WALKING PATH 6 Women Peacemakers: Listening to Essential Voices
INDEX
Walking Path 6 Programme WCLAC (2012). Women's Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation. YWCA (2014). The Olive Tree Campaign: Keep Hope Alive. European Parliament (2011). Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Palestinian Territories. Link UN Women (2014). Palestinian Women's Access to Justice in the West Bank of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. UN Women (2013). Building Ties: Toward Integrated Strategies and Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women. UN Security Council (2000). Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. Nobel Women's Initiative (2011). Partners for Peace: Women in Israel and Palestine Working for and End to the Conflict and Lasting Reconciliation. Kairos Palestine (2010). Come and See: A Call from Palestinian Christians - A journey for peace with Justice Guidelines for Christians Contemplating a Pilgrimage to the Holy Land
2 5 78 94 116 192
327 331
367
WALKING PATH 6 WOMEN PEACEMAKERS: LISTENING TO ESSENTIAL VOICES
A. SUMMARY Pax Christi International’s history has been marked by the presence of courageous women that have led – many times without enough visibility, ordinary but significant peace initiatives at the local level. From this experience we believe in the essential contribution offered by women to peace dynamics in every society. In our world, though, many women are marginalized, exploited and continue to suffer from violence in their homes and during armed conflicts. This is an important challenge to us. Participants in this walking path will interact with women peacemakers and will listen to their stories of resiliency and will learn from their creative initiatives. Afterward they will strategize on how to find ways of encouraging women in conflict areas around the world so they can transcend this victimhood and to take their rightful place as agents of positive social change. B.
PROGRAM
THURSDAY: A PILGRIMAGE TO WOMEN’S ORGANIZATIONS
13h30-13h45
Transportation to the Arab Educational Institute.
13h45-14h45
-
14h45-15h30
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15h30-15h45
Transportation to the Talitha Komi School
15h45-16h45
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16h45-17h45
-
18h00 20h30-21h30
Meeting with Arab Educational Institute: Getting to know the Sumud House programme, introduction to the Wall Museum. Meeting with Parents Circle Families Forum: Mission and main initiatives.
Meeting with Amal Jubeh, office coordinator for the Hebron Area of the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling who will brief on the mission of the organization, main projects, and future perspectives. Meeting with another organization. TBC.
Back to the Hotel (After dinner) Debriefing in Pilgrimage groups
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FRIDAY: DEEPENING THE DISCUSSION ON WOMEN PEACEMAKERS Through a participatory methodology, participants will look at how their own organizations and other member organizations around the globe are forging peace by promoting women’s participation in peacebuilding processes. 8h30-8h45 8h45-10h15
10h15-10h45 10h45-12h00
12h00
Introductions “Fishbowl” conversation Facilitator: Marie Dennis, USA, Co-President of Pax Christi International. Panelists: Hind Khoury, Palestine, Coordinator of Kairos Palestine; Judy Coode, USA, Communications Manager of the Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns; Elisabeth Beazley, New Zealand, member of Pax Christi Aotearoa/New Zealand; Freek Landmeter, the Netherlands, Director of PAX. Expanding the conversation Break Open space to deepen the conversation Discussion about various topics in small groups Return to large group End discussion session
C. RESOURCE ORGANIZATIONS
Arab Educational Institute: Arab-Palestinian NGO affiliated to Pax Christi International and established in Bethlehem in 1986 by a group of Palestinian educators. Working with youth, women and educators, the AEI is engaged in the field of community education to contribute to the general cause of participation in public life and in peace. Contact:Ms. Rania Murra, Director Website:http://www.aeicenter.org
Parents Circle Families Forum: Grassroots organization of bereaved Palestinians and Israelis that promotes reconciliation as an alternative to hatred and revenge. Website: www.theparentscircle.org
Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling. Established in Jerusalem in 1991, is an independent Palestinian, not-for-profit, non-governmental organisation that seeks to develop a democratic Palestinian society based on the principles of gender equality and social justice. By forging a feminist vision based on equality and social justice, WCLAC plays a prominent role in addressing gender-based violence in Palestinian society in both the public and private spheres. Website: http://www.wclac.org 2
D. ANNEXES (online)
WCLAC (2012). Women's Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation. Link YWCA (2014). The Olive Tree Campaign: Keep Hope Alive. Link European Parliament (2011). Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Palestinian Territories. Link UN Women (2014). Palestinian Women's Access to Justice in the West Bank of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Link UN Women (2013). Building Ties: Toward Integrated Strategies and Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women. Link UN Security Council (2000). Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. Link Nobel Women's Initiative (2011). Partners for Peace: Women in Israel and Palestine Working for and End to the Conflict and Lasting Reconciliation. Link Kairos Palestine (2010). Come and See: A Call from Palestinian Christians - A journey for peace with Justice Guidelines for Christians Contemplating a Pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Link
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Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
October 2012 Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), is a Palestinian nongovernmental organisation established in 1991 and based in Ramallah. WCLAC aims to address the causes and consequences of gender-based violence within the community as well as the gender-specific effects of prolonged military occupation.
© Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling
Published in October 2012 by the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling Ramallah, Batn el-Hawa Telefax: +972 2 2956146/7/8 www.wclac.org Cover photo: Sylvie Le Clezio Design: Palitra Design Print: Studio Alpha This report has been produced with the financial support of the French Consulate in Jerusalem. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC).
Table of Contents Introduction ......................................................................................................................................5 Overview .............................................................................................................................................7 Night Raids . ......................................................................................................................................9 Settler and Soldier Violence .......................................................................................... 17 Soldiers Testify............................................................................................................................. 25 Property Destruction ............................................................................................................ 31 East Jerusalem. ........................................................................................................................... 39 The Gaza Strip . .......................................................................................................................... 49 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................ 55 Appendix ........................................................................................................................................ 59
View east towards the Jordan Valley, photo by GhtH.
Introduction This June marked 45 years since the start of Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. During this time, East Jerusalem has been annexed in violation of international law; half-amillion Israelis now live in illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; and at least 730,000 Palestinian men, women and children have been prosecuted in military courts and imprisoned.1 However, as stark as these facts and figures may be, they do not describe the human cost of occupation on the ordinary lives of Palestinians, and particularly, on the lives of women. This report seeks to illustrate some of the day-to-day challenges faced by Palestinians living under prolonged military occupation through the eyes of ordinary women who struggle, on a daily basis, to cope with an extraordinary situation. These are the stories that rarely make the headlines, but are nonetheless noteworthy because they are part-andparcel of everyday life, and illustrate the practices and policies that have been implemented by the Israeli military and civilian authorities for nearly a half-century. Also included in this report are two testimonies from Israeli soldiers from a new publication released by Breaking the Silence. The testimonies graphically illustrate the corrosive nature of Israel’s military occupation on everybody who comes in contact with it. This report is not intended to provide an in-depth analysis of the situation or seek to cover all issues affecting women living under occupation. Rather, the report relies on 14 testimonies collected from women in order to provide a brief glimpse into their lives and some of the challenges they face. Some of the names of women in the report have been changed to protect their identities.
[5]
Qalandia checkpoint, photo by WCLAC.
Overview After six days of armed conflict in June 1967, the Israeli army occupied the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip (Occupied Palestinian Territory). Regardless of the reasons for the war, international law is clear that territory can never be acquired as a result of aggression, even if exercised in self-defence. Accordingly, no sovereignty in the Occupied Palestinian Territory can legitimately pass to Israel, and no military occupation can be legally maintained indefinitely.2 On the conclusion of the war, the Israeli authorities imposed military law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which still remains in force in the West Bank to this day, and affects approximately 2.5 million Palestinians. In reality this means that an Israeli military commander has full executive, legislative and judicial authority over millions of Palestinians who have no say as to how this power is exercised, contrary to basic democratic principles. Further, the reality on the ground is that during the past 45 years, much of the Occupied Palestinian Territory has been subjected to a creeping annexation involving the construction of settlements, the transfer of 500,000 Israeli citizens into the West Bank and East Jerusalem, accompanied by a relentless grab for resources - all done in clear violation of international law.3 Although Israeli military law is applied to Palestinians in the West Bank, settlers living in the same location are subject to civilian law, giving rise to dual legal systems that discriminate based on origin or nationality.4 The inevitable consequence of these actions has produced tension, poverty, despair, mass detention and displacement. Through the eyes of women, this report highlights just a few ways in which ordinary people are directly affected by this process of de facto annexation and dispossession. The report highlights the use of frequent night raids on villages who dare to protest against the loss of their land, and how these same villages are subjected to settler attacks which the Israeli army does little to prevent. The report also looks at the systematic destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, such as water wells and agricultural buildings, and the difficulty in obtaining building permits in East Jerusalem if the applicant is Palestinian. Finally, the report touches upon the hardship of life in Gaza, which has been subjected to a blockade since 2007, and highlights how simple activities such as studying at night, has become so difficult. Through the eyes of women, this report seeks to provide glimpses of the human cost that prolonged military occupation exacts on ordinary people. [7]
Occupied Palestinian Territory Israel
[ 8 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Night Raids
Photo by GhtH.
The Israeli army has been conducting nighttime operations in Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank for the past 45 years. One of the most common reasons for the military to enter a Palestinian village or town at night is to conduct search and arrest operations. However, in recent times the military has also been entering houses in villages where weekly protests occur, waking Manal T. up entire families, photographing children for future identification and taking away items such as computers and documents in what appears to be an attempt to harass and intimidate the residents into submission. “We believe that repeated night raids like the one on my house are intended to intimidate and frighten us and to force us to give up the weekly protests against the nearby settlement.”
Most night-time operations conducted by the military occur at friction points in the West Bank, usually at locations where an Israeli settlement has been built close to a Palestinian village. In many cases these settlements are wholly or partially built on land owned by the village, and their presence naturally causes tension. Other friction points include roads used by the Israeli army and settlers that pass close to Palestinian villages, as well as army checkpoints and the Wall. “There were maybe 20 soldiers. They broke into the house and asked us all to gather in the living room. My 19-year-old daughter was shivering from fear, she just could not control herself. I think it was about 2:00 a.m. and we had to wake up my elderly in-laws who live next door. They are old and sick but the soldiers forced us to drag them out of bed.” I.M.
The tensions that arise at these friction points can manifest themselves in a number of different ways, including: weekly demonstrations; stone throwing and other forms of violence; army incursions; night raids; and arrests. In recent years, an increasing number of Palestinian villages began protesting the settlements, the illegal Wall built on their land and the prolonged military occupation.5 Typically, these demonstrations are suppressed by the military using tear gas, rubber bullets, water cannon containing a foul smelling liquid (“skunk water”) and on occasion live ammunition. These confrontations frequently result in arrests, injuries and in some cases, fatalities. In order to maintain military control over the territory and curtail freedom of expression in the West Bank, the Israeli army continues to rely on a
[ 10 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Woman treated in An Nabi Saleh, photo by Oren Ziv/Activestills.
1967 military order that effectively prohibits Palestinian demonstrations and free speech. The order stipulates that a “political� gathering of 10 or more persons requires a permit from the military. The penalty for a breach of the order is 10 years imprisonment or a heavy fine.6 Women who live at these friction points and who have experienced nighttime raids speak of their fear and the unsettling effect on their families, and in particular, on their children. WCLAC has also documented cases which indicate there is no legitimate security reason for some of these raids, but are conducted as a form of collective punishment in an attempt to force a village to stop protesting.
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Case Study 1 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Bushra T. 39 An Nabi Saleh, West Bank 20 March 2012 Night raid
On 20 March 2012, the home of a 39-year-old mother from the village of An Nabi Saleh, in the occupied West Bank, is raided by Israeli soldiers after midnight and documents, including title deeds, are forcibly removed. The village of An Nabi Saleh is located 15 kilometres north of Ramallah and has a population of 500 residents. In 1977 the Israeli settlement of Halamish was established about 500 metres away, partly on village lands. In 2009, the settlement expanded still further taking over a spring belonging to one of the villagers. This was the spark for weekly Friday demonstrations by the residents of the village against the settlement. The response from the Israeli army has been to conduct frequent night time raids, which create a sense of fear and insecurity in the village. “I was still awake when I heard the sound of cars pulling up in front of our house just after midnight,” recalls Bushra. “I then heard loud banging at our front door. Anan, my 16-year-old son was awake too. He rushed into my bedroom to tell me soldiers had surrounded our house. I immediately assumed they had come to arrest him as they have done twice before. I was scared and worried that they might beat him up as they did before. I woke my husband and told him soldiers were around the house. We all went downstairs and my husband opened the door. About 15 soldiers rushed in and immediately started to search the house. They spread out into each and every room and did not tell us what they were looking for. The Commander then told my husband to tell us to gather in the living room. My husband told him our two young daughters were asleep but he told him to wake them up and bring them downstairs. I quickly rushed upstairs to get the girls. I didn’t want the same thing to happen as last time when our house was raided and the girls woke up to find army dogs in their bedroom. It was a terrifying experience for them,” says Bushra. “Soldiers then took apart the computer and took out the hard drive and placed it on the table. We didn’t know what was going on and my husband kept asking them questions but they did not answer. They also put the laptop aside and some magazines,” recalls Bushra. “My husband became [ 12 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Bushra T. and her son Anan, photo by WCLAC.
very upset and insisted on knowing why they were placing all these items on the table, but they did not pay any attention to him. Soldiers then went upstairs and searched the wardrobes. They found a bag with all our official documents which included land ownership deeds, birth certificates and other important documents. They took the stack of papers together with the laptop and hard drive and left. When my husband realised they were leaving with these official documents he followed them outside asking them to give us some kind of a proof that they had left with all these items but they ignored his request. The soldiers left our house about half-anhour later and went to our neighbor’s house where we later found out that they did the same thing to them,” says Bushra. “I did not really care about them taking the computer but I am worried about the official documents especially the land ownership deeds. We own a large piece of land where our house is built, on the hill opposite the nearby settlement of Halamish. I worry that they might confiscate the land or even forge a sale without our consent.” “This is not the first time that soldiers came to the house in the middle of the night, but this is the first time they have taken things with them. I don’t feel my house is a safe place anymore. When night falls my heart sinks and Case Study [ 13 ]
I find it hard to fall asleep; I find myself distracted by the slightest sound outside. My biggest worry is my children and their safety. My son Anan stays up late because he expects soldiers to come for him any time and he wants to be awake when they do. Life in the village these days is very stressful.”
Case study 2 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Dalal S. 44 Haris village, West Bank 28 February 2012 Night raid / soldier violence / detention / prison visits
On 28 February 2012, the home of a 44-year-old woman from the village of Haris, in the occupied West Bank, is raided at 2:00 am by Israeli soldiers, and her 19-year-old son is taken away. Dalal lives with her husband and five children in Haris village, in the north of the West Bank. The Israeli settlement of Ari’el is located nearby, partly on land belonging to the village. “On 28 February 2012, at around 2:00 am, I woke up to the sound of loud banging at the front gate,” recalls Dalal. “Somebody was shouting in Arabic telling us to open the gate. It was a cold rainy night. My husband ran out to open the gate, and when he opened it, Israeli soldiers rushed in and entered the house. They were terrifying and my three-year-old daughter cried when she saw them inside the house.” At first the soldiers refused to allow Dalal’s husband back in the house and forced him to wait outside in the rain. The soldiers began to search the house without telling the family what they were looking for. “They made a huge mess with their muddy boots and didn’t make any effort to be respectful,” says Dalal. One of the soldiers then asked for Dalal’s 19-yearold son, Imad. “My husband pointed to Imad and asked the soldiers what they wanted from him, but his question was ignored,” recalls Dalal. Imad was then blindfolded and his hands were tied. “One of the soldiers then kicked him and pushed him into a room, while another soldier led me and the other children to another room.” [ 14 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Dalal S., photo by WCLAC.
A few minutes later Imad was taken out of the house. “He was not dressed properly and didn’t have his shoes on,” recalls Dalal. “My husband asked whether they would allow him to put on some warm clothes but they refused. Imad asked to be allowed to go to the bathroom. At first the soldiers refused but then they allowed him to go and one of the soldiers entered the bathroom with him. Then they took him away. All this happened so quickly, they snatched him away in front of my eyes. I did not sleep that night. I felt helpless and scared. Our neighbours told us the following day that as soon as the soldiers left the house with Imad they started to beat him very hard. They hit him with the butts of their guns all the way to the vehicle which was about 100 meters away. The neighbours also told me that Imad passed out when he was kicked in the head. I nearly passed out myself when I heard this,” says Dalal. The next morning Dalal’s husband called a human rights organisation to find out why their son had been arrested and where he was being
Case Study [ 15 ]
held. They also wanted to know if Imad was alright after being told by their neighbours that he had been beaten. Dalal’s husband gave the organisation their son’s I.D. number and they called back 15 minutes later to say Imad had been taken to a hospital near Petah Tikva, inside Israel. “My husband immediately called the hospital for more details about Imad’s health but the hospital refused to give him any details,” recalls Dalal. The family was later informed that Imad was taken to Huwwara interrogation centre, near Nablus, in the West Bank, after being released from hospital. “I haven’t been sleeping well since he was arrested. I worry all the time that soldiers might beat him up again. He is now in Megiddo prison inside Israel. I applied for a permit to visit him but it took two months before the permit was issued. On 30 May I saw him for the first time. I went with my younger son to visit him. We left the house at 6:00 am and didn’t get back until 7:00 pm. The trip was exhausting and humiliating. The minute I saw Imad I started to cry, I couldn’t hold back my tears. He seemed in good health but I could feel he was very sad. The visit lasted for half-an-hour and I cried the whole time. When he saw how emotional I was he asked me not to visit him again. I think he was emotional too and didn’t know what else to say. At the end of the visit he waved his hand good bye but did not look me in the eye, he couldn’t.” “When I got back home I was exhausted. I still cry a lot and I am unable to go about my daily routine as usual,” says Dalal. “I feel my hands are tied; I am unable to do my house work. I don’t have the energy I used to have. I just wish he gets out of jail as soon as possible. I worry that they will keep coming back for him. This will destroy his future,” says Dalal.
[ 16 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Settler and Soldier Violence
Photo by Sylvie Le Clezio.
“The soldiers then forced me to stand up by pulling my hair while the other soldiers pushed me over the thorn and stones. My shoes fell off my feet and I begged them to let me put my shoes on but they refused.”
At the time of writing, there are approximately 500,000 Israeli settlers living in settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. International law is clear that all settlements are illegal and under the Fourth Geneva Convention Israel is not permitted to allow its civilians to live in these areas. This lack of respect for the rule of law serves only to fuel frustrations and a sense of despair.
Alia A.
The settlements are encouraged by the Israeli government and protected by the army. In order to maintain the settlement project, the army has established a network of checkpoints throughout the West Bank and frequently enters Palestinian villages to break up protests and to conduct arrest operations. This open ended military presence is a major cause of tension and source of violence. Most Israeli settlements are constructed close to Palestinian towns and villages. Not only is this construction illegal, but it also poses an enormous provocation to the local Palestinian population and raises tensions between the two communities. According to the UN, the root cause of settler violence “is Israel’s decades-long policy of illegally facilitating the settling of its citizens inside occupied Palestinian territory. This activity has resulted in the progressive takeover of Palestinian land, resources and transportation routes and has created two separate systems of rights and privileges, favoring Israeli citizens at the expense of the over 2.5 million Palestinian residents of the West Bank. Recent official efforts to retroactively legalize settler takeover of privately-owned Palestinian land actively promotes a culture of impunity that contributes to continued violence.”7 Or in the words of the Israeli organisation, Yesh Din: “[A]cts of violence are being committed by Israeli civilians against Palestinians in the West Bank on a daily basis, manifesting in many forms of attacks against people and destruction of their property. These acts of violence are not isolated incidents, nor are they simply acts of hate or anger. Rather this brand of violence is part of a sophisticated, wider strategy designed to assert territorial domination over Palestinians in the West Bank.”8
[ 18 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Woman arrested during demonstration in An Nabi Saleh, photo by Anne Paq/Activestills.
According to the UN, in 2011 the number of settler attacks resulting in Palestinian casualties and property damage increased by 32 percent, and by 144 percent since 2009.9 According to the same source, 10,000 Palestinianowned trees (mostly olive trees) were damaged or destroyed by Israeli settlers in 2011, undermining the livelihoods of hundreds of families.10 Also in 2011, 139 Palestinians were displaced due to settler attacks, many forced to leave their homes for good. In recent years, some acts of violence by settlers against Palestinians have been perpetrated under the “price tag� slogan.11 Essentially, these are acts of violence by settlers against Palestinians or the Israeli army in response to any act that is perceived to be damaging to the settlement enterprise. These acts of violence include firebombing mosques and cars, destroying crops and painting graffiti on buildings and vehicles.12 With a lack of accountability for acts of violence by settlers against Palestinians, there is little reason to expect the situation to get anything other than worse. The Israeli authorities repeatedly fail to enforce the rule of law in response to settlers’ acts of violence against Palestinians.
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“My house is closest to the settlement of Yitzhar where radical settlers often launch attacks against us. The last time they launched an attack was in December 2011 when a large group surrounded our house in the middle of the night and threw rocks at our windows. It was such a frightening experience that I felt sick for days.”
Israeli soldiers often fail to stop attacks and investigations are inadequate or poorly conducted. Measures such as requiring Palestinians to file complaints at police stations located inside Israeli settlements also discourage the filing of complaints.13
According to Yesh Din over 90 percent of complaints regarding settler violence filed by Palestinians with the Israeli police are closed without indictment, and in more than 84 percent of cases, investigations are closed in circumstances that indicate procedural failure.14 In cases of complaints against the Khadra M. army, the situation is no better. According to Yesh Din: “The chances of a criminal offense carried out by an IDF soldier against a Palestinian successfully navigating the obstacle course of the complaint procedure [...] are almost nil.”15 This lack of accountability was also referred to by the US State Department in its Human Rights Report for 2011.16 Further, this situation is taking place against a backdrop in which the Israeli government is actively encouraging more settlers to move into the West Bank and East Jerusalem.17 Finally, in September 2012, the EU issued a statement condemning continuing settler violence and the deliberate provocation of Palestinian civilians. The statement expressed particular concern about the increasing number and the severity of recent attacks by “extremist settlers”. The statement concluded by confirming that settlement activity is illegal under international law and threatens to make a two-state solution impossible. 18 The EU statement followed the release of a report by the US State Department in which violence by settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank were described in some cases as “terrorist incidents”.19
[ 20 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Case Study 3 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Khadra M. 43 ‘Asira Al-Qibliya, West Bank 19 May 2012 Settler violence
On 19 May 2012, Israeli settlers from the settlement of Yitzhar attack the village of ‘Asira Al-Qibliya, in the occupied West Bank and shoot a Palestinian resident. “I was at home doing some house work on Saturday, when I heard some whistling outside at around 4:45 pm,” recalls Khadra. “I looked out the window and saw settlers wearing white shirts coming down the hill towards the village. My house is closest to the settlement of Yitzhar where radical settlers often launch attacks against us. The last time they launched an attack was in December when a large group surrounded our house in the middle of the night and threw rocks at our windows. It was such a frightening experience that I felt sick for days,” says Khadra. Khadra went up to the roof of her house and started filming with a video camera given to her by the Israeli human rights organisation, B’Tselem. “When the settlers were about 40 metres away from our house men from the village started to walk in their direction to stop them approaching any further. I immediately knew there was going to be a confrontation and hoped the soldiers would show up soon,” recalls Khadra. “More and more settlers came down the hill and more and more men from the village went out to confront them. Both the settlers and the men threw stones at each other. Some were carrying sticks. It took the soldiers a long time to show up but when they finally did, they didn’t do much. I saw a settler with a pistol aiming it at the men in the village as if he was about to shoot. I was so scared,” recalls Khadra. “I heard gun shots. I also saw two other settlers aiming their assault rifles at the men throwing stones. There were more gunshots. Seconds later I realised a young man had been shot in the head.” “This dreadful situation went on for nearly two hours and during this whole time the soldiers did almost nothing,” recalls Khadra. “Then they shot tear gas and everybody started to clear the area. The situation was very Case Study [ 21 ]
Khadra M. and her daughter Ruba, photo by WCLAC.
tense until about 7:00 pm. I could not sleep that night,” says Khadra. “No matter how much I tell myself I should not be afraid I cannot help it. Deep in my heart I was sure the situation would change the minute the soldiers came, but I should have known better. It is a disturbing feeling to know we are completely on our own; nobody is there to help or protect us.”
[ 22 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Case study 4 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Alia A. 15 Suseya village, West Bank 15 March 2012 Soldier violence
On 15 March 2012, a 15-year-old girl from Suseya village, in the occupied West Bank, reports being beaten by Israeli soldiers as she tries to herd the family’s goats. Fifteen-year-old Alia lives in the village of Suseya, in the hills south of the West Bank city of Hebron. On 15 March she recalls that her brother went to herd the family’s goats while she stayed home. “At around 5:00 p.m. I saw an army vehicle stop on the hill where my brother was,” recalls Alia. “About 10 minutes later five soldiers stepped out of the vehicle and walked towards my brother. They were carrying guns. I was worried about my brother and ran out to be with him in case he needed help. I also alerted other villagers.” “My brother was so scared when he saw the soldiers walking towards him that he ran away and left the goats on their own,” recalls Alia.“When I arrived I picked up a stone and tried to herd the goats which were hiding in the vines and under the olive trees. I wanted to take them home before the soldiers confiscated them. All of a sudden, one of the soldiers ran behind me and ordered me to stop. He also said something in Hebrew that I could not understand. He chased me for about five minutes until he caught up with me, grabbed my shirt and pulled me down. I fell down with my face to the ground. The soldier then tied my hands behind my back with plastic ties. I was shouting and screaming and felt very scared. I asked the soldier ‘what have I done? Why are you doing this to me?’ But the soldier did not answer me and kicked me many times in my back with his boots. I was in severe pain.” Shortly afterwards Alia’s mother arrived on the scene and asked the soldiers to stop beating her daughter. “When she approached me to try to rescue me from the soldier the other soldiers prevented her from getting closer. One of the soldiers then beat my mother on her leg with the back of his gun,” says Alia.“My mother screamed out in pain and
Case Study [ 23 ]
Alia A., photo by WCLAC.
called the name of one of our relatives who works for B’tselem and has a video camera. She wanted him to document the incident.” “The soldier then forced me to stand up by pulling my hair while the other soldiers pushed me over thorns and stones,” recalls Alia.“My shoes fell off my feet and I begged them to let me put my shoes on but they refused. They pushed me to where the army vehicle was parked. I saw that they had also dragged my brother, Hamza, and had tied his hands behind his back. They asked both of us to sit by the jeep. When our relative arrived with the camera the soldiers beat him up, tied his hands behind his back with a plastic tie and took his camera away.” Shortly afterwards an Israeli police car arrived. After some argument between the soldiers and the policemen the soldiers released Alia and her brother, but arrested the relative with the camera. “This was a terrible incident; I was shaken for a long time. For a whole week I could not walk because the thorns had caused injuries to my feet. I also woke up in the middle of the night terrified; I kept dreaming that a soldier was beating me up. For months I felt pain in my wrists because the plastic ties were so tight. The ties left a blue mark on my wrist and caused them to swell. I am very scared of soldiers, I panic when I see them even from a distance. I still have bruises on my body even months after the incident,” says Alia. [ 24 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Soldiers Testify
In August 2012, Breaking the Silence, an Israeli organisation made up of ex-Israeli soldiers, released a book of testimonies in which soldiers speak about their service in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The focus of the book is on the treatment of children, but it also confirms many of the statements collected by WCLAC from women who speak about the fear they experience every time the Israeli army enters their village. This book provides strong corroborative evidence of the brutal reality of day-to-day life under military occupation.20 According to Breaking the Silence’s website: “Cases of abuse towards Palestinians, looting and destruction of property have been the norm for years, but are still explained as extreme and unique cases. Our testimonies portray a different and much grimmer picture in which deterioration of moral standards finds expression in the character of orders and the rules of engagement, and are justified in the name of Israel’s security. While this reality is known to Israeli soldiers and commanders, Israeli society continues to turn a blind eye, and to deny what is done in its name. Discharged soldiers returning to civilian life discover the gap between the reality they encountered in the Territories, and the silence about this reality they encounter at home. In order to become civilians again, soldiers are forced to ignore what they have seen and done.” The introduction to Breaking the Silence’s new report states that: “[T]he dozens of testimonies contained in this booklet reveal the perspective of the Israeli soldiers on the ground, messengers of Israeli society, and serve as witness to the ongoing slide of the military system toward increasing immorality. The words of the soldiers included here constitute an urgent call to Israeli society and its leaders: We must foster a serious discourse regarding the price of military rule of the Occupied Territories, the factors that enable this reality, and their drastic effect on the future of the region.” The following testimonies are reproduced here with the kind permission of Breaking the Silence.
[ 26 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Title: Unit: Date:
“Arrest of a 15 year old” 50th Battalion, Nahal Brigade April 2011
A soldier describes the arrest of a 15-year-old boy and the effect on his mother: “Towards the end of our service, a guy from my company took a video camera and filmed the company. What you usually find in these films is footage of the guys, sitting around, goofing off, singing songs, etc … like a field trip. But he took the camera along … on arrests, patrols, and patrols on jeeps. He had many hours on tape.” “At one point, I got hold of the material. One of the tapes was of an arrest I took part in. It was a rainy day … We were very professional, with the camera there, people paid more attention to how they were doing things, they were like a commando unit. It was a routine arrest. Nothing special happened and he didn’t film anything special. We went to a village … We surrounded the house from all sides … Everyone reported, you could hear it in the video, that he’s in position and ready. A squad arrived with their commander and radioman and another soldier. They banged on the door … and walked into the house aggressively … They walk into the house, they don’t say who they’re looking for. Everyone’s pressed against the wall in one room and he started searching. Everything is being filmed.” “I wasn’t in the room at the time, I was watching from the outside, they were filming inside the house. We see him going in and out of the rooms holding the camera and filming. He’s very forceful, aggressive. Which is what you’re supposed to do if you want to arrest someone. That’s how you make an arrest. They take a 15-year-old boy out of the house. That was the detainee. A 15-year-old boy. I have no idea what he had done. A 15-yearold can drive a car bomb if he can reach the pedals or hand out Hamas flyers. We don’t know why they arrested him, we just arrested him. And then his mother comes out … it’s raining, he’s barefoot. They lead him in the mud to the place we started out to get him in the truck that would take him to the General Security Services, who knows what would happen to him there. His mother is standing in the doorway watching them take him away and she starts screaming hysterically. Hysterically. Everything is on film. We returned that day with him and someone else who was arrested. We went on as usual.”
Case Study [ 27 ]
“The months passed … About a year later I watch the film again and go back in time. I show the film to my family. I put it on the computer, I show them where everyone is and I start talking about technical things: ‘Here we’re walking into the house. We’re searching the rooms to see if anyone’s inside … And I forget, or I wasn’t conscious, I think that was the problem. I wasn’t conscious of the human side of this incident. I didn’t even remember that they took the mother’s son away. And … When you’re no longer a soldier and you’re in a different situation, you suddenly notice it. And then I said … to myself: ‘Wow, did I do that?’ Now when I look at the people around me, my sister is watching this. If someone took my sister like that? I’d freak out. Or if someone took me, my mother would … pass out in a minute. Suddenly you realize. Suddenly you realize what we did. Those were our orders. It’s not that we were super-cruel. Those were our orders. You don’t think about these things. You become impervious. On all levels, as a soldier, as a commander. Nothing. If we have to take a 15-year-old, we’ll take a 15-year-old. If it’s a 9-year-old, we’ll take a 9-yearold. Without giving it much thought.” “And suddenly … When I think about it, it’s the first time you put yourself in the place of the person standing on the other side of your rifle … Suddenly I started to imagine it and realized that it’s me … I couldn’t contain myself, I went to the bathroom and started crying … I was ashamed. I was also ashamed to cry … because it’s embarrassing. Nobody understood where it was coming from. I was explaining technical things and suddenly … I didn’t know how to swallow it, and neither did anyone else. They knocked on the door and asked me if I was all right. My sister asked if I’m OK, if I needed something … You wonder how you’ll tell your son, you know?”
[ 28 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Title: Unit: Rank: Location: Date:
“Can’t tell right from wrong” Kfir Brigade First Sergeant Hebron, occupied West Bank 2006-2007
A soldier describes the arrest of a 15-year-old boy and his subsequent beating by the soldier’s commanding officer in front of the child’s mother. “Kids would throw stones at us, we’d catch some kid who happened to be there and beat him to a pulp. Even if he didn’t throw stones. He would know who did. ‘Who is it? Who is it?’ Finally he’d tell us who did it. Once we were on patrol, someone threw stones at us, nothing really serious, so we caught some Palestinian kid who had been nearby, we knew he’d seen this, he knew who had thrown stones. Let’s say we hit him, to put it mildly, until he told us. […] He told us where the kid was, we wouldn’t leave him alone until he told us exactly where the kid lived. We went to that person’s home […] He was about 15 years old.” “We went to his house. He hadn’t been home the night before. So we came in the morning, knocked on the door, some old woman came out, around 60 or so. She says: ‘There’s no one here.’ You know how it is. We said we didn’t care, went in, me and another guy, and at this point you have no more patience for Hebron and Arabs and Jews there. We entered, began to trash the place. There are doors on both sides of the corridor, I open all the doors on one side, my friend on the other side. We found the boy behind the last door on the left. He was totally scared, realized we’d caught him. At first he wanted to escape, then he saw my comrade standing at the door, and gave up. We took him out.” “We had a commander, never mind his name, who was a bit on edge. He beat the boy to a pulp, really knocked him around. […] These were the little things. And then it becomes a kind of habit. Patrols with beatings happened on a daily basis. We were really going at it. […] He grabbed him, took him out, and the people saw him, the parents saw him. […] His nose was bleeding. He had really been beaten to a pulp. The commander said to his mother: ‘Keep away!’ Came close, cocked his gun, he already had a bullet in the barrel, or halfway so it wouldn’t just fly out. She got scared. He actually stuck the gun-barrel in the kid’s mouth. Literally. […] ‘Anyone gets close, I kill him. Don’t annoy me. I’ll kill him. I have no mercy.’ He was really on the edge.” Case Study [ 29 ]
“Things got to a point where you can no longer tell good from bad. That’s how it was in our platoon. We thought they were all shits. Anyway, the commander gripped the kid, stuck his gun in his mouth, yelled and all, and the kid was hardly able to walk. We dragged him further, and then he said again: ‘One more time this kid lifts a stone, anything, I kill him. No mercy.’ Interviewer: If I were a Palestinian, what would I get beaten up for? “It was enough for you to give us a look that we didn’t like, straight in the eye, and you’d be hit on the spot. We got to such a state and were so sick of being there, you know what I mean.”
[ 30 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Property Destruction
Photo by EAPPI.
“At around 10:30 a.m., five army jeeps and two bulldozers arrived at the scene and started to demolish the agricultural shed and water well. […] I feel sad and defeated. We depend on our land for income and without the well and the shed we cannot take care of the land. My younger son who is eight cried when he found out the shed was demolished. I don’t think he knows exactly what happened but he could feel the stress and the tension at home.”
Palestinian property is frequently damaged or destroyed by settlers and the Israeli military and civilian authorities throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The types of property destroyed include homes, schools, agricultural land and water cisterns.21 In 60 percent of the West Bank (Area C), Palestinians are required to apply to the Israeli military authorities for all types of building permits which are difficult to obtain, leading to “unauthorised” construction.
The military authorities place many bureaucratic obstacles in the way of Palestinians seeking residential or other building permits. These obstacles have been described by one UN agency as follows: “since the onset of its occupation in 1967, the Government of Israel has implemented a range of measures that restrict Palestinians’ Fatmeh H. use of land and resources in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). One of the primary ways Israel has done this has been through the application of restrictive planning and zoning regimes to Palestinian communities. […] In practice, the Israeli authorities generally allow Palestinian construction only within the boundaries of an Israeli-approved plan and these cover less than one percent of Area C, much of which is already built on. […] As a result of this restrictive planning regime, tens of thousands of Palestinians wishing to build in most parts of Area C are left with no choice other than to carry out un-authorized construction on their land to meet their housing needs and risk demolition of their structures and subsequent displacement.”22 According to UN figures, in the first six months of 2012, 383 Palestinian structures were demolished by Israeli authorities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, of which 120 were residences, displacing 615 people.23 In recent years, the Israeli military authorities have also been systematically targeting Palestinian water cisterns in Area C for demolition. These cisterns are vital to the livelihoods of thousands of Palestinians living
[ 32 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Family sitting on the rubble of their home in Silwan, East Jerusalem, photo by Keren Manor/ Activestills.
in the area who rely on them to provide water for livestock, crops and domestic water consumption. Between 2009 and July 2011, 44 Palestinian water cisterns were destroyed by the Israeli authorities in Area C for being built without permits. It is important to note that these “administrative demolitions” carried out in accordance with Israeli military regulations, violate international law which prohibits the destruction of property considered essential for the survival of the civilian population.24 The human cost of these “administrative demolitions” is that since 2009, at least 13,602 Palestinians have been adversely affected resulting in 127 displacements.25
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Photo by GhtH.
Case Study 5 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Fawziyeh A. 54 Kafr ed Dik village, West Bank 21 November 2011 Destruction of water well and agricultural building
On 21 November 2011, Israeli bulldozers destroy agricultural sheds and water wells belonging to Palestinian farmers near the village of Kafr ed Dik, in the occupied West Bank. Fawziyeh lives in the small village of Kafr ed Dik, in the West Bank. The Israeli settlement of Ale Zahav is located nearby. “On 11 October 2011, Israeli soldiers placed a notice in front of the agricultural shed which we built more than 10 years ago ordering us not to add to the structure,” recalls Fawziyeh. “The shed is made out of bricks and has a tin roof. It has a bathroom, a kitchen and some furniture and mattresses for us to sleep on. I helped build the shed with my own hands together with my son. I worked very hard to make it a nice place for the family to use during the olive harvest season. Ten years ago we also built a well to collect rain water. This enabled us to grow peas and beans on the land around the shed. We sold some of the crop and kept some for ourselves.” “On 21 November 2011, at around 11:00 a.m., two Israeli bulldozers, five army jeeps and a vehicle from the planning authorities arrived at the place where the shed was build,” recalls Fawziyeh. “A farmer who was nearby later told me. I was at my sister’s house at the time when I heard the loudspeaker from the mosque telling the farmers who owned sheds and water wells to go to their land because soldiers were about to demolish them.” “I lost my mind when I heard this and rushed to the place with my sister,” says Fawziyeh. “When I arrived I saw soldiers surrounding all the other farmers who had arrived at the scene preventing them from approaching their land and obstructing the bulldozers. I also saw some journalists and a T.V. crew.” “One of the soldiers stopped me and asked where I was going. I told him I wanted to go to my shed but he prevented me. I sat on the ground because I could not hold myself any longer. I was tired from the long fast Case Study [ 35 ]
walk to the land but when the soldier prevented me from getting to the shed I found it hard to breathe and just collapsed. I suffer from diabetes and high blood pressure, I felt I was about to die,” recalls Fawziyeh. “I collected all my strength and asked one of the soldiers why they were demolishing the shed. I explained to him that we use the shed to store agricultural tools and to keep olives during the harvest. I told him the shed does no harm to anyone, it is way out in the fields. The soldier told me that it was not legal. I was so furious and asked him whether the settlement built on our land was legal,” says Fawziyeh.
Case Study 6 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Amani S. 30 Old City, Jerusalem Continuing House demolition
A mother of five from occupied East Jerusalem describes how her husband was forced to demolish their own home which was built without an Israeli permit.26 Thirty-year-old Amani lives in the old city of Jerusalem. She is married with five young children. “When I married nearly 13 years ago I lived in a small room in the basement of the house of my husband’s family; my husband and I could not afford to rent our own house. We lived in this room for nearly three years. We had no privacy and there wasn’t enough space for the children,” recalls Amani. “My husband and I thought of fixing the space on the top floor of the family house which was neglected and used as a storage area. The advantage was that it was bigger than the basement. My husband fixed the walls, built a bathroom and a small kitchenette. We moved in and lived there until 2001. Again, the place was not big enough as our family grew. My husband decided to add another room. He did not apply for a permit because we all know that the municipality will not issue a building permit [ 36 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Old City / East Jerusalem, photo by GhtH.
for Palestinian residents of the old city. My husband built the room using cheap materials and not concrete. A month after he finished the room we received a notice from the Jerusalem municipality and a 14,000 shekel fine (nearly $3,500). We were very sad, we cannot afford this amount of money and at the same time there was no choice for us, we needed to expand to have the extra space,” says Amani. “My husband appointed a lawyer who managed to have us pay the fine in installments, 500 shekels a month ($125), which put us under a lot of financial stress. At the same time we tried to obtain the necessary permit but the authorities rejected our application as we expected. The case took a long time in the court; the sessions kept being adjourned sometimes for six, seven, even eight months.” “Finally in 2011, the court issued a demolition order for the extra room. The court also ruled that if we did not demolish the room ourselves my husband would be put in prison for three months and we would have to pay the costs of the demolition which they estimated to be about 70,000 shekels (about $18,000). My husband had no choice but to demolish the Case Study [ 37 ]
room with his own hands. The court gave us a two-month notice after which they would bring bulldozers and demolish the room at our own expense,” recalls Amani. “On 20 July 2012, my husband demolished the room. I cannot describe my feelings when I saw him bring down the walls with a sledgehammer. It was the saddest day of my life. I was worried about my children and how this might impact them. I know they are young but I am sure watching their father demolish the room is something they will never forget.” “When my husband demolished the room the electricity was disconnected and the water pipes were destroyed. We extended a cable from the house of my brother-in-law and we still don’t have cold water. My life is destroyed. Our financial situation was not very good to begin with and the extra expenses we had to pay because of this room brought us close to the red line. My husband does not have a regular stable job, he works as a day worker and he stays home when there is no work available. Our average income is about $1,000 a month. This is not enough to buy basic food for the children. There is no way we can afford to rent a bigger house,” says Amani. “Life in Jerusalem is not easy for Palestinian families. The authorities keep an eye on us and make sure they take every opportunity to force us out. Every day is a struggle. The future for my family, of my young children and me is unknown. I cannot live anywhere else because if I move out I risk losing my residency rights in the city and my children will lose their rights too.”
[ 38 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
East Jerusalem
Photo by GhtH.
“Palestinians are utterly frustrated by the impact of Israeli policies on their lives. They can’t move freely around their territory. They can’t plan their communities. They are evicted from their homes. Their homes are regularly demolished. I don’t believe that most people in Israel have any idea of the way planning policies are used to divide and harass communities and families. They would not themselves like to be subjected to such behavior.” UN Under-SecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs, Baroness Valerie Amos, May 2011.
Since 1967, successive Israeli governments have taken a number of measures aimed at annexing East Jerusalem, including applying Israeli law to the east of the city. In response to these unilateral actions, the UN Security Council has on a number of occasions recalled “the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible” and confirmed that “all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section, are totally invalid and cannot change that status.”27 In spite of the legal position, successive Israeli governments have sought to cement Israel’s control over East Jerusalem by facilitating the influx of nearly 200,000 Israeli settlers into the area, including about 2,000 settlers into the centre of Palestinian neighbourhoods.28 The establishment of settlements in the heart of Palestinian neighbourhoods commonly involves forced eviction and displacement, raising tensions in the community that can create unrest.
In addition to the illegal transfer of Israeli civilians into East Jerusalem, the authorities simultaneously make life for Palestinian residents of the City more difficult. This manifests itself in a number of ways, including: • Restrictions on obtaining building permits – Only 13 percent of East Jerusalem is zoned for Palestinian construction - much of which is already built on, compared with 35 percent which is zoned for Israeli settlements. Due to the difficulty in obtaining building permits, many Palestinians in East Jerusalem build without permits risking fines and
[ 40 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
demolition orders. According to the UN, around 93,100 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem live in structures without permits and are at risk of displacement. According to the same source the impact on families experiencing house demolitions or faced with demolition orders can be devastating. “Women often feel a loss of control over domestic matters and heightened sense of insecurity while men experience increased stress and anxiety. For many children, the demolition, along with the disruption to education and increased tension in the home, results in depression, anxiety and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.”29
“It took an hour-anda-half for the Israelis and their bulldozers to destroy the house. The whole house collapsed on top of our things, so we couldn’t get anything else out. All our things were lost. My daughters had saved up money for the holidays in money boxes, but even these were lost in the rubble. […] My daughters found out that their home had been demolished on their way home from school.”
• Limits on freedom of movement and family reunification – Since 1967, Palestinians Manal Z. living in the east of the City have been given Israeli permanent residency status, but not citizenship. A key distinction between the two categories is that the former can be revoked. Problems arise when a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem wishes to marry a resident on the West Bank, even though both areas are considered as one occupied territory under international law. Under an Israeli law passed in 2003, restrictions are placed on the rights of Israeli citizens and permanent residents of Palestinian origin who wish to marry somebody from the West Bank. Under the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, in order for a spouse from the West Bank to legally live in East Jerusalem, women over 25 and men over 35 must apply for temporary military permits, giving rise to a life of constant uncertainty and insecurity. Persons below these age categories must apply to a special committee based on “exceptional humanitarian considerations.” Since 2008, this special committee has only approved applications in 5.5 percent of cases.30 If Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem leave to live with their spouses in the West Bank or elsewhere, they run the risk of having their residency rights permanently revoked – something that has happened to around 14,000 Palestinians since 1967.31
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Photo by GhtH.
The justification given for these restrictions on family reunification is security. However, the evidence indicates that out of 130,000 Palestinians entering Israel or East Jerusalem for the purposes of family reunification between 1994 and 2008, only 0.005 percent have been convicted of a security offence. In January 2012, the Israeli Supreme Court narrowly rejected (6-5) a petition seeking to challenge the constitutionality of the law. The five dissenting judges acknowledged the law’s discriminatory nature, which permits Jewish citizens and permanent residents to marry anyone of Jewish origin, including those from “enemy states”, who automatically become citizens under the Law of Return.32
• Lack of services – As permanent residents, Palestinians living in East Jerusalem are required to pay Israeli taxes and are entitled to all rights and services that are provided to Israeli citizens, except the right to vote in general elections. However, reports indicate that far fewer resources are allocated to the Palestinian residents in the east of the City resulting in a shortage in health and educational services, welfare services, water and sewage systems and roads.33 Taking education as an example, according to the UN, 1,000 additional classrooms are required for Palestinian children in East Jerusalem and many existing facilities are substandard or unsuitable.34 Consequently, many parents resort to fee-paying alternatives even though children in East Jerusalem are entitled to free education under Israeli law. According to a recent report published by the US State Department, although Palestinians make up 35 percent of the population of Jerusalem, they only receive 10-15 percent of municipal spending.35 • The Christian community - The cumulative effect of these measures is also adversely affecting the dwindling Christian community living in Jerusalem and the West Bank. According to a 2008 survey, there are 50,000 Palestinian Christians living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. According to the US State Department, the Palestinian Christian community is primarily concentrated in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem, but smaller communities live elsewhere. Citing local Christian leaders, the State Department reports that Palestinian Christian emigration has accelerated since 2001, in part due to the limited ability of Christian communities in the Jerusalem area to expand due to Israeli building restrictions and family reunification limitations imposed by the Israeli government.36
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Case Study 7 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Rana A. 32 Issawiyeh, East Jersualem Continuing Residency rights / House demolition
A mother of six from occupied East Jerusalem describes how her husband was forced to demolish part of their home because it was built without an Israeli building permit, and how she lives in fear of being separated from her family.37 Thirty-two year old Rana is from the West Bank city of Nablus. She got married in 1994 and moved to the old city of Jerusalem to live with her husband. “We didn’t have much money and lived with my mother-inlaw,” recalls Rana. After the birth of her first child in 1995, Rana and her husband decided to build a small room on the roof of the family house. “I so badly wanted to have my own space,” says Rana. “We knew it was almost impossible to get a building permit for the room because the Israeli authorities do not grant many permits to Palestinians in East Jerusalem, but we had no choice.” “Three years after we finished the room we were issued a huge fine (US $5,000) which we had to pay in installments. There was no mention about demolishing the house,” says Rana. In about 2007, 12 years after they started building the room, Rana and her husband received a notice that they had to attend a court hearing. They appointed a lawyer. “The only thing he was able to do was to buy us time,” says Rana. In about 2009, Rana and her husband received a demolition order for the room. “I was shocked beyond belief,” recalls Rana. “They kept quiet for nearly 14 years and said nothing about demolishing the room. They made us pay a fine of nearly $5,000 in installments and when we paid the whole amount they brought the demolition issue up. “To make matters worse, the authorities told us they will charge us more than US $10,000 to demolish the room. They also said that if the room wasn’t demolished in four days they would place my husband under house arrest. This would mean he would lose his job.” “In June 2010, we realised that we had no choice but to demolish the room ourselves, in the middle of my children’s final school exams,” recalls Rana. “My husband demolished the room with his own hands at his own [ 44 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Rana A. photo by WCLAC.
expense, using a sledgehammer to save us $10,000. My husband and I had to borrow money from my mother and my brother-in-law to pay the cost of carrying the rubble away. My mother felt so sorry for us, especially for the children, that she told us she didn’t want the money back. Me and my husband, and our six children moved back in with my mother-in-law. It was terrible for us and for her,” says Rana. Later that year, Rana, her husband and children, moved to a house in the Issawiyeh neighbourhood of East Jerusalem. “Our house in the Old City was five minutes away from my children’s school, now it takes at least an hour to get to school which costs us a lot of money. I feel disconnected from the world. I used to attend lectures and take part in all sorts of activities in the Old City but not anymore, but this is the only house we could afford to rent,” says Rana, whose friends are also all in the Old City. After 17 years of marriage, the Israeli authorities have still not given Rana a Jerusalem identity card. This makes it very difficult for her to see her family in Nablus. Rana first applied for a Jerusalem identity card under Case Study [ 45 ]
the family unification programme in 1997, but it was rejected by the Israeli authorities without reason. Shortly after her application for family unification was rejected, the Israeli Ministry of Interior informed her that she had to leave East Jerusalem immediately, even though it is considered to be occupied Palestinian territory under international law. “The idea of not being able to live with my family, with my children and husband, terrified me. I worried day and night that one day I might be forced to separate from my children,” says Rana. Rana hired a lawyer who managed to get her a temporary residency permit valid for one year. “Even with this temporary residency permit I don’t feel safe and secure because when it expires I have to go through the whole tedious application process again. They ask me for water and electricity bills and evidence that I have paid the Israeli municipal tax. They ask me about my family and my friends, one by one as if they are looking for the slightest excuse to deny me the permit. There is no doubt in my mind that they don’t want us to live a normal life in Jerusalem. They make life impossible for us,” says Rana. In July 2012, I went to renew my temporary permit, but I have not yet heard back from them. This is not the first time this has happened and it is not good news for me, it is making me anxious.” Whenever Rana’s temporary permit is not renewed in time, she has to stay home until she gets a new permit. This means she cannot visit friends or go on family trips. Three years ago there was a delay in issuing her permit that meant she could not go to the hospital with her six-year-old son, who needed urgent surgery, for fear she would be ordered out of Jerusalem. “I feel like an outcast. I even felt like I was committing a crime when I attended my brother’s wedding,” says Rana. She also does not have any health insurance, as the insurance companies in Jerusalem do not insure non-residents. “It will cost me a lot of money next month when I go to the hospital for minor surgery. What should be routine turns into a nightmare,” she says. “During the holidays I feel miserable because all my neighbours and my friends invite their parents and relatives over for meals except me. My parents, who live in Nablus, less than two hours away, are not allowed to enter Jerusalem. I’m not allowed to invite my mother over for a meal, it is a terrible feeling. Life for a woman is hard enough in the best of circumstances, for me, a Palestinian woman in Jerusalem; life is a neverending struggle.”
[ 46 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Case Study 8 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
S.D. 21 East Jerusalem Continuing Residency rights
A 21-year-old Palestinian Christian woman from occupied East Jerusalem describes how her freedom of movement and her right to practice her religion have been restricted by Israeli government policies. S. is a 21-year-old Palestinian Christian woman from Jerusalem, who is studying at Bethlehem University. “My father’s family owned two houses, one in Jerusalem and another in a Christian village in the West Bank,” says S. “The house in the village was the family’s summer house. After my father separated from his first wife, he gave her the Jerusalem house and moved to the village where he started a new family. He did not realise at the time that giving up the Jerusalem house was going to cost us our right to live in Jerusalem,” says S. “When I turned 15 I went to the Israeli Ministry of Interior to have my Jerusalem identity card issued. Without an identity card I am unable to enter Jerusalem or travel abroad or even within the West Bank. I thought this was going to be a routine procedure as was the case with my older siblings, but I was wrong. I went with my mother and we were unlucky to have an employee at the ministry who was unhelpful and rude. As required, I had my birth certificate which proved I was born in Jerusalem but the official told me it wasn’t enough. He asked for my school certificate. He also asked my mother for proof that we pay the Jerusalem municipal tax. My heart sank when I heard this and I felt my life was going to be hard from now on. I could not understand the link between school certificates and identity cards. It felt as if someone had slammed a door in my face.” “We could not present Jerusalem tax slips since we left the house in Jerusalem. My school certificates were not going to be of any help since what the authorities are looking for is proof that I live in Jerusalem. What bothered me most was the manner in which the official treated my mother. I was very upset when I saw how disrespectful he was. I asked him to be polite but he became worse. He accused me of not having enough
Case Study [ 47 ]
interest in a Jerusalem identity card and immediately typed something into the computer. My mother and I felt it was best if we left, and we did.” “At this time I used my birth certificate and a temporary travel document to move around the West Bank and at checkpoints. I also traveled abroad, but when the temporary travel document expired I began to have problems. Soldiers at checkpoints would not let me cross: I was 16 which meant I was no longer able to use my birth certificate as an official document and my temporary travel document had expired. That is when I decided to go back to the Israeli Ministry of Interior hoping this time a different official would process my application. Unfortunately, the same official dealt with me. He asked me again for my school certificates and for the tax slips. My mother and I decided to appoint a lawyer. I was 17 by then. The lawyer was able to get the Ministry to issue me with a piece of paper valid for two months which allowed me to cross checkpoints pending the completion of my application for a Jerusalem identity card. But processing my application took much longer than two months,” recalls S. “When I turned 20 I went back to the Ministry. This time I had municipality tax slips; my brother and I had rented a small apartment in Jerusalem which was very expensive. During this time I went to Bethlehem University and was stuck there for months. I could not go home to see my family during holidays without official documents that would allow me to cross checkpoints. I also could not go to Jerusalem on Sundays or any other day. This bothered me a lot because I am an active member of the church. All my friends traveled and I could not. I couldn’t visit my doctor in Jerusalem when I had some health problem, or attend my niece’s wedding in Jerusalem two weeks ago. The whole family went and I stayed home. I was miserable.” “I sometimes cry, not only because of my situation but because I am worried that the authorities will chase my brothers and sister and strip them of their rights. This is what happened with other families; one person would have an issue with the authorities and the whole family situation is undermined. Unfortunately they are succeeding. Our financial situation is not great and I cannot afford to rent a house in Jerusalem. I sometimes take risks and travel within the West Bank without documents but I panic when the car I am in approaches a checkpoint, I never know what to expect. It happened twice that soldiers asked me to step out of the car and sent me back home.” “If I marry someone from Jerusalem and have children we won’t be able to live in Jerusalem as a family. Jerusalem is being emptied of its Palestinian residents, one person at a time. For us Christians the problem is worse.” [ 48 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
The Gaza Strip
Photo by RIWAQ.
“Before the blockade, my husband used to make good money working in Israel. With the blockade, that all stopped. When he can’t find any work and we have nothing to eat, he blames me. He is like a crazy animal. I stay quiet when he hits me. Afterwards, he cries and says, if he had a job he wouldn’t beat me.”
Just like the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Gaza was occupied by Israeli forces in 1967. Under the “disengagement plan” in 2005, Israel removed its permanent military presence and civilian settlers from Gaza, but continues to maintain control over the borders, territorial water, airspace, the Palestinian population registry and some aspects of taxation.38 This level of control imposes a number of legal obligations on Israel including ensuring that everyday life and economic activity functions, as far as possible, as normal.
Although the Gaza Strip is an integral part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, it Eman has become increasingly isolated from the - The Guardian, West Bank, East Jerusalem and the rest 30 July 2012 of the world since the Israeli government imposed a blockade on the territory in June 2007. The Israeli authorities justify these measures as a means to protect Israeli civilians and soldiers from attacks by Palestinian armed factions. However, breaches of international law by other parties can not absolve Israel of fulfilling its legal obligations to the people of Gaza, and does not justify the collective punishment of 1.6 million people. Under the blockade, freedom of movement for both people and goods has been severely restricted, causing serious damage to the territory’s economy. A buffer zone has been unilaterally imposed by the Israeli military which is stated to extend 300 metres into Gaza. Anyone entering this 300 metre buffer zone can be shot on sight, although there have been reports of civilians being fired upon up to 1,500 metres from the border, resulting in Palestinians being totally or partially Bara’a Q. prevented from accessing land located up to 1,500 metres from the border, resulting in a loss of 35 percent of Gaza’s agricultural land. Similarly at sea, the fishermen of Gaza are restricted to working within 3,000 metres from the shore, which in effect has virtually “I sometimes wonder why I even bother studying, what use is education under these circumstances? I have no hope for the future; the situation is a disaster with no end in sight. I can hardly say I have a life here in Gaza.”
[ 50 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
destroyed a thriving fishing industry. According to the UN, these restrictions have had a devastating impact on the physical security and livelihoods of around 180,000 people, exasperating an already bleak humanitarian situation.39 The restriction on freedom of movement also affects higher education, as most applications for permits to study in universities in the West Bank are rejected. In July 2012, the Israeli Defense Ministry announced that it would not allow five female students from Gaza to study at Birzeit University in the West Bank. This is in spite of the State conceding at the hearing of a court challenge in May that there were no security issues concerning the five students yet the refusal was part of a blanket ban.40
“The number of psychiatric patients is on the increase because of the deteriorating living conditions in Gaza, but the Israeli quota for medications allowed in is fixed and is hardly enough. […] I wouldn’t be surprised if patients with deep depression, who don’t find the drugs they need, commit suicide.” R.H.
Consequently, recent reports indicate that the Gaza Strip has become more conservative, and unemployment, poverty, depression and domestic violence are on the rise. With 45 percent unemployment, “women and children are often on the receiving end of men’s frustration.”41 This assessment seems to be borne out by a recent study published by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) which found that 51 percent of married women in Gaza had experienced domestic violence in the previous 12 months, with less than one percent saying they would seek help.42 Perhaps most alarmingly, the UN is now predicting that unless the restrictions on Gaza are lifted, the territory will become unliveable by 2020.43
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Case study 9 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Wala’ J. 22 Gaza Strip Continuing Poverty
A 22 year-old woman from Gaza describes her family’s economic situation and the day her husband was shot in the leg working close to the border with Israel. Wala’ is a 22-year-old woman from the Gaza Strip. She is married and has a son who is nine-months old. Like many families in Gaza, Wala’s husband is unemployed. He used to work in a sewing factory but he lost his job a long time ago because of the blockade. Having looked for a job without success, Wala’s husband Ahmad, decided to collect gravel from the “buffer zone”, along the border with Israel where the settlements used to be. Gravel used in construction is a rare commodity in the Gaza Strip since the blockade. Ahmad sold the gravel he collected to construction workers who used it to build and maintain homes destroyed during the war in 2008. “My husband brought home 30 Shekels ($9) every four days or so and we managed,” says Wala’, “I had no complaints.” On 6 April 2010, Wala’s husband was shot in the leg by Israeli soldiers while collecting gravel and as a result lost his ability to work. Wala’ was devastated; her family’s only source of income was suddenly lost and with it her dreams. This forced her to make tough choices like the decision to move back in with her parents. “I moved back to my parents’ place for two reasons,” says Wala’, “my house is made of tin and it gets unbearably hot during the summer. I also moved back so that my parents can support me and my son. I have no money to buy food for him; I can’t bear to see him lose weight.” “My husband visits us from time to time but I can hardly say I have a relationship with him; we are not a family anymore. I am waiting for a miracle to happen for my life to change, but it doesn’t look like anything will change soon. I have no money to buy milk for my son; I have no money to buy food for my family; I have nothing.” “I regret ever having a child,” says Wala’. “I feel I brought my son into a situation he doesn’t deserve.” [ 52 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Case Study 10 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Bara’a Q. 21 Gaza Strip May 2012 Power shortage
A 21-year-old woman from the Gaza Strip describes the difficulties she faces trying to study during frequent power cuts. “I am studying business administration at the Islamic university in Gaza,” says 21-year-old Bara’a. “My course requires me to do a lot of research on the internet and this is almost impossible in Gaza because of the frequent power cuts. We either have electricity during the day for a few hours or during the night but not both. If on one day we have electricity during the day then the following day we will have electricity at night and visa versa. If I am in class during the day I cannot do my research until I go home in the evening and if there is no electricity that night it means I have lost precious time and there is nothing I can do.” “The problem got worse with the fuel shortage in recent months, which meant we couldn’t use the electric generators to generate electricity. When it is possible to find fuel in service stations the prices are so high that turning the generators on costs a fortune,” says Bara’a. I sometimes feel I need to reconsider continuing my education because it has become such a hassle. I am under tremendous pressure. I sometimes stay up all night when there is electricity in order to do my research and to study and this exhausts me. I find I am unable to function the following day. I sometimes light a candle and try to read but this hurts my eyes and gives me headaches. When I get so tired I go to study at a friend’s or a relative’s house if they happen to have electricity in their area. I find this to be very distracting; I simply cannot focus on my work,” says Bara’a. To make matters even worse, public transportation has become very expensive because of the fuel shortages. I think a thousand times before I make a decision to go to a friend’s house. I pay double what I used to pay before the fuel shortage. I also have to queue in line for a long time, sometimes in the rain, sometimes in the hot sun because less and less cars are available and more people depend on public transportation.
Case Study [ 53 ]
Woman studying by candle light, photo by WCLAC.
Arguments and even fights erupt between passengers and taxi drivers over prices. This I find unbearable. I sometimes wonder why I even bother studying, what use is education under these circumstances? I have no hope for the future; the situation is a disaster with no end in sight. I can hardly say I have a life here in Gaza.� According to the UN (OCHA), the Gaza Strip has been experiencing power cuts for up to 12 hours per day for most of the year. The Gaza Power Plant continues to produce only one-third of its capacity due to a lack of fuel. Limited amounts of fuel continue to enter Gaza through the tunnels from Egypt. To compensate for the ongoing fuel shortage, Gaza private companies are importing fuel from Israel, although the price of fuel purchased from Israel is more than double the price of that transferred from Egypt.
[ 54 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Concluding Remarks
Photo by Juman Nijim.
This report seeks to illustrate, through the eyes of women, how for the past 45 years, Israeli military and civilian authorities have sought to establish permanent control over much of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Although usually described as a military occupation, this legal categorisation fails to accurately define what is actually occurring on the ground, day by day, house by house, family by family – a de facto annexation. This relentless process has been well described by one Israeli organisation as follows:44
“The goal is to confine 4 million residents of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza to small enclaves, thus effectively foreclosing any viable Palestinian state and ensuring Israeli control, and to allow for the expropriation of land, the ethnic displacement of Palestinians, and the Judaization of the occupied West Bank. In the cantonization plan pursued by the current and previous Israeli governments, Israel would annex the settlement blocs containing 80% of the settlers in addition to ‘greater Jerusalem’ and the Jordan Valley. It would Judaize approximately 85% of the country, leaving the Palestinians with disconnected enclaves on only 15% of the land. Israel would control all the borders, all the sea and airports, Palestinian airspace, the electro-magnetic sphere (communications), and West Bank seam zones. In this version of the two-state solution, the Palestinians would be deprived of meaningful self-determination. The Palestinian ‘state’ would have only limited sovereignty and no viable economy. While it would be expected to absorb all the refugees who wish to return, it would have no economic potential for development and could offer no prospect for its future generations.”
The process described above has been playing out on a daily basis across the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for over four decades. The testimonies of women presented in this report bear witness and provide a glimpse into these practices. For example, women speak of the sense of fear and intimidation experienced by repeated night-time military raids in which soldiers come into their houses, and even into their bedrooms, because they dare to protest against the creeping annexation. The report
[ 56 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
looks at a similar form of intimidation perpetrated this time by armed settlers, as soldiers stand idly by. In other parts of the report, women describe how Palestinian society living in the West Bank (Area C), East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip is coming under increasing pressure in the form of severe building restrictions and property demolition, an economic blockade and freedom of movement limitations which affect everything from where you can live, where you can study, and even who you can marry. Through the use of these discriminatory and restrictive planning laws that violate international law, Palestinians are being squeezed and corralled into an ever shrinking space. Less publicised are the devastating effects these policies have on the physical and psychological wellbeing of women, and in particular, on mothers. Through research conducted in early 2012, the following psychological symptoms typical of those living with continuous and sequential trauma were identified: insomnia, tension headaches, hypertension, heart disease, gastro-intestinal ailments, hypervigilance, irritability, agitation, and panic attacks. Further, mothers anticipating nighttime incursions, the arrest of a child, the imminent fear of being separated from their children, the demolition or seizure of their homes, settler violence, and the denial of residency rights reported exceedingly high levels of anticipatory terror and dread that adversely impacted their capacity to parent effectively. Mothers who experienced repeated, unpredictable violence over a greater length of time and with more intensity, also exhibited chronic depression, dissociative symptoms, psychic numbing, and other personality impairments affecting cognition, emotional regulation, intimacy, interpersonal relatedness, and overall identity.45 Perhaps the only remaining question to be asked is: does anybody believe that these policies are likely to lead to a just and lasting peace?
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Recommended Action There are a number of ways you can take action on the issues raised in this report and support the work of WCLAC. Write to your elected representative:- Contact your elected representatives, wherever you are, and raise one or more of the issues in this report with them and demand effective action. Visit Palestine:- Join a study tour to the region. Twinning and friendship links:- Establish a twinning or friendship link between your town, university, school or union and one in the region. This is an effective way of drawing the human rights situation to the people in your locality. Become better informed:- The following websites information on the situation in Israel/Palestine:
provide useful
• Adalah - www.adalah.org/eng/ • Al-Haq - www.alhaq.org • Al Mezan - www.mezan.org/en/ • Breaking the Silence - www.breakingthesilence.org.il • B’Tselem - www.btselem.org • Defence for Children International (DCI) - www.dci-pal.org • Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) - www.ichad.org • Palestinian Centre for Humanr Rights (PCHR) - www.pchrgaza.org/portal/en/ • UN Office for the Co-Ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - www.ochaopt.org • Who Profits - www.whoprofits.org
[ 58 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Appendix
Photo by WCLAC.
Case study 11 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Rana H. 20 An Nabi Saleh, West Bank 6 July 2012 Soldier violence
On 6 July 2012, a 20-year-old woman from Ramallah, in the occupied West Bank, is beaten by Israeli soldiers as she demonstrates against the expansion of an illegal settlement near the village of An Nabi Saleh. Rana often goes to the village of An Nabi Saleh on Fridays to take part in the weekly protest. The protest is against the take over by settlers from Halamish of a village spring in 2009. Friday, 6 July 2012, was no different. “As usual, I went to Nabi Saleh to take part in the weekly protest,” recalls Rana. The protesters marched down the main street and headed off to the land where the spring is located. The soldiers responded with tear gas and rubber-coated bullets to disperse the demonstrators. Me and a friend decided to go towards the land where an Israeli army watch tower is located; we wanted to witness the clashes that were taking place there between soldiers and some young men from the village. The owner of the land, Atallah, came with us. It was about 3:00 pm and we stood there and watched when a group of soldiers started to shout at us telling us to go away. Atallah told them it was his land and that he had the right to be there but they did not listen to him. We felt we needed to stay there when we saw that Atallah and the soldiers were having an argument. We wanted to give Atallah some kind of protection just by being there. The argument heated up and the soldiers wanted to arrest Atallah. When we tried to stand between him and the soldiers they decided to arrest all of us. They tied our hands with plastic ties and asked us to sit on the ground by a jeep,” says Rana. “A female soldier who was there was particularly vicious,” recalls Rana. “She beat me each time I lifted my head up or tried to speak to her. She pulled my hair very aggressively. Atallah who was standing nearby, caught my eye just when the female soldier pulled my hair. I smiled back at him and gestured to him that I was o.k. This made the female soldier go mad. She slapped me very hard on my back and shouted at me saying I shouldn’t smile. She then handed her mobile phone to one of the other [ 60 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
soldiers and asked him to take a photo of her standing next to me and my friend sitting on the ground with our hands tied behind our backs. She smiled and held a Palestinian flag as the other soldier took the picture. This was a very humiliating experience. I felt I needed to cry but I held back because I didn’t want the female soldier to feel triumphant.” “The soldiers asked Atallah to call home for his identity card. When his wife brought it to the soldiers they released him but my friend and I together with another Israeli person were taken to Benjamina interrogation centre. The female soldier was with us in the jeep and she slapped me without any provocation. She insulted me the whole way,” recalls Rana. “In Benjamina someone took my finger prints and a saliva sample for DNA. They also took pictures of me. The commander told me I was accused of hitting a soldier and of obstructing his work. He also accused me of being present in a closed military area. I remained silent the whole time except when he told me I was accused of hitting a soldier. I denied this accusation and told him I did not hit anyone.” “We were kept in Benjamina from 4:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. the next day. My friend and I were then put in a jeep and were driven to Ofer prison near Ramallah, where we were kept in an outdoor cell because Ofer is not equipped to accommodate women. I remained in Ofer until 4:00 a.m. I was then taken in a police car to Hasharon prison inside Israel. The car was partitioned into small sections like cages and I could hardly fit. I was shackled and handcuffed the whole time. In Hasharon I was strip searched which was a terrible experience. I was then placed in solitary confinement in a small cell for two days. My friend was released at Ofer because she was an American citizen and her visa expired in a week. She was released on condition that she did not take part in the weekly protests. “I was put in a section with the other Palestinian female political prisoners but I was not allowed to speak to them. I spent most of the time sleeping since I was in solitary confinement.” “On Monday I appeared in front of a judge. My lawyer was able to argue for my release since they released my friend who was accused of the same offences. He also showed a video of my arrest which proved I did not hit any one. I was released after the court hearing, but without my personal belongings, they are still in Hasharon prison and I haven’t been able to get them back yet.” Case Study [ 61 ]
Case Study 12 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Hamda M. 43 Beit Ummar, West Bank February 2012 Soldier violence
A 43-year-old mother from Beit Ummar, near Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, describes repeated night raids on her home and the arrest of her children, and soldier violence. “Our village is surrounded by settlements in all directions and a road used by the army and settlers passes close by,” says Hamda. “We have lots of problems because of the settlements and because of this road. Many children are arrested and the village is raided by the army almost every day. The first three months of this year alone were a disaster,” recalls Hamda. “I was at home getting ready to sleep on a cold winter night in mid-February. I don’t remember the exact date. I found it hard to sleep so I looked out the window to the hill across the valley where the settlement of Karmi Zur is built. I saw army jeeps and soldiers moving around and I immediately knew this was not good news for the village. I woke my husband and told him it looked like the village might be raided. I wondered who the unlucky mother was whose son will be arrested tonight. It did not occur to me that they might be raiding our house.” “My husband went to the bathroom and came back and told me soldiers were surrounding our house. I didn’t believe him, so I looked out to see for myself. I wondered who they were looking for. My son Yousef was already in prison and my other children are too young. I thought maybe this time they had come for my husband,” recalls Hamda. “I got dressed. It was around 2:30 a.m. when we heard the knock at the door. When my husband went to the balcony overlooking the entrance the soldiers verbally abused him. I think they recognised him because he takes part in the weekly demonstration against the settlements. They called my husband a dog and a donkey and my husband answered them back. They told him to come down and open the front gate. We all went down with him. They asked to see my husband’s identity card. They looked at the details and read the names of our children registered on the card. [ 62 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Hamda M. holding a picture of her son Yousef, photo by WCLAC.
One of the soldiers asked for our son Mohammad who was standing next to me. When Mohammad identified himself one of the soldiers grabbed him by the front of his T-shirt and pulled him aside.” “I was shocked when I realised they had come for Mohammad,” recalls Hamda. “He is only 15 years old. When my other son Hamza saw they were about to arrest his brother he kicked a soldier. I got into an argument with a soldier too. I wanted to know why they were arresting Mohammad. ‘He hasn’t done anything wrong,’ I shouted, ‘he is only 15, leave him alone,’ but they did not listen to me,” says Hamda. “Minutes later they took Mohammad away on foot. They did not tie his hands or blindfold him, but later my sister-in-law, who lives next door, told me she saw him blindfolded with his hands tied behind his back. She also told me that the young men in the neighbourhood started throwing stones at the soldiers. She saw that they put Mohammad in front and used him as a shield to protect themselves from the stones. They shouted at Mohammad and told him to tell the young men not to throw stones. Mohammad later told me that he was hit by two stones.” Case Study [ 63 ]
Hamda’s son Mohammad was detained for several days at the settlement of Karmi Zur, then Gush Etzion settlement and finally at Ofer prison, near Ramallah. All this time we didn’t know where he was or why he was taken. We contacted an Israeli human rights organisation who later told us he was in Ofer. They also told us he was assigned a military court hearing and that he was accused of many things,” says Hamda. “That night I wasn’t able to sleep at all. I was worried about Mohammad and feared that they might beat him up. I felt sick for three days and stayed in bed. This is what happens to me each time my house is raided and one of my children is arrested. This is an unbearable situation; living in constant fear is affecting my health. I have high blood pressure and I sometimes have problems breathing. I take medicine to keep me going. It is very hard. Luckily Mohammad was released on bail several days later, but my other son, Yousef, is still in jail. He was arrested in October 2011.” “Yousef’s arrest was a terrible experience for me,” says Hamda. “They beat him on his head in front of my eyes. They tied his hands behind his back and took him away. They forced him on the ground with his face down and then crushed his head with their boots. I saw about 15 soldiers taking turns to beat and kick him all over his body, even in his sensitive parts. They beat him with plastic batons. He screamed out in pain and called for me. When I approached to try to protect him a soldier hit me with the back of his gun in my chest. I was in severe pain and later found out that my rib was fractured. I still feel pain in my chest nearly six months later.” “Yousef and I are very close. He is kind-hearted and always offers to help. He is detained in a prison inside Israel and I haven’t seen him for months. I applied for a permit to enter Israel to visit him but my application was rejected. It is killing me that I cannot see his face and speak to him. When I attended court I saw how badly he was treated; there were bruises all over his face and he had lost weight,” recalls Hamda. “The happiest time for me is when I have all my children around me at home. I cook for them, I chat with them and I know they are safe. Unfortunately we haven’t had a peaceful time together in a long time. My house was raided so much during the last six months that I can’t even remember how many times. Night raids have become a routine. This affects the young children and disturbs the relationship between the adults. We are all anxious and tense all the time and have no tolerance for each other. I sometimes blame my husband for this situation and he blames me. He doesn’t have a regular job and he spends a lot of time at home. “ [ 64 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
“If my husband could find regular work things would be much easier for us. We can hardly make ends meet. We also have to pay a lot of money for lawyers and fines; it is very hard. The village has lost so much land to the settlements and we lost so much income we used to receive from agriculture. The situation is not looking good, not for my husband and not for my children. There is nothing to look forward to in the future. I am sad and I have lost hope.”
Case study 13 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Deema M. 18 Gaza Strip Continuing Freedom of movement
An 18-year-old Christian woman from the Gaza Strip describes how the Israeli authorities prevent her family from spending Christmas and Easter together in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. “Gaza is like a big prison,” says 18-year-old Deema. “We are not allowed to travel, not even to the West Bank or East Jerusalem to visit family and friends. I can’t even go there for Christmas or Easter. I am unable to connect with other young Palestinian Christians in my own country. There is a blanket travel ban imposed on all residents of Gaza by the Israeli authorities. Special permits are sometimes granted to people who need special medical treatment or want to travel during the holidays, but only if they are older than 35 years.” “Last time I was allowed to visit Bethlehem was two years ago when I was 16 and still considered a child,” says Deema. “I traveled with my parents and my younger sister and brother. While we were in Bethlehem the Israeli army launched an attack on Gaza. We were very worried about my other three sisters who were not allowed to travel to Bethlehem with us. I was so worried that something might happen to them. We tried to get them out through the Orthodox Church, the Greek government, and the Red Cross, but it was impossible. We were told that even if a permit was issued, traveling would be too dangerous.” Case Study [ 65 ]
“The authorities issue travel permits to some members of a family but not to all of them. Nearly everybody I know who was allowed to travel from Gaza to the West Bank had to travel either without their mother or father or sister or brother. I sometimes think it is better not to travel at all than travel and leave my sisters behind,” says Deema. It’s even worse when I am the one left behind. This is exactly what happened to me last Christmas. A permit was issued to my parents and younger siblings but not to me, or my older siblings. It wasn’t a real Christmas for me without all my family. I watched the celebrations on television and felt very sad I couldn’t be there with my parents. There is no atmosphere of Christmas in Gaza and to be able to take part in the celebrations in Bethlehem means a lot to me. I cried the whole time. I just wanted to celebrate with my family but I was not allowed.” According to Deema, there are approximately 2,000 Palestinian Christians in Gaza, out of a total population of 1.6 million. “We are generally left alone to live our lives but since Gaza is becoming more conservative we sometimes feel like we are the odd ones out and this makes us feel uncomfortable. There are only four Christian students in my entire school. We are a small community and it is crucial for us to connect with other Christians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.” “I would like to go to university in the West Bank but this is impossible. I need to wait until I am 35 before I’m issued a permit by the Israeli authorities to visit the West Bank. There are universities in Gaza but they don’t offer as many subjects. It is the worse thing in the world not to have choice. When I am older and think of getting married I won’t be able to marry a Christian man from the West Bank or from Jerusalem. It is almost impossible to meet a man from the West Bank, but if I do we won’t be able to live together. West Bank Palestinians are not allowed to visit Gaza let alone live here, and Palestinians from Gaza are not allowed to visit the West Bank. Palestinian society is being torn apart,” says Deema. “All Palestinians suffer from these restrictions but the strain on Palestinian Christians is felt more because of our small numbers.” “I feel I am locked up in a prison against my will for no reason,” she says. “It is hard not to become frustrated. It doesn’t look like the situation will change any time soon. It seems as though the whole world has forgotten us.”
