The International Relations Review Spring 2010

The International Relations Review

Spring 2010 Volume 1, Issue 2

Published independently by the undergraduate students of Boston University since 2009 Andrew Facini, Editor

2

The International Relations Review

Spring 2010

In this issue:

The Failure of Immigration Reform Under the Bush Administration

by Elizabeth Pierson, CAS ’12 p. 3 Cultural Diplomacy, Soft Power, and the Museum

by Lester Ang, CAS ’10

p. 5

President Obama’s “Unclenched Fist” Policy in Syria:

What are the goals and what is the timeline?

by Phillip Brougham, CAS ’12

p. 6

Corn is not the Answer for Tomorrow’s Energy

by Sam Leone, CAS ’13

p. 8

Staff Editorial: A New Apartheid

Letter to the Editor: William Hawke Bassignani

The International Relations Review Volume 1, Issue 2 Print date Apr. 20, 2010

Andrew Facini, Editor-in-Chief CAS ’10 Natasha Cohen, Managing Editor CAS ’11 Elizabeth Prinz, Sr. Copy Editor CAS/COM ’10 Angela Latona, Copy Editor

CAS ’10 Edward Hill, Copy Editor CAS ’11 Giuseppe Caruso, Copy Editor CAS/COM ’11 Joshua Levkowitz, Copy Editor CAS ’11 Caitlin Lesczynski, Photo Editor CAS ’13

p. 10

The International Relations Review, ISSN 2151-738X, is a fully independent publication of the undergraduate students of Boston University. It is a subsidiary of the Boston University International Affairs Association.

http://buiaa.org iaa@bu.edu http://buiaa.org/ir-review editor.irr@gmail.com For advertising rates and circulation information, please visit: http://buiaa.org/ir-review/advertising

Shivani Ray, Advertising Manager

CAS ’12

The Failure of Immigration Reform Under the Bush Administration

By Elizabeth Pierson, CAS ’12 When former U.S. President George W. Bush entered office in early 2001, there were more than 4.6 million undocumented Mexican immigrants living in the United States (Smith 320). Needless to say, immigration reform was at the top of his agenda. He immediately “cultivated a friendly relationship with Mexico’s president, Vicente Fox,” who was also determined to fight for U.S. immigration reform (LaRosa 258). Bush began the push for immigration reform in February 2001 and, in September of that year, he claimed that “the partnership with Mexico was the United States’ most important bilateral relationship anywhere in the world” (Smith 321). However, after the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, immigration reform was moved to the back burner. In 2004, Bush brought the immigration debate back into the spotlight by proposing a comprehensive immigration reform bill to Congress. The only reform that congress could agree upon, however, was the construction of “The Wall,” a barrier 1,200 kilometers in length, along the U.S.-Meixcan border. In 2006 there were still 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States, 6 million of them from Mexico, a 1.4 million increase from when Bush began his immigration reform campaign in early 2001 (Skerry 64). Even today, the achievement of comprehensive immigration reform appears to be something relegated to the distant future.

This paper will begin by analyzing the failure of the Bush administration’s implementation of comprehensive immigration reform through a constraints framework. A

Spring 2010 constraints framework looks at the “degree to which a variety of constraints within the institutions responsible for foreign policy, within the domestic political arena itself, and among the variety of international actors affect both how the policy is pursued and the degree to which it is successful or not” (Palmer 5). This approach will help explain what factors contributed to the failure of the Bush administration’s immigration policy. A focus on the constraint of unexpected events reveals the negative impact the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks had on the process of immigration reform. Similarly, a focus on the public opinion constraint shows how a strong minority was capable of influencing many members in Congress to vote against comprehensive immigration reform. A look at the leadership constraint of the U.S. Congress helps explain why there was division in Congress over immigration reform and how this division contributed to the collapse of hopes for immigration reform.

Finally, an analysis of the leadership constraint of Bush reveals that his lack of involvement in pushing his party to pass the immigration reform bill also greatly contributed

Cultural Redoubt

3

to its failure. Ultimately, the combined effect of these constraints led to the failure of comprehensive immigration reform and a political stalemate that still exists today.

The first constraint affecting the achievement of the Bush administration’s goal for coprehensive immigration reform was the unexpected attacks on 9/11. Though the September 11 attacks cannot be deemed as the decisive factor in the failure of the Bush administration’s goal, certainly had a negative impact on this goal. This unexpected event affected the fulfillment of immigration reform in three main ways: it hurt the momentum immigration reform had carried in 2001, it delayed further discussions until the important midterm elections in 2006, and it brought the discussion of immigration under a terrorism lens. Less than two weeks before the attacks, Bush had announced his strong desire to work with Vicente Fox to bring about immigration reform, but “[t]he idea of a special partnership with former President Bush went down along with those airliners”(Smith 323). The Sept.

