extension, late 1950s to mid-1960s

Map 1.1 Area of PCC self-defense communities and early FARC-EP extension, late 1950s to mid-1960s

Sources: Safford and Palacios, 2003: 355; Richani, 2002a: 60; Osterling, 1989: 280; Walton, 1984: 75; Gott, 1973: 282; 1970: 233–36; Huizer, 1970: 404–5. Note: Most likely because of an error in printing, the map utilized within Huizer (1970) should have been more accurately placed within Gilhodés (1970).

There are differing viewpoints on the development and purpose of the self-defense groups. Some recognized the collectives as autonomous passive alternatives to a repressive state (Walton, 1984: 94, 99). Others saw the communities as strategic centers of grassroots communist-based organizing (Osterling, 1989; Gomez, 1972; Pomeroy, 1968). Arguing the former, Avilés (2006: 36) claimed

the communities were “attempting to build sanctuaries independent from the national government.” Rural sociologist Ernest Feder (1971: 189) stated that the groups were made up of a “peaceful nuclei of peasants operating land collectively in relatively isolated regions of the country.” LeGrand (2003: 175–6) documented how many peasants came to view the state as the people’s primary enemy, and to avoid this threat, fled to create regions of safety. After la Violencia, vast numbers “withdrew into isolated frontier regions where they put aside their guns and turned to agriculture once again” (LeGrand, 1986: 163). In essence, much of the writing related to the communities paints a largely pacifist picture of how “these Communist-influenced rural redoubts became refuge zones for peasants fleeing from the partisan violence” (LeGrand, 2003: 175). Some have even depicted the PCC zones as lacking revolutionary vigor. For example, Petras (1968: 355) portrayed the communities as a stagnant sociopolitical and cultural alternative to state repression.34 These almost romantic accounts of communist organizing in rural Colombia are accurate in some respects but fall short in their recognition of the militant construction and political goal of the self-defense groups. Describing her recollection of the PCC’s involvement with the self-defense groups of the 1950s and 1960s, Maria Ovidia Díaz stated, “the campesino self-defense groups were an organization that sought to address the daily needs of the farmers. In its origins these campesino self-defense groups were organized to protect the well-being of the community” (quoted in Obando and Velásquez, 2004). Far from docile, these sociopolitical collectives sought a peace-filled life through mechanisms that would defend their alternative development projects from reaction. The self-defense groups did not exist as individualized non-violent social organizations, but rather understood that objective security was needed to face dominant class-interests (see Gomez, 1972: 252–3). Therefore:

with the overall policy of preparing for guerrilla action (a policy subsequently pursued in other zones as well) intensive work was done to build up stocks of supplies for the future detachments. Large stores of provisions were cached in the mountains …. A plan of hostilities was worked out in advance. (Gomez, 1972: 253)

Simons (2004: 41) remarked that as a result of la Violencia, peasants had to become “organized in self-defense units by the Communist Party ... forced to take military initiatives to avoid extermination.” In formation the groups illustrated a significant threat for the rural elite and a potential time bomb for the state (Crandall, 2002: 60). The communities – arranged in a localized dual strategy of sociopolitical cultural development and defensive measures to sustain alternative collective societies – did not promote a non-militant autonomous existence. They were rather organized communists, part of a larger network vying for a revolutionary shift in the social relations of production (see Peace and Socialism, 1966). Several scholars have described the sociological make-up of the regional self-defense groups as communities that formed themselves into administrative

social structures independent of centralized state powers (Simons, 2004: 42; Ramírez Tobón, 1981; Gilhodés, 1970; Guzmán Campos, Fals Borda, Umaña Luna, 1964; 1962). At the beginning of the 1950s, increased migrations of peasants and rural wage laborers were occurring in areas where the PCC was organizing. Some of the first were El Davis, Tolima, and El Pato, situated on the borders of Huila and Caquetá, which later became the first regions to house the FARC-EP.35 These networks showed how men, women, youths, and children could facilitate alternative social development (Gomez, 1972: 249).

