IR Review Fall 2015 Issue

IR REVIEW The International Relations Review at Boston University

Fall 2015

The Unhealthy Side of African Development Companies, Conflict Minerals, & the Congo

Exclusive Interview: China as an Economic Giant

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CULTURE & ANTHROPOLOGY FOREIGN SECURITY INTERVIEW ECONOMICS & DEVELOPMENT REGIONAL POLITICS

CULTURE & ANTHROPOLOGY 06 As Our Walls Come Crumbling Down

By Raina Kadavil, CAS ‘19

08 The Unhealthy Side of African Development

By Desmond Molloy, SAR ‘19

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As Our Walls Come Crumbling Down

By Raina Kadavil, CAS ‘19 At the forefront of foreign policy

today is Syria: the hotspot where a civil war, a genocide, a refugee crisis, and an all new terror organization are proliferating all at once. The world is on its toes as it counts the deaths: one, two, three hundred thousand, with no end in sight. Syria has become, by all means, a modern war: the use of social media by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the distribution of videos portraying their gory beheadings of soldiers, journalists and innocent citizens has captured the world’s attention.

One beheading in particular stood out among the others, offering ISIS yet another moniker: destroyer of history. When ISIS captured the ancient city of Palmyra, they brought down the ruins of one of its most ancient temples, and with it, one of its retired heads of antiquities, Khaled al-Asaad.

The inhumanity of the act, which UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) deemed a “war crime,” has spurred a worldwide response, including here, in Boston at its beloved “MFA.” Every hall of the Museum of Fine Arts is filled with pieces that bring history to life; including the recent history of Syria.

Since its establishment in 1876, Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts has attracted hundreds of patrons from around the world every day to gaze in wonder at its Egyptian mummy gallery, installation of letters from John Singer Sargent,

and ancient coins collection. In 1910 and throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the MFA came to acquire a series of pieces that, today, have come to hold a very special significance: nine funerary sculptures from ancient Palmyra, Syria.

Although records of its early existence trace back to the second millennium B.C. during the Neolithic period, Palmyra at its height was a dynamic stronghold that boasted as one of the wealthiest, diverse, and cosmopolitan cities of the ancient world. Its architecture is testament to a rare form of crossroads, a unique instance of cultural diffusion; Persian, Arab, and Greco-Roman influences all blended into a series of magnificent structures and pieces.

Its inhabitants and merchants grew wealthy from Silk Road trade, allowing for the creation of great structures such as the Great Colonnade, the Temple of Bel, and the tower tombs. Like an antique novel, Palmyra has been passed down from hand to hand, empire to empire – Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, Timurid, France, and finally, in May of 2015, into the hands of ISIS. The global community has a bad impression of ISIS for many reasons, and its destruction of history is certainly not the most dominant one. But it is well known that on top of its torture, rape, and murder, ISIS also has a track record of destroying or selling historical sites and antiquities from the lands

that it takes, which it justifies by the belief that religious shrines are idolatrous. Stolen antiquities also play a large part in funding ISIS’ mission of destruction. In the past, it has released videos of its fighters smashing artifacts in Mosul, Iraq, and blowing up the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud.

ISIS’ most recent and horrifying “victory” occurred on August 23, 2015 with the destruction of the Temple of Baalshamin, dedicated to the Phoenician god of rain and fertility. The Temple was one of the few well-preserved structures left from a much bigger complex in Palmyra after centuries of warfare and environmental weathering.

But this time, ISIS took not only a precious piece of the world’s history, but also the life of Khaled al-Asaad who, at 82, was one of Palmyra’s most renowned curators – the Howard Carter of Palmyra, according to Amr al-Azm, another former Syrian antiquities official.

Before he was murdered, he was tortured and interrogated for a month by ISIS on the whereabouts of antiques previously removed from Palmyra for safekeeping.

As is customary for ISIS, he was beheaded publicly in front of the town’s museum. The jihadists hung his mutilated body from Palmyra’s main square declaring him a heretic who pledged allegiance to the Syrian President, Bashar alAssad, and Palmyra’s collection of “idols.” Around the world and amongst those who love history and seek to preserve it, the horrific

Fall 2015

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“Around the world and amongst those who love history and seek to preserve it, the horrific killing of al-Assad has only made clear that this war is far from over.” killing of al-Assad has only made clear that this war is far from over.

After the tragedy in Palmyra, the MFA decided that silence would no longer be an option.

“After [Khaled al-Assad] was killed last August, a number of us came together and discussed ways we could respond,” says Dr. Phoebe Segal, Mary Bryce Comstock Assistant Curator of Greek and Roman Art at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. “I felt it was important to do or say something

because he lived and died doing what museum professionals strive to do every day: to care for and protect art – in his case, very old art – so that it may be enjoyed by people living today and preserved for future generations.” As visitors step out of the coin gallery, they come across a small collection of reliefs, including “Roundel With the Portrait Bust of a Woman.”

Beside the reliefs sits an open book, pages filled with heartfelt comments dedicated to a hero

Photo by Raina Kadavil, CAS ‘19

who gave his life to protect history.

“With the help of our Director, Matthew Teitelbaum, we narrowed the focus to honoring his life and contributions to the fields of art history and archaeology,” Dr. Segal explains. “To me, it’s a very small gesture of respect and solidarity – so infinitesimal when compared with the magnitude of his sacrifice I am reluctant even to talk about it in the same breath.” The designers of the memorial hope that while commemorating the curator’s bravery, the memorial will also inspire dialogue and debate among visitors and encourage them to expand their worldview.

The conflict actions of ISIS in the Middle East has been damaging to many; most of all, to the innocent Syrians and Iraqis who are caught in the crossfire.

But every person – past, present, and future – loses something every time a piece of history is destroyed.

As Dr. Segal says, “It worries me when people advance the argument that the art of Palmyra is important today because it’s being destroyed.

Rather, it is being destroyed because it is important.” To destroy history is to destroy a piece of knowledge, and to destroy a part of the human experience, itself. If future Palmyras are to be preserved, it is critical that awareness be spread and action must be taken now, and action begins with awareness.

At the Museum of Fine Arts, this goal of cultivating consciousness as a foundation for future steps is well underway.

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The Unhealthy Side of African Development

By Desmond Molloy, SAR ‘19 Last year’s Ebola outbreak in West Africa garnered seemingly endless media coverage. With its quick rate of infection and ghastly symptoms, the disease was practically made for cable news. In a year and a half, it took roughly 4,800 lives in Liberia, one of the hardesthit countries, killing one in every 100,000 Liberians.

But in the grand scheme of African health challenges, its importance has been exaggerated. Ebola’s impact is dwarfed by less sensational diseases. For every Liberian killed by Ebola last year, 91 lost their lives to cancer alone. This disparity in mortality and news coverage is hardly new. Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) like cancer or cardiovascular disease have never been as perversely glamorous as HIV/AIDS or other easily transmitted, highly lethal infections. In part, this is because their symptoms are less drastic. But it also has to do with their relative normality for Westerners used

Photo by Isabella Celedon, CGS ’17, SED ’19 to healthcare systems that can and do treat NCDs, and health insurance that supports such care. For sub-Saharan Africa, NCDs are new and difficult to prevent. The area’s health care system remains threadbare at a time when urbanization, aging and an increasingly carbohydrateheavy diet is driving an increase in the prevalence of chronic conditions. Unless the development of health care infrastructure catches up to urban and economic growth, African countries may inherit most of the West’s afflictions without ever reaching its higher standards of living.

For much of the 20th century, Africans did not live long enough to be troubled by NCDs. Inadequate water systems and low rates of vaccination in combination with widespread hunger kept the average life expectancy well below that of the West. But a trend toward better vaccination and sanitation, as well as more access to food

Fall 2015 has reduced the prevalence of infectious disease and starvation.

Accordingly, Africans are living longer, and are more likely to suffer from diseases associated with old age, such as cancer and cardiovascular disease. Africa’s development has also brought about considerable urbanization.In sharp contrast to the rural, physically active lifestyles predominant throughout African history, urban life can be quite sedentary. The results speak for themselves. From 2000 to 2012, infectious disease fell by 11 percentage points as a share of both death and cause of disability. Its place has been taken by conditions familiar to Westerners, among them cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and cancer.

One of the most pervasive chronic diseases in Africa, ironically, is weight gain. The popular Western image of the continent, often featuring starving children, is steadily becoming less and less accurate, but at a high price; a dearth of nutrients has been replaced by a glut of unhealthy calories. South Africa is

9 the grim poster boy for this issue: two-thirds of the country’s citizens are now overweight. It is an epidemic driven by cheap fast food; poor South Africans often find salty, fat-infused meat to be the most accessible form of calories. Consequently, diabetes and cardiovascular disease have overtaken HIV/AIDS in mortality rates, and are catching up to infectious diseases like tuberculosis and influenza. South Africans are hardly alone; almost half of Africans suffer dangerously high blood pressure, and obesity is widespread across the continent. As Africa’s cities become home to a greater percentage of the population over this century, this problem could intensify. Urban Africans are more vulnerable to obesity. This phenomenon was documented last year by a study of a village and city in the same region of Ghana.

Urban participants were much more likely to be physically inactive, and to consume alcohol and tobacco.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, average body mass index was much higher for urban areas, with twice as many

urban as rural women obese. Unless the higher living standards of cities are combined with the seemingly healthier lifestyle of the countryside, Africa will be held back by excessive weight gain. Obesity itself drives many other diseases; breast, colorectal and stomach cancer are more common for overweight patients.

