Notes

Introduction: the making and unmaking of the Namapa Naparamas

1 “Spears against bazookas – the Baramas,” Mf, 178 (May 1991); Metselaar et al. (1994: 39n.20). For the relaxation on initial prohibitions against the use of firearms by Naparama initiates, see Wilson (1992b: 569). 2 Africa Watch (1992: 39); Nordstrom (1997: 58). For a discussion of local peace zones in wartime Mozambique, see ibid., pp. 100–1, 103, 147–51 and Wilson (1992b: 554–66). 3 Hanlon (1996: 93). 4 Shorthand for the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, the Portuguese translation of the army’s original name. 5 Hall (1990: 60). 6 Richards (1998: 3); Newitt (2002: 212). 7 Mamdani (2004). 8 Fauvet (1984); Hanlon (1986: 139); Hall and Young (1997: 120). 9 Bell with Ntsebeza (2003: 244). 10 Minter (1994: 116). 11 Davies et al. (1984: 45–7); Hanlon (1986: 14–16). For other forms of South African destabilization, see ibid., pp. 134–9 and COCAMO (1988b: 2–3). For conflicting positions regarding the existence of economic destabilization by South Africa before 1980, see Hanlon (1986: 134–5) and Hall and Young (1997: 113–14). 12 Minter (1994: 40–1, 44); Hall and Young (1997: 125–8); Harrison (1996: 23). 13 Johnson and Martin (1988: 31–4); Vines (1991: 24–5); Minter (1994: 46–7). 14 Finnegan (1992: 59). About 4,000 Renamo fighters took advantage of the amnesty program. While estimates of Renamo’s troop strength in the late 1980s vary widely (cf. ibid., p. 67), 20,537 Renamo soldiers were demobilized in the wake of the 1992 peace accord. For a discussion of the factors that deterred more Renamo guerrillas from participating in the amnesty program, see Minter (1994: 181). 15 Hanlon (1991: 38); United Nations (1995: 12). 16 See especially Wilson (1992b) and Nordstrom (1997: 57–61). 17 “Recuperation” was the government’s term for the process of transferring Renamo detainees to government-controlled areas. 18 Wilson (1992b: 564, 570, 574); Africa Watch (1992: 58–9; 79–80); Maccari and Mazzola (1992: 96–101). See also Nordstrom (1997: 61, 92–5). In Namapa, the vaccine cost anywhere between US$1.75 to US$3.50 in 1991 –fairly hefty sums given that, according to official estimates, per capita income was about US$99 that year. Interviews, Naparamas, Machicane (Mashikane,

290 Notes

Massicane), 28/8/94; Chief Comala, Napai, 7/10/94; Appendix three in

Hanlon (1996: 161). 19 Africa Watch (1992: 39–40, 128–30); Wilson (1992b: 575–80); Lester (1992: 29); Fauvet (1992: 31). 20 Africa Watch (1992: 40, 130); Maccari and Mazzola (1992: 99–100); Paróquia do Alua, “Vamos comer ... algodão?” Vida Nova, Janeiro 1993; Jane Perlez,

“A Mozambique formally at peace is bled by hunger and brutality,” The New

York Times, 13/10/94; interviews, “animators,” Alua Center, 16/6/94; elders and traditional authorities, “Zagaia” (“Azagaia”; Renamo’s name for its headquarters in Metage), Alua Administrative Post, 24/9/94. 21 “Further mutinies and rioting,” Mf, 218 (September 1994), pp. 10–11. 22 Ibid.; Carlos Coelho, “‘Naparamas’ cortam ligação entre Nampula and Cabo

Delgado,” Notícias, 19/8/94. 23 Ibid. 24 Unless otherwise stated, the discussion which follows draws on informal conversations with missionaries based in Namapa and Alua and the following interviews: Naparamas, Namirôa Center, 20/8/94; Naparamas, Muanona

Center, 23/8/94; former residents of 25 de Junho Communal Village, 25 de

Junho Communal Village, 27/8/94; Chief Muhula, Namirôa Center, 28/8/94;

Naparamas, Machicane, 28/8/94; and Chief Comala, Napai, 7/10/94. 25 Zinco had reportedly learned how to make and administer the vaccine from a former Frelimo combatant from the liberation war. Metselaar et al. (1994: 39n.22). 26 Africa Watch (1992: 40, 130), which refers to the Lalaua elder as “Cinco”; interview, elders and traditional authorities, “Zagaia,” Alua Administrative

Post, 24/9/94. 27 Personal communications, shop-owner and missionaries, Alua Center and

Namapa Center, September 1994; interviews, Naparama major, Namapa Center, 29/8/94 (interview conducted by Pedro Cavala); Chief Comala, Napai, 7/10/94. 28 Coelho, “‘Naparamas’ cortam ...” I have positioned the punctuation marks as they appear in the text itself, which makes it unclear where the source’s own words begin. For more on allegedly copy-cat Naparamas, see Wilson (1992b: 573). 29 Metselaar et al. (1994: 39n.22). 30 See, for instance, Dinerman (1998: 8). 31 Wilson (2001: 112). 32 Ibid., p. 112 and p. xv, respectively. 33 As this book goes to press, Frelimo has won Mozambique’s third general elections, held in December 2004, by a wide margin. The ruling party’s presidential candidate, Armando Guebuza, captured almost 64 percent of the vote while Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama got less than half of that (31.7 percent). Frelimo also secured 160 seats in the 250-seat national parliament, seventy more than Renamo, which claimed majorities in only two out of the country’s eleven provinces, down from six in 1999. 34 For Mozambicans’ “hushed discomfort with talking about the war,” see

Hayner (2002: 201; 186–95). But see also Barahona de Brito et al. (2001: 9). 35 Tutu (1999: 58, 235–6, 239); Wilson (2001: 24, 67). 36 See, for instance, Manning (2002: 52). 37 See, for instance, Minter (1994: 231). 38 Manning (2002: 214). 39 For an early instance of this tendency in the government-aligned press, see

“Jamais esquerecei a noite de 26 para 27 de Outubro,” Notícias, 13/12/94. For parallels in contemporary Spanish politics, see Aguilar (2002: 65, 138, 209–210, 268).

Notes 291

40 Mamdani (2001: 32). 41 Mamdani (1996: 136). 42 Ibid., pp. 130–5. 43 See, for instance, Kruks and Wisner (1984: 27). 44 Isaacman and Isaacman (1983:130). 45 For a comparison of first- and second-wave socialism, see Rosberg and

Callaghy (1979). 46 See, inter alia, ibid.; Young (1982: esp. chs 2 and 3); Hanlon (1984: 34); Saul (1985b: 16–17, 27–8); Saul (1985d: 137–8). 47 The phrase was first enunciated by Amílcar Cabral, the legendary leader of the nationalist movement that fought a contemporaneous guerrilla war to liberate

Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde from Portuguese rule. Cabral was murdered by

African agents of the Portuguese in 1973. His teachings were highly influential among other liberation movements in Africa and beyond. For a lessthan-glowing assessment of this particular notion, see White (1985: 331). 48 Unless otherwise indicated, this paragraph is based on the discussion in

Young (1982: 99–100). 49 Howe (1994: 32). For a less harsh assessment, see Young (1982: 180–2). 50 Ibid., p. 89. 51 See, for instance, Hanlon (1984: ch. 4) and Saul (1985c: 48–61). 52 Casal (1991: 47). 53 Hanlon (1984: 28). 54 Cahen (1988b; 1993); Saad Filho (1997); Manning (2002); Newitt (2002: 189). For a revisionist analysis that explicitly eschews ethnic explanations, see

Brito (1991: esp. chs 2 and 3). 55 See especially Brito (1988; 1991: chs 2–4); and Casal (1991). 56 Ibid., p. 48. 57 See, for instance, Egerö (1990: 183–5). O’Meara (1991: 91–2) makes a similar argument. 58 The term and the criteria used to measure it are from Chabal (2002: 8–12).

Unless otherwise stated, the following discussion is based on his analysis. 59 Under the Armed Forces Movement, which took power in April 1974, the

Portuguese would eventually yield to all of these demands. See, for instance,

Hall and Young (1997: 42–3). 60 Newitt (2002: 207). 61 Chabal (2002: 18). 62 Young (1982: 142, 145–6). The 1979 population census registered less than 800,000 people. Galli and Jones (1987: xiii). 63 Chabal (1992: 78). The coup, motivated in part by ethnic tensions, put paid to the PAIGC’s vision of maintaining a bi-territorial nation–state consisting of Cape Verde and the mainland and led to the creation of the PAICV (African

Party for the Independence of Cape Verde), which became the ruling party in the archipelago. Young (1982: 145–8); Chabal (2002: 53, 70). 64 See, for instance, Minter (1994: 28–32, 39–40) and Birmingham (2002: 145–55). The joint South African-Unita military offensive began a pattern of external intervention and civil war that continued until the end of the Cold

War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil war continued to plague Angola on and off until the death of Unita leader, Jonas Savimbi, at the hands of MPLA troops in 2002. 65 Minter (1994: 40). 66 Ibid., p. 42. 67 Young (1982: 96). 68 On the persistence of poverty, see, for instance, Ratilal (2002: 262) and passim.

On the widening of socio-economic inequalities, see Hanlon (2002: Part I, 2)

292 Notes

and “Report shows sharp drop in illiteracy,” Mf, 313 (August 2002), which notes that the most salient distinction between regions is that between the capital city, Maputo, and the rest of the country. See also O’Laughlin (2002: 529, 529n.71). On tendencies toward the “criminalization” of the Mozambican state, see, inter alia, Hanlon (2001a; 2001b); and Gastrow and Mosse (2002). On tendencies in this direction throughout the continent, see Bayart et al. (1999a). The quote is from Ellis (1998: 295). 69 On Renamo’s evolution, see Manning (2002). The results of the 2004 elections may augur a shift in this regard. See note 33 above. 70 Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 100, 103–5, 171–2). Frelimo also received financial and humanitarian assistance from the Scandinavian countries, as well as religious groups and solidarity organizations in Western Europe and the

United States. 71 On Frelimo’s relationship with the USSR and other socialist countries during this period, see Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 181–4); Hanlon (1984: 235–6); and O’Meara (1991: 82, 95). 72 Cf. Mondlane, as cited in Saul (1983: x), who echoes this view. 73 The term is Chabal’s (2002: 24). 74 Pitcher (2002). The extent to which these critiques mislead in this manner is at times exaggerated by her. For instance, the point that many privately-owned companies were never nationalized (ibid., pp. 43, 79) was made long ago by

Hanlon (1984: 77; 1996: 76), a leading proponent of the recolonization thesis. 75 Pitcher (2002: 237) and passim. 76 Metselaar et al. (1994: 38–40); Newitt (1995: 573). 77 Bayart (1993: 150–79). 78 Roberts (2000: 517). 79 For a discussion of this phenomenon in other historical contexts, see LaCapra (1998: ch. 3; 2001: 171–2). Obviously, memory screens can work in a variety of manners, sometimes at the same time. In the case of French historical scholarship, for instance, the same “event,” namely Vichy, has served both as a screen and as a screened object. LaCapra (1998: 22). 80 For a variation on this theme, see Krzysztof Pomian’s formulation, as cited in

Rousso (1991: 5). 81 “Definitive census results: 17 million people in Mozambique,” Mf, 280 (November 1999), p. 4. 82 The plane crashed in October 1986 just inside South Africa. Machel was returning from a summit meeting of the Frontline States, a six-state regional grouping committed to liberating the sub-continent from apartheid. Cf.

Munslow (1987c: 200–8). 83 “Keeping Samora’s legacy alive,” Mf, 327 (October 2003). 84 Machado da Graça, “10 anos sem Samora,” Savana, 23/2/96. 85 See LaCapra (1998: 20–1) and Hynes (1999: 206–7), respectively. The transgenerational transmission of “primary memory” has been denoted by many other terms, including “postmemory,” “historical memory,” “inherited memory,” “loaned memory.” Cf. Hirsch (1997); Aguilar (2002: 6–7, 13). I prefer “vicarious memory” because it evokes the imaginary aspects that are intrinsic to the transmission process. However, it is highly likely that the phenomenon of postmemory, as defined by Marianne Hirsch (1997: 22), will assert itself in Mozambique, assuming it hasn’t already. 86 The following discussion is based on Manning (2002: 54, 124, 135) and

“Shakeup in Frelimo secretariat,” Mf, 229 (August 1995). The need for generational replacement has been driven home by the deaths of liberation war heroes, such as Sebastião Marcos Mabote, Fernando Matavele and Oswaldo

Tazama.

Notes 293

87 Manning (2002: 54). 88 “Chissano will not run for office again,” Mf, 299 (June 2001), p. 4. 89 “Frelimo’s Eighth Congress: Guebuza confirmed as successor,” Mf, 312 (July 2002). 90 “Luisa Diogo appointed Prime Minister,” Mozambique News Agency, AIM

Reports, 270, 18/2/04. 91 Winter and Sivan (1999c: 6). Compare to Corney (2003). 92 See, for instance, Nora (1989). 93 Huyssen (2000: 23). 94 Olick (1998a: 380). The special issue of Social Science History, devoted to the theme “Memory and the Nation,” has recently been released as an edited collection which contains additional contributions. See Olick (2003a). 95 E.g. as a compensatory reflex in the face of “the deritualization of our world,” as a symptom of a general retreat from the politics of transformation, as a displacement of our fear of the future, and, perhaps most perspicaciously, as a response to “a slow but palpable transformation of temporality in our lives, centrally brought on by the complex intersections of technological change, mass media, and new patterns of consumption, work, and global mobility.” For the first two theses, see Nora (1989: 12) and passim and Maier (1993), respectively. The latter two are examined in Huyssen (2000), who argues for the primacy of the fourth explanation. Ibid., p. 31. 96 Ibid., pp. 25, 37, 38. 97 Ibid., pp. 25–6. 98 Ibid., p. 23. 99 See, for instance, the assessment of former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Roy Stacy, as cited in COCAMO (1988b: 5). 100 Barkan (2000: 110). See also Lazare (2004), especially pp. 5–16. 101 Henry Rousso, as cited in Feld (2000: 32). See also Hamilton (1998) in this regard. 102 O’Meara (1991: 90–4). 103 Roberts (2000: 516). 104 LaCapra (1998: 1). 105 Jelin (2003: 46). 106 Huyssen (2000: 26). 107 See, for instance, LaCapra (1998: 19–20). 108 Aguilar (2002: 14–17). Also referred to as “instrumentalism” and “essentialism,” respectively. 109 Olick (1998b: 568) and passim. For a counter-factual case, see Barkan (2000: xxi, ch. 4). 110 I follow Olick (1998b: 550) and use the term to refer to a “relatively coherent yet dynamic” representational system that solidifies over time and consists of “a variety of legitimacy claims, issue cultures, discursive styles, images of the past, Feindbilder (enemy images), and the like ...” 111 Rousso (1991: 11); LaCapra (1998; 2001). 112 For instances of this mode of leveling, see Finnegan (1992: 8) and “Book reviews,” MPPB, AWEPA, 22 (April 1999). 113 Hanlon (1991: 5). The one official entity set up to investigate the apartheid past, the TRC, has itself been accused of deploying leveling modes of contextualization. Specifically, the TRC’s formal condemnation of all violence as equally abhorrent has left the commission open to the charge of “equating the violence of resistance with the violence of oppression” in a manner that “cut[s] the moral high ground from under the liberation forces ...” and assists in normalizing the history of apartheid. Bell with Ntsebeza (2003: 286). See also Wilson (2001: 102–4, 111–14) In its final report the TRC found that,

294 Notes

although the liberation forces fought a “just war” against apartheid, “unjust means were sometimes used by liberation cadres.” Ibid., p. 103. 114 O’Meara (1991: 102). 115 Minter (1994: 8). 116 Howe (1994: 30). 117 Manning (2002: 16). 118 Cf. Chapter 1 below. 119 At the war’s end, the Mozambican government owed Russia US$850 million in military debt. Alden (2001: 90). 120 Minter (1994: 284). 121 Newitt (2002: 215). 122 Chabal (2002: 119). 123 Minter (1994: 283) and passim. Compare to Chabal (1992: 189). 124 Minter (1994: 285). 125 Minter hypothesizes that, had Mozambique not been subject to foreign destabilization, the country today might well look much like Tanzania, where political disillusionment is widespread but there have been no violent challenges to the long reigning regime. However, it goes without saying that Mozambique is not Tanzania, not only by virtue of geographical-historical destiny but also by virtue of the Frelimo leadership’s political choices. 126 LaCapra (1998: 54).

1 Myth as a “meaning-making device” in post-independence Mozambique

1 Ferguson (1999: 23). 2 Renan (1990). 3 Lonsdale (1992a: 265). 4 In view of the analytic vacuity and slipperiness of terms such as “public” or “collective” memory (Winter and Sivan 1999b: 1; 1999c: 9), I hereafter opt for a vocabulary that foregrounds this study’s focus on “actors and actions” (1999c: 9). 5 See, for instance, O’Laughlin (1996: 16; 2000: 6, 27–9). 6 Brito (1991: 321). 7 As O’Laughlin (2000: 28) herself notes. See also Berry (2001: 79–80) and Wilson (2001: 198). 8 It thus provided a model of sorts for other guerrilla organizations, such as Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia, seeking to terrorize civilian populations. Cf. Richards (1998: 3). 9 J.J. McCuen, as cited in Ellis (1998: 265). In this passage, McCuen was referring specifically to how an incumbent regime can defeat a revolutionary guerrilla insurgency; however, the same logic applies to low-intensity destabilization against a self-styled revolutionary state. See, for instance, Saul (1990a: 76–9). 10 Geffray (1991). Aspects of Geffray’s argument are echoed in Clarence-Smith (1989a); West and Myers (1992: 5); Alden and Simpson (1993: 123); Zartman (1995: 7); and Schutz (1995: 117), among others. 11 Baptista Lundin (1992; 1993). For the case that this policy shift is called for on pragmatic grounds, see Finnegan (1992: 242–3). 12 Roesch (1992a). 13 O’Laughlin (2000: 37). 14 Roesch (1988a: 85). 15 Roesch (1989: 11; 1992a); Saul (1993: 151, 157–8). 16 On the general tendency within Africanist scholarship to treat the relations

Notes 295

between states and chiefs as a “zero-sum game,” see Dijk and Rouveroy van

Nieuwaal (1999: 9). Much the same type of reasoning has been used to explain the rise of ethnic nationalisms throughout the continent. See, for instance,

Zartman (1995: 1). 17 Other parallels are reviewed below and in Chapter 3. 18 The manner in which Vail and White (1980: 328) characterize the subtle manipulation of verb tenses in Machel’s speeches. See also Abrahamsson and

Nilsson (1994: 45, 46n.79). 19 Berman and Lonsdale (1992b: 5). 20 For instances of, or references to, the insertion of traditional hierarchies in post-independence institutions, see O’Laughlin (1992a: 31); Geffray and Pedersen (1985); Casal (1988: 176–7); Centro de Estudos Africanos (hereafter,

CEA) (1986); Littlejohn (n.d.); Wilson (1992a: 5); Tanner et al. (1993: 29, 44–5); Marshall and Roesch (1993: 257–61); Arnfred (1990: 78); Metselaar et al. (1994: 15); Minter (1994: 251); Alexander (1994: 48–51); McGregor (1998: 42); Pitcher (1998: 129); West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 476–7);

Harrison (2000: 117); Dinerman (2001: 23–39); Schafer and Bell (2002: 406); and Manning (2002: 64). The list is long. It is also growing. In contrast, counter-factual case studies feature mainly by their virtual absence. For instances of continuities in class (as well as gender and generational) relations within these institutions, see, inter alia, Harris (1980); Hermele (1988a); Littlejohn (n.d.); CEA (1986); Marshall and Roesch (1993); Myers and West (1993); O’Laughlin (1996: 24–5; 2000: 36–7, 38–9); and Bowen (2000, esp. chs 4 and 5). For similar processes in an urban setting, see Grest (1995). 21 The approach taken by smallholders to colonial and postcolonial socio-political institutions throughout sub-Saharan Africa. See, for instance, Berry (1989). 22 Rathbone (2000: 34). 23 Mamdani (1996: 187–9, 297; 2000: 45). 24 Ferguson (1999: 85). 25 Ibid., p. 14. 26 O’Laughlin (1992a: 32). 27 Artigo 8. For the law’s understanding of the meaning of “traditional authority,” see RM, “Glossário de termos técnico-jurídicos empregues no quadro institucional dos distritos municipais (Lei 3/94, de 13 de Setembro).” 28 RM, Boletim da República, primeiro série, 37, segundo suplemento, 13 de

Setembro de 1994, Lei no. 3/94, Artigo 9. 29 Alexander (1997: 17). 30 In the event, some 75 percent of the population continues to be governed at the local level by an appointed administrator. For more recent developments, see, inter alia, “New law planned for districts” and “New decree recognises

‘traditional chiefs’” both in MPPB, AWEPA, 25 (August 2000); “Government rejects increased local power,” MPoPB, AWEPA, 28 (1 November 2002); Weimar (2002: 71–3) and passim; and “Calm opening to Assembly sitting,” Mf, 321 (April 2003), p. 11. 31 See O’Laughlin’s (1996) and Bowen’s (2000: 209–10) critique of the historical analysis and policy recommendations of researchers associated with the Land

Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin. 32 Van Kessel and Oomen (1997: 570); Van Kessel (2000: 42–3, 83–4). See also

O’Laughlin (1996: 4). The quotation is from Saul (1999: 62). 33 Hanlon (1984); Saul (1985a; 1993); Minter (1994). 34 Attributes which, as we have seen, they have convincingly argued predated independence and thus the advent of South African destabilization. 35 See, inter alia, Brito (1988; 1991); Cahen (1987; 1988a; 1988b; 1989; 1990; 1993); Meillassoux et al. (1990); Casal (1991); and Geffray (1988; 1991).

296 Notes

36 Hanlon (1991: 5). Obviously, Renamo’s systematic destruction of the country’s schools and health clinics paved the way for the onset of this brand of amnesia. Bragança and Depelchin (1986: 31). 37 Machado da Graça, “10 anos sem Samora,” Savana, 23/2/96. See also “Savana

‘entrevista’ Samora Machel,” Savana, 19/7/96 and “Ten years without Samora,”

Mf, 242 (September 1996). 38 For recent Africanist scholarship which has exposed the limits of ideological processes of invention, see Moore and Vaughan (1994) and Hamilton (1998). 39 Minter (1994: 239). See also p. 208. 40 For a classic statement with respect to worker consent to capitalist social relations of production, see Abercrombie et al. (1980). For a critique, see Eagleton (1991: 35–7). 41 Feierman (1990: 32). 42 See, for instance, Meillassoux et al. (1990: 27). 43 Cf. Harrison (2000: 88). 44 See, for instance, Nordstrom (1997: 55); West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 460); and Manning (2002: 65). 45 See, for instance, the sources cited in note 20 above and Chapter 3 below. 46 Cf. West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 460–1). Perhaps in good measure because it “tapped into broader currents of thinking,” much as Robert Kaplan’s (1994) highly influential and controversial article on “the coming anarchy” did. Cf.

