The International Relations Review Spring 2013

Bhutan and Food Security

Implementing Policies for Development

Transformation of Terrorism

Convergence of threats

Special Report:

The Psychology of War

Spring 2013

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Index 2 Briefing 4 U.S.-Pakistani Relations

The United States and Pakistan have been allies for more than 60 years, but their relationship is a tumultuous one. Now the U.S. must assess its ties with Pakistan or risk losing an important ally in the War on Terror.

By Kelsea-Marie Pym, CAS ‘14

6 Bhutan and Food Security

Bhutan’s food security requires a balance of politics and environmental sustainability. However, changing economic relations with countries such as India may affect Bhutan’s food production and require new strategies for sustainable farming.

By Sarah Chudnovsky, CAS ‘14

9 Scottish Independence

First Minister Salmond debates the independence of Scotland from the U.K. He and several others believe Scotland has the potential to become an economically independent country.

By Cheryl Tang, CAS ‘14

11 Cyber Security Beyond Intelligence

The scale of cyber-warfare makes it an important and unique aspect of national security policy that must be addressed, especially if the possibility of a “cyber Pearl Harbor,” a devastating attack involving all types of infrastructure, may be imminent.

By Dustin Vandenberg, CAS ‘15

12 Women in Egypt

Egypt’s new constitution has women concerned about potential laws that could encroach upon their rights more than ever before. Women in Egypt will have to resist legal and cultural discrimination to take back their rights.

By Kristen Keesee, CAS ‘13, COM ‘13

15 Fossil Fuels and Development

Crude oil drilling, production and infrastructure development have begun to affect the ecology of the Albertine rift, but the exploitation of naturla resources has also reduced the government’s ability to protect the public good.

By Sarah Chudnovsky, CAS ‘14

Photo by Lauren Logan, SAR ‘15

Special Report: The Psychology of War 19 Youth

in Chatoic Environments

21 PTSD

in the Soviet-Afghan War

Zachary Crawford, CAS ‘13

24 Memorials

Jesse Crane, CAS ‘14

Emma Brandon, CAS ‘13

29 Irish Language Revival

Gaelic is regaining popularity as the original Irish language, partly due to campaigns targeting youth culture.

By Madeline Rosenberger, CAS ‘14, COM ‘14

31 Globalization and Growth

Globalization not only sparks growing economies, but greater disparity of wealth that hinders the growth of other economies.

By Prithvi Hingorani, CAS ‘15

33 Catalonian Independence

While Catalonian independence draws its basis from the idea of self-determination, its secession from the rest of Spain proves difficult in an increasingly interconnected world.

By Sergio Reyes, CAS ‘14

36 Imam-Hatip Schools

The Turkish government has tried to reconcile religious tensions by overseeing the curriculum of Imam-Hatip religious schools, but many secularists believe the graduates will incite extremist rebellion within Turkey.

By Alisha Davis, CAS ‘13

39 Transformation of Terrorism

Transnational organized crime and terrorism are transforming. States must find unified ways to address these security threats.

By Dean Borza, CAS ‘13

42 Chinese Nationalism

The official and popular definitions of Chinese nationalism differ greatly. The Chinese government faces the challenge of appeasing popular nationalism while maintaining its foreign and economic interests.

By Amy Kim, CAS ‘14

45 Nodding Disease

Experts still debate the origins of nodding disease, an illness without treatment that was first recorded in the 1960s. One potential cause may be a parasite.

By Lauren Logan, SAR ‘15

46 Los Conquistadores China

Chinese economic influence is spreading to small towns like Tuchín, Colombia. As the economic interdependence between China and Latin America grows, prosperity increases overall, but on a smaller scale, new partnerships are met with backlash.

By Allegra Isabel Lee Valeriano, CAS’16

48 Editorial

North Korea’s threats of war against South Korea and the U.S. are part of the same old rhetoric. However, this time it seems there may be more serious.

Want to submit? See our guidelines, page 47.

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Spring 2013

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Briefings cancer for two years. Vice Presi- structuring of the banking system, North Korea

Tensions between North dent Nicolas Maduro will serve as tax increases and privatizations.

Korea and the United States are at an all-time high as North Korea declared April 4 that it was moving a missile with considerable range to the coast.

The South Korean defense minister confirmed hours after North Korea’s military announcement that it had been authorizedt o attack the U.S. with smaller nuclear weapons, according to The Guardian. However, he dismissed speculation suggesting the weapon could be a long-range missile capable of reaching the U.S. if launched.

North Korea has not made any apparent preparations for war.

In the last several weeks, the Communist nation has conducted a series of missile tests and have made threats North Korea against South Korea and the U.S. Most recently, the North Korean government agreed to incorporate nuclear weapons more into its defense strategy. The United Nations placed sanctions on North Korea after it conducted its most recent test, after North Korea declared an end to the armistice with South Korea that was put into place from the Korea War.

interim president until elections on April 14th. Chavez, who became president in 1999, was known for his philosophy of “Bolivarism” or modern-day socialism, and he was frequently a critic of the U.S. Maduro was Chavez’s personal choice as a successor, and opinion polls show he is in the lead for the election.

Maduro also recently expelled two American military attachès and accused the U.S. of intervention in Venezuelan affairs.

The banks reopened for the first time in two weeks on March 28.

The banks were shut down as the governent made negotiations over the bailout.

Central African Republican

The Seleka rebel group took over Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic, on March 24 after a power-sharing deal collapsed. CAR President Francois Bozize, who came to power in a coup d’etat in 2003, fled to CamerPope Francis oon while rebel leaders dissolved

On February 28, Pope parliament and suspended the Benedict XVI resigned as Pope. constitution. Rebel leader Michel Two weeks later, the cardinals Djotodia stated that democratic elected Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio of Buenos Aires as elections would be held. the new pope, adopting the name Pope Francis I. He is the first Latin American to lead the Catholic Kenya Church.

Presidential elections were held in Kenya between candidates Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta.

Six years ago, presidential elections spurred ethnic tensions and vioCyprus

Cypriot banks are now fac- lence, which raised concerns about ing the consequences of investing the consequences of this election. heavily in Greece, which initially With Kenyatta as the election winplunged the economy into crisis. ner, receiving 50.07 percent of the In an effort to alleviate the Cypriot vote, recent reports show little to Venezuela economy, the country has accept- no conflict in the country. Kenyat Venezuelan President Hugo ed the bailout from the European ta’s opponent Odinga contends that Chavez died in Caracas on Tuesday, Union and International Monetary unfair election practices took place, March 5. Chavez had been ill with Fund. This bailout includes a re- calling for increased scrutiny of

Photo by Jake Wildstein, SMG ‘14

North Korea before the death of Kim Jung-Il.

election practices and the recount of votes placing further strain on Kenya’s nascent democratic political system.

Turkey and Israel

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently apologized to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for the deaths of nine Turkish civilians in the 2010 Gaza flotilla incident. Netanyahu reached out to Erdogan, claiming operational mistakes were largely to blame for the event and promising to compensate the families of the victims in an attempt to restore friendly diplomatic relations with Turkey.

Netanyahu recently stated that this move is due to Israel’s anxiety over the deteriorating situation in Syria, which shares a bor-

der with both Turkey and Israel.

Zimbabwe

On March 19, the referendum to approve a new Constitution in Zimbabwe passed with over three million votes. The changes to the Constitution will include presidential term limits, a bill of rights and lead to a presidential election later this year.

Although the vote seemed to pass without controversy, four members of Prime Minister Morgan Tsvingirai’s political team were arrested under questionable charges shortly afterward. Many analysts believe this type of intimidation, believed to be carried out

by Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party, will only intensify as the presidential election approaches.

Congo

Congolese M23 Rebel leader Bosco Ntaganda has surrendered to the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda.

Ntaganda was wanted for suspected war crimes committed in the eastern part of the country, including the conscription of child soldiers, murder, ethnic persecution and rape. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has not seen stability in recent history, and its current Civil War between the official Congolese government and M23 rebel forces has been raging over ethnic rivalries, power struggles and control of rich resource deposits since the early 2000s. Ntaganda has asked to be taken to the International Criminal Court, and although neither Rwanda nor the U.S. has given the ICC jurisdiction in their countries, plans to bring Ntaganda to The Hague for trial are underway.

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Spring 2013

Connecting with an Old Friend Refocusing the U.S.-Pakistan Alliance

By Kelsea-Marie Pym, CAS ‘14

Photo by Fatimi Mufti, CAS ‘14

Finding Osama bin Laden in Pakistan left America with an incredible sense of betrayal and anger. However, America’s apparent lack of respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty shown by the intrusion of the Navy SEAL operation that captured bin Laden highlights another severe rift in U.S.-Pakistan relations.1 As displayed in mass media and movies such as “Zero Dark Thirty,” Americans do not fully understand or appreciate Pakistan, an ally currently portrayed solely as having served as bin Laden’s hiding place.

Yet, bound by over 60 years of a tumultuous alliance, America can neither continue the same relationship with Pakistan, nor afford to walk away from Pakistan.

Rather than let Pakistan sink into isolation and pursue potentially detrimental foreign policy, it is in America’s best interest to continue to facilitate a newer, more equal, partnership. It is in America’s best interest to have Pakistan on the frontline in the fight to win the War on Terror and to build up the country from the inside.

As with most dysfunctional alliances, the basis of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was built on misunderstanding. Hastily formed after the abrupt and bloody partition of India in 1947, Pakistan was a fledgling country with the immediate issue of inheriting one third of the British Indian Army and only 17

percent of the revenue.2 Although the country made a large supply of jute, all processing mills were in India.3 Psychologically, the country felt the sting of paranoia brought about by many Indian predictions of the demise of Pakistan.4 Therefore, clinging to Islam as a unifier and to the military for protection against ever-threatening India, Pakistan, under their first leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah, wooed the U.S. into forming an alliance.

This is not to say the U.S. was not a willing partner. Although Pakistan viewed the U.S. as an ally against India (proved wrong several times), and as an economic source, the U.S. viewed Pakistan as a strategic location in the Cold

War.5 As U.S.-Pakistan ties suffered from Pakistan’s actions due to concerns about India and fights over Kashmir, they also strengthened as Pakistan aided in the opening of dialogue between China and the U.S. in the 1980s, and as Pakistan aided in training jihadi forces to rid neighboring Afghanistan of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War.6 Unfortunately, years of these interpretations and neglect from both sides has led to a new generation of religious extremists with high anti-Western sentiment and an alliance of bitter struggle.

Today, although Pakistan is touted as an ally in the War on Terror, America actively pursues the controversial drone campaign against terrorists within the country. Terrorists which Pakistan continues to categorize between as foreign forces and jihadi “freedom fighters” originally trained to fight Indian forces in Kashmir.7 The U.S. does not accept this categorization, but rather resents the separation and seeming approval for some terrorists. Likewise, Pakistan is unhappy with the U.S. According to Gallup Polls from 2011, 48 percent of Pakistanis saw the drone campaign as ineffective, and 82 percent of Pakistanis aware of American military actions disapproved of the U.S. mission to retrieve Osama bin Laden, whereas 93 percent of Americans approved of the U.S. mission.8,9 These statistics get to the root of a main issue, America’s blatant disregarding of Pakistani sovereignty—as the Abbottabad mission, which found and assassinated Osama bin Laden, was carried out without prior Pakistani approval.

Even more unsettling, in a 2012 Gallup Poll, 55 percent of Pakistanis surveyed viewed Muslim ties to Western societies as “more of a threat,” and only 31 percent saw the interaction as “more of a benefit.”10 Clearly, Pakistani people do not want American military aid or intervention. Similarly, due to Pakistan’s confirmation as a nuclear power and its unclear relationship with terrorism, the U.S. has experienced a sort of “stop-andgo” relationship with aid to Pakistan.

In 2000, at a speech given in Pakistan, President Bill Clinton stated that “We [America] want to be a force for peace. But we cannot force peace.”11 This rings true for the current state of affairs with Pakistan. America cannot walk

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Photo by Fatima Mufti, CAS ‘14

away from a country with nuclear power and terrorist hot spots.

With embarrassingly low literacy rates and less than 2 percent of their GDP going towards education, Pakistan also struggles with other declining health-care and social services.12 Additionally, more than one-third of the country’s population is living under the poverty line, and Pakistan’s economy, with a GDP of $75 billion (absolute terms), is the lowest of any country with tested nuclear weapons, making Pakistan a country in desperate need of aid.13 America should re-appropriate it’s spending in Pakistan to the infrastructure of the country, focusing on building economic ties and trading as well as education.

Economic ties could be opened between the U.S.-India-Pakistan triangle to facilitate an easing of tension and paranoia between Pakistan and India. Pakistan must get over it’s debilitating fear of India in order to focus on it’s internal needs and scale back the military. If this is not done, it is inevitable that this unstable nuclear country will fall to even more unstable hands.

Building upon these ties and thus acting more as an ally and friend rather than military commander, America can then benefit from Pakistan’s inherent influence over the Taliban. Without the support of the Pakistani people, America cannot hope to truly benefit from

Photo by Fatima Mufti, CAS ‘14

open communication and actions in the War on Terror. The War must be publicly made into war waged by both allies for a common goal. Although unclear to what extent the Taliban will work with the Afghan government or the Pakistani government, it is without doubt that America needs Pakistan to facilitate these discussions, and thus to negotiate a peaceful future in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.14

America should move beyond the past and look towards an equal partnership with Pakistan. The overlapping interests between the two countries, misunderstood from the beginning, must become a set of coherent and mutual interests against a common enemy and for a common future of sustained peace.

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Spring 2013

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Bhutan and Food Security Implementing Policies to Support Development

By Sarah Chudnovsky, CAS ‘14

Bhutan, located in the eastern end of the Himalayas neighboring India, Nepal, Tibet and China, is characterized by a diverse range of microclimates and political, economic, cultural and agricultural systems that have been relatively isolated from international forces. As Bhutan undergoes integration into a market economy through development projects and international trade, its economic system’s reliance on domestic food security can be understood in the context of its sovereignty as a nation.

Bhutan has three main ethnic groups: the Ngalops in the West form 35 percent of population; the Sharcopas in the East form 50 percent of population; and the Lotshampas in the South of Nepali background form 15 percent of population. About 85 percent of the population is in the agricultural sector and most practice subsistence agriculture.

Land is distributed relatively equitably, and unemployment and landlessness are not major issues in rural areas.1 Bhutan is very unique as its elevation ranges from 1500m to 7500m. This creates three distinct regions: floodplains and southern foothills with a hot and humid climate; the Inner Himalayas of broad river valleys with a temperate climate; and the Greater Himalayas with a harsh alpine climate. A small percentage of Bhutan’s land is arable, and of this 72 percent is forest, 28 percent is shifting cultivation, and 4 percent is additional pasture land.

The rest of the country is glaciers, rocky outcrops, and marshland.2

Much of Bhutan’s economy is small-scale and has historically been based on barter. Rural women own household land, and most households cultivate approximately one hectare of land. Bhutanese farmers depend on a myriad of farm resources such as: private land, common grazing land, forest products, family labour, livestock and products, draught power, manure, seed, grain, straw, vegetables, and fruit. Animal husbandry is integrated with labor-intensive

crop production 4 (86 percent of farmers also own livestock 5), and crops vary according to geographic region. Different

“While Bhutan is relatively food secure, urbanization and landuse changes due to the development of hydropower have increased the imports of foodstuffs from India.” cereals are grown for household consumption depending on altitude - maize in the south and east and buckwheat/ wheat/barley in the Inner Himalayas.6

While Bhutan is relatively food secure, urbanization and land-use changes due to the development of hydropower, have increased the imports of foodstuffs from India. Historically Bhutan has had many interactions, including political conflict, with the neighboring regions of Tibet, Nepal and India, but in recent centuries the country pursued isolationism, aided by its mountainous location. However, with the growth of India and China, Bhutanese policies changed. To avoid annexation and protect its sovereignty in the context of China’s take-over of Tibet and India’s take-over of Sikkhum, Bhutan allied itself with India and is now dependent on India for military and development aid, manufactured and some food imports. India also provides an export market for cash crops such as potatoes,

oranges, apples, and cardamom, and acts as a buffer against China.

The Bhutanese government began to officially pursue development in the 1940s after India gained independence from the British Empire, and the government’s current policy focuses on the “middle path” of balancing economic development with environmental conservation.8 Instead of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the Bhutanese government measures Gross Domestic Happiness through socio-economic development, good governance, environmental conservation, and preservation of culture and tradition.9 The government promotes an association between cultural values which are related to the practice of Buddhism, and environmental conservation, but there is some disagreement regarding the effectiveness of this policy.10

In land use policy, the government has been pushing for conversion from shifting agricultural practices, such as swidden agriculture, to permanent land use, such as paddies.11 This development process has involved trial and error, and included the creation of agricultural extension centers implementing “green revolution” style high potential yield cereals and cash crops such as potatoes, cardamom, and fruit. Issues arose when this occurred at the expense of local hardy, disease resistant varieties. For example, one issue involved a new variety of rice, resulting in an increase in rice yield, but a decrease in straw yield, which is a necessary intermediate product.12

A unique indigenous variety of red rice is a staple of the Bhutanese diet.

Approximately 84 percent of farming households (28,000 households) grow local red rice, and it meets about half of the national demand.13 Red rice is grown at lower elevations using the “tseri” method of agriculture. Tseri involves traditional swidden agriculture, where plants are cut, allowed to dry during the dry season, then burned before planting crops. Ero-

A group of boys eat food and sit around outside of a temple in the Bhutanese capital of Thimpu.

sion is minimal because there is a short cropping period, absence of tilling, and stability from roots of the plants grown in the fallow period. Varieties have adapted against pests and climate damage,14 but some argue that increased irrigation could create greater rice production.15 Enough surplus red rice is grown to partly support the urban population, but the bulk is imported from India.

Red rice can be grown at elevations up to 8,000 feet,17 but in higher regions it is declining in favor of imported white rice from India as some farmers shift to potato cash-cropping.

The implementation of potatoes as a cash crop has largely been between farmers since the 1970s, rather than distributed from the top-down, making its success as a cash crop unique.18 The potato as a cash crop plays a significant role in Bhutan’s transition from the “food first” self-sufficiency approach to mar-

ket orientation that favors looking for the “competitive advantage.” It currently serves as the third main agricultural foreign exchange earner.19

Bhutan has a competitive advantage for several reasons. The necessary ingredients for a competitive advantage include well-organized marketing, distribution and post-harvest systems, and effective market information and technologies that allow competitiveness in price and quality.21 Bhutan’s potato sector is successful because of its competitive advantage in the Indian market. The peak harvest time in Bhutan is during May, when it is out of season in India and the prices are high there.22 The Indian market for potatoes is so large that the Indian market absorbs everything and marketing is not a critical aspect compared to transportation. While primarily grown in the northern Inner Himalaya region of Bumthang at elevations of 1500-3000m,

Photo by Anbita Siregar, CAS ‘16

potatoes are sold in the southern region at the border to Indian buyers.

