International Relations Review Spring 2017

IRREVIEW The International Relations Review at Boston University

Spring 2017

Women’s Rights and Islam The Problematic Future of the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Exclusive Interview: U.S. Foreign Policy Under the Trump Administration

IN THIS ISSUE 06

18

The Coming Deluge of Climate Refugees

By Desmond Molloy, SAR’19

The Problematic Future of the Trans-Pacific Partnership

By Sydney Siwinski, CAS’19

26

30

Beyond Mexico: What Does Donald Trump’s Presidency Mean for the Rest of Latin America?

By Clara Bezerra, CAS’18

The Western Sahara Conflict: International Players Contributing to a Lack of Resolution

By Ines Boussebaa, COM/ CAS’17

36

Anger in the Kingdom: Why Congress’ Saudi 9/11 Bill Will Be Destructive for U.S. Foreign Relations

By Samira Jafar, CAS’20

08

38

A Kingdom Apart: Security Issues Facing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

By Matthew Manarchy, CAS’18

2017 Elections in Ecuador: A Brief Overview

By Kaitlyn Cyprian, CAS’19

14 Child Labor: A Modern Issue Stuck in the Stigma of the Past

By Rose Weinmann, CAS’19

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW 40

54

Dismantling the Monolith: Reclaiming Stolen Artwork: Repealing the Cuban Embargo Improving International Efforts

By Sara Van Velkinburgh, CAS’18 and Increasing Awareness

By Madeline Van Heusden, CAS’17

44

58

The Macron Contradiction: France’s Populist, Pro-European Candidate

By Christopher Brown, CAS’19

Editorial: The Future of U.S.-Israel Relations

By Anushka Pinto, CAS’17

50 Women’s Rights and Islam

By Oelmis Fermin, CAS’19

20

SECURITY

06 The Coming Deluge of Climate Refugees

By Desmond Molloy, SAR’19 The outflow of refugees from the Syrian Civil War has already destabilized the European political system, and sent shockwaves around the world. But even with a solution to the conflict, the increasing pace of climate change is likely to generate further refugee crises for the foreseeable future.

08 A Kingdom Apart:

Security Issues Facing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

By Matthew Manarchy, CAS’18 A nation-state’s security is not solely determined by its military strength.

While Saudi Arabia’s military is an important factor of its security, religious extremism and the Kingdoms’s economy also play an important role. How the Saudis respond to the many factors that threaten to upend the established order will determine whether or not the Desert Kingdom will continue to thrive in our ever changing world.

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The International Relations Review

The Coming Deluge of Climate Refugees

By Desmond Molloy, SAR’19

F

or nearly three years, Europe has been engulfed by the worst refugee crisis of the postwar era.

A seemingly interminable civil war in Syria, and slow-burning conflicts in Central Asia and Iraq, have displaced millions, leading to a veritable torrent of refugees streaming westward. The refugee crisis has had a profound impact on European society; the EU’s failure to deal with the crisis has given rise to radical right-wing parties across the continent1, and led to the construction of tent cities from northern Greece to “the Jungle,” an infamous settlement in Calais.

Countries like Germany and Sweden have struggled to absorb refugees, and other countries have given up altogether, using drastic means to deport as many as possible.

To most Europeans, the situation seems unsustainable. But it is likely to become the norm. As the twentyfirst century wears on, more and more people will be displaced by the ravages of climate change, as

flooding in low-lying coastal plains and islands, and drought in formerly fertile cropland, force people to seek a new life overseas. The current European refugee crisis is unlikely to recede even if the Syrian civil war ends.

It is no secret that climate change will make many of the world’s most populous areas virtually uninhabitable. The world’s best soil and weather is found in equatorial floodplains, leading to high population density in areas underprotected from the extreme weather events that accompany climate change. Thus far, the most recognizable climate refugees have come from low-lying islands like Kiribati, which are at risk of being submerged by rising sea levels.2 But the mainland is likely to bear the heaviest burden in the years to come. In Bangladesh, a low-lying country among the most vulnerable to climate change and related disasters, nearly 200,000 people already lose their homes to river erosion alone every year, and are

forced to seek refuge in urban slums, trading bountiful farmland for corrugated tin shacks. In a country where 60% of land is within 5 meters of sea level, in which years of unsustainable farming practices have weakened natural defenses against floods and storms, these risks are likely to increase in the coming years. Nor is this risk confined to Bangladesh; worldwide, nearly 200 million people live within 5 meters of sea level, making them extremely vulnerable to floods and storms.3 In other areas, water will become scarce. A third of Kenyan pastoralists, for example, have had to abandon their traditional grazing areas over the last decade.

Of course, climate refugees will not immediately head for Europe. Experts with the United Kingdom’s Government Office for Science have argued that much of the world’s climate migration will occur within countries, especially towards existing urban hubs along the coast.. But many of these sites are already buckling under the

Spring 2017

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Photo by Alex Lo, CAS’20

weight of climate migration. Cities like Khulna, which lies close to the Ganges floodplain in southern Bangladesh, have taken in thousands of displaced farmers, leading to the growth of massive slums on the city edges. Many of these slums are themselves vulnerable to flooding and erosion, making them untenable as long-term solutions.

Indeed, internal migration can carry a heavy cost. Prior to the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, a devastating drought forced many farmers to migrate from rural parts of the country into Damascus, Aleppo and other major cities. This displacement is believed to have fed the social unrest that ultimately gave rise to the Arab Spring in 2011. In African countries such as Niger, which is already struggling with desertification and high population growth, this scenario could play out once again, pushing pastoralists and subsistence farmers to migrate northward.

At the moment, Europe has

the resources to manage the Syrian refugee crisis. The United States was able to successfully absorb Cubans fleeing their home country during the Mariel boat crisis of the early 1980s, and much poorer

“At the moment, Europe has the resources to manage the Syrian refugee crisis.”

Middle Eastern countries have been able to accommodate Syrians and Iraqis without collapsing. But few residents feel this to be the case; to anyone reading a British tabloid or listening to one of the EU’s many populists whip a crowd into a frenzy, the continent might seem to be overrun with Middle Eastern

migrants. Brookings Institution scholar Timmons Roberts estimates that Europeans feeling overwhelmed by current migration could face up to twenty times as many climate refugees in the near future. If industrialized states such as France, Germany and the UK face political turmoil as a result of the current influx, climate refugees will pose an existential crisis. Many of them will be ineligible for formal refugee status, as they will be unable to demonstrate political instability or persecution as a reason for fleeing their home countries. For states like Hungary and Serbia, which have balked at accepting even people fleeing brutal conflict zones, the idea of opening the borders to those who merely lost their homes and farmland to flooding will be unthinkable. Peace in Syria would end a great deal of suffering, but it will not provide Europe with longterm relief.

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The International Relations Review

A Kingdom Apart: Security Issues Facing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

By Matthew Manarchy, CAS’18

A

t first glance the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seems an oasis of relative stability in the sea of chaos that has engulfed the world of late. In a global economy dependent on oil, it has the largest proven reserves of petroleum of any country.

As the land of the two holy places, it is arguably the most important country in the Islamic world, receiving millions of pilgrims every year for the Hajj. The Kingdom is not only the largest military spender in the region, but has one of the largest defense budgets in the world. But if one looks closer these are not harbingers of stability, but of insecurity. The oil that has brought so much wealth has dominated the economy and left it vulnerable to market shocks. The Saudi Monarchy’s close relationship with Wahhabist clerics, as well as its control over Islam’s two holiest sites, has made it a focus

for religious fundamentalists. The defense capabilities of the Desert Kingdom have allowed and potentially encouraged embroilment in costly proxy wars to its north and south. The rising leadership of the Al-Saud dynasty has sought to address these issues through diversifying the economy, implementing de-radicalization programs, and continued support of anti-Iranian forces in Yemen and Syria.

Oil remains the backbone of Saudi Arabia’s economy for most of the country’s existence. Immediately upon establishing his kingdom in 1932, Abdul Aziz Ibn Al-Saud granted Standard Oil a concession to explore the region for oil, which resulted in the discovery of petroleum reserves a mere six years later.1 Since then, Saudi Arabia has been the textbook definition of a rentier state, deriving government revenues from natural resources rather

than taxes on the population. The Kingdom puts its vast reserves to use as the leading exporter of crude petroleum across the globe. As of 2015, sales of oil contributed to 82% of Saudi Arabia’s budget, 42% of its GDP, and 90% of its export earnings.2 This has not been problematic in the past because of typically high prices for barrels of oil, allowing for foreign reserves to accumulate and for the establishment and continuation of lavish spending programs. These programs included heavily subsidized oil and energy prices, free education, and largely free healthcare.

However, with the recent glut in oil processing resulting from continued production despite falling demand, prices have drastically fallen from their highs of about $110 a barrel in the early 2010s to a low in January of 2016 of $28 per barrel.3 4 This is troubling for the Saudi Royal Family to say the least.

Spring 2017 The stability that Saudi Arabia has enjoyed despite the Middle East’s generally volatile politics in recent years is due to the wide social net and high quality of life the government provides. The price of that stability required oil to be sold at about $95 a barrel but, due to recent austerity measures, that number has dropped to about $67.5 While oil prices have somewhat recovered from their January 2016 lows, they are still about $10 short of what Saudis need to break even. The government is pinning its hopes on a recent agreement between members of OPEC and non-OPEC oil producers to curb oil output and drive the price of oil back into the high sixties and potentially low seventies.

This is, however, only a short term fix. The price of oil will continue to rise and possibly return to breakeven levels, allowing Saudi Arabia to cut its budget deficit.

Global demand is veering away from oil, albeit slowly. The United Nations’ C.O.P. conference last year in Paris saw a global agreement to reduce carbon emissions, of which oil is a big contributor, to combat global warming. More fuel efficient vehicles are being developed and the use of solar energy is

9 rising. Saudi Arabia has not been blind to these realities. Recently, the government has tried to diversify its economy by developing its phosphate reserves and bauxite mines, essential for the creation of fertilizers and aluminum respectively.

The Saudi Government has also established the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, dedicated to aiding economic transition from dependence on oil and has tried to develop its manufacturing industry, especially in the petro-chemicals sector.6 These moves towards diversification are important steps towards greater economic security in Saudi Arabia.

Religion, specifically the Wahhabist interpretation of Islam, plays an important role in Saudi Arabia’s history, daily life, and security situation. The founder of the Al-Saud dynasty and the first Saudi Kingdom, Muhammad Al-Saud, made a deal with a puritanical cleric, Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab. The alliance stipulated that Wahhab and his followers would provide the Al-Saud family with religious legitimacy and in exchange the Al-Saud family would ensure the implementation and protection of Wahhab’s puritanical fundamen-

talism, an alliance still in place today.7 Wahhabism is a highly conservative and literalist interpretation of Islam, and casts a long shadow over Saudi society. Women only recently gained the right to vote and are still forbidden from driving cars or unveiling. Adulterers may be stoned to death. Manufacturing alcohol in one’s home can be grounds for hundreds of lashes. Religious police roam the streets and enforce Shari’a law with impunity. Wahhabist interpretations of Islam are not limited to the borders of Saudi Arabia.

The government funds thousands of mosques and religious schools across the globe; these institutions are staffed by Wahhabist clerics and use Saudi textbooks that promote a violent form of jihad, with the latter leading to many local traditions of Islam becoming less tolerant and increasingly conservative. In the popular imagination this is a direct cause of the growth of radical jihadist movements, which is a difficult, if not impossible, claim to prove. That Osama Bin Laden and most of the September 11th hijackers were of Saudi origin likely encourages this thinking. The facts beg to differ; only 0.5% of arrested terrorists in Indonesia had connections to Saudi

Photos by Sabrina Khan, SAR’19

10 funded schools and clerics. Similarly, European Muslims face a slew of discrimination and marginalization before they take up radical ideologies.

In 2004, there were several terrorist attacks on Saudi soil that opened the government’s eyes to the spreading religious radicalization within the Kingdom’s borders.

Radicals in the desert kingdom are nothing new; in 1979 radical fundamentalists seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca and took pilgrims hostage. The ensuing standoff lasted for about two weeks and was only able to end once the Royal Family agreed to enforce an even stricter version of Islam in exchange for acceptance of the Ulema of use of force inside the Grand Mosque. Custodianship of the Two Holy Places puts significant strain on Saudi Arabia. While it receives millions in revenue from pilgrims on the Hajj and commands respect from many Muslims, the Saudi Government is a rallying point against which radical fundamentalists sometimes organize. Some of the sharpest criticism is aimed at the Kingdom’s close ties with the West; a prominent example of this relationship was allowing American troops to be stationed in the country from 1991 to 2003. Following the series of attacks in 2004, the Saudis began to address extremist beliefs in its prison population, starting with a de-radicalization program.8 The participants include domestic radicals, detainees from Guantanamo Bay and Jihadists returned from Iraq, who undergo religious re-education, psychological counseling

The International Relations Review and eased reintroduction to society.

The Saudi Government boasts an 85% success rate for this program.

This does tackle an important part of the problem: those exposed to radical ideology are guided into a more moderate path and largely stick to it. Unfortunately the root of the issue, the proselytizing of a conservative, confrontational, and sometimes violent ideological strain of Islam, is left untouched because of the clerical-monarchical pact that keeps the Al-Saud family in power.

Although limited, the Kingdom is beginning to form solutions to insecurity caused by religion within its borders.

Military security is of paramount importance to the Saudi Arabian Government and has been a cornerstone of its relationship with the West since the end of the Second World War. The relationship began and is still somewhat focused on the secure transfer of oil from the Persian Gulf to the United States and its European allies and encompasses both counterterrorist activities and the containment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.9 Historic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. throughout the Cold War revolved around anti-communist efforts such as arming and supplying the Afghan mujahidin in the 1980s, managing energy security concerns, and eventually opposing Iranian influence in the region. Current relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. have been under pressure as the result of Saudi opposition to the Iran Nuclear Deal, American support for democratic movements during

the Arab Spring, and Saudi-involvement in the Yemeni Civil War. Saudi dissatisfaction with American policy even drove the Kingdom to sign a development agreement with Russia in 2015, with some hints at future sales of military hardware, although just how well that agreement will hold up now that Russia is actively assisting the Assad regime and Iranian proxy forces in Syria’s civil war remains to be seen.10

A primary driver of Saudi Arabia’s military build up is its rivalry with Iran. The basis of this rivalry lies in the theocratic differences between the countries (Saudi’s conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam and Iran’s revolutionary interpretation of Shi’a Islam), their competition for oil markets, and their desire to be the leading nation of both the Middle East and the Islamic World.

