International Relations Review Spring 2016 Edition

IR REVIEW The International Relations Review at Boston University

Spring 2016

The Underground Dancers of Iran Hydropower to the People

Exclusive Interview: Russia Under Putin Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies

FOREIGN SECURITY

04 CULTURE &

ANTHROPOLOGY

20 EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW

26

ECONOMICS & DEVELOPMENT

32

REGIONAL POLITICS

44

FOREIGN SECURITY 06

Risky Behavior: China’s Internet and United States’ Foreign Policy

By Caroline Lord, CAS ‘18 China’s increasingly aggressive cyber behavior, originating from both state and non-state actors, threatens the successful implementation of the United States’ foreign policy.

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Oil as the Main Determinant of U.S. Policy in the Middle East

By Danielle Liberman, CAS ‘16 Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the United States has hidden behind a pro-democracy and pro-Israel policy in order to obscure its intentions in the Middle East to secure and maintain oil alliances in the region.

16 Birds of Pay:

The F-35 and the Costs of Sharing Defense Production

By Brian Monroy, CAS ‘17 The F-35 stealth fighter program was sold as a cost saving and alliance supporting approach to defense production. Today budget overruns, design flaws, and political maneuvering threaten to derail confidence in multilateral arms production.

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The International Relations Review

Risky Behavior:

China’s Internet and United States’ Foreign Policy

By Caroline Lord, CAS ‘18

I

n the context of modern globalization, there is no greater relationship than the one binding the United States and China. Their complex nexus, only a few decades old, has fundamentally changed the world: they are the two largest world economies, they each have a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council and they are the largest emitters of carbon dioxide. But U.S-China relations in cyberspace have tainted their bond with an undeniable sense of distrust.

Chinese President Xi Jinping ranks cyber development at the forefront of its domestic policy, announcing in 2014 the creation of the Central Cybersecurity and Informatization Leading Small Group which he would directly oversee.1 China’s

is most clearly seen in terms of the U.S.’s ability to carry out its foreign policy objectives. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (Q.D.D.R.) is a document which is published every four years by the U.S. Department of State, outlining the four worldwide priorities for U.S. foreign policy.4 The most recent edition of the Q.D.D.R., published in May of 2015, outlined the following priorities: to promote open, resilient, and democratic societies; to prevent and mitigate conflict and violent extremism; to advance inclusive economic growth; to mitigate and adapt to climate change.5 China’s extensive use of censorship and surveillance, support of corporate espionage, and statesponsored hacking threaten all four

placed on users.7 As early as 1994, the Ministry of Public Security was developing the Golden Shield Project or what is colloquially known as “the Great Firewall.”8 The project created an infrastructure for filtering out foreign sites, most notably websites for human rights groups and Taiwan and Tibet advocacy groups. Since its inception, this project and the broad issue of China’s internet censorship has been a contentious one for U.S. policy on China. The Great Firewall has increased in sophisticated since it was first implemented, now expanding to include keyword filters, blocked access to a growing number of websites and bandwidth throttling.9 By some estimates, China has over 100,000 government and private company employees monitoring

“By some estimates China has over 100,000 government and private company employees monitoring internet usage at any given time.” aggressive internet behavior over the past decade has exposed a great deal of vulnerability in U.S. networks, illustrating the destabilizing potential of unregulated cyber relations. Most significantly, the Office of Personnel Management data breach discovered in 2015, with an estimated 5.6 million fingerprints compromised, was attributed to hackers associated with the Chinese government.2 This breach was just the beginning in terms of what is possible with cyber-destructive behavior, which raises critical issues for U.S. policy makers. The threat of China’s aggressive internet policy and actions

of these goals.

The first of the four objectives identified by the Q.D.D.R. is “promoting resilient, open democratic societies”5 Under this, the State Department outlines four recommendations for successful advancement, one of which is to “strengthen support of civil society and protect an open Internet”6 There are significant challenges to this objective posed by China’s internet behavior, specifically perpetrated by government forces. China consistently ranks lowest among countries with regards to internet freedom, with severe restrictions

internet usage at any given time.10 These measures support the policies put forth by President Xi regarding “internet sovereignty,” requiring all people and groups operating in China to abide by strict usage regulations, the main party line used for justifying increased surveillance and censorship. Most recently, the Chinese government enacted a new cybersecurity law which would impose criminal sentences for users convicted of spreading “false information” on the internet, one of many restrictions on free speech in Chinese cyberspace..11 These limitations on internet access

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and usage are a clear roadblock to the promotion of democracy, the State Department’s first Q.D.D.R. objective, and as a result pose a severe risk to the success of the policy. As the threat to free internet has grown, it has become the subject of increasing rhetoric by senior U.S. officials. Most notably in 2010, thenSecretary of State Hillary Clinton made remarks on the abuses to the flow of information China was committing and put internet freedom at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. “Some countries have erected electronic barriers that prevent their people from accessing portions of the world’s networks… In the last year, we’ve seen a spike in threats to the free flow of information. China has stepped up their censorship of the internet,” Secretary Clinton said,12 “They’ve expunged words, names, and phrases from search engine results. They have violated the privacy of citizens who engage in non-violent political speech. These actions contravene the Universal Declaration on Human Rights...

With the spread of these restrictive practices, a new information curtain is descending across much of the world.”13 Clinton condemned China’s internet behavior as a threat to U.S. foreign policy for its extensive use of censorship, and set a precedent for U.S. involvement in China’s internet policies. The censorship and surveillance of Chinese internet is a key way in which China’s internet behavior is a threat to U.S. foreign policy. Chinese internet censorship is a fundamental risk to the U.S., not only as a threat to the promotion of resilient, open democratic societies, but also as the basis for the violation and threat to other platforms of U.S. foreign policy.

China’s internet policy also impedes Photo by Maura Feltault, CAS ‘17

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Photo by Kexin Yang, CGS ‘19

the State Department’s policy aim of “preventing and mitigating conflict and violent extremism.”14 The use of censorship and surveillance programs as significant abuses to human rights are aggravating factors in domestic conflict in China and have, in some instances, led to violent extremism. Given the current Chinese inclination to implement harsh limitations on free internet usage in response to violent extremism, there is a concern that such actions could create a vicious cycle and in turn foster greater acts of violence and instability in regions already subjected to cyber isolation.

This constitutes a significant threat to U.S. foreign policy objectives. This threat is most clearly manifested in the case of Xinjiang Province, a semi-autonomous province in northwest China home to repressed minority groups.15 In the past, the Chinese government has exerted its

control over the province by shutting off access to the internet when social unrest developed or the people of the Xinjiang protested against perceived social injustices. This was the case in 2010 when access to the internet was revoked for ten months following rioting in the province.

Service to the Xinjiang was also cut off following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, with the Chinese government citing concerns that residents of the province would be radicalized over the internet.16 However, human rights groups accurately argue that radicalization in Xinjiang occurs not primarily via the internet, but within the province as a result of the severe restrictions on freedoms.17 While the Chinese government has intensified restrictions in Xinjiang, arguing that the internet is a forum for spreading religious extremism, organizations such as Human Rights Watch

caution that cutting off access to the internet contributes to the unrest, giving rise to more frustrations and provocations in the already wrathful region.18 This case study illustrates the role the Chinese government’s aggressive internet censorship and surveillance plays in regional to conflict and violent extremism.

Their aggravating actions which spur violent responses are a direct threat to the principle of mitigating such violence and extremism. By taking a heavy-handed course of action in dealing with unrest and in meeting protests of human rights violations with more restrictions on those rights, China threatens the implementation and success of the aims of the U.S. Department of State.

The third doctrine of current U.S. foreign policy advocated by the U.S. Department of State is “advancing inclusive economic growth.”19 This is a particularly salient issue

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Spring 2016 U.S.-China cyber relations, and another aim of U.S. Department of State that is threatened by China’s cyber behavior. There are several obstructions in the realm of advancing inclusive economic growth posed by private Chinese hackers and Chinese government units.

International trade is at the forefront of fostering inclusive economic growth, yet China’s restrictive internet policies which block access to major U.S. companies threaten to hinder any progress in this arena.20 This is a particularly problematic restriction given China’s clout as an international market, with more internet users than the entire U.S. population. While Chinese companies are able to saturate U.S. markets using the internet, American companies do not have the same access to Chinese consumers due to the extreme censorship of websites.21 China is banning U.S. websites and companies, such as Facebook, Twitter, Google, Flickr and YouTube.22 However, the brunt of the burden is borne by small businesses and entrepreneurs in the abroad without the means to access the electronic marketplace of hundreds of millions of consumers.

Ed Black, CEO of the Computer and Communications Industry Association, testified in front of the Congressional Executive Commission on China in 2011 saying, “Chinese internet censorship is part of a continuing pattern of using trade and regulatory policies that either restrict access to Chinese markets, or force foreign companies to acquiesce to Chinese government economic and political demands as the price of access.”23 President Obama singled out unequal trade access and restrictions on inclusive economic growth as a priority for

discussion with President Xi ahead of the September 2015 China State Arrival Ceremony.24 China’s censorship policies create a hostile and difficult environment for foreign businesses to navigate and thrive in, and create unequal access to markets which directly inhibits the U.S. State Department’s aim of inclusive economic growth.

Another threat China’s internet behavior poses to inclusive economic growth comes primarily from nongovernmental actors, although it is unclear the extent to which the Chinese government may be covertly aware of or in support of the actions.

“... there is a concern that such actions could create a vicious cycle and in turn foster greater acts of violence and instability in regions already subjected to cyber isolation.”

Hacking with the aim of corporate espionage and theft of intellectual property (IP) is an extraordinarily pervasive issue with significant repercussions for the international community, including a reduction in competition, loss of revenue, and unwillingness to engage in trade, hindering innovation and fair trade for all countries involved. According to a report commissioned in 2013 by the Bipartisan Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, IP theft costs the U.S. approximately 300 million dollars a year, with China accounting for

50 to 80 percent of all IP theft.25 In addition, the report found that “national industrial policy goals in China encourage IP theft, and an extraordinary number of Chinese in business and government entities are engaged in this practice”. Since the report’s publication, cyber espionage and IP theft have come to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy with China and President Obama calls it “one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face.”26 President Obama reinforced this rhetoric in a speech to CEOs last September saying, “traditional intelligence-gathering functions are different from [the Chinese] government or its proxies engaging directly in industrial espionage and stealing trade secrets, stealing proprietary information from companies. That we consider an act of aggression that has to stop.”27 “Corruption and unaccountable governance” is identified by the State Department as one of the main obstacles to promoting inclusive economic growth, noting that such governance “hinders entrepreneurs and entrenches elite interests.

Corruption reduces government revenue collection, and stunts public infrastructure and human capital investments.” The CCP exhibits these qualities, with Chinese government agencies engaging in invasive cyber behavior, escaping public scrutiny. The Chinese government has shown time and time again an unwillingness to own up to criticism, engage in discussions about internet censorship, and end covert hacking operations.28 China’s internet behavior as a threat to U.S. foreign policy is due to the unequal access to markets, unaccountable government, corporate espionage and IP theft, each issue having a

10 profoundly negative effect on the advancement of inclusive global economic growth.

The final foreign policy objective in the Q.D.D.R. to “mitigate and adapt to climate change� is threatened by increasingly frequent cyber-attacks to the U.S. power grid.29 Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta called the threat of a cyberattack on the U.S. power grid a potential cyber-Pearl Harbor.30 It is well understood by government officials that the Chinese have the ability to take down the U.S. power grid.31 In doing so, the critical infrastructure of the U.S., that which provides basic resources such as electricity and maintains critical public works, would be compromised.32 This

The International Relations Review would pose a significant threat to the U.S. foreign policy aim of mitigating and adapting to climate change.

Such an attack on the power grid would put a strain on resources unlike anything experienced by even developing countries, as a serious cyber-attack could leave the U.S. with an estimated one day of functioning and reserves from which to draw.33 An attack on the U.S. power grid would have overwhelmingly negative environmental consequences with deep-rooted issues even after the power grid was restored. This is not hyperbolic conjecture; cyber the U.S. grid and power companies are becoming more prevalent, and Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson conceded that the risk of

a cyber-attack on the power grid is great and that the country is largely unequipped to deal with it .34 Any cyber-attack on the U.S. power grid would directly contend with the country’s ability to pursue its stated aim of mitigating and adapting to climate change, countering actions already taken by both the U.S. and other countries to preserve resources.

