JACs and political pacification

and cultural activities; and the organization of cooperatives and labor exchanges.

(Bagley and Edel, 1980: 260)

A year later, Decree 1791 saw further services bestowed upon JACs, such as “adult education, reforestation, preparation of residents of overpopulated areas for migration, and the development of animal husbandry for dietary improvement” (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 260). Nevertheless, the state did not permit JACs to participate in politics or local decision making, which mattered little as authority appeared to be held at the level of the community. As time lapsed JACs became a façade of “power,” as they provided an image of local control while the political remained restricted.

JACS AND POLITICAL PACIFICATION

The official state line was that JACs were constructed under the premise of supporting rural “development, through community self-help” and to “alter the passivity of the Colombian campesino” (Dix, 1967: 151–2). The goal, however, was to sociopolitically pacify the rural population during the rise of agrarian capitalism (Zamosc, 1986: 38; Bagley and Edel, 1980: 258–60). Resembling the National Front in the cities, the state needed to appear sympathetic to the peasantry but restrict political control. The reasoning was threefold, to:

• pacify active state-antagonists in the countryside • decrease PCC political work and alliances throughout the rural sector • sever ties between peasants, the landless, indigenous groups, small producers, workers, and the militant revolutionary goals of the guerrillas.

In pursuit of these objectives, Colombia’s dominant class supported the implementation of JACs as a means to “make communities less receptive to anti-elite sentiments and movements” (Richardson, 1970: 44). As the local action boards spread, so too did “the presence of the state in the countryside” (Henderson, 2001: 400). Although they appeared to be rural-based peasant organizations, JACs were in fact strategic state-induced mechanisms created to pacify class-conscious peasants. Far from organic, they were “created by government officials” and used by the local elite to procure increased political clout and/or garnish centralized state funds (Pearce, 1990a: 149).10 In most cases JACs, completely guided by state-based development officials and the dominant class, rejected local input (Henderson, 1985: 231; Richardson, 1970: 44; Dix, 1967: 151–3). Robert H. Dix (1967: 153) suggested the action boards manufactured an image of social change; a “motivation to improve rural conditions without altering the real balance of social power in the countryside.” It is not difficult to see why the state greatly expanded JACs in the hopes of gaining a political foothold over the countryside.

JACs were systematically directed towards areas of organized left-wing political action (Pearce, 1990a: 127; Zamosc, 1986: 195; Bagley and Edel, 1980: 260–2). Working with the action boards, the state tried to limit (or eliminate) “rural enclaves of Communist Party strength” (Collier and Collier, 2002: 466; see also Bagley and Edel, 1988: 262; Solaún, Flinn and Kronus, 1974: 152–3). The intention was to not only persuade people to relinquish peasant political activity, alliances with radical groups, and introspection as a class, but to emphasize the importance of localized apolitical community-based development, thereby stabilizing the centralized state (Zamosc, 1986: 38, 51–2, 195; Bagley and Edel, 1980: 258). Others noted that the JACs were formed to discourage alliances between the rural populace and “rural left-wing guerrilla movements” (Collier and Collier, 2002: 683, 686). The state’s hope was that JACs would undermine “the degree of loyalty which the campesinos of some regions continued to hold toward certain former guerrilla leaders” (Dix, 1967: 378). Bruce M. Bagley and Matthew Edel (1980: 261–2) revealed that where “ideological revolutionary groups had some roots among the peasantry” JACs, the state, NGOs, and private corporate interests quickly arrived to gain “central control by bringing peasants groups into closer contact with national agencies. This tactic, accompanied by military and police action in most cases, succeeded in gradually reducing the organizational and ideological coherence of the radical peasant groups.”

JACs and capitalist economic development Action boards took on an “important role in government plans to stimulate economic development” (Collier and Collier, 2002: 686). If revolutionary movements could be weakened, the state was free to broaden rural-based projects for capital expansion. One of the most readily implemented activities was the building of schools. JACs became an active partner in infrastructure related to the construction of rural schools. The end of the 1960s saw roughly 1,000 built through their assistance (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 264). Ironically, this was not done with the intention of escalating rural education, but to stimulate monetary growth outside the urban-industrial sector.11 In reality, rural education was discouraged as the state refused to establish services past the primary level, a practice that remains largely present to this day (Marsh, 1983: 63–4; Jallade, 1974: 33; see also Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008: 6, 12; Dávalos, 2001: 72). The rural school system was grossly deficient in its formal structure and teacher qualifications (Adams, 1968: 89, 92–3). As years passed, it became clear the state had little aspiration of reforming the rural education system or the insufficient services therein (Williamson, 1965: 37). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s “only 10.8 percent of the [rural] population had had five or more years of schooling” (Saunders et al, 1978: 100; Adams and Havens, 1966: 213). During the 1960s, literacy rates exceeding a grade five level were 10 percent while 37 percent of all people above 15 years of age were unable to read at all (Gunther, 1966: 432). By the 1970s, the numbers had barely

improved, with 85 percent of rural-based children being unable to obtain any formal education at even the primary level, while 94 percent of homes had only one-third of their children enrolled (Jallade, 1974: 32).

