International Relations Review Spring 2015 by The International Relations Review

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The Shifting Tide of U.S.Cuba Relations The Vicious Cycle of Corruption in Brazil

Special Report: The Future of European Integration

Spring 2015

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Nigeria’s Humanitarian Crisis By Ines Boussebaa, CAS’16, COM ‘16 The Nigerian militant Islamist group Boko Haram increased their attacks in 2015, leading to international involvement, hoping to curb the organization’s advances.

The Blame Game of Eurozone Crisis By Sam Wong, COM ‘15 The Eurozone economic crisis unearther fundamental problems in monetary policy approaches to debt management and budget deficits. Now, Greece must choose to work with or against Brussels in bringing their economy to normalcy.

Crisis and Corruption in Argentina By Caitlin Hemdal, CAS ‘16 The sudden death of Natalio Nizaman, a government whistleblower and federal prosecutor, has thrown the credibility of state officials into question.

The U.N. Conference on the Status of Women By Lindsay Hawthorne, CAS ‘15 Women’s rights are increasingly being described as human rights, though this idea is far from universal. At CSW59, representatives and advocates discussed and debated steps to establishing a stronger association between these terms.

Photo by Gabriela Griscius, CAS ‘15

The International Relations Review

Nigeria’s Humanitarian Crisis The Challenge of Boko Haram By Ines Boussebaa, CAS ‘16, COM ‘16

ince 2014, the Nigerian militant Islamist group Boko Haram has killed over 7,300 civilians and kidnapped hundreds of others, with former President Goodluck Johnson unable to check the violence. Boko Haram first appeared in 2002 in Nigeria’s northeastern state of Borno under the leadership of the Islamist cleric Mohammed Yusuf. Since the group’s beginnings, the Council on Foreign Relations estimates that over 1.5 million civilians have been displaced, marking a refugee crisis. By 2013, the U.S. Department of State labeled the organization as a foreign terrorist organization. Boko Haram believes Western education is a sin and rejects scientific ideas such as the Big Bang theory and evolution. Before 2009, they aimed to install Sharia criminal courts, but did not aim to overthrow the government. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the group began as “an armed revolt against government corruption, abusive security forces, and widening regional economic disparity.”1 After leader Yusuf was killed harsh government treatment, police brutality and extensive clashes with Christians increased. As a result, Boko Haram radicalized and changed its aims to include installing an Islamic state.2 Analyst Chris Ngwodo writes, "The emergence of Boko Haram… is an effect and not a cause; it is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos." Finance and security analyst Tom Keatinge estimates that Boko Haram has around 9,000 fighters, although other estimates range from 5,000 to 25,000. It is able to finance its actions by looting banks, kidnapping rich citizens and foreigners, threatening citizens with abduction and extorting politicians and businessmen. Keatinge estimates that with all of these actions, Boko Haram’s annual net income is $10 million. Kyari Mohammed, a Nigerian researcher, “believes the group is running a low-cost insurgency, as it is made up mostly of young people from rural areas.”3 Additionally, Boko Haram has raided military bases and police stations, giving it access to arms such as assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, armored personnel carriers and pickup trucks.4

According to the International Crisis Group, the organization has ties with arms smugglers in the Sahel. In 2013, Nigeria declared a state of emergency in the states most affected by the violence. In rural areas where the military is not as involved, vigilante groups have taken up arms. In 2014, Boko Haram increased its attacks against media, schools, Christians, politicians, Nigerian policy and security forces and Muslims believed to be collaborators. According to the Counter Terrorism Guide, by threatening to expand into neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger, the group is threatening Nigeria’s territorial integrity, is raising its international profile and is a greater threat to regional and Western interests.5 Mercenaries from South Africa are helping to plan operations and flying attack helicopters, while Chad and Niger are involved in a regional military push, and have contributed troops to the fight against Boko Haram. Both the mercenaries and troops are fighting to retake captured towns. According to Farouk Chothia, a BBC News writer, France may become involved to protect its former colonies.6 In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped about 276 schoolgirls, sparking mass international outrage and giving the group wider attention – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Canada, Iran and Israel all offered assistance, such as sending experts and intelligence services, to find the missing girls. Dozens of girls have escaped, but 219 remain missing. More recently, on January 3, 2015 Boko Haram attacked the fishing village Baga. According to BBC News, 3,700 buildings were damaged or destroyed, 14,638 people fled to Chad, and 5,000 fled inland to Borno, the state capital. The exact number of people killed is unknown, although claims range from 150 to 2,000. Thomas Fessy, a BBC West Africa correspondent, writes, “Baga…was most likely targeted because of the nearby military base, headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force that includes Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.” Fessy also explains that Baga is a commercial hub, “important for international trade.”7 The Nigerian and Cameroonian militaries have been able to

Spring 2015

Map by Devika Nadkarni, CAS ‘18

reclaim Damasak, where they discovered a mass grave. Boko Haram’s attacks have resulted in a large humanitarian crisis – the head of the United Nations refugee agency visited a camp in Cameroon and stated that efforts are largely underfunded, and international assistance is imperative for Nigerian refugees who have fled violence.8 Many Nigerians are frustrated by the government’s lack of action against Boko Haram, and are hoping for change. Elections occurred March 28 after a 6-week postponement by President Jonathan; writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie said the president’s actions were “a flailing act of desperation from an incumbent terrified of losing.”9 Additionally, the postponement was attributed to security issues. Citizens are not confident in Nigeria’s capability to combat Boko Haram, hold the law and offer security. As such, Johnson launched an offensive against Boko Haram in the northeastern region of Nigeria to help voters and increase confidence in his government. According to the Guardian, “Coupled with the divisive competitiveness of the electoral race, the political and economic stakes of this election are the most significant

since the end of the country’s military rule in 1998.”10 John Campbell, former US ambassador to Nigeria, said Boko Haram may attack during the elections, to seek public attention and to reject democracy, which they believe is a corrupt Western ideal.11 On March 28, extremists killed 41 people, invaded the town of Miringa, burned people’s homes and used scare techniques on hundreds of polling stations. According to the New York Times, “millions still voted across Nigeria in the most closely contested presidential race in the nation's history.”12 General Muhammadu Buhari was elected, gaining 55 percent of the vote compared to Jonathan’s 45 percent. Buhari orchestrated a military coup 30 years ago and exacted harsh military measures for 20 months, before his rule was ended by another military coup. However, he considers his military days behind him, and promised voters that he is now democratic. His authoritarian ways appealed to voters, to whom he promised to crack down on corruption and Boko Haram.

The International Relations Review

The Blame Game of the Eurozone Crisis Germany and Greece spar over monetary policy By Sam Wong, COM ‘15

ver the last decade several countries in the eurozone have been taking out emergency loans from other eurozone countries, the governing bodies of the EU and the International Monetary Fund. These countries include Greece in May 2010 and 2012, Ireland in November 2010, Portugal in May 2011, Spain in July 2012 and Cyprus in May 2013. These countries took out loans because they could not sustain their own budget deficits at the current market level interest rates and more importantly faced the possibility of defaulting. The blame can be placed on multiple actors with the more obvious short-term causes being the budget deficits and increased levels of borrowing. Looking at the long-term causes of the crisis allows for a more critical look at the eurozone and its institutions and unearths its fundamental problems as exemplified by the case of the eurozone crisis. The eurozone is foremost a political project and not an economic one, its main goal being deeper European integration. In signing to be part of the eurozone, European countries hand over their sovereignty on monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB is then responsible for setting the interest rates and controls the circulation of euros. Thus the eurozone is a non-optimal currency area because the participating economies are both individually big and also dissimilar – conditions vary between countries. Labor mobility is also less fluid in Europe than it is in other parts of the world. All of which contribute to making it even more difficult for the ECB to implement a one-size-fits-all monetary policy. In 1999 the single currency was circulated to the then 11 Eurozone members, which have now expanded to 18. Some of the larger countries then experienced weak economic growth, as was the case in Germany, which resulted in the ECB setting a low interest rate. This low interest rate had an adverse effect on the “booming economies” at that time, for instance Ireland and Spain, as it assisted in creating the respective

housing and investment market bubbles. Adopting the single currency meant that countries within the eurozone were not able to use some of the policies other countries affected by the crisis could use, such as higher inflation or currency depreciation either to directly or indirectly promote exports, and quantitative easing programs so as not to default on the debt. The costs for borrowing for all the governments in the eurozone became one and the same with the creation of the euro. Countries that had to otherwise set a high interest rate could now borrow at cheaper prices. In the private sector costs for borrowing also became significantly lower. As a result debt rose for governments in Greece and Portugal and private sector debt also rose in Portugal, Ireland and Spain. The financial markets and its investors believed that the entirety of the eurozone assumed the same risks of defaulting on loans. After the 2008 financial crisis, investors thought similarly and countries with high levels of debt and economies not strong enough to buffer the crisis (i.e. Greece) saw an increase in borrowing costs. The disparate economies of the eurozone grew at different rates after 2000 and when the countries that needed the bailouts called for them they also saw their productivity levels and overall economic competitiveness decline. Countries with formerly booming economies were becoming less internationally competitive as they could no longer buy large amounts of imports. The funds for the trade deficit came out of increased levels of cheaper public and private borrowing. After the borrowing costs started to rise for the bailout countries, there was a lack of confidence in the bailout countries’ ability to repay their debts. As a result financing became more difficult to come by and more costly. Devaluing currency to make economies more effective was not an option precisely because there was a single currency. Larger countries like Germany, however, had large amounts of trade surpluses partly because of wage growth restraints.

Spring 2015

Photo by Erin Flynn, CAS â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;17

12 The ad hoc emergency responses to the debt crisis became associated with long, drawn out planning sessions that were negatively viewed by different member states and their respective constituents. This suggested that the larger countries in the eurozone – that were also responsible for funding majority of the loans – were in doubt as how to effectively parry the debt. This did not serve to strengthen confidence in international markets and thus helped to perpetuate the crisis. When the bailout countries asked to take out the loans they also agreed to the following: the use of economic reforms and austerity measures in the public sector to reduce deficits and the creation of a more competitive economic environment overall. These austerity measures are not ideal given the current situation of the most harrowing financial crisis since the Great Depression. Taxes were raised and spending was cut as unemployment rates rose steadily. Not only is there severe recession in Greece and Spain but “runaway public debt.” Greece’s debt is 175 percent of GDP. Spain’s is 100 percent of GDP, which is something that has not been seen in 100 years. Again devaluing the euro is out of the question, meaning Spain and Greece are forecasted to undergo extreme levels of poverty before they can hope to be saved. Within the eurozone overall, the financial crisis has made labor market performance weaker. The lack of demand is seen by the already low and still falling inflation rate, even in Germany where inflation is below the ECB target of two percent. Keep in mind though that the ECB’s policies are much less aggressive than its international counterparts (i.e. House of Federal Reserves) in trying to increase demand. However, at the same time, the eurozone and its institutions face unparalleled levels of unemployment and inflation, which exacerbates an already gridlocked situation. In the eurozone there are statelike institutions that function to create legislation, run departments, set monetary policy and exercise political control within currency issues and legal courts. However, the bigger decisions

The International Relations Review – like what precisely to do in deep financial crisis – are made unanimously by governments of Eurozone member states. Ultimately, no quick decisions can be made and there is little to no room for unique, out of the box thinking. Transcending the issue of institutions is the psychology behind the decisions made to manage the economy. Gurnek Bains authored “Cultural DNA: The Psychology of Globalization” and suggested the difference in attitudes with regards to economic management stem from different underlying cultural values. Each culture needs mechanisms other than community sanctions or some religious authority. There is an emphasis placed on the rules set by the governing body. However, longstemming cultural differences can trump these institutions. In a more relational culture, like Ireland, looking past rules created by distant institutions comes easier. Similarly, in cultures that have shortterm orientation (i.e. Greece) taking the economic plunge in response to

low interest rates without thought to long-term consequences is much less a surprise than it is a stigma of culture. There are connections to northern Europe and their psychological and cultural DNA that trace their long-term planning and sustainable work ethic to surviving long, hard winters. Not surprisingly there are also future implications that come with cultural differences. Bains writes that the Germans will exercise rules for long-term success because their past survival depended on the same attitude. The Greeks, on the other hand, will not be able to resist a short-term approach. Bains writes that solving the crisis will not just require attention to the superficial differences that exist but also the present cultural differences. It will be a difficult task in rehabilitating the eurozone but failing this will doom it even further.

Photo by Erin Flynn, CAS ‘17

Spring 2015

Crisis and Corruption in Argentina Financial and political woes cripple a promising country By Caitlin Hemdal, CAS ‘16

“I

might get out of this dead,” federal prosecutor Natalio Alberto Nisman told Clarin, an Argentine news outlet in late January this year. On Jan. 18, Nisman was found locked in the bathroom of his Buenos Aires high-rise, dead from a single shot to the head. Four days prior, he had publicly accused President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and Foreign Minister Hector Timerman of covering up the devastating 1994 bombing of a Jewish Community Center in exchange for Iranian oil. The day after his body was found, Jan. 19, Nisman was scheduled to testify before Congress and report the findings of his investigation. Though officially declared a suicide, the mysterious circumstances surrounding Nisman’s death have become a catalyst for ongoing protests throughout Argentina, accusing the president and other foreign officials of murderous corruption. These protests are drawing world attention to a country that seems to be continually crippled by internal government corruption and debilitating financial woes. Twenty-one years ago, on July 18, 1994, a terrorist drove a car full of explosives into the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people and injuring hundreds more. The blast marks the largest terrorist attack on Argentine soil, a country with the largest Jewish community in Latin America. Following the attack, the Argentine Intelligence Service published a report accusing Iranian officials and Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group, for the attack. Syrian officials were also considered to be possible suspects as the president at the time, Carlos Menem, had several ties to the country. Accusations of internal involvement arose, reaching as far as Menem himself, who was ordered to stand trial for allegedly destroying incriminating

evidence. Since the investigation began twenty years ago, the original investigating judge, the former head of the Argentine intelligence services, several prosecutors, and several police officers have been charged with corruption and wrongdoing. Within the country, the attack and the government’s inefficiency in prosecuting its perpetrators are largely seen as a national disgrace. For the past decade, Alberto Nisman had been saddled with the responsibility of investigating the bombing, particularly the Argentine government’s role in the investigation following. In a 289-page report, Nisman accused President Kirchner and Foreign Minister Timerman of meeting with Iranian officials in 2013 and agreeing to end the investigation of the terrorists in exchange for trade concessions on Iranian oil. Much of his report relies on information provided by Antionio Stiusso, the former Argentine director of counterintelligence, as well as wiretapped conversations between a union leader aligned with President Kirchner and an Iranian official. Beginning in 2012, President Kirchner had shifted Argentine foreign policy away from the West, softening its policy toward Iran. In 2013, the government signed a memorandum of understanding with the Iranian government, promising to create a joint truth commission to uncover the truth about the bombing. Nisman alleged that this memorandum evolved out of a deal for Iranian oil, which included a promise that Argentina would request that Interpol withdraw its red notices on Iranian suspects. Nisman’s case is far from airtight. Roland Noble, the former head of Interpol, denies any such deal and has produced correspondence with Timerman wherein they discuss that the red notices were to remain. Media outlets pointed out that Argentina was searching for refined oil,

14 and Iran would only have been able to supply crude oil. Furthermore, Nisman failed to include the presiding judge that had dealt heavily with the AMIA case, and failed to secure the support of the local Jewish community. Horacio Verbitsky, the president of the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, an Argentine human rights advocacy group, reports that only two pages out of Nisman’s 289-page report includes legal basis for the case against President Kirchner. The mysterious circumstances surrounding his death and the puzzling government response has overshadowed many of these inconsistencies however, leading many onto the streets to protest. Nisman was found dead in his apartment bathroom, which was locked from the inside. The main doors to the apartment were also locked, and the hallway was guarded by several bodyguards. Forensic experts analyzed an air-conditioning passageway that could have served as an alternate method of entering the apartment, but found only an inconclusive footprint and smudge. President Kirchner quickly issued a letter posted to Facebook and her website in which she surmised that Nisman had taken his own life. Further analysis of the body however showed that no gunpowder residue was found on Nisman’s hands. President Kirchner then issued another letter wherein she rescinded her earlier conclusion and instead detailed her suspicions that Nisman had been murdered in order to defame the Argentine government. This haphazard explanation has not satisfied Nisman’s family or the general public. Sandra Arroyo Salgado, Nisman’s ex-wife, hired an independent team of forensic experts to investigate. Their report, she told the BBC, concluded that Nisman had been murdered, based on a postmortem examination of the body. Across the country, hundreds of thousands filled the streets to protest. “Here there is no law. We are not a republic,” Laura Ghercovich, an Argentine lawyer told the Wall Street Journal. Among the participants are several opposition leaders to Kirchner’s leftist government. Though the protests are officially apolitical, Kirchner lashed out earlier this year following a protest known as 18F organized by several prosecutors in the case, calling it “the baptism by fire for the Judicial Party” and “decidedly an

The International Relations Review opposition march.” Her fierce reaction has done little to endear her to a population that is already skeptical about her administration’s commitment to transparency and openness. For most, the death of Nisman is just another symptom of a political and economic system that is mired in corruption and incompetence. Though once a country with a GDP that rivaled the United States, contemporary Argentina is a country consistently unable to become a great power. The mystery and outrage over the death of Albert Nisman is simply a microcosm for a larger inability to overcome systematic ineptitude.