Saudi’s military buildup is ongoing since the 1991 Gulf War and has skyrocketed to a point where its total defense budget and spending as a percentage of GDP are, respectively, the third and fourth highest in the world.11 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports that Saudi military spending doubled in the last decade and now constitutes over half of the Middle East’s total according to available data and is eight and a half times greater than that of Iran.12 The agressive nature of this buildup and Iran’s response have manifested in several proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East, namely in Syria and Yemen. The Syrian Civil War certainly has a larger place on the public’s imagination than Yemen’s

“In addition to fighting the Assad regime and Iran through proxies, Saudi Arabia is involved in the U.S. anti-Islamic State (ISIS) coalition and even hosts its headquarters.”

Spring 2017 own civil war, yet the two are synonymous with tragedy. Saudi Arabia’s involvement is, of course, in opposition to Iran’s. As one of a few states led by a Shi’a Muslim, Syria is a natural ally of Iran; the Iranian government has shown its support by sending members of both its Revolutionary Guard Corps and regular military to fight alongside the Assad regime’s military forces.13 These troops, along with Russian airstrikes, have bolstered Assad and enabled him to continue gripping onto power. Saudi Arabia supports multiple anti-Assad factions, from the mainstream Free Syrian Army to the extremist Army of Conquest, which includes former branches of Al-Qaeda.14 This support has not been enough to help Syria’s hapless opposition stay on even footing with Assad, let alone come close to defeating the regime. Anti-Assad forces recently lost control of Aleppo, their last urban stronghold, and will likely be pushed from what parts of Damascus they still control, leaving only the wilderness and small towns as pockets of resistance. Despite its status as a benefactor for most of the opposition, Saudi Arabia has been unable to unify the opposition and stem rebel infighting. The opposition’s situation will only get worse if they do not unite forces now that they have no major urban centers under their control, no matter how much money the Saudis pump into it.

In addition to fighting the Assad regime and Iran through proxies, Saudi Arabia is involved in the U.S.’s anti-Islamic State (ISIS) coalition and even hosts its headquarters.15 Participation in the coalition is related to the Kingdom’s dire need to counter radical jihadist groups that see it as illegitimate and threaten to stir up resentment in

11 the population. ISIS is a particularly troublesome group for the Saudis because of the violent atrocities it commits as well as the group’s openness about the influence of Saudi-funded Wahhabist literature on its members.16 This is a damaging revelation for Saudi prestige, as connections between terrorist groups and Saudi Wahhabism have inspired claims that the kingdom was responsible for spreading terrorism in the past. The existential threats of ISIS’s extremism and expanding Iranian influence are the twin pillars supporting Saudi Arabia’s security policies in Syria.

Yemen’s devastating civil

“Only time will tell if the Saudis made the correct decisions that will benefit the kingdom and its population.” war has become another proxy war for Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is more directly involved in the Yemeni conflict than it is in Syria, as the Royal Saudi Armed Forces are fighting and are leading a coalition of their own, supported

by Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the U.A.E.. The coalition is afforded logistical support and intelligence from the U.S., U.K., and France and is organized around defeating the alliance of former Yemeni President Saleh, military units that defected to his side, and the Houthiis, a Shiite minority in the country and alleged client of Iran; and re-installing ousted President Hadi.17 How successful the Saudis and their allies will be remains to be seen, but it does not look well. The Houthiis have begun launching attacks on Saudi soil and

signaled their abandonment of any negotiated end to the conflict by declaring and forming a government.18 To upend this, the Saudis will need to commit to fighting for an indeterminate amount of time and sink considerably more resources -man-power, material, and financial -- into the operation, an unlikely endeavor. Intelligence regarding the extent of Iran’s involvement has not been declassified, but rumors indicate that the Houthiis and their allies have received at least shipments of small arms and potentially a cadre of Iranian soldiers to assist and advise.19 The prospect of this is very worrying to the Saudis; they consider Yemen their backyard and have a long shared history. Losing a proxy war in Syria, where the Saudis never had much influence to begin with, is of minimal concern. Losing the proxy war in Yemen to Iran, however, would be a huge psychological blow to the Kingdom after wasting significant time, resources, lives, and effort only to end up with an Iranian client at its doorstep and its allies disillusioned.

A myriad of factors contribute to a country’s stability and security. These factors can be the result of diplomacy and negotiation, long-established norms, or simply geographical “luck.” In the case of Saudi Arabia, establishing stability and security is an ongoing concern on economic, religious, and military fronts. The Kingdom has, as a result, focused its efforts on economic diversification, combating the spread of radical religious beliefs, and continuing to challenge Iran for regional military influence. Only time will tell if the Saudis made the correct decisions that will benefit the kingdom and its population.

ECONOMICS & DEVELOPMENT

Spring 2017

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14 Child Labor:

A Modern Issue Stuck in the Stigma of the Past

By Rose Weinmann, CAS‘19 Western society, in general, holds the very limited view that child labor is a barbaric and inhuman practice. This deeply ingrained stigma against child labor stems from the west’s own long complex history with the practice of child labor. This narrow view is propagated by western media and has led to a limited understanding of the social, political and economic realties of modern child labor.

18 The Problematic Future of the TransPacific Partnership

By Sydney Siwinski, CAS’19 With the change in leadership in the United States, a change to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement was called for by all final candidates for the presidency. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement was riddled with restrictions on trade in the field of pharmaceuticals, thus further limiting access to medicine and healthcare rather than expanding access via lower barriers to trade. The promise to make changes to the TPPA has been upheld by the new administration but with the goals of the current administration, the future direction of the agreement is still uncertain.

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The International Relations Review

Child Labor: A Modern Issue Stuck in the Stigma of the Past

By Rose Weinmann CAS’19

T

he image of child labor as created by western media is of young girls working long hours in a dirty, dingy factory sewing clothes for privileged consumers of the Western world. This portrayal is fraught with inaccuracies. This misconstrued depiction of child labor stems from the West’s complicated history with child labor during the Industrial Revolution and the propaganda efforts by labor organizations around the turn of the century. Despite the fact that modern child labor bares little resemblance to the child labor practices during the Industrial Revolution, the Western world still has a narrow view as to what child labor is with an even more limited understanding of its economic effects. These realities of the modern child laborer are often left out of the dialogue around child labor the vast majority of child laborers are not in factories but in the fields of their own families. It is also often forgotten that child labor comes from a place of monetary necessity. In the developed world there is the ill-informed notion that children should be in school, not working. However, this idea fails to grasp the lack of feasible education for the vast majority of children in the developing world. The Western world’s skewed vision of child labor is due to our own complex history with the subject, subsequently feeding into the modern media’s unreal-

istic portrayal of the topic. In turn, this misunderstanding of modern child labor has led to ineffective and sometimes even detrimental efforts to stop it.

The stigma against child labor in the Western world has been present for centuries and is now deeply ingrained in modern society. When the first anti-child labor movements started, it was in response to the use of child labor during the Industrial Revolution.

Jane Humphries, an economic historian, describes the rise of child labor in England: “Children’s jobs were specific and well defined, but in all sectors, they were integral to processes of production and distribution.”1 Child labor was seen as a way to maximize utility in all parts of society, following Adam Smith’s newly popular idea of labor specialization. Child labor is simply defined as youth under the age of fourteen performing any form of labor. By this definition, child labor was prominent and prevalent long before the Industrial Revolution. Children in the past, with a few exceptions of the wealthy elites, were expected to help with domestic work. Previous to the Industrial Revolution, this would entail working in the fields or helping with parents’ craft. Child labor has been around for a significant period of time and is integrated into the family structure, yet why do we currently view it as an immoral practice?

More information about child development has led to a recent shift in mindset about the role of a healthy childhood. New research highlights the benefit of “playing” and early education that has led parents to prioritize those activities over using their children as a source of cheap labor. The very nature of the work being done has changed more than the actual information about child development. At the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Britain one of the first products to be made in mass production in factories was the textile. With mass migration to cities and no land for children to help cultivate, working in a factory was the obvious progression of child labor. Children were uniquely suited to some elements of textile production, such as crawling through running machines to make repairs or using a child’s small finger to un-bunch cotton in preparation for spinning. In some factories, children were even preferred to adult laborers because of their unique skill set and they would accept a lower wage than an adult worker. The use of child labor in factories became globally widespread when textile production expanded out of Britain and into other countries, such as the United States. The next stage of the Industrial Revolution, the rise of steam-powered machinery, led to the use of children in coal mines.

This exposed children to harsher conditions than the textile factories.

Spring 2017 Despite the frequency and severity of injury, most of the general public had no qualms with the use of child laborers in industry. In fact, as Peter Kirby put it, “Parents would frequently blame their own injured children for stupidity or negligence.”2 Child labor was not viewed as a risky or harmful practice like it is today. It was a generally accepted practice during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution because people saw no difference between industrial child labor and agricultural child labor.

It was not until the 1870’s that reforms around child labor began in America. Early policy reforms put limits on age and hours worked in an attempt to cut down

15 adults began to earn higher wages, the economic necessity of children working decreased. The rise of free education meant that children had an alternative to working, creating a new opportunity cost with child labor. The combination of less jobs for child laborers due to unions, parents earning higher wages, and higher opportunity costs led to most young children leaving the workforce and investing their time in education. However child labor was still prevalent in American society.

Labor unions joined forces to create the National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) in 1904, a committee that would be the leader of the anti-child labor movement for the next half century. The climax of the

factor to why so many Americans have stigmatized child labor.

It was not until the Great Depression that legislation passed to end the use of child labor in manufacturing and mining. This change was less tied to the morality of child labor and to the hope that without child laborers more jobs would be available for adults. This was a desperate move by the government to reduce unemployment; it did little to save the economy from depression, but it did formally end child labor in America. In Europe, the fall of child labor was much more gradual with regulations that slowly pushed up the age and wages of workers.

There was little resistance to the regulations as child labor was already

“Focusing on the economic growth of the developing world is the key to reducing child labor.” the use of children as laborers. It is during this period that we also see the rise of unions and universal education in the United States, leading to the eventual eradication of child labor from the western workplace.

The creation of unions meant that employers were held accountable for how they treated workers. This also meant that unions could demand higher wages. The creation of unions changed the fundamental structure of labor markets; companies could no longer rely on the demand for jobs to keep wages low and unions created a price floor on wages. Unions did not support child labor because they believed it cut into their wages. Additionally, the power of being in a union meant that they could demand their employer no longer higher child laborers. As

fight against child labor came in the 1930’s when the committee backed the passage of a new amendment to the constitution that would ban child labor. During the very public debates over the amendment, the NCLC relied heavily on mass media propaganda campaigns. J.E. Hulett, a professor of social psychology, describes some of the propaganda as, “Those favoring the amendment induce[d] a ‘negative’ feeling in their readers by using phrases like exploitation of youth; children in servitude; manufacturers and their lobbyist.”3 Although the amendment did not pass, the heavy use of propaganda led to a shift in the mindset of the American populace.

This change in the way Americans view child labor has persisted to the modern day and is a contributing

on the decline in Western Europe.

Historians argue that this was due to a combination of the higher standard of living that arose from the Industrial Revolution and a change in social values that promoted the belief that the father should be the breadwinner of the household. By the 1940s child labor was almost entirely eliminated from the Western world.4

The modern reality of child labor drastically differs from the child laborers of the nineteenth and twentieth century in America and Europe. Today, child laborers work in the non-formal areas of the economy-- jobs that are almost always low skilled and require no education. The International Labor Organization (ILO) in a 1997 report claims that most child labor is found

16 “in agriculture, domestic service, and the informal sector.”5 Almost every country has laws that limit the use of child labor. However, the laws are poorly enforced and do not reach the informal sector of the economy.

The ILO 1997 report also found that child laborer incomes makes up 34% of the GDP per capita in the developing world (the countries in the lowest quartile of global GDP figures).6 Although there have been attempts to regulate the practice of child labor in the informal economy, most have failed; it is important to look at what impact the failed regulations do have on child labor. In a Kaushik Basu and Pham Hoang Van study of child laborer effects on labor markets they came to the conclusion that, if the market has only one equilibrium which is likely in very poor countries, then a ban can worsen the condition of the labor households... The first-best policy is to attack the problem at its source.

This entails improving the condition and scope for adult labor.7

The belief that child labor comes from the formal sector of the economy is one of the most commonly held modern misconceptions about child labor. The portrayal of child labor by the Western media as a problem that can be solved in the formal sector of the economy, through government and industry regulation, is simply untrue.

This misunderstanding has led to recent movements to boycott products that consumers believe are tied to child labor. S.L Bachman describes the issue around the boycotts as: The attention generated by activists, unions, politicians, journalists and other convinced some customers in developed nations to boycott childmade imports... Unfortunately, public attention has been partially

The International Relations Review misdirected and public policies have occasionally brought harm to the very children they were intended to help.8

Because only 5% of child labor is in the formal economy, the boycotts at best can only affect 5% of the child laborers. The reason behind these relatively useless boycotts is the media’s limited portrayal of child labor as it relates to the Western world. The exposé stories that accuse major Western brands of using child labor are what makes the front page; there is no full page spread announcing that rice sold domestically in a developing country was planted by a seven-year-old girl. The media is not maliciously twisting stories to depict a limited view of child labor, they simply are responding to the incentives that are created for them by the Western consumer. As Bachman explains, the “[media] know that the best way to get a story covered is to package it in a way that emphasizes its connection to American lives.”9 In order to connect to the Western reader, the media has inadvertently portrayed a false image of the child labor. Modern child labor is not something that needs regulation or enforcement, it can be eliminated through economic development. As we saw in Europe and America, the real determining factors are the opportunities for education, the societal view on children working and the demand for unskilled laborers – all factors that accompany economic development.

Child labor is untruthfully portrayed as though it originates from malicious parents exploiting their children, the practice of child labor based in economic necessity, not parental selfishness. Luis Felipe López Calva in his paper, A So-

cial Stigma Model of Child Labor, makes the point that families’ social reputations are at stake and that the stigma within the community must determine the level of necessity.10 He argues that the emotional and social cost must be accounted for in the marginal cost versus benefit analysis of having a child work. The social stigma affects child labor in the marginal population. If it were not for the social stigma there would be a higher incidence of child labor in the developed world. The economic necessity of an impoverished homeless family in Detroit is the same as a family in a slum in New Delhi, the difference is the community expectations and the social standards. In the developing world, where child labor is a common practice, there is a low social and emotional cost; in the developed world those costs are so high they are prohibitive and prevent child labor. The social expectations can affect marginal populations by both decreasing and increasing the incidence of child labor. In a community where child labor is common, a family that is economically stable may still have a child work because there is economic benefit and low social costs (the costs are even lower when there is no accessible education and thus the opportunity cost is near zero). Furthermore, in a community where child labor is not common there is a large social cost and it requires a higher level of economic necessity for a family to put a child to work.