Continued on page 4

On the Yucatan Peninsula, Chichèn Itzà is — both physically and politically — thousands of miles from the problems on the Mexico-U.S. border.

Photo credit: Elizabeth Prinz, CAS ’10

4

The International Relations Review

11, 2001 attacks effectively made Mexico, and immigration reform, a non-priority in comparison to the “War on Terror.” As a result of this shift in priorities, immigration reform was not brought into the political spotlight again until 2004.

However, by the time a comprehensive immigration reform bill came to vote in 2006, much of the momentum was lost for immigration reform and midterm elections were looming. Many Congressmen were hesitant to tackle such a controversial issue before an election, resulting in a stalemate in Congress. Additionally, as a result of the attacks, “the rhetoric of ‘terrorism’ [was] now … connected to the immigration debate” (LaRosa 260). This meant that for many, immigration reform was primarily a matter of national security, rather than a matter of international relations or economic prosperity. This sentiment helped contribute to the creation of security-driven approaches to immigration reforms, rather than the comprehensive immigration reform desired by the Bush administration.

and unqualified paramilitaries to patrol sections of the ArizonaMexico border” was spawned primarily from the sentiments created by Proposition 200 (LaRosa 259). Propostion 200 also inspired the creation of many antiimmigration organizations, such as Citizens Against Government Waste and U.S. English, Inc. (LaRosa 259-60). The vigorous demands of the anti-immigration minority made “many Republicans in Congress, particularly in the House, … convinced that [the anti-immigration minority was] more intense … than anyone else

the burden of enforcement on the Department of Homeland Security” (LaRosa 261). Though enforcement is a key aspect of immigration reform, Tancredo’s approach was enforcement- and securityoriented with no concessions for a path to legalization. A more extreme position was then taken by Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.).

In December 2005, Sensenbrenner proposed the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, which “would criminalize all undocumented persons as ‘aggravated felons’ and would charge anyone who offered any type of aid or help to an undocumented person with an aggravated felony” (LaRosa 261). Sensenbrenner’s bill, created through an anti-terrorism lens, was the antithesis of comprehensive immigration reform. Ironically, the protests over the Sensenbrenner bill helped push the Senate to pass a “more moderate immigration restructuring plan” on March 7, 2006 (LaRosa 262). Unfortunately, the House was too divided, as a result of re-election aims and personal opinion, to pass the bill; immigration reform was then put on an indefinite hold.

“Though Bush supported comprehensive immigration reform, he did not push the members of his party to vote accordingly.”

Once the immigration reform debate was renewed in 2004, a loud, public, anti-immigration minority was the primary constraint that contributed to the failure of comprehensive immigration reform. This anti-immigration minority was only “20 to 25 percent of voters,” but they were very active and determined to prevent comprehensive immigration reform (Jacoby 51). The minority’s most visible anti-immigration achievements occurred at the state and local levels, where they often represented a majority. Proposition 200, voted into law by Arizona voters in 2004, “attempts to prevent undocumented immigrants from receiving public benefits …

The passage of Proposition 200 in Arizona exacerbated a growing wave of anti-immigration sentiment nationwide” (LaRosa 259). The Minutemen Project, its purpose being “to send unarmed, untrained,

likely to go to the polls” (Jacoby 51). “Republicans in the House [therefore] refused to compromise all hopes for comprehensive immigration reform” (Smith 324).

Not all blame can be put on this public minority. The decision to pass or fail comprehensive immigration reform was ultimately in the hands of the Congressmen of the House of Representatives.

It was their decision to allow desires for re-election to outweigh the need for comprehensive immigration.

However, even before the House’s decision to veto the Senate-approved bill, there was division within the House, indicating that some Congressman did not support comprehensive immigration reform regardless of the 2006 midterm elections. In July 2005, Representative Tom Tancredo (R-Colo.) proposed a bill that “would make it a felony to enter the United States without documentation and would put

A final contributing factor to the failure of comprehensive immigration reform was President Bush, himself. Though Bush supported comprehensive immigration reform, he did not push the members of his party to vote accordingly. “Bush attempted to straddle the fence. He expressed cautious support … but declined to pressure Republicans to act on it” (Smith 323).

At the time of the major push for immigration reform, “George W. Bush’s approval rating [was] hovering around 40 percent” and members of the Republican Party were attempting to distance themselves from Bush in preparation for the 2006 midterm elections. Bush may Continued on page 11

Cultural Diplomacy, Soft Power, and the Museum

Spring 2010 (ECA) are to “promote friendship, sympathetic and peaceful relations” (ECA 2010); the ECA’s programs use cultural diplomacy to strengthen U.S. soft power.

reversing cultural apathy through education, museums promote the intrinsic value of foreign cultural awareness and thereby build ties through cultural diplomacy.

In Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, noted scholar Joseph Nye refers to “developing long-lasting relationships abroad through academic changes” (Nye 2008: 102) as a vital aspect of cultural diplomacy. In this essay, I will examine the methodology of cultural diplomacy and show that the institution of the museum has become a beacon of light in the shadows of cultural apathy and an indispensable component of cultural diplomacy.

Cultural diplomacy relies on education. Examining the mechanism of academic exchanges amongst the various programs of the ECA, we find that museums have become the standard means by which populations are able to bridge gaps between seemingly disparate cultures. Exhibits highlight the reciprocal nature of art and culture and show the mutual nourishment of seemingly different artistic movements. Through their exhibits, museums showcase how the melting pot of culture translates to tangible artistic work.

Museums help to proliferate the exchange of ideas between cultures through two veins: the education museums provide, which encourages cultural exchange amongst the public, and by helping to ensure culture holds a place in diplomacy, giving governments a way to connect with the populace. According to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchanges Act of 1961, the objectives of the State Department’s Educational and Cultural Affairs

Academic Kevin Mulcahy concurs with the indispensability of education in cultural diplomacy.

Mulcahy observes that “there is a natural affinity between education and culture. In countries with wellestablished and widely recognized cultural traditions, cultural offerings are core components of the educational curricula” (Mulcahy 2006: 321). Mulcahy underscores the link between the role of the museum and cultural diplomacy. By

The cultural awareness of the masses and the goals of cultural diplomacy are inextricably linked.

The parallels between the goals of the ECA’s visitor exchange program and the utility of the museums highlighted earlier in this essay demonstrate that the educational platform provided by the museum bolsters cultural diplomacy. The ECA points to “[increasing] the mutual understanding” as a means to better America’s foreign relations (ECA 2010). This observation highlights the underpinnings of programs by the ECA: the agency advocates shared values that connect communities. Implicit in this practice is that only through comprehending the intricacies of disparate cultures can America seek to win the hearts and minds of peoples outside the U.S. Pursuant to this point, Nye writes that “conveying information and selling an image is part of that, but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies” (Nye, 2008: 101). The long-term relationship that Nye speaks of is dependent on the “mutual understanding” promoted by academic exchanges in an enabling environment. Museums provide an avenue for American exposure to foreign cultures, and likewise showcase American culture to visitors from abroad. In this way, museums condition visitors to the “mutual understanding” critical to the long-term relationship Nye references.

By Lester Ang, CAS ’10

A Cultural Powerhouse

Intellectual institutions, such as the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, serve as important sources of soft diplomacy. Photo credit: Caitlin Lesczysnski, CAS ’13

The emphasis on “mutual understanding” runs through Nye’s analysis of soft power. He writes that “even the best advertising cannot sell an unpopular product ... effective public diplomacy is a two-way street” (Nye, 2008, 103).

Continued on page 11

5

6

The International Relations Review

President Obama’s “Unclenched Fist” Policy in Syria:

What are the goals and what is the timeline?

Phillip Brougham, CAS ’12 In 2005, President George W. Bush listed Syria as a pariah state.

Syria’s long-standing alliance with Iran, strong links with anti-Israel groups Hezbollah and Hamas and a nasty human rights record provided enough reason for the conservative president’s dislike. After the Syrian government was implicated in the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, however, the existing relationship between the United States and Syria deteriorated rapidly. The United States eventually withdrew its ambassador in Damascus, further exacerbating the split.

At the same time as relations were worsening, however, the Syrian domestic situation made it seem primed for a turn towards western powers. Syria seemed to be on the brink of economic collapse after

An Ancient Playground

decades of central planning and vast unemployment. Politically, President Bashar al-Assad was weak and stumbling; surrounded

by Turkey, a NATO member to the north and Israel, a key western ally in the Middle East to the south, Syria was termed a “low-hanging fruit” in Washington.

Five years later, the United States has is only beginning to try to take advantage of this situation today. Since 2005, when the Syrians looked to be in a position of weakness, the Syrian government has managed to become a major player in the Middle East, independent of any western assistance. Syria’s GDP, foreign trade and private sector loan values have all nearly doubled in the past four years, which can be accredited to al-Assad’s hesitant, but successful, economic liberalization. Moreover, entrepreneurship has flourished; the streets of Damascus are now lined with fancy boutique hotels, bars, restaurants, shopping malls and fast-food chains. Eager to join in this economic rebirth, the European Union signed an agreement with Syria late last year (The Economist). Many foreign dignitaries are currently courting al-Assad,

including the French president, the prime ministers of Turkey and Spain, and a string of prominent Americans (The Economist).