Ending Violence Against Women in the 21st Century The UN Commission on the Status of Women By Lindsay Hawthorne, CAS ‘16

ne in three women in the world will be beaten or raped in her lifetime. Seven hundred million women alive today were married as children. Rape, human trafficking, sexual abuse of women in conflict zones, domestic violence, police brutality, female genital mutilation (FGM)… the list on forms of violence against women goes on. Every nation faces the task of combating the global, prevalent occurrence of violence against women. At the 59th meeting of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (UN CSW59) held from March 9 to March 20, 2015, representatives from UN member-states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) came together to discuss how to end violence against women in the 21st century, and give women equal rights with men. Panelists discussed possible new international legislation on the elimination of violence against women. Ministers for women of various countries agreed that there is a need for greater accountability at the national level. Panelists also emphasized the need to empower women to take advantage of their rights, and the need to engage men to become allies in stopping the cycles of violence. “The world must change, not the women,” proclaimed UN Women Executive Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. Mlambo-Ngcuka spoke alongside UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on International Women’s Day (March 8th) at a march for gender equality in New York City, kicking off the start of CSW59. Mlambo-Ngcuka explained how gender inequality

Spring 2015

Photo by Sam Sherman, CAS ‘17

functions as a root cause for violence against women, perpetuating all forms of violence. She said that empowering women alone to know their rights will not be enough to end gender inequality, because culture in every society values women less than men, whether in the media, in businesses, in governmental representation or elsewhere. Mlambo-Ngcuka also strongly advocates for the engagement of men and boys in the fight for women’s rights. “It is the men who must say, ‘I will not marry a child. I will not beat a woman. My daughter will not be mutilated. I will not accept a paycheck that is higher than that of my female counterpart,’” Mlambo-Ngucka continued. She praised UN Women’s “He for She” campaign and urged government leaders to get more of their male citizens to make the pledge. This awareness campaign championed by Emma Watson, UN Women Goodwill Ambassador and actress, works to engage men and boys to step up for their female relatives and friends. “There is no wrong in the minds of those who have not been taught what is right,” said Farhan Akhtar, male UN Women Goodwill Ambassador for Southeast Asia, and actor. “When men and women unite for the common cause, they will eventually succeed,” said Akhtar. Throughout CSW59, panelists representing governments

of many nations and NGO leaders repeated this point: societies that value women less than men cannot expect to be able to uphold women’s rights to live a life without violence, and with equal representation in government, the media, and every sector of employment. Every society on earth has gender inequality, studies by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, the World Health Organization, the Environment and Gender Index, and NGOs have overwhelmingly shown. That is why in 1979, the UN General Assembly (GA) adopted a treaty that acts as an “international bill of rights for women.” This treaty is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and requires signatory countries to establish laws that promote equal rights and prosecute discrimination against women. Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, three nations that many Americans criticize for human rights abuses, have all ratified this treaty, along with 130 other member-states. The U.S., however, has not. The U.S. signed the treaty in 1980, but to this day has failed to ratify it, probably due to the clause on reproductive rights. Many countries, especially the three mentioned above, included special reservations in their ratification of the treaty, so why the U.S. has not done the same is unclear. Acknowledging the limitations of CEDAW and

16 recognizing the need for further national actions promoting gender equality, the GA adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995 (BPfA). The main objective of CSW59 was to analyze the progress made by each nation since the BPfA was adopted. Every year, the Commission on the Status of Women meets to analyze the progress, and member-states each submitted a report in 2014 analyzing their progress in promoting gender equality, which can be read on the UN Women website. During CSW59, the Australian Minister for Women and Girls, Natasha Despoja, discussed the challenges that persist 20 years after Beijing. “In the past 14 weeks, two women have been killed [each week] as a result of domestic violence in Australia,” said Despoja. She discussed how Australia needs to address this problem as a national emergency, and acknowledge the link between entrenched barriers to gender equality and violence against women. According to Despoja, 123 countries have made domestic violence illegal, yet 53 countries still do not recognize rape by an intimate partner as rape. Despoja and other panelists also discussed a major impediment to progress: a lack of tools for monitoring progress at the national level, and the failure of nations to hold state and nonstate actors accountable. Lack of data on the prevalence of crimes against women also impedes progress, particularly in developing countries. However, in the past 20 years, numerous new tools for monitoring have become available. The Lancet Series on Violence Against Women measures progress, as well as the Environment Gender Index. The few accountability tools available are now being used as a baseline for the Sustainable Development Goals, which will be finalized this year. Advocates for gender equality are fighting for Goal 5, promoting gender equality, to include language of women’s rights as human rights, and specific protections from particular forms of violence against women. Ministers for women from countries including Vietnam, France, Denmark, and Japan discussed how progress since the BPfA has been slow, and uneven in

The International Relations Review many areas. The number of women and girls forced into unwanted marriages or abused are declining in some countries, but it is growing in others. Increasing fundamentalism with groups like ISIS in Iraq, Libya, and Syria and Boko Haram in Nigeria are worsening the situation for women. Director of the Coordination Division for UN Women, Moez Doraid, said that across regions and religions, there is a common thread to fundamentalist groups: attacks on the rights of women. Doraid said that military campaigns have a limited ability to stop the spread of ideas by fundamentalist groups. She said that government initiatives to fight extremism must support good governance and the empowerment of women. “Time and time again research has shown that communities are ... stronger and less vulnerable to extremism when they are more gender equal,” said Doraid. In particular, people have expressed frustration at the failure of the Nigerian government to recover the “Chibok Girls,” some 200 girls who were abducted from their school in Chibok by Boko Haram last year. Lucy Freeman of Amnesty International said that those particular girls are among “many, many hundreds, possibly thousands” of others who have been kidnapped by Boko Haram and beaten, forced to marry the fighters and convert to Islam, or killed. Freeman has interviewed survivors who have fled to Cameroon, and are now living in overcrowded refugee camps where violence is rampant and supplies limited. Further complicating matters, if these women are known to be associated with Boko Haram, even though it was not their choice, they sometimes face prosecution from the governments of Nigeria or Cameroon. So, what can be done about this conflict? Freeman recommends that government leaders look at the conflict in Nigeria as a problem for the whole world. Countries need to uphold CEDAW, fund refugee camps and the protection of women’s human rights defenders. She also recommends bringing in the mothers and female relatives of jihadist fighters to better understand how this ideology spreads.

Experts on gender inequality in economics, government, religion and the media from around the world all agree that governments must each take more action to prevent and prosecute genderbased violence. Supporting CEDAW is one way to do so. In discussion of sexual violence in conflict zones, two panelists made the point that separating sexual violence in conflict from sexual violence in peacetime is not wise. “A country that does not protect its women in peacetime will not protect them in conflict,” said Zainab Hawa Bangura of Sierra Leone, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. An Indian women’s rights advocate, along with other representatives, pointed out a flaw with the UN’s policies as a whole. She said that she does not think most countries treat ending violence against women as a priority. Violence is against the law in India, but a law without a budget, she said, cannot accomplish anything. Panelists agreed that educating men and boys, particularly police officers and other authorities, is essential to changeing mindsets and ensuring prosecution for perpetrators and protection for victims. Experts such as those mentioned are arguing for approaches utilizing multiple sectors, including educating law enforcement officers and health officials, engaging men, educating children and empowering women to end violence against women. Experts at CSW59 agreed that gender inequality and the devaluation of women is due to cultural practices and attitudes perpetuated by religious extremism or the media are directly linked to the pervasive forms of violence against women. If girls are educated and empowered in all fields, and women brought into politics and decision making in all countries, the world will be much better equipped to tackle violence against women. Underrepresentation in the media adds to gender inequality. According to the Nordic Council of Ministers, women produced 15 percent of films in Iceland in 2014. American actress and producer Geena Davis has been studying the hyper-sexualization and stereotyping

Spring 2015 of female characters in films aimed at children. According to Davis, there are profoundly fewer female characters in shows and films aimed at young children. “The message that is being sent to children in the 21st century is that women and girls are less important than men and boys. They don’t do as much as boys; they’re judged for their appearance,” said Davis. Davis explained that underrepresentation in the media contributes to unconscious biases about gender roles, such as only male presidents in films and leads to the idea that men are more competent. “At the rate we are going,” said Davis, “it will be 700 years before we achieve parity. I’m aiming for more like seven.” The sector where gender parity can be achieved most easily, said Davis, is on-screen. Matt Winkler of Bloomberg News said he noticed a disturbing lack of female voices in news stories . “Although we were successful in recruiting many bright women to our news agency, leadership was still overwhelmingly male,” said Winkler. Winkler and others at Bloomberg News actively worked to change this by identifying successful women in every sector and reporting on them, introducing a “woman’s voice in every story” policy. According to Winkler, today most people at Bloomberg News report to women. Winkler explains that this policy has helped the agency, making it more competitive and allowing it to find big news first, like the first female CEO of an automobile company. Winkler said that one reason women are not as likely as men to get leadership positions in the media are the long hours. He makes hours more flexible, because he understands that it’s about “the quality of the story, not the clock you punch.” Experts and advocates are working to get a specific clause on “women in the media” introduced in Goal 5 of the SDGs, promoting gender equality. They are also fighting to include a clause about women in the media and sexist representations in Goal 16, which outlines freedom of expression. Challenges also persist in combating sexual violence during wartime. There is

a widespread lack of accountability in post-conflict situations, such as Vietnam and Papua New Guinea. The Vietnamese minister for Gender Equality connected the current day situations with the mass rape of “comfort women” in Korea by the Japanese during WWII. She described how the 53 survivors left in North Korea are in their nineties, and still suffer from the trauma of what happened to them all those years ago. She called for a global alliance for survivors of sexual violence to help heal their wounds. The Korean Minister for Gender Equality and Family agreed. She said, “Today, we stand together to share the common goal to eradicate sexual violence against women in armed conflict, and to protect women’s rights in pursuit of peace.” The Beijing Platform for Action included a specific clause on the protection of women in armed conflict and prosecution for perpetrators, but it has not been upheld. Helen Hakena of Papua New Guinea described how the recent civil war in which 20,000 people lost their lives saw thousands of girls and women raped. Hakena described how men who tried to intervene were killed, and homes were burned and looted when people tried to stop what was happening to the women. “Perpetrators still roam the villages and roam the streets, there is no justice done,” said Hakena. She said a major fault is that the services for victims are largely run by men, and women do not know how to access services. “Some things have to be done by the international community, now that we are at the end of the MDGs,” said Hakena. “In my village in particular, one night, soldiers came in, put us in a straight line, picked young girls, took them into the temple and raped them. Some of these girls have lost their minds because they do not want to remember,” told Hakena. Afaf Marei discussed the problem of uncaring law enforcement officers and police brutality in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt. She told how protesters advocating for women’s rights have been subjected to forced virginity tests, shot or arrested by government officials. She told of one woman who was shot dead by a police officer while laying flowers at the grave a person

killed during a peaceful march. Marei also reported that ISIS is selling Yazidi women as sex slaves in Iraq. Some governments in the Middle East still consider domestic violence a private matter, or even justified under Sharia. “What we are seeing in the Middle East today is a systemic failure of international system to respond,” said Maria Butler, of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Butler said that advocates need to bring the reality women face around the world to attention at high levels. Post CSW 59, member-states will work on increasing available data on violence against women and creating and implementing laws to eliminate gender inequality and violence against women. All such laws, as pointed out by multiple women’s rights NGO leaders, must be accompanied by a budget to ensure implementation. Member-states will also uphold Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Violence Against Women and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. As the UN finalizes the Sustainable Development Goals to replace the Millennium Development Goals in 2015, ministers for women and gender equality will work to include specific protections for women in conflict zones, women fighting extremism, women facing particular hardships because of climate change, and women with disabilities. And, they will fight to include language of women’s rights as human rights. Roshida Manjoo of the Office of the High Commission, Special Rappateur for Human Rights, pointed out that women should not be protected because of the role they play as mothers, or daughters, but because they are human. The most-repeated quotation throughout CSW59 was an echo of Hillary Clinton’s speech from Beijing in 1995, with the central point that “women’s rights are human rights.” Clinton herself attended the CSW to show her support.

SPECIAL REPORT

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The International Relations Review

The European Union: Legitimacy and Identity By Claudia Morera, CAS ‘15

urope as a continent has been characterized by intermittent war. In centuries past, major monarchies ruled Europe and more often than not saw each other as enemies; however, the damage that ensued during both world wars was enough to reconsider such relations. Post WWII marks one of the longest periods of “peace” amongst European nations. Much like the United Nations, it could be said that the European Union found its origins in the promotion of democracy and the unification of countries in order to avoid war; this displays Immanuel Kant’s theory of perpetual peace in its most basic form. These nations no longer go to war with one another because they are “likenations”. Not only are they bound together by monetary policy, but at their core they stand for the basis of democracy and cooperation. It is only by studying the history of the nations and understanding the basis for the creation of the European Union that one can begin to tackle the complexity of identity. Does the European Union have an identity? This is more complex than a simple yes or no answer. Scholars such as Anthony Smith state that “national identities tend to be rather stable and based on fairly persistent constructions of a historic territory, of common myths and memories… ethnic bonds, and a common language,” and it’s for these reasons that he rejects

a European identity. Although this is a strong definition for national identities, it is crucial to acknowledge the particularities of the European Union as a body. The European Union is a relatively new and fluid body that can categorize its identity by Smith’s definition, but also must not overlook the uniqueness of its situation. Keeping this in mind, a framework of a common EU identity is present. The European Union is undeniably linked both historically as well as economically and there are traces of a common system of communication. To understand the basis of European identity one must first look at the unifying factor that links these nations together. Monetary policy, or in many cases the euro, is the overarching link between all members of the European Union. It is the examination of the euro and what it has come to represent that enables a greater understanding of the framework of European identity. Political sociologist, Giovanni Moro, describes the euro from a social perspective “as a communication tool linking people together.” Essentially, the euro serves a the common language for the European Union. It is a “system of signs associated with meanings, which works as a communication tool.” By looking at the euro as, a language, the structural elements of a European identity become clear. The euro links states together and creates commonality. It is this

commonality and familiarity which serves as the basis for the European identity. When discussing historical territory, the second component of a common identity, Anthony Smith’s definition must be slightly modified. In order to understand the many territorial changes that Europe has undergone, a fluid perspective is necessary. Radical social constructivists tend to think of collective identity as “fluid and always contested.” For the purposes of defining the EU territory it is imperative that we combine Anthony Smith’s emphasis on the historical territory and the social constructivists’ fluid conceptualization of identity to come to a more comprehensive conclusion. For the purposes of identity and its relation to shared land this analysis will focus on the 1995 creation of the borderless Schengen area. Although it does not include all the EU member nations the Schengen area symbolizes a commitment to community and commonality. It is here where the formation of a EU territory becomes palpable. Though in the past Europe was characterized by infighting and border disputes, the Schengen area strengthened unity by facilitating travel between nations. Ideas like these have fostered the development a European identity, one made of a specific territory and a common language (the euro). The European Union has yet to achieve an ingrained sense of solidarity

Spring 2015

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showed “for the first time that overall distrust of the EU now outstrip[ed] trust.” He attributes this distrust to the tensions of the EMU and its ability to have, in this case, negative “identityendowing effects.” This distrust signals the potential delegitimization of the institutions in the eyes of its citizens - distrust that became clear not only through eurobarometer surveys, but also through the actions of individual nation states during the eurozone crisis. Germany and Chancellor Merkel’s unwillingness to bail-out the Greeks from the get-go outlines this. Overall distrust between these two nations led to a series of actions that undeniably exacerbated the situation and led to an even graver economic crisis - a crisis in which Europe still finds itself now. Due to such instability in the EU, Europe has seen the re-emergence of radical parties, particularly those of the radical right. These events threaten the legitimacy of a body that was created for the purposes of upholding democracy and unity. Its susceptibility to fail at the first sign of trouble indicates the instability of the body and its link to a lack of a sense of community within the EU members. Despite the proven legitimacy of the EU, if it does not succeed in strengthening its identity the European Union will not be able to sustain itself as a legitimate governing body. The EU now finds its legitimacy under review by its citizens, and the body’s weak output and overall distrust in one another is greatly to blame. However, though the EU does not yet have a strong and defined identity, it is hard to deny traces of its foundation both in language and territory. Despite the crisis in which the EU finds itself now, one must remain hopeful for its future. The EU has already proven that although they can disband during crisis they are also capable of unifying when needed. The terrorist attacks that transpired January 7, 2015, at the headquarters of Charlie Hebdo are a clear indication of this. The European community banded together in solidarity, for an attack on France and France’s values represents an attack on all of Europe. It is this solidarity that is needed if the European Union is to move past the eurocrisis.

