in selected Latin American countries

Table 7.2 A comparative review of politically motivated assassinations in selected Latin American countries

Country Period of analysis Estimated number of political assassinations Argentina 1976–1983 9,000 Brazil 1964–1979 125 Chile 1973–1990 2,666 Colombia 1986–2006 62,833*

* This figure is actually below that of other scholars and human rights groups that suggest the number of politically motivated assassinations over the past two decades hovers around 70,000 (Torres and Torres, 2005). Sources: Adapted from Dudley, 2004, front flap; Livingstone, 2003: 30; Stokes, 2003b; Giraldo, 1996: 18; with additional data from Chernick, 2007: 54; Petras, 2003: 25; Leech, 2002a: 53.

Revisiting the slaughter of the Unión Patriótica (UP) On paper, Colombia is proclaimed to be one of the longest-running democracies in the Western hemisphere. Since independence, it has held presidential and congressional elections through an electoral college system, coupled with a constitution to ensure ethical, political, and civil matters (Bushnell, 1993; Randall, 1992). However, it should be questioned whether this makes the country a democracy, as a minority has historically placed restrictions on those eligible to engage in politics through requirements of property ownership (the Congress of Cúcuta, 1821), bipartisan alliances as “codified in the restrictive Constitution of 1886” (see Bergquist, 2007: 671), and the direct implementation of political genocide against leftists, as recognized in the case of the Unión Patriótica (UP).50 With a firm place in the hearts of many, the UP has a significant role in Colombian political culture as one of the most important examples of civil society coming together for change through non-violent means (Aldana, 2002). It is argued that the unique ideology, support, and broad spectrum of those who came to form the UP were, in part, the reasons it was subjected to violence, repression, and extermination. Numerous statements, comments, and quotes from renowned scholars of Colombian social and political history provide the basis for the analysis that follows. Those cited do not share a homogeneous perspective on the Colombian civil war, or support a single political philosophy or faction. Nevertheless, there is one common denominator: they all take the informed position that the UP was a legitimate political party in Colombia, which sought, through peaceful means, an end to the civil war and an opening to democratic representation. Historically speaking, the UP, much like the PCC, had indirect associations with the FARC-EP, as did many political institutions and organizations. Following peace negotiations with the Conservative government of Belisario Betancur (1982–86), “many guerrillas laid down their arms and integrated themselves into the orthodox political system, with a good number of them forming a new political party Unión Patriótica” (Crandall, 2002: 33). Hence, in some ways the party was constructed of “former guerrilla members, who in

good faith put down their weapons and who, through the UP, participated in the so-called legitimate political arena” (Rochlin, 2003: 102). The UP, however, was a distinct organization with a dramatically different political project from the insurgency, a program that sought a peaceful path to political change.51 Pearce (1990a: 180) clarified how the FARC-EP was an altogether separate entity at the time, which had organizationally disassociated itself from the UP in ideology and practice. The UP never based itself on a militant doctrine but was “established as a left political party in response to government promises of 1984 at La Uribe that aimed to bring the revolutionary left into peaceful political activity” (Safford and Palacios, 2003: 356). Many believed “the UP was made up of some of the most articulate voices and brilliant political minds of the Colombian left” (Murillo and Avirama, 2004: 63). On May 28, 1985 the UP became an official state-sanctioned political party. As noted, “the foundation and consolidation of the Patriotic Union political party” resulted from governmental agreements where “amnestied members of the FARC-EP were provided legal and constitutional guarantees to organize politically” (Osterling, 1989: 163). The constituency, however, consisted of far more than former insurgents who had left the war behind, and included members of the PCC, trade unionists, and other sectors of the Colombian population who cooperatively worked to establish the UP “as the country’s third political force and main opposition party” (Pearce, 1990a: 175–6, 279; see also Sánchez, 2003: 6; Urrego, 2003: 171; Osterling, 1989: 299).52 While some, such as historian David Bushnell (1993: 258), stated that the UP was partially constructed of ex-guerrillas who had turned their back on violence, researcher Grace Livingstone (2003: 208) suggested the vast majority of the UP rank and file were civilians who had had no direct association with the guerrillas. Only “two FARC comandantes left the mountains, won election, and took up seats as members of congress,” because “most of the UP’s other candidates were not recruited from the FARC, but from other sectors of the left or the Communist Party” (Chernick, 2007: 62; see also Wilson and Carroll, 2007: 85; NACLA, 1990). The most important point to understand is that the UP was never a political arm of the FARC-EP, and to think otherwise is to negate the lateral support and unification of various elements of Colombian civil society. Programmatically, the UP formed itself around the goal of opening a democratic system in Colombia for the purpose of expanding social welfare. The UP sought “political reforms to end the Conservative and Liberal domination of Colombian politics, the popular election of local mayors, rural land reforms and the nationalization of foreign business, Colombian banks and transportation” (Stokes, 2005: 75). Far from armed revolution, or even direct action politics, the UP “advocated constitutional reform, decentralization, grants of land to peasants, increased health and education spending” and “a civilian defense minister” (Livingstone, 2003: 228–9).

The UP stresses that Colombia needs major social, economical, and political structural changes which should be achieved through peaceful means. Among these is the struggle to achieve more political space – the Apertura

Democratica – which would imply the most urgent political opening, such as more access to national institutions and to the mass media, an authentic agrarian reform, various economic reforms which would provide the poor with better educational and health facilities.

(Osterling, 1989: 195)

From an electoral standpoint, the UP was a valid institution which worked in unison with the state. For example, members actively participated with other political parties, government officials, clergy, and former Liberal President Julio Cesar Turbay (1978–82), when drafting a response and review of governmental positions toward the notorious narco-trafficker Pablo Escobar (Kline, 1999: 54). In the field of popular support, the UP showed “significant electoral performance,” which “temporarily demonstrated a plural support base for the emerging ‘legitimate’ left” (Rochlin, 2003: 113). “This support ranged from traditional members such as peasants who endured the brunt of the nation’s poverty, to newcomers in the form of urban and middle-class residents who felt excluded from the elite politics of the Liberals and Conservatives” (Rochlin, 2003: 113). Contrary to conventional political structures of centralized power, the UP proved most prominent at the local level. It was here where “the UP’s gains were more significant,” as “entire areas of the sparsely populated regions east of the Andes comprising almost half of the national territory came under its electoral influence” (Chernick, 2007: 62). By March 1986, less than a year after it had become official, the party had:

succeeded in electing two Senators and three Representatives from its rank, and four more Senators and five Representatives in alliance with members of various liberal or leftist political movements .… The UP won both a Senate and Chamber seat alone both in the department of Antioquia and in Cundinamarca; and alone it won a third Chamber seat in the department of Santander.

(Osterling, 1989: 196; see also Livingstone, 2003: 229)53

In all, the UP gained 12 elected congressional members, 21 representatives to departmental assemblies, 170 members of city councils and 335 municipal councillors (Osterling, 1989: 196–7; Livingstone, 2003: 229). While it has been noted that the 1970s saw a growth in left-of-centre parties, the 1986 presidential elections proved to be the highest vote for the Colombian left up to that point in history (Pearce, 1990a: 198; Cusicanqui, 1987: 129; Maullin, 1973: 16). In a very limited time the UP acquired a significant base throughout the country. Politically speaking, if there was to be electoral continuity the “left” had the potential to become a formidable player in the duopoly of Colombian political culture. Perceiving a threat to traditional political stability, reactionary responses took aim. Doug Stokes reported that the UP was conceived of “as a broad political movement to represent the left in Colombian politics and to articulate peasant