Recognizing Syria’s growing clout in the region, Barack Obama was quick to begin his engagement policy with Syria. The Obama administration acts based on the tenant that isolating a regime fails to change its behavior and may even worsen the situation (Khalaf).

While progress is also being made to open dialogue with Cuba and Iran, the administration’s efforts toward Syria are the most advanced and of great importance to the Obama government (Fifield). Engagement with Syria is largely viewed as a test case for President Obama’s policy (England) – if the policy fares well, it will be implemented with increasing vigor elsewhere.

The Obama administration also hopes that its improved relations with Syria will reap other rewards in the region. The government would like to drive a wedge between Damascus and Tehran, thereby loosening Syrian dependence on the Islamic Republic (Fifield).

The loss of Syrian dependence on Iran would cast doubt on ties

In northwest Syria, the centuries-old Citadel of Aleppo –– a site rarely visited by Westerners –– remains open to the public.

Photo credit: Robina Moyer, CAS ’10

Spring 2010 between the two countries and could potentially increase the effect of international pressure on Iran’s government, a key bargaining chip for the American administration (Roula).

It is unclear, however, whether Syria will welcome U.S. engagement. President al-Assad has made it clear that he wants closer ties to America, which he sees as a necessary mediator in peace talks with Israel, but his intentions behind such statements remain unknown (Khalaf). President al-Assad might be reticent to compromise with the United States now that Syria is no longer in a weak position economically and has strong political relationships with regional allies Iran and Turkey, as well as with political parties Hamas and Hezbollah, further buttressing its negotiating position (Denselow).

(Fifield). If the American and Syrian governments come to an agreement about how to act against Iraqi insurgents, however, the Obama administration can consider lifting the sanctions in return for Syrian cooperation and move forward into a positive relationship (Roula).

Another avenue the Obama administration could pursue is a regional one. Integrating the U.S.-Syrian policy with American relations toward other Arab nations allied with the United States could give the Obama administration a solid foothold for engagement.

“Closer ties with Syria might be President Obama’s best bet for improving relations with the Middle East.”

The best opportunity for U.S.-Syrian cooperation seems to be in Iraq (Khalaf). The Iraqi-Syrian border represents a common security interest for alAssad and Obama as an avenue for foreign fighters to cross from Syria into Iraq, where they can participate in operations against Iraqi and U.S. forces. 2009 plans for a joint-border assessment team consisting of Syrian, American and Iraqi military officers fell through, however (England). In the wake of this failure, the Obama administration should make every effort to revive this project.

Positively, Obama has recently taken an important first step in repairing U.S.-Syrian relations by appointing Robert Ford as the new ambassador to Damascus.

Hopefully Ambassador Ford can open U.S. diplomatic channels and assess whether there is any hope of substantive engagement with alAssad’s government (Denselow).

Unfortunately, the resumption of American sanctions against Syria last spring has hampered his efforts

Last fall, Syria and Saudi Arabia held talks supported by President Obama. Ties with Saudi Arabia would move Syria further away from Iran and closer to countries that already have positive relations with the United States (Biedermann). Furthermore, by encouraging Baghdad to form closer ties with Damascus, and restarting an oil pipeline between the two countries, the American government could bolster both the Iraqi and Syrian economies while gaining diplomatic good will in Syria (England).

As American frustration with Iran grows and prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal dwindle, closer ties with Syria might be President Obama’s best bet for improving relations with the Middle East. If he is to turn his fledgling overtures into a full blown U.S. foreign policy, he will have to abandon the tactics used

by President Bush. Weakening relations between Iran and Syria

7

is a smart strategy, but it must be done with great care. As President al-Assad is now looking to actively connect with the United States, President Obama should take the initiative and follow through on his policy of engagement.

Works Cited: Biedermann, Ferry and Andrew England.

