org.

The IR Review E-Board Maddie Rosenberger, Editor-in-Chief Abbie Gotter, Managing Editor Steph Solis, Senior Layout Editor Anbita Siregar, Junior Layout Editor Vincent Jordan, Copy Editor Jatnna Garcia, Ad Manager Kelsea-Marie Pym, Junior Advertising Manager Nisha Shah, Senior Copy Editor Becca Shipler, Copy Editor Sam Coyle, Copy Editor Jesse Crane, Copy Editor Anushka Pinto, Copy Editor Paulina Limasalle, Copy Editor Pariza Lovos, Copy Editor

COM ‘14, CAS ‘14 CAS ‘14 COM ‘14 CAS ‘16 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘14 CGS ‘15, CAS ‘17 CAS ‘17 CAS ‘17

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The best way to express a reaction to a story or issue is by writing a letter to the editor. Students, professors, and other members of the Boston University community are encouraged to submit a letter for one of our biannual issues.

Letters can range from 200 to 500 words.

Each letter must include the author’s name, school/year at BU or an alternative appellation. Letters to the editor are not printed anonymously, unless there is a clear need for the author to protect his/her identity.

Letters are accepted on a rolling basis.

Any questions about letters should be sent to irr@buiaa.org with the subject line reading “Letter to the Editor.”

Colophon The International Relations Review is created using Adobe In-Design CS5 and exported as a PDF. Adobe Photoshop and Adobe Illustrator are also used in the production process. The IR Review prints more than 1,200 copies from Fowler Printing and Graphics in Randolph, Mass.

The typefaces for the publication include Times New Roman, Garamon, Trajan Pro and Minion Pro. The images in the publication are processed in CMYK. The magazine is printed on 100-pound gloss paper and comes with a saddlestitched binding.

The publication is run by the editorial board, which consists of copy editors, layout editors and the editor-in-chief.

The editorial board also handles external affairs, such as blogging, public relations, marketing, advertising and logistics.

Cover Photo The cover photo used for the Fall 2013 edition of the IR Review was taken by Mano Sakayan, CAS ‘15. The cover photo was one of several taken by Mano that were published in the magazine.

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