Road construction in the 1960s opened up Bhutan to the Indian market, and there was a 30 percent growth in the sector from the 1960s to the 1980s. The growth plateaued and government formed the Bhutan National Potato Project from 1983-1996, but the bulk of the industry was initiated by farmers before any government intervention in the form of education or seed subsidy was put into place.

Potatoes had been grown in Bhutan since it was brought by a British diplomat in 1774, but did not become a staple food and were mostly abandoned by the mid19th century because of a wart disease.

However, the combination of road access and a wart-free variety brought the potato back. In the 1970s, potatoes were seen as causing indigestion and disease, but today they are so highly accepted that they are offered on religious altars.23

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As a cash crop, potatoes seem to hold a lot of promise in providing a steady income for Bhutanese farmers at high altitudes. The main argument against choosing the comparative advantage of growing and selling potatoes for the market asserts that it puts Bhutanese farmers at a high risk of losing everything if they lose their inputs from the government, from climate or disease, or the effects of Indian market failure. However, the crop appears very stable due to the complementary relationship with India’s off-season, and because Bhutanese agricultural goods have a very highly respected reputation in India.24 The other regions of Bhutan are largely food secure through red rice and other cereals, and in the case of crop or market failure these other foodstuffs could provide relief.

Thus, a balance between food-first and the comparative advantage provides stability.

The concern about the future role of the potato as a cash crop in Bhutan rests in sustainability. Potatoes are grown in the region of Bumthang using the agricultural method of “pangshin,” where farmers dig up the topsoil, leave it to dry for several months, collect in into small mounds, add a small amount of fuel, and burn for several hours. This method leaves the soil highly susceptible to erosion, and while it provides immediate high returns, the land has to be fallow for anywhere from 6 to 10 years. Sometimes the field is also rotated with soybeans or another type of legume.25 There is no weeding required after planting, so 85 percent of labor participates in soil preparation.

The concern is that if pangshin is not practiced sustainably, the ecological damage occurring over time will de-

Spring 2013

Land Use in Bhutan

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Scottish Independence

Weighing the Consequences of Secession

By Cheryl Tang, CAS ‘14

Photo by Amrita Singh, CAS ‘15 Graphic by Sarah Chudnovsky, Steph solis Statistics from the LUPP Dzongkhag Data Sheets, 1995

crease the ability of the land and forests to support the current system.26 One study found that potato farmers were 50 percent more likely than non-potato growers to use synthetic fertilizers.27 The land can support the current pangshin system but an increase in fertilizers and pesticides could have unintended effects on the interconnected ecological and hydraulic systems of Bhutan. An alternative land use method for the high elevations besides pangshin potato cropping could be a combination of timber and dairy production, which would provide Bhutanese farmers with $1,000 to $2,000 per hectare per year. While this could serve as a sustainable long-term method, it could also

have unintended ecological and social costs that require research be conducted on the local systems before implementation.

The potato was successful as a comparative advantage crop because it spread on a small scale with a proven record by farmer experimentation and did not replace critical food-first crops grown at lower elevations such as red rice. The success of the potato demonstrates that, in moving forward, the future of food and nutrition in Bhutan should continue to follow the policy of observing and implementing systems that work for small scale farmers.

Submit to The IR Review The International Relations Review receives submissions* year-round. Send essays, articles, reports and photography to the editors at irr@buiaa.org. *Only undergraduate submissions are featured in the magazine. All other submissions that are selected are published on the website.

With the upcoming Scottish referendum in 2014, the country’s future and its ability to sustain itself is uncertain. Although specific details of the referendum still remain unclear, the Scottish National Party (SNP), the majority party in the Scottish Parliament, hopes to pose a yes or no question asking Scottish residents if they want independence.

Feeling culturally disconnected from their fellow Britons in England, nationalism has been encouraging a fair share of Scots to advocate for an independent Scotland.1 Independence prospects have materialized with the SNP’s platform for home rule and the reconvening of a unicameral Scottish Parliament, known as Holyrood, in 1999.

Even though independence is opposed by both the Scottish Labour Party and the Scottish Conservative Party, current first minister Alexander Salmond of the SNP has been campaigning for a complete break from the United Kingdom.2 Although nationalism justifies the want for independence, there are questions concerning Scotland’s ability to sustain itself as a sovereign nation.

Scotland currently holds limited legislative power. It was delegated some governmental authority with the passing of the Scotland Act in 1998, through which Westminster approved the reconvening of Holyrood and the devolution of British Parliamentary power. This devolution permits Holyrood to maintain power over local government, courts, healthcare, schooling, agriculture and partially over economic development. Rela-

tions with the European Union, international treaties and trade, defense policies and social security remain as matters reserved for the central U.K. government.3

First Minister Salmond believes Scotland’s independence would allow the country to meet its full economic potential.

SNP colleagues of Salmond agree that full fiscal autonomy would grant Scotland the ability to make policies on key economic issues and discontinue decisions based on constrained Westminster policy preferences.4 The discovery of oil in the North Sea and Scotland’s position as a major oil producer in both the United Kingdom and Europe would help financially sustain the country, according to the SNP. Research gathered by the party found that oil revenue would generate an excess of one billion pounds per year in tax revenue for Scotland. This excess could be allotted for the local economy’s expansion and the funding of public services. In addition to these revenues, the oil industry can further contribute to higher levels of employment and economic activity.5 Salmond, stated that an independent Scotland could build up a sovereign energy fund worth more than $45 billion within 20 years.6

Holyrood is most frustrated with the weakness of its fiscal capacity due to the nature of a devolved United Kingdom. To demonstrate the problems resulting from limited economic authority, an analysis by SNP’s economics team revealed long term and structural flaws in Scotland’s financial per-

formance. They identify low growth as a core issue underlying economic distress which the SNP recognizes has negatively affected business creation, lowered tax revenues, weakened public services and diminished wages.7 Essentially, proponents of full fiscal abilities attest that the Scottish economy has been suffering social and political costs derived from financial downturns. The SNP argues that unless Westminster encourages economic stimulus through the reduction of corporation taxes and the increasing of investment levels, stagnation will persist.8 In addition to discontent with limited fiscal power, the SNP is frustrated by its inability to delegate control over the amount of block grants awarded to Scotland’s budget funded by Westminster.

The block grants received by Holyrood are calculated by the Barnett formula, which is a population-based formula used to appropriate 10.66 percent of English spending on health, education and local government toward Scotland.9 It was intended to narrow the gap between spending per head in Scotland and the other parts of the United Kingdom.10

In spite of this intention, Scots have recently been complaining against the “Barnett squeeze,” a modification to the block grants agreement in which Scotland’s declining population is taken into account.11 Upon achieving independence, the SNP sees Scotland controlling its own monetary policy, making decisions based on the sole interests of Scotland, rather than the goals of the Bank of England.12

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Despite the proposed benefits of secession, opponents of the SNP hold that the arguments made by the party lack substance and are impractical. As the oil industry is viewed by Scots as their financial safety net, economists have been skeptical of the prospects of Scotland’s independent economy. An independent Scotland would have more than 80 percent of U.K. oil and gas revenue, but economists have elucidated the amount of income produced by this commodity would be difficult to predict because oil prices are so volatile. Many doubt if Scotland’s oil revenue surpluses would be large enough to pay off its debt of £189 billion.13

The Scottish Labour Party, the main challengers to the SNP, has been consistently advocating against the break-up of the union. They argue that it would be economically detrimental to an independent Scotland and the remainder of the United Kingdom. Due to this, they have promoted “Divorce is an Expensive Business” as their slogan.14 Those who side with Scottish Labour have tended to find fault in the SNP’s promotion of a positive economic future. To counter arguments posed by the SNP, a series of reports entitled Government Expenditure and Revenue Surveys (GERS) have been distributed by the Scottish Conservative Party since 1992. These are intended to prove how Scotland positively contributes to the United Kingdom and how independence could impose higher levels of public spending and taxation within a new independent state.15 A recent GERS published in 2010 discovered that oil revenues are worth about one-seventh of Scotland’s total revenue.16 Within the same GERS publication, the report states that Scotland’s deficit at the time was 11 percent of its £14 billion GDP.21 Moreover, a report

by Taxpayer Scotland, a pressure group that advocates for lower taxes, has discovered that even with oil and gas revenues of £6 billion in 2012, Scotland spends £9 billion more every year than it produces in revenue.17

In addition to Scotland’s massive fiscal deficit and its excessive spending, GERS have highlighted the troubles of start-up costs. As current Scottish fiscal authority only permits Holyrood to enact local taxes, opponents of the SNP are determined to prove the impracticailty of attaining separation because of the percieved inability to fund defense and foreign affairs initiatives.

The expenses of financing defense forces, embassies and consulates would overwhelm the Scottish budget. Likewise, developing

a new taxation and social security system would further heighten economic costs. Due to Scotland’s current deficit, the lack of fiscal surpluses held by Scotland would either lead to an increase in income and business taxes or supplementary spending cuts that have the potential in damaging public services.18

The economic consequences of in-

“Despite the proposed benefits of secession, opponents of the SNP hold that the arguments made by the party lack substance and are impractical.” dependence are uncertain, but Scotland would nevertheless be expected to take a share of the United Kingdom’s national debt. Although this has yet to be negotiated, Salmond assured that Scotland’s partial absorption of the United Kingdom’s debt would either be based on current U.K. GDP or on the population. It has been predicted that the Scottish portion of the national U.K. debt would be approximately £80 billion.19 Thus, Scotland’s total debt would accumulate to £269 billion, as its own debt is presently at £189 billion.

A study carried out by M&G Investments, a leading global company that manages a wide range of assets, elucidated that an independent Scotland would be unable to carry over the United Kingdom’s current triple-A rating, a mark of its capabilities to meet financial obligations.20 With a lack of credit history and an intent to increase spending for expansionary fiscal purposes, opponents of independence are wary that Scotland’s debt securities would be purchased in the bond market.21

Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, recently announced that an independent Scotland would need to apply for EU membership.22 Even though Scotland’s EU concerns are separate matters, the EU accession requirement forces Scotland to remain with the sterling pound, which is its original intention. Salmond proposed that an independent Scotland would use the sterling pound as its official currency until Scots, through the referendum process,

Spring 2013 chose to join the Eurozone.23 Due to this default, the sterling pound would give Scotland financial credibility in attracting investors. As the sterling pound remains one of the most traded currencies globally, it seems plausible that Scotland could entice a range of investors to buy government bonds. Such potential buyers include foreign governments, investment companies and speculators. However, retaining the sterling pound would make monetary policy remain ambiguous. The new independent state could establish its own central bank, or it could seek the Bank of England’s advice on monetary governance. With such an agreement, Scotland would then remain politically independent, and only partially economically tied to the United Kingdom. As this arrangement falls short of full independence, a situation like this would be categorized as “devolution max” by the Scottish government.

Even though the SNP has provided valid points for independence negotiations, many observers admit they are unsure of how the economy of an independent Scotland would fare. The only way to know if Scotland has the ability to financially sustain itself would be contingent upon the future decisions of Holyrood. Their decisions concerning minimal government regulation, business-friendly policies and low taxes would determine the financial outcome of Scotland.24 With respect to revenue, the volatility of oil prices makes it hard for politicians and economists to forecast the actual capital gains of the North Sea oil industry. However, the importance of trade would keep Scotland economically afloat. By keeping the pound sterling, the Scottish government could easily preserve trade with the rest of the United Kingdom, which would be its most important foreign market due to their historical ties.

As the United Kingdom and an independent Scotland would use the same currency, there would be no need to engage in exchange rate negotiations. It is also anticipated that Scotland would continue trade relations within the continent, as it is unlikely for the country to lose its current access to other European markets.25 Trade and revenue from the North Sea oil industry would most likely not save an independent Scotland from a budget deficit, but economic activity generated by both sectors would at least help the new nation-state to be financially viable. In spite of the unpredictable nature of the situation, Scotland is capable of being an economically sustainable country.

11

Cyber Security Beyond Intelligence Preventing a Cyber “Pearl Harbor” Attack

By Dustin Vandenberg, CAS ‘15

Illustration by Anbita Siregar, CAS ‘16

Cyber-warfare is often viewed as a subset of intelligence agencies within governments. This categorization is because of the commonality between cyber-security and intelligence work.

Often, cyber-warfare is used to collect information transmitted through digital sources, drawing parallels to spy agencies wire-tapping phones or intercepting radio messages. In addition, cyber-warfare is highly involved in causing damage to servers, networks and websites of foreign nations. This calls to mind a saboteur destroying file records in a foreign nation or cutting access to communication networks by destroying radio antennas.

In fact, cyber-warfare has even expanded to include physical attacks, such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear reactors. These are comparable to direct physical attacks and assassinations as they have been carried out by intelligence agencies for decades. Given all these parallels between cyber-warfare and intelligence work, it seems logical to simply delegate cyber-warfare-related activities to the various intelligence agencies. However, there is a key aspect which makes cyber-warfare unique as a matter of policy: scale.

There have been many dire warnings coming from top-level commanders in the U.S. military and government relating to cyber-security. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned of a “cyber Pearl Harbor.”1 In fact, Stewart Baker, a lawyer and former senior official at the National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security stated, “that view is supported more by wishful thinking than by analysis. If you judge adversaries by capabilities rather than intent, there's no doubt that anyone with a really strong cyber espionage capability can cause something that will feel like a cyber Pearl Harbor.”2 Even President Barack Obama highlighted the importance of cyber-security in his 2013 State of the Union address.3 These warnings show that cyber-security should be viewed as a holistic goal, rather than simply a matter of intelligence.

The U.S. runs entirely on transistors and silicon. Computers, servers and networks manage millions of transactions each day, and they allow power plants to function and corporations to communicate.4 There is undoubtedly a massive amount of infrastructure that has been using computational services to increase efficiency. However, this can

be a cause for concern particularly in larger infrastructure services like power plants. The software running power plants has been left mostly unchanged for many years. Power companies often avoid changing software due to fear that the updates may cause mechanical issues and damage machinery. Only “10 to 20 percent of organizations today [running industrial control software] actually install patches.”5

Running outdated software has massive security risks, for much of this software was designed before certain security vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, argument corruption and exception handling abuse were studied and partially mitigated. Older software was often not viewed from a security perspective and is vulnerable to many of these attacks.6

Outdated infrastructure software was what allowed the U.S. to launch attacks against Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities through a virus known as Stuxnet.7 The U.S. used security vulnerabilities in industrial control software to cause damage to nuclear enrichment facilities. The U.S. has proven that these sorts of attacks are completely viable.

Furthermore, the code for Stuxnet was leaked from Iran and

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can now be studied and used against US institutions. This is why cyber-security should be viewed as a threat not only to military intelligence networks (as it has traditionally been viewed), but also as a potential area of attack across all infrastructure networks.

By applying our knowledge of cyber-security to an aspect separate from military intelligence, we can help secure our critical infrastructure, lead businesses in protecting their networks and create smart regulations on how software and networking can protect our privacy.

Otherwise, we run the risk of intelligence agencies being forced into a position of intruding on the private affairs of utilities companies, private corporations and companies on the Internet.

While certain actions have been taken by the government to try to improve the security of critical infrastructure, there are still limits to what can be accomplished solely through congressional action and executive order. Obama issued an executive order “calling on the federal government to develop cyber security standards for companies that operate key utilities, such as electric grids, telecommunications networks and air traffic control systems.”8 However, the problem rests upon the lack of incentives for companies to adopt protective measures and invest in potentially expensive security systems unless they have directly seen the potential damage. Also, without congressional action, there is little that can be done to mandate industry standards.

This is why an availability of security services to companies that do not require large investment on behalf of the company would be an immediate solution to the massive vulnerabilities within infrastructure systems. Our investments in cyber-security within governmental operations could be leveraged within key infrastructure sectors. However, as long as these cyber-security investments are solely within the purview of intelligence, there is no effective way to propagate this information to private corporations.

While intelligence is key to protecting our nation, our most vulnerable sectors should not be left without protection simply because of an outdated classification of cyber-security services.

Spring 2013

13

Women in Egypt The Continuing Struggle for Rights

By Kristen Keesee, CAS ‘13, COM ‘13

Throughout much of the Western world, people tend to view Egypt based on recent media attention. This has led to the mistaken impression that women are passive and uninvolved in Egyptian public affairs.

The Arab Spring may have provided the opportunity to change these perceptions and promote greater equality among all people in the state. However, when Mubarak’s regime was removed from power on February 10, 2011, women were also removed from the process of rebuilding the government. Since Egypt has accepted the recently proposed constitution, women are concerned that their rights are being further limited than under the Mubarak regime and that key opportunities to change this are passing.

Egypt’s contemporary culture is a mixture of ideas and ideologies from several centuries. It has become a state with hundreds of different ideas and interpretations of law.

The result of this is a society where women’s rights have come to contradict society’s goals in the current state, under the façade of religious law. Madiha El-Safty, a professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo, writes that in Islam, the rights of women are explicitly spelled out.1 While Islam gives women the basic rights that males receive, the culture and development of Egypt has constructed a society in which men have greater access to education and employment than women.

While the 1956 constitution guaranteed women the right to vote and run for public office, it also gave the government the right to control women’s political agenda.

Though women were able to run for office, few were actually elected until Mubarak initiated quotas in various areas of the government. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the state emphasized employment of women outside of the home by expanding educational and employment opportunities. As the world fell into an economic crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, Egypt felt its effects as employment opportunities decreased and those that existed were given to men. Since 2000, the Egyptian government has taken an active approach in efforts to consolidate control over women’s rights agendas by creating the National Coun-

cil for Women, which was led by Mubarak’s wife. Reforms included the right to a “nofault” divorce;, the right to retain custody of sons until they are 15 years old and daughters until they are married; the right to marry foreign nationals; and the right to pass Egyptian nationality to their children.2 Though these reforms sought to further define women’s rights, they were perceived to be corrupt, just like their leaders.

As the Arab Spring in Egypt began to form and protesters lined up in Tahrir Square, women were at the center of it all.

