since 1958

gave priority to the promotion of Accíon Comunal in those regions in which the peasant movement had been stronger and more radical: The number of Accíon Comunal committees doubled between 1966 and 1979 throughout the country” (Zamosc, 1986: 195).

For decades the state sought to restrict the FARC-EP by periodically offering charity (Gomez, 1972: 251). When peaceful methods proved unsuccessful in procuring hegemony, the state “turned to threats and repression. The consequence was the continued failure of rural opposition movements and a growing perception, especially among the landless peasants, that the only alternative was to join the guerrilla” (Collier and Collier, 2002: 685; see also Lemus, Stanton and Walsh, 2005: 102; Marsh, 1983; 204–5).

Despite the efforts made by the government to win over the people in these peripheral zones, the latter are continuing to give strong support to their fellow peasants in the guerrilla units. The correct policy pursued [by] the revolutionary movement has borne fruit.

(Gomez, 1972: 253)

Rather than abandoning the gains achieved through JACs many ideologically joined the FARC-EP and sustained the very structures once created to pacify them (see Richani, 2002a: 80). As clientelism and repression increased, the state and JACs collided over issues of rural politics and development. The 1980s and 1990s saw altercations become common as select JACs allied with the guerrillas in class struggle against the state (Collier and Collier, 2002: 687; Marsh, 1983: 205).

When the government’s and peasants’ interests diverged, the government tended to rein in the newly created groups. However, by constraining these organizations, the government created new groups of angry, cynical peasants who were, as a consequence, more likely to support the very guerrilla groups that these organizations were originally intended to combat. (Collier and Collier, 2002: 687)

Historically, JACs were “successful in limiting the impact of the left insurgent movements, even though they could not end the conditions that gave rise to

Table 7.1 Growth of state-supported Juntas Accíon de Comunal (JACs) since 1958

Time period Number of JACs 1960s 9,000 1970s 8,000 1980s 32,000 1990s 45,600

Sources: Palacios, 2006: 185; Safford and Palacios, 2003: 327; Pearce, 1990a: 149; Bagley and Edel,1980: 263; INCORA, 1971. In 1966 roughly 4,500 JACs were functional (Bagley and Edel, 1980: 263). By 1974 allegiances between many JACs and the elite declined (see Henderson, 1985: 232).

the guerrillas in the first place” (Collier and Collier, 2002: 687). Yet in time alliances would be formed with the guerrillas as a means of responding to socioeconomic and political conditions. Having few alternatives, these JACs adopted a position of revolutionary struggle alongside the FARC-EP (Molano, 2005: 186–7).

The objective, once again, would be to force government authorities and private individuals to recognize the political power of the rural sector, and to elicit from them a reaction that will bring concrete benefits – better services, more credit, higher wages, more input in development planning, etc. – to Caquetá’s poor, rural population. In the case that such peaceful pressures do not lead to positive change or, in fact, provoke more repression and neglect, it would be folly, in light of Caquetá’s current political instability, to deny the inevitability of increased political participation, possibly leading to wider local support for the guerrilla campaigns.

(Marsh, 1983: 204–5)

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, JACs were far from docile or apolitical. Coalitions formed between the insurgency and many JACs as the state lacked the capacity to influence change (see Röhl, 2004: 3; Marsh, 1983). During an interview with one JAC representative from Valle del Cauca, the importance of this partnership became clear. The community leader provided an account of how the FARC-EP and the JACs work together to create emancipatory conditions, not through neo-clientelist relations but by way of class consciousness.

While my view may not be what you want to hear it is my personal belief that the FARC should not provide social services at this stage in the struggle. It is not their responsibility to offer, provide, or distribute social services for they are not the state. If some fronts decide or choose to provide such services this may cause some peoples within certain communities to become apolitically reliant on the guerrillas to provide social services. It may also restrict people in some communities from coming to a political place of understanding or supporting the struggle and the need for revolution in this country because some are receiving services without comprehending that the state [in Bogotá] has failed to support them. The most important service that the FARC provides is their support for the struggle of the people through the defense of our rights and needs for change. It is through our Accíon Comunal that the services are to be provided and through the FARC-EP that our communities can exist to do so.

While it cannot be thought that all JACs are revolutionary, it is demonstrated that some are working hand-in-hand with the FARC-EP, establishing localized rules of conduct and security while engaging in class-based taxation models where capital is handed over to revolutionized action boards for organic infrastructure projects such as the construction of healthcare facilities, schools, and education centers (Leech, 2006b; Ampuero and Brittain, 2005: 370; Richani,