The greatest threat from obesity, however, is heart disease. Heart disease is currently the leading killer of Africans over the age of 30, displacing longtime scourges like malaria and tuberculosis. In part, this is because of a training deficit.

Generations of African doctors have had to combat infectious disease first, and accordingly lack knowledge of chronic diseases. Consequently, many of them do not screen for high blood pressure or other risk factors, making the disease unlikely to be detected before it is too late.

Fortunately, training community health workers to check patients for cardiovascular risk factors is relatively straightforward. One two-week pilot program in South Africa successfully prepared 10

“The popular Western image of the continent, often featuring starving children, is steadily becoming less and less accurate, but at a high price.” of its 15 students, none of whom had a degree in health professions, to screen for such risks. Another hypertension reduction program in rural Nigeria had similarly promising results. These programs will not cure cardiovascular disease, but may serve as good interim measures.

There are no such preventative measures for cancer. Rarely associated with the developing world, the ‘emperor of all maladies’ is a heavy burden for Africa, where it

is very difficult to treat. The contrast with developed world standards of care is stark. In Canada, a pediatric leukemia patient has a 90% chance of survival. In Africa, that chance is about 10%. If cancer were indeed uncommon in Africa, this might not be a major challenge. But the burden of the disease is heavy and still increasing; rates of cervical cancer alone are five times those of the United States, and cancer prevalence is projected to grow as

the population ages. Africa’s health infrastructure is not yet up to this challenge. Hospital access remains sparse, and specialists sparser still; there are ten times as many people per cancer-searching pathologist in Africa as in the developed world.

Consequently, cancer is typically detected at a much later stage.

Assuming a diagnosis comes in time, treatment is hard to obtain. Ghana, for instance, has just five radiology centers for a population of 24

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million, and suffers from a shortage of radiologists; Rwanda, with 11 million inhabitants, has just two such facilities. Africa has experienced considerable economic growth in the 21st century, but has yet to build a strong oncology system from the fruits of its labor.

Looking over cardiology, diabetes care, and cancer in sub-Saharan Africa, a common theme emerges: a lack of adequate health care institutions and care providers. Fixing this problem seems a herculean task. Africa’s hospitals are notoriously low-quality, with the risk of infectious disease driving many patients away. The technology that First World doctors and nurses take for granted is also absent, with African health information systems among the world’s weakest. Some countries, like Rwanda, have been able to build up healthcare in the past few years, but many other are lagging behind.

Capital investment is necessary to modernize African healthcare systems, but funding does not seem forthcoming. Most countries indirectly fund their healthcare sectors through the creation and maintenance of health insurance sectors. Unfortunately, Africa lacks the payroll tax compliance that would be needed to pay for a Social Security or a Medicare, making this task difficult. Temporary solutions may be at hand. Community-based health insurance, where residents of a village or neighborhood make small payments to support medical care, has yielded promising results in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. But such systems do not have the deep pockets to cover cardiovascular or oncological care, or purchase the equipment needed to prevent infectious diseases from dogging hospitals. Until Africa translates the last decade’s growth into investment in medical infrastructure, noninfectious diseases will be a heavy burden to carry.

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Photo by Archit Agarwal, CAS’ 17

FOREIGN SECURITY 14 Dire Straits: Syrian Refugee Pressuring Water Paucity in Jordan

By Danny Rollins, CAS ‘16

16 The Baltic Security Dilemma: Navigating the Russian Federation’s Aggressive Posturing

By James Paige, CAS ‘18

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Dire Straits

Syrian Refugee Pressuring Water Paucity in Jordan

By Daniel Rollins, CAS ‘16 One of the driest countries on the planet, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan continues to struggle with severe water shortages over the past few years. Located on the East Bank of the Jordan River and separated from Syria via the Yarmouk River, it is from these two surface water resources that Jordan extracts much of its water. These resources are shared with neighboring countries Israel and Syria, who leave only a small amount for Jordan. As the kingdom continues to experience a number of impeding factors on water resources such as prolonged drought, significant strains are placed on the national water supply.

Jordan’s water crisis is in fact multidimensional in nature. Factors such as climate change, depletion of groundwater reserves, inflow of migrant workers and population growth have all contributed to the mounting water crisis. To make matters worse, these problems are exacerbated by the waves of refugees escaping the Syrian civil war who flee into Jordan’s cities and towns.

While not the only country to face chronic water scarcity in the Middle East, an inadequate water supply is only slated to get worse by the onset of drought. Emphasizing the severity of Jordan’s drought, the country’s Ministry of Water and Irrigation reported in 2014, that “Jordan had undergone one of the driest rainy seasons in decades,” contributing to an already persistent water shortfall.

Further hindering the government’s ability to solve this problem is unsustainable management and out-of-date infrastructure. According to a recent

report from the American aid agency Mercy Corps, Jordan’s weathered water pumps have resulted in liters of water gushing out of broken pipes instead of ever reaching a family’s spigot. By the report’s estimate, “the amount of water lost nationwide could satisfy the needs of 2.6 million people - more than a third of Jordan’s current population.”

Years of over-pumping have put Jordan on track to deplete its underground fresh water reserves by as early as 2065 . The problem of water mismanagement proves even more alarming in a dry environment where evaporation rates are high.

Because salts are less likely to be leached from the soil in low rainfall areas, high concentrations of salt will have a greater impact on the soil and likely render what water remains less drinkable. Water scarcity not only threatens nationwide health, but also poses a major destabilizing factor for

the registered refugees there are many non-registered Syrians who fled to Jordan in the early years of civil unrest.

As the Mercy Corps’ report further points out, Syrian refugee numbers are equivalent to about a tenth of Jordan’s precrisis population, but they are overwhelmingly concentrated in the North, where the country experiences most of its rainfall.

Such a sudden population boost has quickly overturned Jordan’s carefully-laid plans to manage its water. Additionally, refugees bring with them new challenges, ranging from poor conservation habits to an overwhelming volume of human waste that, if improperly treated, threatens to pollute groundwater.

Since the 1980’s Jordan has undergone nationwide water conservation policies, resulting in a population that is used to water

“Years of over-pumping have put Jordan on track to deplete its underground fresh water reserves by as early as 2065.”

Jordan’s government.

The revolutionary wave of uprisings in 2010, referred to as the Arab Spring, shook the Middle East to its core. Even with brief protests and governmental changes, Jordan appeared to maintain a period of relative calm in the midst of chaos.

However, to the North Syria has been embroiled in civil war since the Spring of 2011. Since then, hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees have fled their home country, but beyond

conservation programs. Conversely, refugees from water-rich nations such as Syria are likely to be unused to water rationing, and can be expected to place high strain on the Jordanian water supply through their high water use. Throughout refugee inhabited areas, shortages have reached critical levels. In some communities, water supply has not kept at pace with growth. In the capital city of Amman, each regional section of the city gets their water

Fall 2015 Citizens must be resourceful with what limited water supply they are given, lest they run out of water until the next resupply. Weeks could elapse before a drop comes out of the spigot. Families increasingly do not have enough water to drink. To counter this problem and to buy more time, Jordan’s government has made several large-scale investments in recent years, such as deeper wells and bigger pipelines. Neighboring countries such as Egypt and Israel have also aided Jordan via large-scale water transfers. Additionally, both

15 Israel and Egypt have significantly invested in desalinization projects in their respective nations in order to establish a new water supply that will ease existing pressures.

International assistance has also been quite spirited as of late, with dozens of international NGOs and foreign governmental aid agencies convening in the Kingdom and in the process, bringing in droves of donor money to develop sustainable water infrastructure.

While the Jordanian Government has taken up the responsibility of

hosting long-suffering Syrians, the institutions responsible for providing water have been unable to meet rising demand. As water resources continue to deplete, anger over water scarcity has followed. Jordanian patience is waning, creating the potential for tensions to ignite. Addressing this crisis will be a requisite for the rising storm of pressures placed upon the Jordanian Government by the influx of refugees and the demands of its own people.

Graphic by Daniel Rollins, CAS ‘16

“In the capital city of Amman, each regional section of the city gets their water tank refilled once a week. Citizens must be resourceful with what limited water supply they are given, lest they run out of water until the next resupply.”

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The Baltic Security Dilemma:

Navigating the Russian Federation’s Aggressive Posturing

By James Paige, CAS ‘18

Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite recently spoke at the UN General Assembly in New York City, on 29 September 2015.

President Grybauskaite condemned the Putin Administration’s poweraccumulating policies in Europe, simultaneously criticizing the United Nations’ accommodation of Russian aggression. “[The] Kremlin seeks to rewrite history and redraw the borders of post-war Europe,” Grybauskaite declared, “The occupied territories of Ukraine,

Georgia, [and] Moldova are full of red lines that we have drawn, but never acted upon”. President Grybauskaite’s admonishment illustrates an increasingly pervasive strain of thought in Baltic threat perception, the fear of a Russian military incursion into the Baltic region. The Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) operate in a region of vital strategic interest for the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation’s aggressive bid for regional hegemony in the Post-

Soviet Space includes – thus far - the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the 2014 Crimean Crisis, and a military presence in the disputed Transnistria region. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – E.U. and NATO member states since 2004 – should move to reduce irritants with the Russian Federation, in the light of the insurmountable power disparity that characterizes Russo-Baltic relations; NATO’s apparent aversion to military confrontation with Russia; the E.U.’s increasingly resource-

“[The] Kremlin seeks to rewrite history and redraw the borders of post-war Europe.” draining immigration crisis and Russia’s recent military deployment to Syria. The Baltic nations should move to placate Russia by refraining from public diatribes against the Putin Administration and bestowing greater rights on “non-citizen”, ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia, thus reducing the likelihood of a Russian military adventure in the region.