Richards (1998: xv). 47 Interview, Maputo, 22/12/94. The party invited Geffray to conduct research in

Namapa and Nacarôa districts in 1988 at Cabaço’s behest. The primary motive was to find out if there was a social basis for the war, as Geffray had suggested there might soon be in his earlier work prior to the war’s outbreak in the area. Geffray and Pedersen (1985); Geffray and Pederson (1986).

During Geffray’s field research in 1988, the party provided him with vital logistical support, official protection, and access to documentary materials, former Renamo captives and amnestied Renamo soldiers. Cf. O’Laughlin (1992b: 112). According to Cabaço, when he distributed copies of the manuscript of La Cause to the Mozambican cabinet (Council of Ministers) to discuss, no one evinced any interest in reading it. 48 A dynamic that Chabal (1996: 46) has dubbed “the Caliban syndrome.” For

Frelimo’s adroitness in this regard, see Alden (2001: 111). 49 See, for instance, Grest (1995). For evidence that these goals have not been met with respect to district development planning and an analysis of why, see

Bornstein (2000: 243–64). 50 For the argument that Western donors were thinking along these lines, see

West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 461). 51 Pitcher (2002: 150). 52 Alden (2001: 90, 93, 94); Hall and Young (1997: 231). 53 See, for instance, Alden (2001: 108). 54 The donors in question, in their turn, reportedly viewed such a concession as the necessary price Frelimo should pay for forestalling some sort of powersharing solution. Cf. West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 461). 55 West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 462); Harrison (2002: 117–21, 123–4);

Chapter 5 below. 56 West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 462–3). 57 For a discussion of the pressures and constraints on career-minded African bureaucrats, see Feierman (1990: 23–4). 58 Although dissenting party members no longer had to defend these decisions as their own. “Frelimo publishes draft statutes,” Mf, 180 (July 1991), p. 15;

“Frelimo Sixth Congress,” Mf, 182 (September 1991), p. 6. It is true that, at

Notes 297

independence, the Frelimo leadership was home to diverse currents of political opinion. According to O’Laughlin (2000: 26), the ideological mix included

“African socialism, social democracy, Maoism and pro-Soviet Communism.”

See also Chabal (2002: 62). However, it is also the case that open political debate regarding questions of Marxist doctrine or non-Marxist versus Marxist ideological orientation was actively discouraged and suppressed. Under the circumstances, political differences manifested themselves elliptically in the form of disputes over the direction and pace of “development,” particularly in the rural areas. Brito (1991: 200ff.). See also Saul (1990a: 58). For steps towards internal democratization in the postwar period, see “Candidates register, campaign starts,” Mf, 280 (November 1999), p. 9. 59 Cf. Manning (2002: 198). See also Serra (1999b: 120–7, 132). 60 Alexander (1994: 35–6); O’Laughlin (1996); West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 473–6). 61 Ibid., pp. 473–4; Harrison (2002: 122–5). 62 A post he held until a new government was formed after the second general elections in 1999. 63 Moore and Vaughan (1994: xxii). The classic case is, of course, the invention of “tradition” and ethnicity in colonial Africa. See, in particular, Ranger (1983); Chanock (1985); Vail (1989); and Berry (1992). 64 The terms are Lonsdale’s (1992a: 265) and Sunseri’s (2000: 567), respectively.

Invoking Sunseri’s terminology here is especially apt given the parallels between his case study of statist narratives of Tanzanian history and the present monograph. One parallel is the presupposition of a potent state (whether conceived in genocidal, revolutionary or nationalist terms) and of rural subjects as hapless and bereft of agency. See O’Laughlin (1996: 2) and

Sunseri (2000: 573), respectively. 65 The terms are drawn from Beck (2001: 611), who deploys a similar logic with respect to Mouride marabouts in Senegal as the one applied here. 66 Roesch (1989/1990: 22). Hall and Young (1997: 181) echo this argument. 67 For these arguments, see Roesch (1989/1990: 22) and Hall and Young (1997: 181). 68 I base this assessment on the research findings of scholars whose field investigations were more or less contemporaneous with my own, e.g. Harrison (1996); Alexander (1997); McGregor (1998); West (1998) in the provinces of

Cabo Delgado, Maputo and Manica and on the state of play in official dealings with rural political authority in seven of Mozambique’s rural provinces in the 1995–97 period, as reported by West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 464–8). 69 Ibid., pp. 466–9. 70 “Government rejects increased local power,” MPoPB, AWEPA, 28 (1 November 2002), p. 8. See also “Donors lose interest” in this same issue. 71 Manicom (1992: 455). 72 Abrams (1988: 76). 73 See ibid., pp. 71, 82. 74 Abrams (1988: 82, 63–4). 75 Bragança and Depelchin (1986: 40, 44). See also O’Laughlin (1996: 3).

According to Bragança and Depelchin (1986: 40–1), Frelimo’s early, rather benign, conception of the state co-existed with the understanding, articulated by Machel, that government employees were deeply enmeshed in the social relations that constituted the wider society and that such ties heavily influenced their behavior on the job. This inconsistency is one reason I do not share the view that Frelimo’s socialist project was ideologically coherent. Cf.

O’Laughlin (2000: 26). 76 Mbembe (2001: 105).

298 Notes

77 In the context of Southern African historiography, I have found Manicom’s review article (1992) particularly illuminating in this regard. 78 Originally FRELIMO, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique. Following the transformation of the front into a vanguard party in 1977, the name became

Frelimo. For the sake of convenience, I use the latter form throughout the present text. 79 Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 173); O’Meara (1991: 82–3, 89). 80 Since renamed the ZANU (PF), the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front). The other movement was the Zimbabwe African’s People’s Union (ZAPU), which used Zambia as a rear base. 81 This often overlooked point is made by White (1985: 330). 82 For general descriptions of the disruptions caused by decolonization, see

Hanlon (1984: 38, 46–9); Saul (1985c: 63–4); and Pinsky (1985: 284–5). See also Chapter 3 below. 83 Wuyts (1978: 30). 84 First (1983: 189–90); Raikes (1984: 96); West and Myers (1996: 31). 85 On this arrangement, which began during the colonial period and ended in 1978, and the revenue it generated, see First (1983: 189–91); Hanlon (1984: 51); and Roesch (1988a: 75). 86 Hanlon (1984: 46, 75–6, 100). 87 In Frelimo political parlance, an “orientation” is, in principle, a guideline emanating from higher government authorities. In practice, it is synonymous with directive. 88 Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 116–20); Hanlon (1984: 49–50); Pinsky (1985: 288–90); Egerö (1990: 132). For the composition of the GDs, see

Munslow (1983: 151). For a geography of the liberation war, see Hall and

Young (1997: 14–35). 89 Hanlon (1984: 73, 95, 103). “Family farmers,” a term carried over from the colonial period, denotes smallholders who do not use wage labor in their farming operations – although, during peak agricultural periods, they may rely on extra-familial labor remunerated in payments-in-kind – and produce primarily to meet their subsistence needs. In both colonial and postindependence official classificatory schemes, the “family sector” is contrasted to “private sector” farming – that is, to capitalist farmers who own factors of production such as tractors and other mechanized equipment, employ wage labor and market a significant portion of their harvests. Hanlon (ibid.: 183);

Bowen (1989: 358); Tanner et al. (1993: 25, 45–7). The distinction between the two sectors is arbitrary and hides both the fluidity and important socioeconomic ties between the two farming types. Ibid. 90 Egerö (1990: 35–6). For Frelimo’s vision of communal villages, see, inter alia,

Hanlon (1984: 98–9) and Roesch (1984: 294–5). 91 For discussions of OMM, see Urdang (1985; 1989); and Sheldon (1994: 43–9). On the OJM and OTM, see Egerö (1990: 111, 138–41). 92 Ibid., p. 122. For the differences in election procedures at the provincial and national levels, see ibid. 93 Sachs and Honwana (1990: 74–5). The switch to community courts came in 1992. KARIBU, Nampula etal. (1994: 26). 94 Hanlon (1984: 95); Wuyts (1978: 6, 8). The figures are from 1970. 95 Hanlon (1984: 84–5, 95) and ibid., Appendix 4, p. 275. 96 Hermele (1990a: 40–1); Saul (1985d: 113–14). 97 Wuyts (1985: 187); Deere (1986: 131). 98 See, inter alia, CEA (1980: 64); Roesch (1984: 301–2, 310); Wardman (1985); and Dolny (1985: 237–8) and passim. 99 Casal (1988: 165).

Notes 299

100 Hanlon (1984: 110). 101 O’Laughlin (1981: 15–16). 102 Raikes (1984: 106–7); Hanlon (1984: 111–13); Casal (1988: 169–71); Brito (1991: 299–300). 103 Figures for these falls range widely. Compare, for instance, Table 1 in CEA (1981: 58); Table 2 in Hermele (1990a: 11); and Table 4.4 in Hall and Young (1997: 108). All three sources report falls of well over 50 percent for both crops between 1973 and 1979–80. 104 Hanlon (1984: 101); EIU, Country Profile: Mozambique, 1986–87, The Economist Publications, London, p. 26; Myers and West (1993: 8). 105 Hanlon (1984: 79, 87, 128); Araújo (1985: 156–7); Roesch (1988a: 76). 106 Egerö (1990: 114–15, 117–18, 121–2, 125, 127–9, 133–4). 107 Brito (1988); O’Meara (1991: 89). 108 Egerö (1990: 117–18) and passim. 109 This emphasis is most explicitly expressed in the charter of democratic mass organizations (FRELIMO [1978: 41]) but is also discernible with respect to the functioning of the other institutions of popular power and was especially apparent in the run-up to and during the Fourth Party Congress. For a description of the pre-congress preparations and the congress itself, see Hanlon (1984: 3–4, 105, 146, 204–5, 250–1) and Saul (1985d: 92–5, 111–13, 124–5). 110 The argument made by Miliband (1977: 149–50) with respect to Maoism. 111 Barker (1985: 331–3); Cliff et al. (1986: 14, 16); COCAMO (1988d: 2–4). 112 Marshall (1985: 170–1, 174–6, 188–9). 113 For the definition of “private farmers,” see note 89 above. 114 Hanlon (1984: 101); Saul (1985d: 94–5, 112–13); Roesch (1986; 1988a: 78–9); Egerö (1990: 105–7). 115 Hanlon (1984: 102–3); Roesch (1986; 1988a: 79–81). 116 Hanlon (1984: 113–14, 118–19, 209, 264); Urdang (1989: 27); Tanner et al. (1993: 35); Myers and West (1993: 21, 63–5). 117 Hanlon (1984: 251); Wuyts (1985: 204). See also Myers and West (1993: 9). 118 Davies (1991: 4). 119 Hall and Young (1997: 129). 120 Hanlon (1986: 146); Green et al. (1987: 18); Gersony (1988); COCAMO (1988b: 3, 5); Magaia (1988); Vines (1991: 89–91) and passim; Africa Watch (1992: 43–56, 122, 129); Wilson (1992b: 531–8, 577–8). 121 Hanlon (1986: 143–4); Africa Watch (1992: 102). 122 The preceding two paragraphs are based on Hanlon (1986: 141); COCAMO (1988b: 3); Hall (1990: 52–3); Vines (1991: 90); Africa Watch (1992: 65) and passim; Wilson (1992b); and Hall and Young (1997: 129–30, 168–9). For an important counter-factual case study, see Schafer (2001). 123 Hall (1990: 43); Vines (1991: 77); Manning (1998: 180). 124 Hall and Young (1997: 136, 176–7). 125 Roesch (1989: 10; 1992a: 27–8; 1992b: 476); Geffray (1991); Vines (1991: 93); Wilson (1992a: 3). 126 The Renamo leadership, however, forbade efforts by its soldiers to propitiate their own household spirits. Such forms of religious observance, which were widespread, took place on the sly. Schafer (2001: 228). 127 Vines (1991: 109, 111–19); Roesch (1992b: 476–9); Wilson (1992b: 540–8); Hall and Young (1997: 177–80). With respect to religious beliefs and practices Renamo’s tactics closely paralleled those of other insurgent movements in independent Africa. See Clapham (1998b: 12). 128 Hanlon (1984: 228–9); Minter (1989b: 8); Roesch (1989/1990; 1992a: 10; 1994: 19); Hall (1990: 48); Geffray (1991); Vines (1991: 113); Wilson

300 Notes

(1992a: 5); Metselaar et al. (1994: 39, 39–40n.23). On the divided response of curandeiros to Renamo, see Nordstrom (1997: 55). 129 Hanlon (1984: 231; 1986: 142); Roesch (1989/1990: 20; 1992a: 27–8); Geffray (1991); Vines (1991: 115–16). 130 For an apparent exception, see Roesch (1992b: 468). 131 Hanlon (1984: 231; 1986: 142); Geffray and Pedersen (1985); Geffray and Pederson (1986); CEA (1986); Casal (1988). 132 For a different assessment, see Morier-Genoud (2002: 129). 133 The characterization was codified in the 1930 Colonial Act. Hedges (1985: 10). 134 Ibid., pp. 7–15; Mondlane (1983: 58–75); Minter (1994: 253). 135 Ibid., pp. 253–4; Morier-Genoud (1996: 2). See also António Cadavez, “Arcebispo de Nampula ao EXPRESSO: ‘Criou-se um vazio que os novos valores não conseguiram preencher’,” Expresso (Lisbon), 31/8/85. 136 The government’s pledge, in 1988, to return all church property marked something of a watershed here. Morier-Genoud (1996: 3). 137 Vines (1991: 105); Minter (1994: 253–4). 138 Morier-Genoud (2002: 130). 139 Hanlon (1986: 142); Vines (1991: 93); Manning (1998: 186–7). 140 Hanlon (1984: 228). For conditions at these camps, see Cadavez, “Arcebispo de Nampula ...” 141 Geffray (1991: 71–9); Hanlon (1984: 229; 1986: 141); Roesch (1992b: 477–8); Wilson (1992b: 536). For a counter-factual case study, see Schafer (2001). Schafer’s research, conducted in Manica Province, corroborates the argument that dismal job prospects in the local or wider economy were a critical feature of the overall context in which some of these inductees, most of whom were forcibly recruited, acquired a “lukewarm acceptance” of life with Renamo. Ibid., pp. 224, 229. 142 Geffray (1991: 25, 59–62); O’Laughlin (1996); Schafer (2001). 143 Hanlon (1984: 244–8, 262–3); Africa Watch (1992: 28–9, 139). 144 See Brito (1991: 250n.30). 145 Ibid., pp. 240–50; O’Meara (1991: 98–9); Africa Watch (1992: 67–70); Urdang (1989: 187–99). 146 Hall and Young (1997: 169–70, 172); Hanlon (1986: 141); Minter (1989b: 5); Vines (1991: 95–6); Africa Watch (1992: 95–8). At the war’s end, Renamo demobilized more than 2,000 child soldiers. Hanlon (1996: 18). 147 For an exception to this, see Schafer (2001: 224–5). 148 Minter (1989b: 3–7; 1994: 174–6, 179–83); Geffray (1991: 69–70); Vines (1991: 95–6); Hall and Young (1997: 169–71); Manning (1998). For other control mechanisms, see Roesch (1989/1990: 21). 149 Gersony (1988: 11, 25); Roesch (1989/1990: 21–2); Geffray (1991: 119–22); Vines (1991: 94); Africa Watch (1992: 37); McGregor (1998: 50). 150 Minter (1994: 60, 239–40); Hanlon (1984: 231); Darch (1989: 45); Roesch (1989: 10–11; 1989/1990: 22); Saul (1990a: 92); Vines (1991: 94–5). 151 Contra Clarence-Smith (1989b). See Minter (1994: 172) and passim and Hall and Young (1997: 167–8, 168n.10). 152 For this and other violations, see Johnson and Martin (1988: 31–4); Vines (1991: 24–5); and Minter (1994: 46–7). See also Vines (1991: 25, 30–1) and Minter (1994: 136–8). 153 Vines (1991: 25, 27, 31, 62, 67, 87–90); Minter (1994: 137–8); Hall and Young (1997: 165–8); McGregor (1998: 51–6). 154 Gersony (1988: 11). 155 Ibid., pp. 10–21. 156 Hall and Young (1997: 167, 167–8n.9); Fauvet (1989: 27); Vines (1991:

Notes 301

91–3); Geffray (1991: 9, 81–112); Roesch (1992b: 477); Africa Watch (1992: 124–8); Minter (1994: 206–17). For qualifications to Gersony’s generalizations, see Vines (1991: 91, 114–15); Wilson (1992a); McGregor (1998: 48–51); and Schafer (2001). None of these sources challenge Gersony’s characterization of Renamo as a violent, parasitical and coercive movement. 157 Minter (1994: 206–17) provides a careful review of the available evidence. For the ecological and topographical inhospitability of the south, see Manning (1998: 168). 158 Minter (1994: 136). 159 Hanlon (1986: 146–9); Gifford (1988: 79–82); Nesbitt (1988; 1991: 75–82); Diamond (1989: 197–200); Eddie Koch, “Renamo’s secret SA bases,” Weekly

Mail, 6 (9) 16–22/3/90; Nilsson (1990); Vines (1991: 31–60, 67–8); Minter (1994: 127, 136–8). For an analysis of the relationship between SADF and private South African support for Renamo, see ibid., pp. 134–8 and Ellis (1998). Wilson (2001: 79) aptly characterizes the networks of support that became increasingly important in the run-up to majority rule as “officialinformal” groupings. 160 COCAMO (1988b: 6; 1988c: 6; 1988d: 5; 1988e: 1–2); Green et al. (1987: 20, 31). 161 Gersony (1988: 25). 162 Marshall (1990: 35); Table 1 in Cliff et al. (1986: 9). 163 COCAMO (1988b: 6). 164 Unless otherwise stated, the following two paragraphs are based on Manning (1998: 176–87).The initiative also entailed asserting the primacy of the internal movement over Renamo’s divided and self-destructive external wing. Ibid., pp. 180–2. 165 Vines (1991: 121–8). 166 Manning (2002: 118). 167 United Nations (1995: 61, 64). On Renamo’s electoral support, see Manning (1998: 176–87). On its political and administrative capacity in the 1992–1994 period, see Alexander (1997: 13–15) and Cahen (1997: 74). 168 For more recent developments on the electoral front, see note 33 of the Introduction above. 169 Davies (1991: 5). 170 Africa Watch (1992: 1, 56–9, 85–6, 116–18) and passim. See also Gersony (1988: 21–4). 171 Roesch (1989); Marshall and Roesch (1993: 268); Hermele (1990a: 42). 172 Cf. Vines (1991: 78). 173 Saul (1993; 1994a: 5). 174 Cahen (1988b: 4). 175 Minter (1994: 87); Marshall (1985: 159). 176 Brito (1991: 78–9); Minter (1994: 87–8). 177 A representative sampling of the main players in the first group includes Egerö (1990); Hanlon (1984); Isaacman and Isaacman (1983); Munslow (1983); O’Meara (1991); Roesch (1988a; 1988b); and Saul (1985d; 1985e; 1990a: ch. 2; 1990b). The second group’s position is outlined in Brito (1988; 1991); Cahen (1987; 1988a; 1988b; 1989); Casal (1991); and Geffray (1988; 1991). Criticisms of the first group have also come from writers who defy easy classification, e.g. Adam (1991); Bragança and Depelchin (1986); Penvenne (1985); and White (1985). 178 Criticisms have come mainly from Minter (1989a; 1994: 207–9, 256n.17); Saul (1990b: 20; 1994b: 28); Adam (1991); O’Meara (1991: 84–5, 102–3); O’Laughlin (1992a; 1992b; 1995; 1996: 1–3, 18–19 and passim; 2000); Alexander (1994: 34–6, 48–9); Dinerman (1994); Manning (1998: 171,

302 Notes

173–4); Pitcher (1998: 131–2); and Bowen (2000: 14–16, 46–8, 96–102, 168, 207). 179 O’Laughlin (1996; 2000). 180 For an eloquent statement of these points, see Minter (1994). 181 Alexander (1994). See also Minter (1994: 251). 182 The discussion which follows draws on O’Laughlin (1981). 183 As João dos Santos Ferreira, a Frelimo leader who, in 1983, became the Minister of Agriculture, put it. As cited by Brito (1991: 254). The dual economy thesis is outlined by leading party theoretician Marcelino dos Santos (1973: 28–9). As de Brito (1991: 202–3n.37) argues, his was, in fact, an advanced understanding relative to the one that informed the work of the National Planning Commission during its first years of operation. For the institutional expression of the dualist perspective in state planning agencies, see Dolny (1985: 213–14) and Brito (1991: 204–5). For the theoretical underpinnings, see Saul (1990a: 21–2). 184 O’Meara (1991: 83). See also Saad Filho (1997: 199–200). 185 Wuyts (1985: 192); Raikes (1984: 99). 186 Brito (1991: 201). For the argument that elements within Frelimo supported these findings and recommendations, see O’Laughlin (2000: 26n.80). However, judging from the results, it is clear that the CEA’s supporters within the party leadership were systematically overruled. 187 Hanlon (1984: 262–4; 1986: 142); Hall (1990: 55–8); Geffray (1991); Roesch (1989; 1992a; 1992b). 188 Cahen (1988b); Brito (1991); Geffray (1991). 189 Significantly, however, de Brito, unlike Cahen, does not consider ethnicity to be a significant political determinant. The ethnic question is only one point of difference between de Brito and Cahen. Compare, for instance, their divergent treatment of the social composition of the leadership and base of the anti“southerner” coalition. Brito (1991: 112, 125) and Chapter 8 below. 190 After independence, Lourenço Marques was renamed Maputo. 191 A term de Brito frames in scare quotes. 192 Brito (1991: 111–12). 193 Ibid., p. 311. 194 See ibid., p. 165 and p. 255, respectively. 195 Ibid., p. 313. 196 Ibid., p. 186. 197 Ibid., pp. 158–9. For a more detailed description of Frelimo’s relationship to traditional authorities in the liberated zones, one which qualifies de Brito’s version of events, see West (1998: 149–54). 198 Brito (1991: 321). 199 Ibid., p. 189. 200 Geffray (1991: 20–1). 201 O’Laughlin (1981); CEA (1986: 5). 202 Baptista Lundin (1993: 22). See also Geffray (1991: 19, 53) and passim. 203 For a critique, see O’Laughlin (1995). The charge of urban bias in this instance, as in others, “is at the very least a rough and potentially misleading proxy for the fundamental inequalities of wealth and power that do exist.” Cooper (1993: 199n.10). 204 Brito (1991: 203). 205 See Kruks and Wisner (1984: 27) and Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 154), respectively. 206 Hyden (1980). Many leading Africanists, representing a wide range of political perspectives, have recently emphasized the degree to which the state in Africa has become indigenized and have explored the social, political and

Notes 303

economic processes that have produced and reproduced this outcome. See, inter alia, Berman and Lonsdale (1992a); Bayart (1993); Mamdani (1996); and Mbembe (2001). 207 Ottaway (1988: 222). A similar argument, from a different political perspective, is made by Minter (1994: 250). 208 Saul (1993: 150). 209 Much as Africans throughout the continent experienced the imposition of formal colonial rule. See, for instance, Chanock (1985: 12–13, 15). 210 Ibid., p. 15. 211 Wuyts (1985: 203). 212 Hanlon (1984: 182–3). 213 O’Laughlin (1996: 19) and passim. 214 For a similarly circuitous approach to studying the history of “the family” in Malawi, see Vaughan (1983: 281–3). 215 With colonialism conceived of as the bearer of capitalism. For a critique of this conception, see Ranger (1978: 102). 216 These themes are ubiquitous but see, in particular, Machel (1980a; 1980b). 217 Ottaway and Ottaway (1981: 77–8); O’Meara (1991: 92). 218 Machel (1980b: 92–3). 219 Hanlon (1984: 203). 220 Ibid., p. 185. 221 Saul (1985d: 93–4). 222 For factors that may have contributed to Frelimo’s distorted understanding of social relations in rural Mozambique, see, among others, Vail and White (1980: 398–9); White (1985: 330); O’Meara (1991: 92); and O’Laughlin (1996: 34). 223 First (1983: 128–33); Hanlon (1984: 180–1); O’Meara (1991: 92). Although there is general agreement on this point, analysts differ in their estimation of the extent to which Frelimo was exercised about an emergent kulak class and its subversive potential. Compare, for instance, Hanlon (1984: 180) and O’Meara (1991: 92) to O’Laughlin (1996: 16; 2000: 27). O’Laughlin (ibid., pp. 38–9) emphasizes what Frelimo underestimated – namely, the political influence of better-off smallholders, who were able to dominate the leadership of producer cooperatives, “turning their hold on offices to their advantage.” See also Saad Filho (1997: 202–3) and Bowen (2000). Frelimo also seriously underestimated the heterogeneity of rural livelihoods. O’Laughlin (1996). 224 As cited in Brito (1991: 240). 225 Saul (1985d: 93). 226 Hanlon (1984: 180). 227 Ottaway and Ottaway (1981: 78–9); Hanlon (1984: 185–7); Hall and Young (1997: 66–7, 74–5). For a glimpse at pictorial representations of the class enemy, see Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 114) and Egerö (1990: 140). As Bragança and Depelchin (1986: 41) have pointed out, even the term “infiltration” reflects Frelimo’s propensity to theorize the “enemy” in individual rather than in sociological terms. 228 See, for instance, Van Kessel (2000: 63–5) and Pool (1998: 20–1) for the cases of the United Democratic Front in South Africa and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in pre-1991 Ethiopia, respectively. 229 For an alternative reading, see Alpers (1994). 230 Casal (1991: 70–5); Young (1988: 179–80); Cahen (1988b: 5–6). See also Saul (1985d: 102). 231 Geffray (1987a: 21–2; 1988: 78, 78n.3). 232 Machel (1981: 195–6). 233 Ibid., p. 194.