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among its citizens, thus hindering the establishment of a concrete EU identity. Furthermore, until the EU is able to move past its member’s cultural differences in order to embrace cultural similarities, this unity will be difficult to consolidate. In this characterization of the European identity, or lack thereof, we arrive at the question of legitimacy. Can the European Union be legitimate if it does not have a strong common identity? Here one must decide how legitimacy will be categorized. Will legitimacy be entirely dependent on each citizen’s overall sentiment or will it be measured based on performance? It seems that simply looking from overall sentiment the European Union is not legitimate. However, if legitimacy is to be measured based on overall performance then it could be argued that the European Union is a legitimate body. The European Union as a body finds its legitimacy in the transparency of its institutions and in the outcome of its actions. Legitimacy must be measured not solely on the outcome but also on the quality of the processes. The role of institutions and organizations as essential elements in the overall legitimacy of a body can not be overlooked. It is by looking at the EU’s ‘throughput’, as well as output, that the EU’s legitimacy can be recognized. The EU has been able to prove itself as an incredibly influential economic body and its institutions continue to grow in strength. An example of this is the rise of the European Parliament, which started out as a powerless body and now has great capability to affect European policy. So, the EU achieves its legitimacy without the need of an identity. But can the EU sustain its legitimacy without the support that comes with a common identity? An observation into the recent events of the Eurozone crisis is in order to better answer this question. Under crisis the legitimacy of a body is tested and the eurozone crisis damaged the growing trust in the European Union. Professor Chris Shore highlights in his article “Divided by a common currency: the euro crisis and european citizenship,” that in 2010 a survey

The International Relations Review

Analyzing Poland’s National Security Strategy Ukraine crisis prompts revised defense strategy By Gabriella Griscius, CAS ‘15

oland’s power within the European Union grew remarkably in 2014. Poland’s delivery of gas supplies to Ukraine against the wishes of Gazprom, the actions of Radosław Sikorski in strongly advocating for sanctions, and the increase of NATO troops in Europe steadily changed the perception of Poland’s role in the EU to that of a major influence. Ultimately, it was the appointment of Donald Tusk to the presidency of the European Union that solidified Poland’s presence as a major European power. Newly confirmed Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz reaffirmed this sentiment in her annual address at the Sejm. Instead of purely focusing on global terrorism, she chose to focus her address specifically on Polish security in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis. Kopacz announced that she would increase defense spending to 2 percent of the GDP starting in 2016.1 Three months later, the adoption of the National Security Strategy reasserted many of Kopacz’s security objectives, but it also represented more than a simple restatement of facts. Poland’s National Security Strategy of 2014 carries a special significance due to Poland’s proximity to Ukraine. The European Union and NATO will look to Poland for logistical support and regional expertise regarding current issues in Ukraine. Russia will also closely watch Poland’s reaction to their continued annexation of Crimea. Poland’s reaction and publicly published strategies are significant. Poland’s National Security Strategy

critically provides a preview of their primary strategies, objectives and overall mood. Considering Poland’s position in the European Union, this document is notably important for future internal EU deliberations and potential strategic options contemplated by Russia. Poland’s National Security Strategy is particularly timely, due to crises that continue to stymie European politicians The violence in Ukraine and Russia’s actions in the region greatly concern Polish and other European lawmakers. Russia’s actions seem to only undermine the rule of law established worldwide. As a result, this forces eastern countries such as the Baltic States and Poland to reevaluate their security infrastructure and stability. The upheaval in energy security also worries multiple European countries. While the majority of European Union member states depend on Russia for energy and Russia continues to act in a rogue manner, conflict of interest becomes immediately apparent. The National Security Strategy is a response to the growing crises in Europe and the anticipated growth of distinct threats to Polish security, whether domestic or international. Poland’s NSS is also an answer to the increasing globalization processes and demand for energy resources worldwide, which are apt to sudden change and potential economic crises. Background On the surface, the creation of the 2014 National Security Strategy (NSS) can be attributed to the recent

appointment of Ewa Kopacz and the actions of the National Security Bureau, stated on the last pages of the NSS.2 Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz’s address validates this theory through emphasizing the point that “…in the new type of war, it is crucial to strengthen the Polish military potential, but also to protect the borders and cooperating law enforcement services, the Police and Border Guard, with the armed forces.” Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tomasz Siemoniak presented this plan during a meeting of the National Security Council, and it was approved by the Council of Ministers on November 5.3 The Strategy of Development of The National Security System Of The Republic of Poland 2022, adopted in 2013, less succinctly describes Poland’s security situation. Furthermore, it dictates how a system should be created in order to deter threats to national security. This document describes Poland’s main objective as being “Strengthening efficiency and cohesion of the national security system.”4 This objective and the many others listed originated from the 2007 NSS.5 The mere existence of this document proves that it cannot simply be Russian actions in Ukraine and more recent crises that have resulted in the publication of the 2014 NSS. While the swift publication of the NSS is certainly connected to the alarming events in Ukraine, the general mood of Poland cannot be purely attributed to one recent conflict. There has been an increase in insurgencies throughout Europe in the 21st century.

Spring 2015 One must only remember the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, 2011 unrest in Kosovo and the recent 2015 Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in Paris to see an uptick in the amount of violence. On a worldwide scale, revolts and instability also continue to climb in occurrences. Boko Haram in Nigeria and the recent Arab Spring uprisings demonstrate an increase in armed violence primarily directed against supposed established states. With Poland steadily becoming a major European player, its opinion will be further sought on many of these matters. The NSS is certainly a response to global crises including the current war in Ukraine. But it is also a crucial document that Poland must publish in order to maintain its growing prestige as a player on the world stage. The 2014 NSS represents many different agendas in its publication. It must adequately respond to Russian actions and stand as an example for future EU and NATO strategy in Eastern Europe. It must also embody the rising power of Poland within the European Union. These are no easy tasks. The NSS successfully and concisely handles the importance and necessity of modernization, integration and readiness of both internal and external security forces. The focus on energy security, occasional paragraphs on ‘leaking national secrets’ and specifically the Ukrainian conflict reveal this document to be particularly novel in the manner in which it addresses currently vital concerns worldwide while remaining focused on chiefly Polish security strategy. Delving Deeper The two most discussed and echoed themes through the NSS are integration and modernization. Given the precursors The Strategy of Development of The National Security System of The Republic Of Poland 2022 and Poland’s Regional Development Strategy 2020, this is not surprising. This term can refer to the amalgamation of the national security system, as stated in point 109, “The basic objective of preparatory actions is to appropriately combine within the national security system its military and non-military, internal and external

components.”6 Integration also refers to an alliance of non-Polish and Polish security forces in point 38. Point 7 moreover describes Poland’s wish for regional cooperation with the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany and Poland); the Visegrad Four (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia); the Nordic Group; and Romania and the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The focus on external cooperation is noteworthy, considering the lack of recent agreement within the EU regarding the freedom of movement clause and the degree of sanctions on Russia. It also represents a concern that Poland would be abandoned to deal with Russia should any aggression be directed their way. With such close relations with France and Germany, Poland is more secure. Internal integration of security forces primarily signifies the concept of readiness. Much of Poland’s security remains split between internal and external, police and military. There remains a lack of preparedness for any sort of immediate conflict. These two variants of integration together illustrate that Poland expresses a clear need to show strength by preparing for conflict and attempting to divert it through collaboration and alliances. It comes as little surprise that modernizing Poland’s armed forces is necessary. The NSS clearly states, “A consistently implemented security policy, which constitutes an integral part of the Polish foreign policy, favours the strengthening of defence capacities in military and non-military terms.”8 The NSS goes into further detail and specifies the different types of modernization. Revamping the CFE Treaty is of utmost importance. Poland is not known to have any sort of nuclear capability and is therefore more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than other nuclear powers. However, the upgrade of Poland’s defense capabilities is no less critical. Not only is Poland better prepared for any sort of conflict near its borders, but Polish goods become more competitive on the world market. One aspect of modernization is the refurbishment of the diplomatic service. Improving the diplomatic core serves the purpose of

increasing Poland’s reach worldwide through better-trained diplomats and better-utilized techniques. Remodeling the military education system is another tenet of modernization, which follows the trend of readiness for conflict. Perhaps the most critical form of modernization mentioned in the NSS is the renovation of the infrastructure for energy storage. It acknowledges the need to solve the energy dilemma in which Europe finds itself. The variety of cutting edge adaptations within Poland’s security strategy represents a significant shift from a previously stagnant state to a dynamic state flexing its ability to acclimatize to a new and unsafe world.9 Novel Aspects While the themes of integration and modernization are heavily articulated throughout the NSS, two novel aspects emerge as new phenomena in the national security mainstream theory. The emphasis on energy security can be primarily attributed to a growing concern about energy shortages. In many separate points, the NSS notes that energy security is not just about ensuring that energy is available, but rather that it comes “by means of continuous and diversified sources of supply.”10 Part of this task includes the initiative to “start extracting energy resources from domestic unconventional deposits, to develop network and generation infrastructure on the basis of coal, nuclear, and gas fuels, and to ensure diversified access to sources and routes of raw material supply.”11 What makes the inclusion of these policies so innovative is that they take into account a variety of different parts of energy security. Many conflicts worldwide can be attributed to energy shortages or instability. Energy is one of the primary reasons for the conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine acts as a transitory state for the majority of Russian gas as it flows to the European continent. When former President Yanukovych chose to reject the EU Association Agreement, popular support within Ukraine forced him to flee from office.12 Poland’s distinct concentration on energy security shows that there is an understanding of the importance of energy and the very real

24 effects that it has upon security policy, among the Polish government. The second novel aspect of the NSS is the topic of ‘leaking’ classified documents to the public. It is true that “possible unauthorized disclosure or theft of classified information and other data protected by law may cause damage to the national security and interests of the Republic of Poland,” but it is very unique to see it referenced in a security document.13 This may certainly refer to other intelligence services. Hence, the focus on “the development and implementation of national solutions in the field of cryptography.”14 But it could also refer to ‘leaking’ documents. In recent years, the United States has seen sources such as Wikileaks and Edward Snowden casually disperse valuable intelligence information to the wider world. The motives of these two ‘leakers’ are disputable at best. There remains the constant concern that information may fall into the wrong hands. Both of these potential concerns fall under the reign of counter-intelligence. The concept of protecting classified documents is well known under counter-intelligence. However, point 56 states unequivocally, “an improving position of Poland in the international arena results in an increased interest of foreign secret services in our country.”15 The statement is valid. Becoming more visible certainly attracts more attention, especially in retrieving classified information. Furthermore, the NSS does not discriminate between hackers and foreign terrorists. This interesting take on classified information seems to reaffirm a general Polish principle of showing strength in all areas of security. Main Strategic Objectives 1. Maintaining and demonstrating readiness of the integrated national security system for seizing opportunities, taking up challenges, reducing risks and preventing threats 2. Reinforcing NATO’s readiness and ability to provide collective defence, as well as the coherence of EU’s actions in the field of security; building a strong position of Poland in the two organizations 3. Ensuring energy security and climate security as well as protection

The International Relations Review of the environment, biodiversity and national resources, in particular water resources, and shaping the spatial development of the country in a manner increasing the resistance to a variety of hazards, in particular military, natural and technological ones.16 Out of the sixteen separate objectives, the above three successfully summarize the NSS in its most basic form. The first objective, focuses primarily on maintaining preparedness, as is stated multiple times throughout the NSS. It focuses on a multitude of different security aspects, including military education or defense industry capacity. The second objective emphasizes cooperation and collaboration with supranational security organizations. The third objective discusses energy security and uniquely discusses building the ‘spatial development of the country’ against military threats. Most of what is highly emphasized in the NSS can be related back to a crisis or security event in the past year. Energy security following the outbreak of war in Ukraine, or modernizing the armed forces following Boko Haram’s devastating attacks on the Nigerian army. Understanding their regional position forces Poland to observe their security situation as not fully stable. Close to Russian borders, heavily dependent on Russia for oil and gaining status as a major player in Europe, Poland is in a precarious position. Implications Comprehensive as it may be, Poland’s National Security Strategy 2014 is only the start of new security reforms that may sweep across Poland in the future. The Polish National Security Council has again met in 2015 to discuss cyber security. The most interesting piece about this meeting was that, when asked about the terrorist attacks in Paris as affecting Poland, Minister of Internal Affairs Teresa Piotrowska responded, “all of the country’s services are constantly on full alert.”17 That statement is indicative of just how anxious the Polish government appears to the world. With the escalation of the crisis in the

Ukraine, Poland must continuously reevaluate its position on foreign policy, border security and potential threats that may cross into Poland from Ukraine. The recent push into Mariupol by Ukrainian separatists is a sign of just how volatile the situation may become. Poland must rely on not only its current forces and policies, but must reassess and continuously adapt. The first step was the approval of the 2014 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. Following the establishment of the strategies and concepts, all that remains is the potential for change and improvement.