The Baltic region enjoyed a period of relative calm in the final months of 2015. In September, Russia and Estonia effectuated a prisoner exchange of two intelligence officers at remote border post near the Piusa River. In October, the United Kingdom Defense Secretary Michael Fallon announced the dispatch of 100 British military personnel to the Baltic region for the purpose of deterring Russian aggression in the eastern flank of NATO. Additionally, Poland

recently concluded negotiations with the Baltic nations for the construction of the Gas Interconnector PolandLithuania (GIPL), a 534-kilometer natural gas pipeline, with project completion slated for December of 2019. GIPL’s completion will reduce Baltic energy dependence on the Russian Federation. These events unfolded in an uncertain political atmosphere, which has been increasingly volatile since mid2000. The heart of this tension and uncertainty lies in Russia’s desire to maintain a sphere of influence in the Baltic region.

The Russian Federation operates with great military strategic concerns and strong economic interests in the Baltic region. For instance, The Baltic nations, along with Poland, straddle Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast exclave, thus geographically isolating the territory from the Russian state. The Kaliningrad

Oblast houses Russia’s Baltic Fleet (comprising fifty-six warships and two submarines), several thousand soldiers, and a number of shortrange ballistic missiles. The high concentration of valuable military equipment and personnel in an exclave territory necessitates clear communications with the military district’s headquarters. As such, Russia views the Baltic States as possessing a capacity to sever communications between the Russian Armed Forces’ Western Military District headquarters in St. Petersburg from its forces in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Russia therefore seeks to maintain heavy influence in the region in order to mitigate any and all threats to the cohesiveness of its Western Military District.

From an economic perspective, Russia has generally enjoyed an energy monopoly in the Baltic region, and desires its continuation.

Fall 2015 For instance, the Russian stateowned gas-exporting ministry, Gazprom, owns controlling shares in the major gas companies of each Baltic state: Eesti Gaas, Latvijas Gaze, and Lietuvos Dujos.

However, in the accordance with the E.U.’s 2009 Third European Energy Package, the Lithuanian government in 2010 attempted to separate of the transmission business of Lietuvos Dujos from the distribution business, thereby empowering the Lithuanian state to make decisions regarding the transmission of gas.

Russia views this bold reduction of Gazprom’s influence in the Baltic energy markets, along with the 2015 negotiations regarding GIPL, as a deliberate challenge to Russia’s economic privileges in the region.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should satiate Russian ambitions, bearing in mind Russia’s willingness to utilize military methods to manage their strategic interests, NATO’s aversion to conflict with Russia, the E.U.’s preoccupation with a massive immigration crisis and the Baltic countries’ abysmal defense spending, which – as of 2014 – amounted to a combined sum of just under $1.2 billion, in comparison to Russia’s 2014 defense expenditure of $69.3 billion. The Baltic states should continue to find ways to reaffirm their sovereignty (i.e. encouraging the presence of NATO and US forces in the region), but they must exercise caution. Bombastic rhetoric against Russia will do the Baltic leaders no good in the coming years.

Luckily, the closing months of 2015 have presented the Baltic nations with a window of opportunity in which to secure themselves from Russian aggression.

Russian military deployment in the Middle East significantly

17 reduces the likelihood of further Russian military deployment on another front. As of 21 September 2015, Russia has been projecting military power into Syria in order to organize an alternative antiISIS coalition. For instance, Russia deployed six Su-34 attack aircraft, twelve Su-25 attack aircraft, dozens of transport helicopters, and two thousand military personnel to Syria. Given the likelihood of mission creep, Russian deployment in the Middle East likely means, for the time being, that Russia will not increase their military expenditure on a military intervention in Europe.

Military deployment drains a state’s financial resources and generates both domestic discontent and international popular indignation, neither of which the Putin Administration desires.

On the other hand, the temporal proximity between the 2014 acquisition of Crimea by Russia and the current day, as well as the subsequent storm of American and EU sanctions, provides further disincentive for renewed Russian military action in Europe.

Russia’s recent military escapade in Ukraine tested the flexibility of the international system. Russian foreign policy makers surely recognize that further offensive military aggression will probably precipitate NATO retaliation. The Baltic countries should immediately begin reducing the high conflict potential issues of Russo-Baltic relations, starting with the issue of “non-citizens” in Estonia and Latvia, considering Russia’s current, disadvantaged standing in the international political landscape.

The resolution of the issues of “non-citizen” Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia would pacify Russo-Baltic relations in the short

run. Vestiges of Estonia and Latvia’s Soviet past continue to resonate in their demography. Estonia and Latvia respectively house approximately 93,000 and 280,000 non-citizen minorities, comprising mainly of ethnic Russians, who continue to experience political disenfranchisement. Bearing in mind the Putin Administration’s drive to preserve the “ethno-cultural identity of the Russian diaspora and its links with the historical homeland”, as enshrined in the Compatriot Policy, this issue could serve as justification for intervention, as it did in Crimea and the Donbass region of Ukraine in 2014. As such, resolving the non-citizen issue would drastically reduce the rationality for Russian military maneuvering in the region, especially in light of Russia’s military engagement in the Syria and their current standing in the international community. Baltic foreign policy makers must think about their position in the international political landscape rationally, taking into account their relative weaknesses.

At the moment, the Baltic countries do not necessarily have the support needed to confront the Russian Federation. As such, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must tread lightly in the shadow of Russian power.

Photo by Sophia Culpo, CGS’19

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Interview

China as an Economic Giant: A Conversation with Professor Min Ye

Conducted by Caroline Lord CAS ‘18 Photo by Sara Hayden Van Velkinberg, CAS ‘18

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What do you see as the root causes of China’s recent economic slowdown and what’s the global impact?

Well, number one, China has had long high-growth periods for a very long time, and that was unsustainable.

Keeping that kind of growth, the Chinese environmental impacts and the impacts on the world would be more negative than positive. So the U.S., particularly the World Bank, has tried for over 15 years at least to persuade China to change its growth model. But it’s actually more important to slow down, and I think this is the beginning, the deepening of the transition from the manufacturing-based, heavy investment-based, to consumption-based, to services-based growth. So there are two conditions. Externally, basically the world’s appetite for Chinese goods has not been growing, and actually has been slowing down. And within China, the investment-driven, heavy industrydriven development was creating lots of social issues. I think we probably would need to look out for the new trends that are being unleashed—the services sector, the small companies, the consumption patterns, and the real-estate market. So if we see signs of recovery or stable development from those sectors, I think that actually would be more encouraging than just looking at the GDP growth numbers.

One could argue that China’s global political influence is a result of its extraordinary economic power as opposed to ideological leadership. Does the U.S. want a more politically active China in the world? Given the current state of play, would the U.S. benefit from greater engagement or should it pursue a policy of containment?

Right now you see China and the United States are so deeply integrated and so deeply interdependent in social, economic, political, multilateral forms that containment is simply out of the question. But I also feel we cannot talk about the U.S. as a unitary actor, because we all know that the U.S. is not a unitary actor. There are different interests at play and in many issue areas you want China to play much greater political roles, such as the Middle East, anti-terrorism, climate change, and rule-based institutions. You want China to contribute to peacekeeping, stability, and human rights. But on the other hand, in finance, in global development, clearly it’s playing much greater roles. In the IMF reform being vetoed in the U.S. we see that the United States doesn’t want China to be a bigger financial power in the world. But you cannot stop it, because turn around and we have the Chinese Fund, BRICS banks, China Development Bank, and now you have AIIB. In the 1960s, the United States GDP was about 46 percent of the world GDP, which is why when the U.S. led the construction into national organizations and institutions it reflected the U.S.’s dominant economic power. Now the U.S. is about 23 percent, a dramatically reduced international role. If the U.S. does not lead or support the process of reform, then you will see different pillars, different kinds of institutions coming out of the world and beyond these US-led institutions.

Photo by Sara Hayden Van Velkinberg, CAS ‘18

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Photo by Kexin Yang, CGS ‘19

You recently won an International Security and Foreign Policy fellowship from the Smith Richardson Foundation for your research project entitled Rising China’s Rising Strategy: New Silk Road Domestic Sources and Regional Impacts. Could you describe the New Silk Road Initiative, its purpose, and its expected impact?

I want to know what this strategy was about and how it’s going to impact the region. So far I’ve found it’s more important in a development sense than in foreign policy strategy. From the U.S. perspective, this is a kind of a competing foreign policy strategy against U.S.-dominated maritime Asia, versus a land-based Asia. What’s breaking the path is really the land-based Silk Road. The land-based Silk Road is connecting China to Central Asia, with the majority of the road in China. The Chinese economy was earliest developed along the coastal lines, and then in the last ten years they tried to move to the West, which was called the Western Development Program, but this was only successful in terms of development in central China. So if the Silk Road is implemented, the most energized, the most excited places will be actually the localities in central and western China. Outside of China the places that would grow most clearly and benefit from the new Silk Road would be Pakistan and Kazakhstan. It’s a very long, huge silk road that includes 57 countries, but most of the countries’ bilateral ties may not be changed. And because of this, so I also think it’s actually much more promising to succeed than Americans who have been quite skeptical might think, because the Silk Road strategy is about domestic development. So if you could energize local reforms in the less developed areas and bring the eastern investments and manufacturing skills to those areas, just this shift from the coastal central west, that’s a big accomplishment and it’s achievable.