Men and women put pressure on the Mubarak regime and worked toward ushering in a new democratic Egypt. In an interview for the New Woman Foundation, Amal Abdel Hadi notes: “Women from all ages and all walks of life were involved in every aspect of this revolution: in confrontations on the front line with security forces, organizing, writing slogans, shouting and sleeping in Tahrir Square… Women and men were comrades in the protests.”3 As it became evident that the Mubarak regime was in its final days, Egyptian society began to return to its previous ways. On the night of Mubarak's resignation, CBS journalist Lara Logan was sexually assaulted by a mob of 40 men in Tahrir Square, bringing world attention to Egypt and the way women are perceived and valued in the country. Less than a month later, on March 8, women gathered in Tahrir Square to celebrate International Women’s Day and were attacked and harassed by male counter-protest groups. Engy Ghozlan, who was amongst the crowds in Tahrir Square that day, said, "We were faced by abusive men making fun of our demands, saying that a woman should never run for president.”4 Violence continued to escalate the following day when women protestors were arrested by the army and taken to the Egyptian Museum to be beaten, verbally abused, and tortured.5 One of the victims, Samira Ibrahim, took the case to court, where the judge ruled in her favor. In an interview the following January, she said: “I didn't go to court as Samira Ibrahim. The violations that occurred are against all the women of Egypt.

If everyone remains silent, then nothing will change.”6

Photo by Lauren Logan, SAR ‘15

Since Mubarak’s removal, the number of women in the government has decreased substantially. In 2010, 63 women served in the People’s Assembly, compared to 11 women in 2011.7 Similarly, there have been concerns about the absence of female representation in Egypt’s Constituent Assembly. Of the 100 spots on the constitutional committee, only six were held by women.

This decrease in representation raises concerns regarding women’s rights in the new Egypt. For Egyptian women, the outcome of the constitutional dispute could affect their rights in several major areas, such as their ability to inherit property, to pass on citizenship to their children and to earn equal pay for equal work. In December, the United Nations expressed concerns about the role women have been allowed to play thus far in drafting the new Egyptian constitution. Kamala Chandrakirana, who heads the UN Working Group on Discrimination Against Women in Law

and in Practice states that “Women’s perspectives were grossly under-represented in the final draft.”8 The constitutional committee, which is largely comprised of conservative Islamists, is hoping to further assert Sharia as the primary foundation for legislation in the state. Many people fear that this approach is not progressive enough and will continue suppressing women’s rights. Longtime Egyptian activist Esraa Abdel Fattah also expressed her concerns with the way the transition has proceeded thus far and expressed the need for this change, stating, “We need to change how people in our society think about women…all of society will benefit, not only women. I should participate in building my country.”9

Egypt’s resolution could potentially have an impact on the rights of women in other post-Arab Spring nations, like Libya and Tunisia. Women in these countries have seen the struggles Egyptian women have faced in

the aftermath of Mubarak’s regime and fear their governments will look to keep them in traditional roles. Opponents to the recent draft of the constitution have inspired similar groups in nearby countries facing the same situations. The role of women in a post-Arab Spring society is not just an issue for Egyptians, but for women throughout the Middle East.

Despite these setbacks for women’s rights, the process for democratization in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world is still young. While key opportunities to bring further advancements in these areas have been missed, Egyptian leaders can still make the choice to review the role of women in the society. With more outspoken women, it is advantageous for the government to address what the role of women will be in the future.

However, should the government fail to address these matters, Egypt will return to its pre-Arab Spring state.

Spring 2013

15

Fossil Fuels in Uganda Assessing the Consequences of Development

By Sarah Chudnovsky, CAS ‘14

Although petroleum exploration in Uganda by British companies has been occurring since the 1920s, the Ugandan government only confirmed the existence of commercially viable crude oil and natural gas reserves in 2006. The private British corporation Tullow Inc, with investment from CNOOC (a Chinese national corporation) and Total (a private French corporation), has drilled 46 exploratory wells in Western Uganda in the region of the Albertine Graben, and commercial drilling is expected to begin in 2017.1 The wells, estimated to number 3.5 billion barrels, are thought to be worth between $20 billion and $100 billion, and from the perspective of the Ugandan government, this supposed revenue has the incredible potential to bring many Ugandans out of poverty through development projects.

However, pollution from crude oil drilling, production and infrastructure development has begun to affect the ecology of the Albertine rift as well as the people who depend on it for their livelihood. Although the environmental impacts have been minimal so far, but they hold the potential to dramatically increase and affect the people who live in the region and depend on its high level of biodiversity for ecosystem services such as clean water and air. The region is comparable to the Niger River Delta, where thousands of oil spills are destroying the delta’s ecological productivity and have caused public health risks through water, air and soil pollution.2

The issue in Uganda is twofold: determining and implementing environmental, economic and social policy and infrastructure to protect the Albertine; and avoiding the “resource curse,” where political stability and the capacity of the government to protect the public good are both greatly diminished through the exploitation of natural resources.

The environmental issues that face the region stem from oil drilling processes, several aspects of the transportation and waste management practices. The oil drilling process requires seismic activity and artificial light that disrupts wildlife and local

Photo by Sarah Chudnovsky, CAS ‘14

citizens. This process in Murchison Falls could potentially disrupt elephants and cause them to come into greater conflict with people through crop destruction. In Lake Albert, seismic activity and lake access for equipment could disrupt fish breeding grounds that serve as a keystone for biodiversity and serve a critical role to local fishermen.

An oil spill in the lake would be devastating for the fishing industry, which forms a critical domestic food supply as well a significant percentage of Uganda’s exports. Water pollution could also occur from flaring (the burning of natural gas released in the process of oil extraction), which causes acid rain that in turn reduces the biological productivity of croplands and wildlife habitats and threatens public health. Oil spills can occur from blow-outs, when wells explode from natural gas build-up, or from the transportation process. The transport of crude oil and construction of pipelines and power-lines (to heat the pipelines) could also lead to more habitat and land destruction.

Proper waste management of by-products of the extraction process could

prevent the pollution of groundwater needed by wildlife and people. These land use changes include issues of land tenure title for Ugandans to ensure compensation for re-purposed land. This issue is less high-profile in western Uganda than in other regions because much of the oil exists in “protected” or government-owned areas: national parks and wildlife reserves. The Nile Delta region of Murchison Falls National Park is listed in the Ramsar Convention--an international treaty ratified by Uganda that aims to protect wetland areas around the world--and the impact of an oil spill near this region could potentially threaten the Nile system in South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt. The Albertine Rift is frequently cited as one of the most highly biodiverse regions in the world and is essential to the Ugandan and East-African tourism industries.3

Interventions to take measures to prevent or mitigate environmental impacts are occurring on several levels. Non-state actors have gotten involved, including youth activists in Bunyoro kingdom, academics at Makerere University and Columbia Univer

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Photo by Sarah Chudnovsky, CAS ‘14

sity and an international NGO, “Save Virunga.” As local and international actors do not have a direct connection to the oil companies, the bulk of the intervention rests in the hands of the Ugandan government through President Museveni and Parliament. In most interventions, the actors pressure and advise the Ugandan government, creating tension as members of parliament call for more accountability from the president and transparency of his role in the situation.4

Ugandan policy regarding the oil exploration and intended future drilling is new and has not been integrated into the rest of environmental policy. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development is involved in the process with little participation from the Environmental Department.5 Currently, Uganda’s Sharing Agreement allocates the responsibility for environmental management not to the oil companies, but to the Ugandan government. There is a National Oil and Gas Policy, which has not been formed into law yet but suggests guidelines that could be effective in monitoring environmental changes.6 There are currently three bills in the Ugandan parliament to create environmental and social protection, which indicates progress on the national level in terms of governmental protection.7

Academics argue that intervention by the government should take the form of economic and licensing transparency to en-

sure government accountability at the macro level, and that they should only let in oil companies with policies to mitigate and offset environmental damage for local and regional groups. A critical aspect of the intervention is the consequences of oil and natural gas resources being governed nationally, not locally by the groups of the Bunyoro Kingdom, Acholi people and Toro Kingdom.

Currently, the Environmental Impact Assessments for the oil exploration are only available in Kampala and are thus out of the reach for the average person impacted. One effect of governmental protection is using resources as tools to subjugate populations who are not easily governed, as theorized by Nancy Peluso.8 Ugandan politics have been historically dominated by the Baganda kingdom Because of this, soldiers who are sent to protect the oil rigs are often not from the region. Seizing control of natural resources as property of the state is a way to extend control over populations that have shown resistance to governance, such as pastoralists and the Acholi.

Mistrust of the government is reflected in a theory that British colonial government purposefully designated oil rich regions as state-owned “protected areas” for the purpose of setting aside uncontested land for future energy uses. Current policy does not protect the land rights of Ugandans, even if they have their land tenure certifi-

cate, because the minister can still grant the land to oil prospectors.9 Administering land rights is a subjective, political process and it is important that collective areas are withheld from outside privatization that would disadvantage local people. In this way, land privatization can reveal the weakness of market-based solutions that commodify ecosystem services at the expense of the larger picture.

The role of multinational investors is ambiguous, but will determine the economic, social and environmental impacts of oil and natural gas development. The Ugandan government has expressed that their investment is critical for production of the oil, but has also stated that through the construction of another refinery, Ugandan oil will be used in Uganda and not exported. To further complicate matters, Tullow Oil Inc’s six-month exploration license expired in October 2012 and was not renewed by either party, and Tullow is currently in a legal battle with one its own investors, Heritage Oil. Tullow also expressed certain issues with the high fees from Ugandan government.10

How the relationships between all of these actors will proceed remains unseen.

Hopefully, domestic and international pressure to create and institutionalize comprehensive environmental policy will result in effective environmental governance in the Albertine.

Special Report: Psychology of War

Spring 2013

19

Youth in Chaotic Environments Breaking a Vicious Cycle of Poverty

By Zachary Crawford, CAS ‘13

In South Sudan, United Nations personnel persuade hundreds of children and teenagers to relinquish their guns in exchange for a peaceful society, while in Mali, families flee their homes in the northern region from militias. In Gaza, prolonged instability and armed exchanges between militants and Israeli forces have resulted in PTSD in a majority of the strip's one million children. Just to the north in war-stricken Syria, thousands of Syrians flee their homes in the midst of bloodshed that has killed more than 60,000 people.

International aid organizations like Save the Children--perpetually understaffed and underfunded--scramble to provide adequate resources to thousands of refugees in Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.

These are only a few examples of children engulfed in crisis situations.

This environment has a drastic impact on a child's formation of intelligence, personality and social behavior. While children anywhere could be victim to any number of threats to their development and security, there are critical differences between how a massacre of children in Connecticut, children affected be a flood in Pakistan or life in a refugee camp in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In the former situation, resources and personnel are readily accessible and available.

There are local, state and federal governments that have the capacity to provide aid, the capacity exists to pass legislation to diminish the chances of reoccurrence. Children can receive counseling and support from a grieving community that will foster their healthy, post-trauma development. In contrast, children and adolescents in poor, unstable and war-torn countries face a different set of challenges and opportunities.

The governments may be corrupt, illegitimate or nonexistent, and thus unable or unwilling to provide adequate emergency supplies to those displaced and affected

PHOTO BY ANBITA SIREGAR, CAS ‘16

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by crises.

The child's community becomes defined by the shared experiences of squalor, homelessness, malnutrition and witness to violence, instead of by its capacity to nurture the afflicted back to health. Political instability invites actors to recruit children to battle; in some cases, these actors are the government.

Without the conditions to foster healthy physical and mental development, children are left exposed to harsh realities that invite extremism.

In chaotic environments, threats to a child’s development and security include minimal or irregular access to food and water, violence and its physical and psychological ramifications, displacement caused by violence or natural disaster and limited upward mobility and economic opportunity. Combined, these factors desensitize and normalize the chaotic status quo, making an eventual transition to normalcy far more difficult.

Over 180 million children under the age of 5 suffer physical and mental impairments caused by malnutrition and stunted growth. For children threatened by violence and instability, joining a militant group means the promise of meals, drugs and protection that satisfy the nutritional

“Those in chaotic circumstances are far more likely to become the next generations of the poor and disenfranchised, making them a prime audience for recruitment to arms and extremism.” and security aspects of their survival.

Many youth embrace the violence, often finding that this option is far more practical. With distorted incentives, no safety net and survival at stake, children in these crisis situations end up vulnerable to the centripetal pull of conflict and instability and the consequences of prolonged crisis.

Spring 2013

Although international agencies like UNICEF make it their goal to alleviate suffering and shield children from malnutrition, violence and instability, youth in crisis situations are still at considerable risk. Higher education and job opportunities remain distant fantasies for many witnessing their environments deteriorate. Those in chaotic circumstances are far more likely to become the next generations of the poor and disenfranchised, making them a prime audience for recruitment to arms and extremism. The vast majority of them might never experience a secure and nurturing environment.

Instead they will depend on international aid agencies and donors for survival and will be lucky if their emotional and physical development isn’t impaired.

As the current crises in South Sudan, Gaza, Syria, DRC and Mali persist, more youths are at risk and perish at the twin altars of political consideration and insufficient donor efforts. Revamped political will and continued multilateral efforts embrace the notion that investing in a child’s security and development is not just an investment for the present but for future generations as well.

Send essays, articles, reports and photography to irr@buiaa.org. Your work could get published!

21

The Soviet-Afghan War

The Emergence of PTSD among Algerian Veterans

By Emma Brandon, CAS ‘13

On May 26, 1993, journalist and writer Taher Djaout was shot dead by Islamic gunmen in Algeria. His crime was writing articles questioning the value of an Islamic state, and he was far from the only Algerian intellectual marked for death by radical Islamists. In fact, six other Algerian moderates were killed in 1993 by the Armed Islamic Group, known by its French initials, GIA.1 The GIA includes many of what historian Hugh Roberts calls “Afghans” or those who fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s as a form of “jihad.”2 These veterans had experienced and perpetrated some of the most horrific acts of terror in defense of their coreligionists in Afghanistan. These experiences left indelible marks on their collective psyche, which made perpetrating violence upon returning home not only acceptable, but the method that they were accustomed to employing to achieve their political goals.

In 1979, the Soviet Union began a land invasion of Afghanistan that resulted in the overthrow and assassination of President Hafizullah Amin. The invasion had many causes, but the proximate cause was the need to replace President Amin with another Communist leader in order to control the populace and maintain Soviet influence. The Afghan people did not take kindly to this invasion of national sovereignty by an atheistic and foreign superpower.

The Afghan people’s rejection of the Soviet invasion took the form of a preternaturally violent rebellion fueled by religious rhetoric and jihadist theology.

Muslims around the world responded to the call of their coreligionists and flocked to Afghanistan to defend Islam against foreigners invading. Once in Afghanistan, they joined the Mujahidin rebels and fought as equals with them in a bloody guerilla war. Many of those foreign Muslims who joined the jihad were from North Africa, particularly Algeria. According to Michael Willis, many Algerians saw a connection between the Afghan fight to

Photo by Sarah Miller, COM ‘13

expel the Soviet invaders and their own fight to expel the French colonialists decades earlier. They saw kindred spirits in the Mujahidin, as well as a chance to solidify their Islamist credentials. This was evidenced by the subsequent popularity of Afghan fashions in Algeria and the presence of Algerian fighters in the ranks of the Mujahidin.3

Because the Mujahidin consisted mainly of young men who had never before been part of an organized militia and the resistance had very little prior planning, the guerilla tactics and weaponry were often improvised. A frequent tactic was to ambush Soviet military and political convoys and launch rockets at close range which was necessary because the rocket launchers lacked appropriate sighting gear.4 This tactic exposed young guerilla fighters to the horrors of mass murder in intimate quarters. A young jihadist would see the terror in his victims’ eyes as he approached and hear the cries of unimaginable pain as the rockets burned through skin and extinguished lives.

The Mujahidin also perpetrated the traditional terrorist acts of murdering those who spoke out against them or had any connection to the Soviet invading force, which reinforced the expendability of human life in the minds of the young jihadists.5 In general, the Mujahidin encouraged individual initiative in finding new killing methods for Soviet soldiers and sympathizers. The willingness to take human life became the most prized attribute and there was nothing to stop young jihadists from killing indiscriminately both in the Afghan war and when they returned to their home countries.

When the war in Afghanistan ended in 1988 with a US-backed peace accord and Soviet troop withdrawal, these young jihadists returned to an Algeria that did not embody what they had been fighting for in Afghanistan (BBC News).6 The Algerian ruling party was resisting popular attempts to increase the influence of Islam in decision-making. On February 9, 1992, the Algerian government declared a state of emergency and cancelled sched

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Spring 2013

Graphic by Anbita Siregar, CAS ‘16

uled legislative elections. A first round of elections had been held two months earlier and the moderate Islamist group known as the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) had won a large enough percentage that they were expected by all to win the second round of elections. In order to prevent an Islamist accession to power, the ruling government not only canceled this second round of elections but also officially disbanded FIS.

Algerian Islamists were angered and moved to violence by this stifling of Islamist legitimate political expression.

According to North African studies scholar Michael Willis, “The blocking of the constitutional path by the regime in January 1992 caused most of these [more violent] elements to break their tactical alliance with the party and join those

seeking armed confrontation with the government.”7 These more radical elements formed the GIA and began to follow through on their philosophy of achieving Islamic government through violence.

The GIA’s tactics were notably similar to those of the Mujahidin in Afghanistan. They began with assassinations and killed those who openly questioned their tactics and beliefs. These victims were seen as collaborators with the authorities similar to when the Mujahidin killed collaborators with the Soviet invaders. In both cases, this campaign of assassinations functioned effectively as a deterrent to questioning Islamist actions and working with the enemy.

The Algerian situation had one element that was absent from Afghanistan and that was the ethnically French Algeri-

ans who had lived in Algeria for their entire lives. The GIA treated these citizens like the Mujahidin had treated the invading Soviets. They killed a large number of the French Algerian people and delivered the rest an ultimatum that gave them five months to leave the country or be killed.8 This is a common tactic of terrorists and certainly one that was used by the Mujahidin.

These similarities in tactics between the Algerian Islamists and their Afghan counterparts are not coincidences. According to both Willis and Roberts, many of the most violent members of the GIA were veterans of the Afghan jihad. As Willis writes, “many drew their ideological inspiration from ideas and experiences established abroad, particularly those who had served as volunteers in the Arab Mu-

jahidin in Afghanistan.”9 The character of Rashid in Merzak Allouache’s novel Bab el-Oued is a perfect example of the type of person who would employ violence upon returning from Afghanistan and of the indelible connection between the GIA and their experiences in Afghanistan. Rashid is a poor and powerless young man who fought in the jihad for fame and to feel like he was in control of something. He speaks of what he will do to Algerians who disagree with him and longs to feel the Kalashnikov in his hands again.10 The specific reference to the Kalashnikov is a perfect metaphor for the way the GIA used Mujahidin methods in its own “jihad”. Because the Mujahidin used methods that let the fighters feel powerful and successful, they used them upon returning home to Algeria.

The Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) defines Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as “the re-experiencing of an extremely traumatic event accompanied by symptoms of increased arousal and by avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma.”11 This re-experiencing of traumatic events can also lead to angry and violent outbursts, particularly when the affected individual was involved in the perpetration of violence.