The social stigma or lack thereof plays as much of a role as economic necessity in the practice of child labor.

One of the other common misguided beliefs about child labor is that if children were not working that they would be in school. The

Spring 2017 best response to this idea is from Shahadt, a Bangladeshi garment worker who started working before he was thirteen. He told reporters: “If we were fired from the factory, I could go to school, but then who would feed my mother and sister”(qtd. in Bachman, San Jose Mercury News).11 The belief that school is an option for child laborers shows how unaware Western audiences and media are to the realities of extreme poverty that these children come from. Unlike child labor in the western world, this is not the practice of the working class or lower-middle class, it is a necessary practice of the extreme poor in order to survive.

This belief also shows how Western media projects influence the rest of the world, disregarding the fact that the developing world has different societal and economic structures.

The creation of free education in the Western world and the campaigns to get children into schools have led to the West to prioritize education. This belief does not extend to other parts of the world. The value of education is often put second to fulfilling family obligations. In

17 many places in the world today, the role of a girl is not in a classroom, but in the home. This seems unfair and discriminatory to Westerners who were raised to think that everybody should be educated. In other cultures a girl must help to run the household and is needed to work in the field or in the family business.

In the developed world, it is easy to project the values that are present here on to other places. The media, in its portrayal of child labor, does not take the time to correct that belief.

Child labor has been part of human society for centuries, the stigma against child labor, however, appeared millenniums later. In modern portrayals of child labor the practice is depicted as inhuman and inherently barbaric. However, child labor is a major part of the developing world’s labor markets and societal practice. This misrepresentation stems from the Western world projecting their own ideas and history on to modern child laborers.

The removal of child labor from the developed world was a result of regulation and a shift in societal

expectations. The modern child laborer bares no real resemblance to the factory workers of the Industrial Revolution-- they are mainly in the informal sector of the economy and work out of necessity and family obligation. This misrepresentation of child labor has led to Western movements against child labor that are simply ineffective and arguably do more harm than good. If child labor is to someday become an obsolete practice it will not come from Western intervention. The key to ending the use of child labor is to have their income no longer be a necessity for family survival. This criteria can be met only from significant economic and social development.

Focusing on the economic growth of the developing world is the key to reducing child labor. The Western media’s portrayal reinforces the misguided stigma against child labor and promotes the misinformed notion that the Western world can stop child labor through changing their purchasing practices.

Photo by Morgan Peterson, CAS’17

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The International Relations Review

The Problematic Future of the TransPacific Partnership

By Sydney Siwinski, CAS’19

W

hen the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPPA) was concluded and signed in February 2016, it signified a future of global trade, interconnected world economy, and greater access to the goods produced in member nations. The TPPA endeavored to “incorporate all negotiating participants under one free trade agreement which eliminates tariffs and non-tariff barriers to goods, services, and agriculture.”1 However, the TPPA also introduced Trade Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS-Plus) protections of intellectual property and patents, meaning these member states were expected to introduce patent law restrictions even stricter than that enforced by the TRIPS agreement. The TPPA actually weakens the standard of what is considered “patentable”, allowing companies to extend monopoly control over a pharmaceutical product with minimal changes made. It allows companies to prevent the registration of generics and further pursue legal action with those who are in violation of these new regulations.2 While opening up free trade benefits the economies of many member nations, TRIPS and other free-trade agreements simultaneously open up the pharmaceutical industry to the risk of frequent ‘reverse engineering’ and to countries being able to import those slightly-varied generic drugs. Not surprisingly, this is

met with lobbying resistance from many pharmaceutical corporations, including the all-powerful Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) in the United States. At the ‘request’ of these corporations, greater patent protections were introduced as a component and conditionality of the TPPA. However, even still these corporations do not see the protections as sufficient.3

Of the twelve original signatories of the TPPA, the UN Human Development Index considers four developing countries.4 These nations, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, and Peru, offer important products that citizens of developed nations consider important components of daily life–especially in the United States. An example of this has recently been a popular topic of conversation; we rely on Mexico for a significant variety of produce such as avocados, raspberries, and strawberries. Although not essential to life, these crops are important to both Mexico and citizens of other countries like the United States.

Allowing greater access to trade for these countries hypothetically benefits their access to goods and services, yet other aspects of the TPPA do more harm than good.

According to Baker, a professor of law at Northeastern University and a foreign policy analyst at Health GAP, “most low- and middle-income countries in Africa have little to show in terms of increased in-

novation, technology diffusion, or IP-related FDI. Instead, intellectual property rights (IPRs), have primarily benefited right-holders from rich countries resulting in reduced access to affordable medicines, educational resources, agricultural inputs, and green technologies.”5 The tightened access to pharmaceuticals and enhanced patent law protections actually inhibit developing nations, rather than expanding their access to innovation technologies.6 Though PhRMA and other large pharmaceutical corporations argue that patent protection is beneficial for all, articles in the TPPA such as Article 18, “To compensate for unreasonable curtailment of patent term as a result of pharmaceutical marketing approval, an adjustment to the patent term shall be made available,” actually misrepresent the threat to cost recoupment and create barriers to access for everyone.7

Often we forget that the citizens of the United States are included in the group of those who are affected. Though many large and powerful pharmaceutical corporations may call the U.S. home, so does a civic society that is growing increasingly concerned about the astronomical cost of medicine and healthcare. According to Global Access Project, an organization that works to assess and eliminate barriers to global access to vital medicines, the citizens of the United States pay some of the highest prices for medications in the world, and as

Spring 2017 they try to impress upon readers, “the American public is increasingly concerned about unchecked and escalating prices for medicines as is the American Medical Association.”8 In terms of access to medicine, the TPPA seems to even inhibit the citizens of one of the wealthiest nations in the world.

Though the TPPA has the potential to expand access to imported goods at lower prices, “TPP dangerously expands monopoly power over medicines just as the U.S. public and public officials are waking up to the excesses of pharmaceutical pricing.”9 Realistically, the supporters of a utilitarian application of patent law, as in providing the greatest positive externalities possible, would agree that the addition of new patents does not increase those public positive externalities, rather it solely enhances the economic incentives of PhRMA and other pharmaceutical companies to continue their tactics of evergreening existing patents and lobbying for further protections.

Interestingly, the playing field for these companies has recently experienced a shift. As of January 23, 2017, the United States no longer intends to ratify or participate in the TPPA as it exists currently. As the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) states, “USTR is working to reshape the landscape of trade policy to work for all Americans”, implying that the TPPA or some other document for international trade may be proposed in the future.10 For many valid components of international trade, alliances and access to free trade is important for both the citizens of the United States and of other countries in the particular agreement. It is worth reworking an agreement such as the TPPA to better serve “all Americans” as well as all civic society rather than large corporations like PhRMA. Lowering barriers to trade can potentially lead to an invalu-

19 able increase in access to goods, services, medicines, and to a higher quality of living. However, in the context of patent law, incentive to innovate is still a relevant argument, one that will likely not be given up easily by pharmaceutical corporations. Without protections on inventions that grant the temporary monopoly power that ensures a company can regain the millions invested in research and development, many of the innovations in medicine that greatly enhance modern society will cease to be invented and produced. A reworking of the TPPA will hopefully strike a better balance between patent protection and access to medicine, at least compared to the present agreement. However, it’s unlikely that with the current new policy aims of the United States, less protection for domestic businesses and companies will be endorsed by our government. Instead, the new Trump administration in the United States seeks further protections for United States industries and agreements that give more advantages to the United States and its various industries. With this more protectionist approach, the administration seeks greater tariffs and less free trade in general, agreement or otherwise.11 However, it may soon become apparent that ideas that seem advantageous to the United States in the moment actually isolate the citizens of the country even further from access to imported goods, from produce to life-saving generic pharmaceuticals.

Until further developments are made, the rest of the world can merely wait and watch.

Photos by Sophie Park, CAS’20

Photo by Brenda Chavez, CAS’17

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The International Relations Review

Exclusive Interview: U.S. Foreign Policy Under the Trump Administration

A conversation with Professor John Woodward about the future of U.S. foreign policy under President Trump.

Photo by Sharon Afflu, CAS’17

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What do you think are some of the main changes to U.S. national security policy under Trump? Are there any positive changes from the Obama administration to the Trump administration?

I think it’s the turn away from globalization, which is the most significant change we’ve seen with respect to the new Trump administration. The previous administration and U.S. policy post World War II very much embraced the international community, free trade, and globalization. It seems with this administration that’s not the case. We’re out of the TPP and query what’s going to happen with NAFTA. I’d say that a good 45% of Americans would be in agreement with this economic nationalism.

In regards to U.S. foreign policy, how is the mass media impacting how people view policies as they develop further under Trump?

My problem with the media is that they have taken a “my team” approach. Fox, MSNBC and others interview a hired gun from one side, who gives you talking points, and then you bring in a hired gun from the other side, who gives you talking points, and to me that’s not the kind of thoughtful analysis we should have, especially in a democracy. Now PBS does this the best, which may mean I’m making the case for more government funded media, which is appalling to many. I think that with the Trump presidency some outlets like the New York Times and the Washington Post are trying to play the vibrant role of watchdog and that’s healthy. A lot of the media just really disappoints me and a lot of that is just bad for democracy. But in fairness, we as citizens also have a job to be informed and participative members of democracy.

In regards to security especially with the immigration changes, will there be lasting long term effects for security policy and do you think that security has improved?

I don’t think the immigration changes have a profound impact on the security of the United States. We’ll see if they pass legal muster, that’s something for the courts to decide. But I would say that the president has the authority when it comes to the realm of immigration and border control. Looking at this immigration executive order, it’s been tweaked from the original. Iraq is no longer one of the target countries. From a national security perspective, I think there has always been intensive vetting of people that are from weak or failed nation states. So I think that this is done primarily for a domestic, U.S. audience and not based on some kind of national security calculus.

Do you think that he took Iraq out of the list for the people who worked for the U.S. military?

I think is that the Secretary of State probably advocated the President to take Iraq out. I think it was done because, first of all, there are a lot of Iraqis who have helped the United States and are in the immigration pipeline. Secondly, I would just make a note that with respect to vetting, the United States can actually vet Iraqis fairly well because we were in the country for many years and we have assembled a lot of records on Iraqis. Thus we actually have a better chance of knowing something about them. Compare that to one of the other countries on the list like Somalia. There is really no robust record keeping in Somalia.

It’s a failed nation state. That’s usually one of the signals you have of a failed nation state: the nation state doesn’t have an infrastructure or a functional government. So I can see how it is very hard to vet someone from Somalia. Iraq on the other hand is not because the United States fought a war there, had a large presence there, and was able to collect a lot of data. I think we have a much better chance of vetting people from Iraq then probably a lot of other countries.

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During the U.S. War on Terror, the U.S. started to rely more on cyber security and SIGINT (signal intelligence), whereas the Russians continued to develop their HUMINT (human intelligence). Can we see that in this situation?

The argument is that after 9/11 the U.S. placed overwhelming emphasis on counterterrorism. We got involved in Afghanistan and furthermore in March of 2003 with the invasion of Iraq and a very strong paramilitary focus. The U.S. government put a lot more resources into counterterrorism, but when you go in that direction, where the resources are in your counterterrorism, that means we’re not going to emphasize other things as much. Those other things would be traditional intelligence operations and measures taken against Russian intelligence service, Chinese intelligence, and other long-standing adversaries. So, to put it crudely, it’s the four-year-olds playing soccer. It’s them all running after the counterterrorism ball. What about the rest of the field? I think that’s what happened. The good thing in the Russian involvement in the U.S. election is now suddenly both Republicans and Democrats have woken up and realized that Putin and the Russians really are back. So that’s a good thing.

We’re a little skeptical on that and we should be. I don’t want to sound like a Cold Warrior here, but what the Russians are doing with the election activities is not that different from classic KGB disinformation campaigns that they ran for decades. The domain has simply changed.

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Are there any countries that you personally are concerned might be “under the radar” that Trump may alter relations with during his presidency? And if so, what would be the consequences?

I think immediate term, North Korea poses a huge threat to security in East Asia and in the United States. If you do your basic threat equation, a threat equals capability plus intent and your adversary has to have the capability to cause you harm and the desire to do it. So with North Korea on the capabilities side, it’s clear they are improving their capabilities to cause mass harm with respect to nuclear weapons and with respect to their delivery capacity with missiles. It’s also clear, cite the assassination in Kuala Lampur, they have VX, which is a very, very deadly nerve agent. So on that capability side, North Korea looms large. One of the challenges is that we don’t really have a good fix on what the intent is for the North Korean leadership. I think that’s an immediate area of interest, that’s what I would prioritize. What are we going to do about it? That’s a tough challenge. You may have to look at more robust offensive measures. Now we’re deploying an anti-missile system to Korea, the THAD, that has the Chinese all upset, but you might have to look at even more defensive measures. And there’s a huge military exercise taking place now with the U.S. in South Korea. The USS St. Vincent, a very powerful nuclear powered aircraft carrier, is deployed to take part in those. Thus, it seems we’re demonstrating that North Korea is a huge issue.

Photo by Alex Lo, CAS’20

REGIONAL POLITICS 26 Beyond Mexico:

What Does Donald Trump’s Presidency Mean for the Rest of Latin America?

By Clara Bezerra, CAS’18 President Trump’s inflammatory comments about Mexico and his pledge to sever many of the U.S.’ ties with their southern neighbor have, with reason, received much international attention. Less discussed, however, is the question of what his presidency means for the rest of Latin America.

Scholars on the region have conflicting predictions on how Trump will carry out the U.S.’ relations with Latin American countries.

30 The Western Sahara Conflict:

International Players Contributing to a Lack of Resolution

By Ines Boussebaa, COM’17, CAS’17 Western Sahara, a little-known region, has been steeped in conflict since 1956. Morocco has laid claim to the territory, while its neighbor Algeria has supported the independence movement. However, the conflict is not just regional - many international players, including the US, the UN, the African Union, and the EU, are involved, keeping the conflict from moving towards a resolution. largely overlooked victims of sanctions and strained relations with the U.S. and Europe.