While there is some progress in opening a dialogue on these issues between Beijing and Washington, the conversation is lacking in commonly defined norms and enforcement mechanisms. The four objectives of U.S. foreign policy and the increasingly clear threats to their success and implementation

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Spring 2016 presented by China’s internet behavior are eliciting greater response and engagement from all branches of the U.S. government on the issues. Most notably, the September 2015 meeting of President Obama and President Xi was a historic step. A ‘memorandum of understanding’ was reached, with both sides agreeing to a few, fundamental norms. These agreements and the focus of the discussion clearly reflect the priorities identified by the U.S. Department of State, the identified threats to their objectives and the way in which the threats are manifested. Important issues such as enforcement and oversight cannot yet be a part of a conversation which

is so lacking in commonly defined norms, standards of behavior, and boundaries. This lack of standards is not going unnoticed. Government officials and military leaders around the globe have warned that the next world war will be fought, at least partially, in cyberspace.35 Discussions of what constitutes cyber warfare are already underway, coupled with a discussion on what would be considered cyber “disarmament”36 These threats to U.S. foreign policy interests promote an urgency to create rhetoric and guidelines on this developing field.

In trying to grapple with these issues, the September meeting between President Xi and President Obama identified a fifth, critical threat to the

foreign policy aims of both countries: the threat of ignoring the need for a framework of international norms for cybersecurity and behavior. The four objectives of the Q.D.D.R. will continue to be threatened by Chinese internet behavior at an exponential rate if these gaps in understanding are not confronted. The identified threats to the Q.D.D.R. objectives have significant impacts which must be addressed with appropriate rhetoric and common understanding in order to take full advantage of the opportunities for prosperity and mitigate the growing dangers of the developing field of cyber behavior.

Photo by Harini Natarajan, COM ‘16, CAS ‘16

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Photo by Victoria Reynolds, CAS ‘18

Oil as the Main Determinant of U.S. Policy in the Middle East

By Danielle Liberman, CAS ‘16 During the twentieth century maintaining access to oil became a central aspect of the United States’ foreign policy and has remained an imperative element today. After the formation of the United States’ alliance with Saudi Arabia in 1933, oil became permanently tied to the U.S. economy. Since then, preserving this security has become the primary political-economic concern for the United States. Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the United States has hidden behind a pro-democracy and proIsrael policy in order to obscure its intentions in the Middle East to secure and maintain oil alliances

in the region. The true issue with U.S. foreign policy today lies in the disparity between the advertised aims and true intentions, as shown through numerous instances over the past few decades.

Since the 1930s, the main determinant of U.S. policy in the Middle East is based around protecting oil producers and its flow through the region. In 1945, President Roosevelt cemented oil’s link to U.S. national security when he hosted a Saudi king, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud for the first time on the USS Quincy.1 Since then, the U.S. has interfered in several conflicts in the Middle East, attempting to stabilize

any disturbance that affects its oil producing allies. One prominent example of how oil has deeply affected domestic foreign policy was the CIA-led Iranian coup that unseated the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammed Mossadeq, in place of Reza Shah.

After this, and throughout the 1970’s, the U.S. focused on a new regional geopolitical strategy of strengthening Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both of these countries were subsequently positioned as the “twin pillars” of this strategy within the region. However, this new era of militarization led to further instabilities in the region.

The United States continued to

Spring 2016 to support Saudi Arabia and Iran, whose leaders abused their power for personal interests. This support drastically decreased public support.2 The United States’ commitment to intervention in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf is further exemplified by President Carter’s reaction to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Carter’s new vision for the region revealed that he would begin to use military force to protect the flow of oil. With the recall of the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and the postponement of action on the SALT-II nuclear weapons treaty, Carter made it undeniably clear that the Soviet Union’s invasion and subsequent establishment of a puppet government was incredibly damaging to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Another example of two countries engaging in conflict within the region is Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran and then Kuwait.

Kuwait, invaded by Iraq in 1986, requested the protection of the U.S., which ultimately led to America’s permanency in the region.3 The takeover of Kuwait by Iraq increased the chances of an invasion into Saudi Arabia, which would have lead to Saddam controlling one fifth of the world’s oil supply. Further, the importance of maintaining stability in the oil-producing allied nations is demonstrated in with Operation Desert Storm, where the U.S. mobilized five-hundred thousand troops in defense of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.4 Through the direct involvement of the U.S. and militarization of the region, the U.S. is participating in a sustained war to protect pro-Western regimes and maintain the stable price of oil.5 While the war was initiated over suspicion of Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is since revealed

13 that not only were there no WMDs present, but that several U.S. officials fabricated evidence to gain support for the invasion. It is also clear that U.S. control of the oil resources in the region was far more prevalent than was previously published.

Throughout the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, U.S. dependence on oil has become the the main determinant of U.S. policy in the Middle East and the driver of regime-change in the region.6 While the American Israel Public

“U.S. dependence on oil has become an economic and strategic liability, transforming oil as the main determinant of U.S. policy in the Middle East and the driver of regime-change in the region.”

Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Pro-Israel Lobby’s goal is for the U.S.’s alliance with Israel to be the main determinant of U.S. policy in the Middle East, this is not the case.

With oil as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the U.S. has struggled to balance its support for Israel with its support for oil producers in the region.7 Many of the region’s oil producers are against the U.S.’s overwhelming support for Israel, as seen through the Arab lobby. The Arab lobby is based on oil and the Palestinian Question encompassing the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict that has enveloped the region since the mid20th century. Yet Saudi Arabia, the main component of the Arab lobby, focuses primarily on the survival of the Saud family. Contrary to what the U.S. advertises, the involvement of the U.S. and Israel is secondary to that goal.8 When the dual priorities of oil-based relationships and the U.S.’s relationship with Israel are compared, it is clear that oil interests are the priority. The U.S. oil-based concerns include Israel to a certain degree as well, but not to the level of states such as Saudi Arabia. For example, the U.S. was impacted by the embargo on oil after the October War that occurred in Israel, but this did not lead the U.S. to reconsider its policies; rather, it served as another reason for the U.S. to increase its security of the region as a whole.9 While the Pro-Israel lobby has deeply influenced U.S. policy, it is not the main focus of U.S. policy in the Middle East. International Relations theorists Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the unwavering U.S. support of Israel and the skewing of national interests has jeopardized U.S. security in the region.10 Interest groups, including the Pro-Israel lobby, shape policies by through campaign contributions and influencing public opinion.11 The U.S.-Israel alliance is a strategic partnership rather than a cornerstone in U.S. security and military interests and this has resulted in the unraveling of the ProIsrael lobby amongst the Obama Administration.12 While Israel is a strategic alliance and the Pro-Israel lobby is effective in Washington, U.S. public opinion in the Middle East has undergone remarkable shifts since the success of 1967.

Thus, while support for Israel is by no means guaranteed, protecting oil

14 and oil producing states are deemed as more important.13 While the U.S. has promoted democracy in the Middle East, its involvement with oil has lead to some unraveling of democracy in the region.14 The U.S. promotion of its own oil concerns have led to a rise of Islamist political movements and military violence in oil producing states and surrounding regions.15 While many regimes throughout the Middle East have expressed a strong commitment to democracy, they do not represent the will of their people. As levels of anti-American sentiment rise, the United States has stifled democratic gains in the region in order to maintain control over the oil producing countries.16 Looking at cases such as the Iranian coup, it’s clear that maintenance of democracy and stability continually falls second to ensuring that the regimes are

The International Relations Review secure in their backing of U.S. oil interests.

Democracy is at odds with the strategic interests of the United States in the Middle East as it will likely bring groups unsympathetic to the United States into power.

Instead of increasing and promoting democracy, the United States foreign policy is designed to secure its own interests, which primarily revolves around access and protection of oil. This results in authoritarian and Pro-American regimes maintaining power through authoritarian rule.17 During the past few decades, one of the advertised goals of the United States’ foreign policy has been to foster democracy abroad to ensure national security, but in the Middle East the U.S. has proven to value cooperative alliances and regimes over democracy and its potential value in the region.18

While the United States continuously boasts foreign policy that promotes democracy and a strong alliance with Israel, the main determinant of its policy in the Middle East is oil. Throughout the past century, the United States has attempted to secure and maintain its oil alliances in the region by frequently destabilizing democratic regimes. By doing so, the United States has at times disregarded democracy in favor of corrupt and authoritarian regimes for protection of its regional oil interests. There is a clear disconnect between the publicly advertised goals of U.S. foreign policy and its true motivations due to its patterns of continuous intervention within the Middle East over the past few decades.

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Photo by Rayyan AlJamali, CAS ‘18

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The International Relations Review

Birds of Pay:

The F-35 and the costs of sharing defense production

By Brian Monroy, CAS ‘17

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n the morning of October 30, 2013 the sound of a roaring jet engine pierced through the quiet blue skies off the coast of California. The sleek, gray-colored plane cruised above the water at high speed. After completing its survey of the area, the aircraft locked on to a target and fired a single AIM120 air-to-air missile. The missile proceeded at near supersonic speed toward its target and then produced a spectacular explosion upon impact over the waters of the Pacific. However, this was not an encounter with a hostile force. What had just taken place was the very first weapons test conducted by the United States Air Force’s F-35A Lightning II, a state-of-the-art stealth fighter aircraft designed for the next generation of air warfare.1 However, getting to this point had been far from easy. Since its inception in 1994 as the Joint Strike Fighter program, the F-35 project has been marred by controversy and plagued by various design problems. The cost of the program has ballooned

to an astronomical $400 billion, making the F-35 Lightning II the most expensive weapons acquisition program in U.S. history.2 In addition to this distinction the program is unique in that, unlike most previous American defense procurement projects, the F-35 is a joint endeavor between the governments of several foreign countries seeking to bolster their own defense capabilities while stimulating their respective economies. This has led to a situation where governments continue to invest money in a defense project in order to attain short term economic benefits such as job creation and industry protection while remaining largely negligent of the many performance issues and design flaws of the aircraft that jeopardize its ultimate strategic military purpose.

While international collaboration on defense is intended to promote more interoperability and cohesion between allies, the case of the F-35 has illustrated the need for serious reform and reconsideration for future co-produced weapon systems in order to ensure lower costs and

the leading-edge performance required to counterbalance Russian and Chinese military capabilities.

When test pilot Air Force Captain Logan Lamping returned his F-35A to Edwards Air Force Base in southern California, the test was lauded as a great success and important milestone for the troubled aircraft. “This test represents the culmination of many years of careful planning by combined government and contractor teams,” said Charlie Wagner, the weapons team lead for the F-35 Joint Program Office.3 Since then, the F-35A, as well as its Marine Corps (F-35B) and Navy (F-35C) counterparts, has gone on to complete a variety of flight operations and tests, steadily reaching full capability for subsequent deployment in the U.S. armed services and air forces abroad. The plane reached another milestone earlier this year when an Italian built F-35 completed its first transatlantic crossing in February.4 But the jet has been and continues to be plagued by a risky development schedule, design flaws, lackluster performance, and skyrocketing

Spring 2016 a high level of concurrence between the testing and production phases of the design process, meaning units were being built before critical tests were scheduled to be completed, leading to massive cost increases when design flaws force contractors to replace parts in planes that have already been produced, a process further complicated by the fact that there are three different variations of the aircraft.5 Officials within the U.S. Air Force have also expressed concerns that the F-35 may not be able to outperform existing aircraft such as the F-16 in aerial combat.6 Yet with all of its problems the F-35 Lightning II remains fully funded and plans to deploy the fighter to the Armed Services, while delayed, will still proceed as planned. This is largely thanks to near unanimous support from Congress, where senators and representatives are hesitant to jeopardize the employment in their states that the program provides. Domestically, the Joint Strike Fighter program supports 1,300 suppliers in 45 states, providing 133,000 jobs.7 At a time when the U.S. is still reeling from the effects of the 2008 recession, the provision of jobs for constituents has become the bread and butter of most politicians. Even Senator John McCain (R-AZ), who had long

17 been opposed to such “disgraceful” and “outrageous” spending, did not hesitate to praise the F-35 as “the greatest combat aircraft in the history of the world” at a Marine Corps Air Station ceremony in Yuma.8 Defense Secretary Robert Gates was less reluctant to accept such reckless spending. In 2010 he placed the F-35 “on probation,” threatening cancellation if the plane’s propulsion system was not fixed immediately.9 The Department of Defense withheld $614 million in fees to Lockheed Martin and fired the Marine general in charge of the program. The plane has since returned to a stable procurement schedule and all F-35 models are projected to reach initial operational capability by the end of this year.