Spring 2015

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The International Relations Review

Modern Day Saga Iceland and the EU Essay and Photo by Nicole Backhaus, CAS ‘16

he political geography of Europe over the past two decades has been largely determined by the advent and growth of the European Union. Today, twenty-one years after the creation of the European Union, only three western European countries remain outside of the EU: Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland. Of those three countries, only Iceland has ever come particularly close to European Union accession. In 2008, after the collapse of its three major banks and the ensuing financial and economic crisis, Iceland made its first push to join the European Union. The appeal of adopting the Euro was at an all time high, and many thought that accession to the EU would help to stabilize the country’s economy, and increasingly unstable political situation. The crisis prompted a fascinating paradox - political support for accession reached unprecedented highs, while popular support reached an all time low. What is the explanation for this discrepancy? Certainly there are some political justifications. Chiefly, if Iceland were to join the European Union, it would have to open its fishing waters to other EU member states, including its historic rival in the fishing industry, the United Kingdom. Likewise, while there are some obvious economic incentives to joining the European Union – most importantly, the allure of a stable currency (the Euro) – there are also economic concerns voiced by the tremendously influential agriculture and fishery industries. There is no denying the influence that the economic and political issues of the mid-late 2000s had in prompting Iceland to apply for European Union membership. Without this crisis, it seems highly unlikely that Iceland would have ever applied for EU candidate status, let alone have gotten so far along in the negotiation process. However, I believe that Iceland’s attempted accession to the European Union was simply a flash-inthe-pan reaction to a profound economic and political crisis. As the economy has recovered, negotiations have all but been called off, and once again the future looks

bleak for Icelandic accession to the EU. This is because the most compelling reasons for Iceland’s refusal to join the European Union have little to do with these economic and political concerns, and everything to do with Iceland’s sense of identity and unique geopolitical position. A small island nation in the middle of the desolate North Atlantic, Iceland finds itself geographically, economically and politically positioned between two of the world’s most powerful political forces: the United States and the European Union. Combined with its relatively recent independence and its long democratic history, Iceland has cultivated an identity between both imposing countries by forming bilateral agreements and treaties with both to strengthen its position between the two. Thus Iceland finds itself in a unique position: is it willing to sacrifice its special relationship with the United States for full integration in the European Union? And will the Icelandic desire for autonomy ultimately outweigh its deference to European supranationalism? The answer to these two questions is the most integral part of understanding the ultimate fate of Iceland and the European Union. In the autumn of 2008, all three of Iceland’s major banks – Landsbanki, Glitnir and Kaupthing – failed. The culmination of irresponsible banking practice, the collapse plunged Iceland into a state of economic, and soon political, crisis. One of the chief economic concerns, which had long been a problem in Iceland but had become particularly glaring during the crisis, was Iceland’s currency problem. The already notoriously unstable Icelandic krónur, which had declined over 35% against the Euro during the period of January 2008 through September of that year, all but crashed after the bank failures. Throughout 2008, the Icelandic government had attempted to peg the krónur to the Euro at a rate of about 131 krónur to the euro. These efforts failed, and by early October, the exchange rate hovered around 340 krónur to the euro. The need for a stable currency was obvious, and given Iceland’s proximity to Europe and its close economic and political relationship

Spring 2015 with the European Union, it seemed a reasonable proposal, and ultimately was responsible for Iceland’s bid for EU membership. When Iceland began exploring the possibility of adopting the euro to replace the Icelandic krónur, the country hit a wall. The European Union informed the country that a requisite for adopting the Euro was EU membership. This response left Iceland at a crossroads. Iceland to this point was the only Western European country to have never considered EU membership – even Norway and Switzerland had held referendums on the matter. However, while the issue of adopting the euro certainly helped propel Icelandic politicians to seek out EU membership, support for EU membership did not transcend the political realm to the Icelandic public. One important detail to note about the push to begin negotiations for EU membership is that the movement was completely initiated by the government. There was never any sudden public support for European Union membership. In fact, support for joining the EU actually hit an all time low between 2009 and 2010, when it hovered around a mere 25% of the population. This seems to be contradictory in light of the Icelander’s overwhelming desire to adopt a foreign currency – that is until one decouples the desires of the Icelandic politicians from those of the Icelandic people. While public support was undeniably in favor of adopting a foreign currency, that did not necessarily translate into overwhelming support for joining the euro specifically – and certainly not going to the length of joining the European Union in order to adopt it. There was also widespread talk of adopting other foreign currencies such as the Norwegian krone and the US dollar. Interestingly, most Icelanders favored the adoption of the Canadian dollar over other options. This currency situation highlights the interesting position that Iceland occupies – both geographically and geopolitically – in the North Atlantic. While Iceland does enjoy an undeniably favorable relationship

with the European Union, it also benefits in many ways from its strong relationships with three non-European Union countries – Norway, Canada, and perhaps most significantly, the United States. During World War II, Iceland was occupied by the Allied Forces. This occupation undeniably affected Iceland’s defensive policy, and tilted it in the direction of the United States. In fact, Iceland – along with the US – was one of the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This defensive relationship is in stark contrast with the relationship Iceland has with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the defensive branch of the European Union. As Icelandic political scientist Baldur Thorhallsson explains in his article, “The Distinctive Domestic Characteristics of Iceland and the Rejection of Membership of the European Union”, “Denmark, Norway and Iceland align themselves with British intergovernmentalism as a vision of European unity, preferring power to be located at the state level, and that decisions in security matters are made with the Americans.” This is in opposition to the CFSP, which saw foreign policy and defense strategies being determined at a supranational level, with EU member states helping to execute the agreed upon strategy. In 1951, Iceland signed a bilateral defense treaty with the United States, which allowed for the US to maintain a military base on the Reykjanes Peninsula until 2006. Even after the closure of this base, the United States pledged to continue working with the country on issues such as search and rescue, disaster surveillance, and “maritime interdiction training with U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard units and U.S. deployments to support the NATO air surveillance mission in Iceland”. This special relationship between the two countries on defensive matters also extends into the economic realm. Iceland’s geographic position lends itself to beneficial economic relationships with both the United States and the European Union. The US is Iceland’s fourth biggest

export market, behind the European Economic Area (EEA), Germany, and the United Kingdom. Likewise, US investment in Iceland has historically accounted for approximately 1/3 of all foreign direct investment in the country. In 2009, Iceland and the US signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement that outlined a plan to enhance bilateral trade and investment between the two countries. In one specific example, Iceland and the state of Maine recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding that aimed to “forge an official relationship between the two states and outlines a desire for increased cooperation in the areas of business development, transport, logistics and culture. It also calls for further cooperation in the Arctic and North Atlantic, in regards to mutual interests, such as environmental security and search and rescue operations.” While Iceland’s greatest trading partner does continue to be the European Economic Area, it is able to enjoy significant levels of trade with the EU without being an EU member. Through bilateral negotiations with the European Union Iceland already benefits economically from the EU, and it benefits without having to sacrifice any degree of autonomy over its fishing waters or agricultural sector. Iceland is a member of both the European Economic Area (EEA) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA). These agreements allow Iceland to participate in Europe’s free flow of labor and goods, and benefit from the market that the EU creates for Iceland’s exports. However, since these agreements were negotiated with Iceland as a non-EU member state, the rules and laws regarding the fishing and agriculture sectors do not apply to Iceland, allowing it to continue to regulate these sectors as it sees fit. These two sectors are of great importance to Iceland’s economy, and are key political factors in Iceland’s continued resistance to joining the European Union. Like Norway, one of the major political reasons why Iceland has continued to resist joining the European Union is because EU

28 membership would force Iceland to give up autonomy of its fishing waters. The fishing industry comprises approximately 63% of Iceland’s export earnings, and fishermen enjoy a great deal of representation in the Icelandic parliament, the Althingi. Under the current arrangement – that is, Iceland as a non-EU member state but a signatory to the EEA, EFTA, and Schengen Agreement – Iceland can export its fish to the European market, without having to share its fishing waters with other European Union states. Under EU laws, as dictated by the Common Fisheries Policy, EU member states must share fishing waters and abide by the “total allowable catches for different species and national quotas” agreed upon by the European Union. Implicit in the conflict about fishing waters is the history surrounding the issue. During the Cold War era, there were a series of “Cod Wars” between Iceland and the United Kingdom. These conflicts over fishing waters ultimately culminated in Icelandic acquisition of some of Britain’s fishing waters, which strained the relationship between the two countries. When Iceland’s Landsbanki bank collapsed, it lost massive amounts of foreign wealth that had been invested in the bank. Much of that foreign wealth came from British and Dutch citizens. After allowing the bank, along with two others, to fail, the Icelandic government agreed not to pass the burden of reimbursing those who had invested in the banks on to the Icelandic taxpayers. In response, both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands filed lawsuits against the Icelandic government, which culminated in the IceSave trial. The ultimate decision by the EFTA court ruled that the Icelandic state was not responsible for paying back the money owed by Landsbanki – that was the responsibility of the Landsbanki estate. The ruling was welcomed in Iceland, but regarded with great consternation in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The strain that the IceSave case put on the relationship between Iceland and these two EU powerhouses was not

The International Relations Review insignificant in the grand scheme of Iceland’s negotiations regarding accession to the European Union. It was especially damning as Iceland’s relationship with the United Kingdom in particular was not particularly strong to begin with. However, despite strained relations between the countries, negotiations were able to continue, and in all likelihood would have led to Iceland accession to the European Union – if Iceland had decided to continue to pursue the matter. After four years of on and off negotiations, the Icelandic government announced in February of 2014 that they would officially withdraw their application to the European Union. The announcement came after a couple of years of stagnated negotiations, due to lack of public support. In theory, Iceland had been a shoo-in for the European Union. It abided by all of the terms of the Copenhagen Criteria, and no EU countries opposed its candidacy. Despite this, and despite the faltering economy and tense political situation, Icelanders never came to accept EU membership. This could, of course, have been the result of all of the political and economic issues that I have previously outlined, but one more intangible factor – though no less significant – is the role that the Icelandic sense of identity played in the public debate. One of the key features of Icelandic identity is the importance of democracy and the democratic process. Iceland is home to the world’s oldest democracy – the Althingi – which dates back to the year 930. When Iceland’s banking system collapsed, both the bankers and politicians involved were held accountable and sent to jail. In fact, Icelanders value democracy so much that there were massive protests when the government decided this past February to unilaterally withdraw negotiations. Despite the fact that support for joining the European Union was all but nonexistent, 72 percent of Icelanders favored a popular referendum on the matter. In response, the government backpedaled

and agreed not to officially withdraw the application without holding a referendum. This deeply ingrained respect for democracy is one of the reasons Icelanders are so skeptical about joining the European Union. The EU’s democracy deficit has been well noted, and is a major concern for the Icelandic public. It seems unlikely that Iceland would be willing to compromise on something so essential to their identity, especially when combined with all of the other factors that make EU membership so unappealing to Iceland. As a small island nation in the North Atlantic situated on the ridge between the European and North American tectonic plates, Iceland finds itself in a unique geopolitical position. At once isolated and caught between two of the world’s most powerful political entities, Iceland’s location transcends geography into the realm of politics and economics. In recent years, economic and political crisis pushed Iceland to the brink of accession to the European Union. But as Iceland’s economy and political system stabilized, negotiations for EU membership all but flat-lined. This can largely be attributed to the fact that, while integral to Iceland’s decision to apply for membership, the political and economic issues presented by the 2008 financial meltdown were not severe enough to push Icelanders to compromise on their sense of Icelandic identity, or their position as an intermediary between the European Union and the United States of America. The political and economic obstacles confronting Iceland’s accession to the European Union could be overcome – but not without Iceland wanting to overcome them. Because of its identity and position between the US and EU, it seems highly unlikely that the Icelandic people will change their minds on EU membership any time soon.

Photo by Gabriela Griscius, CAS â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;15

The International Relations Review

Crisis Control and the Future of the Eurozone: A Conversation with Professor Vivien Schmidt Conducted by Latifah Azlan, CAS ‘15, and Madeleine Martin, CAS ‘16 The financial crisis of 2008 left Europe in shambles and set in motion austerity measures in a number of Eurozone countries. Now, a stagnated recovery in countries like Greece and Spain has laid seige to the promise of a unified, properous Europe. We talked with Professor Vivien Schmidt to dig deeper into what’s causing the crisis.

How does the 2008 global crisis impact, or continue to impact, the Eurozone crisis today? Essentially there were three crises. The first is a banking crisis. The second is the crisis of the real economy, so banks go bust and then it affects business. The third crisis is the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. The main story is that the markets began to worry about debt. Did there need to be a Eurozone crisis? No, the EU could have decided to rescue Greece, create a fund for Greece immediately, or provide for some sort of mutualization of debt, such as Eurobonds, which like Treasury bills, would cover all of the countries in the Eurozone. Basically, if you have a central bank that [acts as] a lender of last resort, that central bank will never allow your country to go bankrupt, because it will simply buy the debt itself and print money to

buy the debt. That’s what the U.S. Federal Reserve did, that’s what the Bank of England did. But the EU, unlike the U.S. and UK, which have been very pragmatic and continued with something of a stimulus, takes a much more orthodox, ordoliberal, rules-following response that essentially means everyone is tightening their belts in a recession. Bad idea, [which] is what Keynes said, and he was right. The result is the difference between the U.S. and the Eurozone. The U.S. [has] largely recovered, even if it is a fragile recovery, but it’s still recovering. The Eurozone is heading into deflation and other serious problems and you can now talk about the rise of poverty, the rise in inequality, etc.

Photo by Vincent Jordan, CAS ‘15

Spring 2015

Do you think there’s a possibility that Greece might pull out of the Eurozone? Could that initiate a domino effect throughout the southern region?

You mentioned Syriza. How do you think that the party’s rise will empower or inspire similar parties in Europe like Podemos?

There’s always a possibility of an accident in terms of a Greek exit. The new Syriza government certainly doesn’t want that; no one wants that. The big question is what these negotiations are going to bring about. Syriza came to power promising it was not going to continue with austerity, but it [still] needs to get loans. It needs to continue to get money from the bailout fund and from the troika (the IMF, the EU, and the European Central Bank). A lot depends upon the interaction going on now, and one of the problems is that everyone’s angry with Greece. The Euro council [has] continued to push austerity, yet Greece is saying they don’t want to do it anymore.

The fact that Podemos went from nothing to 13-15 seats is already significant. So, Syriza’s presence is very important for the left. If it fails, we’re going to have real trouble in Greece and I get very worried. The left are essentially for more humanitarian aid, they don’t want austerity and are not anti-immigration, not racist and not authoritarian - at least we hope not. What’s worrisome is if you crush the extreme left, you’ll get the extreme right, and it’s a much nastier world that we’ll live in as a result.

What do you think the Eurozone crisis says about the integration project? Do you think that it’s just going to get worse unless something drastic happens? I think this is a moment where things could go one way or another. Within the next couple of years you’re going to see a whole range of new elections. If parties on the extreme right increase their share of the vote in the different countries, at least some of them will end up in coalition governments. This could lead to total gridlock - the EU will not be able to go forward. The EU needs to have a new grand bargain, a new vision, a new narrative for where its going. What the EU actually needs is to find ways to help countries get out from under their debt burden, or restructure the debt. Even if the debt goes out 30 or 50 years there needs to be some kind of agreement or grand bargain to get out from under this. The EU is in a difficult situation both economically, given the threat of deflation, and politically, given the decreasing trust and the growing divides among EU citizens in different member-states. You can say that more people are aware of the EU, and more people are talking about the EU, but no longer always in a positive way. The shine is off the rose for the EU, in particular as a ‘normative power’ or as ‘the European Social Model.’ Instead, Europeans are inclined to think: “we’re poorer, we’re not growing, and what’s the point?” And of course there are sovereignty and identity issues at the national level, as well as democracy issues. Citizens are saying “we change our governments and they do the same thing. Is that democracy?” It was the radical right that had been saying it. And now the radical left. So what you’re going to see if this is not resolved soon is a greater move to the extremes.

Will it be the end of the Euro? Maybe, probably not. But if the Euro does end, so will the EU, or the EU will continue to limp along, but it won’t be the same. And there’s so much that could and should be done in Europe, but relatively little has happened since the Eurozone crisis because all the attention is focused there. So where is the talk on common security and defense policy? Nowhere. Energy union? Nowhere. And yet there are serious needs. Immigration has continued to fester as a problem and no general agreements. Each country is left on its own- so places like Italy are drowning in immigrants. And no one is going to say “we have a common obligation”. Greece has tons of asylum seekers, and doesn’t know what to do with them. There’s no common policy that really works in terms of immigration, everything has been sort of held in abeyance as this Eurozone crisis has continued. It’s now slow burning, but who knows when it’ll become fast again? At the end of the four month period Greece is supposed to have a plan, so that it’s able to pay its debts, or it’s going to be in default. For the moment, EU leaders are playing chicken- not a good idea.

Vivien Schmidt is the Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration, Director of Center for the Study of Europe, and a Professor of International Relations and Political Science in the Pardee School of Global Studies. She specializes in European political economy, integration, and politics.

Photo by Vincent Jordan, CAS â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;15

ESSAYS 36

Private Military Contractors in Combat By Michael Stinnett, CAS ‘16 The U.S.’s increasing reliance on private military contractors has become an essential part of success on the battlefield. Yet this reliance seems to have more drawbacks than benefits.

Center and Periphery By Andrea Yávar, CAS ‘15 Education in Peru faces many challenges, but for those on the outskirts of society, the challenge lies in neglect.

The Shifting Tide of U.S.-Cuba Relations By Morgan Peterson, CAS ‘17 The U.S. and Cuba have begun to reestablish diplomatic relations, but work still needs to be done in order to repair the damaged relationship.

The Vicious Cycle of Corruption in Brazil By Gabriela Griscius, CAS ‘16 Brazil, a country long touted for its economic potential, continues to grapple with political roadblocks and setbacks.

The Eighth Boston Area Model United Nations Conference Staff BarMUN VIII! Visit www.barmun.org to apply. BarMUN is Boston University's premiere collegiate Model United Nations conference with twelve historical and modern committees. It is hosted and staffed entirely by talented Boston University students. No prior Model United Nations required! Contact outreach@barmun.org for more information!