36 Anger in the Kingdom:

Why Congress’ Saudi 9/11 Bill Will Be Destructive for U.S. Foreign Relations

By Samira Jafar, CAS’20 In September 2016, Congress pushed forth a bill that would give the families of 9/11 victims the opportunity to sue the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for any alleged involvement in the terrorist attack. Ultimately, the enforcement of such a bill would not only derail the United States’ alliance with Saudi Arabia, but also lead to intense legal, economic, and social consequences within U.S. foreign policy.

38 2017 Elections in Ecuador: A Brief Overview

By Kaitlyn Cyprian, CAS’19 Ecuador is preparing for its second round of voting after a stalemate back in February, with the liberal incumbent’s vice president running against a conservative outsider and former bank president. Before we try and predict who will win the second round in April, here are the facts about the initial voting results from the first round, as well as where each candidate’s support lies.

40 Dismantling the Monolith:

Repealing the Cuban Embargo

By Sara H. Van Velkinburgh, CAS’18 In recent years the world has witnessed a shift in the United States’ policy towards Cuba, but the tumultuous political environment has led many to speculate on the future of the relationship. Now more than ever, it is important to understand the President’s authority to regulate the United State’s policy towards the island. In order to understand obstacles to the Cuban Embargo’s repeal, it is vital to understand the legislation that constitutes it, and the political changes that allowed for a warming of relations in the first place.

44 The Macron Contradiction:

France’s Populist, Pro-European Candidate

By Christopher Brown, CAS’19 In this spring’s wave of European elections, populism and far-right ideology are referred to by many analysts as inseparable, inevitable allies against the current world order. French candidate Emmanuel Macron breaks with this association by presenting a pro-European platform with a populist campaign. His policy could very well be integral to the future of European international relations.

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Photo by Jacqueline Kresse, SAR’19

Beyond Mexico:

Photo by Kate Weiser, COM’19

Photo by Brenda Chavez, CAS’17

What Does Donald Trump’s Presidency Mean for the Rest of Latin America?

By Maria Clara Soares Bezerra, CAS’18

F

rom his promise to build a wall and make Mexico pay for it to his claim that Mexican immigrants are “killers and rapists,”1 President Donald Trump’s attacks on U.S.Mexican relations have attracted worldwide attention. Throughout the presidential election he made clear his intentions to pull out of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and crackdown on illegal immigration, especially targeting immigrants from America’s southern neighbor. Since he took office the media has closely monitored his strides to deliver on his promises regarding Mexico, which have led to widespread fear and public outrage. Less clear, however, is President Trump’s attitude towards the rest of Latin America.

With the exception of Mexico and to a lesser extent Cuba, Trump has devoted little attention to outlining the policies he intends to pursue in the region. This uncertainty has divided observers of U.S.-Latin American relations into two primary

camps with opposing interpretations of the potential effects of Trump’s presidency on the region. Some, such as former Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Jorge Castañeda, believe that “Trump’s election is an unmitigated disaster for the region” and that his policy towards Mexico will carry through to Latin America as a whole.2 Others have taken a more optimistic posture and argued that Trump is not as dangerous as his rhetoric seems to indicate and that Mexico is the only country in Latin America that will suffer under his presidency.3 A closer look at President Trump’s campaign platform reveals the merits of each interpretation and highlights the uncertainty that has accompanied his election.

Predicting a problematic next four years for Latin America, Castañeda argues that, although Trump has not attacked other countries in the region as he has Mexico, the consequences of U.S. anti-immigration and protectionist policies towards its Southern

neighbor on the entire region should not be underestimated. Every Central American country, along with several South American and Caribbean countries, are a source of migration to the U.S. Of the 1.5 million Guatemalan immigrants in the U.S.4 less than one third are legal residents.5 Trump’s emphasis on deportation would lead to security consequences for these immigrants and also disrupt their process of sending remittances to their families, thereby also affecting the economic well-being of citizens residing in Guatemala.6 Furthermore, in regards to trade, renegotiating or scrapping NAFTA would put in jeopardy the various bilateral free-trade agreements between Latin American countries and the U.S. that have sprung from it.7 This breakdown of trade agreements could lead at best to slow trade growth and at worst to a trade war, both which pose risks for Latin American countries. For various countries in the region, boosting and diversifying export

Spring 2017

Photo by Kate Weiser, COM’19

goods is a major component of their recovery strategies. Therefore, if Trump carries through with his campaign rhetoric, the effects of his policies, even if targeted specifically at Mexico, will be felt throughout the entire region. And to the optimistic political observers who claim Trump will not be able to implement his agenda, that the Senate and House of Representatives will never allow his policies to be enacted, Castañeda provides the reminder that former President Barack Obama successfully deported over two million Mexicans and Central Americans during his presidency and that U.S. presidents have been expanding the U.S.-Mexican border partition since construction began in 1933. It would be unsurprising for Trump to surpass Obama’s deportation record and increase and strengthen the partition. According to Castañeda, the result will be a shockwave of economic downturn and mass deportation triggered by protectionism throughout the entire region.

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Photo by Brenda Chavez, CAS’17

The World Bank’s 2017 projections for economic growth in Latin America, however, leave space for optimism. The World Bank predicts that this year Latin America will return to positive economic growth and expand, despite shrinking investment in Mexico due to policy uncertainty on the part of the United States. Forbes writer and specialist in emerging markets Kenneth Rapoza explains this trend by arguing that most of Latin America is not dependent on the United States and its policies: “With the exception of Mexico and the security nightmares of Central America, South America has been on its own since the commodity super cycle began in the early 2000’s.” Rapoza argues that Washington has been shifting its focus away from South America and toward regions it considers national security threat, leaving most of Latin America to “take care of itself,” which it has been able to do for the most part. There is little reason to believe Trump will reverse

Photo by Kate Weiser, COM’19

this trend, especially since he has seldom mentioned South America, never mind propose a consistent foreign policy towards the continent.

Therefore, according to Rapoza, the economic effect of Trump’s antitrade policies will be limited to a few countries in Latin America rather than the entire region as Castañeda suggests. Another optimistic wave of political analysts argue that the threat of Trump’s protectionism may actually unite the countries of Latin America. The region has long been divided into two agreements, Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, both aimed at expanding free trade but built on different models.

Argentinian president Mauricio Macri and Chilean president Michelle Bachelet currently serve as the leaders of Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, respectively, and they have expressed their willingness to work together in order to increase economic unity. Representatives of the two organizations are scheduled to meet in April “to deal with the protectionist pressures”

“Given Trump’s inconsistency, it is a real possibility that Latin American leaders will be faced with an American administration that has no clear visions of its relations with the region.”

28 from Trump’s administration.

Although it is unlikely that the two organizations will merge in the near future, Trump’s election may have accelerated the process and motivated cooperation.

It is impossible to speak of the future of Latin America without considering the role of the Asian giant, China. The increasing presence of China in the region’s economy seems to be a shared prediction by political observers, independent of their opinions regarding the consequences of Trump’s presidency on Latin America. While the U.S. president has championed protectionism, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has

The International Relations Review publicly declared his support for globalization and open markets, already stepping in to fill the vacuum left by the U.S. in Latin America.

Professor of global development policy Kevin Gallagher explains that China has declared its willingness to engage with Latin American economic affairs, calling the region a “land of vitality and hope” in a Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean released on November 2016. Gallagher also explains that China has outlined its plans for future investment in the region, pledg[ing] to increase trade with the region by $500 billion and foreign investment to $250 billion by 2025.” Unlike the effects of Trump’s

policies on Latin America, the growth of China’s involvement in Latin America has gone undisputed.

The fact that scholars have such opposing views on the effects of the current U.S. administration’s on Latin America is a testament to Trump’s conflicting remarks about the region. Besides constant attacks on Mexico and promises to cut trade ties, the rest of Latin America has not received much attention from the President. Given Trump’s inconsistency, it is a real possibility that Latin American leaders will be faced with an American administration that has no clear visions of its relations with the region.

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Photo by Kate Weiser, COM’19

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The International Relations Review

The Western Sahara Conflict: International Players Contributing to a Lack of Resolution

By Ines Boussebaa, COM’17, CAS’17

T

he Western Sahara is a little-known, resourcerich region bordering Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania, steeped in conflict since 1956. Morocco has laid claim to the territory, while Polisario, an independence movement backed

by Algeria, has struggled for selfdetermination. This neglected international conflict involves major geopolitical players, including the United States, the United Nations, the African Union, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Spain, France and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Tensions are high between Algeria and Morocco, and the various policies pursued by outside players have only been counter-constructive, resulting in a decades-long stalemate.

Spain colonized the Western Sahara in 1884, whereas France colonized Morocco in 1911.

In 1956, Morocco obtained its independence and laid claim to the Western Sahara, as it considered the region integral to Moroccan unity. Spanish troops repelled Moroccan military incursions into the Western Sahara. The situation became more complicated as the newly independent Mauritania also laid claim to the territory in 1960.

Anticolonial sentiment grew among the indigenous Saharawi, and in 1973, an independence movement

formed through the group Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro) and commenced an insurgency against Morocco and Spain. In 1975 the King called on 300,000 Moroccans to march into the Western Sahara and claim it as their own. This was a strategic move to force Spain to hand over the territory. By 1976, Spain withdrew and Mauritania and Morocco partitioned Western Sahara between themselves.

Polisario moved to Algeria, which supported its movement through military aid and bases, and declared their government the “Saharan Arab Democratic Republic” (SADR). For 15 years, they conducted guerilla warfare against Morocco, and approximately 165,000 Sahrawi refugees fled to refugee camps.1 Mauritania left in 1979, and Morocco claimed their part of the territory.

At this point, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) became active in the conflict, trying to help find a solution. In 1984 Morocco left in protest of the OAU’s recognition of the SADR. It was only in 1991 that the United Nations (UN) brokered a cease-fire and put forward a plan for a referendum on self-determination, accepted by both Polisario and Morocco. From there, the UN created a mission for the referendum, known as

MINURSO. Since 1991, the war ended but Morocco has failed to hold a referendum on independence, and numerous discussions have failed.2 ,3

The Western Sahara is the main area of tension between Algeria and Morocco – as a result of the conflict, the border between the two countries has been closed since 1994.4 Algeria’s position has been support for a referendum for the Western Sahara, and has provided continual support for the Polisario.

Morocco claims the Western Sahara is part of Morocco, and refers to the region as its Southern Provinces.

Morocco is also interested in the Western Sahara due to its strategically important sectors, including phosphate, rich fisheries, iron ore reserves, and potential oil and gas reserves.5 Giving up the region would also potentially undermine the monarchy, creating instability. Morocco’s interest in the Western Sahara and its resources have made it unwilling to move forward with the conflict; it is unwilling to do anything that might mean losing the territory. Due to Algeria’s leadership position on the continent, the resolution of the conflict is impossible without Algeria’s acquiescence. However, Algeria sees the conflict as the UN’s responsibility and “outside the scope of Algerian-Moroccan bilateral relations.”6 Still, Western Sahara

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Photo by Matthew Manarchy, CAS’18

remains part of Algeria’s national security.7 Algeria’s unwillingness to become involved in negotiations has contributed to the stagnation of the conflict – If Algeria took an active role, they could help improve Polisario’s position. At the same time, taking action could increase tensions with Morocco. In any case, Algeria’s acting would cause some changes to the conflict.

In 1991, civil war broke out in Algeria. This resulted in uncertainty throughout the region, and the status quo in the Western Sahara was deemed satisfactory between major players, including the US. At the same time, radical Islamism was growing. Morocco’s willingness to cooperate with the West meant the US and European countries viewed it as a bulwark

against radical Islam, and were more likely to appease Morocco on various issues.8 However, after 9/11, Algeria and the US also grew closer and cooperated on security issues, and relations grew friendlier. This might make Algeria even less willing to become involved in negotiations – the country has always supported Polisario, and taking strong action in favor of the independence group may endanger its relationship with the US.

Morocco and Algeria are not the only two players involved.

The OAU attempted to play a peace role throughout the 1980s. Due to limited enforcement powers, the OAU attempted to level against Morocco by allowing the Western Sahara to join as an independent state. This action failed, as Morocco

pulled out of the OAU in protest in 1984, ending their active role in the conflict; Recognition from various African countries and the African Union disabled any role African mediation might be able to play in the conflict, contributing to its stagnation.

Now, Morocco has rejoined the OAU’s successor, the African Union (AU). This comes with the caveat that Morocco will not change its position on the Western Sahara.

The Financial Times states that “...while the kingdom’s decision to rejoin the AU was driven by a desire to weaken Polisario, it is also a reflection of its economic ambitions on the continent.” Of course, Polisario was against Morocco joining and says this would go against the OAU founding

principles of self-determination, respect of borders and eradication of colonialism.9 Since Morocco has re-joined, several AU members have withdrawn recognition of the SADR.

The AU remains committed to Western Sahara’s independence, but does not have the capacity to pressure Morocco to hold the referendum – this would jeopardize relations with Morocco. Since Morocco has left the AU, the AU has been unable to force any change. To bypass this, the AU has demanded the UN set a date for the referendum, which is unlikely to happen.

In 1963 the UN recognized the right of Sahrawis to selfdetermination and has not clarified Morocco’s status in the region – they are not acknowledged as a legal ruler, but have no alternative status.

As such, there is recognition of de facto control over the territory.

In 1991, the Secretary General’s report put forward a settlement plan to deal with the Western

Sahara. It called for a transitional period, first with a cease-fire, and ending with a referendum.10 After 1991, the ceasefire has held, with minor violations. The transitional period has not begun – Morocco attempted to increase the number of people voting, some who were proMorocco, in order to slow down the UN identification process. Since 1991, the process to resolve the conflict and hold a referendum has stagnated, and the UN’s ability to exact change has actually decreased in the region.

In 2016 UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon visited Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria and described Morocco’s actions as an occupation. His comment soured relations with Morocco, and in retaliation the government expelled MINURSO staff and closed the military liaison office. Morocco claimed the UN was not being neutral in the issue.11,12 The UN quickly expressed regret and stated the word was just Ban Ki Moon’s personal

reaction. Morocco’s response was a violation of the UN charter, and the worst dispute with the UN since 1991. Tensions grew and “prompted concerns over whether the UNled settlement process can lead to a stable outcome.”13 The situation greatly tarnished UN credibility and set a dangerous precedent: countries unhappy with the UN can expel UN forces without input from the Security Council, undermining the UN’s work.

European countries in the Security Council have also played an active role in the conflict, making it more difficult for the referendum to occur. Morocco falls within France’s sphere of influence, and France has a strict pro-Moroccan position.

