Becoming the people’s army: The evolution of the FARC(-EP

1999: 128). Jennifer Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin (2006: 178) have clarified how a “lack of economic opportunity contributes to leftist guerrilla violence.” The FARC-EP are bound to experience defeats, tactical reformation, and withdrawal, but to think that this implies the movement is over is indicative of a level of ignorance towards both guerrilla warfare and the material conditions that pervade Colombian society and class struggle. The suggestion that the FARC-EP has experienced defeat fails to comprehend the right of self-determination. The struggle in Colombia is far from over. It will continue to be waged through radical and antagonistic forms. As the US and Colombian dominant class continues to engage a war against the poor, so too will they exacerbate “Colombia’s internal conflict by robbing families of their livelihoods and leaving them with little option but to join the left-wing guerrillas, particularly the FARC” (O’Shaughnessy and Branford, 2005: 7).

BECOMING THE PEOPLE’S ARMY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE FARC(-EP)

In agreement with the writings of Che Guevara (2006: 13–14), Colombia offers an important example of “revolutionary optimism” and contests the premise that certain countries lack the immediate conditions for radical transformation. The FARC-EP has been applauded for consistently vindicating “the ideological roots of the revolution, with Martí and Bolívar, which moreover undoubtedly found echoes throughout the continent even in countries where conditions were not ripe for insurrection” (Raby, 2006: 105). For decades, the PCC – in accord with the USSR – proclaimed that Colombia was in no position of revolutionary upheaval (Livingstone, 2003: 206; Gott, 1970: 519; Pomeroy, 1968: 308).11 Yet in the early 1980s, the FARC-EP, independent of the PCC, argued that “for the first time … a revolutionary situation existed in the country,” and therefore, new strategies needed to be developed to take advantage of the sociopolitical situation (Pearce, 1990a: 173; see also Schulte-Bockholt, 2006: 110). After years of cooperation and struggle, at the Seventh Conference of the Guerrilla Movement (May 1982), the guerrillas announced that they had become the “People’s Army” (Ejército del Pueblo).12 Doing so meant moving from a solely defensive collective to a revolutionary guerrilla movement taking on “more offensive military tactics” (Simons, 2004: 52).

This new method meant that the FARC-EP would no longer wait in ambush for the enemy. Rather, it would go in pursuit to locate, besiege, and surround the enemy and if the enemy were to change its method of operation, returning to its old concept, the FARC would attack with an offensive of mobile commandos. For the first time since the revolutionary guerrilla movement arose in Marquetalia, the Seventh Conference gave the movement a clear strategic and operational concept for a revolutionary army.

(FARC-EP, 1999: 26)

Safford and Palacios (2003: 356, 364) described this period as a “metamorphosis,” where the guerrilla organization extended its operations while decreasing relations with the PCC. By changing its military structure, the FARC-EP “altered its gradualist strategy and prepared to seize power” (Livingstone, 2003: 207–8). Hylton explained the change by sharing how the guerrilla group:

abandoned its defensive strategy, in theory (they had already done so in practice), to protect themselves throughout the national territory – a change symbolized by the initials, EP (Army of the People), added to the group’s name. The FARC had already expanded from its bases in Caquetá, Meta, and Putumayo, into the Urabá, the Middle Magdalena, and areas of the southeastern plains – Guavaire, Vichada, and Vaupés – which had indigenous majorities. This was the jump-off point from which … the FARC would become a military enterprise dedicated to territorial expansion and control.

(Hylton, 2006: 65)

Maintaining its Marxist-Leninist roots, the FARC-EP became “an authentically offensive guerrilla movement” (FARC-EP, 1999: 26). By the end of 1982, the guerrillas claimed to be a formidable force for and of the people, “with a centralized hierarchical structure, a general staff, military code, training school and political program” (Molano, 2000: 26–7). This has remained intact as the FARC-EP carry out “political work with its rural and urban popular bases and a hit-and-run war of attrition on the army” (Safford and Palacios, 2003: 364). Through “a readjustment of all its mechanisms of leadership and command” the insurgency changed in name and form (Hylton, 2006: 63; Simons, 2004: 52; Safford and Palacios, 2003: 364; Livingstone, 2003: 207–8). The FARC-EP has a complex command structure. Although there is a strict and binding hierarchy, the level of constant interaction between the highest sectors of the FARC-EP’s leadership and all members is surprising. It was not rare to see those belonging to the FARC-EP’s Secretariat involved in dialog, jovial discussion, and seeking general observations and input from the various ranks. On a daily basis, the leadership talked with all members on a variety of issues ranging from camp structure to regional coordination. An example of how combatants are organized and must follow formal levels of authority in the organization was noted during a trip to an educational facility. When travelling through an immense river system, a small group of guerrillas, who belonged to a different company from those I had been with, quickly surrounded the boat I was on. I was asked a series of questions relating to who I was, what I was doing in that part of the country, and so on. I was then asked to wait. As they walked away, I could overhear three of the squad members who had just interrogated me. They met with what seemed to be a squad commander or deputy. After roughly ten minutes, the commander/deputy proceeded to order one of the squad members to contact the column commander to find out whether my answers were accurate and I truly was who I claimed to be. Within 15 minutes the squad commander, with three squad members,