304 Notes

234 Ibid., p. 199. For similar formulations, see Machel (1975: 48). 235 The remarks made by Machel in 1976, as cited in Saul (1985b: 16–17), are illustrative in this regard. 236 West (1998: 152). 237 Cited in Bragança and Wallerstein (1982: 120). For similar formulations, see Mondlane (1983: 164–5). 238 Brito (1991: 158–9). See also the pronouncement the previous year by Frelimo’s official mouthpiece, Mozambique Revolution, as cited in Munslow (1983: 106). 239 With the onset of Renamo’s war, the charge of obscurantism tended to shade over into, and become indistinguishable from, the “subversion.” See Geffray (1988: 78n.3). 240 For the discursive constitution of underdeveloped societies as an object and a target of outside development interventions, see Ferguson (1990). 241 The following discussion draws on CEA (1986). The CEA’s findings were subsequently published in Egerö (1990: 143–69). 242 CEA (1986: 5). 243 Ibid., p. 28. 244 Ibid., p. 18. 245 Ibid., p. 20. 246 Ibid., p. 25. In fact, in officially-recognized villages, “councils of elders” continued to hold de facto political power and were regularly consulted by local executive councils and courts. Egerö (1990: 160). 247 CEA (1986: 20). 248 Saad Filho (1997: 205, 214n.25). 249 As variously expressed in Geffray (1991: 54); Baptista Lundin (1993: 13); and Alexander (1994: 49). 250 Hall (1990: 47). A similar argument has been made by Newitt (2002: 200) with respect to the politicization of regional and ethnic identifications. 251 Reno (1998). 252 Ibid. The quote is from Bayart et al. (1999b: 9). 253 The term is Bayart’s (1993: 20–32) and passim. 254 Reno (1998: 8). 255 Bayart (1999: 114). 256 Hanlon (2001b); Gastrow and Mosse (2002); Ellis (1999: 63–5); Hibou (1999: 84). Many trafficking operations are a legacy of South Africa’s “total strategy,” having served as conduits for the funneling of covert supplies to South African-sponsored surrogate forces destabilizing the region. Ellis (1998). As Ellis points out elsewhere (1994: 63–4), the ivory and rhino-horn trades, which had previously been an important spur to the growth of the underground economy, had diminished markedly by 1993 due to the temporary global ban on ivory products and stepped up law enforcement. 257 Such destruction, Reno shows, has been undertaken by warlord rulers with a view to ridding themselves of longstanding but financially and politically onerous patronage networks that are no longer sustainable in the post-Cold War period and, at the same time, to ensuring their internal rivals are unable to avail themselves of a potentially politically influential and profitable institutional base. The strategy enables warlord rulers “to use global recognition of sovereignty to serve their own private interests.” Reno (1998: 9). 258 Ibid., pp. 70–2. 259 On this dynamic, see, for instance, Hibou (1999: 96). 260 See Bayart et al. (1999b: 20, 26) for the first and third labels. See Zartman (1995) for the second. For the limits of criminalizing tendencies, as they played themselves out in Mozambique and elsewhere through the 1990s, see

Notes 305

Bayart et al. (1999b: 26) and passim. On the analytic distortions that arise from lumping Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau under the generic label of collapsed states, see Allen (1995: 314–15). 261 Roesch (1989/1990: 22); Hall and Young (1997: 181). 262 Table 1 in Wuyts (1978: 34); O’Laughlin (1996: 36n.15). 263 Table 2 and Table 3 in CEA (1981: 60–4). 264 O’Laughlin (1996: 36n.15). 265 United Nations Operation in Mozambique, Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (1994: 33); United Nations (1995: 64). Maputo City is also a province. The 1997 national population census estimated the total population was just under 16.1 million and Nampula’s population was about 2,975,700 (according to adjusted figures, it was about 3,074,956). Zambézia’s population had, by that time, overtaken Nampula’s by a slim margin. 266 On Portugal’s counter-insurgency strategy in Nampula, see CEA (1981: 15–16); Henriksen (1983: 79, 159); Branquinho, “Prospecção ...”; and Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 59–60). 267 White (1985: 329); Roesch (1989/1990: 22). See also Vail and White (1980: 392). 268 According to the 1997 population census, 26.3 percent of the total population speaks Makua (Emakhuwa) and 7.9 percent speaks Lomwé (Elomue) as their first language. It estimated that 90 percent of the population in Nampula speaks Makua as their maternal tongue. 269 Henriksen (1983: 79, 159); Roesch (1989/1990: 22). 270 White (1985: 329). 271 Minter (1994: 103); Roesch (1989/1990: 22); Hall (1990: 55); Conceição (1993: 234–5). Starting from the mid-1980s, growing numbers of MakuaLomwé-speakers gained appointments as district administrators in Nampula. Dinerman (1998: 61n.196). At the same time, regional representation became more even at the level of the national state and party leadership. See Minter (1994: 103). Nonetheless, political liberalization has also brought to the fore tensions within Frelimo regarding Makua representation within party structures. Manning (2002: 134). 272 Conceição (1993: 229–33, 236, 266); Ivala (1993: 59–63); Penvenne (1996: 456, 456n.144). By the early 1980s Frelimo had adopted a more evenhanded historiographical approach. Ibid. 273 For more recent developments, see note 33 of the Introduction. 274 On this issue, see Cahen (1987: 62–70) and Minter (1994: 249–50). 275 Geffray (1991). 276 Dinerman (1994). 277 See, inter alia, Faria Lobo (1962); Gray (1980); CEA (1980); Conceição (1984); Geffray (1984; 1985; 1987a); Geffray and Pedersen (1985); and Geffray and Pederson (1986). 278 United Nations Operation in Mozambique, Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (1994: 33). The 1997 national census came up with significantly different numbers. District residents, it found, accounted for only 7.1 percent of the provincial population. That would put the Namapan population at under 220,000. The 1980 census registered 290,000 residents in Eráti District. Geffray (1987a: 38n.1). Namapa’s agricultural and demographic importance has made it a focal point of government initiatives aimed at reviving rural economic activity starting from the mid-1980s. 279 Quadro VII in Brito (1995: 497); Anexo 1 in Tollenaere (2002: 248). On the politics of splitting the vote in 1994, see ibid., p. 234 and Alden (2001: 64–5). 280 Newitt (2002: 213, 217, 220).

306 Notes

281 Alexander (1994: 36, 57) and passim; West (1998: 157–60). 282 Bayart (1993: ch. 3, 176–9), among others, has argued against the existence of either a bourgeoisie, in the classical sense, or of a “dominant class” within the African context. 283 On the lack of an explicitly ethnic consciousness among the Makua-Lomwé, see Henriksen (1983: 79); Mbwiliza (1991: 50); and Minter (1994: 85–6); see also Geffray (1987a: 32–33n.1). On the instability of the meaning of “Makua,” see Conceição (1993: 263n.3). 284 Minter (1994: ch. 4) reviews evidence of the historical basis for the emergence of ethno-regional distinctions and the politicization of these distinctions during the colonial and post-independence periods. For studies of assimilado identity during the colonial period, see Penvenne (1989; 1996). 285 Specialists in particular may wish to note that I do not take up the question of precolonial “historic oppositions” within Eráti/Namapa, hostilities which Geffray (1991: 25, 59–62) argued influenced the local dynamics of the war. A possible alternative interpretation of these same occurrences is suggested by Minter (1994: 208). On the instability of the term “Macuane,” see Geffray (1991: 25n.16). Both the Eráti and the Macuane, however defined, fall into the Makua-Lomwé ethno-linguistic cluster. 286 Rathbone (2000: 4). 287 See, inter alia, ibid.; Alexander (1996); Maxwell (1999); Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and Dijk (1999); Vaughan (2000); and Berry (2001) for recent scholarship probing these themes. 288 See, for instance, West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999) and Harrison (2002). Cabaço, the former Minister of Information, also emphasized this point. Interview, Maputo, 22/12/94. 289 According to the 1997 population census, 23.8 percent of the population is Catholic and 17.8 percent is Muslim. Morier-Genoud (2002: 142) puts the latter figure at “at least 20%.” In Nampula, Islam is the leading faith, accounting for 39.7 percent of the provincial population, according to official figures. Catholics account for 27.3 percent of all Nampulans. For a detailed study of the history of Islamic communities on the littoral of Cabo Delgado, which takes the story into the early post-independence period, see Conceição (1993). The complex interconnections between rural political authority and religious hierarchies beg for investigation, especially in view of the politicization of religion in general (and of Islam in particular) attendant upon political liberalization in the 1990s. Cf. Morier-Genoud (2002). On wartime and postwar social, spiritual and psychological healing and the pivotal role of curandeiros in this, see, inter alia, Nordstrom (1997); Honwana (1998); and Baptista Lundin et al. (2000: 197–200). On sorcery and witchcraft accusations in post-independence Mozambique, see Alexander (1995: 58–61) and West (1997). 290 Mbembe (2001: 32). Or what Chabal (1992: 232) conceptualizes as the colonization of the state by “civil society.”

2 Aspects of precolonial and colonial Nampula

1 The following two paragraphs are based on Mbwiliza (1991: 1–37) unless otherwise stated. 2 Newitt (1995: 119). In 1902, Lourenço Marques was designated as the colony’s capital. 3 Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 19); Hall and Young (1997: 2). 4 Departamento de História, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) (1988: 100–1); Mbwiliza (1991: 40–4).

Notes 307

5 Ibid., pp. 84–94, 105–6, 120; Newitt (1995: 270). 6 Departamento de História, UEM (1988: 102). 7 Newitt (1995: 270); Mbwiliza (1991: 87–8). 8 Ibid., p. 105. See also Medeiros (1988: 45–6). 9 Pitcher (1991: 50). On the uses of slave labor at the end of the nineteenth century in the Nampulan hinterland, see Mbwiliza (1991: 112–13). 10 A state of affairs that he contrasts with that prevailing on the littoral. Ibid., pp. 105, 120–1. 11 See especially da Conceição (1984: 12). See also Geffray (1984; 1987b). 12 Mbwiliza (1991: xii, 37, 66–74). 13 Ibid., p. 143. 14 Ibid., p. 128; Geffray (1984: 20–5, 27, 34–5); Brito João (1993: 179–80).

René Pélissier, has questioned whether these groups were the descendants of the Nguni who fled Zululand during the mfecane. Ibid., p. 179. 15 Mbwiliza (1991: 24, ch. 4, 108); Geffray (1984: 30). 16 Geffray (1984: 28–31). For other meanings of the term “epotha,” see Geffray (1987b: 51n.4). The following two paragraphs draw on Geffray (1984: 7–8). 17 Ibid., pp. 9–14; Geffray (1987b: 45). According to Geffray, this could take anywhere between four and six generations. See ibid., p. 46 and Geffray (1984: 14) for different estimates. For qualifications to his argument, see ibid., pp. 10, 14. 18 Conceição (1984: 11–13). 19 Gray (1980: 69–72). See also Ivala (1993: 28–9, 41). 20 Conceição (1984: 16–17). 21 West (1998: 167). Pockets of armed resistance continued into the early 1920s, however. Mondlane (1983: 27). 22 Conceição (1984: 82–4); Geffray (1984: 4); Gerard (1941: 15). 23 Duffy (1959: 281–3, 290–1); Borges Coelho (1993: 114–15); Newitt (1995: 383, 388); Penvenne (1995: 1, 4, 65, 67–8). 24 Conceição (1984: 36–9). 25 A.E. Pinto Correia, Província do Niassa, Inspecção dos Serviços Administrativos e dos Negócios Indígenas, Relatório e documentos referentes à Inspecção ordinária feita na Província do Niassa, 1938–1940, Vol. 1, p. 69, AHM,

ISANI, Cx. 94; A. E. Pinto Correia, Colónia de Moçambique, Província do

Niassa, Inspecção dos Serviços Administrativos e dos Negócios Indígenas,

Relatório da Inspecção ordinária às circunscrições do Distrito de Moçambique, 1936–37, Vol. 1, pp. 41, 160, AHM, ISANI, Cx. 76. 26 Ibid., p. 41; Almeida (1957a: 73); Isaacman (1985: 32); Borges Coelho (1993: 116–17). 27 Pinto Correia, Colónia de Moçambique, Província do Niassa, Inspecção dos

Serviços Administrativos e dos Negócios Indígenas, Relatório da Inspecção ..., 1936–37, Vol. 1, p. 42. 28 Vail and White (1980: 307–8); Brito João (1989: 154); Hedges (1993: 98–9). 29 Newitt (1995: 449); Vail and White (1980: 245–6). 30 Hedges (1993: 85–6). 31 Ibid., 183–6; Vail and White (1980: 308). 32 Ibid., pp. 302, 307; Duffy (1959: 280). For similar ploys, see ibid., pp. 279–80 and Pereira (1986: 212–14). 33 Vail and White (1980: 307). 34 See, for instance, Coissoró (1964: 73). 35 Brito João (1989: 110); Isaacman (1992b: 493). 36 Wuyts (1980: 14–18); Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 39). 37 Isaacman (1992b: 493). 38 Vail and White (1978: 257–62); Hedges (1993: 93).

308 Notes

39 Vail and White (1978: 252–3); Isaacman (1992b: 493–5, 498–501). 40 Ibid., pp. 501–5 and pp. 516–17. 41 The following discussion is based on Isaacman (1985: 22–39) and Isaacman (1992b: 514–16) unless otherwise stated. 42 For other beneficiaries, see O’Laughlin (2002: 520). 43 Isaacman (1992b: 498); Hedges (1993: 92). 44 Table A4 in Pitcher (1993: 283). 45 Hedges (1993: 153–6); Isaacman (1992a: 827; 1996: 150–70); Geffray (1985: 14n.2). 46 Hedges (1993: 136). 47 Isaacman (1996:114). 48 Pitcher (1993:129); Hedges (1993: 104); Isaacman (1996:117). 49 Fortuna (1993: 144–7); Isaacman (1996: 116–17). 50 Isaacman (1992b: 507–8; 1996: 105–13); Hedges (1993: 90–1); Fortuna (1993: 134–5, 135n.117). 51 Ibid., p. 149; Geffray (1985: 20). 52 Ibid., pp. 13–14; Isaacman (1996: 150–63; 166–70). 53 Hedges (1993: 93–5, 130–1); Pitcher (1993: 131–5, 191); Isaacman (1996: 124–5). 54 Pitcher (1993: 124, 126, 137, 179–80, 187–90). 55 Vail and White (1980: 280, 282); Hedges (1993: 95–7). For additional measures taken at this time, see ibid. That the circular brazenly contravened 1930 legislation which, among other things, explicitly proscribed “forced labour for private purposes,” was, in the Governor-General’s eyes, clearly besides the point. White (1985: 325); Vail and White (1980: 249–53, 280, 282). 56 Isaacman (1996: 107). 57 Hedges (1993: 131); Isaacman (1992b: 512; 1996: 142–3); Pitcher (1993: 191). 58 Ibid., pp. 183, 192, 197; Isaacman (1982; 1996: 131–7, 141–2); Hedges (1993: 132–3). 59 See, for instance, CEA (1981: 15). 60 Hedges (1993: 153–6); Isaacman (1992b: 509; 1996: 166–8). 61 Pitcher (1993: 194); Hedges (1993: 136–8). 62 Isaacman (1996: 139) and Pitcher (1993: 194), respectively. 63 For these and other drawbacks, see Hedges (1993: 133, 136–7, 151); Fortuna (1993: 140, 164); and Isaacman (1996: 116, 137–41, 165–6). 64 Isaacman (1992b: 519). 65 Pitcher (1993: 196). 66 Hedges (1993: 140, 142). 67 Ibid., pp. 138–45. See also Isaacman (1996: 81–2). 68 Pitcher (1993: 270). 69 CEA (1981: 15–16); Pitcher (1993: 258–9, 266–7). 70 CEA (1981: 15–16); Pitcher (1993: 259, 262, 265–6, 274). 71 CEA (1981: 15). 72 Pitcher (1993: 262, 264). 73 CEA (1981: 20–1). 74 Pitcher (1993: 263–4). 75 CEA (1981: 15, 17–18); ibid., Table 2, p. 60. 76 Ibid., pp. 15, 17; Pitcher (1993: 265–6). 77 Isaacman (1996: 75). 78 Vail and White (1980: 310–13); Newitt (1995: 409); Wuyts (1978: 13–20). 79 Isaacman (1996: 74). 80 Ibid., pp. 77, 102 and Table 4-4, p. 103; Pitcher (1993: 118). 81 Almeida (1957b: 91); CEA (1980: 16); Isaacman (1992b: 522–4; 1992a: 832; 1996: 74).

Notes 309

82 Ibid., pp. 81–2, 147. See also Hedges (1993: 155). 83 Alpers (1984: 375, 377–9); Isaacman (1996: 147). Whole families also migrated. However, while Alpers’ study (1984: 371, 374, 377) refers to Makonde families settling in Tanganyika, it is unclear if Makua families did likewise. 84 Isaacman (1996: 134–5). 85 Pitcher (1996: 59); Isaacman (1996: 36, 76). 86 Ibid., pp. 70–1 and Table 6-2, p. 135. 87 Hedges (1993: 137); Dinerman (1998: 96). 88 Hedges (1993: 103, 154–6); Isaacman (1996: 160–1, 166). 89 CEA (1981: 15–16). 90 Ibid., p. 18; CEA (1980: 8). 91 Ibid., Table 2, p. 60 and Table 3, p. 62, respectively. 92 Faria Lobo, “Extractos ...,” p. 12. 93 CEA (1980: 7). 94 Ibid., p. 7; CEA (1981: 16–17); Faria Lobo, “Extractos ...,” p. 12. 95 RPM, IAM, Delegação do Norte, “Relatório suscinto do Instituto do Algodão de Moçambique, em Nampula, para a reunião a nível Provincial, para estudo e resoluções a tomar, na produção individual e colectiva, a prazos imediato e curto,” Nampula, 2 de Novembro de 1975, p. 5, JBFL. 96 Faria Lobo, “Extractos ...,” p. 12. 97 Henriksen (1983: 143–70); Borges Coelho (1993: 160–322). 98 See, for instance, J.A.G.M. Branquinho, “Prospecção das forças tradicionais. Distrito de Moçambique,” Governo-Geral de Moçambique, Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações, Lourenço Marques, 1969, p. 116, AHM, SE, 20 and Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 59–60). 99 RPM, IAM, Delegação do Norte, “Relatório suscinto ...,” p. 5; CEA (1980: 16, 25). 100 Geffray (1984: 32–3); Capelo and Medeiros (1987: 114). 101 Geffray (1984: 25, 33); Medeiros (1988: 39). 102 Geffray (1984: 9–19, 33–4). 103 Compare Capela and Medeiros (1987: 114) to Brito João (1993: 182–3n.10). 104 Geffray (1984: 20–3). 105 Ibid., pp. 21, 23. 106 Brito João (1993: 182–3n.10). 107 Geffray (1984: 23–4). The Meto confederation in southern Cabo Delgado emerged during the same period as the chieftaincy of Comala. Medeiros (1988: 39); Capela and Medeiros (1987: 114). For divergent explanations of the provenance and meaning of the term “Meto,” see Brito João (1993: 182n.3). 108 For one account, that of Chief Tubruto’s, see Geffray (1984: 24–5). 109 Ibid., pp. 24–5, 33 and passim. 110 For the early administrative history of the district, see A. Cotta Mesquita, Relatório das Inspecções ao Concelho e Comissão Municipal do Eráti, Feitas em 1965, n.d. [1966], pp. 4–5, AHM, ISANI, Inventário dos Relatórios das Inspecções Administração Civil, Fundo de Administração Civil de Lourenço Marques, 27 and Conceição (1984: 17–18, 33–4). 111 Ibid., pp. 24–9; Branquinho, “Prospecção ...,” pp. 24–5. 112 Gray (1980: 69–72); Conceição (1984: 21–4, 29–31). 113 Hedges (1993: 103); Soares (1988). 114 Cf. Mesquita, Relatório das Inspecções ..., p. 50. 115 Conceição (1984: 157). 116 Almeida (1957b: 21); Faria Lobo (1962: 35); Mesquita, Relatório das Inspecções ..., p. 51; Soares (1993: 155); Dinerman (1998: 103). 117 Conceição (1984: 88, 88n.6); Fortuna (1993: 130).