A community leader with executive powers, a parcelador (who distributed the land and assumed the role of judge in the event of confl ict), and a general secretary (in charge of publicity and information). They formed a kind of council, together with representatives from each of the veredas (rural neighborhoods), in which the representatives of the party and of the youth and women’s organization also participated. The women’s organization was responsible for promoting certain elements of cooperativism in the home, such as the collectively used sewing machine and for taking care of the schools. Other elements of collective life were in evidence as well in Pato (and, with variations, in other zones) including a collective cane distillery and a library (in general, of a very political nature). Literacy campaigns were waged and classes in politics, to which attendance was compulsory, were given. (Gilhodés, 1970: 437–8)

This sheds light on the PCC’s relation to the self-defense groups; it is manipulative to call them “independent republics.” Led by members of the Central Committee, the networks would later be responsible for founding the FARC-EP (Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, 2002: 32–4; de la Peña, 1998: 331; 353). Hence, guerrilla warfare was “the intensification” of an already existing class-based struggle (Lenin, 1965f: 216). As noted by Alfredo Molano (2000: 25), “Marulanda ... organized a community based on economic self-management and military self-defense. This was the first of the guerrilla bases that later came to be known as ‘Independent Republics.’” Part of a multifaceted plan of class struggle, the communities soon became a potential risk to the existing class structure, and then had to be suppressed (Gomez, 1972: 249, 251–2; see also Crandall, 2002: 60).

The growth and demise of Marquetalia: The US/Colombian state’s response to rural (communist) development The success of the communities led sectors of the political and economic elite to see:

a threat in the existence of the self-defense zones. It realized that they were not a sign of relative equilibrium in the class balance, but a manifestation of class struggle. Consequently, a plan of aggression against these zones began to be elaborated in 1957. It envisaged fi ve stages: civilian action, economic

blockade, military action, unifi cation of the zone, and its “return to the orbit of national life”. In 1960–63 the government began to carry out this plan. (Gomez, 1972: 251; see also Sánchez and Meertens, 2001: 178–84)

Under the rubric of Plan Lazo,36 the United States and the Colombian state implemented an extensive tactical campaign entitled “Operation Marquetalia,” to disrupt the progress of the self-defense groups (Sánchez and Meertens, 2001: 204n.4; de la Peña, 1989: 354; Gott, 1973: 299). It was in 1964, however, that the most aggressive military campaign in Colombia’s modern history occurred, with orders to “retake the municipality of Marquetalia, a communist hamlet in the extreme south of Tolima, on the border of Cauca and Huila” (Hylton, 2006: 56). The mission suboperations “Cabeza” and “Soberanía” added a two-pronged military attack aimed at killing PCC/guerrilla leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez and eliminating the southwestern self-defense groups (Ruiz, 2001: 110; Lartéguy, 1970: 147–8). Accompanied by Colombia’s entire fleet of Iroquois helicopters, over 20,000 Colombian forces and US advisors conducted aerial bombardments and ground assaults against the region (Ruiz, 2001: 109). Well before its use in Vietnam, the Colombian Air and Armed Forces also utilized US-supplied napalm during the campaign to desolate the Marquetalia valley (Hylton, 2006: 40; O’Shaughnessy and Branford, 2005: 25; Dudley, 2004: 10; Sánchez and Meertens, 2001: 204n.4; Cala, 2000: 58; Cockcroft, 1972: 117n.1, 134). Some have even said that Marquetalia gave the United States “the opportunity to try out napalm” (Walker III, 2001: 24; see also Grandin, 2006: 98).37 To illustrate the importance of the operation, all we need do is underline its monetary and tactical costs. By mid-1964, the Colombian state had devoted over US$17 million alongside one-third of its entire army to defeat Marulanda and the network of self-defense communities (Alejandro and Billon, 1999; de la Peña, 1989: 354; Gott, 1970: 249; Lartéguy, 1970: 148). Using general inflation rates, the operation would today total almost US$3 billion. Marquetalia became a defining moment in Colombian history. Winning in Marquetalia was essential for US/Colombian forces. Marquetalia had become an objective and symbolic capacity of the people’s ability to fend off the state while partially existing outside a capitalist system. The communities had become “virtually autonomous principalities whose borders were not violated by government forces” because of the defensive measures employed by the guerrilla (Walton, 1984: 94). A very real need existed to quell stories circulating of how peasants and guerrillas were able to create and hold power for themselves (see Gilhodés, 1970: 445). The stories held some truth as the state had been unsuccessful at hampering the PCC’s growth inside Marquetalia, Rio Chiquito, El Pato, Guayabero, and other regions through southern Colombia throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.38 Over a span of several years, the state saw thousands of troops defeated by the self-defense forces in the southwest (Osterling, 1989: 294; Gomez, 1972: 251; Gott, 1970: 248; Lartéguy, 1970: 146).39 While in some areas “troops easily dealt with groups of young patriots who, influenced by romantic idealism, had taken arms,

ignoring the actual conditions in which they had to operate,” Marquetalia (and Marulanda) proved far more complex.