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The International Relations Review

Private Military Contractors in Combat: A cost-effective solution or a disaster for U.S. foreign policy? By Michael Stinnett, CAS ‘16

he use of mercenaries in war and combat is certainly not a new phenomena. Soldiers for hire have been used ever since the wars of classical Greece and Rome. Their use continued well into seventeenth century Europe until their use became more of a hindrance than a benefit. Throughout the Middle Ages, from the twelfth century until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, most fighting was contracted out to professional soldiers who were not loyal to a single state or cause, but who fought for profit. It turns out, however, that mercenaries are not extinct. Today, mercenaries have made a resounding resurgence in the form of Private Military Contractors (PMCs). PMCs resurfaced in the 1990s as private security forces. This rebirth was a result of the decrease in the size of the military after the Cold War. Although the United States reduced its military size significantly, it still decided to intervene in regional conflicts abroad, such as the first Gulf War in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999. The U.S. invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan was no different. As the environment became increasingly difficult for the U.S. to manage alone and international forces were often unwilling to fill gaps where U.S. forces had been spread too thin, President Bush relied on private security forces such as Blackwater. While PMCs were spun by the United States as a necessary tool to supplement U.S. forces, their use created controversies surrounding the morality and legality of their application. Contractors provide a vast array

of military services, from acting as interpreters and driving fuel trucks to providing technical expertise. Yet, the longer the wars dragged on, the more PMCs were used in combat operations by providing security for convoys and interrogating prisoners. Out of approximately 180,000 contractors in Iraq in 2007, there were 20,000 to 60,000 armed contractors at any given moment, compared to the 165,000 military personnel. The massive increase in PMCs in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars brought about several important problems, some of which not only hurt U.S. war efforts in the short-term, but also in the long run as well. The first issue is the fact that these PMCs often operate in a legal gray area. They are not held accountable by the same rules as U.S. soldiers, therefore they cannot be punished in the same way under the UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). They are also not held accountable under the Geneva Convention for two important reasons. First, the war is no longer a conflict between the U.S. and Iraq, but "'between the Iraqi government and its allies, including the United States, and dissident elements within Iraq.'" Therefore, PMCs do not fall under the statute that there “must be a 'declared war or ... any other armed conflict' between at least two nations that are 'High Contracting Parties' to the Convention'”. Put simply, PMCs are operating with the consent of the US and Iraq against insurgents, not against another country that is a part of the Geneva Convention. Second, the Geneva Convention exempts

"a national of a Party to the conflict [and] a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict..." from being classified as a mercenary. Since the United States is involved in the conflict, and hires the PMCs, they cannot be prosecuted as mercenaries under the Geneva Convention. They are also unlikely to be punished by the host country as their laws usually do one of two things: protect PMCs or give them prerogative in the use of force. As Peter Singer, Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institute, criticizes, “As a result of these gaps, not one private military contractor has been prosecuted or punished for a crime in Iraq (unlike the dozens of U.S. soldiers who have), despite the fact that more than 20,000 contractors have now spent almost two years there. Either every one of them happens to be a model citizen, or there are serious shortcomings in the legal system that governs them.” One of the leading voices against the use of PMCs in combat has been Deborah Avant, a professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine and a fellow at the Pacific council on International Policy. In her article “The Mercenary Debate: Three Views”, she elaborates on the benefits of citizen involvement militarily as it incentivizes an informed public wary of war and more cautious of military risks. But this only works if the citizens themselves make up the bulk of the military forces and if they are informed of all military actions overseas. As Avant explains, “When conscription was a feature of

Spring 2015 U.S. wartime mobilization, constituents were more likely to pressure their Congressmen to justify wars. The public demanded accountability as the human costs – lives of friends and family members interrupted or lost – were more widely distributed.” If citizens are suiting up and taking arms to fight for the interest of the state, then the state is forced to only undertake only those military actions that are vital to the security of the state. When the state turns to PMCs to fill the role of the military, it does not have to justify each and every decision, and has less reason to behave responsibly overseas. PMCs are hired to do a specific job for a particular contract, not perform military service. They perform their task solely for the paycheck that they receive, and can walk away any time they please. As Avant explains further, “They are not organized within congressional constituencies, and... this arrangement weakens congressional incentives to check the Executive Branch and masks the human costs of war.” Congress must authorize the use of troops overseas, acting on behalf of those who elected them, but they have no say when the Executive Branch contracts PMCs instead, even though they have the same effect on our foreign policy, if not worse. Even if Congress authorizes the use of a certain amount of troops, the Executive Branch can use PMCs to augment the remainder of bodies that it desires. The use of PMCs also caused other problems regarding the legitimacy of the U.S. as a global leader. Human rights violations carried out by military contractors, such as those that took place at Abu Ghraib prison, bring about condemnation not only from the local population, but from the international community as well. While more than a dozen U.S. soldiers have been punished for their roles in the Abu Ghraib incident, no contractors have been charged or prosecuted for their roles in the scandal. After Blackwater employees killed seventeen civilians in Nisour Square in 2007, it took over a year of public condemnation for charges to be brought against five of the contractors. Even though contractors are not allowed to carry out offensive operations, the tragedy at Nisour

Square shows that playing defense does not guarantee that the contractors will abstain from engaging in combat operations, whether they are justified or not. When contractors falter, U.S. foreign policy suffers. However, while not all of the actions of the PMCs cause international incidents, even the most routine operations are seen as obscene and draw the ire of the local Iraqi population. According to former Coalition Provisional Authority Ann Exline Starr, while soldiers are mindful of the locals, even “playing cards and drinking tea with local Iraqis”, the contractors' sole concern was the contract itself, telling her that “'Our mission is to protect the principal at all costs. If that means pissing off the Iraqis, too bad.'” Singer writes that “This protection first and last mentality has led to many common operating practices that clearly enrage locals. In an effort to keep potential threats away, contractors drive up the wrong side of the road, ram civilian vehicles, toss smoke bombs, and fire weaponry as warnings, all as standard practices.” Journalist Robert Young Pelton described his month spent embedded with Blackwater contractors in Baghdad. 'They're famous for being very aggressive. They use their machine guns like car horns.'” The lack of concern or awareness of how their actions affect the bigger picture is “poisonous” to U.S. foreign policy and counterinsurgency efforts. Singer even uses a quick equation to demonstrate the serious consequences the actions of these PMCs have on the overall mission: “Over the course of the day, that Iraqi civilian might tell X people about how 'The Americans almost killed me today, and all I was doing was trying to get to work.' Y is the number of other people that convoy ran off the road on its run that day. Z is the number of convoys in Iraq that day. Multiply X times Y times Z times 365 and you have the mathematical equation of how to lose a counterinsurgency within a year.” Friedrichs and Friesendorf point out another problem with utilizing PMCs in combat. As Michael C. Desch argued in Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, outside conflict generally strengthens a military, as they have an outside threat

to focus on, leaving little opportunity for internal dissent to develop. But in Iraq, U.S. soldiers develop feelings of contempt for the contractors that they work with, creating unnecessary tension and conflict that would otherwise be absent. Among the causes of conflict are the different standards to which they are held and different laws that they are subjected to. The fact that contractors are paid significantly more for performing the same tasks as U.S. soldiers deals a severe blow to troop morale. The vastly higher pay of contractors not only causes low troop morale, but it creates a drain on what talent the military does have. Many U.S. troops leave the military once their contracts are up, just to work for the very security companies they once held with contempt. The military spends millions of dollars and countless hours to train troops, just to see them “'graduate...into the private sector'”. As Colonel Douglas MacGregor observes, “[American] politicians frequently substitute a fascination with direct action in the form of air strikes or special operations killings for strategy.” Similar to how our obsession with drone warfare is losing the hearts and minds of the Iraqi population with every strike from above, we lose just as much credibility with every PMC convoy that barrels down the streets of Baghdad, harassing daily commuters with their machine guns. As Jeffrey A. Sluka, Ph.D states, “Perspective is everything in making moral and strategic assessments.” To the Executive Branch, PMCs are a cost effective way to address the shortcomings of the military in Iraq and beyond, both monetarily and politically. But just like our overemphasis on drone warfare, PMCs create more problems than they solve, recruiting more insurgents than they discourage, all while American citizens and their elected representatives lose control over U.S. foreign policy. Since their inception centuries ago, mercenaries have been used initially as a quick and effective way to bring bodies to the battlefield when a traditional army is not an option. But just as the medieval knights were eventually discarded for their greed, disorganization and lack of discipline, PMCs are now being seen as a curse rather than a blessing.

38 Their shortsightedness and allegiance solely to the contract cause long term problems for the U.S. military and U.S. foreign policy. As Singer paraphrases General von Moltke, “'No plan survives first contact with the enemy' and it is expected that the enemy will react, and the plan will have to be adjusted. What

The International Relations Review is not expected is for a third force to cause the strategy to be jettisoned before it even has a chance to succeed.” Unless the issue is addressed and our reliance on private contractors is reduced, either by increasing U.S. troop numbers or decreasing U.S. commitments abroad, the problem will only grow larger and

insurgent recruitment will continue. By continuing the current path, “when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can't win with them, but can't go to war without them.”

Center and Periphery How Peru’s education system is hurting its poor By Andrea Yávar, CAS ‘15

or indigenous Peruvians lacking the same privileges as their urban counterparts, education represents an escape from the poverty cycle. With an education, citizens can attend university, get a good job and be granted access to opportunities previously reserved for the urban elite. In order for Peru to develop, the country must first invest in its untapped human resources. This can be done through the enhanced education of a highly skilled, productive labor force. Geographically, the Peruvian government focuses on the coast at the expense of the interior regions. This tension between the center and periphery reinforces limited state presence in the interior regions, inefficient allocation of resources, and subjugation of indigenous people. To overcome these regional inconsistencies, the Peruvian government must allocate regional resources more efficiently, improve the quality of teaching, set higher national standards for education, implement bilingual programs for Quechua-speaking children and provide greater financial incentives for poor parents to send their children to school. The Peruvian government’s centralization is the root of this regional inequality challenge in the educational

system. Centralization is a process through which the central authority maintains all or almost all functions of the education system under its power and is the socio-political and cultural phenomenon that defines the traditional form of government of most Latin American countries; it does have, however, many negative social side effects.1 Since the Peruvian central government's main focus is on Lima and the coast, the sierra and selva have not developed at the same rate. According to David Scott Palmer, Professor of International Relations at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, despite the fact that overall poverty levels in Peru have declined dramatically from 69 percent in 2001 to 46 percent in 2009, regional poverty levels in the highlands remain higher than the national average and almost twice as high as the coast. While poverty levels in the coast have dropped from 39 percent in 2001 to 19 percent in 2009, in the highlands they have lowered from 72 percent in 2001 to 53 percent in 2009.2 While the coastal regions have experienced rapid progress, the interior regions of Peru have not experienced the same benefits of economic growth, development and investment.3 This

federal policy thus contributes to the overall inequality between the coastal and interior regions. The state’s inefficient and inherently limited capacity to allocate resources prevents a large peasant population from receiving benefits. From Lima, the central government’s ability to enforce social reforms in remote rural zones is limited geographically. As such, educational reforms are left behind in the highlands.4 According to Peru’s Grupo Análisis Para Desarrollo (GRADE), Peru maintains a system of unequal distribution, where the regions with the highest levels of poverty and greatest need receive the least amount of funding for education. Richer regions such as Tumbes, Moquegua, Arequipa and Tacna, receive adequate amounts of funding, but Huánuco, the second poorest region in the country, receives the least amount of funding.5 For example, the average student in coastal Moquegua receives $442, while a student in highland Huanuco receives only $252.6 Local governments that lack sufficient funds cannot afford high quality teachers, and their students are thus disadvantaged even further. Since the central government's distribution of funds does not account for regional

Spring 2015

Photo by TeAndrea Jackson, CAS ‘17

differences, such as population density or poverty level, resources are not allocated for even regional coverage. Unequal distribution of resources across Peru continues social reforms in richer regions at the expense of poor and neglected regions. AmongProgrammeforInternational Student Assessment (PISA) countries, Peru is ranked as significantly unequal in terms of its educational performance, with a ratio of 2.8.7 In comparison to other Latin American countries, Peru scored far below the Latin American

average.8 According to Oxford Analytica for Peru, “[t]he proportion of students passing the PISA test in 2010 was 35 percent for comprehension, 21 percent in mathematics and 35 percent in science. The Latin American averages for these three were 51, 37 and 48 percent, respectively.”9 The current Peruvian educational system reinforces what sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls “the social reproduction” of the bourgeoisie and the social exclusion of indigenous children.10 Although Peruvian indigenous children

legally have the right to be educated in their native language of Quechua, in practice, cultural and linguistic barriers are not taken into consideration by many schools. Education in Quechua only occurs at certain elementary schools, while secondary school is generally taught in Spanish. The transition into school is therefore more difficult because indigenous children face the depreciation of their culture, identity and language.11 At an institutional level, Peruvian education promotes the cultural assimilation of indigenous

40 people into the socially acceptable mestizo national identity, referring to a person of mixed race. The glorification of mestizaje, or ‘racial mixing,’ imposes the mestizo identity and use of the Spanish language at the expense of the indigenous culture and native language.12 According to the International Journal of Educational Development, “[t]he undervaluing and exclusion from school of young indigenous children's identities at this early stage represents considerable stress and aggression for children, and threatens their very right to education.”13 The social contempt towards their identity causes many to develop an inferiority complex, or to “know their place,” which thus contributes to the Peruvian social hierarchy with indigenous people at the bottom.14 Consequently, academic failure is common and many indigenous children will eventually quit school, inflating rural poverty. Thus, indigenous children face social and economic disadvantages of various forms that undoubtedly affect their learning capacities. Because this educational model presents additional educational challenges for indigenous children, it reinforces social inequality. Peru must improve its education in order to promote economic growth and tackle poverty. With such poor quality of education, the possibility for Peru to transform into a developed country is not feasible.15 Improving educational performance increases a country’s competitiveness by generating a skilled labor force that can create value-added products and services.16 Moreover, social mobility allows for the representation of marginalized indigenous groups’ voices in sociopolitical affairs. Hence, education has the potential to reduce political as well as economic inequality, creating a more inclusive and egalitarian society. In order for Peru to improve its educational system, the most important approach would be the decentralization of education. This requires the designation of responsibilities and power to regional, local, and communal governments. Over time, decentralization would produce a more effective allocation of public resources, and an improvement in educational quality and performance in the periphery, which would also take

The International Relations Review into account the multicultural diversity of its population.17 The Peruvian central government must also allocate funds more equitably. For example, by taking into account regional differences, such as poverty levels, the central government could allow for an investment increase in the regions that require the most aid.18 Academic journal Economics & Politics found that “the recent boom in commodity prices and generous revenue sharing agreements have spurred transfers to some municipalities that may simply not be able to manage the sudden increases in revenues.”19 These transfers, given to all 1846 districts with educational decentralization, are potential vehicles because significant resources are available at the municipal level, including the mining tax which goes to regions. There needs to be a commitment to use these resources for educational purposes. Thus, to efficiently decentralize into local municipalities, Peru must focus on local needs in conjunction with local capacity. In addition, Peru needs to establish more detailed, coherent performance expectations and standards for teachers. This particular career field in Peru has previously attracted poorly qualified applicants.20 By strengthening teacher training programs to improve skills, schools would hire increasingly competent teachers. In order to implement this proposal, Peru should provide financial incentives to encourage teacher accountability towards improvements in their students’ educational achievements. According to the World Bank, teacher accountability means “to work professionally according to high moral standards while ensuring that the children of the community receive an education that enables them to improve their personal opportunities and collective development of the country.”21 Moreover, the educational system needs to provide social inclusion for indigenous children by implementing a bilingual Quechua-Spanish program with respect for the indigenous culture and identity. Currently, in the education system there is lack of equitable attention paid to the poor, indigenous populations.22 Due to high poverty levels

in the rural areas, children often quit school to work at their family’s farm or small business. Since Peru lacks an official policy for school retention, teachers are forced to deal with the issue personally, without aid from educational incentives.23 By creating an educational program that fosters multiculturalism and the acceptance of varying national identities as opposed to cultural assimilation, indigenous children would have a greater incentive to stay in school. An example of conditional cash transfers is the current welfare program JUNTOS that the Peruvian government introduced in 2005 to improve education for the poorest children.24 The program gives financial a incentive to parents, $33 per month, to send their children to school. This makes sure that most poor children at risk remain in school instead of quitting to pursue employment. The focus is on addressing educational underachievement and poorquality educational services to break intergenerational transfers of poverty and increase rural school attendance. Overall, JUNTOS is an effective program. A recommendation would be to emphasize school attendance since many children currently enrolled in the program are still absent from school and continue to work to help their family.25 The Peruvian educational model fuels inequality by prioritizing the center over the periphery. While the center reaps the benefits of economic progress and is mostly compromised of whites and mestizos, the periphery is poor and has a large population of indigenous people. Through educational reforms Peru would be able to put a stop to inter-generational transfers of regional poverty, allowing greater social mobility to the rural poor. In the last twenty years there have been initiatives to decentralize the government: central government resources allocations to municipalities, the mining tax for regions, and additional stimuli such as JUNTOS. These initiatives must be built upon to bridge the inequality gap through increased quality of teaching and the implementation of bilingual programs for Quechua-speaking children.