310 Notes

118 Conceição (1984: 89); Dinerman (1998: 104). 119 Fortuna (1993: 130–2); Hedges (1993: 85–6). 120 Fortuna (1993: 133–4, 136, 136n.118, 136–137n.119); Hedges (1993: 104); Faria Lobo (1962: 27, 142). 121 Ibid., p. 72; Hedges (1993: 103, 154); Fortuna (1993: 149). 122 For colony-wide statistics, see Table 2 in CEA (1981: 60). For statistics on Eráti, see M. Gouveia, “O algodão na economia do Distrito de Moçambique,” Centro de Documentação Económica, C.T.P.I.E., 1968, Quadro 2.3, p. 39, CEA Documentation Center and Mesquita, Relatório das Inspecções ..., p.42. 123 Quadro 6.1 in Fortuna (1993: 144); Geffray (1985: 20). 124 Ibid., pp. 12, 14. 125 Hedges (1993: 154); Mesquita, Relatório das Inspecções ..., pp. 43, 47; Faria Lobo (1962: 24, 27–9, 33, 113, 118, 141–3). 126 J.B. de Faria Lobo, “Breve resumo histórico,” in Faria Lobo, “Monografia do Cajueiro,” n.d., pp. 13–15, JBFL; Geffray (1985: 26); Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 60). On this phenomenon more generally, see Hyden (1983: 17–18, 199). 127 For figures, see Geffray (1985: 28). By then, cashew nuts had surpassed cotton in terms of export earnings. See Table 3 in Wuyts (1978: 8). 128 See Faria Lobo (1962: 40) and Mesquita, “Relatório das Inspecções ...,” p. 44, for the numbers of retail stores in 1950 and 1965, respectively. 129 Table 2 in Geffray (1985: 27). 130 Almeida (1957b: 91–5); Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 63). 131 According to da Conceição (1984: 48n.7), the first white settlers arrived in Eráti in the 1950s. 132 Dinerman (1998: 108–9). 133 Conceição (1984: 48n.7); Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 13). 134 Branquinho, “Prospecção ...,” pp. 116–17; Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 59–60). According to an IAM official who was familiar with the state of affairs in Eráti, about 80 percent of the rural population in the district was relocated to the picadas during the colonial period. Interview, José Bernardo de Faria Lobo, Galizes, Portugal, 9/7/95. 135 Branquinho, “Prospecção ...” details the first waves of such arrests in Nampula. See pp. 109–12 for the case of Eráti. 136 For details as they pertain to Eráti, see Dinerman (1999: 212n.90). 137 Interview, Chief Intalia, Napala, 25/8/94. Intalia was also a mwalimo. If, as Morier-Genoud (2002: 127) conjectures, Portugal succeeded in its bid “to coopt or at least to neutralize politically the majority of Mozambican Muslims” during the last decade of colonial rule, it also seems to be the case that the colonial state remained less than convinced of its success in this regard. 138 Conceição (1984: 48). 139 For an exception, see Dinerman (1998: 110). 140 Personal communication, STAE Director of Namapa District, October 1994. The STAE Director was from the area in question. On Portugal’s “hearts and minds” programs, see Borges Coelho (1993: 197–202). 141 Unless otherwise indicated, the following discussion is based on Geffray (1985). 142 Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 65). 143 Ibid., and passim. 144 Ibid., p. 60 and O’Laughlin (2002: 523), respectively. 145 Mandala (1990: 158). 146 Roesch (1989/1990: 22); Hall and Young (1997: 181).

Notes 311

3 From “abaixo” to “chiefs of production,” 1975–1987

1 Geffray (1991). 2 Roesch (1988a: 85; 1989: 11; 1992a); Saul (1993: 151, 157–8). 3 Geffray and Pedersen (1985). 4 Ibid., p. 23; Roesch (1992b: 466); O’Laughlin (1992a: 28; 1996: 18, 36n.18); Alexander (1994: 44–5). Rural support for the abolition of the regedoria system did not necessarily imply popular endorsement of Frelimo-imposed prohibitions on former régulos and their underlings holding public office. O’Laughlin (2000: 30); Bowen (2000: 99). In principle, a mapéwé is direct descendant of, and heir to, a precolonial paramount chief; he is thus not necessarily a former colonial régulo or a descendant of one. In practice, virtually all holders of the office of “régulo” and all claimants on this office in contemporary Namapa contended that they were mpéwé. 5 Cahen (1987: 62–70); Geffray (1991: 46–7, 133–7). 6 O’Laughlin (1996: 36n.23; 2000: 33–4). 7 For various views on when this crisis began, see, inter alia, O’Meara (1991: 99); Bowen (2000: 102, 112); and O’Laughlin (2000: 34–5). 8 CEA (1981: 22, 25); Hanlon (1984: 100). 9 For the case of Nampula, see Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 13) and Marshall and Roesch (1993: 245). 10 CEA (1981: 26, 29). 11 Ibid; Borges Coelho (1993: 355–6). 12 CEA (1980: 8, 29, 43, 50; 1981: 25). 13 Ibid., pp. 18, 40; Pitcher (1996: 57). 14 Ibid.; CEA (1981: 23). 15 RPM, MOA, PN, DPA, “Orientações específicas da Provincial [sic] de Nampula para o sector agrário,” Nampula, 20 de Maio de 1986, p. 4 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA. For JFS’s rather unique historical trajectory, see Pitcher (1996: 59–60). 16 CEA (1980: 8, 14). See also Habermeier (1981: 41–2). 17 Table 2 in CEA (1981: 60). 18 Table 4 in CEA (1980: 22). 19 Wuyts (1978: 30). 20 CEA (1980: 44). 21 Personal communication, António Carvalho Neves, Maputo, April 1994. 22 RPM, PN, CDAC de Eráti, “Relatório,” Namapa, 5 de Outubro de 1983. Nudity was also cited as an important factor in declining school attendance rates. RPM, PN, CDAC de Eráti, “Relatório,” Namapa, 3 de Julho de 1983. Both reports are in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPA. 23 RPM, PN, DDA de Eráti, “Relatório,” Eráti, 12 de Maio de 1984 in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPA. 24 O’Laughlin (1996: 28). 25 CEA (1980: 31–2). 26 Ibid., p. 44. 27 Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 156–7). 28 CEA (1980: 17, 43, 64, 70). 29 Ibid., p. 84; RPM, PN, Comissão D. das Aldeias Comunais, “Relatório,” Namapa, 4 de Janeiro de 1983; RPM, PN, CDAC de Eráti, “Relatório,” Namapa, 31 de Março de 1983; RPM, PN, CDAC de Eráti, “Relatório,” Namapa, 10 de Janeiro de 1984; and RPM, PN, CDAC de Eráti, “Mapa de controle de rendimento de produção agrícola da campanha 81/82, cooperativas agrícolas e m. [machambas] colectivas,” Namapa, 21 de Junho de 1983, all in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPA; GPN, DPA, “Relatório sobre o movimento

312 Notes

cooperativo,” Nampula, 12 de Fevereiro de 1982, pp. 1–3 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA. 30 Interviews, traditional authorities and Frelimo party secretaries, Muanona

Center, 22/8/94; male elders and traditional authorities, “Zagaia,” Alua

Administrative Post, 23/9/94; former residents of Samora Machel Communal

Village, Samora Machel Center, 30/9/94; UNAMO representatives and members, Alua Center, 15/6/94; Frelimo party secretaries, Namirôa Center, 11/6/94; traditional authorities, shéhé and Frelimo party secretary, Nahachari, 12/6/94. 31 In Nampula, the point was candidly acknowledged by DPA in 1982. GPN,

DPA, “Relatório sobre o movimento cooperativo.” See also Marshall and

Roesch (1993: 249). For the case of Tete, see Borges Coelho (1993: 408–9, 437). 32 RPM, PN, Comissão Coordenadora Provincial para Socialização [sic] do

Campo, IV Sessão Ordinária, “Relatório,” Nampula, 28 de Setembro de 1985, p. 3 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA. See also CEA (1980: 2, 62). 33 Ibid., pp. 62, 65, 68–71; Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 15). 34 Geffray (1991: 19–20). The point is acknowledged in RPM, MOA, Programa

Nacional CRED, Centro Regional de Experimentação e Desenvolvimento de

Napai, Distrito de Eráti, “Relatório,” CRED Napai, 21 de Outubro de 1983 in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPA. 35 GPN, DPA, “Relatório sobre o movimento cooperativo,” p. 7. 36 Personal communication, Phil Woodhouse, former cooperante (developmentcum-solidarity worker) in Eráti, June 1996. 37 GPN, DPA, “Relatório sobre o movimento cooperativo,” pp. 1–2. 38 RPM, PN, DPA, Departamento para a Socialização do Campo, “Sector cooperativo 83/84,” pp. 1–2 in DPA, Departamento Provincial para Socialização do

Campo, Nampula, “Dados estatísticos ...,” Nampula, 27 de Novembro de 1984 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA. The total is approximate because the number indicating the membership of one pilot cooperative is illegible. 39 With respect to Eráti, this problem was cited in interviews (for instance, by

Chiefs Alua, Comala, Saíde and Nametemula, Alua Center, 14/6/94 and

Frelimo party secretaries, Namirôa Center, 11/6/94) and in RPM, PN,

CDAC de Eráti, “Relatório,” Namapa, 5 de Outubro de 1983. For the case of Nampula as a whole, see RPM, PN, V Sessão da Comissão Coordenadora

Provincial para a Socialização do Campo, “Síntese,” Nampula, 23 de Junho de 1989, pp. 2–3 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA. For the argument that this problem was nationwide, see Borges Coelho (1993: 334–5, 339). 40 Roesch (1988a: 77). 41 Dinerman (1998: 130n.49; 1999: 131). 42 Geffray (1991: 17–18). 43 “Mapa de novas aldeias comunais surgidas em 1980” and “Mapa das aldeias comunais existentes na Província,” in RPM, CPAC, Nampula, “Relatório das actividades desenvolvidas em 1980,” Nampula, Dezembro de 1980, p. 3 and p. 5, respectively in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA; Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 3–4). 44 RPM, PN, CDAC Eráti, untitled list, Namapa, 2 de Fevereiro de 1983 in

Dossier, “Namapa,” DPA. 45 Letter, RPM, PN, Comissão Distrital das Aldeias Comunais de Eráti à Comissão Provincial das Aldeias Comunais, Nota. No. 1/CDAE/84, Namapa, 10 de

Fevereiro de 1984 in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPA. For a brief description of the various stages of village formation, and the criteria deployed in distinguishing

Notes 313

among them, see Borges Coelho (1993: 372). 46 Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 4). 47 Ibid.; Geffray (1991: 22); Vieira Pinto (1984: 2–3); EIU, Quarterly Economic

Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, 3, The Economist Publications, London, 1984, p. 17; Grest (1986: 342–3). 48 Table 9.5 in Borges Coelho (1993: 345). 49 As reported in DPA, Departamento Provincial para Socialização do Campo,

Nampula, “Dados estatísticos ...,” p. 1 and RPM, PN, Comissão Coordenadora Provincial para Socialização do Campo, IV Sessão Ordinária,

“Relatório,” p. 9. 50 See, for instance, Minter (1994: 269) and O’Laughlin (1996: 18–19). 51 As most forcefully articulated by Geffray (1991: 21) and passim. See also Cahen (1987: 49–60, 68–70) and Brito (1991: 252–69). 52 See also Geffray (1991: 123–30, 135–6). 53 RPM, PN, CDAC de Eráti, “Relatório,” Namapa, 9 de Junho de 1983; RPM,

PN, CDAC de Eráti, “Relatório,” Namapa, 3 de Julho de 1983. 54 Geffray (1991: 134–7). 55 Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 3). 56 Ibid., p. 24. 57 Ibid., pp. 7–15. 58 The following discussion is based on ibid., pp. 31–49. 59 Ibid., pp. 9–11, 18–21, 26–7. 60 Unless otherwise indicated, the following discussion is based on ibid, pp. 28–30. 61 For the workings and effects of Operation Production in Nampula, see J.B. de

Faria Lobo, “Contributo para a prevenção contra a fome em Moçambique.

Alguns temas, Provincia de Nampula,” 1989, pp. 16–17, JBFL and Marshall and Roesch (1993: 246–8). According to Egerö (1990: 188), forced removals from Nampulan towns and cities began in 1982. They thus served as a kind of dress rehearsal for the national campaign the following year. 62 Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 20, 27). 63 Ibid., p. 25 and unnumbered note at the bottom of the page. 64 Interview, former administrator of Eráti/Namapa (1984–1987), Nampula

City, 10/9/94. 65 The use of surrogates by local notables has been carried forward into the postwar period as a means of maintaining control over state-sponsored rural development projects. See Schafer and Bell (2002: 412). 66 Baptista Lundin (1992: 27); Alexander (1994: 48–9). 67 Interview, traditional authorities and party secretaries, Muanona Center, 22/8/94. 68 Interview, Namapa Center, 28/9/94. In Portuguese people often spoke of

“humus” and “n’jeios” when referring to mahumu and mi-jeio. 69 Interviews, Chief Taibo (former former colonial régulo) Namapa Center, 2/10/94; Chief Comala, Napai, 1/10/94; Cabo Cumar, Namapa Center, 15/10/94. 70 Ibid. 71 Interview, Namapa Center, 27/9/94. 72 Interview, Namapa Center, 28/9/94. 73 According to José Branquinho, the regedoria of the chief in question,

Nametaramo (Nametarramo), had been absorbed by Chief Mumia’s. J.A.G.M.

Branquinho, “Prospecção das forças tradicionais. Distrito de Moçambique,”

Governo-Geral de Moçambique, Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de

Informações, Lourenço Marques, 1969, p. 51, AHM, SE, 20. I was unable to determine if Nametaramo regained recognition as a régulo during the last years

314 Notes

of colonial rule or whether it was only in the early 1990s that his regedoria was reborn. The First Party Secretary, typically mindful of distinctions in chiefly rank, was, however, insistent that Nametaramo was, and had been in the recent past, a “régulo.” 74 Interviews, Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 27/9/94; Bernardo Mussa, Namapa Center, 17/11/94. 75 Interview, Namirôa Center, 13/6/94. 76 Interview, Namapa Center, 28/8/94. 77 Ivala (1993). 78 Personal communication, Nampula City, May 1994. 79 As reported in Mutaquiha (1992: 8). 80 For historical antecedents to this stratagem, see J. de Figueiredo, Relatório –1938. II Parte, Governo da Província do Niassa, 1938, AHM, FGG, Cx. 86 and Baptista Lundin (1992: 10n.8). 81 The difficulties in investigating this question are noted in Baptista Lundin

Coloane (1990: 2–3, 10–11) and Geffray (1987b). 82 For similar dynamics during Zimbabwe’s liberation war, see Kriger (1992: 196–206). 83 Interview, “Zagaia,” Alua Administrative Post, 25/9/94. 84 Interview, male elders and traditional authorities, “Zagaia,” Alua Administrative Post, 24/9/94. For another instance of locals masking the identity of a

Frelimo party secretary – in this case, a uterine nephew of a former régulo – see

West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 476–7). 85 Interview, Namapa Center, 27/9/94. 86 Gundana was subsequently appointed Minister in the Presidency and went on to become General Secretary of the Frelimo Party with the creation of the post in 1991. 87 Interview, Nampula City, 2/8/94. 88 Geffray and Pederson (1986: 317). The CCPSC was the successor to the

Provincial Commission for Communal Villages which, along with the national commission, had been extinguished in 1983. 89 Metselaar et al. (1994: 15n.16); O’Laughlin (1992a: 31; 1992b: 135; 2000: 39); Pitcher (1998: 129); Dinerman (2001: 35–9). 90 Hanlon (1984: 170–4). See also Borges Coelho (1998b: 81). 91 Interviews, former administrator of Namapa District, Ilha de Moçambique, 31/8/94; António Gabriel Comala, Alua Center, 30/9/94; Ernesto Mabonhane,

Nampula City, 2/8/94; Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District,

Namapa Center, 27/9/94. 92 Interviews, Chief Muhula, Namirôa Center, 28/9/94; community court judges, Namapa Center, 27/9/94; Cabo Cumar, Namapa Center, 15/10/94. 93 Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 25) and unnumbered note at the bottom of the page. 94 Geffray (1991: 44–50). 95 Interview, Nampula City, 9/10/94. 96 Roesch (1988a: 89). 97 EIU, Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, 3, The Economist

Publications, London, 1985, p. 22; EIU, Country Profile. Mozambique, 1986–87, The Economist Publications, London, 1986, p. 9. 98 The following discussion is based on Faria Lobo’s curriculum vitae (Nampula, 12 de Maio de 1993) and conversations with him in Galizes, Portugal, 5–11/7/95. The Namapa section consisted of Eráti, as well as Mecúfiand

Ancuabe districts in southern Cabo Delgado. 99 His ideas are laid out in RPM, IAM, Delegação do Norte, “Relatório suscinto do Instituto do Algodão de Moçambique, em Nampula, para a reunião Provin-

Notes 315

cial, para estudo e resoluções a tomar, na produção individual e colectiva, a prazos imediato e curto,” Nampula, 2 de Novembro de 1975, JBFL. 100 Ibid., p. 2. 101 Borges Coelho (1993: 350); Hanlon (1984: 108–9). 102 Quoted and paraphrased in ibid., p. 109. 103 RPM, PN, DPA, Departamento para a Socialização do Campo, no title, pp. 2–3 in DPA, Departamento Provincial para Socialização do Campo, Nampula, “Dados estatísticos ...” 104 Faria Lobo, “Contributo para a prevenção ...,” p. 8. 105 MOA, DPA de Nampula, Departamento de Arvenses, “Assunto: Recuperação das areas assoladas pela Depressão ANGEL. Proposta para plano de actuação,” Nampula, 1 de Janeiro de 1979 and related documentation, pp. 59–68 in J.B. de Faria Lobo, “Contributo para a recuperação de areas afectadas por deficiência alimentar,” in Faria Lobo, Contributos, 1989, JBFL. 106 Interview, Galizes, Portugal, 9/7/95. 107 Ibid. 108 As he emphasized in personal correspondence, 15 May 1997. 109 Loxley (1988: 3). 110 Africa Watch (1992: 29); Casal (1988: 164–5); COCAMO (1988c: 6); EIU,

Country Profile. Mozambique, 1986–87, 1986, pp. 10, 25. See note 158 below. 111 Ibid., pp. 10, 28; Hanlon (1984: 87, 95–120); Loxley (1988: 4); Roesch (1988a: 76–8). 112 Casal (1988). 113 For a review and appraisal of the debate on the relationship between Renamo’s military success and villagization, see, inter alia, Hall (1990: 57–8); Hall and Young (1997: 183–4); Brito (1991: 266–7); and Borges Coelho (1993: 431, 431n.166; 1998a). 114 Grupo de Empresas João Ferreira dos Santos, Direcção Geral de Produção, Nampula, No. 1/DGP/Conf., Ao Estado Maior da Economia, Província de Nampula, 4 de Setembro (de 1985), “Assunto: Campanhas agrícolas. Contributo para a sua reestruturação” (signed José Bernardo de Faria Lobo) in J.B. de Faria Lobo, Contributos, 1989, JBFL. The document claims to represent the personal views of its author only. The meeting with Gundana took place on 22 August 1985. 115 IV [Quarta] Sessão da Comissão Coordenadora para Socialização do Campo, “Documento final,” Nampula, 2 de Outubro de 1985, p. 3 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA. The figures are from RPM, GPN, “Relatório do Governo Provincial por ocasião da visita de Sua Excelência, JOAQUIM ALBERTO CHISSANO, Presidente do Partido FRELIMO e Presidente da República Popular de Moçambique à Província de Nampula,” Nampula, Outubro de 1988 in Land Tenure Center Library, Maputo. A higher total for 1985 is cited in RPM, PN, “Relatório da Comissão Executiva para a Socialização do Campo, V-Sessão Extraordinária,” Nampula, n.d. [1989], p. 2 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA. All figures are, at best, ballpark estimates. 116 IV [Quarta] Sessão da Comissão para Socialização do Campo, “Documento final,” p. 5. 117 Ibid., p. 4. Another one of the fourth session’s documents puts the figure at 72 percent. On the instability of the commission’s numbers, see Dinerman (2001: 48–9). 118 RPM, PN, IV Sessão da Comissão Coordenadora para Socialização do Campo, untitled speech, p. 1. 119 Ibid., pp. 1–2. 120 Ibid., p. 2.