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Case study 14 Name: Age: Location: Date of incident: Nature of incident:
Aida R. 39 Silwan, East Jerusalem Continuing Threat of house demolition
A mother from the al Bustan neighbourhood of Silwan, in occupied East Jerusalem, describes living under the constant threat of having the family home demolished, and the effects on her family.46 Thirty-nine-year old Aida was born in Silwan, and her family has lived in the area for generations. Aida and her husband, Yacoub, have seven children. ‘Like most of the homes in Bustan, my home is under threat of demolition,’ says Aida. ‘Nearly 10 years ago, I inherited some land in Silwan from my family, so we decided to save up and also borrow some money in order to build our own house. By 2005, we had got together enough money to start building, but it was a slow process because we didn’t have much money and so could only build a bit at a time. We didn’t apply for a permit for the house, because we knew that they don’t give permits to build in Silwan. We know that they have plans for this neighbourhood which is not to allow the Palestinians to build homes here. But I couldn’t live anywhere else, this is my land and I have a right to be here,’ says Aida. In June 2006, some Municipality officials came to the house with police and soldiers and took photographs. They left a leaflet saying that the house would almost certainly be demolished. Aida and her husband went to see a lawyer who advised them to move in immediately, even though the house was not complete and still had no doors or windows. ‘We were sleeping in the house but living in fear that soldiers and police would come in the middle of the night,’ recalls Aida, but nothing happened for over 18 months. ‘Then one day, in February 2008, they arrived early in the morning,’ says Aida. ‘The children were all at home because there wasn’t school and we were still in our pyjamas. It was the army together with the men from the municipality. When the door was opened they pushed through the door. The soldiers were carrying big guns. The children were terrified and hid behind my back,’ remembers Aida.
Case Study [ 67 ]
“My husband argued with them and said “talk to me, can’t you see how frightened the children are?” One of the men from the municipality took our identification cards. I asked him what he wanted and he said: “You have built on land owned by the State.” I replied: “How is it State land, when it is owned by my grandfather? I’m not building in Tel Aviv.” He then said that we didn’t have a permit to build and asked if we had proof that we were paying the municipal tax. I did and showed him the receipts. He then handed me a paper that stated that if we didn’t leave the house in 21 days it would be demolished and we would have to pay 70,000 shekels.” “It was very distressing,” recalls Aida, “here were lots of soldiers standing around the house. My husband was in a bad way. He was very upset about what had happened and was also feeling sorry for himself – he was talking about how he had borrowed the money and soon he would lose the house and be left with debt. He was so upset and helpless, it was awful. Later that day, his condition got worse and he was having problems with his chest. In the evening, it was so bad that he went to the neighbours and asked them to take him to hospital. At the hospital they said he had had a heart attack, and that he had to stay there for four days. He recovered, but his heart is now weak and vulnerable and he was advised to avoid stress,” says Aida. “I was terrified and the stress was doubled by what had happened to my husband. I didn’t feel safe for me or my children, and I expect them to come back and demolish the house at any moment. I feel lost. What will I do without my home or my husband? I can’t find the words to express how I feel,” says Aida. “For me the problem was that they were not simply going to demolish the house, but they were also going to take the land, then we would have nothing. I would be prepared to live in a tent on the land, but if they took the land as well, that would be devastating.” Aida reports that there have been a number of court hearings to try and save the house, but nothing has been resolved, and every time they go to court it costs them 500 shekels. “In June 2012 the neighbourhood lawyer informed the residents that the authorities are going to demolish the houses in Al-Bustan by September 2012. I was devastated when I heard the news. The authorities give us contradictory information: once they said only 29 houses would be demolished but then they say all 88 houses will be demolished. I don’t feel the lawyer trusts what the authorities tell him. The official messages are not clear and this makes it worse.” “Lately we have noticed a lot of activity by the soldiers, the police and even the under-cover units. They enter Al-Bustan almost every night. I hear them during the night and I wake up. I hardly sleep these days. Many young men [ 68 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
Aida R., photo by WCLAC .
and even children are being rounded up, harassed and put in prison. Those who are released without charge are told to stay out of the neighbourhood for months. This scares me. If indeed they will demolish the house in September there will be no one left in the neighbourhood to protest. They are waging a war against the neighbourhood . Things are not looking good and I feel we are alone, I feel helpless and vulnerable. I lose my temper for no reason. I shout at the children and I am impatient with my husband who does not have a regular job these days. The level of stress in the house is very high and the atmosphere is tense. The children will pay the price.” “I’m also worried about my son; there have been lots of children arrested recently by the Israelis, children as young as 10 or 12 years. My son is 12 years old and I don’t allow him to leave the house to play with his friends. I am worried that he might be arrested by under-cover units. He begs me to go out but I don’t allow him. It is the worst feeling not being able to protect your children. My children often ask me about the house and whether it will be demolished and where they will go if that happens, and how they will find me if it is demolished with me inside it. The children are very creative and like making ceramics and crafts. They keep the things they’ve made by their pillows so they can take them with them if they have to get out of the house in a hurry. For a long time, they also used to take their favourite toys with them to school because they didn’t want to lose them if the house is demolished while they are at school.” “I believe that the Israelis want to get rid of the Palestinians in the area, as if we are an outdated product, as if we are dispensable. But I don’t believe that they will succeed,” says Aida. Case Study [ 69 ]
Endnotes 1.
2. 3.
4.
5.
6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.
UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Professor John Dugard, “Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories,” (21 January 2008, A/HRC/7/17 – paragraph 45; and B’Tselem – Statistics on Palestinians in the custody of Israeli security forces (2008 to 2012). UN Charter – Article 2; see also International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004). The illegality of the settlements was confirmed by the legal adviser to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an advice dated 18 September 1967. In the advice, T.Meron, unequivocally stated that “civilian settlement in the administered territories contravenes explicit provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention.” The advice is available on line at: http://is.gd/bX6yeJ US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 – Israel and the occupied territories. Available at: http://is.gd/7zvQG4; see also Children in military custody: A report written by a delegation of British lawyers on the treatment of Palestinian children under Israeli military law, June 2012 – paragraph 14. Available at: http://is.gd/EM6Imu Palestinian villages that frequently hold Friday demonstrations include: An Nabi Saleh; Beit Ummar; Ni’lin; Bil’in; Al Walaja; Al Ma’sara; Kafr ad Dik; and Kafr Qadoum. As to the illegality of the Wall, see: International Court of Justice (ICJ), advisory opinion (2004) on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 – the occupied territories. Available at: http://is.gd/7zvQG4 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) – Israeli settler violence in the West Bank, November 2011. Available at: http://is.gd/pp7yoq Yesh Din – Criminal Accountability of Israeli Civilians. Available at: http://is.gd/WWTJaj UNOCHA – Israeli settler violence in the West Bank, November 2011. Available at: http://is.gd/pp7yoq UNOCHA – Protection of Civilians Weekly Report (27 June – 10 July 2012). Available at: http://is.gd/dshdco Ibid B’Tselem - Violence by Settlers. Available at: http://is.gd/ALiRQP Haaretz (19 June 2012) - “Mosque in West Bank village set alight in suspected ‘price tag’ attack.” Available at: http://is.gd/VVqut7 UNOCHA – Israeli settler violence in the West Bank, November 2011. Available at: http://is.gd/pp7yoq Yesh Din – “Law Enforcement upon Israeli Civilians in the West Bank,” (27 March 2012). Available at: http://is.gd/vtmhRU Yesh Din, Alleged Investigation: The Failure of Investigations into Offenses Committed by IDF Soldiers Against Palestinians (August 2011) – page 101 US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 – Israel and the occupied territories. Available at: http://is.gd/7zvQG4 The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) - http://is.gd/tY4EuH EU statement, 5 September 2012 - Available at: http://is.gd/PjyzvE Haaretz, 18 August 2012 - Available at: http://is.gd/iOkU5V Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies: Children and Youth 2005–2011 Diakonia – “Israel’s Administrative Destruction of Cisterns in Area C of the West Bank,” (September 2011). Available at: http://is.gd/KYnRyX
[ 70 ] Women’s Voices: Glimpses of Life Under Occupation
22. UNOCHA – “Restricting Space: The Planning Regime Applied by Israel in Area C of the West Bank,” (December 2009). Available at: http://is.gd/zdAhOU 23. UNOCHA – Protection of Civilians Weekly Report (27 June – 10 July 2012). Available at: http://is.gd/dshdco 24. Article 54 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (1977); and Diakonia – “Israel’s Administrative Destruction of Cisterns in Area C of the West Bank,” (September 2011). Available at: http://is.gd/KYnRyX 25. Ibid 26. This statement has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this statement are the sole responsibility of Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC) and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union 27. UN Security Council resolution 298 of 1977. See also the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004). 28. UNOCHA – Settlements in Palestinian residential areas in East Jerusalem (April 2012). Available at: http://is.gd/scfDQy 29. UNOCHA – Demolitions and forced displacement in the occupied West Bank (January 2012). Available at: http://is.gd/phRYb4 30. UNOCHA – Monthly Humanitarian Monitor (January 2012). Available at: http://is.gd/swGVhj 31. UNOCHA – East Jerusalem: Key humanitarian concerns (December 2011). Available at: http://is.gd/g4skVT 32. UNOCHA – Monthly Humanitarian Monitor (January 2012). Available at: http://is.gd/swGVhj 33. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI). Available at: http://is.gd/t3vxQh 34. East Jerusalem: Key humanitarian concerns (December 2011). Available at: http://is.gd/g4skVT 35. US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 – Israel and the occupied territories. Available at: http://is.gd/7zvQG4 36. US State Department, International Religious Freedom Report for 2010 – Israel and the Occupied Territories. Available at: http://is.gd/Zuc6i2 37. See endnote 26 38. Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement 39. UNOCHA, Special Focus: Between the Fence and a Hard Place, August 2010. Available at: http://is.gd/gaSkzn 40. Gisha, Despite Supreme Court recommendation: State upholds refusal to allow gender study students to travel from Gaza to the West Bank. Available at: http://is.gd/CsCYLQ 41. The Guardian, “Women in Gaza: How life has changed,” 30 July 2012. Available at: http://is.gd/OKZiuN 42. Available at: http://is.gd/mmHDU8 43. UN News Centre, 27 August 2012 - Available at: http://is.gd/fdV5gA 44. The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) - http://is.gd/tY4EuH 45. In March 2012, WCLAC staff member Salwa Duaibis and visiting clinical psychologist, Judy Roth, PhD, conducted an exploratory, qualitative study, using extensive interviews of mothers in their 30’s and 40’s living in the friction points of the West Bank and East Jerusalem (near settlements and by-pass roads). One of the purposes of the study was to gauge the psychological impact of night-time incursions and child detention on mothers. 46. See endnote 26 [ 71 ]
Qalandia checkpoint, photo by Martin Hauschild.
The Olive Tree Campaign Keep Hope Alive Report July 1st 2013- June 30th 2014 Background: Palestinian land has been the focus of conflict between Israel and Palestinians for 66 years. In 1948 and its aftermath, many Palestinians were forced to leave their land by the Zionist military forces and the Israeli army, using a variety of methods in villages and cities across Palestine to force Palestinian people from their homes. This deliberate theft of land did not end there. On the contrary, these land seizures have continued to this day. The situation in Palestine is visible in land confiscation and settlement expansion, offering proof of Israel's goal to take control of much of the remaining Palestinian land. In this situation, Israel has the power, has gained the support of many of the world's most powerful nations, and can justify their actions to the international community by using security as a cover. Israel is undisputed, and feels justified in its measures to take Palestinian land. To create the appearance of legality in their actions, they created several laws that enable them to confiscate Palestinian land. They use an Ottoman absentee law to confiscate land, and they can announce the land it as 'State Land' without dispute. Using this method, they have taken control of land inside the green line and within the West Bank itself. In regards to the West Bank, Israel uses military orders to take control of land through building Israeli bypass roads, the apartheid wall and through settlement expansion . All these methods come together to stop Palestinians reaching their land to cultivate it, and to stop them building on, developing or using their land. This military orders system gives Israel the opportunity to confiscate more land, and enable more settlers to come and settle in the 'empty' land in the west bank, a process that is encouraged by the Israeli government who supplies settlers with financial support and subsidized services. The Israeli occupation measures in the West Bank, including land confiscation, restricting access to land and water, preventing the farmers cultivating their land, and destroying and uprooting of olive trees, all pushed the Joint Advocacy initiative (JAI) to launch the Olive Tree Campaign(OTC) with the intention to plant olive trees and educate the international community about these violations and mobilize it to intervene in defense of Palestinian landowners’ rights, and the Palestinian general right to freedom, peace and justice. 1
Introduction:
This report discusses the activities and accomplishments of the Olive Tree Campaign (OTC) over the period from July 1st 2013 to June 30th 2014. It describes the OTC main programs as well as all the other related activities. It shows in details the benefitted areas of the Campaign as well as the number of trees sponsored and the number of sponsors, over the reporting year and the previous years. The report also sheds light on the impact of the OTC's activities on the participants and activists as well as the farmers. Some challenges we have faced, and a section on future plans, are also included. This report is submitted to the JAI partners and friends who are involved in the OTC activities, and to any interested party upon request.
Olive trees in Palestine: From a geographic point of view, Palestine's location is considered as one of the prime areas for olive production, because Palestine located in the Mediterranean basin, which has the suitable conditions for cultivating olive trees. Olive production has the potential to improve the Palestinian economy, but in Palestine the olive trees carry more than just economic significance. They are not just like any other trees, they are symbolic of Palestinians’ attachment to their land. Because the trees are drought resistant and grow under poor soil conditions, they represent Palestinian resilience. The fact that olive trees live and bear fruit for thousands of years is parallel to Palestinian history and continuity on the land. Palestinians are proud of their olive trees; they tend them with care and appreciation. Palestine has some of the world’s oldest olive trees, some dating back 4,000 years. Some families have trees that have been passed down to them over generations, and the olive harvest season in October bears a socio-cultural significance, where families come together to harvest olive trees bearing in mind that their forefathers and mothers had tended to the same trees many years ago. Moreover, the three Abrahamic faiths teach their followers of the olive trees' divine and sacred value. The olive tree is mentioned 30 times in the Old and New Testaments and seven times in the Quran. In addition to their symbolic meaning, olives are the main source of income for approximately 80,000 Palestinian families. According to UN figures, around 48% of the agricultural land in the West Bank and Gaza is planted with olive trees. Olive trees account for 70% of fruit production in Palestine and contribute around 14% to the Palestinian economy. 93% of the olive harvest is used for olive oil production, while the rest is used for olive soap, table olives and pickles. Much of the olive production is for local consumption, with a small amount of olives being exported, primarily to Jordan. With the growing interest in organic food and fair trade, Palestinian olives are now also reaching European and North American markets.
2
Attacks on the Olive Trees in Palestine: Palestinian farmers face daily suffering and harassment from Israeli soldiers and settlers. The Israeli military occupation and settlers are trying to erase Palestinian history and their connection to the land by the following measures:
Building the Apartheid Wall that seperates farmers from land.
Confiscating Palestinian land, fields, and destroying olive groves.
Uprooting some 2 millions olive trees since 1967.
Creating buffer zone area around the Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
Attacking farmers and their properties, chopping olive saplings, and cutting and burning olive trees .
Dumping wastewater on Palestinian fields and olive trees .
Restricting access or no free access to the farmers' own land.
restricting access to water springs and the destruction of water wells.
Building the Israeli Bypass roads on Palestinian land and farms.
Attacking farmers and their land frequently by settler groups and soldiers
Reports on general attacks on Palestinian land, olive trees, farmers, are detailed here: http://www.jai-pal.org/en/campaigns/olive-tree-campaign/general-attacks-fields Attacks on the campaign’s farmers can be found here: http://www.jai-pal.org/en/campaigns/olive-tree-campaign/attacks-on-campaign-fields
Efforts to Protect the Olive Tree: In 2002, the JAI started the Olive Tree Campaign (OTC), which seeks to replant olive trees on Palestinian land that is under threat of confiscation. The OTC aims to protect Palestinian land and strengthen the agriculture sector. It also offers Internationals the opportunity to visit Palestine and support farmers, while experiencing local culture and the hardships of life under occupation, with the goal of encouraging internationals to advocate for peace with justice for Palestinians by demanding policy changes.
3
The Campaign has been able to empower Palestinian farmers and support their right to maintain their own land. It is a method of dealing with Israel's systematic destruction of olive trees in a creative and steadfast way. The OTC has also been
working
on
engaging
individuals and organizations from around the world in supporting farmers by sponsoring the olive trees it plants, involving them in the olive planting and olive harvest seasons, as well as educating and lobbying
activities
in
their
respective countries and working on policy changes to influence changes on the ground.
Methodology: At the beginning of every year, the OTC starts working and prepares for the year ahead. The year of 2013\2014 was full of preparation, work and challenges. In August, the JAI met representative of local authorities and agricultural groups to cooperate with and to facilitate the application procedures. Between September and November, the JAI received more than 300 applications from farmers to follow up and study. After reviewing the applications and visiting the land, JAI selected the eligible land to support based on the following criteria:
Threat of confiscation due to the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements
Distance from the Apartheid wall, the settlements and the bypass roads
Threats of confiscation received from the Israeli Military Authorities
Number of uprooted trees in the field, if any Farmers determination and effort to look after their land and trees
Capacity of the campaign, in terms of availability of olive trees compared to the capacity of the field
Proof of land ownership
Application details
In the reporting year, the JAI purchased 11,100 olive trees this year from a nursery in the West Bank. The specific species chosen is a native breed that is perfectly adapted to the dry environment of Palestine. The trees were of a minimum of one-meter high, three-years-old, straight and free of diseases or physical damage. 4
The 11,100 trees were planted in 163 fields in 18 villages around Bethlehem, Hebron and Ramallah. The table below explains the distribution of the trees:
Note: This year the OTC focused its mission primarily on the Bethlehem area because of the intensive settlements expansion in the area, especially around Al-Khader Village. Governorate
Fields 5 21 26 2 16 1 2 3 3 31 2 3 2 37 2
Tree Planted
Bethlehem
Location Batter Housan Nahallen Wad-Fouken Al-Jaba’a Al-No’man Za’tara Tequa’a Al-ferdous Ertas Beit Jala Al-Walaja Azzion Al-Khader Al-Asakrah
Hebron
Soureef Bani Na’im
2 2
120 100
Bili’n
3 163
500 11,080
Ramallah Total
200 1,100 1,410 100 850 300 80 1,050 270 1,300 250 350 100 2,940 60
Olive Tree Sponsors: In the season 2013/14 the planted olive trees were sponsored by 1,061 sponsors** from 16 countries, as well as from Palestine. This is a direct outcome of the campaign’s global efforts. The table below shows where the majority of sponsors come from: Country Denmark Japan Netherlands Norway USA Switzerland Sweden UK Other* Total
Sponsors 15 121 479 18 20 44 111 200 53 1,061 5
* Other sponsors came from south Africa, Germany, Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and Palestine. ** Sponsors could be individuals, groups or partner organizations Sponsors can search for their sponsored tree(s) online, to see where it/they are planted, along with the area, village, map, farmer's name, pictures, and story of the field: http://www.jai-pal.org/en/campaigns/olive-tree-campaign/search-sponsored-trees
Beneficiaries : The OTC targets and benefits different people on the ground in Palestine and throughout the world. Among these are: 1. Sponsors of olive trees, and friends and partners of the JAI, as they continue to become involved and be part of a growing number of people around the world advocating for peace with justice for Palestinians. 2. Participants of the olive picking and olive planting programs during the year. 3. The global YMCA and YWCA, as the campaign is considered to be a direct tool to mobilize the movement’s commitment to peace with justice. 4. The farmers and landowners are considered to have benefited directly from the actual planting, as well as being given the opportunity through the campaign to tell the world about their life stories and struggles under the ongoing occupation. The campaign continues to focus mainly on farmers whose land and livelihood is affected directly by the military occupation. 5. Laborers, transportation workers, fieldworkers and many individuals who took part in providing services to the campaign during the picking and planting seasons. 6. The olive tree nurseries where the trees are purchased from 7. Palestine's domestic production and economy, as the JAI team and their friends are committed to BDS and work on promoting Palestinian agricultural products 8. The communities in which the planting took place. The OTC managed to plant trees in 18 communities in the West Bank. The land belonging to these communities is located near settlements, on the other side of the Apartheid Wall, or close to bypass roads, and is threatened with confiscation, by military order or otherwise. The JAI believes that these communities benefit from the campaign as it provides trees for their land, as well as highlighting the kind of oppression and injustice they live through on a daily basis.
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2013-2014 Olive Tree Campaign: Olive Picking Program 2013: In
October, during the olive
harvest, the JAI cooperates with the Alternative Tourism Group (ATG) to run the Olive Picking Program as a part of the ongoing Olive Tree Campaign. In 2013, more
than
130
international
participants came to Palestine from all over the world to join us in this event.
The
internationals
participating in the program come through
YMCAs,
YWCAs,
Christian organizations, Churches and solidarity movements from Australia, Canada, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and Palestine. The program ran from the 19th to the 28th of October 2013. Participants were divided into 3 groups for logistical purposes. Each group had similar schedules, and helped to pick olives with Palestinian farmers and landowners in various villages and fields in the Bethlehem area. Participants helped farmers in Wad Foukin, Nahhalin, Makhrour and Bir Oneh areas in Beit Jala, east of Beit Sahour, and Teqoua'a. The program also included geopolitical, historical and religious tours and visits to some Palestinian cities, and presentations and discussions on the main issues for Palestinians living under occupation, and on international advocacy campaigns including: the Kairos Palestine Christian Initiative, the Boycott-Divestment-Sanctions (BDS) campaign, Palestinian child rights under occupation, and Palestinian popular resistance. As usual there were also activities related to the Palestinian culture in addition to enjoyment See the olive Picking Program 2013 – report with pictures in this link : http://www.jai-pal.org/en/campaigns/olive-tree-campaign/olive-picking-program/6-jai-atg-olivepicking-program-2013
Participants' reflections on the 2013 Picking Program: Aine from Ireland said: "I am so delighted to be here in Palestine. With this program, I see that there is lots of hope. There is a sense of solidarity, at the same time there is fun. People here, the Palestinians, are so strong and I do not see them broken. It is great to work in their shoes. My friends 7
were telling me that I am going to a terrible place. But I am not afraid. The people are friendly and peaceful…from a learning point of view, it is necessary to come here and see the situation with your own eyes." Tazim from England said: "This is my second trip to Palestine since my last trip 18 months ago for the olive planting. This kind of activity is a very nice way of learning the real situation in Palestine…you do not just hear stories…you are also doing it in practical way by helping the Palestinians and interacting with them… it connects things… It is nice to see at the end of the day that bags are full of olives…"
Olive Planting Program 2014: 55 internationals from 12 countries, namely:
Australia,
Canada,
Denmark,
England,
Germany,
Netherlands,
Norway,
Ireland,
Palestine, Sweden, UK and USA, joined the JAI-ATG Olive Planting Program from the 8th to the 17th of February 2014. The program included four half day planting activities on various threatened fields in villages in the Bethlehem area. Each day the participants planted approximately 400-500 olive saplings, which were some of the season's internationally sponsored olive trees from the Olive Tree Campaign. Through planting, participants got to witness the Israeli occupation's policy of land confiscation, settlement activities, harassment of farmers, and attacks on property including olive trees and land. They met and listened to the stories of Palestinian farmers and their families, and expressed their solidarity with them to "Keep Hope Alive". Olive Planting Program 2014 – report with pictures: http://www.jai-pal.org/en/campaigns/olive-tree-campaign/olive-planting-program/176-olive-plantingprogram-2014 8
Participants' reflections on the 2014 planting Program: Mechtild from Holland said "For more than 20 years I have followed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
and I have visited Palestine before, but this year during the Olive Planting trip, I learned so much more about the Palestinian people, and how strong they are! The program was very well organized and we had many interesting excursions and presentations from NGO's. I was impressed by all these highly educated people who withstand the pressure of living under occupation (meaning those who stay and do not go abroad for a better paying job) and are working hard for the future of a free Palestine"
Other planting Activities: 1. The Christmas Trip: Every year the JAI in cooperate with the Dutch Olive Tree Campaign in Netherlands organize a trip for Dutch people to come and visit Palestine during the Christmas time in December, this season 15 participants attended to this program, and they have planted 200 Olive trees in Tequa’a village in the east of Bethlehem. 2. The Palestinian Land Day: On the 30th of March every year Palestinians commemorate Land Day. This is a very special day for Palestinians, since 1976 when the Israeli government confiscated thousands of dunums of land that belonged to Palestinians in the Galilee that resulted in the killing of 6 Palestinians, the injuring hundreds, and the arrest of those who resisted this measure . This year on March 30th, the JAI, alongside many other local organizations, arranged to plant olive trees in the land of Al-Khader Village in southern Bethlehem. A big group of young Palestinians and international volunteers attended this event in order to plant 100 olive trees. This activity was intended to support the farmers, and to keep hope alive for them, as well as marking the Land Day. For details on this activity see the link below: http://www.jai-pal.org/en/campaigns/olive-tree-campaign/olive-planting-program/229-landday2014 3. Rønningen Folkehøgskole /Norway : Through the exchange program between JAI and Rønningen Folkehøgskole School in Oslo, 15 students came to visit Palestine to learn more about Palestinians who are living under the Israeli occupation. This group of students participated in 3 days of planting in Palestine, and they planted 460 Olive trees in Al-Khader Village in February 2014. More on this link: http://www.jai-pal.org/en/youth-exchanges/youth-exchange/students-exchange-programs/161-13students-from-r%C3%B8nningen-efterckole-%E2%80%93-norway-program-in-palestine-with-the-jai
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4. Dronninglund school : 10 Danish "Global Teenager" students from Dronninglund Efterskole (DE) had a program in Palestine with the JAI and Palestinian students from the 28th of February until the 6th of March 2014. These students also participated in Olive tree planting in Palestine. On one of the days of their visit to Palestine , they planted 200 olive trees, together with Palestinian students, on a threatened field in Beit Jala, as part of the JAI Olive Tree Campaign. See the link below for details: http://www.jai-pal.org/en/youth-exchanges/youth-exchange/students-exchange-programs/198dronninglund-efterskole-danish-students-program-in-palestine-with-jai-feb-march-2014 5. NNE school : 31 "Global Teenager" students from the Nørre
Nissum
Efterskole
(NNE) in Denmark, together with 3 of their teachers and a school board member, had a week program in Palestine with the JAI, from the 14th to the 21st of March 2014, as part of ongoing student
exchange
partnership that has been running for 4 years, in cooperation with DanChurch Aid. The students, their teachers, and another 15 Palestinian students planted 500 Olive trees at a field in Teqou' village, east of Bethlehem, that is under threat of confiscation. See the link: http://www.jai-pal.org/en/youth-exchanges/youth-exchange/students-exchange-programs/216-nnepalestine-2014
10
6. YMCA\YWCA Haugaland : 11 youths and 2 leaders from the YMCA-YWCA Haugaland in Norway were hosted and had a program in Palestine organized by the JAI, from the 22nd of February to the 2nd of March 2014. The students, and other Palestinian students, went together to plant olive trees in al Asakrah Village in the east of Bethlehem. At this event they planted 300 olive Trees in support of Palestinian Farmers. http://www.jai-pal.org/en/advocacy-visits-trips/advocacy-programs-palestine/194-ymca-ywcahaugaland-norway-program-in-palestine-with-the-jai 7. YWCA of East Jerusalem : The JAI, in cooperation with the YWCA of east Jerusalem, organized a tour in Bethlehem for 25 students from Jerusalem. This event was created to raise the awareness of students from Jerusalem, and to educate them about the separation wall and settlement expansion in the West Bank. After the tour and showing them the wall, they went to plant olive trees near one of the Israeli settlements south of Bethlehem. At that point, the settlers attacked us and we could only plant 70 Olive trees.
General Achievements of the OTC: In the period of 2013-2014, the OTC achieved its main goal by raising the number of olive trees planted in the West Bank. This year we purchased and distributed 11,100 olive trees, and more than 180 Palestinian families have received help and support, either by our helping them to plant olive trees or helping them pick their olives during the Olive Harvest Season in October. This year the number of the sponsors was 1,061 from many different countries around the world. The whole Number of sponsors during the last 12 years was 9,061. This achievement has allowed for people from around the world to become engaged with the ongoing struggle of Palestinians for freedom and peace with justice. During the reporting period the OTC arranged many guided geopolitical tours around Bethlehem, Hebron and Ramallah to show more than 370 international students and visitors what the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory is.
Throughout the past 12 years, the Olive Tree Campaign has been able to help nearly 1,063 families from the occupied West Bank and Gaza strip, and has been responsible for the planting of approximately 98,000 olive trees, as shown in the table below:
11
The OTC Coordinator visiting the Netherlands: This trip was the first experience of the Netherlands for the new Olive Tree Campaign coordinator, Muhanad Al-Qaisy. The aim of this trip was to work together with the Dutch Olive Tree Campaign in the Netherlands, and tour with them in different cities across the country, in order to the people about the work of the Olive Tree Campaign, and how the campaign works to Keep Hope Alive for Palestinians, especially the farmers in Palestine who are facing daily attacks and harassment from Israeli settlers under the protection of the solders and the Israeli government. The trip was a good opportunity to describe life under occupation for the audiences so as to be aware of the difficulties the Palestinians and particularly the farmers face During the trip, from the 14th to the 27th of May 2014, Muhanad and his Dutch colleague gave more than 17 different presentations for students in their schools, and also in churches, mosques and cultural centers. After each lecture they opened discussion and answered the questions of the audience. They also informed the people of how they could support and show solidarity with Palestinians through the OTC..
OTC study: In June 2014, the JAI concluded a study to find out what impact of the Olive Picking/Planting programs have on past participants, in terms of meeting the objective to encourage advocacy in participants. This involved discovering whether or not past participants of the program had felt the need to advocate or be involved in activism in light of the program, and whether this translates into people having been or currently being involved in advocacy or activism on Palestinian issues. We also sought to discover what issues and problems these participants had with the program, to see if there is 12
anything we could change to make the programs more effective. We found that the programs had a significant impact on the advocacy/activism of our sample. 96.3% of respondents said they felt the need to advocate due to their participation in the program, with 86.4% stating that they have participated in some form of advocacy/activism since they took part in the program. We found that those who engaged in advocacy/activism within the first 6 months of their return from Palestine were significantly more likely to continue these activities. Because of our findings, we can assert that the program is meeting its objective in encouraging advocacy in its participants. For more details see the following
link:
http://www.jai-pal.org/en/publications-information/jai-publications/pamphlets-
researches/265-study-into-the-impact-of-the-jai-atg-olive-picking-and-planting-programs-onparticipants
New OTC staff : A part-time OTC field worker was employed as of mid June 2014. Her role will primarily be to work in the field with the municipal council, agricultural groups and to follow up with the farmers, identify the lands eligible for support, creating a database on the farmers, and keeping their information. She will be in charge documenting Israeli violation and attacks on olive groves. She will also help in other relevant researches and studies, and will do all the preparation for the planting activities
New Partnership 1. Embrace the Middle East: "Embrace the Middle East" is one of the main organizations that works in middle east in order to improve the lives of vulnerable and disadvantaged people. In the beginning of this year, Embrace the Middle East arranged some meetings with the JAI staff so as to discover more about the Olive Tree Campaign's mission and the work we do toward supporting the Palestinian farmers. After doing several fields visits, talking to Palestinian farmers and listening to their stories, Embrace The Middle East decided to support the OTC by educating people about the work we do, enabling people to sponsor olive trees through the their website, and they have also started promoting the Campaign by spreading many flyers and brochures as of May 2014. The news received from the Embrace are promising
2. The Church of Scotland Following many meeting, field visits and discussions, the Church of Scotland has decided to promote the OTC in Scotland in a show of solidarity and support to the JAI and Palestinian farmers. In May 2014, the Church of Scotland mutually launched the Campaign with the Embrace the Middle East and they agreed to work in full cooperation in this regard.
3. The YMCA Korea 13
By the end of 2013, the JAI Manager met volunteers and senior staff of the YMCA Korea, including the President and the General Secretary, in a ceremony to launch a project for Alternative Tourism and an Olive tree Campaign in South Korea. The JAI expects that this partnership will help to promote the Campaign, and this will result in many sponsorships
OTC Expand to the North: After years of focusing on Bethlehem and Hebron, the OTC achieved its goal of expanding their work in the West Bank by reaching Ramallah and starting to support the people in the villages of Ramallah governorate. This year, the OTC planted 500 Olive Sapling in Bili’n village in the west of Ramallah.
OTC Promotion Materials: The OTC issues the annual Olive Tree Campaign calendar every year. The calendar contains different stories about Palestinian farmers and many other subjects about our partners and issues related to Palestinians who live under the Israeli occupation. The JAI produced some useful promotional material, such as t-shirts, pens, calendars, stickers, hats, booklets and notebooks to help promote the OTC here in Palestine and internationally. Some of these were sent to the JAI partners and friends but almost all types of the materials were distributed among participants in the JAI's activities and among visitors. The JAI film “the Uprooted” that tells the story of families suffering from the Israeli violations against their land, and was also distributed/sold to partners, participants and visitors.
Challenges: During the reporting period, four of the campaign planted fields were attacked by either the Israeli army or settlers:
On June 27th 2013, Israeli soldiers attacked a field in Ertas, Khalet Al-Nahla with a Bulldozer. The land was related to the farmer Mohamad Abu Laban. They destroyed the pipes of the irrigation system, and they also destroyed more than 150 olive sapling.
On February 14th 2014, the Israeli settlers from Mejdal Oz settlement came down to Yassen Al Dadoa's Field and they uprooted more than 100 olive sapling, which were planted only one week before the attack.
On February 16th 2014, during the last planting day, the participants were prevented from planting olive trees by Israeli soldiers and settlers. One month after the event, JAI went back to the same field in order to continue the work with a group of students from Jerusalem, but the settlers from Nekodem Tequa’a attacked the group and confiscated the agriculture tools. 14
On October 28th 2014, during one of the visits for international visitors from the UK to one of the fields near Tequa’a village, the Olive Tree Campaign Officer and 2 internationals were stopped and detained for one hour in Nekodem Settlement, and were interrogated by Israeli soldiers .
JAI documented these incidents and shared it with its international support network, asking members to write to the Israeli diplomats in their countries, and to share the information with their media agencies. OTC also asked recipients to sponsor more trees to replant these farmers’ fields, and to come help with the olive harvest.
One of the main challenges that the campaign faces is reaching the fields during the planting or picking seasons, because the Israeli government do not allow Palestinians to build agricultural roads to access their lands. In some countries many individuals face difficulties sponsoring olive trees because there are no partners there to facilitate this, especially when paying for the trees. This might have been an inhibitor for many people, because of the difficulties in paying/transferring the fees. Having a PayPal system will help overcome this difficulty.
Future Plans:
The Olive Tree Campaign will work on updating the database related to the OTC in the JAI website, especially the section where the sponsors can track the trees they have already sponsored. The OTC will work on collecting more data, pictures and maps about the farmers and the fields we have planted using GPS. This would be useful for the sponsors to learn more about the Palestinian situation and how the Israeli settlements surround the Palestinian villages and their fields.
The OTC Plans to plant 10,000 olive trees for next year, and also to expand work to cover more villages in Ramallah.
The OTC team will work on engaging more organizations in the campaign work in order to do promotion at the international level.
The JAI will have a Pay Pal account to help make it easier for people to sponsor olive trees, and in receiving support for other JAI activities.
Thank you 15
JAI would like to thank the partners, and every person, organization or group for their valuable support and efforts. Many thanks for our sponsors from around the world. The JAI appreciates your solidarity, consideration and cooperation. The achievements of the Olive Tree Campaign could not have been possible without the efforts of our committed friends, partners and sponsors. It is very much appreciated that all these people decided to help keep hope alive for Palestinians. The achievements of this year come as a result of the overwhelming support in recruiting sponsors and helping planting olive trees of:
Y Care International/UK; Sumud Palestine /UK; St. Mary’s Iffely Church (UK); OTC Netherlands (ICCO, Cord Aid, YMCA, YWCA. IKV Pax Christi); Watersheds Foundation (USA); Common Service Cooperation of the United Church of Christ, USA; Y Global/ Norway; the YMCA of Japan; the EJW/ Germany; YWCA/ Japan ; YMCA/YWCA of Sweden; The First Presbytery Church in San Anselmo/USU; KHA/USA; Horyzon-Switzerland; Rønningen Folk High School/Norway; Nørre Nissum Efterskole/Denmark; Danish Church Aid/ Denmark ;; Trinity Presbyterian Church USA; United Reformed Church Trust/ UK;
And all the individual supporters from South Africa, Germany, Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and Palestine. Many thanks to the participants who came to Palestine to help the Palestinian farmers in the olive picking and planting programs as well.
We thank the Palestinian farmers and their families for their daily struggle to keep their lands from the risk of confiscation by Israel.
Gratitude goes also to the JAI volunteers who exerted effort here in Palestine and in their own countries to support and promote the OTC campaign.
16
a
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS
GENDER EQUALITY
Gender Equality and Women’s Rights In Palestinian territories
NOTE
Abstract This note gives an overview of women’s rights and gender equality in Palestine. It introduces the main actors, and then provides information on women’s status in the economic, educational, health, political, legal and cultural domain. It finds that, although advances have been made, women activists need to continue and be supported in their struggle against dual oppression from Israeli occupation and patriarchal control, if women’s rights and gender equality are to be secured in Palestine.
PE 453.212
EN
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality.
AUTHOR Dr. Sophie RICHTER-DEVROE Lecturer in Gender and Middle East Studies Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies University of Exeter Email: s.richter-devroe@exeter.ac.uk
RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR Mrs Claire GENTA Policy Department C - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs European Parliament B-1047 Brussels E-mail: poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu
LINGUISTIC VERSION Original: EN
ABOUT THE EDITOR To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its newsletter please write to: poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu Manuscript completed in October 2011. Brussels, Š European Parliament, 2011. This document is available on the Internet at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies
DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorized, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.
Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Palestinian territories
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS
3
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
4
1. INTRODUCTION
5
2. ACTORS
5
2.1. The General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW)
6
2.2. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA)
6
2.3. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
6
2.4. The Islamic Women’s Movement
7
2.5. The Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC)
7
3. ECONOMIC RIGHTS
8
3.1. Labour
8
3.2. Education
9
3.3. Property Rights
9
4. VIOLENCE & HEALTH
9
4.1. Political Violence
9
4.2. Domestic Violence & Honour Crimes
10
4.3. Health
11
5. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
12
6. CIVIC & LEGAL STATUS
12
6.1. International Legal Provisions: CEDAW and UNSCR1325
13
6.2. Nationality and Residency Laws
13
6.3. Personal Status Laws (PSL)
14
7. CULTURAL RESTRICTIONS
15
8. CONCLUSION
16
REFERENCES
17
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine GUPW General Union of Palestinian Women IWC International Women’s Commission MOWA Ministry of Women’s Affairs NGO Non-Governmental Organisation OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory PA Palestinian Authority PDP Palestinian Development Plan PLC Palestinian Legislative Council PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation PSL Personal Status Law UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution WATC Women’s Affairs Technical Committee
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Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Palestinian territories
1. INTRODUCTION Palestinian women’s struggle for gender equality and women’s rights is restricted by two main interrelated forces: the Israeli occupation, and internal patriarchal control. Women activists in Palestine are fighting simultaneously on two fronts for political (national) and social (gender) liberation. They remain sceptical of a feminist agenda that primarily focuses on individual and social gender empowerment and instead insist that gender inequality in their context stems not only from patriarchal oppression, but from poverty, economic dependency, continued political violence, insecurity and instability caused by Israeli occupation, siege and settler-colonial policies. Israeli occupation policies of territorial (and political) fragmentation, spatial separation and mobility restrictions have systematically dispossessed, occupied and destroyed Palestinian living spaces, breaking up Palestinian territory into several unconnected and isolated cantons. Such policies of spatial control have a severe damaging impact on Palestinian economy (Roy, 2004), society, family and kinship organisation (Johnson, 2006), but also on women’s activism. Women are not only divided geographically (between - and within - the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the Diaspora), but, more importantly, their contexts and predicaments are widely varying: refugees, West Bank and Gaza ‘citizens’, East Jerusalemites and Palestinians with Israeli citizenship all have different access to rights. This wide variation and fragmentation complicates women activists’ efforts to organise a united agenda. While the specificities of refugees and ‘citizens’ in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem will be drawn out, this note does not cover Palestinian women’s rights and issues of gender equality inside Israel or the Diaspora. Women’s rights in Palestine thus cannot be dealt with in isolation; the impact that the occupation and political conflict have on women’s legal, social, cultural, educational, economic and political status is crucial when looking for possible strategies to empower women. This is not to say that patriarchal structures and cultures are not a major concern for Palestinian women’s activists. To the contrary, it highlights that women’s empowerment in the Palestinian context and their struggle for equal rights is closely linked to their political and economic empowerment which can only be achieved by ending the Israeli occupation.
2. ACTORS With the Oslo Accords the PLO moved from exile to the Occupied Territories and was established as an interim government, the Palestinian Authority (PA), in January 1994. After some years many Palestinians were disillusioned with both the Oslo process and the PA (see e.g. Rabbani, 2001). The peace process had neither brought independence nor justice, and continued annexation and occupation were worsening the economic situation. Both the secular right and the Islamists started to dominate the political and social sphere, marginalising the left which had been most active in supporting women’s rights (particularly the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, DFLP). Analysts tend to agree that patriarchal structures in Palestinian society were intensified under conflict and consolidated by the PA (Abdo, 1999; Amal, 2001). The PA is dominated by one person, the President, who monopolises executive, legislative and judicative power and can appoint high-ranking positions. This has led to mostly male Fatah members (the President’s party) or male PA returnees from exile receiving appointments (Abdo, 1999). Such practises of political patronage and clientelism within the PA hinder women from equal participation as private patriarchy intrudes the public sphere in the process of state-building
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
(Amal, 2001). Today women activists in Palestine either work for change from within the PA, or organise their work on women’s and feminist issues independently through NGOs.
2.1.
The General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW)
The General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), dominated by middle and upper-class returnee women, was established in 1965 as a body within the PLO. It holds a strongly nationalist agenda, favouring changes from inside the institutional structures of the PA. As a nationalist political body, rather than a representative body of the Palestinian women’s movement, it prioritises the national struggle over social gender change. Today the impact of the GUPW on women’s political and social activism is of mainly symbolic value.
2.2.
The Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA)
In November 2003 the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) was established as a body of the PA. The Ministry seeks to ensure women’s equal political representation and legal rights by centrally coordinating the efforts of governmental and non-governmental women’s organisations, and refers to international conventions to support this claim. MOWA’s importance lies in the fact that, as a central coordinating body with a national plan of action, it provides institutional support from the state for feminist activism. It is especially with regard to the two issues that are most central for gender equality in a future state women’s political representation and women’s legal rights - that MOWA tries to follow up and support the persistent lobbying of NGOs and feminists.
2.3.
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
Many women activists (particularly from the left), who had established themselves as important social and political players through their committee work in the First Intifada (1987-1993), were wary of entering the PA structures and placing too much emphasis on nationalist goals, fearing that this might eventually relegate women’s issues to the background. Instead, many founded their own independent feminist NGOs which often focus their work on strategic gender interests, lobbying the PA for women’s equal political and civil rights, but also addressing taboo topics, such as domestic violence, honour crimes or the personal status laws (PSL). Among the more prominent women’s organisation are the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), the Women’s Studies Center, Miftah, the Jerusalem Center for Women, the Arab Women’s Union and In’ash al-Usra. 1 NGOs are mostly foreign-funded, often led by western-educated feminist activists and tend to promote participation in international feminist forums. As a result some NGOs receive criticisms from parts of Palestinian society. They are accused of belonging to the “globalised elite” (Hanafi and Tabar, 2005) who, removed from grassroots needs and priorities, follow foreign agendas which prioritise women’s over national liberation. Such accusations are generally brought forward by nationalist and religious-political actors in order to strengthen their own political and social power. Nevertheless, the danger of ‘NGOisation,’ i.e. of NGOs replacing social and political movements (particularly women’s - often voluntary - work in, and through, the women’s branches of the political parties) and a resulting depoliticisation, fragmentation and professionalization of the women’s movement is not to be dismissed.
1
The latter two are long-established charity organisations which are based on voluntarism and work predominantly on women’s practical needs, rather than strategic gender interests.
6
Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Palestinian territories
2.4.
The Islamic Women’s Movement
Women activists in the Islamic movement have emerged as important players in the Palestinian women’s movement after Oslo, particularly in Gaza. The failure of the peace process has provided Islamic movements with fertile ground to widen their political and social influence and resulted in further polarisation between the nationalist secular and Islamic forces. Although women activists in the Islamic movement often represent themselves in stark contrast to what they denounce as ‘westernised’ secular NGO feminist activists, such a dichotomy does not represent women’s actual political and social practices on the ground. It is true that women in the Islamic movement adopt an ‘Islamic feminist’ approach and advocate the re-interpretation of the religious texts from a women’s or feminist perspective to reform the personal status laws (PSL, see point 6.3), but they do not act in complete isolation from other local and international women’s agendas. The Islamic women’s success also stems from their adoption of methods to mobilise ordinary women as practiced by the secular and left-wing women’s committees during the First Intifada. Their gender agenda, too, is formed in interaction with, and reaction to, the secular feminist movement (Jad, 2005).
2.5.
The Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC)
The 1991-founded Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC) functions as an umbrella organisation uniting various women’s groups and coordinating their social and political activism. In its early phase its main focus was to integrate gender issues in peace- and state-building. Towards the late 1990s, when it had become clear that the Oslo peace process would not materialise, WATC changed its agenda and focused predominantly on gendering the state-building process. WATC, together with the GUPW and some of the independent women’s NGOs, has been organising campaigns on less controversial topics, such as women’s practical needs or their political and civil rights. Although WATC has managed to build strong grassroots support, it has not succeeded in uniting the women’s movement; the Islamic women’s groups still do not form a genuine part of WATC. The post-Oslo Palestinian women’s movement thus is characterised by strong divisions, particularly around the issue of women’s rights in the private sphere. Divisions are not just between religious-political and secular women’s groups: The Islamic women activists and the WATC have mass support, but differ on their social agendas; feminist NGOs enjoy foreign financial backing, but sometimes lack legitimacy in Palestinian society; and MOWA and the GUPW are maintained by the PA and PLO, but their actual functions and impact on the women’s movement are limited. Inherent in this split are fragmentations along the lines of class (with NGO workers forming a new foreign-funded elite), residence (with the urban elite exercising power over rural and camp women), legal status (with returnees and citizens being privileged over refugee women, and the camp emerging as a separate neglected entity), and religion (with the nationalist-secular activists denouncing and restricting Islamic women’s work, and vice versa).
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
3. ECONOMIC RIGHTS 3.1.
Labour
The World Bank puts the number of Palestinians living in poverty 2 at a little over 20% in 2009 (with Gaza’s poverty rate at 33.7% being twice as high as that of the West Bank) (WB, 2011). Although no reliable data exist, female-headed households (which are estimated to be between 5-11% of all Palestinian households) are probably among the most vulnerable ones. Given high unemployment rates, women have had to devise multifaceted informal livelihood strategies and coping mechanisms to avoid aid dependency and family destitution (Abdo, 2006; WB, 2011). Palestinian women face no legal barriers to enter the labour market as entrepreneurs or employees. But the new Palestinian Labour Law of 2000, although advanced compared to previous laws, still does not guarantee equal rights for women in the workplace. For example, the law does not include domestic, agricultural, and informal labour, i.e. the main sectors of female labour (Azzouni, 2010). Between 1998 and 2009 female labour force participation was constantly below 16.6%, making it one of the lowest rates in the Middle East, and the world (WB, 2011). Female participation in the labour force in Gaza has traditionally been lower than in the West Bank. One factor causing this low female labour force participation might be cultural perceptions which expect men to act as breadwinners for the house. Such perceptions, however, are changing. Estimates show that widespread male unemployment pushes women into work: female workers are more likely to be employed if the head of household is unemployed (WB, 2011). Another obstacle is the lack of adequate services to help women balance work with their reproductive roles. Very few employers provide child-care services and although women are granted a maternity leave of 10 weeks by law, most businesses do not adhere to it and in practise avoid employing married women. In registered employment women earn an average daily wage of 60.7 NIS, compared with 81.3 NIS for men. Such wage differences are, however, not reflective of the true picture of women’s discrimination in the labour market. Most women work in the informal sector or as unpaid family members (in family shops, agriculture, etc.) without any benefits or protection by the Labour Law. Only 9% of business owners are women, but they represent 82.7% of unpaid family labour compared to just 17.3% of men (ESCWA, 2009). Women’s small-scale business and income generation projects are often supported through microcredit financing. Furthering women’s economic empowerment and addressing practical needs is crucial not only because it provides women with security and a livelihood, but also because the satisfaction of basic material needs should in itself be seen as a first step toward women’s empowerment. In order to sustain women’s advances, gained mainly through expanding economic practices, women need to, however, ensure that their acts are recognised as politically and socially significant through a change in gender norms, policies and discourses as well. Most importantly, economic support programmes can only temporarily alleviate women’s dire economic situation. Their real economic, social and political empowerment is blocked by the occupation which results in massive economic losses, a barely functioning economic infrastructure and de-development (Roy, 2004; WB, 2011).
2
For a reference household of 2 adults and 4 children, the poverty line in 1997 was set at 1390 NIS, i.e. about 404 US$ per month (WB, 2011).
8
Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Palestinian territories
3.2.
Education
Education in Palestine is systematically obstructed by Israeli occupation policies. Between 2003 and 2005 28% of the Palestinian student population was affected by killings, injuries or arrests, and incursion and curfews have caused massive losses of school days (PMG, 2005). Female students often suffer from gender-specific intimidations and humiliations (for example being forced to take off their hijab) by soldiers at the checkpoints on their way to school or university. Nevertheless, girls are catching up in education and literacy rates are improving for women. In 2002 the literacy rates among the 15-19 age group were 97.5% for girls and 96.6% for boys. For adults, women’s literacy rate stands at 87.4% and men’s at 96.3%. Women are also advancing in higher education: while in 1996 for every 100 male students there were 77 female students registered in tertiary education, women’s enrolment in 2001 rose to 90 female students per 100 male students. These increases in women’s enrolment rates may reflect a change in the social awareness of the value of education for women, but it must also be taken into account that many younger men are imprisoned, or are forced to drop education in order to act as family providers (Nahle, Nasser and Kuttab, 2006).
3.3.
Property Rights
Palestinian women have the legal right to own land and property. However, only few do so: women are often expected by society to give their share of inheritance to their brothers, and men tend to keep property in their names rather than jointly registering it with their wives. The actual percentage of women formally owning property thus is low. According to the shari’a (religious law), which regulates inheritance issues, a woman has the right to half the share of a man. Many Palestinian women - especially in rural areas – do, however, not make use of this right. Palestinian social and family structures are organised around the principles of patrilocality and patrilineality: it is preferred that wives move to and integrate themselves into their husband’s family, and that sons inherit so that possessions stay within the family. Recently there have been increased campaigns by women's institutions encouraging women to claim their share of inheritance (Azzouni, 2010).
4. VIOLENCE & HEALTH 4.1.
Political Violence
Palestinian women suffer from direct physical and structural political violence enforced by the occupation. While concrete statistics of sexual harassment by Israeli soldiers at checkpoints or in house raids are hard to obtain, the specific gendered impacts of structural violence through mobility restrictions, arrests, house demolitions and economic strangulations have been documented. With the Oslo Accords the West Bank was split into Areas A, B and C with each having different administrative and security arrangements. Israeli spatial control has, however particularly increased after 2000. In 2002, operation Defensive Shield meant the comprehensive invasion of the West Bank, and the institutionalisation of Israeli policies of house demolition, mobility restriction as well as the destruction of institutions and infrastructure. 2002 also saw the beginning of the construction of the wall, which is largely (87%) built inside the West Bank, annexing fertile lands and surrounding Israeli settlements. Following the election of Hamas in 2006 Israel intensified movement and
9
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
access restrictions, enforced a blockade on Gaza, and stopped relying on Palestinian labour (which before had been significant mainly in construction and domestic work). In September 2011 the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA) identified 522 fixed obstacles to movement within the West Bank (such as checkpoints, roadblocks, earth mounds or trenches), indicating a large increase over their baseline figure (376) of August 2005. Additionally 495 ad hoc ‘flying’ (i.e. moveable) checkpoints have obstructed movement in the West Bank in the past two years (OCHA, 2011). The separation wall and checkpoints in the West Bank as well as the blockade enforced on Gaza have prevented women from reaching hospitals and health care centres in time, forcing, for example, pregnant women to deliver at checkpoints (see section 4.3). Just as the rest of the Palestinian population, women and girls have been denied access to education and employment, especially in areas where secondary schools are scarce and where jobs or university require moving from one village or city to another. Mobility restrictions have, furthermore, influenced marriage patterns, increasing marriages between partners who live close to each other (or on the same side of the wall), so as not to enforce family separation (Azzouni, 2010). The demolition of Palestinian homes also specifically impacts on women and children. Since 1967 more than 24.000 homes have been destroyed, 5388 in 2009 alone (ICAHD, 2010), and many of them in East Jerusalem, where Israeli policy of home demolitions has increased over the last years. The displacement and instability caused by demolitions have severe impact on the psychological and mental health of parents and children.
4.2.
Domestic Violence & Honour Crimes
Domestic violence and honour crimes largely remain a taboo topic; investigations into and public debate on its scope only started during the last two decades. Very little accurate data on domestic violence against Palestinian women exists. In 2006 the Domestic Violence Survey conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics showed that 61.7% of ever-married women were exposed to psychological violence, 23.3% to physical violence, and 10.9% to sexual violence at least once during the year. 25% of never-married women were exposed to physical violence and 52.7% to psychological violence by a household member (PWRDC, 2010). There has been a rise in domestic violence since the start of the Second Intifada (2000). Men’s stress and intolerance seems to have increased as a result of curfews, constant apprehension and humiliation at the hands of Israeli soldiers, leading them to act more aggressively and violently at home. Yet, cultural attitudes also show no clear condemnation of violence against women: 22% of Palestinian population support a man hitting his wife, if he thought it is necessary (AWRAD, 2008). Domestic violence is not prohibited by a specific clause in the law. Data on sexual violence, rape and honour crimes are often inaccurate and hard to obtain. Studies report 488 women seeking assistance related to sexual violence between 1996 and 1998, but such numbers do not reflect the scale of assaults, since discussing sexual violence remains a taboo and most cases, particularly of incest, remain unreported. Family violence is seen as a private issue, in which the police might not want to interfere. Criminal data on honour crimes thus varies: MOWA reported 20 cases of honour killings in 2004 (Abu Nahle, Nasser and Kuttab, 2006), while PWRCD cites reports of 46 women killed in the name of honour from 2000-2005 (12 in 2005 alone) (PWRCD, 2010). Women often choose not to report threats against them to uphold ‘family honour’, but also because existing laws do not offer protection to women, and prosecutors often side with the 10
Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Palestinian territories
accused rather than the victim. There are laws that provide impunity or reduced sentences for offenders. Article 308 of the Jordanian Penal Code (in force in the West Bank) provides for the dropping of legal proceedings against a rapist who marries his victim according to a proper marriage contract; Article 340 grants exemption from prosecution or reduced penalties to husbands or male blood relatives who kill or assault female relatives on grounds of ‘family honour;’ under Article 98 men who kill female relatives under ‘suspicious’ circumstances can receive reduced sentences; finally, Articles 285 and 286 stipulate that if a girl wants to report a complaint, this must be filed by a male relative (see ShalhoubKevorkian, 2004). In Gaza, the Egyptian penal code on adultery similarly provides reduced sentences for men who kill their wives on the accusations of adultery. Reforming these codes is a priority for women’s rights activists in Palestine. The PA has intensified its investment in combating violence against women. In 2005 the Palestinian Legislative Council adopted a decree demanding the provision of protection for abused women; in 2009 President Abbas endorsed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); and in 2008 the Palestinian Cabinet approved the formation of a National Committee to Combat Violence Against Women. This Committee is responsible, in coordination with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA), for the implementation and monitoring of the 2011-2015 National Strategy to Combat Violence Against Women.
4.3.
Health
Palestinian society is very young with 45.6% individuals below 15 years of age, and a fertility rate of 4.6 (PCBS, 2006). The early median age of marriage (ca. 18-19 years), in addition to the low percentage of women in the labour force, are contributing to these high fertility rates. Families tend to marry off their daughters early if they are economically disadvantaged. International, governmental and non-governmental organizations’ efforts to promote women’s rights, enhance family planning and improve reproductive healthcare have been informed by a modernist national discourse urging women to raise their children in nuclear families to educated modern national subjects. Since 1994 the Ministry of Health in Palestine has accorded special importance to the health of women. A strategic national health plan that includes awareness-raising campaigns was initiated to develop health facilities and counselling programs. Although around half of the married women aged 15-49 use family planning and most mothers receive routine prenatal examinations (PCBS, 2006), continuous pre- and postnatal maternal healthcare, as stipulated by the Palestinian health law, is not guaranteed due to the health sector’s dependence on volatile foreign funding, as well as mobility restrictions and security problems caused by the occupation. Women have been hindered from accessing continuous and/or emergency life-saving pre- and postnatal care (resulting in high maternal and infant mortality rates) and have sometimes been forced to deliver at checkpoints or at home. Women in the reproductive age often suffer from anaemia, caused by malnutrition and multiple pregnancies from a very young age. No special programs target elderly women who are the most marginalized in society. Abortion is not allowed in Palestine and is considered a crime unless the physical health of the mother is threatened (Azzouni, 2010).
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
5. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Considering their wide participation in the First Intifada, women had hoped to be given equal share in political representation after the Oslo Accords. Yet, the PA has systematically marginalised women from the political decision-making process. While informal political participation in the different political parties (particularly the left) continues to be significant, women’s involvement in party executive committees and party councils remains much lower than men’s. In the 2009 party elections, for example, no woman was elected to Fatah’s Central Council, and only 11 women were elected to its 120-member Revolutionary Council (Azzouni, 2010). Initiatives by MOWA and women’s NGOs aimed at reversing such trends. Gender-based programmes and women’s units have been introduced in different ministries. In 2005 women’s quotas were established for the local and national legislative elections. For the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, political parties must have at least one woman among the first 3 on their list, at least 1 woman among the next 4, and 1 woman among every five for the rest of the list. This guarantees about 20 percent women among the candidates (through the party-based part of the elections). 3 In the 2006 elections women won 13,6% of the representation in the PLC (Azzouni, 2010). In the local council elections women are guaranteed at least 2 seats in every one of the 26 local councils. As a result of these amendments the percentage of women that won seats in the 2004-2005 local elections rose immensely to ca. 17% (Azzouni, 2010). Particularly interesting was the response from religious-political groups. Hamas, which had first opposed the gender quota, started to organise a series of activities to mobilise women and included them in their listings. Its success in the elections can be traced, among other factors, to its strong grassroots support and networks maintained largely by women. In August 2009 the Palestinian Cabinet initiated the process of creating a new Palestinian Development Plan (PDP) for the years 2011- 2013. With the purpose of placing gender equality and women’s empowerment at the core of the forthcoming PDP, the Palestinian Cabinet, together with the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, assigned to MOWA the task to develop a Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy within the basic framework of the new development plan.
6. CIVIC & LEGAL STATUS Palestinian law is not unified; it is a mixture of Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli military law. Additionally, international laws and conventions apply to Palestine. The PA institutions have been largely dysfunctional, due to internal corruption and favouritism, but also due to Israeli restrictions on their execution of the law through mobility restrictions and lack of jurisdictional power (in Area C, and in other areas due to the application of Israeli military law). Legal provisions in Palestine thus are fragmented, and enforcement is impeded.
3
Candidates for the 2006 PLC elections were presented through party lists and by districts. While a quota was established for the party lists, the district constituency elections did not have a quota. Only one of the 66 seats allocated by district was won by a woman. Election Laws (and quotas) are likely to change again.
12
Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Palestinian territories
6.1.
International Legal Provisions: CEDAW and UNSCR1325
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas signed the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in March 2009. This is a major step, but fraught with difficulties: Since Palestine is not recognized as a state it cannot participate in the CEDAW process of initial and periodic reviews. Palestine can also not submit a report to be reviewed by the CEDAW committee and complaints cannot be sent through the optional protocol. Palestinian women activists therefore cannot use the report mechanism of CEDAW to highlight discrimination and needs for reform (Rought-Brooks, Duaibes and Hussein, 2010). A similarly complex picture emerges with regard to the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security which calls for women’s increased participation in conflict prevention and resolution initiatives, their protection and empowerment during conflict. In 2005 the International Women’s Commission (IWC), a tripartite body comprising Palestinian, Israeli and international high-level female delegates, was founded and tasked with monitoring the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Israel and Palestine. Although the Knesset has adopted a law calling for the implementation of 1325 and President Abbas has recognised the IWC through an official decree in 2005, the responsibility (and accountability) for enforcing 1325 is not clarified. Palestinian women’s rights are constantly violated under occupation, the PA is unable to stop Israeli human rights violations and the Israeli government does not consider this its responsibility. Furthermore, the UNSCR 1325 makes no mention of social or economic rights, such as the right to basic living conditions or right to housing, and thus does not fully cover women’s actual needs and priorities on the ground. Since women’s rights in conflict cannot be guaranteed if basic human and political rights are denied, most women activists on the ground find it more helpful to seek international legal leverage from the 4th Geneva Convention, human rights and those UN Resolutions which directly acknowledge Palestinian national rights (e.g. 242, 338 or 194) or condemn Israeli violations of international law (e.g. 1322 or 1860).
6.2.
Nationality and Residency Laws
In its first draft of the Palestinian Basic Law (the basis for the constitution of a future state) of 1994 the PLO did not guarantee women’s equality. Women groups thus presented a Women’s Charter, the “Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Women’s Rights” to Yasir Arafat demanding that women’s equality in political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights must be incorporated. These hopes were disappointed: the 1996 Basic Law only retained the inclusive anti-discriminatory formula of giving the same rights to all citizens irrespective of race, sex, disability or other traits. It did not specifically address the problem that women are denied the right to pass on their citizenship to their husbands or children. In 2003 the Basic Law underwent amendments. Article 12 states that the right of citizenship passes on from fathers or mothers to their progenitors and Article 19 expresses gender equality with regard to political and civil rights. In comparison to other Arab states’ constitutions, the Palestinians Basic Law thus is remarkably strong on gender equality. Yet, these positive changes should not be overestimated. The PA still has only limited sovereignty, the Israeli government exercises control over nearly every aspect of Palestinian life, and Israeli military law applies. In the West Bank the Jordanian nationality code and in Gaza the Egyptian nationality code currently regulate nationality affairs. According to these codes only men, not women are allowed to pass on their nationality to 13
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
their children or spouses. A woman loses her nationality if she marries a non-Palestinian, unless she submits an application to the Ministry of Interior. Although the Ministry of Interior does not always ask women to give up their nationality in practise, these laws clearly discriminate against women’s equal citizenship and nationality rights (Azzouni, 2010). The 2003 Israeli Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law prohibits Palestinians who are married to Israeli citizens from receiving Israeli citizenship and Palestinian citizens of Israel are also not entitled to family reunification with foreign (i.e. also Palestinian) spouses or children. Palestinians living in East Jerusalem (under Israeli rule) are subject to particular regulations: They hold Jerusalem identity cards which serve as residence permits and allow them to travel, work, attend school, etc. Jerusalemite women married to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza cannot obtain residence cards for their spouses, and children born to a non-Jerusalemite father also face difficulties to live and attend school in Jerusalem (Azzouni, 2010). Thousands of families are concerned by this problem. Rights to equal political and civil status, to family reunification, and to passing on citizenship to spouses or children thus remain theoretical in the Palestinian quasi-state under occupation. The Palestinian women’s movement will need to ensure that the PA indeed puts their gender-friendly legal amendments into practise, if and once there is an independent Palestinian state with full legislative, judicative and executive powers.
6.3.
Personal Status Laws (PSL)
One of the major priorities for women activists in Palestine today is the amendment of the gender-discriminatory PSL, which are based on the shari’a. PSL regulate rights in marriage, divorce and inheritance issues. PSL cases are handled by shari’a courts, but family disputes have also increasingly been dealt with by tribal and customary laws which, just as PSL, discriminate against women. PSL has not been unified by the PA: Palestinians in Gaza are subject to the 1954 Law of Family Rights of Egypt and those living in the West Bank follow the 1976 Personal Status Law of Jordan. Both are discriminatory against women. The legal minimum age for marriage is 16 for boys and 15 for girls in the West Bank, and 17 for girls and 18 for boys in Gaza. Men are allowed to marry up to four wives, women need a male guardian in marriage decisions, they receive only half of a man’s share as inheritance, and after divorce they are denied the right to child custody after their son reaches age 10 and their daughter age 12. A divorced or widowed woman is not allowed to keep her children after remarriage. While a man faces no legal obstacles to divorce his wife, women have to provide proofs (e.g. of husband’s inability to provide, to procreate, to pay the mahr, etc.) and mostly have to surrender the mahr (the brideprice, which in Islam is paid to the wife) as well as any claim to financial maintenance (Azzouni, 2010). Palestinian women activists have sought to amend PSL. One major advocacy NGO concerned with women’s legal rights is the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC). In 2008, a more progressive PSL was drafted by the National Campaign for the Family Law, which – if approved – would raise the minimum age of marriage to 18 and place restrictions on polygamy (Azzouni, 2010). Among women activists there are two main approaches to ‘gendering’ PSL. The first, a liberal religious approach, calls for a feminist re-interpretation of the religious texts to provide equality between men and women from within the Islamic framework. The second,
14
Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Palestinian territories
a secular approach, proposes to base claims for women’s equality on human rights and international conventions, mainly CEDAW, because it finds that Islam is not, or only vaguely, compatible with women’s rights. Although a secular approach might be more comprehensive, it risks being rejected by conservative elements in society as ‘foreign-imposed’ and might lead to strong backlashes. Secular women activists are continuously accused by conservative forces of being dangerous for Palestinian cultural integrity and part of a ‘Western conspiracy against Islam’. According to a 2002 study (Hammami, 2002), the majority of Palestinian women (85%) want PSL to remain shari’a-based, yet 66% of the same respondents also find the current Palestinian legal system to be discriminating against women. Both popular legitimacy for the shari’a and critique of its gender-biased nature thus coexist. Such a seemingly contradictory opinion stems from women’s understanding that tradition and not Islam is the cause for gender inequality. Changing ‘traditional’ gender stereotypes and cultural attitudes thus is another – very complex and difficult – struggle for women’s rights in Palestine.
7. CULTURAL RESTRICTIONS Palestinian social organisation is dominated by classic patriarchy: the dependent (and thus inferior) status of women is promoted through cultural frameworks, and maintained through patrilineal tracing of decent and inheritance, patrilocal (extended) households, and men’s authority in decision-making and control over family finances. The family is the most vital social institution in Palestine. Given the high political, economic and social instability caused by war and Israeli occupation, marriage and children are considered crucial for socio-economic security, particularly women’s. While the husband holds ultimate authority and financial responsibility for the household, the wife is expected to fulfil her reproductive and domestic roles. In Palestinian culture motherhood, child-bearing and -rearing play a central role in defining femininity models and women’s status in society. Additionally, motherhood is endowed with political meaning and considered a national duty for women in the discourses of Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation. With the process of Palestinian nation-state building initiated, but unrealized, women’s bodies and their reproductive behaviour have become markers of both authenticity and modernity. Given the Palestinian fear to be outnumbered and uprooted, women are encouraged to have many children and teach them Palestinian history, traditions and values. The image of a resistant, steadfast, sacrificing and morally superior mother as a national Palestinian symbol is taken up by many Palestinian artists and often stands for the homeland itself: Mother Palestine who is eternally giving and loving toward her children. The self-composed public performance of mothers of martyrs (required by a nationalist discourse that associates motherhood with sacrifice) has been interpreted by some mainstream Israeli and/or Western media as encouraging children to martyrdom and violence. Empirical studies, however, disprove such claims and show that Palestinian mothers widely suffer from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental and psychological problems caused by loss of their children. While more conservative voices - which are now gaining ground particularly in Gaza - view motherhood as Palestinian women’s main moral and national obligation, often seeking support in religious texts, others condemn such attempts to restrict women to a mainly passive role in the private sphere and demand women’s equal status in Palestinian society.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
8. CONCLUSION Without ending the political and economic repression and de-development exercised by Israeli occupation and settler colonial policies, Palestinian women’s rights and gender equality will most probably continue to be restricted. Women’s social and cultural empowerment can only progress once women’s economic and political position is strengthened. Unachieved national rights thus remain a major hindrance for fulfilling women’s rights in Palestine today. More immediately, Israel must be held to comply with international law, such as the 4th Geneva Convention, international humanitarian law, human rights, and relevant UN resolutions. Women’s economic, social, political and cultural rights under conflict must be guaranteed and protected, and family reunifications need to be processed and implemented. Aside from alleviating the heavy restrictions placed on women’s freedom through the occupation and in what concerns Palestinian internal reform, efforts should be targeted at the level of the law, the labour market, education, political representation, health and cultural norms. At the legal level, the PA should guarantee equal rights for women in all domains. Priorities would include giving women the right to pass on their nationality to children and spouses without any discrimination. Additionally, a unified gender-egalitarian family code needs to be enacted, that would guarantee women equal family rights in inheritance, marriage, divorce, and child custody. As concerns the penal code, all laws that allow for reduced sentences for crimes committed in the name of honour must be abolished and laws that protect women from all forms of violence should be introduced. Finally, at the judicial and executive level, gender-sensitive training should be established for police and court officials, and the representation of women in such posts should be raised. As concerns women’s labour participation and education, laws should be introduced that protect women from all forms of discrimination at the work place and more vocational training opportunities need to be provided for women and girls, particularly for those from rural areas and camps. With regard to political representation, a women’s quota should be implemented for the PLC and other government branches (for example, 30%) and women need to be offered more training programmes with a view to raising female high-level representation in government and political parties. In the health sector, women’s health programmes and services need to be increased. Mothers must receive sufficient prenatal, but also postnatal care. Public awareness-raising campaigns should be intensified, providing information about family planning, but also about taboo topics such as domestic violence, inheritance, and women’s rights more broadly. Such efforts, if placed carefully and in a culturally-sensitive way, can be a first step towards changing cultural norms that reinforce patriarchal structures and a subordinate position of women in society, and thus towards constructing alternative gender models in Palestine.
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Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Palestinian territories
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Abdo, N. (2006) Women and Poverty in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Critical Literature Review, Ramallah: PWRDC.
Amal, J. (2001) “The Women’s Movement and the Gender-Regime in Palestine” Middle East Journal, Vol. 55, No. 2.
Abu Nahle, L., Nasser, R. and Kuttab, E. (2006) Palestinian Women’s Empowerment: An Assessment. A Study for UNESCO, Birzeit: Women’s Studies Institute, Birzeit University.
Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD) (2008) Opinion Poll: Palestinian Women: Challenges and Priorities, Social and Economic Rights, Political Participation, Legal Reform, The Role of Women and Human Rights Organisations, Overall Trends. Ramallah: AWRAD.
Azzouni, S. (2010) “Palestine” in S. Kelly and J. Breslin (eds) Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance, New York: Freedom House.
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) (2009) Social and Economic Situation of Palestinian Women 2006-2009, UN ESCWA.
Hanafi, S. and Tabar, L. (2005) The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalised Elite: Donors, International Organizations and Local NGOs, Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, Muwatin, The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy.
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Johnson, P. (2006) “Living Together in a Nation of Fragments. Dynamics of Kin, Place, and Nation” in Taraki, L. (ed.) Living Palestine. Family Survival, Resistance, and Mobility under Occupation, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
Hammami, R. (2002) “Attitudes Towards Legal Reform of Personal Status Law in Palestine” Review of Women's Studies Vol. 1, No. 1.
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2011) Movement and Access in the West Bank. September 2011, Occupied Palestinian Territory United Nations: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistic (PCBS) (2006) Demographic and Health Survey – 2004. Final Report, Ramallah: PCBS.
Palestinian Monitoring Group (PMG) (2005) Education under Occupation. October. Available online at: http://right2edu.birzeit.edu/downloads/pdfs/PMGReport.pdf
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Palestinian Women’s Research and Documentation Center (PWRDC) (2010) Violence against Palestinian Women & Girls Factsheet: A Summary of Findings, Ramallah: PWRDC.
Rabbani, M. (2001) “A Smorgasbord of Failure: Oslo and the Al-Aqsa Intifada” in Carey, R. (ed.) The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid, London: Verso.
Rought-Brooks, H., Duaibis, S. and Hussain, S. (2010) “Palestinian Women: Caught in the Cross Fire Between Occupation and Patriarchy” Feminist Formations, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 124-145.
Roy, S. (2004) “The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict and Palestinian Socioeconomic Decline: A Place Denied” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 17, No. 3.
Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2004), Mapping and Analyzing the Landscape of Femicide in Palestinian Society, Jerusalem: Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC).
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Research Report
ACCESS DENIED Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the West Bank of the occupied Palestinian Territory: Where are women? Where is women’s accessibility to “justice”? Are there possibilities for justice in the context of military occupation?
March, 2014
Acknowledgments Lead researchers: Prof. Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Dr. Suhad Daher-Nashif Research team: Sama Aweidah, Aida Esawi, Abeer Abu-Turk, Ameena Aslan, Sahar Omar, Sanaa Sayori Women’s Studies Center, Jerusalem External assistants: Najmolmolouk Ibrahim Dr. Sana Khsheiboun Professional advisors/consultants: Huda Rouhana Fabrizia Falcione - UN Women Elena Gentili - UN Women Iman Qassis - UN Women Randa Siniora - ICHR Dr. Cairo Arafat Sama Aweidah ICHR lawyers: Adv. Nura Barahme, Adv. Sharihan Ja’bari, Adv. Anwar Shaban, Adv. Ghandi Raba’i Research participants, including female college students and women victims/ survivors. Justice System personnel, including general prosecutors and district attorneys, police officers, judges, lawyers, directors of women’s institutes, women’s rights organizations, and other related NGOs that work with and address violence against women Editor: Amjad Iraqi
Table of Contents Acknowledgments
2
Map of the West Bank
4
Executive Summary
5
Introduction
7
The Sociopolitical and Legal Context for this Study
8
Methodology
19
Findings (Focus Groups and Individual Interviews)
22
Discussion and Conclusions
48
Policy Recommendations
54
Appendixes
56
Bibliography
70
Map of the West Bank
4
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
Executive Summary General Background This study examines the sociopolitical and psychological factors affecting, hindering, and/or promoting Palestinian women’s access to justice in the West Bank of the Israelioccupied Palestinian territory (oPt), with a specific focus on “Area C.” It does not examine the situation in the Gaza Strip and in East Jerusalem; nevertheless, it is envisaged that similar research will be conducted in these two geographical areas of the oPt in the future. The aim of the research is to analyze the interrelationship between Palestinian women’s experiences dealing with the local Palestinian legal system and the more complex militarized Israeli system within which it is embedded, be it through formal or informal institutions, while uncovering the various layers (both tangible and intangible) of bureaucracy, challenges, and restrictions they face in the process. The study also aims to examine the considerable hindrances Palestinian women face when they interface with civil society organizations, political institutions, and formal and informal Palestinian and Israeli agents and institutions of social and political control in their quest for justice. The study identified the many factors that structure the experiences of Palestinian women when they engage with the various legal systems that prevail in this area: personal factors such as social status and family dynamics; social and political factors; spatial factors such as those found in Areas C, H1, and H2; legal system factors; bureaucratic factors; the relevant laws; and the case type and its specifics. These factors are analyzed in the context of settler violence occurring in the West Bank with the complicity of Israeli security forces. It bears noting that such violence constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law on the part of Israel as it is violating its obligation set forth in article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits an Occupying Power from transferring citizens from its own territory to the occupied territory.
Methodology The research team included researchers and field workers who are familiar with research and fieldwork with female victims/survivors and women in conflict with the law. The study used qualitative research methodology, which can reveal meanings, processes, and attitudes. This methodology privileged voiceless Palestinian women and documented their experiences when they engage with the legal systems in the West Bank. The research used qualitative research tools such as semi-structured interviews and textual analyses for the relevant documents. Fifty-six women aged 19 to 50 were interviewed. They were from four main Palestinian areas: Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus, and Hebron. The types of cases in the study included: sexual assault and rape; violence within the family; divorce; and females whose lives had been threatened. The study participants 5
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
had the following social statuses: widow; divorced with and without children; re-married after divorce; married without children; married with children but separated; and single. The interviews also incorporated workers in the formal and the informal legal systems, including: lawyers, prosecutors, judges, directors of legal institutes affiliated with the Palestinian Authority, activists, and workers at relevant Palestinian NGOs in the area. In addition, we conducted focus groups with women, including young women living in Areas C, H1, and H2. We analyzed various relevant texts, such as cases in which women are in conflict with the law; the articles of several laws; and previous studies on the issue, including formal statistics.
Main Findings The main study findings fall into three focal areas as detailed below.
i. Paths to justice The first focal area is the identification of the various paths Palestinian women in the West Bank take when they enter and engage with the prevailing legal systems as they seek to access justice. We examined cases of violence against women, looked closely at the hardships women endure when facing life-threatening crimes, and studied cases of rape and sexual abuse. Furthermore, we analyzed the multiple paths women victims/survivors and those in conflict with the law needed to take as they navigated the local legal systems. In particular, the study focused on the geopolitical and temporal factors affecting women’s access to justice in geographic areas where highly complex arrangements for administrative and military control have resulted in severe fragmentation of communities and social services delivery, as well as extreme restrictions on Palestinians’ freedom of movement—namely, Areas C, H1, and H2.
ii. Women facing injustices, charges, and attacks within the criminal justice system Police/Family Protection Unit (FPU) The second focal area explored what happens to Palestinian women victims/survivors at each station along these various paths. In this regard, the study addressed and examined questions such as what happens to women while they stay at the Family Protection Unit (FPU) and how the staff perceive and respond to women’s voices, rights, and needs. Within this area, the study also investigated how prosecutors, courts, shelters and prisons handle cases involving violence against women. The study also explored what kind of treatment the families give to these women.
iii. Main themes of analysis Finally, the study analyzed the factors and hardships affecting women’s access to justice. Here, both women’s voices and the reactions of social control agents as well as the narratives gathered from focus groups allowed us to comprehend and fully explore the ways in which the militarized spatial politics, conflicting
laws, and discrepancy of legal frameworks negatively impact Palestinian women who seek to access justice. Furthermore, the study findings clearly show that the geopolitical fragmentation/closure of the entire area and the time spent to call for or get help create tremendous blockages to women seeking to access justice in the West Bank. This fragmentation is further exacerbated by the commuting of cases from one area to the other, from one judge to another, from one welfare or women’s organization to the other—and all these obstacles delay addressing the urgent needs for safety, security, and life. In the process, female victims/survivors and those in conflict with the law are often stigmatized and end up being afraid of and regretting that they ever engaged with the legal systems in the first place.