France’s contentious relationship with Algeria has only furthered this position. In fact, Polisario has accused France of blocking action in the UN due to its close historical ties with Morocco.14 Additionally, France is economically tied to Morocco: Morocco is the third largest African

Photo by Brenda Chavez, CAS’17

destination for French goods, and Morocco is France’s first export market. France’s close relationship with Morocco meant that France did not take on an active mediation role.

When the issue fell under the UN, France levied its interests through the Security Council, defending Morocco’s position and blocking any effective response. In a sense, international law is not applying to France’s sphere. For the French, “Western Sahara is an integral part of the Kingdom of Morocco.

The French made it clear that they would use their veto power at the UN Security Council should the UN decide to impose a solution that was not acceptable to Morocco.”[25] French policies mirror that of the US, and together they have helped support Morocco’s rejection of the Western Sahara referendum.

Indeed, France’s influence extended to a US conflict resolution plan, known as the Baker plan, as France signed it along with the US, Morocco and Polisario. When Morocco rejected the plan, France blocked efforts to endorse it.[26] France favors Morocco, and will do its part to block any effort that does not benefit Morocco. Unfortunately, this is just another player effectively stopping any change.

The US has played a similar role in the conflict. It states that it supports self-determination for the Sahrawi, which requires a referendum, and does not recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara. In 1991, President Bush said the issue was for the UN to handle.16 However, US actions prove that the US supports Morocco due to political and economic reasons.17 Since the beginning of the conflict, the US has backed Morocco: during the war, the US

supplied arms, economic and military aid, and advisors, turning the war to Morocco’s favor.18 Today, the US continues to supply aid, including arms, to Morocco. Some of the financial aid provided is meant to be used in the Western Sahara. Despite US hesitance to use clear language supporting Morocco, the US is one of the most important external players in the Western Sahara conflict.19 Today, Morocco is a major US ally for several reasons: Moroccan support during the 1991 Gulf War, its role as a buffer against Algerian instability during its cold war, the King’s success in stifling radical Islamist movements, and Morocco’s role in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Morocco has supported US strategic aims in the region, and has also increased their free market economic reforms, moving closer to US ideology.20 US cooperation with Morocco and Algeria has increased its interest in maneuvering between these two allies. If the US wants economic cooperation with both Morocco and Algeria, all sides will have to play with each other; if Algeria and Morocco are dependent on the US, the US could ask for certain things and expect to get them. As such, the US could use its influence to achieve something in the Western Sahara. However, the US’s relationship with Algeria remains relatively new and taking any action that may anger Algeria (or Morocco) may result in a setback in trade agreements.

Ultimately, the US is focused on other conflicts within the Middle East, such as the unstable IsraelPalestine conflict. Western Sahara is secure due to Morocco’s military occupation and US interests are not threatened.22 As long as the US

can balance between Moroccan and Algerian economic interests, the situation will likely remain the same.

According to Daniel Volman, “the US does not care if international law is followed in the Western Sahara, except to the extent that the situation has an impact on the stability of the Moroccan monarchy and efforts to promote regional economic development.”23

Animosity and mistrust have grown, and UN and AU efforts have proved futile. The UN is influenced by the agendas of those on the Security Council, who have blocked enforceable resolutions.

This decades-long conflict has stunted the region and created large numbers of refugees relying on humanitarian assistance. As they wait for their right to freedom and self-determination, original refugees are still living in Algerian camps, creating one of the most protracted situations in the world; gaining some movement in the conflict could only help refugees. Additionally, the economic integration of the region is stilted due to the conflict.

Morocco and Algeria are the backbone of the region, and ending tensions would open up a space for greater cooperation, helping meet economic and security concerns.

For this conflict to end, each side must make necessary concessions and follow international law.

Specifically, Morocco should allow a referendum. In order for things to get moving, the US should be more involved, using diplomacy and their relations with each party to pressure for meaningful solutions.

Additionally, the US could help support talks. If any large country were to take some meaningful action, the conflict could finally move forward.

Photo by Matthew Manarchy, CAS’18

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The International Relations Review

Anger in the Kingdom: Why Congress’ Saudi 9/11 Bill Will be Destructive for U.S. Foreign Relations

By Samira Jafar, CAS’20

I

n the months following the September 11 attacks, news media outlets and the United States public as a whole were shocked by the violent turn of events. Suddenly, federal rhetoric was filled with calls for war and the promise of exacting revenge on the Taliban.1 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia became another nation with suspected ties to the attacks, with U.S. officials attempting to piece together documents that held important information on some of the Saudi hijackers.2 Though it has been over a decade since 9/11, the pain of losing family members and loved ones has remained with the families of those affected. With this in mind, Congress overrode a veto issued by former President Barack Obama this past September, pushing forth a bill that would give “families of 9/11 victims a chance to sue Saudi Arabia for allegedly supporting the terrorists who carried out the attacks.” 3 With the current unstable political situation in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is considered an important ally in the U.S. fight against the Islamic State. By enforcing such a bill, the federal government would be

opening itself up to potential international lawsuits, aiding the liquidation of its foreign assets, and ultimately pushing forth a dangerous agenda of increased Islamophobia and political interference in the Middle East.

While discussing the possibility of passing such a bill, many U.S. officials took a closer look at why some may believe that Saudi Arabia was involved in the attacks. Suspicions sparked after it was revealed that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers had been of Saudi nationality.4 With the release of the “28 pages,” a document that details possible monetary connections between the Saudi government and the hijackers, the concerns of U.S. officials only intensified.5 However, the legitimacy of this document has been called into question. Missing pages and deleted paragraphs hint that the report may have been tampered with. In an interview with Al Arabiya News Channel, former CIA director John Brennan admitted that “there was no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution” or that individuals within the government were involved in the 9/11 attacks.6 Due to

the skepticism surrounding alleged Saudi involvement, the Obama administration declined to support the bill proposed by Congress. However, with the backing of many prominent politicians from all parties, such as Democrats Chuck Schumer and Hillary Clinton as well as Republicans John Cornyn and Ted Cruz, Congress was able to override Obama’s veto of the bill.7

Members of the Obama administration immediately began to warn Congress about the negative effects this bill will have on U.S. foreign relations. Congress is currently giving families the authority to suea foreign government by tweaking the rules set in place by the 1975 U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which provides foreign governments with immunity from the majority of lawsuits in U.S. courts.8 Tweaking this law would ultimately open the doors for the U.S. to be subject to various international lawsuits on the other end. Saudi Arabia would have the potential to sue the U.S. if a Saudi national were to ever perish in an attack imposed by the U.S. government on Saudi soil or otherwise. Considering the high Photo by Sabrina Khan, SAR’19

Spring 2017 amount of drone and airstrikes conducted by the U.S. government in the Middle East, the possibility of this turning into a more concrete concern is very possible. Though the U.S. has legal immunity on the federal and state levels, internationalizing the subject will leave the U.S. very vulnerable to legal retaliation on behalf of the Saudis.9 The United States’ alteration of its international legal policies may also prompt other nations to do the same, specifically in ways that might aim to damage American industries. For example, Ecuador altered its international laws in 1999 to be able to take legal action against Chevron, which hurt the U.S. energy industry.10 Saudi Arabia now has the ability to take similar legal action if they wished to do so.

Another negative political impact posed by the new bill would be the call for increased foreign intervention in the Middle East. A 2007 research article published in the Journal of Communication by Jill A. Edy and Patrick C. Meirick examined the impact that political media frames may have on executive decisions. They found that the focus on blame, war, and crime that followed 9/11 significantly contributed to the airstrikes on Afghanistan in October of that year.11 In cases where political decisions are decided by the citizens, Edy and Meirick found that they too are susceptible to the rhetoric and ideologies that accompany news media outlets.12 This idea is key to understanding why in pushing this bill, Congress is making the U.S. more vulnerable to yet another war in the Middle East. In this case, the damage that could accompany a conflict with Saudi Arabia would be even more problematic due to the growing influence of the Islamic State in neighboring countries as

37 well as the derailment Saudi Arabia’s current efforts towards thwarting the group’s expansion.

In addition to legal counterattacks and dangerous foreign policy involvement, the U.S. could be under threat of economic insecurity. The oil-based partnership between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. will be disrupted by the bill, which will be accepted as a hostile political move by the Americans. The United States’ involvement in oil trade is a main tool used to maintain its stable presence in the Middle East and keep monetary benefits away from the Islamic State.13 Saudi Arabia recently threatened to liquidate billions of dollars of its assets in the U.S if the bill were to pass, though many economists wonder if doing so would damage Saudi Arabia’s semi-fragile economy as well.14 The U.S. defense industry also has cause to be nervous about this new bill.

Saudi Arabia is one of the United States’ best customers when it comes to purchasing military equipment and other weapons. If Saudi Arabia were to stop purchasing weapons from the U.S., it would not only cost the industry billions of dollars, but also put the industry’s employees out of work as Saudi Arabia turns to Russian and Chinese industries instead.15 Yet, as Congress continues to encourage the families of 9/11 victims to act on this new bill, officials seem for the most part unconcerned about the potential economic consequences posed by such action. Though the new bill comes with concrete political and economic threats, it is also accompanied by a myriad of social issues, including the potential further spread of Islamophobia. In Shana Kushner Gadarian’s article on psychological reactions to threats in politics for the Journal of Politics, she argues

that vulnerable citizens “turn to political leaders and the media to make sense of ” traumatic events.16 In doing so, citizens are more susceptible to adopting cultural or social beliefs based on the emotional undertones present in the news media or in political agendas. By putting a single face on a complex terrorist plot, Congress may be aiding the spread of Islamophobic ideologies and hostile foreign policies, which would worsen the already shaky religious and racial relationships the U.S. has with Arabs living both within and outside of the United States.17When emotional information is attached to an issue or foreign conflict, “hawkish decisions” are a more likely outcome.18 If American citizens are presented with Saudi Arabia as a clear potential threat in the War on Terror, it could lead to a detrimental social climate made even worse with current Muslim immigration laws being pursued by President Donald Trump.19

In conclusion, if the families of the 9/11 victims follow through on their new right to sue the Saudi Arabian government, detrimental political, social, and economic side effects would be sure to follow. In overriding former President Obama’s veto of this bill, Congress made the mistake of damaging the United States’ relationship with a key ally not only in the fight against ISIS, but in economic matters as well. The effects that this bill will pose already show signs of being detrimental to American foreign policy; however, considering the rhetoric being used

by President Trump to describe Muslim communities, it is difficult to see Congress amending the situation in the months and years to come.

2017 Elections in Ecuador: A Brief Overview

By Kaitlyn Cyprian, CAS’19

O

n February 19th, Ecuador held elections for their president and National Assembly determining the course of Ecuadorian politics for the next four years. Ecuador is a democratic presidential republic and there are two ways to win the presidency: either earn fifty percent of the popular vote or earn forty percent of the popular vote, while also succeeding the next best candidate by at least ten percent.1 The top pick, Lenin Moreno, was 10% ahead of his competitor, but only earned 39.36% of the popular vote.2 While Ecuador featured eight candidates on its ballot this year, Lenin Moreno and Guillermo Lasso were the two individuals that had the most momentum and public support due to fierce campaigning and promotion from current political leaders, including the incumbent Rafeal Correa. Lenin Moreno, a member of the Alianza Pais, the

dominant socialist political party in Ecuador and former vice president to Correa, represented the socialist liberal face of Ecuadorian politics.

Guillermo Lasso is running under the party he and others created in 2010 called CREO or Creating Opportunities.

Lasso’s presidency would call for many changes in Ecuador’s current internal and external policies, while Moreno’s policies would continue to uphold the social programs currently in place in Ecuador such as health and maternity insurance, unemployment insurance and other pensions.3 The party also promises to maintain higher tax rates and continue the platform of his predecessor.4 Currently Ecuadorians view Correa favorably, but there continues to be discontent towards him and Alianza Pais due to scandals of fraud that occurred during his presidency. Despite these sentiments his favorability is still relatively high

due to decent growth and relatively low oil prices, one of Ecuador’s largest industries.5 These ties make many voters wary of Moreno, as they worry him and his party will continue down the same road that has dissatisfied many in the country throughout the past eight years.

This is not Lasso’s first ime running for president as he ran and lost to Correa in 2013.6 He is best known to the Ecuadorian public as the former president of Banco de Guayaquil, the second largest bank in the country.His platform promotes new economic growth in Ecuador, tax cuts and foreign investment. Additionally, he promises to remove Julian Assange from the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, potentially deporting the whistleblower back to Sweden or even sending him to the United States court system. While Lasso is the most likely successful candidate after Moreno, there is worry on Lasso’s potential actions related to so-

cial programs currently benefitting millions of Ecuadorians, since his plans plans would reduce taxes.

Many blame him for a large financial meltdown that hurt the country in 1999 and therefore are hesitant to give him presidential power.

Because of this many Ecuadorians turned to alternative candidates in February, rather than give their votes to Lasso or Moreno.

When all the votes were counted in February, Moreno officially only received 39.36% of the popular vote, while Lasso earned 28.09%. Because neither met the standards implemented to become president, the country must move on to the second round of voting or la segunda vuelta. This electoral system was established in the 1987 Law of Elections and it is not the first time a second round of voting was required in the country.7 In this next stage, which will take place April 2nd, only Moreno and Lasso will be

on the ballot.

In February, Moreno won by a large margin in the most densely populated provinces, Pichincha, Guayas and Azuay, where the three most populous cities also reside – Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca.

Moreno was popular in many other heavily packed provinces as well, showing his favorability among urban Ecuadorians. Lasso was successful with the sparsely populated provinces of Ecuador including Pastaza, Orellana and Morona Santiago, all of which have less than 10 inhabitants per square kilometer.8,9 These areas have been the least affected by Correa’s administration and social programs, so it is understandable that they would favor an outside candidate more.

While Lasso won many sparsely populated provinces, Ecuador counts the total popular vote and does not have an electoral college system like the United States.

Thus winning these provinces does not do much if there are less people voting than in urban areas such as Quito and Guayaquil. However, it is important to see where Lasso’s popularity is strongest and note that urban Ecuadorians overwhelmingly seem to have chosen Moreno.

Now that the other candidates have been removed from the race, many believe that those who voted for third party members and smaller political parties in the first round will gather behind Lasso in order to prevent Moreno from taking office. It is also entirely possible for these voters to stand behind Moreno or split between the two candidates. Either way it is clear that the global political climate of late has favored the outsiders and the underdogs, with the unexpected becoming reality. While one can speculate on who will win, the world will have to wait for April to find out the fate of Ecuador’s politics.