The U.S. has for the most part remained cautiously optimistic with its outlook on the F-35 fighter.

However, continuing battles over budgets place increasing pressure on the Armed Services to make cuts to their procurement plans. As a result it was announced in February of this year that the Air Force would purchase five less aircraft than originally planned, reducing its order from 48 to 43 planes for FY-17, saving millions.10 While overall not a significant decrease, it demonstrates that the Air Force

is aware of increasing pressure of budget allocation.

But the F-35 is not just an American issue. While the U.S. is the primary stakeholder in the project, there are several American allies that have collaborated directly throughout the entire process. These allies include the UK, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Israel, Turkey and the Republic of Korea. In the past, the governments of these countries might have purchased fully produced weapon systems independently manufactured in the United States. Generally, these states lack the capacity to produce these armaments on their own, due largely to the inability of their small defense industries to achieve the economies of scale necessary to make such production feasible. Small states can solve this issue by either investing heavily in their domestic defense industries or by collaborating with other states on military weapons projects. International collaboration allows states to share technology and specialize production in specific parts of a weapon system rather than individually produce all components, potentially saving billions in research and development costs.

The access to new technology and specialization of production should, in theory, reduce costs and yield a superior product. Yet

Photo by Brian Monroy, CAS ‘17

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and yield a superior product. Yet in both regards the opposite has been true of the F-35. Not only have costs skyrocketed since the program’s creation, but there are looming questions and doubts over the aircraft’s ability to perform as promised, leading many to wonder whether or not this collaborative undertaking will payoff in the end.

The F-35 is far behind schedule and has come up short in performance tests against the very aircraft it is supposed to eventually replace.11 All of this has led many countries to reconsider their involvement in the Joint Strike Fighter program. Italy announced in 2012 that it would reduce its overall purchase of F-35s from 131 units to 90.12 Canada showed signs of taking similar action when Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promised during his campaign last fall that a Liberal government would put an end to Canada’s involvement in the costly program. Prime

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Minister Trudeau has since recanted his promise and for the time being intends to allow the F-35 to bid for the replacement of the country’s aging fleet of Cold War era CF-18 fighter jets.13 The exit of any one country from the Joint Strike program threatens to raise costs even higher for the remaining parties. This puts the United States, the key stakeholder in the project, in the position of having to convince her allies to continue their support of the F-35, something especially difficult in light of their decreased willingness to devote large portions of budgets to defense. Washington’s only hope would be to convince each skeptical country of the economic benefits of retaining a stake in the F-35. It is a strong argument as F-35 production supports jobs for thousands of suppliers in the nine partner countries. Yet the jobs produced abroad by the program remain

small next to the costs incurred by allied governments in countries that are more sensitive to increases in defense spending.

But questions remain over whether or not the F-35, once deployed, will be able to successfully carry out its mission as advertised. This has produced serious concerns from experts within the U.S. Air Force and elsewhere, who warn that the F-35 may not be able to effectively perform the duties previously given to its predecessors such as the A-10 Thunderbolt II, which has been in service since 1977. The A-10 is just one of several platforms the F-35 is slated to replace within the US Air Force. Critics have blasted the fighter’s inability to perform operations such as close air support at the level of existing technology and blame this lackluster performance on the government’s emphasis on creating a platform that is a “jack of all trades, but a master of none.”14

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They also deride the F-35’s focus on stealth technology, which many see as both responsible for unprecedented costs and entirely unnecessary given recent conflicts the U.S. and allies have participated in, mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan, where stealth provides little tactical advantage.15 Proponents insist, however, that the new aircraft, when ready, will be able to outperform any existing weapon system on the battlefield once the F-35’s complex software features become operational.

The F-35 fighter, a project over twenty years in the making, is still far from prepared for full deployment, which will not be completed until at least 2037.16 In the meantime the Joint Strike Fighter program has become a major liability for the governments involved as they face increased domestic pressure to cut their losses and walk away from the project altogether. This is especially true for countries that are more

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reluctant to spend on defense than the U.S. It has become clear that the economic benefits that countries gain from the program are no longer enough to keep them interested in a plane that is over budget and may not be able to fly as well as promised, leading them to look elsewhere for future procurement of defense technology. This leaves the US straddled with the bulk of the debt and unable to abandon the F-35 due to the project’s hold on forty-five states and, therefore, on Congress. If anything can be learned from the case of the F-35, it is that the American weapons procurement process is in need of major re-evaluation and reform.

The Pentagon and Department of Defense will have to apply harsh rules and penalties to reign in contractors and prevent political immunity.

This may also include providing incentives for firms to complete work on time and at minimal costs.

But the prospects for reform of the process remain extremely dubious given the lobbying capacity of defense contractors. In addition, reform today will do little to fix the Joint Strike program, which has already absorbed too much time and money to be abandoned.17 At this point, with few other options, the United States and her allies can only hope that the F-35 Lightning II, once its many problems are solved, will be the cutting-edge, game changing platform it was meant to be. Until then, one thing remains clear; international collaboration on defense production is not the efficient and dynamic process that they had hoped it would be, and they will now likely need to find another way to balance against rivals Russia and China, who continue to successfully develop their military capabilities for 21st century warfare.

Photo by Maddie Ferrill, CAS ‘19

CULTURE & ANTHROPOLOGY 22 The Underground Dancers of Iran

By Raina Kadavil, CAS ‘19 Under a policeman’s gaze, it is almost impossible to “dance as if no one is watching.” Dance is a freedom that most people take for granted, but in Iran dancers can pay the ultimate price.

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The International Relations Review

The Underground Dancers of Iran

By Raina Kadavil, CAS ‘19

D

ancing is generally understood as an inalienable right and furthermore one that might seem futile to deny. From swing, jazz and modern hip hop in the United States to Bharatanatyam, Kathak and modern Bollywood in India; from Adumu and Kpanlogo in Sub-Saharan Africa to Samba and Capoeira in Brazil, dance is a uniting force that has evolved, fluxed and carried nations and their peoples into the modern world. Dance has served as a way of expressing oneself and telling stories that would otherwise have been lost; a boost in morale when the future seems bleak; a form of entertainment that has the ability to bring people of all backgrounds and beliefs together. It serves as a testament to the globalizing nature of the modern world: the expansion of both media and travel brings the creativity of peoples miles apart from one another into close concentration, paving the path for greater knowledge, tolerance, and inspiration. Not all nations, however, see it as such. Bans against dance and freeform movement have swept across the world, often in the most unexpected places and for a variety of reasons. While many nations, from Kuwait to Japan to the liberal stronghold that is Sweden, have passed laws that prohibit various

aspects of dance, the harshest of these comes from Iran.

The Middle East is ripe with hotspots of violence and human rights violations. The news has recently been plagued by Iran thanks to its newly signed nuclear deal with world powers, laying the groundwork for nuclear disarmament in exchange for the loosening of economic sanctions. Amid dozens of other problems, the world’s activists are hardly taking a closer look at dance, one thing in particular that Iranians are deprived of.

The persecution of dance was brought to light in 2014 among cries of outrage when seven young Iranians were arrested for their video dancing to Pharrell’s “Happy.”1 The young men and women believed that they were exercising a basic human right of expression and embracing their culture; unfortunately, not everyone was happy with the production. Each of the convicted has been sentenced to up to one year’s jail time and ninety-one lashes.

Luckily for them, the sentences have now been suspended and will not be carried out unless they are found guilty of other crimes within the next three years.

The jail time was punishment for participating in the video, while the lashes condemned their challenging of Islamic norms. One defendant was even given an additional six

months for the possession of alcohol – all of which bring to light the alarming nature and extent of Iran’s theocratic rule. The dancers were forced to apologize publicly for their “vulgar” actions.

Unfortunately, this is not the first time that young people in Iran have been punished for their passion for dance. Last year, Hollywood further publicized the issue through their release of Desert Dancer, which tells the story of Afshin Ghaffarian, an infamous Iranian dancer who fled the country during the 2008 Iranian elections and the Arab Spring in order to escape persecution and freely practice his art.2 The Iranian National Ballet Company, now known as Les Ballets Persans, disbanded soon after the 1979 Revolution and now operates out of Stockholm, leaving dozens of aspiring dancers to stage their own miniature revolutions in the dark and hidden corners of Iran.3 From a historical perspective, this phenomenon seems oxymoronic: Iran is heir to the legacy of Persia – one of the history’s greatest empires both in might and in cultural richness.

Historically, court dances, folk dances and war dances in dozens of different styles were a fundamental part of Persian culture. The Sufis or devishes who often facilitated the spread of Islam owe their spinning

“Dance has served as a way of expressing oneself and telling stories that would otherwise have been lost; a boost in morale when the future seems bleak; a form of entertainment that has the ability to bring people of all backgrounds and beliefs together.”

Spring 2016 fantastically embellished costumes and fluid skirts that are characteristic of the Middle East all stem from the Persian forefathers of Iran.4 Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, dance was an integral part of Iranian culture. The government poured funding into programs for the arts. Dance in particular was held to very high esteem, combining elements of Western dance with traditional Persian styles. The first Iranian ballet institution was founded in 1928 and until recently, Iran was home to the Middle East’s most celebrated ballet company.

During the 1940s and -50s, Iranian dance companies toured across the Middle East, India, and Europe, performing for prestigious guests like the Queen of England and U.S. President Nixon. Thanks to the government and many wealthy patrons, dance in Iran has been transformed from the last-choice career of a lowly entertainer into an art form celebrated by the whole world. Today, however, these same dance companies have been forced underground or out of the country altogether, or risk being dissolved altogether.

Everything changed with the 1979 revolution: the Cultural Revolution that followed reinstated Iran as an Islamic theocracy and it recast dance in the beliefs of traditional Islam, as sinful. Women in particular are restricted by this law, as they are not only prohibited from dancing in public, but must conform to the standard loose-fitting garb and headscarf which are difficult to dance in. The Committee for Islamization of Universities went to work purging the Iranian education system of everything they considered to violate an “Islamic atmosphere.” Today, courses like music and dance have been classified as “fake knowledge.”

23 This jurisdiction even extends to humanities like law, political science, economics, psychology, education, and sociology. As a result, the Revolution gave way to the Iranian Diaspora. Thousands of Iranian intellectuals, artists, writers, and politicians are today isolated to other parts of the world in fear of persecution, producing a nation free of Western influence, but greatly weakened in development, innovation, and economic growth.

The prohibition of dance in Iran both then and today takes two forms: the desire to conform society to the fundamental ideals of Islam, and the desire to expel all things Western from contaminating Iranian society.

It sets a precedent that violates a basic human right of expression, which is echoed in various ways by other Islamic nations such as Kuwait, where anything more than clapping and slow swaying at concerts is illegal, and Afghanistan, where the rich traditions of Sufi spinning and Pashtun attan are being suppressed out of fear of Taliban insurgents and their public beheadings of dancers.5 But as is the case with many forms of irrational oppression, it has also given birth to a beautiful movement.

While mass demonstrations in the streets are neither logical nor safe the way they would be in Japan or Sweden, Iranians who wish to dance – particularly young, female ballerinas – have found their refuge in two places where they feel safe: dark basements and social media.