“Saudi King and president of Syria aim to heal wounds.” The Financial Times 8 Oct. 2009 Black, Ian. “Peace with Syria in Israel’s sights.” The Guardian 5 Feb. 2010 Denselow, James. “Engaging Syria.” The Guardian 20 Dec. 2009 England, Andrew. “Ba’athist exiles in Syria vow to free homeland from ‘slavery’.” The Financial Times 11 Dec. 2009 England, Andrew. “US seeks to restore envoy.” The Financial Times 4 Feb. 2010 England, Andrew. “Syrian economy risks wilting in severe draught.” The Financial Times 4 Feb. 2010 Fifield, Anna. “Syria learns the private way.” The Financial Times 5 Mar. 2009 Fifield, Anna. “US renews sanctions against Syria.” The Financial Times 8 May 2009 Fifield, Anna. “US supports Syria-Israel pact.” The Financial Times 8 May 2009 “Has it won?” The Economist 26 Nov. 2009 “Honor Killings.” The Economist 16 July 2009 Katz, Yaakov. “Analysis: Wooing Damascus to isolate Teheran” The Jerusalem Post 5 Feb 2010 Khalaf, Roula. “Syria-US talks offer hope of better ties.” The Financial Times 6 Mar. 2009

8

The International Relations Review

Corn is not the Answer

Why biofuels will do more harm than good

By Sam Leone, CAS ’13 There is a growing understanding in the United States that the current system of energy production is unsustainable. Increasingly, policymakers in Washington and the public alike are beginning to comprehend that global warming, volatile markets and looming shortages are mandating a change away from a fossil fuel-based energy economy. In recent years, the government has begun encouraging investment in alternative energy sources, one of which is biofuels.

Biofuels (fuels such as ethanol produced from biological materials like corn and sugarcane)1 have become the darling of many legislators, and Congress has created subsidies to help America’s fledgling corn-ethanol industry.

A particular blend of ethanol and gasoline (a concoction with a 1:9 ratio, respectively, called gasohol), receives a 5.2 cent/gallon reduction on the federal 18.4 cents/gallon gas tax.2 In addition, former President George W. Bush signed a bill in 2007 mandating that the United States produce 36 billion gallons of biofuels a year by 2020.3 With these policies in mind, General Motors recently began selling “Flex-Fuel” vehicles that could run on both gasoline and corn ethanol.

It would be easy to succumb to the inertia of this trend and assume from these developments that biofuels are the way toward a sustainable future. However, since they are at best carbon neutral, have an undesirable energy balance, destroy aquatic ecosystems, cause deforestation and compete with food production, biofuels should not become a major energy resource.

Understanding why biofuels are harmful starts with understanding their production process. Plants produce the carbohydrate glucose, which people have used to produce fuel. In the case of corn, the stalks and cobs are dissolved into water, which turns the carbohydrates into ethanol.4 Burning the ethanol creates energy, at which point the carbon dioxide, once captured by the plant, returns to the atmosphere.

trucks carry the ethanol to fueling stations. Corn ethanol, the most common biofuel in the United States, has an energy balance (input to output) of 1-to-1.3.6 That means it takes 10 Joules of energy to make 13 Joules worth of biofuels from corn. Harnessing another renewable form of energy such as solar thermal energy or wind energy, which releases no carbon dioxide, would be more beneficial.

This is often called a carbonneutral system because the carbon released during energy consumption is the same carbon captured by the plant, and it is likely that the reintroduced carbon dioxide will once again be captured by another photosynthetic organism. In this way, burning biofuels is certainly a much better arrangement than burning fossil fuels, which releases carbon dioxide that has been trapped beneath the Earth for millions of years. A carbon-neutral system is perhaps a step in the right direction, but it is too little, too late. Since the beginning of the industrial era, the atmosphere has gone from 275 parts per million of carbon dioxide to 350, a number many scientists call the “tipping point” of maximum sustainable greenhouse gas levels.5 As the climate speeds on to a point of no return, neutrality is unhelpful.

Solar, wind and other non-carbon renewable energy systems produce energy while plants remain alive, sequestering the carbon that biofuels dangerously release.

There are still more environmental problems that stem from biofuel production, one of which is related to the fertilizers used to grow corn and sugarcane. First, most industrial fertilizers are nitrogen-based, meaning that they release nitrous oxide into the air. This is a problem because nitrous oxide is a greenhouse gas whose heat-trapping ability is 296 times greater than that of carbon dioxide, according to Nobel laureate (chemistry) Paul Crutzen.7 Second, the nitrogen compounds that the atmosphere does not absorb can destroy aquatic ecosystems. According to a 2008 report in Nature, farmers often use more fertilizer than plants can absorb (especially on corn), causing “runoff” from farms to nearby streams.

In the Great Plains of the United States, where most of the country’s corn originates, those streams take the nitrogen to the Mississippi River. The river in turn carries the pollutants into the Gulf of Mexico.

Once absorbed into the warm ocean waters, the nitrogen fuels excess algae growth. When the algae die, the decomposition process sucks oxygen from the water, killing fish and other life forms.