Photo by Morgan Peterson, CAS’17

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The International Relations Review

Dismantling the Monolith: Repealing the Cuban Embargo

By Sara Van Velkinburgh, CAS’18

F

or over 50 years the United States did not officially recognize the Castro government. Taking a distinctly unique tone, Barack Obama was the first president to call for a new policy towards Cuba. He promised Cuban-Americans the removal of all restrictions on family travel and remittances.1 However, in order for a shift of such magnitude to occur an issue must become relevant, a feasible solution must be identified, and the solution must be politically viable.2 Had a time for change finally come? Was now the time to take on the colossus, the Cuban embargo? President Obama’s election surely suggested so. Slowly, over the last 50 years, the American people’s attitude toward Cuba has gradually changed, allowing President Obama to uphold his election promises and remove parts of the trade and travel restrictions. However; he is restricted by a network of previous decisions and laws that uphold the embargo. Nonetheless, the embargo has begun to fall, piece by piece.

To understand the current components upholding the Cuban Embargo, it is necessary to understand why it was first enacted. In October of 1960 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, grew increasingly displeased with the Cuban government’s communistic tone. By the end of January of 1961, the United States had cut all diplomatic ties with Cuba. Within weeks of being sworn into office, the subsequent President, President John F. Kennedy, decreed a full trade embargo on Cuba (Presidential Proclamation

3447), beginning February 1962.

With little response from Castro, the embargo took effect. A year later, the Office of Foreign Assets Controls prohibited all travel-related transactions with Cuba, unless granted a license, as stipulated by the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917.3 The embargo was intended originally to punish Cuba for its ideological views and foreign policy, primarily their support for communists and revolutionaries. Additionally, Presidential attitudes towards Cuba ranged from lukewarm to downright frigid. Moreover, several presidents including JFK, Nixon, and Jimmy Carter all attempted rapprochement tactics centered on Cuba’s foreign policy. Under Ronald Reagan, the State Department listed Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982, placing restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, banning defense exports and sales, restricting exports of dual use items, and enacting financial and other restrictions.4 Consequently, the embargo now included several components including JFK’s presidential decree, policies of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and restrictions put in place by the State Department. Until 1992 the embargo had yet to be formalized by congressional action and was upheld be a continuation of policy from presidency to presidency.

When the Soviet Union fell in 1989, there was a clear opportunity for the softening of relations with Cuba. Facing economic depression, Cuba retired most of its military equipment due to lack of fuel and reduced their armed forc-

es by less than 50,000. Fidel Castro even announced Cuba would no longer provide support to revolutionary movements abroad.5 Rather than taking advantage of the opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba, the United States shifted its policy objectives and entrenched its position. In 1992, Congress offered their contribution to the embargo by passing the Cuban Democracy Act under President George W. Bush. The act prohibited U.S. foreign subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibited any ship from unloading its cargo in the United States, if it had traded goods with Cuba in the previous 180 days.

Four years later, in 1996, under President Bill Clinton, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act –also known as the Helms-Burton Act– which prohibited most financial transactions with Cuba, and prevented the executive branch from lifting the economic total embargo until Cuba held democratic elections excluding the Castro family among other requirements. Thus, the economic embargo had been formally linked to Cuba’s political system.

This was further reinforced by the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) of 2000.

While it permitted the direct sale of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Cuba, it required all payments to be made in cash in advance, or financed by a third country financial institutions.

Moreover, the law formally codified the American tourist travel ban by prohibiting transactions relating to

Spring 2017

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Photo by Morgan Peterson, CAS’17

tourist activities. In 2003, President George. W. Bush added the final piece to the puzzle, revoking all licenses for people-to-people travel to Cuba, which had accounted for 40% of all licensed travel to Cuba.6

The embargo would be more accurately described as a complex network of presidential orders, federal policies, and laws which make its repeal exceptionally difficult.

Many of the restrictions constituting the Cuban Embargo were enacted by presidential authority and policies instituted within federal agencies, resulting in a degree of flexibility for certain shifts in policy from president to president. Obama was the first president to take advantage of this flexibility to relax restrictions on trade and travel to Cuba, rather than strengthen them.

Fundamental to understanding this opening of relations is understanding the circumstances that allowed President Obama to adopt a new stance.

In part, President’s Obama’s shift in foreign policy towards Cuba was motivated by growing opposition to the inflexible stance

by Latin American nations, subsequently bringing the “Cuba issue”

back into the political debate. After the 1959 revolution, Cuba’s denial of entry into the Organization of American States (OAS) was due to U.S. instance of its ties to the Soviet Union. By 1964 the organization had enacted mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions.7 However, after 6 years, countries began to defect from the United States’ policy and by 1975 the mandatory sanctions were removed. Disapproval of the American stance began to grow, remaining benign until the early 2000s when more Latin American governments began to shift left. This became clear when in 2009 the OAS moved to repeal the 1962 resolution suspending Cuba from the organization. Faced with insurmountable opposition, the United States grudgingly supported the repeal. Latin American nations forced the United States to re-evaluate a its policy towards Cuba when the host nation, Panama, unilaterally invited the Summit of the Americas (organized by the OAS), to the 7th Summit, in 2015. Forced to either boycott the meeting, or attend despite Cuba’s presence, the American President agreed to attend. Had he chosen not to, he would have damaged the or-

ganization’s reputation and severely harmed the United States’ relations with the region.8 Consequently, pressure from Latin American nations helped force a shift in American foreign policy towards Cuba.

At home, President Obama faced strong opposition to his policies, especially from the Cuban Lobby. The Cuban lobby is a conglomerate of exiles, sympathetic members of congress, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), against the restoration of relations with Castro’s government. Among its ranks it counts Senators Marco Rubio and Bob Menendez, Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Mario Diaz-Balart. One of the most powerful NGOs of the Lobby is the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) backed by the US-Cuba Democracy PAC, which has provided more than $3 million dollars in funding in the last 5 years.

The PAC alone spent over $1 million dollars in the 2008 elections.9 One of the most influential members of the Lobby has been, the CANF’s chairman, Jorge Mas Canosa. Under his leadership, the Lobby was one of the most powerful ethnic foreign-policy organizations until his death in

42 199710.The conglomerate attempts to influence Congress by providing financial support, and condemning those who take stances against its interest. In particular, Cuban-American, Senator Bob Menendez holds considerable political power as he has displayed his willingness to oppose his fellow democrats, and president, when it comes to issues related to Cuba. Both he and Senator Bill Nelson, also a democrat, voted with Republicans against a $410 billion omnibus appropriations bill because it would ease trade and travel restrictions on Cuba– it passed despite their opposition.11 Menendez’s opposition is rooted in the belief that the opening up of relations with Cuba, will only bolster the repressive Castro regime.12 His political power is only increased by the Republican majority in the Senate.

Republican Senator Marco Rubio has been equally as aggressive in opposing Obama’s policies. Also the son of Cuban immigrants, he has actively opposed several of Obama’s nominees to key diplomatic positions, which need Senate approval.

He sees no need to change the US’s policy on Cuba ultimately because the regime has not improved its human rights record.13 Part of his opposition stems from Cuba’s atrocious human rights record. While many advances have been made, Cuba is still a very repressive and

The International Relations Review restrictive society. Between January and October 2015, the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation received more than 6,200 reports of arbitrary detention, a tactic intended to intimidating citizens into cooperation.14 Senator Ted Cruz, has likewise declared his opposition to the opening up of relations with Cuba, calling the shift “appeasement of the Castro Dictatorship.”15 Overall, the Lobby has been influential in blocking key appointments and gaining support or disapproval for specific legislation. As William M. Leogrande argues in Foreign Policy, the Lobby has been able to paralyze US foreign policy towards Cuba through generating a climate of fear, a fear of political backlash, so strong it can destroy careers.16

While the Cuba Lobby’s power appears to be insurmountable, its power is actually waning.

Most recently we have seen a shift in Cuban-Americans’ attitudes toward the Cuban embargo. There is clear support for a change in tactics, if not a change in policy, as seen in the 2008 elections. According to polls conducted by Florida International University, only 37% of Cuban-Americans in the Miami area support the continuation of the embargo, compared to 84% of Cuban-Americans in 1990. This is influenced by a shifting demographic,

FIU concluded that both new Cuban immigrants and Cuban-Americans born in the United States are more likely to view policies developed under the Cold War with hostility. This is partly due to the fact that older refugees were more likely to have immigrated to avoid political repression whereas newer immigrants are likely to have left due to economic reasons.17 This desire for change was validated in the 2008 election, where Obama’s moderate tone still allowed him to win 35% of the Cuban-American vote. Previously, it was believed the only way to sway the solidly Republican constituency was by adopting a harsh stance on Cuba.18

In 2009, Obama began by directing the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce by lifting all restrictions on family visits and remittances as well as authorize U.S. telecommunications network providers to establish connections linking the United States and Cuba through Presidential Policy Directives. The thawing of the relationship was stalled when That September, the Treasury department enacted at his request, removing nearly all restrictions on family travel and remittances.19 The strengthening of US-Cuban relations stalled however when the Cuban government arrested USAID worker Alan Gross for undermining the regime

Spring 2017 in December 2009. Alan Gross was on an official project with USAID to help local Jewish communities gain access to the Internet by smuggling communication equipment onto the island to set up secret networks as part of US “Democracy Programs.”

20 Until his release, the United States struggled to further relations with Cuba.

Fidel Castro had once remarked that he needed a two-term president in order to normalize relations with the United States, and with Obama’s successful second-term campaign, hope resurfaced.21 In May of 2014, talks related to Alan Gross again resumed thanks to Pope Francis’s intervention. December 17th 2014, the United States agreed to release the three still-jailed members of the Cuban Five in exchange for Rolando Sarraff Trujillo, a U.S. intelligence officer. That morning Alan Gross was released on humanitarian grounds. That evening, both Raúl Castro and President Barack Obama announced their respective publics that they would restore full diplomatic relations.22 Additionally, the President announced that U.S. financial institutions would be allowed to open accounts at Cuban financial institutions, restrictions on exports would be lowered, and to review Cuba’s designation as a State

43 Sponsor of Terrorism. For the first time since before 1961, the United States extended an olive branch to Cuba, and Cuba responded. By January, Cuba had released all 53 dissidents per the United States’ request.

3 months later, the Department of State recommended Cuba’s removal from the list of Sate sponsors of terrorism, once again easing restrictions on trade. In his final days in office, Obama has noticeably tried to solidify the new Cuban-American relationship. Controversially, the Department of Homeland Security officially ended its “wet-foot/dryfoot” policy, which granted Cubans who had touched U.S. soil legal status.

Now, two question remains, how vulnerable to repeal are Obama’s actions, and what will President Trump’s stance be towards Cuba. Overall, President Donald Trump’s position is unclear amid contradictory statements on business and Cuba. Just 3 days after Fidel Castro’s death Trump tweeted, “If Cuba is unwilling to make a better deal for the Cuban people, the Cuban/American people and the U.S. as a whole, I will terminate deal” raising serious concerns he would reverse Obama’s policy towards Cuba. However; this conflicts with Trump’s support of American busi-

nesses who have begun investing in Cuba, especially in the aviation and telecommunications industries.

Such a reversal of policy could cause serious backlash from the business community, which Trump may not want to risk.23 One reason Obama’s policies towards Cuba were successful was the unified vision of cabinet spanning key departments, including the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, and State. Trump has chosen business leaders for his Cabinet, and none have been particularly outspoken against Cuba. It is unlikely that Cuba will be reclassified as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, although it is possible. While this is promising, Donald Trump has also repeatedly promised to repeal all of President Obama’s Executive Orders. In February, Sean Spicer, the White House spokesman announced that Trump was reviewing the United States’ policy towards Cuba. However; if Trump does decide to take a stronger stance on Cuba he will face opposition from the American businesses that have begun opening shop in Cuba, in light of the lessened restrictions. So far, Trump has seemed to ignore the island but we can only wonder how much longer that will continue.

Photo by Brenda Chavez, CAS’17

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The International Relations Review

The Macron Contradiction:

France’s Populist, Pro-European Candidate

By Christopher Brown, CAS’19

P

olitical scientists and policy analysts, when discussing the spread of the radical right in Europe have often named politicians such as Geert Wilders, Beppe Grillo, and Marine Le Pen, all in the same breath.

But in France, the history of the Le Pens and le Front National set Marine Le Pen apart from these other candidates. Where right-wing radicalist nationalism across Europe is led by charismatic individuals who only recently began hijacking their party systems and taking parliamentary seats, Marine Le Pen represents a different era of French politics, and lacks the same populist qualities which define Wilders, and Grillo.

Risky as it may seem to make election predictions after Trump, French pollsters are confident that Marine Le Pen will not be the next President of the French Republic. This is largely the result of a precedent established in the 2002 Presidential election between Jacques Chirac and her father, JeanMarie.1 As it appears, Marine will not redeem the Le Pen name with a win in the 2ième tour. Le Pen is, rather, on track to ‘Pull a Le Pen’ this May. This has been evident in the polls since January, and even beforehand, when Le Figaro’s joint poll with LCI and RTL placed her behind by at least 20 points in the 2ième tour against both Emmanuel Macron and François Fillon.2 In a multitude of ways, Le Pen is nothing new to France, and her 1ier tour lead has even been cut into by Emmanuel

Macron as of this March.3 Le Pen and her party, the Front Nationale, is no longer the relevant “outsider’s voice” in French politics. That voice is Emmanuel Macron, the 39 yearold former finance minister, turned independent face of En Marche.

Almost as if to top the mislabeling of Marine Le Pen as a populist leader, Emmanuel Macron is subject to an enormous irony of his own. He speaks with the charisma and language of a populist, but has a background and policy which could not be closer to that of the Francois Hollande establishment. Macron paints policy with broad strokes, tweeting, “‘The problem is not that the French no longer trust politics, it is that politicians no longer trust the French.’”4 When he resigned from his position as French Finance minister under Hollande, he claimed that this decision was made because he wanted the leeway to “transform” France.5 This verbiage is indicative of a new populist impulse which challenges the nationalist message of right-wing leaders in Europe. In February, he spoke in front of 8,000 in Lyon, after an earlier one that week to 4,000 in Lille.6 At the core of the speech was a direct response to one of Marine Le Pen’s speeches, which tried to decentralize and alienate her nationalist message to French voters.

Macron has what it takes to challenge the right in a time when many other centrist European leaders appear to be weak, and incapable of explaining the reasons for their actions as policymakers.