In Marquetalia however – and this is an indicative fact – the resistance offered by the self-defence detachments (backed by a nationwide protest movement against the aggression) repulsed an expeditionary corps of seven thousand men in early 1962 and compelled the [class] enemy to give up the operation. (Gomez, 1972: 251)

With much of the region destroyed, Operation Marquetalia was a success (see Gott, 1973: 301). Yet in the context of Plan Lazo, it is hard to characterize Marquetalia as a victory: Marulanda remained alive and well, the self-defense groups stayed intact, the organizational presence of the PCC continued in southern Colombia (Hylton, 2006: 56; Stokes, 2005: 73). For example, during Operation Cabeza, “the seemingly easily ensured victory proved much more difficult to achieve. While the government’s troops prevailed, that they struggled to defeat a few hundred guerrillas was an embarrassment” (Crandall, 2002: 60). Cabeza characterized both the failure of the state to achieve its goals and the surprising ability of the guerrilla forces to function and defend zones when targeted. A mere 50–200 combatants were stationed throughout Marquetalia at the time of the attack (Simons, 2004: 41; Crandall, 2002: 60; Osterling, 1989: 295). Alongside preparations for the strike, the guerrillas successfully evacuated all families from the area (Livingstone, 2003: 180; Gomez, 1972: 252). The entire community of 4,00040 was able to flee due to the intelligence gathering and organizational preparation of the guerrillas (Stokes, 2005: 73; Livingstone, 2003: 180; Ruiz, 2001: 110; Pearce, 1990a: 64; Osterling, 1989: 281, 294; Gilhodés, 1970: 444). The rural leaders in the community knew of the state’s mission and “anticipating the attack, the peasants evacuated children, elderly people, and women who could not fight” (Richani, 2002a: 62; see also Gomez, 1972: 252).41 Within months of Operation Marquetalia the guerrillas were also able to retake the zone (Gott, 1970: 254). The legend of Marquetalia is still shared by everyone from the countryside to the café – a legend that details how Marulanda proved incredibly resourceful in taking on US/Colombian forces (Alejandro and Billon, 1999). It symbolically

marks the start of renewed armed resistance .… The army symbolically took the Marquetalia region, but in spite of its new anti-guerrilla conceptions, it was militarily impossible to wipe out the seed of struggle, which had sprouted from these lands. The seed is the origin of the FARC-EP. (FARC-EP, 1999: 17–18)

Marquetalia became the turning point in Colombia’s revolutionary struggle. Immediately following the campaign a significant segment of the rural population moved to support the guerrillas (Gott, 1970: 251–2; see also Chernick, 2007: 55–6; de la Peña, 1998: 360).42 After multiple attempts to find a

peaceful solution to the internal strife, even offering to surrender himself so as to protect civilians in the communities, Marulanda claimed that no other avenue but armed struggle was available (Braun, 2007: 29; Maullin, 1973: 131n.13). Contrary to claims that the PCC sought “a peaceful road to revolution,”43 the Party supported Marulanda and acknowledged that many forms of struggle (including “armed action”) were needed to achieve change in Colombia (Ratliff, 1976: 70, 73; Vieira, 1970: 22; 1963: 17–19; Pomeroy, 1968: 312–13).44 In short, Marquetalia produced both the legend of Marulanda and the victorious rise of the FARC-EP (Gomez, 1972: 253–4).