Despite the government’s best efforts to eradicate it from the populace, Iranian ballet endures. Ads are slyly coordinated into newspapers, and classes are conducted in secret, in abandoned buildings or in teachers’ homes with the curtains carefully drawn. There is the ever-present fear that the police may appear and shatter

the blissful dream, but the teachers and students find the risk well worth the rewards. And occasionally there is a silver lining: the destruction of the dance industry has created small pockets of opportunity for those who are able and willing to produce and silently sell dance shoes with little competition. Shoes and dance classes are advertised on Instagram – something never before possible, but now revolutionary. Dance is occasionally allowed under one condition – massive bribes equaling thousands of dollars.

It is encouraging to know, however, that with young people, change is beginning. Our world currently faces the largest and most informed population of young people it has ever known, and they continuously refuse to remain silent on the issues that they face, particularly in the Middle East. The Egyptian Revolution of the 2011, for example, was spurred by young people using technology to bring about the change they sought in their government.6 This holds true in Iran. Iran’s middle and upper class youth were overtaken over the course of recent years by a craze to learn dance, despite the harsh law that forbids them to do so.7 From graceful ballet to fiery salsa and tango, Iranian youth spend huge sums of money to be able to express their forbidden passions. Partner dances like the salsa and tango are especially forbidden because Iran’s Islamic code forbids unrelated men and women from mixing in private.

Dance classes are taught cleverly in secret, or otherwise in gyms, disguised as aerobics.

Iran is perhaps the most extreme case of a regime that preserves a hatred for dance. However, it is not the only case; nor is it the most shocking. Japan is a dance ban success story – its ban was recently Photo by Raina Kadavil, CAS ‘19

24 lifted. For the last sixty-seven years, Japan has prohibited dance anywhere but in specially licensed venues, and all dancing regardless of where was mandated to stop at midnight, creating a story of Footloose meets Cinderella. The law came postWorld War II when dance halls were prostitution hotspots. However, since the evolution of Japan into a dynamic, highly developed nation, this law is looked upon by Japanese dance enthusiasts the same way the second amendment is often spoken of in the United States: an archaic rule that is thriving far beyond its

The International Relations Review time period and intended purpose.

However, the combined force of a petition by Ryuichi Sakamoto, the world-famous Japanese musician, and the looming approach of the 2020 Olympics in Japan have recently inspired the repealing of the ban. The petition gained 150,000 signatures and placed increased pressure on Japanese officials to address the issue at hand. The Olympics, meanwhile, has the Japanese government scrambling to make the nation appear as “fun” – and open to foreign spending – as possible.

Photo by Joy Cohen, CAS ‘16

IR REVIEW The International Relations Review at Boston University

Since 2009

GET PUBLISHED

Russia Under Putin: A Conversation With Professor Igor Lukes

By: Caroline Lord, CAS ‘1 Conducted By Ellen Gilley, CAS ‘17

Professor Igor Lukes explains the evolution of Putin’s policy from the early stages of the Russian President’s attempts at reform to his “flag-waving nationalism” that confronts the West today. While Putin has decided to press his influence in Crimea and Syria, Lukes explains how this is consistent with the direction that Yeltsin had set Putin upon from the second half of the Yeltsin years.

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The International Relations Review How has the Russian public’s opinion of “Western values” such as democracy and free markets changed since the fall of the USSR? What was Putin’s influence on this?

P

Photo by Maryna Markowicz, CGS ‘19

utin is elected at the end of 1999 and quickly discovers he has received a country in a serious, serious crisis.

Never mind the tensions in the west, that’s not even important. The real issue is they’re in the middle of a fantastic demographic crisis. More people die every year than are born every year, and the gap is something like 350,000-400,000, which means that the country is dying. There are projections made that if the trend continues that there could be no Russia thirty, forty years hence.

Putin, in fact, says our number one problem is the demographic crisis; we have to start having children, we have to stop drinking, we have to stop all this destructive behavior.

And he tries bravely at the beginning to tackle huge issues such as the declining population and men’s life expectancy. In the 1990’s the life expectancy was significantly under 60 years. Give me any other country in Africa and I will tell you that it has about the same life expectancy as Russia for men. So Putin realized that this was a serious issue and he tried to do something about it, and like everybody else before him, he fell flat on his face. To persuade the Russian public not to drink, to persuade the Russian public to stop behaving destructively is diffcicult.

For instance many causes of death are listed as accidents, what is it?

Drunk driving and workers falling off roofs because they were drunk.

Alcohol is at the root of so many of these issues. What did he do? He realized he had a choice, he could

Spring 2016

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Photo by Nailya Yafyasova, Questrom’19 realized he had a choice, he could either go down as a failure, or he would abandon these important topics and move to something entirely different. He would move to something easy, like for instance waving the flag of eternal Russia. It turns out that waving the flag is much easier. The public, whether drunk or not, loves it.

So do you think Putin’s opposition to LGBT and the HIV/AIDS problem is a reaction to that?

Exactly! He tried to deal with these issues: medical crisis, public health, declining numbers of Russians, people not having children, all of these are serious issues. Turns out that it is too difficult to address, so what does he do? He picks up the banner of nationalism and morality.

He will lead Russia toward morality; we may be drunk but we are a pure people. Just a few days ago, Lavrov repeated all this nonsense with references to historical events, “In 1988 Russia was the purest country in the world.” Putin brings up these topics into the public forum and suddenly he discovers that

his popularity is hitting the roof.

People can be poor but they can still feel good about themselves if you persuade them that they are on the right side of history. This is the tragedy of the Soviet Union- that they were constantly told that they were on the right side of history, the side of progress and the west was doomed and capitalism was a

“Russians have proven themselves to be the champions of the world for suffering” horror. Now Putin resurrected all of this Soviet rhetoric, telling the Russians that they may be poor, but they are pure, and they loved him for it. Now he starts portraying Russia as an island, as a fortress that is being besieged by the filthy other, by the world around it. Who are the filthy outsiders? As you mentioned the

gays, lesbians, transgendered, and of course liberals and democrats, free market economists, nongovernmental institutions, and all non-Russian non-orthodox churches are in the same category, they all want to poison the pure, true heros that are in the besieged city called Russia. And that is what gave him the popularity that he’s enjoyed for the past sixteen years, anywhere from 60 to even over 80 percent popularity.

But of course that means he has hidden the real problems of Russia under the carpet, which is now coming back to bite him. Especially now that the barrel of oil is not racing towards 200 dollars.

How do you think that people will respond to the economic slump that has recently seized the country, with wages dropping 6.3 percent?

Ok well this is a wonderful question, but I must tell you up front that I cannot answer with any degree of certainty and here’s why. Historically the Russians have proven themselves to be the champions of the world for suffering, and by suffering I mean

30 suffering I mean passively accepting the condition of suffering. It’s not just that they endured the poverty under the tsars, or the horrors of the Stalinist era, both before and after the war, it’s not only the shortages they endured in the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s. It is especially the horror of the 1990’s. It is now forgotten that from 1991-1996 there were people who had not been paid for 6 months. Workers, teachers, police officers had not seen a salary for half a year or more. It is astonishing, not only that they had not been paid, but that there was no civil war, there wasn’t an uprising, riots, absolutely nothing happened. This is scene one, so if I knew only this I would say, “Hmm the Russians will fall back on their old pattern of behavior and they will prove yet again that they can suffer in silence and they will accept whatever fate will put on their shoulders.” Scene number two, I think a month ago

The International Relations Review some new fee was imposed on truck drivers. Truck drivers called on each other through social media to protest and later negotiate. I don’t know if they have succeeded because it’s not over yet, but I think the signs are that the state is going to retreat. So if you ask me about the future, I have to say I don’t know which Russia is going to emerge. Is it going to be the Russia that passively accepts suffering and accepts its fate no matter what it is, or is it this new Russia where people will not accept what corrupt people have decided because you know it will be a very good friend of President Putin who will line his pockets with gold from these fees.

Has Putin’s time in office caused an increase or decrease in stability of the Caucasus?

Vastly increased stability, but here I can answer it very simply, some

very famous Roman said it, “They razed the city to the ground [I think referring to Carthage] and they called it peace.” Basically they killed Chechnya as it once was and now it’s stable because fantastic sums of money have been invested in rebuilding of Grozny, the capital city of Chechnya. A horrific dictator was put in to run the country as a viceroy of Mr. Putin and he runs it in the most totalitarian manner, so if anyone is in any way out of the line, they die. So it’s peaceful. But can it go on forever? No. It’s not a threat?

Of course it’s a threat to Russia, but Russia finally figured out that if you go there and try to turn the Chechens into Russians, you will fail.

To begin with there is the matter of ethnicity and even more important there is the matter of religion. And you cannot take away their religion.

It resulted in widespread tensions,

Spring 2016 which is why several hundred Chechens are in Syria and maybe in Iraq in the ranks of the Islamic State, which Putin said himself. Why are they there? They have come to believe that their religion is being threatened by these infidels, and for them it’s not America, well that too, but the first infidel is the Russian. So you can’t change the Chechens into Russians on both ethnic and religious grounds, thus what Putin wants is for the Chechens not to cause trouble to him. You [Putin] will not interfere and impose a viceroy who is Chechen, a Muslim fundamentalist, and a murderer too. As long as he keeps it peaceful, which means that anyone who speaks out of line gets his head chopped off, then Putin is okay with that because he can call it peace. That’s what Rome did to Carthage; they razed it and said there was peace.

31 Is the threat to Russia equal to that than that, so Ukraine for him is a of Ukraine, or can you compare it to matter of life and death. That is the the Ukrainian crisis? first reason, he needs to control it in order to be a very influential power.

Oh I think the threat of Ukraine is Secondly, should Ukraine manage vastly bigger, well let me give you the to build bridges with the European most banal thing, which is that Russia, Union, never mind even NATO with Ukraine, is a considerable and become safe from intrusions power, no matter what happens by Russia. If it ever managed to with oil and all these things. Russia, eradicate the corruption there, then as long as it controls these things, is it would become a sort of mirror a great power. Should Russia lose in which Putin, or all the Russians, control of Ukraine, and it now seems would see the failure of Russia. to have happened, then Russia is still Because they would now contrast a significant country, but no more the fate of Ukraine, now firmly important than Spain, no more embedded in Western alliance and important than Sweden. Sweden is enjoying freedom and economic important, Spain is important, but prosperity, and contrast it with their you know the world doesn’t stop and own situation, which is a lot of flag listen when Sweden says something. waving but basically back in the So Putin doesn’t want to be like troubles of the 1970’s and 80’s.

Sweden, he wants to be much bigger

Photo by Melissa Trostel, CAS ‘17

ECONOMICS & DEVELOPMENT 34 The Future Does Not Work:

Will Vladimir Putin’s plans for Russia be stymied by inadequate healthcare?

By Desmond Molloy, SAR ‘19 Russians have long suffered worse health outcomes than their Western counterparts. The government’s unwillingness to address looming health crises is making matters worse.

38 Rice Crisis in the Philippines

By Jessica Mansur, CAS ‘18 and Tal Dickstein, CAS ‘19 2008 marked the end of the global rice crash, but its effects have lingered to this day in the global South.

42 Hydropower to the People

By Perrin Krisko, CAS ‘16 Most people heard about the devastating earthquake that struck Nepal in 2015, but when American eyes turned away, daily life didn’t get easier. Now the Nepalese have an entirely new set of issues to handle, from government corruption to fuel deficit.

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The International Relations Review

The Future Does Not Work:

Will Vladimir Putin’s plans for Russia be stymied by inadequate healthBy Desmond Molloy, SAR ‘19 At first glance, Russia appears resurgent. The Kremlin assumed control over a substantial portion of Ukraine in the past two years’ conflict and its influence in the Middle East continues to grow, with President Vladimir Putin now recognized as a key player in the fight against the Islamic State. The resurgence is illusory. Ironically, for a country once known for its scientific prowess, Russia currently runs the risk of becoming the first global power crippled by its poor health. Russia’s drastically underfunded healthcare sector paralyzed by political considerations and bureaucratic inertia is failing to respond to challenges like alcoholism, drug abuse and HIV/AIDS. Soviet officials used to say that

“The State takes care of its citizens.” Initially, this promise was kept. Looking back at the USSR’s healthcare legacy the year before the country’s 1991 collapse, Harvard’s Dr. Mark Field noted that “Quantitatively the progress has been impressive both in numbers of personnel and facilities.”1 But the centralized nature of the system, under which private medical care was illegal, meant that doctors often had their hands tied by the USSR’s infamous bureaucracy.2 Progress was only made when Politburo power brokers personally intervened. From the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, alcoholism grew steadily worse, eventually threatening Russia’s war preparedness. Yet no action was taken until Mikhail Gorbachev

personally stepped in with a series of measures to curb the epidemic.3 While an American Surgeon General might have seen alcoholism as an emerging threat and responded accordingly, the centralized nature of Soviet healthcare prevented Russian health officials from obtaining the autonomy needed for such quick reactions.