A 2011 study of returning American veterans from the most recent American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by the Costs of War Project has confirmed and further elucidated the presence of violent tendencies in those who have perpetrated violence in war. According to the study, rates of rape, murder and other violent crimes among soldiers have increased significantly since the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003. There was a particular cluster of violent outbursts at Fort Carson, Colorado during the summer of 2009. Fourteen war-torn soldiers committed eleven brutal homicides in that summer alone.12 These particular horrors parallel the GIA’s violent murder of those who disagreed with them and have the same root cause. When the goals of those suffering from PTSD are thwarted they respond with violence, as it is the reaction to which they have become accustomed.

Although written before the existence of the PTSD diagnosis, Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth contains a case study that perfectly illustrates

these violent tendencies. Fanon describes a European police inspector in Algeria during the Algerian revolution who was intimately involved in the grotesque torture of suspected revolutionaries and as a result responded to any confrontation with violence. He even physically abused his wife and twenty-month old baby. This in-

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ciety.14 They return home with all of the emotional scars of having perpetrated horrific violence and find that they no longer understand their fellow citizens’ preoccupation with the monotonies of everyday life and that their fellow citizens cannot understand their changed psyche. Because of this, they begin to develop an image of

“This re-experiencing of traumatic events can also lead to angry and violent outbursts, par-

ticularly when the affected individual was involved in the perpetration of violence.”

ability to respond to conflict with anything other than violence is a hallmark of those haunted by their own acts of violence.

Another effect of PTSD that is particularly relevant to the political nature of the crimes of the GIA is the inability of PTSD sufferers to participate in the democratic process. A 1994 study of American Vietnam War veterans found that combat veterans could not comprehend how the political process allows citizens to resolve political conflict without the life or death element that was ever-present in military combat. The political process also requires long-term thinking and the recognition that there will be a future.

In combat, the recognition of a future paralyzes soldiers and makes it impossible for them to step into dangerous situations that they may not survive. For this reason, it is heavily discouraged in the military and discarded by soldiers simply as a matter of survival.13 Therefore, even if the Algerian Islamists had been allowed to participate in the democratic process, the Mujahidin veterans among them would have found violence a more familiar path to their goals.

A corollary to the inability of combat veterans to participate in the democratic process is the “outlaw mythos” that returning veterans ascribe to themselves in order to justify their exclusion from and inability to comprehend mainstream so-

themselves as separate from and often better than the average citizens. They are the only ones who truly understand what is to watch others die and the only ones who have fought for what they believe in. This separation from society makes murdering members of it an easier task psychologically because one feels no personal connection to the victims.15

These symptoms of PTSD all add up to a veteran who is not only capable of but also prone to extreme violence when his or her goals are thwarted. PTSD sufferers are people outside of society and outside of the normal processes of expressing political ideas who are used to violence as the way of projecting power. This creates a perfect storm of personality traits that can explode into violence when confronted by a society that is anything but the one in which the veteran would like to live.

Devout and desperate Algerian Muslims gathered in Afghanistan to fight a jihad on behalf of their coreligionists and to feel as if they had control over their circumstances. They returned to an Algeria that met none of their expectations for how a society should be run and knew only one method of expressing their disapproval: violence. They bore the psychological scars of bloody and close quarters combat that made violence and murder simply facts of life and the proper method of expressing political views.

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Spring 2013

Memorials

Personal and Symbolic Narratives

By Jesse Crane, CAS ‘14

Memorials must fulfill two criteria to be effective in healing a national trauma. First, they must create just enough of a narrative to be approachable by those who have no direct connection to the event, and second, they must also be personal enough for those who were directly affected by the event to properly mourn. Most memorials fail this careful balancing act because of political, social or historical issues. Memorials often too heavily impose a narrative, usually one that glorifies the state, thus making it a monument to state power, not to the victims. On the other hand, a memorial that is too personal becomes something more akin to a gravestone, full of meaning to those who knew the individual buried beneath it, but essentially meaningless to everyone else.

Some memorialization scholars, most notably Jenny Edkins, defend the position that any inclusion of a narrative on a memorial is an attempt to domesticate the trauma of survivors of mass violence or veterans of wars, and damages the memorial’s ability to provide a space to mourn and remember.1 According to Edkins, “many earlier memorials were propagandized statements about the victory, the issues, the politics, and not about the people who served and died.”2 She argues that the use of any kind of narrative in a memorial denies victims the opportunity to grieve personally by inserting them into a national story.3 Edkins rightly points out the danger of creating a narrative through memorials, but a memorial completely devoid of a narrative can only be truly relevant to those who experienced the trauma being remembered. A memorial that transcends time to teach a lesson must contain at least a small narrative so that those who were not affected by the trauma can connect with and learn from the event. If memorials fail this balancing act then the trauma of individuals will never be adequately addressed, leaving open wounds in a fragile society, and a lesson will never truly be ingrained into the psyche of a society, leaving am-

PHOTO BY JOHN SMITH, CAS ‘13

The Iwo Jima Memorial in Washington, D.C., is pictured above. The sculpture was inspired by a Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph of one of the most historic battles fought in the Pacific Theatre during World War II.

ple room for further suffering. Both needs must be met to heal national wounds. This struggle is exemplified by two memorials in particular: the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial in Washington D.C. and the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in

Berlin.

The Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial was destined to be controversial. With the Korean War as a precedent, the Vietnam War was justified as an attempt to contain communism in Southeast Asia and there-

fore vital to the U.S.’ interests. As the war grew bloodier and the mission more and more muddled, resistance began to mount against the government’s military policies.

The draft was wildly unpopular, jungle warfare was increasingly unpalatable and victory seemed more and more elusive.

The factor that undermined the public’s support for the war most, though, was the overall mission. Containment seemed like a foolish policy, especially since it seemed that the South Vietnamese people did not want American assistance in fighting off the communist North. The eventual effective defeat of the U.S.’ military left the war a tangled mess in the national psyche.

Therefore, any attempt to memorialize the war would be inherently controversial. American society showed uncertainty as to how to remember the men who fought and died in an unpopular and morally questionable war. On one extreme the anti-war protesters of the 1960s and ‘70s felt that “‘[b]uttering up Vietnam veterans as ‘forgotten heroes’ is a slap in the face directed at millions in this country who resisted the war.’”4 On the other extreme, veterans of the conflict wanted a more traditional memorial, along the lines of those erected following World War II.

Jan Scruggs, the driving force behind the creation of the memorial and a Vietnam War Veteran himself, decided to create a pointedly apolitical monument.

He wanted to separate the soldier from the cause, thereby creating a memorial that would satisfy the American public, but also appease veterans and protesters alike.

Most importantly it would prevent the state from using the memorial to impose a narrative on the national memory and framing the history of the U.S.’ invasion of Vietnam as “a good, clean, glorious war seen as necessary and supported by the united country.”5

The design was as crucial to the creation of an apolitical memorial as Edkins and Scruggs would have seen it. A commission chose a design from Maya Lin, a Yale University student. The design was starkly different from any previous war memorial. It consisted of two long curved retaining walls sunk into the ground with all the names of the American soldiers carved into it. The names were listed chronologically by the date of their deaths, with the first name meeting the last name, separated by the entrance to

the memorial. The original concept for the memorial did not include a plaque or even a flag. and this minimalist style evoked strong outrage from the veterans. They felt that the memorial, in particular the choice of black marble, symbolized shame, defeat and emasculation. The sunken structures of the memorial were reminiscent of a grave and ultimate defeat.

This controversy eventually led to the erection of a flag, the creation of a set of statues next to the memorial and an inscription.6 While Edkins hints that these detracted from the memorial and come dangerously close to imposing a narrative, in reality they were necessary additions, although somewhat aesthetically unpleasing. The statues and the flag

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moral or not. The memorial must allow visitors with no direct connection to the war to engage with the memorial and learn from the experience.

The greatest success of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial, though, is the degree to which veterans, family members and the general public have connected with it. Visitors feel connected to a conflict that might have ended decades before they were born.

Widows and mothers can leave tokens for their fallen loved ones. Fellow brothers-at-arms can remember the comrades whom they saw die before their very eyes.

It is a place that people become attached to.7 Scruggs and Lin’s commitment to an apolitical monument meant that individuals felt comfortable enough to mourn at

“The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is a symbol of the modern German state’s attempt to distance itself from the past, not a place to remember or mourn.” helped to pacify veterans’ groups, and important demographic to please because the memorial should first and foremost be an object of unity for these survivors. While the flag and statues of soldiers do impose some sort of vague narrative it is not completely detrimental. The statues are representations of what the soldiers looked like, which serves an arguably didactic purpose for visitors potentially unfamiliar with the history of the Vietnam War. The national flag is somewhat more difficult. Its presence at the memorial makes a political statement, but it is ultimately appropriate because there is no way to completely divorce American soldiers from the flag under which they fought.

The inscription was the most important addition because it orients visitors. Before its addition the purpose of the names on the wall was ambiguous. Visitors could not be sure the names were of veterans of the war in Vietnam or or whether these veterans were even dead. While the attempt to remain apolitical was a noble choice, it failed to recognize the veterans even as people who passed away, not to mention as people who fought for a cause,

the memorial, not receive a false sense of closure. The loved ones lost are not coming back, yet they still remain intimately connected to their families because their deaths have not been co-opted into a heroic tale of sacrifice and struggle focused on the power and glory of the state. In death, they at least retain their humanity, the way the memorial designers saw it.

The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe commemorates an entirely different type of event. While the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial was an attempt to allow societal grieving, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is something more like an admission of guilt. Its position in downtown Berlin near the Brandenburg Gate stands as a stark reminder of the Holocaust, but it fails to provide a space for mourning and dignified remembrance of victims. Its creation marked the culmination of a long national dialogue in Germany. In the years after World War II the German public began to discuss the horrendous actions taken by the Nazi political-military structure. While the German public knew to a certain degree about the atrocities as they were happening, starting

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in the 1960s they had to truly confront their shameful past and attempt to chart a new course for their future.8

However, the memorial immediately sparked controversy. On a certain level it seemed like any attempt to memorialize the Holocaust would be impossible because of the viciousness and soullessness it embodied. At the same time, attempting to adequately memorialize the destruction of an entire people was incredibly daunting. In a certain respect it seems almost unfair to be overly critical about a Holocaust memorial, where it may be impossible to do any justice for the survivors through the cutting of stones and the laying of bronze plaques. However, criticism of these memorials is also vitally important. These sites will be the way that future generations learn about the Holocaust and, hopefully, take away some kind of personal meaning.

The impetus for the memorial came from a grassroots movement in 1988 when a group of German citizens suggested that a memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe be built in Berlin. Early in the process the citizens tried to enlist the help of the national government. They slowly gained support, and 11 years later the German Parliament declared that a memorial would be built in Berlin.9 However, the desire to include the government in the design of the memorial was a crucial mistake. The project became a political factor, which seems incredibly unsettling for a Holocaust memorial.

There was also some debate as to whether the memorial should honor Jews alone or all victims of the Nazi regime.

Those who favored a memorial strictly for Jews argued that Jews were the primary target of the Nazi death machine and the group that was proportionally affected most. Those who wanted an inclusive memorial argued that creating a memorial only for the Jews meant that other memorials for other victim groups would need to be constructed. This separation, they argued, was essentially buying into Nazi ideas about dividing different people into groups.10 Ultimately, though, it was decided that the memorial in Berlin would honor only the six million Jews slain in the Holocaust.

The government eventually decided on a design by Peter Eisenman. The original Eisenman proposal was simply for

a field of large concrete blocks on a wavy surface. The government then decided that this alone would be inappropriate and asked that an informational center (“Ort der Information”) be added underneath the concrete blocks.11 The Ort der Information features a permanent exhibit detailing the Holocaust, the involvement of Germany and the fate of its many victims. Visitors first descend into the Ort der Information, which consists of the Room of Dimensions, the Room of the Families Fates, the Room of Names, and the Room of Places, each room detailing some specific aspect of the Holocaust. After moving through all the rooms in the Ort der Information, visitors emerge disoriented in the middle of the labyrinth of concrete blocks on the surface. Visitors must then traverse the undulating ground and maneuver through the blocks back out to the street.

The design itself is also slightly unsettling. The Ort der Information is rather crypt-like. Maike Mügge posits, “[s] ituations like this are familiar to us from ecclesiastical buildings... In the Christian tradition, it is important for the spiritual impact of an ecclesiastical building as a whole... Jewish spiritual architecture, on the other hand, does not have crypts.”

Therefore, “the connection between aboveand underground elements seems questionable if not inadequate” for a memorial honoring the “‘Murdered Jews of Europe.’”12 Additionally the mapped-out route of the memorial seems to symbolically track a journey first into the depths of Hell (the Ort der Information) and then a circuitous journey through a confusing and disorienting maze (the stones) and finally a rebirth upon exiting the memorial. This whole process seems to suggest that it is possible to emerge from the darkness of the Holocaust, that grief and despair can and will be transformed into hope and renewal. Christian imagery aside, this narrative is entirely inappropriate for two reasons: it imposes a narrative of healing on those affected by the Holocaust and it suggests that healing is possible. This pushes away genuine human emotion because visitors cannot imprint their own feelings on the memorial.

There is simply no emotional space left by the design.

The memorial is also a significant German diplomatic symbol, especially in relations to Israel and the U.S.. In a speech

Spring 2013

to the Israeli Knesset, Chancellor Angela Merkel referred to the memorial as a political representation.13 For the German government, the memorial’s only function is as a political representation, as a result of the narrative imposed upon it. The memorial physically provides no space to remember the victims. The entire experience is didactic, which is dangerous for a memorial commemorating such a horrific event.

The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is a symbol of the modern German state’s attempt to distance itself from the past, not a place to remember or mourn.

The state did not impose a narrative of national glory, but it imposed a narrative nonetheless. The German historian Reinhart Koselleck passionately noted that, “After we Germans have beaten, shot or gassed 5–6 million Jews, then dissolved them in ash, air and water, then we volunteer to promise those very same Jews resurrection symbolically.”14 The funerary design of the monument promises to give

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Photo by Lauren Logan, SAR ‘13

Pictured above are memorials of the Berlin Wall and the Memorial of the Murdered Jews of Europe. The memorial includes an exhibit detailing the Holocaust and Germany’s involvement.

closure to an event that cannot be so neatly concluded.

Intimacy is a crucial part of memory and remembering. Imparting some kind of message is also important so that future generations can learn from the actions of their ancestors. Memorials can approach two extremes in their designs, both of which are inherently flawed. The first is a lack of intimacy. Stone is a naturally cold and uncompromising material. This can make some memorials seem distant and unapproachable. If designers do not try to create an intimate setting with room for emotion, then a memorial fails at its most important duty: being a place of remembrance. On the other hand, if a memorial only tries to create space for mourning and remembrance then the memorial itself will be forgotten because it will be unapproach-

able to future generations who cannot connect with the memorial on a personal level.

The Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial succeeds at meeting these two responsibilities. The subtle and gentle design by Maya Lin invites emotion into the memorial and encourages it to stay, allowing people to cry and mourn if they feel so inclined, which is why the memorial is so beloved.

The memorial’s apolitical nature also makes it non-divisive, which united a fractious society around the cause of remembering the men who served in Vietnam, but not in celebrating the war itself. This careful balancing act makes the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial the ideal artistic blueprint to building a memorial in societies trying to come to terms with national trauma.

The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe on the other hand fails the

criteria of providing space to mourn and remember the victims of the Holocaust.

There is no attempt to allow visitors to have an individual experience and simply contemplate the trauma that occurred. Worst of all, the narrative that the memorial teaches is one decided by the state. The memorial is unsatisfactory to its very foundation. It seems to be little more than a political tool for the government to cleanse the stains of the Nazi era from the national conscious.

Memorials are powerful tools for national and personal healing if they are created properly. They should not offer closure nor should they be used to whitewash the messiness of history. To their very foundation they must promote reconciliation and healing, lest they become a new source of trauma and contention.

Spring 2013

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Irish Language Revival Restoring a National Culture

By Maddie Rosenberger, CAS ‘14, COM ‘14

Photo by Madeline Rosenberger, CAS ‘14, COM ‘14

The once flourishing Irish, or Gaelic, language was thought to be dead, but there is now a movement to revive it. Although it is still Ireland’s official language, there are only about 30,000 fluent Irish speakers today, compared to 250,000 when the country was founded in 1922.1 The history of the Irish language, as well as the history of how the Irish people view their own language, are extremely important to understand. The Irish media, education system and economy are influential to the revival movement and affect both native speakers and Irish speakers abroad.

Gaelic was the primary language spoken in Ireland until the British assumed full control over the island in the 17th century, after which English was forcibly put into place. In the 17th and 18th centuries, penal laws were implemented in Ireland in an attempt to replace old Irish customs with traditional British ones. The only way for the Irish to survive was to learn English.

Ireland’s history has always been a story of emigration. A devastating famine in the late 1840s was the catalyst to this trend.

During the 1900s when Ireland rebelled against the British crown, many were beaten or killed for speaking in their native tongue.

Because of this and the devastating famine

Ireland’s history continued to be one of emigration. It seemed that the only way to survive would be to leave for Britain or the U.S., and for that they would need English.

In an attempt to restore the Irish language both in Ireland and abroad, Douglas Hyde founded Conradh na Gaeilge, or the Gaelic League, in 1893.2 The new Irish Republic worked with the Gaelic League to promote traditional Gaelic customs and put forth legislation to help revitalize the Irish language.

Throughout Ireland’s history, Irish has been associated with poverty and ignorance. In an interview with BBC News, Daithi O’Duffy of Gael Linn, an organization devoted to the Irish language and arts, described English as a symbol of social prestige. “The language of progress, of commerce and the future was English,” he said. “Parents wished to give their children the best chance in life, naturally, so they colluded with the system.”3 This image of the Irish language is the largest hurdle the revival movement must overcome to make Irish a normal form of communication. Today, the language is viewed as a cultural adornment, a part of Irish history and culture but still not important enough to make a daily habit. In this way, enthusiasm

for reviving the language has been lost because Irish is not used as a form of communication but merely as a cultural trait. Pádraig Ó Conaire, an Irish writer and journalist from the early 20th century, once said, “A language which was nothing more than an ornament to a race never survived and never will survive.”4

This view of the Irish language as a mere cultural adornment instead of a practical form of communication is problematic in many areas of Ireland. However, reports suggest that the language is growing the fastest among nationalist communities in Northern Ireland as people learn it to reaffirm their cultural identity.5 Today, the British government pays for an organization called Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta to run Irish-speaking schools in Ulster, the northern county of Ireland.6

According to a BBC News interview with Mait Ó Brádaigh, the principal of an Irish language immersion school in Galway, the ratio of Irish learners to Irish speakers is greater than any other language in the world. “There’s a worldwide network of Irish speakers, but the native speaker areas are under severe distress,” he says.7 Gaeltacht regions, in which Irish is the primary language,

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are getting smaller every day. In 2007, Ó Brádaigh predicted that the Gaeltacht communities would last no more than 20 years.8 The revival movement has had a significant impact in gaining enthusiasm for learning Irish, but has done little to slow the disappearance of Irish in the Gaeltacht regions.