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The China-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was recently established with the participation of 56 other countries and plans to begin operation by the end of the year with authorized capital of $100 billion. What are the U.S.’s objections to the operation of the AIIB and how legitimate do you think they are?

In dealing with the AIIB, the U.S. was not smart. Before they raised their concerns, the U.S. lobbied its allies to veto and to not join the AIIB, and that was unwise, because even the U.S. allies know that Asia needs lots of investment in infrastructure. Once that kind of backfired that’s when they stepped back and started to talk about the transparency and the standards issues. The concerns are totally legitimate, and I think that in AIIB, the new Secretariat, and the Chinese counterparts, and the Ministry of Finance, tried really hard to incorporate these concerns. The operation is more or less similar to Asian Development Bank, but the cost structure is much cheaper. The Asian Development Bank had this permanent international advisory board and had to spend dozens of millions of dollars just on having this board in Manila. The AIIB will have this kind of rotating board and once the project comes in, then they will send to these individual boards or they have a conference. It’s already pushing the Asian Development Bank to reform and to lean to streamline its approval and make it quicker. So there are a couple things that most of the borrowers aren’t happy about, such as that it’s too costly to borrow and it’s too long to approve. Procedurally AIIB perhaps will try to incorporate those shorter comments of the existing banks. More or less they will try to make sure that the high standards are upheld and to show that with Chinese involvement, with Chinese leadership, international organizations can be just as high quality as the rest of the banks.

ECONOMICS & DEVELOPMENT 24 A Game of Risk and Reward:

Options in Greece’s Withdrawl from the Eurozone

By John Benducci, CAS ‘17

28 Smuggling Hope

By Brady Moses, CAS ‘17

30 Companies, Conflict Minerals, and the Congo: An Update on Dodd-Frank

By Jane Dimnwaobi, CAS ‘18

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The International Relations Review

A Game of Risk and Reward Options in Greece’s Withdrawl from the Eurozone

By John Benducci, Questrom ‘17

As a massive economic union that exists in our global economy, the European Union (E.U.) exerts a major influence in the global economic vernacular. With 500 million citizens represented by over $17 billion in outputs, it is easy for us to say that the E.U. is one of the biggest economic risks ever taken that has paid off. At the time of its inception, major economists worldwide said that a common currency and a union of this degree were impossible and would fail. However, while the E.U. still functions to this day and endures through the challenges that come

with a truly global economy, it is clear that economic crises plague the union and challenge its constituents with how far they will go in the name of solidarity. Greece, a member of the E.U. going through one of the largest debt crises today, is bound entirely by the policies that have evolved since trade agreements in Europe were created in 1957, which Greece acceded to in 1975.

With Greece’s complicated history with the E.U. and speculation in 2015 of its exit, withdrawal from the Eurozone monetary union with the intent to better the country’s quickly crippling economy becomes increasingly possible. There are serious potential benefits and consequences to consider.

Since Greece joined the European Union, it has enjoyed numerous benefits.

Not only did it feel that the E.U. stood for stability in their new government systems, but it would also help them assert independence as actor in the regional community, especially with Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Greece also felt that revolutionary policies would stand for a modernization of their economy and that it was important for them to have a significant presence in the process towards an integrated Europe. As per the request of the EEC in 1976, Greece began to transition their economy to full integration into an institution and were accepted as a full member

three years later. Until more recent years, Greece began to integrate themselves into the E.U. through the modification of institutional, political and defense regulations while continuing to create their own special regime and asking for additional support to fortify their economy. Through 1996, Greece furthered their support of further economic and social convergence by following the Maastricht treaty, meeting its convergence criteria to enter the Eurozone in 2002. It is evident that Greece had truly become increasingly devoted to the ideals of a single European community for quite some time. However, the onesize-fits-all nature of the EU does not necessarily work well in times of individual crises.

ECB and Eurozone suspended its bailouts until it was clear that the new government would fall in line with their policies. Starting in 2009, many began to fear that Greece would become unable to meet the obligations of its debt due to a great increase in government debt levels and high structural deficits. In 2010, it was discovered that Greece had been through three recessions in the past three years and major credit rating agencies put their debt below investment grade.

Later that year, the Eurozone, ECB, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) put forth a 110 billion euro bailout plan to lift the nation from its severe default and allow it to have enough funds to operate financially for the next three years. However, in 2011, another recession proved that a

Fall 2015 second 130 billion euro bailout would be necessary to expand the transfer of assets through 2014.

With the ongoing economic crisis and recession, the IMF continues to extend its support through 2016 with an additional 8.2 billion euros in loans. Despite Greece receiving a plethora of help from international bodies and a decline in unemployment and growth in GDP, the need for parliamentary elections earlier this year proved to be a danger to economic progress. Under this time of political uncertainty, the IMF, This overall crisis and the prospect of a new government led to extreme speculation that Greece would be leaving the Eurozone to focus on its own economic restructuring for a short while.

Different arguments exist in favor of Greece leaving the Eurozone. More radical economists feel that coming to terms with the downfall of the Greek economy sooner rather than later will hurt EU lenders and other members much less. An exit from the Eurozone would have to come very quickly, however, due to the high risk of volatility.

Others can agree that the IMF, ECB, and Eurozone’s policies have begun to infringe on Greece’s sovereignty as it directly monitors the activity within their government to see if bailout plans can continue.

All can agree however that a plan that gives Greece room to work independently under their own economic policy may be the safest bet for the success of the nation at large.

Earlier this year, Greece’s exit of the Eurozone was heavily discussed, especially by right-wing European politicians that feel rescuing Greece has become impossible. While it is clear that the idea of Greece exiting the Eurozone has some merit, a

25 decision to leave a union with such great influence as the E.U. would definitely not be easy.

The desire to exit the Eurozone is mainly driven by attempts to avoid potential fallout in the future.

However, it is the fear of ripple effects across the global economy that keeps both the Greek government and the E.U. strong proponents of Greece staying a full member. Many fear that, internally, a gap will develop between the rich who will maintain their euros and try to participate in the international economy and the poor who will resort to using the drachma, a currency still working to rebuild its international rapport. In terms of the European economy, it is speculated that Eurozone stock would decrease up to 50% in the

event that Greece leaves without careful work beforehand. With swift action, however, economists foresee long term gains in the ability of the Eurozone to manage economic circumstances and a strengthening of both the Greek and European economies.

Despite two differing opinions in regards to the European economy, the global economy fears that a depression within Europe would cascade across all of world trade.

Political cartoon by Hyeonju Kwon, CAS ‘18

26 Greece’s potential exit of the Eurozone is a game of risk versus reward. Historically, countries that have left currency unions since World War II have been large, rich, democratic and take advantage of periods of low macroeconomic volatility. Greece is experiencing a period of immense debt, government uncertainties and high economic volatility thanks to the European debt crisis. The risks associated with leaving the Eurozone are too substantial for the Greek people, the European economy and the global economy. While radical economists find that swift action will have a tremendous result in the long term, the benefits do not seem to outweigh the major costs that come with Greece leaving the Eurozone. If the Greek economy reached a stage where it had significantly lesser debt and more governmental certainty, an exit of the Eurozone would seem

The International Relations Review much more within reason. It is clear, however, that there would be no reason to leave if the economy did reach such a stage. Based on this, it is evident that the Eurozone, Greece and their allies still have a long way to go to help Greece reach a place of less volatility as a member of the E.U. In more recent months, the situation has not improved for Greece. In June of this year, all negotiations on a mutuallybeneficial deal for Greece and the Eurozone ceased as Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras called for a referendum on the proposals given by the IMF and E.U. Not only did this referendum fail by a margin of 61-39 but Eurozone ministers further refused to extend the bailout. Failed negotiations have only lead to a saga of further delays and missed deadlines for bailout plans through August of this year. It

is evident that reaching terms for a bailout package will continue to be a struggle. While major opponents of Greek bailout packages, namely the German Bundestag, are beginning to accept discussions of negotiations with Greece, it is clear that there will need to be a comprehensive arrangement to keep all parties in agreement. With a long way to go in negotiations, leaders throughout the Eurozone are further considering the Greek exit of the Eurozone as a real possibility. Consideration of this plan, while potentially poisonous for Greece and the reputation of the Euro worldwide, will be the true test of how Greece will balance the benefits and costs of methods to improve their failing economy.

“Greece is experiencing a period of immense debt, government uncertainties and high economic volatility thanks to the European debt crisis.”

Photo by Jennifer Gonzales, CGS ‘19

Fall 2015

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The International Relations Review

Smuggling Hope

By Brady Moses, CAS ‘17

Photo by Ryan Galindo, CAS ’16

In recent years a new brand of Robin Hood has struck the pharmaceutical industry – except these thieves are stealing from the lower classes and redistributing to the same individuals through the medium of the pharmaceutical industry. I am referencing to the illegal resale of the HIV/AIDS drug Combivir. Combivir is an antiretroviral drug produced by British drug conglomerate GlaxoSmithKline that acts by decreasing a patient’s total burden of HIV in order to slow the progression of the disease.

Recently, there has been a major underground industry of smuggling this antiretroviral from Africa and reselling it in European markets.

This is due to a price disparity between the version of the drug sold in Africa and a similar version in Europe. National and international governmental bodies should regulate drug industry pricing more in order to eliminate the need for the underground market for HIV/AIDS drugs.