Spring 2015

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The International Relations Review

Spring 2015

The Shifting Tide in US-Cuba Relations Castro and Obama administrations begin to repair a historically complex relationship By Morgan Peterson, CAS ‘17

“C

uándo?” responded my enthusiastic companion, his rough Cuban hands reflective of his days spent as a dishwasher rose in the air. I had asked him for his opinion on the newly restored diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba. The television in the background flashes a discolored recap of a recent baseball game. I take a sip of my mojito as I wait for his response - cool relief from the stark heat surrounding me. “When?’” came the answer in Spanish. As I looked around the dimly lit bar and met the eyes of eager Cubans, I finally came to understand the man. These individuals surrounding me had experienced periods of great diplomatic isolation and economic loss. Standing here sharing a mojito with an American is the change that is happening. Cuba’s history has shaped him to remain hopeful, but not expecting change. His drink with an American at his favorite bar is simply a new experience, but when the change occurs only then will he change his answer from “Cuándo?” to “Qué más? [What more?].” Raul Castro’s presidency brought hopeful changes in attitude towards U.S. relations and internal reform. On July 31, 2006, Fidel Castro announced the transfer of provisional power to Raul Castro.1 On February 24, 2008, Raul officially succeeded his brother as the first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, head of the Politburo, president of the Council of State, and commander and chief of the armed forces.2 In his concise speech, the new leader emphasized a desire to rebuild a relationship between the state and the individual, a radically different approach to policy than his forerunner. During

the early years of the Revolution, Raul was known for his rigor and loyalty coupled with somewhat draconian measures of discipline.3 His leadership as Minister of Defense in the revolutionary government demonstrated a strong focus on productivity and efficiency, compared to an emphasis on mass mobilization and voluntarism by Fidel.4 In the past seven years the Raul administration has implemented minor reforms that compliment this progressive mindset. At the administrative level, systems of accountability directly addressed corruption, while at the local level the ban on citizen access to hotels, beaches, and tourist facilities was lifted.5 The most significant change was the elimination of the tarjeta blanca, a document granting Cubans permission to leave the country.6 Talks of eliminating the Cuban peso, salary caps and other subsidies were also mentioned on numerous occasions by the administration. The progressive approach to domestic policy by the Raul Castro administration confirmed a readiness to reevaluate foreign policy towards the United States. The Obama administration openly demonstrated a willingness to restore diplomatic ties with Cuba during its first term. During a rally in Miami’s Little Havana in August 2007 Barack Obama, then a presidential candidate declared, “We’ve been engaged in a failed policy with Cuba for the last 50 years, and we need to change it.”7 The Cuban American National Foundation warmly received Obama, and he later carried Florida through the elections, proving a Democrat could assume a moderate stance on Cuba with voter support.8 Obama’s first term began with

a clear message by Cuban president Raul Castro just before the Summit of the Americas, “We have let the American government know both in private and in public [that Cuba was willing to open a dialogue concerning] everything they would like to talk about, but on an equal footing, with absolute respect for our sovereignty and for the right of the Cuban people to their self-determinations.”9 The U.S. interests section turned off the flashing electronic billboard, placed to display bright and bothersome American messages that displeased Cuban officials, while Cubans took down the black flags blocking the billboard. Obama quickly sought to renew cultural and academic relations by granting intellectuals and artists alike travel visas to the U.S.10 Mail service between the two countries was restored with the assistance of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bisa Williams.11 This “show of good faith” by the administration came with expectations of reciprocity openly spoken of by the president: “We don’t expect them to change overnight. That would be unrealistic. But we do expect that Cuba will send signals that they’re interested in liberalizing in such a way that not only do U.S.-Cuban relations improve, but so that the energy and creativity and initiative of the Cuban people can potentially be released.”12 Negative reactions by the Castro regime to such statements temporarily placed a hold on further reforms, bringing issues such as Obama’s continuation of George W. Bush’s democracy promotion programs to light. The Obama administration’s first presidential term labeled the inklings of reform, but an unwillingness to run the political risk of trying something

44 new locked the president in a continued pattern of animosity. December 14, 2014 marked for the United States a newfound importance in re-establishing stronger relations with Cuba. The United States delegation, led by Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson, met with the Cuban delegation, led by director-general of the U.S. division of Cuba’s Foreign Ministry Josefina Vidal, to discuss U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations. The historic prisoner swap of the Cuban Five for government contractor Alan P. Gross and fifty-three political prisoners reveals a bilateral cooperation between the countries.13 One of the main topics discussed was the establishment of a “normal” U.S. embassy with officials attached to other departments beyond the State, such as Commerce, Treasury or Justice.14 Lifting travel restrictions on U.S.

The International Relations Review diplomats and the return of U.S. fugitives were also heavily emphasized, along with migration and property claims issues.15 While explicit Cuban interests remain unclear, three demands were made clear: the reestablishment of its embassy in the United States, returning Guantanamo Bay, and taking its name off of the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.16 But the laws insist that full economic relations cannot be restored until Cuba allows freedom of expression, something the Communist Party has shown no interest in, “We think you will agree that the United States-Cuba relationship cannot near its considerable potential until the fundamental human rights of the Cuban people are respected by their government,” wrote Rep. Edward R. Royce (R-Calif.), the committee chairman, and ranking member Rep.

Eliot L. Engel (D-N.Y.) to President Obama in early January, 2015.17 Immobility towards human rights expansion continues to brew discontent within the U.S. delegation. Although many see the lifting of economic sanctions as only a beneficial decision, the economic, institutional and political repercussions are substantial. Without the embargo it is clear that trade between the U.S. and Cuba would increase dramatically, with some estimates reaching $2.8 billion annually.18 The American Farm Bureau Federation, for example, predicts the sale of food and farm products to approach $1-2 billion annually.19 This greater economic exchange, accompanied by greater investment by American industries, would bolster the Cuban economy and expand local industry. Many envision

Photo by Morgan Peterson, CAS ‘17

Spring 2015 greater opportunities for employment and capital for the local people, coupled with an inevitable democratic opening from the capitalist-expanding economy. While the benefits are apparent, negative effects also exist. Before 1959, Cuba was the top tourist destination of the Caribbean, grossing 18-21% of the region’s tourism annually.20 Lifting all travel restrictions between the United States and Cuba would draw up to 2 million U.S. tourists each year, causing serious strain on local systems.21 The need to accommodate for a drastic rise in tourists would require the construction of new facilities, inevitably modifying or destroying historic buildings. A flood of tourists would raise annual GDP levels, but voids exploitation of Cuba’s highly educated workforce as government investment would not target specialized industries such as healthcare technology. The average Cuban monthly wage falls between $12-$30.22 Monthly power consumption for an average Cuban family falls between $2-3.23 These drastically different numbers from the rest of the world, coupled with free healthcare and education, previously owned housing, and no taxes creates a disproportionate cost of living compared to the rest of the world. The Cuban government will face a great challenge balancing this cost of living with an increasingly capitalist trade system. Social stresses from the influx of remittances to communities in Cuba are further challenged if sanctions were to drop. Between $1 billion and $3 billion dollars in remittances enter the island annually, with whites 2.5 times more likely to receive such funds than blacks.24 According to Alejandro de la Fuente, director of the Afro-Latin American Research Institute at Harvard University, “Remittances have produced new forms of inequality, particularly racial inequality.”25 Issues of security in drug trafficking and human smuggling are also apparent. If a Cuban government proves unable to control its border and migration to the United States, it elevates the risk of narcotic and terrorist entry.26 While the economic and political benefits of lifted sanctions on Cuba are feasible in the future, issues concerning local inequality and security would only get worse before they got better. One significant benefit felt in both

Cuba and the United States from the diplomatic talks is the exchange of the arts and culture. In their first terms as presidents, both Raul Castro and Barack Obama loosened travel restrictions for artists. With this, relaxed cultural institutions in the United States are reaching out to distinguished Cuban artistic institutions in attempts to boost the flow of artwork, performances and cultural programming. The Bronx Museum of Arts recently announced an art exhibit exchange with the National Museum in Cuba and the Minnesota Orchestra announced that it would play at Havana’s International Cubadisco Festival in May.27 While logistical problems still exist, (many Cuban artists lack bank account), there is widespread hope in the artistic community for continued progress. Additional partnerships between American and Cuban cultural institutions are expected to flourish following the ease of CubanUnited States relations. The political enthusiasm felt in the United States towards the diplomatic talks reflects a widespread change in the Cuban-American community. Currently about 1.4 million Cubans live outside of Cuba, with 1.2 million living inside the United States, mostly in Southern Florida.28 The traditional emigrant relationship with Cuba is one of distance and hostility. Most of the current leaders of the Cuban-American community emigrated in the early 1960s as exiles, defeated by the Communist government.29 The Cuban American Foundation (CANF) currently plays a significant financial and political role within the United States government, influencing party campaigns in Southern Florida and lobbying the passage of bills such as the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as the HelmsBurton Act, which strengthened and continued the U.S, embargo against Cuba.30 The public CANF support of the Obama Administration during the elections of 2008 and gain of 49% of the Cuban vote in the 2012 elections marks a newfound interest in restoring U.S.Cuban ties.31 According to Roberto Veiga, director of Cuba Posible, an organization that promotes political dialogue, “Civil society in Cuba is a whole group of actors who have social and cultural

roles and different political visions. Last week’s [The diplomatic] announcement was a great gesture of détente, and we Cubans have to make the same gesture with one another.” Since the 1990s, the Cuban-American community has made an increasing number of trips to Havana and sent more remittances each year.32 There are on average 50 flights to Havana each week from the United States.33 Still an assumption remains that Cuban-Americans will punish legislators at the polls should the White House further overhaul the current policy. The newly lifted restrictions on Cuban-American travel bring to light a somewhat unconstitutional paradox: Cuban-Americans currently have unlimited travel and investment access to Cuba while non-Cubans are limited to expensive “people-to-people” licenses.34 While recollections of a repressive Communist regime continue to resonate among Cuban-Americans, there is newfound support in favor of diplomatic talks by the community. The commencement of both the Raul Castro and Barack Obama administrations led to the first significant changes in bilateral diplomatic sentiments between the countries since the Revolution began over fifty years ago. Both countries expressed widespread hope at reforming the outdated policies. The diplomatic talks demonstrate a willingness for political conversation and adaptation at the risk of public and political backlash, for the sake of the country’s best interests and not for political power or personal pride. Benefits of the talks are already felt in each country with enriched cultural exchange and economic expansion. While a new relationship could hold the promise of reconciliation, it will bring newfound conflicts and challenges that will test the political strengths of each administration. Cuba and the United States carry not only a biological but also a cultural interdependence with each other, a relationship that is unbreakable no matter the economics. The upcoming months will test the true disposition of the governments to overcome political animosity and the strength of the people to extend a hand ninety miles off the coast.

Photo by Morgan Peterson, CAS ‘17

The International Relations Review

The Vicious Cycle of Corruption in Brazil By Daniela Sanchez, CAS ‘16

orruption — the abuse of power by political leaders to pursue personal interests—is a phenomenon most of Latin America currently faces. Whether through illegal agreements, or the manipulation of elections, corruption can bring very negative consequences to the countries in which its leaders are mishandling power. Moreover, if not addressed correctly, this phenomenon becomes harder to eradicate with the passing of time. Brazil is a country with a corrupt history – it has endured numerous scandals and has struggled to alleviate the root problem. Five specific events demonstrate how corruption became deeply embedded in the country’s politics, and how Brazil inadequately responded to these issues: Getulio Vargas’ presidential term in the early 20th century, the military dictatorship of the 1960s, Fernando Collor de Mello’s resignation due to corruption charges, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s Mensalão scandal, and Dilma Rousseff’s anti-corruption campaign. Despite past and current efforts to combat corruption in Brazil, the only way to effectively tackle this issue is through a thorough investigative and judicial mechanism that eliminates all networks that lead to corruption. Vargas’ presidency during the first half of the 20th century represents Brazil’s earliest encounter with corruption, since his repetitive attacks on dissidents demonstrated efforts to silence opposition. If corruption is defined as “the amount of power concentrated in any given political post, plus the discretion given to

the postholder, minus the degree of accountability to which a corrupt postholder can expect to respond if corruption is detected,” Getulio Vargas’ authoritarian/personalistic practice of outlawing or imprisoning those who opposed him was nothing but corrupt.1 Vargas had an excessive amount of power at his disposal that, when used incorrectly, could not be adequately checked because his discretion had allowed him to eliminate any institutions for accountability. As Michael Reid argues in his book Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power, the existence of dissent “Gave Vargas the excuse to crack down. Thousands… were arrested, and many tortured.”2 By perpetuating negative action against this dissent, Vargas created the notion that leaders could do anything to hold onto power. This belief was the backbone of the Brazilian military dictatorship’s corruption. By the time the military dictatorship began in 1964, after Vargas’ time in office, corruption was not only used to suppress but also to fool civilians. After the military coup d’état, leaders promised to hold elections and allow for the existence of congress. In reality, elections never happened because of continuous constitutional powers granted to the leaders. Moreover, congress was purged in order to ensure minimum opposition and maximum uniformity.3 As Reid states, “In this way, the armed forces sought to maintain the consent of regional elites and share the burden of government…”4 By engaging in deceptive practices, the military was incorporating them into the political

system. As Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva argues, “Corruption was not extinguished. On the contrary, in many ways it [corruption] flourished as never before…”5 However, it was repression, not political manipulation of institutions, that was the most corrupt practice the military dictatorship engaged in. During the twenty-one years of military rule, corruption manifested itself as the violent silencing of dissent—the most violent oppression in Brazilian history. Opposition rose in 1968 when students and workers decided to take to the street their discomfort with government policies and methods. The protests were met with extreme violence, resulting in the imprisonment and torture of many protesters. Pablo Uchoa recounts the experience of his father, a student who was a victim of the repression perpetrated by the regime: “Opponents of the regime were subjected to harsh physical ordeals. Many prisoners were…subjected to electrical shocks to their fingertips, genitals, and wherever else the sadistic imagination of their torturers would choose.”6 Statistics also demonstrate the scope of the regime's crackdown—“In all, between 1964 and 1973, 4,841 Brazilians were deprived of their political rights…”7 These numbers show how the military dictatorship manipulated power for the sole purpose of denying the existence of opposition. Hence, power was ill-managed only because of the leaders’ intention, to preserve their power. Sadly, corruption did not end with the conclusion of the military dictatorship.