Conclusion Focusing on access to justice in the West Bank has allowed us to delve deeply into spatiotemporal, sociolegal, political, and economic factors and ideologies to uncover hidden abuses and analyze the policies and practices that hinder Palestinian women’s ability to access the prevailing legal systems in the West Bank and enjoy their rights to a secure and dignified life. The study findings clearly demonstrate that Palestinian women and men, victims/survivors, legal professionals, and service providers tend to neither trust the legal systems nor believe in their ability to address women’s needs or be attentive to women’s hardships. Our main conclusion is that without questioning the politics and bureaucracies of justice under such spatiotemporal constraints and violence, and without responsible, comprehensive, and contextually sensitive socio-legal formal and informal systems of intervention, Palestinian society will continue to suffer from profound abuse by the Occupying Power, and Palestinian women and girls will remain the most disadvantaged group in an unequal social justice system. The failure to defend women and girls, and wider society, from broken political and socio-legal systems not only violates theirs right to access justice but also entrenches a gender-discriminatory structure and mores that enable the continued abuse and traumatization of present and future generations of women and with them, their children. Until this systematic phenomenon is acknowledged, confronted, and transformed, Palestinian women and girls living in the West Bank will continue to find their access to justice denied, and the repercussions to Palestinian society generally will be felt for generations to come. To even begin to make justice adequately accessible to Palestinian women in the West Bank, with the very complex situation of belligerent military occupation that currently exists there and all of its socio-political ramifications and multiple legal systems (both formal and informal), we recommend starting with the following: 1. Engaging with women’s narratives and soliciting their cooperation in increasing women’s capacities to claim their rights in their own terms, languages, and strategies. 2. Ensuring that service delivery by legal actors 6
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
and other social control agents (e.g., civil society, feminists, social welfare centers) is gender-sensitive. Patriarchal ideologies—when embedded in a pre-structural condition of military occupation and juxtaposed with the multiplicity of service delivery in a fragmented geo-political space—result, as this study has shown, in jeopardizing women’s access to justice. We therefore recommend that service providers be more attentive while putting women’s safety, needs, and context at the forefront of their service delivery. 3. Evaluating compliance of the applicable legal framework to international human rights and humanitarian law standards, while contextualizing it with the political situation in the West Bank. 4. Learning, documenting, and disseminating best practices that engage with the informal justice system, and which keep women at the center of any proposed informal community intervention. 5. Promoting cooperation between the various NGOs and international organizations in building special training projects for lawyers, judges, social workers, and women. The study concludes by explaining that although specific practical steps can and should be taken to ease Palestinian women’s access to justice, as women and girls should not be left alone in such a complex, fragmented, and dysfunctional system, the present conditions of political uncertainty, added to the pre-existing condition of dispossession from the Occupying Power, makes the likelihood of effecting the types of sweeping changes needed to ensure true access to justice very slim.
Introduction This study examines the sociopolitical and psychological factors affecting, hindering, and/or promoting Palestinian women’s access to justice in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), with a focus on the West Bank and more specifically on “Area C.”1 The aim of the research is to analyze the interrelationship between Palestinian women’s experiences as they attempt to gain access to justice in the West Bank and the local Palestinian justice system, be it through formal or informal institutions, while uncovering the various layers (both tangible and intangible) of bureaucracy, challenges, and restrictions they face in the process. The study also aims to examine the considerable hindrances women face when they approach civil society organizations, political institutions, and formal and informal Palestinian and Israeli agents and institutions of socio-political control when accessing justice. The main questions this study raises are as follows: ·
How is women’s access to justice in the West Bank structured and constructed? Who are the main actors?
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How do women interact with these actors in the various areas of the West Bank?
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What challenges do women face when they engage with the West Bank justice system (both formal and informal)?
The growing recognition of the hardships facing formal and informal institutions in their efforts to offer gendersensitive access to justice to women living in conflict zones encouraged us to examine how Palestinian women in the West Bank seek help, and, through their experiences, map and analyze the potential resources available to them when they need the intervention and involvement of the justice system. To do so, we began this study by soliciting women’s stories, not only of their experiences with the formal justice system, but also of the hardships they and their female friends had faced in their own lives. These inputs were then used to investigate how women perceive, trust, or seek the help of services offered by the justice system in the West Bank. In order to answer our research question and other questions, which will be elaborated later in the report, we adopted a qualitative research methodology using semi-structured interviews and textual analyses for this study. The process of data collection, the tools used, the research methodology, and the initial themes of analysis are described in the body of the report. Women’s access to justice requires that we remember that women’s rights are human rights, and that they should be addressed and dealt with in an equal manner. Access to justice, as we see it, requires that structural 1 ‘Area C’ denotes an area in the occupied West Bank that, under the Oslo II Accord of 1995, was designated to fall under ostensibly temporary Israeli civil and security control for about 5 or 6 years, after which time it was slated to return to Palestinian control. This never took place, and Area C remains under Israeli control today. These areas include all Israeli settlements (cities, towns, and villages), nearby land, most roadways that connected the settlements (and which are exclusively for Israeli use) as well as areas denominated as strategic and described as “security zones.” As of 2012, there were more than 300,000 Israeli Jewish settlers living in Area C. 7
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
factors should be examined to understand the mode in which existing justice systems develop paths, services, laws, procedures, bureaucracies, and other mechanisms of protection for those they ostensibly serve. Protecting women includes, inter alia, ensuring that they have access to services such as welfare, legal services, and legal protection, access to the workplace, to the health care institutes such as hospitals, access to their land, and more. In the context of the occupied West Bank, this protection also includes defending Palestinian women against the patriarchal systems and practices embedded in their traditional society, as well as in the context of the Israeli military occupation that was imposed on their society in 1967, and their community in 1948. We conclude that the failure to identify structural factors hindering women’s access to justice and the inability of both the formal and informal justice systems to prevent women’s poverty, challenge sociopolitical inequality and violence against women (VAW), and punish the practice of child marriage all hinder Palestinian women’s ability to achieve justice and security in the West Bank. To understand women’s accessibility to justice, we must address, among many topics, women’s property rights and interventions in cases of divorce, inheritance, spousal abuse, political violence, and more. Justice for women is far more than simply passing laws and regulations; it requires strengthening the community and the political system to prevent harm to present and future generations of Palestinians. The Palestinian case study, focusing on access to justice in the West Bank, allowed us to delve into spatio-temporal, socio-legal, and political and economic factors and ideologies to uncover hidden abuses and analyze the policies and practices that hinder women’s access to the justice system and their right to a dignified life. The study findings clearly demonstrate that Palestinian women and men, victims/survivors, legal professionals, and service providers tend to neither trust the justice system nor believe in its ability to address women’s needs or be attentive to women’s hardships. Our main conclusion is that without questioning the structural factors affecting women’s access to justice, without a closer look at the politics of bureaucracies of justice, and without responsible, comprehensive, and contextually sensitive formal and informal sociolegal systems of intervention, Palestinian society will continue to suffer serious human rights abuses by those in power, and Palestinian women will remain the most disadvantaged group in an unequal socio-economic justice system. The failure to defend women, and wider society, from a hybrid of a mix of old and new, gendersensitive and gender-oppressive, formal and informal political and socio-legal systems not only violates the right of women to access justice, but also entrenches a gender-discriminatory structure and mores that enable the continued abuse of present and future generations of women. Until this systematic phenomenon is acknowledged, confronted, and transformed, Palestinian women living in the West Bank will continue to find their access to justice denied.
The Sociopolitical and Legal Context for this Study The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines access to justice as: “the ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy through formal or informal institutions of justice, and in conformity with human rights standards.” UNDP identifies six key stages in the access to justice process. The first stage, legal protection, is the provision of legal standing in formal or traditional law. Legal protection determines the legal basis for all other stages in the access to justice process. The second stage, legal awareness, relates to people’s knowledge of the possibility of seeking redress through the justice system, whom to demand it from, and how to start a formal or traditional justice process. The third stage, legal aid and counsel, includes the capacities (from technical expertise to representation) that people need to initiate and pursue justice procedures. Legal aid and counsel can involve professional lawyers, laypersons with legal knowledge, and paralegals. The fourth stage, adjudication, describes the process of determining the most adequate type of redress or compensation. The means of adjudication can be regulated by formal law, as in the case of courts, or by traditional legal systems. The process of adjudication includes a series of sub-stages such as investigation, prosecution, and decision. The fifth stage, enforcement, relates to the implementation of orders, decisions, and settlements emerging from formal or traditional adjudication. Enforcement systems are crucial to ensuring accountability and minimizing impunity, thus preventing further injustices. The sixth and final stage, oversight, includes watchdog and monitoring functions that civil society actors or parliamentary bodies perform with regard to the justice system. Strengthening overall accountability within the system is critical to ensuring effective reforms.2 This study describes and maps what Palestinian women face as they navigate through these stages in their attempts to access justice within their communities. Access to justice is critical for women living in conflict or post-conflict situations, in the context of occupation and other oppressive systems. It is particularly important in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, where every political, economic, and social sphere of life begins and ends in the history of injustice and continual denial of the rights of Palestinians. Our analytical point of departure perceives the denial of women’s access to justice as a tool of patriarchal control in the context of a continuous political conflict. Our analysis is based on the critiques of various scholars of women of color and Native American women, including Andrea Smith, who pointed out that analyses of VAW and 2 According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2005). Programming for Justice: Access for All. As cited in: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2009). Access to Justice in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Mapping the Perceptions and Contributions of Non-state Actors. Retrieved from http://www.undp.ps/en/fsh/pubs/a2jeng.pdf. 8
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women’s access to justice cannot be divorced from the structure of violence, racism, discrimination and classism. Theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw concurs with this position when she argues that it is inadequate to investigate the oppression of women of color by examining racial and gender oppression separately. She hence advocates for an intersectional approach that looks at the overlap between race, class, and gender.3 When Palestinian women try to access justice, and in the context of settler violence, they face hardships not only as women but also as members of a national group being targeted for hegemony and control. Their identity as women cannot be separated from their identity as Palestinians facing dispossession. Basing our analysis on philosopher Ann Stoler, we argue that racial ‘otherness’ is embedded in the social fabric of the settlement enterprise and “is woven into the web of the social body, threaded through its fabric.”4 The process of constant dispossession and continuous political violence in Palestine turns women who need to access the justice system into ‘dissenters’ who should be kept silenced, hidden, and/or eliminated. Women living under such unjust conditions, particularly when needing to access justice, are identified as external and internal threats to their communities and to society at large. Gender discrimination under such conditions thus marks women’s lives and bodies as “abnormal.” The dominance of violence, poverty, and intractable conflict in the occupation context of the Palestinian justice system, as Shalhoub-Kevorkian describes,5 result in a dysfunctional legal system that is maintained by systematic denial of the perpetuation of violence against women and a failure to comprehend the intricacy of the Palestinian socio-legal structure. Blocking women’s access to justice – whether through inappropriate laws and bureaucracies, conflicting and inconsistent legal systems, or restrictions on their mobility and ability to reach out and call for help – will likely perpetuate women’s disadvantaged status in a marginalizing system. Analyzing the connection between women’s access to justice, spatial movement, and geopolitics and economy under the occupation context of the West Bank should also be rooted in a detailed understanding of belligerent military occupation. We therefore argue that the examination of women’s access to justice in conflict zones such as Palestine should not simply address the existing judicial systems, but should venture further to examine how the interrelationship between the social patriarchal system and the masculine militarized occupation in Palestine shapes the structures and logic of women’s accessibility and inaccessibility to justice. Several formal and informal justice mechanisms exist in the judicial system in the West Bank. Civil society and feminist organizations have played an important role 3 Crenshaw, K. (1996). The intersection of race and gender. In Critical race theory, Crenshaw, K., Gotanda, N., Peller, G., & Thomas, K. (Eds.). NY: New Press. 4 Stoler, A. (1997). Race and the education of desire. Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, p. 59. 5 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2003). Re-examining femicide: Breaking the silence and crossing “scientific” borders. Signs, 608-581 ,)2(28.
in addressing and raising awareness to justice-related issues—a role that in some cases complemented, interfered with, and affected the existing informal and formal justice systems. Since its establishment in 1994, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has established domestic justice institutions to deal with the limited civil matters under its jurisdiction. The key institutions in the Palestinian justice sector are the High Judicial Council, the courts, the public prosecution, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, and the police.6 This study attempts to understand women’s access to each of these institutions in addition to the existing socio-legal system and to reveal the role that each system plays in enabling or preventing women’s access to justice within the West Bank. To further elucidate the existing structure of justice in the West Bank, we elaborate on two main factors among many others (such as poverty, unemployment, the role of civil society organizations, etc.) that this study has identified as being major to understanding how Palestinians view the justice system, on the one hand, and how it actually functions, on the other. The first factor is the geopolitical one, and the second is the Palestinian court system in the West Bank. It should be noted that although the court is the last to be addressed in the chain of justice, among women participating in this study, the court’s power and role in reproducing patriarchy and transforming women’s accessibility to justice was perceived to be major. In addition, the effect of geopolitical as well as politicoeconomic factors can’t be underestimated.
The context and characteristics of Area C Following the Oslo II Agreements of 1995, the West Bank (except East Jerusalem) was administratively divided into three zones: Area A was placed under Palestinian civil and security control; Area B, under Palestinian civil and shared Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C, under full Israeli security control and almost full Israeli civilian control. Area C comprises the largest portion of the West Bank, and it engulfs and separates the fragmented Areas A and B. Area C also constitutes most of the fertile and resource-rich land in the West Bank.7 Area C constitutes 62% of the West Bank, with 5.8% of the Palestinian population. Palestinian presence in Area C has been routinely undermined through different administrative measures, planning regulations, and other methods adopted by Israel as an Occupying Power.8 Before 1967, there were 200,000 to 320,000 Palestinians in the Jordan Valley. Today, the number of Palestinians in the region is 56,000 (of which 70% live in Area A in Jericho). The increasing integration of Area C into Israel proper has left Palestinian communities in the area ever more isolated.9 This isolation is manifested in the daily lives of Palestinians through their participation in multiple 6 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2009). Access to justice in the occupied Palestinian territory: Mapping the perceptions and contributions of non-state actors. Retrieved from http://www.undp.ps/en/fsh/pubs/a2jeng. pdf. 7 World Bank WBG Strategy FY-08FY10. Retrieved from http://www.passia. org/publications/bulletins/area-c/area-c.pdf. 8 European Union Report. (2011). Retrieved from http://rebuildingalliance. org/wp-content/uploads/03/2012/Area-C-Palestinian-State-Building.pdf. 9 Ibid. 9
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
bureaucratic systems, including the legal system. The isolation is more apparent with women as a marginalized group in society. This compound marginalization by the Israeli military regime and the Palestinian patriarchal social authorities makes women’s access to formal judicial institutions extremely difficult and sometimes entirely impossible. The inability of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to access Area C has severely impacted women’s and girls’ accessibility to essential services and deprived them of resources such as education, welfare, health, police, courts, and more. With no official PA presence, added to the economic deprivations and military control, women’s and girls’ physical safety and psychosocial security is imperiled. In August 2009, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad introduced his two-year statehood plan entitled Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State. With regard to Area C, Fayyad said: “Area C is not disputed territory, it is occupied territory, and the Israelis have to relinquish control […] It is an integral part of where the Palestinian state is going to emerge.”10 Despite this declaration, the Palestinian government did not give much attention to Area C in their national plans. The Palestinian Reform and Development Plan of 2008-2010 (PRDP) did not take Area C into full consideration, nor did it give recommendations on how to deal with the needs of the Palestinian residents there. Similarly, the Palestinian National Development Plan of 2011-2013 (NDP) did not give clear guidance on how the Palestinians would deal with Area C, seam-zones, or East Jerusalem. The lack of government attention toward Area C is a reflection of the Palestinian government’s inability to exercise any authority or implement policy in the area due to monolithic Israeli control. This reality inhibits Palestinians in Area C from participating in formal national institutions to address their social and economic needs. It also sends the message to many Palestinians never to move to, live or build in, or establish schools or other social services in, Area C. This study explores how this structure of negligence, reluctance, and inability to act in such an inaccessible area as Area C has influenced the manner in which women’s access to justice – or lack thereof – affects their lives. Through accounts of women’s considerable obstacles and analyses of their shared voices, we hope to provide a detailed understanding of the hardships facing women in their attempts to access justice. The Israeli military administration or so-called “Civil Administration” (CA) was established by the Israeli government in 1982 pursuant to Military Order No. 947, with the mandate to “administer the civil affairs in the area [West Bank](...) for the welfare and benefits of the population and provision and operation of public services, considering the need to maintain proper administration and public order in the area.”11 Its mandate includes serving both Israeli settlers and Palestinians. However, because of this conflicting dual role, the Civil 10 Middle East Online. (2009). Palestinian PM: New strategy for statehood. Middle East Online. Retrieved from http://www/middle-east-online.com/ english/?id=35434. 11 European Union. (2012). Internal Report on “Area C and Palestinian State Building,” Brussels, January 2012 (Excerpts). As published in The Journal of Palestine Studies, 223-220 ,)3( ,41.
Administration does not govern for the genuine welfare of the local Palestinian population.12 Palestinians living in Area C have to contend with a range of restrictive Israeli policies and practices, including restrictions on movement and access and harassment from the Israeli military and settler violence, which makes daily life a never-ending struggle for the Palestinian population.13 These restrictions drive already-impoverished families deeper into poverty. A report published by B’Tselem in 2013 noted that “Israel’s policy in Area C violates the essential obligations of international humanitarian law, namely: to safeguard occupied territory on a temporary basis; to refrain from altering the area or exploiting its resources to benefit the occupying power; and, most importantly, to undertake to fulfill the needs of the local residents and respect their rights.”14 Furthermore, in a fact sheet published by OCHA in January 2013, it was reported that Israel retains near exclusive control in Area C, including over law enforcement, planning, and construction. OCHA’s fact sheet further reported that 24% of the Palestinian population in Area C is food insecure.15 If we add all this to the demolitions and forced evictions that deprive people from their homes, disrupt their livelihoods, and make them more impoverished and aid-dependent, we realize that women and children are turned into highly vulnerable entities. This exclusion of the Palestinians, corralling them into an area akin to that which Giorgio Agamben referred to as the ‘bare life’ area,16 has resulted in women’s being “doubly excluded” and has created an inordinately complex context for women wishing to gain access to justice. Because the Palestinian judicial system is still influenced and structured by mandate and former laws (Ottoman, Jordanian, and British) promulgated in the last century, this study also attempts to expose the deficits in the old laws and to suggest legal reforms necessary to free women from this outdated legislation, which places many obstacles in the way of women’s unimpeded access to true justice.17
12 Middle East Online. (2009). Palestinian PM: New strategy for statehood. Middle East Online. Retrieved from http://www/middle-east-online.com/ english/?id=35434. 13 United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, occupied Palestinian Territory. (2011). Humanitarian factsheet on Area C of the West Bank, July 2011. Retrieved from http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_ opt_Area_C_Fact_Sheet_July_2011.pdf. 14 Kadman N. (2013). Acting the Landlord: Israel’s policy in Area C, the West Bank. Report summary. Retrieved from B’Tselem website http://www.btselem. org/publications/201306_area_c. 15 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, occupied Palestinian Territory. (2013). Area C of the West Bank: Key humanitarian concerns, January, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ ocha_opt_area_c_factsheet_January_2013_english.pdf. 16 Agamben, G. (1998). Sovereign power and bare life. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press. 17 On the issue of the need for legal reforms, see Anderson M. (1999). Access to justice and legal process: Making legal institutions responsive to poor people in LDCs. Paper discussion at WDR Meeting 17-16 August 1999. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/DfiDProject-Papers/anderson.pdf. 10
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The context and characteristics of Areas H1 and H2 The military geography of Hebron Since 1997, following the Hebron Protocols, Hebron has been divided into two areas, H1 and H2. H1, home to about 140,000 Palestinians, is theoretically under the Palestinian Authority’s control, while H2, home to about 35,000 Palestinians and 500 Israeli settlers, is under Israeli military control. In order to move between these two areas, one needs to cross through military checkpoints. Within the H2 area, there is also a difference between the “unrestricted” and “restricted” areas. The old souq (market) is under Israeli military control, but Palestinians are able to move in the area. Parallel to the old souq is Shuhada Street, along which there are four Israeli settlements and two military bases; Palestinians are forbidden from moving through this area. In order to keep Shuhada Street an enclosed area for settlers only, the Israeli army built a number of roadblocks, barbed wire entrances, concrete walls, and checkpoints. Palestinian movement within the Israeli-controlled section of Hebron City (H2) remains subject to severe restrictions. This area is segregated from the rest of the city by over 120 closure obstacles, and Palestinian vehicular, and in some cases pedestrian, traffic, is still banned along certain streets. As a result, those Palestinians who still live in the area continue to suffer from poor access to basic services, including schools.18 What are the security arrangements in Hebron like today? In the wake of the Ibrahimi mosque massacre in 1994, Israel imposed new security arrangements on the city of Hebron, ostensibly to prevent revenge attacks on settlers by Palestinians. These arrangements – formalized in the “Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron” (aka “the Hebron Agreement”) in January, 1997 – became the foundation for the long-standing division of Hebron and the effective closure and depopulation of the central Palestinian market area. Under the Hebron Agreement, the city was divided into areas designated as H1 (18 sq. km., under full Palestinian Authority control) and H2 (4.3 sq. km., under full Israeli control and home to most of Hebron’s settlers, as well as more than 35,000 Palestinians). From the start of the second intifada, the Israeli Army resumed open operations in H1. In April 2002, as part of Operation Defensive Shield, the Israeli Army re-took control of H1, and in August 2003 began constructing two permanent, squad-sized fortified posts in the neighborhoods of Abu Sneineh and Harat al-Sheikh, which overlook the homes of Hebron’s Jewish settlers in the city center. While the Israeli Army had maintained a temporary presence in this area since the beginning of the intifada, this marked the first establishment of a permanent Israeli Army presence in H1 since the implementation of the Hebron Agreement. The immediate area around the new military outposts was declared a “closed military zone” without 18 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, occupied Palestinian territory. (2012). West Bank Movement And Access Update, September 2012. Retrieved from http://hlrn.org/img/violation/ocha_opt_ movement_and_access_report_september_2012_english.pdf – 2013/15/7.
any warning to its residents, who were barred from the area. About 50 dunams of land were expropriated for both sites. In addition, during the intifada, Palestinian residents of H2 and neighboring areas of H1 were subjected to the harshest restrictions on movement of any population in the West Bank. According to the Israeli human rights organization, B’Tselem: “At the beginning of the intifada, the area was under curfew for three consecutive months. Following the killing of the [Israeli] infant Shalhevet Pass [March 2001], a curfew was imposed for three weeks. After the attack on Worshippers’ Way [November 2002], in which nine security forces and three auxiliary personnel from Kiryat Arba were killed, the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] imposed a curfew for six months. The curfew also applies to the Bab a-Zawiya area (located in Area H1 near Area H2), which the IDF has controlled since Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002). The IDF also imposes a curfew on Area H2 in response to Palestinian shooting at settlers from Area H1(…)In other cases, the IDF imposes curfew on Palestinians to enable settlers to maintain their way of life and to hold public events in the city during Jewish and national holidays. For example, on 23 September 2002, during Sukkoth, the IDF imposed a curfew on Palestinians to enable Hebron’s settlers to host safely thousands of Israelis who had come to visit the city. Last Purim, the IDF imposed a curfew to allow settlers to conduct their annual parade and because it was the anniversary of the death of Baruch Goldstein, who committed the massacre in the Tomb of the Patriarchs.”19 The spatial restrictions on movement, added to the Israeli Army’s severe modes of surveillance and control, the deprivation of vital services such as health, education, welfare, and others have a heavy and direct impact on women’s and girls’ lives. This study brings to the forefront Palestinian women’s words, experiences, and reactions to the intrusive conditions that compromise women’s and girls’ human rights and their ability to access justice.
The Palestinian court system in the West Bank The Palestinian court system in the West Bank consists of five different levels of courts, detailed below.
Civil court system The first level of Palestinian courts includes Conciliation and First Instance Courts. Conciliation Courts are used to judge civil disputes and criminal cases. Conciliation Courts are also specialized to adjudicate the following cases regardless of the case value: division of movable and immovable properties, eviction, partition of joint property, evacuation of leased premises, and a number of other property and land-related cases. Conciliation Courts also have jurisdiction to try significant or high-profile criminal cases. First Instance Courts have the jurisdiction to hear all claims in civil cases that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Courts and can also hear 19 Friedman L. & Etkes D. (2005). Hebron – Settlements in focus. Retrieved from Peace Now website http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/hebron-settlementsfocus. 11
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appeals from the Conciliation Courts. In terms of criminal cases, First Instance Courts hear cases of a higher level of seriousness as stipulated by the Penal Procedure Law and the Criminal Procedure Law. The second level of Palestinian courts is the Appellate Courts or Courts of Appeal. The Appellate Court sessions are convened by three judges who hear appeals on civil and criminal cases. The third level is the High Court (Supreme Court), which is comprised of the Court of Cassation and the High Court of Justice. The Court of Cassation exercises jurisdiction over civil and criminal challenges from the Courts of Appeal, challenges to the First Instance Courts in their appellate capacity, and matters related to changing the terms of reference for a case. The High Court of Justice is responsible for reviewing: challenges related to elections; requests presented by interested parties for the cancellation of final administrative regulations and decrees; applications opposing imprisonment that entail the issuance of orders to release persons who have been detained illegally; public employee disputes; and administrative disputes. There is also a specialized Income Tax Appellate Court under the supervision of the Judicial Authority, as well as a Municipal Court in each Conciliation Court, which reviews violations of municipal laws.20
Religious court system Shari’a Courts for Muslims and Church Courts for Christians deal with matters of family status such as marriage, divorce, alimony payments, and child custody.
Military court system Military courts try crimes that are defined as “security” crimes, committed against security personnel – the police and security forces – and crimes by civilians against security forces. These courts apply PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) revolutionary laws. According to the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), the parameters under which these courts may try civilians are unclear. The ICJ also asserts that: “The PA affords itself wide discretionary powers in deciding which cases are to be prosecuted before which courts,” and that “On several occasions, military courts have transferred jurisdiction over cases in which the civilian Attorney General has claimed jurisdiction.”21
The informal “tribal” dispute resolution system In addition to the formal Palestinian justice system, a traditional or “clan-based” justice system also functions throughout the West Bank and elsewhere that Palestinians reside. This social phenomenon comprises the settlement of disputes between citizens outside of the formal justice system and includes clan-based sulha, a traditional indigenous method of conflict resolution through conciliation and clanbased law adjudicated by clan-based judges.22 20 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2009). Access to Justice in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Mapping the Perceptions and Contributions of Non-state Actors, p. 11. Retrieved from http://www.undp.ps/ en/fsh/pubs/a2jeng.pdf. 21 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2009), p. 12. 22 Birzeit University Institute of Law. (2006). Informal justice: Rule of law and
Military laws of the Israeli judicial system Israeli military laws continue to have extensive direct control over the daily lives of Palestinians living in the West Bank. These laws reflect the local political reality, in which Israel has the power to detain Palestinians, restrict their freedom of movement, limit accessibility to natural resources, confiscate land, and declare curfews. Permits issued by the Israeli military are required for numerous aspects of life, including building homes, working in Israel or East Jerusalem, and traveling around the West Bank.23 Through this study, we try to travel between these myriad “justice” systems and explore how Palestinian women’s entry to these various institutions in different types of cases (criminal, political, civilian, etc.) affects women’s access to justice. By focusing on women’s experiences, we shed light on access to justice for socially and spatially marginalized groups in occupied areas. The study also examines access to justice in Area C, where Palestinians are primarily governed by the Israeli legal system, have pseudo-Palestinian laws at work, and where women are objects of control of both the occupying legal system and patriarchal Palestinian legal practices. A recent report published in June, 2013 by HaMoked: Center for the Defense of the Individual exposed the destructive bureaucratic mechanisms governing the daily lives of Palestinians under the permit regime inside the “seam zone.”24 The report’s main data are solicited from various reports published by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The report reveals the ways in which Palestinians’ rights to freedom of movement violate their rights to family life, health, education, property, livelihood, and cultural and community life. The report notes that such violations further constitute a severe breach of people’s rights to safety, equality, and dignity.
Access to justice and violence against women in the West Bank Palestinian women living in the occupied West Bank suffer from violence that reflects a triple, gendered oppression that is connected to the military occupation that not only militarized the area and its people, but also impoverished them; patriarchal ideologies, policies, and practices; and socio-legal discrimination. They are subjected to multiple forms of violence by the policies of the prolonged Israeli military occupation (such as home demolitions, the closure of every neighborhood behind Israeli military checkpoints that severely restricts mobility in daily life, inspections at checkpoints, being forced to give birth at checkpoints, and difficulty accessing health centers, work places, schools, and universities, not to mention relatives’ homes and other social supports). Violence against women when perpetrated by the Israeli system is dispute resolution in Palestine. Retrieved from http://lawcenter.birzeit.edu/ iol/en/project/outputfile/5/a391785614.pdf. 23 Kelly, T. (2006). Law, violence and sovereignty among West Bank Palestinians. N.Y. and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 24 Cahana A. & Kanonich Y. (2013). The permit regime: Human rights violations in West Bank areas known as the “seam zone.” Jerusalem: HaMoked—Center for the Defense of the Individual. Retrieved from http://www.hamoked.org/ files/1157660/2013_eng.pdf. 12
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exercised on at least two levels: by authorities and troops in the Israeli occupying army, and by unofficial parties acting on their own volition to “take the law into their own hands” – often Jewish settlers (male and female). When VAW is perpetrated by the Palestinian patriarchal system, it is conducted through various internal social forces, be it the social/communal or the family systems; patriarchal oppression among religious power holders; or in health services, social and educational services, and economic opportunities (or lack thereof). In addition, patriarchal and gender-discriminatory oppression is exercised through local laws, bureaucracies, and laws that tend to disregard and/or marginalize women’s entitlements, needs, and rights, and that treat them unfairly by focusing on the promotion of male power and agency at the expense of female development in Palestinian communities.
Available statistics During preparations for the Palestinian National Strategy to Combat Violence Against Women (NSCVAW) 20112019, a paper submitted by the coroner Dr. Ziad Al-Ashhab showed an increase in the number of cases of women exposed to violence in the West Bank. In 2006, 64 cases of sexual assault were reported as compared to 85 in 2007, 339 in 2008, and 466 in 2009. The number of reported murder attempts against women was 72 in 2009, ranging from stabbing to poisoning, intense beating, denial of treatment following exposure to violence, burning, drowning, and falling. Palestinian police statistics for the West Bank in 2009 indicate that 1,173 cases of domestic violence and violence within the family were reported that year, ranging from physical abuse to attempted murder, threats, rape, attempted rape, and attempted suicide. According to data published by the Family Protection Unit (FPU) covering the period 2010-2011, the FPU caseload was 1,755 cases and more than 2,500 reported incidents.25 The report published by the FPU further indicates that in addition to the fact that their family violence case load when compared with those of other types of crimes is high, the cases of family violence reported to the police represent only a fraction of the actual incidents. The report further stresses: “It would be detrimental, not only to the opportunity to contribute to longer-term change processes, but also to the police’s credibility, if the FPU ended up not having the skills or resources to properly perform their work, thereby letting down victims/survivors.”26 A study conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics titled Violence Survey in the Palestinian Society (2011) revealed that among 5,811 Palestinian families (3,421 families in the West Bank and 1,797 in the Gaza Strip), 37% of married women surveyed (29.9% in the West Bank and 51.1% in Gaza) reported that they 25 See the Palestinian National strategy to combat Violence against Women: 2011( .2019-2011) http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Media/ Stories/en/PalestinianAuthorityNationalStrategytoCombatpdf.pdf and UN Women, Comprehensive Background analysis, and Recommendations for strengthening the Palestinian civil Police and Family Protection Unit, 2013. Titled: Policing For Palestinian Women’s Security and Justice. 26 UN Women, Comprehensive Background analysis, and Recommendations for strengthening the Palestinian civil Police and Family Protection Ubit, 2013. Titled: Policing For Palestinian Women’s Security and Justice.
had experienced violence by their husbands in the last year. A majority, 58.6%, reported that they are experiencing psychological violence; 55.1% reported that they are exposed to economic deprivation; 54.8% experiencing forced social isolation; 23.5% physical violence; and 11.8% are exposed to sexual violence.27 According to that survey, as a response to the violence, 30.2% sought refuge with family, while 65.3% kept silent. Only 0.7% of those women who experienced violence sought refuge in shelters. With regard to children, 51% of those surveyed reported being exposed to violence inside the household by at least one member of the household. Of these, 69% were exposed to psychological violence by their parents and 34.4% to physical violence. Disturbingly, data also indicate that violence continues to affect the elderly, with 7.3% of those 65 and over reporting that they suffered abuse from within their family.28 The following tables show selected data from this and previous surveys that were conducted in both the West Bank and Gaza. Table 1: Violence against married women in three surveys29,30 Domestic Violence Survey
Psychological (%)
Physical (%)
Sexual (%)
First Survey (1994)
52.0
33.0
27.0
Second Survey (1995)
44.0
32.0
30.0
Third Survey (2005)
61.7
23.3
10.9
Fourth Survey (2011)
58.6
23.5
11.8
Table 2: Percentage of ever-married women exposed at least once to a violent action by husband, different types of violence, and region, 2005 and 201131 Region
Psychological
Physical
Sexual
2005
2011
2005
2011
2005
2011
Palestinian Territory
61.7
58.6
23.3
23.5
10.9
11.8
West Bank
68.0
48.8
23.7
17.4
11.5
10.2
Gaza Strip
49.7
76.4
22.6
34.8
9.7
14.9
Table 3: Percentage of never-married women (aged 18 years and over) who lived with household members and were exposed to at least 1 violent action: by different types of violence and region, 2005 and 201132 Region
Psychological
Physical
Sexual
2005 (%)
2011 (%)
2005 (%)
2011 (%)
2005 (%)
2011 (%)
Palestinian Territory
53.5
25.6
24.6
30.1
NA
0.8
West Bank
56.1
19.5
24.4
24.0
NA
0.7
Gaza Strip
47.3
35.3
25.1
39.7
NA
1.0
Based on statistics from the al-Muntada Coalition, 11 cases of femicide committed on the pretext of “family honor” were documented in 2009, 7 of which occurred in the West Bank. According to MARSAD (the Palestinian Security Sector Observatory), 13 women were killed in the West Bank under this pretext in 2012.33 In 2013, and in recent publications by the Women’s Legal Aid and Counseling Center (WCLAC) based on the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (published November 13, 2013, which does not include numbers covering all of 2013),34 it was found that 28 cases of femicide occurred under the pretext of “family honor” in the PA-controlled area. 27 Palestinian National Authority, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2011). Press Release: Main findings of Violence Survey in the Palestinian society, 2011. Retrieved from http://82.213.38.42/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/el3onfNewenglish.pdf. 28 See UN Women (2013). Policing for women’s security and justice in the occupied Palestinian territory: A comprehensive background analysis, and Recommendations for strengthening the Palestinian Civil Police and Family Protection Unit. 29 Palestinian National Authority: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2005). Press Conference on the Preliminary Results: Domestic Violence Survey – 2005. Retrieved from the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics website: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Domestic_e.pdf. 30 – تقرير النتائج الرئيسية2011 الجهاز المركزي الفلسطيني – مسح العنف في المجتمع الفلسطيني Retrieved from http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Domestic_e.pdf. (Arabic). 31 Ibid. 32 See http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1864.pdf. 33 Campaign against killing women calling the president to make changes on the Palestinian Law. (November 2012 ,10). Retrieved from http://www.marsad.info/ ar/content/. (Arabic). 34 Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC). (2013, November 13). Workshop in Hebron: Feminist women requesting all the responsible institutes to stop killing women. Retrieved from http://www.wclac.org/atemplate.php?id=310. (Arabic). 13
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
The mechanisms that are available to Palestinian women to protect their rights and security can be divided into: ·
Formal mechanisms, which include the legal framework and legislation such as the Palestinian Basic Law and the penal code, and the formal executive framework including the police, the judiciary, and the Ministry of Social Affairs
·
Informal protection mechanisms, including the family, community and tribal system, religious personnel and institutions, political parties, women’s institutions, and the family
These mechanisms are considered next.
Women and formal protection mechanisms—the legal framework The Palestinian Declaration of Independence includes a passage believed to guarantee gender equality. The document confirms that: “Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality, and nondiscrimination in public rights of men and women, on grounds of race, religion, color or sex, under the aegis of a constitution which ensures the rule of law and an independent judiciary.”35 Article 9 of the amended Palestinian Basic Law further states: “All Palestinians are equal under the law and judiciary, without discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, political views, or disability.” Article 10 goes on to declare: “The Palestinian National Authority shall work without delay to become a party to regional and international declarations and covenants that protect human rights.” However, the current legal system in the oPt in general, and in the West Bank in particular, is neither unified nor inherently Palestinian, and these articles of the Basic Law are not reflected in the legislative process. Furthermore, the first paragraph of Article 11, which states that “personal freedom is a natural right, and shall be guaranteed and protected” conflicts with some applied local laws, where women are deprived of their personal freedom and their right of choice and self-determination. This is demonstrated in the texts of local laws like the penal code and personal status law, which entrench women’s dependency on men, regarding them as objects owned by male family members.36 While the PA has been responsible for introducing some new legislation since the 1993 Oslo Accords, the bulk of laws on record draw from the Ottoman and British Mandate eras, as well as from the Egyptian (Gaza Strip) and Jordanian (West Bank) systems. East Jerusalem, having been annexed by Israel, falls under Israeli civil legislative jurisdiction. In non-PA controlled areas of the West Bank (Area C and occasionally Area B), Israeli military law is used. Furthermore, tribal and customary laws are 35 Palestinian National Council. (1988). Declaration of Independence. Retrieved from http://www.multaqa.org/pdfs/PNC20%INDEPENDANCE20% DECLERATION.pdf. (English). 36 Ministry of Women’s Affairs, National Committee to Combat Violence against Women (2011). Palestinian National Strategy (PNS) to Combat Violence Against Women 2019 – 2011. 14
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
frequently applied for resolving disputes at the local level or within families throughout the Palestinian Territory.37 Hence, the applicable penal codes in each location are not based on the Palestinian Basic Law issued in 2003. As such, women do not have even the modicum of legal protection that should be provided by their own law. Rather, the laws in force throughout the West Bank treat women as the ones responsible for crimes perpetrated against them.38 The legacy of years of foreign domination can be clearly seen in the Palestinian legal framework. Some new Palestinian Authority laws apply to both the West Bank and Gaza, but Jordanian law (in the West Bank), Egyptian law (in the Gaza Strip), Ottoman law, and British law also remain in force throughout the territory. Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority has no jurisdiction to prosecute Israeli citizens suspected of perpetrating crimes in the West Bank or Gaza.39 This study focuses on the penal laws in the West Bank, which have existed since 1960. These laws were passed by Jordan in the early 1960s, when the West Bank was under its rule before 1967. Those laws are the one’s that women address when using the formal justice system. Gender-sensitive legislation is one of the important and basic channels to justice, security, protection, and improved status within society. In the Palestinian justice system despite the numerous efforts to challenge patriarchy embedded in the structure of the justice system; the constant political hazards and violent changes hindered the various trials; and discriminatory laws still exist that make the justice system inaccessible to women.40 Below, we present the laws relevant to women’s lives in the West Bank, analyze their ability to be gender-sensitive, and analyze the effect of patriarchy and masculinity on their ideology, rhetoric, and policy implications.
Analytical framework for relevant Palestinian laws and institutions (West Bank) The penal code In the oPt area, two penal codes are invoked to assist women when accessing justice; the first is the Jordanian Code of 1960, used and applied in the West Bank, and the second is penal code of 1936 applied in Gaza Strip. Numerous proposed and contextually appropriate penal codes were proposed and submitted to the Palestinian 37 Chaban, S. (2011). Promoting gender-sensitive justice and legal reform in the Palestinian territories: Perspectives of Palestinian service providers. Journal of International Women’s Studies Special Issue: Arab Women & Their Struggles for Socio-economic and Political Rights, 167-150 ,)3(12. 38 Palestinian National Strategy (PNS) to Combat Violence Against Women 2011( .2019 – 2011) 39 See also http://www.marsad.info/ar/tags/%D%87%9D8%9A%D%8A%6D%8A%-9D8%9 %5D%83%9D%8A%7D%81%9D%8AD%D%8A%-9D%8A%7D%84%9D%81%9D %8B%3D%8A%7D%8AF-%D%8A%7D%84%9D%81%9D%84%9D%8B%3D%8B7 %D8%9A%D%86%9D8%9A%D%8A9. 40 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2002). Femicide and the Palestinian criminal justice systems: Seeds of change in the context of state building? Law and Society Review, 606-577 ,3 ,36.
Legislative Council (PLC), but, none of them was endorsed and the Council members could not come to a consensus concerning the text; it has remained untouched ever since.41 The delay in approving an all-Palestinian penal code was due to internal disputes regarding the various proposed penal codes, and external political and structural reasons including the detention of some of the PLC members, the constant political hazards, the paralyses of PLC, and the low priority afforded to women and girl’s accessibility to justice and protection from violence, and to gender-sensitive penal code. For example, while according to the 2003 Draft Penal Law, Article 242, domestic violence is a crime that carries a punishment of two years’ imprisonment, paragraph 3 of the Draft Penal Code mentions that legal action can be taken if the victim herself or a relative (up to the fourth degree for minors under age 15) files a complaint. The contradiction and lack of clarity in the law may be used against women.
Specific laws Jordanian Penal Code Article 292 Paragraph 1 of 1960: Reading this law (see Appendix A: Laws) identifies two main issues. The first is that the article states that rape is defined as non-consensual penetration of a female who is not the wife of the perpetrator. This means that the law does not recognize marital rape as a crime, and therefore does not protect wives from spousal rape. The second issue is that according to the law, any sexual attack without penetration is not considered rape. Such lesser acts, according to the penal code, merit milder punishment. It is also important to note that the law does not include the rape of boys or men. According to His Excellency, Justice Farid Jallad, head of the Palestinian High Judiciary Council, the term “sexual assault” in Article 296(1) of the Jordanian penal code of 1960 draws on social and conceptual understandings of “honor.”42 Both Articles 292(1) and 296(1) classify unwanted sexual contact other than vaginal penetration as sexual assault, irrespective of its gravity or harm. Similarly to Article 292, Article 296(2) only prescribes a greater punishment for sexual assault when the victim is younger than age 15. It is worth noting that the terminology used in Article 296 provides that sexual assault is committed against persons, which means men and women. Although the narrow definition and wording used to define rape excludes men, the article on sexual assault does not.43 In fact, the options that are suggested for a woman or a girl who was raped are the following: marrying the rapist (legally approved); marrying an older or disabled man; being incarcerated at home or in prison; or other methods that equally and effectively put the victim on the equivalent of “living while awaiting death” row.44, 45 The punishment is aggravated if the victim of the assault 41 Jallad Z. (2012). Palestinian women and security: A legal analysis. Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, p. 6. Retrieved from http:// www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Palestinian-Women-and-Security-A-Legal-Analysis. 42 Jallad 2012, p. 8 43 Jallad 2012, p. 8 44 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2003). Re-examining femicide: Breaking the silence and crossing “scientific” borders. Signs, 608-581 ,)2(28, p. 597. 45 Palestinian National Strategy (PNS) to Combat Violence Against Women 2011( .2019 – 2011) 15
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
is a child and the assault occurs within the family and is perpetrated by the person responsible for raising that child, a person having direct authority over the child, or by an ascendant relative. Ascendant refers specifically to the father and grandfather, which means that the aggravated punishment for sexual crimes cannot apply to brothers and uncles. As for adultery and incest crimes, both penal codes define adultery as occurring when two people have sex, of whom both or one is married, and incest as occurring when two people within the same family have sex, meaning one person is a legal or illegal descendent or ascendant, an in-law, or someone who has legal or actual authority over the victim. Both crimes are considered by law to be consensual crimes that happen with both parties’ consent and responsibility. These crimes are dealt with as special cases whereby the complaint can only be filed by male relatives—a form of discrimination against women, who are considered incompetent to file complaints for such crimes. Jordanian Law Article 308 of 1960: This article is called Article 308: Discontinuance and Resumption of the Prosecution. Article 308 of the Jordanian penal code states: “If a proper marriage is made between the offender who committed one of the crimes previously mentioned in this Chapter and the victim, the prosecution shall be ceased, and if a sentence was already made on this case, the implementation of the punishment in the sentence shall be put on hold.” This also applies in Article 42 in the British penal code.46 According to the law: 1. If a valid marriage is concluded between the perpetrator of one of the crimes provided in this Chapter and the victim, the prosecution shall be discontinued, and the execution of any sentence rendered against the perpetrator shall be stayed. 2. If the marriage ends with the divorce of the woman without a legitimate reason, the Prosecutor General may, before the lapse of three (3) years starting on the date of the commission of a misdemeanor, or five (5) years starting on the date of the commission of a crime, resume the prosecution of a case, and the execution of a sentence. Such a law is rewarding for the perpetrator, and in most cases when the perpetrator agrees to marry the victim, she is under the pressure of accepting the rapist to be her husband. This law further ignores the feelings, trauma, and opinions of the women and girls when they are raped. In most of the incest cases, we found that the family exerts pressure on the female victim if she refuses to marry her rapist, thereby making her feel guilty. Jordanian Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 (Articles 97, 98, 99, 340, and 285): Article 340 is written in heavily masculine language. According to this law: 1. A husband who surprises his wife or a close female relative in the act of adultery with another person, and kills, injures, or harms either of them, or both, shall benefit from a mitigating excuse. 46 Ibid.
2. The perpetrator of a killing or an injury shall benefit from a mitigating excuse if he surprises a spouse, ascendant, descendent, or sibling with another person in an unlawful bed.47 The law states clearly that the right to kill belongs to men, but not to women. It does not take into consideration the perspective of the wives who witness their husbands in the act of adultery with another woman, nor the fact that no one has the right to take the life of another. The law portrays women as people who have no feelings, or who must control their feelings, and who must be killed if they allegedly engage in relations outside the home. This argument places women under the control and hegemony of their husbands, fathers, or brothers who control these women’s bodies and lives. This law was met with unanimous condemnation by human rights and women’s rights organizations, who called for its immediate cancellation as a result of numerous women being killed under the pretext of “honor,” even when there is no connection between “family honor” and the act of murder. The law thus grants impunity for individuals who kill women, which in turn leads to the killing of more women and girls as a result of its acceptance and even reverence in the family and society. In May, 2011, PA President Mahmoud Abbas signed a presidential decree that removed Article 340 from the Jordanian Criminal Law applicable in the West Bank as well as Article 18 from the British Mandate Criminal Law, ostensibly ending the sanctioning of lenient and often meaningless sentences for acts of femicide. However, WCLAC notes that many lenient sentences are not issued under these articles, which relate specifically to crimes of passion, but rather are applied through articles that give significant discretion to judges to reduce sentences as they wish (e.g., Articles 98, 99, and 100 of the Jordanian Criminal Law).48 One of our findings was that a common scenario in which women are exposed to violence is when a husband decides to marry another woman, but his wife refuses to accept his decision. In 2011, the head of the Palestinian Shari’a Supreme Council canceled Article 28 of the Jordanian Personal Status Law, which had not required a man to inform his wife about his other marriages, stating that a “man has to inform his wife about his interest in taking another wife.”49 This decision is not an official law; thus, men are able to choose whether they wish to abide by it. From the cases we studied, we found that several men had in fact violated the Councilman’s ruling regarding marital transparency. It is important to note that the legal decision requires the man to inform his first wife about a second marriage, but does not require him to seek or obtain her acceptance of it. This allows the man to feel that he can marry another woman as he wishes, which has negative effects on the woman in regards to her relationship with her husband. Furthermore, he is not even obliged within this framework to provide or prove any condition for wedding 47 Selected provisions of this law pertaining to women can be found at the Corpus of Laws website: http://corpus.learningpartnership. org /?s=article340 +&Submit.x=1088 -&Submit.y=417 -&Submit=Go. 48 WCLAC 2011a. 49 Jallad, 2012. 16
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
a second wife, such as that he has the economic ability to provide shelter and food for the second wife. To the contrary, the second wife’s arrival commonly adversely affects the economic security and status of the man’s first wife and their children. Another law that causes a strong sense of insecurity among Palestinian women is Article 38 of the Jordanian Personal Status Law.50 According to the law, a man can divorce his wife in absentia; meaning that the male has a powerful monopoly over the relationship and can act without his wife’s participation or even presence in marital decisions.
The executive institutions The work of the Palestinian police for the women’s protection is restricted by various laws that determine how the police operate and how they can offer protection to women. By defining which family members have the right to file a complaint with the police and how to carry out police investigations, existing Palestinian laws limit the ability of the police to offer women full protection, especially when it comes to honor crimes. Moreover, despite the existence of the Family Protection Units (FPUs), which were established in 2008 by the PA to protect women from violence, police departments in all governorates continue to lack the appropriate infrastructure and qualified staff needed to receive abused women. In addition, and as just noted (reporting from the FPU in 2013), the increase in the number of female victims/survivors, the insufficient number of staff working in these units,51 and the need for further capacity development severely affects women’s accessibility. In some cases, police officers who receive complaints from abused women encourage them not to press charges and to resolve the problem within the family instead.52 Judges, on the other hand, continue to use the abovementioned laws to address violence against women and girls, their criminalization and victimization. For example, there are no specialized courts or judges dedicated to working on VAW, and female victims/survivors prefer to remain silent about their cases instead of risking exposure due to the lack of confidentiality prevailing in the existing court system. In the PA system, it is the role of the prosecutor to deal with cases of various crimes, including VAW. However, women in shelters who were interviewed during the development of the Palestinian National Strategy to Combat Violence against Women 2011-2019 stated that prosecutors had humiliated and embarrassed them during the interrogation process. Moreover, reports of prosecutors are considered the most important pieces of evidence by judges and therefore affect the outcomes of the judicial process and the fate of women victims/ survivors of violence.53 50 We will broaden the information about that Law when we talk about divorce cases later. 51 Palestinian Civil Police / Family Protection Unit Strategy, 2013. See note 28. 52 Amnesty International. (2005). Conflict, occupation and patriarchy: Women carry the burden. London: Amnesty International. Retrieved from Amnesty International website http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ MDE2005/016/15/en. 53 Palestinian National Strategy (PNS) to Combat Violence Against Women 2011( .2019 – 2011)
When delving into religious courts, we realize that three administrative orders passed by the Chief Justice of the Shari’a Court stipulate, firstly, that in inheritance cases, women should be informed of the value of their inheritance directly by a court official (ensuring that accurate information is given). Secondly, in cases of polygamy, it is a legal requirement that current wives are informed of any further marriage, and so that additional marriages cannot be hidden. Thirdly, a wife must be informed if she is being divorced at the moment that she is being divorced.54 Women’s rights defenders argue that current Palestinian laws do not effectively prohibit or punish violence against women and girls. In fact, no law exists to protect Palestinian women and girls from violence in the home and the community. If certain laws do indirectly protect the rights of Palestinian women, then religious claims and cultural constraints, such as the focus on the preservation of male/family honor, patriarchal tribal practices, and a desire to hold onto “authentic” traditions interfere with their implementation, as does lack of an alternative path for women, such as qualitative services and tools of protection. A public opinion poll on the status of Palestinian women found that 77% of respondents (male and female) believed that more laws must be enacted to protect women from domestic violence. The same poll also revealed that 74% of the Palestinian population supports an amendment to the current law that allows for murder in the name of honor.55, 56
Women’s Access to Justice Observatory The Women’s Access to Justice Observatory has functioned since September 2012 within the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR). The Observatory’s main aim is to strengthen the monitoring mechanisms regarding women accessing justice in the Palestinian territory. The ICHR is the Palestinian National Human Rights Institution and has full membership in the International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions of the United Nations. The ICHR was established in 1993 upon a Presidential Decree issued by President Yasser Arafat, in his capacity as President of the State of Palestine and chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. In accordance with the decree, the duties and responsibilities of ICHR were set out as follows: “To follow-up and ensure that different Palestinian laws, by-laws and regulations, and the work of various departments, agencies and institutions of the State of Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Organization meet the requirements for safeguarding human rights.” The decree directed the ICHR with to drafting its statutes in a manner that would ensure its independence and effectiveness. Building on its institutional mandate, UN Women has supported ICHR in the establishment of a Judicial Observatory on VAW to monitor judicial processes and outcomes in cases of violence against women, 54 WCLAC, 2011a. 55[The footnote numbers should change now that 58# was deleted, but for some reason it won’t allow me to delete] 56 Chaban, 2011. 17
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
and to document any violation of women’s rights due to discriminatory laws/procedures, discriminatory applications of laws/procedures, or gaps/dysfunctions within the judicial system. The ICHR-VAW Observatory’s documentation system has been built consistently with and on the experience developed by key actors in the provision of security and protection services to women— especially specialized shelters and police units (FPUs)—so as to be able to produce a holistic picture of the situation of women female victims/survivors of violence who attempt to access the justice system. Within the framework of the new UNDP/UN Women Joint Program the ICHR-VAW Observatory’s role is strengthened through expanding the number of cases monitored, also in the Gaza Strip, and through further empowering CSOs in their monitoring role to feed into the Observatory database.
Social mechanisms for the protection of women Family and community protection mechanisms: With the high rate of poverty and severe mobility hardships facing Palestinians in general and Palestinian women in particular, women in turn first to family and helpers from among the close-knit community. Even the act of seeking help from family and community may result in women’s being blamed for being abused, but, and as demonstrated by the focus groups with college students in this study, family and community (such as family doctors, teachers, and nurses) intervention might also protect women, preserve their safety and security, and prevent the revictimization that might occur if the women were to request the help of the tribal or formal justice systems. Informal protection mechanisms: The tribal system plays an important role in the enforcement of order in Palestinian society. Tribal decisions often override official national laws, mainly in cases related to abuses inflicted upon women. The tribal system may criminalize and reject acts that are legal and permitted by national law. This informal mechanism for addressing cases of VAW is represented by the intervention of the extended family, the tribe, or the hamula (clan), depending on the type of violence perpetrated.57 Women seeking services: The baseline study for the project Palestinian Women and Security: Why Palestinian Women and Girls Do Not Feel Secure58 asked Palestinian women and girls about their perceptions of the services available to them. Respondents overwhelmingly indicated that they felt unable to turn to these support services for assistance. The report further found that women and girls were either unaware of the support services available to them or, if they were aware, hesitated to use them due to fears of scandals and family humiliation. In some instances, women and girls did not trust core service providers for justice (i.e., the court system and the police), public services such as school counselors, hospital staff, or shelters, and the services offered by human rights and women’s organizations. The legal system was also viewed as ineffective. 57 Palestinian National Strategy (PNS) to Combat Violence Against Women 2011( .2019 – 2011) 58 Chaban, S., Daraghmeh, R. & Stettler, G. (2010). Palestinian women and security: Why Palestinian women and girls do not feel secure. Geneva: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
According to service providers, much of the current Palestinian legislation is insufficient to protect women and girls from abuse or to protect their human rights. Service providers from diverse professions recounted detailed stories highlighting the ways in which the women and girls they have worked with have not been properly protected within the current Palestinian legal system. Thus, turning to the police and other security and justice providers appears to be a very difficult decision for Palestinian women in the West Bank due to the lack of a clear legal framework in which the police could function for the women’s benefit.59 The women’s focus groups conducted during the development of the Palestinian National Strategy to Combat VAW (2010) found that when legal protection is unavailable and a woman has no trust in the judiciary system, she often turns to her family to solve the problem, embedding the idea that violence is a private issue to be handled outside of the legal and legislative systems. In the 2011 reporting period, WCLAC provided legal and social counseling to 456 women. Forty-five of these were cases that were continued from the previous reporting period, and 411 were new clients from East Jerusalem, Ramallah, Hebron, and Bethlehem. Fifty-eight of the new clients were referred to WCLAC by a previous client, or were previous clients themselves. One hundred and six cases were brought from the courts, four from government bodies, and fifty from NGOs. There were also a further 382 one-off consultations for clients (Jerusalem: 131; Ramallah: 108; south of the West Bank: 143).60 Statistics from the Mehwar Center for Women’s Protection indicate that the Center’s Protection Department received 86 cases between 2007 and the end of 2008. In 2009, 50 cases were received from various locations throughout the West Bank, in addition to 12 children accompanying their mothers. Furthermore, from a UN Women study published in 2011, entitled The Mehwar Center: Evaluation of Policies and Procedures, and based on interviews with professionals working with women victims/survivors, it was apparent that there is a high incident rate of women and girls (age 12-18) victims/survivors of sexual and physical violence; when perpetrators are mostly male relatives.61
conducted by the Palestinian Statistics Bureau, found that just 30.2% of women who were ever married and were victims/survivors of violence by their husbands have had recourse to the home of one of their brothers or sisters. Nearly two-thirds of spousal violence victims/ survivors—65.3%—preferred to remain silent, while the rate of women who were exposed to violence and visited a women’s institution or center for advice was less than 0.7%.63 The Sawa Center organized four gender-training workshops for prosecutors64 in Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron, and Tulkarem. The participants stated that both men and women face various obstacles to accessing justice, including obstacles connected to: Social and cultural factors, such as: A societal culture of shame, the patriarchal nature of the society, pressures from the family and the community, fear and worries for the daughters and families of women who seek justice Formal factors: Discriminatory laws, fear of arbitrary divorce as there is no law that protects women from it, lack of specialist protection units, lack of specialist family judges, judges’ patriarchal perceptions, negative perceptions toward the police, and lengthy trials Informal factors: seeking tribal judgment, absence of organizations that support women in all geographic areas, lack of communication between the women and the organizations that are interested in helping women, and the lack of protection for women after their complaint is filed Individual resources: Women lack both financial resources needed to move and cover legal expenses and legal knowledge about their rights and how the system works This study describes how all of these obstacles, in addition to the ones already mentioned, structure and shape women’s accessibility or inaccessibility to justice in the West Bank.
In addition, statistics from the Girls’ Care Center indicate that 19 young female victims/survivors of domestic violence were received in 2009, while the PCBS survey of 2011 indicates that 51% of the surveyed children reported being exposed to parental psychological violence and 34.4% to parental physical violence. Defense for Children International (DCI) statistics reported that the organization offered counseling services to 24 female children exposed to domestic violence.62 The Violence Survey in Palestinian Society (2012), 59 Chaban, 2011. 60 WCLAC, 2011b. 61 For more details, see UN Women. (2013). Policing for women’s security and justice in the occupied Palestinian territory: A comprehensive background analysis, and Recommendations for strengthening the Palestinian Civil Police and Family Protection Unit. p. 18. 62 Palestinian National Strategy (PNS) to Combat Violence Against Women 2011( .2019 – 2011). 18
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63 مســح العنــف فــي- جهــاز اإلحصــاء المركــزي لإلحصــاء الفلسطيني:الســلطة الوطنيــة الفلســطينية تقريــر النتائــج الرئيســية،2011 ،المجتمــع الفلســطيني The Palestinian National Authority: Palestinian Central Bureau: violence survey in the Palestinian Society, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/ Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1864.pdf. 64 Sawa Organization. (2011). Annual Report. Retrieved from Sawa’s website http://www.sawa.ps/Upload/documents/annualReport2011_en.pdf.
Methodology In addition to the primary questions raised in the introduction, the study aimed to answer the following additional questions: ·
What kind of legal protections are offered to women?
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Which NGOs and government organizations provide social, psychological, and legal services to women? How do they do so? How do women victims/survivors/survivors of abuse perceive and portray such services?
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How do representatives of the social and criminal justice system operate and behave? What kinds of bureaucracies are imposed? Are such modes of operation and bureaucracies gender-sensitive?
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How do representatives of social and political control interact? How do they structure women’s access to justice?
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What are the unique characteristics of access to justice in Areas C, H1, and H2?
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Our research is based on phenomenology, as interviews were the appropriate tools for this type of study. The purpose of the phenomenological approach is to highlight and identify the structure and the characteristics of a phenomenon by the actors who experience and live within it. This normally translates into gathering ‘deep’ information and perceptions through inductive, qualitative methods such as interviews, discussions, and participant observations, and representing an issue from the perspective of the research participant(s). Phenomenology is concerned with the study of experience from the perspective of the individual(s). This research is based on the experiences of the various actors in the legal system, focusing on women’s experience, the NGOs’ experience, and the legal workers’ experience. In order to bring a holistic picture of women’s access to justice, we conducted our research through several levels and stages, which are based on the Grounded Theory strategy.67 Charmaz68, 69 identifies a number of features that all grounded theories have: ·
Simultaneous collection and analysis of data
What does it mean for police and judges to conduct investigations and support women’s access to justice? How do they conduct such investigations and support in Area C, H1, and H2?
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Creation of analytic codes and categories developed from data and not by pre-existing conceptualizations (theoretical sensitivity)
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Discovery of basic social processes in the data
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What kinds of social and psychological protections are offered to female victims/survivors of abuse?
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Inductive construction of abstract categories
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What socio-legal knowledge do these women have? How does knowledge about these structures influence legal and social issues?
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Theoretical sampling to refine categories
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Writing analytical memos as the stage between coding and writing
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How does socioeconomic background affect Palestinians’ access to justice?
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The integration of categories into a theoretical framework
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How does the political background of areas, communities, or individuals affect women’s access to justice?
In order to answer these questions, we applied a qualitative research methodology based on grounded theory approach and using phenomenology research strategy. According to Glaser and Strauss, grounded theory is “the discovery of theory from the data systematically obtained from the social research.”65 We used this approach because this is the first research study aiming to structure the processes of Palestinian women’s accessibility or inaccessibility to justice. It is also the first research project that brings women’s voices from various socio-legal spaces of the West Bank. Grounded theory is ideal for exploring integral social relationships and the behavior of groups where there has been little exploration of the contextual factors that affect individuals’ lives.66 This research is the first to describe the various relationships between the formal and informal legal systems, and the interrelationship between the legal, social, and political 65 Glaser, B.G. & Strauss, A.L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, p. 2. 66 Crooks, DL. (2001). The importance of symbolic interaction in grounded theory research on women’s health. Health Care for Women International, ,22 27-11. 19
aspects of women’s lives through their journeys within the Palestinian justice system.
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
To answer our research questions, we conducted semistructured interviews. In these interviews, we went into the field with the main axes of the research, with three to four questions for each axis. Each of the interviewee’s answers would open up new questions that expanded the interview.70 In addition to the interviews, we also conducted textual analyses of various documents that were relevant for our research. The analyzed texts included laws, media coverage of several cases, documents published by various NGOs on relevant issues, such as the 18 annual reports published by ICHR on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Authority areas, and other annual reports of various NGOs. Textual analyses are very important for the research, because through these analyses, we can acquire information that was not raised in the interviews. Textual analysis is a way for researchers to gather information about how other human beings make sense of the world. 67 Glaser, B.G. & Strauss, A.L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, p. 2. 68 Charmaz, 1995 on http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/36848_birks.pdf. 69 See Charmaz, 2002 on http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/017586_9548ch1.pdf. 70 See Appendix B for the semi-structured interviews with: women, legal system and NGO workers and women in the Area C focus groups.
It is a methodology—a data-gathering process—for those researchers who want to understand the ways in which members of various cultures and subcultures make sense of who they are and of how they fit into the world in which they live. Textual analysis includes analyses of the discourse, meanings and attitudes written in the relevant texts, and it is useful for researchers working in cultural studies, media studies, in mass communication, sociology, and philosophy.71
Stages of research We conducted our research through the following stages.
1. “Reading and feeling” the field In order to “read and feel” the field, we began by reading the collection of writings described in our theoretical background. We then conducted our interviews with various specialists from the field who had worked or currently work with women who interact with the legal system or agents of the Palestinian legal system. These specialists included:
4. Analyzing, re-reading the field, and producing basic analytical themes In parallel to interviewing women, we held a meeting with the ICHR to share our initial findings and collect their data from the field. It was our first step in validating our readings with data in the field according to the women’s voices. We drew the basic processes, “maps,” and procedures to outline women’s access to, or denial of access to, justice.
5. Second round of interviews Based on the results and themes we gathered from the women’s stories, we designed the next round of semistructured interviews for workers at NGOs and institutes within the legal system. The draft interview questions were sent to specialists working in the legal system and in research methodology, returned with feedback and comments, and then finalized for the actual interviews.
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A consultant on policing and prosecutor strategy for handling cases of domestic violence at UN Women
6. Re-forming and re-structuring the data—new themes
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TheexecutivedirectorofthePalestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)
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Directors of local women’s organizations, including the Center for Women’s Studies in Nablus and Jerusalem and the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling in Hebron, Ramallah and Jerusalem.
After completing the interviews in stage 5, we read and analyzed the material and outlined new themes that emerged from each group of interviews: women, NGO workers, legal system institutes, and legal workers.
2. Building the semi-structured interviews From our “reading of the field,” we designed and prepared the semi-structured interviews. We distributed our core interview questions to the research team72 for their review, received their feedback, and then wrote the final version of the interviews. We decided to interview the women first, as it was crucial for us to hear their experiences and their journeys within the legal system, in order to get a detailed picture that would help us prepare our questions for the NGOs and legal system agents. Furthermore, as this research is on Women’s Access to Justice, it must begin with women’s experiences.
3. Interviewing women—experiencing the field The first step we took to begin our interviews with women, as an ethical step, was to write a letter through UN Women to the Palestinian general prosecutor asking for legal permission to enter the various institutes of the Palestinian Authority. We then wrote to various PA ministers requesting permission to access the various institutes under their ministries’ authority, including shelters, prisons, police stations, and courts. After receiving the permits to conduct our research, the 71 McKee, A. (2003). Textual analysis: A beginner’s guide. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications. 72 The research team conducted the interviews with the various interviewees. They are familiar with interviewing as it is part of their profession, and they are familiar with the field as they interviewed women in the past for other research projects. 20
research team began interviewing women who had experience interacting with the Palestinian legal system.
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
7. Focus groups Our last round of interviews was conducted with 93 women living in various locations including Areas C, H1, and H2, and women who did not interact with the Palestinian legal system. These interviews were based on the semi-structured interviews prepared by the researchers of the study. There were 6 focus groups: 1 group consisted of students from Area C and areas close to it (21 participants); 1 group of students from the central region of Palestine who were studying in Ramallah while some of them lived in Area C (17 participants); 1 group of women from Areas H1 and H2 and the surrounding Area (28 participants); and 2 groups of workers in the welfare and formal social institutes of the Palestinian Authority (one of the groups consisted of 6 participants; the second, 11 participants). A final focus group that aimed at helping the researchers validate their analyses was conducted with 15 college women who crossed checkpoints, lived inside the West Bank, when about 6 of them commuted to their college from Area C.
8. Case studies In addition to the female subjects, we interviewed various other actors such as lawyers, police officers, and prosecutors in different cases, without interviewing the women involved in the cases. Through these testimonies, we collected 10 additional case studies that had reached the Palestinian legal system. These cases provided more professional insight into the picture that our initial interviewees had described to us.
The research groups
again, and as many headings as necessary were noted in the margins to describe all aspects of the content.73,74,75 The researchers then generated categories into which to group their headings.76 In the second stage after this open coding, the lists of categories were grouped under broader headings77,78 to reduce the number of similar categories and highlight the dissimilar ones.79,80,81 The purpose of creating categories is to create a means of describing the phenomenon in the research and to increase understanding of the subject.82 When formulating categories by inductive content analysis, the researcher comes to a decision as to which headings to put in the same category.83,84 In the third stage, we produced the main themes of analysis through categorization of the categories from the second stage.
Validity and reliability of the research As a methodological step for proving the validity, reliability, and stability of the results, we conducted two group meetings: one with the research team, and the other with the ICHR workers who had shared their data and information with us from the beginning of the study. The research team’s meetings were joined by several specialists from the field: a manager of one of the shelters, a NGO worker, and two UN workers dealing with the Palestinian legal system. In these meetings, we presented our final themes of analysis and shared our findings. We received feedback and new information from these meetings and confirmed our findings, explanations, and interpretations. The second way of ascertaining the validity and reliability of our research was our use of multiple methods of data collection. We used semi-structured interviews, focus group interviews, and textual analyses of relevant documents. This way, we were able to see if the same data emerged through the various methodological approaches and ensure that the researcher did not miss any important information. The third way to verify the study’s validity and reliability was to have experts review our work. After completing the research, we issued a draft of the final report to three
Data and content analysis In parallel to gathering the data from the field through the interviews, we conducted inductive content analysis of the interviews and documents we received. Content analysis included three main stages. The first stage was the open coding, through which the researcher wrote headings and notes while examining the research material. The written products were then read through 21
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73 Burnard P. (1991). A method of analysing interview transcripts in qualitative research. Nurse Education Today, 466-461 ,11. 74 Burnard P. (1996). Teaching the analysis of textual data: An experiential approach. Nurse Education Today, 281–278 ,16. 75 Hsieh, H.F. & Shannon, S. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. Qualitative Health Research, 1288-1277 ,15. 76 Burnard, 1991. 77 McCain, G.C. (1988). Content analysis: a method for studying clinical nursing problems. Applied Nursing Research, 150-146 ,)3(1. 78 Burnard, 1991. 79 Burnard, 1991. 80 Downe-Wamboldt B. (1992). Content analysis: Method, applications and issues. Health Care for Women International, 321-313 ,13. 81 Dey I. (1993). Qualitative data analysis. A user-friendly guide for social scientists. London: Routledge. 82 Cavanagh S. (1997). Content analysis: concepts, methods and applications. Nurse Researcher, 16-5 ,4. 83 See Elo, S. & Kyngäs, H. (2008). The qualitative content analysis process. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 115-107 ,)1(62. 84 Dey, 1993.
top professional experts from the field. These experts were: ·
Project Manager, Women Human Rights, UN Women
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Gender Sensitivity Associate in the Palestinian legal system
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Social Worker for women who approach the legal system
The various reviewers accepted our discourse and thematic analyses. They gave us comments based on their experience and knowledge from the field and confirmed the accuracy of our data, findings, and conclusions. In the next section, we present the findings of the research. These findings are the main themes that emerged after the open and the axial coding.
Findings (Focus Groups and Individual Interviews) Nuha, 25, living in one of the geographically restricted areas examined in this study (Area C, H1, or H2): I suffered my entire life from my father’s violence, and I tried in so many ways to prevent his abuse. I asked the help of my aunt and uncle, I talked to my doctor, then told my teachers. Then one day, he opened the door, and without provocation, started beating my mother and me. So I ran away at the age of 14. Being a runaway girl turned me into an ill-reputed woman, with no ‘sharaf’ (honor), and my only way out was to accept a marriage proposal. If I can only tell you how many people I saw, how many I shared my story of abuse with, and nothing changed the situation. When the police finally managed to call him for an investigation, he ran away to Israel. Since then, and although I am a married woman with children, I live my life with so many constraints. I can’t move out of this area. I’m living in this prison under constant violence, threats, fears, and health problems.85
Salwa, 19, college student: I was very young when I learned that if a young girl does not have supporters, she could end up as a dead body and no one would care. I was 7 when my own sister was killed by a stranger, total stranger; but the family feared she did something wrong (she was 14 when she was killed), and decided to tell everyone that she was hit by a car. But I knew she was killed, and I feared for my life. I told my doctor that I wake up in the middle of the night sweating, screaming, crying, and missing my sister, but he did not seem to care. I also told my favorite teacher, and she asked me to be careful, study well, and be a good and obedient girl. I wanted to be a good girl, so I agreed to marry someone my family chose. My husband is kind, so he agreed to allow me to finish school, and study to help him economically. His family bothers me a lot because I go to college, but he is my supporter, otherwise I would be in trouble. Justice for me is reaching my university without fear, without facing tear gas. Accessing my college freely is a just right, isn’t it? And I feel my sister was killed and no one was punished, and I am being threatened on my way to my college and the abusers are also not punished. I guess justice is a relative concept. As a woman, you know you will never be treated in a just manner; as a Palestinian, you know you are not treated in a just manner. Maybe you need to conduct your studies in a different place. Here, we do not think about justice.… We think about coping as much as we can.86
85 Focus group meeting. 86 Focus group meeting. 22
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
Ala’a, 21, college student: I am 21 years old, and I can tell you, as the wife of a political prisoner, I have no access to justice; not in the Palestinian system and for sure not in the Israeli one. My story is long, but to cut it short, my husband ended up in prison for his politicization 8 months after we got married, and I haven’t seen him for over two years…now I am back to studying. When you said that you study women’s access to justice, I wanted to tell you that as a young wife of a political prisoner, my access to justice is hindered. I can’t even visit him, and I feel this is total injustice.87
Naela, 27, worker at one of the justice institutions: I am considered an educated woman, a woman who managed to graduate with a law degree and become economically independent. When you asked me about women’s access to justice, my first inclination was to tell you, “Are you joking? What justice?” Who can talk about justice in the context of occupation, when legislators and political leaders are dominated and humiliated? When laws are not clear, when the applicability of the same law differs from one place to another, when appointments of police officers, prosecutors, or judges are political, and when external donors control those claiming to work for women’s rights. How could women access the justice system, when justice does not exist, and the community – including we women – can’t trust those working in the justice system?88
Marwa, 20, college student: If the society believes in sutra (covering up), how can a woman disclose her abuse? How can we trust the system? The system is comprised of members of our society who prefer to silence women’s issues and yusturuha (keep it undisclosed, concealed or hidden). This is why I tell my girlfriends to fight alone for their rights and not through the legal system or the police, for then they will lose their safety entirely.89 As the above testimonies show, our general findings suggest that Palestinian women’s accessibility to justice in the West Bank is subjected to various gendered political, structural, social, economic, and legal factors. The political and structural factors permeate throughout all the results, mainly because they form the gender asymmetries, affect the workings of power, and perpetuate the violation of women’s access to justice in the context of the West Bank as a conflict-ridden area. In addition, the economic and spatial factors were found to impede women’s and girls’ access to justice. The following results expand and explain the juxtaposition between the political and structural, on one side, and the socio-legal, on the other. This section presents the main findings in three sections: 1. Paths to Justice: This section shows the various paths women undertake to access the Palestinian legal system and institutions of justice. 87 Focus group meeting. 88 Focus group meeting. 89 Focus group meeting. 23
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
2. Women facing injustice, blame and attacks within the criminal justice system: This section describes what happens to the women and girls on each stage of their path. 3. Main themes of analysis: This section presents main themes as inferred from the facts and experiences described in the first and second sections.