What seems to be the most effective approach to increasing the number of Irish people speaking Irish and changing the negative connotations of the language is the use of Irish in newspapers, radio and television. This way, people use the language as a form of daily communication as opposed to using it as a method of expressing nationalism sentiment. The Gaeltacht regions, areas where the primary language spoken is Irish, are fiercely loyal to the all-Irish radio station Radio na Gaeltachta or RTÉ, a community radio station that first aired in April 1972. In 1997, Telefis na Cathair, Ireland’s all-Irish TV station, aired its first show. This channel and its dynamic programs portray the Irish language as a young and trendy language. No more is Irish seen as the language of the poor and weak; rather, it is becoming fashionable.9

When Ireland became an independent nation in 1923, the Irish cultural revival, including the promotion of Gaelic sport and music as well as the revival of the almost dead Irish language, was the centerpiece for the new national agenda. In an attempt to get schoolchildren to start learning the language early, the new government forced a policy of mandatory Irish lessons starting in primary school. This gave Irish children a negative view of their native tongue, as they found learning the language to be a tedious chore.10 Over the past decade the number of schools in Dublin that teach entirely in Irish has grown from 50 to more than 200. While this is a reassuring step towards the revitalization of the language for the youngest generation, it raises more questions and problems. Many textbooks used in schools today have not been translated into Irish, so Gaelic schools are severely limited in the resources they can use for their students.

In his book, Who Needs Irish?, Ciarán Mac Murchaidh points out the increased number of students diagnosed with learning disabilities in Irish-speaking schools. Children thought to have any sort of learning difficulty are sent to a psychologist where a standardized diagnostic test is given in English. The diagnostic test used has never been translated into Irish and although the children can read the English version, their compre-

hension of the material is severely limited.

Therefore, even a child with no learning disability can score poorly on these tests, leading to a misdiagnosis.11

One of the greatest successes in the Irish language revival, however, is the growth of Gaelscoileanna, Irish-medium schools that are Irish speaking. The growth of Gaelscoileanna was driven by parents, language activists and teachers who felt that the Irish language would best be taught and accepted by children in an environment that could work side-by-side with the English language.

By the 1960s, many primary schools ceased teaching a number of subjects in Irish, as the language was hindering students’ comprehension. In the early 1970s, Dublin became the

“Today, the language is viewed as a cultural adornment, a part of Irish history and culture but still not important enough to make a daily habit.” center for newly established Gaelscoileanna.

Students were still learning Irish, but were doing better academically since their more difficult classes were taught in English.

Enthusiasm for the Irish language revival seems to ebb and flow along with Ireland’s economy. When Ireland is experiencing economic growth, there are plenty of jobs for those who need them, so people no longer associate Irish with poverty and depression.

In times of economic downturn, however, the Irish people once again view their native language as one of the poor.

The government also tried to gaelicise the internal work of the new Irish state, making it compulsory for any candidate for a civil service job to pass an Irish examination. This law caused an uproar in society as people who did not speak Irish were automatically disqualified for positions in teaching, the Gardaí (police force) or other civil service jobs. After much debate, the Irish Republic passed the Official Languages Act of 2003.

Instead of using an Irish exam as recruitment criteria, the new act stated that each civil ser-

Spring 2013 vice office must have a sufficient number of people on staff who can offer services to Irish speakers.12

Currently, six percent of the Irish people are nationals of another country. With the recent increase in immigration into Ireland, many workers have come from Africa, Asia or the Middle East to find work primarily in Dublin.13 Many of these immigrants choose to speak Irish as a sign of solidarity with their new country or in the hopes of getting a good job. Likewise, the Irish diaspora has created a brand new generation of people excited about where their ancestors came from and increasingly enthusiastic about learning the language of their ‘homeland’.

The Modern Language Association found that in 2009, 409 students were enrolled in Irish language classes in the U.S., compared to 278 students in 1998, 58 in 1990 and 28 in 1980.14 Catholic University in Washington boasts one of the oldest Irish language programs in the nation, dating back to 1896 when the Ancient Order of Hibernians granted the school $50,000 to start the program. The Washington Post reports there are also substantial Irish language programs at New York University, the University of Notre Dame, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Montana, whose program, now in its sixth year, serves 187 students.15

Brenda Ní Ghairbhí, manager of an Irish language program Seachtain na Gaeilge, notes the growth in Irish extracurricular activities.16 Irish clubs and societies all around the world are expressing a renewed interest in learning the language. Many in the U.S. recognize that people abroad with an “affinity for the language, coupled with their distance from Ireland, has helped create virtual Gaeltachts.”17

The Gaelic Revival has been an important issue in Ireland’s history for decades.

The once thriving Irish language has been pushed aside in favor of a more globalized language: English. The revival movement is greatly influenced by the use of Irish in the media, education and the economy and it affects Irish speakers both in Ireland and abroad. For now, the revival seems to be working to increase the number of Irish learners, but it is unclear how long this enthusiasm will last. It is uncertain if Irish will survive as a functioning medium of communication or if it will be remembered only through myth and legend.

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Globalization and Growth

Increasing Income Gaps Within Nations Prithvi Hingorani CAS ‘15

Before the First World War, the economies of the world were dependent on each other due to trade and migration. Once the war started in 1914, most trade activities between countries slowed down and globalization was lost until the 1980s. Globalization, in addition to cultural and political integration worldwide, includes the interdependence of economies to foster economic growth and competitiveness in their respective countries. This idea is more broad now than ever before, as it includes not only trade of goods and services, but also the transfer of capital, technology and labor across national boundaries. While globalization has led to faster economic growth in some countries, it has not brought prosperity to all individuals equally. The result has been that some segments of the population are not actually better off. Globalization has led to an unequal distribution of income within nations, which has the potential to affect the prospects of future growth for countries.

The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem lies at the heart of the debate on globalization and income inequality within nations. The theorem predicts that trade liberalization, an inherent part of globalization, in a developing economy would lead to higher incomes for low-skilled workers and lower incomes for high-skilled workers, thus closing the gap between the rich and poor. However, the theorem also states that trade liberalization in a developed economy would result in the opposite effect, thus increasing income inequality.1 As the following evidence will suggest, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem is not completely accurate. It rightly predicts that income inequality within developed countries will increase, but inaccurately claims that inequality within developing countries will decrease.

Since the latest wave of globalization began, income gaps within nations have widened.

The rich have become richer and the poor have become poorer. Jeff Faux and Larry Mishel support this argument, claiming, “As trade and financial markets have been flung open, incomes have risen not faster, but slower … Within nations, inequality seems

Graphic by Anbita Siregar, CAS ‘16

to have worsened.”2 Berch Berberoglu, in his book Class and Class Conflicts in the Age of Globalization, uses numerical data to demonstrate globalization’s effect on the income distribution within the U.S.. Berberoglu points out that the share of total income of the top 5 percent of families in the U.S. increased by approximately 6 percent. He adds that the share of the highest fifth of families also increased by 6 percent, while the lowest fifth’s income-share decreased by a little more than 1 percent.3 It is important to note that this change is not only evident in developed countries like the U.S.. In his essay Globalization and its Challenges, Stanley Fischer argues that globalization had a uniform effect across the planet, increasing inequalities

within nations from developed countries like the U.S. to developing powers like China.

Unfortunately, no one has been successful in finding and explaining a direct causal relationship between globalization and income inequality within countries. Many scholars have suggested various reasons for this inequality, including technology, higher demand for skilled workers, de-industrialization, outsourcing, demographics and the unequal effects of globalization on different sectors of society.

Globalization has encouraged the transfer of new technologies from one country to another. New technology generally makes the production process easier. Most countries prefer to procure this new technolo

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gy from the inventors, in order to reduce their costs in the long run, and to increase profits.

The International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook reports that technological change increases the price of activities that require a higher skill level, and reduces the demand of lower skilled employees.4 As demand for higher-skilled activities rises, so does their price, leading to a higher compensation for people who perform such activities.

These people may also be called are considered qualified specialists, or people who have some experience and training in the activities they specialize in. These people are generally educated at higher-level institutions, and thus earn a higher income than others. Additionally, Braeuninger argues that new technology allows firms to get rid of lesser skilled workers, and thus reduce costs. As technology takes over their jobs, lower-skilled workers are rendered obsolete. The World Trade Organization’s report on Globalization and Within Country Inequality claims that technological change has expanded the market for executives.5 The expanded global market has resulted in a higher demand for top quality executives, thus increasing their salaries.

In this way, technology increases the income gap between skilled and unskilled workers.

Technological transfers between countries have led to an increase in demand for skilled labor. In Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings Inequality, Katz and Autor argue that the development and spread of skill-biased technology, like computers and micro-processors, has increased demand for individuals who possess the skills to run these computers.6 This changed the wage structure of society because these peoples’ wages increased more rapidly than the rest of the working population’s. James Pethokoukis, in his article The Income Gap, writes, “Rather, globalization has increased the demand for top corporate managers, and it has made companies more valuable as it has spurred economic growth and higher stock market values.”7 The companies that these executives work for end up growing and making huge profits due to their ability to tap global markets. Multinational Corporations have obtained this ability due to globalization. As the executives lead the company’s services into newer markets, they are rewarded for their efforts with huge bonuses over and above their already exorbitant salaries.

Their incomes rise further and the wage gap between the skilled and the unskilled increas-

es.

De-industrialization and outsourcing have had a big role in widening income gaps within nations. De-industrialization has significantly contributed to these income gaps as developed economies have reduced manufacturing activities within their economic territories, and transferred these activities to emerging economies like those of China and India. This allows firms in developed countries to take advantage of the low costs of labor in developing countries, thereby increasing their own profits.8 This has resulted in a loss of jobs for the laborers who work in this industry. The demand for these kinds of workers has gone down, due to the lack of available jobs. As demand decreases, the price, or the wages, for these workers also decreases, leading to a rise in inequality. Ber-

Spring 2013 of movement of jobs abroad has forced unskilled workers to accept their meager wages and not push for a raise. Additionally, as firms start setting up their own factories abroad, labor demand goes down and so do their wages. Faux and Mishel add that the setting up of factories abroad leads to an increase in imports and a decrease in exports, leading to a higher trade deficit. A higher trade deficit pushes manufacturing wages down, and thus contributes to the higher income gap.

Changing demographics due to globalization also plays a role in increasing the income inequality within nations. Mishel and Faux write “Other factors, such as demographics, can also lead to increased inequality. For instance, a growth of single-mother households or aged households can increase the number and share of low-income house-

Globalization’s benefits have not spread equally across all strata of society. The people who were already rich have benefited more than the others. beroglu, on the other hand, acknowledges that the process of de-industrialization has led to unemployment and underemployment amongst lower-skilled workers as their jobs are shifted abroad, which in turn has led to an increase in income inequality.9 Berberoglu also adds that the workers who lose their jobs in the manufacturing industry move to tertiary sectors of the economy in search of jobs.

These jobs pay a lower income than those in the manufacturing industries. The possible explanation for this is that no new jobs are created in other sectors of the economy, thus there is no additional demand for workers.

When laborers look for jobs in other sectors, they increase the labor supply in those sectors. As labor supply increases, and demand remains the same, the wages of the laborers in these sectors fall. There is a direct cause and effect relationship between de-industrialization and higher income inequality.

De-industrialization’s effect on the income distribution within nations goes even further. Jeff Faux and Larry Mishel argue that workers have started accepting lower wages so that their jobs are not moved abroad. They add “The shift of direct investment abroad also has an impact as demand for labor weakens in vulnerable sectors.”10 The fear

holds.”11 Globalization has created an economic scenario in which women are taking over men’s jobs in manufacturing. There has been a redistribution of jobs from male to female workers in factory settings. Women are getting more jobs in manufacturing as they are willing to work for lesser wages than men. Due to this, men are rendered unemployed, and subsequently their incomes fall.

At the same time, the women who take up the jobs are working for a lesser amount than they could have earned. This widens the income gap further, as these unskilled employees earn less. These demographical changes, caused by globalization alter the wage structure of the economy.

Globalization’s benefits have not spread equally across all strata of society. The people who were already rich have benefited more than the others. Michael Blim, in his book Equality and Economy: The Global Challenge writes that “Those with capital have seen their investments flourish in this accelerated world economy. Those without capital or without the new skills demanded by the new world economy have had a difficult time capturing any of the new wealth.”12 The additional income generated by globalization has gone to only a few people who have the

necessary capital to make investments. The rich have become richer due to trade liberalization, and the poor have not benefitted.

There is sufficient evidence to say that globalization has indeed had some impact on the distribution of income within nations. However, The Economist says that the International Monetary Fund’s research shows that income inequality can harm the growth prospects of a country.13 The newspaper argues that wide income gaps can cause financial crises and deficient demand. Joseph Stiglitz, in his article Inequality Undermines Prosperity, writes “Firms won’t invest if there is no demand for their products. And one of the key reasons for lack of demand is America’s level of inequality - the highest in the advanced countries.”14 Stiglitz argues that the income inequality in the U.S. has led to deficient demand, confirming The Economist’s

argument. The deficient demand prompts firms not to invest, as there are not enough people to buy the goods and services. When firms decide not to invest enough, the potential gross domestic product, that the country could have earned is lost. This leads to slower growth than expected, harming the country’s economic potential. Therefore, a rising income inequality, which is caused by globalization, is bad for a country and its citizens.

It is clear that globalization has had an impact on income distribution in both developing and developed nations, however the impact has not been direct. Globalization’s different facets have had individual impacts on income distribution. Deindustrialization, globalization’s varied impacts on different segments of the society, transfer of technology, skill-based gaps, outsourcing and

Catalonian Independence

Self-Determination in the Modern World

By Sergio Reyes, CAS ‘14

Photo by Erin Thibeau, CAS ‘13

Pictured above is the view from the top of the hill in Parc Güell in Barcelona. The Catelonian people campaign for independence from Spain.

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demographics have all contributed in making income gap wider within countries. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem argues that trade liberalization leads to an unequal distribution of income within developed nations and a more equal income distribution in developing nations. But the evidence acts as a counterexample to a part of the theorem; income distribution is unequal in developing countries as well.

A wider income gap is bad for individual economies as it harms their potential to grow. Economic growth can be sustained if the income distribution within countries is more equal. Some amount of government regulation with globalization may help in avoiding wider income gaps, and thus sustaining a country’s potential to prosper.

After months of painful resistance, Barcelona lay defeated by the Royal Army. Despite the unlikelihood of victory, the Principality of Catalonia prolonged hostilities beyond the point of a possible negotiation of a peace treaty, and all of its allies had retreated from the war.

Without the support of England, Holland, Portugal, Denmark, the Duchy of Savoy, the House of Hapsburg and the territories of the former Crown of Aragon, Barcelona succumbed to the siege of Phillip V’s troops on September 11, 1714. In 2012, on the anniversary of the war of Spanish Succession, thousands gathered in celebration of Catalonia’s national day, the Diada, in commemoration of the defeat suffered at the hands of the Bourbons. Through a peculiar interpretation of history, September 11 has been adopted as a key date in the campaign for independence. The international press captured images and chants that would evoke both solidarity and opposition around the world in the weeks to come. The most fitting reaction, however, seems to be perplexity.

Riding on the clamor for independence expressed on the Diada, the president of the Generalitat of Catalonia, Artur Mas, initiated negotiations with the central government in the hopes of reaching a fiscal pact that would grant him greater autonomy in economic matters.

Following the failure to reach an

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Photo by Erin Thibeau, CAS ‘13

agreement, Mas dissolved the Parlament and scheduled early elections for the 25th of November of 2012, seeking to obtain a mandate in favor of his separatist project. During the campaign, the pro-union rhetoric of the Popular Party (PP), Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), and, controversially, even the King, opposed the nationalist and secessionist message of Convergència i Unió (CiU). The polemical dissensus proved pervasive throughout Catalonian neighborhoods, where graffiti proclaiming “Catalonia is Spain” contradicted other signs saying “Catalonia: new European state.” In the end, Mas’ electoral endeavor resulted in another failure, costing his party several seats in the legislature, as well as their previously held absolute majority.

The subject of Catalonian independence, far from being settled, has been revived along the lines of historical, legal, economic and political considerations.

Given the proliferation of similar movements in Scotland, Flanders and other regions of Europe, the Catalonian case merits special attention.

The Catalonian secessionist sentiment finds ideological support in the concept of the self-determination of nations.

The idea of self-determination has been around since the American Revolution and has had prominent defenders throughout the development of international law. It is featured in documents such as the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations. In order to unravel the complex meaning of such an abstract concept, it is important to consider its principal dimensions: self-determination as synonymous to self-government, self-determination as a base to territorial changes after a war, and to a lesser degree, self-determination as an escape route from imperialism.

The dimension of self-determination as self-government was the first

to be considered in the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the most commonly defended. In this context, self determination refers to popular sovereignty, which is to say, the right of the people to choose the type of government they want for themselves and consent to be governed by. Following this logic, sovereign states are guaranteed the free election of leaders. Self-determination has also been proposed as a principle to guide the territorial changes that may be necessary after an armed conflict. This is one of the interpretations President Wilson had in mind when he spoke of self-determination in his Fourteen Points. Wilson’s hope was that new European frontiers would be drawn according to the will of the citizens and not strategic negotiations between states: “Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part

of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States.”1 The notion of self-determination as an escape route from colonialism has also had sound legal foundations. Again, it is Wilson who defends this interpretation of self-determination, proposing that it be taken into account as one more factor in the resolution of colonial disputes. In a general sense, it can also be argued that the American Declaration of Independence also backs this dimension of the concept.

The secessionist spin on self-determination has had more opposition than support in the history of the body of international law. Where the concept is mentioned, the possibility of construing the right to self-determination as a right to secession is often unequivocally negated.