316 Notes

121 Interview, José Bernardo de Faria Lobo, Galizes, Portugal, 9/7/95. 122 Interview, Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 4/10/94; RPM, PN, DDA de Eráti, “Relatório,” Eráti, 12 de Maio de 1984. 123 RPM, PN, DPA, Departamento para a Socialização do Campo, “Relatório das actividades desenvolvidas durante o ano de 1984,” Nampula, 22 de Fevereiro de 1984 [sic: given the title and contents of the report, the year was probably 1985], p. 2 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA. For earlier national attempts to raise cashew nut production, see Pitcher (2002: 90). 124 Samora Machel, “Mistakes and deviations persist. A speech by President Samora Machel during the debates on the laws for the state budget and plan for 1986 in the December 1985 session of the People’s Assembly,” Supplement to Mozambique News (AIM), no. 114, January 1986, pp. 2–3. 125 Ibid., p. 6. A slightly different version of this portion of the speech appeared in Tempo and is cited by Cahen (1987: 63). 126 Hanlon (1984: 231). 127 Hanlon (1991: 32); Vines (1991: 55–6); Minter (1994: 47, 137). 128 EIU, Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, 3, 1984, p. 17; Vieira Pinto (1984: 1, 3). 129 Metselaar et al. (1994: 37n.16). 130 Hanlon (1991: 32). 131 Vieira Pinto (1984: 3). 132 For the political and diplomatic background to this invasion and the possible reasons for it, see Davies (1986) and Vines (1991: 55–6). On the invasion itself and its aftermath, see Hanlon (1991: 33, 37–8). 133 Vines (1991: 56). See also Wilson (1992a: 3–4). 134 See Salomão Moyana, “Produzir algodão e castanha de caju não é favor, é ordem do Estado,” Tempo, 836, 19/10/86, p. 13. The local party committee was also involved in the decision. All of the quotations cited here appear in ibid., pp. 13–14. 135 Minter (1994: 250). 136 On the political significance of such violence, see Mamdani (1996: 178). 137 Interviews, chief and smallholders, settlement, Odinepa Locality, 2/6/94; male elders, Odinepa Center, 6/6/94; Chiefs Alua, Comala, Saíde and Nametemula, Alua Center, 16/6/94; animadores (“animators,” grassroots leaders of the Catholic Church), Alua Center, 16/6/94; Chief Khanatepa Ali, Alua Center, 17/10/94; Comala, Napai, 1/10/94. 138 Interview, Namapa Center, 17/6/94. 139 Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 42). 140 See, for instance, the views expressed by the then Second Secretary of the Frelimo Party Provincial Committee and provincial military commander, Eduardo Nihia, and Dzimba earlier that year in Salomão Moyana, “Nampula: passar da candonga ao trabalho,” Tempo, 826, 10 de Agosto de 1986, p. 11. See also the ominous pronouncements by the president of the Nampula City executive council in Tabo Motema, “Nampula em tempo de eleições,” Tempo, 832, 21/9/86, p. 17. 141 Geffray (1991: 134–5, 135n.10); interview, former administrator of Eráti/Namapa (1984–87), Nampula City, 9/10/94. 142 Dinerman (2001: 56–7). 143 Interview, former administrator of Eráti/Namapa (1984–87), Nampula City, 9/10/94. 144 For the flawed logic underpinning this policy, see Wuyts (1985: 200–1). 145 RPM, GPN, “Relatório do Governo Provincial ...,” p. 8; IAM, “Mapa da evolução da produção no país,” 1994. Indeed, the entire economy benefited

Notes 317

from a major, donor-enabled import of consumer goods that year. Hanlon (1996: 114); Pitcher (2002: 110). 146 RPM, GPN, “Relatório do Governo Provincial ...,” p. 8. 147 Interview, administrator of Eráti/Namapa District (1984–1987), Nampula City, 9/10/94. 148 Interview, First Frelimo Party Secretary, Namapa District, Namapa Center, 18/10/94. 149 Interview, Faria Lobo, Galizes, Portugal, 9/7/95.The following discussion is based on this interview. 150 Minter (1994: 252). See also Gil Lauriciano, as cited in Nordstrom (1997: 151). 151 It is unclear how extensive this phenomenon was. However, Renamo appears to have received support from former régulos and/or people claiming the mantle of chieftaincy in parts of Mogovolas, Murrupula, Muecate and Namapa/Nacarôa. In each case, the political sympathies of the traditional authority in question was deemed by government officials to have had an adverse effect on the local security situation. Lourenço (1992: 18). 152 Geffray (1991: 44–50). 153 Branquinho, “Prospecção ....” For details, see Dinerman (2001: 60). Gamito, the governor of Nampula in the early 1990s, regularly consulted Branquinho’s study. Personal observation and communication by Gamito, April 1994. For the speculation that Pretoria’s military strategists were making use of Branquinho’s study to further South Africa’s destabilization campaign, see Roesch (1989/1990: 21). 154 Geffray (1991: 136–7). 155 Interview, former administrator of Eráti/Namapa District (1984–1987), Nampula City, 9/10/94. 156 See Chapter 6 below. 157 Interview, Galizes, Portugal, 9/7/95; personal correspondence, José Bernardo de Faria Lobo, 15 August 1995, Galizes, Portugal. 158 In recent years, the importance of agriculture – and, by extension, Nampula’s marketed agricultural output – to Mozambique’s foreign-exchange-earning strategy has been dramatically diminished by the growing importance of manufactured products (most notably, aluminum ingots produced by Mozal, a mammoth smelter inaugurated in 2000) in securing hard currency. 159 Statistical Appendix, Table 1, p. 34 and Table II, p. 35 in Wuyts (1978). See also O’Laughlin (1996: 36n.15) 160 DPA, Departamento de Estatística, “Produção comercializada de castanha de caju na Província de Nampula,” Nampula, 1993, JBFL; EIU, Country Profile.

Mozambique, 1986–87, 1986, p. 14; Cahen (1987: 70). 161 Table 2 in CEA (1981: 60). 162 Ibid., p. 46 and Table 2 on p. 60. 163 Ibid., and Table 3 on p. 62, respectively. 164 These figures are from J.B. de Faria Lobo, “Apresentação e oferecimento,” in Faria Lobo, Monografia: Nampula, I, Nampula, 17 de Agosto de 1986, p. 17, JBFL and Appendix 5 in Hanlon (1984: 284), respectively. 165 IAM, “Mapa da evolução ...,” Nampula, 1994. The 5,200 figure is also cited in section 7.2 in Bawden et al. (2001), among other sources. A higher total (10,000 tons) is cited by Boughton et al. (2003), among others. 166 “Surplus crops unsold,” Mf, 209 (December 1993). 167 Africa Watch (1992: 103, 112, 116, 128–9). 168 Cahen (1987: 70). 169 Luís David and António Elias, “Organizar o sucesso das eleições gerais é um dever de todos os moçambicanos,” Tempo, 825, 3/8/86, p. 8. See also Cahen (1987: 81).

318 Notes

170 Ibid., p. 40; Alexander (1997: 3). 171 Cahen (1987: 40, 60). 172 For contrasting views of the government’s objective in holding elections, see ibid., p. 80 and Grest (1987: 370). 173 Cahen (1987: 78). 174 Lourenço and Hilário (1988a: 8); letter from the district administrator of Lalaua, RM, PN, Administração do Distrito de Lalaua, “Informação circunstanciada sobre o artigo publicado no jornal Notícias de 16/6/92 com o título ‘Poder tradicional-tribal’ ganha força em Lalaua) [sic] da autoria de Pedro Nacuo da Delegação de Nampula,” Lalaua, 20 de Julho de 1992, p. 4 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA; interviews, José de Almeida, former Frelimo First Secretary of Muanona Locality, Namapa Center, 28/9/94; Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 4/10/94. 175 Interview, Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 4/10/94. For the case of Manica Province, see Alexander (1994: 51–2). 176 Ibid. See also Harrison (2000: 127n.299). 177 Cahen (1987: 76–7). 178 Egerö (1990: 127). 179 For analyses which stress continuity, see Wilson (1995: 31); Grest (1989: 209); and Newitt (2002: 216–17). For an alternative view, see Hall and Young (1997: 190).

4 The context, 1987–1994

1 For discussions of the PRE, see, inter alia, Roesch (1988b); Loxley (1988); Hermele (1988b; 1990a; 1992); Wuyts (1991); Hanlon (1991: 118–51); Marshall (1992); and Tickner (1992). Mozambique joined the IMF in September 1984 but talks between the two parties began more than a year before that. Hanlon (1996: 25). 2 Minter (1994: 273). 3 Bowen (1992: 264); Hanlon (1996: 92–3). 4 Ibid., p. 70. 5 United Nations (1995: 12). 6 Hanlon (1991: 149–51). 7 “Strike wave spreads across Mozambique,” Mf, 163 (February 1990). 8 Bowen (1992: 265). See also Hanlon (1991: 129, 147–9). 9 Marshall (1992: 15–16, 70–4); Hanlon (1996: 64). 10 Ibid., pp. 93–4. 11 “State budget for 1993,” Mf, 198 (January 1993), p. 12; “Budget for 1994,”

Mf, 210 (January 1994), p. 16. 12 “Mixed news on the economy,” Mf, 210 (January 1994), p. 14. 13 Plank (1993: 410); Hanlon (1996: 16–17, 118–19). 14 Ibid., pp. 49–50; Hanlon (1991: 151, 230–8); Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1994: 292). 15 Africa Watch (1992: 116–21). 16 Hanlon (1991: 207, 233–4, 236; 1996: 112); Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1994: 293–4). For other effects of the donor presence in Mozambique at this time, see, inter alia, Marshall (1989: 5); Hanlon (1991); and Wuyts (1991: 230–2). 17 “Reaching the ‘riot threshold’” and “Criminal lynchings,” both in Mf, 182 (September 1991); “Police? What police?” Mf, 224 (March 1995); Hanlon (1996: 5). 18 Hanlon (1991: 34–6), who also discusses the geo-political factors which caused this shift.

Notes 319

19 For varying estimates, ibid., p. 42 and Africa Watch (1992: 2). 20 Ibid., pp. 3, 102–5, 113; Hanlon (1996: 15–16); United Nations (1995: 12, 13, 52). 21 For demobilization and the formation of the new army, see ibid., pp. 38–43 and Hanlon (1996: 18). For all other points in this paragraph, see United

Nations (1995: 4, 22, 34, 46, 48, 50, 59). 22 Hanlon (1996: 19). 23 Hall and Young (1997: 231); Alden (2001: 51). 24 Alden (2002). 25 Manning (2002: 75). 26 Much the same can be said of the 2004 general elections, whose results were endorsed by independent observers but which were nonetheless deemed to be plagued by irregularities, including fraud on a significant scale (committed primarily by Frelimo) in Tete Province. 27 Ibid., p. 133. 28 The World Bank Group (2004); “Economic growth lower than expected,” Mf, 322 (May 2003), p. 22; “Plan and budget for 2004,” Mf, 330 (January 2004), p. 13. 29 Alden (2001: 90); “Consultative Group discusses crime,” Mf, 304 (November 2001); “Consultative Group meets in Paris,” Mf, 288 (July 2000), p. 15;

“Donors give more than requested,” Mf, 329 (December 2003), p. 9. 30 “Phase two of MOZAL breaks records,” Mozambique News Agency, AIM

Reports, 262 (9 October 2003). 31 “More children than ever attend school,” Mf, 310 (May 2002); “Report shows sharp fall in illiteracy,” Mf, 313 (August 2002), p. 8; “Plan and budget for 2002,” Mf, 306 (January 2002), p. 11; “Frelimo analyses nation’s progress,”

Mozambique News Agency, AIM Reports, 278 (22 June 2004). 32 “Fewer Mozambicans living in poverty,” Mozambique News Agency, AIM

Reports, 273 (April 2004). 33 The World Bank Group (2004). 34 “Consultative Group discusses ...,” Mf, p. 10; “Donors promise Mozambique $790 million,” Mozambique News Agency, AIM Reports, 262 (9 October 2003). The government’s goal for 2004 is for aid to account for less than 50 percent of government expenditure, a substantial reduction from current levels. Ibid. 35 “Ten years of peace celebrated,” Mf, 316 (November 2002), p. 12; Part I, p. 2 in Hanlon (2002); “Can government meet poverty reduction targets?” Mf, 323 (June 2003), p. 10. 36 “AIDS now one of main causes of death,” Mozambique News Agency, AIM

Reports, 280 (27 July 2004). 37 “Lower growth than expected,” Mf, 298 (May 2001), p. 14. For other factors depressing raw cashew nuts sales and, by extension, peasant incomes, see

Pitcher (2002: 232–3). It should be noted that, since late 2003, the cotton sector has shown signs of recovery. “New cotton prices fixed,” Mozambique

News Agency, AIM Reports, 277 (7 June 2004); Ofiço and Tschirley (2003: 4). 38 “No banks for peasants,” Mf, 296 (March 2001). 39 “New paper appears,” Mf, 308 (March 2002), p. 20. See also Pitcher (2002: 170, 189). 40 “Cashew industry in death throes,” Mf, 320 (March 2003), p. 18. For an analysis of the industry’s collapse, see Pitcher (2002: 225–33). 41 Ibid., pp. 193, 196; “Government exempts sugar from VAT,” Mf, 309 (April 2002); “Mozambican economy resumes rapid growth,” Mozambique News

Agency, AIM Reports, 215 (20 September 2001). 42 Hanlon (2001b); Part II in Gastrow and Mosse (2002); “Anti-corruption unit

320 Notes

publishes report” and “Policemen turn to drug trafficking,” both in Mf, 329 (December 2003); Alden (2002: 350). 43 Cf. “Sombre picture of justice system,” Mf, 309 (April 2002) and Part IV, p. 2 in Gastrow and Mosse (2002). 44 For the financial repercussions of the banking scandals, see “Who will pay for the ruined banks?” and “Plan and budget for 2002,” p. 12, both in Mf, 306 (January 2002); “Can government meet ...?” Mf; Section 3.4 in Hanlon (2002); “Business as usual?” Mf, 323 (June 2003). 45 Manning (2002: 214). 46 Ibid., p. 208. 47 Ibid., pp. 24, 215. 48 The manner in which the former Minister of Culture, Mateus Katupha, described this dynamic. Cited in “Renamo insists on a recount,” Mf, 286 (May 2000), p. 8. 49 See especially Manning (2002: 8, 186). For discussions of other intra-party divisions within Frelimo and Renamo, see ibid., pp. 42–4, 54, 124–5, 126–7, 134, 135, 136–7 and Chapter 5, especially pp. 111–18, respectively. The term is Bayart’s (1993: 20–32) and passim. 50 See, for instance, Weinstein (2002: 151–3). Parliamentary efforts to introduce constitutional amendments that would have moved Mozambique to a “semipresidential” system were defeated by Renamo MPs in 1999. For the promulgation of a much more modest set of constitutional amendments pertaining to the office of the presidency, see “Assembly finally passes constitutional amendments,” Mf, 341 (December 2004). 51 “Land law increases peasant rights,” MPPB, AWEPA, 19 (September 1997) and related articles in this issue. A “local community” is defined in “Key points of land law” in ibid. For the flaws that inhere in this definition, see

Kloeck-Jenson (2000: 2); Schafer and Bell (2002); and Pitcher (2002: 212).

On the dearth of supporting institutional arrangements to give the land bill legislative teeth, see Weimar (2002: 70–1). Other concerns are raised by

Kloeck-Jenson (2000: 4) and Schafer and Bell (2002: 404). 52 “Land law increases ...,” MPPB. For an even rosier assessment, see Braathen and Palmero (2001: 281–4, 293). 53 According to Braathen and Palmero (ibid., p. 285ff.), municipal reform, although designed and imposed from above, “is likely to produce important participatory effects in its implementation ...” (ibid., p. 294). 54 Section 3.4 in Hanlon (2002). 55 The figures are from “More Montepuez rioters sentenced,” Mf, 307 (February 2002). 56 “More disturbances in Maringue,” Mf, 326 (September 2003); “Renamo demands right to keep armed bands,” Mozambique News Agency, AIM

Reports, 278 (22 June 2004). 57 “Renamo attacks dissident conference,” Mf, 327 (October 2003). 58 Alden (2001: 110). 59 Hall and Young (1997: 218). 60 The figure given by the then UNDP administrator Mark Malloch Brown.

“Human development report launched,” Mf, 325 (August 2003), p. 9. 61 United Nations (1995: 4, 67). 62 See note 29 above. 63 Section 1.3 in Hanlon (2002). 64 It has also strengthened the government’s negotiating position in relation to foreign investors, whose interest in Mozambique intensified following the successful conclusion to the 1994 elections in both Mozambique and South

Africa. Pitcher (2002: 150).

Notes 321

65 Alden (2001: 111); Hanlon (2002); “Business as usual?” Mf, 323 (June 2003).

For specific examples, see Pitcher (2002: ch. 4), especially pp. 150–1, 173–8;

“New provincial governors appointed,” Mf, 289 (August 2000), pp. 9–10;

“New governors,” MPPB, AWEPA, 25 (August 2000); sections 4.1 and 1.3, respectively, in Hanlon (2002); and “Early tests for U.S. in its global fight on

AIDS,” The New York Times, 14/7/04. 66 “Government rejects increased local power,” MPoPB, AWEPA, 28 (1 November 2002), p. 8. See also “Donors lose interest” in this same issue. 67 “Renamo constitutional amendments unthinkable,” Mf, 278 (September 1999), p. 10; “Bill on forestry and wildlife,” Mf, 274 (May 1999), p. 13;

Weimar (2002: 70). 68 “Will régulos be tax collectors?” MPPB, AWEPA, 19 (September 1997). 69 “Disinformation leads to riots,” Mf, 307 (February 2002), p.23; “Bill on forestry ...,” Mf, p. 13; “Elections: dispute over registration,” Mf, 276 (July 1999), pp. 4, 7; “Crisis in justice system denounced,” Mf, 295 (February 2001), p. 23; “Assembly passes family law,” Mf, 330 (January 2004), p. 13;

Ivala (1999: 324); Serra (1999b: 130, 149, 172); Schafer and Bell (2002). See also Kloeck-Jenson (2000: 5n.1). 70 These points can be found in the sources cited above and “What role for ‘traditional’ leaders?” MPPB, AWEPA, 19 (September 1997). 71 “Land law increases ...,” MPPB and related articles in this issue. “Assembly passes new land law,” Mf, 253 (August 1997), p. 6; “Renamo opposed” and

“Land law recognises ‘custom,’” both in MPPB, AWEPA, 19 (September 1997). 72 Geffray (1991: 133, 133n.7); RM, PN, DN, Ano de 1991, Mês de Julho,

“Relatório”; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1991, Mês de Janeiro, “Relatório”; RM,

PN, ADN, Ano de 1991, Mês de Fevereiro; “Relatório”; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1991, Mês de Março, “Relatório”; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1991, Mês de

Agosto, “Relatório”; RM, PN, DN, primeiro semestre, 1991, “Relatório,”

Namapa, 10 de Julho de 1991, p. 2; all in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA.

Second references to district reports in this chapter are referred to in English by month (or months) and year. 73 January 1991 and February 1991 district reports; RM, PN, DN, Ano de 1991, Mês de Maio, “Relatório” in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA. 74 RM, PN, Ano de 1991, Mês de Outubro, “Relatório”; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1992, Mês de Fevereiro, “Relatório”; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1992, Mês de

Abril, “Relatório”; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1992, Mês de Maio, “Relatório”; all in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid.; February 1992 district report; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1992, Mês de

Setembro, “Relatório”; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1992, Mês de Agosto,

“Relatório”; RM, PN, DN, “Relatório,” Ano de 1993, Mêses

Janeiro/Fevereiro, “Relatório”; all in Dossier, DPAC, DA. 77 RM, PN, DN, “Monografia do Distrito de Namapa,” n.d., pp. 24–8, DPAC,

DA. Judging from its contents, the monograph appears to have been written in mid-1992. For other constraints on access to education in the postwar period, see RM, PN, DN, Ano de 1993, Mês de Abril, “Relatório” in Dossier,

“Namapa,” DPAC, DA; Metselaar et al. (1994: 108); and Marshall (1992: 33–4). 78 February 1991, April 1992, May 1992, August 1992 and April 1993 district reports; first semester district report for 1991; RM, PN, DN, “Monografia ...,” p. 30; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1993, Mês de Setembro, “Relatório” and

DPAC, DA, “Breve informação sobre o Distrito de Namapa,” Nampula,

Fevereiro de 1994, respectively, both in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA.

Smits (1994) reviews the health situation of children at this time.

322 Notes

79 May 1992, August 1992 and September 1992 district reports; RM, PN, DN, “Relatório do primeiro trimestre, Ano de 1993,” 31 de Março de 1993, p. 4 in Dossier, “Namapa” DPAC, DA. 80 First trimester district report for 1993, p. 3; DPAC, DA, “Breve informação sobre o Distrito de Namapa,” Nampula, 26 de Agosto de 1993 in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA; September 1992 district. 81 RM, PN, DN, “Monografia ...,” p. 23. 82 As described in the February 1991 district report. 83 Rehabilitating the water supply system in the town was an objective of Memisa, a Dutch NGO. 84 Cf. Roesch (1989: 12). 85 Interview, Provincial Coordinator, Agricultural Recovery Program, World Vision, Nampula City, 22/10/94. 86 August 1991 district report. 87 Interview, Chief Comala, Napai, Samora Machel Locality, 1/10/94. 88 United Nations (1995: 34, 46); “Renamo admin boycott,” MPPB, AWEPA, 13 (11 October 1994), p. 7; “Dual administration continues,” MPPB, AWEPA, 16 (December 1995), pp. 1–2. 89 Hanlon (1996: 19). 90 Interview, District Director of STAE, Namapa Center, 1/10/94. 91 For the situation elsewhere, see, for instance, “Zonas da Renamo continuam vedados a livre circulação,” Notícias, 4/21/94; “Access stll [sic] restricted,”

MPPB, AWEPA, 13 (11 October 1994), p. 3. 92 Interviews, male elders and traditional authorities, “Zagaia,” Alua Administrative Post, 24/9/94; Chiefs Alua, Comala, Saíde and Nametemula, Alua Center, 14/6/94; District Director of Agriculture, Namapa Center, 17/10/94. 93 For the argument that the PRE/PRES’ designers failed to take the impact of the war on the economy and thus on the economy’s response to “adjustment,” see, inter alia, Wuyts (1991); Marshall (1992); Tickner (1992); and Hermele (1992). 94 For an overview of rural commerce in Nampula in the late 1980s, see Roesch (1989). 95 RPM, PN, “Programa geral de reabilitação agrária dos distritos prioritários’ realizado por Abdulcarimo Ismael e Dionisio Chereua,” n.d., p. 93, DPAC, DA. While this study has no date of publication, its findings are based on a survey undertaken in May 1989. 96 March 1991 district report. 97 RM, GPN, DPAC, “Informação sobre a situação do Distrito de Namapa,” n.d., p. 3, attachment to the 1991 first semester district report and first trimester district report for 1993, p. 2, respectively. 98 May 1991 report. 99 RM, GPN, DPAC, “Informação sobre ...,” p. 3. 100 For the case of Namapa, see, inter alia, district reports for August 1991, April 1992 and April 1993; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1993, Mêses Julho/Agosto, “Relatório” in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA and RPM, PN, “Programa geral ...,” p. 93. For the case of the province, see Momade (1994: 53–4) and Metselaar et al. (1994: 113). For a review of the credit situation in the country as a whole, see Hanlon (1996: 7, 57–62). See also Pitcher (2002: 94, 204). On the ways in which neoliberal policies and the privatization of the banking sector have aggravated difficulties in obtaining rural credit, see Ratilal (2002: 276, 291). 101 Metselaar et al. (1994: 113); Roesch (1989: 13); Tickner (1992). 102 August 1991 and July/August 1993 district reports; DPAC, DA, “Breve informação ...,” Nampula, 26 de Agosto de 1993.