Spring 2015 In spite of the return of democracy, the country still suffered from corruption. President Fernando Collor de Mello was impeached in 1992 for bringing his closest allies into key governmental positions. His campaign treasurer, Paulo César Farias, exemplified this behavior by using his awarded position to pursue the corruption scheme and steal money from citizens. Therefore, the appointment of Farias as treasurer allowed him to, as Barbara Geddes and Artur R. Neto argue, “…control an extensive network that facilitated public contracts and influenced government decisions in exchange for kickbacks and commissions.”8 Collor de Mello thus diminished the possibility of opposition and increased the probability of cooperation by having his allies close to him. Collor de Mello, in addition to ruling next to his allies, gave himself leeway to rule corruptly by enacting medidas provisorias—emergency measures through which he abolished the remaining institutions that checked the executive power. These measures allowed for much faster legislation because they overlooked congressional approval, so Collor de Mello managed to enact 141 of these in only one year (1990).9 As The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry stated after investigating Collor de Mello, these measures “…gave a deadly blow to all that was developed up to then to establish an effective control of the executive power.” Collor de Mello, by “… accumulating privately large amounts of cash and investments through kickbacks and 'mediation taxes,” and receiving the help of allies like Farias, bought properties across Europe and flaunted his excessive riches.10 By exercising unchecked power, the president, a man meant to portray the rebirth of Brazil, represented a mere thief. However, it was not all bad news with Collor de Mello’s scandal. Collor de Mello’s exposé and subsequent resignation demonstrated that the state apparatus was capable of discovering and collapsing a corrupt authoritative figure. Fernando Collor, the president’s brother, was the one responsible for leaking

the investigations and exposing his brother’s corruption scandal. Because of all the pressing evidence, Collor de Mello resigned a day before congress passed a vote in favor of his impeachment. As Reid argues, this episode shows how “The institutions worked. For the first time in Brazilian history a president was removed from office by legal, constitutional means…”11 The joy was short-lived, however, since the country was entangled in yet another corruption scandal with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s presidency in 2005. The ordeal took the name of the “Mensalão scandal,” which translates to the “stipend scandal.” Ultimately, Lula da Silva’s all-too-familiar strategy of filling government positions with his party members led to the bribery of congress members in exchange for votes. Despite being similar to Collor de Mello’s manipulation of power, Lula da Silva not only positioned his allies in key posts, but also created more cabinetlevel posts for his party members to fill. As Reid argues, “Lula added an extra 2700 patronage appointments to the 20000 traditionally in the president’s gift,” which led the PT (Worker’s Party) to get “…60 percent of the top jobs in the first cabinet.”12 One of the divisions within the party itself that benefitted the most from this manipulation was the Campo Majoritário, a small party founded by José Dirceu who, not surprisingly, was to become one of the protagonists of the Mensalão scandal. Peter Flynn, in his article “Brazil and Lula, 2005: Crisis, Corruption and Change in Political Perspective,” argues that Campo Majoritário held the most positions within the government, and that Dirceu was adamant about maintaining such a lead. He states, “[Campo Majoritário] held nearly 70 percent of the 81-member Dirétorio Nacional, the party's National Executive…and he [Dirceu]… ensured that the PT maintained its grip on the new government.”13 The means through which both Dirceu and Lula da Silva controlled the government, however, were both fraudulent and bewildering. Portrayed like a telenovela, the Mensalão scandal exposé on daytime television not only demonstrated how

embedded corruption was in Brazil’s political system but also how people were accustomed to it. It was Roberto Jefferson, the president of the PTB political party, who first accused a PT member of offering to pay a stipend to him in return for his vote; and after this accusation, the whole scandal unraveled. The stipend offers were as high as $12,500 and the scandal was so overreaching that a PT member was arrested at the airport for carrying $100,000 in his underpants.14 As more people were implicated, more PT member began to resign, including Dirceu. Nonetheless, the party stayed in power. This led to the birth of the Brazilian term of corruption scandals “ending in pizza (acabam em pizza)”, which, as Reid explains, “…applied in the political context to refer to the traditional impunity politicians enjoy.”15 As Ashforth and Anand argue in their article The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, the Brazilian people’s blasé attitude can be expected from the Brazilian people because corruption has been institutionalized—embedded in the system, rationalized—given a personal explanation to justify the actions, and socialized—portrayed as a normal occurrence to newcomers.16 It was with this normalization of corruption that Lula da Silva, despite his scandal, managed to pick a successor—Dilma Rousseff. She set forward to establish an anti-corruption campaign. On her inaugural speech in 2010, Dilma Roussef “…promised zero tolerance of corruption,” and lived up to that promise during her first year in office—she fired various ministers because of corruption allegations.17 Moreover, the Mensalão scandal trial conclusion during Rousseff’s presidency, despite being controversial, bolstered her image of commitment to battle corruption. Her removal of corrupt government members and her will to finish the Mensalão scandal could have been seen by Brazilians, as Melo and Santos state, as “…a clear demonstration of intolerance towards corruption.”18 However, these measures were overshadowed by new economic and social problems that had begun to develop. Despite the advancements made

48 against corruption, an unstable economy and an unsettled public were what characterized Dilma Rousseff’s first term in office. She was not able to maintain the positive economic pace that her predecessor, Lula da Silva, had. This led to a rise in opposition and unpopularity. As Roberto Setúbal states, the government began to change and implement so many policies that the civilian society could barely keep up.19 This uncertainty influences corruption because it diverts the attention from itself. Brazil is remains under a mantra of confusion, which means few efforts have been made to thoroughly tackle corruption. What is the reason, then, behind Brazil’s cyclical collision with corruption? A country that has faced various corruption scandals is battling to find the correct recipe to fight the problem. First off, people in power need to realize the benefits of eradicating corruption. In a world where democracy is particularly appealing to Latin America because of its promising economic and social advantages, there is no room for corruption. As Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph E. Espach state, “Such [corruption] scandals…can undermine citizen’s confidence in the democratic system altogether.”20 Brazil’s leadership will suffer from a discontent population and from drawbacks to their democratization process, which gives them the perfect incentives to battle corruption thoroughly. Moreover, the eradication of corruption is dependent on a functioning democracy, since the latter’s institutions would be in charge of the former’s abolition. As argued in Combating Corruption in Latin America, “Reducing corruption requires stronger democratic institutions… free and responsible enough to act as a watchdog over government operations.”21 It is after identifying the benefits of a corruption-free country that Brazil can act upon its strategy to battle it—a strategy that must be constructed with both national and international assistance. International Organizations (IO’s) must push for the constitutionalization of anti-corruption laws through conventions and treaties. As World Polity

The International Relations Review Theory (WPT) explains, IO’s initiative will persuade other organizations and countries to follow suit and take action against corruption. As John W. Meyer, pioneer of WPT, explains: “Collective principles, ceremonies, and agreements influence individual and national behavior…”22 Some advancements have already been made in this field, with the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption set forward by the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1996. Soon after, the InterAmerican Development Bank and the World Bank declared the fight against corruption as one of their priorities. As Tulchin and Espach argue, these conventions and declarations resulted in the commitment of governments to completely eradicate corruption.23 The means through which each government should take on this challenge are, however, very country-dependent. In Brazil’s case, the country needs to not only make the rules established by international conventions and treaties part of the constitution, but also to add stringent laws against corruption. Dilma Rouseff’s anti-corruption campaign has only been partly successful because it does not attack the roots of the problem; the removal of officials will not, by itself, eradicate the network through which corruption was working. As argued in Battling Corruption in Latin America, “corruption thrives in the gaps between an institution’s aim and the management of its operations.”24 Moreover, as Matthew W. Taylor explains, the problem lies not in the incapability of finding corruption, but rather on the ineffectiveness of punishing those implicated. He states: “…high profile corruption continues to be regularly exposed but seldom punished.”25 Therefore, Brazil urgently needs to put in place a thorough investigative mechanism that not only exposes, but also prosecutes the network in charge of facilitating corruption. In addition to uncovering and dismantling corruption networks, Brazilian leaders need to identify and abolish the incentives behind this behavior. Politicians engage in corruption because they aim to use power for interests different to those

of the state. Susan Rose-Ackerman explains that, “Corruption incentives occur whenever public or private agents have monopoly power over the distribution of valuable benefits.”26 Therefore, anti-corruption efforts should ensure the benefits given by corrupt people are better provided by the state and thus dismantle the incentive of providing them through corruption. Moreover, the notion that these practices will allow leaders to hold onto power needs to be discredited.27 The government should work effectively enough for leaders to exercise power without fears of losing it. It is by understanding the reasons behind corruption that Brazil will be able to address through effective means. Despite facing corruption repeatedly throughout its history, Brazil is a resilient country committed to end this practice at all costs. Dilma Rouseff’s reelection will benefit the country in this matter because she still pushes forward her anti-corruption campaign. However, until Brazil invests in the creation of an effective judiciary it won’t be able to tackle the problem. Moreover, by de-incentivizing the public of engaging in this practice, the government will be ahead of the problem and eradicating it will be easier. In addition to domestic efforts, the international community’s influence will help Brazil in unimaginable ways, since it is already committed to ending corruption all over the world. Notwithstanding domestic and international efforts, real change will only come about if every citizen, regardless of work or social status, is devoted in the fight against corruption. Without the help of the civil society, the government will not be able to do much.

Spring 2015

THE CONVERSATION STARTS HERE SUBMIT TO THE IR REVIEW SEE SUBMISSION GUIDELINES ONLINE AT IRR.BUIAA.ORG.

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Spring 2015

GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE, LOCAL OUTREACH. BUIAA’s Global Civics program connects it’s members with local high schools, teaching classes on politics, economics, and more.

If you are interested in being one of BUIAA’s teachers, email the Program Directors at globalcivics@buiaa.org!

Photo by Lily Purqurian, CAS â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;15

Spring 2015

OPINIONS 54

The Iran Nuclear Deal and International Law By Lily Purqurian, CAS ‘15 The relationship between Iran and the United States carries a lot of baggage, but new leadership may be able to work through it.

The Future of Israel-U.S. Relations By Mustafa Shehzad, ENG ‘18 A tumultous year of conflict and political maneuvering defined the U.S.-Israel relationship. Can the U.S. and Israel find new common ground?

The Start of Something New By Julie George, CAS ‘16 After decades of diplomatic misunderstandings, the pivot to Asia may be taking form in renewed U.S.-India relations.

Failing Syria & the Growing Refugee Crisis By Sophie Shanshory, CAS ‘17 Despite passing a number of resolutions, the UN Security Council’s pledges have failed to pass any meaningful humanitarian result in Syria. Specifically, the protection of the growing number of refugees has presented a challenging and largely unaddressed crisis.

Staff Editorial: Effective Foreign Policy Starts with Us By Vincent Jordan, CAS ‘15

The International Relations Review

What Does the Nuclear Deal with Iran Say About International Law? By Lily Purqurian, CAS ‘15

ince the breakthrough of an interim agreement in 2013, the international community has been torn over negotiations with Iran. So torn that the framework reached on Thursday, April 2 between Iran and the P5+1 – United States, France, Britain, China, Russia, and Germany – did very little to sway diehard supporters or opponents of the negotiations. However, beyond this bifurcation lies the challenge of international law and its subjects: are the subjects of international law bound by technicalities or by discretion? Technicalities are the details, or the niceties, often rendering sentiments of fear or paranoia. Discretion, however, is best defined by an anonymous blogger as “the process of reading a situation.” When the election of President Hassan Rouhani followed President Obama’s back channel to Iran, the two countries began, respectively, reading the situation. Because President Obama and President Rouhani shared similar goals in ending Iran’s international isolation, talks were able to take off with a solid quid pro quo that did not want to lose itself in technicalities. Mitigating the international community of a nuclear-armed Iran was offered in exchange for relieving the Iranian people and economy of suffocating sanctions. Interestingly enough, however, the international community could have felt secure about Iran’s nuclear capability in 2007, when the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Iran halted its nuclear program. The Iranian people then could have also been relieved of the proliferation of sanctions with a number of UNSC Resolutions that were passed after 2007. So why the six year wait for a negotiations process or framework? Because there was a change in leadership. The technicalities of Iranian compliance (or, lack thereof) with the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), paled in international law once the two countries’ respective leadership gave discretion priority – and subsequently, negotiations a chance. The framework agreed upon on April 2nd which calls for an unprecedented investigation of Iranian nuclear facilities was just as capable of being agreed upon six years ago, only the leadership and politics did not allow it. Then, it was more common to favor hostility and belligerence at the sight of nerve-wrecking technicalities, while efforts for diplomacy were deemed embarrassingly weak and wide-eyed – only naively appealing to discretion. Now, however, President Obama has redefined diplomacy: one that confidently reaches out to the world with an open hand. This divergence between militancy and diplomacy is essentially the rift between so-called patriots and so-called revisionists. A false binary, which does not necessarily hammer at inevitable fault lines but draws them itself. On one hand, Iran’s hardliners assume staunch

Spring 2015 anti-Americanness goaded a deal, in which Western surrender was inevitable to Iran’s growing hegemony in the region. Iran’s refusal to comply with IAEA standards of uranium enrichment and Western monopolies on the for-profit sale of enriched uranium was seen by its hardliners as heroic and patriotic. On the other hand, the P5+1 assume sanctions as the repression necessary to engage Iran. Both of these are dangerous interpretations that only feed a model of containment constructed to warrant violence. Sure enough, there is legitimacy

to this rhetoric. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and the Republican signatories of the infamous Iran letter are not speaking too irrationally given Iran’s actions in the region. Iran’s anti-imperialist hardliners, also, are not speaking too irrationally given Western meddling in Iran’s past. This traditional mistrust and disapproval, however, should not take priority when two leaders have aligned in their willingness to negotiate over joint interests. That, in and of itself, places an invaluable pressure – without such directly violent consequences – on both characters

to act accordingly as members of the international community, subject to international law. None of this is to say violence is never necessary. It is to say, however, that an interpretation of when violence is necessary is vulnerable to an interpretation of history. Allowing sanctions or resistance to rule impressions of an agreement – instead of the wave of good leadership and discretion – has the potential to viciously shape international relations as one not merely dangerously militant, but even worse: in the eyes of the people, justifiably militant.

Photo by Lily Purqurian, CAS ‘15

The International Relations Review

The Future of Israel-U.S. Relations By Mustafa Shehzad, ENG ‘18

n an interview conducted last year, President Obama was asked about the nature of the United States’ relationship with Israel, specifically regarding the extent to which the United States would continue supporting the Israeli government’s interests in the region. President Obama highlighted strong ties between the two countries and stressed the unbreakable nature of their relationship. However, he also clarified that, should the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis break down, the United States’ ability to manage the implications of such a turnaround in events, at the Security Council and elsewhere, would be limited. He stated, “I do believe is that if you see no peace deal and continued aggressive settlement construction — and we have seen more aggressive settlement construction over the last couple years than we’ve seen in a very long time — if Palestinians come to believe that the possibility of a contiguous sovereign Palestinian state is no longer within reach, then our ability to manage the international fallout is going to be limited." However, in light of recent events, it is becoming increasingly clear that the pressing concern is not about the United States’ ability to protect Israel internationally, but its willingness to do so. On March 16, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blatantly dismissed the two-state solution and appealed to rightwing, anti-Arab prejudices in an ultimately successful attempt to secure for himself office for a fourth consecutive term. After his electoral victory on Tuesday, Netanyahu recanted his previous renunciation of the two-state solution made the day before. It is obvious the Obama administration is not taking kindly to what can safely be labeled as Netanyahu’s mercurial shifts

in policy. Washington maintains that they are not convinced by Netanyahu’s claims that he is still, in fact, in favour of the peace process. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said, “It’s pretty clear that Israel is no longer committed to [a two state solution].” Earnest also called out Netanyahu’s “election day tactic” as “cynical” and maintained that U.S. decisions at the UN had been previously “based on a commitment to two states,” but now that Israel’s commitment to such an approach was missing, the US would “reevaluate [their] approach.” The ramifications of Netanyahu’s comments prior to and post election are serious. State Department spokeswoman Jennifer Psaki stated that the United States would not cease attempts to block resolutions that are seen as “unfair or biased.” It is nevertheless clear that President Obama is not keen on blocking resolutions that would inevitably lead towards Palestinian statehood. In the coming weeks it is up to Netanyahu to demonstrate that he is truly committed to an eventual two-state solution. It would be ideal, of course, if the White House would stop the pressure on Netanyahu, however, this is a problem created largely by Netanyahu’s deep cynicism and unrelenting obstinacy. In the event that the Security Council recognizes Palestine as an independent state, Netanyahu will have absolutely no time whatsoever before Israel becomes a pariah. For years it has been clear that Netanyahu has had two options: arrange for the creation of an independent Palestinian state in a peaceful, secure way, over a gradual time frame, or take no actions whatsoever and then be faced with a sudden crisis that leaves Israel/Palestine

Spring 2015 at a complete loss, and himself unable to manage the situation in the region. It is interesting to note that Obama said last year that he had not heard even a single “persuasive vision of how Israel survives as a democracy and a Jewish state at peace…in the absence of a peace deal with the Palestinians and a twostate solution.” He further elaborated by saying, “Nobody has presented me a credible scenario…The only thing that I’ve heard is, 'We’ll just keep on doing what we’re doing, and deal with problems as they arise. And we'll build

settlements where we can. And where there are problems in the West Bank, we will deal with them…yet, at no point do you ever see an actual resolution to the problem... And my assessment…is [that] there comes a point where you can’t manage this anymore, and then you start having to make very difficult choices." The universal fear is that Netanyahu’s right wing government will only take measures to further Israel’s isolation from both the United States and the world, and that the Obama administration, which at the moment is

angered and confused by Netanyahu’s recent statements, will only make things worse by misinterpreting and dismissing Israel’s concerns. Practical suggestions are a rarity at the moment; however, if a suggestion is to be made, it will have to keep in mind that the longstanding relationship of trust that the Obama administration once had with its Israeli counterpart has been greatly damaged. There is much left to be answered - only time will tell whether this relationship will heal or deteriorate further.