Over three-quarters of the rural schools offer only two years of education, and only 15 percent of those enrolling in the rural first grades can expect to enter the third grade in a rural area …. Only three percent of those entering rural primary education later register in the fifth and final grade of primary school in rural areas.

(Adams, 1968: 89)

The state cared little for rural education but rather sought to stimulate economic expansion (while making Bogotá appear to be an active supporter of the peasantry). Failing to offer education at secondary or post-secondary levels, the young migrated from the countryside en masse (Jallade, 1974: 33). Of those who remained, almost 100 percent were denied the ability to obtain any formal education past the age of nine (Shultz, 1970: 15). Ironically, at a time of proposed rural prosperity and development – specifically through the construction of schools – young people wanting to obtain an education were forced to leave the very areas the JAC “helped” (see Shultz, 1970: 14-18, Jallade, 1974: 32n.1). Not necessarily intentionally, certain non-government organizations (NGOs) that worked with action boards patronized what little education was given to the rural population. For example, accounts showed how indigenous peoples, who have cultivated agro-based crops for millennia, were seen as rationally unable to comprehend how to “grow vegetables” (see Sumwalt, 1974: 34; Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1965: 52). Demonstrating their supposed lack of cultural understanding, these US-based NGOs “taught” them how to properly nurture crops in the Colombian countryside. We can recognize the state’s intentions concerning rural education through such practices. The “students” did not receive any applicable education, nor was it within a formal education facility. Certain documents suggest that rural infrastructure was unavailable or nonexistent amidst the “development” construction boom (Sumwalt, 1974: 36). Rather, the state-supported foreign NGOs pushed rural producers to better conduct manual labor, an already all-too-familiar activity. Dale W. Adams (1968: 94–6) argued that what was truly needed was a developmental program that encouraged a model of higher education and domestic training of localized production. Adams (1968: 91) opposed Colombia’s development programs as a platform organized and carried out by persons completely disassociated from the realities of rural life and the social relations of production there. One of the reasons was that the Colombian state, with the support of Washington, did not offer any educational facilities or opportunities to people in the countryside (Marsh, 1983: 193; Jallade, 1974: 33; Adams, 1968: 89, 92–3). In short, JACs (alongside the state, associated foreign development agencies, and/or NGOs) assisted capital development and not a change in inequitable rural-based social relations.12

The politicization of JACs While excluded from formal politics, JACs did enable large numbers of small producers, landless peasants, and rural workers to increase their understanding of functions related to local governance.13 In pursuit of financial support from Bogotá, those from the countryside became acquainted with managing finances and lobbying. Apart from the state, JACs also developed relations with industry. In Arauca, for instance, action boards:

became one of the main mechanisms for BP’s [British Petroleum’s] relationship with the communities. In addition, the idea that oil would bring new developments to communities and that BP was willing to help with social projects led a number of communities to organise their own community development associations. These associations also became involved in protests about the impact of oil on their environment. (Pearce, 2007: 239–40)

Such conditions “led the community boards to see themselves as local semigovernments able to represent their communities in matters outside the search for project grants” (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 265). This empowered the once-pacified JACs to become pseudo-autonomous political organizations. “Though in many ways effective, these organizations ... began to escape from central government control and various local JACs began to form regional organizations to increase their ability to pressure the government” (Collier and Collier, 2002: 696–7). In turn, some JACs sought reformist measures to better satisfy the wants and needs of their community, while distancing themselves from centralized state control and the promotion of capitalist expansion via development agencies. Nearing the end of the 1960s and early 1970s certain JACs began to work alongside rural federations and unions at municipal and regional levels. This unification of interests antagonized the state and increased the influential power of the community action boards (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 265). Southern-based JACs particularly rallied around issues of land and were becoming radicalized (Pearce, 1990a: 149). Several carried out actions against local state representatives who had supported elite interests over the peasantry, small producers, and the landless. Throughout Caquetá, Cundinamarca, Nariño, and Putumayo, JACs were demanding land, credit, irrigation, and various social services (Zamosc, 1986: 45–6).

A large number of community action boards had presented government agencies with petitions for land redistribution, complaints about government services, demands for transportation services, and had made other grievances known. In 1966, three-quarters of the juntas had experience with petitioning for matching funds, and slightly over one-third had presented petitions or demands on other matters.