I. Paths to justice One clear result of this study is that ALL women survivors/ victims interviewed believe that, in most cases and under the current socio-legal and political conditions in the West Bank, it is safer for females of all ages to live a life of violence and to accept the fact that there is no justice under such a context than it is to disclose the abuse inflicted against them. Ghada, 24, explained: I am not considered human, and even if I try to speak, share my pain, and ask for help, no one will hear my real voice or understand my pain. I was raped when I was very small, and when I asked for my mother’s help, she did not know what to do. She did not have money to take me and run away, and her family live in Jordan (…) My mother wanted so much to help me, she even tried to burn herself to prevent him from touching me, but, we are suffocated here, and if my mother asks for the help of someone from the neighborhoods, he might also hurt her. Hebron is a trap, and women can’t even move. They fear the settlers around us, and they fear society’s reaction (…) This is why my mother kept silent. I spoke, I screamed, I reported (...) but I paid such a high price – a price that is higher than silence itself. My mother was right.”90 The spatial and economic confinement added to the political violence surrounding the spaces and lives of Palestinian women and girls, added to the bodily harm inflicted on their physical bodies and psyches is, as Ghada stated, “beyond imagination.” The limited mobility, the lack of economic means, and the daily attacks on the residential areas were found to hinder any effort even to search for a path for justice. It was apparent, that only in cases where women could not handle the abuse anymore, that they called for help, and looked for modes to access justice. As Maysam, a woman in her early 20s who accompanied Ghada, told us during the interview: This is not only the case of Hebron, for I live far away from here, and I could tell you that today, under such harsh living conditions, people are barely managing to help themselves. Do you think they can handle dealing with sexual abuse? If Ghada was not my cousin, I would have never involved myself, and even now I am afraid. I am not afraid to be killed, for I have the best supportive brother ever, but rather afraid to complicate Ghada’s injury. Her wound is very deep, and we are a wounded society and can’t deal with pain any more.91 Maysam’s acknowledgment of her cousin’s pain and her knowledge as a student of social work for the need to be with her cousin at such trying time did not prevent 90 Focus group meeting. 91 Focus group meeting.
her from explaining the complexity of getting involved in any call for help—be it social, legal, or both. Her analyses juxtaposed her cousin’s trauma against her people’s collective economic, political, and social trauma. Despite her support for Ghada to come and discuss her abuse with a women’s organization she had learned about in college, Maysam remained unconvinced that there are paths for justice under the current conditions in which Palestinians live. The interview with Ghada and Maysam was reflected in most of the interviews with other professionals, who painted a picture of a very complex situation whereby they believed in the need to open new spaces for women to access justice but were also acutely aware of the structural and political restrictions that meant that seeking help might bring further harm to the already traumatized victim. These voices, and others analyzed in this study, indicate that females take various paths when trying to access justice in the formal and informal Palestinian systems. These paths include appealing to powerful family members, such as fathers, brothers, and male cousins, as well as to community members, such as health professionals, teachers, religious figures, or distant male cousins. When females decide that familial and informal community agents of social control have failed to help, they disclose their abuse to more formal social control agents. Our interviews show that, under both circumstances, females suffer when disclosing their abuses due to the social, legal, political, and economic situation. To gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which Palestinian females in the West Bank access justice, we will first look closely at cases involving violence against women (VAW) both inside and outside the family. We will then move to analyzing cases involving femicide—and explore how and when the victims/survivors called for help and tried to access the formal or informal justice system. We will then consider cases involving sexual abuse. Finally, we conclude with cases combining multiple crimes against women.92
A. Paths to justice in general VAW cases93 Marwa 31 year old, an interviewee, recounts her story: I wanted to study, but my father forced me to get married. I was 16, and he [her husband] was 18, and he was a worker. After one year of marriage, our families began to have problems with each other. My family wanted me to leave my husband but I did not want to, because I had a baby. I was living with my father – and mother-in-law and two brothers-in-law; we had problems all the time. My brother and father used to come to our home and beat me. They wanted me to leave my husband, and I told them that I would not leave my children. From the other side, my husband’s family would come and do the same thing; they wanted me to leave the house. I was a victim of these two families. My husband beat me a lot, but I was quiet; what could I do? Who could I talk to? He beat my children too, and once he beat my child so much that my child had to go to the hospital.94 92 You can see examples of these paths in Index No. 3 (Paths in Justice). 93 Here we refer to cases of violence against women while excluding sexual abuse and femicide, which will be discussed separately to allow us to elaborate on their unique characteristics. 94 Focus group meeting. 24
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
Marwa’s case is only one example of many women who were abused by their own family members, their husbands, and their husbands’ families, and were thus trapped in a life of violence from all sides. In addition to having to deal with internal family conflicts that left the women in a very vulnerable state, women who participated in our focus groups explained that achieving justice in their circumstances is extremely difficult, particularly as young girls, and even when their families try to help. Maha, 24, another interviewee, stated: My sister was attacked by her employer. Even though my father wanted to help--and he really tried and sought the help of the governor of Jenin--he did not succeed. Her employer is from Israel, and he ran away and did not give her the money back, nor did he pay her compensation. She was injured at work, but he ran away, and we do not know the law in Israel. My parents paid for a lawyer to help her, but even he could not give my sister her rights (…) Here in Jenin, women can never access justice, and to be honest, I think that the system might have worked better if the injured person was a man and not a woman.95 In cases of internal family violence when the victims/ survivors are females and other kinds of abuse such as employer abuse (as shared by Maha) or medical maltreatment (as shared by two focus group members), respondents made it clear that while family support is very important, it does not suffice to help women gain an adequate remedy from the justice system, whether the formal one or the informal one. The narratives collected in this study indicate that when women seek help or enter the Palestinian justice system, they are either denied the right to access the system at all or it fails to meet their needs. As to the women in the former category, many observed that economic hardships such as poverty and severe economic hardship blocked them from even reaching out for help or following up with the social welfare or police. These women insisted that their own and their family’s severe economic hardship prevented them from seeking help at all. Young female victims/survivors and almost half of the women interviewed (25 interviewees) stated that lack of knowledge of their legal rights resulted in their being victims of the existing “structure.” Some explained that they addressed one or more civil society organizations before asking their families for help, and the mere sharing of their abuse in public, disclosing it to the police, or confiding in a community leader (mainly political or religious leaders) exacerbated their hardship. In some cases discussed in the focus groups, even for females who received family support, the plurality of the legal system and the political restrictions facing women blocked them from accessing justice. As in the case of Maha’s sister, described above, women and their helpers could not protect women’s right to justice due to geographic and legal factors, such as the fact that the abuser escaped to Israel, which is difficult for most Palestinians from the West Bank to enter due to the permit system, checkpoints, and closures. The same applies to females whose abusers fled to Israeli-controlled areas of the West Bank, that such as Area C or H2 – their right to access justice was often denied. Such in-access was also revealed in cases 95 Interview with Maha, Focus group meeting.
of young girls being married to men who hold Israeli IDs revealed how their husbands and or abusers deprived them from their children, from their right to economic support and from bodily safety and psychological welfare. Furthermore, women became victims/survivors of abuse not only due to external political-economic factors or from their own families but also from their community, the welfare or health services, or the criminal justice system. One young woman, Angham, explained that after being abused by her brother, she asked the help of a male cousin, who exploited her vulnerability as a young girl in dire need of his assistance and started blackmailing her. He was first asking for favors, such as to bring food when I went to visit him, but it ended up in him touching me, kissing me, and more. When I tried to tell my mother that I did not need his help anymore and that he was trying to use me, she started hitting me, cursing me, and blaming me for being abused.96 As we probed deeper into understanding the paths that Palestinian women use to access justice in the West Bank, for example by analyzing legal files and juxtaposing them against interviewees’ narratives, we found that the situation is indeed dire. Our data reveal that after females try all possible internal (family and community) ways to stop violent abuse and realize that they cannot prevent it by themselves, they approach the police. The police then take the case to a prosecutor, who investigates further and decides whether to bring the case to court. The fact that numerous social control agents are involved and that they are the ones who decide whether the case should be tried by the Shari’a court, the civil court, or in some cases, the national security courts increases women’s sense of helplessness. Samar, 33 years old, explains: The fact that they decide upon my life made me so depressed, I even tried to commit suicide 3 times. [My husband] kidnapped me with the help of his brother, and all of them – the police, the court, even my family – wanted to go to the Shari’a court and impose a marriage on me. He did not touch me, but he wanted to teach my brother a lesson because my brother was hitting on his sister while she was in school. They forced him and me to get married (…) And after marriage, he abandoned me, left me like an injured animal, and even on the day of Eid [a major Muslim holiday], he gave me 50 shekels without even looking at my face. They all did this to me, all of them; my parents, the judge in the Shari’a court, the police, the social worker (…) all of them.”97 Samar’s narrative shows how various players suggested “solutions” to serious crimes without consulting, listening to, or even acknowledging the ramifications of their “solutions” on the female victim. For example, in the courts, the judges determine the mode of handling and following up on a case, including the amount of alimony and child support required. At this stage, following the disclosure of a familial conflict and/or abuse, we found that women often have problems receiving their rights in terms of alimony, child custody, and the like from their husbands. Women stated that the legal system fails to attend to their needs or acknowledge their suffering, let alone their legal and religious rights. 96 Interview in March, 2013. 97 Interview in March, 2013. 25
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
It is important to mention here, in regard to the courts, that women who are victims/survivors of spousal violence must move back and forth between the Shari’a court and the civil court, because many women have files in both places, one for divorce (or another personal status matter) in a Shari’a/church court and one on violence perpetrated against them in a civil court. Women must approach the executive courts in order to implement the Shari’a court’s decisions. Women sometimes can’t move easily between both courts, both because they don’t have money or child care that could accommodate these continuous moves and because of the existing checkpoints, closures, and sometimes curfews that block their freedom of movement. Interviewees explained that they were forced to re-enter the justice system many times in order to request their rights from their husbands or abusers. In more than 90% of the cases in the study, there were various interventions for reconciliation between the victim and the offender. In the Shari’a courts, these interventions are undertaken by committees established to achieve reconciliation. Marwa, 34, explains: I called the number that the Ministry of Social Affairs gave me. Police came to our home and took me, and on the second day we went to the court (…) The judge asked my husband if he beats me, and he said no. Then the judge told us to go and reconcile, saying it is a shame what we are doing, that we are grown up people (…) I went back to my husband, but I was afraid, he became worse (…) Then, the Ministry sent me to the shelter.98 I filed a complaint against him, and he was in prison for three days. There was again a court session, the same thing happened as before, and I went back with him again. Now everything is worse than before.99 In Marwa’s case, we can see that the path to justice is a spiralone:100 Figure 6: Spiral path to justice
98 We do not mention the names of the shelters for research ethical issues. 99 Interview with M., married with 7 children. 100 The meaning of the spiral is that the woman is entering an open-ended path through which she returns to the same stations again and again.
According to several lawyers we interviewed, the governor sometimes intervenes in this spiral path to justice and decides what to do with the case, without the involvement of an official institute and without the case reaching a court or a prosecutor. They mentioned that the governor has the authority to send women to a shelter or “safe house” or to prison—even without a court decision. My family came to the safe house to take us, and I told my two brothers that we ran away because of the conditions at home. We went home (…) my brothers had a gun. I was afraid to tell them what happened to me, because when they knew about my sister, they pointed the gun at our heads and threatened us. We spent a week at their homes, but their wives didn’t approve of our stay, so they put us in a separate room made from iron between their buildings. The floor was made of wood, there were no windows for sunlight, no bathroom, and every three days they brought us a scant amount of poor quality food. I managed to escape and went to the worker from the Social Affairs Unit who had helped us in the beginning. He then talked to my brothers, and I went back home with them. They locked us in the room and nearly beat us to death. We spent nine months with my brothers, until the governor came with the prosecutor and 15 police cars, closed the area and took us in the ambulance; my brothers were in Israel that day.101
Violence at home Police Family Protection Unit Prosecutor Court Family refusal and threats Some of the women we interviewed are still at the shelters. Others who have left the shelters now live in very insecure conditions, unsafe, and facing constant threats to their lives. It was apparent that seeking the help of the formal system produced new kinds of pressures and dangers to women’s lives, particularly to younger and unmarried women and girls. The many examples shared in the focus group discussions revealed that disclosure of abuse to external parties, if not carefully thought out and planned, might cause further harm to women. The focus group discussions allowed us to learn that when family members or powerful players in society such as health workers, teachers, or male supporters join the effort to stop abusing women, the disclosure of abuse was found to be helpful. But in those cases (which, as the groups explained, was most cases) where women have no support or are not protected by a social group, their safety and their lives would often be in jeopardy.
text-messaged her sister-in-law when her teacher tried to threaten her, while Dima, 21, explained that when her brother took her salary, she posted the information on Facebook, and that was the last time he took her money. Similar stories were raised in the focus groups, but it was apparent that, although participants agreed that using Facebook and the internet can be of great help, they the reverse could also hold true: nefarious/malicious characters can seek out vulnerable young women on Facebook and manage to lead them into prostitution and delinquency, endangering their lives. Shockingly, the college-aged participants explained that the most vulnerable groups are girls as young as 9 or 10, who can easily become victims/survivors of psychological, physical, and sexual abuse. The students explained that this segment of society is very fragile, unaware of the dangers of these resources, and at high risk of abuse. Girls’ access to justice in these cases was found to be very shaky due to the failure of parents, teachers, police officers, and even judges to protect them. They stressed that girls, like abused women, tend to call for help from their social groups; the problem is whether such internal community and family resources are aware of these young girls’ vulnerability. The focus group’s results showed that the general societal tendency (of parents, mothers, teachers, doctors, and peers) is to blame women and girls for these scenarios, rather than question the community’s failure and ability to attend to their needs. The data that we collected from women who suffered abuse supports the analyses of the college students in the focus groups. It shows that women who suffer from violence by fathers, brothers, uncles and male cousins tend to deal with their violence internally, by asking for help from close family members, including mothers and cousins. Only when all other options have failed and violence poses a serious risk to their lives do they ask for help from the police, including its Family Protection Units and social welfare departments. The case of Nahla, 27, exemplifies this:
It was surprising that the young college women in the focus group were able to map, deconstruct, and discuss societal reactions in detail while sharing stories of women victims/survivors and deviant and criminal men and women. They pointed out that disclosure of victimization is very challenging for women, and therefore they thought that women should first seek ways to access justice inside their communities. Only if that failed, and with carefully planned steps, should they seek the help of external agencies. They also described the dangers and the opportunities offered by text messaging, Facebook, and the internet. They shared many stories of young women who used Facebook to call for help when they needed it. Siwar, 19, for example, told the group that her cousin
I was engaged when I was 20 under pressure from my family. I was originally in love with a man who was rejected by my family. They threatened me with a knife and said if I married him, they would kill me. I was forcefully engaged to the man of their choice, and we got married. During the first two months he was nice, but after that he began causing problems for me with small things. He prevented me from visiting my family alone and began accusing me of cheating on him. Once he took me to my family by pulling me from my hair; he hit me in the street, the police saw us, and I told them that he was my husband. I went to my family, but my family sent me back to him. He locked me at home, called my father and told him that I had stolen gold from him. My father shouted back at him, saying that his daughter is not a thief, and he came with my uncles and took me from my home. I left home, emptyhanded, with only the clothes I was wearing. I then submitted a complaint for my legal expenses. I deserve it, but I still haven’t received anything. When I wanted to submit a request for divorce, my family didn’t want me to do so. They claimed that I would lose everything, and they asked me to solve the problem tribally. I didn’t agree, so I talked to a lawyer, but nothing has happened till now because the lawyer is sick.102
101 Interview in February, 2013.
102 Interview in February, 2013.
26
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
As Nahla’s case shows, we found that women and girls victims/survivors of violence primarily look for help inside the family, such as parents or cousins. Some families help their members and even connect them with lawyers and legal experts to help them fulfill their rights. In most cases, however, due to the lengthy process, financial expenses, and uncertainty of the end results, added to the fact that family supporters fail to expedite the formal legal process, the families tend to abandon the pursuit of formal justice, leaving women in a precarious state. It must be noted that young women participating in the focus groups shared cases of women relatives who got tangled in the justice system without knowing how to get out of it. At least seven cases were mentioned among the three focus groups where women victims/survivors and their families grew extremely weary of dealing with one office after another. Riham, 20, explained: My uncle went to the police to file a complaint against his son-in-law, but the police needed medical proof that my uncle’s daughter was burned [her husband poured hot water on her body]. When my uncle brought the report, they still asked for witnesses to testify that the husband was the one that burned her. When he asked the neighbor to testify that the husband was screaming and throwing things when his daughter was burned, they still did not act, arrest, or even file a complaint against the husband. Only then we learned that the husband’s friend is a police officer, and there was no way my uncle could make the police arrest him…and this is why he ended up stabbing him.103 Other victims/survivors’ stories, as well as interviews with various institutional representatives, highlighted the need for evidence, testimonies, medical reports, technical reports, and other documents to initiate a suitable justice process. As one social worker stated: “By the time the system realizes that a woman’s rights were violated, the women and their families lose hope and end up committing crimes, such as in one case where two sisters killed their brother-in-law.”104 Police bias due to an officer’s being related to the abuser is not uncommon. As Maram explained: “When [my brother] and my father are well connected, and they know everybody in the security apparatus, who am I to challenge them?”105 The data indicate that a “personal connection” with the security and political apparatus, added to the lack of belief in the system’s integrity, the lengthy legal process, and the inability of the criminal justice system to move faster due to procedural and political hardships (such as needing Israel’s approval to arrest someone or collect evidence), resulted in women becoming very distrustful of the justice system in general.
B. Paths to justice in cases involving the threat of killing This path regarding the threat of killing includes several scenarios, such as the following: 103 Interview in May, 2013. 104 Interview in March, 2013. 105 Interview in February, 2013. 27
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
Threat of killing Police and its FPU Prosecutor Shelter106 In 90% of the cases interviewed, collected, and analyzed for this study, the main source of the threat was within the family. The reason a woman was threatened with being killed was often one of the following: She was involved in a relationship that the family rejected; she was in a dispute with the husband or ex-husband; or she rejected the family’s plan for an imposed marriage. The threat that she would be killed could be issued by the husband or one of her family members, such as the father, a brother, or an uncle. In our interviews, we heard from various agents of social control that these women stay at the FPU (Family Protection Unit) or sometimes other police unit/ department107 until they are transferred to the office of the prosecutor for investigation.108
Threat of killing FPU Police Return home Threat of killing attempt to kill FPU Police Shelter In these cases, the spiral path is part of the process. According to our interviewees from the formal and the informal institutions, women are forced to stay at the shelter until the threat has passed, or they are killed upon their return to the family or soon after their release from the shelter. In three of the interviews conducted with helpers, we learned that over the past three years, two women were killed following their release from a shelter. We could not validate this number, mainly because through the interviews, each case carried various conflicting narratives. The fact that it was not even possible to validate the exact number of women killed following release from shelters, prisons, or other safe homes is indicative of severe systemic problems and requires further scrutiny. In only a very few cases were the victims/survivors able to lead independent lives after they had left the shelter. Women and girls who had sought the aid of the police were usually returned to their homes when one of their relatives or those responsible for their security (father, brother, or husband) signed a commitment not to strike or harm them. In most of the cases after the victim returned to her family, she continued to be subjected to violence and to live under the threat of death. In some cases, the women were indeed killed. In one story of a murdered woman in Bethlehem, as told to us by her lawyer and the Family Protection Unit (FPU) officer, the woman’s husband regularly beat and threatened to kill her. She filed a complaint with the police; she tried every avenue possible – the social welfare department, her friends, her family, a center for psychological counseling, added to the police stations in various locations, and the husband was brought to the prosecutor’s office, where he signed a commitment not to hurt or threaten her. The next day, he killed her in the market in front of an entire crowd. In another case, two sisters were killed directly after 106 There are three shelters in the West Bank: in Nablus, in Bethlehem, and in Jericho. 107 We will describe this stage later when we expand our descriptions of each station on the various paths. 108 According to Palestinian law, the prosecutor is the only person responsible for investigations. The police unit or the FPU is responsible for taking women’s testimony and assisting her in filing a complaint if she wishes to do so.
their release on bail from prison, and the judicial system failed to evaluate their security situation. The sisters were released after five years in a women’s prison for killing one of their husbands after he had tried to rape the other sister. According to various interviewees, the institutions involved in the case knew that the sisters’ lives were in danger outside the prison, but did not act. In addition to the failure of the previous systems to protect them, the court – namely the judge – approved the women’s release without calling for any precautions and without asking the police to conduct a risk assessment, despite the existence of evidence of an imminent threat on their lives. It should also be stated here that the FPU, as a body trained in risk assessment, could have aided the court, if only the judge had taken the necessary steps to ensure the women’s safety and accessibility to justice. We could further argue that in this instance, the two sisters were killed due to the court’s negligence and unprofessional legal work. College women in the focus groups expressed great concern about women’s conditions when cases of femicide were discussed. Salwa explained: “Just look at the two women who were killed: It was the judge who did not protect them. How can we ever trust the legal system, especially the judges?”109 In all the focus groups, college students explained that the leniency towards perpetrators and the criminal justice system’s lack of willingness to act firmly and swiftly leaves the lives of women at the mercy of men. Afaf explained: If my aunt can’t receive her child support because she is afraid to request it, fearing [her husband] will kill her, how can I trust any justice system? When I told my aunt to go to court against him, she explained to me that he is well connected with various officials in the Palestinian Authority (PA), and he could easily kill her and claim she provoked him or something similar. The PA won’t investigate, they won’t even bother, but rather would support him simply because he is a man.110 In one of the focus groups, Nahla said: “If you check each and every case of women that were killed as ‘honor crimes,’ you will realize that they were all abused as young girls, continued to suffer as women, and ended up paying with their lives for the injustice they faced.”111 All the group participants concurred.
C. Paths to justice in cases of rape and/or sexualbodily assault Although most of the young college-aged women and other female interviewees revealed that family support was crucial for helping women, they also pointed out the dangers of conditional support. The data revealed that some family members who came to help ended up exploiting abused women or using their vulnerability and weak conditions to impose sexual relationships. Such is the story of Salwa, 25, who used to be beaten by her father and older brother. Her male cousin began to express warm and sympathetic feelings towards her, and she confided in him as an escape from her abusers. 109 Interview in February, 2013. 110 Interview in March, 2013. 111 Focus group meeting. 28
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
He promised to marry her and convinced her to engage in a sexual relationship with him. When Salwa became pregnant, he left her and did not admit to his act, so she was forced to deal with the stigma and consequences from her family and society. Although, for example, Salwa’s youngest brother helped her reach a doctor and paid for her abortion, he never trusted her, controlled her behavior, and deprived her of any liberty or financial resources. She explained: It is true that he fed me and kept me safe with his wife and children, but he also prevented me from looking for a job, going out to pick olives like all the girls in the village, or even thinking of going back to school. I became his kid’s babysitter, when I am only 23 years old and can have my own life.112 In five cases, young women being abused by their families escaped with a stranger who promised them help, love, and marriage in order to save them from their pain. After the promise of marriage, the woman would feel safe, start to hope, and begin a sexual relationship with the person. This later leaves the woman in a very dangerous situation, whereby the partner can leave her and she has to cope with the societal response—including threats on her life—on her own.113 Manal was 16 when her mother died. With her mother’s loss, she also lost love, safety, and support: My mother died when I was 16. As a child, I lived a very agonizing and torturous life. My life was all violence and humiliation. My family refused to allow us to study and get an education, and they had a whole list of prohibitions; no television, no mobile phone, no visits to my aunt or uncle, no talking to our cousins (...) We were treated in a very bad way, and we worked like men. My sister and I decided to look for and meet men in order to get married and escape the torturous life we lived. I first knew a man that I would talk to on a secret mobile phone, but it didn’t work out. Then I knew a man through a friend of mine, and we were in relationship for two months. He told me that he wanted to introduce me to his mother, so we went to his home, but no one was there. He asked me to have sex with him, and I agreed because I wasn’t aware of what it would mean for my body, and he photographed me. I was afraid that my family would see the pictures, but it took me a long time to tell the police, and so my complaint was deemed irrelevant. My sister also slept with men and had dangerous results, so we decided to escape from the village together in order to save ourselves from being killed.114 We argue here that, like Manal’s case, young girls who lost their loved ones, suffered from a family trauma, and have no financial means to support themselves, continue their education, or build a safe future might end up being victims/survivors of an abuse of power. The search for escape with other men can be explained in several ways, including a search for ways to stop the abuses inflicted upon them by their families. Abused females seek safety, a dignified life, love, and emotional relationships to compensate for the lack of love and care in their own 112 Focus group meeting. 113 We will elaborate on this path later. 114 Interview in February, 2013.
homes. Some might use their attempted escape as a way to punish their male relatives who abused them, to the degree that they would even get involved with socially unacceptable behaviors, including sexual relationships with strangers. Others wanted to challenge their abuser’s authority, patriarchy, and ability to control women’s lives. Five of the women and girls interviewed for this study gave explanations such as these. Thus, women abused by their families try their best to adhere to their family’s rules and to use internal family resources to address abuse. Only after all internal attempts fail do women seek help outside the family, such as by requesting intervention by the police or the Social Affairs Unit. In most of the cases, however, the circle of violence did not stop, and every time women survivors asked for additional help, they paid a high price and suffered additional harassments, abuses, and violence, including sexual abuse. In most of the interviews done for this study, it was apparent that females turn to their schoolteachers, doctors, and members of their immediate community, such as neighbors and relatives beyond the nuclear family. Yet, as indicated in the study, the response is all too often either apathy, fear, or ignorance about avenues for redress, which impedes females’ access to justice. The crime of sexual abuse was found to further hinder the already impossible access to justice for women. One member of the focus group explained: In a case in Birzeit, the disclosure of sexual abuse ended up stigmatizing the young girl. Her mother supported her and found her to be a victim of rape, but the entire society, even with posts on Facebook, blamed her for being abused and not [the man]. Asking for help from the justice system further stigmatized her, even though she is a young girl, a victim of rape.115 One of the prosecutors whom we interviewed said: In our work, the cases that get a high degree of attention are cases of rape, according to their danger. We listen to the victim’s testimony under oath and she undergoes the examination of a forensic physician, but only if she agrees to such an examination. After that, we collect all the requested papers for the case, visit the location of the crime, and analyze the effects on her body. She gives her affidavit at the police station and testifies at the prosecutor’s office.116 The research identifies various paths in cases of sexual assault and rape:
Rape sexual-bodily assault117 Shelter
Police
FPU118
As the following cases show, women whose stories follow this particular path ask for police intervention only after they experience direct physical sexual violence against them, including attempted rapes and actual rapes. In 115 Interview in May, 2013. 116 Interview in April, 2013. 117 We tie the “bodily” with the sexual in order to highlight that the assault is on her body as well. 118 In most of the cases, women approached a Family Protection Unit (FPU), which are established for women as alternatives to police stations. 29
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
most of the cases we analyzed, the perpetrators were close family members, relatives, or strangers whom the women dated or contacted to escape their family’s violence. We found that when women who were in vulnerable conditions asked for the help of the police, the prosecutor, or unknown community members (e.g., not their teachers, educators, or health professionals) under many threats and fears of abuse by their families, the women’s safety was further jeopardized and their social status weakened. In the stories of three sisters—Dalia, Einas, and Fadya— we can observe the dilemmas that women face when they are caught in a weak social position due to the absence of family support or having lost the family’s trust. Dalia said: My sister and I were only a few months old, and our third sister was only one year and a few months old, when our uncle forced my father to divorce our mother. We used to hear a lot of bad things about our mother from our uncle, and we began to hate her. After the divorce, we lived with our grandfather. We are refugees from the 1948 area [villages that existed in what is today Israel], and we get aid from UNRWA and the Ministry of Social Affairs because my father did not work. Within a few months, our grandfather and father died. Our uncle became responsible for everything; he collected the aid from UNRWA and our monthly allowance from the Ministry of Social Affairs. At the same time though, he did not buy us any food or give us money to buy food for ourselves, so we were left without food.119 Her sister Einas continued, saying: My uncle wanted me to get engaged to his son, who was 22 years old and a mechanic. I did not want him, but he forced me to get engaged. We were engaged for three months, and we signed the marriage contract. My uncle forced me to do these things.120 As a reaction to the uncle’s abuses, mainly sexual abuse, the third sister, Fadya, decided to approach the police, the FPU. She described the humiliating way they interrogated her: They asked me very embarrassing questions. What was the color of my uncle’s underwear? The color of his sex organ? How was he having sex with me? Where and when did he have sex with me? Did I agree to have sex or not? Do I know how to use the internet? How old was I when he had sex with me? Is my sleeping light or heavy? 121 In such cases where the family becomes part of the problem, the women in the study reported that they were transferred directly to shelters, because the police or the investigator at the FPU decided that it would be too dangerous to send them back home as it might risk their lives. It is also very important to realize the difficulties these women face after emerging from cycles of sexual assault and rape. They have to describe what happened to them in detail at the police station when they file a complaint and must do so again during the interrogation 119 Interview in February, 2013. 120 Interview in February, 2013. 121 Interview in February, 2013.
at the prosecutor’s office. These testimonies are very embarrassing and painful for women, because they have to recall and relive their traumas at every legal stage they pass through, including the last stage of trial.122 It should also be noted that interviewees involved in two additional cases that occurred in 2012 and 2013 reported that the FPU acted in a humane and professional manner, while taking into consideration the societal discomfort attached to discussing sexual abuse and dangers facing females socially. Differences were also noted in various locations. For example, cases from Ramallah and Bethlehem were found to be dealt with in a more victim-sensitive manner, while cases from Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nablus received heavy criticism from those interviewed for the study. It is also crucial to mention that in rape cases, every female should undergo a genital examination at the Forensic Medicine Institute if she wishes to file an official complaint against the abuser and have sufficient “legal” evidence to prove it. During this process, women’s virginity is assessed, and they also are asked to recount the whole rape experience in detail. Several of our respondents, both victims/survivors and NGO workers, mentioned that women do not always trust the reports written by the Forensic Medicine Institute and don’t feel safe attending their centers. This indicates a need to examine what happens to women during this process and develop better ways to conduct the very intrusive and embarrassing examination and support the victim through it.123 NGO representatives, women activists, and prosecutors all indicated that there is a serious need to work on the forensic medicine examiners and sensitize them to the effect of such examinations on women victims/survivors. They also indicated that judges dealing with cases of abuses against women, mainly sexual abuse, should be trained to understand the psychosocial effect of re-visiting the abuse.
Rape Sexual-bodily assault FPU Police Prosecutor for interrogation Shelter
They were asking me questions such as, Why did you go out of your house after 5:00 pm? What exact route did you take to reach the village grocery? Did you really leave your home with a housecoat? Why do you think he dared to touch you? How come you allowed him to push you and injure you? Couldn’t you scream?124 Nawal’s emotional reaction when sharing her ordeal being injured while fleeing an old man in her village who kissed her and tried to hug her by force further clarified how in some cases, informal intervention helps, while, as in Nawal’s case, their attempt to intervene (for she refused to cooperate with them and ended up changing her story to block any additional intervention) resulted in causing further pain to the abused. Generally, however, when we asked individual women interviewees if any religious or tribal personalities tried to help, they said that there was no intervention from any of them. ‘Religious men’ is just a big name that carries many question marks. Unfortunately they can’t be religious men, because under the cover of religion, they would blame me and portray women as sinners who angered God. Before I left my husband, they sat with me and advised me to return to him, even though he didn’t ask them to do so and didn’t want me to go back to him. They always blame the woman and say that the woman must concede and suffer—she must, she must, she must—until you finally decide not to listen to them at all when they talk about religion or mention religious codes (…) and then they say that our religion does not allow it [separation or divorce]. These tribal men, it is better if they stand aside and do not interfere. They wanted to take my baby from me on the day I gave birth (…) They even tried to persuade my family to give my baby, by telling my father that I’m still young and that I could get married again, but that keeping my baby boy would prevent me from marrying again.125
Rape sexual-bodily assault Police FPU Shelter
Social Affairs Unit
In most of the cases of sexual assault or rape in this study, there was no intervention from the tribal legal system. According to the lawyers, prosecutors, and NGO workers who were interviewed, these cases are regarded as sensitive family matters, and so the tribal leaders do not attempt to intervene. Even if they did intervene, they would almost always blame the females for the situation, not the males. In one of the narratives shared by a young college woman, Nawal, 24, explained in our focus group that tribal leaders have no sensitivity to women’s needs. However her classmate Iman, 22, disagreed with her and said that when her cousin had troubles with her husband, only the tribal leaders managed to discipline him. Then Nawal followed us after the focus group meeting and stated: “When the tribal leader came to the house and wanted to talk to me in order to decide what to do, and what steps should they take, their mode of talking was very hurtful.” Nawal expanded:
We found some cases of women who approached a Social Affairs Unit for help after experiencing assault. The unit would direct the women to the police, telling them that the police were the ones the women should contact if they wanted to leave home. For most of the cases we analyzed, the assault occurred at home and was committed by a family member, and the women themselves would file the complaint. The victims/survivors often found that their families, even their closest relatives like their mothers or maternal aunts, did not trust their accounts in cases of sexual assault. In one case, a young girl tried to tell her mother that she had been raped by her father and brother: “I told my mother about it but she did not believe me, and began to blame me.”126 In another case, a young girl who was raped by her father said: “My brother and my mother’s brother believed me and took me away; but my father’s brothers did not believe me, calling me a fajreh [heretic] and saying that I must be killed.”127
122 We will elaborate this issue later in the themes of analyses. 123 On the Palestinian Forensic Medical System in the West Bank, see DaherNashif, S. (2011). The social and political “enlivening” of the dead Palestinian body: The case of the Palestinian Forensic Medicine Institute. (Doctoral Dissertation). The Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
124 Focus group meeting. 125 Interview in February, 2013. 126 Interview in March, 2013. 127 Interview in March, 2013.
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Rape Sexual-bodily assault Social Affairs Unit Return home FPU shelter In four cases, the unit of Social Affairs tried to send the women or girls back to their homes after an incident of rape or assault. The four paths shared in the previous analyses show that no matter how the victim responded to the violent incidents, who was informed about the abuse, how young the victim was, who the abuser was, or who was involved in the justice process, the victims/survivors always ended up in the shelter—not for their own protection, but rather to erase their presence from the community—or as one victim stated: “to get rid of me.”128
D. Multiple paths in one case The study findings indicate that most women who entered the criminal justice system by merely filing a complaint failed to achieve their objectives. If a woman who experienced violence began a case to file for divorce, her efforts would often result in an increase in the violence committed against her. In some cases, the efforts led to her being raped, subjected to constant psychological threats, an attempt on her life, or actual femicide. These difficulties and risks led most of the victims/ survivors to regret getting involved with the justice system, calling it a system of severe injustice. The women victims/survivors, women who were not victims/ survivors, and social control agents interviewed in this study all suggested that the system, the workers, and the laws fail to safeguard women’s lives and prevent further abuse. Children who faced abuse from their father and children of abused women also suffered a continuity of violence in their lives. This cross-generational effect of violence can be seen in the following case. Alia was eight years old when she and her three sisters witnessed their father abusing their mother. The father’s abuse did not stop there, and he started sexually harassing his own daughters, including young Alia. Her mother requested the help of a women’s organization. They provided legal aid to get the mother her divorce but failed to support the young girls; as Alia stated: Even when I needed help getting back into school, the social worker stated that this is not part of her work… I was even ready to go to a boarding school with my sisters— anything not to feel his heavy body on me—but the social worker did not understand my mother’s request.129 At one point, the abusive father took Alia and her oldest sister and ran away with them outside the West Bank to a place in Israel, near Tel Aviv, where he sexually abused them and prostituted them to gain money. At age 14, Alia ran away from him, even while she suffered from severe anxiety attacks and physical fits, and returned to her city in the West Bank. Her mother took her to a psychiatrist, who decided that she needed mental hospitalization. She was treated in the mental hospital and released to her mother’s house. Her father managed to find her and took her back to areas under the Israeli jurisdiction, close to Ashdod. She tried several times to run away, but the borders, checkpoints, and her need for official documents prevented her from leaving the area. At a later point, the father managed to find her sister and brought her also to 128 Focus group meeting. 129 Interview in July, 2013. 31
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
his place inside the Israeli border. At one point, and after a long time of suffering abuse and being prostituted by their father, both sisters ran away and returned to their neighborhood. It was around the year 2004-2005 when Alia and her sister filed complaints against the father, but they ended up being imprisoned for over a year in order to be “protected” from any attempt by the father or his family to kill them. When they asked for help from community and political figures in their area, she and her sister were sexually harassed and abused. Eight years have passed since Alia returned to her neighborhood, but she is now considered a criminal and a prostitute and is facing many accusations against her and her sister. She is serving prison time, and her fate is unknown. She concluded her narration by stating: “So, you think, at the age of 24, when I leave this place, that I will find a home to go back to? Or a place to work in? Or a family to host me? Or a husband?”130 Alia’s story, like the stories of other women, suggests that no matter who deals with the abuse or how it is dealt with, the systems of social control (including the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs, the justice system, the informal social control agents, and the various women’s and human rights organizations) are failing to protect victims/survivors’ rights to stay in their communities and their rights to safety and dignified lives. Letting abusers go free, or free until proven guilty, while at the same time uprooting or imprisoning women in jails or even keeping them in shelters where their security, freedom, and ability to go about their lives are severely restricted requires serious critical introspection and scrutiny for its damaging effects on women and their pursuit of justice. As Alia stated: We [she and her sister] lived and are still living a life with no hope. He stole all our hopes, and those who claimed that they are helping us—first, that women’s organization, then in the prison,and lately in the shelter— they all fail to understand the meaning of life without any hope. He killed us alive [the father], and no one was able to punish him—no police, no prosecutor, no Ministry of Justice or Welfare. And Israel and his friends there [in Israel] helped him live his life as a man. It is only we who have lost everything, at ages 23 and 24.131
E. Paths of justice within Areas C and H2
Over here, this is called Area C; women can’t live like humans, but rather like animals. My sister wanted to officially certify her grades, just to be able to find a job, to support her children, but she could not leave due to the authorities’ refusal to give her a permit. We believe that her husband has strong relationships with some Israeli officials, and that is why they are denying her right to a permit. They are denying her right to life, and her abusive husband is keeping her under his mercy. When I went to one of those organizations asking for help, they said that my sister should come to them, and that they can’t take any steps without her approval. When I told them they could call her and talk to her, they said this is not acceptable according to their own internal regulations.132 Maha, 19, college student 130 Interview in July, 2013. 131 Focus group meeting. 132 Interview in June, 2013.
Maha’s story is one of the many that we heard from Area C that unveiled the effects of geopolitical restrictions on women’s accessibility to justice. The testimonies of both women victims/survivors and possible victims/survivors (women who participated in our focus group discussions, but did not share with us their own personal victimization) suggest that in cases from Areas C, H1, and H2, women were frustrated and anxious because of the lengthy times and weary processes they had to go through just in order to approach social institutions, human rights organizations, or the justice system. Even in cases where women were able to access the legal system, the lengthy process, the money required, the tiring commute to the location, the Israeli permit system (which requires the submission of specific official papers to get a permit to cross or move from one area to another), and the lack of sensitivity from local service providers caused constant frustrations. These effects of economy, space, and time are particularly severe for women living in Area C, making them feel that they are unsafe and unprotected. The financial aspect was very apparent in our interviews with women respondents; women noted that they spent a lot of money on transportation. For mothers, the issue of what to do with their children is especially crucial, as sometimes they cannot attend the legal proceedings due to the lack of childcare or due to a child’s illness.
custody, alimony etc.).
Maysoon, another college student, explained:
My friend was killed. Do you know that she tried her best to go according to the law, the regulations, the family’s requests? Her husband drove her crazy, for he was hiding in Area C, then back to Nablus, then in Hebron with his relatives. She kept on trying, she even managed to get a report from the mental hospital…but she was killed before she achieved justice. What justice are you discussing with us, if we as Palestinians can’t achieve justice as a nation, with all the international support we are getting? How do you want my friend to prevent her husband and brother from killing her?136
When my friend needed to invite a witness to her court case, she needed to pay for the transportation and the food. She also needed to pay for them to get an official permit [from the Israeli authority] to reach the court, and then, when my friend managed all this, the court was postponed because the judge could not cross the checkpoint.133 Most of the social control agents interviewed in this study repeated many of the same troubles faced by Maysoon’s friend. They stressed the fact that since there is little protection for Palestinians in general, including women in Area C, mainly because the police and the Palestinian system can’t reach them easily, they find it difficult to work with women, men, or communities living or hiding in Areas C, H1, and H2. The interviewees explained that finding witnesses for their cases was a tremendous hardship. They explained how they did not know whom to ask for help or whether they could reach any service provider at all. They further explained the financial burdens on the victims/survivors, who are required to pay for their own witnesses’ transportation and other expenses. Furthermore, sometimes women exerted tremendous efforts to arrive at the court, only to discover that their cases had been delayed for various reasons without any notification to them. In such instances, the witnesses were asked to return at another time—incurring yet another procedural fee. Several women claimed that the money they pay to pursue redress for the case is more than the money they receive after it ends. As a result, they prefer not to approach the legal system and instead try to solve situations through informal social institutions, such as the tribal system. This solution is used when the case is about violence, divorce, and/or expenses (child 133 Interview in June, 2013. 32
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
Our focus group shared many stories of how frustrating it was to attend and attain justice while living in Area C. Due to women having to move in and out of Areas C, H1, and H2, the pursuit of justice was a constantly spiraling endeavor: I am so tired of courts. I have been going there almost every day, and each time they find a new missing paper, a new part of the law that should be applied. There is a kind of darkness, no clarity (...) I had filed for divorce two years ago but nobody can take the papers to him [the husband] in his village134 (...) Time is passing and each day you hear a new discovery in my case. A year has passed, and now they tell me that I must renew the papers because a year has passed, and I paid so much money on transportation between Al-Ram and Ramallah. I can only file a complaint on Thursdays, and Thursday is a short workday, and when I arrive they tell me that they are done for the day.135 These difficulties can become so detrimental that if a woman’s life is under threat, and she tries to reach the police, the court, or the Social Affairs Department, and one document does not reach someone or a witness fails to arrive, the woman’s life and safety is often in jeopardy to the degree that some women were killed while awaiting justice. One young woman in our focus group at one of the colleges explained:
In our interviews, women commonly connected their ordeals and failures to access the legal system from Areas C, H1, and H2 to the Palestinian national experience. Many of the college women said that if their own nation could not attain justice with all the international human rights laws and local and international activism, how could an individual woman face the militarized restrictions before her—restrictions that not only impoverished her and her family but also jeopardized her safety by empowering patriarchy and enabling males to abuse females? Manar, a 22-year-old law student, explained: Palestinian women are like the story of Palestine: We live our uprooting every day. I can tell you that the law never protected us, neither as women nor as Palestinians. Here I am, living in H2, a couple of settlers control our entire lives, our movements, even our decisions. Just look at me: I accepted a marriage offer not because I was convinced, but because I am trapped in this place with no way out. My only way out was to accept marrying someone from the Bethlehem area, just to free myself a bit. Look at the situation of my relatives. My aunt is being abused by her 134 They both live in two different villages in Area C. 135 Interview in March, 2013. 136 Interview in June, 2013.
brothers, and she can’t even reach the court, or even think – I really mean the mere thinking – of going to the police and asking them to interfere. Here in my area, many women and more young girls suffer from this suffocation. I really feel so sad for my youngest sisters; they are even prevented from dreaming. Just listen to my 14-year-old sister, who writes poetry so well; she can’t even dream or plan to enroll in Bir Zeit or Bethlehem University.137 The women interviewees expressed their inability to even dream about a better future. In their discussions, they could not differentiate between their personal lives as young women, their lives as families imprisoned in spatially restricted areas, and their nation’s exceptionally oppressed condition. As Salwa, 25, stated: “Some Palestinians live in refugee camps in Lebanon or in Jordan. We live in refugee camps that are not called camps, but which are worse, for we have no security.”138 When we asked to hear more about the effects of the restrictions on movement and the militarization of space, Khawla, 22, Manar’s cousin who joined the focus group, stated: It is true that men also suffer when living in Hebron, particularly in our area (H2), but the suffocation made more men unemployed and made them more worried about women’s and girls’ safety, and this gave them power over us. For example, my little brother needs to accompany me every time I leave the area. All our male relatives need to know every movement, every act we do, every shop we enter; all this because they fear the threats against our security. Then, those settlers that jump in our faces without notice—they keep us in a state of constant fear and uncertainty as to when would they attack, what graffiti would they write, what they will do, and what could happen to us. (...) Lately, I have been suffering from severe difficult (shortness of) breath, because I can’t focus; all I do is hear new stories about the threats against us. Under such conditions, one has no mind to study, to organize their house, or plan any future. All this is causing troubles, and I am having some hard times in my marriage, but I will never ever think of looking for help from the legal system, the court, let alone the police. My husband can’t find a stable job—would I add to his already burdened life? Living here requires that we stand together, and women here strongly need men.139 Ghaida, 22, supported Khawla’s statement by saying: In H2, we should all be attentive to the external danger of the settlers, and they are very vicious; they follow every movement we make. If, God forbid, a woman goes to complain against her father’s or brother’s abuse, the whole community will abandon her. I can even tell you the story of one of my relatives who went to a women’s organization to ask for help. She paid such a high price because all the men in the area stood by each other. They all supported each other, supported the father and the brother, and she lost it all. She even lost the help and support of the women in the community; actually, the women were even worse than the men.140 137 Focus group meeting. 138 Focus group meeting. 139 Focus group meeting. 140 Focus group meeting. 33
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
Khawla responded: I tell you, it is better for a woman to be killed. She will find more love and respect as a dead body than to even think about approaching any formal system. It might be better to ask a women’s organization for help, but again, who knows how it could end up. The daily problems in this area, the constant fears of the settlers’ attacks, and the daily Israeli raids into our houses becomes a serious obstacle in women’s ability to call for any help, let alone formal help. Maybe our best bet is to work with our fathers, brothers, and husbands and make them aware of our rights to safety and security; but forget about the law. Law can be applied in normal places, in America, maybe in Tel Aviv; but not in Hebron or Jerusalem.141 Alia, 22, another college student who discussed Area C, described how the militarization of space reproduces patriarchy and promotes new modes of patriarchal exclusion and control: Women in Area C are not protected. The opposite is true for men, who are the perpetrators and the people from whom we want justice; but it is difficult to catch them in Area C. It is the same in H2, which is under Israeli control and requires security coordination. Sometimes the coordination is prevented, and it becomes very difficult to perform the legal duties and decisions of the cases.142 A female lawyer who lives in Area C shared with us the following story: A young woman who ran away from her abusive marriage came to live beside us, for she could not handle her husband’s abuse. She used to work as a helper in a kindergarten. She rented the room beside us and brought her mother to live with her. But, since this is Area C, her husband managed to gather some armed men. They attacked the two women, and I saw them from the window when they left. The two women were dragged with them, while the husband was walking as if he had won a war. He took her back by force. I called the police, but none of them followed up, or managed to reach the two women. They live here in Area C; but who cares about women’s rights here?143 The discussions of the hardships faced by women and girls in Area C revealed the main vulnerabilities of women in their attempts to access justice to end their marriage, keep their children, prevent sexual or physical violence against them, receive their inheritance rights, and more. Respondents who discussed Area C expressed their belief that living in such areas exacerbated inequalities between men and women, between rich and poor, and furthered the gap between Palestinians and Israelis. Living in or close to Area C (such as in villages between Areas A and C) restricted women’s accessibility to the PA’s institutions and further excluded them from their own social support system. In the cases of women working in agriculture and farming, respondents indicated that worsening of poverty and unemployment deprived women of an education and of the chance to continue their higher education. 141 Focus group meeting. 142 Interview with focus group in June, 2013. 143 Focus group meeting.
One issue that was apparent when listening to the women’s stories was that Israel has repeatedly changed the boundaries of Area C, making it extremely difficult for women living in and near to the area to know how to access services. As Maha, 24, explained: In our neighborhood, they change the legal definition of the area every time Israel decides to do so. First they had the checkpoint opposite our house. Then they moved it further down, which made our house part of the West Bank. At a later stage, we became Area C, and they even constructed the wall to separate us from the main street and from our friends, families, and lifetime neighbors. So when my father passed away, and my mother was struggling to get her rights from my uncles, no one helped us. She actually managed to get a court order for her rights, but she could not get the PA police to enforce it.144 Maha’s story supports the analysis that, under military occupation, women’s otherness is embedded in the social body and political fabric of the Occupying Power. The constant dispossession enhanced women’s marginalization, and reproduced and constructed a new and robust form of patriarchy. Such unbeatable patriarchal militarized conditions were also reflected in the words of Naela, 22: In Al-Ram, where I live, the wall divided our neighborhood. Half the people at home carry a Jerusalem ID, and half (like myself) have a West Bank ID. The combination of the political situation, the restrictions on movement, and the fact that our area is Area C, left us in a condition where we do not belong to anyone. So, my life can’t be protected, and it is in fact the opposite: someone like me can be the best victim, for no one can protect me. The PA can’t even step in here, and Israel, as you know, has no problem with erasing us.145 Naela’s statement was debated by a number of college women, 8 out of 12 of whom lived in Area C. For example, Samira, 24, said: “In Area C, it is Israel and the PA that decide when to get in, who to protect, and who not to protect.” Her comment raised a great deal of discussion, and the young women shared many stories to show that if Israel was interested in getting in, and if the PA also had an interest, they would find a way. Siham, 24, shared this story: In the past couple of months, we noticed that the PA and Israel are in total coordination. The building beside us was raided by both of their police forces, the Israeli and the Palestinian together. Why? Because they feared that the men living in that building had weapons, and it seems that the weapons were stolen from some Israeli settlement. So they managed to coordinate to catch the perpetrators, fearing their weapons. And they ended up handing over a group of men to Israel. So, when it is Israel’s security, they find a way to come in and catch perpetrators; but, when it is me or my mother in need of support, no one will even care. This is justice in our area.146 144 Focus group meeting. 145 Focus group meeting. 146 Focus group meeting. 34
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
Siham’s friend, Maram, 21, shared another story: It is not only in cases of weapons but [also] in cases of drugs or selling of outdated meat. We also learned that a family relative who dealt with outdated meat was arrested, all with cooperation between the Israeli and PA police personnel.147 The cooperation between the PA and Israel was also apparent in the following story: A while ago, maybe 4-5 months ago, there was a building hosting a group of men who were trafficking and sexually abusing Palestinian women. They used to bring women here, to Area C, and use them for prostitution. We called the PA police several times, and we even called the Israeli police, but no one cared. One day, a woman came and found out that her daughter was also used by this gang, and when the daughter saw her mother, out of fear, she threw herself out the window. All the neighbors looked for a way out, and called the police on both sides, but no one cared. The mother barely managed to get an ambulance to take her daughter to the hospital, and no knows what happened to her, whether she is dead or alive.148 The previous story raised many fears and questions, and prompted young women interviewees to share similar stories of groups of men using and abusing women and girls. They explained how financial need and poverty, adding to the inability to seek help in such an area, jeopardized the lives of many Palestinian women. As Salwa, 19, explained: Men in Area C have now found a new profession: They can own prostitution houses; they can have factories and employ women; they can steal and hide things in Area C and have women sell them. So they get money, and we women get killed. This is the condition of Area C.149 Area C was repeatedly described by legal workers we interviewed as a hindrance to women’s access to justice. For example, an administrator of a Palestinian Family Protection Unit (FPU) in the West Bank described her work in Area C as follows: In order to access Area C, we need the permission of the DCO.150 We have to call him at every event, give him the names of the policemen who will enter the area, their ID numbers, the number of weapons they have, the cars’ numbers, and which equipment will be taken. After giving them all of these details, instead of giving us an answer in 15 minutes, it takes them two to three hours. If we coordinated with the DCO, we could go with our official uniforms; if we did not, we were prevented from going into the area, and if someone informed them of our presence without the permission, we would all be taken to prison. Imagine what an image it would be to have the police being taken to prison. How can we demonstrate authority or control when we ourselves are controlled by the Israelis (...) Sometimes if the event is not urgent, we try to coordinate with the village council. For example, if someone is wanted in the justice system, we ask the village council to help us reach them. If we coordinate 147 Focus group meeting. 148 Focus group meeting. 149 Focus group meeting. 150 Direct Commission Office between Israel and Palestine.
with the DCO, we have to ask for more than 30 persons at the same time, instead of asking for coordination every day or every week. We utilize the single-case request for certain cases, while we organize arrest campaigns with one entrance into Area C.151 A prosecutor who was interviewed further described the process of entering Area C: We went to the crime scene and investigated the case—a husband who had killed his wife in front of their three children. Everything we did was done in coordination with the Israeli side (...) In hard cases such as killings and rapes, we make the effort to enter Area C, but in other cases, in which there is no life threat, we can’t enter easily.152 The previous quotations raise serious questions as to whether the Palestinian legal system can function effectively, or if accessibility to PA legal officials is even possible in Area C. Further questions that arose after that interview were whether the Palestinian DCO (District Coordination Office) considers the beating of a wife, sister, or child a dangerous or life-threatening case. According to the narratives we collected, in Areas C, H1, and H2, if a woman’s life is not truly endangered, the DCO does not make the effort to initiate proper coordination. If the woman has already been killed, then the DCO responds more quickly and smoothly. The number of testimonies to this observation was so numerous that it almost seemed as if women had to be killed in order to receive appropriate help. Should women really have to be dead bodies for the system to function? Our interviews also showed that Area C is used by Palestinian perpetrators as a destination to escape from the Palestinian legal system in Area A. For example, one woman interviewee said: “Both my brothers escaped to Area C and no one can bring them back to be punished for the violence they inflicted on me.”153 A director of a women’s center concurred, saying: “The security services are not able to enter Area C. As a result, people have to solve their problems through popular committees and social frameworks which are based on a tribal approach.” One prosecutor further commented that: “The tribal solution is useful in some cases; sometimes we can’t reach Area C and H1, so we ask their help in arresting specific suspects.”154 In a focus group with three NGOs, social workers claimed that: Women in Area C are not protected. If they called for help when their life was in danger, in order to reach her while we arrange the security coordination, we are sometimes forced to ask for the help of tribal men until the police arrive to protect her. But sometimes she could be killed before they reach her.155 A woman from Area C also recounted her experience with this: “Tribal men tried to intervene [in my divorce case], but it would have been better if they didn’t. They tried to take my son from me on his first day of birth…these are well-respected men from my family in both our villages.”156 151 Interview in Ramallah, March 2013 ,27. 152 Interview in Ramallah, March 2013 ,27. 153 Focus group meeting. 154 Interview on April 2013 ,1. 155 Interview on June 2013 ,3. 156 Interview in March, 2013. 35
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
F. Paths of women in conflict with the law To further comprehend the formal legal processes that women need to go through, we examined and analyzed 10 cases of women who themselves were in conflict with the law in various charges including:157 7 charged with killing, 1 for theft, 1 for adultery, and 1 for espionage. The paths for these cases can be summarized as follows:
Revealing the act Being arrested arrest Imprisonment
Extension of
An example of this path is the case of KA. The crime occurred in February of 2008 in a village in the Hebron area. KA was accused of murdering another woman. On the same day, there was an investigation of the crime scene and an autopsy of the victim was conducted. The suspect, a woman, was arrested and questioned four days later. In March, testimony was gathered from the eyewitnesses who had had found the victim’s body, as well as from KA, the alleged perpetrator. From April until May, testimonies were gathered from all the individuals who were involved in the case, including the policemen who arrived at the crime scene and the doctor from the village medical center. The suspect was remanded until March 2010. Our interviews showed that the fragmentation of the West Bank has greatly affected the long drawn-out legal processing of this case. Moreover, other interviewees who had been imprisoned also mentioned this problem, indicating that time and space were entirely intertwined with the West Bank’s geographic and political systems. In one case reviewed for this study, a woman who did not have a Palestinian ID card had killed her mother-inlaw. The murder occurred in Nablus in December 2006, and a charge sheet was introduced on January 6, 2007. When we looked at the case, we found that a hearing had been held every month of her imprisonment. She was first jailed in a women’s prison in Nablus. The prison was closed in February 2009, and she was moved to a women’s prison in Jenin. However, the hearings continued to take place at the Nablus court. As stated in the files, moving from one area to another required an Israeli permit, or at least coordination with the Israeli authorities. So KA was required to apply for an Israeli permit to enter Nablus merely to attend her own trial. It must be stressed here that in the case of KA and other similar cases, transporting women prisoners from one place to another and the entire process of coordinating gave more power to officials to use the prisoners’ dire need to reach the court to extract concessions and in some cases even to abuse them. In further analyzing the cases, we learned that at a later stage, when the prisoner had been moved to Jenin prison, some of the witnesses for her case simply did not show up. One reason was that they were simply unable to obtain permission to transfer from Nablus to Jenin, and another was that the police did not issue written orders requiring the witnesses to be present at the court. In several hearings, even the defendant’s lawyer was unable to reach (or maybe used women’s vulnerability and the justification of the political situation to not appear in 157 We didn’t receive an official permit to interview women who are incarcerated. We tried to obtain one, but we couldn’t. This was one of the research limitations.
court) the court to represent her client because of Israeli restrictions in their area. These restrictions, in addition to the PA’s poor functioning, have led to this particular case being repeatedly extended, all while the accused woman remains prison awaiting trial. At the time of writing, the case was still open-ended. The woman’s movement from one location to another, including between the prison and the court, had to be done in coordination with the Israelis. Between May 2007 and September 2008, when the case was in process, no witness summoned by the attorney could come to the hearing. At a later stage, some of the witnesses were able to make it, but the others failed or refused to come. These obstacles greatly slowed the legal process and violated the woman’s rights to due process and her rights as a prisoner. Such delay violates the UN Minimum Standard for the Rights of Prisoners, which specifies clear guidelines vis à vis the rights of any person held in custody.
II. Women facing injustices, charges, and attacks within the criminal justice system/ Police/Family Protection Unit (FPU) The role of the Police Unit and its specialized Family Protection Unit (FPU) is to take the complaint of a woman who has suffered violence, whether from her spouse or from another relative (if the victim is under 15 years of age). Our research identified various problematic police behaviors that require reform. For example, several interviewees mentioned that women were criticized for coming to file a violence complaint against a husband, brother, or father, especially when the violence was not visible on the complainant’s body. For example one lawyer said: “Sometimes when the woman goes to the police, they deal with her in a very accusatory or condescending manner, asking her why she came to the police station and even giving her the feeling that she was beaten because she did something wrong.”158 Another lawyer stated: “When a woman goes to complain [to the police] about sexual harassment or rape, they treat her as if she consented to the sexual relationship, and [insinuate] that it was not her first time doing so. They treat her as if she was a prostitute.”159 This kind of prejudice expressed through the police’s “treatment” prevented women from returning to the police station to ask for help or to file a complaint. Women also shared that they became discouraged from going to the police stations to file complaints about rape or sexual assault because the police questioned them in a demeaning manner. The police would ask very intimate questions and details of the event, including how she was dressed; what the perpetrator did to her before, during, and after the assault; and other embarrassing questions such as how the women realized that it was a penis, an erection, and so on. These questions and the tones in which they were asked caused many women to feel ashamed, anxious, and humiliated. Formally and legally (according to official regulations), the only person who 158 Interview on February 2013 ,27, Ramallah. 159 Interview on February 2013 ,27, Ramallah. 36
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
is responsible for conducting the formal investigation or interrogation is the public prosecutor, the attorney general, and members of the prosecution, including the assistant prosecutor and chief prosecutor. One lawyer said: “In sexual violence cases, the women must relive and reopen their traumas three times: first, at the police station, next, at the prosecutor’s investigation, and finally at the court.”160 Our interviews with legal system and NGO workers pointed to yet a fourth such re-traumatization: when the victim undergoes a forensic examination. A male prosecutor said: “We are a conservative society, so each and every question on sexual issues can cause women to be embarrassed. The policeman must fill out an official form, and female victims/survivors must give details in order for the police to know if she really experienced rape or not. But it’s true that it is not easy.”161 According to a female lawyer: “In most of the cases of rape or sexual assault, women complain to policemen and not policewomen, because the policewomen go home between 13:00 and 13:30, after which there are only policemen at the stations. That makes it harder for women to describe what happened to them.”162 She added: “What makes it harder is when a girl who is younger than 15 comes in with her father or other family member, and she must describe what happened in front of that person. Sometimes she doesn’t speak openly, so her complaint is lacking important details, and the case is compromised.” The analysis of female victims/survivors’ narratives, and the discourses and analytical reflections of the various interviewees in this study suggest that the protection system is lacking a professional social worker to assist female victims/survivors of violence as they move through the system. Supportive relatives should also be allowed to remain with the victims/survivors, so as to make sure that they have the necessary support from their close circles. A clear attentiveness from both the formal and informal protection systems might create a buffer that could prevent further victimization.
Stay at the Family Protection Unit (FPU) When the case concerns a woman who experienced rape, sexual assault, and/or life threatening situations, the police do not send the woman back home, because her life is at risk. In such cases, after filing the complaint and before transferring her to the prosecutor or the shelter, the woman is kept at the police station/FPU. These places are not adequately prepared to accommodate women who need to stay at the units, as there are no special rooms designated for such situations, and so women find themselves having to sleep on a seat at the unit. The question we then asked was: What might these women experience if they are alone at night with policemen? How do they feel? How would society react or perceive the women? 160 Interview on July 2013 ,10, Jerusalem. 161 Interview on March 2013 ,27 (We’ll not mention the location, because it may reveal the identity of the prosecutor.) 162 Interview on February 2013 ,27, Ramallah.
We learned from the women interviewed, be they victims/ survivors, in conflict with the law, or social control agents (both men and women), that the stays at these units are traumatic, uncomfortable, embarrassing, and frightening. In Hebron, the FPU is located in a special building divided into two departments, an administrative one for filing the complaints and a residential one for the public to stay in while the complaint is filed. Interviewees indicated that even the staff members at the residential department are uncomfortable with keeping women overnight because of the social stigma that it subsequently attaches to women who “stay alone in a building with policemen.” It should be noted also that leaving abused women and girls under such unprotected condition increases their vulnerability and exacerbates their feeling of being abandoned and isolated. A young girl who experienced this situation shared with us that after that night, alone in the police station, she spent the night thinking of ways to commit suicide: “All I had in mind is how to burn myself (...) all I wanted is to die (...) burn myself, hang myself, and leave this world.”163
The staff In most of the interviews, both women victims/survivors and legal workers pointed to the absence of female staff in both the formal and informal legal systems. For example, one of the prosecutors interviewed said: “One of the difficulties that we face when dealing with women’s cases is the absence of women specialists for following up on cases.”164 A director of a women’s center said: “Many of those working in the criminal justice system carry a male chauvinistic mentality, and somehow a part of our work is supposed to increase the number of women working at the legal system.165” The director explained that on one hand, the aim is to have more women working in the system on the assumption that women can be more attentive to other women. On the other hand, women judges, lawyers, social workers, and others can actually be harsher and more patriarchal than men. This became a serious challenge. Our data also show that in many cases, women can sometimes be even more chauvinistic than men and hold patriarchal beliefs to the extent that they cause more harm than help to abused women. In one case, a female police officer was found to be very harsh on women and more demeaning to the victims/survivors than their abusers. When I went to the police unit they treated me in an inhumane way; they said that if I did not compromise, they would arrest me and my mother. I came as a beaten woman, and the entrance to the police station is itself violent (...) I remember they brought a girl who ran away from her home and was missing for three days. The police who investigated her looked me over from head to toe. The rape was easier than his stare. I told him to go away from here.166 Women’s stories about their experiences seeking police assistance revealed great hardships, from not being able 163 Focus group meeting. 164 Interview in April, 2013. 165 Interview in June, 2013. 166 Interview in February, 2013. 37
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to openly discuss the abuse inflicted upon them, to the police station’s unpleasant and frightening environment, to the demeaning attitude of police officers, to the intrusive officers asking about the women’s sexual behavior and history. In addition, these police units are burdened by a huge number of cases and serious understaffing. A coordinator in an FPU stated: We have 7 staff members, 5 of whom work on these cases. The number of cases in 2012 was 865, so the number of the cases doesn’t fit with the number of staff workers. These cases are not finished in one day; sometimes it takes two to three months. At least 200 cases are urgent, 70 cases are classified as complicated or risk the woman being killed, one woman was killed in 2012, and 80 cases are related to running awayfrom home. The number of the latter cases is increasing, so that may become a growing phenomenon.167 The police officers interviewed were aware of the perceptions of women, victims/survivors, and service providers vis-à-vis the police’s role and behavior. They explained that police officers find it hard to deal with cases of sexual abuse and violence against women when their staff numbers are small, and when the cases are time consuming. As the coordinator in the FPU explained, in the last few years, his department has tried to improve services for women and be more attentive to their cases, but much more improvement is needed. It should be mentioned that the police officers interviewed, as well as female victims/survivors, explained that even when the police were attentive and tried to bring the abusers in for investigation, the roadblocks, the checkpoints, the Area C restrictions, and other related geopolitical difficulties caused many delays and further jeopardized women’s safety and right to justice.
The prosecutor The physical location and conditions of the public prosecutors’ office do not offer women confidentiality to help them lodge complaints with a sense of security. The locations of these offices are often in very open, public spaces. The rooms in which women detail their complaints are usually in close proximity to the waiting rooms in these offices, which allow all conversations to be overheard and compromise privacy. Some of the offices are very intimidating: in Hebron, for example, the public prosecutor’s office is regularly filled with policemen, and the detention cells are right in front of the investigation rooms such that one can even see the detainees being held. The Hebron office does not have sufficient rooms to hear complaints, and the entrance to the building is frequently crowded with people waiting to get inside. Thus, women arriving at these offices seeking a confidential ear instead find their stories and their private lives on public display—a visible and embarrassing ordeal that shames and discourages women when filing complaints, which can make them withhold certain details or deter them from approaching the investigators. Women are questioned about their complaint at the prosecutor’s office. In cases of violence, the prosecutor 167 Interview in April, 2013.
explains to the woman the scenarios that await her by taking action on the complaint. One male prosecutor explained: “A woman comes and wants me to imprison the husband [because he attacked and beat her]. I ask her, are you sure? If he goes to prison, you are going to be divorced, and if he is in prison, he cannot pay alimony. A lot of women say they want a divorce but do not want to imprison the husband, because the families don’t trust the women and would blame them for the divorce.”168 He added: “Sometimes a woman will file a complaint against her husband without her family’s knowledge. When she goes back home and tells them about it, they tell her that if she does not cancel her complaint, they will kill her; and so she does not continue the process. A lot of women, even after their investigation or complaint to the police, disappear and do not come to the court hearing.” The interviewees’ stories revealed that in such cases, the tribal men intervene in the formal legal process in order to bring the woman back to her husband’s home, even if they know that she will be beaten again. The women interviewees – victims/survivors, in conflict with the law, and young college students – all said that the tribal leaders work only for the men’s benefit, treating women as objects or properties while acquiring money for their counsel and activities. Sometimes the governor will also interfere in a case’s legal process and decide what steps to take to resolve the situation. More than half of interviewees in this study mentioned this circumstance. However, as noted above, in cases of sexual assault that have been brought to the formal legal system, tribal and informal institutions (including religious personnel) do not interrupt the legal process. Numerous cases of rape within the family and sexual assault, particularly against girls under age 15, do not ever enter the legal system because by law, the victim must be accompanied by an older family member or custodian in order to file a complaint. In such situations, the relative who is supposed to accompany her is in fact the perpetrator, and so many cases involving young girls go unreported. We urge that the issue of young girls be further studied, and young girls’ experience with the justice system be further investigated. In addition to the former challenges, it should be noted that prosecutors who conducted criminal investigations in Area C pointed out that the Israeli authorities were more cooperative in granting entry permits when the reason for traveling was to inspect a crime scene than in other sorts of cases, such as thief or life threatening. As one prosecutor said: The coordination with the Israelis is much faster in cases where women have already been killed than in cases involving threats on women’s lives. For example, in one case where a mother was killed in al-Ram by her husband in front of their three children, I was able to easily get to the crime scene and to conduct the investigation around it, and brought the husband to justice.169 This gives the disturbing impression that Israel is more willing to coordinate and issue permits for prosecutors when women are only dead bodies. It also suggests that, as one female prosecutor indicated, Israeli officials 168 Interview in March 2013. 169 Interview in March 2013 ,27. 38
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“enjoy” listening to stories about abused Palestinian women, mainly sexual abuse against young girls. Similar reflections were found in the questionnaires completed by the prosecutors, when 18 out of the 23 respondents stated that Israel expedites its issuing of permits in homicide and femicide cases; however, urgent permits to intervene when a crime is imminent take much longer to be granted. It is of grave concern that a threat to a person’s life matters less to the Israeli bureaucracy than if the victim has already died. In more than 20 interviews, women claimed that they faced inappropriate treatment from the prosecutor themselves. Nawal, a social worker, explained: Women are sometimes exposed to verbal violence by the prosecutors (…) They return to the safe home holding negative views of the prosecutor. I’m not distrusting all the prosecutors, but I’m asking that they develop a special unit that deals with family issues and women’s issues. Sometimes girls hold back a lot of important information that could be very helpful to their cases because of how they were questioned in the investigation.170 Nawal’s words shed light on an important issue regarding the information collected following women’s complaints. If women are concerned about being harassed and disrespected by prosecutors or in fact if they are actually being so harassed, they may hold back crucial information. An insensitive and untrustworthy investigator is a critical issue that cannot be overlooked when devising policy recommendations. In interviews, female prosecutors mentioned that the past year featured numerous trainings and discussions around gender-sensitive analyses and responses in the prosecutor’s offices. It must be noted that, during the writing of this report, one prosecutor called the authors and asked for help in finding a way to protect and support a woman who had been stabbed five times by one of her own family members. The prosecutor explained that she had called a women’s organization asking for assistance, but the response she received was not satisfying; they did not take into consideration the victim’s condition as an injured mother who was being supported by her in-laws while her attacker was in prison. The discussion with that prosecutor revealed the importance of acting in a swift and timely manner, because even the slightest delay can cost women and their families more harm or even their lives. Our research found that the prosecutors were conscious of the complexities of dealing with women’s accessibility to justice. They provided details about the patriarchal nature of their profession and its institutions, but they also stressed the fact that the geopolitical conditions, including the rival Palestinian political factions and security forces, added to the insensitivity of abuses inflicted upon women. All of these factors hinder prosecutors’ abilities to act in a fair and contextually sensitive manner when dealing with women’s access to justice.
The lawyers Women’s access to justice was also denied when they sought the help of lawyers. In more than 25 cases, the interviewees voiced blame against the lawyers for the 170 Interview on April 2013 ,17, with a director of a shelter.
manner in which they dealt with women. Some of the women said that they did not feel confident with the lawyers, because they felt that the lawyers were only concerned about how much money they could get from their clients, not the outcome of the case. One woman claimed: “The lawyers are working only for themselves, rather than for achieving women’s rights.”171 Besides, our focus groups with college students revealed the hardships facing women who solicit the help of lawyers. They explained that lawyers (both male and female) are not only expensive, but they abuse their power. Fatina, a first-year college student, explained: My mother needed to obtain her inheritance rights, and her only way was to go to one of the very famous lawyers. I can’t even start explaining to you how much he used my mother. Not only did he take her money and a large share of the land she inherited from her parents. He made her cook for his wife and bake for them twice a week. He was willing to discuss with her the case only if she met him in his house and helped his wife. I remember, as a child, the way they treated my mother, and how humiliating was it for us. But my father, who is a university graduate, was unable to find a job after being fired from his work in Israel, and my mother had no other choice but to abide by all the requirements the lawyer dictated to get her money and land. By the end of the case, my parents sold him part of the land, just to be able to support the family.172 Lawyers were severely criticized also by women victims/ survivors of abuse. They shared many stories of being ill-treated and humiliated. Areen explained: “The lawyer at the women’s center was very disrespectful to me. She delayed my case, refused to allow me to express my opinion when in the court, and behaved in a condescending manner with me.”173 Women interviewed for this study also shared that their lawyers were not always sensitive to their traumatic experiences or ethical. For example, five women we interviewed stated that lawyers do not always agree to be present when their clients are being heard in the prosecutor’s office, even though it is a woman’s right to have a lawyer present throughout the investigation hearing. A prosecutor said: “In most of the cases, we request that an attorney be present, but in urgent and dangerous situations, we hear the woman without a lawyer. The report is accepted and taken to court, and then a lawyer will be authorized to join the proceedings.”174 In addition, in one of the femicide cases, we learned from the various service providers who worked with the victim before she was murdered that “her death was a result of the relationship she had with the lawyer prior to being killed.” Similar statements were also made regarding another femicide case, where two sisters were murdered. Testimonies and interviews that mentioned fear, disappointment, financial, social, and sexual abuse of lawyers were also mixed with narratives that revealed the importance and major help of lawyers. In one case, a 171 Interview in March. 2013 172 Focus group meeting. 173 Focus group meeting. 174 Interview in March, 2013. 39
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college student explained: “It was the lawyer who helped us. She was the one who managed to get my mother her rights and forced my father to pay his alimony for my mother after he divorced her to marry a younger woman.” Hala, a female lawyer working in a local NGO, noted that female lawyers are not always taken seriously, which affects their ability to intervene effectively. Therefore, as Hala explained: “I make many compromises, and I know this is not right (...) but what is right when any direction we take might harm our client?” Hala shared the difficulties she encounters when she tries to defend women while needing to be attentive to detailed legal requirements such as getting the right forms, applying the proper request to move a woman offender to a different place, coordinating with the Israeli authorities, etc. Among our interviewees, both women and young college students explained the challenges they face when addressing lawyers. Female lawyers were portrayed in some instances as very professional and supportive; in others, as strict and unsympathetic. Male lawyers were sometimes portrayed as professional, serious but more often as inconsiderate, negligent, and abusive.
The family at home In 90% of the 56 cases we examined in our interviews, women’s families did not trust or support their daughters in taking legal action against their abusers, even when they knew that the women were victims/survivors of violence or sexual assault. My husband used to beat me with an electric cable. He didn’t take care of me even during the delivery of our child and he used to disappear to avoid paying the hospital bills. My brother-in-law used to have to pay for the hospital instead, and he told my family that I should get a divorce because my husband behaved so inhumanely, and that he would end up killing me one day. Once my husband beat me on my eye, and I couldn’t see for a week because it was swollen. My mother saw this and said she did not want him around anymore; but my brothers didn’t want me to leave him, because they believed that a woman shouldn’t be divorced but should suffer and be patient. Eventually, after the last problem, my brother decided to arrange a divorce for me from my husband without even consulting me; I felt like an animal without any idea. We went to the court, and I was divorced. My husband paid me 1,500 dinars, but my brother took the money and only gave small amounts to me each time I wanted to buy something, while he took a large share of it. After my divorce, I lived with my family for a year and a half, during which period I was exposed to all kinds of insults from my brothers and their wives. That’s besides the beatings they would give me for no reason. I hate my brothers, because they also used to beat me when I was a child. They accepted a marriage proposal on my behalf [against her will] from my second husband, who was 66 years old when I was 19. They wanted to get rid of me, and they agreed without asking me. They even told me that I should send my sons to live with their families; I sent them and I couldn’t see them for seven years. I got married and I continued to be beaten by my family and by my husband’s family. His big son used to beat me,
until he broke my hand, and once he beat me on the head and I ended up at the hospital. The hospital transferred me to a Social Affairs Unit, which took me to a Family Protection Unit. I filed a complaint against my husband’s sons, and they were arrested for 24 hours. When the police saw my situation, they transferred me to the safe home.175 Of all the cases explored for this study, there were only eight in which one or more family members supported the victim in her legal actions, such as the following: I was 14 when my uncle brought me to the West Bank from Gaza. A big problem happened in my parents’ home that led my uncle to call the police and the Social Affairs Unit. Coordination was done between the Israeli side and the police unit in Bethlehem. They made for me residency statement, I went to Erez in Gaza and the Social Affairs Unit took me because my father raped me. I was with my little brothers at home, my mother went out, I made a cup of tea for my father (...) he raped me (...) my older brother found out, beat my father, and called the police. My brother told my uncles, but they called me a whore and said that they wanted to kill me. But my brother and my mother’s brother prevented them and said that I was the victim. I then became pregnant from my father. They transferred me to the Qureish Institute in Bethlehem.176 We found in similar cases that women were saved from being killed when one or more male family members supported the female victims/survivors in the family. But as we also saw in the above case, not all the family members were willing to protect the 14-year-old abused girl; some chose rather to stand with the father. Such reactions were frequent in cases where the assault was perpetrated by a family member. This is particularly concerning when taking into account that nearly all the perpetrators in these assaults are close family members, as one shelter coordinator pointed out: “Ninety percent of the cases we deal with involving women threatened to be killed are committed by their brother or uncle.”177 In the focus groups with female college students, it was clear that families play a major role in helping, defending, blaming, attacking, abusing, or killing female victims/ survivors or women seeking to access the justice system. The students shared various stories of mothers who stood up against the victim’s brothers and fathers and also revealed numerous cases of uncles or aunts calling the police and demanding a family member’s arrest. Maysa, a 20-year-old college student, shared this striking story: I recall very vividly the discussions in our house, when my uncle used to abuse his wife, preventing her from visiting her family in Hebron. One day, following the death of his wife’s mother, my uncle hit his wife viciously because she was crying hysterically. He pulled her by her hair, threw her out onto the street, and she kept screaming, crying, and calling for her dead mother to come save her. She was screaming at her dead mother: ‘Why did you force me to marry him?!’ My uncle went crazy: he picked up a piece of wood from the street and started beating her 175 Interview on March, 2013. 176 Interview in February, 2013. 177 Interview in June, 2013. 40
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with all his strength, while his young kids ran screaming and crying, begging him to stop. At that point, my grandmother called the police, telling them to come. It took them a while to arrive, but when they came, my grandmother, who confronted my uncle, told the police to arrest him because ‘he hit the mother of his children.’ She later testified against him in court, and everyone in the family held great respect for my late grandmother. She was known as a fair woman, and she made us all strong, intelligent, and fair like her. Even my father, a man, kept on telling us this story.178 Maysa’s story reveals the pivotal importance of family support during episodes of abuse. However, most of the narratives we heard indicated that the opposite is more typical: families often abandon their women when they are most in need. One focus group participant summed up the situation in a way that reflected the heated discussions across all the focus groups: “The family is the number one obstacle for women to access justice.” Others explained: “Families are part of this society, and they see abuse everywhere. But they believe that if they separate themselves from social problems and exclude troublemakers from their lives—particularly if the troublemakers are women—they will have a better life.” Young women also explained that access to justice is denied when religious preachers speak against women’s rights to a dignified life, including their right to choose their husbands. They also explained that women’s access to justice is severely hindered in cases of sexual abuse; not because families fail or refuse to help, but because it is very stressful, embarrassing, and difficult for families to deal with sexual abuses. The college students recommended that the state and the community should build a strong support system for families facing such abuses, otherwise female victims/survivors will end up paying the price with their lives.
The courts The workers at the courts treat women with mockery and a sense of superiority, and this demeaning behavior imposes psychological effects on women when they approach the court.179 In this study, female victims/survivors and those in conflict with the law, female lawyers, social workers, human rights defenders, and men who deal with cases of VAW and personal status law all stressed the same point as the above quotation. They explained to us the hardships facing women when they reach the court, whether the civil or the Shari’a court. Some women and NGO workers said that women were more able to negotiate for their rights in the Shari’a courts; because men were usually able to solve their personal status matters outside the court (through divorce, for example), women would usually approach Shari’a courts. Our interviewees shared stories of women being mistreated or disrespected in the courtroom, including by judges, court personnel, and police officers. In contrast, when judges gave attention to female witnesses, or 178 Focus group meeting. 179 Focus group interview in June, 2013.
refused to tolerate any misbehavior by family members, lawyers, prosecutors, or police officers, the women’s conditions were improved and their confidence in the process was increased. The questionnaire responses and the documents analyzed also raised the importance of differentiating between the Shari’a courts and the civil courts. The Shari’a courts address cases of divorce, child custody, visitation, and payments for divorced women. The civil courts deal with cases of sexual assault, violence, and death threats. In the Shari’a courts, there are efforts by a committee to reconcile the abused and the abuser, even when the woman has been severely beaten. According to one of the social control representatives who worked in the Shari’a courts: The legal system does not and will never understand women’s rights, or the hardships and issues facing women… besides, the way lawyers look at women, the way they deal with them, the amount of money and expenses that are exhausting to women—all these factors make women feel as if they have failed to achieve their objectives.180 Another interviewee related: The judge always prefers to take the reconciliation direction without considering the nature of the case (...) the legal system is not developing (...) it is a pity that there is no law for girls who are daughters of single women, or girls without a father (...) if the mother is known, why can’t they just register her under her mother’s ID card? 181 Furthermore, not one woman interviewed said that she appreciated the court’s efforts for reconciliation. It is also important to mention that most of the legal sentences are not implemented, and often the requested compensation is never paid to the victim. According to the director of the Alimony Fund:182 “Ninety three percent of alimony verdicts are not implemented; only 7% are implemented. We have around 1,200 cases every year.”183 As a result, most of the women in the study said that they deeply regretted approaching and going through the legal system. They all agreed that, if they could go back in time, they would never have entered the legal system.184 One of the findings in the research is that the mentality of the judges at the Shari’a and civil courts and their discretional powers deeply affect women’s access to justice. Patriarchal decisions result in severe violations of women’s rights and lack of respect to due process, as one respondent explained: The individual judge’s mentality and discretion is the most decisive factor in the case, not the professional or the legal factors (...) there are degrees of empathy according the type of case. The most difficult cases are those of physically abused women (...) with which the laws do not help. Add to that the fact that the legal system does not help women in general, and abused women can be returned to face assault again and again.185 180 Interview in March, 2013. 181 Interview in April, 2013. 182 Sondook Al-Nafaqah 183 Interview in June, 2013. 184 We will expand on this theme later in the report. 185 Interview in June, 2013. 41
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Shelters There are only three women’s shelters in the West Bank: one in Bethlehem, one in Nablus, and one in Jericho. These shelters are meant to protect women in distress, women who are under the threat of being killed by their families or husbands, and women and girls from being raped or sexually assaulted. There are various ways to send women to the shelters, including self-referral, but most of the cases are referred by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) district offices, the FPU, and women’s organizations. Occasionally, women are referred also by governors or tribal leaders, or brought in by neighbors, or extended family members, or guardians. As a feminist activist explained: Shelters were newly established in the Palestinian area, and only in the last 10 years or so shelters started developing specialized services to address women’s needs when unprotected and in danger. The various shelters do not operate in the same manner, and there are no nationalized standards and regulations.186 Women respondents discussed the various shelters in different ways: Some shared stories of how the shelter addressed their needs and supported them; others expressed severe frustration and anger towards a shelter’s operations. Generally speaking, for women, being in a shelter is a very harsh and frustrating situation. It means being away from their family and their social milieu and facing societal and community suspicion, stigmatization, and ostracization. Women who had been in shelters shared their sense of insecurity and uncertainty regarding their future and their fate. Additionally, interviewees explained that shelters are not culturally acceptable; yet the shelters were the only sanctuary for women who were under threat and in imminent danger. A major result that emerged from our interviews of social control agents (such as lawyers, prosecutors, social workers) was that female respondents did not favor the use of shelters and feared sending victims/survivors/ to shelters. It is possible that even discussing shelters made the women interviewees very anxious because of the pronounced social stigma they carry. It could also be due to their wish to protect women victims/survivors/ from such ostracization or even their own professional experiences with shelters. As one prosecutor explained: “In some places, shelters are better than in others. In our area, we have Mehwar, and they are trying their best to attend to women’s needs, mainly in offering them economic empowerment and more.”187 Two abused women expressed frustration with these shelters, because they said there was nothing to do there except watch television, clean the rooms, and eat. The women felt that the stays at the shelters were boring, and there was nothing they could do to improve their life conditions. 186 Focus group meeting. 187 Focus group meeting.