Wilson expressed regret for failing to consider this interpretation of the concept, so that he may have avoided the phrase altogether. The Secretary of State during Wilson’s administration wrote in reference to self-determination as a justification for secession:

The more I think about the President’s declaration as to the right of ‘self-determination,’ the more convinced I am of the danger ... such ideas. It is bound to … create trouble in many lands.2 Upon drafting the Charter of the United Nations, the delegates took notice of this probable misinterpretation. In response to the concern of several countries, the committee in charge of the drafting of this point made the following clarification: “the principle conforms to the purposes of the Charter only with respect to the implication of self-governance, and not to the right to secession.”3

In 1907, Catalonia took a step towards autonomy with the electoral triumph of Catalonian nationalism, represented by Lliga y Solidaridat Catalana, in the provincial elections for the Council of Barcelona. In 1914, the provincial councils of Barcelona, Gerona, Lerida, and Tarragona were fused to form the Commonwealth of Catalonia. Even though the state transferred only those powers and resources held by the Provincial Councils to the Commonwealth, the relative weight of the new organization and the political unity of the Catalan nationalists under the strong leadership of Prat de la Riba made it possible to take major steps in public

works, welfare services, education and culture with exemplary and long-lasting effects.4 In 1923, under the Second Republic, Catalonia obtained at last a Statute of Autonomy, establishing the Generalitat of Catalonia and a Parliament. Under Franco’s regime, all of these achievements were annulled: the Generalitat was abolished, and all the powers granted to the

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state by the industrious Catalans do not return to Catalonia, and instead are used to finance social and other kinds of services in other regions of Spain.7 This theory is also supported by President Artur Mas’ declarations that, had Catalonia been awarded certain economic advantages, he wouldn’t have pursued independence.

A similar hypothesis suggests

The subject of Catalonian independence, far from being settled, has been revived along the lines of historical, legal, economic and political considerations. Given the proliferation of similar movements in Scotland, Flanders and other regions of Europe, the Catalonian case merits special attention.

Catalonian region reverted to the state.

Catalonia would have to wait until the death of Franco to recover its autonomy.

Catalonian nationalism has its foundation in “particular linguistic, historical, cultural, ethnographic and institutional elements. The origin of Catalanism was the romantic movement for the recovery of the language, the history and the civil rights that began around 1830-50s.”5 As a movement, it was promoted by illustrious figures such as Valenti Almirall, Barcelonian writer and politician, and Joaquim Rubio i Ors, who praised and promoted the Catalan language and wrote the manifesto of the Renaixença, the Catalonian cultural movement.

However, CiU’s secessionist furor in 2012 suggests political opportunism. Since 2008, a monumental economic crisis has affected Spain. Catalonia’s unemployment oscillates around 20 percent, and has recently beaten the record for provincial debt at 43.954 million Euros.6 Every analysis indicates that the success of the past September 11 is due in great degree to the skill with which nationalist leaders have transferred blame for the economic crisis and its painful consequences to the fact that the taxes paid to the central

that CiU’s secessionist project was a political strategy to distract the citizenry from the poor governance of which the party has been accused. Purposefully or not, Mas has taken advantage of the importance of his office to deviate the public discourse away from economic matters, unemployment, and spending cuts and into the pros and cons of Catalonian independence.

Catalonian independence draws its ideological basis from the idea of self-determination of nations, but this may not justify secession. Disregarding the Spanish and international legal frameworks, the cultural and historical bases, and economic or political motives, independence seems impossible in today’s world. The world is interconnected, and must remain so if there is to be hope for peace and progress. Because of this, the Diada of 2012 elicited a series of differwwwent emotions worldwide. There were some who sympathized, some who became alarmed, and some who were shocked. But once the situation is carefully considered through Catalonia’s historical and ideological lens, it becomes clear that the question of independence has not been settled and has instead been revived in modern nationalist movements.

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37

Imam-Hatip Schools

The Dissemination of a “True” Islam

By Alisha Davis, CAS ‘13

The existence of Imam-Hatip Schools (Prayer leader and teacher schools) has been a topic of contention since their creation immediately following the Turkish Republican Revolution of 1923. Kemalists see Imam-Hatip schools as a threat to Turkey’s status as a secular state. They argue that Imam-Hatip school graduates have no place among graduates of secular schools in the civil service or as academics in state universities. Ironically, these religious schools were created by a military administration that wanted to disseminate a strictly controlled Islam in order to keep power away from those who challenged its authority.

Many political parties quickly realized that re-integrating religion into the public forum would gain support from conservative Islamists and would unify the nation.

Over the last few decades, ImamHatip schools have created opportunities for children whose families had little money for private religious schools. As the number of Imam-Hatip graduates continues to exceed the demands of the religious sector, more religiously conservative Turks are claiming employment within non-religious sectors, thus re-integrating religion into the public realm of society. Regardless, the schools were organized to support the established secular order, not destroy it. Education within the Turkish state is meant to create a type of “monoculture” in which there is only one Islam and “order” is given more importance than “freedom.” No evidence suggests that Imam-Hatip schools harbor a harmful interpretation of Islam since they continue to be run by a secular state.

Today, Turkey’s state-sponsored Islam is the only version permitted to be taught in classrooms. Officials are often sent to schools to audit teachers and to make sure that state-issued guidelines are followed.1 Any other point of view is interpreted as a threat to the secular status of the republican state. Often times, teachers who do not teach the mandatory curriculum lose their jobs. As one Turkish university student stated, “The state makes sure that children

aren’t brainwashed into unauthorized interpretations of Islam by brainwashing the children first with authorized interpretations of Islam.”2

Despite this control, “underground” religious education has been an alternative option for religiously observant Turks who don’t trust the curriculum offered in Imam-Hatip schools. Religion authorized by the state has been “domesticated” for the masses and any alternative views are considered illegal by the state.

Anyone caught teaching a condemned interpretation of Islam risks being thrown in jail. Participants of alternative religious education believe that Imam-Hatip schools are flawed because their curriculum separates religion from the social aspects of life.

Many Turks do not agree with government policies which aim to make all public spaces and institutions devoid of religious influence.

The Imam-Hatip schools’ success is greatly dependent upon the varying strength of Islam within Turkish politics.

Today, the number of these schools is on the rise due to the current rule of the Islam-

schools and has recently begun transforming previously secular schools into schools for religious education. During the spring of 2004, the AKP made changes to the legislation that had previously limited Imam-Hatip graduates’ options for university studies and career opportunities. One of the attempted changes was to allow Imam-Hatip students to transfer to regular state schools before graduation through correspondence courses, thus giving them an equal opportunity in the university application process, although this never materialized.3

For many religiously observant families in Turkey with little social standing, Imam-Hatip schools have given their children an affordable education and access to upward mobility and possible employment within the religious sector. Children who attend these schools tend to come from parents who are self-employed as rural farmers, urban traders, craftsman or sometimes civil servants.4 They also tend to live in towns where illegal institutions of Islamic education can be better monitored by the government. Though the state-sponsored secular schools are open to all Turkish

For many religiously observant families in Turkey with little social standing, Imam-Hatip schools have given their children an affordable education and access to upward mobility and possible employment within the religious sector.

ic-leaning AKP or Justice and Development Party. Additionally, many of the effects of the military intervention process have been reversed since the AKP took power in 2002. AKP, an offshoot of the Virtue Party1 is made up of graduates of Imam-Hatip

youth, many families admit that they would not have allowed their children to enroll due to the lack of morals and religious guidance offered.5

All schools offer religion courses, but many secular schools do not take them

Photo by Erin Thibeau, CAS ‘13

Pictured above is the Blue Mosque in Istanbul.

seriously and secular families often do not encourage their children to perform well.

As the prayer leader and teacher schools moved away from focusing solely on the education of religious leaders, girls began enrolling (starting in 1975) despite the fact that women cannot become imams. Families that otherwise would not have sent their daughters to secular schools after the 5th grade, due to the dissemination of secular values in the curriculum and negative attitudes towards wearing the headscarf, gladly enrolled them in Imam-Hatip schools especially if single-sex courses were offered through the institution.

According to statistics from the Turkish Ministry of National Education, during the 2010-2011 academic year, there were a recorded 493 Imam-Hatip or Anatolian Religious High Schools. Within those schools, there were a total of 235,639 students, with a little more than 123,000 (more than 50 percent) of them females. This is a striking change from just six years before when girls accounted for only about 42 percent of the Imam-Hatip school population.

Amongst all secondary schools the core curriculum is identical and although all schools require courses on religion, Imam-Hatip schools provide more in-depth lessons on

the topic. Students of these schools study vocational subjects that include but are not limited to Islamic law, history, Tawhid (the concept of “oneness” in Islam), calligraphy and Islamic customs.6 At the end of their four years, secondary school graduates receive high school diplomas and must take the National University Entrance Examination in order to continue their educations through a university or two-year institution. However, despite the equal proportion of secular courses to vocational courses, many critics still believe that Imam-Hatip graduates have the potential to spread radical Islamic beliefs within universities if they are granted admission.

Another option for religious education outside of the state-sponsored school system is the Gülen education system. The Gülen movement has established schools throughout Turkey, Central Asia, Africa and the U.S. and claims to promote faith through students’ life experiences, rather than through the curriculum.7 It is an alternative to Turkey’s nationalized model of education, which aims to strengthen the role of Islam without challenging the nation’s secular nature. The Gülen schools differ from Imam-Hatip schools in that they require all students to board with the institution so that they will be continuously ex-

posed to an education based on morals and piety.

There are more than 100 Gülen schools located in Turkey alone and the movement has also established numerous private universities. While Imam-Hatip schools are public and open to all youth who desire a quality religious education, Gülen schools have an admission process and fees, with scholarships available to those who qualify. Religious education is not integrated into the curriculum, but instead composed exclusively of science courses and one history course. Students do not study Arabic and are mostly taught in English and Turkish. They have greater access to recent technology and their educational materials are often brought over from Western countries. Once these students graduate from Gülen movement schools, they are expected to enroll in some of the best universities in the world.

Much of the success of both the Gülen and Imam-Hatip schools comes from their funding. Followers of the Gülen movement are often wealthy and donate money for scholarships and the construction of new schools and dormitories. Statistics on Imam-Hatip schools show that despite government ownership, 65 percent

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PHOTO BY Erin Thibeau, CAS ‘13

Pictured above is the sacred calligraphy in the Aya Sofia in Istanbul, Turkey.

of their buildings were constructed without state assistance.8 Instead, the vast majority of this money comes from various private institutions, foundations and associations.

Gülen and Imam-Hatip schools also share a significant amount of criticism from Turkey’s secularist movement. Despite the Gülen schools’ efforts toward transparency and assurances that they operate in cooperation with every nation’s national curriculum, they are still being accused of harboring Islamist and fundamentalist traits by secular institutions like the STKB (United Civil Society Organizations). In the late 1990s, the Gülen movement’s conflict with the STKB and Turkish courts caused its founder, Fethullah Gülen, to offer to transfer the ownership of the schools over to the state. In 1998, the Turkish military and government announced that such a transfer of ownership was not necessary. They considered Gülen’s followers “sincere Muslims” who should be allowed to keep their schools because they acted within the “moral principles of Islam” privately while still respecting the secular discourse publicly.9

The event demonstrated that, like Imam-Hatip schools, Fethullah Gülen and his followers showed obedience to the state without any intentions of betraying

the Turkish government. Overall, Gülen schools appear to have a better record of upward mobility for its graduates than the state-sponsored Imam-Hatip schools. However, Gülen schools may not be the best option for all religiously observant youth. Several former followers and students (perhaps coerced by organizations that disapprove of the schools’ role within the Turkish education system) have come forward to testify that the movement was entirely too involved in their lives and personal choices.

T h e r e are also many critiques of the Imam-Hatip schools, one of them being that teachers do not allow students to express any form of doubt about their religion.10 Students who do express curiosity or ask questions are sometimes subjected to humiliation and told that they are ignorant. These methods of education encourage these students to internalize beliefs of their teachers that are not necessarily a part of the state-mandated curriculum.

Furthermore, the curriculum’s limited world religions course only offers a short introduction to other religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism, potentially contributing to intolerance. Often times, Imam-Hatip students do not inter-

Spring 2013 nalize the meaning of pluralism nor do they believe that other religions are valid. This level of intolerance may encourage those of the religious conservative lifestyle to avoid relationships with others who do not live in the same manner. Soon-Yong Pak writes that Imam-Hatip school graduates who give up the “Islamic way of life” are sometimes forced to cut off contact from their close friends and family due to strained relationships. Lastly, Imam-Hatip graduates tend to receive less support from within Turkish society and the state, causing them to feel isolated especially in sharp contrast to the intimate environment of their high schools.

Despite this isolation, Kemalists have desired to make Islam compatible with secular culture and the modern Turkish state since its inception. Instead of offering religious courses and schools to religiously observant families, they wish to make religion and religious organizations a private affair that should be kept out of the public sphere.

However, this is not consistent with the tenets of laicism, which place religion under the control of the state. The intent of laicism was to have greater authority over religious education than had previously been presided over by the “ulama,” those scholars of Islamic studies. Out of an elitist fear that other interpretations of Islam would spread information that challenged the authority of the secular state, a cooperative effort between the ministries of education and religion shut down the religious institutions run by various “tarikats” (religious orders).

Regardless of both the ImamHatip and Gülen schools’ obvious efforts to appease the Turkish government and military, the secularists’ learned distrust of Islam forces them to remain wary of these schools’ existence in Turkey. Additionally, the evidence offered in Kim Shively’s article on unauthorized religious courses in the suburbs of Ankara demonstrates that regardless of the availability of legal religious education, people will find a way to learn and discuss Islam.

At present, both the Imam-Hatip and Gülen schools have proven that religious conservatives can contribute to a modern society as long as they are given the resources to improve their social and economic standing. These schools have allowed religious youth to receive the necessary education to develop a voice within Turkish society. However, past measures to

limit the influence of Imam-Hatip schools have negatively affected their enrollment numbers. Penalties on university entrance exams are convincing families to send their children to secular high schools to improve their chances of attending university. Many Turks have argued that because graduates of Imam-Hatip schools are not remotely qualified to be religious leaders, the penalties for testing outside of one’s high school concentration should be removed. Without a curriculum that properly trains its students to become religious preachers and teachers, the schools are mostly attracting students who do not have goals of receiving additional education after graduation, thus the quality of their student body has changed.

Many of the reasons why students choose to attend have to do with religious freedoms, a sense of security and a well-rounded education.

Despite the AKP’s efforts to empower Imam-Hatip graduates in their post-graduate education and careers, the victories they have gained now cannot be guaranteed if this party loses power in the future. Since 2002, these graduates have been filling more jobs in non-religious sectors, especially in government. This gradual shift within Turkey’s secular society has angered the Kemalists, however, their fears of terrorists infiltrating the secular state or reverting Turkey back to an Islamic state are unfounded. Many religious Turks have not been demanding an Islamic state, but rather freedom to follow their religion without government limitations because the state is such a large part of their lives. It is therefore unlikely that they wish to threaten the state or work to achieve its demise.

However, Kemalists are correct to question whether Turkey’s policy of laicism will last forever. The Imam-Hatip and Gülen schools have shown that they are not reliant on state funding to operate. While the teachers are required to teach specific outlines and lesson plans, they still manage to impart their opinions of Islam to their pupils. While some Turks are willing to risk arrest and jail time by teaching their own “illegal” interpretations of Islam, the last several decades have proven that religious individuals can integrate into Turkish society without threatening its status as a modern state.11 Perhaps one day, these developments will allow pious Muslims in Turkey to practice their religion as they see fit.

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Transformation of Terrorism

Convergence of Threats in a Globalized World

By Dean Borza, CAS ‘13

Although increasingly rapid globalization during the post-Cold War era has brought many positive developments in technology, transnational trade and global governance, it has also brought about more complex threats and security concerns. Neither terrorism nor organized crime are new phenomenons. Today’s security threats, however, are taking on a distinct transnational identity, making the effects of terror and organized crime increasingly virulent on a global level. The activities and goals of terrorist organizations and transnational organized crime (TOC) syndicates are converging on points of common interest as these clandestine actors realize the benefits of increased cooperation.

President Bill Clinton’s 1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century was one of the first instances during which the U.S. government acknowledged international crime (or TOC) as “a serious and potent threat to the American people at home and abroad.”1 While this strategy hinted at the connection between terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, it failed to stress the full extent of their convergence and proceeded to analyze these threats separately.

Over a decade later, the National Security Council (NSC) under the Obama Administration has made great strides in highlighting the convergence of these threats. The Department of Justice reports that 29 of 63 organizations on its FY 2010 Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, which includes the most significant international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) threatening the U.S., were associated with terrorist groups.2 The U.S. Government’s acknowledgment of the nexus of terror and TOC represent the transition from the treatment of these threats separately to an increased awareness of the manner in which they are converging and growing.

The analysis of the specific nature and characteristics of groups carries implications for the often nebulous identities of terror and TOC. Analysts and academics often identify terrorist groups by their ideo-

logical, religious or political motivations in achieving change. In contrast, scholars tend to characterize TOC groups by their economic motivation and power-maximizing goals.

James Cockayne explains that, “terrorists aim to magnify their social and political power through the use of public media and indiscriminate violence, whereas criminals adopt narrower commercial goals and more discriminating methods.”3 These goals, however, are not mutually exclusive. Funding obtained through the illicit commercial activities of TOC groups may be a means to a political end.

In addition to intersections of goals and purpose, both organizations thrive in weak or failing states with inadequate executive, legislative and judicial institutions.

Defining the goals and identities of these organizations can strongly impact policy to combat these threats and their complex consequences. As terror and TOC unite, states must centralize and share intelligence while strengthening global governance norms and institutions through multilateral efforts. Significant challenges, however, still remain in establishing a unified transnational response to a distinctly transnational threat.

The 1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century identifies international crime as a series of activities rather than a specific entity: “Drug trafficking, illegal trade in firearms, financial crimes—such as money laundering, counterfeiting, advanced fee and credit card fraud, and income tax evasion—illegal alien smuggling, trafficking in women and children, economic espionage, intellectual property theft, computer hacking and public corruption…”4 While one can certainly classify terrorism according to activities and tactics, the U.S. NSC refers to terrorism primarily by entity rather than activity.5 It would be a dire oversimplification to delimit terrorism and TOC in this manner, just as political, ideological, and economic motivations can no longer be separated. For instance, the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) reports that transnational terrorist

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operative and Al Qaeda trainee, Mohamedou Ould Slahi maintains that, “AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb] represents itself as acting in the name of ideological and religious ideals, but it appears mostly interested in obtaining ransom revenue and engaging in criminal activities for profit.”6 Similarly, the GCSP reports estimate that “more than eighty percent of Taliban commanders in the sSouth of Afghanistan now fight for profit rather than religion or ideology.”7 The Taliban originally started as an Islamic fundamentalist organization attempting to gain power and legitimacy in Afghanistan (often employing terroristic strategies), but its motivations are becoming increasingly economically oriented. AQIM and the Taliban demonstrate the complexity and nebulous nature of the nexus of terror and TOC.

Failed states serve as incubators for terror and TOC, highlighting a critical point of convergence between these two threats.

Terrorism and TOC thrive in the absence of legitimate governance institutions, law enforcement mechanisms and judiciaries. The severely attenuated West African state of Guinea-Bissau exemplifies the dire consequences of the absence of such institutions.