Now that he has shown a capability to compete with heavyweights like Marine Le Pen and François Fillon in the polls, he could soon be a significant European foreign policy leader. His youth, drive, and independence from political parties has also made Macron a reason for concern in his own right. His freedom from a single party could prove to be his downfall in foreign policymaking, and the general indifference of the French public towards far-reaching foreign policy during election season has many wondering how he will transition from Hollande’s often unpopular foreign policy.7

The full effect of Macron’s role as a unique leader would be dependent upon the powers of a French president. While French media and voters have predominantly discussed and voted for domestic policies and economic reforms, the French office of the presidency concerns itself mostly with foreign affairs. French foreign affairs has been almost exclusive to the executive offices of the presidency ever since the beginning of the 5ième république, to an extent far greater than that of other contemporary democracies.8 So long as the French president and prime minister hail from the same party, the French National Assembly and Senate are virtually powerless to restrict him. The scheduling of French presidential and parliamentary elections is also such that it is rare for a president and a prime minister to come from

Spring 2017 opposing political camps.9

With Macron, however, this requirement to earn his party a powerful position in the parliament is much less perfunctory; Macron lacks an established political party to grant him free rein through its prime ministerial seat. While En Marche certainly has accrued a substantial following among french voters, and

45 if the PS were to win the most seats in the parliamentary election. If not, and les Républicains gain a plurality in the Parliament, Macron would be faced by an even larger challenge, as their leadership has actively tried to associate Macron with the PS. Francois Fillon, malcontent with his decline to accompany Benoît Hamon in polling numbers,

it is “at best, ineffective, useless and irrelevant and at worst an obstacle to our development and freedom” (16). Fillon’s foreign policy designs as a candidate may not reflect the interests of all Républicains, such as Alain Juppé, but he is not necessarily alone in his relatively ‘Poutinophilic’ tendencies and contempt for the European Union.16 These

“The problem is not that the French no longer trust politics, it is that politicians no longer trust the French.”

-Emmanuel Macron via twitter while Macron may be supported by notable figures from other parties such as François Bayrou of MoDem and, more recently, former Parisian Mayor and Parti Socialiste member, Bertrand Delanoë, Macron needs more than just the grudging support of a few individuals to achieve foreign policy control. He needs the fully-fledged support of a victorious party. As Delanoë admits, choosing Macron was far from an easy decision, citing fear of a Le Pen or a Fillon presidency as one of his main reasons to support Macron.10 Furthermore, while Delanoë may see Macron’s centrist, capitalist approach to economic policy as a progressive, and is amenable to following this approach, the same cannot be said of the entire PS.11 The entire official reason for Macron’s presidential run is that his economic reforms as Hollande’s finance minister were rejected for being too critical of the left’s established policies.12 Ultimately, this continued disagreement between Macron and the PS could mean foreign policy gridlock, even

claimed that Macron’s platform was “socialism in a mask”13

As if the domestic policy disagreements between Macron and LR weren’t enough, if France’s newest populist were forced to share power with the established right, he would face gridlock on a number of foreign policy on a number of foreign policy issues, as well.

Francois Fillon has praised Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy since the beginning of the Russian president’s involvement in the syrian conflict, and has argued for the removal of sanctions against Russia over the annexation of Crimea.14 Macron’s foreign policy platform could not be more vehemently opposed to the Fillon stance on Russia, with his website claiming that Putin’s foreign policy is “dangerous”, and “unafraid to act without the restraint of international law.”15 The En Marche site goes on to imply that the solution to the numerous dangers facing France around the world is the European Union, while Fillon’s general opinion of the EU is much less optimistic, claiming that

stances among Fillon supporters would impede Macron’s foreign policy aspirations if LR wins the Parliament, and thus the prime minister’s seat.

Ironically, one of the qualities French presidents have suffered from in the face of their new and expansive foreign policy making responsibilities is a general inexperience in foreign policy.

Francois Hollande suffered from this, and decided that despite his best wishes to change up the French foreign policy regime established under Nicolas Sarkozy, ended up following up on Sarkozy’s general course, with a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy.17 This general decisionmaking course led to a growing level of discontent among his opponents, who wanted to see their countrymen abroad as leaders, not followers. When Hollande turned to foreign policy again to cover for domestic policy mistakes, he suffered consequences in polls, as many of these interventions in Syria and operations in Mali were blamed as the cause for the Bataclan attacks

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The International Relations Review

Photo by Brenda Chavez, CAS’17

Photo by Alice Yih, CAS’18

Photo by John Benducci, CAS’17

Photo by Jonathan Hauser, CAS’18

and operations in Mali were blamed as the cause for the Bataclan attacks.18 Towards the end of his term, however, Hollande began thinking outside the box in terms of how he acted, and instead of exposing French troops and their actions to criticism by intervening in more conflicts, used soft power to pressure Putin during negotiations over Aleppo. Hollande once even threatened to pull out of negotiations between himself, Merkel, Putin, and Petro Poroshenko.

Hollande demanded, furthermore, that those parties responsible for the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo be punished.19 He also pushed for more multilateral intervention efforts and humanitarian missions to Western and Central Africa alongside his European Union partners, which meant reinforcing defense coordination between these states, as well.20

So how does this new and unique, populist candidate compare to Francois Hollande? Well, given what rhetoric Macron has put forward regarding these issues, France’s foreign policy under Macron would be virtually identical in terms of stances, to that of Hollande. He presses to maintain the great french military, and as a matter of fact, move forward with interventions and foreign operations.21 What differs is Macron’s progressive preference for cybersecurity and refusal to augment the troop numbers of the French operational army, while increasing defense spending, itself.22 Hollande’s stance against Russia and disgust at the presence of new Putinophilic leaders across the Atlantic is also featured as part of Macron’s foreign policy platform, which, through its exciting rhetoric23, is a revitalization of all of the priorities which Hollande would back, given the power and the

need.

After Macron showed the potential to upset the relatively proPutin François Fillon, and showed his hand in terms of sharing Hollande’s foreign policy opinions, foreign policy actors have also revitalized their efforts against the European establishment. Sputnik and Russia Today allegedly began spreading fake news about Macron, while Julian Assange claims to have more information up his sleeve which he could disseminate before the May 7th runoff.24 The agitation of the Radical right in Europe has yielded a strong reaction from the centrist Macron, and now the information war that is politics has struck back against him.

Unstoppable Forces and Immovable Objects

Macron’s role in foreign policymaking would be more than just as a policy actor: This election might introduce a new and unique voice to Europe, and to the world.

Macron’s message carries more than just action, policy, and claims of economic expertise; it brings charisma to the European identity, and the European sense of unity.

The idea that a populist leader could come straight from the ranks of the upper class, the ranks of financiers, and the ranks of the exhausted, lambasted regime which stood before him would have gotten as far as he has come seemed objectively unreasonable a few months ago, but here he is: Emmanuel Macron.

Even if he moves forward to claim the French presidency, there remain numerous obstacles and attacks which will try to prevent his campaign from being En Marche, and a unique clash of ideals will soon take place in the 2ième tour, and then perhaps around the globe.

Spring 2017

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Culture & Anthropology

50

Women’s Right’s and Islam

By Oelmis Fermin, CAS’19

In a world where Islamophobia is on the rise, it is important to consider how women rights are distributed in the largest Muslim-majority country.

From a political, economic, and social spectrum, how are women’s rights assessed in Indonesia?

Spring 2017

54 Reclaiming Stolen Artwork: Improving International Efforts and Increasing Awareness

By Madeline Van Heusden, CAS’17 Recent discoveries of large collections of stolen artwork, the increasing number of ancestors making reparations, and the opening of exhibitions surrounding the heists during the Second World War has brought the importance of art restitution to the attention of the public. International efforts, including the updating of commissions and the signing of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act, have displayed a serious commitment to the restoration of justice to the victimized families. A variety of international contemporary case studies will be presented alongside a look into the future for the process of reclaiming stolen works.

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Women’s Rights and Islam

By Oelmis Fermin, CAS’19

T

hey cannot drive, they cannot vote, they cannot do anything without the permission of their husbands, and they must always have their face covered. The penalty for breaking these rules, among others, is death. Of the many Islamophobic misconceptions developed in the western world, one strong recurring theme among these fallacies seems to be the suppression of women’s rights in all Islamic countries. Yes, there are rights that are restricted in certain Muslim-majority nations, and certain countries act more virulently when addressing these restrictions; however, it is incorrect to generalize that all Muslim countries limit rights in a misogynistic manner or to state that Islam is a religion that does not value women in any way. In fact, according to the Quran (the Muslim holy book) there is no spiritual superiority between men and women: they are created equal. This misconception can be examined by looking at the political and educational rights of Muslim women in Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority country with over 200 million practicing Muslims.

Muslims look for guidance from the Quran, the Muslim holy book sent from God to Muhammad, the Hadith, the historical story of the Prophet Muhammad Ibn Abdulla and Sharia, the moral and religious Islamic law and tradition. Sharia is often associated with draconian punishments that include the decapitation of limbs and death amongst others.

Some followers of Islam, however, feel that Sharia was created to nurture humanity as it frees the potential of humanity.1 Additionally, there are certain rights and restrictions imposed on

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Photo by Peter Evans, CAS’20

52 male and female followers where men have superiority in some cases and women have superiority in others. Although Indonesia is a Muslim-majority state, it is also a secular state with followers of other major world religions such as Catholicism, Buddhism and Hinduism. Therefore, while the majority of the country’s citizens are Muslim, sharia law does not officially guide the political, economic and social lives of Indonesian citizens at large.

Furthermore, during the times of Muhammad (570-632), Islam led to changes in women’s rights in marriage, divorce and inheritance that continued within the texts that guide Islam affecting the milieu of the treatment of women in Arabia,

The International Relations Review to the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), which is continuously unfolding for humanity.

Another major force that promotes rights for Muslim women in modern society which is largely invisible to Western society is Islamic feminism. The primary goal of these women is furthering the rights of women using the principals of their religion and essential morals that dictate human rights. Islamic feminism plays an important role in Indonesian society especially since the nation promotes democracy and allows citizens the right to protest. Dayana Paranova from the University of Vienna concludes that “as the basis of their knowledge and as the field of their actions Islam

mocracy and equality is the right to vote. If Muslim women were as oppressed as some westerners perceive, they surely would not hold this right, but most Muslim women do. For example, even before Indonesia formally gained independence from the Dutch in 1949 to form the Republic of Indonesia, women were allowed to vote since four years prior when they gained suffrage on August 17, 1945.3 The first President of Indonesia, Sukarno, established the equality of opportunity for women and men, also known as Sarinah, in 1945. During the presidency of Sukarno, the Indonesian government also voted to ratify the U.N convention that women had the right to vote, run in elections and hold

“It is largely overlooked that the Prophet Muhammad’s first wife, Khadija was not only a business owner, but Muhammad’s boss.” while other societies that had different cultural and religious beliefs did not grant these rights until later centuries. For instance, forced and false marriages are illegal in Islam, where women have a say if they want to marry a suitor or not and if they unknowingly sign a marriage contract they have a right to divorce, as they have in any marriage. Sharia law is not a specific text, but the tradition behind the text, separating itself from fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) that is historically misogynistic, but open to interpretation from any muslim. This also includes Tafsir, the interpretation of Islam’s sacred texts. Sharia literally means ‘the path or the road leading to the water source.’ In Muslim belief it is the totality of God’s will as revealed

plays a fundamental role in Muslim feminists’ activism and represents a key element in Indonesian Muslim women’s empowerment. Hence, religious awareness, piety and commitment to Islam do not disagree with democratic and feminist ideas on gender equality and social justice.”2 Paranova states that under the guidance of Islam, the rights of women are promoted in a way that does not ruin the integrity of democracy and does not anticipate the destruction of society for success. Instead the religion promotes the ethics under which they should dispute their struggle, opposed to western views of how women are not empowered under Islam.

In Western society, one of the most prominent features of de-

public office in 1961.4 Sukarno was no longer the president in 1967, but there were four women in the cabinet and a few others that held high parliamentary positions. In a Muslim-majority state women had the right to vote since the inception of the nation, proving there was no voting oppression for women. In the history of the Republic of Indonesia there have been seven presidents, one of them being a woman.

Megawati Sukarnoputri, the second child of President Sukarno, served as vice president from 1999 to 2001 and president of Indonesia from 2001 to 2004.5 Although it took some time for women to be recognized in the political spectrum, Muslim (and non-Muslim) women do have political rights in Indonesia

Spring 2017 and have held the highest positions in the government. Certain misconceptions where generalizations may have been made from might be the country of Saudi Arabia, where women are currently obtaining the right to vote along with other natural rights that they did not previously have. Other muslim-majority nations that have had female heads of state include Turkey, Senegal, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. With all of this occurring in a Muslim-majority nation it has prompted western countries to argue that Islam and its suppression of women in politics is invalid and outdated when compared to the number of heads of state or second-in-command positions held by women in their own nation. Furthermore there is a perception that Islam denounces women’s education. It is largely overlooked that the Prophet Muhammad’s first wife, Khadija was not only was she a business owner, but Muhammad’s boss.

53 Some also speculate that she was the scribe that wrote the Qur’an because Muhammad because was illiterate.

The female heads of state in muslim-majority nations prove otherwise in conjunction with the Qur’an stating that women must be educated in society.

With a new Indonesian president comes new public policy.

President Megawati Sukarnoputri was succeeded by Susilo Yudhoyono, who took office from 2004 through 2014. Yudhoyono’s ten years in office were plagued by policy letdowns and missed opportunities. Yudhoyono and his administration “made little progress in ending impunity for past serious human rights abuses by security forces.”6 Of the many victims who endured those abuses were women, who faced twenty-three discriminatory laws added by Yudhoyono’s government. The current president of Indonesia, Joko Widido, took office in October 2014 with aspirations to

deplete the human rights issues he inherited. Widodo is hoping to end the authoritarian style “democracy” and replace it with a true democracy in a nation with over 200 million practicing muslims.

In Indonesia the Islamic majority syncretized with the worldly affairs of the nation as religion plays an important role to Indonesian politics and gender relations. Because of the Muslim-Majority, women are given educational rights and somewhat restricted in certain areas of health and reproductive rights, but Indonesia is a secular state boasting religious and ethnic diversity.

Voting rights are given to all as the religion or gender of an Indonesian does not change the fact that they have the right to vote for who they prefer in public office. Moreover, religious beliefs and Indonesian customs syncretize to form diversity as some choose to be Muslim Conservatives while others choose to be Islamic feminists.