But even if one were to approve of a carbon-neutral energy source, biofuels are only carbon-neutral in theory. In reality, fossil fuels are used in the production of biofuels, resulting in a net surplus of carbon emissions. Corn and sugarcane cannot merely be cut down, ground up and stuffed inside a gas tank – there are many energy-intensive steps in the process. Farmers put diesel gasoline in the tractors they use for harvest and trucks use diesel gasoline to transport the biomass to refineries. The refineries are often powered by coal , and then more

This may be a long and complicated causal chain, but it is not hypothetical. The Nature study cites a documented “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico which is already 20,500 square kilometers in size, equivalent to the state of New Jersey.8 If biofuels are meant to become America’s main energy source, fertilizers will be needed for the massive requisite production.

Yet if nitrogen-based fertilizers

Spring 2010 remain part of the process, biofuels will actually contribute to climate change and ecological destruction.

Then there is the problem of where to plant biofuels. Since most tilled land is already used to make food, the obvious option is to cut down trees to expose arable land.

There are three major downsides to this approach. First, the Earth’s forests are its most effective line of defense against global warming. When people burn oil, coal and natural gas, trees around the world soak up much of the resulting carbon dioxide. A 2008 study by the Nature Conservancy said that, depending on the scale of the operation, “converting rainforests, peatlands, savannas, or grasslands to produce biofuels in Brazil, Southeast Asia and the United States [would be like releasing] 17 to 420 times more carbon dioxide than the fossil fuels they replace”.9 This makes carrying out deforestation in the name of environmental sustainability comparable to sacking police officers in the name of crime reduction.

Second, disturbing land during the tilling process releases carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and other greenhouse gases that had previously been trapped in the soil.10 In this way, deforestation (for biofuel production and in general) is a onetwo punch against the atmosphere: it adds greenhouse gases while simultaneously subtracting a greenhouse-gas remover.

The third problem with clearing land, while not directly related to climate change, is the most intuitive: namely, deforestation destroys natural habitats. When people clear forests for agricultural production, they destroy plant and animal life. When these populations are destroyed, food chains are destroyed, having a direct impact on human welfare. The plants and animals that humans eat survive only by virtue of a finely tuned “web of life.” Disturbing this web could spell disaster for the human

race. As the “savannization” of the Amazon rainforest continues to eliminate untold acres, biofuels should not make matters worse.11 Growing biofuels on alreadycleared land would have none of these three harmful effects, yet it would lead to a competition for agricultural resources between biofuel producers and food producers. Land is a finite resource, and there is only so much arable land that people can possibly use to make food. Fresh water is also limited. A 2008 report by Sweden’s Stockholm Environmental Institute found that using biofuels to replace 50 percent of the fossil fuels necessary to meet 2050’s anticipated worldwide demand would require an extra 12,000 cubic kilometers of water (total annual flow through the Earth’s rivers is only 14,000 cubic kilometers).12 That leaves little for food production.

Biofuels increase the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, cause untold ecological destruction and inevitably put stress on the food supply. With present technological and economic realities, these problems are unsolvable, so biofuels are not a viable option for becoming a widespread energy source in place of fossil fuels. In short, the United States would be, economically and

9

environentally, far better off investing its resources in other forms of renewable energy.

Works Cited [1, 2, 4] Kraushaar, Jack and Robert Ristinen. Energy and the Environment: 2nd Edition. 2006. pp. 153-154 [3, 9] The Washington Post. “The Problem With Biofuels.” Staff Editorial. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/26/ AR2008022602827.html [5, 8] Eilperin, Juliet. “Studies Say Clearing Land for Biofuels Will Aid Warming.” The Washington Post.

Feb. 8, 2008.

[6] Bourne, J. K. Jr., Clark, R.. “Green Dreams” National Geographic Magazine October 2007. p. 41 [7] Walsh, Brian. “Another Problem with Biofuels?” Time Magazine. http://www.time.com/time/health/ article/0,8599,1721693,00.html [10, 12] Oliver, Rachel. “Biofuels: Green Gold or Porblems Untold?” http://edition. cnn.com/2008/TECH/02/24/eco.biofuels/ [11] Friedman, Thomas. Hot, Flat and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution and How It Can Renew America. 2008. p. 149

“In particular, the U.S. must find a way to profit from Turkey’s development if it has any hope of another round of sanctions against Iran.”

A Croatian Decoration

Locals remark over a large decorative egg one week before Easter in Ban Jelačić Square, Zagreb, Croatia. Photo credit: Julie O’Neill, CAS ’11

10

The International Relations Review

Staff Editorial A New Apartheid

In early June, the nineteenth FIFA World Cup, the world’s premier international soccer tournament, will take place across South Africa. This year’s tournament, the first to be hosted by an African nation, is a stark example of humanity’s under-the-carpet attitude towards severe poverty. As a species, we cannot take part in the revelry of the World Cup without acknowledging the tremendous divide between rich and poor.