I’m feeling depressed; I can’t believe that my son Majd died.188 I don’t talk to anybody. I am always in my room holding a picture of my son, crying and smiling at his clothes (...) I just sleep, eat, and clean my room. The safe home gave me a lawyer and security, and the officer…[is] helping me to prove the father’s paternity.189 Also: The only thing I do today is to eat, drink, and sleep. I want to leave this safe home, to work and get my money by myself. I want to raise my daughter (...) At the safe home, we don’t do anything except eat, sleep, and watch TV.190 An issue that emerged in various interviews with both women victims/survivors and social control agents is women’s freedom while in the shelter and later when she decides to leave the shelter. A feminist activist explained: During the stage of integration (once the woman in the shelter recovers from trauma, feels safe, and has received social and legal counseling, and is thinking of the future), a dilemma arises. From one side, we realize that we should respect women’s decision to leave the shelter and take care of her life and be free. From the other side, the social worker’s evaluation that detects vulnerabilities that might jeopardize the victim’s life once she is released from the shelter. I realize it is the woman’s choice to leave, and the shelter legally has no authority to held her, yet, it is true that when there is no support system and no protection in society, women will most likely be re-victimized.”191 Another interviewee stated: “If, for example, a woman files a complaint in the criminal court, the procedure is so lengthy that by the time she is ready to leave the shelter, she ends up legally unprotected, while her perpetrator is enjoying his freedom and left unpunished.“192 The fact that shelters hold some women for prolonged periods (about two or three women in each shelter)193 whose lives are not under immediate threat of death, rape, or other offenses creates further hardships and denies women access to a free life. According to some interviewees, keeping a large number of women in the shelter could help the institution continue to receive funding. As one lawyer said: “I know a woman who has been kept there for four years for no reason (...) the woman has begged the shelter to release her, as there would were no longer any threats on her life and no one will harm her (...) She wants to get out and begin her new life, to work and to be independent.”194 In several cases, we saw that when a woman entered a shelter, the custody of her child went to the father or to the “children’s house,” such as in the case of M.: I went to the court at the beginning of my divorce, the Shari’a court and the administrative court, then to a “family protection institute,” then to the Family Protection 188 Her son Majd died due to a severe illness he had since birth. He was taken from her immediately after his birth, because he was considered an “illegal” child – born out of wedlock. 189 Interview in February, 2013. 190 Interview in February, 2013. 191 Focus group meeting. 192 Focus group meeting. 193 This information is according to a lawyer at ICHR. 194 Interview on March 2013 ,27, in Ramallah. 42
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Unit of the police and the Social Affairs Unit. I finally won the divorce and the custody of my daughters, but they were taken from me when I entered the safe home.195 Such incidents discourage women from filing complaints against their husbands or other abusers for fear that they could lose custody of their children once they enter the legal system or the shelter. In other cases, the Shari’a courts, with the support of the shelter’s lawyers, social workers, and psychologists, came up with innovative sentences that allowed female victims/survivors of violence to gain financial rights and custody of their children, even in cases where they were not entitled to these rights by law. The Shari’a court supported such decisions with social reports that found that the children’s best interest is being with their mothers, given the father’s history of violence toward his family.
Prisons and centers for correction and rehabilitation for women Although we could not interview women being held in prison, we learned about their experiences at the Correction and Rehabilitation Centers (CRCs) from various lawyers, judges, prosecutors, NGOs, and women who were released from prison. According to our interviews, the CRCs can do a great deal of damage to women rather than rehabilitating them. We were also informed about the poor conditions in which women live, including poor nutrition, unsanitary bathrooms, and the denial of requests to fulfill basic needs, such as new clothing and underwear. The interviewees mentioned cases of women who spent more than three to four years in prison without ever being given an official sentence; some women even stayed for seven years. These cases occur due to the difficulties that the legal system faces in the complicated political environment, such as restricted movement within the West Bank, having to receive permits from Israeli authorities to enter Areas C, H1, and H2, and the overall dysfunctional nature of a system existing under occupation. According to a member of the prison management: We have 20 to 30 cases in four units, most of which are for murder and petty crimes. The women’s prisons are separate from the men’s. Some of the women are sentenced; others are not. For example, in Jericho prison, there are 12 prisoners, 10 of whom are sentenced, but two of whom still are not. The women’s prisons are located in Jericho, Jenin, and Ramallah (...) the difficulties that we are facing revolve around the pace of the legal proceedings: an arrested woman can remain in prison for four years without a sentence, as her innocence needs to be proven by witnesses, which greatly slows down the whole process.196 It was apparent from the data that lawyers had serious problems representing women in the court.
195 Interview in March, 2013. 196 Interview in April, 2013.
III. Main themes of analysis In this section, we will present the results of our analyses of the various paths and stages in the justice system elaborated in this report.
The law All of the interviewees—women, prosecutors, directors and workers at NGOs, and managers and workers at shelters— agreed that Palestinian laws regarding the rights of women were outdated and obsolete. As one lawyer stated: “The biggest difficulty we face in our work is the system of ancient laws that is still being implemented in women’s cases. We are even talking about the penal law, which permits beating as a form of discipline.”197 Another lawyer stated: “Fifty years have passed since the [establishment of the] Jordanian penal code of 1960, which is implemented in the West Bank, in addition the Jordanian personal status laws of 1976. These laws are not appropriate today.”198 Furthermore, according to one prosecutor: “The deficit is in the law; the law is still based on the old Jordanian penal code of 1960. Jordan has already changed this law, but here [in the West Bank] the law is still the same. The law lacks articles for new issues in society, such as articles forbidding sexual harassment (...) there is no law to protect girls and children from these acts.”199 The law also contains various stipulations that make violence easy to perpetrate without punishment, such as the fact that a person must file a complaint within three months of the incident, after which he or she does not have the legal right to do so. The biggest problem with this is that, if a woman was subjected to bodily abuse for many years and could not approach the police because she did not know the procedures or could not go for any another reason, then she would not be able to submit a complaint once the three-month limit has passed.200 Furthermore, according to Palestinian law, in order for a case to be prosecuted, the period of physical and bodily disability caused to the woman by violence perpetrated against her must be at least 10 days. The law makes it seem as if women’s lives must be at risk in order for them to receive proper legal attention and protection. In some cases, women, NGOs, and lawyers also faced difficulties in proving incidents of rape because of the different legal articles that could be manipulated against the victims/survivors. For example, if a girl or woman could not “prove” that she did not agree to a sexual relationship with a family member who raped her, then according to the law, she would be guilty of incest and charged for the same offence as the person who raped her.
There is a story that I like to tell, because it was a case from the central region of Palestine that lasted many years. A woman was married in the Gaza Strip, and she had two girls before the family split between Gaza and the West Bank. She was expelled from Gaza by her husband and his family, who took the couple’s 2 small children, aged 5 and 6. The woman came to the West Bank and filed a complaint for alimony and child custody at the same time that the split occurred. The executive authorities in Gaza did not accept the decision that was made in the West Bank, and so she went back to Gaza and litigated the case again. She won, but she could not take the children because the father would be unable to visit them if they went with the mother. Two different laws for one case, in one state. The age of child custody in Gaza, as based on Egyptian law, is different from the law in the West Bank. We are talking here about how the political split is affecting cases and their legal process. The slowing down of the legal process can affect the case, as happened with this woman: by the time she gained the right to take her children, the age of custody had passed. So she won the case, but it became irrelevant and unhelpful to her. I know that six organizations worked on that case, and political and national personalities also tried to help, but until today she is still in Qalqilya [West Bank] and her children inGaza.201
The stigma The woman is stigmatized from the first moment she enters the legal system.202 In all the interviews we conducted for our research, including the students’ focus groups, women expressed regret for their decision to approach the legal system. Some used the word “scandalous” to describe how they felt from the moment they entered the premises of the FPU or the police units. For example, these units are located around active hubs or prominent places in the communities, making the women who are seeking help very visible in the public realm. This prevents many women from attempting to approach or enter these institutions. “The difficulties and the obstacles for women are the social attitudes towards divorced women, which prevent them from living an easier life. There is a distorted reputation attached to women who attend the courts.”203
Fear and regret There is a fear among women to go to court, because they heard the experiences of other women. There is no secrecy or privacy in the courts or in the prosecutors’ offices.204
The Gaza Strip and the West Bank have two different legal systems, and women pay the price for that difference and for the spatial fragmentation imposed by Israeli occupation policies.
Women also expressed regret for approaching the legal system, because when they sought punishment for the abuser, such as the husband, and had him imprisoned or investigated, they lost their rights to have a ‘safe home’, alimony, and respect and help from society. If the man was not imprisoned, he would return home, marry another woman, and make life more difficult for
197 Interview in April, 2013. 198 Interview in June, 2013. 199 Interview in March, 2013. 200 This data is according to one prosecutor we interviewed in April, 2013.
201 Interview in May, 2013. 202 Coordinator of the “Alimony Fund.” 203 Focus group interview in June, 2013. 204 Focus group interview in June, 2013.
Between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
43
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the abused woman. Women mentioned that during the investigation process, they would always be informed by investigators about what they stood to lose by imprisoning their husbands. This led many women to compromise and cancel their complaints; but the husbands might still divorce them during the investigation period, and the women would be left to re-enter the world homeless and facing an unknown fate. A lot of women are afraid of their brothers when they want to file a complaint (…) there are a lot of women afraid of asking for divorce, wondering what will happen to them after the divorce, and what their status will be in society. Women who have been beaten by their husbands are afraid throughout every stage of the legal process. They never stop thinking about their fate: they are afraid of their family, afraid of losing their children, and afraid of society’s attitude.205 Women thus did not trust the legal system because they found it unproductive and damaging when they, a friend or a family member attended it. As one lawyer said: Part of the difficulties I face in my work is that many women fear being confrontational [with their family members] (...) they come and authorize me to start the legal process, but after two days, they cancel it because people interfere and pressure the women, especially in cases of violence, to abandon her rights. I know that the women’s situation is very difficult and they are afraid to ask for their rights to their inheritance…For example, I followed an inheritance case of a woman for four years who was expelled from her village by her brothers.206 When asked what they would do if they went back in time to the beginning of the process, all the women interviewed for this study said that they would not have entered the legal system. All of them said that they would rather stay in their homes and bear the torment from their abusers than go through the justice system. One woman, Sama’a, said: “If I went back in time, I would stay with my children, even if my husband killed me. I would rather die from him beating me than have to leave my children.”207 Another woman commented: If I went back in time, I would be more patient with my husband; more patient with his long stays away, more patient with his lack of responsibility. I shouldn’t have gotten a divorce; divorce is a catastrophe (...) the social attitude towards the divorced woman is a stain.208 The statements express the women’s feelings of insecurity, unfairness, and fear around a legal system that is supposed to make them feel safe, be treated fairly, and achieve a sense of justice.
The masculine mentality women face throughout the judicial process According to the various interviewees, chauvinistic behavior and patriarchal values permeate every stage of a woman’s journey through the judicial system. 205 Interview with a lawyer in May, 2013. 206 Interview in March, 2013. 207 Interview in March, 2013. 208 Interview in March, 2013. 44
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The Palestinian penal code: The law includes various articles that empower and privilege masculine and patriarchal attitudes and behaviors over women’s lives. The workers in the legal system: The women felt that the workers in the various legal institutes (lawyers, police men, prosecutors, secretaries etc.) were themselves very masculine and were not making sufficient efforts to help or protect them. This was clear in their discussions about the lawyers, for example: Most of the information I received was through the lawyer (…) but each time he told me it requires a long procedure in the court (…) the lawyer had the time to deal with the slow court, the case still stands in the same place, and I still haven’t received the expenses for my girls and I did not get a place to live.”209 The informal legal agents: The informal legal agents are tribal personalities and dignitaries, the family’s “wellrespected men,” religious figures and the governor; all of whom use their authority to empower men and weaken the status of women. “The tribal persons ruined all my ambitions,” said one woman. “Everything I ever did, they destroyed. They oppressed me when they took all my rights, including my daughter and my money, without leaving me anything.”210 We found that in various cases, especially those involving physical abuse from husbands, which led to divorce, child custody, and alimony, male dignitaries from both sides of the family tried to intervene and resolve the situation by convincing the woman to return to her home, to be tolerant and patient, and to endure the suffering for the good of her children. The women in these cases expressed negative opinions towards these dignitaries, who always took the man’s side without understanding the feelings and suffering of the women. In addition to the interventions of family dignitaries, we found that regional governors, whether they belonged to Fatah, Hamas, or the Popular Front, also interfered in family affairs, especially in cases of sexual assault: There were religious figures who came, and one of them was a member of the legislative council, he was a leader in Hamas…in the beginning he intervened and resolved my problems, but in the divorce case, because of the sensitivity between Fatah and Hamas, and my father is affiliated with Fatah, he was only involved from a distance. He told my father he should help his daughter and he would receive God’s blessings because of it. He was a great man, but he felt that he had to keep his distance because my father was opposed to his involvement (...) There was also my cousin, who was my sister’s husband and a member of Fatah. He told my brother that he should trust and support me because I was his sister.211 In such cases, women paid the price for the political fragmentation of the West Bank. We also found that the tribal personalities did not interfere in cases of sexual harassment and assault, but they did interfere in cases of bodily abuse. This indicates a scenario in which sexual 209 Interview in March, 2013. 210 Interview in February, 2013. 211 Interview in March, 2013.
issues are seen as the responsibility of the government, as if sovereignty over women’s and men’s bodies belongs to the state, not society.
Commuting of cases In 11 cases, we found that the sentence for the perpetrators’ crimes did not comply with those stipulated by law. This is because the legal system accepts social influence to achieve compromises, such as in cases where a father rapes his daughter or a brother kills his sister: One case that came to my attention was a case of incest, a rape committed by a father and brother against a 17-year-old girl as she left the safe home (...) the father and brother were imprisoned for one year, but I felt that there was no justice: how is it her fault to be taken out of the home? We reached a solution with her uncle and her mother’s brother to house her at the uncle’s home in a distant place (...) In the beginning, the mother didn’t believe the girl’s story and asked her to stop talking about it. After that, she was a witness in the court.212 One NGO worker commented: Sometimes the cases are commuted by the lawyers according to their interest. For example, a young man who sexually harassed three girls in his family [his nieces] has been in prison for a year (...) a plea bargain was made to give the girls money if they dropped their right to press charges, but I decided that there will be no place for bargaining. If one of the girls had reached the legal age for sexual relationships, the judge’s sympathy for the girl would be much lower.213 In cases where women are seeking a divorce, the husband can make threats against his wife’s life or the welfare of their children in order to force her to abandon her rights, thereby turning a case for divorce and child-support costs [Nafaqah] into a family dispute. But even if the woman does compromise, the law is supposed to provide a woman protection from her husband’s threats, which would in turn give her the confidence and security to refuse unjust compromises. In reality, however, this is not the case. The law is unjust and unfair (...) the legal committee always tries to divide the fault equally among both spouses; once they even said that it was the woman’s fault that she went to her parents’ home without asking her husband. Even though she was beaten and violated and her husband always told her to ‘go away,’ the judge considered it to be appropriate speech and behavior (...) the case is transformed from a rift and dispute to a case of deposition, so that the woman is forced to pay all the dues for receiving a divorce.214 Furthermore, according to a coordinator of one of the police’s FPUs: Very few cases are registered as rape and most of them are instead categorized as ‘sexual abuse.’ The number of rape cases in the legal system doesn’t exceed 10 (based on the data we collected when conducting the research), but the cases of sexual abuse and sexual assault are numerous.”215 212 Interview in April, 2013. 213 Focus group with NGO workers, June 2013. 214 Focus group interview with NGO workers, June, 2013. 215 Interview in April, 2013. 45
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This method of commuting offenses is a way of exploiting the deficiencies in the law in order to benefit the rapist. Turning the man’s serious crime into a case of sexual harassment absolves him of punishment, because there is no law in the Palestinian penal code that applies penalties for sexual harassment.
Personal relations There is a manipulative and masculine approach in dealing with women’s cases. I went to the police, to the hospital, and to the court (…) my husband had connections at the police station. They took his statement first, and left me sitting alone for four hours (…) The guard then came to write my statement, but he ended up deciding what my statement would say.216 In more than 8 cases out of the 56 studied, the legal process was expedited if one of the disputants had good connections with the police or authorities. For example, one woman was able to get a divorce from her husband because her brother worked in the security services. The case was completed in one month instead of several months or years as was the norm. In another case, the husband had a friend who was a policeman, and they were able to trick his wife into granting the husband child custody. Relations between authorities and perpetrators are very detrimental to women’s cases throughout their legal process, as A.Z. recalled: “The judge sympathized with my husband and his family because he was from the same extended family. He was against me in everything.”217 In another case, a woman’s family members had connections in the Palestinian Authority, which helped to influence the legal process: My brother holds a respected position in the Palestinian Authority. He could apply pressure and threats, so my husband divorced me quickly and I received child custody after three court hearings. I couldn’t take my rights such as my dowry or the house though; I went to live in my family’s home, and there the suffering began.218
Accessing the legal system if the abuser is the husband, not the father or brother In our research, we found that girls used marriage as an escape from their fathers’ or brothers’ physical abuse. After marriage, they became an object of further abuse by their husbands, after which they decided to access the legal system for help, especially after severe physical abuse. The issue here is that the perception of the fathers’ and brothers’ abuse as “normal” or “acceptable” prevents many young women and girls from approaching the legal system to protect themselves. Legal protection is seen by many Palestinian women as something that should not be considered when it comes to violence within the family. Furthermore, there is a Palestinian law that could be interpreted as permitting fathers to beat their children as a form of discipline or punishment. This theme is an example of the interconnectedness between patriarchal abuse in society and the legal patriarchal practices that Palestinian women face. 216 Interview in February, 2013. 217 Interview in February, 2013. 218 Interview in March, 2013.
Women’s lack of knowledge of regulations, laws, and legal protection In almost all the cases we studied, women did not know what their legal rights were. Information about their rights would usually come to them by chance from a lawyer, relative, or another woman who had been through the legal process. One NGO worker said: “There is a kind of knowledge-sharing dynamics among women in the court halls. You can see them helping each other by explaining various issues and explaining their rights to one another.”219 The lack of knowledge of legal details led women to sign papers without knowing or understanding their meaning or significance and to believe the erroneous or false statements made by others. Furthermore, in some cases, lack of legal knowledge caused women to pay a very high price, such as losing their right to custody. We noticed that the various centers and associations for legal protection and consultation provided these women with some knowledge of the legal system, such as which centers to go to or what type of legal aid to use if they are physically abused or sexually abused or harassed. However, these consultants did not help women in the later stages of her case, when she had to face rigid bureaucratic institutions filled with men holding patriarchal beliefs. Furthermore, almost all the interviewees mentioned the absence of lawyers during questioning and document signing this process. In this study, we found that women only became aware of their lack of knowledge when it was too late, after they had already passed through significant stages in the legal process. For example, one woman shared that her lack of understanding of the law “caused me not to differentiate between child custody and visitation”220 regarding her children’s welfare. “One obstacle for women in accessing justice is her lack of knowledge of her rights.”221 In the circumstances where there is lack of women’s legal awareness about their rights and procedures, the presence of lawyer during the process of interrogation becomes even more crucial.
Endless process and open-ended scenarios Most of the cases that we studied have not been concluded; there were still no final rulings. A divorce case or a case over child custody takes longer than a year. In most of the cases, women did not know what the fate of their case would be, and they had no idea what was going on or what should be done. They expected their lawyers to continue taking responsibility for their case, but most said that they did not trust the lawyers because they felt that they were misusing or abusing their power and the women’s situation for financial gain. Our main conclusion is that, regardless of whether the case involves physical abuse, cases of divorce and child custody are an extremely long and painful process for women, who are filled with uncertainty and despair throughout the legal proceedings because they do not understand their rights, the process, or if they can expect any positive outcome by accessing the courts. 219 Interview in Jerusalem, June 2013 ,27. 220 Interview in February, 2013. 221 Interview with social worker at a Social Affairs Unit in May, 2013. 46
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Financial delays An obstacle in accessing justice is the lack of financial support. The question is how a woman could take that step if the justice system costs money and needs financial cover. The families almost never support their daughters, and so they have no financial support.222 Through the women’s stories, we found that the financial issue is one of the main factors that delay the access to justice. Women have to track down their husbands in order to receive their alimony, and the payment of the alimony is decided by a court decision. Men could delay the woman’s attendance in court and ask for the help of a lawyer to get the expenses. These paths to justice and the legal services required cost women more money than they would receive from their husbands. Women have to pay a fee for submitting a complaint, and they have to pay for the witnesses they bring to the courts, including their transportation costs. Women have to pay even more money if they live in Area C and have to attend a court hearing, whether it is occasional visits or regular visits of at least once a month. In cases of physical injury, women also have to get an expensive medical report. If they cannot pay, women cannot receive the report and the whole legal process is impaired. “One of the challenges that women face today is the importance of the medical report in the legal process and the investigation process (...) the women’s inability to receive it is often because it can cost more than 90 [New Israeli] shekels.”223 According to one lawyer: Even if there are visible injuries, she needs the medical report from the Health Ministry. It is not free, and not all women have the ability to pay for the report that proves that she was exposed to violence. It costs between 50 to 150 shekels; for some women, this is a huge amount of money, especially women who are not financially independent.224 Women sometimes preferred to turn to a private lawyer because the lawyers that the court designated for them worked very slowly. As a result, the women had to pay more than they received from the alimony. As one woman said: I married my cousin when I was 16. I have four boys and one girl. With each problem that I had with my motherin-law, my husband used to beat me, even for ridiculous reasons. Once he beat me and I lost consciousness and my ability to hear. I filed a complaint to the police and requested expenses. For each sum I received, the lawyer would take some from it. I left my house and rented a home for 8 months. My husband began to threaten that he would take my daughter from me. I compromised because I wanted to keep my daughter with me, and because the court didn’t do anything to help me. Some people intervened and I compromised on everything; I went back home with his second wife because he promised to give me some money. I have diabetes, and the money he gives is not enough.225 222 According to the director of an NGO for women in the West Bank. 223 Interview in April, 2013. 224 Interview in June, 2013. 225 Interview in June, 2013.
Some women noted that when a woman goes to the Social Affairs department to ask for financial help, the aid ends up going to her husband. One interviewee recounted: I received a verdict for expenses, but the implementation was very slow and the amount of money was very little. The delay in implementing the court decision caused the woman to pay more than she received. [The time it takes to] evaluate the amount of money for the alimony and to implement it is itself an injustice to women.226 The research revealed that, because men have the money to pay for the legal procedures but women do not, men can manipulate the justice system to absolve them of serious consequences and instead impose punishments on the victimized women. The next story demonstrates this: There was a case of two sisters who were sexually assaulted by their father several times (…) The case was exposed through the pregnancy of one of the girls, who was not aware of what was happening because she suffers from mental handicap. She didn’t understand the meaning of pregnancy or her menstrual cycle. It was only when she had the labor pains that the family knew, and she was taken by the Social Affairs Unit with the baby. The girl suffered from shock and lost her ability to talk, and yet she was arrested for incest even though they knew she suffers from mental handicap. Even the other sister was mentally handicapped ; they have never been to school. They were arrested longer than the father because he had money for a lawyer but the girls did not. We transferred them to a women’s center. One of the girls suffered from liver inflammation because she wasn’t exposed to the sun when she was in prison, and that is aside from the fact that she was not given appropriate medical treatment. I’m talking about the period in 2006 when there was security chaos and the government offices were destroyed. They were in prison for two – and-a-half years. We tried to reach a deal with the justice system for the girls to be released and transferred to a safe home (...) they spent a period of time there, but the medical condition of one of them became worse and they went back to their family.227 In this story alone, we can see the various factors preventing women from receiving legal protection and justice: financial issues, the chauvinism of the father, the daughters’ lack of knowledge, the prejudice of the law, the commuting of the case, and the punishment of the victims/survivors instead of the perpetrators.
226 Interview in June, 2013 227 Interview with a lawyer in May, 2013. 47
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Discussion and Conclusions The current justice system is insufficient in addressing women’s and girls’ access to justice in occupied West Bank. A counter system should be developed to prevent further rights violations. For Palestinian women, access to justice cannot be achieved by locking up a few abusers or even by strengthening the official criminal or informal justice system. Ensuring adequate access to justice requires addressing the effect of settler military occupation on individuals and communities in the territory. The voices shared and lessons learned in this study indicate that ensuring proper access to justice for Palestinian women and girls requires political organization that centers on women’s perceptions of, and experiences with, justice in the context of the occupied West Bank. Such a solution focuses on challenging and transforming society as a whole in order to reject and condemn violation of women’s and girls’ rights. As a result, society provides alternative and efficient solutions for women and girls who are victims/survivors of violence, or who are attempting to use the justice system to exercise their rights. The problem of dealing with access to justice and violence against women (VAW) in the context of military occupation and a protracted political conflict is that access to justice and VAW is not simply a tool of male and patriarchal control, but it is also a tool of political dispossession, economic oppression, discrimination and occupation. The condition of Palestinian statelessness in which VAW is situated must be recognized as one of the primary causes of endemic violence. It is only in linking VAW with the political context that we can strategize and design antiviolence policies and movements. Strategizing on ways to open women’s access to justice cannot be separated from the hegemonic power imposed by the Occupying Power, the violence between the occupied and the occupier, and the internal violence that arises among the occupied themselves. Strategies for women’s access to justice must therefore be linked to all Palestinians’ access to justice, including their fundamental rights to security, a safe home, education, economic independence, freedom of movement, and more. Furthermore, the legal and criminal justice systems exist within the social context and under the gaze of Palestinian society. As a result, women who approach these institutions, especially the police and the FPUs, are highly visible in their communities, and this affects their social status and transforms social attitudes towards them. This stigma and labeling of women prevents many from seeking help from the formal and informal systems and leads them to feel that they cannot trust or rely on the formal or informal laws or on the justice system as a whole. As an initial starting point, we recommend making the police stations, the FPUs, the courts and judges, and the prosecutors’ offices less visible to the wider public by locating them in areas removed from the main hubs of 48
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towns and villages, in order to protect women socially before helping them legally. We further believe that the criminal justice system’s personnel should: 1) Be better trained and become sensitive and attentive to address women’s and girls’ rights to access justice; 2) Preserve utmost confidentiality in cases involving female victims/ survivors and women in conflict with the law because of the potential social consequences for those involved; and 3) Establish a mechanism of punishment for members of the criminal justice system who violate clients’ confidentiality and/or who re-victimize women victims/ survivors of violence seeking access to justice. It is impossible to allow a so-called justice system to continue while its members are not trusted by their clients, not working according to the most basic professional and ethical rules, and not observing fair trial standards and due process rights. The results of this study show clearly that in many cases, anti-violence messages, trainings, and activism in the West Bank strengthened the technical work and technical functioning of the justice system. We realize the importance of procedural justice and technical expertise, but this alone is not sufficient to ensure that women’s rights to access justice are protected. Interviewees commonly described some of the NGOs that have recently been established in the West Bank, including hotline centers and human and women’s rights organizations, as primarily preoccupied with presenting papers to ministries and international experts who are neither acquainted with the local dynamics nor directly impact them. In this study, by contrast, focus groups with young women and the analyses of prosecutors’ statements revealed stories of NGOs, lawyers, social workers, and government employees failing to address women’s urgent needs and concerns, while instead focusing on technical details such as collecting certain types of evidence, finding the suitable legal code, or reaching the proper police officer or political leader. Interviews with service providers validated these young women’s perceptions and prosecutors’ statements and revealed that service providers and NGOs are predominantly focused on building “good connections” with the police, the prosecutor, the district attorney’s office, governors, and other actors involved in the justice system. Moreover, while the anti-violence messages and trainings organized by various Palestinian NGOs did help open a public discussion on women’s access to justice, they simultaneously and paradoxically strengthened Israeli control over Palestinians’ movement and accessibility to legal, health, and social services. This is because every time a call was made to the Israelis to approve someone’s access to and within Area C in a VAW case, the need to justify the request and the time and energy it required weakened Palestinians’ capacities, exposed them to Israel’s security questioning, disclosed women’s conditions to untrustworthy sources and, as more than half of the social control agents whom we interviewed explained, deeply diminished the efficiency of the already dysfunctional criminal justice system. It also empowered the internal Palestinian patriarchal system that favored using informal social control agents, who are mainly males, and using the masculine tribal system; and, in
turn, promoted Palestinian male power over women. The study revealed that the various mechanisms available to women to gain access to justice in fact serve the interests of an occupying, politically male-oriented system that allows only a few steps to be taken, but many others to be omitted. This process also strengthens the internal male-oriented justice system, because access to justice was conducted based on pre-existing socio-legal models that do not take into consideration the context, needs, and aspirations of Palestinian women in today’s world. The information shared in this report suggests that the endless hours of trainings and strategies used by police, prosecutors, and judges only end up empowering the status quo and those in power within that system — not the women whom the system is meant to serve. Conclusions related to the specific data gathered about Areas C and H2 revealed that these areas are where the most egregious injustices and violations of the women’s rights of women and girls occur, and where abuses and mistreatment of women and girls are the most widespread. Our findings indicate that the main obstacles women and girls in Areas C and H2 face when they attempt to access justice are: 1. No Man’s Land: Generally speaking, Areas C and H2 do not fall under anyone’s authority and do not ‘belong’ to anyone. Women and girls are thus seeking justice in what can be described as a “No Man’s Land.” 2. Structural insecurity for women: Neither the PA, the Israeli police, nor the criminal justice system in these areas, is capable of securing women’s bodily safety and rights. This condition keeps women at the mercy of internal and informal systems of social control, such as the tribal, religious, or other communal systems. 3. Inaccessibility of response units: Even the FPUs, which must act swiftly to respond to emergencies, face serious hardships in reaching Areas C and H2. 4. Non-enforced court decisions: The system is so broken in Area C that even a court order does not guarantee that it will be enforced. 5. Fragmented families: Palestinian women from the area who appealed and requested family reunification with family members who carried a different kind of ID (Israeli or Palestinian) failed to unite with their families. The fragmentation of nuclear families has affected women disproportionately, furthering their dispossession. 6. Impunity for those who carry Israeli IDs: Abused women and girls from Area C were ill-treated: first, because they reside in Area C – a No Man’s land; second, because interventions would only be made against an abuser from the West Bank, not against one carrying an Israeli ID. Abusers who carry Israeli IDs are almost always benefiting from impunity. And in the case of perpetrators from the West Bank, only few of 49
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them are arrested and brought to trial.. 7. New forms of criminality: Area C has enabled new kinds of male abuse of women and girls, including sex trafficking, drugs, arms dealing. 8. Settler’s violence: Settler attacks, including “price tag” attacks of cutting and burning trees, throwing stones at homes and people, scare tactics, and others have created another level of obstacles in women’s and girl’s faith that they are able to access justice. 9. Land confiscations and home demolitions: The terror of living under constant threat of displacement has worsened the insecurity of women and girls and pushed many women to stay put within familiar social groups, even if they are abusive. Thus, concerns related to the loss of land and residential shelters have restricted women’s opportunity to move freely, as well as their perception that they can actually/appropriately access justice. 10. Complex military structures: Living under constant uncertainty in a highly militarized area where women have minimal or no security has eroded the community’s basic ability to support its own. This has also decreased the ability of the courts and the police to respond to women in a free manner. Several key observations can be made from these findings. First, the failure of the justice system to assist and help young women at an early age is resulting in their ongoing victimization and/or delinquency and drift. This failure has led some young girls and even women to seek out alternative sources of help, such as using Information Computer Technology (ICT). This use or misuse of ICT, such as Facebook, text messages, and phones to connect with friends, call for help, look for relationships, and search for ways out of oppression and domination was found to be helpful in some cases, but devastating and very risky in others. Therefore, we highly recommend a focus on the youngest girls (those using technology, ages 10-18) to help them navigate their way out of the challenges they face when living in a spatially restricted community under military occupation while going through their own developmental stages and the socio-economic and political hardships facing their communities. Empowering girls and working with them at an early age, as young respondents explained, is one of the most important preventive measures. This work should go hand in hand with educational work with their parents and schools. The study shows that when teachers and parents were understanding and supportive, they served as a psychosocial buffer to girls in distress. This calls for serious attention to preventive measures. Second, women cannot have effective access to justice when the criminal justice system focuses mainly on heavy police involvement, harsher prison sentences, evidence gathering, while failing to take into consideration the effect of such interventions and policies on women’s lives. All these strategies enlarge the prison-industrial complex, which is already a highly complex system. The
political circumstances in the West Bank do not allow for effective national Palestinian management of the criminal justice system, and almost all its agencies are dependent on political and geopolitical interests and restrictions, external funders/ agendas and preferences, and the approval (direct or indirect) of the Israeli Civil Administration. Rather, we recommend working with the PA’s system workers, its ministries’ officers, and Palestinian civil society members to be aware of their interventions when addressing women’s and girls’ access to justice. Training PA officials on a women-centered and gender sensitive approach to the administration of justice can enhance their understanding and attentiveness to girls’ and women’s needs and prevent officials from further violating (by omission or commission) these victims/survivors’ rights to safety and justice. Third, the NGO sector’s treatment of women facing abuse as “clients” looking for services, rather than as partners in ending violence and advocating social change, is another hurdle that needs to be overcome in ensuring women to have access to justice. Our interviews revealed that representatives of NGOs see women as “ignorant others” instead of as knowledgeable actors who should be consulted in the same way as women consult with legal practitioners and psychosocial workers. We recommend that NGOs engage with women and girls, not as “clients,” but rather as partners. Fourth, the use of strict anti-crime agendas among criminal justice and legal representatives, including the reliance on legal jargon, legal tools, bureaucratic procedures, and legislation while turning a blind eye to each victim’s socioeconomic and geopolitical context turns access to justice into an overly technical process. These technicalities prevent many abused women we interviewed from asking for help. Furthermore, the technicalities and bureaucratic process created apprehension between victims/survivors and service providers and prevented them from filing complains at a sufficiently early stage. Many women victims/survivors dropped their charges, and some even found themselves in prison accused of misleading the criminal justice system or engaging in “illegal activity.” In many cases, public prosecutors see the social context and take it into consideration, but they decide on behalf of women what their best interest will be. At the center of their decisions is the family unit, but not necessarily the female victim’s interests or her safety. We recommend that criminal justice personnel focus on women and girls’ right to access justice, to safety, and security; while negotiating legal jargons and legal tools, using them when possible, and challenging them when abiding by legal procedures could harm women and girls. It would be a great step to allocate a yearly prize to criminal justice personnel who protected girls’ and women’s rights. Starting the process by gathering success stories might be a good educational message to law enforcement agents. Scholars who study VAW among native communities around the world pointed out that criminalization of violence and abuse against women has not led to a decrease in VAW or to improved access to justice for women. We raised the same question of whether 50
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criminalization of VAW might help Palestinian society to promote women’s access to justice. The study’s results do not offer simple answers or solutions, but rather suggest various paths to improving the situation, including alternative models of intervention suggested by Palestinian women. These models include making committed efforts to engage with and help women at an early stage and searching for internal communityoriented interventions that prevent the labeling of women as “victims/survivors” or “perpetrators”. Labeling women results in women’s exclusion from accessing justice. An additional model suggested by young and college-aged women interviewees in this study was to organize women in the family, community, and grassroots organizations politically to collectively conceptualize and advocate for innovative approaches for women’s access to justice. To this end, interviewees suggested to include health and mental health professionals, socio-legal professionals, and even engineers and geographers in this collective organizational effort. The analysis revealed that in Palestine, to address women’s access to justice, there must be political organization of women that can take into consideration the fractured geography of the West Bank (due to spatial restrictions such as check points, the Barrier, and Areas C, H1, and H2). Health professionals also need to be trained to communicate the societal effects of VAW and of impeding women’s access to justice, including the impact on the family’s and society’s welfare and psychosocial conditions, with all that imply for human development. When UNDP identified the six stages of access to justice, the first stage they recognized was legal protection, which is the provision of legal standing in formal or traditional law. Legal protection constitutes the legal foundation for all other stages in the process. All women interviewed in this study expressed their feelings of being completely unprotected. The other interviewees, including the legal system workers and the NGO workers, also agreed that Palestinian women are not protected by the law or by society. If this situation is ever to be changed, the first step that must be taken is to change the manner in which the law is implemented, and the very substance of the law itself. The Palestinian legal system in its current unfair form, especially with regards to several legal provisions related to violence against women, excludes Palestinian women’s voices and turns them into subjects of control by male authorities who have the power to decide whether they deserve to live or to die. The structure in which the law functions—the military occupation—and the highly oppressive system in which the law must adapt and navigate, makes justice inaccessible to women. The way the law addresses women’s safety and security is very lenient on perpetrators, particularly fathers, brothers, and husbands who kill, beat, or rape their daughters, sisters, or wives. Securing women’s access to justice requires broader analysis as to how each factor—be it the criminal justice system, the law (including family law), government regulations, or bureaucracies—could work hand in hand to safeguard women’s rights. The failure to map the means through which all these components play out in the process is greatly jeopardizing women’s collective well-being, and thereby, the well-being of the
next generation of Palestinians, whether male or female. UNDP’s second stage is legal awareness. This study showed how little women, social control agents, and law enforcement personnel (police, FPU, lawyers, judges, and informal social control agents) knew about girls’ and women’s legal rights and the legal processes they were attempting to navigate. This lack of knowledge is partly a result of the ever-changing regulations, the inability to apply the law and lack of due process, and the absence of efforts by lawyers and NGO workers to educate and raise public awareness about these issues, especially through the educational system. Those women who were aware or partially aware of their rights usually had a relative who was a lawyer or who was able to research legal information to assist them. In very few cases did we find a lawyer in the court or in an NGO who made an effort to provide women with detailed explanations on the applicable legal framework or legal proceedings. We recommend constructing public information campaigns that inform the public not only about women’s and girl’s rights, but also on the complexity and problems embedded in the system itself. Such awareness can help women victims/survivors become better equipped to advocate for themselves and keep them also at the center of any intervention, despite the complex geopolitical and socio-legal context. The study’s findings revealed that Palestinian girls’ and women’s access to justice must be spearheaded by women’s own initiatives to counter violence within the family, community, and political levels. (For a model of how this might be done, see, for example, the Nairobi Declaration in Appendix D.) Geopolitical/military restrictions were found to be a major obstacle preventing women from accessing courts. Suggesting new pathways for Palestinian women in the West Bank to access justice and addressing VAW must take into consideration Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land and life, and the historic and systemic violence perpetrated against women and dispossession of their communities. Women’s access to justice must therefore offer new modes and strategies for transforming society and the political environment in which they live. In this study, we have argued that Palestinian women in the occupied West Bank have fallen between the cracks of militarized patriarchal control and internal indigenous patriarchy. They suffer from the dysfunctioning of civil rights and retributive legal reforms and claims that denounce violence against women, an unstable semi-state justice system that intends and claims to criminalize and imprison victims/survivors rather than the perpetrators; inadequate legal texts and bureaucracies that discriminate against female victims/survivors and those who are in conflict with the law; a restorative justice system that seeks to slow the criminalization of male perpetrators; and a very complicated and uncertain politico-legal system that imposes spatial and political restrictions on Palestinians seeking to access the justice system. The spiral effect of the violation of women’s accessibility (or rather, their inaccessibility) to justice indicates that the justice system that operates in the studied area is, in fact, closed to women. From our analysis, the strategies used 51
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by local prosecutors, social workers, lawyers, and women activists appear to be driven by a desire to adhere to abstract bureaucratic procedures and legal technicalities imported from other places where military occupation does not exist, rather than embedded in the condition of occupation and appreciative of the intersection of military occupation, violations of the most basic rights such as the right to freedom of movement and education, mundane oppression and demonization, patriarchy, poverty, and women’s own violence. The examination of modes of sentencing and the practice of law reveals a societal failure to recognize and address the extent to which Palestinian women’s lives are highly endangered within their own communities. Our study suggests that the logic and politics of inaccessibility to justice continue to structure Israel’s power over Palestinians and reproduce patriarchy both within and upon Palestinian society. We further believe that one needs to engage with a more complex understanding of Palestinian women’s access to justice; as individual women living in a complex context, which includes the community and the quasi-state (i.e., the Palestinian Authority). We believe and recommend that feminist policymakers and activists should reconsider laws, bureaucracies, and other related intervention strategies and look at the limits of the law.228,229,230 This was apparent in the reactions obtained by the persons interviewed in the present study to the innovative sentencing by the Shari’a court, and their impression that if the law restricts the court, the court can look for modes of supporting women while keeping women’s safety at the center of their work. If the criminalization and victimization of women is erased from political debates, and if interventions are made without historical understanding or contextualization, then women will continue to be denied access to justice. Therefore, applying an analytical framework understood within the context of the occupation to examine women’s access to justice as a gendered, structural condition of violence could help combat the systematic violations of women’s rights.231 Entrapping women in an apartheid state to face the consequences of destruction resulting from the occupation and from patriarchy, as the results of this study pointed out, keeps justice out of the women’s grasp—or, as the title of this report suggests, keeps women in a state of “access denied.” As to proposing concrete actions for stakeholders, we strongly recommend the following: 1. Young girls’ vulnerability should be part of any gender-sensitive training about girls’ and women’s access to justice. Their young age requires that women NGOs urgently develop mechanisms to give them administrative, legal and psychological support as soon as possible. 228 Smart, C. (1989). Feminism and the power of law. London: Routledge. 229 Snider, L. (1994). Feminism, punishment, and the potential of empowerment. Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 104-75 ,9. 230 Snider, L. (1998). Understanding the second great confinement. Queen’s Quarterly, 46-29 ,)1(105. 231 See also Balfour, G. (2008). Falling between the cracks of distributive and restorative justice: The victimization and punishment of Aboriginal women. Feminist Criminology, 120-101 ,)2(3.
2. The various institutes of the Palestinian Authority should develop administrative, legal, social, economic, and psychological specialized services for women seeking to have access to the justice system. 3. Directors of the various Palestinian social and formal systems should promote multi-agency cooperation with them in order to adequately respond to women’s and girls’ needs. 4. The chain of justice should be routinely examined as a whole to ensure that women who are trying to access justice do not at any stage face barriers or intimidation or punitive consequences from any side for attempting to access justice. That would be practiced by identifying and choosing cases and examine the process these women followed in their search for access to justice. 5. Social control agents, be they official or nonofficial, should also take into consideration the various vulnerable individuals involved in the studied cases. The study reveals that in some cases, women who needed physical protection received it, but their children’s safety, including from sexual abuse, was left unaddressed. The protection of one woman should never be secured at the expense of other VAW cases. A holistic case-management approach has to be applied. 6. Case management by workers and officers working on a given case, could support women’s and girls’ access to justice, including by promoting the development of a Victim Impact Statement (VIS) to be used in the court. 7. Professional reporting to the court by social workers and psychologists, (social and psychological examinations) about women’s situation in shelters, prisons and in other places should become a standardized practice aiming to enable women’s access to justice. 8. A woman’s initial call for assistance in a VAW case should involve immense efforts from the part of stakeholders, to enable a smoother and more secure access to justice for women and girls. Follow-up inquiries into new cases should be common practice among stakeholders involved. 9. In femicide cases, including for women who are under the active threat of being killed, the following measures should systematically be taken: a. Conduct a holistic case analysis by formal and informal systems’ agents including professionals and activists, to protect women’s lives and maintain their safety in their own community to the extent possible. b. Hold perpetrators accountable to the full extent of the law. Certainty of punishment might deter future violations of women and girl’s access to justice. This step begins by conducting changes in several unfair laws. 52
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These changes are within the responsibility of the judicial system agents. (See, for example, the Nairobi Declaration in Appendix D. c. Prevent situations where legal proceedings in VAW cases become lengthy. Women and girls should not be imprisoned without a detention order or held in shelters against their consent for prolonged periods. This is the PA’s responsibility, and the persons in charge should be held accountable and sanctioned when such cases occur. 10. Health professionals, police officers, educators, community activists, and family members, should be trained to increase awareness of the intricacy of accessibility to justice in the geopolitical context of the West Bank. Such awareness should stress the importance of rejecting stereotypical beliefs about women and girls, and preserving their best interest first. Training should be conducted by feminists and human rights activists that hold women victims/survivors at the center of their work and intervention. 11. Social workers and other social control representatives should activate communityoriented potential resources to allow abused women and girls to remain in their communities and instead remove the abusers – keeping them away from victims/survivors. 12. The Shari’a court’s positive and gender-sensitive efforts to promote women’s and girls’ access to justice should be supported by the state institutions and criminal justice system. 13. A gender-sensitive monitoring system, including participatory observations inside the civil court system and the District Attorney’s office, should be set up. This should be followed up by gender-sensitive training for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. In this regard, we recommend strengthening the experience of the Observatory on VAW, established within the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR). 14. It appears necessary to introduce rules and procedures enabling individuals to file a complaint and ask for compensation against any state official (Governors, police personnel, FPUs, prosecutors, social workers, lawyers or any NGO representative) who hindered their ability to access justice, or caused them any harm and abuse. Such rules might decrease the rampant abuse of political connections to abuse power in many cases, but especially in cases of domestic abuse. 15. The PA should set up an oversight function to monitor interventions by tribal and other informal religious and community parties to ensure that their interventions are in alignment with facilitating, instead of preventing, women’s access to justice. Interventions that jeopardize
women’s access to justice should be prohibited. 16. Lawyers should be trained by professionals, to raise their awareness on gender-related issues, especially on women’s rights, international human rights standards and due process 17. Civil society organizations, as well as formal officials, must be aware of the role that ICT (Information and Communication Technology) plays in promoting, hindering, and/or interfering with women’s and girls’ access to justice, and in even furthering crimes against women and girls. We therefore suggest that additional training should be given to these stakeholders on the matter.
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Policy Recommendations
“honor” remain the highest priority; we believe that this can help improve Palestinian women’s and girls’ access to justice in the occupied West Bank.
This study highlights five main analytical and policyoriented models for understanding and improving Palestinian women’s access to justice within the West Bank. These models are detailed below. These five models are interrelated, and all of them situate women and girls at the center of the analysis, intervention, and legislation.
The best interest of women and girls when approaching the justice system that functions in the West Bank context, is to operate simultaneously in one or more of the following models as follows:
A. Female-centric approach Placing females at the center of analysis, intervention, and legislation has three major implications. ·
·
·
First, helpers and other social control agents must remain cognizant that Palestinian female victims/survivors are trapped in a cycle of geopolitical and bio-political violence that is enmeshed with an extremely complex and dysfunctional socio-political context in the West Bank. Such violence has fragmented families and communities and weakened the social fabric of support that would normally exist. Any attempt to intervene in this situation must be informed first and foremost by such awareness. Second, social control agents such as officials, legal personnel, professionals of the criminal justice system, and welfare/hotline and NGO affiliates should turn to women (including young girls) as the main sources of knowledge regarding the meaning and experience of seeking access to justice. We suggest that female victims/survivors, potential victims/survivors be consulted when analyzing the justice system. Decision makers should first learn from women’s experiences and stories and then base the formulation of new regulations on these voices. They need to develop gender sensitive regulations that contain information obtained from women survivors who have undergone the meanders of the justice system. Judges, prosecutors and police officers should then be trained on how to apply these regulations when dealing with sexual assault cases. Third, our findings indicate that women victims/survivors who know the applicable legal framework, their rights and their options, despite all the obstacles they have faced in their search for justice, manage to avoid or circumvent the cycle of legal and patriarchal oppression in the justice system. We recommend that NGOs and women’s associations produce a manual for women and girls which can assist them during legal proceedings. These NGOs and associations should also be made aware that they will be held accountable for negligence, inaction, or abuse of power.
Keeping women victims/survivors at the center of every intervention and making sure that their physical and psychological safety as well as their socio-economic security are safeguarded, and not the “family’s unity” and 54
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B. Community-based model The community, as we define it, includes three main societal segments: ·
Workers in the formal criminal justice system (including workers at family courts—Shari’a and church courts, the forensic medicine system workers)
·
The victim’s social circles, including family members, schools educators and administrators, and health system professionals
·
Relevant NGOs, including women and feminist NGOs, in the West Bank.
This model requires all these segments to cooperate for the benefit of women’s access to justice. NGOs and formal institutes should recognize the interconnectedness of the formal and informal legal systems that operate in the West Bank, and should therefore be adaptable and aware of protecting women’s rights according to the circumstances of each case.
C. The Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel model This model views the Palestinian Authority as primarily responsible for raising the problem of women’s access to justice, including VAW, as one of its top social and political priorities. The PA should also be held accountable in cases of abuse and misconduct within the justice system. The PA should confront the ways in which women’s access to justice is denied by Israeli security policies and Israel’s militaristic system of control. Within this model, the PA should seek international intervention in cases where the PA’s accessibility is prevented by Israeli restrictions, such as in Areas C, H1, and H2. This intervention can be part of the next international and UN Women model.
D. International and UN Women model This model requires that the UN and other international organizations look for ways to challenge the denial of Palestinian women’s access to justice in the occupied West Bank. This model should address questions of how international intervention could be useful in this context, what further strategies can be applied, and how UN agencies can contribute. International interventions, whether by the UN as a whole or by UN Women, should always be focused on girls’ and women’s rights in the unique context of the occupied Palestinian territory. Clearly, the UN should prioritize areas such as C and H1 where spatial restrictions and conflicting paths to justice make justice the least accessible to Palestinian women
who live there.
D. The multi-systems model This model envisions cooperation between Palestinian local formal and informal systems and international organizations such as UN Women. For example, UN Women can provide advice based on this and other studies, and the PA should in turn examine and integrate those recommendations and generate new discourses on the treatment of women who attempt to access the Palestinian justice system in the West Bank. These changes should include the: ·
Palestinian legal system
·
Structures and agents of the formal system
·
Treatment of women when they approach the FPU
·
Services provided by the police
·
Services rendered by forensics
This process should take into consideration the important role of the informal system in certain types of cases, and should not deny its benefits for those who wish to use it. The cooperative work of these different systems will help facilitate these changes and help counter the patriarchal system that discriminates against women. This can be further assisted by workshops and meetings organized by external organizations such as UN Women.
E. Research model The present study has exposed the urgent need to conduct further research on the issue of Palestinian women’s access to justice. The role and responsibilities of all stakeholders involved in the justice system should be examined more in-depth in order to analyze the quality of services they are currently providing and to determine how they could be improved. We hope that the research methodology outlined and used in this study will help inspire other similar studies, which, in turn, will help improve Palestinian women’s access to justice in the occupied West Bank.
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Appendix A: Laws According to the Jordanian Penal Code no.16, year 1960, applicable in the West Bank. Article 292: Rape 1. Any person who has forced sexual intercourse with a female, other than his wife, shall be sentenced to at least five (5) years of temporary hard labour. 2. The sentence shall not be less than seven (7) years if the victim is less than fifteen (15) years of age. Article 293: Rape of a Vulnerable Female
sentenced to temporary hard labour. 2. The sentence shall not be less than five (5) years if the victim, whether a boy or a girl, is less than twelve (12) years of age. Article 299: Attacking the Honour of a Person between Fifteen (15) and Eighteen (18) Years of Age Any person mentioned in Article 295 above who attacks the honour of another person, whether a male or a female, who has reached fifteen (15) years of age but is less than eighteen (18) years of age, or forces the latter to commit such an act, shall be sentenced to temporary hard labour.
Any person who has forced sexual intercourse with a female, other than his wife, who cannot defend herself due to a physical disability, a cognitive impairment, or as a result of any form of deception, shall be sentenced to temporary hard labour.
Article 300: Aggravating Circumstances
Article 294: Sexual Intercourse with a Female under Fifteen (15) or Twelve (12) Years of Age
Article 301: Aggravating Circumstances
1. Any person who has sexual intercourse with a female that is under fifteen (15) years of age shall be sentenced to temporary hard labour. 2. The sentence shall not be less than five (5) years if the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age. Article 295: Sexual Intercourse with a Female between Fifteen (15) and Eighteen (18) Years of Age 1. Any person who has sexual intercourse with a female who has reached fifteen (15) years of age, but is less than eighteen (18) years of age, and is an ascendant, whether legitimate or not, step-father, the husband of the paternal grandmother, or the caregiver of the girl, shall be sentenced to temporary hard labour. 2. The same penalty shall be imposed if the perpetrator of the act is a clergyman, or a director of a public office, or an employee therein, who commits such an act by abusing the power or privileges granted to him. Article 296: Attacking, by Violence or Intimidation, the Honour of a Person 1. Any person who attacks the honour of another person by using violence or intimidation shall be sentenced to at least four (4) years of hard labour. 2. The sentence shall not be less than seven (7) years if the victim is less than five (5) years of age. Article 297: Attacking the Honour of a Vulnerable Person Any person who attacks the honour of another person, and the latter cannot defend themselves due to a physical disability, a cognitive impairment, or as a result of any form of deception, or forces the latter to commit such an act, shall be sentenced to temporary hard labour. Article 298: Attacking, without Violence, the Honour of a Person 1. Any person who attacks, without having recourse to violence or intimidation, the honour of a child, whether a boy or a girl, who is less than fifteen (15) years of age, or forces the said child to commit such an act, shall be 56
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The penalties for the crimes provided for in Articles 292, 293, 294, 296 and 298 shall be increased by one-third (1/3) to one-half (1/2) if the accused is one of the persons mentioned in Article 295 above. 1. The penalties for the crimes provided for in the Articles of this Chapter shall be increased by one-third (1/3) to one-half (1/2): a) If two persons committed the crime in order to overcome any resistance by the victim, or if the victim was successively attacked by the perpetrators. b) If the male victim contracted a venereal disease, or if the female victim lost her virginity as a result of the crime. 2. The sentence shall not be less than ten (10) years of hard labour if the victim dies after the commission of one of the abovementioned crimes, provided that the perpetrator did not intend to cause such an outcome. Article 302: Abduction Any person who abducts, by using a ruse or coercion, another person, whether male or female, and escapes with the abducted person to any place, shall be sentenced to: 1. A prison sentence of two (2) to three (3) years, if the abducted person is a male and has not reached fifteen (15) years of age; 2. Temporary hard labour, if the abducted person is a female; 3. Hard labour for a period of no less than five (5) years, if the abducted person was a married female who has reached, or not reached, fifteen (15) years of age; 4. Hard labour for a period of no less than ten (10) years, if the abducted person, male or female, was raped or attacked; 5. Hard labour for a period of no less than ten (10) years, if the abducted person was a married female, who has not reached fifteen (15) years of age, and who was sexually assaulted; 6. Hard labour for a period of no less than seven (7) years, if the abducted person was a married female, who has reached fifteen (15) years of age, and who was sexually
assaulted. Article 303: Release of the Abducted Person A prison sentence for a period of one (1) month to one (1) year shall be imposed upon the abductor if they voluntarily release and return, within forty-eight (48) hours, the abducted person to a secure place, provided that the abducted person was not subject to any attack to their honour or reputation, or any other act that amounts to a crime or a misdemeanour. Article 304: Seduction 1. Unless a harsher sentence is deserved, a prison sentence for a period of three (3) months to one (1) year shall be imposed upon any person who deflowers a virgin, who has reached fifteen (15) years of age, after promising to marry her. The perpetrator shall also guarantee her virginity. 2. The following elements constitute admissible evidence against the accused: a confession made by the accused before the inquiry judge or in court; or, the existence of letters and other relevant written documentation. 3. A prison sentence for a period of no less than three (3) months shall be imposed upon any person who incites a woman, married or not, to leave her residence and take up with an unknown man, or attempts to separate by corruption the said woman from her husband to break the marriage bond. Article 305: Unwanted Sexual Contact A prison sentence for a period not exceeding one year shall be imposed upon any person who engages in unwanted sexual contact with: 1. Another person, male or female, under fifteen (15) years of age; or, 2. A woman or a girl, who has reached fifteen (15) years of age, but without their consent. Article 306: Indecent Acts and Words A prison sentence for a period up to six (6) months, or a fine not exceeding twenty-five (25) Dinars, shall be imposed upon any person who exposes a boy who is less than fifteen (15) years of age, or a female, to indecent acts or words.232 Chapter VIII Crimes and Misdemeanors against Human Beings Chapter I Article 340: Excuse 1. A husband who surprises his wife or a close female relative in the act of adultery with another person, and kills, injures or harms either of them, or both, shall benefit from a mitigating excuse. 2. The perpetrator of a killing or an injury shall benefit from a mitigating excuse if he surprises a spouse, ascendant, descendent, or sibling with another person in an unlawful bed. 232 See http://corpus.learningpartnership.org/jordanian-penal-code-no-16of-1960-selected-provisions-relating-to-women-2-title-vii-offences-againstpublic-ethics-and-morality-chapter-i-offences-against-honour. 57
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Appendix B: Semistructured Interviews used in this study 1. Interview with women Arabic version
:بعد املقدمة العامة عن البحث مثال مهــم يل ان اوضــح ان الهــدف.“شــكرا لــك ملوافقتــك عــى اجــراء املقابلــة معــي االســايس للبحــث هــو فهــم وادراك قصــص النســاء حــن تدخــل بخيارهــا او رغــا عنهــا الجهــاز القضــايئ مبــا يف ذلــك كل الصعوبــات واالشــكاليات التــي تواجههــا ”.وكذلــك كل العوامــل امليــرة لهــا )األسئلة األساسية (من كل إجابة يجب اشتقاق أسئلة إضافية حسب اإلجابة )سريورة القضية (تاريخها )... السجن، امللجأ،إحيك يل عن قصتك التي أوصلتك إىل (املحكمة1.1 هل توجهت لجهات رسمية؟ ملن؟ كيف؟ وماذا حصل؟2.2 ) مــا هــي املؤسســات الرســمية التــي تدخلــت (برغبتــك أو رغــا عنــك3.3 خــال مشــوارك حتــى وصلــت إىل هنــا؟ من املهم أن نسأل ملاذا برغبتها وملاذا رغام عنها؟4.4 هل توجهت لجهات غري رسمية؟ ملن؟ كيف؟ وماذا حصل؟5.5 ما هي املؤسسات الغري رسمية التي تدخلت (برغبتك أو رغام عنك)؟6.6 ما هي الصعوبات التي واجهتها خالل مشوارك؟7.7 ما هي العوامل التي كانت ميرسة أو سهلت سريورة القضية؟8.8
English version After the general introduction about the research, for example: “Thanks for your agreement to be interviewed by me. It’s important for me to clarify that the main goal of this research is to understand and to recognize the women’s narratives when they enter by choice or by force to the legal system, including the hardships and the problems that they face and the factors that make this process easier”. The main questions (must derive additional questions from each answer according to its content): The case process (its history): 1. Tell me about your story that brought you to the (court, shelter, prison …). 2. Did you go to formal organization? To whom? How? What happened? 3. What where the formal organizations that interfered (according to your will or by force) during your journey until you arrived here? 4. Important to ask why she was willing to accept the interfering or why it was by force? 5. Did you go to informal organizations? To whom? How? What happened? 6. What were the informal organizations that interfered (according to your will or by force)? 7. What were the hardships you faced during your journey? 8. What were the factors that made the case process easier?
هــل كان دور لعائلتــك يف كل مجريــات األحــداث؟ مــا هــو؟ إحــي عنــه9.9 بالتفصيــل؟
9. Did your family have a role during the events occurrence? What was this role? Tell me about it in details?
ما هو؟ صفيه بالتفصيل:هل كان دور لرجال الدين؟ إذا نعم1010
10. Did the religious personnel have a role? If your answer is yes what was their role? Describe it?
مــا هــو؟ صفيــه:هــل كان دور ملؤسســات حقــوق اإلنســان؟ إذا نعــم1111 تفاصيلــه مــاذا كانــت مصــادر معلوماتــك حيــال قضيتــك؟ هــل بحثــت عــن1212 معلومــات؟ أيــن؟ ملــاذا احتجــت للبحــث؟ هل كانت معلومات مهمة مل تعريف عنها وكانت حاسمة؟1313 :حال القضية اليوم أين تقف قضيتك اليوم؟1.1 !صفي يل وضعك الحيايت اليومي حاليا2.2 هــل مــن مؤسســات رســمية أو غــر رســمية تدعمــك أو تصعــب عليــك3.3 اليــوم؟
11. Did the human rights organizations have a role? If your answer is yes what was their role? Describe it in details? 12. What were your information resources regarding your case? Did you search for information? Where? What did you need to search for it? 13. Were the information important that you didn’t know about, hence it was crucial? The case status today: 1. Where does your case stand today? 2. Describe your day-to day-status currently?
مــن ايــن حصلــت عــى:هــل أنــت مدركــة لحقوقــك اليــوم؟ إذا نعــم4.4 ملــاذاالوملتبحثــيأوتجتهــدللوصــوللــكلاملعلومــات؟:املعلومــات؟وإذاال
3. Are there any formal or informal organizations that support you, or making it harder on you today?
بنفســك:لــو عــاد بــك الزمــن إىل الــوراء مــاذا كنــت توديــن أن تغــري5.5 وبتعاملــك مــع ذاتــك؟ بــأداء املؤسســات الرســمية والغــر رســمية؟ بالعائلــة والديــن واملجتمــع؟
4. Are you aware of your rights today? If the answer is yes: where did you get the information? If it is no: Why you didn’t or aren’t looking or making effort to reach information?
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5.
If time goes back, what would you like to change: in yourself and in dealing with yourself? In the formal and informal organizations performance?
2. Interview with legal system workers (lawyers, judges, prosecutors, police officers) Arabic version
، وكيــل نيابــة، قــايض،ات يف الجهــاز القضــايئ (محامــي/اســتامرة مقابلــة للعاملــن )رشطــي بدايــة نشــكرك عــى املســاهمة يف هــذا البحــث مــن خــال موافقتــك عــى إج ـراء .هــذه املقابلــة ، (مــكان وســنوات التعليــم:نــود بدايــة أن نتعــرف عليــك أكــر مــن الجانــب املهنــي مــكان الســكن ونــوع القضايــا التــي عمــل بهــا عــى،ســنوات الخــرة واماكــن العمــل )مــدار ســنوات العمــل إحيك يل عن عملك اليوم بالتفصيل1.1 ما هو دورك يف ايصال املرأة للعدالة؟2.2 مــا هــي تجربتــك بالعمــل يف قضايــا النســاء (نطــرح كل نــوع عــى حــدة3.3 ،ونســال عــن تجربــة العمــل بــه مثــا التجربــة مــع الجانيــات الســجينات ونطلــب تفصيــل عــن العمــل بــكل... مــع املغتصبات،مــع املهــددات بالقتــل )نــوع مــا هــو رأيــك بالجهــاز القضــايئ الفلســطيني مــن ناحيــة تعاملــه مــع قضايــا4.4 تخــص النســاء؟ مــا هــي التحديــات التــي تواجــه القضــاء اليــوم بقضايــا النســاء؟ (مــع5.5 )التفصيــل بــكل نــوع ما هي الصعوبات التي تواجهك يف عملك اليوم يف قضايا النساء؟6.6 أيــن تــرى مســؤوليتك ومســؤولية الجهــاز الــذي تعمــل بــه مــن القضايــا7.7 التــي ال تصــل للعدالــة؟ ملــاذا يتــم إغــاق الكثــر مــن ملفــات النســاء خاصــة يف حــاالت االغتصــاب8.8 والتهديــد بالقتــل؟ ،كيــف تــرى التفاعــل بــن مؤسســات املجتمــع (القضــاء العشــائري9.9 العائــات) وبــن مؤسســات القضــاء الرســمي؟،مؤسســات حقــوق اإلنســان .نســال عــن كل واحــد عــى حــدة ملــاذا ال يتــم عمــل تغيــر يف القوانــن املجحفــة بحــق النســاء وأيــة اقرتاحــات1010 كنــت لتقــدم مــن اجــل تحســن موقــع املــرأة يف جهــاز العدالــة؟ كيف ترى اداء البيت اآلمن؟1111 ما هو رأيك مبالجئ النساء يف املناطق املختلفة؟1212 ما هو رأيك بسجون النساء؟1313 صــف لنــا مســار قضيتــن عملــت فيهــا مؤخ ـرا (كل قضيــة توصــف عــى1414 )حــدة هل تريد ان تضيف لنا شيئا مهام مل نذكره؟1515 شكرا جزيال عىل التعاون طاقم البحث
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English version First we appreciate your contribution to this research through your agreement to be interviewed. We would like to know more about your professional side: (place and years of education, years of experience and work places, place of living and type of cases he worked with over the years). 1. Tell me about your work today in detail. 2. What is your role in leading women to justice? 3. What is your experience in working with women cases (present every type of work experience separately for example, experience of working with criminal female prisoners, with women threatened by murder, with raped women…. and ask for details on each type of work). 4. What do you think about the Palestinian legal system and the way it deals with cases related to women? 5. What are the challenges that facing the legal system today when dealing with women cases? (With details on each type). 6. What are the hardships that you face today with women cases? 7. Where do you see your responsibility and the system you work at towards cases that don’t reach justice? 8. Why many of women’s files are getting closed especially in cases of rape or murder threats? 9. How do you see the interaction between the community organizations (tribal justice, human rights organizations, families), and between the formal legal organizations? Ask about each separately. 10. Why there is no changes in the unfair towards women rights laws, and what suggestion you have in order to improve the woman’s status in the justice system? 11. What do you think about the safe home? 12. What do you think about the women shelters in the different areas? 13. What do you think about women prisoners? 14. Describe for us two cases you worked with lately (each case described separately). 15. Do you want to add something we didn’t m e nti o n ? Thanks a lot for your cooperation. Research Staff
3. Interview with NGO workers
English version
Arabic version
After a short introduction on the research (its goal: studying the experience of women through the process of the Palestinian legal system, examining the main obstacles they face and what are the factors that made it easy for them. Who funds it: UN-Women. The aim of the interview: to understand the level of a woman access to the Palestinian justice system, and to learn about what she faces during her interaction with it. In addition to exposing what the Palestinian woman face in area C when she needs or interact with the Palestinian justice system, and to examine the specific obstacles she faces because of her living place).
أسئلة مسرية ملقابلة املؤسسات األهلية الوقــوف عــى ســرورة املــرأة يف جهــاز:بعــد الــرح القصــر عــن البحــث (هدفــه ال: مــن ميولــه.العدالــة الفلســطيني وفحــص أهــم املعيقــات واالمــور امليــرة لهــا فهــم مــدى مناليــة املــراة الفلســطينية: والهــدف مــن املقابلــة،NU– nemoW توثيــق محطــات.لجهــاز العدالــة والوقــوف عــى مــا تواجهــه أثنــاء تعاملهــا معــه املــرأة يف ســرورتها القضائيــة وكذلــك الكشــف عــن مــا تواجهــه املــرأة الفلســطينية حــن تحتــاج او تحتــك بجهــاز العدالــة الفلســطيني وفحــص خاصيــةC يف منطقــة .)C املعيقــات لهــا كونهــا يف منطقــة •إحــي لنــا عــن أهــداف املؤسســة وعــن عملهــا خــال الخمــس ســنوات األخــرة (يجــب الرتكيــز عــى عمــل املؤسســة مــع املــرأة) ممكــن طــرح مــن بــن األعــال التــي تقومــون بهــا مــا هــو عمــل املؤسســة:ســؤال بديــل مــع املــرأة؟ •مــا هــي طبيعــة عملكــن مــع نســاء دخلــت أو مل تســتطع دخــول جهــاز العدالــة؟
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Tell us about the organization’s goals and its work during the last five years (must focus on the organization work with women), you can ask an optional question: among the work you do what is the organization work with women?
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What is the nature of your work with women who entered the justice system or couldn’t enter?
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What do you think about the Palestinian woman’s access to justice?
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What do you think are the hardships that a Palestinian woman face when interacting with the justice system?
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What do you think are the obstacles that prevent a woman from reaching the justice system and going through a just process towards her right?
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What do you think about the informal organizations role when dealing with women who go through the justice system stations?
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What do you think about the Palestinian justice and legal systems?
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What do you think are the advantages for women who live in Area C in relation to their access to the Palestinian Justice System?
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Can you tell us in details about one case?
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Do Israeli legal organizations interfere in some cases? How and Why?
•ما هو رأيك مبنالية املرأة الفلسطينية يف جهاز العدالة؟ •مــا هــي برأيــك الصعوبــات التــي تواجههــا املــرأة الفلســطينية أثنــاء تعاملهــا مــع جهــاز العدالــة؟ •مــا هــي برأيــك املعيقــات التــي متنــع مــن املــرأة الوصــول لجهــاز العدابــة وخــوض ســرورة عادلــة بحقهــا مــن خاللــه؟ •مــا هــو رأيــك بــدور املؤسســات الغــر رســمية بتعاملهــا مــع النســاء الــايت متــر مبحطــات بجهــاز العدالــة؟ •ما هو رأيك بنظام العدالة والنظام القضايئ الفلسطيني؟ مبوضــوع مناليتهــاC •مــا هــي برأيــك املميـزات للنســاء التــي تقطــن منطقــة لجهــاز العدالة الفلســطيني؟ •هل لك أن تحيك لنا بالتفصيل عن إحدى الحاالت؟ •هــل مــن تدخــل ملؤسســات قضائيــة ارسائيليــة ببعــض الحــاالت؟ كيــف وملــاذا؟
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English version
4. Interview with focus groups
After a short introduction on the research (its goal: studying the experience of women through the process of the Palestinian legal system, examining the main obstacles they face and what are the factors that made it easy for them. Who funds it: UN. The aim of the interview: to learn what a Palestinian woman from Area C faces when she needs or come in contact with the Palestinian Justice system, and to examine the specific obstacles she faces as a result of living in Area C).
Arabic version
The following questions are to be asked to women who had an experience of interaction with the legal and justice system (followed by questions for those who didn’t have such interaction):
أسئلة مسرية ملقابلة املجموعات البؤرية بعــد الــرح القصــر عــن البحــث (هدفــه :الوقــوف عــى ســرورة املــرأة يف الجهــاز القضــايئ الفلســطيني وفحــص أهــم املعيقــات واالمــور امليــرة لهــا .مــن ميولــه :ال- ،NUوالهــدف مــن املقابلــة :الوقــوف عــى مــا تواجهــه املــرأة الفلســطينية يف منطقــة Cحــن تحتــاج او تحتــك بجهــاز العدالــة الفلســطيني وفحــص خاصيــة املعيقــات لهــا كونهــا يف منطقــة .)C األســئلة التاليــة توجــه لنســاء خاضــت تجربــة التفاعــل مــع جهــاز القضــاء والعدالــة (تليهــا أســئلة ملــن مل تتفاعــل مــع الجهــاز): •عرفينا عىل نفسك (يجب استخدام أسامء مستعارة أثناء التفريغ)
Introduce yourself (use fake names in the transcription).
·
What is your story with the Palestinian Justice System? In other words what made you ?interact\need\come in contact with it
·
•هــل بإمكانــك أن تصفــي لنــا مــا هــي الصعوبــات التــي واجهتهــا خــال مشــوارك؟
Can you describe to us the hardships you faced ?during your journey
·
•هل بإمكانك أن تصفي لنا ما هي األمور التي يرست مشوارك؟
Can you describe to us the factors that made ?your journey easier
·
•هــل كان تدخــل للمؤسســات الغــر رســمية؟ كيــف تدخلــت؟ هــل انــت توجهتــي أم أنهــم فرضــوا نفســهم عليــك؟
Was there an intervention from the informal organizations? How did they interfere? Did you ?go to them or they imposed themselves on you
·
Where there an interaction with the PA ?organizations? How? If there weren’t, why
·
•هــل ســمعت عــن حــاالت مــن املنطقــة التــي تعيشــن بهــا وبرأيــك مهــم ان نعــرف مــا مــرت بــه خــال تفاعلهــا مــع جهــاز القضــاء؟
?Where does your case stand today
·
Did you hear about other cases in the area where you live that you think we should know about their experiences regarding what they went through during their interaction with the ?legal system
·
•هــل ســمعت عــن حــاالت مــن املنطقــة التي تعيشــن بهــا مل تســتطع الوصول للعدالــة والقضــاء بســبب موقــع الســكن؟ ماذا حــدث؟ وأيــن وصلت؟
Do you about cases in your area that couldn’t access justice and judiciary because of their living place? What happened? Where did they ?go
·
When a problem occurs such as murder or ?robbery in the area what usually happens
·
•مــا هــي قصتــك مــع جهــاز العدالــة الفلســطيني؟ او بكلــات أخــرى مــا الــذي جعلــك تتفاعلني/تحتاجني/تحتكــن بــه؟
•هل كان تفاعل مع مؤسسات السلطة؟ كيف؟ وإذا مل يكن ملاذا؟ •أين تقف قضيتك اليوم؟
•حني تحدث مشكلة مثل قتل أو رسقة يف املنطقة ماذا يحدث عامة؟ األسئلة التالية توجه لنساء مل تخض تجربة مع جهاز العدالة
The following questions are to be asked to women who didn’t have an experience with the Justice System:
•عرفينا عىل نفسك (يجب استخدام أسامء مستعارة أثناء التفريغ) •هــل بإمكانــك أن تصفــي لنــا مــا هــي الصعوبــات التــي تواجههــا املــرأة اذا احتاجــت تدخــل األجهــزة التابعــة لجهــاز العدالــة الفلسطســني؟ •حــن تحــدث مشــكلة مثــل قتــل أو رسقــة يف املنطقــة مــاذا يحــدث؟ ملــن تتوجــه النــاس؟ •هــل تتدخــل عــادة مؤسســات غــر رســمية يف املشــاكل خاصــة الجنائيــة؟ كيــف؟
Introduce yourself (use fake names in the transcription).
·
•كيف تتدخل عادة أجهزة األمن التابعة للسلطة؟
Can you describe to us what are the hardships faced by a woman if she needs the interventions ?of the Palestinian Justice System
·
•هــل ســمعت عــن حــاالت مــن املنطقــة التــي تعيشــن بهــا وبرأيــك مهــم ان نعــرف مــا مــرت بــه خــال تفاعلهــا مــع جهــاز القضــاء؟
When a problem occurs such as murder or robbery in the area, what happens? To whom ?people go
·
•هــل ســمعت عــن حــاالت مــن املنطقــة التــي تعيشــن بهــا مل تســتطع الوصــول للعدالــة والقضــاء بســبب موقــع الســكن؟ مــاذا حــدث؟ وأيــن وصلــت؟
Do informal organizations interfere usually in ?problems, especially criminal ones? How
·
How do the PA security systems interfere ?usually
·
•هــل حــدث أن إحــدى قريباتــك احتاجــت تدخــل أحــدى جهــات جهــاز العدالــة؟ مــاذا حــدث؟ مالحظــة :مــن املهــم جــدا الوقــوف عــى الســرورة أي مــن أيــن بــدأت عــر أي مؤسســات رســمية أو غــر رســمية مــرت؟ كيــف اســتطاعت التنقــل؟ مــن أي منطقــة إىل أي منطقــة تنقلــت؟ أي محطــات القضيــة /القضايــا املطروحــة. ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
61
·
Did you hear about cases in the area where you live that you think we should know about their experiences regarding what they went through during their interaction with the legal system?
·
Do you about cases in your area that couldn’t access justice and judiciary because of their living place? What happened? Where did they go?
·
Did any of your female relatives need the intervention of one of the justice system? What happened?
P.S: It is very important to learn about the process, where did it start, through which formal or informal organizations did she go? How was she able to move? From what area to what area did she move? What are the stations of the presented case\cases?
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Appendix C: Paths to Justice Case 1
Interrogation by general prosecutor in Bethlehem
Prison in Bethlehem
Shelter
2
Interrogation in police station in Qalqilia
Interrogation by general prosecutor in Bethlehem
Prison in Jenin
Shelter in Bethlehem
3
Hospital In Ramallah
Mehwar
Interrogation in Ramallah by general prosecutor
Prison in Ramallah
Shelter in Bethlehem
4
Family protection unit in Nablus and was interrogated
Shelter in Jericho
Back to husband
Family protection unit in Jenin and was interrogated
Stayed in custody in Qalqilia and was interrogated
Shelter in another Palestinian City
5
Police station in Hebron for filing a complaint to military and civil courts
Interrogation by civil prosecutors
Interrogated by military prosecutors
Shelter
6
Hospital in Bir Saba’a
Israeli shelter for one week
Family protection unit in Hebron – told her story
Shelter
7
Hospital
Filed a complaint in police station and was interrogated
Ministry of Social Affairs
Shelter in Nablus
Back to husband and isolation
Shelter in Nablus
8
She was smuggled back from Israel to Bethlehem and was taken to a place where she does not know who they were.