Price discrimination is the concept of companies selling a product at different prices, depending on who is purchasing it, with the intent of maximizing their profit. An inelastic demand for a product often facilitates the practice. Price elasticity of demand is a concept used in economics to measure the responsiveness of the demand for a good to a change in its price. A high elasticity indicates that demand responds dramatically to a small price change, whereas low elasticity indicates the opposite.

The demand for HIV/AIDS drugs is highly inelastic, as patients would die quickly without any sort of treatment.

In 2002, the price of Combivir in Europe was roughly $6 per pill, which amounted to $4,380 a year, as individuals required two pills per day. In Africa, the price was 80 cents, or $584 per individual per year. A smuggling business resulted from this price gap. Middlemen in Africa bought the cheaper Combivir on the black market and shipped it back to Europe where it was resold at a lower price.

Often media makes out smugglers to be the villains. In an article for The Guardian a GlaxoSmithKline representative commented, “One didn’t think that people would be so evil as to feed this product back into the Western world.” Much of the public views Westerners’ behavior as stealing Combivir from needy Africans. In reality, it is the drug corporations that are at the root of the problem.

The World Health Organization, one of the world’s leading NGOs in the public health field, cites the HIV/ AIDS outbreak of the late twentieth century as one of the world’s deadliest continuing epidemics. In 2013, there were thirty five million people worldwide living with HIV/ AIDS. A staggering 1.5 million people died of AIDS-related illness in that year alone. The spread and deadliness of HIV/AIDS is thus to be taken seriously.

With the virus creating such a pervasive public health problem, it is unethical for drug giants like GlaxoSmithKline to attempt to maximize profits via price discrimination. In Africa, Combivir is sold at a fair price similar to the cost of production, but in Europe, it’s sold well above it. People with

Fall 2015

HIV/ AIDS should not have to accumulate debt in order to continue living a healthy life. To stop the illegal sale of HIV/AIDS drugs like Combivir, we should not look to stop the redistribution of the drug, but rather reevaluate the pricing methods of producers.

Of course, there is little hope of getting pharmaceutical companies to agree to halt price discrimination willingly. As a corporation, GSK’s end goal is to generate profit.

Unsurprisingly, the company exhibits behavior that indicates it wishes to dominate the HIV/AIDS drug market. The reason the drugs need to be resold on the black market in the first place is because GSK has a patent on Combivir. If the patent did not exist, other competitors would be able to enter the drug market with similar products and the price of antiretroviral drug treatments in Europe would be driven downwards.

Additionally, GSK has taken steps

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to attempt to stop the leakage of its drug into the black market. The company has created a distinctive packaging for its drugs that will be sold in developing countries so those smuggled back to Europe are easier to identify.

In order to create a solution that benefits public health, we should turn to national and international governmental bodies.

These institutions have the power to induce economic regulations that will both end the drug smuggling from Africa and lower prices of Combivir in Europe. I suggest that national governments or inter-governmental organizations like the European Union institute price ceilings, or a maximum price that pharmaceutical companies may charge per pill. In Europe the price ceilings would be significantly lower than the $6 per pill tag, but in Africa they would remain similar to the 80 cents per pill to prevent a price jump in

response to the change in Europe.

While some economists may argue that price ceilings restrict the natural economic order of supply and demand and could thus cause the pharmaceutical market to become stagnant, current pill prices do not accurately reflect the market either.

Due to HIV/AIDS drugs’ highly inelastic demand, pharmaceutical companies are able to fix the market in their favor. Price ceilings would help solve this problem, and with countries like Canada already using them in their national drug industries to moderate success, there is already a template in which to design a plan for implementation.

As a student of international relations and public health at a top research university, I firmly believe the solution to the HIV/AIDS crisis is one step closer if governments regulate the antiretroviral drug market.

Photo by Eva Gallagher, CFA ‘19

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The International Relations Review

Companies, Conflict Minerals, and the Congo: an Update on Dodd-Frank

By Jane Dimnwaobi, CAS ‘18 In 2010, the Obama Administration passed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to combat rampant financial mismanagement that preceded the disastrous recession of 2008.1 The goal remains to make the domestic and international business procedures of such companies transparent.

Packaged within the Act is Section 1502, which sets requirements for any American company engaging in mineral trading in the Democratic Republic of Congo; they must disclose to the Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) the origin of conflict minerals such as tin, tantalum, tungsten, or gold that are utilized in the manufacturing of their products.2 Section 1502 intends to expose the link between the prolific activities of the violent, armed groups in eastern Congo and the profitability of their mineral exports to foreign companies. Furthermore, it encourages American companies to gradually minimize their role in the region’s devastating cycle.

Yet, many companies respond to requirements within Dodd-Frank Section 1502 by filing lawsuits, as the most recent case National Association of Manufacturers, et al. v. SEC demonstrates. The plaintiffs claim violation of their First Amendment rights when certain provisions under

Section 1502 require detailed reports to the SEC investigating the nature of their tin, tantalum, tungsten, or gold must be summarized verbatim: “DRC Conflict Free” or “Not Been Found to Be ‘DRC Conflict Free.’”3 These companies may not enjoy exemption from submitting specifics regarding their conflict mineral purchases, but following recent decisions by the U.S. District Court of Appeals; they can now succinct descriptors of the findings within the reports. The strategic objection to the explicit disclosures shows that these companies recognize the power within these brief statements. Should they disappear, the submitted reports become one of countless dense records, far too muddled to discern the truth amid overwhelming technicalities. As a result, these reports will move towards ineffectiveness, gradually breaking down the policy until it can be dissolved. I wholly support regulations mandating companies trading in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the wider Great Lakes Region, unequivocally disclose to the SEC whether their minerals are “DRC Conflict Free” or “Not Found to Be ‘DRC Conflict Free’” to render them inexcusable from the guidelines outlined in Section 1502.

Investigating conflict mineral sources increases corporate responsibility,

ensuring that American dollars both of producers and consumers - shun the hands of armed groups illicitly trading in conflict minerals and harming civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Additionally, advocacy groups such as the Enough Project and Global Witness, government officials such as the Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region of Africa Tom Perriello, and students across the world continue emphatic support for legislation scrutinizing mineral procurement. Activist movements for responsible mineral extraction continue to advocate for scrutiny and legal requirement through DoddFrank increases culpability. Large technology companies have thus shied away, but they must remain engaged.4 For decades, the DRC has been infamous for its stark juxtaposition of remarkable natural resource wealth and deeply entrenched poverty, with its eastern region home to the deadliest conflict since World War II.5 So convoluted are the roots of eastern Congo’s harrowing warfare that even prolonged interventions by the international community only scratch the surface of the work ahead - protecting the livelihood of Congolese civilians affected daily by ongoing violence. Armed groups in eastern Congo maintain a reign

So convoluted are the roots of eastern Congo’s harrowing warfare that even prolonged interventions by the international community only scratch the surface of the work ahead - protecting the livelihood of Congolese civilians affected daily by ongoing violence.

Fall 2015 of terror, seizing control of villages and commanding men, women, and children with unchecked dominance. Under threat of death, they force ablebodied men and boys to work in dangerous mineral mines, with no concern for their immediate safety and continued well-being.6 Women and girls, when confronted, choose between death and gender-based violence. Currently, tens of thousands of eastern Congolese women have been victims of such violence, which is largely perpetrated by intruding armed rebel groups, as well as the Congolese National Army.7 The object of their fear and American technology companies trading partner are one and the same, and this should not be the case.

The conflict mineral trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo continues to produce a dire and demanding human rights crisis. For this reason, I believe the conflict minerals case is of exceptional importance and urge the U.S. District Court of Appeals decide to review the most recent decision. Demanding disclosure increases the responsibility and accountability of both parties within the Congo’s mineral trade.

If companies demand conflict-free minerals to comply with DoddFrank Section 1502, armed groups cannot then offer tin, tantalum, tungsten, or gold obtained through illicit or violent mining, thereby

31 reducing the funds and freedom they are often granted. The passing of the Act marked great progress, although companies halt this by opposing Section 1502 on the grounds of freedom of speech. In fact, the potential benefits of their divulgence lead me to respectfully disagree with their non-compliance and vocally oppose their legal action against the terms of disclosure. The ongoing lawsuits emphasize the significance of foreign and domestic activists’ diligence in calling attention to the conflict mineral trade and implementing policies that bring technology companies across the world to begin reassessing their imbrued supply chains. Currently, the conflict mineral trade funds corruption and violence, so for large corporations to file lawsuits opposing Dodd-Frank Section 1502 is unprincipled, and the subtle, calculated method by which they are undermining its potential is reprehensible. The common goal is increased participation in conflictfree trade in the DRC; therefore, increased transparency of the trade process must be recognized as an undisputable, necessary step towards a more sustainable peace in the Congo. This situation can be evidence for a potentially beneficial relationship between the United States and Congo in place of a corrupt foreign transaction borne out of an exorbitant amount of power.