With about 57 percent of individuals in South Africa living below the poverty level, South Africa has the second largest discrepancy between rich and poor in all of that continent. Some figures put unemployment rates in the country around 25 percent. Complicating the situation is the widespread HIV/AIDS endemic, which is a main contributor to the national life expectancy of just less than 49 years, according to the WHO. For South Africa, the World Cup’s arrival was immediately eyed as a chance to build a positive image of the troubled country –– which is still shaking the vestiges of its racist apartheid period.

Billed as an opportunity to bring hope to many impoverished South Africans, this year’s tournament will instead be known for its staggering budget surpassing billions of U.S. dollars. In the effort to

Letter to the Editor Reflections on BosMUN BosMUN IX, the Boston Invitation Model United Nation Conference, is again finished for this year. Of course, BosMUN is never done — elections, hiring, background guides — we’ve started the cycle all over again. As I begin this process once more, this time as the Secretary-General of BosMUN X, I can’t help but reflect on the decade that brought us to where we are today.

When I began my career in the International Affairs Association, we were still no larger than 800 guests,

build up the nation’s image, upwards of a dizzying $3.5 billion has been spent in the construction and renovation of major soccer hubs in major cities, according to various sources. That’s just less than 2 percent of the national budget in a nation already struggling to fight endemic AIDS and pandemic poverty.

Worse, increasingly loud and more reputable reports out of many South African cities are claiming that officials are evicting homeless and destitute South Africans from their urban homes in preparation for the Cup, placing them in “temporary relocation areas.”

Particularly deplorable tales of “Tin Can Towns” being set up near Cape Town are said to mirror Nazi concentration camps and conditions today “are worse than in the townships created during apartheid,” according to The Guardian.

Rather than empowering the impoverished citizens, South Africa appears to be sweeping them aside for fear of losing the positive image it hopes to gain from hosting the Cup. Police have been instructed to keep tourists and soccer fans away from particular areas of each city. Zones around the soccer venues are being set up and enforced by police to bar street businesses and market vendors from interfering with the crowds.

Ticket prices alone are set at a minimum of $17, thus preventing the majority of sharing hosting duties of the multischool conference with MIT. Over the past three years, we’ve nearly doubled in size and split away to run BosMUN by ourselves. The growing pains have been tough, and there is still much to be done, but as I enter my final year as the Secretary-General, my only emotion is hope. Not fear, nor apprehension, nor doubt — just hope and excitement for what the next year will bring.

Being the SecGen will be the most daunting, yet undoubtedly rewarding task I will undertake during my years at Boston University. Never before have I had the opportunity to work with my fellow undergraduates so closely, as we

South African soccer fans from even attending the events.

In 2008, China was the recipient of international criticism for its handling of the Summer Olympics in Beijing.

Chinese officials used sometimesdrastic measures to prepare the capital city for the Games, including relocating entire businesses and setting up “protest zones” in the name of building a positive national image. The actions being taken in South Africa to this end are even more drastic and detrimental to its people.

This is an unfortunate –– yet predictable –– situation for humanity. For too long, the gap between rich and poor has been allowed to widen, and the results are evident in places like South Africa: rampant health issues, crime and violence, and the continuation and worsening of poverty itself. When the world turns to South Africa to cheer on the teams of the World Cup, these issues should not be far from our minds. South Africa has taken a serious misstep in trying to hide its humanitarian crises, and should immediately work to use the tournament to its peoples’ advantage, not the other way around.

If soccer is the world’s sport, then poverty is the world’s disease. This June, both will be on display in South Africa.

voluntarily give hours of our time — days; weeks, even — toward creating this experience.

Each year, I ask myself how we are going to outdo our own excellence from the year before. Without fail, I am reminded that it’s these high-caliber individuals who push us further each time. I’d like to extend sincere thank you to everyone who has been a part of BosMUN in the past, and a hopeful invitation to readers to join our great organization.

William Hawke Bassignani Secretary-General of BosMUN X

Spring 2010 “Immigration” from page 4 not have pushed his fellow Republicans to pass comprehensive immigration reform for fear that his approval ratings would drop even lower or perhaps because he felt that he was incapable of influencing his party members. Regardless, Bush’s failure/inability to pressure his party to vote for comprehensive immigration reform contributed to its demise.

Ultimately, the failure of comprehensive immigration reform under the George W. Bush administration was a result of many constraining factors. The Sept.

11 terrorist attacks served to halt momentum for reform and connect terrorism with immigration.