Was taken by those people to police station in Bethlehem and was interrogated
Shelter in Jericho r
Shelter in Bethlehem
Prison in Ramallah for protection
Prison in Bethlehem for protection
Ministry of Social Affairs
Filed a complaint in police station
Back home and legal help from the shelter without the knowledge of her husband
Ministry of Social Affairs in Bethlehem – not helped
Ministry of Social Affairs in Ramallah – not helped
9
Ministry of Social Affairs
Shelter
10
Was interrogated in police station and signed confession
Interrogated by general prosecutor and was shown the signed confession
63
Back home
Prison in Ramallah Released on bail
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
Shelter in Nablus
Appendix D: Nairobi Declaration English version
NAIROBI DECLARATION ON WOMEN’S AND GIRLS’ RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND REPARATION At the International Meeting on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation, held in Nairobi from 19 to 21 March 2007, women’s rights advocates and activists, as well as survivors of sexual violence in situations of conflict, from Africa, Asia, Europe, Central, North and South America, issued the following Declaration: PREAMBLE DEEPLY CONCERNED that gender-based violence, and particularly sexual violence and violations against women and girls, are weapons of war, assuming unacceptably alarming proportions as wars, genocide and communal violence have taken their toll inside and between countries the world over within the last two decades; BEARING IN MIND the terrible destruction brought by armed conflict, including forced participation in armed conflict, to people’s physical integrity, psychological and spiritual well-being, economic security, social status, social fabric, and the gender differentiated impact on the lives and livelihoods of women and girls; TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION the unimaginable brutality of crimes and violations committed against women and girls in conflict situations, and the disproportionate effects of these crimes and violations on women and girls, their families and their communities; ACKNOWLEDGING that gender-based violence committed during conflict situations is the result of inequalities between women and men, girls and boys, that predated the conflict, and that this violence continues to aggravate the discrimination of women and girls in post-conflict situations; TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION the discriminatory interpretations of culture and religion that impact negatively on the economic and political status of women and girls; TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION that girls specifically suffer both from physical and sexual violence directed at them and from human rights violations against their parents, siblings and caregivers; BEARING IN MIND that girls respond differently than women to grave rights violations because of less developed physical, mental and emotional responses to these experiences. Noting also that girls are victims/survivors of double discrimination based on their gender and age. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION the roles and contributions of women and girls in repairing the social fabric of families, communities and societies, and the potential of reparation programs to acknowledge these roles; BEARING IN MIND advances in international criminal law that confirm gender-based crimes may amount to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; RECALLING the adoption by the UN General Assembly in October 2005 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law; TAKING COGNIZANCE of the existence of international, regional and national judicial and non-judicial mechanisms for individual and collective, symbolic and material reparation, and the enormous challenges of catering for all victims and survivors, individually and/or collectively; CONCERNED that initiatives and strategies at the local, national, regional and international levels to ensure justice have not been effective from the perspectives of victims and survivors of these crimes and violations in a holistic manner; DECLARE AS FOLLOWS: 1. That women’s and girls’ rights are human rights. 2. That reparation is an integral part of processes that assist society’s recovery from armed conflict and that ensure history will not repeat itself; that comprehensive programmes must be established to achieve truthtelling, other forms of transitional justice, and an end to the culture of impunity. 3. That reparation must drive post-conflict transformation of socio-cultural injustices, and political and structural inequalities that shape the lives of women and girls; that reintegration and restitution by themselves are not sufficient goals of reparation, since the origins of violations of women’s and girls’ human rights predate the conflict situation. 4. That, in order to accurately reflect and incorporate the perspectives of victims and their advocates, the notion of “victim” must be broadly defined within the context of women’s and girls’ experiences and their 64
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right to reparation. 5. That the fundamental nature of the struggle against impunity demands that all reparation programmes must address the responsibility of all actors, including state actors, foreign governments and inter-governmental bodies, non-governmental actors, such as armed groups, multinational companies and individual prospectors and investors. 6. That national governments bear primary responsibility to provide remedy and reparation within an environment that guarantees safety and human security, and that the international community shares responsibility in that process. 7. That the particular circumstances in which women and girls are made victims of crimes and human rights violations in situations of conflict require approaches specially adapted to their needs, interests and priorities, as defined by them; and that measures of access to equality (positive discrimination) are required in order to take into account the reasons and consequences of the crimes and violations committed, and in order to ensure that they are not repeated. FURTHER ADOPT THE FOLLOWING GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMEND that appropriate bodies at national, regional and international levels take steps to promote their widespread dissemination, acceptance and implementation. 1 – BASIC PRINCIPLES RELATING TO WOMEN’S AND GIRLS’ RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND REPARATION A – Non-discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, ethnicity, race, age, political affiliation, class, marital status, sexual orientation, nationality, religion and disability. B – All policies and measures relating to reparation must explicitly be based on the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, ethnicity, race, age, political affiliation, class, marital status, sexual orientation, nationality, religion and disability and affirmative measures to redress inequalities. C – Compliance with international and regional standards on the right to a remedy and reparation, as well as with women’s and girls’ human rights. D – Support of women’s and girls’ empowerment by taking into consideration their autonomy and participation in decision-making. Processes must empower women and girls, or those acting in the best interests of girls, to determine for themselves what forms of reparation are best suited to their situation. Processes must also overcome those aspects of customary and religious laws and practices that prevent women and girls from being in a position to make, and act on, decisions about their own lives. E – Civil society should drive policies and practices on reparation, with governments striving for genuine partnership with civil society groups. Measures are 65
ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
necessary to guarantee civil society autonomy and space for the representation of women’s and girls’ voices in all their diversity. F – Access to Justice. Ending impunity through legal proceedings for crimes against women and girls is a crucial component of reparation policies and a requirement under international law. 2 – ACCESS TO REPARATION A – In order to achieve reparation measures sensitive to gender, age, cultural diversity and human rights, decision-making about reparation must include victims as full participants, while ensuring just representation of women and girls in all their diversity. Governments and other actors must ensure that women and girls are adequately informed of their rights. B – Full participation of women and girls victims should be guaranteed in every stage of the reparation process, i.e. design, implementation, evaluation, and decisionmaking. C – Structural and administrative obstacles in all forms of justice, which impede or deny women’s and girls’ access to effective and enforceable remedies, must be addressed to ensure gender-just reparation programmes. D – Male and female staff who are sensitive to specific issues related to gender, age, cultural diversity and human rights, and who are committed to international and regional human rights standards must be involved at every stage of the reparation process. E – Practices and procedures for obtaining reparation must be sensitive to gender, age, cultural diversity and human rights, and must take into account women’s and girls’ specific circumstances, as well as their dignity, privacy and safety. F – Indicators that are sensitive to gender, age, cultural diversity and human rights must be used to monitor and evaluate the implementation of reparation measures. 3 – KEY ASPECTS OF REPARATION FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS A – Women and girls have a right to a remedy and reparation under international law. They have a right to benefit from reparation programs designed to directly benefit the victims, by providing restitution, compensation, reintegration, and other key measures and initiatives under transitional justice that, if crafted with gender-aware forethought and care, could have reparative effects, namely reinsertion, satisfaction and the guarantee of non-recurrence. B – Governments should not undertake development instead of reparation. All post-conflict societies need both reconstruction and development, of which reparation programmes are an integral part. Victims, especially women and girls, face particular obstacles in seizing the opportunities provided by development, thus risking their continued exclusion. In reparation, reconstruction, and development programmes, affirmative action measures are necessary to respond to the needs and experiences of women and girls victims.
C – Truth-telling requires the identification of gross and systematic crimes and human rights violations committed against women and girls. It is critical that such abuses are named and recognized in order to raise awareness about these crimes and violations, to positively influence a more holistic strategy for reparation and measures that support reparation, and to help build a shared memory and history. Currently, there is a significant lack of naming and addressing such abuses in past reparation programs and efforts, much to the detriment of surviving victims.
CLADEM – Comité de América Latina y El Caribe para la Defensa de la Derechos de la Mujer, Peru
D – Reconciliation is an important goal of peace and reparation processes, which can only be achieved with women and girls victims’ full participation, while respecting their right to dignity, privacy, safety and security.
Demus – Estudio para la defensa y los derechos de las mujeres, Peru
E – Just, effective and prompt reparation measures should be proportional to the gravity of the crimes, violations and harm suffered. In the case of victims of sexual violence and other gender-based crimes, governments should take into account the multi-dimensional and long-term consequences of these crimes to women and girls, their families and their communities, requiring specialized, integrated, and multidisciplinary approaches. F – Governments must consider all forms of reparation available at individual and community levels. These include, but are not limited to, restitution, compensation and reintegration. Invariably, a combination of these forms of reparation will be required to adequately address violations of women’s and girls’ human rights. G – Reparation processes must allow women and girls to come forward when they are ready. They should not be excluded if they fail to do so within a prescribed time period. Support structures are needed to assist women and girls in the process of speaking out and claiming reparation. H – Reparation must go above and beyond the immediate reasons and consequences of the crimes and violations; they must aim to address the political and structural inequalities that negatively shape women’s and girls’ lives. The following organizations are authors and signatories of the declaration: Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations
CODEPU – Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo, Chile Coordinadora Nacional de Mujeres Afectadas por la Violencia Política, Peru Corporación Humanas, Chile Corporación para la Vida Mujeres que Crean, Colombia
ESSAIM – Cadre de concertation et d’activités pour la protection et la défense des droits des femmes à l’est de la République démocratique du Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, USA FOKUPERS – East Timorese Women’s Communication Forum, Timor Leste. Grupo Suporta Inan, Timor Leste Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales, Guatemala International Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic, CUNY Law School, USA Khulumani Support Group, South Africa LDGL – Ligue des droits de l’Homme dans la région des Grands-Lacs, Rwanda Mamá Maquín, Guatemala MARWOPNET – Mano River Women Peace Network, Sierra Leone PAIF – Programme d’appui aux initiatives féminines, Democratic Republic of Congo PCS – Consejería en Proyectos, Latin America REDRESS, United Kingdom Ruta Pacifica de las Mujeres, Colombia SEVOTA – Solidarité pour l’épanouissement des veuves et des orphelins visant le travail et l’auto-promotion, Rwanda
Urgent Action Fund-Africa, Kenya
SOFEPADI – Solidarité féminine pour la paix et le développement intégral, Democratic Republic of Congo
Rights & Democracy, Canada
Women’s Forum, Sierra Leone
Alianza de Mujeres Rurales por la Vida, Tierra y Dignidad, Guatemala
Women’s Jurist Association, Burundi
ASADHO/Katanga – Association africaine de défense des droits de l’Homme, section Katanga, Democratic Republic of Congo Asociación Reflexión de Inocentes Liberados, Peru CCJT – Coalition congolaise pour la justice transitionnelle, Democratic Republic of Congo CDA – Community Development Centre, Sudan CEDA – Community Extension Development Association, Sierra Leone 66
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Women’s Research and Action Group, India
مــن وجهــة نظــر ضحايــا هــذه الجرائــم واالنتهــاكات والناجــن منهــا؛ نعلن ما ييل:
Arabic version
بحق النساء إعالن نريويب املتعلّق ّ
1.1أن حقوق النساء والفتيات هي حقوق إنسان ّية.
والفتيات يف اإلنصاف والتعويض
2.2أن التعويــض جــزء ال يتجــزأ مــن العمل ّيات الهادفــة إىل مســاعدة املجتمعات عــى التعــايف مــن الرصاعــات املس ـلّحة ،ولضــان أال يك ـ ّرر التاريــخ نفســه؛ ورضورة وضــع برامــج شــاملة إلظهــار الحقيقــة ،وإيجــاد أشــكال انتقال ّيــة أخــرى لتحقيــق العدالــة ،ووضــع حـ ّد لثقافــة اإلفــات مــن العقــاب.
بحــق النســاء والفتيــات يف اإلنصــاف والتعويــض، يف االجتــاع الــدويل املتعلّــق ّ واملنعقــد يف نــرويب مــا بــن 91و 12آذار/مــارس ،7002أصــدر املدافعــون عــن حقــوق املــرأة والناشــطون مــن أجلهــا ،والناجيــات مــن العنــف الجنــي يف مناطــق ال ـراع مــن أفريقيــا ،وآســيا ،وأوروبــا ،وأمــركا الوســطى والشــاليّة والجنوبيّــة ،اإلعــان التايل:
3.3أن التعويــض يجــب أن يــؤدّي ،بعــد انتهــاء ال ـراع ،إىل حصــول تح ـ ّوالت لتصحيــح املظــامل االجتامع ّيــة – الثقاف ّيــة ،والتفــاوت الســيايس والهيــكيل الــذي يصــوغ حيــاة النســاء والفتيــات؛ وأن إعــادة الدمــج يف املجتمــع ور ّد املمتلــكات ال تشــكّل بحــد ذاتهــا أهدافــاً كافيــة للتعويــض ألن جــذور انتهــاكات حقــوق النســاء والفتيــات ســابقة عــى نشــوب ال ـراع.
متهيد:
4.4أنــه مــن أجــل عكــس وجهــات نظــر الضحايــا واملدافعــن عنهــا بدقّــة ودمجهــا ،فــا ب ـ ّد مــن اعتــاد تعريــف واســع ملفهــوم «الضحيّــة» ضمــن ســياق تجــارب النســاء والفتيــات وحقّهــن يف التعويــض. 5.5أن الطبيعــة األساســ ّية للنضــال ضــد اإلفــات مــن العقــاب تفــرض أن تتنــاول جميــع برامــج التعويــض مســؤول ّية جميــع األطــراف ،مبــا فيهــا الــدول والحكومــات األجنبيّــة ،والهيئــات الحكوميّــة الدوليّــة ،واألطــراف غــر الحكوم ّيــة مثــل الجامعــات املسـلّحة ،والــركات املتعـدّدة الجنســيات، واألفــراد واملســتثمرين. 6.6أن الحكومــات الوطنيّــة تتح ّمــل املســؤوليّة األوىل يف مجــال تأمــن اإلنصــاف وتوفــر التعويــض ،ضمــن منــاخ يضمــن ســامة اإلنســان وأمنــه ،وأن املجتمــع الــدويل يشــارك يف تح ّمــل املســؤول ّية يف هــذه العمل ّيــة. الخاصــة التــي أدّت إىل تحويــل النســاء والفتيــات إىل ضحايــا 7.7أن الظــروف ّ ظــل رصاعــات ،تتطلّــب اعتــاد لجرائــم وانتهــاكات لحقــوق اإلنســان يف ّ خاصــة تســتجيب لحاجاتهــن ،ومصالحهــن ،وأولوياتهــن كــا مقاربــات ّ يحدّدنهــا؛ وأنــه ال ب ـ ّد مــن اعتــاد إج ـراءات تضمــن لهــن الحصــول عــى املســاواة (التمييــز اإليجــايب) ،مــن أجــل أخــذ أســباب الجرائــم واالنتهــاكات املرتكبــة ونتائجهــا بعــن االعتبــار ،ولضــان عــدم تكرارهــا. إضافــة إىل مــا ســبق نعلــن تب ّنــي املبــادئ التاليــة ونــويص بــأن تقــوم الهيئــات املالمئــة عــى املســتوى الوطنــي واإلقليمــي والــدويل باتخــاذ الخطــوات الالزمــة للتشــجيع عــى نرشهــا وقبولهــا وااللتـزام بهــا. بحق النساء والفتيات يف اإلنصاف والتعويض 1.1املبادئ األساس ّية املتعلّقة ّ 2.2أ – عــدم التمييــز اســتنادا ً إىل الجنــس ،والنــوع ،واإلثن ّيــة ،والعــرق ،والعمــر، واالنتــاء الســيايس ،واالنتــاء الطبقــي ،والوضــع العائــي ،والتو ّجــه الجنــي، والجنسـيّة ،والديــن ،واإلعاقــة الجســديّة أو العقليّــة. 3.3ب – يجــب أن تســتند جميــع السياســات واإلجـراءات املرتبطــة بالتعويــض بشــكل رصيــح إىل مبــدأ عــدم التمييــز اســتنادا ً إىل الجنــس ،والنــوع، واإلثنيّــة ،والعــرق ،والعمــر ،واالنتــاء الســيايس ،واالنتــاء الطبقــي ،والوضــع العائــي ،والتو ّجــه الجنــي ،والجنســ ّية ،والديــن ،واإلعاقــة الجســديّة أو العقليّــة ،وإىل إجــراءات إيجابيّــة إلزالــة التفــاوت. الحــق يف اإلنصــاف 4.4ج – االلتــزام باملعايــر الدوليّــة واإلقليميّــة بشــأن ّ والتعويــض ،إىل جانــب حقــوق النســاء والفتيــات. 5.5د – دعــم عمليّــة متكــن النســاء والفتيــات عــر أخــذ اســتقاللهن الــذايت ومســاهامتهن يف عمل ّيــة صنــع القـرار بعــن االعتبــار .ويجــب أن تــؤدّي هذه العمليّــات إىل متكــن النســاء والفتيــات ،أو األشــخاص العاملــن يف ســبيل مصلحــة الفتيــات ،مــن أجــل الســاح لهــن بتحديــد أشــكال التعويــض األكرث
انطالقــاً مــن قلقنــا العميــق مــن واقــع أن العنــف املســتند إىل الجنــس ،والســيّام العنــف الجنــي واالنتهــاكات الجنسـيّة ،أصبحــت أســلحة يف الحــرب وأخــذت حجـاً غــر مقبــوالً ومث ـرا ً للقلــق خــال العقديــن املاضيــن ،مــع قيــام الحــروب واإلبــادة الجامعيّــة ،والعنــف بــن الجامعــات الطائفيّــة واإلثنيّــة بإيقــاع العديــد مــن الضحايــا داخــل بعــض البلــدان واملناطــق يف العــامل؛ ومــن إدراكنــا لحجــم الدمــار الرهيــب الــذي تخلّفــه الرصاعــات املس ـلّحة ،مبــا فيهــا املســاهمة اإلجباريّــة يف الـراع ،عــى الســامة الجســديّة لألفـراد وص ّحتهــم النفسـيّة والروحيّــة ،وأمنهــم االقتصــادي ،ومركزهــم االجتامعــي ،وعــى نســيج املجتمــع، وتفــاوت هــذا التأثــر عــى حيــاة املــرأة والفتــاة وســبل كســب الــرزق تبعـاً للجنــس؛ وأخــذا ً بعــن االعتبــار الوحشــ ّية التــي ال ميكــن تص ّورهــا للجرائــم واالنتهــاكات املرتكبــة بحـ ّـق النســاء والفتيــات يف ظــروف ال ـراع ،واآلثــار غــر املتناســبة لهــذه الجرائــم واالنتهــاكات عــى النســاء والفتيــات ،وعوائلهــن ،ومجتمعاتهــن؛ واعرتاف ـاً بــأن العنــف املســتند إىل الجنــس واملرتكــب يف ظـ ّـل الرصاعــات ناتــج عــن التفــاوت مــا بــن النســاء والرجــال ،والفتيــات والفتيــان ،والســابق عــى نشــوب الرصاعــات ،وأن هــذا العنــف يواصــل مفاقمــة التمييــز ضــد النســاء والفتيــات يف مرحلــة مــا بعــد ال ـراع؛ وأخــذا ً بعــن االعتبــار التفسـرات التمييزيّــة للثقافــة والديــن والتــي تؤثّــر ســلباً عــى الوضــع االقتصــادي والســيايس للنســاء والفتيــات؛ وأخــذا ً بعــن االعتبــار أن الفتيــات تحديــدا ً تعــاين مــن العنــف الجســدي والجنــي بحــق أهاليهــن ،وأشــقائهن، املو ّجــه ضدّهــن ،ومــن انتهــاكات حقــوق اإلنســان ّ وشــقيقاتهن ،واألشــخاص الذيــن يتولّــون رعايتهــن؛ ومــع إدراكنــا أن الفتيــات تســتجيب بشــكل مختلــف عــن النســاء لالنتهــاكات الخطرية لحقــوق اإلنســان ألن اســتجاباتهن مــن الناحيــة الجســديّة والعقليّــة والنفسـيّة لهــذه التجــارب أقـ ّـل تط ـ ّورا ً مــن النســاء ،ومــع اإلشــارة إىل أن الفتيــات تعــاين مــن متييــز مــزدوج اســتنادا ً إىل الجنــس والعمــر؛ وأخــذا ً بعــن االعتبــار أدوار النســاء والفتيــات ومســاهامتهن يف إصــاح النســيج االجتامعــي للعائــات ،والجامعــات ،واملجتمعــات ،وقــدرة برامــج التعويــض املحتملــة عــى االع ـراف بهــذه األدوار؛ ومــع إدراكنــا ملــدى التقـدّم الــذي حقّقــه القانــون الجنــايئ الدويل الــذي يعتــر الجرائم املســتندة إىل الجنــس مبثابــة إبــادة جامعيّــة ،وجرائــم ضــد اإلنســانيّة ،وجرائــم حرب؛ ومســتذكرين قيــام الجمعيّــة العا ّمــة لألمــم املتحــدة يف شــهر ترشيــن األول/أكتوبــر حــق اإلنصــاف والتعويــض 5002بتب ّنــي «املبــادئ األساســ ّية والتوجيه ّيــة بشــأن ّ لضحايــا االنتهــاكات الجســيمة للقانــون الــدويل لحقــوق اإلنســان واالنتهــاكات الخطــرة للقانــون اإلنســاين الــدويل»؛ ومــع معرفتنــا بوجــود آل ّيــات قضائ ّيــة وغــر قضائ ّيــة ،دول ّيــة وإقليم ّيــة ووطن ّيــة، ـادي ،الفــردي والجامعــي ،والتحدّيــات الهائلــة التــي تواجــه للتعويــض الرمــزي واملـ ّ عمليّــة االســتجابة لحاجــات جميــع الضحايــا والناجــن ،بشــكل فــردي و/أو جامعــي؛ وانطالقــاً مــن قلقنــا بســبب عــدم فعاليّــة املبــادرات واالســراتيجيّات ،ســواء عــى املســتوى املحـ ّـي والوطنــي واإلقليمــي والــدويل ،يف تحقيــق العدالــة بشــكل متكامــل ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
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وإعــادة اإلعــار والتنميــة لالســتجابة إىل حاجــات الضحايــا مــن النســاء والفتيــات ،وتجاربهــن. 1818ج – يتطلّــب إظهــار الحقيقــة تحديــد الجرائــم وانتهــاكات حقــوق اإلنســان الجســيمة واملنتظمــة واملرتكبــة بحـ ّـق النســاء والفتيــات .وتعتــر تســمية هــذه االعتــداءات واالعـراف بهــا أمـرا ً حيويـاً مــن أجل رفــع مســتوى الوعي بشــأن هــذه الجرائــم واالنتهــاكات للتأثــر بشــكل إيجــايب عــى اسـراتيج ّية أكــر تكامــاً للتعويــض وإجــراءات تدعــم التعويــض وتســاعد يف إيجــاد ذاكــرة وتاريــخ مشــركني .وقــد عانــت جميــع برامــج وجهــود التعويــض يف املــايض مــن نقــص مهـ ّم يف مجــال تســمية مثــل هــذه االعتــداءات وتناولهــا، عــى حســاب الناجــن مــن الضحايــا. 1919د – تشــكّل املصالحــة هدفــاً مهــاً لعمليتــي الســام والتعويــض واللتــن ال ميكــن تحقيقهــا إال مبشــاركة كاملــة مــن جانــب الضحايــا مــن النســاء والفتيــات ،مــع احــرام حقّهــن يف الكرامــة ،والخصوص ّيــة ،والســامة ،واألمــن. 2020ه – يجــب أن تكــون إجـراءات التعويــض عادلــة وف ّعالــة ورسيعــة ومتناســبة مــع خطــورة الجرائــم واالنتهــاكات واألذى الــذي عانــت منــه الضحايــا .ويف حالــة ضحايــا العنــف الجنــي وغــره مــن الجرائــم املســتندة إىل الجنــس، يتعـ ّـن عــى الحكومــات أن تأخــذ بعــن االعتبــار األبعــاد املتع ـدّدة واآلثــار بحــق النســاء والفتيــات ،وعائالتهــن، البعيــدة املــدى لهــذه الجرائــم ّ متخصصــة ومتكاملــة ومجتمعاتهــن ،األمــر الــذي يتطلّــب اعتــاد مقاربــات ّ ومتع ـدّدة املذاهــب. 2121و – عــى الحكومــات أن تــدرس جميــع أشــكال التعويــض املتاحــة عــى املســتويني الفــردي والجامعــي .وهــذا يشــمل بطريقــة غــر حرصيــة ،ر ّد املمتلــكات ،والتعويــض ،وإعــادة الدمــج .ويتطلّــب توفــر معالجــة مالمئــة لالنتهــاكات التــي عانــت منهــا النســاء والفتيــات اســتخدام أشــكال متعـدّدة مــن التعويــض. 2222ز – يجــب أن تســمح عمل ّيــات التعويــض للنســاء والفتيــات بالظهــور عندمــا تصبحــن جاهــزات لذلــك .وال يجــب اســتبعادهن يف حــال عــدم متكنهــن مــن فعــل ذلــك خــال مهلــة زمن ّيــة مع ّينــة .ومــن الــروري إيجــاد هيكليّــات دعــم ملســاعدة النســاء والفتيــات عــى إســاع أصواتهــن واملطالبــة بالتعويــض.
مالءمــة ألوضاعهــن .ويجــب أن تتخطّــى هــذه العمل ّيــات أيض ـاً األع ـراف والقوانــن الدينيّــة واملامرســات التــي متنــع النســاء والفتيــات مــن بلــوغ الخاصــة والعمــل مركــز يســمح لهــن باتخــاذ الق ـرارات املتعلّقــة بحياتهــن ّ وفق ـاً لذلــك. 6.6ه – عــى املجتمــع املــدين أن يكــون ق ـ ّوة الدفــع للسياســات واملامرســات املتعلّقــة بالتعويــض ،وعــى الحكومــات أن تســعى إىل عقــد رشاكات حقيق ّيــة مــع هيئــات املجتمــع املــدين .ومــن الــروري اتخــاذ إجـراءات مــن أجــل ضــان االســتقالل الــذايت للمجتمــع املــدين واإلفســاح يف املجــال أمــام متثيــل أصــوات النســاء والفتيــات عــى اختالفهــا وتن ّوعهــا. 7.7و – ضــان العدالــة .فوضــع حــ ّد لإلفــات مــن العقــاب عــر إجــراءات بحــق النســاء والفتيــات ،هــو عنــر خاصــة بالجرائــم املرتكبــة ّ قضائيّــة ّ حيــوي يف سياســات التعويــض ورشط رضوري لهــا وفقــاً للقانــون الــدويل. 8.8ضامن التعويض 9.9أ – مــن أجــل تنفيــذ إج ـراءات تعويــض تراعــي النــوع ،والعمــر ،والتن ـ ّوع الثقــايف ،وحقــوق اإلنســان ،يجــب أن تتض ّمــن عمل ّيــة صنــع الق ـرار بشــأن التعويــض الضحايــا كطــرف كامــل الحقــوق ،مــع ضــان متثيــل عادل للنســاء والفتيــات عــى اختالفهــا وتن ّوعهــا .وعــى الحكومــات واألطـراف األخــرى أن تكفــل اطــاع النســاء والفتيــات بشــكل مالئــم عــى حقوقهــن. 1010ب – يجــب ضــان املشــاركة الكاملــة للضحايــا مــن النســاء والفتيــات يف مختلــف مراحــل عمل ّيــة التعويــض ،أي التصميــم ،التنفيــذ ،التقييــم ،واتخــاذ الق ـرار. 1111ج – يجــب معالجــة العقبــات الهيكل ّيــة واإلداريّــة املالزمــة لألنظمــة القضائيّــة والتــي متنــع أو تحــرم النســاء والفتيــات مــن الحصــول عــى اإلنصــاف الف ّعــال والقابــل للتنفيــذ ،مــن أجــل إيجــاد برامــج تعويــض عادلــة للضحايــا. 1212د – يجــب إرشاك موظفــن مــن اإلنــاث والذكــور املتف ّهمــن ملســائل معيّنــة متعلّقــة بالجنــس والعمــر والتنــ ّوع الثقــايف وحقــوق اإلنســان ،وملتزمــن باملعايــر الدول ّيــة واإلقليم ّيــة لحقــوق اإلنســان ،يف جميــع مراحــل عمل ّيــة التعويــض.
2323ح – يجــب أن يذهــب التعويــض إىل مــدى أبعــد مــن األســباب والنتائــج املبــارشة للجرائــم واالنتهــاكات .ويجــب أن يهــدف إىل تنــاول التفــاوت الســيايس والهيــكيل الــذي يؤث ّــر ســلباً عــى حيــاة النســاء والفتيــات.
الخاصــة بالحصــول عــى 1313ه – يجــب أن تراعــي املامرســات واإلجــراءات ّ التعويــض مســائل الجنــس والعمــر والتنــ ّوع الثقــايف وحقــوق اإلنســان، ويجــب أن تأخــذ بعــن االعتبــار الظــروف املحـدّدة للنســاء والفتيــات ،فضـاً عــن كرامتهــن ،وخصوصيتهــن ،وســامتهن.
Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations
1414و – يجــب اســتعامل مــؤرشات تراعــي الجنــس والعمــر والتنــ ّوع الثقــايف وحقــوق اإلنســان لرصــد عمل ّيــة تنفيــذ إجــراءات التعويــض وتقييمهــا.
2424صاغت هذا اإلعالن ووقعته املنظامت التالية: Urgent Action Fund-Africa, Kenya Rights & Democracy, Canada Alianza de Mujeres Rurales por la Vida, Tierra y Dignidad, Guatemala ASADHO/Katanga – Association africaine de défense des droits de l’Homme, section Katanga, Democratic Republic of Congo Asociación Reflexión de Inocentes Liberados, Peru CCJT – Coalition congolaise pour la justice transitionnelle, Democratic Republic of Congo CDA – Community Development Centre, Sudan CEDA – Community Extension Development Association, Sierra Leone CLADEM – Comité de América Latina y El Caribe para la
1515األوجه األساس ّية للتعويض عىل النساء والفتيات 1616أ – للنســاء والفتيــات الحـ ّـق يف اإلنصــاف والتعويــض وفقـاً للقانــون الــدويل. ولديهــن الحـ ّـق يف اإلفــادة مــن برامــج التعويــض املص ّممــة إلفــادة الضحايــا مبــارشة عــر توفــر ر ّد املمتلــكات ،والتعويــض ،وإعــادة الدمــج ،وغريهــا مــن اإلجـراءات واملبــادرات األساسـيّة الناشــئة عــن العدالــة االنتقاليّــة ،والتــي يف حــال تصميمهــا بعنايــة ودقّــة ،مــن شــأنها أن تكــون لهــا آثــار تصحيحيّــة، والسـ ّيام يف مجــال إعــادة الدمــج ،واإلرضــاء ،وضــان عــدم تكـرار الجرائــم. 1717ب – عــى الحكومــات عــدم اســتبدال التنميــة بالتعويــض .فجميــع املجتمعــات تحتــاج يف مرحلــة مــا بعــد الـراع إىل إعــادة اإلعــار والتنميــة، والتــي يش ـكّل التعويــض جــزءا ً ال يتجــزأ منهــا .ويواجــه الضحايــا ،والس ـ ّيام النســاء والفتيــات ،عقبــات معيّنــة يف محاولــة اغتنــام الفــرص التــي توفّرهــا التنميــة ،األمــر الــذي يهــدّد باســتبعادهن مــن هــذه العمليــة .فمــن الــروري اللجــوء إىل إجــراءات التمييــز اإليجــايب يف برامــج التعويــض ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
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Defensa de la Derechos de la Mujer, Peru CODEPU – Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo, Chile Coordinadora Nacional de Mujeres Afectadas por la Violencia Política, Peru Corporación Humanas, Chile Corporación para la Vida Mujeres que Crean, Colombia Demus – Estudio para la defensa y los derechos de las mujeres, Peru ESSAIM – Cadre de concertation et d’activités pour la protection et la défense des droits des femmes à l’est de la République démocratique du Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, USA FOKUPERS – East Timorese Women’s Communication Forum, Timor Leste. Grupo Suporta Inan, Timor Leste Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales, Guatemala International Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic, CUNY Law School, USA Khulumani Support Group, South Africa LDGL – Ligue des droits de l’Homme dans la région des Grands-Lacs, Rwanda Mamá Maquín, Guatemala MARWOPNET – Mano River Women Peace Network, Sierra Leone PAIF – Programme d’appui aux initiatives féminines, Democratic Republic of Congo PCS – Consejería en Proyectos, Latin America REDRESS, United Kingdom Ruta Pacifica de las Mujeres, Colombia SEVOTA – Solidarité pour l’épanouissement des veuves et des orphelins visant le travail et l’auto-promotion, Rwanda SOFEPADI – Solidarité féminine pour la paix et le développement intégral, Democratic Republic of Congo Women’s Forum, Sierra Leone Women’s Jurist Association, Burundi Women’s Research and Action Group, India
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Palestinian National Authority. Ministry of Women’s Affairs, National Committee to Combat Violence against Women. (2011). National Strategy for Combatting Violence Against Women: 2011-2019. Ramallah, West Bank. Palestinian National Council. (1988). Declaration of Independence. Retrieved from http://www.multaqa. org/pdfs/PNC%20INDEPENDANCE%20DECLERATION.pdf. (English). Peltz, A. (2006). Gender-based violence in Palestine: A case study. Jerusalem and Ramallah: Miftah. Rob-Jackson, C. (2012). Justice Watchdogs: Promoting Women’s Access to Justice Through Community-Based Paralegal Programs. Legal Working Paper Series on Legal Empowerment for Sustainable Development. Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2002). Femicide and the Palestinian criminal justice systems: Seeds of change in the context of state building? Law and Society Review, 36, 3, 577-606. _____________. (2003). Re-examining femicide: Breaking the silence and crossing “scientific” borders. Signs, 28(2), 581-608. Shomar, O. (2007). Crimes of women’s killing in Palestine in the period 2004-2006: Follow up and supervision. Ramallah, Palestine: Palestinian Non-governmental organization against domestic violence against women (al-Muntada). Smart, C. (1989). Feminism and the power of law. London: Routledge. Smith, A. (2000). Colors of violence. The national newsmagazine on race and politics, 11, 1-4. _____________. (2004). Beyond the politics of inclusion: Violence against Women of Color and Human Rights. Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism, 4(2), 120124. Snider, L. (1994). Feminism, punishment, and the potential of empowerment. Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 9, 75-104. Snider, L. (1998). Understanding the second great confinement. Queen’s Quarterly, 105(1), 29-46. Stoler, A. (1997). Race and the education of desire. Chapel Hill: Duke University Press. Tadiar, N. (1993). Sexual economies of the Asia-Pacific. In Arif Dirlik (Ed.), What’sinarim! Critical perspectives on the Pacific region idea (pp. 45-53). Boulder: Westview Press. Tallman, V. (1991, December 18). Tribes speak out on toxic assault. Lakota Times, Rapid City, South Dakota. _____________. (1992). Toxic waste of Indian lives. Covert Action, 17, 16-22. The Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR). (2013). Statement issued by ICHR on the occasion of the International Women’s Day/March 8th. Retrieved from the ICHR website http://www.ichr.ps/en/2/4/999/ Statement-issued-by-ICHR-on-the-Occasion-of-theInternational-Women%E2%80%99s-Day-/-March-8th-
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ACCESS DENIED، Palestinian Women’s Access to Justice in the Occupied West Bank
Research Report
Building Ties Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
UN Women oPt Alami (UNOPS) Building, Rosary Sisters School Street, Dahyet Al Barid PO Box 51359 East Jerusalem
May 2013
Tel.: +972 (0) 2 628 0450 Fax: +972 (0) 2 628 0661 Email: opt.co@unwomen.org http://palestine.unwomen.org www.unwomen.org
State of Palestine Ministry Of Women's Affairs
UN Women is the UN organization dedicated to gender equality and the empowerment of women. A global champion for women and girls, UN Women was established to accelerate progress on meeting their needs worldwide. UN Women supports UN Member States as they set global standards for achieving gender equality, and works with governments and civil society to design laws, policies, programmes and services needed to implement these standards. It stands behind women’s equal participation in all aspects of life, focusing on five priority areas: increasing women’s leadership and participation; ending violence against women; engaging women in all aspects of peace and security processes; enhancing women’s economic empowerment; and making gender equality central to national development planning and budgeting. UN Women also coordinates and promotes the UN system’s work in advancing gender equality
© 2014 UN Women. All rights reserved This research and report was prepared by the Institute of Women’s Studies (IWS) of Birzeit University, in cooperation with UN Women and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Palestinian Government, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Birzeit University, the Institute of Women’s Studies, UN Women, the United Nations or any of its affiliated organizations. Produced by UN Women office in oPt Photo Credit: UN Women/Shareef Sahran (2009) Design:
Research Report
Building Ties Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
May 2013
State of Palestine Ministry Of Women's Affairs
Acronyms & Abbreviations CAP
Consolidated Appeal Process
CEDAW
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
ECOSOC
United Nations Economic and Social Council
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FGDs
Focus Group Discussions
GS
Gaza Strip
ICT
Information and Communication Technology
ILO
International Labour Organization
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IWS
Institute of Women’s Studies
LACS
Local Aid Coordination System
LDF
Local Development Forum
MDGs
Millennium Development Goals
MoE
Ministry of Education
MoEHE
Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MoL
Ministry of Labour
MoPAD
Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development
MoSA
Ministry of Social Affairs
MoWA
Ministry of Women’s Affairs
NGO
Non-governmental organization
OCHA
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PA
Palestinian Authority
PCBS
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PLC
Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO
Palestine Liberation Organization
PNGO
Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Network
oPt
occupied Palestinian territory
SGs
Sector groups
SWGs
Sector Working Groups
UN
United Nations
UNDAF
United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UN Women
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF
United Nations Children›s Fund
UNRWA
United Nations Relief and Work Agency
WB
West Bank
WHO
World Health Organization
Table of Contents Introduction
6
1. Health and Population: Towards health frameworks and indicators
11
2. Education – Beyond accessibility: Towards a gender-sensitive education
23
3. Social Services: From charity to protection
41
4. Labor and Employment – Towards addressing the structural impediments
55
5. Women and Assets – The missing link
68
6. Access to Justice – Towards a legal structure for women’s empowerment
80
7. Political Participation – Beyond the numbers 88 8. Access to the Public Sphere – A main determinant of political participation
103
9. Violence against Women – Changing perceptions
113
10. International Aid and Policy Questions
122
ANNEX 1: Interviews and consultations
128
ANNEX 2: Overview of focus group discussions
131
INTRODUCTION 1. Aims and objectives of the study The Institute of Women’s Studies (IWS) at Birzeit University prepared this study at the request of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) in cooperation with and support of UN Women to provide the Ministry of Women’s Affairs’ staff with research evidence to support them in: 1.
Informing the ongoing assessment process of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs’ current Strategic Plan (2012-2013) and the formulation of the upcoming Strategic Plan (2014-2016);
2.
Advocating the integration of women’s empowerment strategies in targeted sectoral plans of line ministries for the years (2014-2016) based on an understanding of the existing gaps in current policies as well as the potential for constructive change;
3.
The final report is an evidence-based policy brief on selected thematic areas identifying key trends, challenges, policy priorities, and a range of strategic opportunities around which the Ministry of Women’s Affairs can focus its strategic plan while engaging other ministries in order to address existing problems in an orderly and effective manner.1
2. Methodology The study was conducted under the supervision of a Steering Committee comprising the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, UN Women, and IWS representatives. The idea and framework of the study emerged from a series of 1 See the minutes of the meetings of the Project Steering Committee on 23 October 2012; Project Terms of Reference. 6
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
consultations with the Steering Committee, in which priority was given to six main focal areas: women and population health; women’s education; women’s social protection; women’s economical participation and empowerment; women’s access to justice; and women’s participation in political and public life. In addition, violence against women, gender mainstreaming strategies, and the restructuring of international aid were identified as cross-cutting issues. Finally, the study places special focus on women and girls from marginalized and disadvantaged communities. Given the wide range of data, reports, studies, expertise, and cumulative experiences available at the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, we felt that the study should serves as an in-depth review and analysis of the available literature. Members of the Steering Committee emphasized the need to build on the review report prepared for the previous triennial Strategic Plan, as well as ongoing assessment and available literature. However, there was no need for a comprehensive situation analysis as it was inappropriate under the existing framework. Instead, the research team was asked to focus on significant changes and new trends in the thematic areas of the study. They were also urged to provide analysis related to strategic opportunities and policy priorities in harmony with the overall vision of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs toward enhancing equal rights and opportunities for men and women and girls and boys in its Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy 2011-2013. Based on the agreed thematic areas, the IWS formed a research team made up of more than six senior researchers with tremendous experience in the related thematic areas of the study. While academics were involved, both theoretically and practically, in the relevant areas of the study, the researchers provided important analyses and updated information about the targeted thematic areas. They also provided rich insights on broad contexts that provide information on the experiences as well as the
aspirations and challenges facing Palestinian women, in particular, and the Palestinian society in general. In addition to research work, members of the team conducted a series of meetings to discuss the theoretical frameworks and issues related to data collection. They also discussed and shared criticisms of each other’s results and analyses. The initial research started with an extensive literature review, with a particular focus on the studies and reports issued since the Ministry of Women’s Affairs last situation analysis. In addition, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) data was statistically analyzed for certain areas of interest. A series of focus group meetings, consultations, and interviews with experts were held to seek the feedback and input of a wide segment of civil society representatives and relevant government agencies. After the completion of the first draft of the report, a series of workshops were held to obtain feedback from experts on the preliminary results and recommendations. While the study was based on the Steering Committee’s commitment to a participatory approach, and despite the limited time available for the preparation of the report, the research included contributions from more than 50 men and women, including activists, practitioners, decision-makers and academics. The research team paid special attention to analyzing the nature of gender-sensitive systems and processes and understanding how the experiments and outcomes of such systems and processes differ across gender lines. In many, if not most, sectors, the comparison of quantitative indicators of access to services for males and females in the occupied Palestinian territory shows small differences. In this regard, the levels of the occupied Palestinian territory correspond to those of other countries in the region. At the same time, differences in access to livelihood opportunities and control over resources and assets, such as women’s labor force participation rate compared to men, show significant actual differences in the lived experiences of women and men. As such, researchers faced challenges in examining how systems, structures and processes (and their standard indicators) deepen inequality across gender lines. This work implied raising questions, not only about the meaning of the different indicators but also about what the numbers have failed to tell us and what they can tell us. For example, we need a better understanding of gender inequality in the health sector in view of health and well-being indicators rather than illness indicators. In the education sector, the analysis looks beyond accessibility indicators to examine what boys and girls learn in classrooms and the outcomes in terms of the life opportunities they expect as a result of their learning.
3. Challenges and obstacles · Restrictions imposed by Israel on movement between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the separation and fragmentation policies practiced by the occupation 7
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
forces and the ongoing internal political divide between the West Bank and Gaza Strip continue to undermine efforts to provide policy analysis and recommendations at the national level. · While reports and studies on the occupied Palestinian territory abound, many of these studies rely on weak, and sometimes incomplete, analyses. They also fail to follow a gender-based approach. · Incomplete, inaccurate or missing citations make it difficult to verify information. · While PCBS is making progress in terms of its local analysis capabilities and providing qualitative data on a range of issues, such data remains unanalyzed. Most of the gray literature reports, which use PCBS data, are limited to providing simple percentages without further analysis – as if data is self-explanatory. In any case, researchers are required to analyze the same data, including PCBS data, to generate new information. · Gender-disaggregated data are often missing. When available, such data are not disaggregated by geographical location or relevant socio-economic characteristics.
4. Structure of the report The report begins with an overview of the main characteristics of the general contexts of the occupied Palestinian territory which effectively influence the prospects for the formulation of national policies. The rest of the report consists of nine chapters. Seven chapters address the following focal areas: health and population; education; access to social protection; economic participation and empowerment; access to and control over assets; access to justice; and participation in political and public life. The last two chapters explore cross-cutting issues such as violence against women and international aid. Each chapter was prepared by a different researcher with relevant expertise. This has resulted in a richness and diversity of the approaches and methods used to understand the main challenges and opportunities in each sector. Each chapter is divided into three sections: (a) introduction and context, providing background on the local context and theoretical frameworks, (b) main results, highlighting the key trends and challenges in the current contexts of the Palestinian territories, (c) strategic opportunities and policy priorities, providing a number of recommendations. In editing the final report, we have attempted to maintain the voice of each researcher and the rich analysis and views provided by the various contributors.
5. The general context of the occupied Palestinian territory The long-standing military occupation and the widespread violence resulting from it are still the main features characterizing the political, social and economic situation of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Their dayto-day life entails a systematic denial of the most basic human rights, namely attending school, work and places of worship, access to healthcare, cultivating one’s field, visiting family or choosing the place of residence. Under the Israeli military occupation, Palestinians face persistent and severe violence on a regular and widespread basis, both overtly and covertly, permeating all aspects of life and leaving them no safe haven. This violence involves frequent military incursions; the destruction of life, property and economic livelihoods; ongoing displacement; arrests; complex and extensive territorial control; and broad restrictions on the movement of Palestinians, further deepening the separation, isolation and fragmentation of the Palestinian communities. The impact of the long-standing Israeli policies on creating a state of systematic “non-development” and geographical, political and social fragmentation of the Palestinian society is widely documented. Nevertheless, understanding the gender dimensions of the resulting transformations in the Palestinian society remains a challenge. Over the past 15 years, in particular, social and economic life has been profoundly de-stabilized and so too normative gender roles, relations and expectations. As Palestinian households fall victim to ongoing destruction of their livelihoods and absence of everyday security, many of the former roles and arrangements between men and women, as well as the mutual expectations associated with them have come under severe stress. This situation raises important questions as to the ways in which the intensity and magnitude of political, social and economic violence decomposed the previous gender arrangements and to what extent new ones emerged in their place. Given this complex situation, a number of salient characteristics of the Palestinian society emerge, with their resulting significant policies.
imprisoned the majority of democratically elected Hamas representatives. On the level of day-to-day governance, both the West Bank and Gaza Strip governments are incapable of undertaking most of the basic responsibilities of government anywhere. They cannot decide who is a “citizen” or who simply enters or leaves the areas under their ostensible control. They cannot undertake basic protection functions – with rights limited to internal and civil policing. Most aspects of economic planning (such as internal and external trade) and economic development strategies are beyond their control. Land and natural resource policy, urban planning and infrastructure are all confined within the physical limits of areas A and B that Israeli allows. While totally vulnerable to Israeli intervention, Palestinians and their governments are also extremely vulnerable to international actors. Rather than carrying through their responsibilities under International Humanitarian Law (and specifically the Geneva Conventions) to protect the occupied population, external actors have intervened primarily to affect the political behavior or determine the viability of the Palestinian leadership.2 The outcome of this high degree of external intervention and lack of autonomy is the extremely narrowed scope for Palestinians to exercise free will and independent decision-making. This is obvious at the government level. For instance, in terms of gender, government policy remains severely constrained – restricted to the limited areas and population under its jurisdiction, while simultaneously unable to freely prioritize resources for gender needs, given its total aid-dependence on international donors. But it is also true in terms of households and their members. Many of the most basic decisions of life – where to live, work or study within their own patrimony is beyond the ability to free choice. As much, the most intimate life-decision of who to marry or whether to have another child is often completely constrained by the crippling realities of residency requirements and movement restrictions. And dealing with limited life choices always involves calculations based on gender – usually at the expense of the weaker parties of girls and women.
A high degree of external intervention and a low degree of self-determination or autonomy Israel, through its vast military machinery continues to hold comprehensive and decisive power over all spheres of Palestinian life. Through its control over external borders, the population register, added to its internal mobility regime, all aspects of Palestinian decision-making continue to be determined by the limited horizons that Israeli power allows. Thus, on the political level, holding legislative council (PLC) elections is dependent on whether Israel allows them. Israel can also simply dispense with democratic outcomes – such as following the 2006 PLC elections, when they 8
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2 Since 2000, international aid has accounted for 53 per cent to 162 per cent of the annual Palestinian government expenditure (GE) attesting that the occupied Palestinian territory is structurally dependent on external financial support (MAS 2009 16). This aid has fluctuated dramatically – with higher aid flows during periods of “humanitarian emergency (such as in 2012, the watershed year of Israeli military invasions in the West Bank, when it reached 162 per cent of GE as well as when there is a political investment in a standing government (thus following 2008 support for Palestinian National Authority was reflected in a 16 per cent jump in donor aid (MAS 2009 16). It is also lower when displeased with Palestinian political behavior – following the outcome of the 2005 Palestinian Legislative Council elections and the creation of a national unity government between Fatah and Hamas, when aid was almost completely stopped.
A high degree of securitization without protection At present, security forces of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank are comprised of approximately 23,000 personnel while in the Gaza Strip, the Hamas Government has a separate force comprised of approximately 25,000 (Milton-Edwards, 2009). This means a police to civilian population ratio of approximately 1 to 60 in the Gaza Strip and 1 to 110 in the West Bank while in liberal democracies the ratio on average is 1 to 500. Given that even in unstable post-conflict situations such as Kosovo the ratio is 1 to 404, it is clear that Palestinians have one of the highest police to civilian ratio in the world (Last et al, 2009; 13, 31). As noted in Penny Johnson’s chapter, while unable to offer protection against Israeli aggression, the security services are also unable to provide the protection of even civil policing to many communities. The gendered implications of securitization without security are myriad. On the economic level, the security sector budget takes up the majority of government resources at the expense of health, social security and education. Security sector jobs are profoundly gender-exclusionary – as the largest single employer within the Palestinian Authority and Hamas public sectors it is almost completely closed to women. Shrinking Space for Public Action; a Domesticated Public Sphere Israel controls the narrow confines in which Palestinian public action is even possible – thus outside the confines of Areas A – public action, even when visibly non-violent (such as in the villages of Ni’ilin and Bi’lin, or in East Jerusalem) has to contend with Israeli military brutality and bureaucratic sanctions. But within the confines of Area A and within the Gaza Strip the space for public action also continues to narrow – partly as a result of the skewed nature of Palestinian securitization. Given that the Palestinian security forces, are unable to undertake either nationalist resistance or protection from the fundamental threats to the civilian population (be it by Israeli soldiers, settlers or Israeli policy generally), in both regions they have become ever more focused on internally policing the population – be it politically, ideologically or socially. In the process, in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the public sphere becomes more and more devoid of space for public criticism of either standing government or their policies, while particularly in the Gaza Strip (but not only) security forces increasingly narrow the space for social freedom. The hard won struggle for an autonomous women’s rights movement has not escaped this political fate. Growing Social Fragmentation and Socio-Economic Inequality Over the decade, the separation of the occupied Palestinian territory into three main geo-political units, has become institutionalized. Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem have lived in 9
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separate economies and under vastly different political/ bureaucratic regimes (either under the Palestinian Authority, Hamas de facto-government, or direct Israeli rule). Given the ongoing enclavization in the West Bank – everyday lives, social and economic possibilities and futures are now vastly different depending on whether one lives in an urban center, in “Area C”, the Jordan Valley or in a seam zone community caught between the Wall and Israel. This means not only that life chances are increasingly determined by specific geographic settings – but that these processes have led to Palestinian society as a whole becoming increasingly differentiated and unequal. The Collapse of a Unified National Project and the Rise of a Polarized Polity Finally, perhaps the greatest challenge facing Palestinians in 2013 is the collapse of their most hard-won and longstanding achievement – their unity as a polity under the national movement as represented by the PLO. The breakdown of the unified national movement into two rival governments can only be understood as a product of the various processes outlined above. But the collapse of the national movement is not just another outcome of these powerful forces that have succeeded in disinheriting Palestinians from their patrimony and national rights into the 21st Century. Instead, a unified national movement is the fundamental pre-condition for finding a way forward and beyond them.
6. Developing national strategies for gender equality The above-mentioned features of the Palestinian context have special implications as to the capacity and means to develop national policies. The development of policies requires, first and foremost, a political vision of how to form and organize society (Walter, Morris, and Simpson, updated). This requires a framework and an ethical foundation that constitutes a basis for and supports this vision based on policy agenda (priorities) derived from scientific information based on collective, logical, and specific social interests (Simon, 1997). Policies are usually developed by governments which adopt beliefs and values emerging from the democratic process and the engagement of voters and government officials (Walter, Morris, and Simpson, updated). Policies must be consistent and coherent (Michel, 2007). This means that the different policies of the various sectors must be coordinated to ensure that they support one another and contain no contradictions. Moreover, these policies must be based on the same beliefs and values. Furthermore, policies must be explained and defended in public discussions, so that a general agreement on the basic elements is reached. In the end, policies become written statements that describe principles, requirements, and limitations. They indicate what needs to be done
and establish rights, requirements, and responsibilities between citizens and the state (Unit, P. 2005). The current context in the occupied Palestinian territory poses a number of questions regarding the prospects and possibilities of developing national policies. These include: ·
How are policies developed and defined?
·
What are the moral principles and values that support and promote policies?
·
What are the objectives of these policies?
·
How are these objectives defined? And based on what evidence?
·
Do both the citizens and government approve these policies? And what are the mechanisms used to ensure agreement?
·
Have the various sectoral policies been linked and coordinated to together form public policy objectives?
·
What is the role of international and humanitarian aid policy-making? And what are the consequences?
These are just some of the questions that must be raised in relation to the development of gender-specific policies in the occupied Palestinian territory. It is clear that very little of the above-mentioned criteria have been followed and adopted. This means that for the purpose of advancing gender equality there is a need to develop in parallel ethical principles and political vision based on equality, fairness, freedom and justice.
English references IWS (forthcoming) A dangerous decade: The 2nd gender profile of the occupied West Bank and Gaza (2000 – 2010). Birzeit: Institute of Women’s Studies, Birzeit University. Michel, L. (2007). EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development. European Commission. Simon, D. (1997). Development reconsidered: New directions in development thinking. Geografiska Annaler. Series B. Human Geography, 183-201. Unit, P. (2005). Guidelines for Policy Formulation, Development and Review. University of the Free State. Wallter, P., Morris, R., & Simpson, D. (Undated). Understanding the Formulation and Development of Government Policy in the Context of FOI. London: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/ cdp/cdp_publications/2012cdppolicynote.pdf.
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1 Health and population
Towards health frameworks and indicators
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1.1. Introduction and context 1.1.1. An alternative discourse The first fact we have to face in order to have a sound understanding of health and security is that “the circumstances in which people are born, grow up, live, work and age, and the systems put in place to deal with illness” are social determinants of health – as emphasized by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2008 (Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2008). It is worth mentioning here that Palestinian health workers have realized since the 1980s the effect of the more comprehensive social, economic, and political contexts on the health of the population. Since then, the concept of health as a social construction has captured their attention. This early interest may be attributed to the clarity of the conditions of the Israeli military occupation, and its direct impact on the health status of the population, particularly during the first Palestinian Intifada, which resulted in thousands of injuries and disabilities (Giacaman, Health as a Social Construction: The Debate in the Occupied Territories, 1989). This alternative view of the nature of heath and illness and their causes is a cornerstone for any attempt to address women and population health. There is an urgent need to think outside the walls of clinics and hospitals and outside the sphere of health services and sectors in order to achieve any improvement in the health situation. We must also seek to align healthcare services with the local community’s view of itself. Cooperation between different sectors must be established, with a focus on the concept of justice and the basic healthcare principles. Another issue that must be addressed is that Palestinian studies focus on disease rather than health. Indeed, most indicators used to assess health are biomedical indicators concerned with disease only. For example, we have the mother and child mortality rate, the prevalence of anemia among pregnant women, and the incidence rate of chronic diseases. These indicators observe a late stage of shifting between wellness and illness. People continuously traverse the continuum between health and illness, according to the degree of the harm/damage caused (physical, moral, social, or political as in the case of Palestinians). This does not exclude the cumulative impact of humiliation over the years. After a period of going back and forth, one may rest in the illness zone. Only then the case is observed, without paying due attention to the conditions that have accumulated over the years and led to illness (Giacaman R, et al, 2010). Third, if we agree that health is not just the absence of disease, and it certainly isn’t, we must start using health indicators to measure health and disease indicators to measure disease. This leads to the need for self-reported health indicators (which measure an individual’s perception 12
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of his or her overall health, for example the WHO well-being index) (Psychiatric Research Unit, WHO, 1998) along with the (objective) biomedical measures, which are necessary, but inadequate for assessing health. Fourth, percentages, i.e. numbers, do not speak for themselves. They need to be analyzed and explained in order to be used as a database that informs the policymaking process. It is useless to keep stating that women do not seek postnatal care, based on the small percentages that seek such services. What should be done here is to try to understand the reasons why only a small number of women seek postnatal care, without blaming the victim. This means we should not automatically assume that the reason why women do not seek such services is “ignorance” as this leads to ineffective healthcare awareness efforts in most cases. There is an almostcomplete study by the Institute of Community and Public Health at Birzeit University which raises questions about the quality of postnatal care services provided in clinics and the extent to which they meet women’s needs. The study recommends reevaluating those services, taking women’s needs into consideration before taking any step forward. Finally, in accordance with and interpretation of a number of international conventions and the vision of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, we must examine the reasons why certain groups of the population (such as women and people living under the poverty line, etc.) suffer from poor health conditions compared to other population groups. We must also examine the organizational structures and mechanisms that lead to such variation in the health levels between the various groups in the same society. Biomedical measures are often used to evaluate the health of individuals rather than communities. As a result, important factors are neglected, leading to lower health levels for certain population groups which are subject to social factors that affect health. This is exactly why biomedical indicators are inadequate, even though necessary. This is also why we need a broader view taking the context into consideration. We need to reach the root causes of poor health conditions in the Palestinian society, particularly amongst women.
1.1.2. Analysis framework Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) have lived in war-like conditions for long decades. These extraordinary circumstances have affected the health conditions of the population in various ways. Most are not taken into consideration when counting the deaths, injuries, and disabilities from political violence. One paradoxical example is that according to biomedical indicators, Palestinian health improved in the 1980s. According to the same indicators, Palestinians’ health declined post-Oslo. To a large extent, this paradox is attributed to the impossibility of studying the healthcare system from the perspective of community public health in light of the incarceration and siege imposed by Israel
as well as the lack of sovereignty on borders, land, water, population movement, and commodities (Giacaman R, et al, 2009). Life under the Israeli occupation has created a chronic sense of distress, social suffering, and lack of security among the Palestinians, which are all associated with the circumstances of war (Batniji, R, et al, 2009) (Ziadni, M, et al, 2011). To this we may add the negative impacts of exposure to direct political violence. Surveys, conducted on Palestinians, show that the lack of a sense of security and feelings of distress have negative impacts on health if well-being and health indicators are used (Abu-Rmeileh, N, et.al, 2011). In addition, it has become established that stress that causes distress can lead to illness (Stewart-Brown, 1998). Hence the importance of using self-reported health indicators, which measure an individual’s perception of his or her overall health, when developing health-related policies. Understanding the comprehensive context, in which the population lives is a precondition for understanding health, particularly women’s health.
1.2. Main results Trends and challenges 1.2.1. Demographic and epidemiological changes In the past 20-30 years, Palestinians have experienced a demographic transition characterized by a low infant mortality rate and a growing “youth bulge” with 29 per cent of the population aged between 15 and 29 and 72 per cent aged under 30 (PCBS, 2010). At the same time, the society is aging, as 4.4 per cent of the population is over 60. Also, the fertility rate decreased to 4.1 in 2008-2009 (3.1 in the West Bank and 4.9 in the Gaza Strip) (PCBS, 2008). These demographic changes were followed by epidemiological changes, namely a low incidence rate of infectious diseases, particularly childhood diseases. This has resulted in a lower infant and child mortality rate and an increased life expectancy, in addition to a rise in noncommunicable diseases such as hypertension, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and cancer to an epidemic level. Mortality rate studies emphasize that the oPt have gone through a rapid demographic and epidemiological transition. Thirty years ago, infectious diseases were the main cause of death. Today, chronic diseases are the main cause of death (Abu-Rmeileh, N, et al, 2008). The increasing rates of chronic diseases carry a special significance in relation to women’s health. Recent studies have revealed that women aged 51-60 have higher rates of diabetes (25 per cent compared to 16 per cent for men). Similarly, 32 per cent of women have hypertension compared to 16 per cent for men. As for cancer in the age group 41-50, 0.7 per cent of women had cancer 13
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compared to 0.2 per cent of men (PCBS, 2010). Research (Husseini A., et al, 2009) also shows that urbanization and the shift from Mediterranean dietary habits to western dietary habits that are associated with higher obesity rates (particularly amongst women) have led to a higher incidence rate of chronic diseases. It is difficult for the existing healthcare system, which is programmed to provide maternity and child healthcare services, to handle such changes. As such, it faces a double burden. In addition to the regular services provided to mothers and children, another burden was added, namely handling the increase in disease rates among the elderly. On the other hand, people have to handle such epidemiological and demographic changes by changing their lifestyle in an attempt to increase physical activity, lose weight and change dietary habits. But it is difficult to implement such lifestyle changes because of the restrictions on movement imposed by the Israeli army, social restrictions on women’s movement, and inadequate physical activity because of the shift from income-generating work in the field to professions of static nature (such as civil service jobs). Similarly, it is difficult for women to change their eating habits to reduce factors leading to chronic diseases, such as reducing fats and carbohydrates in their food, because healthy food costs more. So, poverty is often an obstacle to controlling our diet (and not what some healthcare workers call “ignorance”). The question that remains here is: what is the point of providing health education when women cannot change their behavior because of the context in which they live? So, it becomes clear that we need to change some elements in this context, so that women can make use of the health education they receive.
1.2.2. Underdevelopment-related diseases Despite the ongoing epidemiological transition and high chronic disease rates, some underdevelopment and poverty-related illnesses still plague the Palestinian female population. For example, a PCBS study indicates that the prevalence rate of anemia among married non-pregnant women was slightly higher compared to pregnant women, 35 per cent to 31 per cent respectively (PCBS. Birzeit University, 2003). These results are inconsistent with the global fact that anemia is more prevalent among pregnant women. However, this data may be analyzed in light of the fact that Palestinian healthcare services focus on prenatal, mother and child care while ignoring all other aspects of women’s health and needs. In addition, the local concern for chronic diseases continues to focus on men only. We may conclude from the above that to make a change, the main priority of policies and implementation programs must focus on moving toward a broader perception of women’s health and illness so that it does not remain limited to mother and child health. Also, the healthcare system must be upgraded to address the needs of Palestinian women regardless of
their social status or being pregnant or not.
1.2.3. Early marriage and high celibacy rates PCBS data indicate that the average age at first-marriage for females increased to 20 years in 2011 (20.2 years in the West Bank and 19.8 in the Gaza Strip) (PCBS, 2011). Yet, PCBS preliminary data for the years 1997-2007 indicate a high rate of child marriage (under the age of 18) accompanied by a high celibacy rate. Rates vary by region in the oPt. The highest rate of early marriage was observed in Hebron, and the highest celibacy rate was observed in Ramallah/Al-Bireh (Abu Rmeileh and Hammoudeh, unpublished data). PCBS recorded an increase in celibacy rates among women (over 30 years of age) in 2010 by 9 per cent compared to 3 per cent for men (PCBS, 2010). Of course such changes impact women’s health. On the one hand, early marriage and pregnancy are dangerous to health while on the other high celibacy rates increase family and social pressures. Also, celibacy involves exclusion from healthcare services which focus mainly on mother, child and prenatal care. The logic upon which this system is based is that women’s health needs are related to childbirth only. This suggests that the only role that may affect a woman’s health is reproduction, not any other life activity, such as paid or household work, or any other stage in a woman’s life. This narrow view of women’s social role inevitably leads to neglecting the health needs of non-pregnant women, whether single or married. This is another point that needs policy and implementation attention as 9 per cent of women over the age of 30 in the oPt are unmarried. This means that 190,000 women are excluded from healthcare services because of the absence of programs for single women’s health. In addition, single women, particularly those over the age of 30, face a social stigma because they are unmarried. Unmarried women are categorized in a non-scientific and derogatory manner as “spinsters” rather than “single”, the simple word used for unmarried men. This underscores the need for objective medical classifications and moral indicators related to the quality of life for single women when assessing women’s health in the future.
1.2.4. Pregnancy, delivery and postdelivery care Studies indicate that prenatal care and supervised delivery (in hospitals and clinics, not at home) have constantly risen since 2000, almost everywhere (Abdul Rahim H., et al, 2009), but the quality of this service remains questionable. For example a significant increase in caesarean deliveries was observed in the oPt (from 6 per cent in 1996 to 15 per cent in 2006) (Abdul-Rahim, H, et al, 2009). The highest rate was recorded in the West Bank; 19 per cent in 2010 (oPt Health and Nutrition Cluster, 2012), 14
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exceeding the WHO recommended acceptable rates. There is a possibility that these results reflect unnecessary surgeries, putting the mother and the baby’s health at risk because high fertility rates and poor healthcare increase risk factors. These results also indicate problems in the emergency response system. As such, it is recommended that the system is placed under observation. There is also a need to investigate how caesarean delivery decisions are made and to follow up the results of such surgeries. So, there is a need for a thorough review of the current practices and for new assessment indicators in order to determine the gaps separating us from a sound obstetric healthcare system. Defining the cases that require caesarean delivery and setting a plan to reduce the number of surgeries performed for non-medical reasons are a priority for future policies. Caesarean deliveries overwhelm the already overburdened healthcare system, both financially and in terms of human resources. As for postnatal care services, they are still not used by many women (not because of ignorance). PCBS data indicates that only 38 per cent of women reported receiving postnatal care from a trained person after two deliveries (PCBS, 2010). According to PCBS, postnatal care involves at least one visit to a healthcare specialist in the first six weeks after delivery (PCBS, 2007). This accurately matches the WHO definition of healthcare services that meet the minimum care requirements, as the post delivery period is crucial to the health and quality of life of the mother and the infant. Many pieces of research focus on biomedical aspects such as visiting the healthcare specialist – something that is not common among Palestinian women. In contrast, a study on women’s quality of life in the post-delivery period indicated several healthcare needs which exceed the specialist’s visit. The study highlighted the type of services provided in the post-delivery period. While 44 per cent of women stated that moral support comes on top of their priorities, 21 per cent stated that medical services are more important. This result emphasizes the need to introduce measurement indicators beyond the limited domain of currently provided postnatal biomedical services. It also indicates that healthcare services need to go beyond the traditional health standards (inside the clinic) to meet women’s needs as expressed by women. Mother and infant home visiting programs are essential for providing the support they need.
1.2.5. Fertility and infertility The Palestinian fertility rate has been the subject of many discussions given its close association with the Palestinian people’s struggle for survival, justice, and sovereignty. The point of contention is the population balance between Palestinians and the Israelis. Israelis view fertility as a danger; whereas Palestinians view it as a resistance weapon (Courbage, 1999). Despite the decline in the Palestinian fertility rate from 6.1 in 1991 (PCBS, 2006) to 4.1 in 2008-2009 (PCBS, 2010), we notice that
the interest in having children and fertility rates are, to some extent, a mystery as they are not linked to women’s education levels only; educated women in the Gaza Strip are more fertile than educated women in other parts of the world.3 It is believed that the low participation rates of adult females in the labor force explain why fertility rates have remained high, despite their decline. On the other hand, it can be seen that Palestinians’ interest in having children has not affected the ratio of investment in their health (child mortality rates are decreasing) or in their education (Palestinians have the highest literacy rate in the Arab world). Indeed, we find that the needs of middle-class Palestinians and the framework in which the population lives, which in turn determines their rate fertility, is not taken into account in these debates about Palestinian fertility. For example, it is clear that the measures taken by individuals or households to live and survive drive them to have children. As a result, fertility rates remain the same. As long as there is no social security system in place to ensure a decent life for the elderly and to provide the different life requirements, such as housing, healthcare, income, disability needs, and food, especially food that reduces the risk of chronic disease, Palestinians are expected to continue to depend on their children in their old age instead of social security. This explains, to a large extent, the constant increase in fertility rates compared to expectations of each development stage (Giacaman, Population and Fertility. Population Policies, Women’s Rights, and Sustainable Development, 1997). This situation requires comprehensive policies that go far beyond providing access to family planning or population control as indicators of change. This is confirmed by Ministry of Women’s Affairs and some UN studies. (MoWA indicators 2011-2013) (Division for the Advancement of Women; Department of Economic and Social Affairs, undated). The situation also requires policies broader than those which focus on access to healthcare. These policies assume that the needs not provided by the healthcare system will automatically be met through family planning instead of viewing these needs as universal needs that affect the living conditions and quality of life of women, particularly older women. In other words, all these complex facts require a policy view that extends beyond family planning measures. The policies in place require reformulation to become conscious of the social context and gender issues and involve all sectors to be able to handle the complex population problems in the oPt. It is safe to say that we cannot handle the current conflict between the immediate living needs and planning for a sustainable future development unless a balanced trend is adopted in the form of policies that take the living needs of the population into consideration. On the other hand, if we are to seriously take the needs of men and women into consideration in order 3 A personal phone call with Professor Marwan Khawaja, a pioneering demographic statistics expert in the Demographic & Social Statistics Section, ESCWA, Beirut. 15
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to reduce fertility, we must take infertility-associated problems as seriously. For many years, the infertility rate among Palestinian couples stood at 7-10 per cent. It reached 8.4 per cent in 2010 (PCBS, 2011). Yet, women’s health indicators fail to take this important point into consideration, namely that there are men and women who need fertility care and treatment. As indicated above, children play an important role in ensuring social protection in old age because of the lack of an effective social security system for Palestinians. So, it is not surprising that sub-fertile or infertile couples suffer greatly because of their inability to have children. Having children is one of the primary purposes of marriage in the Palestinian society. In addition, having children enhances the social status and capacity of Palestinian women and enables them to participate in social life more freely. What makes things worse is that infertile women are blamed for their infertility. They face mocking and sometimes ostracism or divorce. An infertile woman lives under much social pressure, not only from her husband and his family, but also from her local community and the society as a whole. So, infertility is a major threat to women’s status and influence in society. There is also the risk of facing financial and healthcare needs in addition to other old age needs. (Giacaman, Introduction. Reproductive Health. Infertility Among Palestinian Women: Urgent Medical and Socio-cultural Concerns, 2012). Contrary to the stated objectives of women’s institutions, we find litte support being provided to women in the face of infertility, including from international donors and humanitarian institutions aiming at improving the status of Palestinian women. On the contrary, they only seem to be interested in birth control, by focusing on family planning services supported and established by development aid. There is no doubt that focusing on providing access to family planning services is extremely important, but it is not enough, as it does not take into consideration people’s inalienable right to have children, particularly women. So, it becomes clear that the provision of infertility treatment services by government institutions must become a priority when setting new policies and implementation programs.
1.2.6. Menopause and elderly women’s health To date, there is no sufficient information regarding the quality and form of healthcare services provided by healthcare institutions in the oPt. While information regarding the number of cases (not only individuals coming to clinics) are abundant, we still need more research to identify the gaps in the services provided. This is especially so because healthcare for women should not stop at providing natal and postnatal services. They should include all healthcare needs and for all women, be they single, married and not pregnant, menopausal or elderly women. Some initial research conducted in Ramallah may shed the light on such gaps (Khatib, R, Ghandour, R, et
al, 2011). This research indicates that clinics only provide prenatal and postnatal care, family planning services, and treatment of gynecological diseases including medical care for infections and breast, uterus, or ovary problems, in addition to conducting examinations and tests. The results of this research also indicated that the majority of the women who visit the clinics were married (throughout the study period; 4 months). Half of them sought prenatal services. The second purpose for visiting the clinic was to seek family planning services. Postnatal services were very limited. In general, the services provided marginalize and exclude some women, particularly unmarried, menopausal, and elderly women. The study concluded that in order to reach a broader perception of what women’s healthcare should be like, there is an urgent need to train, educate, and supervise staff to be able to carry out women’s health protocols. Certain problems regarding diagnosis and treatment prescription were observed. The study recommended monitoring and following up such practices. Yet, the needs of menopausal and elderly women go beyond the scope of the healthcare services provided. Once again, we stress that meeting these needs requires the collaboration of efforts and policies of a number of ministries and sectors. For instance, socially, women face humiliation because of a biological phase they go through, namely menopause and losing the ability to give birth. Some medical workers use the term “age of despair” (the term colloquially used in Arabic to refer to menopause) to speak of the menopause period, an indication of how deeply rooted this degrading view of women’s biological stages is, even among healthcare providers. As if women’s only role in society is to give birth, once a woman is unable to do so, she must feel despair because of losing her main value in life. In the process, the symptoms and consequences of menopause are neglected, although they might cause much suffering and require effective care inside and outside the clinic through home visiting and society rehabilitation and involvement. There are some Palestinian statistics on the elderly that may wake us up from our slumber. In 2010, extended family households comprised only 12 per cent of all households in the oPt. This means that most elderly people live alone. Also, 91 per cent of elderly men are married, in contrast with the percentage of married elderly women: 43 per cent. Also, 50 per cent of women are widowed, compared to 8 per cent for men (a clear sign that men get married when their wives die, whereas women do not). On the other hand, 25 per cent of the elderly are poor, even though they represent 4.4 per cent of the total population. This means that the elderly represent 5 per cent of the total number of poor people in the oPt and that the elderly are poorer than the rest of the population. There is a clear trend toward an increasing aging rate in the oPt. The average life expectancy increased to 71 years for men and 73.9 years for women in 2011 (PCBS, 2011). 16
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Meanwhile, there is an increase in the number of nuclear families. This raises the question of how and who takes care of the elderly, particularly in light of the absence of elderly care institutions, in contrast to the abundance of family institutions. The fate of the elderly and the method of elderly care in nuclear family households, which, in turn, lack the necessary financial, moral, and social resources for providing elderly care, is a problem that cannot be underestimated. Considering the age differences between couples and the higher average life expectancy for women compared to men, it becomes clear that larger numbers of women get widowed and face a life of destitution at old age. This means that age is qualitative, with more women living longer than men and facing various handicaps. Generally speaking, more people are living longer and they will inevitably need a variety of services. These not only include medical care but also home care and social services, including meal delivery services. The problem here is not only a problem of human rights, equality and justice, but also a problem where efforts are needed to lift the burden of caring for the elderly from the shoulders of the young, particularly women, so that they are more able to effectively participate in the labor force – provided that elderly and child care are equally included in institutional services. Policies that foster child and elderly care needs would rejuvenate the economy, consolidate the independence of women and the elderly, and improve their quality of life, dignity and self-confidence at the same time. In all cases, the demographic trends observed in the last decade stress the need for providing care for the elderly by giving them priority in surveys, research and policy-making and implementation programs in the future.
1.2.7. People with disabilities The disability rate in the oPt has remained constant over the years. In 2011, the reported rate was 2.7 per cent (2.9 per cent in the West Bank, and 2.4 per cent in the Gaza Strip). Disability affects all ages but people with disabilities face the consequences of the aging society when the difficulties of aging are added to the burden of disability in the case of older persons with disability. A survey conducted by PCBS in 2011 provides valuable data in this regard. As expected, disability rates increase with age; 32 per cent of people over 75 are registered as disabled. 34.1 per cent of women, 28.9 per cent of men, 1.8 per cent of boys, and 1.3 per cent of girls are registered as disabled. One third of the people with disabilities were never married. Another third never went to school. Also, 87 per cent of them do not work. The study observed some of the unmet needs of people with disability, starting from the simplest vision aids such as eyeglasses, hearing aids, wheelchairs to facilitate their movement in society and work, not to mention speech therapy programs, physical therapy, occupational therapy or any other form of rehabilitation that may relieve some
of their suffering. Of course people with disability suffer from poor integration in society. A large percentage of people with disability (up to 76.4 per cent) do not use public transportation because of its poor infrastructure. About one fifth of people with disability dropped out of school because of financial problems or environmental obstacles. Also, most of them suffer from the social stigma associated with their disability (PCBS, 2011). All these results emphasize the need for incorporating the needs of people with disability and the elderly in all sectoral policies.
freedom. It seems that the patriarchal system, by limiting women’s movement outside the house and compelling men to go out the house in search for livelihood, has caused this paradoxical protective effect for women. The public sphere, i.e. the world of men, is full of daily dangers, violations, anxiety at checkpoints, exposure to arrest, detention, self-inspection, prevention from crossing, and humiliation – which may explain this result. However, these results emphasize the need to pay attention to men’s health too, as the gender issue is misunderstood to be concerning women only whereas gender affects both men and women’s lives.
1.2.8. Exposure to Israeli political violence and its impact on health
Studies conducted on the West Bank population show high levels of psychological distress inside the house, particularly during the Israeli army incursions. This includes cases of severe distress, insomnia, involuntary fear, fatigue, depression, and humiliation. All were accompanied by negative health symptoms. A study conducted on adolescents in Ramallah showed that exposure to humiliation was significantly associated with an increased number of subjective health complaints (Giacaman, 2007); whereas collective exposure to violence was associated with negative impacts on mental health even after making modifications to the results in terms of gender, residence and other associated factors.
It is well known that wars and conflicts have an adverse impact on health. In addition to death, injury, disability, displacement, and difficult access to healthcare services, people are constantly exposed to danger during conflicts. This stress leads to a state of distress, which ultimately leads to illness (Watts et al, 2007). Yet, describing Palestinians’ suffering continues to be limited to counting deaths, injuries and disabilities without paying attention to the impact of war on population’s health and the consequent “internal wounds”. Interest in the security aspect of people’s lives opens the way for taking self-reported measures of health status into consideration such as people’s assessment of their own security, fears, and health status and using the selfassessment health and well-being index to complement objective measures and assess the health situation (Schalock, 2004). Here, in the oPt, the measures derived from self-assessed health status provide us with the means to assess the impact of war-like conditions on the health status of the population as biomedical measures alone are inadequate. In 2005, WHO “Well-being Index” was used to assess the quality of life of Palestinians living in the oPt. It was applied on a general sample of the adult population. This research showed that the quality of life in the oPt is lower than any other country listed by WHO (Mataria et al, 2009). The study also showed that the respondents had great fears for their personal safety and the safety of their families. They had fears of losing their source of income, house, or land as well as fears for their future and the future of their families. They were “careworn”, a broad expression that encompasses emotions of fears, sadness, depression, anguish, anxiety, powerlessness, and deprivation. Most respondents said they were negatively affected by the constant violations of the Israeli military occupation, shutdowns, sieges, and violence among the Palestinians. It is worth mentioning that women reported higher rates of quality of life compared to men (Mataria et al, 2009). It is a surprising result, as women generally have fewer opportunities compared to men in a patriarchal society that discriminates against women and limits their 17
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This study is also of significance as it documents differences between boys and girls in exposure to violence and the emergence of symptoms. Whereas the level of exposure to violence between boys and girls was very high, boys were more exposed to forms of violence such as beating by the Israeli army, humiliation, being used as a human shield, inhalation of tear gas, self-inspection, arrest, and detention, among others. Meanwhile, there was a higher prevalence of depressive-like symptoms among girls compared with boys. These results are similar to the results of other studies in both parts of the oPt. They can be explained by the different social environments for both men and women. Social rules allow boys a wider scope of freedom, especially outside the house and the school. So, they are more exposed to political violence compared to girls (who remain protected from violations, once again as a paradoxical effect of the patriarchal system restrictions). A study conducted in the Gaza Strip in 2008 came out with similar results to that of the West Bank: high rates of distress and fear, particularly among children. It was reported that children are exposed to traumatic incidents like seeing their relatives getting killed, seeing mutilated bodies, or having their homes demolished. These studies cite several mental symptoms including behavioral problems, speech difficulties, fears, anxiety, anger, low performance at school, or difficulty doing homework (United Nations, 2008). Perhaps there is not much to be done now to stop the ongoing Israeli violations suffered by the population on a daily basis. However, it is important not to “cause damage”. The damages caused by the violation of the
rights of Palestinian people find their roots in sociopolitical issues. This requires us to search for sociopolitical solutions and not just medical prescriptions of tranquilizers, pain relievers or psychotherapy sessions, or diagnose trauma and distress as diseases. We should not contribute to describing war suffering as illness; thus increasing pressure on victims. In fact, our studies on the mental, social, and psychological health institutions have shown a kind of exaggeration in prescribing medication, to the extent of rejecting any call for addressing the root causes of distress (Giacaman, 2004). There’s no doubt that a proportion of the population needs medication and psychotherapy sessions, but it is a small proportion. Most of the Palestinians go back and forth between well-being and illness continuously, as a result of being exposed to violence, trauma, and distress on a daily basis. Despite having some symptoms as a result of this constant going back and forth, they are not sick. They suffer from violations and long for an end to these violations and for justice.