While the Semashko system largely fell apart during the chaos of the 1990s, its legacy of central control and heavy politicization remains prominent in Russian health policy today. After Gorbachev’s alcoholism prevention campaign was dissolved along with the end of the USSR, alcoholism made a comeback. A 2014 study warned that because of alcoholism, “at 2005 mortality rates,

Spring 2016

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“If Russians begin to get sick at much higher rates, the healthcare system is not equipped to handle the increased strain.” of UK men but 37% of Russian men would die before the age of 55 [of alcoholism].”4 Once again, the Kremlin was forced to directly intervene with Vladimir Putin strongarming a flotilla of sales tax increases and regulations through the Duma, Russia’s parliament.5 Putin’s measures were effective, reducing the growth in alcoholism. But the inability of Russian doctors, hospitals and other institutions to address the crisis without a presidential decree illustrates an ongoing weakness in the country’s healthcare.

The Kremlin turning away from a crisis can be fatal. Nowhere is this more apparent than the threepart epidemic of intravenous drug use, HIV/AIDS and drug-resistant tuberculosis (TB) running rampid

in the country. Russia is currently beset by one of the world’s worst heroin epidemics. 30,000 Russians die every year from heroin-related causes and 5.4% of the population injects the drug on a regular basis.6 Those trying to kick their addiction have few options. A 2015 study of drug addiction and policy found that “Russian drug policy pursues an approach of punitive policing to reduce drug use and supply,” including extrajudicial crackdowns on drug paraphernalia and violence against users.7 The Russian public views drug use as a sign of personal failure, making such harsh law enforcement policies popular.

Drug use alone would be bad enough for public health, but intravenous drug use has also contributed to

the spread of infectious diseases, among them HIV/AIDS and TB. Of the roughly one million Russians living with HIV, at least 64% are intravenous drug users. To make matters worse, Russia’s cultural mindset makes it highly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. Russians are deeply opposed to sex education; “anything that smacks of sex education is like waving a red flag in front of a bull.”8 Consequently, young Russians are unlikely to be taught about HIV/ AIDS, which is typically associated with drug use, as opposed to unsafe sex. If HIV remains prevalent among drug users, the risk that it will spill over to the broader population will continue to increase. increase.

The perpetual threat of TB only

PhotobybyMelissa KaitlynTrostel, Dally, SAR Photo CAS ‘16 ‘17 Photo by, Nailya Yafyasova, Questrom’19

36 makes matters worse. Russia has lower rates of TB infection than most of the world, but resistance to antibiotics is widespread. A study published in Nature magazine found that “nearly half of the TB isolates were multi-drug resistant, which means that they were impervious to the two common first-line antibiotics that cure most TB infections, while 16% of these isolates also harboured mutations that made them impervious to ‘second-line’ drugs.”9 TB preys on the weakened immune systems of AIDS patients, annually accounting for a quarter of all AIDS-related deaths.10 Because of Russia’s punitive approach to drug enforcement, drug users are often in and out of prisons, a hotbed of TB infection. Once they acquire TB, the disease’s airborne nature enables it to spread quickly. Each epidemicHIV/AIDS, TB and opioid useboosts the others, complicating any efforts to combat them.

If Russians begin to get sick at much higher rates, the healthcare system is not equipped to handle

The International Relations Review the increased strain. Observers might have reasonably thought that the end of communism would improve medical services across the former USSR. It failed to do so for Russians, while per capita healthcare spending has increased since the 1990s, inflation has largely erased those gains.11 Most Russians cannot afford the expensive private hospitals that emerged in the 2000s, and still rely on underfunded public facilities. Pregnant women and cancer patients must pay out of pocket for ultrasounds, radiation treatment and other needed services. Overall, the in-hospital death rate has skyrocketed.12 The deficit largely originates with the Kremlin; the crisis in Ukraine and NATO’s subsequent military buildup have channeled more and more money into defense at the expense of medical care. The city of Moscow has shut down 28 hospitals and clinics as state funding has dried up.13 If HIV/AIDS and TB are not checked, there may not be enough hospital beds to handle increased

demand.

The prognosis for Russia is grim.

Alcoholism appears to be in recession, but the age-old problem of healthcare politicization seems likely to continue strengthening the threeheaded HIV/AIDS, TB and drug use epidemic. While it may seem farfetched, the threat to Russia’s global standing is very real. Before George Bush’s PEPFAR program cut HIV/ AIDS transmission and infection rates, economists were predicting that South Africa alone would lose 8% of its GDP to the disease and its complications.14 PEPFAR helped prevent this from happening, but few Western countries would be willing to make similar investments to protect Russia from a similar fallout. The healthcare system in Russia is still stronger than its African counterparts, but against a disease like HIV/AIDS it may not be good enough.

Spring 2016

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Photo by Melissa Trostel, CAS ‘16

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The International Relations Review Photo by Kathy Chu, CGS ‘ 17, CAS’19

Rice Crisis in the Phillipines

By Jessica Mansur, CAS ‘18 and Tal Dickstein, CAS ‘19

A

midst the 2008 global food crisis, the cost of rice grew so exponentially in the relatively short span of six months that the global rice market’s bubble burst. While similar in time and content, this was a separate phenomenon now known as the 2008 Rice Crash that has little relation with the general food crisis.

The prices of various types of grain peaked in late 2007 at an average increase of 300% as a result of a combination of two main factors: uncertainty in the market and food security. Major rice exporting

countries (India, Viet Nam, etc) fostered a universal sense of panic by imposing temporary commercial bans.

The fallout in Asia’s largest importer of rice, the Philippines, illustrates the rice crash’s impact on the global community. Rice is a staple food in the Filipino diet, with the average Filipino consuming about 123 kilograms of rice per year.1 Its production industry is also a significant economic sector in the country and accounts for 15.5 percent of country’s value added in agriculture and 3.5 percent of its gross

domestic product.2 International and domestic prices of rice are a major concern for Philippine lawmakers.

Despite policymakers’ attempts to wean the country off its dependency on rice imports, the competitiveness of the Filipino rice production industry is still crippled by negligent government intervention, high production costs borne from inefficiencies, and illegal market activities.

The importance of rice to the Filipino economy is hard to overstate. As of 2015, rice constitutes 20% of total consumption among 30% of the

Spring 2016 In comparison, the average family in the United States of America spends 11% of total consumption on all of its food.3 High prices chip away at the consumers’ purchasing power and families have to make sacrifices in other crucial areas such as education and health care—the costs of which are both cyclical and immense.

Less education means less qualifications for work and less productivity on average in the future. According to the director of the Department of Agriculture, Asterio Saliot, the average level of education of a farmer doesn’t pass the fifth grade. Shortages of rice also threaten to exacerbate malnutrition. The chance of a child from birth to the age of five being under the average height in the Philippines is 30%, and the incidence of being underweight passes that at 32%.4 Perhaps most importantly, rice is a wagegood, thus an increase in prices prompts worker demands for higher wages that eventually leads to increased production costs and, finally, mass unemployment by companies attempting to break even.

After decades of popular discontent with sharecropping, the Filipino government undertook land reform with 2008’s Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms (CARPER), which enacted a mechanism for the widespread redistribution of land with just compensation to beneficiaries.5 But the Department of Agrarian Reform lacks the funding and infrastructural support needed for implementation.

By 2014, just a quarter of the land

39 slated for redistribution had gone to its new owners.6 The problem was exacerbated by the law’s vague language, which led to multiple rounds of court battles and retribution by disgruntled farmers.

Loopholes present in reform policies have allowed large-scale producers

to manipulate impoverished farmers and seize their land.

Slow implementation has been damaging for Filipino agriculture.

In response to being shut out from access to proper land for rice paddy cultivation, farmers have shifted their focus to marginal lands and increased input usage. However, the natural resource degradation that results from this practice ultimately diminishes the average yield capacity these lands hold. Poor land policies have long contributed to the high production costs in rice production, evident in the average production

costs of paddy cultivation compared to costs in neighboring countries. In the Philippines, paddy production costs about $222 per tonne.7 This is especially alarming when taking into consideration the substantially smaller average cost of just U.S.$111 per tonne in Vietnam and U.S.$178 per tonne in Thailand.8 The need for fertile lands and more cost effective production methods could be supported by investments in irrigation and agriculture infrastructure, but these investments take time and financiers are averse to allocating funds towards such time consuming and risky ventures.

The Filipino government has made attempts to circumvent the issue of insufficient investment, but their attempts have fared little better than land reform. For example, the money appropriated to the Fertilizer, Infrastructure and Irrigation, Extension and Education, Loans, Drying and other Postharvest Facilities and Seeds (FIELDS) program was deducted from existing agricultural expenditures budget, spreading needed resources thin.9 In addition to being underfunded, the program improperly accounted for the needs of farmers due to poor coordination between agencies.

These inefficiencies, coupled with weak policing and high transportation costs, these inefficiencies brought about FIELDS’ demise.

In an effort to increase research and development in the rice industry, government institutions such as thePhilippine Rice Research Institute have devoted resources Graphic by Jessie Mansur, CAS’18

40 the Philippine Rice Research Institute have devoted resources towards the development and sustainability of hybrid rice. In recent years, the Department of Agriculture has encouraged farmers to invest in hybrid seeds, which yield seven to eight metric tons (MT) per hectare compared to inbred varieties that yield only between four to five MT per hectare.10 But farmers are reluctant to make that investment due to the high cost of hybrid rice seeds, which undermine the overall profitability of hybrid rice production. The unsubsidized cost of a bag of hybrid rice seeds is PhP2,400 per 20-kilogram nearly double that of a bag of certified inbred seeds.11 Because they are open pollinated, the seeds are susceptible to diseases and cannot be reused. Hybrid seeds also require vast amounts of labor, knowledge, and capital, something that is not easily obtainable for poor farmers.

Above all else, half of the hybrid rice market is controlled by one supplier, meaning guaranteed government prices only go to a limited number of producers.12 Such active government intervention proves dangerous for a market as sensitive as that of rice. Because the industry is immune to the competitive forces at play in a free market, producers lack incentive to invest in efficient production means and quality assurance. A

Photos by Kathy Chu, CGS ‘17, CAS’19

The International Relations Review large government presence also discourages the private sector from becoming involved in the market, further propagating government dominance. Additionally, centralized government control creates a breading ground for corruption amongst both government officials and large corporations. Just two years ago, infamous businessman David Tan’s name could be found on every newspaper headline in the Philippines as the country found itself in the middle of a scandal in which 50,000 MT were smuggled illegally into the country’s borders every week.13 Officials within the Philippine government, including a specific quote by Senator Villar, have stated that rice smugglers cannot successfully operate without the assistance of corrupt government officials.14 Such illicit activity is costly. The Philippines lose approximately PhP7 billion to rice smuggling.

Rice smuggling unfairly undercuts competition, which in turn takes business away from small-scale domestic producers that desperately need the profits.15 Less demand quantity of rice being sold, which then diminishes incentives for producers to allocate more resources into developing their production infrastructure. The effects are cyclical, with inefficient production leading to increased production costs that ultimately further bolster

domestic rice prices. These high domestic prices become unbearable for the growing impoverished population, who then look for outlets to purchase cheaper rice and increase the demand for rice on the black market. However, it is important to note that the systemic problem of avoiding customs and import duties has resulted in problems more serious than lost profits.

Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, known for his use of “death squads” targeted at criminals and vandals in late 1990s, was eager to call for the death of anyone caught partaking in rice smuggling.16 With growing frustrations by both government officials and the general population, the risks of possibly violent backlash is increasing.

While the effects of the rice crash can at first seem isolated to the Philippines, the crisis may have a global impact. Commodity prices and markets are highly intertwined on a global level; rising wheat prices in 2007 prompted India to ban exports on non-Basmati rice and reallocate wheat-growing resources to rice paddies. This kept the rice prices low, but hurt Bangladesh, which imports 60% of its rice from India.

A crisis in the Philippines could send global rice prices tailspinning or skyrocketing, and have similarly wide-ranging effects on other ricedependent countries. Globalization is a double-edged sword.

Spring 2016

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irr.buiaa.org | irr@buiaa.org Photo by Jacqueline Kresse, SAR’19

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The International Relations Review

Hydropower to the People

By Perrin Krisko, CAS ‘16

N

epal is the world’s tenth most hydropowercapable country and second only to Brazil in terms of its renewable water resources.1 Yet, in 2015, twenty four percent of Nepal’s population subsisted without access to electricity,2 a number that skyrocketed to nearly 80 percent in rural areas.3 After American eyes shifted away from the April 2015 earthquakes that killed over 8,860 people and left millions more without shelter,4 Nepalis have not recuperated easily from the crisis and currently face a debilitating fuel shortage that is estimated to push an additional 800,000 into poverty.5 Equally tragic, Nepal’s incompetent government failed once again to gain traction on an international level by missing the deadline to submit its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) form to the CoP 21 Conference on Climate Change in November 2015.6 How can one of the world’s leading hydropower countries be

experiencing such acute power shortages after receiving millions of dollars in foreign aid?

A large contributor to the ruinous events that unfolded after Nepal’s earthquake was its governmental corruption, punctuated by a majoritarian political choice that selected Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli as Prime Minister.7 After months of inaction and failure to allocate relief funds towards reconstruction efforts in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the “election” dawned a new era of little change.8 A side effect of the government’s discriminatory and fast-tracked constitution was a series of fervent protests by the Madhesi people and other marginalized indigenous groups that sparked a subsequent Indian blockade.9 Nepal had been without a recognized constitution since 2007, one year after the civil war with Maoist rebels ended.10 After years of failed assemblies to rewrite the interim constitution, many Nepalis expressed their desire

to just have something come out of the 2015 Constituent Assembly. But when the earthquake shocked the entire nation, that hope dissipated.

In the meantime, the Communist Unified Marxist-Leninist Party of Nepal (UML) took advantage of the nation’s vulnerability and instability in order to promulgate a constitution in its own favor.11 The new constitution largely neglected the rights of indigenous people, granting a smaller percentage of representation in parliament and a disproportionate division of territory for the newly devised provinces.12 In response, a wave of deadly protests and police brutality erupted throughout the southern edge of Nepal, and India declared a blockade in September 2015 on all exports to the country in order to indicate its solidarity with the Madhesi protesters, who also hold a large ethno-historical presence in India.13 Nepal, a land-locked country transporting most of its fuel and other supplies through India to

Photos by Lauren Peterson, CGS ‘18

Spring 2016

impacted.14 The socioeconomic effects of the Indian blockade that finally ended in Feburary 2016 were disastrous for Nepal’s working class.2 The tourism industry took a nosedive as not enough fuel was avaliable for local bus companies to transport Nepalis from one province to the next;15 transportation restrictions were implemented in the state of emergency;16 queues at petrol stations lasted for hours to get a bucket of fuel;17 mothers and wives switched from gas stoves to wood burning stoves for cooking;18 helicopters bringing much-needed pre-winter relief aid for rural communities still suffering from the earthquake were grounded;19 new trade routes for a petroleum black market developed;20 and electricity outages worsened as wintertime heating needs heightened.21 The effects on the people were indeed devastating.

Hydropower initiatives in Nepal were also impacted by the flood of bad news following the 2015 earthquakes.

Prior to when the earthquake hit, nearly forty hydropower projects equating to 718

43

megawatts of potential hydroelectric power were underway, but more than half of these sites were either directly on top of, or in the vicinity of, an earthquake epicenter.22 Projects in the past have had their own share of trouble getting off the ground, like the famous 1995 Arun III Dam failure that resulted when the World Bank withdrew its $1.1 billion investment plan, the largest in Nepal’s history.23 Nepal’s geologic positioning between the Indo-Australian and Eurasian tectonic plate boundary makes it an ever-moving and volatile area for hydropower and infrastructure projects.24 The World Bank reentered talks about hydropower development in Nepal in February 2016 as it agreed to fund a $22.5 million loan for the implementation of a Power Sector Reform and Sustainable Hydropower Development Project.25 But the World Bank’s sudden involvement begs the question, why now? The World Bank’s persevering interest with hydropower in Nepal may reflect evolving alternative energy politics on the global scale, but the success of these kinds of upcoming

projects will largely depend on Nepal’s central government, which has proven ineffective in the past.

The greatest obstacle to hydropower implementation that Nepal faces right now, more so than its geography, is its corrupt government. Hydropower brings in a great deal of foreign investment,26 but to whom does that money go? It is the government of Nepal that holds exclusive rights to water and sells project licenses to the Department of Electricity Development (DoED) and the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA).2 7 While the government capitalizes on its monopolization of transnational investments, tax incentives, and water rights, the typical Nepali who sacrifices their home and land does not benefit from it, at all.28 The ugly side of Nepal’s hydropower potential is that most of the energy produced would be outsourced and the profit directed toward an already corrupt government.

The new Oli administration has exhibited little effort to equalize fuel distribution in Nepal, and it fumbled at the CoP 21 conference by not submitting an INDC form, thus reneging on an opportunity to tell the world how it was ready to transform its fuel crisis into a low carbon opportunity for hydroelectric ventures.29 Nevertheless, hope for Nepal exists within its rural and indigenous populations, such as the Madhesis, as they become more knowledgeable about, and invested in, national politics than we have ever seen in the past. We can hope that with a new age of civil movement in Nepal, rural communities will be better equipped to represent themselves in the inevitable age of upcoming hydropower and alternative energy infrastructure.

REGIONAL POLITICS

46

Pyongyang: The indescribable regime of the east

By Danielle Wallner, CAS ‘19 The belligerent state of North Korea has continued to thretean international peace, but the reason the hermit kingdom continues to survive is due to the international community. All regional players, including the United States, have a reason to see the status quo of the DPRK remain unchanged.

50

The Untapped Strategic Potential of Turkmen Agency in the Syrian Civil War

By James Paige, CAS ‘18 Syrian Turkmen fighters continue to stave off Russian-backed loyalist assaults in the Bayırbucak region of northwestern Syria. The need to integrate all politically organized elements into a broader coalition that accounts for a wider range of strategic interests is an increasingly vital imperative for peace prospects.

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What Zika Says about Brazilian Politics: Inside the Brazilian government’s reactions to the virus outbreak

By Clara Bezarra, CAS ‘18 Facing the worse health crisis in decades, the Brazilian government has shown itself incapable of stopping the Zika virus from spreading throughout the country. Political interests, economic limitations, and systematized sexism are all factors that are contributing to this failed war.

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The International Relations Review

Pyonyang:

The indescribable regime of the east

By Danielle Wallner, CAS ‘19 Photo by Michael Yang, CGS ‘18

Spring 2016

W

ith its crippling human rights record and attempted autarky, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is truly the anomaly in international politics. North Korea’s recently reported satellite launch1 within its own territory has renewed global tensions and paranoia surrounding the country.

Keeping the Pyongyang Regime from falling and the North Korean population remaining at the mercy of a callous oligarchy is in the best interest of China, South Korea, Japan, the United States and Russia.

China enables the Pyongyang Regime’s notorious cruelty more than any other neighboring state.

From the time of the Korean War to present day, China has served as North Korea’s omniscient protector. The two states have always maintained their alliance and even celebrate “friendship week” with a display of fine arts, dances, and live performances.2 The weeklong celebrations are intended to strengthen “the traditional DPRKChina friendly and cooperative relations.” In actuality, the alliance is no more than a slave-master relationship in which North Korea is kept on a short leash by its master, China. Every time North Korea acts out China must punish or protect, and with no major natural resources.

China’s reason for keeping the small hermit kingdom around is the result U.S. hegemony. North Korea acts as a buffer between China and the large U.S. military presence found in the South. China needs North Korea to deter the U.S. presence in East Asia. China’s goals for perseverance of North Korea lie beyond militaristic theories; a major humanitarian crisis looms in the

47 distance if the Kims ever fall. North Korea shares its longest border with China to the North; if the regime falls, China will be inundated with refugees placing an irrefutable strain on the largest economy of the East.

China needs to remain competitive to prevent Japan from overtaking it and to keep the U.S. alert. North Korea continues to bleed Beijing of resources, capital, and international prestige, but Pyongyang allows China to continually establish itself as the hegemony of the East.

The splintering of the Korean peninsula and people was another tragedy borne from the intense heat of the Cold War. When the

“As of today, the idea of unification remains an idealist’s dream and a realist’s nightmare for the Koreans residing below the 38th parallel.”

Korean War ended in 1953, the two Koreas signed an armistice, meaning that the Northern and Southern brothers of Korea are still at war.3 Acts of war are still prevalent, such as the launch of a supposed North Korean satellite which Pyongyang claim to be for scientific and “peaceful purposes”and the sinking of the Cheonan in which 46 South Koreans were killed.4 If any nation would want the dissolution of North Korea, it would be the South. Not only would the threat of a nuclear attack decrease exponentially5 for the East Asian state, but it would also reunify the Korean people after over

60 years in complete estrangement.

But South Korea is neither ready nor willing for a united peninsula.

With Beijing’s support of the North, it would be almost impossible for unification to happen without provoking China. China sees “North Korea [as] a buffer from having a democratic nation on its border.”6 This unification would result in a great power confrontation between the U.S. and China in which South Korea would be stuck in the crosshairs. If the Korean people learned anything from the Korean War, it’s that when world powers are involved in regional conflicts, the local population and economy suffer.

War is not the only threat that faces South Korea with respect to reunification and preserving the status quo. If the North fell, the economic cost of rebuilding Northern infrastructure and renourishing the Northern people could push the South into an economic fallout. The North Koreans are on average so malnourished that they are physically smaller than South Koreans, and the per capita income gap between the neighbors is a staggering 19:1.7 The mere feat of integrating 24 million people at once could be just as devastating to the South as a nuclear bomb. South Korea’s Central Bank estimates that its 1.4 trillion dollar economy is forty times as large than that of the North.

Distribution of wealth between the North and the South would not only cause an economic crisis, but a social crisis as well. As of today, the idea of unification remains an idealist’s dream and a realist’s nightmare for the Koreans residing below the 38th parallel.

Since World War II, Japan has been on a spectacular rise with the

48 times as large than that of the North.8 Distribution of wealth between the North and the South would not only cause an economic crisis, but a social crisis as well. As of today, the idea of unification remains an idealist’s dream and a realist’s nightmare for the Koreans residing below the 38th parallel.

Since World War II, Japan has been on a spectacular rise with the second largest economy in Asia and the third largest economy in the world.9 Behind China, Japan guides the future of the region. Japanese and North Korean relations can be described as hesitant at best.

Relations are still tense between Japan and North Korea, with a history of acts some could akin to terrorism, In 2001 Japan’s armed forces sank a supposed North Korean spy ship, the first ship sunk by the Japanese since World War II. The prime minister at the time, Junichiro Koizumi, justified that the ship’s behaviour was “bizarre.”10 The DPRK also has a history of heinous acts, such as the abduction of numerous Japanese citizens by the North. Starting in 1977, Japan official counts 17 abductees, but

The International Relations Review reports range “a few dozen to several hundred.”11 Despite the history of provoking behavior, relations have been warming. World power politics again play a role in Japan’s policies. If a conflict broke, Japan would likely side with the U.S. and be forced to help take on the Chinese bear. With Japan’s negative interest rate, the island nation may not be able to handle a crisis of that size.12 Japanese and South Korean economies are also tightly intertwined, crisis in either nation would greatly affect the other. If the Koreas united, the economic strain would be felt throughout East Asia and hurt an already tense market.