Photo by Isabella Celedon, CGS’17, SED’19

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The International Relations Review

Fall 2015

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REGIONAL REGIONAL POLITICS POLITICS 34 La Línea and Operação Lava-Jato: An Analysis of the Corruption Scandals in Brazil and Guatemala Clara 00 By Clara Bezerra, CAS ‘18 By: Raina, CAS ‘19 Description

38 The Current Migration Crisis the European Union 00 of Emily By: Desmond, CAS ‘19 By Emily Kausch, CAS Description

‘17

The Balancing of Legal and 42 00 The Balancing of Legal and

Moral Obligations to to Refugees Refugees by Moral Obligations European Nations

by European Nations By: Rahim Hiriji

By Rahim Hirji, CAS ‘16 Description

00 Ines Piece By: Desmond, CAS ‘19 Description

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The International Relations Review

La Línea and Operação Lava-Jato: An Analysis of the Corruption Scandals in Brazil and Guatemala

By Clara Bezerra, CAS ‘18 Guatemala and Brazil have moved to the forefront of Latin American political discussions as their governmental systems continue to shake under major money laundering accusations. Whether initially directed at Brazil’s staterun oil company Petrobrás or Guatemala’s Otto Pérez Molina himself, political giants from left to right are forced to face the Supreme Court’s gavel. Popular demands for justice and transparency increase as politicians are jailed and replaced, and it becomes increasingly clear that the two countries are undergoing political crises of magnitudes unmatched in recent years. At first glance, it may seem that Brazil and Guatemala have been following a similar trend of political chaos. A closer analysis, however, proves that there are fundamental dissimilarities in how the corruption charges were played out within the political systems of each country, especially when the different levels of government targeted by the accusations are taken into account, as well as the contrasting democratic processes that followed these charges. The ramifications of nearly simultaneous crackdowns on corruption within the political spheres of Brazil and Guatemala have shown that strikingly similar accusations can lead to different results according to government structure.

The string of accusations in Guatemala that triggered the president’s resignation began in April

of this year, when a commission of prosecutors backed by the United Nations presented evidence of a customs fraud ring within the government. The charges behind the La Línea (“The Line”) operation point to multiple government officials as responsible for taking bribes in exchange for lowering tariffs, a process that involved laundering millions from the treasury.1 Amidst the accusations, vice-president Roxanna Baldetti stepped down in May and was detained three months later, maintaining that she was not involved in the scheme even as she sat in court listening to the wiretapped conversations that led to her arrest.2 As detentions of officials related to the scheme quickly rose, President Molina vehemently defended his innocence. The president’s voice was weakened, however, by evidence released in August that implicated Molina as one of the fraud’s ringleaders.1 Mr. Molina clung on to his position while law enforcement authorities and mass protests called for him to step down. Between angry expressions of indignation at the charges he faced and attacks to the country’s justice system, Molina made it clear that he would not go without a fight. After a Congressional vote stripped him of his immunity and a warrant was issued for his arrest, however, Mr. Molina finally resigned in early September2 and was jailed only hours later.3 Petrobrás is at the heart of

Brazil’s economic and political system and at the center of the country’s corruption scandal. With over 35 billion dollars in earnings last year and operating in 21 countries, the company is involved in all of the country’s economic branches and has ties to prominent individuals who serve as subcontractors to the company.4 Investigations into a graft scheme within Petrobrás date back to 2013, inaugurating a demand for transparency that has placed the men who run the country under great scrutiny. The corruption charges, which have received the name of Operação Lava Jato (“Operation Car-Wash”), refer to a moneylaundering operation orchestrated by the leaders of Petrobrás and government officials, the former accused of overbilling the company and receiving millions in bribes from politicians in exchange for securing personally advantageous construction contracts.5 In an unprecedented show of justice that stunned Brazilians, the Supreme Court began a series of arrest related to the scheme. In June, Petrobrás subcontractor Marcelo Odebrecht, the head of Brazil’s main construction business and one of the wealthiest men in the country, was arrested after material proof indicated he paid millions in bribes and knew of the practice of overbilling. Along with Mr. Odebrecht three other company executives were detained. The four executives were charged with using their companies to pay bribes that

Fall 2015 amounted to 230 million dollars.6 Both Brazil’s economy and President Dilma Rousseff’s approval rates plummeted as a result of the scandal, but the President herself has not yet been implicated in the scandal, despite having served as Petrobrás’s chief executive for years before presidency. The bureaucratic circles around President Rousseff, however, continued to close in as investigations into corruption persisted and spread beyond Petrobrás. In August, major political figure and speaker of Brazil’s lower house of Congress, Eduardo Cunha, was charged with receiving 40 million dollars in the form of bribes. President Rousseff’s political rival, Mr. Cunha claimed that his accusation was a scheme to deflect blame from the organization truly responsible for the corruption— Rousseff’s government.7 Arrests continue to move closer and closer to the president, reaching a peak in July when prosecutors opened

35 an investigation on Brazil’s former president and Rousseff’s political ally, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, on the grounds that he would have used his position to sanction and support Odebrecht’s actions.8 As both the Brazilian population and vice-president Michel Temer turned against Rousseff, it was surprising that she was still standing. Investigation scrutinized all aspects of the president’s governance, and she was eventually cornered in October when Brazil’s federal accounts court charged her with manipulating government accounts to hide a fiscal deficit in 2014.9 President Rousseff held on to her presidential post for far longer than Molina since investigations began in each country, despite the fact that the political and popular forces demanding her impeachment were at least as strong in Brazil as they were in Guatemala. The accusations both politicians faced are similar, but while Molina was forced to step

down only a few months after the beginning of La Línea, Rousseff only faced serious accusations after about two years of investigation and, even so, was not immediately impeached.

Of course, any analysis regarding the source of this discrepancy must necessarily take into account several fundamental differences between the countries and their corruption cases. Most obviously, Brazil and Guatemala have diverse developmental histories, and international actors such as the United Nations played different roles in each graft scandal, exerting more pressure on the Guatemalan government and adding more credibility to the prosecution’s charges against Molina. Not so obvious and often overlooked as a possible explanation, however, is the difference in the levels of government that were implicated in each scandal and in each country’s democratic processes.

While in Guatemala corruption

Photo by Alessandra Setaro, CAS ‘18

36 charges primarily targeted the heart of government, in Brazil they had to surpass multiple layers of non-political authority before reaching Rousseff herself. That bureaucratic subgroups temporarily shielded the president in Brazil but not in Guatemala is both indicative of the greater levels of government involved in Brazil’s scandal and of the two countries’ contrasting government structures.

Operação Lava-Jato implicated not only politicians but also several major leaders of corporations, state-run or not, who hold power over governmental decisions. This underscores the dissipation of power that has been responsible for much of the inefficiency that has characterized Brazilian politics—often it is economic giants, not the people’s interests, that inform domestic and foreign policies.

Furthermore, the two countries’ different experiences with selfgovernance also helped shape their respective corruption processes.

Brazil had its first democratic government in 1889 and passed its first democratic constitution in 1891 nearly half a century earlier than Guatemala, where the first

The International Relations Review democratically elected government only took power in 1944, a year prior to the passing of its first democratic constitution. It is likely that Brazil’s longer experience with democratic governance allowed the country to develop a more thoroughly democratic legislation that carries out the impeachment process in greater complexity. The impeachment of a president is a drastic democratic constitutional act, which must necessarily be evaluated by multiple governmental bodies in order to prevent arbitrary overthrows.

In more mature democracies, institutions such as the Supreme Court are better established and more autonomous, which protects the Constitution from undemocratic acts and makes governmental decisions more immune to popular pressures. As a result impeachment processes are more just, but also sluggish. Therefore, when the corruption accusations moved past bureaucratic layers of government and non-government officials and finally reached the president of Brazil, the multi-step legal movement towards impeachment allowed

President Rousseff to remain in her post despite the collapse of her support base. Ironically, democracy and the democratic characteristics of Brazil’s legal system played a large role in slowing down the process of impeachment in the country, making the swift, rapid changes that occurred in Guatemala impossible.

The complexity of the corruption cases in Brazil and Guatemala as well as of the forces that pushed for Molina and Rousseff’s resignations cannot be understated. However, it is also unquestionable that these corruption cases, overlapping in time frame but not in resolution, have shed light on the role of each country’s governmental structure in determining how each scandal was dealt with and played out. The future of both countries remains uncertain as they face the blows that Operação Lava-Jato and La Línea have dealt to their political systems. Brazilians and Guatemalans alike hope to rebuild and solidify the just, democratic ground they seem to have lost over the years, if it ever did exist.

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Photo by Leonardo Gonzalez Dantas, CAS ‘19

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The International Relations Review

The Current Migration Crisis of the European Union An Economic Analysis

By Emily Kausch, CAS ‘17

In the midst of a long, bloody civil war in Syria many of the country’s refugees have risked everything to perilously travel to safer countries in Europe. Along with Syrian refugees, many other Middle Eastern and African citizens are migrating out of war-torn and conflict-ridden areas, and heading towards countries in the E.U. Aside from the close geographical location of Europe to the Middle East, refugees are drawn to Europe due to the E.U.’s relative stability and economic strength.

The steady and heavy influx of Middle Eastern refugees into Europe has presented a challenge to the E.U. This wave of misplaced migrants appears to the E.U. institutions as a group that will be forced to rely on the charity and aid of their host countries indefinitely, creating a substantial drain on resources.

Add to this that the end of migration is nowhere in sight, and many countries are understandably wary. While this perception may be partially valid, it does not cover the entirety of the refugee case.

The refugees that take up residence in E.U. countries will eventually become a part of the working population.

Although they will be provided with immediate assistance when initially migrating into Europe, this will only take a toll on the E.U. in the short-term.

The migrants’ eventual assimilation into the population and economy will help the countries of the E.U. in the long-term. The refugee crisis, while an unfortunate event of bad circumstances, will ultimately create a net positive effect on the E.U.’s economy. In exchange, the region’s economic strength will provide stability for the new migrant workers. Overall, the trade will produce a constructive impact that will eventually benefit both of the sides involved.

