4
Introduction
independence, nine states in the region formed the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC; since renamed the Southern African Development Community). SADCC’s explicit goal was to diminish South African economic and technological dominance in the sub-continent. This goal was unacceptable to Pretoria, whose objective was to establish a band of apartheid-friendly, politically submissive and economically dependent states along its border. A third factor was the galvanizing effect Frelimo’s accession to state power had on black political activism within South Africa. The collapse of Portuguese colonialism and the installation of a militant nationalist regime in Maputo “helped spur the revival of black political resistance inside South Africa” in the mid-1970s.10 Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that South Africa had a stake in ensuring that independent Mozambique did not become a beacon of black revolution, socialist or otherwise. As a direct extension of the SADF, Renamo gained a second lease of life, becoming the primary instrument of South Africa’s war against Mozambique.11 The rebels expanded their fighting forces, their field of action and the scale of their attacks dramatically. After being reduced to some 1,250 men in 1980, Renamo’s rank and file stood at an estimated 5,000 armed fighters by mid-1981. Two years later, the insurgents’ leaders claimed a few thousand more guerrillas to their army’s name. Rebel units moved both southwards and northwards from central Mozambique and, by mid-1983, were operating in all the country’s provinces save for Cabo Delgado in the country’s northeast corner. A little over a year later, the entire national territory had become a war zone.12 Peace in the 1980s proved elusive. In 1984, Mozambique and South Africa had signed a “non-aggression” pact. Under the terms of the agreement, known as the Nkomati Accord, Frelimo agreed to ensure that ANC guerrillas no longer accessed South Africa via Mozambican territory. The Mozambican government also pledged to reduce the ANC presence within its borders to a small diplomatic mission. South Africa, in its turn, undertook to stop supporting Renamo. The pact was, however, repeatedly flouted by Pretoria and the war escalated in the ensuing years.13 Frelimo subsequently placed high hopes in a government amnesty program launched in December 1987. But only a fraction of Renamo’s fighting force opted to take up the amnesty offer. Two years later, the program was discontinued.14 In the meantime, it had become clear that neither side could prevail militarily. By then, the conflict had produced over one million Mozambican refugees, an estimated 4.6 million people had been displaced within the country’s borders and about 7.7 million people – about half of Mozambique’s population – needed food aid.15 The appearance of the Naparama movement on the Mozambican scene was thus the most visible, dramatic sign that ordinary rural dwellers had decided to take their destiny into their own hands. The years of waiting in vain for the two warring belligerents to reach an accord, they appeared to be