The U.S. NSC reports, “Due to its lack of law enforcement capabilities, its susceptibility to corruption, its porous borders, and its strategic location, Guinea-Bissau remains a significant hub of narcotics trafficking on the verge of developing into a narco-state (meaning a state that is a seemingly blind to illegal international drug trade).”8 These developments carry particularly concerning implications considering the geographical placement of Guinea-Bissau. Its status as a coastal country provides TOC syndicates with uninhibited access to substantial West African ports. The U.S. NSC also maintains that West Africa has “become a major transit point for illegal drug shipments to Europe and for Southwest Asian heroin to the U.S.,” making Guinea-Bissau a strategic point of connectivity for the TOC drug trafficking network.9

Narco-trafficking provides an example of the convergence point between the activity and entity concepts of TOC and terrorism. As TOC organizations pursue their economic interests by facilitating the transfer of narcotics into Europe and the U.S., terrorist groups, such as AQIM, view this as a successful attack against the West.

Cockayne explains, “The corrosive impacts of narco-trafficking such as accompanying neighborhood crime and transmissible dis-

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$500 million

The profit that terrorist group Hezbolla gets from drug trafficking in Paraguay, Venezuela, Colombia and Uruguay in a year.

-Joint Special Operations University

eases (particularly HIV/AIDS and hepatitis) are among the better understood effects of TOC.”10 Such a threat, originating from activities of organized crime, directly coincides with the ideological interests of terrorist organizations.

The economic interests of TOC and the ideological, political and religious interests of terrorist organizations also carry serious implications for the individuals within failed states. Cockayne references growing anomie amongst the populations of failed states (or even lesser developed areas of functioning states) as a fuel for amorphous ideological movements.11 The shattering of one’s identity due to lack of relationships with the state and/or its society, can create individuals who are susceptible to political, ideological or religious influence. For instance, as TOC may become a form of employment for citizens of Guinea-Bissau, in the absence of legitimate job opportunities, the propaganda of groups such as AQIM may fill the religious or political identity of these individuals.

Hezbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon embodies the complexity of the terror/ TOC nexus and places it within the context of a weakened state. This multi-faceted organization has identified terrorist activities and social services as key tactics to attaining its strategic goals. The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) reports that providing social services, such as healthcare and religious education centers, is critical to the legitimacy and existence of Hezbollah.12 The historically weakened and war-torn state of Lebanon has sustained a vacuum of such services, creating opportunity for Hezbollah to fill this void. TOC activities, in conjunction with terrorism, are essential to Hezbollah’s social service operations. The JSOU reports

that without funding from TOC, Hezbollah would be merely an ideological group and not a threat.13 The JSOU also maintains that Hezbollah will engage in anything that turns a profit: drugs, human trafficking, cigarette smuggling, mafia-style shakedowns, and copyright infringement. Analysts have connected Hezbollah to drug trafficking in Paraguay (Cuidad del Este), Venezuela, Colombia and Uruguay, which yields up to $500 million annually. Beyond drugs, the sale and export of illicit or conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo yields millions of dollars per year.14 This extensive network of TOC has facilitated the establishment of Hezbollah as a quasi-governmental institution with a strong Islamic identity that continues to garner legitimacy through the approval of the Lebanese people, Syria and Iran. Its TOC network is critical to sustaining this legitimacy.

As the identities and interests of terrorism and TOC converge and coincide between and within organizations states must adapt their security strategies to combat these threats. Cockayne argues that, “Even as crime is transnationalized, crime control remains largely corralled behind national borders.”15 The U.S. NSC has outlined a detailed strategy, consistent with the National Security Strategy, to combat these growing threats.

It includes enhanced intelligence and information sharing;, protecting and monitoring U.S. involvement in the global financial system;, the disruption of drug trafficking; and building international capacity, cooperation, and partnerships.16 Regarding intelligence sharing, the U.S. has been attempting to coordinate organizations such as El Paso Intelligence Center, the Bulk Cash Smuggling Center, the National Export Enforcement

Coordination Center, and the Cyber Crimes Center with law enforcement training organizations such as the Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support Center.17 Although this may sound effective and comprehensive rhetorically, intelligence sharing has not yet caught up to the terror/TOC nexus. Cockayne asserts, “This [continued intelligence fragmentation] is unsurprising, given that crime control continues to be regarded by states as an essential competence of sovereignty, to be jealously guarded.”18 The aforementioned intelligence and law enforcement organizations primarily reflect U.S. domestic efforts to combat a complex transnational threat, undermining multilateral security strategies and intelligence sharing. Because the terror/TOC nexus thrives by taking advantage of differences and inconsistencies across the sovereign regions and states, these entities must overcome feelings of jealousy and distrust.

Previous relationships between the EU and the U.S. provide concrete examples of jealousy and distrust which inhibit cooperative policies against the TOC nexus. The relationship between U.S. law enforcement the European Union’s law enforcement and intelligence agency (EUROPOL) highlights these challenges to multilateral security cooperation. In his working paper The EU and the Fight Against Organized Crime, Hugo Brady reports that “US law enforcement agencies sometimes viewed EUROPOL with ‘uncertainty and even distrust.’”19 Unfortunately, the U.S. NSC still prioritizes “leveraging bilateral partnerships” rather than focusing on an increased commitment to multilateral information-sharing and law enforcement cooperation across jurisdictions.20

Despite these complications, the U.S., has, however, made significant multilateral strides to combat the terror/TOC nexus. In February of 2011, the U.S. and the United Kingdom established the Organized Crime Contact Group, opening up both bilateral and multilateral channels through Britain’s relationship with the EU.21 The U.S. has also revealed plans to institutionalize the OCCG, a significant step towards galvanizing multilateral efforts to reduce terrorist and TOC groups’ ability to hide in the shadows between states’ jurisdictions.22 The U.S., however, is not limiting its international operations against the terror/TOC nexus to bilateral and multilateral efforts vis-à-vis Britain alone. The U.S. recently hosted a multilateral conference with all twenty-seven members

of the European Union to address common security concerns arising from TOC across Latin America, West Africa and Europe.23

Although the U.S. has taken an active stance in combating the terror/TOC nexus internationally, the European Union appears to be the most developed in terms of multilateral security strategy. Cockayne observes, “Only in the EU does the level of political integration between neighboring states seem to herald any significant prospect of near-term integration of counter-TOC strategies.”24

“Although the U.S. has taken an active stance in combating the terror/TOC nexus internationally, the European Union appears to be the most developed in terms of multilateral security strategy.”

This level of political integration mitigates the jealousy and distrust in the relationship between the U.S. and the EU. EUROPOL is a beacon of strong multilateral response in Europe. In 2006, EUROPOL offered a centralized analysis of strategic threats, which continues to serve as the EU’s main tool for assisting investigations into transnational organized crime.25 To further bolster the EU’s efficacy combating the terror/TOC nexus, EUROJUST offers a transnational judicial framework to close the “shadow gap” between European jurisdictions in which terrorism and TOC thrive. This supranational judiciary facilitates warrants to speed up the extradition of TOC suspects and allows for the sharing of evidence between member states.26 EUROPOL and EUROJUST operate in tandem, to execute not only transnational investigation/law enforcement, but also transnational prosecution, a comprehensive approach to inhibiting the terror/TOC nexus.

In addition to creating supranational enforcement and judicial infrastructure, the EU member states have made great strides in intelligence-sharing capabilities. Hugo

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observes that, “In 2005, Austria, the Benelux countries, France, Germany and Spain formed an information-sharing avant-garde outside the EU by signing the Treaty of Prüm.”27 Such an increased level of cooperation has inspired a sharp increase in cross-border biometric information sharing, as almost all 27 EU member states have accepted this agreement.28 These efforts have also served to reduce information deficits between jurisdictions. Additionally, with the loosening of border controls on the flow of people following the Schengen Agreement, the EU has developed the Visa Information System to harmonize information and combat visa fraud. In taking this information and intelligence based approach to immigration enforcement, the EU is inhibiting a profitable activity of TOC, which also facilitates the movement of terrorist actors.29 Despite these strong advances in enforcement, intelligence sharing, and multilateral cooperation, the EU still faces issues with nightmarish bureaucracy and states’ reservations to delegate substantial responsibility to individual actors of EUROPOL, EUROJUST and creators of intelligence-sharing systems.

As the terror/TOC nexus continues to thrive in a symbiotic manner, states must continue to address the resulting threats to health, human, domestic, and global security through transnational, multilateral measures.

Strategic analysis has made great strides in addressing both terrorism and TOC as interrelated threats, affirming that the identities, characteristics and motivations of terrorism and TOC, although different, converge. Hezbollah is a beacon of convergent economic, ideological, religious and governmental interests within a single entity. States must accept that resources invested in rehabilitating failed states, multilateral global governance efforts, and transnational enforcement mechanisms will yield not only global security benefits but also domestic security benefits.

The European Union, based on its investment in EUROPOL and EUROJUST, highlights the potential benefits of concerted cooperation regarding security policy. As the terror/ TOC nexus takes advantage of intelligence gaps, vacuums of sovereignty and deregulated markets, continued fragmentation of intelligence could prove dire. Intelligence organizations must resist pressures to sequester information and move towards secure information sharing and multilateral intelligence efforts.

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Spring 2013

Chinese Nationalism

The Dilemma in the Post-Maoist State

By Amy Kim CAS ‘14

PHOTO BY Samantha Weinberg, CAS ‘13

Pictured above is the entrance to the Forbidden City.

Anger and pride can be powerful forces in domestic and global political contexts. China exhibited its first display of nationalism during the Boxer Rebellion, but nationalism today remains a “central part of the Chinese worldview.”1 Modern Chinese nationalism has been the result of an internal legitimacy crisis that has brought attention to the need for a new national identity.2 China has instituted ideological education of state-based nationalism through many political campaigns, including the revamping of school history books with a patriotic narrative. It is no surprise that from this extensive program, the world has witnessed the tumultuous Chinese nationalist reactions in recent years. The fear that such education could damage China’s economic growth and liberalization policies demonstrates the fragile nature of maintaining state-based nationalism.

Under an authoritarian system and in light of globalization and the ethnic diversity within China, nationalism has proven to embody inherent problems.

The problem begins with the nationalists themselves. Western media often portrays Chinese expressions of national-

ism as a direct, calculated manipulation by the Chinese Communist Party. Although the Party has control over the media, Chinese scholars assert that this view skews the reality of Chinese nationalism. According to John Wong and Zheng Youngnian, this neglects the contradictions between “popular nationalism” and “official nationalism.”3 The two nationalisms differ as the official discourse focuses on patriotism from the Party, whereas popular nationalism tends to embody anti-Western sentiments. The latter is unpredictable and may destabilize society, which means the results are usually not conducive to the government’s domestic and foreign interests.4 Peter Hays Gries, author of China’s New Nationalism, disagrees with the notion of state dominance over nationalism, claiming with the rise of the New Left (conservative nationalists), it is evident that the CCP is losing its control over the nationalist discourse. For example, the book China Can Say No was published in 1996. It was a popular anti-American book written by the New Left which the Chinese officials first supported, claiming it “fully reflected popular opinion.”

They criticized it as an interference with the

Party’s foreign policy.5 While the content of popular anti-Americanism reflected the official nationalism, it was now the people that wielded the power of the rhetoric.6 The state “lost control of nationalist writings,” says Gries, and with it, the legitimacy of the government became questionable.

Similarly, NATO’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 caused mass popular protests that the Western media blamed on the Chinese government. Not only was the government unable to mobilize those overseas, but demonstrations also happened in hundreds of cities in China.7 Popular nationalists sent letters to Guangmindang Daily demanding the government take action. According to Gries’ findings, one student posted a letter to the Premier Zhu cautioning him that “[the] government’s weak stance has created a distance between itself and the people.”8 This movement by the popular nationalists who believed the bombing was intentional was not an easy task to manage. Isolated incidents such as the Japanese premiers visiting the Yasukuni shrine, French President Sarkozy shaking hands with the Dalai Lama, or even an unfavorable description of the Boxer rebels as a “terrorist military group” in the Wall Street Journal, can result in a dilemma for the CCP as it caters to “chauvinistic and increasingly vengeful nationalism.”9 In theory, nationalism is the source of legitimacy for the Party. However, the consequences of nationalist sentiment may challenge the authority of the state as it tries to balance its international reputation with national stability.

The CCP may not have full control over the nationalists, but it has the power and incentive to manage the nationalist sentiments. According to Wang, “order and stability have been the top priority of the Chinese leadership.”10 The question of a threat to legitimacy from unmet nationalist demands not only concerns the Party itself, but the legitimacy of the individual leaders.

For the leaders, when nationalist sentiments are mishandled, there could be major repercussions from other party members. During the Belgrade Embassy bombing in 1999,

which coincided with the 80th anniversary of the May-Fourth Movement and the 10th anniversary of the pro-democracy movement, the government was viewed as unpatriotic when it did not respond to the event enthusiastically.11 Throughout the student demonstrations, the Chinese government’s priority was to maintain domestic social stability. As nationalist sentiments increased, Hu Yaobang appeared on national television to emphasize “the government firmly supports and protects accordance with the law, all legal protest and activities.”12 This shows why the government must closely monitor activities within the country. It must manage and censor the information presented to the Chinese people to minimize instability while protecting the legitimacy of the leaders and the CCP.

The greatest problem is minorities who hold a different notion of nationalism, such as Tibetans. For the Chinese and Tibetans, there is a profound divergence in national identity. While the Chinese national identity is based on views of the Communist party, Tibetan national identity is ethno-linguistic, based on language and religion with the Dalai Lama as their spiritual leader.13 The People’s Republic of China continues to assert its claims to the Tibetan territory, which has been formally renamed as Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Even after years of “Policy of Exceptionalism” from “imperialism,” and “gift giving,” the Chinese government has been unable to exercise its authority over the region. In 1994, Jiang Zemin’s “Golden Bridge to the New Era Campaign” outlawed worship of the Dalai Lama and all forms of the religious practice.14 This forced a “patriotic re-education” of the people and a marketization of the economy, but instead of bringing economic prosperity to the region, brought discontent. In 2008, a march by 300 monks near Lhasa who were allegedly ill-treated sparked more than 100 revolts across the Tibetan Plateau.15 As China came under international scrutiny, heavy pressures from the U.S. and EU on the issue of human rights followed. In December 2008, Beijing was forced to cancel a planned summit meeting because the EU’s meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Dalai Lama was later in the month.16 Beijing’s relation with Tibet illustrates how central the problem of diverse nationalism is to the CCP.

International relations scholars, having witnessed the atrocities of the World Wars, evaluate nationalism “pessimistically

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PHOTO BY Samantha Weinberg, CAS ‘13

People walk around the Bird’s Nest Stadium in the summer of 2008, when China hosted the Olympic games. Nationalism is so ever-present in Chinese society that even government leaders have to take caution with how they manage nationalist sentiments to maintain credibility.

as it increases the chances of international conflict.”17 In recent years, many have noticed the positive correlation between the rise in China’s Composite National Capabilities Index and the reawakening of nationalism.18 This revival has provoked questions about distribution of power, raised the possibility of a military rivalry between the U.S. and China, and highlighted security concerns in the Asia-pacific region. All three of these concerns are dubbed the “China threat” generally by the international community.19 The argument goes that if China “does not seek hegemony now it will do so in the future, even when it is economically developed.”20 This apprehension by the international community rightfully brings nationalism to its attention because, as Aaron Friedman theorizes, the “resort to nationalism has often been accompanied by militarism and by the scapegoating of enemies of the nation.”21 To avoid this perception, Chinese leaders have suppressed any domestic sign of anti-foreign sentiments from leaking abroad. The government must perform a difficult balancing act between nationalism and economics. Survey data indicates that Chinese citizens view economic growth as an important measure of government performance.

The CCP has attempted to “forge a new ideological connection between economic performance and legitimacy,” shifting the legitimacy debate from nationalism to economics by arguing that “political stability is an essential precondition for economic development.”22 This approach is risky during an economic downturn, as an underperform-

ing economy can affect the legitimacy of the Party. Downs and Saunders illustrate this case with the outcome of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute in 1990 and 1996. Both China and Japan have asserted its claims to the islands, especially after the discovery of a possible oil reserve surrounding the rocks.23 China bases its claims with historical documents dating back to the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and 1943 Cairo Declaration, which ordered Japan to return all the annexed territory back to China. Japan put forth the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, in which both Taiwan and the “surrounding islands” were ceded to Japan after China’s humiliating defeat of the first Sino-Japanese War, and the U.S.’s return of “administrative rights” over the islands surrounding Okinawa.24 After the Japan Youth Federation built a lighthouse on one of the islands, Jiang Zemin, to shore up the Party’s legitimacy, launched major patriotic educating and “Spiritual Civilization” campaigns in 1995-1996 that played to anti-Japanese sentiment in time for the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This was unhelpful because the Chinese government, not as economically powerful at the time, was trying to attract Japanese investment and obtain new concessional loans, which would help to invigorate China’s economy. This would in turn boost the party’s legitimacy by improving China’s welfare with the help from the Japanese.25 For the sake of trade relations, China’s leaders attempted to suppress expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment for fear that “they would damage Sino-Japanese economic relations and might turn into anti-govern

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ment protests.”26 For this purpose, the staterun media did not reflect popular nationalist sentiments, which elicited accusations of the Chinese leadership of being “illegitimate and unpatriotic.”27 As a result, similar statements of rage flooded cyberspace criticizing the government’s reticent actions towards “illegal” Japanese actions.28 In Beijing, students hung posters criticizing the CCP, and banners entitled “We want the Diaoyu Islands, No Yen,” reprimanding the CCP for giving up Chinese territory for Japanese loans.29 Peter Gries remarks that the Party did respond to the claims for firmer action by publishing in the People’s Daily with headlines such as “Japan, Do Not Do Stupid Things,” and announcing that the issue was to be “handled through cool government to government deliberations.”30 With the concessional loans and $30.9 billion trade at stake, Jiang Zemin contradicted his own policies by ignoring the petition requesting Chinese leaders to send warships to dismantle the lighthouse.31 Newspapers ignored the protests in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Anti-Japanese protests were shut down.