1.2.9. Wives of men in Israeli prisons Reports confirm that the Israeli army has arrested or detained more than 800,000 Palestinians on political charges since 1967 (PCBS and Ministry of Detainees and Ex-detainees’ Affairs, 2012). The number of persons arrested in 2012 is around 4,000 (B’tselem, 2012). While the media and various reports are interested in the issue of arrest and imprisonment, we know little of the impact of men’s imprisonment on their wives and children. A recent study described them as “invisible victims” of political violence (Rabaia, Balsam & Giacaman, 2013). This study indicated that wives of arrested or convicted men in Israeli prisons suffer from various additional problems in their daily lives. Financial need comes on top of the negative consequences of imprisoning men, particularly if the prisoner is the main family supporter. Although the Ministry of Detainees & Ex-Detainees’ Affairs provides financial support and legal representation to political prisoners, yet such financial support was described as “nothing” by women. A large portion of this income is spent on prisoners’ needs such as clothes, food, and cigarettes from prison shops at double prices. The word “nothing” also reflects a strong feeling of moral isolation which is not mitigated by the financial support from the government. It also shows that local communities’ appreciation of imprisonment has retreated after the 1993 Oslo agreements, compared to the first Intifada period, thus deepening the isolation of prisoners’ wives even in their own communities (Rabaia, Balsam, & Giacaman, 2013). These research results also highlight the suffering and humiliation accompanying visiting husbands in Israeli prisons. Also, women have expressed a lack of independence after the arrest of their husbands. Control over women is transferred to her parents-in-law, which increases restrictions imposed by the family and the 18
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local community on their freedom, movement, and way of dressing. Also, there are social and mental problems. Women reported mental problems among their children, such as distress, behavioral disorders, and missing their father, especially during holidays. Finally, fear of the future was also clearly observed. Some wives were concerned about the change in family relationships after the release of their husbands. On the one hand, wives waited and prayed for their husbands to be released while on the other hand, some had fears about how their husbands would treat the children who grew up while they were detained. They were also afraid of getting old, which might cause their husbands to marry again (Johnson & Giacaman, 2013). While there are some institutions concerned with detainees’ needs, few are concerned with the wives’ needs, particularly social support, children, and handling additional social pressures on wives while their husbands are in prison. These results alert us to the need to focus attention on Palestinian detainees’ wives and ensure that their needs are incorporated in comprehensive policies aimed at mitigating their suffering.
1.3. Strategic opportunities and policy priorities Global recommendations · Health is largely built and destroyed in the environment in which individuals live. This means we should incorporate the wide scope in which people live if we want to understand and deal with the health status of Palestinian men and women. · It is important not to “cause damage”. The damages caused by the violation of the Palestinian people find their roots in socio-political issues. This requires us to search for socio-political solutions and not just medical prescriptions of tranquilizers, pain relievers or psychotherapy sessions, or diagnose trauma and distress as diseases. We should not contribute to describing war suffering as illness; thus increasing pressure on victims. Palestinian men and women suffer from violations and long for an end to these violations and for justice. · There is an urgent need to think outside the walls of clinics and hospitals and outside the sphere of health services and sectors in order to achieve any improvement in the health situation. We must also seek to align healthcare services with the local community’s view of itself. Cooperation between different sectors must be established, with a focus on the concept of justice and the basic principles of
healthcare. · This is exactly why biomedical indicators are inadequate, even though necessary. This is also why we need a broader view taking the context into consideration. We need to reach the root causes of poor health conditions in the Palestinian society. There is also a need to intoduce new health status indicators in the future, in addition to disease indicators, such as self-assessment of quality of life, health status, distress, personal saftey and food security, as well as other indicators that depend on self-assessment. This enables us to understand the social, political, psychological, and economic factors that accelerate illness. · Giving priority to women’s health and illnesses in policies and implementation programs. This can be achieved through a public health perspective that is not limited to mother and child health, but also addresses the Palestinian woman’s needs regardless of her status: married, single, married but not pregnant, menopausal, or old. That is why we need to train, educate, and supervise healthcare workers to be able to carry out the currently unimplemented women’s health protocols, perhaps exluding pregnancy protocols. · This situation requires comprehensive policies that go far beyond providing access to family planning or population control as indicators of change. This is confirmed by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) and some UN studies. (MoWA indicators 2011-2013) (Division for the Advancement of Women; Department of Economic and Social Affairs, undated). The situation also requires policies broader than those which focus on access to healthcare. These policies assume that the needs not provided by the healthcare system will automatically be met through family planning instead of viewing these needs as universal needs that affect the living conditions and quality of life of women, particularly older women. In other words, all these complex facts require a policy view that extends beyond family planning measures. The policies in place require reformulation to become conscious of the social context and gender issues and involve all sectors to be able to handle the complex population problems in the oPt. It is safe to say that we cannot handle the current conflict between the immediate living needs and planning for a sustainable future development, unless a balanced trend is adopted in the form of policies that take the living needs of the population into consideration. · Gender reflects a social structure that influences the roles and responsibilities of both men and women. Palestinian men suffer from a high level of exposure to violence. Hence the need to pay attention to men’s health as well as the gender issue is misunderstood to be concerning women only whereas gender affects both men and women’s lives. 19
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· The health and population information system needs qualitative improvements. In addition, issues like refraining from reporting information, inaccurate reporting, and the poor explanation of available reports must be addressed. Those reports feed policies and plans. So, they must accurately reflect the demographic and health conditions of the population. For example, we cannot determine the average life expectancy without accurate information on the death rates by age. Also, we cannot accurately estimate the number of clinics required for treating chronic diseases without having accurate information, not only regarding the percentage of each disease, but also about the percentage by age, sex, region, and geographical location. Depending on regular surveys is quite costly. Qualitative improvements to the current information system may require considerable efforts, but in the long run it will be more accurate and less costly. · In general, the demographic development observed over the past decade requires us to pay more attention to elderly care as a future priority through studies, policies and implementation programs.
Specific recommendations · Due to the rapid increase of the number of women suffering from chronic diseases, practical measure inside and outside the health sector must be taken to help women lose weight, exercise and return to the traditional Palestinian dietary habits which mainly consist of fruits and vegetables and olive oil as an alternative to the highfat and processed foods consumed by more and more people. · Addressing early marriage is another priority, particularly in Hebron. This must be accompanied by an expansion of services needed by single women across the oPt. This requires incorporating indicators for assessing single women’s health. · Due to the high rate of caesarean deliveries, reaching unacceptable levels, there is a need to investigate how caesarean delivery decisions are made and to follow up the results of such surgeries. There is a need for a thorough review of the current practices and for new assessment indicators in order to determine the gaps separating us from a sound obstetric healthcare system. Defining the cases that require caesarean delivery and setting a plan to reduce the number of surgeries performed for non-medical reasons are a priority for future policies. Caesarean deliveries overwhelm the already overburdened healthcare system, both financially and in terms of human resources. This result emphasizes the need to introduce measurement indicators beyond the limited domain of currently provided postnatal biomedical services. It also indicates that the healthcare services need to go beyond the traditional
health standards (inside the clinic) to meet women’s needs as expressed by women. Mother and infant home visiting programs are essential for providing the support they need. · Paying attention to infertility treatment services, ensuring quality, and assessing wastage in infertility care should be a priority when setting policies and implementation programs by the governmental health system. · Paying more attention to the menopause stage and focusing on its symptoms and consequences as it causes much suffering and is generally neglected. This requires providing effective care inside and outside the clinic through home visiting and society rehabilitation and involvement. · The results of various reports alert us to the need to pay special attention to the wives of Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons, and ensuring that their needs are addressed in policies aiming to reduce their suffering.
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References: Abdul Rahim, H, et al. (2009). Maternal and Child Health in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Lancet, 967-977. Abu Rmeileh N, Hammoudeh W. (2008). Unpublished Data. Abul-Rahim, H, et al. (2009). Cesarean Section Deliveries in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt): An Analysis of the 2006 Palestinian Family Health Survey. Health Policy, pp. 151-156. Abu-Rmeileh, N, et al. (2011). Health-Related Quality of Life of Gaza Palestinians in the Aftermath of the Winter 2008-2009 Israeli Attack on the Strip. European Journal of Public health, pp. 732-737. Abu-Rmeileh, N, et al. (2008). Mortality Patterns in the West Bank, Palestinian Territories, 1999-2003. Public Health Research, Practice, and Policy, pp. 1-8. Batniji, R, et al. (2009). Health As Human Security in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Lancet, 1133-1143. B’tselem. (2012). Statistics on Administrative Detention. Jerusalem: B’tselem – http://www.btselem.org/ administrative_detention/statistics. Commission on Social Determinants of Health. (2008). Closing The Gap in a Generation. Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health. Geneva: The World Health Organization. Courbage, Y. (1999). Reshuffling the Demographic Cards in Israel/Palestine. Journal of Palestine Studies, pp. 21-39. Division for the Advancement of Women. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (undated). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. New York: United Nations – http://www.un.org/ womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article12. Giacaman R, et al. (2010). Mental Health, Social Distress and Political Oppression: The Case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Global Public Health, pp. 1-13. Giacaman, R et al. (2009). Health Status and Health Services in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Lancet, pp. 837-849. Giacaman, R. (1989). Health as a Social Construction: The Debate in the Occupied Territories. Middle East Report, pp. 16-20. Giacaman, R. (2012). Introduction. Reproductive Health. Infertility Among Palestinian Women: Urgent Medical and Socio-cultural Concerns. Birzeit: Institute of Community and Public Health. Birzeit University. Giacaman, R. (1997). Population and Fertility. Population Policies, Women’s Rights, and Sustainable Development. Birzeit: Women’s Studies Program – Birzeit University. Giacaman, R, et al. (2007). Humiliation: the invisible trauma of war for Palestinian youth. Public Health, pp. 563-571. Giacaman, R, et al. (2004). Imprints on the consciousness. The Impact on Palestinian civilians of the Israeli Army invasion of West Bank towns. European Journal of Public Health, pp. 286-290. Husseini, A, et al. (2009). Cardiovascular Diseases, Diabetes Mellitus, and Cancer in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Lancet, pp. 1041-1049. Johnson, P; Giacaman, R. (2013). Triple Captivity. New Haven: Accepted for Publication, Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies. Khatib, R, et al. (2011). An Assessment of the Availability of Women’s Health Services, Patient Management, Selected Access Aspects, and Drug Utilization Patterns. Birzeit: Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University. Mataria, A, et al. (2009). The quality of life of Palestinians living in chronic conflict: assessment and determinants. European Journal of Health Economics, pp. 93-101. oPt Health and Nutrition Cluster. (2012). CAP 2012-2013 Needs Analysis Framework.: oPt Health and Nutrition Cluster http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/documents/Health.Nutrition.Cluster.pdf Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Detainee and Ex-detainee Affairs. (2012) on the Occasion of Palestinian Prisoners Day – The 17th of April. Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 21
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http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/prisonersDay2012E.pdf Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2006). Demographic and Health Survey – 2004. Final Report. Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics. (2010). Maternal and Child Health Indicators. Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – http://pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/healthE3.htm Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2011). Median Age in the Palestinian Territory at First Marriage by Sex and Governorate. Ramallah: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2011). On the Eve of World Elderly Day 1/10/2011. Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/elderly_E2011.pdf Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2007). Palestinian Family Health Survey, 2006. Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/English_Report.pdf Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2011). PCBS, Family Survey, 2010 Results. Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority. Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/FamilyRes2011_E.pdf Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2008). Population. Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics http://pcbs.gov.ps/site/881/default.aspx#Population Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2010). Women and Men in Palestine: Issues and Statistics 2010. Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2010). Women and Men in Palestine: Issues and Statistics 2010. Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics. Birzeit University. (2003). Nutrition Survey – 2002. Analytical Report. Ramallah: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Palestinian National Authority. Ministry of Women’s Affairs. (2010). Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy: Promoting Gender Equality and Equity 2011-2013. Palestinian National Authority. Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Psychiatric Research Unit, World Health Organization. (1998). WHO (Five) Well-Being INdex. Geneva: World Health Organization – http://cure4you.dk/354/WHO-5_English.pdf Rabaia, Y; Balsam, C; Giacaman, R. (2013). “They came at midnight”. A report on the impact of detention on the children of Palestinian political detainees in Israeli prisons. Birzeit: Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University. Schalock, RL. (2004). The concept of quality of life: what we know and do not know. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, pp. 203-216. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2011). Survey of Persons with Disabilities 2011 – Report of Main Findings (In Arabic). Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority – http://pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1812.pdf Stewart-Brown, S. (1998). Emotional Well Being and its Relation to Health. Physical Disease May Well Result from Emoitional Distress. British Medical Journal, pp. 1608-1609. United Nations. (2008). Gaza Strip inter-agency humanitarian fact sheet. United nations. WHO. (2008). Social determinants of health in countries in conflict: a perspective from the Eastern Mediterranean Region. Cairo: WHO, Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean. Ziadni, M, et al. (2011). Sources of human insecurity in post-war situations. Journal of Human Security, pp. 23-36.
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2 Education-Beyond accessibility:
towards a gender-sensitive education
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2.1. Background and Context 2.1.1 Education in the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority Palestinian children’s right to education remains dependent on ending the occupation. Violence and the absence of security at the school, home, and in society weaken and disrupt the education process. Also, restrictions on movement are a major impediment for teachers and students in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and other regions. In addition, the long-standing economic crisis, which is a result of the Israeli economic grip and politically-motivated economic restrictions (such as withholding tax revenues and donor-imposed restrictions on funds), has led to a persistent financial crisis in the education sector. These restrictions, as well as occupationassociated restriction are cumulative in nature. They have an effect on students (and also on teachers and the entire education system). They become worse with each school year in a country that lives in a permanent state of emergency. Despite the tremendous challenges, the first 15 years under the Palestinian Authority witnessed significant achievements, particularly in enrollment rates, student’s participation, infrastructure and curricula. In the middle of 2000, there was a general agreement on the need for more focus on the quality of education, as stated in the Ministry of Education and Higher Education’s (MoEHE)4 “Education for all” initiative and strategic plan for the years 2008-2012 and its accompanying teacher-training plan, as well as in planning and programming documents of local and international actors in the education sector. But the unstable and constantly changing political, economic, and social situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the increasingly frequent and extreme violence at the hands of the Israeli occupation forces have led to redirecting efforts towards conflict and emergency situations (responding to crisis and rehabilitation), instead of being used in development (MoEHE, 2008). Increasing Israeli actions aimed at the fragmentation of Palestinian geography have weakened and impaired the development of the Palestinian education system. As Israel split Palestine into territories where the Palestinian Authority has limited or no access or control, the extent to which a national vision, plans and strategies can be developed and implemented must be taken into consideration. East Jerusalem, Area C, the Gaza Strip, the regions along the barrier or the borders between the Gaza Strip and Israel all pose special situations and challenges. 4 The Ministry of Education and Higher Education was divided into the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education in the spring of 2012. Most of the current plans and programs were formulated under the joint ministry. Thus, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education remains the main reference in this report. 24
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
Also, the collapse of national unity as well as the deeplyrooted divide between authorities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip further exacerbated the situation. The hardly won gains that have been made to unify the educational vision and system, which has long suffered from fragmentation imposed by colonial powers, were diminished in the past seven years. Except for administering the Secondary School Examination (Tawjihi), only little tangible cooperation remains between the two authorities. In the West Bank, the authorities avoid implementing any reforms that deepen division. This has practically led to the suspension of long-planned reforms in the educational curriculum. In the Gaza Strip, the de facto government is introducing additions to the curriculum and systems with gender dimensions, such as the recently issued Education Law no. 1 of 2013. This law prevents co-education after the age of nine and calls for establishing schools for girls only to accommodate female students and teachers in all education levels.5 Furthermore, the global trends in education further complicate the prospects of having a unified educational project for the Palestinian people who suffer from continuous military occupation challenges, excessive demographic and geographical divisions and an almost complete reliance on foreign funding. The last two years have seen more and more focus on a “more instrumental, commercial, and practical” education (quoted from Giroux, Institute for Women’s Studies), moving further away from commitment to academic and human values which serve public interest and enhance life chances (including, but not limited to, useful work) toward an educational vision dominated by market and commodification values (a term indicating that commodity is the most important thing), and the concept of educational institutions – particularly higher education institutions – becoming consumer-oriented company networks whose value is determined only by cost-efficiency, efficiency, and profits. The influence of this vision is deeply established in current Palestinian plans, policies, and rhetoric. Also, the increasing intervention of global entities, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the educational sector has consolidated this perspective both globally and in the occupied Palestinian territory.6 5 Education Law no. 1 of 2013 was issued in Gaza. Articles 46 and 74 prevent co-education in educational institutions after the age of 9 and entrust the Ministry with the responsibility of establishing girls-only schools. Also, Articles 13 and 56 oblige public schools to abide by the minimum standards imposed by the government. The Palestinian NGOs network and human rights institutions have criticized the law, expressing concern that “this is part of a larger context in which the government aims to impose a specific ideology and identity on Gaza that does not respect cultural and ideological diversity in the Palestinian society” and as such the government does not respect the text and spirit of the Palestinian Basic Law. The joint statement expresses concern over the different procedures that threaten to establish two different legal systems in Gaza and the West Bank. It calls on the authorities in Gaza and the West Bank to refrain from acts that undermine efforts aiming at establishing “a unified Palestinian legal system” (Palestinian Human Rights Center, 2013). 6 In the last two decades, international aid, particularly the IMF and the World Bank, intensified efforts in education, both qualitatively and quantitatively. On a global level, interest on new loans increased from 4% in 1980 to 9% in 1999. Education lending exceeded USD 2.8 billion in the late 1990s (World Bank, 1999). Qualitatively, the World Bank increased its intellectual outcomes under the context of educational policies in terms of the number of specialists work-
There is also more and more global demand for cuts in public spending and public education subsidies aimed at supporting disadvantaged groups, including girls/women. This basically undermines the principle of equal access to quality education (upcoming publication entitled “Gender Overview”). In this context, we face greater challenges in enhancing learning/education processes that promote gender equality and social justice by enabling people to transform unequal power relations and to engage fully in meaningful work and public life. The Palestinian Authority is party to international agreements that clearly recognize the right to education as a universal and inalienable right. These include the International Declaration of Human Rights,7 the International Covenant on Economic, Social , and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Article 24 of the amended Palestinian Basic Law of 2003 states that every citizen shall have the right to education.8 The Palestinian Authority’s commitment to global education can be clearly seen in its involvement in international efforts, including the Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All initiative. In addition to the Ministry of Education and Higher Education plans and programs,9 education-related strategies and commitments are addressed in the key national strategy documents, including the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (2007) and the National Report on Poverty (2004) (MoEHE, 2008). The total national expenditure of the Palestinian Authority on education is about 17-18 per cent of the national budget and 6.5 per cent of GDP.10 Education also accounts ing in the sector, and the number and frequency of policy papers and analyses published by its educational departments. It was noted that the internal crisis in the UNESCO led financial institutions – such as the World Bank and the IMF – to control the formulation of the global development agenda. The World Bank contributes around 30% of international development aid in education. Top priorities of the Bank are maintaining the neoliberal pattern of development. This was accompanied by the implementation of structural adaptation policies and institutional reforms which became a condition for granting loans (Mundy, 2002). These conditional loans have particularly influenced the management of educational systems (IWS, an upcoming study). 7 Article 26 of the International Declaration of Human Rights: “Every person has the right to education” 8 Article 24 of the amended Basic Law reads as follows: 1. Every citizen shall have the right to education. It shall be compulsory until at least the end of the basic level. Education shall be free in public schools and institutions. 2. The National Authority shall supervise all levels of education and its institutions, and shall strive to upgrade the educational system. 3. The law shall guarantee the independence of universities, institutes of higher education, and scientific research centers in a manner that guarantees the freedom of scientific research as well as literary, artistic and cultural creativity. The National Authority shall encourage and support such creativity. 4. Private schools and educational institutions shall comply with the curriculum approved by the National Authority and shall be subject to its supervision. 9 These include, among other things, the National Strategy for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (1999), the Five-Year Plan for Education (2001-2005), the Higher Education Development Plan; the Teacher Training Strategy (2008), the Strategic Plan for the Development of Education (20082012), and the National Strategy for Early Childhood Education (2012). 10 The 2013 budget, according to Maan News Agency, allocates 17% of the 25
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
for more than 30 per cent of the proposed budget for the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (2007) and around 20 per cent of the donor funding required for the public investment program (MoEHE, 2008). The de facto government figures in the Gaza Strip are much lower.11
2.1.2. Theoretical frameworks – Education and gender equality In the past few decades, research has produced a vast body of evidence showing that promoting gender-equitable education requires addressing a wide range of issues regarding education quality, relevance, and accessibility. Social and cultural intolerance as well as discriminatory practices in general, are brought to schools and classrooms. Overcoming these issues requires effective and innovative policies and programs. The main results indicate the need to address the following issues: teacher-student interactions, curriculum and learning resources, and education systems and structures. These issues raise a number of critical questions for education policymakers and education practitioners concerning equitable access to quality education for all. These include: ·
How are learning opportunities and the relevant experiences different for males and females?
·
What do males and females learn – not only in terms of academic topics, but also in terms of standards, cultural expectations, self-capacities, and life opportunities?
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How are gender stereotypes and literature promoting/defying gender discrimination challenged/reinforced in classrooms and schools?
·
What are the environmental factors and organizational structures that encourage/hinder learning? How do these factors influence males and females, students with disabilities, students with learning difficulties, and students from different economic and social backgrounds?
The importance of early childhood care and development in changing the prevailing gender roles and opportunities is well established.12 Similarly, the literature supports the total budget to the MoEHE (Ministry of Finance, as stated by Maan News Agency in Future Network). According to the Ministries of Education and Higher Education and Finance, public expenditure on education amounted to 18.2%, 17.9%, and 18.1% in 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively (Ministry of Finance 2012, Monitoring and Evaluation System). These figures should be viewed as estimates, because the actual financial picture is much more complicated. Millions of dollars are spent on education every year from budgets other than the MoEHE budget, for example municipalities, local councils, universities or non-governmental institutions. This makes it difficult to trace the total national expenditure (interview with Basri Saleh, MoE, April 17th, 2013). 11 According to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), education accounted for 11% of the 2012 budget of the de facto authorities in Gaza. In contrast, the Ministry of Interior budget accounted for 34% of the general budget (UNDAF, 2012). 12 Research in developing countries shows that girls who attend early childhood programs are more ready for primary school, cope better, and stay longer than girls who do not. (UNESCO, 2007) • Socially disadvantaged children who attend preschool are also more
importance of alternative informal education programs in helping females to overcome socially restrictive norms and expectations that are rarely challenged at school or in the classroom (responding to the needs of children with different learning difficulties). For example, there is strong evidence that by providing an appropriate social and healthcare infrastructure “sports can play a meaningful role in girls lives” (Brady, 2011, p2).13 In the Palestinian context, anecdotal evidence shows that extracurricular, remedial, and informal education programs can play a crucial role in making up for educational opportunities missed during times of crisis and frequent school disruptions as a result of the ongoing occupation and accompanying violence (Nicolai, 2007).
2.2. Main results – Trends and indicators/ challenges 2.2.1. Access to education Indicators reflecting Palestinians’ access to primary, secondary, and higher education in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are high according to regional and international standards. Access to basic and secondary education is highly equitable with respect to gender, location (rural and urban), refugee status, and household income (UNESCO, IBE, 2011). Females currently hold equal and more positive rates compared to males in terms of the main indicators of access to education in all education levels (basic, secondary and tertiary education) – with major exceptions in females’ access to technical and vocational education and training and enrollment rates 14
ready for primary school, perform better in school and are less likely to drop out than their peers who do not attend preschool. Early childhood programs that give children snacks or meals increase the chance that children who live in poverty will survive. • Early Childhood Care and Education may free older sisters of child care responsibilities that pull them out of school. In many families, girls must look after their younger brothers and sisters so their parents can work. If their younger siblings are safe and supervised in early childhood services, the older sister may have a better chance of going to primary school “UNESCO Rules” 13 According to Brady (2011, p2), well-designed and carefully implemented girls’ sports programs can: • Provide a safe space in which to learn new skills and build assets ; • Challenge traditional scripts for girls and break down gender stereotypes; • Increase girls’ visible, active presence in the public sphere; • Transform the ways girls think about themselves, and the way families and communities perceive them; • Improve girls’ knowledge about their rights, their bodies, and their health; • Build leadership skills; offer opportunities to practice leadership; • Expand girls’ social support networks, friends, and access to community resources; • Provide girls with female mentors and role models. 14 Higher Education has witnessed a steady increase in the number of female students over the past years reaching 53% in 2004 and about 59% in 2010. High graduation rates from universities were observed among females reaching 56% in 2004 and 61% in 2010, reflecting the decreasing rate among male students (MoHE, 2004, 2010). 26
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
in kindergartens. Enrollment in early childhood care and development programs remains low (15.3 per cent in 2010; 14.9 per cent for girls, slightly lower than that of boys) (PCBS, 2012, Press Statement: Violence Survey). Differences in access to education among geographical areas are generally limited. In the Gaza Strip, where females have lower attendance rates than males, particularly in the post-secondary level, gender gaps are less than 1 per cent (PCBS). Similarly, drop-out rates for females, which were once higher than the drop-out rates for males in the Gaza Strip, are now less than or equal to the dropout rates of males until secondary school. The gap decreased to 0.5 per cent (PCBS).15 In general, secondary school dropout rates in 2010/2011 were about 3.2 per cent, with the highest rates found in the three areas of Hebron (4.9 per cent, 7.2 per cent, and 7.6 per cent) in south West Bank. Female dropout rates are higher in North Hebron and Hebron areas. Gender differences are clearly seen in secondary school female dropout rates compared to male dropout rates in East Gaza, Jericho, and Nablus areas.16 Palestinian (+15) literacy rates are very high (95 per cent), with gender gaps narrowed to less than 5 per cent in 2012 compared to more than 14 per cent in 1995. Women aged 45 and above comprise the only remaining gap exceeding 1 per cent where women’s literacy rates are 71.4 per cent compared to 93.5 per cent for men in this age group (PCBS, 2013).
2.2.2. Education quality and relevance In the climate of prolonged crisis interspersed with periods of violence and destruction, especially in the last decade, continuous conflicts and emergencies prevented the Ministry of Education and Higher Education from fulfilling its obligations toward addressing education quality and relevance. This forced the Ministry to focus on “maintaining and preserving the educational system”, rather than implementing its plans (MoEHE, 2008). However, concerns about the decline of the quality of education and relevant learning outcomes remain widespread. Gains in the quality of education remain slim and fragmented at best. Experts indicate an increase 15 Secondary school dropout rates in the West Bank which stand at 3.2% remain a source of concern. The slightly higher rates for females (3.3% compared to 3.2% for males) must be understood in the context of the higher enrollment rates of girls in secondary education, retention rates until the 10th grade, transition rates from primary to secondary school, and the higher failure rates of male students (MoEHE Monitoring and Evaluation System, 2012). High secondary school dropout rates for girls in Gaza (3.1% for females and 2.6% for males, compared to 3.4% for females and 3.6% for males in the West Bank) are mainly attributed to high dropout rates from the industrial stream as well as the secondary year for the literary stream (MoE 2012, Annual Educational Statistical Book). 16 In the year 2010/2011, secondary school dropout rates for girls in East Gaza, Jericho, and Nablus were 2.9%, 2%, and 1% higher than boys. High dropout rates among girls were also recorded in Jenin, South Nablus, Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Hebron, North Hebron, North Gaza, and Khan Younis, with all differences within 1% (MoE, 2012, Annual Educational Statistical Book).
in occupation violence and access and movement restrictions. The effects of this violence and restrictions on the economic and social situation and health and welfare of children and their families are cited as the main reasons for this decline. National and international tests show a significant decline in academic performance over the past decade or more. In general, females score higher on all types of tests. The important thing about educational equity is the significant variation in scores between and within schools. This indicates hidden inequality in the Palestinian system. In a fair system, deep differences are absent, as the schooling system seeks to overcome the differences in achievement which are the result of socioeconomic and family conditions (World Bank, 2006). For example, the nationally-run Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2011 showed that private schools scored higher than public and UNRWA schools in mathematics and science. Coeducation schools also scored higher in mathematics and science followed by girls’ schools and then boys’ schools (MoE).
children learning experiences and outcomes.18 Available data on education in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and international research on the quality of education indicate a number of main challenges facing efforts made to improve the quality of Palestinian education as shown below.
The Ministry of Education definition of education quality and relevance focuses mainly on improving student achievement and life skills. Improving student services and extra-curricular activities was the target. The Ministry’s strategies for improving education quality focused mainly on teachers’ performance and the relevance and availability of the curriculum (MoEHE, 2008). International bodies and local NGOs emphasize the same points. Despite commitments to inclusive education and gender equality by international and national players, educational plans and programs address gender equality as an issue of accessibility that is limited to ensuring equality in terms of numbers in a context where gender gaps are small or in favor of females. Some considerations were given to the promotion of women’s employment in all levels of education. The Strategic Plan for the Development of Education aims to encourage women in senior decision-making positions (MoEHE, 2008).17 There are other important aspects to ensure gender equality in quality education, but these have been largely ignored to date. Also, there are crucial issues that have not been sufficiently addressed, including what happens to boys and girls when they go to school and how the educational system enhances or challenges discrimination and social injustice.
Geographical margins
Generally speaking, there is little information regarding efforts to improve the quality of education. For the major part, there is no good documentation of programs and initiatives to improve education quality and relevance. Available documents lack the data and analysis necessary for monitoring and enhancing gender equality opportunities and learning outcomes. Several studies have attempted to examine improvements in quality or relevance to certain projects and programs, but only limited gender-based analysis is available, if any, regarding 17 An upcoming study indicates some improvements in this regard (Assaf, Alfar, and Abu-Ghoush, 2011). 27
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
3.2.3. Main challenges facing girls/women 1. Neglected Children Having a better understanding and designing policies and programs that respond to marginalized and/or disadvantaged children and youth is crucial in light of evidence that the exclusion of such groups is repeatedly increased in times of emergency or crisis. Girls in these groups are exposed to a double risk (Nicolai, 2007). Children in geographically isolated or marginalized areas, children with disability, and children out of school are among the most likely to lose educational opportunities.
The shortage of classrooms and lack of an adequate infrastructure are important obstacles facing education in geographical areas most affected by the Israeli restrictions on development, movement and access. These areas include East Jerusalem, Area C and the Gaza Strip in general as well as access-restricted areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In Jerusalem, while Palestinians have the right to free public education as stated in the Israeli Compulsory Education Law, Israel does not abide by its obligations. According to a 2012 study, 24,000 Palestinian school-aged children are unaccounted for by Jerusalem Education Administration. In the summer of 2012, the education system in Jerusalem had a deficit estimated at 1,100 classrooms.19 Also, only 5 per cent of 15,000 Palestinian children aged 3-4 who reside in Jerusalem attended official kindergartens during the 2012-2013 school year (Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2012). Also, more than half the classrooms in Jerusalem Municipality (647 out of 1398) were below standard and were lacking the minimum requirements for health and safety. In addition, East Jerusalem had the highest dropout rates in the country: 2 per cent in the 1st grade, 5 per cent in the 8th grade, 10 per cent in the 9th grade, and an astonishing 40 18 For example, the 45-page Child-Friendly Schools Case Study prepared by UNICEF fails to provide a gender analysis. While inclusiveness is one of the three main areas of the program, only a quick reference was made to discrimination across gender lines in the program’s goals, implementation, or outcomes. Yet, the MoEHE CFS monitoring adopts international standards including “gender sensitivity” and “inclusiveness” as one of four issues that require monitoring (See, MoEHE, 2012, Monitoring and Evaluation System). 19 According to the Supreme Israeli Court, in February 2011, 40,000 thousand children who have the right to free education were enrolled in alternative schools. This reality infringes on the constitutional rights of children in East Jerusalem to enjoy equality in education (Maimon, 2012). Half the Palestinian children in Jerusalem are enrolled in public schools, while the rest are forced to pay for private/informal education, attend Endowment schools, or not to go to school at all (Maimon, 2012).
per cent rate in the 12th grade (Maimon, 2012).
People with disabilities
In 2010, 26 schools in Area C were classified as below standard, unfit, having unsafe and unhealthy facilities, threatened with demolition, exposed to settler violence, and having limited access. In 2011, there were 18 schools with outstanding demolition orders as a result of the lack of a building permit. The above factors contribute to the high drop-out rates in affected schools, particularly among girls, as well as pose significant health and safety risks for students that continue to attend school. (OCHA, 2010, 2011; UNICEF CFS, 2011).
28,000 Palestinian children suffer from some sort of disability (Nicolai, 2007).22 Whereas the MoE adopted a commitment to inclusive education officially in 1997, there are still some major challenges. In the Gaza Strip, no official strategy has been prepared in this regard since the 2008 split. In 2010, only 50 per cent of Palestinian schools were adapted to ensure access for people with physical disabilities. Still, obstacles facing the formal and informal curriculum, students, teachers, social trends and learning/educational methods remain of significance (Riyada, 2011).23 The enrollment rates of people with disabilities are much lower than the general rates. A study conducted in 2011 found that while 97 per cent of the surveyed people with disabilities (50 per cent of the sample are aged 2-20 years) and their families think that people with disabilities have the right to education. 18.5 per cent of the respondents (15.5 per cent in the West Bank and 22.5 per cent in the Gaza Strip) said they never had access to education. The study also showed that females with disabilities had 10 per cent less education opportunities than males (29 per cent for females compared to 19 per cent for males). Also, only 50 per cent of the respondents went to primary school, 19.5 per cent went to secondary school, and 5.9 per cent went to colleges/universities (Riyada, 2011). Dropout rates among people with disabilities were 37.9 per cent (44 per cent for males, and 28.1 per cent for females); a high percentage taking into consideration the generally low dropout rates (Riyada, 2011). Dropout rates were uniform across the West Bank, but were higher in the Gaza Strip. They differed by location: 75 per cent, 50.8 per cent, and 11.1 per cent in the north, center, and south respectively (Riyada, 2011).24 Another study on the types of disabilities showed that people with mental disabilities and those with learning difficulties are more likely to never attend school (Riyada, 2011).
In the Gaza Strip, the shortage of classrooms is a serious issue. According to UNICEF, in the Gaza Strip, over 5,000 girls began the 2011/12 school year attending classes in tents, caravans or tin shacks with minimal protection from the heat (UN Economic and Social Council, 2012). 85 per cent of all schools in 2012 taught on a double-shift system to accommodate students, thus reducing school hours by one third (UNICEF, 2012). Also, the shortage of fuel which resulted in scheduled blackouts and random unscheduled cuts had an impact on the functioning of schools. (UN Economic and Social Council, 2012). Also, restrictions on movement (closures and checkpoints), harassment from soldiers and settlers, violence on the way to and from school, bad roads and lack of a lowcost transportation system in remote and limited-access areas are all obstacles to access to education and other essential services. Safety restrictions and movement controls imposed by Israel constitute a source of stress for children in Jerusalem, Area C, the West Bank, “the seam area” and the so-called access-restricted areas in Gaza Strip.20 In the 2009-2010 school year, more than 1,200 children and 860 school staff had to pass through the Barrier built by Israel everyday to reach their schools. 50 per cent of the affected students were enrolled in Jerusalem schools (MoE, 2012, The Impact of the Barrier). In 2011, 26 attacks were reported on schools in the oPt, 33 per cent in the Gaza Strip, leading to the destruction of school buildings and disruption of education process.21
20 In Jerusalem, about 2,000 students and 250 teachers are delayed at barriers and checkpoints, or as a result of checking permits on the way to school. One UNESCO survey found that 69% of Palestinian children do not feel safe on their way to and from school. (UNESCO, 2011) Also in restricted-access areas, including West Bank communities near the Barrier, stories indicate that restrictions on movement require taking twisted routes to and from school and passing through Israeli military checkpoints which is accompanied by exposure to harassment and threats. This affects girls’ attendance, as parents tend not to send their daughters to school (Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling, 2010). 13 schools serving around 4,500 girls and boys and employing over 300 faculty members are located in the Access Restricted Areas in Gaza (the area extending 1.5 km from the border with Israel). These areas see frequent Israeli incursions. (UNESCO, n.d.). A report prepared by UNESCO documents “security and protection threats violating the right to education and undermining its main humanitarian role” for both students and teachers (UNESCO, p3). The report indicates that the “restricted access areas” also faces displacement risks because of these protection threats. Most of those who stay there simply lack sufficient resources to leave given the pressures under which they live” (UNESCO, p3). 21 CAAC, annual report 2011, UNDAF, 2012, p25. In Area C, the lack of a proper infrastructure for public services is attributed to the restrictive Israeli planning and permits system. In Gaza, it is attributed to presence of a “Belt Area”. See UNESCO. 28
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
Moreover, public education programs for people with 22 Using the narrow definition of disability, 1.5% of Palestinian children aged 0-17 suffer from disability: 1.6% in the West Bank compared to 1.4% in Gaza Strip; 1.8% for males compared to 1.3% for females. Using the broad definition of disability, the rate was 7% in the oPt, with similar rates for both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Using the narrow definition of disability, the rate of disability in the oPt was 2.7% (2.9% in the West Bank and 2.4% in the Gaza Strip; 2.9% for males and 2.5% for females). In the West Bank, the highest rates were observed in Jenin (4.1%), followed by Hebron (3.6%), with the lowest rate in Jerusalem (1.4%). In the Gaza Strip, the highest rate was observed in Gaza (2.5%), followed by North Gaza, Rafah and Deir El-Balah (2.4% each), with the lowest rate in Khan Younis (2.2%) (PCBS and MoWA, 2011). 23 According to the MoE, in the 2011-2012 school year, 37% and 51.9% of schools in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively, provided desks for students with disabilities and 50.8% of schools in the West Bank and 52.5% in Gaza Strip provided restrooms for students (MoE, 2012, Annual educational statistical book). 24 The absence of specialized education centers (15.6% of people with disabilities) and refusal by government schools to accept them, (11% of people with disabilities) were the main reasons for discontinuing education. Also, qualitative research shows that the unsuitable school infrastructure, social restrictions, and priority given to non-disabled children were among the main reasons for not obtaining an educational opportunity. As for those who receive education, parents prefer to send them to public schools. Obstacles to the continuation of education were the lack of essential services (main reason for females), no benefit of academic education (main reason for males), lack of appropriate programs, and weak social integration (Riyada, 2011)
disabilities are few, particularly in the Gaza Strip. According to a study sample, only 20.9 per cent of people with disabilities benefit from public programs. This is of special significance for girls with disabilities in contrast to the general rates of access to education for people with disabilities. Although girls with disabilities are generally 10 per cent less likely to get education, females benefit more than males from public programs (69.4 per cent and 38.3 per cent, respectively) (Riyada, 2011). It was also found that negative attitudes towards girls/women with disabilities are very strong. This leads not only to bias and discrimination, but also to severe social isolation. Social stigma plays a crucial role in parents’ desire to educate their children (Riyada, 2011).
Out-of-School Children The percentage of children who never attended school is very low (0.65 per cent of 10-15 age group in 2004, World Bank, 2006). Little is known about who these children are and to what extent marginalized group may be disproportionately represented in this group. According to MoE figures, 10 per cent of boys and 5 per cent of girls aged 6-15 are out of school. These numbers increase to 41 per cent and 24 per cent, respectively, for the 16-17 age group (MoE as in Passia, 2013, p. 380). While the general incidence rates of child labor, whether paid or unpaid; 25 according to PCBS are relatively low at 3.7 per cent (6.3 per cent for males and 1.1 per cent for females; 5.7 per cent in the West Bank compared to 0.6 per cent in the Gaza Strip in 2011), children who work are less likely to enroll in school compared to other children. 24.3 per cent of non-enrolled children are involved in child labor (33.1 per cent males and 3.2 per cent females; 33.4 per cent in the West Bank and 7.8 per cent in the Gaza strip).26 The correlation between economic difficulties, child labor, and enrollment in school is complicated. It is unlikely that this is a simple cause-and-effect relationship. There is a need for more research to understand the correlation between the factors that lead to the nonenrollment of boys and girls.
Other marginalized and at risk children There are other groups at risk as indicated in the literature, but we lack sufficient data to understand the obstacles facing these groups in accessing and continuing education (quality and relevance). These groups include child detainees, children exposed to violence, Bedouins, nomadic children, children affected by drugs, and children suffering from low academic performance. Whereas we know little about these groups in the Palestinian context, global evidence indicates the need for alternative forms 25 63.0% of working children work for their families as unpaid workers. The vast majority of unpaid children were females (94.2% compared to 57.9% for males) (PCBS, Palestinian children – Issues and statistics). 26 In addition, 2.3% of children students are employed (most of them in the West Bank: 3.6% males and 1% females). (PCBS, Palestinian children – Issues and statistics). 29
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
of education to ensure that these children have access to their educational and developmental rights.
2. Horizontal segregation – persistence of gender stereotypes While females have achieved equal or greater educational participation and attainment, the options concerning the fields of study are still affected by gender standards and expectations for females and males in secondary and tertiary stages.
Patterns of enrollment in secondary education by field of study It is noted that gender differences in the fields of study during the secondary and tertiary stages are decreasing in some fields but remain of significance. The number of high school students enrolling in the literary stream compared to the scientific stream continues to increase. But, the number of females in the literary stream is still higher than the number of males. This means that girls adhere to their expected gender roles (73.3 per cent and 6.8 per cent respectively in the 2011-2012 school year) (PCBS, women & men). However, the gender gap in the scientific stream is getting significantly narrower by the year; females’ enrollment in the scientific stream is almost 1 per cent less than males (21.8 per cent and 23.4 per cent, respectively in 2011/2012) (PCBS, Women & men). For the same academic year, the number of girls in the scientific stream in the last year of secondary education (Tawjihi) exceeded the number of boys by around 0.2 per cent (MoEHE Monitoring and Evaluation System, 2012). Rates of enrollment in vocational and technical education and training increased, but they remain low (in the 2011-2012 school year, rates of enrollment in vocational secondary schools were 6.8 per cent of the total number of secondary school students). Girls’ enrollment (4.3 per cent) remains lower than that of boys (9.4 per cent) (PCBS, 2011, women & men). The vast majority of vocational and technical education and training institutions is concentrated in city centers where it is difficult for women who live in rural areas and refugee camps to reach them. Many girls are excluded from this type of education because of eligibility requirements, which often include high academic scores or pre-training qualifications. Furthermore, training available or accessible to women is limited to a few “feminine” and socially acceptable professions and saturated professions. The segregation of the labor market based on gender is strengthened by the distribution of work based on gender in the household and educational system. Girls’ enrollment in vocational training and education is clearly concentrated in the agricultural field (3.8 per cent for girls and 5.4 per cent for boys, with lower enrollment rates in the industrial field (0.3 per cent for girls and 3.1 per cent for boys) and in other disciplines (0.2 per cent for girls and 0.3 per cent for boys). (PCBS, 2011, women& men).
Patterns of enrollment in higher education by field of study In this regard, options remain influenced by gender considerations, particularly in the fields of science and engineering where 13 per cent of females compared to 22 per cent of males enroll in these fields (MoHE, 2004, 2010). Also the number of male engineering students is double the number of female students in this field, with similar graduation rates (MoHE, 2004, 2010).27 Whereas the fields of science, mathematics, and computer science showed similar rates of enrollment for both genders, a closer look at the sub-majors in these disciplines reveals a male/female classification in some of them. Despite the increasing family support for females to continue their higher education, parental gender norms are decisive in what young women ultimately end up studying. Some girls stated that they could not study the specialization of their choice because their parents wanted them to study “gender-appropriate” specializations, particularly education (Hammami & Siam, 2012). Other studies showed that gender expectations in child-rearing and family management, stereotyping certain fields as “feminine” or “masculine” and similar gender differences that are reflected in the educational system through the curriculum, teachers, instructors, and peers also hinder women’s specialization choices.28
3. Horizontal segregation – sticky floor and glass ceiling As for postgraduate studies, gender equality is very low in terms of educational enrollment and attainment. Similarly, while there is good or above-average representation of women as teachers in kindergartens, schools, and higher education institutions, the proportion of women sharply declines as we go up the career ladder in education and administration jobs in all types of educational institutions, leading to lower female representation in positions of power and decision-making.
The postgraduate Level Gender equality rates decline sharply in educational attainment after the first university degree, where only 10 per cent of doctorate holders are women. There are several reasons for this all related to women’s access to higher education. Until recently, Palestinian universities did not provide PhD programs and females wishing to study PhD abroad needed to ensure funding and to overcome social and family obstacles not encountered by 27 In 2004, 2,649 female students (4% of all female students) enrolled in engineering, manufacturing, and construction fields compared to 5,612 male students (10% of all male students). Figures went up to 3,824 (4%) and 7,551 (12%) respectively in 2010 (MoHE, 2004, 2010). 28 See, for example, Giacaman, R., Saab, H., Nguyen-Gillham, V., Abdullah, A., &Naser, G. (2004).; Abu Awwad, 2003; Palestinian Women’s Research and Documentation Center, 2009; and Filosso, 1996. Movement restrictions also play a role in limiting educational options (Giacaman et al, 2004). 30
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
their male peers (PCBS, 2009).29 The relative distribution of female doctorate holders across the scientific fields equals the number of male doctorate holders, except for social sciences and engineering, where a clear imbalance is observed, especially in engineering (5 per cent for females vs. 11 per cent for males) compared to 22 per cent for females and 17 per cent for males in social sciences. Similarly, the distribution of female and male doctorate holders in science and engineering submajors provides evidence of gender differences, where the majority of females are concentrated in human sciences whereas males are concentrated in engineering (PCBS, 2009).
Women’s position in the education system Women dominate the lower levels of education, occupying low wage/position jobs.30 Also, female teachers in the preschool stage (who are still without a union) represent 100% of the teaching staff. Fifty-five per cent of the teaching staff in public schools are females (PCBS, 2012, Women & Men). In higher education institutions, the percentage of female doctorate holders was 7 per cent in 2004 and 9 per cent in 2010. Women’s access to PhD programs appears to be limited as 72 per cent of female academic staff work as lecturers/instructors compared to 45 per cent for their male counterparts (MoHE, 2004, 2010). This can be attributed to two phenomena established in the literature on institutional discrimination: the “sticky floor” that keeps women trapped in low wage positions with little opportunity for upward mobility, and “glass ceiling” that indicates organized visible and invisible forces that prevent women (or other groups) from advancing to higher positions with higher wages during their professional and academic careers. The Glass Ceiling Index31 in the oPt was 3.1 in 2004 and 2010. This shows that for females in the academic field to achieve progress in research careers, they face three times the difficulties faced by their male counterparts (EC, 2009; MoHE, 2004, 2010). It is unlikely for this situation to change unless serious thought is given to the nature of policies and measures, influenced by gender, that hinder women’s progress. Also, low representation of women in higher academic positions limits their chances of contributing to gendersensitive policies, employment, and research. So far, no woman has headed a higher education institution in Palestine offering bachelor’s degrees or higher. Also, 29 N.B.: the 2007 census, conducted by the PCBS, covered the West Bank only, without including Gaza Strip or Jerusalem. 30 According to a study conducted by Miftah Institution, although female teachers carry more teaching burdens (regarding the number of students, the number of classes per week, busy departments, and the number of subjects), male teachers have higher positions and receive more income (Abdul Karim, 2010). 31 The Glass Ceiling Index is the ratio of male to female professor-rank doctorate holders. The Glass Ceiling Index ranges from zero to infinity. The value (1) reflects equality between men and women. The higher the value, the thicker the glass is and the harder it is for women to advance in their academic careers (The European Commission, 2009).
women’s representation is low in most boards of trustees and college and university councils (MoHE, 2004, 2010).
4. Early childhood education and development – A missed opportunity By the time they enter pre-school, most children have adopted socially-accepted gender roles and models of behavior, which have an enormous impact on their education and their lives. Research shows that early childhood education can act as a strong equalizer for the most disadvantaged children, including girls. However, evidence suggests that challenging gender stereotypes and textbooks limiting the ambitions and opportunities of girls and boys in early childhood education institutions has strong potential to expand girls’ life chances, combat discrimination based on gender, and promote gender equality in communities and the larger society. In the Palestinian context, pre-school enrollment rates are low (38.1 per cent in 2010/2011). It is noted that, contrary to other stages of education in the oPt, girls’ pre-school enrollment rate is low (34.7 per cent) compared to boys (41.2 per cent) (6.5 per cent lower) (MoE 2012, the National Strategy for Early Childhood Development). Whereas international and local representatives give more attention to early childhood care and development – with the Ministry issuing a comprehensive plan for developing this sector in 2012 – the role of early childhood care and development had no significant impact on promoting/reducing gender equality in policy discussions or programs.
5. Learning experiences and gender – What do boys and girls learn Without clear and positive policies and processes to promote gender equality, education systems will inevitably reinforce existing discriminatory practices and trends. While there was strong interest and significant advancement in gender equality with regard to access to education in the oPt, little attention was given to how the work of educational facilities and the available experiences and information on violence, the formal and hidden curriculum, and the public education system affect the expansion or limitation of comprehensive development, life choices, and opportunities for students in line with sex/gender.
School and classroom facilities Whereas the general trend is improving in terms of student/classroom and student/teacher ratios, student/ teacher ratios remain much higher in UNRWA schools compared to public and private schools (27.3 per cent, 8.20 per cent, and 16.5 per cent respectively, according to the PCBS, 2012, 34). Important gaps remain regarding students in Jerusalem, Area C, seam zone areas, the Gaza Strip, and especially the access-restricted areas, as mentioned before. A study conducted in 2010 found that 31
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
girls’ schools were more crowded than boys’ schools in terms of the number of students in the classroom and the classroom size (Abdul Karim, 2010). In addition, based on strong evidence in the literature on teachers’ favoritism to boys over girls in the classroom and the correlation between teachers’ attention and students’ performance, crowding in the classroom32 in co-education schools has a negative impact on female students’ learning opportunities. Despite the remarkable progress in equipping schools with computer and science labs and, to some extent libraries, many schools still do not meet the targeted criteria. There are no figures about the availability of equipment and educational facilities by school type (boys, girls, or co-ed) (Abdul Karim, 2010). In addition, the Ministry has said that even available resources are not properly utilized (MoEHE, 2008). We have little information about differences in access and use among boys, girls, students from limited socio-economic backgrounds and students with different learning needs ,although the observation of student involvement and use of facilities since 2009 provides detailed data by gender.33 Anecdotal evidence and some studies indicate the need to pay special attention to health and sports facilities as well as IT facilities for females.34
Trauma, violence and gender experiences Because of the persistence of the occupation, students suffer from danger, violence, and trauma in their places of residence, near their homes and sometimes inside them. Occupation violence, whether at the hands of the Israeli army or the settlers, has led to high levels of exposure to violence, individually and collectively, for both females and males. The types of violence, how they are understood and responded to, and the impacts of exposure to them vary greatly based on gender (Giacaman et al, 2004).35 32 One third of the schools are co-ed schools, particularly in low grades. Building schools in the West Bank targets 70% co-ed or girls’ schools (Nicolai, 2007). 33 For more details about the quality of school education, see: MoEHE, Monitoring and Evaluation System of the Strategic Plan for Education Development (2008-2012), 2011 Annual report. Since 2009, the MoEHE Monitoring and Evaluation System has used data disaggregated by gender about the degree of student participation (use of libraries, computer labs, science labs, and educational tools) and standard tests. Annual reports provide data disaggregated by gender, but they do not provide a gender-based data analysis. 34 According to the PCBS 2008 survey of school sanitation and infrastructure environment, 27% of schools in the West Bank and 30% of those in Gaza did not meet territory-wide standards for water and sanitation facilities in schools of 1 toilet per 30 students. A large number of co-educational schools in Gaza do not have separate toilets. (UNICEF, 2011). Information indicates the absence of usable toilets (Owaida, 2013). See also: Abdul Karim, 2010. 35 According to the World Bank study: In their encounter with Israeli soldiers, women are in many ways far more vulnerable than men. In this arena, without family protection, a woman faces not only the uncertainty of safe passage; the possibility of delays moving from one area to another; and the humiliation that accompanies intrusive body searches and detainment, but also the risk to compromise her reputation. As a woman’s reputation is intrinsically linked to family honor, what happens to a Palestinian woman when she encounters the apparatus of occupation during, for example, searches at checkpoints can have devastating consequences on her autonomy, mobility, aspirations for education, and work. This is not so for men whose reputation is not affected in the same gendered way. In addition, the application process to obtain permits and the feats of getting goods to markets, finding employment, visiting family, and accessing services that fall outside the boundaries of home all pose additional
Also, teacher and peer violence has become a significant phenomenon, particularly for male students. According to the PCBS, 22 per cent of (male and female) students aged 12-17 reported being exposed to emotional or physical violence by teachers or peers at school in 2010/2011 at a rate of 28.7 per cent for boys and 15.1 per cent for girls. The rate of exposure to violence in the Gaza Strip (22.7 per cent), which was slightly higher than the West Bank, reflected higher rates of exposure to violence among girls in the Gaza Strip (16.7 per cent) compared to the West Bank (15.1 per cent) (PCBS, 2012, Press Statement: Violence Survey). No data was published by school type (boys, girls, co-ed). Also, no data was provided on sexual harassment/violence at school, although sexual violence was addressed in other sections of the survey. Research indicates a significant correlation between violence at school, and performance and drop-out rates. According to a study conducted by Birzeit University in 2005, the lower the achievement level of the students, the higher the levels of different forms of violence being perpetrated against them (as published in UNICEF, 2011, the situation of Palestinian children in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, p.18). So far, no in-depth research has been conducted on gender differences in order to understand violence, be it from peers or teachers, its occurrence and how to respond to it.
The formal curriculum Some studies have focused on analyzing gender-sensitive curricula. Several gender reviews of the curriculum have been conducted and a number of recommendations for improvement have been submitted. But, in general, these issues still need to be addressed.36 There are long-term plans for reforming the curriculum in the West Bank, but they were suspended due to the continuous political conflict with the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, as indicated in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs’ 2011-2013 Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy, the curriculum, textbooks, and manuals continue to reflect traditional stereotypes and gender-based discrimination in the use of language and content (25).37
The hidden curriculum There is a broad consensus that school education is characterized by lecturing, issuing commands, taking notes, memorizing by repetition and evaluation based on exams. As such, to improve the quality of education, these issues must be addressed through effective prechallenges for women that stem from the prevalent culture of gender relations but that are exacerbated by the restrictions. (World Bank, 2010, p14). 36 One of the early gender reviews of the Palestinian curriculum was conducted in 1999 (Nicolai, 2007). An upcoming study prepared by Assaf, Alfar, and Abu Ghoush indicate some changes in language (use of plural instead of masculine) and an increase in the number of women participating in the preparation of textbooks. The same study also indicates that there is still much to be done to address gender stereotypes and discrimination in the curriculum. 37 See also: Assessing the educational system in Palestine: An NGO perspective. 32
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service and in-service teacher training, curriculum reforms and/or a well-organized school-based education management. However, few discussions have been held on the dynamics of gender in the classroom and the school, the discriminatory treatment of children within and between schools, and how these affect injustice and inequity in terms of opportunities and outcomes, for females, children with disabilities and/or special learning needs, children from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds or other marginalized groups such as children involved in child labor or children of detainees. Initial research in the oPt suggests, for example, that children with limited resources are subject to ridicule and discrimination by their peers and teachers (Save the Children, 2001), and that children with disabilities, particularly females, are subject to socio-cultural prejudices that impair access to educational opportunities and quality (Riyada, 2011). Research also indicates that the escalation in occupation violence, since 2000, has led to more restrictions on movement outside the home as a result of the absence or implied absence of safe and appropriate public spaces, which increases the isolation of females (Save the Children, 2011). These trends are particularly important with regard to the design and operation of learning environments and programs, as well as for the type of teacher training required to achieve progress in the Ministry of Education and Higher Education commitment to an inclusive quality education. The following are some of the main challenges in this regard: ·
The absence of a gender perspective to inform policy-making and clarify goals and indicators related to education quality under national education plans and documents of the international program.
·
Scarcity of information on the roles of teachers, counselors, administrative staff, and other players in enhancing/defying gender and other forms of discrimination.
·
Lack of gender-responsive teacher training and professional standards for teachers.
·
The absence of sufficient information on the different learning experiences and outcomes for females in single-sex classrooms versus coed classrooms.38
·
The lack of an open gender-based criticism of the educational system and the corresponding need for a gender-based approach to introduce improvements in governance, administration,
38 This is of particular importance as construction targets in the West Bank are currently set at 70% co-ed or girls’ schools (Nicolai, 2007). On the other hand, authorities in Gaza have announced that they will not allow co-education after the 9th grade, and that girls’ schools must have female teachers only (See Education Law no. 1, 2013). According to the MoEHE, active learners’ participation in learning and education processes is low at all schools, but is lower in co-ed classrooms (8.7%) compared to 13% for girls’ classrooms and 16.1% for boys’ classrooms in 2011 (MoEHE Monitoring and Evaluation System, 2012). But no data is available on differences between males and females in co-ed classrooms.
and application of the educational system within ministerial plans for example with regard to recruitment, promotion, training, and capacity-building (addressing the sticky floor and glass ceiling phenomena). ·
The lack of female leadership models in senior education and management positions and other leading positions at schools and universities (important to defy gender stereotypes and perceptions regarding study and career choices of males and females, as well as to defy maledominated institutional cultures).
Access to and experiences of extra-curricular activities, informal education and support services The Ministry of Education and Higher Education gave priority to school health, educational counseling and career guidance and made important gains in introducing these services, which pratically did not exist before 1994. But a large number of schools and students (males and females) still have no access to these services and resources. In addition, there is little information regarding the implementation and impact of counseling programs, particularly concerning gender differences related to extra-curricular, remedial and informal activities, both in terms of the number and types of opportunities available and the participation rates or results. There is also little documentation about disparities across school types and geographical areas.39 A better understanding of gender-based differences may be of p articular importance in this context due to the variety of literatures emphasizing the importance of such activities and services in facing gender discrimination against females (and other disadvantaged groups) in schools, classrooms, and the society in general. Educational programs integrating females in sport and physical activity show, for example, that when female sports programs are carefully designed, they become effective tools for breaking down gender stereotypes which limit females’ aspirations and achievements.40 Also, limited information is available regarding female access to and participation in sport and physical education, whether in the formal or informal education system. The importance of these activities is likely to be enhanced in the context of the continuous occupation violence and movement 39 A study conducted by MIFTAH indicated that while female students are more likely to think that they have opportunities to participate in local extra-curricular activities, they feel that their opportunities to participate in international conferences and workshops outside their communities are smaller. Similarly, female students feel they are less likely to receive equal opportunities for obtaining educational assistance and scholarships compared to their male peers to be able to submit complaints, and to report to play areas and sports rooms (Abdul Karim, 2010). Though the scope of the study was limited and results were not always clear, the study indicated important issues that need further investigation. Concerning differences across student groups and geographical areas, a study conducted in 2010 stated that “with more children facing psychological trauma, the limited services for students with special needs has also become more evident. The inequity in resource allocation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has also become acute.” (World Bank, 2010, 90). 40 Sports and play are associated with healthy child development and with building self-efficacy and a set of life skills. The therapeutic effects of physical activity and sport post-trauma have also been documented. (Brady, 2011). 33
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
restrictions imposed by Israel which, when added to traditional social norms, leave females in isolation. One study indicates that in all areas, girl participants said that they spend more time at home. Palestinian girls’ experience is restricted by family pressure and the lack of facilities for them, particularly outside cities. If anything, girls are facing even more restrictions and more time at home, and this is compounded by the sadness of conflict and impoverishment. Many child participants felt that girls face bigger problems than boys because of their increased isolation. (Save the Children, 2001).
6. Learning ambitions and outcomes – From equality to justice In terms of academic performance, data from standardized tests show that girls stand on an equal footing with or do better than boys. But, successful academic performance results are not necessarily an indicator of the relevance of education or associated with more choices or life chances as reflected by the trends of vertical and horizontal segregation as girls progress through the educational system and attempt to enter the workforce.
Investing in education and expected outcomes In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, education has acquired special importance in the climate of the long-standing economic and political crisis. Families’ investment in education is a main indicator of changing social expectations regarding females’ education. It is also an important factor in academic performance. Data show a range of mixed and variable patterns that indicate a need for more research.41 It is obvious that educational expectations and results differ for males and females. At the same time and to some extent, they are shaped by the prevailing social roles of young men and women. Education has become an insurance policy for Palestinians, and not simply a means to gain employment. For girls 41 On the other hand, a recent study by the UN concluded that “households in Gaza still prioritize the higher education of sons over daughters, a bias that was expressed most strongly among households in agricultural communities. Thus young women can only overcome this bias in favour of their male siblings by excelling at their studies, both proving their worthiness for higher education, as well as making it more likely that they can access funding through scholarships.” (Hammami & Siam, 2012, 46). Similarly, on the primary education level, in private schools, the distribution of students by gender tipped heavily in favour of male students (59%) over females (41%) (MoEHE statistics in UNICEF, 2011, The Situation of Palestinian Children, p.17), indicating a clear bias toward investing in the education of boys due to the huge difference in the expenses of private schools, where expected academic achievement and learning outcomes are much higher. Similarly, a World Bank study (2006) indicated that households’ spending on students varies greatly, which is believed to have a significant impact on students’ achievement. But the study does not provide a gender-based analysis of the differences in spending. Meanwhile, recent national statistical data and qualitative research reveal that families place a premium on education, especially girls’ education (World Bank, 2010). The same study stated that women are under pressure to join “socially” acceptable jobs and since socially acceptable jobs have become so difficult to find, single women pursue higher education as one way to secure greater access to socially accepted jobs, which is why many of the families interviewed in the focus groups expressed a preference for their male rather than female children to drop out of schools and universities” (World Bank, 2010, p28).
in particular, higher education can bring about better marriage prospects, enable them to supplement family income, and serve as an insurance policy against future vulnerability in case of the loss of a male breadwinner. For boys, education is a key to emigrating in search of more gainful employment opportunities abroad. In practice, educated young men and women, but particularly young women, have had a hard time finding work (World Bank, 2010, p16).42
The relevance of education and returns to education While the data suggest that years of education and delayed marriage follow general patterns of positive correlation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a study on the economic returns to girls’ education reveals a more complicated picture. Contrary to expected patterns, with one of the lowest rates of female participation in the labor force in the world, the gender gap in participation in the labor force (in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) greatly contradicts with the high rates of gender participation in education. Women’s participation in the formal economy is sharply fragmented and restricted to a narrow range of fields in the services sector and in agriculture. The services sector employs women with higher education, while the other employs women with low or no education. (See also, the Economic Participation section in this report). In this context, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the correlation between education and female participation is U-shaped: the odds of participation are highest for those with a bachelor or master’s degree, lowest for women with 1012 years of schooling and relatively high for women with no education (World Bank, 2010).43 Yet, educated women continue to encounter difficulties compared to men: “women with post-secondary education make up the largest part of the female unemployed, in contrast to their male counterparts, who are the least likely group of men to be unemployed.” (World Bank, 2012, p71). In addition, employers continue to prefer hiring male graduates compared to female graduates. Educated women continue to join the labor market at rates lower than men, with lower pay and lack of protection. Females’ unemployment duration is four times that of males. (According to ILO as indicated in the World Bank study 2010, p 30). While one third of vocational and technical training and education male graduates find work in the year following their graduation, only 6 per cent of female graduates find work in the same period (ILO). It also seems that education also affects how women perceive work. Women with high education feel empowered by their work. The World Bank study (2010) indicated that “educated women in the formal labor 42 Hammami and Siam (2012) confirm the same trends in a recent study focusing on Gaza. 43 The likelihood of a woman with a postgraduate degree to join the labor market has increased from 18 to 37 times that of a woman with a high school education (World Bank, 2010). 34
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market, such as teachers, perceive themselves as having decent work that earns them respect both at home and in the community. They move more easily between work space and home space.” (World Bank, 2010, p. 68). The same survey showed that the key factors protecting women from physical harm appear to be: (i) secondary or higher level of education, (ii) gainful employment, and (iii) old age. (World Bank, 2010, p. 68). For the most part, women with limited skills who work in the informal sector for low wages and continue to assume responsibilities for household reproduction see little significance in their work, and prefer to stay at home (World Bank, 2010). There are some “social returns” to education which may be important but not yet explored in literature. There is a need for more research to reach a better understanding of the correlations between women’s feeling of power and empowerment and increased life chances and education levels. It is also important to understand the effect of the combination of formal and hidden curricula and extracurricular activities on such patterns.
Educational visions and gender mainstreaming Key players in the education sector are strongly committed to providing high-quality education for all children and to addressing gender gaps in obtaining education at all levels – as reflected in the Ministry of Education and Higher Education strategic plans. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education and the Palestinian Authority have generally expressed commitment to gender mainstreaming. But all the plans and programs of the Ministry have remained neutral with respect to gender, instead of launching gender mainstreaming initiatives. This has maintained the existing gender-based differences at worst, and led to partial and gradual results at best. The Ministry’s five-year plan (1998-2003) was criticized for not incorporating gender as an analytical category or cross-cutting issue that affects the whole plan, leading to structural failure of gender mainstreaming (as indicated by an upcoming IWS study entitled “Gender Overview”). So, while a gender-based vision of a society based on social justice is adopted (MoE, 2011), the situation analysis of the current strategic plan (Palestinian National Authority, 2011) is quite limited to the issue of accessibility with a focus on achieving number equality. Policies, interventions, and the expected outcomes and indicators in the strategy brief lack a clear genderbased analysis. The Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy includes: enhancing gender equality and justice for the years 2011-2013, and improving “educational services in the oPt in terms of quantity and quality from a gender perspective.” But all three indicators focus on access to education rather than on the quality and relevance of education. The educational goals set forth in the Palestinian National Development Plan 2011-2013 incorporate various baseline indicators of quality with the exception of the Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study scores. They do not address gender/sex differences. The plan generally lacks an effective gender approach.44 The Ministry’s monitoring and evaluation system has monitored a number of quality indicators by gender since 2009. Such data may provide an insight into gender-based education experiences with time. But, annual reports do not provide gender analysis of such data, nor do they provide any indicators disaggregated by gender or gender analysis of data collection methods or report main performance indicators for management and vulnerable communities.
2.3. Strategic opportunities and policy priorities Despite the tremendous challenges, the education sector is not without opportunities. Success in achieving high levels of access to education provides an important foundation for addressing the barriers and horizontal and vertical obstacles still facing certain women and girls groups. Also, there is a widespread consensus (among policy makers, educators, civil society groups, and students and their families) on the need to focus on quality and inclusive education. At the policy level, a strong network of donors is working closely with the MoE through the sector working group.45 UN agencies partner with the Ministry in setting priorities for improving education quality and relevance, with a commitment to enhancing safe, childfriendly and inclusive educational programs and learning environments that respond to the diversity of children’s learning needs and abilities.46 Practically, the education sector has witnessed rich and varied interventions that enhance and encourage quality education, including governmental and non-governmental initiatives. This sector currently has relatively effective partnerships across the public sector and non-governmental players with international support.
Recommendations 1. Educational vision(s) – Advocating for education for liberation and social justice Obstacles to developing education – whether in terms of access to education or quality education – remain the result of the Israeli occupation and foreign 44 The National Plan 2011-2013 makes only one reference to gender considerations in more than 5 pages of tables summarizing policies and interventions. They were not mentioned at all in the 29 expected results. A close look at the Strategic Plan for the Development of Education gives similar results. Although beyond the scope of this research, examining the documents of international agencies active in the field of Palestinian education reveals similar trends. 45 Interview with Basri Saleh, April 17th, 2013. 46 See UNDAF. 35
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
political decisions.47 So, overcoming such obstacles and achieving tangible gains are, in general, subject to political developments and decisions. As such, the cornerstone for achieving all development rights of the Palestinian children is the effective advocacy for ending the occupation and its tightened grip on all aspects of Palestinian life and development horizons. The PLO and the Palestinian Authority and its ministries, including the Ministry of Planning and Development, Ministry of Education and Higher Education, and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, must partner with donors and the international community to advocate for an end to the Israeli occupation. · Building on the rich Palestinian history of engaging in education for liberation and social justice48 with a view to enhancing a national vision for education that encourages gender equality and social justice in its broadest sense. · Resisting pressures for reducing public education subsidies and privatization trends that undermine the principles of educational systems on a global scale. · Defying the narrow visions oriented toward commercializing education, promoting an alternative vision of education as a process that explores people’s potential to change imbalanced power relations, and supporting the exploration of various initiatives in the formal and informal sectors for the purpose of protecting and expanding educational institutions as open places for dynamic exchanges, criticism, independent thinking, freedom of expression, and knowledge production for empowerment and liberation. · Requesting international donors to show a strong commitment to gender equality as a priority at all education levels in relation to the quality of education and not just accessibility.
2. Efforts to enhance education quality and relevance require a more proactive approach to gender mainstreaming and inclusive and transformative education. · Adopting a unified and more effective and proactive stance on gender mainstreaming in planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, and enhancing the capacities of ministerial staff concerned with advancing gender equality policies, practices, and programs. · Providing pre-service and in-service teacher training. 47 For example: obtaining funds, movement issues, and the Israeli movement restrictions which affect access to education and education quality, as well as economic conditions which significantly affect education provision and demand, access to education, and education quality. 48 UNICEF report. For example, this report indicates that “Education and its purpose can be defined, not only by those in authority, but also by those who participate in schooling. Historically, education used by occupiers of the oPt as a political tool; but at the same time, Palestinians seized educational opportunities as a means to advance themselves.” (Nicolai, 2007).
Principals and administrative staff must adopt gendersensitive and responsive educational approaches and incorporate specific course modules to ensure gender equality and inclusive education. · Integrating gender equality in the professional standards for teachers and other educational staff and holding them responsible for achieving justice in terms of competencies, practices, and outcomes. · Establishing codes of conduct for the school, classroom, and students that enhance gender equality.
· Gender mainstreaming policies and programs must focus on systemic change and not just on individual change.49 Effective incentives and/or positive policies must be developed to integrate female students, teachers, administrative staff and principals with disabilities in the public education system. Also, legislation on children with disabilities’ access to education must be reviewed from a gender-based perspective.
· Promoting initiatives for involving families and communities more effectively in supporting girls’ education and defying gender-based restrictions concerning socially accepted fields of study and work for both males and females.
· Acknowledging the crucial role of alternative and informal education, particularly in supporting the education of children with different educational needs and abilities, as well as developing carefully designed programs that adopt alternative learning spaces, approaches, and measuring units that are gender-responsive and more inclusive of the diversity of learners.
· Adopting positive and relevant initiatives to increase male/female participation in “non-traditional” fields, and addressing the different learning experiences and gender-based results at all education levels.
4. Ensuring that all policies and programs support an inclusive approach to child education and welfare.
· Paying more attention to gender sensitive dynamics and their impacts on learning in educational settings inside and outside the classroom. · Ensuring a curriculum review and reform efforts based on adopted gender reviews, and setting priorities for making gender-sensitive and responsive modifications. · Exploring and promoting different tools for measuring students’ learning performance; thus allowing diversity in learning/learners’ activities and reflecting a wide range of learning goals and outcomes. · Ensuring the implementation of pilot national programs, such as the gender-responsive child friendly school project, in planning, implementaition, monitoring, and evaluation. · Exploring the possibility of using sport and physical activity to change prevailing gender stereotypes by implementing documented and well-designed programs while giving attention to female sports in schools and informal educational settings.
3. Ensuring policies, plans and programs that effectively address certain situations and requirements of girls and women in the marginalized and more vulnerable groups in terms of education quality and access to education. · Efforts concerning access to education must give priority to Jerusalem, Area C, and access restricted areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Clear genderresponsive frameworks must be adopted to focus on the impact of the lack or absence of authorities, facilities, security, and easy passage to school on girls/ young women.
Children are raised and grow up in families and communities. They do not develop and learn only at school. A child’s ability to learn is generally associated with his/her well-being. Also, physical and mental health and sound social relations in a safe environment are preconditions for effective learning. Successful effective learning requires a unified and comprehensive set of opportunities and services for children, starting at early childhood and extending to maturity inside and outside the school. · Enhancing relations between counselors, teachers, and protection staff (Ministry of Social Affairs) and parents to address gender equality and justice issues in classrooms, schools, and the society in general; and ensuring that service providers across different sectors receive training and support in the planning, implementation, follow-up, and assessment of services provided to children and young people. · Giving priority to gender-responsive programs to address school violence. · Developing and implementing effective policies on sexual harassment for all members of the educational system (students, teachers, administrative staff, and principals).
5. Education management and systems – giving more attention to how systems and procedures reinforce gender biases and discriminatory practices · Reviewing and modifying education policies and practices from a gender-based perspective to ensure creating supportive and empowering situations for teachers, administrative staff, and principals by addressing existing gender gaps in the form of 49 Nicolai, 2007.
36
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
compensation packages, professional development, employment and promotion opportunities, and sexual harassment.
6. Research and documentation – bridging knowledge gaps · The goals of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (access to education and improving education quality) must involve gender statistics; including gender-disaggregated data on children with disabilities and learning difficulties. · Bridging the gap through qualitative and quantitative research on steps taken to improve education quality, in particular, providing a clear analysis from a gender perspective, improving qualitative and quantitative data on female participation and experiences in all education levels by type of school/education place, and devising gender-responsive programs.
Targeted interventions at specific levels · Emphasizing gender-sensitive/responsive environments, approaches, and learning/educational resources in early childhood programs. · Expanding and enhancing science/IT disciplines in the secondary stage; making them easier for young women; working with teachers, counselors, and parents to overcome gender restrictions imposed on specializations and fields of study; and encouraging girls and boys to pursue their studies in a wider scope of disciplines. · Continuing to challenge horizontal segregation in post-secondary education, with a focus on a wider range of scientific degrees that provide young people better economic opportunities. · Putting special emphasis on developing more gender-responsive programs and policies in technical and vocational education and training; improving geographic female access to this type of education and training, and developing a clear strategy for integrating gender in technical and vocational education and training curricula, with a special emphasis on increasing curricular diversity to suit students with different academic backgrounds, especially non-traditional specializations that provide job opportunities, as well as enhancing female participation in technical and vocational education and training and in a wider range of work roles through culturally-sensitive public awareness campaigns.50 · Ensuring that adult education programs are genderresponsive.
50 Recommendations submitted to the ILO, undated, by special means. 37
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
Arabic References: ·
PCBS (2012). Violence survey in the Palestinian society. Main Findings Report. Ramallah: Author.
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Dr. Assaf, Saeed; Dr. Alfar, Shahinaz; and Abu-Goush, Hanan (2011). MoEHE Policies on Gender and their reflection in textbooks and pre-service and in-service teacher training.
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Owaida, Sama. (2013). Girls’ education in Jerusalem: between reality and ambition. An unpublished paper submitted in the 5th IWS Conference, Birzeit: IWS, Birzeit University.
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Where does Palestinians’ money go (undated), taken from: http://www.fu300.com/news.php?id=1444
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Education Law no. 1 of 2013. (2013). Palestinian Official Gazette, 86, 1-18
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Together to expose the details of the proposed governmental budget, 2013. (undated). Taken from: http://www.maannews.net/ARb/PRINT.ASPX?ID=576550
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MoEHE (2005). Dropouts from Palestinian Schools: Causes and Preventive and Corrective Measures.
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Abdul Karim, N. (2010). Gender-perspective analysis of the public education sector: A field Study from the beneficiaries’ point of view. Ramallah: Miftah.
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Abu Awwad, N. (2003). Gender and education: Palestinian education under the Palestinian Authority 1994-1999. Birzeit Institute of Women’ Studies, Birzeit University.
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ARCI. (2012). 24,000 Palestinians schoolchildren unaccounted for by Jerusalem education administration. Retrieved from: http://www.acri.org.il/en/2012/08/28/ej-education-report2012/
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Brady, M. (2011). Leveling the playing field: Building girl’s sports programs and creating new opportunities. Promoting healthy, safe, and productive transitions to adulthood series. Population Council, 1, 1-4. Retrieved from: http://www.popcouncil.org/publications/serialsbriefs/TABriefs.asp
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Bulbul, M. and Karaki, G. (2013, February). Women careers in academic and professional fields. Unpublished paper presented at the IWS 5th Annual Conference 2013. Birzeit: Institute of Women’s Studies, Birzeit University.
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Caprile, Maria et al. (Eds.).2012. Meta-analysis of Gender and Science Research: Synthesis Report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union
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ECOSOC. (2012). Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women report of the Secretary-General (information series E/CN.6/2013/1). UN Economic and Social Council.
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European Commission. (2009). She figures 2009: Statistics and indicators on gender equality in science. Brussels: Author.
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Giacaman, R., Saab, H., Nguyen-Gillham, V., Abdullah, A., &Naser, G. (2004). Palestinian adolescents coping with trauma: Initial findings. Birzeit: Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University.
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Hammami, R., & Siam, A. (2012). Who answers to Gazan women? An economic security and rights – research. Jerusalem: UN Women.
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ILO. (n.d.). Mainstreaming gender equality concerns in Palestinian TVET system (Policy Briefno. 11). Beirut:ILO Regional Office for Arab States.
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IWS. (Forthcoming). A dangerous decade: The second gender profile of the occupied West Bank and Gaza (2000-2010).
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Maimon, O. (Ed). 2012. Failed grade: The failing education system in East Jerusalem. Jerusalem: ACRI and Ir Amim.
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MOE. (2012). Education statistical yearbook for scholastic year 2011/2012. Ramallah: Author.
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MOE. (2012).The impact of the apartheid-expansion wall on the educational process. Ramallah: Author.
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MOE. (2012). National early childhood development strategy. Ramallah: Author.
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MOE. (n.d.). Trends in international mathematics and science study – TIMSS 2011: Primary results for Palestinian students. MOE – Assessment and Evaluation Departmen
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MOEHE. (2012).Annual narrative progress report, January – December 2011. Ramallah: Author.