Photo by Meghan Delaney, CAS ‘18

The International Relations Review

Photo by Asha Mehrotra, CAS â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;17

Spring 2015

The Start of Something New India and the United States’ Strategic Relationship By Julie George, CAS ‘16

t is no surprise that the United States and India had quite a turbulent relationship for the past few decades. However, the two countries recently improved relations this past year. US President Barack Obama and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi increased diplomacy and networking in 2014. President Obama is the first American president to visit India twice during his presidency. He is also the first American chief guest at India’s Republic Day Parade. The White House did not foresee President Obama’s invitation to be the chief guest, but this strategic action helped pave the way for the two largest democracies to reveal a growing, symbiotic relationship. Moreover, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi met with each other five times to discuss their burgeoning alliance within five months. Prime Minister Modi even met President Obama personally on the tarmac and hugged him when he visited New Delhi for his state visit. Despite the past unstable relationship between India and the United States, President Obama set this aside in

the hopes of strengthening relations between the two countries. At a joint session of the Indian Parliament in 2010, President Obama stated, “We are two strong democracies whose constitutions begin with the same revolutionary words – the same revolutionary words – ‘We the people.’ We are two great republics dedicated to the liberty and justice and equality of all people. And we are two free market economies where people have the freedom to pursue ideas and innovation that can change the world. And that’s why I believe that India and America are indispensable partners in meeting the challenges of our time.” Diplomatic relations between the United States and India began in November 1946 when the US Department of State transformed the American Mission in New Delhi to an embassy. In fact, India and the United States formed a friendship before India formally gained its independence from the British Empire. In past years, the United States collaborated with “biggername” countries such as China and Pakistan with regards to a number of

political issues. However, it is now the United States and India’s time. Establishing civilian nuclear power plants in India is at the center of these leaders’ conversations. While a concrete deal on nuclear plants was not sealed, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi stated that they made significant progress in an issue that former leaders have previously evaded. This conversation established that American companies would provide civilian nuclear technology to India. Ironically, it took approximately six years to reach this monumental point. Although the nuclear pact was approved in 2008, the United States’ hesitation over the possibilities of accidents and Indian laws on liability resulted in a long delay in the confirmation of this pact. As a result, an insurance pool was created to handle the financial risk of establishing these nuclear facilities and to streamline the bureaucracy of more legislation. President Obama famously stated, “India and the United States are not just natural partners – I believe that America can be India’s best partner.” Interestingly, the

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Photo by Sathvika Ramachandran, CAS ‘17

United States and India also established the sentiment of raising their bilateral trade five folds. The two countries currently have a trading partnership that ranges over 100 billion pounds, which will likely increase in future years. The United States will also increase its production of military equipment to sell to India. This would have been unthinkable two or three decades ago. But the United States and India fully take advantage of their strategic relationship for the whole globe to witness. What is this relationship likely to consist of in the coming years? There will likely be an increase of consultations and meetings between President Obama and Prime Minister Modi over the civilian nuclear deal, their defense policies, and bilateral trade. India and the United States now have a more transparent relationship compared to the late 20th century. President Obama is clear about the United States’ desires for India to change its environmental policies, including its offer of assistance to help India reduce its carbon footprint. India currently makes more efforts to address climate change, nuclear power, and business ventures to further align with the United States’ goals. Prime Minister Modi clearly views

the United States as a critical ally in regards to India’s economy and hopes for the modernization of its military. There will continue to be a greater number of US exports such as aviation equipment, engineering goods, and organic chemicals sent to India. The exports will be especially related to progress in air transport and nuclear power. Both American and Indian business leaders are open to opportunities for joint ventures, which will raise foreign direct investment in India. While India and the United States’ strategic alliance is durable, it will go through a number of tests within the next few years. Although President Obama has a cohort of South Asia specialists, the United States should designate a US official to be in charge of US-India relations, if it truly desires for this relationship to be the defining partnership of the 21st century. The past year was a victorious year for the two countries in terms of diplomacy. The world will continue to see the two largest democracies champion bilateral negotiations on a myriad of issues.

Spring 2015

Failing Syria and the Growing Refugee Crisis By Sophie Shanshory, CAS ‘17

efugees occupy an unstable space in the realm of global politics. By definition, they are a group that has been issued asylum (from identified dangers in one country) by a state other than their own. However, during crises like the ongoing Syrian Civil War, the issuance of refugee status can be somewhat arbitrary when it comes to determining to whom protections might actually be extended. The importance of this distinction has recently been highlighted by the rise of asylum seekers who have failed to gain acceptance in Syria’s neighboring countries. The report titled “Failing Syria,” an ad hoc coalition of INGOs (international NGOs) including OxFam, Save the Children, and Syria Relief Network, described asylumrejection as one of the effects of the international community’s failure to act. The document was released on March 12 and features grades on resolution implementation success; though it focuses primarily on displaced persons and refugees rather than those rejected for refugee status, it successfully indicates the limited level of commitment by the UN Security Council and states. The coalition strongly denounces the UNSC’s 2014 resolutions on Syria as “hollow.” In its evaluation of resolution implementation success, the report grades the following categories: “protection of civilians”; “international contributions to the humanitarian response;” and “political developments,” all of which received a score of “F” for Deterioration, with the only other category “humanitarian access and besieged communities”

receiving a score that indicated the slightly less unfavorable score of “D” for no improvement at all. For example, with respect to the first category, the report includes direct excerpts of UNSC Resolution 2139. Approved in Feb. 2014, the resolution is one of several to demand the halt of attacks against civilians and “[demand] that all parties take all appropriate steps to protect civilians.” The report follows with statistical information about casualties and displacement numbers: 2014 experienced a 2.5 million increase in internally displaced and fleeing civilians – and then explicitly indicates what needs to be done to mitigate the unaddressed crisis. Through the juxtaposition of the UNSC’s commitment to Syria and its failure to enforce, the report succeeds in shaming the UNSC and displaying the urgency for action. Another point the report is critical about is the role of states, both in granting refugee status and pressuring for secure humanitarian access. Syria’s bordering countries Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, – all feeling the weight of the civil war with their populations increasing by millions,– have begun a more frequent process of rejecting appeals. The coalition of NGOs articulates that this increases personal danger and displacement statistics; however, it is clear in their denunciation of wealthy, distanced nations that the share of the burden is extremely disproportionate. In fact, Syrian refugee numbers in the United States have only reached 335 (out of 3.8 million). The refusal of refugee status by Syria’s neighbors cannot be seen solely as an injustice

acted out by the these countries; instead, it indicates that a greater injustice is taking place – namely, that the wealthy countries of the world, at a distance, (besides their insufficient humanitarian funding achievement) are unwilling to make greater sacrifices or to take protectionist actions for refugees. In its recommendations, the report urges for the international community to “scale up resettlement” and for humanitarian efforts to be directed towards supporting those Syrian populations now living in neighboring countries. It sets a five percent minimum as the target 2015 quota for refugee access to wealthy countries outside of the region. In addition, the Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan has grown to such a scale that it is now the fourth largest city in the country. This statistic has vast implications on the dire nature of the refugee crisis. The number of in-camp refugees has clearly ballooned enough to pull up neighboring populations, as discussed within the report. In addition, the report points out that the numbers of internally displaced and asylum-seeking persons are a part of another population increasing even more dramatically. Thus, the high numbers in Za’atari are indicative of a related but often overlooked, and statistically more pressing, emergency. The number of people forced to remain within warring boundaries is a crime, and the international community should use the numbers and initiatives included within this report to galvanize legitimate efforts to support both refugees and those who have yet to gain a protective status.

The International Relations Review

EDITORIAL: EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY STARTS WITH US By Vincent Jordan, CAS ‘15

he past two years have seen an unprecedented widening of the ideological split in American politics: the government has shutdown; immigration reform has started, stopped and started again; politicians on the state level squabble over gun rights and abortion, not economic competition or cultural exchange. Populist campaigns on both sides have secured seats and influence in congress, from Elizabeth Warren to the tea party. After every election cycle, one half of the country holds the other half hostage for approximately four to eight years, trading blows and holding policy objectives over each other’s heads. The negative impact of this unwillingness to compromise has unfortunately affected foreign policy as well, but with consequences that for most Americans don’t resonate due to distance, difficulty or complexity. The world is getting smaller and the number of international players has increased, despite the stubborn insistence by some of American “exceptionalism.” Markets are more integrated, borders more arbitrary and decisions that are made looking only two or three years into the future are having negative impacts in the long term. American foreign policy and practice, long left untouched by partisanship and amateurism, is now in need of serious reform. It’s not that America isn’t great, but our output, stature and influence are so far below what they could potentially be, crippled by ignorance, corruption and suspicion. Events both recent and not exemplify this. When the president of the United States congratulates himself on a stable and troopfree Iraq only months before the collapse of its government and military, there’s a problem. When a potential NATO ally in eastern Europe is dragged back into Russia’s sphere of influence and war, there’s a problem. When 48 Republican senators have the hubris to ignore the fundamentals of diplomatic practice and mail Iranian leadership an invitation to scuttle a nuclear agreement, there’s a problem. At the height of those nuclear negotiations, fragile to say the least, Congressional leadership chose to further the interests of their donors rather than their constituents and invite Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to speak to Congress on the issue. Netanyahu, who according even to his own intelligence officials has overstated Iran’s nuclear ability on numerous occasions, and his address embody the dysfunction present in our current polarized system: our elected representatives would rather listen to a foreign leader, desperate for reelection, than attempt to work with their own. The entire culture needs to be changed, and shifted from a backwards, stubborn and selfish view to one that acknowledges the international system and our globalized reality. It’s easy to blame the politicians, those who seemingly

make blunder after blunder, at home and in places like the Middle East, clearly only concerned with surviving the next election cycle. But who’s hiring these people anyways? Had our elected representatives shown the same job performance in the private sector, wouldn’t they have been fired by now? Would they have been hired at all? Knock soft power all you want: these changes aren’t possible without a cultural shift. We live in a society where large swaths of our citizenry would rather read their Facebook feed than an article concerning a foreign country (or any topic, for that matter), where in negotiating with Iran many seem to believe we’re dealing with Arabs and not Persians, where we drool at economic policies that “keep jobs in America” rather than allow the market to allocate them elsewhere. Instead of promoting curiosity and open-mindedness we’ve created an entire generation of armchair quarterbacks, “experts” in their own right because they’ve educated themselves so thoroughly with their favorite popular source of news media. Instead of listening to researchers and professionals (who often form the consensus our politicians so often lack), we engage barelyqualified talking heads that are selected precisely because they cannot, and will not, agree or compromise. Should our neighbors hold differing views than us, we no longer speak to them as partners, but as enemies. All of this internal, uneducated bickering only shows the world with which we will be forced to engage that we are weak, and unable to accomplish or fulfill any meaningful joint goal or treaty obligation. If we seek the best candidates for the job we need to not only educate ourselves on the issues and countries involved, but also on the politicians who claim their expertise and judgment in dealing with outside powers. Our national shame does not lie in the false wars we’ve fought, the inequality we’ve created or our disregard for our democratic principles: it lies in polarization we’ve created through our collective ignorance, incapable of remedying these issues and mistakes because we refuse to educate, to cooperate and to work for each other, not ourselves. Unwillingness to compromise and to listen is not a sign of strength, or of leadership. It is not “American,” and it is not wise. It is the opposite of democratic. Do yourselves a favor next year, whether you’re American or International: try and find a politician who is funded by a variety of sources, who reads extensively on foreign affairs and who has a track record of bipartisan cooperation, cast a vote. Then keep reading. Being the world’s greatest power means nothing if we aren’t intellectually respected, and reform starts with us, not our politicians.

Spring 2015 THE IR REVIEW EDITORIAL BOARD Vincent Jordan, Editor-in-Chief Fatima Mohie-Eldin, Managing Editor Stuart Ross, Advertising and Marketing Devika Nadkarni, Design Editor Latifah Azlan, Senior Editor, Online Editor Paulina Limasalle, Senior Editor Pariza Lovos, Senior Editor Anushka Pinto, Senior Editor Becca Shipler, Senior Editor Victoria Reynolds, Editor Ines Boussebaa, Staff Writer Caitlin Hemdal, Staff Writer Morgan Peterson, Staff Writer Mustafa Shezhad, Staff Writer Sam Wong, Staff Writer Sophie Shanshory, Staff Writer Emily Wren, Editor Abby Klinedinst, Editor Lily Purqurian, Editor Madeleine Martin, Editor

COLOPHON CAS ‘15 CAS ‘15 COM ‘15 CAS ‘18 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘17 CAS ‘17 CGS ‘15, CAS ‘17 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘18 CAS ‘17, COM ‘17 CAS ‘16 CAS ‘17 ENG ‘18 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘17 CAS ‘16 CAS ‘16, CFA ‘16 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘17

ABOUT THE IR REVIEW The International Relations Review, ISSN 2152-738X, is a subsidiary of the Boston University International Affairs Association. With a circulation of nearly 1,000 the IR Review has striven to create a forum for students interested in international affairs. The IRR website (irr.buiaa.org) is open to submissions from graduate students and others outside of Boston University’s undergraduate population. Since it was founded in 2009, the IR Review has striven to create an intellectual forum for students interested in international affairs. The submissions features in the publication cover a myriad of topics and controversies, including but not limited to politics, economics, globalization, international security, human rights, international law and politics and sustainability. A PDF of the current issue, as well as citations and archives of previous issues, can be viewed online at www.irr.buiaa.org.

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS Briefings, essays, and opinion submissions are accepted year-round for the IR Review. All essays must contain at least 1000 words and must not exceed 3,000. Submissions must also include the author’s name, college, graduation year, a title, and appropriate citations to be considered for publication. The IR Review reserves the right to revise submissions. All the revisions are sent to the author for approval before going to print. The IR Review also reserves the right to edit photo submissions minimally. All work must be properly cited. Plagiarized work violates the IR Review’s Code of Ethics, as well as the Boston University Handbook, and will not be accepted. If the IR Review finds that a submission has been plagiarized, the staff will no longer accept submissions from that author. Opinion pieces do not require a bibliography unless the author cites other sources. Submissions are accepted on a rolling basis. The editorial staff can be contacted for questions regarding submissions at irr@buiaa.org.

The International Relations Review is created using Adobe In-Design CC and exported as a PDF. Adobe Photoshop and Adobe Illustrator are also used in the production process. The IR Review prints copies at Fowler Printing and Graphics in Randolph, Mass. The typefaces for the publication include Baskerville Old Face, Futura, and Farnham Display. The images in the publication are processed in CMYK. The magazine is printed on 100-pound gloss paper and comes with a saddle-stitched binding. The publication is run by the editorial board, which consists of staff writers, editors, layout designers, and the editor-in-chief. The editorial board also handles external affairs, such as blogging, public relations, marketing, advertising and logistics. The Spring 2015 issue of the IR Review was designed by Vincent Jordan CAS ‘15 and Devika Nadkarni, CAS ‘17.

COVER PHOTO The cover photo used for the Spring 2015 edition of the IR Review was taken by Vincent Jordan, CAS ‘15.

TABLE OF CONTENTS PHOTO The photo for the Table of Contents of the Spring 2015 edition was taken by Gayle Miner, CAS ‘16.

SPECIAL REPORT PHOTO SUBMIT OVER THE SUMMER! If you have an essay or photos you want to submit and want to see them published, send them to the editorial board to have it considered for the Fall issue of the IR Review!

The photo introducing the Special Report of the Spring 2015 edition was taken by Vincent Jordan, CAS ‘15.

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