Photo by Peter Evans, CAS’20

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The International Relations Review

Reclaiming Stolen Artwork:

Improving International Efforts and Increasing Awareness

By Madeline Van Heusden, CAS’17

I

n late February 2017, Horst von Wächter, son of the Third Reich’s Nazi governor of Krakow, returned two treasured drawings and an eighteenth-century map of Poland to the original owners of the pieces, the Potocki family.1 The Potocki’s were subjects of one of the greatest robberies in all of history, the art looting conducted by Nazi officials during World War II. The National Archives estimates that over twenty percent of artwork in occupied territories was stolen while Hitler was in power. Tens of thousands of pieces remain missing or displaced, and out of the hands of the original owners.2 There were a number of reasons for Hitler’s order to amass European works in the 1940s, including his plan to construct and fill his imagined cultural center, the Führermuseum, in Linz, Austria.

Hitler additionally planned to eradicate pieces he deemed as “degenerate,” such as the works of expressionists Matisse, Picasso, and Kokoschka. While Nazi thieves under Hitler’s command confiscated many objects, it is noteworthy that avaricious Aryan collectors such as leading Party member, Herman Göring and Charlotte Wächter, mother of Horst, also personally displaced and relocated works of art. While the theft of artwork during World War II may seem like an outdated concern, President Barack Obama did sign of the Holocaust Expropriated Art

Recovery Act in 2016. The recent discoveries of enormous collections and the revamping of committees prepared to tackle these issues have all shed light on the thousands of Jewish families in the United States and abroad who are still searching for their ancestors’ lost artwork.

There are dozens of cases currently underway and recent success stories elucidate the importance of restituting these pieces. These cases encourage those who conducted acquisitions and museums to comply with new governmental efforts to restore justice to the victims of human rights abuses during the second World War.

This examination will first present the collective international agreements regarding the restitution of works stolen during the reign of the Third Reich and continue with an exploration of a variety of contemporary case studies and additional efforts in the United States, Germany and France. The first major document highlighting the importance of resolving concerns related to stolen artwork was put forth in December 1998 at the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets co-hosted by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the U.S. Department of State.3 Fortyfour countries agreed on the eleven objectives outlined by the Washington Principles on NaziConfiscated Art; however, due to the use of relatively vague terms

and the non-binding nature of the agreement, it has fallen short of remaining a fundamental document. Eleven years later, the Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues was announced at the Holocaust Era Asserts Conference in Prague. Fortyseven countries pledged to begin the implementation of programs, “geared toward ensuring assistance, redress and remembrance for victims of Nazi persecution.”4 Similar to the case of the Washington Principles, this declaration did not enforce any compliance standards, nor was it descriptive enough in its language.

Recently, the United States has adopted a much more serious approach to legislation concerning artwork stolen during WWII. On December 16, 2016, President Obama signed the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act (HEAR Act), which had both Republican and Democrat sponsors in its early drafting stages.5 The major achievement of this legislation was that it provided a solution to a problem many individuals had when approaching cultural institutes and private collectors: expired statutes of limitation. Now, claims can be resolved not by these limitations but on their merits and legal actions are permitted within six years of the family’s location the artwork.6 The new law additionally extends its rules to any cases that were previously dismissed based on state law, which means that in the next

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Photo by Anushka Pinto, CGS’15, CAS’17

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few years there could be a rise in the number of individuals bringing their lost cases back to court in the United States7.

One such case involved the attempted retrieval of two Egon Schiele drawings by their original owner, Fritz Grunbaum. Raymond Dowd, the lawyer of the ancestors of Grunbaum, cited the HEAR Act as grounds for the restitution of two drawings, “Woman in a Black Pinafore” (1911) and “Woman Hiding Her Face” (1912).8 The pieces are currently owned by a London art dealer, Richard Nagy, whose lawyers refuted the accusation by citing evidence released a few years ago that family members sold some of the Grunbaum collection in the 1950s in legitimate transactions.

However, Mr. Dowd remains optimistic that he will win the case, as it should not matter what evidence was presented in other cases, only that the two drawings in question were in fact stolen. On

The International Relations Review

an institutional level, organizations such as The Commission on Art Recovery engage with museums and governments to encourage moves to restore justice to families, including taking public stances on the Grunbaum case in particular.9

The recent announcement of two art shows in Europe that will highlight the Nazi art raiding events of the 1940s brings this issue to the attention of the public. It allows for the further examination of measures taken by other nations in regards to the restitution of stolen artwork as well. The shows were announced after Cornelius Gurlitt, the son of a Nazi-era art dealer, bequeathed over one thousand works to the Kunstmuseum Bern in Switzerland before his death in 2014.10 The museum has publicly stated they will be returning certain works to Jewish families who identify them as stolen and they additionally plan to open the exhibition, “Dossier Gurlitt: Degenerate Artist” later

this year.11 A similar show, “Dossier Gurlitt: Nazi Art Theft and Its Consequences,” will open in November at the Bundeskunsthalle in Bonn, Germany.12 Germany in particular is preparing to revamp a committee that would allow for more cooperation in matching the families with their stolen works. The Limbach Commission has been around for many years, but the Culture Minister Monika Grütters is pushing a new agenda that includes the drafting of reform proposals and funding for outside reviews.13 These plans, combined with the awareness created by the exhibition in Bonn, may push Germany to the front of the line of nations committed to bringing justice to the victims of Nazi art theft.

Many other countries, including the Netherlands and Austria, created restitution laws in the late 1900s and early 2000s and have dedicated time and funding to ensure that legislation is effective and

Spring 2017

action is occurring14. Efforts made in France are newfound and slow, but are crucial for bringing awareness to the extreme cultural changes that can occur under oppressive regimes.

“21 Rue La Boétie,” an exhibition traveling to Paris this March, will feature over fifty paintings that were originally owned by Paul Rosenberg and stolen by Nazi officer Hermann Göring. Rosenberg’s granddaughter Anne Sinclair oversaw the creation of the exhibit, which features a number of Picasso and Matisse pieces. With presidential elections this spring, Sinclair hopes the exhibition will shed light on the history of and potential restrictions placed on cultural institutions by powerful regimes15.

The project of returning artwork to descendants of Holocaust victims is no easy task and will require immense international cooperation.

While current multinational agreements may need

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reform, domestic efforts such as the proposed Justice for Uncompensated Survivors (JUST) Act, led by Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), would require the State Department to report on international compliance of the Terezin Declaration and display a hopeful future for restitution16.

Additionally, the rising number of lawsuits citing the HEAR Act, the updated Limbach Commission and numerous exhibitions throughout Europe should be viewed as tremendous efforts to prioritize the restitution of artwork as an international issue, worthy of the attention of the public.

Even Hollywood has brought the subject to the big screen, with The Monuments Men (2014) and Woman in Gold (2015) contributing to the education of moviegoers on a relatively unexplored historical event17.

While monetary

compensation is a possible option for justice, the memories, achievements and histories encompassed in a work of art are more valuable to many individuals than any amount of money. Leone Meyer, who was seven years old when she lost her entire family in Auschwitz, stated in a personal letter that reclaiming her family’s artwork, “has nothing to do with money- it is about justice and a duty to remember.”18 During World War II, Hitler attempted to erase and eradicate certain identities and the restitution of the works of art to original owners restores to them the preservation of their culture and these identities.

Photo by Anushka Pinto, CGS’15, CAS’17

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The International Relations Review

Editorial: The Future of U.S.-Israel Relations

By Anushka Pinto, CGS’15, CAS’17

O

n the 23rd of December, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding Israel to stop building settlements in the disputed territory of the West Bank. This is unsurprising as the UN has always opposed what it deems as encroachment on Palestinian land. However, in an unprecedented move, the United States let the resolution pass by abstaining from the vote. Many members of the U.S. Congress condemned the actions of the U.S. by calling for a vote to repeal the UN Security Council decision.

The 342 to 80 majority vote in favor of the repeal not only reflects Congress’s support for Israel, but also the interests of the Republican Party in what is a long standing tradition of backing Israel.1 Since Donald Trump has taken office, it appears U.S.- Israel relations are strengthening as Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump have met to discuss important matters for the future of the two nations- a stark contrast between often cold and hostile relations between Obama and Netanyahu. Superficially relations seem to be good, but Trump himself may risk causing tension with the only democracy in the Middle East. In a statement made in February, Trump seemed to agree with the UN Resolution condemning the Israeli settlements in the West Bank by stating, “As far as settlements, I’d like to see you hold back on settlements for a little bit.

We’ll work something out.”2 This rather confusing statement has the potential to create negative relations between the U.S. and Israel, reminiscent of the Obama administration. Confirmed by a press release on the White House website, Press Secretary Sean Spicer issued a statement claiming, “While we don’t believe the existence of settlements is an impediment to peace, the

construction of new settlements or the expansion of existing settlements beyond their current borders may not be helpful in achieving that goal. As the President has expressed many times, he hopes to achieve peace throughout the Middle East region.”3 He also asserted that President Trump looks forward to working with the Prime Minister in the future. 4

As far as “the two-state or onestate debate,” Trump has committed his support to whichever solution both the Israelis and Palestinians agree upon. 5 This can be interpreted as a laissez faire diplomatic approach on his part. However, his plans to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem shy away from the blasé approach and place him in the center of controversy. Traditionally, the U.S. establishes its embassies in capital cities; however, in an act of protest, the U.S. placed its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv rather than the disputed capital city of Jerusalem. The implications of Trump’s plans to move the embassy will strike huge favor in U.S.- Israeli relations as Tel Aviv is legally recognized as the capital by the Israeli government.

The Trump administration is off to a questionable start with U.S.Israeli relations. On the one hand, Trump criticizes the Obama administration for unfairly condemning Israeli settlements, yet issues statements that seem to do just that. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Trump suggests that the U.S. will move its embassy to the disputed territory of Jerusalem sending a strong pro- Israel statement.

Despite the President’s flip flop stance, the future of U.S.- Israeli relations seems promising thanks to conservative leaders who push to have stronger ties with Israel. This is demonstrated

through the majority vote to repeal the UN Resolution. In addition to the pro-Israel stance by Congress, lobbyist bipartisan organizations like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) pledge to continue to forge better ties between the two nations.6 In late March, speakers, students and politicians alike from all over the U.S. came together in Washington for the annual AIPAC conference. Addressing a crowd of 18,000 from Jerusalem, Netanyahu “expressed appreciation for Trump’s increased funding request for military aid in keeping with the 10-year, $38bn commitment Obama signed with Israel last year, the single largest pledge of military assistance in US history.”7 Such expression by Netanyahu and actions by Trump demonstrate that the future of U.S.-Israeli relations will maintain in strength despite Trump’s unclear comments and rash decisions.

This is crucial because Israel is the only democratic nation in the Middle East and has considerable natural resources and technological capabilities. Moving forward it appears the Trump administration will continue a legacy set by the Obama administration, but with an expressed desire for more open relations.

Spring 2017

The IR Review Editorial Board

Anushka Pinto, Editor-in-Chief Morgan Peterson, Editor-in-Chief Ines Boussebaa, Senior Staff Writer Clara Bezerra, Senior Staff Writer Desmond Molloy, Senior Staff Writer Samira Jafar, Staff Writer Sophie Shanshory, Senior Copy Editor Madeline Van Heusden, Senior Copy Editor Jessica DellAquila, Copy Editor Jennifer Gonzales, Copy Editor Morgan Cope, Copy Editor Maddie Ferrill, Senior Layout Editor Josee Matela, Layout Editor Ellen Gilley, Photography Editor Gowtham Ashokan, REACT News Mairin McQueen, REACT News Cecilia de Almeida, Blog Writer

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Colophon CGS’15, CAS’17 CAS’17 COM’17, CAS’17 CAS’18 SAR’19 CAS’20 CAS’17 CAS’17 CAS’17 CGS’17, CAS’19 CAS’19 CAS’19 COM’20 CAS’17 CAS’19 COM’20 CAS’19

About The IR Review The International Relations Review, ISSN 2152-738X, is a subsidiary of the Boston University International Affairs Association. The IR Review is an international relations magazine serving the undergraduate students at Boston University. With a circulation of nearly 1,500 the IR Review is considered Boston University’s premier academic journal.

Since it was founded in 2009, the IR Review has striven to create a forum for students interested in international affairs. The submissions features in the publication cover a myriad of topics and controversies, including but not limited to globalization, international security, human rights, international law and politics and sustainability.

A PDF of the current issue, as well as citations and archives can be viewed online at www.irr.buiaa.org.

Guidelines for Submissions Essay submissions are accepted year-round for the IR Review. All essays must contain at least 500 words and must not exceed 3,000. Essays must also include the author’s name, college, graduation year, a title, and citations to be considered for publication.

The IR Review reserves the right to revise submissions. All the revisions are sent to the author for approval before going to print. The IR Review also reserves the right to edit photo submissions minimally. However, creative liberties are taken into account.

All work must be properly cited. Plagiarized work violates the IR Review’s Code of Ethics, as well as the Boston University Handbook, and will not be accepted. If the IR Review finds that a submission has been plagiarized, the staff will no longer accept submissions from that author. Opinion pieces do not require a bibliography unless the author cites other sources.

Submissions are accepted on a rolling basis. The editorial staff can be contacted for questions regarding submissions at irr@buiaa.org.

Submit for the Fall 2017 Issue

Submit photos and written pieces to irr@buiaa.org with your name, school and class year for a chance to be published in our Fall 2017 edition. Check out our website for more details: www.irr.buiaa.org

The International Relations Review is created using Adobe In-Design CS5 and exported as a PDF. Adobe Photoshop and Adobe Illustrator are also used in the production process. The IR Review prints more than 1,500 copies from The Fenway Group located on Commonwealth Avenue.

The typefaces for the publication include Baskerville and Minion Pro. The images in the publication are processed in CMYK. The magazine is printed on 100-pound gloss paper and comes with a saddle-stitched binding.

The publication is run by the editorial board, which consists of copy editors, layout editors and the editors-in-chief. The editorial board also handles external affairs, such as blogging, public relations, marketing, advertising, and logistics.

Photo Credits

The cover photo used for the Spring 2017 edition of the IR Review was taken by Morgan Peterson, CAS’17.

The photo used for the Economics and Development section was taken by Morgan Peterson, CAS’17.

The photo used for the Regional Politics section was taken by Morgan Peterson, CAS’17.

The photo used for the Security section was taken by Mariel Dweck, SHA’17.

The photo used for the Culture & Anthropology section was taken by Derek Hartnett, CAS’17

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