Before this year’s refugee crisis had

developed fully, there had naturally already been immigrants affecting the economy of the E.U. Immigration from a country into the E.U. has normally been offset, for the most part, by corresponding emigration from within the E.U. Therefore, these countries that gain immigrants tended not to be drastically hurt by immigration from outside of the E.U. This of course,

“There are multiple reasons that demonstrate why the positive contributions of current refugee migration into the E.U. will eventually outweigh the cons.” does not include immigration within countries of the E.U. (such as movement from Romania to the United Kingdom).

For example, in 2014 the United Kingdom was very concerned about how immigration within the E.U. would affect the country’s tax and welfare system.

This issue overshadowed most other economic problems in the UK, and furthered British sentiment in favour of putting distance between their country and the rest of the E.U. However, in this case, the immigrants into E.U. countries, especially the United Kingdom, have been statistically proven to help the countries they worked in. There is a positive net contribution by the immigrant workers to the European economy. In a tenyear period up until 2011, immigrants

to the United Kingdom alone brought 5 billion pounds into the country’s economy. This positive net contribution is aided by the skills and education that the immigrants brought into the country with them – their experiences making them more valuable workers.

When studying the ongoing migrant crisis that is affecting the E.U., one could argue that there may be some similarities between past European immigration events and the current one.

The E.U. interest in the well being of its economy is the main concern, just as it has been in previous incidents. While the concerns of E.U. countries are valid, it might be true that in both cases the benefits of immigration into the E.U. outweigh the negative impacts.

There are multiple reasons that demonstrate why the positive contributions of current refugee migration into the E.U. will eventually outweigh the cons, just as they have in previous European migrant situations.

The first reason is that migrant workers will provide young labor, as well as skills and training. The second reason is that the young migrant workers will balance out the demographics of countries with an increasingly aging population that is beginning to affect almost all EU countries. And a third reason migrants will bring a net positive contribution to the E.U. is that they will help to expand and stimulate the national and regional economies they participate in.

The clearest example of the positive contributions that migrants will eventually bring to the E.U. is a longterm benefit. In the long-term, migrants into the countries of the E.U. will bring many new workers – this large number of diverse workers will benefit countries of the European Union that have a declining working population.

Fall 2015 Specifically, well-off European countries are severely lacking skilled trade workers. Thus, it is good news that these migrant workers will bring a variety of skills, education, and training with them into Europe. These workers will bring in more business and capital into the companies they provide their services to. The final product of this event will be economic stimulation for the businesses and countries that the migrants work in. Although the final product will take some time to produce, it will have a positive impact on the E.U.’s economy.

Some may argue that migrant workers joining the E.U. workforce will create unsustainable job competition and possibly take jobs away from Europeans. However, as long as the influx of refugees is well managed by European countries, then the migration can specifically be directed towards the countries where there are enough, or even too many, jobs available for refugees – countries like Sweden and Germany, both of which are stable, economically strong, and have a great deal of job vacancies for young workers. Others could also argue that not all workers will be skilled, trained, or educated upon arrival to the E.U. While this is true, the workers with no skills or experience could easily be trained in trades that specifically cater to Europe’s needs. In addition, according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “the costs to national budgets are minimal,” regarding what the E.U. countries would need to spend on training and educating migrants. Just as these countries have a deficiency in skilled workers, the same is true of the size of their young working population.

The stable countries of Europe that have strong economies generally tend to be the same countries that have aging populations. Thus, countries need young workers to fill the gap in their populations. A great case study of how E.U. immigrants will balance European demographics is the

39 country of Germany. Angela Merkel has already said that Germany will welcome 800,000 refugees into the country. But unofficial reports say that this number is likely to rise up to almost 1.5 million refugees. This estimate of refugees coincides perfectly with the number of skilled workers Germany will soon face a shortage of. Thus Germany has the fiscal space to accommodate the refugees for living and working purposes. In support of this, Germany’s status as the biggest economy in all of Europe will definitely aid the country in putting the migrants to work. One could even argue that there is no better European Union country for the refugees to migrate to and work in, aside from the economically sound country of Sweden. Even though it will cost Germany a good amount of money to fund the refugees when they migrate, this cost will only be temporary. Germany’s population will be balanced because the young migrant workers will live and work in the laborpoor country. Overall, Germany will eventually have a net positive impact from the immigrants.

One final example of the positive contributions that migrants will eventually bring to the European Union is the expansion of the overall E.U. economy. The migrants can help by working in the labor and manufacturing sectors of their host country’s economy. This employment will raise the output of the country’s production, thus stimulating the economy and providing an environment conducive to economic growth. However, in addition to this national economic growth, the economic prosperity will spread throughout the rest of the E.U. and into other European economies.

This is because the E.U. acts as one large, single market economy. The single market economy that the E.U. nurtures is one where all of the countries involved are affected, in this case positively, by inputs of production of the migrant workers.

Photos by Ibrahim Rashid, CAS ‘19

40 On the other hand, refugees who migrate into the E.U. in the future will be compensated for the economic contributions they will make to the country they now reside in. There are multiple ways that the E.U. economy will help the refugees that migrate into Europe. Unlike the ways that the migrants will help Europe, these compensations will be both short and long-term. These benefits include the refugees’ immediate provision of shelter and security. Also, the refugees own benefits from the E.U. include the possibility of economic stability, and possibly even economic prosperity.

For example, secure jobs with benefits are generally more accessible in the E.U. than war-torn countries like Syria.

The same is the case for a steady, wellestablished education for students. Both the steady jobs and schooling that E.U. countries offer are conducive to creating a backbone for a more economically stable life.

The short-term help the refugees will receive are very clear. The needs of the refugees are the push factor that drives the event of a migration crisis

The International Relations Review in the first place, and the countries of the E.U. that take refugees into their borders will provide immediate support to the refugees seeking shelter. Next, the aid for refugees could come in the form of work, possible skills training or education, language classes, or any thing else that helps the new migrants get settled into a new country. The final level of the short-term benefits that E.U. countries can provide refugees is aiding in the process of assimilation and integration into the European lifestyle and workforce.

In addition to short-term benefits, the E.U.’s economy will provide longterm aid to the migrant workers. This long-term aid will come in the form of a stable lifestyle and economic security. Refugees will mostly migrate into European countries that have flourishing economies because refugees are drawn to stable countries. Thus, the new migrant workers will be able to enjoy the prosperity of a country for as long as they reside and work there.

In most cases, this lifestyle could be the only possible way for migrants of the current refugee crisis to live in an

economically stable country, it is no longer possible in their home country.

Although the steady influx of Middle Eastern refugees into Europe has threatened to challenge the E.U.’s stability, this is an unjustified perception. In actuality, the refugee crisis will provide skilled labor that many European countries are missing while also balancing Europe’s demographics and expanding the economy. In exchange, the migrant workers will gain security, stability, and humanitarian aid that refugees may need to get back on their feet after fleeing from more dangerous circumstances. In the shortterm, the refugees will only have a small impact on the European economy.

Short-term setbacks such as this do not outweigh the overall constructive impact that the migration will have on all of those involved. In the end, both parties benefit with net positive results.

In the near future, one can argue that it is highly possible for Middle Eastern refugees to successfully assimilate and be accepted into the E.U.’s economy and workforce.

Photo by Anahita Afshari, SAR ‘19

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The International Relations Review

The Balancing of Legal and Moral Obligations to Refugees by European Nations September 15th 2015: the day Hungary became the first European Union state to refuse any more improperly documented immigrants entry into its territory. European Union officials responded angrily to the erection of a barbed wire fence

by Hungary along its Serbian border, with Germany’s foreign minister, Frank-Walker Steinmeier, saying that the E.U. should cut subsidies to nations rejecting migrants.

Following weeks of cries from the international community that European nations have a moral obligation to accept and protect asylum seekers from Middle Eastern nations, Hungary decided that enough was enough. It declared that the mass influx of refugees coming in by crossing its Serbian border had led to the country now being in a state of emergency.

Other E.U. states – notably Germany and Sweden, who have currently taken in more migrants than any other E.U. states – had already tightened border controls and documentation checks to control the rapid arrivals of migrants. Hungary, on the other hand, took a more hostile approach by utilizing tear gas and armed police to prevent further entry and arresting those trying to cross its fence. These measures have caused Hungary’s immigrant intake to drop from around 6,000 per day to just 30 per day.

But what is the legal obligation

By Rahim Hirji, CAS ’16 that countries who are worried about receiving too many migrants must adhere to? European nations, especially Hungary, have heard the emotional pleas and cries of refugees and the international community, and have been compelled into feeling that they have a ‘moral obligation’ to aid in the crisis. But where is the line?

When a nation’s own security and economy is threatened, to what extent does international and European law say that a country has to accept refugees?

The governing rules lie in several documents and treaties, with the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention governing its 147 ratifiers. For many European countries, a separate agreement in the form of the 1985 Schengen Agreement is also enforced. The Refugee Convention is a treaty that was created following World War II to allow the thousands of refugees who were homeless and, in some cases, stateless, to be protected by the government of another country.

“The international community steps in to ensure they [refugees] are safe and protected,” says the UNHCR, the branch of the U.N. that is responsible for the status and affairs or refugees.

International law states that it is the responsibility of the international community to protect people whose own governments no longer offers them protection from

discriminatory persecution, war (international or civil), or natural disasters. Under the convention, by accepting a refugee, the receiving country is obliged to give that refugee “the same treatment of nationals of the receiving country” for several rights including freedom of religion, access to courts, and protection of social security. For rights that do not come under that umbrella, such as the right to own property and the right to belong to a trade union, refugees must receive “the most favorable treatment provided to nationals of a foreign country.”