Notes 323

103 Metselaar et al. (1994: 113–14). For the case of Cabo Delgado, see Harrison (1996: 26). 104 Metselaar et al. (1994: 109). 105 Ibid., pp. 108–10. See Hanlon (1991: 149) and Tickner (1992) for this tendency nationally. For the shift from fixed to minimum producer prices, in accord with World Bank mandates, see ibid. For subsequent changes to the pricing of agricultural products, see “Increase in agricultural marketing,” Mf, 274 (May 1999), p. 17 and “MOZAL leads to huge rise in exports,” Mf, 301 (August 2001), p. 15. 106 Metselaar et al. (1994: 42, 114); Marshall (1992); Tickner (1992); March 1991 district report. A sufficient number of sacks only became available throughout the country in 1997. “Increase in ...,” Mf, p. 17. Other structural constraints mentioned here persist and continue to hinder the expansion of agricultural production and marketing. Ratilal (2002: 275–7). 107 Personal observation; DPAC, DA, “Breve informação sobre o Distrito de Namapa,” Nampula, 7 de Junho de 1993 in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA. 108 The rationale given by the Namapa administration’s report for July/August 1993. 109 For the case of Nampula, see Roesch (1989) and Hermele (1990b). See also Hermele (1992). 110 Pitcher (1996: 57, 59, 61, 63). For an overview of changes to the cotton sector in the last decade, see ibid., pp. 212–25 and Ofiço and Tschirley (2003). 111 Interviews, Chief Namiquela, Mirrote, 8/5/94; Chief Namiquela, Nahopa, 12/5/94; Chief Muhula, Namirôa Center, 11/6/94; Chief Tubruto, Namirôa Center, 13/6/94; Chiefs Alua, Comala, Saíde and Nametemula, Alua Center, 14/6/94; cotton growers, Namirôa Center, 21/8/94; Chief Comala, Napai, 1/10/94; Chief Taibo (former colonial régulo), Namapa Center, 2/10/94; SODAN engineer, Namapa Center, 15/10/94. Chief Taibo also had been a colonial capataz but lost his position for reasons discussed in Chapter 6 below. 112 Marshall (1992: 50). 113 “Situação salarial nas administrações de distritos da Província de Nampula,” n.d. in Dossier, “DPAC 88, 22.3 Vencimentos,” Arquivo, GPN. The last part of the document is missing which is why there is no date. Judging from its contents, it was written in 1990 or 1991. 114 January 1991 and February 1991 district reports, respectively. 115 RM, GPN, DPAC, “Informação sobre ...,” p. 3. The escape of inmates with the apparent connivance of prison guards is a common occurrence throughout the country. “Sombre picture ...,” Mf, p. 10. See also Harrison (2000: 94–5). 116 August 1991 district report. 117 October 1991, February 1992, April 1992, May 1992 and January/February 1993 district reports; first semester district report for 1991, p. 8; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1992, Mês de Março, “Relatório” in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA. 118 First trimester district report for 1993, p. 8; DPAC, DA, “Breve informação ...,” Nampula, 26 de Agosto de 1993. Its functioning prior to then had been highly problematic. Dinerman (1998: 220n.137). As Hall and Young (1997: 78) point out, it was never transparent what people’s assemblies “were supposed to do at all.” 119 RM, PN, DN, “Monografia ...,” p. 31. 120 January 1991 and February 1992 district reports. 121 April 1993 district report. 122 Alexander (1995: 34–5; 1997: 12). 123 First semester district report for 1991, p. 7. 124 March 1993 district report; DPAC, DA, “Breve informação ...,” Nampula, 26

324 Notes

de Agosto de 1993; DPAC, DA, “Breve informação ...,” Nampula, Fevereiro de 1994. 125 First semester district report for 1991, pp. 7–8; RM, GPN, DPAC, “Informação sobre ...,” p. 1. 126 RM, PN, DPF de Nampula, “Assunto: Relatório à Primeira Sessão Ordinária do Governo Provincial sobre a Situação Financeira dos Orgãos Locais (Distritos e Cidades),” Nampula, 29 de Janeiro de 1992 in Dossier, “Aparelho do Estado 1992, 2.2,” Arquivo, GPN, pp. 1–2. 127 Ibid., p. 2. 128 Ibid., p. 3. 129 “Situação salarial ...” 130 RM, PN, DPF de Nampula, “Assunto: Relatório ...” 131 February 1992, March 1992 and April 1992 district reports; RM, PN, DN, Ano de 1993, Mês de Março, “Relatório” in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA. 132 Secretária de Administração do Distrito de Namapa, 21 de Abril de 1994; signed by the head of the accounting department. 133 April 1992, May 1992, August 1992, September 1992 and July/August district reports and RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1993, Mês de Junho, “Relatório” in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA. 134 Interview, Namapa Center, 17/11/94. 135 June 1993 and September 1993 district reports; RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1993, Mês de Outubro, “Relatório” and RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1993, Mês de Novembro, “Relatório,” both in Dossier, “Namapa,” DPAC, DA. 136 See Dinerman (1998: 223–5). 137 DPAC, DA, “Breve informação ...,” Nampula, 26 de Agosto de 1993. 138 DPAC, DA, “Breve informação ...,” Nampula, Fevereiro de 1994. 139 Interview, SODAN engineer, Namialo, Meconta District, 30/8/94. 140 Because of their centrality to tax collection in northern Mozambique, the cotton markets hardly qualify as “minor theatres of bureaucratic power,” as they do in neighboring Zimbabwe. See Worby (1998: 561). It is, however, unclear to what extent the cotton markets constitute a site for the assertion of such power today in view of government attempts, initiated in 2000, to gradually liberalize the concession model and to allow peasant associations to sell their cotton to the highest bidder. On reform efforts, the glitches they encountered and the return, in 2001, to the “older, closed model,” see Ofiço and Tschirley (2003: 7). 141 January 1991 district report. 142 First trimester district report for 1993, p. 7. 143 Ibid., and September 1993 and October 1993 district reports, respectively. 144 For other instances, both historical and contemporary, in which revenueraising on the part of cash-starved local authorities in Africa has helped fuel corruption at the grassroots, see Mamdani (1996: 57–9). 145 “Interior Minister still in place,” Mf, 226 (May 1995), p. 17; “Nampula governor hits out,” Mf, 225 (April 1995). It is unclear if police conduct in Nampula was any worse than elsewhere in the country at this time. For the implicit suggestion that it was, see “The minister versus the media,” Mf, 226 (May 1995). 146 See, inter alia, “Demobilisation by mutiny,” Mf, 229 (August 1994); “Further mutinies and rioting,” Mf, 218 (September 1994), pp. 10–11. According to Alden (2001: 53), there were about 155,000 government irregulars at the time of the AGP. 147 Pedro Nacuo, “Nampula faz reflexão sobre a causa dos motins,” Notícias, 9/9/94; “‘Violent monsters on the dole,’” Mf, 219 (October 1994), p. 15.

Notes 325

148 Interview, local manager of Casa Salvador, Namapa Center, 21/9/94; November 1993 district report. 149 “Ex-soldados e milicianos ameaçam amotinar-se em Nampula,” Notícias.

5 Multipartyism, the retraditionalization of local administration and the apparent duplication of state authority

1See Baptista Lundin (1993: 1–2). 2Lourenço and Hilário (1988a; 1988b). 3Lourenço and Hilário (1988a: 6–7). The same story is described, blow-for-blow, in Geffray (1991: 32–4). 4Lourenço and Hilário (1988b: 11). See also Lourenço and Hilário (1988a: 8, 10). 5The practice was known to – and was apparently perfectly acceptable to – the colonial authorities. See, for instance, J.A.G.M. Branquinho, “Prospecção das forças tradicionais.” Distrito de Moçambique, Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações, Governo-Geral de Moçambique, Lourenço Marques, 1969, p. 115, AHM, SE, 20 and passim. 6Lourenço and Hilário (1988b: 6). 7Ibid., p. 9. 8Lourenço and Hilário (1988a: 10). 9Lourenço and Hilário (1988b: 9). 10Lourenço and Hilário (1988a: 9). 11Ibid., p. 5. 12Lourenço and Hilário (1988b: 7–8). 13Ibid., pp. 10–11. 14As cited in Alpers (1994: 10). His emphasis. 15FRELIMO (1978: 42). 16Hanlon (1984: 135); Saul (1985d: 77–8). 17Hanlon (1984: 140). 18Ottaway and Ottaway (1981: 84). 19Egerö (1990: 114). For the case of Maputo, see Grest (1995). 20Egerö (1990: 114–15, 129); Hanlon (1983: 140). 21Egerö (1986: 131–2). 22Ibid., p. 113; Hanlon (1984: 137). 23As cited in Egerö (1990: 115). 24Saul (1985d: 86). His emphasis. 25Egerö (1990: 119). 26Hanlon (1984: 203). 27See ibid., p. 186 for the key excerpt. 28Ibid., pp. 140, 202–7; Saul (1985d: 91–6). 29If anything, the Central Committee appears to have lost power vis-à-vis the

Politbureau. Manning (2002: 138n.11). 30Egerö (1990: 110, 122). 31As specified by the CCPSC. RPM, MOA, DPA, “Orientações específicas da

Provincial [sic] de Nampula para o sector agrário,” Nampula, 21 de Maio de 1986, p. 6 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA. For the prevalence of

GDs nationally during the mid-1990s, see Irene Jamisse, “GD’s ultrapassados no tempo,” Savana, 14/4/95. 32Egerö (1990: 130). 33As suggested by Young (1988: 173). 34Personal communication, April 1994. 35MAE, a equipe técnica do projecto, “Documento sumário de trabalho para apresentação às Províncias. Projecto: autoridade/poder tradicional no contexto sócio-cultural, sócio-económico e sócio-político de Moçambique,” 7 de Agosto de 1992, Maputo.

326 Notes

36DPAC, Nampula, “Reflexão sobre a autoridade tradicional,” 18 de Maio de 1991 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 37On the absence of an organic link between many newly emergent parties in

Africa and the general electorate, see Manning (2002: 27). 38Gonçalves (1998: 25). 39See, for instance, “Dispute over agenda holds up peace talks,” Mf, 179 (June 1991), p. 4. 40Interviews, former administrator of Namapa (1984–87), Nampula City, 9/10/94; chefe do posto, Namirôa Center, 16/10/94; Administrator and Deputy

Administrator of Murrupula District, Murrupula Center, Murrupula District, 10/11/94. The administrator of Lalaua District also invoked the Sixth Party

Congress in defending his administration’s collaboration with former régulos in the early 1990s. Letter from the district administrator of Lalaua, RM, PN,

Administração do Distrito de Lalaua, “Informação: circunstanciada sobre o artigo publicado no jornal Notícias de 16/6/92 com o título ‘Poder traditionaltribal’ ganha força em Lalaua) [sic] da autoria de Pedro Nacuo da Delegação de

Nampula,” Lalaua, 22 de Junho de 1992 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,”

DPAC, DA. 41MIO, “Frelimo’s Sixth Congress looks to the future,” Special Report, 7 (4 September 1991), p. 1. 42As cited in “Frelimo Sixth Congress,” Mf, 182 (September 1991), p. 9. 43MIO, “Party membership on the increase,” Special Report, 7 (4 September 1991), p. 3. 44“Renamo rejects truce,” Mf, 186 (January 1992); Vines (1994: 22). 45As described in a proposed DPAC circular, enclosure to letter from the Director of the DPAC to the Governor of Nampula Province, 15/7/92 in Dossier, “O

Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 46See, for instance, the intervention of the district administrator of Mogovolas, as transcribed in MAE, “Província de Nampula,” 15 de Agosto de 1992, Maputo.

If the districts were left largely in the dark as to how best to decipher the provincial government’s precise intent, NGOs were given at least one broad hint as to how they might go about incorporating chiefs into their local activities. In June 1992, Nampulan government officials issued straightforward instructions to relief agencies to involve traditional authorities, as well as party secretaries, in food distributions. Interview, Provincial Coordinator for German

Agro Action, Nampula City, 21/4/94. 47Proposed DPAC circular. 48RM, PN, Administração do Distrito de Angoche, “Síntese da primeira reunião com as estruturas tradicionais (Régulos, Chefes das Povoações e Reis),” 14 de

Fevereiro de 1992 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 49RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1992, Mês de Abril, “Relatório,” in Dossier,

“Namapa,” DPAC, DA. My emphasis. 50Interview, Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 27/9/94. Also letter from the Secretariat of the District Committee of the

Frelimo Party, Murrupula District, to the Secretariat of the Provincial Committee of the Frelimo Party, “Assunto: informação,” Nampula, 19 de Março de 1992 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 51RM, PN, ADN, Ano de 1992, Mês de Maio, “Relatório,” in Dossier, “Namapa,”

DPAC, DA; interviews, President of the Locality, Odinepa Center, 1/6/94;

Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 27/9/94; chefe do posto, Namirôa Center, 16/10/94; personal communication, the chefe do posto,

Alua Center; personal communication, district administrator of Namapa,

Namapa Center, June 1994. 52Interview, Frelimo party secretaries, Odinepa Center, 3/6/94.

Notes 327

53Interview, Namapa Center, 9/6/94. 54Interview, Namirôa Center, 11/6/94. 55Interview, Frelimo party secretaries, Namirôa Center, 11/6/94. 56Interview, traditional authorities and Frelimo party secretaries, Muanona

Center, 22/8/94. 57Interview, Nahopa, 12/5/94. 58Interview, male elders, traditional authorities and Frelimo party secretaries,

Nantoge, 24/8/94. 59For the case of Angoche, see Dinerman (1998: 253–4). 60According to the First Secretary, 16 of the province’s 21 district-level party secretariats had been so outfitted. Personal communication, June 1994. It is likely that, in equipping party secretariats in the districts with new motor vehicles,

Frelimo was seeking to cement their political loyalty as much as providing them with the means to win over voters. Similar considerations had, no doubt, informed the central government’s decision to provide district-level first secretaries with salaries in 1991, as well as its decision to give these secretaries a raise in the months preceding the election. 61Personal communication, June 1994. 62In all cases, civil servants and members of the provincial government were on full government salary. 63For controversy over Nihia’s double identity, see “Ngonhamo diz que CCF comprovou alegações contra General Nihia,” Notícias, 15/2/94 and “Ngonhamo’s war of words,” Mf, 212 (March 1994). The latter article fails, tendentiously, to mention Nihia’s government hat. The Frelimo general’s demobilization awaited the extinction of the FAM high command in August 1994. 64UNAMO is a splinter group of Renamo which, after its founding in 1987, operated as an armed movement against both Renamo and the government army in

Zambézia in the 1980s. Hall (1990: 47); Africa Watch (1992: 40). UNAMO became a minor political party after the adoption of the new constitution. In 1999, it joined a coalition of opposition parties headed by Renamo but it has subsequently broken with this grouping. 65“Administrador de Rapale confirma fraqueza da oposição,” Notícias, 2/2/94. 66“Moçambique sem oposição?” mediaFAX, 623, 1/11/94; Fernando Lima, “Notas eleitorais. A contabilidade da democracia”; Fernando Manuel, “Nampula: Os destinos do voto macua,” both in Savana, 4/11/94. 67See Pedro Nacuo, “Coisas de coração ...,” Notícias, 10/11/94. 68Personal observation as a UN Elections Observer in Maluma, Mualamacosi and

Alua Center, all in Alua Administrative Post, Namapa District. Other members of the UN contingent in Namapa reported similar findings. For an instance of party monitors candidly admitting that they had voted for parties other than the ones for which they were working, see “Elections held, Frelimo wins,” Mf, 220 (November 1994), p. 10. 69The 5 percent clause was included in the AGP at Renamo’s insistence much to the consternation of the unarmed opposition. “Final battles over electoral law,”

Mf, 209 (December 1993). 70Cited in Pedro Nacuo, “Só teremos partidos políticos nas vésperas das eleições?”

Notícias, 5/1/95. See also Pedro Nacuo, “Oposição está ‘muda’ em Nampula,”

Notícias, 13/1/95. The evanescence of the “newly emergent” opposition has been a standard feature of more recent electoral cycles. 71Interviews, Renamo officials, “Zagaia,” Alua Administrative Post, 22/9/94; Fernando Maela, Renamo’s deputy provincial political delegate, Nampula City, 9/9/94. 72“The peace agreement in detail,” Mf, 196 (November 1992), p. 5. 73See MIO, “Party membership ...”

328 Notes

74Interview, former administrator of Namapa District (1984–1987), Nampula

City, 9/10/94. See the intervention of the administrator of Ribáuè dating the recruitment of former régulos to the party from 1990 in MAE, “Província de

Nampula,” 15 de Agosto de 1992, Maputo. See also the interventions of the district administrators of Angoche and Mogovolas on this occasion. 75Interviews, Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center 27/9/94; UNAMO representatives and members, Alua Center, 15/6/94;

Renamo representatives and members, Alua Center, 16/6/94. 76Interview, administrator of Nacarôa District, Nampula City, 10/9/94;

“Nampula governor hits out,” Mf, 225 (April 1995). 77Cited in “Qual é a posição dos régulos?” Vida Nova, 12 (Dezembro 1993), p. 8. 78This view is common among chiefs themselves. See the blunt remark of an

Ashante chief in Ghana, as cited in Berry (2001: 140). 79Interview, UNAMO representatives and members, Alua Center, 15/6/94. Suspicion of chiefly authority by African political leaders is by no means unique to

Mozambique. Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (1987: 3–4). No doubt the perceived ideological and political flexibility of chiefs has fed into such suspicions. 80The operative assumption at work here seems to have been that chiefs were only to be considered politicized if they aligned themselves with a party other than

Frelimo. It was just such an assumption that informed the Convention People’s

Party’s understanding of chiefly political activism in Ghana throughout the 1950s, as Richard Rathbone (2000: 26, 62–3, 116–17, 121–2) has shown. 81Letter from the Head of the Department for Mobilization and Propaganda,

Provincial Committee of Nampula to the Governor of Nampula Province, 9/9/92, Nota No./88/SCPPF/92 in Dossier, “Informação 20.2, 1992,” Arquivo,

GPN. 82First meeting between the STAE director and traditional authorities, Namapa

Center, 14/5/94; interview, Namapa STAE Director, Namapa Center, 1/10/94.

For CNE President Brazão Mazula’s positive appraisal of the role played by traditional authorities in voter registration nationally, see Salomão Moyana, “O recenseamento e um desafio a capacidade do cidadão,” Savana, 12/8/94. 83See “Lideres tradicionais trabalharam para as eleições,” Notícias, 5/11/94. The article’s focus is Namapa. 84Interview, Namapa Center, 17/11/94. 85Interview, Frelimo First Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 4/10/94. 86See Chapter 3 above; Dinerman (1998: 264); Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 7–45). 87Interview, Ilha de Moçambique, 1/9/94. 88Interview, Murrupula Center, Murrupula District, 10/11/94. An early party recruit, the administrator had been a member of one of the provincial brigades that were sent to the districts to form dynamizing groups. By coincidence, he had been sent to Murrupula, his home district, where he observed the nominating process firsthand. He recalled that a nephew of former Régulo Umpuata served as a secretary from the beginning; another chief, Cavar, was himself elected secretary. See also RPM, PN, Distrito de Murrupula, “Relatório sobre o poder tradicional,” Murrupula, 19 de Novembro de 1990, DPAC, DA, GPN. 89My thinking on this point has been clarified by reading Rousso’s analysis of the ways in which Gaullist symbolism finessed the differences between the two world wars by placing both under the rubric of the “thirty years’ war.” The upshot was that the historical specificity of the Second World War and the role of the Vichy regime in it was blurred. Rousso (1991), especially pp. 17, 25, 71–4, 171–2. For an instance of the opposite phenomenon, that of a “temporal hiatus,” see the review of Alessandro Portelli’s work in Jelin (2003: 57–9).

Notes 329

90Olick (2003b: 11). 91I have borrowed and adapted the term from Appiah (1992: 145–8), who uses it to denote the contemporary multiplication of identities, which, he argues, is a function of the commodification of identity per se. 92Interview, Ilha de Moçambique, 31/8/94. Both emphases are his.

6 Labor, tribute and authority

1 Berry (1992: 327–55). 2 For a discussion of the implications of this development as it bears on Mamdani’s global analysis of the experience and prospects of radical regimes in postcolonial Africa (i.e. Mamdani ([1996]), see Dinerman (2004). 3 Geffray (1991: 132–7); Baptista Lundin (1993); Mutaquiha (1992: 7–9). The governor’s views are expressed in the latter source. The governor in question, Alfredo Gamito, was subsequently appointed Minister of the MAE upon the formation of a new government following the 1994 elections, a post he held through 1999. 4 Interview, traditional authorities, Odinepa Center, 4/6/94. 5 Interview, Namirôa Center, 11/6/94. 6 Interview, Nahopa, 7/5/94. 7 As a SODAN field agent characterized it. Interview, Mirrote, 11/5/94. 8 Interview, Napala, 25/8/94. 9 Interview, Nampula City, 10/9/94. In the district seat, for instance, a prominent humu and a muene sat on the bench of the local court. Much the same seems to have been the case in Lalaua District further to the west. Pedro Nacuo, “Poder tradicional-tribal ganha força em Lalaua,” Notícias, 16/6/92. 10 Mbwiliza (1991: xiii, 69–70); Soares (1993: 162); Conceiçao (1984: 67–8). 11 Interview, Nakapa (Nakhapa), 5/6/94. 12 Interview, Namapa Center, 27/9/94. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations of community court judges are from this meeting. 13 He had also expressed great enthusiasm when I proposed holding a group interview with local judges and had organized the meeting. 14 RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Tribunal Comunitário do Posto Administrativo de AluaSede, “Relatório,” Alua, 17 de Dezembro de Ano de 1992, archives of the District Court, Namapa. 15 RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Tribunal Comunitário da Aldeia Comunal de Namajupa No. 1, ex: Ripiha, “Informação,” Namajupa No. 1, 10 de Março de 1993, archives of the District Court, Namapa. 16 RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Posto Administrativo de Namirôa, Tribunal Comunitário de Napala, “Relatório,” 1 de Julho de 1993, archives of the District Court, Namapa. 17 RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Tribunal Comunitário da Localidade de Muanona, “Assunto: informação no. 1/tclm/94,” 25 de Agosto de 1994, letter from the Magistrate of Muanona to the District Magistrate of Namapa and RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Tribunal Comunitário da Localidade de Muanona, “Relatório de (2) mêses Junho Julho/9,” 25 de Agosto de 1994; both in archives of the District Court, Namapa. 18 RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Tribunal Comunitário da Localidade de Muanona, “Assunto: informação ...” 19 A third humu, who headed the community court of Namapa Center, did not attend the meeting. 20 The problem is by no means confined to dispute resolution at the local level. “Sombre picture of justice system,” Mf, 309 (April 2002), p. 9. 21 Interview, Nampula City, 15/9/94.