Even more frightening to Japan than a struggling united Korea, however, is a thriving one. Since World War II, Japan has been continuously searching for economic security, and a united Korean peninsula threatens the prosperity they have so far been able to achieve. A united Korea is a capitalist hegemony, and Japan fears this potential capitalist utopia because it threatens to usurp it as the foothold of the west in the east.

In 2002, George W. Bush notoriously spoke of an “axis of evil, arming to

threaten the peace of the world.”13 From that moment forward, U.S. foreign policy has been focused on taking down the regimes of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. While U.S. troops have been stationed in Iran and Iraq, North Korea remains j untouched, and as dangerous as it was 14 years ago. With Pyongyang’s aggressive rhetoric against the United States and its allies, the question emerges as to why the victor of the Cold War has allowed the hermit kingdom to exist and threaten the values of security, freedom, and human rights central to the U.S. identity. While U.S. rhetoric against the Kim regime is harsh and swift, U.S. policy is much more hesitant. If one reads behind the levels of propagandist speeches by lawmakers, he might realize that America needs North Korea. China has emerged as the only other nation capable of halting U.S. supremacy.

By allowing North Korea to continue to be aggressively harmless, the U.S. has a reason to keep a large military presence in China’s backyard. 91,000 U.S. military personnel sit on the 38th parallel, not including air force and navy equipment.14 American military superiority is put on display

Spring 2016 in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), as a direct threat and a reminder to the Chinese. If the Pyongyang regime falls, the U.S. would no longer have a legitimate or democratic reason to keep its military in East Asia. Trade is another key factor in U.S. hesitance to unify the Korean peninsula. A united North and South Korea could be a key trading partner for China, whose economy each year comes closer to overtaking that of the United States.15 American policy toward North Korea is not intended to destroy an axis of evil, but to instead keep pressure on Beijing.

The Russian Federation and DPRK have a complex relationship. Russia is neither its defender like China, nor aggressor like the U.S. In the past, Russia expressed frustration with the Kim empire due to their unpredictable way of dealing with domestic and international conflicts.

North Korea is a liability as an ally, but also a scapegoat if the need for one arises. Russia acts as a stabilizer in the Korean peninsula, engaging in projects with both the North and the South. In South Korea an underwater gas pipeline is bringing Russian oil to the growing Seol.16 In

49 North Korea, Russia is financing an improved rail system in order to expedite the exportation of the North’s mineral resources.17 At times, Putin and his government seem uncomfortably close to the North by especially its policy of after last year’s announcement of a possible visa-free travel between Pyongyang and Moscow.18 But even this act can be seen as an equalizer to the U.S. support of the South.

Russia’s positive relationship with both Koreas leave it in the position that it would be a main mediator in a unification convention. But Russia benefits too much from its separate trade agreements. If the Korean Peninsula united, China may be able to become the major trading partner of the peninsula, again forcing Russia in a role of second best. Also, it could force a possible confrontation with China and the U.S., a situation the recovering Russian economy or population is not ready nor willing to address. Another major threat is that unification will most likely be done on the South’s (and therefore American terms) which may tip the balance of East Asia toward the West and away from Russia and its interests. Russia

certainly reaps direct benefits from a separated Korea. From monetary power coming from both sides of the 38th parallel, to its role as the main mediator between interpenisula related disputes, a separate Korea preserves Russian power in the far east.

The Pyongyang regime is moments away from shattering, However, the international community is actively ensuring that the Hermit Kingdom maintains its statehood.

Each regional player in East Asia expresses rhetoric of unification, but their policies reflect a continuation of the status quo. From the U.S.’s and China’s struggle to become the dominant power, to Russia’s complete exploitation of Korean resources and political strife, the balance of power in East Asia is delicate. As long as North Korea continues empty threats, the situation on the Korean peninsula will remain unchanged, forcing the citizens of the DPRK to drown in a sea of corruption, abuses, and hardships.

Photo by Harini Natarajan, COM ‘16, CAS ‘16

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The International Relations Review

The Untapped Strategic Potential of Turkmen Agency in the Syrian Civil War

By James Paige, CAS ‘18

R

ussian-supported Assad loyalists intensified their offensive assault on the Handarat District, north of Aleppo, at approximately 1:52pm local time. By 4:20pm, Acıbayır, a village in the Bayırbucak region, was also attacked. Absolutely nothing changed as a result of this ceasefire,” remarked Syrian Turkmen Front Commander Mahmut Süleyman Zengin, while in attendance of the First Nomadic Turkmen Workshop and Research Conference in the Turkish capital of Ankara.1 Unsurprisingly, Russian warplanes and contingents of Assad loyalists effectively ignored the fragile February ceasefire, whose tentative implementation served as a means to facilitate aid convoys reaching isolated, famine-struck civilian centers.2 The Russo-Assad thrust into northwestern Syria, especially Bayırbucak, appertains to the vital loyalist imperative of neutralizing Turkmen-inhabited regions, which have seen the political and military reorganization of a historically marginalized Turkic community that now exercises a capacity to exert potentially crippling pressure on Russian and loyalist elements in Latakia and Tartus. The United States and its coalition partner states have neglected to integrate the Syrian Turkmen Assembly and its military wing, the Syrian Turkmen Army, into its security architecture plans for the post-Syrian Civil War era. This reflects poor policy-making on the

part of the West. The United States and its coalition partner states should enable Syrian Turkmen elements, currently backed only by the Republic of Turkey, to play a larger role in the war effort through material support, intelligence sharing, and air support. Such an arrangement would prove fruitful in facilitating the war’s conclusion. The coalition could provide such support to the Syrian Turkmen Army, enabling them to push into Latakia, while – in a quid pro quo exchange - requesting Syrian Turkmen assistance in combating Islamic State forces. Ultimately, a policy of cooperation with Syrian Turkmen elements would optimize the efficiency of the war effort and foster a more inclusive atmosphere that will go a long way in sowing the seeds of stability for the post-war era.

The history of the Syrian Turkmen demographic bears great similarities to the history of other Turkic populations isolated beyond the borders of the modern Turkish Republic in the footprint of the former Ottoman Empire. Turkmens began penetrating the region as early as the 7th Century, by way of Transoxiana and Khorasan. These Turkmens would establish an elite military caste and preside over grand empires, notably the Seljuk Empire and the Ottoman Empire.3 The Syrian Turkmen population of today found itself largely unaccounted for in the post-World War I border treaty arrangements, with the exception of a treaty in 1937. Some

academic studies estimate the Syrian Turkmen population to number as high as 3,500,000 people. During the reign of Hafez al-Assad (1971-2000), Syrian Turkmen communities endured brutal assimilation policies, effectuated with the intent of imposing an artificially manufactured SyrianArab identity on an undoubtedly Turkic ethnic segment that was viewed as a potential conduit of Turkish penetration.4 Syrian Turkmen discontent finally found expression in the chaotic and anarchic environment of postArab Spring Syria. In 2011, Syrian Turkmen communities seized the opportunity to organize themselves politically. Two parties emerged, the Syria Turkmen Bloc (Latakia and Bayırbucak) and the Syria Democratic Turkmen Movement (Aleppo).

The Republic of Turkey reconciled these two camps in 2012 with the creation of the Syrian Turkmen Platform (now the Syrian Turkmen Assembly). Additionally, Turkey built up a Syrian Turkmen military wing, the Syrian Turkmen Front.

The Turkish government continues to provide training, weaponry and other forms of materiel support to the Syrian Turkmen Front.5 Looking beyond the dramatic media narrative of the Islamic State, it can be argued that the struggle for Bayırbucak serves as one of the most important zones of contention in the Syrian Civil War. Assad’s Russiansupported loyalist regime forces have militarily engaged the Syrian

Spring 2016 Turkmen Front in the Bayırbucak region. In fact, in 24 November 2015, a Russian Su-24 fighter jet violated Turkish airspace after completing a bombing raid over Bayırbucak. As a result of the airspace violation, two Turkish F-16 fighter jets downed the Russian aircraft.6 Bayırbucak possesses immense geostrategic value. Syrian Turkmen success in Bayırbucak would mean the Turkish military and Syrian Turkmen Front would establish a corridor from which rebel forces could launch an assault on Latakia and Tartus, the heartland of Assad. Additionally, a Syrian Turkmen-controlled Bayırbucak would serve as a partial barrier between the Turkish border and the US-backed Syrian Kurdish forces, ameliorating Turkish concerns about supply lines and communication channels feeding PKK terrorist cells operating throughout the southern regions of Turkey. Furthermore, a Turkmen-controlled Bayırbucak could ultimately become a safe zone for Syrian refugees, for which Turkey has repeatedly advocated as an ameliorative solution to the refugee crisis facing Europe. Given that Turkey is a NATO member

51 and a EU applicant state, it comes as a surprise that the United States and other European states have been so stubborn in cooperating with Turkey on the ground.

The United States-spearheaded Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) must expand its parameters of operation to include the ousting of Bashar al-Assad and establishing a safe zone for refugees. The threat of the Islamic State cannot be simply snuffed with an unbalanced policy of supporting Kurdish elements and certain moderate forces in regional combat operations. Far too often have US policy-makers romanticized and favored one element in complex multi-ethnic and sectarian conflicts.

This narrow-sided approach not only prevents inclusive multilateral military operations, but it also alienates actors outside of the favored element. Syrian Turkmen agency must be accounted for in this war. Furthermore, the strategic concerns of the Republic of Turkey, a long time NATO ally, must take precedent over non-state military actors. Turkey possesses the second largest military in NATO, but cannot

effectively project optimum force into Syria, lest it engage in a three-front ground war with domestic PKK terror cells, Islamic State jihadist warriors, and Russian-backed Assad loyalists.

Compromises should be made on all sides however. In this case, an autonomous Syrian Turkmen buffer zone – perhaps one that links up with an autonomous Iraqi Turkmen buffer zone – might serve as a comprise for the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish zone that does not share a border with Turkey. It’s a troublesome time in international relations when traditional allies pursue their own strategic interests at the expense of the other allies’ security and stability. The U.S.-led CJTF-OIR should aim for a more balanced approach to combating the forces at work in Syria, and this includes cooperation with the Republic of Turkey and the Syrian Turkmen Army.

Photo by Maryna Markowicz, CGS ‘19

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The International Relations Review

What Zika Says about Brazilian Politics: Inside the Brazilian government’s reaction to the virus outbreak

By Clara Bezerra, CAS ‘18

T

he mosquito-borne Zika Virus has taken over U.S. and Latin American news media outlets this year and prompted a wide array of panicked government responses.

This viral infection, transmitted by the globally present Aedes species mosquito, has spread to more than 20 countries in the Americas since Brazil reported its first outbreak in May 2015, including the United States.1 Although the virus is not new and has rarely resulted in fatalities, concern grew over an alleged link between the virus and a surge in the rare neurological illness of microcephaly in newborn Brazilian infants.2 Acting quickly, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared an international public health emergency3 and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention issued a travel alert, advising pregnant women against traveling to areas in Latin America and the Caribbean heavily afflicted by the virus.4 Although initially publicized as a certainty, the existence of this connection continues to be debated, with health officials pointing to other potential causes of microcephaly in Brazilian infants.5 Amidst this chaos and international quest to uncover new information about the virus, the Brazilian government and its health ministries have issued contradictory statements regarding its symptoms and failed to develop efficient emergency policies to combat the spread of Zika.

The Brazilian government’s initial

courses of action to contain the virus are unlikely to yield success. Health analysts have pointed to the fact that, although Brazil is most severely impacted by the virus outbreak, its response was to postpone action. There was no immediate effort to analyze the validity of the Zika-microcephaly link.6 The first real initiative by the Brazilian government came in early February, when President Dilma Rousseff made a nationally televised promise to eradicate the mosquito through a plan of national mobilization.7 Rousseff recruited more than two hundred thousand soldiers who, along with three hundred thousand health workers and members of the military, are tasked with conducting door-by-door checks with the goal of eliminating breeding sites for the mosquito.8 The massive government resources devoted to this initiative are likely to amount to nothing; public health professionals have remarked that eradicating the Aedes mosquito is a nearly impossible task.