The convention goes on to state, “no state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever,” meaning that the burden of affording thousands of people rights and welfare is long term. A refugee may leave voluntarily, but has absolutely no obligation to do so.

The Schengen Agreement specifically governs European countries that ratified the Agreement and therefore whose territory lies in the ‘Schengen Area.’ The Agreement essentially abolished border controls for travelers between Schengen Area countries.

Any non E.U. citizen wishing to enter a Schengen Area country is required to have a common visa which grants them permission to enter the area and travel freely within it.

The original Agreement was not obligatory for E.U. states, and

Fall 2015 the U.K. and Ireland chose not to participate and instead maintain their own visa policies. Due to this, the U.K. and Ireland have provided far more legitimate arguments for taking in fewer migrants. The Agreement was integrated with E.U. law in 1999, meaning that since then any new E.U. members must also adopt the policies of the Schengen Agreement.

Therefore, when Hungary joined the E.U. in 2003, they were required to sign onto the Agreement, and it is on this basis that Germany and others are critical about Hungary’s barbedwire fence and tear gas utilization. By using mechanisms on its border with an Schengen neighbor, Hungary is violating the Agreement they signed twelve years ago. But whilst that may be true, nations have a duty to look after themselves, their structure, and their citizens. There are two big issues that threaten the enforcement of this duty for countries like Hungary, who are receiving a large number of refugees but do not have the economic or security strength of countries like Germany.

The first issue is the economic one. Hungary has a GDP per capita of €11,900, and its 2014 defence budget was €0.9 billion. In contrast, Germany’s GDP per capita is €39,700, and Germany spent €43 billion on defence in 2014. A country with an already relatively low GDP cannot ensure that the immigrants it receives can benefit from the same standards of treatment as nationals when it comes to welfare benefits, shelter and healthcare, if the immigrants themselves are not obliged to pay anything into the system, be it in taxes or some other form.

Economic theory and the unpredictability of population change in the E.U. due to free movement

43 laws mean that for small countries with small GDP’s, it is very difficult to be able to provide for the number of immigrants that Hungary claims it would receive if it didn’t shut off its borders. The only other feasible way would see a decrease in the standard of living for everyone, including that country’s own citizens.

The second issue is security.

The prominence of terrorism in the 21st century, paired with the rise of right-wing parties in Europe over the last ten years, means that nationalistic and predominantly Christian E.U. states – particularly those in Eastern Europe – are increasingly skeptical and concerned about welcoming thousands of people from countries where the roots of extremist Islamic terrorism lie. Additionally, in February 2015, phone calls intercepted by Italian intelligence provided evidence that ISIS had threatened to send thousands of migrants to Europe if they were attacked as part of NATO’s intervention in Libya. ISIS is one of the world’s most dangerous jihadist groups and operates mainly out of seized territory in Syria and Iraq. The group recruits jihadists across the globe and uses local and international terrorism as a method to achieve their ultimate goal of Sharia law being the law that governs the world.

The capture and arrest – months after the intelligence from the intercepted phone calls – of an ISIS agent posing as an asylum seeker by authorities in Germany in September 2015, was a warning that ISIS was not making empty threats.

A final point of consideration that has perhaps not been highlighted enough in global media is the deafening silence from countries in the oil-rich Gulf region regarding the

intake of refugees. The economic concern should barely virtually nonexistent for many of these states. The United Arab Emirates, for example, has the 7th highest GDP per capita ($65,037) in the world and the 110th lowest population density (90/km2 ).

Money? They have it. Space? They have it.

As for security, the goal for groups like ISIS is to spread the rule of Sharia law. Almost all states in the region implement Sharia law and because of this the threat of jihadist terrorism, while not totally ruled out, is certainly less likely than in Europe.

Therefore, the reluctance of Gulf States to be more open to receiving refugees is almost as strange as the relative silence that Europe has maintained about that reluctance.

Ultimately there is no law that states a minimum number of refugees that nations have to take.

The 1951 Convention states that refugees must be looked after at a high standard, and the Schengen Agreement gives refugees with the appropriate documentation the right to move freely within the Schengen countries. But the necessity to selfprotect economically and from security threats, especially for small European nations, provides a platform for them to stand up for their choices. And when they decide that they have fulfilled the moral obligation cry, for them to say that enough really is enough.

Photo by Ryan Galindo, CAS ‘16

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The International Relations Review

Editorial: The Potential Problem in the South China Sea

By Ibrahim Rashid, CAS ‘19

A bold statement was made by the United States on October 27th when the Lassen naval carrier sailed without prior announcement within twelve nautical miles of the Spratly islands. Though no official directly stated it, the United States made it clear that China’s illegal expansion into the Spratly islands will not be tolerated. While China claims the U.S. violated their territorial sovereignty, the U.S. says they’re exercising their right to freedom of navigation in international waters.

For years, the United States has stood behind this internationally protected right while harshly criticizing China’s expansionism in the South China Sea. China’s claim to the Spratly, Paracel, and other islands in the region are based on historical ownership by the Ming Dynasty despite contradicting established international law.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a treaty China is signatory to, defines each nation’s territorial waters. Territorial waters are all waters twelve nautical miles from the coastline and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) – areas designated for economic and scientific exploitation – are 200 nautical miles from the coastline. The Spratly islands fall within the Philippines’ territorial waters, yet for the last few years, China has been developing air bases, lighthouses, and filling coral reefs with sand to strengthen their territorial claim.

These aggressive actions have the potential to threaten the global economy and endanger the security in the region.

This, coupled with the fact that China has no legal precedent in asserting their claim to the South China Sea is why they must halt their imperialistic program.

Every day ten million barrels of crude oil travels through the South China Sea via the Straits of Malacca to Japanese, Korean, and Canadian markets. These straits provide South Korea and Japan with

two thirds and sixty percent of their energy needs, respectively. China’s actions could threaten these countries’ energy security and the global economy. If the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) passes, Japan’s, and potentially South Korea’s ,if it joins the trade deal, economy will be integrated with eleven other countries including the United States. In the European Union, when Greece’s economy collapsed, the aftermath was felt all over the region.

With 40% of the world’s GDP integrated into a single market, China has the potential to disrupt this entire economic system by blockading or imposing strict tariffs on the flow of goods through these straits if their claims are enforced.

Furthermore, Chinese dominance will give them a monopoly in global oil trade allowing them to wage economic war by influencing prices by following Saudi Arabia’s model. Currently, Saudi Arabia has been flooding the market with an overabundance of oil, driving prices to record lows of $40.74 a barrel in an attempt to cripple the Russian and Iranian economy. This is to deter their efforts in Syria seeing as they’re regional rivals. Control over the South China Sea puts the Chinese in a position to threaten other oil dependent countries for their own political needs.

As it stands, China uses its stature as a world superpower to flex its muscles and act with impunity. Yet in the South China Sea, these actions could have dangerous repercussions. There have already been numerous naval confrontations involving China and Vietnam over these disputed waters. The oil rig, Haiyang Shiyou 981, was deployed by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and began drilling for oil in the Paracel islands and was joined by up to sixty naval carriers for its own ‘protection’. However, these waters are Vietnam’s by legal right under UNCLOS. These actions have deteriorated Sino-Vietnamese relations.

Furthermore, there has been numerous clashes between the Chinese navy and Filipino fishermen who claim that the Chinese are preventing them from exploiting their own waters. Bearing in mind that the United States has a defensive pact with the Philippines, these actions could only escalate tensions between both superpowers and threaten security in the region.

Up until now, China has been dodging accountability for her actions, yet this trend seems to be changing.

In 2013, the Philippines filed a case in the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, underscoring its claim to islands 200-nautical miles within its EEZ. Despite a Chinese boycott of the tribunal’s proceedings, citing their lack of jurisdiction in the matter, the case will still proceed undisrupted. This means that China’s and all other countries’ claim to the South China Sea will be based now on legal precedent rather than historical claim.

In an increasingly interconnected world bound by military agreements and commerce, the actions of one nation could have ramifications that are felt at each corner of the globe. It is for this reason that the United States and her allies must ensure that the South China Sea remain international waters.

Fall 2015

The IR Review Editorial Board

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Colophon

Morgan Peterson, Editor-in-Chief CAS ‘17 Anushka Pinto, Editor-in-Chief CGS ‘15 CAS ‘17 Victoria Reynolds, Senior Editor CAS ‘18 Sophie Shanshory, Editor CAS ‘17 Ines Boussebaa, Staff Writer COM ‘17 CAS ‘17 Clara Bezerra, Staff Writer CAS ‘18 Desmond Molloy, Staff Writer SAR ‘19 James Paige, Staff Writer CAS ‘18 Raina Kadavil, Staff Writer CAS ‘19 Caroline Lord, Editor CAS ‘18 Kelley Gourley, Editor CAS ‘16 Andre Gellermen, Editor CAS ‘18 Madeline Van Heusden, Editor, Layout Editor CAS ‘17 Maddie Ferrill, Layout Editor CAS ‘19 Andrea Van Grinsven, Layout Editor CAS ‘17 Sana Johnson, Blog Writer CAS ‘17 Ibrahim Rashid, Blog Writer, Podcast Commentator, Web Editor CAS ‘19 Gowtham Ashokan, Blog Writer, Podcast Commentator ENG ‘19 Ellen Gilley, Photography Editor CAS ‘17

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The International Relations Review, ISSN 2152-738X, is a subsidiary of the Boston University International Affairs Association. With a circulation of nearly 1,000 the IR Review has striven to create a forum a forum for students interested in international affairs.

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