A loud anti-immigration minority effectively pushed House Republicans, who were concerned

“Museums” from page 5

Nye’s evaluation of cultural diplomacy speaks to the complexity of understanding that goes deeper than promoting an image — it refers to the education of sincere perspectives that would make a product “popular.” Mutual understanding promotes a reciprocal relationship and is least likely to be interpreted as invested with an ulterior motive. Only through this two-way street facilitated by education and dialogue can cultural diplomacy be effective. Cultural awareness cultivated by museums opens the door for the construction of such a relationship.

Museums have truly become a two-pronged instrument of foreign policy. Their role in education promotes the intrinsic value of crosscultural exchanges, facilitating and inspiring academic exchanges. Its ability to harness cultural awareness is the extra mileage that bolsters the mutual understanding that is demanded by cultural diplomacy

about re-election, to thwart the comprehensive immigration reform bill passed in the Senate.

Finally, Bush was not able to persuade his fellow Republicans to put thoughts of re-election to the side.

La Rosa, Michael. Ingwerson, Lance R.. “The Forgotten Relationship.”

Neighborly Adversaries. Ed. Michael LaRosa and Frank O. Mora. 2nd ed. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007. 26374. Print.

All of these factors placed constraints on the formation of a new U.S. policy toward immigration that resulted in enhanced border security, political stalemate, and a mutual desire to put comprehensive immigration reform off until another day. When this day might be is still uncertain, as many factors contributing to the failure of comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 are still at work today.

Palmer, David Scott. U.S. Relations With Latin American During the Clinton Years Opportunities Lost or Opportunities Squandered? (International Relations/ Latin American Studies). New York: University of Florida, 2006. Print.

Works Cited Jacoby, Tamar. “Immigration Nation.”

Foreig Affairs Nov. & dec. 2006: 50-65.

and the exposure of foreign visitors to America’s humanistic side is proven to be a successful tool to “win the hearts and minds” of foreigners. Museums not only complement the academic exchanges — staples used by the ECA — but also are an independent instrument among the tools of cultural diplomacy. As we further contemplate the undeniable role of the museum in soft power, we are confronted with the inevitable question: How do museums in foreign nations affect the image of American culture?

Do they have the power to mitigate our efforts to better soft power?

Nevertheless, it is a fair conclusion that cultural diplomacy sits snugly on the enduring shoulders of the museum.

Works Cited Educational and Cultural Affair Bureau (ECA). “Electric Code of Federal Regulations.” Title 22: Foreign Relations. http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-i

Skerry, Peter. “How Not to Build A Fence.” Foreign Policy Magazine Sept. & oct. 2006: 64-67. Print.

Smith, Peter H. Talons of the Eagle Latin America, the United States, and the World. New York: Oxford UP, United States of America, 2007.

dxc=ecfr&sid=c329fb110ea15b0bf4b16 f4d88cb4d16&rgn=div5&view=text&n ode=22:1.0.1.7.37&idno=22 (accessed January 29, 2010) Mulcahy, Kevin 2006 “Cultural Policy: Definitions and Theoretical Approaches,” The Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society 35(4): 319-330 Museum of Fine Arts (MFA), Boston: Visit, Website Annual Report: The Museum Year 2009. http://www.mfa.org/annualreport2009/

The International Relations Review always accepts letters to the editor of no more than 400 words at editorial.irr@ gmail.com.

If you are interested in contributing a longer piece or a photo, please visit http://buiaa.org/ir-review for more detailed submission guidelines.

Please contact editor.irr@gmail.com with any other questions or concerns.

11

Proudly printed on 100% post-consumer recycled stock.

Advertise with the IR Review Reach the 1,200+ international relations students at Boston University and beyond by placing an in-print and online advertisement in the IRR. For full placement and rate information, please visit

http://buiaa.org/ir-review/advertising

or send an email to advertising.irr@gmail.com

Thank you to all our editors and contributors Lester Ang

Caitlin Lesczynski

William Hawke Bassignani

Joshua Levkowitz

Phillip Brougham

Robina Moyer

Giuseppe Caruso

Julie O’Neill

Natasha Cohen

Elizabeth Pierson

Andrew Facini

Elizabeth Prinz

Edward Hill

Shivani Ray

Angela Latona

Vanessa Santos

Sam Leone

Hilary Wartinger

This issue’s cover shot by Hilary Wartinger, CAS/COM ’11 Taken in Morocco, 2009.

The International Relations Review

Advertising space available in print and online.

ISSN 2151-738X (Print) ISSN 2151-7398 (Online)

For rate and placement information, please visit http://buiaa.org/irreview/advertising/

http://buiaa.org/ir-review/

Vol. 1, Issue 2 Since 2009

advertising.irr@gmail.com