Furthermore, private residences do not account for all of the mosquito’s breeding grounds9 and therefore even if the program were to reach maximum success the greater effort to eliminate the mosquito would still fail.

Not only has this plan been criticized for its authoritarian undertones and invasion of private property, but it has also led to a wave of theft whereby criminals disguise themselves as health officers with the purpose of entering citizens’

homes.10 It is thus unsurprising that some homeowners have been disinclined to cooperate with the program and allow officials to enter their properties for inspection. In a country that historically has trouble with curbing crime rates, the opening this new policy leaves to theft may become increasingly dangerous.

However, despite obvious evidence pointing otherwise and Brazilian health minister Marcelo Castro’s statement that Brazil is “badly losing the battle” against Zika,11 President Rousseff has maintained that her war will be effective.

Several explanations were set forth due to the government’s inability to effectively address the problem and unwillingness to investigate the repercussions of the disease.

Among them is the possibility that the country’s current severe economic recession has thwarted efforts against the spread of Zika.

Although Castro denied this claim and stated in January that the country was quickly moving towards the creation of a vaccine against the epidemic, accounts by other Brazilian authorities argue otherwise. The governor of the state of Pernambuco, for example, admitted that the economic crisis creates limitations to the country’s ability to deal with the disease, and the director of the institute responsible for creating the vaccine stated that it would take several years to finalize its development due to scarce resources.12 Others, such as internationally renowned Brazilian

53

Spring 2016 of a larger effort to blame individuals, particularly women, for the spread of the disease, to avoid taking responsibility for the role government played in propagating the virus.13 According to Brum, “The Aedes mosquito has proliferated in Brazil due to the negligence of the state: an inadequate sewage system, poor management of waste, precarious urban development and the difficulties a section of the population faces in accessing drinking water, making it necessary to store it.”14 Brum also argues that the policies created by the government to address the Zika outbreak are rooted in the country’s patriarchal traditions, holding women responsible for their contraction of the disease.

She provides as evidence Marcelo Castro’s statement that women have failed to protect themselves from Zika as much as men “because they expose their legs.”15 In addition Brazil, has not caved to international pressure to allow women access to

abortion given the possibility of a link between Zika and microcephaly.

In fact, conservative groups of politicians are drafting laws aimed at increasing the penalty for abortion when related to microcephaly or similar illnesses.16 There are yet other scholars who argue that the government’s reactions are all part of an effort to downplay the severity of the virus in order to ensure that athletes and tourists attend the 2016 Rio Olympics.17 The primary motivations and interests behind the government’s actions continue to be debated, but it remains indisputable that its policies against the virus have been completely misguided.

It is important to note that members of Brazilian society have taken efforts to prevent the spread of the virus, despite the government’s missteps. Educational programs in schools, warnings through various popular means of communication, and the constant presence of news reports regarding the virus by the

country’s main news outlets have been effective. But whether due to sexism, economic limitations, or government interests, the Brazilian government’s domestic efforts to contain the spread of the disease have paled in comparison to international efforts by bodies such as the WHO or even by local citizens. The picture this failure paints is not a reassuring one—it is one of self-interest, political incompetence, and lack of regard for the population at large. It is undeniable that the government’s mishandling of one event is not representative of the entire nature of the country’s administration.

However, the Brazilian government’s inability to deal with this crisis, the biggest health crisis the country has seen in years, brings into question its ability to exercise its fundamental function of ensuring its citizens’ access to basic human rights.

Photo by Ana Paula Amatuzzi, CAS ‘18

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The International Relations Review

Editorial:

The Future of U.S. foreign affairs is up for grabs in 2016

By Madeleine Martin, CAS ‘17

T

he long-term relationship between the United States and the European Union could crumble depending on the outcome of critical moments this calendar year and yet, little to no investigatory reporting or foreign policy steps are being made to keep it intact.

The problem began when the Court of Justice (CJEU) invalidated the United States–European Union Safe Harbor Agreement in October 2015. Although its replacement was finally agreed upon four months later, announced two days after the CJEU’s unofficial expiration date in February,1 the new “E.U.–U.S. Privacy Shield” is written on unusually vulnerable grounds. The Privacy Shield is intended to restore the essence of the former agreement’s shared citizen data and privacy law practices, with its most critical updates strengthening E.U. control over regulatory requirements and instilling limits on U.S. national security access to E.U. citizens’ private information.2 These updates are indicative of the E.U.’s continued concern over the controversial National Security Agency (NSA) practices leaked

by Edward Snowden in 2013; the same concern that caused the invalidation of the original safe harbor agreement.

While even hesitancy over the longterm stability of U.S. relations with the E.U. may appear unwarranted—perhaps because of the absence of any substantive talks on foreign policy in the U.S.’s 2016 presidential election cycle—foreign trust in the U.S. respect other nations’ own citizens privacy and security rights has the potential to significantly change the U.S.’s power abroad. European citizens’ lasting, post-Snowden fear in both the security and regulation of U.S. intelligence work threatens permanent fallout and/or a second suspension of the agreement, each of which would create repercussions in not just E.U.–U.S. relations but in global trade, expansion and stability of

multi-national corporations (MNCs), and international peacekeeping efforts. NonEuropean nations will look to the E.U. as an example of how to treat the U.S. with regards to cybersecurity and technology policy, and any outcome marking divisions between the U.S. and E.U. could elicit inconceivable consequences.

The initial suspension of the Safe Harbor Agreement was triggered by the complaint of one private Austrian citizen, Maximillian Schrems, who submitted to the High Court of Ireland that the NSA and other agencies within the U.S. Intelligence Community had extended its reach beyond the privacy standards upheld in Europe. Although his complaint was specific to the transfer of European Facebook users’ data to U.S. servers, the ICJ agreed with Ireland’s finding that the U.S. did not adequately protect the personal data of individuals in comparison to the degree of individual privacy assured within Europe.3 Accordingly, MNCs headquartered in the U.S. could no longer obtain data from its international users and consumers in the E.U., including technology conglomerates like Google, Facebook, Twitter and consequently Apple.

This threat to MNCs is precisely what makes the viral 2016 case of Apple versus the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) so pertinent to foreign affairs; should the E.U. interpret the FBI’s capacity to hack and unlock some of the most advanced devices on the market as invasive or potentially threatening to European citizens, the E.U.–U.S. Privacy Shield could again fall through.

As of March 28, 2016 the FBI unlocked San Bernardino terrorist Syed Rizwan Farook’s iPhone without the previously requested aid of Apple which, particularly following Apple CEO Tim Cook’s public plea for individual privacy as an ethical necessity, the E.U.’s concerns over the U.S. federal government’s technological potential to overreach in cyber security

and intelligence gathering has been moderately confirmed. Unless the U.S. makes significant efforts to appease the E.U. citizens’ fears of individual privacy rights disintegrating through seemingly excessive U.S. surveillance, not only will tensions heighten between the U.S. and its strongest ally, but also the relative stability of many MNCs reliant upon both the U.S. and the E.U. is at stake.

It should be the United States’ goal to represent the ideal forms of governance in terms of both the efficacy and efficiency of federal legislation and citizens’ respect for governments; however, should the U.S. ignore the E.U.’s warning signs to any degree of a decaying alliance again, we should not be surprised if and when the rest of the world follows in the E.U.’s footsteps.

Luckily, U.S. citizens can all but determine this incredibly variable yet critical trajectory: all you need to do is vote. In perhaps one of the most distinguishable ways in recent history, the outcome of the 2016 presidential election will set the tone for international relations for at least the next decade. Whether you’re liberal or conservative, pro-Tea Party or pro-democratic socialism, you should critically analyze each candidate and disregard your initial biases as best you can on policy platforms to decide for yourself who will best sustain and strengthen our presence abroad. We as a nation should strive not to merely uphold our world power status, but to honestly and admirably live up to—and surpass— the demands and expectations that go along with it. 2016 will mark a major transitional moment in U.S. history and come November, the direction in which we turn could begin with you.

55

Spring 2016

The IR Review Editorial Board Anushka Pinto, Editor-in-Chief CGS ‘15, CAS ‘17 Morgan Peterson, Editor-in-Chief CAS‘17 Victoria Reynolds, Senior Editor CAS ‘18 Madeleine Martin, Senior Editor CAS ‘17 Clara Bezerra, Staff Writer CAS ‘18 James Paige, Staff Writer CAS ‘18 Raina Kadavil, Staff Writer CAS ‘19 Danielle Wallner, Staff Writer CAS ‘19 Caroline Lord, Editor CAS ‘18 Kelley Gourley, Editor CAS ‘16 Andre Gellermen, Editor CAS ‘18 Madeline Van Heusden, Editor, Layout Editor CAS ‘17 Maddie Ferrill, Layout Editor CAS ‘19 Ellen Gilley, Photography Editor CAS ‘17 ENG ‘19 Gowtham Asokam, Blog Writer, Podcast Commentator SAR ‘19 Desmond Molloy, Staff Writer, Blog Writer, Podcast Commentator

About The IR Review The International Relations Review, ISSN 2152-738X, is a subsidiary of the Boston University International Affairs Association. The IR Review is an international relations magazine serving the undergraduate students at Boston University. With a circulation of nearly 1,500 the IR Review has striven to create a forum for students interested in international affairs.

Since it was founded in 2009, the IR Review has striven to create a forum for students interested in international affairs. The submissions features in the publication cover a myriad of topics and controversies, including but not limited to globalization, international security, human rights, international law and politics and sustainability.

A PDF of the current issue, as well as citations and archives can be viewed online at www.irr.buiaa.org.

Colophon The International Relations Review is created using Adobe In-Design CS5 and exported as a PDF. Adobe Photoshop and Adobe Illustrator are also used in the production process. The IR Review prints more than 1,500 copies annually from Fowler Printing and Graphics in Randolph, MA. The typefaces for the publication include Times, Baskerville Italics, Baskerville Old Face and Garamond. The images in the publication are processed in CMYK. The magazine is printed on 100-pound gloss paper and comes with a saddle-stitched binding.

The publication is run by the editorial board, which consists of copy editors, layout editors and the editors-in-chief. The editorial board also handles external affairs, such as blogging, public relations, marketing, advertising, and logistics.

The cover photo used for the Spring 2016 edition of the IR Review was taken by Melissa Trostel, CAS ‘17.

The photo used for the Interview section was taken by Maryna Markowicz, CGS ‘19.

The photo used for the Foreign

Guidelines for Submissions Essay submissions are accepted year-round for the IR Review. All essays must contain at least 500 words and must not exceed 3,000. Essays must also include the author’s name, college, graduation year, a title, and citations to be considered for publication.

The IR Review reserves the right to revise submissions. All the revisions are sent to the author for approval before going to print. The IR Review also reserves the right to edit photo submissions minimally. However, creative liberties are taken into account.

All work must be properly cited. Plagiarized work violates the IR Review’s Code of Ethics, as well as the Boston University Handbook, and will not be accepted. If the IR Review finds that a submission has been plagiarized, the staff will no longer accept submissions from that author. Opinion pieces do not require a bibliography unless the author cites other sources.

Submissions are accepted on a rolling basis. The editorial staff can be contacted for questions regarding submissions at irr@buiaa.org.

Security section was taken by Maura

Feltault, CAS ‘17.

The photo used for the Economics and Development section was taken by Lauren Peterson, CGS ‘18.

The photo used for the Regional Politics section was taken by Kexin Yang, CGS ‘19.

The photo used for the Culture & Anthropology section was taken by

Submit for the Fall 2016 Issue If you have an essay or photos you want to submit and want to see published, send it to the editorial board to have it considered for the IR Review.

Ganimete Lamaj, ENG ‘19.

THE CONVERSATION STARTS HERE. SUBMIT TO THE IR REVIEW. SEE SUBMISSION GUIDLINES ONLINE AT IRR.BUIAA.ORG.