330 Notes

22 Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 37). 23 Interviews, Frelimo First Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 27/9/94; District Magistrate and Registrar, Namapa Center, 29/8/94. 24 As articulated in several of the reports cited above, as well as RM, MOJ, PN,

DN, Tribunal Comunidário [sic] da aldeia comunal de Eduardo Mondlane,

“Relatório anual,” 28 de Março de 1993, archives of the District Court; and interviews, community court judges, Namapa Center, 27/9/94 and District

Magistrate and Registrar, Namapa Center, 29/8/94. 25 RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Posto Administrativo de Namirôa, Tribunal Comunitário de Napala, “Relatório.” 26 See RM, PN, DN, “Monografia do Distrito de Namapa,” n.d. [c.1992], p. 33,

DPAC, DA. 27 For an overview of the functioning of local courts during the first decade of independence, see Sachs and Honwana Welch (1990), especially Chapters 3 and 4. 28 RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Tribunal Comunitário do Posto Administrativo de Alua-

Sede, “Relatório.” 29 RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Tribunal Comunitário da Localidade de Muanona,

“Relatório de (2) mêses Junho Julho/9.” 30 RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Posto Administrativo de Namirôa, Tribunal Comunitário de Napala, “Relatório”; RM, MOJ, PN, DN, Tribunal Comunidário [sic] da aldeia comunal de Eduardo Mondlane, “Relatório anual.” 31 Interviews, Chief Vaquina, counselors and heir apparent, Nahopa, 7/5/94;

“animators” (animadores) of the Catholic Church, Alua Center, 16/6/94; parishioner, Namapa Center, 27/5/94; parishioner/smallholder, Namapa Center, 6/5/94; Frelimo First Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 27/9/94;

António Gabriel Comala (Frelimo party member and cousin of Chief Comala),

Alua Center, 30/9/94; Chief Taibo (former colonial régulo), Namapa Center, 2/10/94. 32 Interview, Namirôa Center, 16/10/94. 33 Interview, District Magistrate and Registrar, Namapa Center, 29/8/94. 34 Interview, António Gabriel Comala, Alua Center, 30/9/94. 35 The de facto juridical pluralism which characterized Namapa at this stage appears to be a feature of much of Mozambique today. See “Crisis in justice system denounced,” Mf, 295 (February 2001). 36 Interview, Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 4/10/94. 37 Interview, missionary, Namapa Center, 4/10/94. 38 Such notions were also expressed by interested parties in the conflict over the stewardship of Alua regedoria. See Dinerman (1998: 290–1). 39 Interviews, Chief Vaquina, counselors and heir apparent, Nahopa, 7/5/94;

Chief Taibo (former colonial régulo), Namapa Center, 9/6/94; former cipaio and

Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 18/10/94; former colonial interpreter, Namapa Center, 19/10/94. 40 Interview, Chiefs Alua, Comala, Saíde and Nametemula, Alua Center, 14/6/94. 41 Interview, Namapa Center, 15/10/94. For more on Mateus’ gatekeeping powers and influence-peddling, see H.E. de Sousa, “Relatório da Inspecção Ordinária ao

Distrito de Nampula, da Província do Niassa, 1946–1948,” Vol. III, pp. 644–5,

AHM, ISANI, Cx. 77 and Branquinho, “Prospecção.. .,” p.21. 42 Such machambas were common in the colony’s three northern provinces.

Hedges (1993: 50). 43 Coordenador [Brigada Distrital para Assuntos de Autoridades Tradicionais],

“Autoridade tradicional do Distrito de Namapa,” 2 de Fevereiro de 1993.

Notes 331

44 Interview, Namapa Center, 19/10/94. 45 Interview, Chiefs Alua, Comala, Saíde and Nametemula, Alua Center, 14/6/94. 46 Interview, Namapa Center, 10/15/94. 47 Branquinho, “Prospecção ...,” p. 21. 48 Interviews, Chief Vaquina, counselors and heir apparent, Nahopa, 7/5/94;

Chief Taibo (former colonial régulo), Namapa Center, 9/6/94; Frelimo First

Party Secretary of Namapa District and former cipaio, Namapa Center, 18/10/94; former colonial interpreter, Namapa Center, 19/10/94. 49 Interviews, Cassimo, Namapa Center, 6/5/94; Chiefs Alua, Comala, Saíde and

Nametemula, Alua Center, 14/6/94. 50 For evidence of such maneuvers in the late 1960s, see Branquinho,

“Prospecção ...,” pp. 24–5. 51 Interview, Namapa Center, 9/6/94. 52 Interview, Chief Taibo (Carlos Máquina), Namapa Center, 5/5/94. 53 See Chapter 2 above. 54 According to Branquinho (“Prospecção ...,” p. 21), this expansion took place

“around 1943,” thus placing it a year after the then Governor-General Bettencourt had enunciated the general framework in which the process of centralizing and consolidating chieftaincy would take place. The colonial anthropologist estimated that the regedoria had more than 26,000 inhabitants in 1967. 55 Hedges (1993: 98). 56 I am uncertain as to the precise timing of this shift. However, as the above quote suggests, it seems to have occurred after the Taibo/Máquina replaced his cousin as régulo. 57 Namirôa has a surface area of 2,171 square kilometers; that of Alua’s is 1,600 square kilometers; that of Namapa’s is 1,900 square kilometers. RM, PN, DN,

“Monografia ...,” p. 8. Namirôa’s administrative seat is situated sixty-six kilometers from Namapa Center, whereas that of Alua’s and Odinepa’s are only twenty-five and thirty-two kilometers, respectively, from the district capital. 58 Interviews, chefe do posto, Namirôa Center, 16/10/94; Chief Tubruto, Namirôa

Center, 13/6/94; former residents of 25 de Junho Communal Village, 25 de

Junho Communal Village, 27/8/94. 59 Interview, President of Muanona Locality, Muanona Center, 22/8/94. 60 Cf. Geffray (1991: 133) for this portrayal. For details of the challenge the ruling family faced, see Dinerman (1998: 291–2). 61 Coordenador [Brigada Distrital para os Assuntos das Autoridades Tradicionais], “Autoridade tradicional ...” 62 Interview, Namapa Center, 6/5/94. 63 Nacuo, “Poder tradicional-tribal ...” 64 Proposed circular, enclosure to letter from the Director of DPAC to the Governor of Nampula Province, 15/7/92 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,”

DPAC, DA; cover letter from the Director of DPAC to the Governor of

Nampula Province, 15/7/92 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 65 Mutaquiha (1992). 66 This view was expressed by members of UNAMO and Renamo, with the latter group maintaining that such disputes could be settled by other régulos.

Interviews, Alua Center, 14/6/94 and 15/6/94, respectively. 67 Interview, Chief Vaquina, counselors and heir apparent, Nahopa, 7/5/94. 68 Interview, Nahachari, 12/6/94. 69 Interviews, UNAMO members and representatives, 15/6/94 and Chief

Khanatepa Ali, 17/10/94, both in Alua Center; former cipaio and Frelimo First

Party Secretary of Namapa District, Namapa Center, 18/10/94. Many people in the crowd reportedly perceived the administrator’s response as a form of

332 Notes

stonewalling. For some background to this encounter, see Chapter 5 above and

Dinerman (1998: 290–1). 70 Interview, Namapa Center, 15/10/94. 71 Interview, Chief Vaquina, counselors and heir apparent, Nahopa, 7/5/94. 72 Interview, former cipaio and Frelimo First Party Secretary of Namapa District,

Namapa Center, 18/10/94; Branquinho, “Prospecção ...,” pp. 26, 30. 73 Interviews, male elders and Frelimo party secretary, Odinepa Center, 6/6/94; chief and smallholders, settlement, Odinepa Locality, 2/6/94; Chiefs Alua,

Comala, Saíde and Nametemula, Alua Center, 14/6/94; animadores, Alua

Center, 16/6/94. Chief Taibo and Chief Muhula implied as much when they maintained that contemporary forms of resistance to cotton production are the same as they had been during the colonial period. Interviews, Chief Taibo (former colonial régulo), Namapa Center, 9/6/94; Chief Muhula, Namirôa

Center, 11/6/94. 74 Interview, Nahopa, 7/5/94. 75 Interviews, missionary, Mirrote, 7/5/94; Chief Namiquela, Mirrote, 8/5/94;

SODAN field agent, Mirrote, 11/5/94; animadores, Alua Center, 16/6/94; former capataz, Namapa Center, 17/6/94; SODAN engineer, Namialo,

Meconta District, 30/8/94. 76 Paróquia do Alua, “Vamos comer ... algodão?” Vida Nova, Janeiro 1993, p. 25. 77 SODAN statistics; RM, MOA, DDA de Namapa, “Plano agrícola, Campanha 93/94 – Interno,” n.d. [1993], DDA records, Namapa. 78 Interview, Alua Center, 16/6/94. 79 Paróquia do Alua, “Vamos comer ... algodão?” p. 25. 80 “Chamboco: acabou ou não acabou?” Vida Nova, Maio 1993, p. 26. The appearance of the report in the pages of Vida Nova was delayed because, at the time it was written, it had been censored by government authorities. 81 Paróquia de Namapa, “Dignidade humana,” Vida Nova, Março 1993, p. 27. 82 Interview, smallholder/parishioner, Namapa Center, 6/5/94; informal conversations with the missionaries in Namapa Center; anonymous sources in the bairros of the town and in Nahopa. 83 Paróquia de Namapa (1994). 84 Interview, Namapa Center, 17/6/94. 85 Interview, Mirrote, 7/5/94. 86 Interview, Mirrote, 11/5/94. 87 RM, MOA, DDA de Namapa, “Plano agrícola ...” 88 Interviews, cotton growers, Namirôa Center, 21/8/94 and Muanona Center, 22/8/94. 89 Interview, Namirôa Center, 20/8/94. 90 Interview, Chiefs Alua, Comala, Saíde and Nametemula, Alua Center, 14/6/94. 91 Interview, Chief Comala, Napai, 1/10/94. The inadequacy of the soil stood as testimony to the exhaustion of the land following the intensive, uninterrrupted cultivation of cotton during the colonial period, when Alua was a premier smallholder cotton-producing region. The fact that Alua had been a major site of pest infestations during the colonial period may well have also dimmed smallholder enthusiasm for cotton production. Faria Lobo (1962: 31–2). 92 Interview, Namapa Center, 17/6/94. 93 Interview, settlement, Odinepa Locality, 2/6/94. By late 1994, the state had made no move, in Namapa at least, to distance itself from private capital, a precondition for any attempt on its part to derive political mileage from the process of privatization. For the argument that the Frelimo state was pursuing such a strategy of re-legitimization in cotton-growing zones through the formation of joint ventures, see Pitcher (1996; 2002: 208ff).

Notes 333

94 Interview, Alua Center, 15/6/94. 95 Interview, Napala, 25/8/94. 96 Interview, Odinepa Center, 4/6/94. 97 Secretaria da Administração do Distrito de Namapa, 21 de Abril de 1994; signed by the head of the accounting department; interview, Chief Namiquela, Mirrote, 8/5/94. 98 Interview, Chiefs Alua, Comala, Saíde and Nametemula, Alua Center, 14/6/94. 99 See “Qual é a posição dos régulos?” Vida Nova, 12, Dezembro 1993, pp. 7–8. The journal canvassed 52 people from all districts in the province and from both government and Renamo-held zones. Other responses struck a similar chord. 100 The argument that chiefs could sway ordinary citizens to disobey the directives of secretaries or otherwise subvert Frelimo rule is made in Lourenço (1992: 17–20). See also the comments of the district administrator of Ribáuè in MAE, “Província de Nampula,” Maputo, 15/8/92, p. 3. 101 Interview, Chiefs Alua, Comala, Saíde and Nametemula, Alua Center, 14/6/94. 102 Interviews, José de Almeida (former party secretary and former administrator of Muanona Locality), Namapa Center, 28/9/94; Chief Tubruto, Namirôa Center, 13/6/94; Chief Namiquela, Mirrote, 8/5/94. 103 Interview, Namirôa Center, 13/6/94. 104 Interview, Namapa Center, 19/10/94. His emphasis. 105 Dinerman (2001: 59). 106 RM, GPN, DPAC, DA, “Análise sobre a reunião havida no Distrito de Angoche com as estruturas tradicionais, realizada nos dias 13 e 14.02.92,” 4 de Maio de 1992 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 107 Interview, Nampula City, 10/9/94. 108 Personal communication, José Salvador, Namapa Center, September 1994. 109 Cotton growers in Namirôa shared this assessment. Interview, Namirôa Center, 21/8/94. 110 Interview, Namialo, Meconta District, 30/8/94. 111 Much as it had during the colonial period (e.g. witness the example of the friction between Muhula’s and Momola’s families, which persisted into the 1990s). 112 For a study that highlights competing interests and agendas within and between state institutions, see Bowen (2000: 4, 16–17) and passim. See also Schafer and Bell (2002). 113 See, inter alia, Reno (1998); Chabal and Daloz (1999); and McGregor (2002). For a journalistic account that is informed by this kind of analysis, see Berkeley (2001). 114 The trend toward increased reliance on tributary earnings was partially mitigated in certain areas by the control of grassroots leaders over the distribution of humanitarian aid rendered by NGOs, which had been authorized and encouraged by the provincial government in mid-1992 to involve both traditional authorities and Frelimo party secretaries in such distributions. In Namapa, NGOs were, at the time, few and far between reportedly because of their reluctance to tread on the turf of cotton concessionaries. In more recent years, international NGOs have become active in concession zones. Ofiço and Tschirley (2003: 13). 115 Hermele (1990b: 11). 116 That the appeal of holding royal office to those able to exploit such opportunities is anything but static is demonstrated by the case of postcolonial Ghana. See Rathbone (2000: 147, 163–4).

334 Notes

7 In the name of the state

1 DPAC, Nampula, “Reflexão sobre a autoridade tradicional,” 18 de Maio de 1991 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 2 Rousso (1991: 4). 3 Recent studies and/or overviews of the African context that I have found useful in this regard are Callaway (1993); Kriger (1995); Werbner (1998a); Nuttall and Coetzee (1998); Roberts (2000); and Sunseri (2000). I also owe an intellectual debt to Stoler’s study (1995) on the discourse of power in the Dutch East Indies. 4 Werbner (1998b: 13; 1998c: 73–4). 5 I have borrowed the term from Peter Schneider, “The Germans are breaking an old taboo: speaking about the trauma of carpet-bombing and ruin after 50 years of silence,” The New York Times, 18 January 2003, p. A19. 6 Jelin (2003: 33–4ff). 7 Olick (1998a: 384). 8 Jelin (2003: 33) and passim. 9 Hamilton (1998: 32, 33). My argument owes much to Hamilton’s analysis of how the figure of Shaka and Shakan rule became powerful metaphors in political discourse in segregationist South Africa and of why, as metaphors, they have continued to resonate powerfully through to the present day. See, in particular, her illuminating discussion of the antinomies and constant slippage between two prevailing images of Shaka’s kingdom that have marked African and “white” political discourse in South Africa starting from the preconquest period. Ibid., pp. 91–2, 209–13. 10 As in the sense elaborated by Gramsci. See Hoare and Nowell Smith (1971). 11 Ranger and Vaughan (1993b: 2). 12 Mallon (1995: 6). 13 Ibid., p. 7. 14 Feierman (1990: 222). 15 The party has also conducted its own studies on this subject but I did not have the opportunity to consult its archives. MAE, “Província de Nampula,” Maputo, 15/8/92. 16 Lourenço and Hilário (1988b); RPM, PN, Distrito de Murrupula, “Relatório sobre o poder tradicional,” 19 de Novembro de 1990 (hereafter the Murrupula report); Lourenço (1992), all in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 17 As cited in the Monapo district administration’s untitled report’s cover letter, RPM, PN, Gabinete do Administrador do Distrito de Monapo à Direcção Provincial de Apoio e Controlo de Nampula, Nampula, 85/ADM/3.6, 6/6/92 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA (hereafter the Monapo report). 18 MAE, “Reforma dos Orgãos Locais e o Papel da Autoridade Tradicional no Processo de Descentralização,” 19–23 de Abril de 1993, Maputo. 19 MAE, a equipe técnica do projecto, “Documento sumário de trabalho para apresentação às Províncias; Projecto: Autoridade/Poder Tradicional no contexto sócio-cultural, sócio-econômico e sócio-político de Moçambique,” Maputo, 7 de Agosto de 1992 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 20 The Monapo report; the Murrupula report; Lourenço and Hilário (1988a; 1988b); Lourenço (1992); RM, PN, Administração do Distrito de Malema, “Informe sobre o poder tradicional,” Malema, 21 de Janeiro de 1991; cover letter: RPM, PN, Administração do Distrito de Malema à Direcção Provincial de Apoio e Controlo, 23/ADM/17.9, 7/2/91 (hereafter the Malema report); RM, PN, Administração do Distrito de Mecubúri, “Levantamento efectuado

Notes 335

sobre o poder tradicional (Distrito de Mecubúri),” elaborado por A. Tesoura,

Dezembro de 1990 (hereafter the Mecubúri report); RM, PN, Distrito de

Mogovolas, Administração do Distrito de Mogovolas, “Reflexão sobre autoridade poder tradicional,” Nametil, 19/10/92 (hereafter the 1992 Mogovolas report); RM, PN, Distrito de Mogovolas, Administração do Distrito de Mogovolas, “Reflexão sobre autoridade poder tradicional,” Nametil, 5 de Maio de 1993 (hereafter the 1993 Mogovolas report). All of the above documents were housed in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 21 This is the case of the authors of the reports from Monapo, Mogovolas and

Mecubúri. 22 Cavala (1990). 23 Interview, functionary, DA, DPAC, Nampula, Nampula City, 4/8/94. 24 DPAC, Nampula, “Reflexão sobre ...” 25 Mutaquiha (1992). 26 Baptista Lundin (1992). 27 The Mecubúri report, pp. 1–2; RM, PN, Conselho Executivo do Distrito de

Angoche, “Reflexão sobre a autoridade/poder tradicional,” Angoche, 16 de

Novembro de 1992, pp. 3–4; cover letter: RM, PN, Administração do Distrito de Angoche a Exmo. Senhor, Director Provincial de Apoio e Controlo de

Nampula, Nampula, 649/ADA/9.12, 3/12/92 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 28 Baptista Lundin (1992: 28, 29); Lourenço and Hilário (1988a; 1988b);

Lourenço (1992). 29 Ibid.; the Monapo report; Cavala (1990). 30 RM, PN, Distrito de Angoche, “Comunicado final,” Angoche, 4 de Dezembro de 1991; cover letter: RM, PN, Administração do Distrito de Angoche à

Direcção Provincial de Apoio e Controlo, Nampula, 383/ADA/18.7, 19/12/91 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. 31 Grest (1995); Metselaar et al. (1994). 32 RM, PN, Administração do Distrito de Angoche, “Síntese da primeira reunião com as estruturas tradicionais (Régulos, Chefes das Povoações e Reis),”

Angoche, 14 de Fevereiro de 1992 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,”

DPAC, DA; cover letter: RM, PN, Administração do Distrito de Angoche à

Direcção Provincial de Apoio e Controlo de Nampula, Nampula, 5/ADA/2.5, 31/3/92 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA, p. 1. 33 RM, PN, Conselho Executivo do Distrito de Angoche, “Reflexão sobre ...,” p.10. 34 MAE, “Província de Nampula.” 35 Lourenço and Hilário (1988a: 10). RM, GPN, DPAC, DA, “Apreciação sobre o poder tradicional: Reflexão do Distrito de Mogovolas,” Nampula, 13 de

Novembro de 1992 in Dossier, “O Sistema Tradicional,” DPAC, DA. Cf.

MAE, “Província de Nampula,” p. 6 and p. 7, respectively. 36 Ibid., p. 6. Cf. Lourenço and Hilário (1988a; 1988b); Lourenço (1992); the

Mecubúri report. 37 Lourenço and Hilário (1988b: 7). 38 MAE, “Província de Nampula,” p. 16. 39 Mutaquiha (1992: 7). 40 Cf. the Malema report, p. 2; the Murrupula report, p. 2; Lourenço and Hilário (1988b: 8). 41 For the first emphasis, see the Monapo report, p. 6. For the second emphasis, see RM, PN, Conselho Executivo do Distrito de Angoche, “Reflexão sobre ...,” p. 2. 42 Cavala (1990: 5–6). 43 To this extent, they represented what Tom Holt has called “symmetrical

336 Notes

discourses” in which secretaries and chiefs occupied structurally homologous positions.Cf. Stoler (1995: 127). See Malkki (1995), especially Chapter 3, for a recent extended study of this phenomenon in independent Africa. 44 Interventions by the administrators of Mogovolas, Angoche, Ribáuè and Murrupula in MAE, “Província de Nampula”; the Malema report, p. 3. 45 RM, PN, Distrito de Angoche, “Comunicado final,” p. 4. 46 The 1993 Mogovolas report, p. 3. See also the 1992 Mogovolas report, p. 2. 47 Ibid.; RM, PN, Conselho Executivo do Distrito de Angoche, “Reflexão sobre ...,” p. 5. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid; Lourenço (1992: 21–4); DPAC, Nampula, “Reflexão sobre ...,” p. 8. 50 Cf. ibid.; RM, PN, Conselho Executivo do Distrito de Angoche, “Reflexão sobre ...,” p. 5; Lourenço (1992: 20–1); the 1993 Mogovolas report, p. 2. 51 Lourenço (1992: 9–10; 11–12). 52 Ibid., pp. 15–16. 53 Ibid., p. 16. 54 Ibid., pp. 17–18. 55 Ibid., p. 18. 56 In Portuguese the passage reads as follows: “violação dos direitos fundamentais do homem, universalmente condenados pelos amantes da vida humana (milicianos).” 57 Ibid., pp. 19–20. 58 The Monapo report, p. 13. 59 DPAC, Nampula, “Reflexão sobre ...,” p. 5. 60 Mutaquiha (1992: 7–9). 61 Ibid., p. 9. 62 Baptista Lundin (1992: 28, 36–7, 39–40). 63 MAE, “Província de Nampula,” p. 3. 64 The Monapo report, p. 13. 65 For a harsh assessment, see Geffray (1988: 72–6). 66 CEA (1986); Geffray and Pederson (1985); Geffray and Pederson (1986);

Hermele (1988a). Harris’ study of social relations in a production cooperation deployed a similar approach and, to a certain extent, prefigured this later work. See Harris (1980). 67 It did not, however, problematize, as Englund (2002) does, the ways in which the local and external are mutually constitutive in the historical process. See, in particular, ibid., pp. 78–9. 68 Brito (1991: 189); Geffray (1991). See also Finnegan’s (1992: 228–9) late night musings. A variation of this theme is also to be found in Geffray’s later work: that the nationwide confrontation was reproduced at the local level in a violent clash between historically marginalized, more traditional, lineagebased communities and groupings which had reaped some of the fruits of modernization but still retained their essential character as lineages. For an extended case study that underscores the fallacies of viewing local wartime and postwar dynamics through the prism of the official ideologies of the two main belligerents, see Englund (2002), especially pp. 2, 58–9, 66, 70, 151. In certain critical respects, the accounts provided by de Brito and Geffray represent inverted versions of “nationalist epics” that have found it useful to identify and showcase leaders of early anti-colonial, inter-ethnic rebellions and to portray these individuals as the political and intellectual forebears of modern pan-African nationalist leaders. Sunseri (2000: 575–9). If the political objective of the nationalist epic was to stress the indigenous roots of nationalism, the aim of revisionist historiography of post-independence Mozambique is to assert the foreign provenance of Frelimo’s Marxist-inspired nationalism,

Notes 337

the steadfast refusal of the Mozambique’s rural populace to assist in this ideology’s indigenization, and the suspect character of Frelimo’s grassroots devotees. Whereas the central protagonists in the nationalist epic are heroes, self-evidently the secretary in revisionist historiography is anything but. 69 See especially Brito (1991: 269–301). 70 A variation on this theme which appears in policy-oriented writing is that local conceptions of legitimacy and accountability are negotiated and contested but that such negotiations and contestations are waged and settled independently of their engagement with outside influences and forces, most notably those exerted by state institutions. Cf. West and Myers (1992); Baptista Lundin (1993). 71 The Monapo report, pp. 13–15. 72 O’Laughlin (2000: 33). 73 See, inter alia, Casal (1988: 187–8); Geffray (1991: 17); Marshall and Roesch (1993: 249); and Borges Coelho (1993: 392–416). See also Chapter 3 above. 74 Lourenço (1992: 19). 75 Ibid., p. 20. 76 For the case of Eráti, see Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 4, 8, 24). For the case of Nampula Province more generally, see Vieira Pinto (1984). 77 Baptista Lundin (1992: 10). 78 Ibid., p. 12. Cf. ibid., pp. 9n.6, 26, 33–4. 79 Ibid., p. 38. 80 Ibid., p. 34. 81 Ibid. 82 Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 60). 83 The Murrupula report, p. 3. 84 The Mecubúri report, pp. 3–4. 85 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 86 MAE, “Província de Nampula,” p. 6. 87 Geffray and Pederson (1986: 317). 88 Interview, former administrator of Ribáuè District, Nampula City, 2/8/94. See Chapter 3 above. 89 MAE, “Província de Nampula,” p. 1. 90 RM, PN, Administração do Distrito de Angoche, “Síntese da primeira reunião ...,” p. 2. 91 Lourenço (1992: 16). 92 Ibid. 93 My emphases. 94 Baptista Lundin (1992: 27, 28, 36–7). 95 Lourenço (1992: 19, 21). 96 The Mecubúri report, p. 3. 97 Lourenço and Hilário (1988b: 8). My emphasis. 98 O’Meara (1991). See also Hanlon (1984: 67–70) and Saul (1985d: 82–3). 99 Machel (1979: 156). 100 O’Meara (1991: 94–5). 101 Machel (1979: 158). 102 Ibid., p. 163. 103 Munslow (1987b: xxvii). 104 For a variation on this theme, see Nordstrom (1997: 100–1). 105 Mbembe (2001: 109). 106 Ibid., p. 110. Compare to ibid., p. 104. 107 That Frelimo leaders were of this opinion is asserted by Hanlon (1984: 145). 108 Machel (1979: 160). 109 Interview, Chief Taibo (the former colonial régulo), Namapa Center, 2/10/94.