Nationalism is a challenge for the CCP and not yet a threat because it has the means to quiet unrest. While nationalism does have its short-term costs, the power of the CCP must not be overlooked as an authoritarian regime censoring information and managing disgruntled citizens. This means the government does have the room to cooperate with “enemy” nations, as seen during the most recent Senkaku/Diaoyu Island, while preaching the nationalist narrative. In this example, nationalism has proven to be manageable for the current Party. In August 2012, months before China’s 18th National Party Congress, the Chinese public showed its (both real and orchestrated) indignation over the purchase and the concurrent nationalization of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands by the Japanese government in September 2012, unearthing an earlier dispute over the claim of the archipelagos.32 Immediately, Chinese and Japanese boats patrolled the vicinity.33 While the Western media portrayed the protests as a convenient diverter from the Politburo leadership transition, the damages were real.34 Violent anti-Japanese protests occurred in over fifty cities as angry protesters shut down Japanese shops, destroyed manufacturing plants owned by Toyota, Panasonic and other Japanese companies, and boycotted Japanese products.35 Whether this was a grassroots or top-down movement directed by the govern-

ment, factories where the Chinese worked were shut down; and violent protests terrorized the residents of the area as arsonists destroyed the facilities.36 Tensions between the two countries escalated in August following Japan’s announcement and China obtaining its first aircraft carrier.37 On September 16, Chinese officials submitted claims for a continental extension from the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, to resolve the issue the “rational way.”38 Chinese and Japanese foreign ministers met in secret on October 11, with no visible progress.39

What is striking in the difference

Spring 2013 nization, ASEAN+6, which includes China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, proceeded to launch negotiations the following year creating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) during the protests.44 While unbridled nationalist sentiments embraced by nationalists caused damage to trade at home by placing the two historical enemies in a binding multilateral environment, the two states were able to function, illustrating a new kind of “rational nationalism,” without the challenge.45

Sinologists like Peter Hayes Gries claim that nationalism, as a legitimacy strat-

“In theory, nationalism is the source of legitimacy for the Party. However, the consequences of nationalist sentiment may challenge the authority of the state as it tries to balance its international reputation with national stability.” between the 1990 dispute and 2012 is that although deeply rooted national sentiments remain, bilateral and multilateral commitments were kept without having to compromise the demands of nationalism. It is due to China’s better economic position to bargain.

Economists agree that with the amount of trade between China and Japan reaching a record $342.5 billion, both sides recognized the harmful consequences of halting their trading relationship. China is Japan’s largest trade partner and the second-largest destination for Japanese exports.40 Despite the turmoil, trade between Japan and China has been consistently above world average from 1990 to 2000. Additionally, since 2000, trade relations have deepened between China and Japan.41 Japan’s dependence on China has grown stronger, said Tsugami Toshiya, at the forum held in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations.42 Since joining the WTO in 2002, Armstrong argues, China’s multilateral commitments constrain the effects of bilateral political sentiments and have provided the “foundations for the huge growth of the bilateral relationships between Japan and China within the multilateral system.”43 Furthermore, another multilateral treaty orga-

egy, is a double-edged swor. While nationalism in theory promotes solidarity in the Party itself, it has a destabilizing force in the international arena. A weak response by the Party to an action by a historical enemy decreases Party legitimacy. The unpredictability of nationalism prompts the government to make a tradeoff between domestic legitimacy and its reputation of being a peaceful and cooperative player in the international arena. On another level of analysis, nationalism can be difficult for individual party leaders since an attempt to better economic relations with a country like Japan can leave an Achilles heel for the party member. Finally, with an ethnically diverse country with contending claims on nationalism, China’s ethnic minorities such as the Tibetans remain as a perennial headache for the Communist leaders in Beijing as they protest for their ethnic national independence. However, the Chinese government still has the ability to quiet the unrest by moving the focus of popular nationalism from anti-Westernism to economic strength.

It remains to be seen if this strategy could be effective in the long-term to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP while also managing disgruntled citizens.

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Nodding Disease: A Mysterious Child Killer

By Lauren Logan, SAR ‘15

Sixty years after a syndrome now known as nodding disease was first reported in Sudan, doctors and healthcare professionals around the world are still baffled by its origin or propagation. Characterized by vigorous head nodding symptoms, this disease almost exclusively strikes children between the ages of five and fifteen and is nearly always fatal.1 It is often difficult to diagnose because symptoms cause children to look tired, distracted and as if they are “nodding” off to sleep. Behind their drooping eyes, victims’ brains are anything but tired. Seizures invisible from the outside fire erratically, brain tissue atrophies by the second and crucial cognitive abilities disappear forever.2

Though the disease is currently contained to South Sudan, Tanzania and northern Uganda, its prevalence is growing rapidly within those regions. Recent reports suggest that nodding disease may be linked to a waterborne parasite, which indicates the disease’s potential to spread throughout East Central Africa.3 Young children often die within a few years of the first symptom. The disease attacks the nervous system, causing the brain to stop developing and the child’s growth to stop.4 As the disease progresses, most victims are forced to leave school and are unable to work. Nodding seizures tend to strike with the consumption of certain foods, which can lead victims to develop a fear of eating.5 Since the majority of affected children already suffer from severe protein and nutritional deficiencies, this disease sends victims further and further into the cycle of malnourishment and poverty.6

The potential origin of this disease has been traced to a deadly parasite, Onchocerca volvlus, the known culprit of another disease called “river blindness.”7 Prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa, river blindness develops when people in the community drink water that has been contaminated by parasitic worms. Onchocerca volvlus make their way into the body when water is consumed and crawl towards the brain where they can eventually damage the ocular nerve. This parasite, however, does not appear to be the sole cause of nodding disease. The U.S. Center for Dis-

Photo by Sarah Chudnovsky, CAS ‘14

ease Control (CDC)’s lead investigator on the disease, Dr. Scott Dowell, stated: “We know that [Onchocerca volvulus] is involved in some way, but it is a little puzzling because [the worm] is fairly common in areas that do not have nodding disease.”8

Many believe nodding disease could be linked to past war conflicts in affected areas. According to Al Jazeera, there is no record of nodding disease before Sudan’s first civil war in the 1960s.9 Many families were displaced from their homes during the wars and forced to move to overcrowded refugee camps.10 This may have caused toxin exposure as well as the mass distribution of contaminated food and water. Despite these theories, nodding disease’s impact on only children remains the most puzzling factor Health efforts focus on treating and relieving symptoms of suffering victims. Anti-seizure medications have been used as an experimental treatment and appear to temporarily relieve symptoms.11 While the CDC and World Health Organization (WHO) appointed research groups to investigate causes of the disease and potential treatment options,

there have been no significant discoveries in the past several decades. The lack of answers may be due to the government’s hesitation to send researchers and health officials into the unrest of Uganda and Sudan.12 There have been accusations toward the Ugandan Minister of Health that the government is not doing enough to investigate and treat nodding disease.13 Although the Ugandan government sent several teams to investigate possible causes to the disease, their efforts have not been widespread or effective.

Even though nodding disease is only a speck on the enormous map of health concerns and initiatives around the world today, it still deserves global attention.14 Though this devastating disease currently affects only a few thousand people, its potential to spread throughout Eastern Africa without an effective treatment classifies nodding disease as a critical international health concern.

It is only prevalent in three small African regions, but the seriousness of the symptoms and fatal outcomes seem severe enough to merit more international attention.

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Spring 2013

Los Conquistadores

China’s Entry into the Latin American Economies

By Allegra Isabel Lee Valeriano, CAS’16

In the small Caribbean town of Tuchín, Colombia, locals arm themselves with rocks and prepare to attack an aggressor who, like the Spanish 500 years before, threatens to destroy their culture and livelihood. Unlike the conquistadores, the enemies are no longer Spanish soldiers carrying guns and deadly diseases. Instead, the new conquerors of this region are the Chinese, armed with cheaply manufactured imitations of the nation’s signature handcrafted hat, the vueltiao.1

While seemingly harmless, the Chinese have managed to steal consumers and tourists away from local artisans and conquer the vueltiao market. A story, originally published by Businessweek, reports that authentic vueltiao sales have been cut by 50 percent, bringing the 34,000 locals in Tuchín who depend on this trade to the edge of bankruptcy.2

“Free trade of the 21st century has rules. It’s not the law of the strongest,” says Colombian Trade Minister Sergio Diaz-Granados in response to this situation.3 His hostile reaction not only resonates with the 34,000 residents of Tuchín, but also reflects an anti-Chinese sentiment in Latin America that has recently surged in the face of similar issues.

The relationship between China and Latin America developed exponentially in the past decade. The April 2011 edition of Foreign Policy In Focus reported that trade revenue between China and Latin America rose from $12 billion in 2000 to over $140 billion in 2011.4 Recently China has begun to surpass the United States for the rank of top trade partner in the region. It is now Brazil and Chile’s largest trade partner and just falls short of the United States in Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela as their second largest trade partner.

This relationship grew during the impact of the fiscal crisis in 2009. As the rest of the world dealt with wounds from failing markets, China took advantage of Latin America’s shrinking economies and dropping commodity prices to strengthen

PHOTO BY Victoria Galarneau, SED ‘14

A little toddler is seen sleeping in her parents’ display of blankets at the market in Otavalo.

the bonds with the region. By investing billions of dollars that the rest of the world did not have, the Chinese stimulated growth in the Latin American economies, and at the same time secured their own access to underpriced raw materials that the region produces (like iron ore, soya beans and oil)and found consumers for their surplus goods.

5, 6 The largest of these outstanding investments includes $350 million loaned to the Inter-American Development Bank in 2009, $10 billion to Brazil for future oil shipments in 2010, $20 billion to Venezuela to pump oil and $10 billion to Argentina for their railway system.7

This partnership has greatly contributed to Latin America’s tremendous growth in recent years. As of 2010 its economy grew 6.1 percent, surpassing the World Bank’s predicted rate of 4.3 percent and the expectations of many who have not seen such growth in their lifetime.8 According to an International Institute of Finance report, in 2011 Brazil grew 4.8 percent, Mexico 4.5 percent, and Chile 6.5 percent,9 only beaten by even faster growth in 2010.

But while the relationship between China and Latin America has endowed many obvious benefits, it is also said to be a “Neo-colonial” situation, where China undoubtedly collects most of the benefits.10 Because of this, many Latin Americans are apprehensive about China’s influence on Latin American economies. In a recent interview with Businessweek, Colombian Finance Minister Mauricio Cádenas said, “While we’re all happy with one side of the story—enjoying the high price for our commodity exports—the economic impact on the currency and manufacturers can be very negative.”11 For example, 92 percent of the products produced in Latin America are also produced by the Chinese, which has increased competition in the region. There has also been acute job and income loss throughout Latin America, especially in the footwear, textile and auto industries, which cannot compete with the low prices of China’s unregulated products.12 One startling example, first reported in Foreign Policy In Focus, is Brazil’s labor market, where in 2010 approximately 700,000 jobs and $100 billion in income were lost to foreign competition.13

Wikileaks diplomatic cables also reveal growing anti-Chinese sentiments among Latin American politicians. In one

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Photo by Colin Rosenow, CAS ‘13

correspondence, the Brazilian consul general in Shanghai said, “China’s strategy is clear: it is doing everything possible to control the supply of commodities.” In another, a Colombian trade representative staunchly stated that neither he nor his country will be taken advantage of by China.14

Like the hat makers in Tuchín who have begun to take a stand against competing vendors who sell the Chinese hats, governments all over South America have begun to defend their countries by using tariffs and stricter regulations. Even Colombian President Emanuel Santos, who only recently lowered tariffs from 12 percent to 8 percent, on January 22 proposed a $4 per kilogram tax on imported apparel and footwear.15

However, internationally these tax proposals have been met with a negative reception. They are often criticized for replicating the failed tariff regulations of the 1970s and are seen as particularly dangerous to the EU, which has been recently trying to encourage freer trade in South America.16 Many current and past tariffs have been proven to have adverse effects. In one case, Argentina’s 2010 anti-dumping measures on Chinese footwear and textile products were met with a harsh retaliation from the Chinese. Not only did the tariff stop the flow of affordable Chinese goods to the country, but it also halted Chinese imports of Argentina’s

main export, soya oil. Even though Argentina conceded, trade relations have not resumed.17

Fears are fuelled by the fact that the Chinese and Latin American countries have developed a dependent relationship with little room for change, but it is debatable whether or not this relationship is truly harmful. In the past few years it has been assumed that a Chinese downturn would subsequently lead to a downturn in South America.18 But with China’s 8 percent export increase from 2011 to 2012 that exceeded the gains of the Group of 7, India, Brazil and South Korea, this fear does not seem warranted.19 Furthermore, partnership with the Chinese still very much favors the Latin Americans. In 2011, the year that was supposed to be the worst for the region, CNN reported that Brazil had an $11.5 billion trade surplus with China.

While legitimate, many fears of a Chinese takeover of Latin America have roots in the fear of Chinese political and cultural influence. More than anything, these fears are an example of globalization that challenges the markets, politics, and culture of individual countries and beyond. While the venders in Tuchín may believe that rocks will defend them from the Chinese conquest, they are no match for the adjustment to a globalized world that they will eventually have to face.

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Spring 2013

Editorial: A Sea of Fire

North Korea’s repetitive rhetoric or successful manipulation?

Kim Jong-Un, the current leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), issued a New Year’s Day message that dubbed the United States the “sworn enemy of the Korean people.” In February of this year, a 5.1 magnitude earthquake confirmed that North Korea had conducted its third underground nuclear test in seven years.

In March, the UN issued sanctions on North Korea in response to its nuclear test. Since then, the DPRK has declared war on South Korea, threatened the United States by targeting nuclear weapons in its direction, and pledged to reopen a nuclear reactor despite UN Security Council resolutions. These actions give rise to a state of panic in the international arena, especially because of the US response to these statements including plans to move ICBM’s to Guam.

North Korea has been consistently and frequently issuing combative rhetoric since UN sanctions were implemented. A statement issued by the North Korean army in March 2013 threatened to wage a “merciless and sacred war” against the South, and has repeatedly claimed to “wipe out the aggressor,” meaning the United States. The militant state often employs belligerent language directed at its aggressors, even before the 2013 crisis. A North Korean negotiator threatened in 1994 to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” The threat was issued again in 2011, following South Korea’s military exercises marking the anniversary of the YeonPyeong attacks, when the military in the North threatened “a sea of fire” upon the South’s presidential office.

Not surprisingly, the same hyperbole was employed this past March, when the North vowed to “engulf Washington in a sea of fire” once again..” The language employed to issue threats to the North’s perceived enemies is so extreme, that it often cannot be taken seriously and causes humorous interpretations.

According to North Korean Analyst Aidan Foster-Carter this rhetoric is typically extreme and all too familiar. With statements like these being released daily from the North, it is difficult to interpret the weight or gravity of the threats because physical con-

frontations have occurred in the past. Most of the time when North Korea spews a bellicose and extreme threat, the rest of the world does not notice because it is so commonplace and most often unfounded. But with the clearly issued threats that were dismissed as empty threats prior to both the bombing of Yeonpyeong island and the sinking of South Korean navy’s Cheonon, there is a growing concern that the threats may not be as empty as they have been in the past. While some still dismiss the militant language, others warn of the “tyranny of low expectations” because of past confrontations.1 A game of cry wolf has ensued; whether these threatened states interpret pugnacious rhetoric from North Korea seriously or interpret them as empty threats is crucial, especially when dealing with threats of nuclear attack.

Since the nuclear genie came out of the bottle, global military strategy has been defined by the nuclear bomb, and an international regime for that nuclear strategy has been in place since its invention. Before the Cuban Missile Crisis, the idea of massive retaliation was in vogue, inspiring the arms race between the Soviet Union and United States. After coming so close to nuclear war, both powers vowed to freeze current nuclear stockpiles and work towards disarmament.

Arms control evolved from the 1970s to the present to mean continued reductions and limited deployments.

From a pessimistic and realistic point of view, the United States, Russia, China and other nuclear “haves” will never disarm their nuclear weapon stockpiles entirely.

Waltz’ theory of nuclear peace holds fast and gives powerful states like the US an excuse to retain nuclear weapons. But the regime also informs those states without nuclear weapons, the “have-nots” that it is taboo to obtain nuclear weapons. The NPT is flawed and unfair in this way – it allows the “haves” and disallows the “have-nots.” North Korea’s nuclear weaponization has a rational foundation. It knows that nuclear weapons give states diplomatic power, and so wants to pursue a more elevated, powerful status. It is

testing the power of the current arms control regime.

The United States is giving North Korea exactly what it wants: acknowledgement. It is acknowledging the idea that nuclear weapons convey diplomatic and bargaining power in the international arena. It is acknowledging that North Korea’s threats have the potential to come to fruition by responding militarily to bellicose rhetoric and action. Professor John Delury of Yonsei University commented on this during a BBC interview saying,"There are cases where the threats are geared towards getting on the radar particularly of the White House, which tries to ignore North Korea as a matter of policy. Pyongyang's message is - you cannot break us, we will not go away, you have to deal with us." The DPRK wants to be on the foreign policy radar of the United States. By gaining that singular recognition, it receives a substantial amount of clout in the international world. In 2013, it has finally achieved that goal.

As is evident by current events, North Korea will now test this acknowledgement of legitimacy. The North has consistently stated that it will retaliate to military tests conducted in threatening areas. As of 7 April 2013, it seems that the United States has decided to take North Korea’s threats seriously. It has decided to postpone an intercontinental ballistic missile test in light of “the tension between western powers and Pyongyang.” The United States is concerned with a miscalculation from this regime that would result in a nuclear attack from this perceived irrational state, a threat that would be too grave to ignore. These actions are significant on an international scale because the DPRK is proving that nuclear weapons do give small states the power to manipulate large states too, including China and the United States.

North Korea has attained the attention of US foreign policy and military strategy. The Republic of Korea has attained the acknowledgement of legitimacy. What will Kim Jong-Un want next?

The International Relations Review Sarah Miller, Editor-in-Chief Abbie Gotter, Senior Editor Steph Solis, Senior Layout Editor Jatnna Garcia, Senior Editor Fatima Mohie-Eldin, Senior Editor Anbita Siregar, Junior Layout Editor Samuel Nota, Copy Editor Nisha Shah, Copy Editor Ellen Sarkisian, Copy Editor Olivia Haywood, Copy Editor Sophia Qadir, Copy Editor Shontelle Sanchez, Copy Editor Margarite Zighami, Copy Editor Marissa Lafave, Copy Editor

CAS ‘13 CAS ‘14 COM ‘14 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘16 CAS ‘13 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘16

About The IR Review

The International Relations Review, ISSN 2152-738X, is a subsidiary of the Boston University International Affairs Association. The IR Review is an international relations magazine serving the undergraduate students at Boston University. With a circulation of nearly 1,500 the IR Review has striven to create a forum for students interested in international affairs.

Since it was founded in 2009, the IR Review has striven to create a forum for students interested in international affairs. The submissions features in the publication cover a myriad of topics and controversies, including but not limited to globalization, international security, human rights, international law and politics and sustainability.

A PDF of the current issue, as well as citations and archives can be viewed online at www.buiaa.org/ir-review.

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The cover photo was taken by Anbita Siregar, CAS ‘16.