The linkages between Marulanda, the FARC-EP leadership, and the PCC As might be expected, the FARC-EP’s founding commander-in-chief of the Central High Command45 (sometimes referred to as the commander in chief of the Central General Staff) was Manuel Marulanda Vélez.46 Known for having “elements of political and military genius,” Marulanda’s story is one of great complexity and importance (Ruiz, 2001: 8). Even though he has been cited as the greatest revolutionary peasant leader in the history of the Americas, and will forever remain one of the most important figures in Colombian history, very little is known about the political and sociological origins of “Tiro Fijo” outside Colombia.47 While any text worth its salt contains an account of the once commander-in-chief, most fail to address the origins of his ideology. Like many of those who make up the FARC-EP Secretariat,48 Marulanda was the son of a peasant. As a young adult he became a peasant producer, and at times a wage-based agricultural worker (Alejandro and Billon, 1999; Pearce, 1990a: 56). Other accounts have claimed that prior to his involvement with the guerrillas Marulanda was a lower-level employee in public works, and specifically the Ministry of Transportation in Tolima and Caldas, in the area of highway construction (Braun, 2007: 29; Maullin, 1973: 129n.2; Gilhodés, 1970: 444).49 Whatever his occupational history, it is imperative to outline Marulanda’s politics, especially his relation to the PCC. Any statement describing Marulanda as a Liberal rather than an orthodox communist and member of the PCC is seriously misleading. It is true that Marulanda briefly associated himself with the Liberal party as an adolescent.50 Yet his ideology and sociopolitical tendencies resonate with the doctrines of a communist program, a political theory he faithfully followed for well over a half-century without deviation (Lozano Guillén, 2001; Marulanda, 2000; Alejandro and Billon, 1999; Alape, 1989). During his early and mid-teens, Marulanda was, as a result of his socio-geography not his politics, historically aligned with the leftist tendencies of the Liberal Party in rural Colombia. This was due, in part, to the fact that he was born into “a peasant family deeply influenced by the violent political struggles between Colombia’s Liberals and Conservatives” (Cala, 2000: 57; see also Wickham-Crowley, 1992: 331). By the time he was in his early 20s, however, Marulanda clearly became aligned with Marxism-Leninism and abandoned any social-democratic ideology (Cala, 2000: 57–8; Alejandro and Billon, 1999; Pearce, 1990a: 56; Maullin, 1973:

129n.2). Already politically astute in Marxism, Marulanda’s education in Marxism-Leninism can also be traced to Jacobo Arenas51 (Cala, 2000: 57–8; see also Dudley, 2004; Molano, 2000). By the end of the 1940s, Marulanda had become strongly involved in the PCC, and in 1952, at age 24, he officially became a member (Pearce, 1990a: 56; Maullin, 1973: 129n.2). In a few short years Marulanda stood out as an outstanding guerrilla fighter and organizer of the PCC in the Central Cordillera. As an important leader he was elected to the Central Committee in 1960 (Wickham-Crowley, 1992: 331; Pearce, 1990a: 56; Hobday, 1986: 363; Maullin, 1973: 129n.2; Gomez, 1972: 249; Pomeroy, 1968: 312). Marulanda became instrumental in the establishment of all the self-defense groups in southern Colombia, most notably Marquetalia (Molano, 2000: 25; Gott, 1970: 26, 235). Following the military aggressions associated with Plan Lazo, Marulanda pursued the formation of the FARC-EP as a revolutionary political-military organization with a coarse but organized hierarchical structure (Gomez, 1972: 254-255; Gott, 1973, 1970). When looking back on this formation, Marulanda retrospectively explained how the FARC-EP organized itself under a broad, flexible, yet complex, revolutionary strategy.

Faced with the aggression against Marquetalia, for example, we created a single leadership. We were building a new type of general staff as the supreme political and military authority, taking care that militarism did not overwhelm everything. We set up the military structure that corresponds to an extraordinarily mobile struggle, and we adjusted the tactics to the necessities of that needed mobility. The guerrilla detachments and groupings are deployed in the fi eld with the same versatility as a very small guerrilla unit. If we need to, we establish fi xed commands for whatever time is required. Discipline is not imposed; rather, it springs forth in the conscious combatant as a necessity of the struggle. The barracks method modeled on that of the units of troops in the bourgeois army is now but a memory of the fi rst days of the guerrilla force. However, our military structure is guided by conscious revolutionary military principles, adjusted to our form of guerrilla force. We maintain a critical and self-critical attitude in the face of our political and military errors, while we are guided by a profoundly respectful conduct in our dealings with the masses and in their interests. We raise and support the immediate and fundamental demands of the masses, which by virtue of our activity are in the fi elds like us. We were never, and we will never be, a bunch of self-important people trying to dictate the line to everyone else, nor defenders of the absurd thesis that ‘the guerrilla force creates the party.’ We go forward guided by the orientation of the only party that has always been with us: the Communist Party. And we will always continue to be so guided. (Marulanda, 2003: 120)

This chapter has demonstrated how the FARC-EP’s roots are firmly planted in the PCC of the twentieth century alongside those from the countryside, making it the people’s army.52