338 Notes

110 Interview, three apuiamuene, Namapa Center, 3/10/94. 111 Similar themes have been recently sounded by Renamo MP’s. See “Family law to protect women’s rights,” Mf, 322 (May 2003), p. 11. 112 Interview, Namirôa Center, 26/8/94. 113 Interview, former residents of 25 de Junho Communal Village, 25 de Junho Communal Village, 27/8/94. 114 See Chapter 2 above. 115 Interview, Chief Tubruto, Namirôa Center, 13/6/94. 116 Interview, “Zagaia,” Alua Administrative Post, 24/9/94. 117 Interview, Odinepa Center, 3/6/94. 118 Interview, demobilized troops, “Zagaia,” Alua Administrative Post, 25/9/94. 119 Interview, UNAMO representatives and members, Alua Center, 15/6/94. 120 Interview, Odinepa Center, 6/6/94. 121 For more on the phenomenon of “colonial nostalgia” in postcolonial Mozambique, see Englund (1996; 2002: 67–8, 116); O’Laughlin (2000: 40); and Harrison (2000: 76, 187–93). The “boom” in colonial and precolonial nostalgia throughout the continent has been widely remarked. Werbner (1998b: 1; 1996: 3–4); Ranger and Vaughan (1993b: 1). 122 Interview, Namapa Center, 19/10/94. 123 Mazrui (1969: 201). On the subject of heroes and villains in the context of postwar Mozambique, see Englund (2002: 39). 124 As cited in Clapham (1991: 263–4). 125 A point driven home by Minter (1994: 9ff). 126 Brito (1991: 242–3). 127 Geffray and Pedersen (1985: 29). 128 Geffray (1991: 74). 129 See Weinstein (2002: 145) on both sides’ heavy reliance on forced recruitment. 130 Minter (1994: 250). 131 Chabal (1992: 72ff), especially pp. 74, 228, 229. 132 Ibid., p. 187. 133 Serra (1999b: 175); “Disinformation leads to riots,” Mf, 307 (February 2002). 134 Serra (1999b: 176) and passim. 135 Ibid., pp. 133–4, 177. For similar, contemporaneous fears, see Schafer and Bell (2002: 412). The 1997 conscription law mandates that all Mozambicans must register for military service within the year following their 18th birthdays. It empowers the army to select a determinate number from this pool of potential recruits and to train them for a two-year-period of compulsory military service. Recruitment targets set by the military have been low and, by early 2001, only 1,000 recruits had undergone training and were serving under the new program. The vast majority of draft-age youngsters dodge their legal obligation to register for military service. “Defence Ministry out to conscript 3,000,” Mozambique News Agency, AIM Reports, 143 (23 September 1998); “Youngsters ignore conscription,” Mozambique News Agency, AIM

Reports, 201 (19 February 2001); “Most youngsters not registering for military service,” Mozambique News Agency, AIM Reports, 225 (11 February 2002). 136 “Polemic over cholera violence,” Mf, 274 (May 1999). 137 See “Family law ...,” Mf, p. 11 and Serra (1999b: 133), respectively. See ibid., pp. 133–4, 172–7 for a discussion of similar rumors, how they might be interpreted, and how they were cast publicly by the government. See “No evidence for tales of trafficking in human body parts,” Mf, 332 (March 2004) and “Assembly approves agenda,” Mozambique News Agency, AIM Reports, 271 (4 March 2004) for more recent developments along these lines. 138 If this reading is correct, the influence exerted by the memory of large-scale out-migration serves, at one and the same time, as the metaphorical social

Notes 339

equivalent of what psychologists call “proactive” and “retroactive” interference. Winter and Sivan (1999c: 12). 139 “A criminalidade em Maputo data do periodo colonial,” Domingo, 10/7/94. 140 For a similar speech, see Africa Watch (1992: 67). 141 Spillman (2003: 185) and passim. 142 This is my reading of how the logic of Spillman’s argument (ibid.) would apply to the present case study. 143 On the need to investigate why an object of mnemonic practice comes to function as a screening device (of whatever ilk) in the first place, see WagnerPacifici and Schwartz (1991: 403). See also Hamilton (1998).

8 Roots, routes and rootlessness

1 Quoted in “Second month of national debate on draft constitution,” Mozambiquefile, 167 (June 1990), p. 8. See also the remark made by Chissano the previous year, as cited in Matonse (1992: 31). 2 For other aspects of Frelimo’s legitimation profile in the post-1990 period, see Pitcher (2002: ch. 7). 3 Cahen (1993: 58). 4 Here and elsewhere I owe an intellectual debt to Ann Stoler’s work on the deep connections between the making of the bourgeois body and that of the modern national body politic. See Stoler (1995), especially Chapter 4. 5 RPM, PN, V Sessão da Comissão Coordenadora Provincial para a Socialização do Campo, “Síntese,” Nampula, 23 de Junho de 1989, p. 5 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA, Nampula. 6 Ibid., p. 1. 7 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 8 V [Quinta] Sessão da Comissão Executiva Provincial para Socialização do Campo, “Resolução sobre Socialização,” Nampula, 23 de Junho de 1989, pp. 2–3 in Dossier, “Socialização do Campo,” DPA, Nampula. 9 RPM, PN, V Sessão da Comissão Coordenadora Provincial para a Socialização do Campo, “Síntese,” p. 1. 10 Rural testimony as paraphrased in Salomão Muiambo, “Chissano e Frelimo sentem-se derrotados,” Notícias, 10/10/94. 11 Harrison (1996: 25). 12 Harrison (2000: 180). 13 Interviews, Chief Taibo (former colonial régulo), Namapa Center, 9/6/94; Frelimo party secretaries, Namirôa Center, 11/6/94; Chief Tubruto, Namirôa Center, 13/6/94. 14 Overviews of the campaign, or aspects of it, are taken up in Saul (1994a); Cahen (1994; 1995; 1997; 2000); Hall and Young (1997: 233); and Manning (2002), as well as in the sources cited below. 15 Saul (1994a); Allen (1994); “Sluggish start to campaign,” MPPB, AWEPA, 13 (11 October 1994); Eddie Koch, “Who cares about electing ‘thieves’ and ‘murderers’?” Weekly Mail and Guardian, 10, 42, 21–27/10/94. 16 Cahen (1992: 10; 1993: 57); Saul (1994a); Harrison (1996). 17 When the country held its first presidential and general elections based on the principle of universal franchise. 18 Koch, “Who cares ...?” 19 Lourenço Jossias, “Arrogância,” Savana, 14/10/94. 20 Cahen (2000: 183). 21 Chabal (2002: 119, 102). Chabal emphasizes Renamo’s commitment to the latter option while Cahen (1995: 151) concedes that there were leading elements within Renamo that were hostile to the prospect of elections. Cahen

340 Notes

also makes various allusions to Dhlakama’s growing conviction that he could win the presidential race. Ibid., pp. 143–6. 22 “‘Em campanha ataca-se o mais forte’,” Savana, 7/10/94; Salomão

Muiambo, “Ontem foi dia negro para Dhlakama em Nampula,” Notícias, 8/10/94; Carlos Coelho, “Helicóptero de Dhlakama apedrejado em Mogovolas,” Notícias, 10/5/94; “Dhlakama’s election campaign,” Mf, 220 (November 1994). 23 Ibid.; Lourenço Jossias, “‘Dêem-nos uma oportunidade’,” Savana, 7/10/94.

This was perhaps especially the case in southern Mozambique where, according to Cahen (1995: 139), Frelimo “did not hesitate to instill tribalist resentments in order to win votes.” It is important to stress, however, that ethnicity was far from being the dominant theme of either sides’ campaign. Manning (2002: 148). For more on Dhlakama’s political appeals, and especially on the contrasting ways in which he addressed urban and rural voters, see ibid., p. 135 and Cahen (2000: 174). 24 Jossias, “‘Dêem-nos ...’” This view was apparently widespread among

Renamo’s cadres. Cahen (1995: 129). 25 António Elias, “Dhlakama está seguro em Sofala,” Savana, 1/7/94. 26 Ibid.; Jossias, “‘Dêem-nos ...’” 27 Ibid.; Lourenço Jossias, “Dhlakama a todo gás na Zambezia,” Savana, 30/9/94;

Alexandre Chiúre, “Dhlakama pisa terreno falso,” Savana, 14/10/94. 28 Jossias, “‘Dêem-nos ...’” 29 Fernando Manuel, “Santo de casa também faz milagre,” Savana, 26/10/94. 30 See also Cahen (1995: 135, 139, 141) on this point. 31 Jossias, “Dhlakama a todo gás ...” 32 For this claim and the psychology behind it, see Cahen (1995: 143–4). 33 Manuel, “Santo de casa ...”; Elias, “Dhlakama está seguro ...”; Jossias,

“Dhlakama a todo gás ...”; Jossias, “‘Dêem-nos ...’”; Chiúre, “Dhlakama pisa ...”; “Sluggish start ...,” MPPB; “Dhlakama’s election campaign,” Mf; “The other giant,” MPPB, AWEPA, 13 (11 October 1994). 34 Manuel, “Santo de casa ....” See also Salomao Muiambo, “Dhlakama segue hoje para Cabo Delgado,” Notícias, 11/10/94; Chiúre, “Dhlakama pisa ...”;

Muiambo, “Chissano e Frelimo ...”; Elias, “Dhlakama está seguro ...” 35 Muiambo, “Dhlakama segue ...” 36 Elias, “Dhlakama está seguro ...” See also Manuel, “Santo de casa ...” and

“Dhlakama’s election campaign,” Mf. For an interpretation of these allegations and predictions, see Cahen (1994; 1995: 134–5). 37 Marcelo Mosse, “Homoine hostil a Chissano,” Savana, 21/10/94. 38 Cahen (1995: 141). 39 Hilton Cuvaca, “O centro é baluarte da RENAMO mas a FRELIMO provou a sua implantação,” Savana, 14/10/94; Fernando Veloso, “‘Se a Frelimo se safar é boleia de Chissano’,” Savana, 14/10/94; Alexandre Chiúre, “O ‘showmício’ e as

‘promessas’,” Savana, 26/10/94. 40 “Chissano on the campaign trail,” Mf, 215 (June 1994), p. 15. 41 Ibid., p. 16. See also “Chissano on the hustings,” Mf, 220 (November 1994);

Salomão Muiambo (texto) and Amadeu Marrengula (foto), “Guerra dos que se afirmam democratas foi de destruições, roubos e matanças,” Notícias, 7/7/94;

Fernando Manuel, “Lar, doce lar,” Savana, 15/7/94; and Severino Sumbe, “O mérito de chamar as coisas pelos nomes,” Domingo, 29/5/94. 42 “Chissano on the hustings,” Mf, p. 9. 43 Ibid., p. 10. 44 Ibid., p. 8. 45 “Chissano tours Nampula province,” Mf, 178 (May 1991), p. 6 sounds similar themes.

Notes 341

46 See, inter alia, Hanlon (1991); Plank (1993); and Saul (1994a; 1996). For a critique, see Freund (1995) and Pitcher (1996; 2002). 47 See, inter alia, “Chissano on the campaign trail,” Mf, p. 16; “Chissano on the hustings,” Mf, p. 7; Salomão Muiambo (texto) and Isidro Pascoal (foto),

“Rombézia está condenada a desaparecer do país,” Notícias, 27/8/94; Manuel,

“Lar ...”; Sumbe, “O mérito ...”; and “Biggest show,” MPPB, AWEPA, 13 (11 October 1994). For an exception, see Bento Balói, “Um povo que reclama sem papas na língua,” Domingo, 1/5/94. 48 See, in particular, “O Governo está sob pressões internacionais,” Domingo, 10/7/94. 49 “Chissano visits South Africa and Malawi,” Mf, 225 (April 1995), p. 15. For a variation on this theme, which is recurrent in Chissano’s speeches, see

“‘Organised crime’ killed Cardoso,” Mf, 294 (January 2001), p. 15. 50 See also Hall and Young (1997: 231) on this point. 51 On this latter point, see Hanlon (1991: 120–1) and Hall and Young (1997: 198). 52 Manning (2002: 133). 53 Cf. Muiambo and Marrengula, “Guerra ...”; Bento Balói, “O voto já (?) está no bolso,” Domingo, 8/5/94; “Chissano on the campaign trail,” Mf, p. 15. 54 For the few instances where these benefits were invoked, see “Chissano on the hustings,” Mf, p. 7 and Sumbe, “O mérito ...” 55 Machado da Graça, “10 anos sem Samora,” Savana, 23/2/96. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion which follows is based on this article. See also “Savana

‘entrevista’ Samora Machel,” Savana, 19/7/96; “Ten years without Samora,”

Mf, 242 (September 1996). 56 For similar views, see Manning (2002: 133). 57 As reported in “Mais traficantes do que comerciantes,” Savana, 16/9/94. 58 “Chuva de inaugurações, apoio ao poder tradicional e crença em Deus,”

Domingo, 31/7/94. 59 Fernando Lima, “Chissano em Nampula de camisete e boné,” Savana, 23/9/94. 60 For a critique of this argument as articulated by Sachs and Honwana Welch (1990: 71–2), see Mamdani (1996: 132). 61 “Renewal or continuity? Frelimo’s Seventh Congress,” Mf, 251 (June 1997), p.6. 62 “Elections: dispute over registration,” Mf, 276 (July 1999), p. 5. 63 “Mocumbi defends nationalisations,” Mf, 274 (May 1999), pp. 6, 8; “Assembly throws out Renamo bills,” Mf, 275 (June 1999), p. 14; “Renamo aborts constitutional change,” Mf, 279 (October 1999), p. 9. 64 “Frelimo cadre conference in Beira,” Mf, 303 (October 2001), p. 4. If anything, it has shown itself much more prone to underscore what did not qualify as such an error. The many round-ups of “anti-social elements” from the streets of Maputo that both preceded and marked Operation Production stand as a case in point. See “‘Guebuza’s not from the north or south – he’s from

Mozambique,’” Mf, 312 (July 2002), p. 11. 65 As cited in Manning (2002: 131–2). 66 West and Kloeck-Jensen (1999: 463). 67 Ibid., and p. 464, respectively. 68 As cited in ibid. 69 As cited in “Chissano addresses regulos,” Mf, 232 (November 1995). 70 What the entire ensemble of practices examined here also suggests is that, in the post-1990 period Frelimo has pursued a strategy of normalization via ritualization; in contrast, Renamo has elected to try to normalize its past through a strategy of relativization, as attested by Dhlakama’s campaign rhetoric reviewed above. For a discussion and evaluation of these two routes as played

342 Notes

out in the Federal Republic of Germany and in a reunited Germany, see Olick (1998b). 71 B.B., “Frelimo e Mungói,” Savana, 24/2/95. 72 For more on the spirit of Mungói and its evolving relationship with the government, see Nordstrom (1997: 147–51). 73 Balibar (1991: 86). 74 Cf. Chapter 3 in Appiah (1992), especially pp. 60–1, and Mbembe (2001: 105). 75 Hall and Young (1997: 231). 76 Cahen (1988b: 13). 77 Cahen (1987: 157). 78 Cahen (1988b: 4). 79 Cahen (1987: 158). 80 Ibid., p. 159. 81 Cahen (1988b: 3). 82 Cahen (1992: 3; 2000: 168). 83 Cahen (1995: 127) specifies the social groups he believes the label should apply to. 84 Cahen (1993: 49). 85 This argument is echoed by Saad Filho (1997: 195–6). For the general case that the creation of new capital cities under colonial rule gave birth to new geographic centers of power and thus carried consequences for post-conquest state consolidation, see Herbst (2000: 16–17). 86 Cahen (1993: 49). 87 Cahen (1987: 159). 88 Cahen (1993: 56). 89 Cahen (1987: 162). 90 Cahen (1988b: 12). 91 Cahen (1992: 9). My emphasis. 92 Cahen (1987: 160). 93 The problem is not resolved in Cahen’s subsequent work, which I am unable to delve into in detail here. In a more recent piece, for instance, Cahen finds, on the one hand, that Frelimo was true to its declared commitment to antiracist and anti-tribalist principles; on the other, he argues that:

Since they [the social group which came to power under “Southernist ethnic hegemony” but which was not reducible to a single ethnic group, nor to a coalition of ethnicities] expressed themselves through a “national” discourse, without ever publicly revealing their own identity, the denial of ethnicity classically served to disguise the strong ethnicity of Southern groups, particularly those of the Shangaan. (Cahen 2000: 168–70)

See also ibid., p. 171. 94 Cahen (1993: 50). 95 Cahen (1988b: 10). 96 Cahen (1992: 5). 97 For an instance of such a movement, see Dinerman (1998: 377–8). 98 For the tendency for Africanists to abstract the petty bourgeoisie from relations with other classes and the social relations of production, see Williams (1976). 99 Lonsdale (1992b: 352). 100 Cahen (1993: 49; 1992: 3). 101 Cahen (1993: 49). 102 Cahen (1988b: 10).

Notes 343

103 Ibid., p. 8; Cahen (1992: 4; 1993: 48). The term derives from French Marxist anthropology, most notably the scholarship of Meillassoux (1981). Meillassoux’s work, like modes of production theory in general, has been critiqued for being functionalist. For the intellectual influence Meillassoux exerted on Geffray, see O’Laughlin (1992b: 110). 104 Cahen (1993: 54). 105 Ibid. 106 Cahen (1983; 1984). 107 Cahen (1985: 52–6). 108 O’Laughlin (1977). For a review of the feminist critique of the concept of the domestic mode of production and the theory of the relationship between production and reproduction it explicates, see Moore (1988: 49–54). 109 As Minter (1994: 256n.17) has described it. 110 Geffray (1991: 16). 111 Ibid, p. 53; Young (1994: 166); Finnegan (1992: 125–6), who cites the then Minister of Culture approvingly to this effect. 112 Geffray (1991: 14). See also the section entitled, “Le malentendu,” in Brito (1991: 153–61). 113 Ibid., pp. 160, 162–3. See also pp. 131–2. This reading is curious given that the prevailing view is that popular support for conventional nationalism on the continent was predicated on a very different, if no less colossal, misunderstanding. As Chabal (1992: 160) puts it,

The masses who supported nationalism expected or were led to expect that independence would bring an end to colonial inequalities. But the new African élites, who largely ran the nationalist parties, expected for their part that independence would permit the unfettered development of the pattern of productive inequalities which had served them well. 114 Geffray (1988: 79). My emphases. This view is now widely held. See Manning (2002: 49). 115 Geffray (1991: 14). 116 Geffray (1987a: 29). 117 Geffray (1991: 16). 118 Geffray (1988: 80). 119 Manning (2002: 131–2). 120 See, in particular, O’Laughlin (1996) on this point. 121 Cahen (1993: 58); Brito (1991: 324). 122 Chabal (2002: 98). 123 Cahen (1993: 56). 124 Cahen (1992: 10). See also Cahen (1993: 57). For the argument that dynamics such as these are typically in play in “Third World” nationalisms, see Nairn (1975). 125 I owe this point to Fine (1992), especially p. 78. 126 See Honwana (1993: 7). 127 The characterization is Mateus Katupha’s (1993: 1). Katupha was then serving as Minister of Culture, Youth and Sport. 128 Wuyts (1985: 198). 129 Saul (1985d: 116). 130 Finnegan (1992: 115). 131 On the importance of “claims for the genuineness of revolution” (Olick 2003b: 10) in the Soviet Union and fascist Italy, for instance, see Corney (2003) and Falasca Zamponi (2003), respectively. 132 Newitt (2002: 198). 133 Ibid., p. 217.

344 Notes

134 Ibid., p. 213. 135 This is the way Manning (2002: 131) describes the manner in which Frelimo cast its embrace of formal democratic institutions in the party’s Central Committee report to the Sixth Congress. 136 Olick (1999). 137 As cited in Saul (1985b: 16–17). 138 The term is Thomas Callaghy’s. As cited in Mamdani (1996: 11). 139 The line of demarcation between foreign-manufactured social forces and precapitalist local societies was situated differently in the two ideologies – in Frelimo’s case, squarely inside the polity; in the case of African socialism, virtually at its margins. But, in both cases, the market remained an alien (super)imposition that had left precolonial social formations essentially intact – even though these formations were the progenitors of the African petty bourgeoisie. Given this common presupposition, the real source of division between African socialism and Frelimo’s Marxism was in their contrasting assessments of the political significance of the near absolute autonomy of most Africans from the market. For devotees of African socialism, the virtual absence of classes was a boon since it meant that traditional African societies would be naturally disposed to socialist politics. For the Frelimo leadership, this selfsame attribute was an obstacle that had to be overcome through stateled development. 140 The term derives from Polletta (1998: 480). Emphasis in original. See ibid., and Falasca Zamponi (2003: 60) on the working through of this dynamic in other contexts. Compare Frelimo’s ulterior motives in this respect to those underlying the SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organization) government’s “national reconciliation” policy in Namibia. Saul and Leys (2003). 141 Glassman (1995: 9). 142 Both phrases are from Barkan (2000: 323). 143 Chabal and Daloz (1999: 69).