(Bagley and Edel, 1980: 265)

While some reforms were carried out as early as 1962 due to such demands, radicalized JACs began to obstruct the state in their communities (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 266). JACs in Tolima attacked “public officials who favored large landowners over small farmers in the distribution of services,” while letter and telegram campaigns concerning land reform flooded Cauca (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 265). As the National Front restricted oppositional party viewpoints from entering the conventional governing sphere, the more radicalized JACs formed their own local governments, imitating what had been done during the 1920s and early 1960s through the PCC (Osterling, 1989: 296; Henderson, 1985: 318n.38; Gott, 1970: 231–2; Alexander, 1973: 46; 1957: 252; Hobsbawm, 1963: 17). After witnessing the politicization of these JACs, the state grew concerned about destabilizing scenarios in various sectors of the country (Berry and Solaún, 1980: 448). Those in Bogotá feared the action boards “were in danger of escaping from central influence,” and therefore “had to be brought back under control” (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 266). To rein them in, the state implemented clientelist policies, which saw JACs that supported official state policies being pleasantly rewarded with financial assistance, and those that wavered experiencing a withdrawal of monetary support (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 266, 269; see also Collier and Collier, 2002: 687). Additional restrictions were implemented through Decree 2263 (1966). This permitted the state to appoint representatives directly to JACs as a means to divide “the community action movement by creating new organizations to compete with or replace” the growing unity within (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 267).14 The administration of Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970–74) even tried blackmail to depoliticize the JACs (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 269). Those seen as too political (that is, radical) were charged with violating government policy and denied state support. While some JACs became radical, many wished to remain neutral. As time went on, however, the realities of state apathy led to more moving outside Liberal and Conservative party structures (Berry and Solaún, 1980: 439; Richardson, 1970: 44–5). In one study, 52 percent of those surveyed felt that state-based JACs “benefited few or none” of the rural populace (Henderson, 1985: 232).15 As government financial support wavered, action boards were forced to find funding within their impoverished communities (through for example horse races, fiestas, or dances) (Richardson, 1970: 44–5). Though noble, such efforts proved unsustainable because of the local socioeconomic conditions. Exploiting this problem, rural elites offered to fulfill this need for capital, thereby establishing themselves as the primary financers of local projects. By the 1970s, non-politicized JACs were associated less with small and landless peasants and more with the propertied class (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 262; Richardson, 1970: 44). These JACs saw “substantial participation by politicians, who used their special legislative allocations (‘parliamentary assistance’) to assist projects” (Palacios, 2006: 185). Once again the elite became the decision makers. For centuries, state absence, repression and fiscal insecurity led to rural disarray and political unrest. After decades of clientelist politics, and after

Law 14 (1958) had failed to change the rural political economy for the better, it became customary for JACs to become even more radical. “As time passed, campesinos became skeptical that much would come of Accíon Comunal programs, and a majority came to view them cynically as proof that the government wanted to save money at their expense” (Henderson, 1985: 232). From below, JACs engaged civic protests and rejected political convention by the mid-1980s (Pearce, 1990a: 161). On the one hand, “under the impact of rapid urbanization, regional inequalities, and lack of state provision, the Juntas began to lose their legitimacy, along with the traditional parties” (Pearce, 1990a: 149). On the other, certain JACs radically reformatted their structure to one of revolutionary alliances with the FARC-EP.

The shift to revolutionary alliances On the surface, state-induced community action boards “intended to encourage community participation and self-help projects to improve local services, uniting communities across class lines” (see Pearce, 1990a: 149). Structurally, they were mechanisms to renounce the peasantry as a class (Zamosc, 1986: 38, 52). Leon Zamosc (1986: 195) claimed JACs had two principal functions: “they provided a channel for the expression of the peasants’ needs and they created vertical lines of submission that ... subordinated the peasantry to the executive agencies of the state.” To achieve these methods peasants had to be disengaged from material class relations, “by vertically integrating all sectors of the population around ‘shared community concerns,’ Accíon Comunal was opposed in principal to horizontal class associations” (Zamosc, 1986: 38).

The committees of Accíon Comunal were based upon the principle of vertical integration of the different rural sectors, and since they reproduced local patterns of clientelist domination, they could not be used to promote the demands of the peasantry as a class .… The committees of Accíon Comunal were able to obtain tangible improvements for the peasants, at the price of reinforcing vertical “communitarian” channels that abolished the horizontal bases of class association and strengthened the power of the gamonales and local political clientelism.

(Zamosc, 1986: 51–2, 195)

Colombian history has shown that rural populations are susceptible to organizing around political and socioeconomic class interests (LeGrand, 1986; Gilhodés, 1970). The countryside houses a unique mix of ingenuity, motivation, and solidarity toward community-based development (Payne, 1968: 308). That the state recognized this aptitude for progressive peasant mobilization arguably explains why it established so many JACs over the past half-century. One explanation for why action boards grew so exorbitantly was that they met the state’s need to quell rural protest. By the 1970s and 1980s, JACs were strategically placed in areas where peasant activism was most concerted, moving beyond grievance to radicalism (Pearce, 1990a: 127). “The state