The Castaño connection

he sustained into his first term as president (Hylton, 2006: 93; Murillo and Avirama, 2004: 103; see also 113, 204n.4; Scott, 2003: 71–2). The CONVIVIRs were finally “outlawed in 1999 after many of them were implicated in human rights abuses, including massacres of civilians” (Leech, 2002a: 26; see also Murillo and Avirama, 2004: 103, 204n.4). However, what eventually arose from the ashes of the CONVIVIRs was what had been predicted by its original opponents; the inclusion of the civilian forces into paramilitary organizations (Sánchez, 2003: 22; Crandall, 2002: 97n.78). While some saw the elimination of the CONVIVIR as a progressive move to restrict paramilitarism, in reality the “cooperatives” inflated the existing paramilitary networks throughout the country (see Simons, 2004: 316; Restrepo M., 2003: 103). The networks did not evaporate but were “instrumental in the accelerated growth” of the country’s largest paramilitary organization during the 1990s – the AUC (Murillo and Avirama, 2004: 103–4; see also Sweig and McCarthy, 2005: 19). Colombian sociologist Fernando Cubides (2003: 131) revealed how the CONVIVIR “became semi clandestine, and, according to various sources and the declarations of some of their leaders, put themselves at the disposition of the paramilitaries.” While the AUC witnessed growth outside the formation of the CONVIVIRs, once it was outlawed paramilitary membership saw a significant influx (Hylton, 2006: 93). In short, “when the Constitutional Court banned the Convivirs for numerous massacres of unarmed civilians, their foot soldiers simply passed into the ranks of the AUC” (Hylton, 2006: 95; see also Holmes, 2003: 90; Leech, 2002a: 26). By relinquishing its “formal” involvement with the CONVIVIR and not ensuring its disintegration, the state facilitated aggressions against suspected guerrilla supporters via civil society (Brittain, 2006d).10 The justification behind institutionally validating paramilitarism was to defend the conventional economic and political stability of a select minority. The result, however, has been an offensive mechanism that propagates far-right conservatism. Rather than rectifying the reasons for antagonism to the dominant class, the state – assisted by Washington – put its energy into counterinsurgency in an attempt to decimate resistance (Ampuero and Brittain, 2005). As this account emphasizes the state’s link to “regulating” paramilitarism, it is important to detail where the ideology and persona of contemporary Colombian paramilitarism came from.

THE CASTAÑO CONNECTION

As the FARC-EP increased its presence in the country by the mid-1970s, so too did it adopt the practice of “retention.” This is regularly referred to as kidnapping, but in fact the practice of retention is quite complex, with a clear class target and political motive. First the guerrillas collect intelligence on persons whom they view as representing the interests of the dominant class.11 This usually includes right-wing ideologues, members of the political elite, those

with relative wealth, military personnel, and so on.12 The insurgency then conducts a “study” of the individual’s political-economic status, and decides whether to “retain” the person against their will. In most cases, the individual remains in custody as a prisoner of war until a monetary fee has been acquired or a humanitarian prisoner exchange has taken place. In the late 1970s, the insurgency carried out such intelligence gathering on one Don Jesús Castaño. A staunch far-right Conservative, Don Jesús was a dominant capitalist in Segovia, Antioquia. In addition to his class position and political ideology he was a director of community affairs, making him a textbook case for “retention.” By 1981, the FARC-EP made the decision to retain the right-wing cattle rancher and landowner.13

Don Jesús fathered twelve children, eight of whom were boys, the eldest named Fidel. Leaving home at 16, Fidel became involved in the lucrative emerald industry, though illicitly, as a smuggler (Livingstone, 2003: 133; Ruiz, 2001: 172). Always keeping his foot in the waters of the infamous Colombian emerald trade, Fidel stretched out into the profitable and growing economy of narcotics by using his contacts and experience. A competent smuggler, he soon tried his hand at trafficking marijuana and cocaine. In a relatively short period of time the one-time thug established himself as a principal figure in the Colombian drug trade. Fidel quickly became excessively wealthy, enabling him to acquire extensive tracts of land in the north (Livingstone, 2003: 221). He and his younger brother Carlos purchased over 1.2 million hectares of land throughout Antioquia, Córdoba, and Chocó (Mercedes Pereira, 2001: 19–20). By the 1980s, Fidel had become one of “the most powerful capos in Colombia and the world” (Dudley, 2004: 98).14 Aside from being first and foremost an illicit entrepreneur, Fidel was brought up a staunch Conservative in socio-economic opposition to egalitarian forms of production. The experience of their father’s retention and death changed the Castaño brothers’ ideology from mere economic protectionism to reactionary aggression aimed at the FARC-EP. The two wealthiest sons of Don Jesús organized a private military to both protect their property and business interests in northern Colombia and avenge their father’s passing. The Peasant Self-Defense Units of Córdoba and Urabá (Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá, ACCU) became one of the most powerful and well-funded paramilitary forces up to that point in Colombian history.15 The brothers, through the ACCU, began to work with sectors of the military to combat the guerrillas.16 By utilizing their wealth, they began “an explicit anti-guerrilla agenda – and offered its services, particularly in the area of intelligence, to the army’s Bomboná battalion, which was operating in the areas where the brothers owned land” (Richani, 2000: 38–9). Southeast of the Castaño brothers, another paramilitary organization was beginning to form as well. Unlike the ACCU this anti-guerrilla collective was not formulated around an individual family or regional context, but through a much wider coordinated effort of mercenaries, drug cartels, large landowners, cattle ranchers, foreign MNCs, state officials, and high-ranking members of the Colombian army.