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MOEHE. (2012). Monitoring and evaluation system for the education development strategic plan, 20082012: Annual report 2011. Ramallah: Author.
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MOEHE. (2011). Palestinian national plan: Summary strategy of education, higher education and vocational and technical training 2011 – 2013. Ramallah: Author.
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MOEHE & MOL. (2010). TVET Revised strategy. Ramallah: Author.
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MOEHE. (2008). Education development strategic plan 2008-2012: Towards quality education for development. Ramallah: Author.
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MOHE. (2010). Statistical year book 2010. Ramallah: Author.
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MOHE. (2004). Statistical year book 2004. Ramallah: Author.
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MOWA. (n.d.). Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy: Promoting gender equality and equity, 20112013. Ramallah: Author.
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Nicolai, S. (2007). Fragmented foundations: Education and chronic crisis in the OPT. Paris: UNESCO – IIEP & London: Save the Children.
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OCHA. (2011). Displacement and insecurity in Area C of the West Bank. Retrieved from: http://www. ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_area_c_report_august_2011_english.pdf)
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OCHA. (2010). OPT Area C humanitarian fact sheet. Retrieved from: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ ocha_opt_area_c_humanitarian_response_plan_fact_sheet_2010_09_03_english.pdf
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PASSIA. (2013). PASSIA diary 2013. Jerusalem: Author.
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PCBS. (2013). Press release on International Women’s Day 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/ portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_WomenWD2013E.pdf
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PCBS. (2012). Press release: Main findings of violence survey in the Palestinian Society, 2011. Ramallah: Author.
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PCBS. (2012). Press releaseon the eve of International Youth Day 12/8/2012. Retrieved from: http://www. pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_youthIntDay2012E.pdf
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PCBS. (2012). Press releaseon International Children’s Day 20/11/2012. Retrieved from: http://www.pcbs. gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_Child2012e.pdf
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PCBS. (2012). Women and men in Palestine: Issues and statistics. Ramallah: Author.
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PCBS & MOWA. (2011). Disability survey: Press conference report. Retrieved from: http://www.pcbs.gov. ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_Disability2012E.pdf
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PCBS. (2011). Women and men in Palestine: Issues and statistics. Ramallah: Author.
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PCBS. (2011). Palestinian children – Issues and statistics (Child Statistics Series #14). Ramallah: Author.
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PCBS. (2009). PCBS census 2007. Ramallah: Author.
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PCBS. (n.d.). Statistics. Retrieved from: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/
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PCHR. (2013). PNGO and Palestinian human rights organizations call for end to application of Education Law, halt to the enactment of unnecessary legislation in light of division.Retrieved from: http://www.pchrgaza. org/portal/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9408:pngo-and-palestinian-humanrights-organisations-call-for-end-to-application-of-education-law-halt-to-the-enactment-of-unnecessarylegislation-in-light-of-division&catid=36:pchrpressreleases&Itemid=194
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PNA. (2011). National plan for development 2011-2013: Establishing the state, building our future. Ramallah: Auhtor.
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PWRDC. (2009). Reality of female graduates seeking employment: What do Palestinian women want from the labor market and how to achieve that? Ramallah: Palestinian Women’s Research & Documentation Center (PWRDC) &UNESCO.
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Riyada Consulting and Training. (2011). Evidence based research study: Access to formal education for people with disability. Diakonia/NAD.
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Romahi, E. (2010). Assessing the educational system in Palestine:An NGO perspective – Context, problems, challenges and policy recommendations. Ramallah: Teacher Creativity Center.
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UNDAF. (2013). OPT UNDAF drafts.
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UNDAF. (2012). OPT UNDAF drafts.
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UNESCO. (2011). UNESCO education for all global monitoring report 2011. Author.
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UNESCO-IBE. (2011). World Data on Education,2010/11 (7thed) (Information series UNESCO-IBE. IBE/2011/ CP/WDE/PS). Retrieved from: www.ibe.unesco.org
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UNESCO. (n.d.). Safe schools: Protecting education from attack twelve schools in the Gaza buffer zone. Author.
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UNESCO. (2007). Strong foundations in gender equality in early childhood care and education – Advocacy brief. Bangkok: Author.
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UNICEF. (2012). Gaza Facts and Figures.
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UNICEF. (2011). The situation of Palestinian children in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jordan and Syria: An assessment based on the Convention of the Rights of the Child, 2010. Amman: Author.
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UNICEF. (2011). Child-friendly schools in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A case study. Occupied Palestinian Territory: Author.
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Velloso, A. (1996). Women, society and education in Palestine. International Review of Education, 42(5), 524-530.
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WCLAC. (2010). Life behind the wall: Voices of women from the seam zone. Ramallah: Author.
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World Bank. (2010). Checkpoints and barriers: Searching for livelihoods in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – Gender dimensions of economic collapse (Report No. 49699-GZ).
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Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
3 Social services:
From charity to protection
41
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
3.1. Introduction This report adopts the concept of social protection according to the definition endorsed by the Ministry of Social Affairs in the Social Protection Sector Strategy 2011. The Strategy provides a definition covering the philosophy and activities of social protection and the institutions operating in this sector and their function. The Strategy describes this definition as “human rights-oriented, emancipatory, and transformative”, that entrusts the Palestinian Authority with the duty of “providing social protection for its citizens under a social contract in the making” based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which states that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” This definition is consistent with the ESCWA and ILO definition of social protection, namely interventions and activities carried out by a society to protect its members from hazards and exposure, sustain their stability, and enhance their ability to manage the dangers they may face in a way that promotes social integration (ESCWA, 2003). The Ministry of Social Affairs has set the following social protection measures (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2011): 1.
Cash and in kind contributions, and programs and services to households and individuals under the poverty line.
2.
Projects and programs targeting vulnerable and marginalized categories: the disabled, the elderly, children, and women in distress.
3.
Social security programs, including benefits of retirement, unemployment, work-related injuries, workers’ compensation, maternity, and death of the family supporter. They also include health insurance benefits and basic healthcare services for everyone. For that purpose, social security funds are established and funded by the government, the private sector, and citizens.
4.
Empowerment (incentive) programs: to create appropriate human capital to access the everchanging labor market. They include training programs, small enterprises, grants, easy loans, and employment programs.
The Ministry of Social Affairs regards social protection as a part of a “constructive development process, whose philosophy and goals depend on available budgets. “It is associated with policies in the fields of education, health, and women and children protection and empowerment.” The Ministry emphasizes that such social protection levels are “interconnected and integrated.” Each is 42
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
necessary in its own right, so they all benefit from the existence of a consistent legislative framework that abides by the conceptual framework based on codifying protection in the context of the rights and duties of the state and citizens, and the implementation of programs that ensure access of the poor and the needy to care and rights (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2011). This reflects the Ministry’s aspirations and provides a compass that guides the development of its programs. This section focuses on institutionalized social protection measures, i.e. those provided by governmental and nongovernmental institutions and international organizations. Non-institutionalized forms of social protection are not addressed. These include the actions taken at the level of the household and the local community, which continue to play an important role in the Palestinian social protection system in its broad sense. But no data or studies are available to allow monitoring the weight and effectiveness of a non-institutionalized social protection system, its impact on Palestinian women, and its interaction with the institutionalized protection system. Although it is obvious that women carry the main responsibility of caring for the elderly, children, people with disabilities, and the ill – which may reinforce their traditional role (at home) and enhance their marginalization – we need a study that distinguishes between the non-institutionalized social protection system and the institutionalized system, their impact on the status and roles of women, and the possibilities and opportunities for building models of interaction between the two levels of social protection, thus contributing to the promotion of fairness and justice for Palestinian women.51 The assessment of the reality of social protection in the oPt is based on the Palestinian Basic Law and the Declaration of Independence, which reiterate the basic citizenship rights, and the standards contained in relevant international conventions and declarations. In this context, the signing of CEDAW by the Palestinian President is a clear sign of the Palestinian Authority’s commitment to gender equality. The institutions working in the field of women’s empowerment in the 1967 oPt have formulated the Palestinian Women’s Bill of Rights in partnership between governmental and civil society institutions (the General Union of Palestinian Women and the MoWA, 2008). There are various actors in the social protection sector, including a large number of ministries and government, civil, international, and foreign organizations. Also, there 51 Some studies provide data on some aspects of non-institutionalized protection, particularly regarding the benefit exchange network at the kinship group and local community levels (Hilal and Al-Malki, 1996); or the mechanisms of Palestinian family adaptation during the second intifada, and women’s role in this process (Abu-Nahla, 2008). Both studies raise the issue of the ability of this system to continue to play its role, and its apparent effect on the reinforcement of the traditional patriarchal system. Perhaps we need more studies that examine the effectiveness of the non-institutionalized protection system and its role in empowering women, and the chances of changing her traditional roles towards more participation in different aspects of public life. Also, some studies indicate the erosion of the family, kinship groups, and local community roles in this regard (UK Aid, 2012).
are multiple sources of support for this sector, and multiple areas in which they operate including preventive measures, such as social insurance; relief work, such as direct cash and in-kind assistance; empowerment measures, such as loans and employment opportunities; and care services, such as care services for vulnerable groups (the elderly, people with special needs, and women and children in distress). The roles of these institutions vary in terms of their visions, mechanisms of action, targeted sectors, and the size and type of support they provide.52 The social protection approach in the oPt is both a means and an end. Providing effective protection for Palestinian men and women is directly linked to citizens’ welfare and survival and enhancing their resistance of the occupation. It is also associated with “building a dynamic and coherent society free from poverty and vulnerability through increasing fairness and security” (Muwatin, 2010). In this context, the focus is on the principles of fairness and social justice, and empowerment in approaching Palestinian women’s situation in this system: specifically how social care services respond to the needs of beneficiary groups (considering special needs based on several variables, most importantly gender, and contributing to changing women’s roles at the household and society levels).
3.2. Issues and Indicators This section addresses the situation of social protection in the oPt in terms of the social groups in need of protection and from a gender perspective. An intensive analysis of the institutional and legislative structures will be conducted in addition to analyzing the situation of women in each group, the adequacy of services and identifying gaps.
3.2.1 Deficient and contradictory legal environment The legal framework regulating social protection in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consists of a set of laws, legislation, regulations and strategies that are related to achieving this concept. Social protection issues are distributed across a number of laws, including the general retirement, child, public health, senior citizens, rights of people with disabilities and battered women’s protection centers laws to include most of the social groups covered by protection. The legal framework is characterized by 52 The list of major institutions working in this field includes ministries and government agencies. The Ministry of Social Affairs plays the main role in terms of: planning, follow-up, monitoring, and service providing. In addition we have the Families of Martyrs and Injured Citizens Foundation, and the Ministry of Detainees’ Affairs. Social protection services are provided by a number of other ministries (in addition to the above-mentioned ministries), such as the Ministries of Health, Education, Labor and Endowments; civil institutions (more than one thousand charities and foundations); and Zakat committees (11 in the West Bank and 5 in the Gaza Strip); Palestinian private sector; international organizations including UNRWA, WFP, FAO, EU, the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UN Women, and various international development agencies, and foreign NGOs. For more details, see: Ministry of Social Affairs, 2011, Social Protection Sector Strategy. 43
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a shortage of legislation, particularly the absence of a social security law, and legislation that date back to various eras, some of which are outdated. In this regard, we can find some laws that date back to the time of the Jordanian rule that were used in the West Bank (the civil service retirement law known as the 2 per cent law, laws on juveniles and the penal code). In addition there are some laws from the time of the British Mandate which were applied in the Gaza Strip (retirement and insurance law, penal code and juveniles law). In this context, the ILO Secretary General believes that the absence of social security laws has led to discrimination, especially against women and workers with family responsibilities. Based on studies it conducted or funded, ILO recommends devising a social security law that guarantees the provision of medical care and financial aid for workers and expands the scope of social protection to include maternity protection and some useful measures helping workers who have family responsibilities, and to include all female employees in different sectors (ILO, 2012). The importance of this diagnosis stems from the fact that ILO is a main partner of the National Authority in this field. As for laws issued following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority which include forms of social protection, they are: the civil service law, the labor law, the law on the rights of people with disabilities, the public health law, the general retirement law, battered women’s protection centers law and the child law. It goes without saying that the laws preceding the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority are not based on the Palestinian Basic Law which is the legal reference for all laws. So not only are these laws obsolete, they are also conflicting with the Basic Law that guarantees gender equality. In this regard, legislation governing violence against women and children come to the forefront, particularly the penal code and personal status law. Some presidential decrees or cabinet orders have contributed to limiting laws that are biased against women, for example suspending provisions that mitigate punishments for “honor killings”. The referral system – Takamol – is expected to contribute to improving the work of various Palestinian institutions in the field of combating gender-based violence against women. The new referral system takes into consideration the experience of the concerned institutions and integration between civil society institutions and the relevant ministers, particularly the Ministry of Social Affairs and police according to protocols identifying referral mechanisms for abused women or women who live in dangerous environments, as well as a services package. This indicates a state of legal contradiction in dealing with this issue. For instance, we have obsolete laws hostile to women on the one hand and modern systems that take into account women’s needs and protection on the other. This confuses law enforcement agencies such as the police and the judiciary when dealing with women’s
issues. This also gives rise to the need to harmonize laws with the Palestinian Basic Law and relevant conventions, particularly CEDAW. On the other hand, some of the laws and relevant strategies issued after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority are neutral in terms of gender, such as the law on the rights of people with disabilities, the child law, the strategy for the elderly and children’s strategy. Their neutral wording leads us to believe that they are based on the principle of equality, in terms of dealing with the individuals targeted by this legislation regardless of gender. However, they may cover discrimination against women. So, it is useful to examine the effect of this neutral language in practice, in terms of its ability to address the specific needs of women associated with their biological composition, or the socio-cultural conditions which constitute an obstacle to women’s access to their rights. This sometimes requires the introduction of the principle of affirmative action to achieve the principle of fairness; so the specific needs of women are highlighted, at least, at the level of the executive regulations of laws and implementation plans of strategies. The impact of that on women’s situation must be examined. Other laws and regulations highlight the special needs of women, such as the labor law, which dedicates special articles to women’s employment, and the cabinet decision on the regulation of women’s work at night. Also, some systems are specifically designed to deal with women’s issues such as the referral system Takamol. But the existence of a legal text does not mean the effectiveness of its application. The labor law sets out the rights and duties of workers, as well as controls for public safety and work in hazardous professions. There is a special section addressing the employment of women, and entrusts the government with monitoring the implementation of the law through the Department of Labor Inspection. Enforcing public safety requirements, monitoring juvenile labor, including girls, combating child labor, and ensuring compliance with women’s rights are some of the responsibilities of this Department. The Ministry of Labor reports indicate a deficiency in this area, especially in the field of labor inspection. This is due to the lack of human resources and necessary equipment, according to the Ministry (Palestinian Ministry of Labor – Labor Inspection Department, 2013). This brings us to the need for reviewing the laws related to the interaction between the two levels: sensitivity to gender issues (addressing the specific needs of women), and the institutional structure through which the law is being interpreted and implemented, all the way to monitoring its impact on the protection of women . Some categories lack appropriate legislations. One example is the absence of a social security law to date; with insurance being limited to the amended general retirement law which now covers all public and private sector workers after being amended by a presidential decree in 2007. But implementation is still limited to government employees, 44
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
and employees in some municipalities and universities. At the end of 2012, the minimum wage system was endorsed. The implementation of this system is expected to benefit women in particular, especially those working in the public sector (in kindergartens, secretarial work, and sewing workshops), and those who are paid less than the minimum wage. Currently a social security law is being prepared by a ministerial committee headed by the Prime Minister. The Ministry of Social Affairs and its partners in the Social Policy Advisory Council in Palestine, in which all segments of the Palestinian society participate, are preparing a social security law. The proposed law is based on the Muwatin Study (2010) “Toward a Social Law for Palestine”. The project uses a gender-neutral language. The proposed wording is based on gender equality in terms of benefiting from insurance proposed by the law, including stipulations of earning pension (same age and benefits for men and women, including inheritors benefiting from the pension of a deceased woman). In addition, the law provides maternity insurance under the additional packages chapter. A tradition has been established here of institutionalizing the rights and needs of marginalized groups in laws such as the law on the rights of the people with disabilities and the law of the rights of the elderly. This trend contributes to establishing an important ground in dealing with the needs of the different groups as rights protected by the law. As such, they constitute a cornerstone for these groups and institutions supporting them in the fight for materializing these rights. In the same direction, an institutional structure that is based on partnership in leadership and follow-up is currently being established. Examples include the National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, the National Committee for the Elderly, and the sectoral advisory boards for the different development sectors. This tradition provides better chances for an effective partnership between the various stakeholders.
3.2.2. Groups targeted by social protection services53 This section addresses the groups targeted by social protection activities and existing protection services in the oPt, with the exception of some groups/services addressed in other sections, particularly health insurance and protection for women in distress. Households and individuals under the poverty line: The road to fighting poverty Poverty in the Palestinian community is a main challenge for policy makers due to its implications and impact on large segments of the Palestinian society. It is an important indicator of the effectiveness of existing social 53 Some aspects of protection targeting certain groups were excluded as they were addressed in other sections of this study, particularly health insurance and protection for women in distress.
protection. The high prevalence of poverty affects the nature and levels of required social protection; the poor have the priority in providing social protection services. Poverty in the oPt is associated with the occupation that characterizes the Palestinian reality. It is influenced by political and security factors, and other external factors such as international aid. This necessarily weakens the chances of using it as an indicator of public policies usefulness. The Palestinian society does not only suffer from poverty, it is also facing a systematic process of impoverishment and marginalization by the occupation in order to perpetuate the causes of poverty, weaken the Palestinian economic production base, and increase its dependence on the Israeli economy.
influence in the Gaza Strip. Official data indicate that the poverty rate among individuals decreased in Gaza from 49.9 per cent before receiving assistance to 38.8 per cent after receiving assistance. On the other hand, the same rate decreased in the West Bank from 20.2 per cent to 17.8 per cent (PCBS, 2012, b). However, there is no data that allows for observing change in poverty rates in female-headed households compared to male-headed households as a result of receiving social assistance. Female-headed households comprised 43 per cent of the total households receiving assistance from the Ministry of Social Affairs by the end of 2011 (Miftah, 2012). The percentage of female-headed households in the oPt is 9.3 per cent (PCBS, 2012, c). This indicates a larger impact of assistance on reducing poverty rates in female-headed households compared to male-headed households.
The poverty rate in the oPt was 25.8 per cent in 2011 (17.8 per cent in the West Bank and 38.8 per cent in the Gaza Strip). 25.5 per cent of males live under the poverty line, compared to 26.2 per cent for females. It is worth noting that a poor individual is one who lives in a poor household (the household is the basic unit of analysis). The table below shows differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip in poverty trends by gender of the head of household. Female-headed households in the Gaza Strip are less poor than male-headed households; whereas West Bank data shows an opposite trend. This special case (female-headed households being less poor than male-headed households) is partially attributed to the biased assumptions of institutions working in the field of providing social assistance to the poor. Such authorities believe that female-headed households are poorer than male-headed households. This means that priority is given to these households in providing assistance, thus raising their consumption levels, and reducing poverty among them. Social assistance plays an important role in reducing poverty rates in both areas, with a wider
In the same context, PCBS surveys showed a decline in equity in living standards in 2011 compared to 2010. The data also show a decline in the consumption of the poorest 20 per cent of the population during the same period (from 10.6 per cent in 2010 to 10.2 per cent in 2011) (PCBS, 2012, a). But the change in the gender gap cannot be monitored. As for policy-making, it is useful to rely on poverty data by income as they allow for building policies that develop households’ resources; show the impact of coping mechanisms adopted by Palestinian households in the face of reduced or interrupted income, which poses a strategic burden for the household; or contribute to deepening the degree of exposure: selling properties or borrowing. Poverty rates by income show that about half of the Palestinian households are under the poverty line, and that female-headed households are poorer (53.4 per cent) than male-headed households (47.2 per cent) (PCBS, 2012, a).
Poverty rates among individuals and households according to the monthly consumption patterns in the oPt by region and gender, 2009-2011 Gender / Gender of household head
Individuals
Households
West Bank
Gaza Strip
oPt
West Bank
Gaza Strip
oPt
Males
17.4
38.6
25.5
17.5
39.4
25.9
Females
18.3
39.0
26.2
22.5
29.7
25.0
Source: PCBS, 2012. Standards of living in the Palestinian territories: expenditure, consumption, and poverty, 2011. Ramallah, Palestine.
In the same context, a large proportion of Palestinian households suffer from food insecurity (27 per cent in 2011; 44 per cent in the Gaza Strip and 17 per cent in the West Bank) (MAS, 2012). This shows considerable improvement compared to 2009-2010. In 2010, 33 per cent of households suffered from food insecurity (52 per cent in the Gaza Strip, and 22 per cent in the West 45
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
Bank). The percentage was 36 per cent in 2009 (60 per cent in the Gaza Strip and 22 per cent in the West Bank) (Palestinian National Authority, 2012; MAS, 2012). It can be said that the improvement in food security levels in 2009-2011 is attributed to cash and in kind aid provided through cash and in kind transfer programs implemented by the Palestinian National Authority,
whose beneficiaries have steadily increased; as well as through assistance programs implemented by international institutions, particularly in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian National Authority, 2012). Related studies show that despite the slight increase in food security levels in the Gaza Strip, the situation is still fragile. A conclusion reached by a recent study on food security in the Gaza Strip can be generalized to the oPt in general. The study emphasizes that two overlapping factors affect food security trends and the agriculture sector, namely the Israeli occupation and donors’ funding trends (MAS, 2013). Available data shows that the rates of the loss of food security are higher in female-headed households compared to male-headed households, with a 7 per cent difference nationwide. Female-headed households comprised 44 per cent of households suffering from food insecurity in the Gaza Strip, and 17 per cent in the West Bank (ECOSOC, 2013). FAO (2012, a) emphasizes the importance of agricultural growth in reducing hunger and malnutrition; as a large proportion of the poor work in agriculture. Agricultural growth involving smallholders will be most effective in reducing extreme poverty when accompanied by social protection for the poor – particularly empowerment, enhancing capacities, and protecting and developing their resources (FAO 2012a, 39). Yet, programs in the oPt focus on providing relief aid (cash and food), while continuing to ignore the agricultural sector. For example, there are three committees (international committees working in partnership with local institutions) that work toward reducing food insecurity in the oPt. These are the Food Aid Committee, the Cash for Work Committee, and the Agriculture Committee. These three committees take up 70 per cent of the requirements of the 2013 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)54 for international institutions. The Agriculture Committee’s share was 7 per cent of the CAP amount (MAS, 2013). Also, agriculture accounted for 1.6 per cent of development aid in 2010 (FAO, 2012, b). The absence of a national strategy to combat poverty There is no integrated policy to combat poverty in the oPt yet. The programs and projects in place are closer to a poverty “alleviation” rather than “elimination” philosophy. There are many scattered and sometimes conflicting programs and projects but there are also many laws that were long studied and some of them are consistent with the latest relevant international standards. However, there is no effective social protection system in the oPt. Actions taken in this area tend to take the form of coping measures to the deep and prolonged crisis imposed by the Israeli occupation. Relevant studies refer to the waste 54 The consolidated appeal of international organizations operating in the oPt, which determines the funding requirements for their projects. The Cash for Work Committee plans to provide assistance to 320,000 persons: 72% of them in Gaza Strip and 55% of them women. As for the Agriculture committee, it plans to provide assistance to around 22,000 households with agricultural properties; 30% of them are female-headed households (MAS, 2013). 46
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
of time, effort, and money as a result of the fragmentation of this sector, the multiplicity of governmental and nongovernmental organizations working in it, and the lack of coordination among them. As such, the trends in this sector are closer to improvisation and dependence on the availability of funding (Palestinian Ministry of Planning, 2009; Hilal, 2007). Measures taken in the oPt are merely providing social assistance. Programs targeted to the poor involve services provided by several parties. The most important are the Ministry of Social Affairs, UNRWA, and the Zakat committees. They involve different systems, most notably the cash assistance system, particularly the cash assistance programs in the Ministry of Social Affairs and UNRWA. There are various types of interventions executed by different parties, including cash and in kind assistance (particularly food items), and services (healthcare, education, housing modification, etc). Social assistance is provided to a large number of families (the Ministry of Social Affairs provides regular assistance to around 100,000 families in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) through regular support programs. Different eligibility criteria are applied by the different parties providing assistance. Also, the assistance packages are different. Such assistance depends, to a large extent, on foreign funding from several parties, most importantly the EU and the Islamic Development Bank. The general nature of this assistance is based on the principle of charity, with a weak assistance scale that depends on the availability of funding. Targeting mechanisms are based on exclusion. Also, there are emergency support programs provided by various parties, depending on available funds. They provide a quick response to the catastrophic reality of the crisis in the oPt (Hilal, Al-Kafri, and Kuttab 2008; Al-Malki, Ladadwa, Sawalhah, and Elbarghouthi, 2012). Based on the results of different studies that focused on the Ministry of Social Affairs programs, particularly the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (Miftah, 2012), the study of UK Aid (UK Aid, 2012), and Hilal (2007), the following issues emerge as being influential in terms of justice and equity in providing such services, particularly with regard to gender. Targeting: Poor households are targeted based on the poverty line (according to a certain equation). Flexibility was added to the targeting process in the West Bank by taking into consideration family needs based on field scrutiny and consulting safety nets in the local communities. The Ministry of Social Affairs in the West Bank, and its targeting mechanisms, are subject to continuous reviews aiming at improvement. Yet, the targeting mechanism remains exclusionary; i.e., focusing on excluding groups that do not deserve assistance according to the program criteria. This can be attributed to limited resources available, which puts decision makers in front of the challenge of deciding who deserves it most rather than who deserves it. Criteria exclude the poor
in favor of the poorer. In the Gaza Strip, the equation decides, without a chance for effective field scrutiny, because of the existing split between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Targeting mechanisms and criteria need repeated examination to determine their gender sensitivity. Criteria take into consideration giving more points to households with marginalized women, but treat the household as a targeted unit. Sometimes, individuals with special cases are targeted (with chronic diseases or disability). Although the Ministry of Social Affairs emphasizes in the social protection strategy and cash assistance strategy the principle of the right to receive assistance, practice is still far from realizing this right. Assistance philosophy: is based on reducing the gap between the household situation and poverty line by 50 per cent, i.e. reducing poverty. This weakens the chances of dealing with different family/family members’ needs. It does not consider variation of needs by location, age, education, health status, or sex. The Ministry of Social Affairs in the West Bank took important steps in this regard by adding flexibility to targeting mechanisms and responding to individuals’ needs in some cases, or responding to the special needs of families through emergency assistance. The Ministry of Social Affairs is currently reviewing the amount of aid, taking into account variation in family members’ needs. The Ministry of Social Affairs developed a special program targeting the poor close to the poverty line, with different materials available to get them out of poverty. This new program is the Deprived Families Economic Empowerment Program. The first stage was completed, and the second stage has begun. The Ministry seeks to target 18,000 families in the second stage (Miftah, 2012). This program needs an evaluation from a gender-based perspective where the project’s relevance to women’s needs is examined, as well as its ability to respond to the variation in men and women’s needs and the impact of its projects on empowering men and women. In light of the Palestinian Authority’s intention to develop a general strategy to combat poverty based on the multi-dimensional concept of poverty, it is important to reconsider the assistance programs targeting the poor so that they take into consideration the following aspects: ·
Addressing the different family member’s needs.
·
Addressing the different forms of marginalization and their causes, including designing interventions that target regions (village, district), households, and certain individuals (Bedouin communities, valleys, villages isolated by the Barrier,…).
·
Households’ self-assessment of their needs.
This allows for increasing the effectiveness of aid, and responding to family members’ needs (men and women). 47
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
It is important to emphasize that the current poverty database serves the new trend. Also, the Ministry of Social Affairs in the West Bank is closer to this approach in addressing poverty through the flexible targeting of poor households. On the other hand, there are no guarantees that the new approach to poverty reduction would automatically respond to women’s needs. This requires perseverance and monitoring with a focus on ensuring that the targeting mechanism takes into consideration women’s needs (the diversity of poor communities by region and source of marginalization of women), and the impact of this assistance on empowering women. This requires analyzing the impact of these interventions on the household/individual level, without stopping at macroeconomic indicators. Of course, it is important to reduce poverty rates. But it is also important to examine places of reduction (regions, social groups), and whether this reduction benefited both men and women and made a change in their roles. People with disabilities: neutral wording harms women Although there is a law on the rights of people with disabilities, many of its articles are still suspended, due to the absence of bylaws. Now, one article is under focus. This article stipulates that institutions shall fill 5 per cent of their jobs with disabled employees, with application limited to new governmental jobs. The language of the law is neutral to gender issues. This has a negative impact on women during implementation, as is the case with women’s share in jobs, custom exemptions, etc. The important intervention that would make a difference here is the disabled card. The Ministry conducted the first stage of the disabled card survey in cooperation with the PCBS. It is important here to search for a mechanism for determining needs that takes into consideration disabled women’s needs. In this regard, the care strategy for people with disabilities is based on integrating these people into society and providing care for them in their social environments (family and local community). Here, women may bear the primary responsibility for their care in consolidation of the traditional role of women in the household that excludes them from participation in public life. So, it is important to study the impact of this strategy on women, their roles, and time available for them; and to complement this strategy with appropriate measures: day-time entertainment centers, local societies, etc. As for the empowerment programs for this group (lending and training programs), the number of beneficiaries is limited. For example, out of 108 beneficiaries benefiting from the Ministry of Social Affairs fund for people with disabilities 28 are women. This requires reviewing three interconnected aspects in these projects: the systems that determine eligibility conditions and mechanisms; existing assumptions among service providers (preferences),
where priority is given to men as family supporters deserving empowerment; and the expectations of women candidates, as their expectations as to the relevance of the service to their needs influence their choice to claim their rights. It is important here to emphasize the importance of making public institutions accessible to people with disabilities. In this regard, the right guaranteed by the law is still far from being achieved in reality. The rights of this group are still treated from a relief/charity perspective, as providing assistance to them is linked to their family income. The elderly - Towards considering the special situation of elderly women The elderly comprised 4.4 per cent of the total population in 2012, of them 55 per cent were women. This percentage is expected to increase. Also, elderly women are more vulnerable to poverty, marginalization, and disease compared to elderly men. In this context, a large proportion of women live alone (one-person family): 14.2 per cent of elderly women compared to 2.4 per cent of elderly men in the West Bank in 2007. The same trend is observed in the Gaza Strip based on older statistics. More than one half of elderly women are widowed (52.2 per cent) or never have been married (3.7 per cent), compared to 8.7 per cent and 1 per cent for elderly men, respectively (Khalifa, 2008). 70.7 per cent of the elderly in the oPt suffer from at least one chronic disease: 71.6 per cent in the West Bank and 68.7 per cent in the Gaza Strip; 75.4 per cent for elderly women and 64.7 per cent for elderly men. Twenty-two per cent of the elderly live in poor households (PCBS, 2012, d). Despite significant gender differences in this age group, translated into different needs, the elderly strategy uses a neutral language without taking into consideration the special needs of elderly women. It talks about the elderly in general. The strategy is based on providing care for the elderly in their own environments. This raises the previous questions related to providing care for the disabled. While this strategy is the best option for the elderly (integration instead of isolation) and the state (less costs), it may negatively impact women in households. So, what are the possible solutions in this regard? Qualifying social workers who work with the elderly is of crucial importance here. This includes taking into consideration gender differences in the needs of women and men on the one hand, and understanding the impact of intervention policies on the relations between men and women on the other. Certain social activities (focusing on homes that provide day care to the elderly, organizing visits for the elderly to elderly homes as well as field visits by social workers/volunteers to the elderly in their local communities and homes, etc.) play an important role in reducing the impact of providing care to the elderly in their local communities, including the expected negative impact on women. Perhaps it is useful here to draw upon the experience of the rehabilitation 48
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
program that is based on understanding society in targeting the disabled in their local communities. As for elderly care homes, most of them belong to civil societies. The Ministry buys services there. There is one home in Jericho that belongs to the Ministry. These homes accommodate the elderly whose families decide to put them there to avoid providing care for them, or who do not have a supporter. In most cases, staying at a home is not the decision of the elderly (Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University, 2012). It would be useful to consider improving the work of these homes, to be based on developing elderly relationships with the local community, including benefiting from their experience and paying attention to women’s special needs. A law on the rights of the elderly is pending approval. In the same context, a national committee for elderly affairs has been established. Children There is a national strategy for children, which used a neutral language. It talks about children in general without giving due consideration to gender differences. Child groups covered by protection measures are: · Children in difficult circumstances. They are dealt with according to a referral system to social care institutions (orphanages and foster families). The referral system was devised to include determining cases requiring intervention by the society and the Ministry for protecting children. · Orphans: cash and in kind assistance is provided to them. The Zakat fund sponsors about 20,000 orphans (Zakat Fund, 2012). Also, the Ministry of Social Affairs orphans’ sponsorship project sponsored 3,750 orphans in 2013 according to the Ministry website. Here, there is no gender discrimination in targeting or aid value. Also, shelter services, mostly supervised by charity organizations, are provided. Orphanage services involve providing care up to a specific age (18 or completion of education). The mechanisms of action adopted by these shelters differ: some institutions provide care as part of families headed by volunteer mothers (such as SOS) while others provide care through supervisors. There are no studies regarding the effectiveness of orphanages’ programs in preparing orphans for life outside these homes and their impact on both genders; including reviewing the impact of measures taken by these institutions (and perhaps the government, too) to provide suitable opportunities for reintegrating them in the society (work, marriage, etc). Foundling cases are of peculiar importance here. · Children from poor families who drop-out of school: vocational rehabilitation is provided to these children. The effectiveness of this program is limited, with few opportunities offered to girls. Focus is mostly
on traditional professions. The program needs to be reconsidered and upgraded to meet the needs of the labor market. Its ability to attract both girls and boys must be enhanced. · Child labor: Although the law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 15, this phenomenon is widespread. It indicates weaknesses in follow-up agencies (particularly labor inspection staff in the Ministry of Labor), and the inefficiency of programs targeting these children by different institutions; particularly poor families support programs. · Delinquent juveniles: the general trend is to reintegrate them in society, with no special treatment given to girls, whether at the level of litigation or serving their sentences. This requires providing special systems that consider the fragility of girls’ situation, and the impact of rehabilitation programs on providing appropriate options for reintegrating girls (and boys) later in the society. Social security services: Fragile social protection in the absence of a Social Security Law There is no social security law in the oPt. What exists is a law on general retirement (see list of insurance systems in the oPt). This law theoretically covers workers in the public and private sectors. However, it still excludes most of the workers in the private sector. According to available data, less than a quarter of the Palestinian workforce benefits from retirement pension (public sector and employees of some municipalities and some universities), together with Jerusalemites. The Muwatin 2010 study estimates the scope of protected labor in the oPt to be 16 per cent for males and 30 per cent for females. We have to be careful in dealing with these figures as the high percentage of protected labor among women, compared to men, conceals two facts: first, the poor participation of women in the workforce (women account for 18 per cent of the workforce) (PCBS, 2012, c); and second, the concentration of women in the service sectors (about 60 per cent of working women) (PCBS, 2012, c, 47), mostly in the government sector, where women comprise about 40 per cent of the civil government sector employees (45 per cent in the West Bank and 30 per cent in the Gaza Strip) (PCBS, 2012 c , 57). Of course this is a protected sector, while the agriculture sector is not protected (22 per cent of working women). Meanwhile, a large proportion of workers remain uncovered by retirement services for the foreseeable future. Those workers are in the unorganized sector55, comprising more than one quarter of the Palestinian workforce56, or workers in 55 A study conducted by Jamil Helil et al. (2008) indicated a change in estimates of the number of workers in the unprotected sector (i.e. those who lack entitlements and social insurance) by definition. According to the study, those were about one half of Palestinian workers (Hilal et al., 2008). 56 About 180,000 people were working in the unorganized sector in 2003 (one quarter of the workers) (Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), 2004). The unorganized economic sector in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: general social and economic characteristics, Ramallah. 49
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
small enterprises. A large proportion of working women is concentrated in these sectors. Currently, those workers are not covered by any type of social insurance, with no future coverage plans. The majority of women are outside the coverage of social protection, because of their low rate of participation in the labor market. The percentage of women benefiting from the retirement schemes in the oPt reflects their percentage in the public sector. Women constitute about 22 per cent of the total participants in retirement schemes (43 per cent of civil servants, and 2 per cent of the security employees). Thus, the percentage of women participants in pension funds is insignificant if not linked to women’s situation in the labor market. As for other types of insurance – except for health insurance, which covers three-quarters of Palestinian households, including poor households and the unemployed (unions’ insurance) – they are limited in terms of the groups benefiting from them: only public sector employees, some large private companies, some civil institutions, and universities. These types are mentioned in the Civil Service Law and Labor Law. They cover disability insurance, work-related injuries, inheritors, and disease (occupational diseases). As for maternity insurance, the Labor and Civil Service Laws grant women maternity leave for 10 weeks, borne by the employer, which adversely affects the employment opportunities for women, or drives some employers to circumvent the law in different ways. It should be noted that the implementation of maternity leave outside the government sector is limited only to large institutions subject to inspection systems. There are no methods for protecting the unemployed (unemployment insurance), and unemployment is addressed according to available funds (relief programs, or through temporary employment programs). Normally, the chances of women benefiting from these projects are limited, especially that women who remain unemployed for a long time (years) redefine their relationship with the labor market and tick the “housewife” box. The Palestinian government announced, through the Prime Minister and the Minister of Labor, that the year 2013 will be the year of social security. A ministerial committee was formed for this purpose. The concerned parties are working on developing options, including the preparation of proposals for the Social Security Law. So, it is important to focus on passing the new law, and ensuring the following: ·
Coverage of categories where there is a concentration of women: the unprotected economic sector, agricultural workers, cooperatives’ and the self-employed.
· Insurances that have a direct impact on women and their employment opportunities, particularly maternity insurance. This insurance seriously contributes to improving opportunities for women at work. Moreover, it allows a woman to obtain an adequate income during the leave period.
· Ensuring that the law is sensitive to gender issues, through explicit provisions. Examples include women’s right to bequeath their pension benefits, maternity and paternity leave, and emergency leave related to children’s needs. · Also the unemployment insurance encourages women to return to the labor market, and take advantage of retraining opportunities, and participation in the labor market. It is expected that providing such insurance would have a positive impact on women, perhaps more than men, through its contribution to increasing women’s participation in the labor market. It is worth noting that the rate of unemployment among educated women is high (44.6 per cent of women who completed 13 years of education or more compared to 16 per cent for men from the same category in 2012). At the same time, 45.7 per cent of those who completed 13 years of education or more classified themselves as housewives (PCBS, 2013). · It is clear that applying the law would be subject to technical and financial capabilities. Therefore, it must be applied gradually. Here, we must set out a clear timetable and stages for implementing the law: gradual insurance and gradual coverage of different groups.
3.3. Strategic Opportunities and Policy Priorities Social protection in the oPt faces significant challenges, namely occupation and its procedures that enhance the impoverishment of the Palestinian people, and the dependence on foreign funding, in addition to the demographic structure of the Palestinians (a young community with high rates of economic dependence), and political division. Such challenges must be taken into account when discussing social protection and development prospects in the oPt. At a time when the occupation represents a challenge that must be confronted and resisted through social protection, it is the duty of the international community to fulfill its responsibilities in this regard (working toward an immediate end to the occupation and exerting pressure on the occupation to stop its policies aimed at isolating the Palestinian communities from each other and restricting movement, etc). Emphasizing that the occupation is the main factor in the deterioration of Palestinians’ conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip means that the end of the occupation and full control of the Palestinians over their resources is a necessary condition for establishing a sustainable and adequate protection system. Without this, the protection measures 50
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will remain hostage to the intentions of the occupation. As for foreign funding, increasing its effectiveness is achieved through good (Palestinian) internal preparation, and managing negotiations with donors based on local priorities. Moreover, the social responsibility of the private sector in this area can be utilized. The use of this concept has recently become popular in the oPt. It refers to the role of the private sector, particularly corporations, in the field of social protection. This concept has been mainly implemented in the form of sponsoring different activities, providing social assistance, or contributing to the funding of social activities (health, education and social care institutions). There is no law or regulation to organize these activities (khayyat, 2010). An important development in this area is the trend to achieve this under the tripartite partnership, so the private sector participation in social protection is governed by regulations and according to quotas setting the minimum level of participation in social security, and in the funding of various related funds. Taking the previous challenges into account, the evaluation of existing strategies and policies of social protection stems from the principles of justice, fairness and empowerment. This would mean examining: ·
Relevant data and information and their consideration of gender issues as well as the geographical area, age and education level to determine the priority interventions. These are important factors of general inequality in society.
·
Assessing laws, regulations and strategies targeting work with the concerned group in terms of observing the special needs of women.
·
Translating these laws and regulations into actions and their impact on women’s empowerment. When reviewing laws, regulations and strategies, it is important to evaluate them at the level of the text and their translation into policies, interventions and programs. Implementation is influenced by the assumptions of those implementing the law. The impact of these interventions must be observed in terms of women’s empowerment and changing the roles of men and women from a gender perspective.
Intervention Priorities · The available data do not serve the development of policies based on the principle of justice and equal opportunities, which sometimes requires the use of the principle of affirmative action in favor of disadvantaged groups in the society. Therefore, it is useful to map regional gaps in this area that allow the monitoring of inequality at the level of the region
and the local community. Among these are the gaps associated with gender. This is the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning. These maps are useful in drawing interventions based on field observation, while at the same time, constitute a base for measuring achievement and impact. · Finalizing social protection laws, specifically the adoption of a modern social security law that takes into account the right to take maternity leave, unpaid leave up to one year after childbirth, parental leave to take care of a child and to be paid an adequate salary during a mother’s break from work due to pregnancy and childbirth in addition to health services before and after childbirth. The rights of social workers and the extension of social security coverage to include women working in various fields should be considered, as well as benefiting from the experiences of neighboring countries, particularly Jordan in reforming the social security system according to the criteria of gender equality (equal benefits in different insurance systems, with the exception of maternity insurance). This requires an assessment of the proposed draft law from the perspective of its responsiveness to the requirements of gender equality and to the needs of both men and women. There is no doubt that the social security law is a top priority but there are laws that need to be reviewed in terms of the obstacles facing their implementation and their impact on gender relations and the gender gap, particularly the law on the rights of people with disabilities. The expertise of law enforcement officials, such as labor inspectors, should be developed as this would contribute to promoting gender equality and reducing the gap between the legal text and its implementation on the ground. · First, establishing an effective institutional structure based on partnership, which would ensure harmony among governmental institutions in terms of their vision toward the development of the social protection sector in general, and the social insurance system in particular. Second, ensuring integration and follow-up among civil society institutions and the government and reinforcing the current trend of establishing public institutions based on the tripartite partnership to address and follow up various issues related to social protection (people with disabilities, the elderly, women’s employment, social security, violence against women and children ...) while maintaining the commitment to gender equality in the work of these committees and councils. · As for social protection services, the current trend which is based on the institutionalization of rights of marginalized and vulnerable groups in laws must be reinforced. This contributes to enhancing the shift towards the principle of rights in the provision of social protection services. · As for poverty reduction and social welfare programs, 51
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indicators that measure the gap between men and women should be adopted, particularly when addressing women’s special needs at the level of goals. It is useful to highlight the level of interventions and monitor indicators; specifically, setting an index that measures the gap between men and women in terms of the poverty rate and access to vocational training and credit. Attention should be paid to monitoring developments in the gaps of inequality in the region. In some cases, this may require developing region-specific indicators, such as the Jordan Valley or Bedouin communities in Area C, as these areas need an integrated services package, namely infrastructure, health, agricultural development, and cash and in-kind assistance. Perhaps it is useful to align interventions targeting poor households with a new poverty reduction strategy that addresses multidimensional poverty. This involves targeting the individual needs of household members and targeting marginalized local communities (integration and intersection of the individual, household, and community levels). · In this context, realizing the principle of the right to old-age, disability and unemployment insurance or other protection services associated with rights requires separating entitlement to these services from household income and addressing individuals’ needs. One priority in this area is the speedy completion of the disabled card program, ensuring its gendersensitivity and responsiveness to disabled women’s needs. A similar system should be developed for the elderly. · Reviewing the impact of social welfare policies on women and their empowerment opportunities, particularly strategies of care for the elderly and people with special needs. The focus should not be limited to the access of men and women to services, but should also cover the impact of services on gender roles and women’s empowerment, and breaking down the traditional roles that contribute to the exclusion of women from public life. This requires qualitative studies that examine the dynamics of the impact of these interventions on the household and community levels. The priority programs in this area are women’s empowerment programs (microcredit) and the Deprived Families Economic Empowerment Program. The impact of the disabled and elderly care strategies should also be examined. · Reviewing the mechanisms of action in shelters from a gender perspective, specifically the effectiveness of the mechanisms of action in orphanages and protection shelters in providing social reintegration requirements. The same applies to rehabilitation centers for delinquent boys. · The development of a monitoring system that derives its standards from relevant Arab and international conventions (in terms of the provision of social welfare
services, scope of coverage, and effectiveness). CEDAW is particularly important in this regard. This Convention may need to be localized through social dialogue. There is a need to establish standards to measure the impact of social protection programs, specifically the poverty rate and the proportion of food-secure households. In this regard, it is necessary to review the definition of the poverty line, as the adopted definition dates back to 1998, and significant changes may have occurred on the consumption patterns of Palestinian households. It is important for evaluation mechanisms and indicators to use the gender gap approach as one of the dimensions of the compound perspective that monitors ​​gaps of inequality within society. For example, it is not enough to talk about reducing poverty by a certain percentage as this reduction may be at the expense of certain groups and in favor of others. Therefore, it would be useful to assess achievement, and then assess the impact based on the maps depicting the various forms of inequality, and their intersection with the gender gap. A top priority in this area is developing specific standards for poverty and food security: two sectors in which various social protection activities are concentrated and reflected.
52
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Hilal, J, Al-Kafri, S., Kuttab, E. (2008). Unprotected Employment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Gender Equality and Workers’ Rights Perspective. Beirut: ILO – Regional Office for Arab States. Centre of Arab Women for Training and Research (CAWTAR)).
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Hilal, Jamil. (2007). The status of social security nets in Palestinian national authority territories A paper presented in MAS Conference, 2006. Ramallah, MAS.
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Hilal, Jamil; and Al-Malki, Majdi (1996). Informal Social Support System (non-institutionalized) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Ramallah: Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute – MAS.
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Palestinian Pension Authority. (2010). Retirement laws in Palestine under the microscope. Palestine.
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Palestinian Ministry of Planning. (2009). Integrated Social Policies in the Palestinian Territories. Beirut: ESCWA.
·
Ministry of Social Affairs. (2011). Social Protection sector strategy 2011-2013.
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Palestinian Ministry of Labor. (2009). Labor Sector Development Strategy in Palestine. Ramallah.
Arabic References: ·
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Khayyat, R. (2010). Role of Palestinian private sector’s institutions in enhancing developmental dimension of corporate social responsibility (Master’s Thesis). University of Bethlehem, Bethlehem.
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
4 Labor and employment
Towards addressing the structural impediments
55
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4.1. Background and context Women’s economic empowerment, that is, women’s ability to make an economic change for themselves and their society, is a central element in any country’s development trajectory. In countries where the level of women’s participation in paid labor is low, women represent an underutilized resource who could contribute towards further economic development. In countries where female participation is already widespread, women are directly responsible for a major share of the national economic output, and as earners, contribute to their families’ economic well-being. Female access to work is also central to women’s economic advancement, empowerment and status. Women’s status has commonly been defined through their degree of access to and control over material resources (including food, income, land, and other forms of wealth) and social resources (including knowledge, power, and prestige) both within the family and society at large (Roy, Tisdel and Blomqvist, 1996). Increasing participation for women widens their social and economic opportunities, and allows them to benefit from higher rates of economic activity. It also may reduce fertility rates, improve women’s health and prospects for education as well as enhance their bargaining power within the household (Standing, 1978). This section of the study comprises three parts. The first sheds light on the main characteristics of Palestinian women’s labor market participation. We will briefly address this as there is a vast amount of literature on women’s status in the labor market, and there is no need to redouble the efforts in this regard (see: Hammami, 2001; Olmsted, 2001; Al-Botmeh & Sotnik, 2007; Hilal, AlKafri, & Kuttab, 2009; Shabaneh & Al-Kafri, 2009; DCAF, 2010; UN Women, 2011; Economic and Social Council, 2012; Al-Botmeh, 2013). The second addresses barriers to women’s participation in the labor market with a focus on the supply and demand considerations. The third provides a number of recommendations, initiatives and practical strategies aimed at enhancing women’s participation in the labor market.
4.2. Key Findings: Trends, indicators and challenges 4.2.1. Characteristics of women’s participation in the labor market As discussed extensively in the literature about the economic role of Palestinian women, Palestinian women’s engagement in the labor market is amongst the lowest in the world despite high education rates (Olmsted, 1999; Hammami, 2001; Al-Botmeh and Sotnik, 56
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2007; Shabaneh & Al-Kafri, 2009). Although these rates have increased over the years, they remain low in comparison with those of many countries. In 2012, the female labor force participation rate stood at 17.4 per cent57 compared to 17 per cent in the MENA region and 53 per cent in the rest of the world (World Bank, 2011; PCBS, 2013).58 These rates are a source of concern and interest because in more conservative societies, like the Gulf countries, women’s labor force participation rate is higher than in the oPt, which implies that the factors of women’s non-participation in labor in the oPt go beyond the social structures which are less or as conservative as neighboring Arab countries. In addition to the low participation rates, women’s labor force participation trends have been characterized by volatility.59 For example, between 1995 and 2000, women’s participation rates were rising. With the start of the second Intifada, the trend declined sharply. In the period from 2003 to 2013, participation rates for women resumed their pre-Intifada rising trend. These unstable and fluctuating trends of participation in the labor market have consequences that weaken the long-term interest of women in participating and remaining in the labor market. Moreover, unemployment rates among women are also high and rising compared to men. In 2004, women’s unemployment rate reached 20.1 per cent and increased to 32.9 per cent in 2012. Meanwhile, unemployment rates among men declined during the same period from 24.3 per cent in 2004 to 20.5 per cent in 2012.60 Although female participation in the labor force increased during the past 15 years (from 11.2 per cent in 1995 to 17.4 per cent in 2012), women face more discrimination in the labor market compared to men (PCBS, 2005, 2012). This indicates problems stemming from the demand side of the labor market (economic sectors structures, including workers within these sectors and the economy’s ability to produce responsive models for stable employment). The participation rate for women with 13 years of education or more is much higher than other educational groups (43.7 per cent). Less educated women (1-6 years) have the second highest participation rates (12.9 per cent) compared to the largest segment of women who have 9-12 years of education whose participation rates reached 6.6 per cent (؛PCBS, 2012). These rates imply that the largest segment of Palestinian women with 9-12 years of education is excluded “almost” entirely from the labor market. This means that women at both ends of the education spectrum, i.e. those with low or high 57 14.7% in the Gaza Strip and 18.9% in the West Bank. 58 World Bank (2011) World Development Indicators, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2013) Labor Force Survey: Annual Report 59 It is important to provide data on the status of women in the labor market over time, and not just the most recent data available, because the trends give insight into the behavior of women in the labor force with a look at the future prospects for these women’s status in the labor force. 60 Unemployment rates reached 17.3% among men and 25.3% among women in the West Bank, while they reached 50.1% among men and 26.8% among men in Gaza Strip in 2012.
educational rates, have a bigger labor-market share than women who received “average” education. This situation indicates the presence of structural problems in the economy, as the labor market generates job opportunities for the most and least educated women but not for the largest segment of women. Although this phenomenon is observed among women in the rest of the Middle East countries, it remains more extreme within the Palestinian context. The labor force participation rate for older women has increased over time. The highest participation rates amongst women were recorded from 2002-2012 for the 25-44 age group. This means that the prime working age for women in the oPt peaks in this age group.61 It also indicates that more women are remaining in the labor market compared to earlier periods. Accordingly, the fact that the highest participation rate is observed among this age group (25-44 years old) indicates that groups of younger women (less than 25 years old) are facing more difficulties in entering the labor market. Similar to other parts of the region, Palestinian youth face substantially higher rates of unemployment than older workers. Young women are at an even greater disadvantage in the labor market than young men and older women, as the female youth unemployment rate for age group 15-24 in 2011 was four times that of women in age group 25-65 (10 per cent compared to 54 per cent) (PCBS, 2012). This is also true compared to men, where young women’s unemployment rate is nearly double that of men in the same age group. At the same time, women with 13-15 years of education or more suffer from disproportionately high levels of unemployment. Young women under the age of 25 with 13 to 15 years of schooling have nearly four times the unemployment rate of women aged 30 or older with the same schooling. These exceedingly unfavorable indicators for youth women compared to other women and men imply that particular attention has to be paid to this group in devising policies to adress obstacles they face in the labor market. Women are highly concentrated in two sectors: agriculture and services. In 2011, agriculture accounted for 22.2 per cent of women’s employment compared to 60 per cent in services (PCBS, 2012). These rates indicate that there is significant horizontal segregation in the labor market62 and that women do not have equal access to all economic sectors. This means that the economy’s structure is hostile to the broader participation of women in the labor market. Although this is a worldwide phenomenon, the Palestinian case tends to be extreme, indicating the importance of interventions on the demand side of the labor market. 61 The prime working age varies across countries depending on women’s childbearing patterns, enrolment in education and productivity over their lives of market versus non market time (Goldin, 1990). 62 Horizontal segregation is the concentration of women in a few sectors of the economy. 57
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In addition to horizontal segregation, the share of women’s employment in the productive sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) continued to decline, while their share of employment in the services sector rose. In 1995, women’s employment in agriculture and manufacturing reached 43 per cent compared to 47 per cent in the services sector. By 2011, the productive sectors had accounted for only 31 per cent of women’s employment, compared to 60 per cent for the services sector (PCBS, 2000, 2012). This is due to the erosion of the productive capacity of the economy, resulting in lower contributions by the agriculture and manufacturing sectors to GDP over time. This situation is reflected in the low employment rates for women in these sectors, and their concentration in the services sector. The rising horizontal segregation is alarming, especially with the presence of economic sector structures that enable the future participation of a small number of women. Here, too, this phenomenon requires interventions on the demand side. The constant high levels of intermittent work or activities of the informal labor sector among women are a big problem facing women’s economic empowerment. In the period before the second intifada (2000), the average annual growth rate for women working as unpaid family workers was 0.1 per cent compared to 0.3 per cent in the period after 2003 (2003-2012) (Al-Botmeh, 2013). These data show that by 2011, the percentage of women working as unpaid family workers stood at about 23 per cent compared to 5.5 per cent for men (PCBS, 2012). As there is no protection for the types of informal labor in the labor law, these types of work are outside the requirements of the government in terms of workers’ entitlements and insurance benefits. These workers usually work for no or low wages. This means that women in the informal labor sector are more vulnerable compared to other women and men. Also, a gap in the wages of men and women has always existed. In 2010, the average real wage for women amounted to 60 shekels, compared to 72 shekels for men, with women’s wages continuing to decline at a higher rate than men’s wages. In the period between 2003 and 2011, the real wage rate for women decreased by about 12 per cent compared to 5 per cent for men, which means that the vertical segregation of women is continuing and increasing (PCBS, 2012).63 In general, we can say that despite the small rise in women’s labor market participation rate, women’s position in the labor market is becoming increasingly inferior. The situation indicators include low participation rates, especially among educated working women, high unemployment rates, the exclusion of young women from the labor market, horizontal and vertical separation, and the continuation of the forms of informal labor. Despite the fact that these aspects are not limited to Palestinian women, the oPt tend to show weak indicators of women’s labor market participation compared 63 Vertical segregation is the concentration of women in limited professions within sectors.
to women in the Middle East and the rest of the world in general.
4.2.2. Impediments to women’s participation in the labor market The available literature discusses several factors that contribute to the inferior position of women in the labor market. These include: first, the lack of demand for the employment of women, and the distorted nature of the Palestinian economy in favor of the services sector. The devastation of the local Palestinian economy in the post second Intifada period has means that the local economy was further compressed. The high unemployment rates recorded for women compared to men during this period means that despite women’s high education rates, the demand side of the labor market presents significant impediments in the face of women’s participation. This partly explains why female participation rates continue to be low despite their rising trends. At the same time, PCBS data shows that despite the high educational rates of women participating in the labor force, they tend to dominate a few occupations, including office clerks, teaching and associate teaching professionals, as well as skilled and subsistence agricultural workers. This concentration means that the demand for women’s employment is restricted. Second, the overarching political context and the prolonged duration of Israeli occupation have forced women to generate coping mechanisms and support their households through both entrepreneurial initiatives and informal economic activities. There is not one established definition of the informal labor market. According to Hilal et al (2009) and Esim and Kuttab (2002), informal work refers to labor that lacks entitlements, such as health insurance, a pension scheme, paid maternity leave, paid sick leave, unemployment benefits; it is also entails long hours and unsafe working conditions. The third source of the definition is PCBS informal sector surveys (2004, 2011), which defined the nature, characteristics and conditions of the informal sector.64 In the PCBS surveys, the informal establishment refers to an establishment that employs fewer than or equal to 5 employees, and they are mostly proprietors with unpaid family members, low value of capital, a lack of complete accounting records and a lack of working contracts. It is worth mentioning that the survey excludes professionals such as doctors, engineers, auditors and other related professions. On the other hand, the informal household project refers to the project established by the household or a household member to generate a source of income due to the lack of employment opportunities in the formal economy, where the project is heavily dependent on strong social and other personal relations. Based on the PCBS definition of informal economic activity, the 2008 survey found that there were 90,607 64 The first survey was undertaken by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in 2003 then repeated in 2008. The 2003 survey was analysed by the Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) in 2003. 58
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informal establishments in the oPt, compared to 54,885 in 2003 (a 65 per cent growth). This survey also showed that the informal sector employed 191,917 people in 2008 compared to about 98,727 people in 2003 (a 95 per cent rise). Nearly 77 per cent of those working in this sector in 2008 were unpaid workers (owners and family members). Agriculture is the predominant economic activity (40 per cent) for workers within this sector. This is followed by internal trade (employing 30 per cent of this sectors’ workers) and manufacturing (20 per cent). Despite the hypothesis that the number of women working in the informal sector is higher than the number of men as a result of the limitations of the labor market, a PCBS survey found that 85 per cent of workers in this sector are men and only 15 per cent are women. However, in the period from 2003 to 2008, the participation of women in this sector has nearly doubled (from 8.3 per cent in 2003 to 15 per cent in 2008). This finding implies that a significant increase in women’s employment has taken place within the ranks of the informal sector. If we consider the overall female employment numbers in 2008, we find that the informal sector employed nearly a quarter of working women, which is a high percentage by all standards. Although the informal sector is an important source of employment for women, one cannot underestimate the exploitative nature of this work, or disregard the insecurity and lack of social protection that this kind of employment entails. The informal sector may prevent households from starvation, but it does not offer a way out of poverty. Moreover, because this sector is organically linked with the formal sector, when the formal economy is structurally in trouble, this in turn reflects in and shapes informal economic activities. Finally, there is a danger of further informalisation because of Israel’s continued pressure on the economy and forms of humanitarian aid which creates dependencies rather than innovation (Esim and Kuttab, 2002). Third, as has been pointed out extensively in the literature through studies elsewhere in the region, women face more obstacles than men in accessing credit, and for a number of reasons. For example, women’s ability to obtain funding is impacted by traditional property arrangements. Although women are legally allowed to own property, in practice their husbands / brothers / fathers may own house deeds but not them. As a result, women often do not have the collateral necessary to access commercial loans (Chamlou, 2008). In other cases, the small and family-based nature of enterprises run by the vast majority of women in the Middle East means that access to professional credit is also restricted (De Soto, 1997). Other studies have indicated that women do not prefer to take loans because these loans represent a form of pressure on women (ASALA, 2010). In addition to formal credit, women’s projects have become primary beneficiaries of microfinance programs. This also has been the case in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, where microfinance has been expanding since the 1980s while being skewed towards women. In 2011, there were 10 microfinance institutions in the oPt that over the years have provided USD 139 million in loans to 47,836 borrowers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While there are no data disaggregating access to this form of informal credit along gender lines, one can note that a large number of the beneficiaries of this type of credit are women.65 It is often claimed that microfinance represents a potential that creates space for economic empowerment through giving entrepreneurs and the poor access to credit, but this tool is not without problems. There is also the risk of expansion of the informal sector through microfinance so more and more people fall into the poverty trap. Also, simple competition for low profit margins can lead to more economic failure. Fourth, the mismatch between education and labor market skills is another important factor. Tertiary enrolments in Palestine are very high, yet present quite an imbalanced picture. Enrolments in traditional universities and university colleges have doubled during the last decade. Most women students are enrolled in stereotypical ‘female’ subjects that represent an extension of their traditional roles. Women are highly represented in health care, teacher training, arts and humanities and life sciences. Although women are highly represented in life and physical sciences, these subjects tend to be rather abstract and frequently direct students toward careers in teaching. Higher female enrolment rates in tertiary education – be it vocational or academic – does not seem to help these women in the labour market partly because their education is limited to a few stereotypical domains. This implies that women’s choices and skills in the labour market are partially predefined through the nature of their enrolment in schools and higher education institutions. This, as we will discuss in the recommendations section, is an important area that requires policy interventions to expand the scope of subjects and disciplines in which women are engaged to assist in their participation across different sectors of the labor market. The Conditions of Graduates Survey (PCBS, 2010) collected self-reported reasons why recent graduates have difficulty finding jobs. The most important reason cited is the lack of capital to start one’s own enterprise, which indicates that the possibility of being self-employed is at least considered by recent graduates. The second reason for not finding a job is the lack of job market opportunities for graduates with their particular specialty. This reason is not simply due to universities producing too many humanities and social science majors as at least 55 per cent of vocational degree graduates as well as Bachelor’s degree graduates cite the lack of demand for their particular specialty as a reason for their not finding a job.
hampering the effective participation of women in the labor market. Over the years, as in other societies, the nuclear family has become the common type in the oPt. The Population Census 1997 found that nuclear families accounted for 73.2 per cent of all Palestinian families. This percentage rose to 82.1 per cent in 2011. At the same time, the percentage of extended families dropped from 23 per cent in 1997 to 14.2 per cent in 2011 (PCBS, 2012 a). Extended families can provide a mechanism for taking care of children through old women in the family. However, the decline of the extended family system, with no other forms of support for child care, may contribute to the withdrawal of more women from the labor market. At the same time, in spite of the decline in fertility rates from 6.1 per woman in 1997 to 4.6 per woman in 2007, these rates remain among the highest rates in the world. Total fertility rates in neighboring countries were significantly less in 2007, even in more conservative societies, such as Saudi Arabia. According to the World Development Indicators, the total fertility rate in 2007 in Jordan was 3.8 births per woman; in Lebanon (1.9); Saudi Arabia (3); Syria (3.1); Egypt (2.9); and Turkey (2.1) (World Bank, 2011).66 Sixth, the patriarchal structure is another factor that negatively affects the prospects of women’s participation in the labor market. Palestinian society grants men power in the family sphere, as well as in the public sphere. As a result, men have an advantage in resources and are perceived as enjoying superior personal characteristics as well as skills and abilities that are supposedly possessed exclusively by men. Accordingly, it is more acceptable in society to subject women to constraints and discrimination, which are usually imposed on them to a greater degree than on men within and outside the family. The inegalitarian economic and occupational structure of patriarchal societies, including the Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, leaves few alternatives for women. In general, the objective and perceived status of occupations and jobs open to women are inferior to those available to men. For this and other reasons, in many cases Palestinian women earn less than men who are employed in the same jobs. Without having access to “good” jobs, women will continue to be economically dependent on their spouses or partners (Haj Yahya, 2005).
Fifth, high fertility rates and changes in the household structure in the oPt over the years are another factor 65 For example: ASALA, Women’s Fund, FATEN. 59
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66 Afghanistan, Angola and Zambia are among the countries where births per woman were higher than in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (World Bank, 2011).
4.3. Strategic opportunities and policy priorities: Enhancing women’s labor market participation In terms of interventions, policies addressing female participation in the labor market in the oPt have mostly focused on the supply side of the labor market, as well as the institutional impediments to women’s participation. These policies center on equipping women with the education/skills to improve their chances of competing in the labor market while running campaigns to address some of the impediments faced by women in the labor market. This is reflected clearly in the Cross-sectoral National Gender Strategy: Promoting Gender Equality and Equity, strategic objective 8: “To improve women’s participation in the labor market and increase their participation in economic decision-making.” The Strategy focuses specifically on: (1) institutional impediments (amendment to the law to remove provisions unfavorable to the economic participation of women and provide better protection for women in the informal sector); (2) adopting economic incentive policies by the government (providing tax exemption to women’s agricultural products and women’s cooperatives and providing custom facilitation to institutions exporting the products of rural women), (3) promoting knowledge about the situation of women in the labor market and raising women’s awareness about their rights; (4) mainstreaming gender in local ministries, and strengthening relationships with regional and international institutions concerned with gender; (5) creating job opportunities for women with 13 years of education or more (MoWA and UN Women, 2011, p. 38). All these interventions are highly relevant and have an important impact on gender relations and outcomes in the labor market. However, these policies do not address the above-mentioned economic structural impediments that prevent the participation of women in the labor market. Structural impediments arising from the formation of economic sectors and the labor market constitution lead to high rates of unemployment and horizontal and vertical segregation, etc. The lack of job opportunities in the oPt is the underlying cause of these problems. This shortage is a result of the erosion of the productive capacity of the Palestinian economy, and its dependence on external sources of growth (remittances from workers in Israel, and the assistance of the international community). As a result and in order to deal with the structural causes of women’s exclusion from the labor market, policy interventions need to make a shift to focus on the interlinkages between the supply and demand sides. That 60
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is, to design practical interventions which promote the demand for women’s labor, while continuing to address the institutional and market impediments facing women’s participation in the labor market. This shift is necessary in light of the fact that the current policies have reached their limit given the constraints imposed by Israel and resources available for the Palestinian Authority. For example, although there is an opportunity to improve women’s skills and knowledge about women’s labor, the position of women in the labor market will remain weak unless policies to expand demand for women’s labor are developed.
Recommendations This paper recommends the following policies and practical interventions to enhance women’s participation in the labor market. Some of these policies are a continuation of the Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy while others aim to reach maximum effectiveness: ·
Boosting demand for women’s labor in the economy;
·
Linking women’s skills and education to the needs and requirements of the economy / labor market;
·
Addressing the impediments on the level of the institutional framework governing the labor market;
·
Implementing practical interventions and campaigns to address violations of women’s rights at work;
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Enhancing women’s access to formal and informal credit;
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Strengthening women’s cooperatives and women run collective economic ventures;
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Utilizing the plans/budgets of the government and the international community to expand the demand for women’s labor;
1. Boosting demand for women’s labor in the economy As explained above, the lack of demand on labor in the local economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and women’s labor in particular, is one of the most significant hurdles in the face of women’s increased participation (Al-Botmeh and Sotnik 2007). Women are aware that this lack of demand greatly affects the decisions of the labor market and that is why we see 83 per cent of women outside the labor market. The services sector, which witnessed the fastest expansion since 1995, has reached its limit in absorbing women. In order to provide a strategic solution to the problem of women’s low participation and high unemployment, policies have to aim at expanding the size of the productive sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) as well as strengthening the information technology sector to absorb women.
These sectors are considered women-dominated sectors worldwide (Standing, 1999, Oppenheimer, 1982). Through expanding work opportunities within these sectors, women participation and employment levels will necessarily rise. In addition, a part of this strategy should address promoting the policy of reducing dependence on external sources of growth, including dependence on Israel and international aid. This policy is necessary, because such dependence means that the Palestinians’ ability to implement long-term plans is conditional upon factors beyond their control. Although this is what life is like under occupation, there is an opportunity to reduce this dependence, as will be discussed below. In practice, this recommendation can be implemented through several ways: · In light of the fact that Palestinians are restricted from conducting “normal” economic life under occupation, and particularly since the restrictions on trade with the rest of the world impede the viability of economic enterprises, a significant opportunity for expanding the productive sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) arises from replacing imports of Israeli goods and services by local production. Palestinian import USD 4.3 billion each year, of which USD 3 billion (70 per cent) of goods and services originate from Israel (PCBS, 2011a). Also, a great proportion of these imports are agricultural products and simple manufacturing goods, which can be easily replaced by local production. A rise in local production will necessarily generate more employment. Since women dominate these sectors, their expansion will give women more opportunities to join the labor market. · The importance of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors lies in the fact that they generate forms of employment that do not necessarily require high levels of education. This allows women with different levels of education to participate in the labor market in contrast with the services sector, where most of the jobs require relatively high levels of education. · However, an effective protection of the local market from Israeli goods and services can only be possible through practical measures on the ground led by the government while tackling the various components of the trade linkages and distribution networks. This requires policies that focus on upgrading and enhancing local distribution networks and local marketing systems. This can go a long way towards increasing productivity and generating employment in these sectors67. · In order for the suggestions above to succeed, 67 Although Israel has confiscated much of the land of the West Bank and places draconian controls on water resources, the current production in the agricultural sector does not utilize the available resources. In other words, there is excess capacity within this sector. Work with the Ministry of Agriculture can focus on pushing for the full utilization of the land under the Palestinian Authority’s control through legislation while encouraging employment. 61
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policies aimed at expanding local production and creating jobs should support local production quality standards to enhance its potential to compete locally. Such policies that protect the local economy through enhancing the quality of goods and services were implemented by Israel in the 1970s and 1980s to promote its economic development. They have also been implemented by the most advanced emerging economies in the world, India and Brazil, and brought huge economic benefits, particularly with regard to women’s labor. · Another important issue in this area is related to the possibilities available to women in the information technology sector. This sector is part of the growing industries around the world in which women can play an important role. Israel is beginning to dominate this sector in the oPt through IT and program design subcontracts. This is a trans-border sector that can expand and prosper without being subject to Israeli restrictions. But the reality on the ground is that Israel has dominated this sector through subcontracting, which means that the growth of this sector is subject to Israeli control. Palestinians do not have the capacity on the ground to promote it. Regarding this sector, interventions must work at two levels: first, ending the dependence on Israel in order to be able to steer the sector in a way that meets the needs and demands of the Palestinians, enabling to develop better plans to maximize opportunities for women’s participation in this sector. This can be done through linking the local IT companies with the international information technology sector by the Palestinian Authority without passing through Israel as an intermediary. The second level is to support political interventions linking vocational training for women with skills required by the information technology sector. This requires supportive strategies aimed at enhancing the quality and relevance of vocational education programs and encouraging parents to consider enrolling their daughters in such programs. This also requires supportive policies aimed at strengthening the information technology departments in higher education institutions and encouraging female enrollment in these programs. · In order to expand demand and enhance women’s participation in the labor market, lawyers/women’s advocates, especially in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA), should discuss and support government plans/budgets aimed at expanding the sectors of manufacturing and agriculture by replacing imports of Israeli goods and services with local products. Also, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) should support and advocate the separation of the Palestinian IT sector from Israel, and linking it directly to international information technology centers. · There were some discussions in the media about
the Gaza Strip with regard to self-sufficiency in some agricultural products. But it is necessary to study this experiment to evaluate whether these forms of economic self-sufficiency are of importance, and to assess their impact on the participation of women in the labor market.
2. Matching women’s skills and education with the needs and requirements of the economy/market · In order to ensure a greater share for women in the productive sectors, interventions should focus on preparing women for work in the sectors of manufacturing and information technology in particular. This means targeting girls to encourage them to obtain vocational training at an early stage. The development of quality vocational training programs that meet the requirements of these expandable industries is also important. The same applies to encouraging girls at an early age (10-12) to enroll in vocational training by explaining the potential economic benefits for them and their families. This may contribute to increasing women’s participation in the labor market. At the same time, it is important to address the prevailing negative image of vocational training. · Education and higher education and youth strategies emphasize the importance of matching vocational training with labor market skills. However, these two documents do not establish a link between labor market sectors that need to be strengthened and forms of vocational training and skills that should be targeted for further development. This means that these documents have broad coverage but without a specific focus on translating female education into useful skills that meet the needs of the expanding sectors of the economy or the labor market. · It is important to set priorities for some sectors and to adapt knowledge and skills to the needs of these sectors. From this perspective, the various strategic documents (youth, education, local governance, natural resources, etc.) must be interconnected in order to produce effective policy measures towards the economic empowerment of women.
3. Addressing impediments on the level of the institutional framework governing the labor market (labor law)68. The endorsement of the Labor Law in 2000 was a step forward. But with regard to women, the law suffers from a number of shortcomings: · The labor law, in its current form, excludes large 68 This section relies heavily on the report ‘Unprotected Employment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Gender Equality and Workers’ Rights Perspective,” by Jamil Hilal, Saleh Al Kafri, and Eileen Kuttab (2008), ILO. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/arpro/beirut/employment/informalemploy/palestine_en.pdf 62
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segments of the Palestinian labor force, including self-employed workers, seasonal workers, unpaid family workers, and those involved in unpaid domestic care and reproductive work at home. These categories are strongly dominated by women, and therefore we see that the law does not provide enough protections to large segments of working women. Moreover, the labor law does not cover workers in Israel and in Israeli settlements. Although the proportion of women working in Israel is low, they remain vulnerable. Since the Legislative Council is not functional, initiatives must be coordinated with the Ministry of Labor to issue special instructions to protect these workers. Since the work of these groups does not fall within the “formal” sector, experiences from other countries have to be studied to learn how to address their rights.69 · Although the labor law is clear in its clause for equal treatment between men and women, it does not specify penalties for employers who violate this article of the law. Therefore, work has to be done with the Ministry of Labor to issue instructions to address these shortcomings. · Although the labor law is clear on the right of pregnant women to paid maternity leave, it does not prevent employers from dismissing pregnant women in their eighth or ninth month of pregnancy to deprive them of their right to a 10-week maternity leave. Once again, amendments have to be introduced or instructions issued by the Ministry of Labor to address this shortcoming in the law. · The law is not clear on issues relating to compensation for workers employed for less than one year. This is of particular importance to non-governmental institutions that employ a relatively large number of women. Therefore, it is necessary that work is done with the Ministry of Labor to clarify issues relating to compensation for workers employed for less than one year. · There are no specialized courts in resolving labor disputes. As a result, there are thousands of cases of labor disputes, as reported by trade unions and individual workers, pending before the judiciary. This has undermined trust in courts and the absence of solutions to labor disputes has encouraged employers to violate the law and not abide by the measures that protect workers’ rights. This further complicates the situation of women, because the legal framework governing the sector does not provide mechanisms for resolving such disputes.
4. Implementing practical interventions and campaigns to address violations of women’s rights at work 69 See, for example, Akawasai et al (2009) Social Security of Female Workers in Informal Sector: Perspectives of Structure and Agency.
· This is one of the points raised by a number of strategies and policy recommendations over the years, but the Ministry of Labor does not have a sufficient number of well-trained inspectors to ensure compliance with the minimum standards of decent work as stipulated in the labor law. A safe work place which meets the standards of decent work is important for women in particular because it makes it easier for women to join the labor market in light of the many restrictions imposed by society on women. However, this issue is related to policies and budgets that need to be given priority by the National Authority. One idea that might be useful but a little costly to the Ministry of Labor is to take advantage of hours of community work for university students to conduct inspections on businesses. In this context, students can be trained and paid transportation fees when they inspect projects as part of community work and submit reports to the Ministry. This requires arrangements between the Ministry and the various universities and colleges. · Another important measure is to launch awareness campaigns to educate working women about their rights, including visits to work places, especially small businesses. Such campaigns can achieve two goals. The first is to educate women about their rights, and the second is to send a warning to employers that the law is implemented. Again, students may participate in these campaigns as part of their community work after receiving relevant training. This requires arrangements with universities and colleges.
5. Enhancing women’s access to formal and informal credit There are no available data on women’s access to credit (formal and informal) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.70 This refers to the first recommendation on the need for data disaggregating access to credit along gender lines. This may be done through coordination with the Palestinian Monetary Authority so that the data obtained from the banking sector on access to credit are disaggregated across gender lines. This should be complemented with information that is available from microcredit institutions and saving associations, to reflect the credit landscape from the informal sector perspective. At the same time, it is important to conduct studies that assess the extent and nature of women’s access to credit, both formal and informal. This indicates the need to address the obstacles faced by women from the perspective of policies. This may include: · Recognize that women’s needs and way of doing business may be different from men. For example, finance institutions in the European countries have increased the number of female workers because 70 Formal credit is accessed through banks. Informal finance includes microcredit, as well as loans from money changers, or rotating saving and credit associations. 63
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
they understand women’s projects and can assess creative business ideas that have no comparable benchmarks to be used in evaluation. · The introduction of different forms of credit guarantees can significantly improve access to debt financing for small businesses, and models can be put in place that target women-owned businesses. A credit guarantee is a commitment by the guaranteeing agency to reimburse a lender all or part of a loan in the case of default. Eligibility criteria vary depending on the objectives of the guaranteeing agency. The borrowing firm usually receives the guarantee in exchange for a fee. Credit guarantee agencies can be operated by the public or the private sector. Kafalat, the main provider of credit guarantees in Lebanon, provides a useful example. It was initially started by the government and is now privately run (Women’s Business Forum, 2011). But, it is important to examine how these projects work under the conditions of occupation where uncertainty dominates economic activity in general. · Guiding micro-enterprises towards productive activities in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors enhances the prospects for women’s sustainable participation in the labor market. The introduction of training in financial management and marketing is an important factor in ensuring the success of such projects.
6. Strengthening women’s cooperatives and women run collective economic ventures Collective economic ventures, cooperatives and credit cooperatives are important ways to enable women to overcome the trap of the informal sector and small business competition. These cooperatives can provide male and female participants with the capabilities to improve their skills through combining experiences and providing training and markets for marketing activities. In addition, young producers and manufacturers can exert pressure on decision-makers through joint efforts. There are several models of cooperatives in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, classified by sector and by product. They can be linked to an (inward looking) production system based on small economic ventures that can contribute to establishing local production which meets the needs of domestic consumption. This can be achieved through partnerships among the Ministries of National Economy, Agriculture, and Women’s Affairs to promote the culture of purchasing local products through organizing awareness campaigns, improving the quality of local products and supporting marketing networks.
7. The role of government and international community plans/budgets in supporting the economic empowerment of women The abovementioned suggestions provide insights into
interventions that can enhance the position of women in the labor market. However, the analysis remains incomplete without studying the role of government strategies and plans and without international funding for women’s economic empowerment. Accordingly, this section considers, briefly, the way in which a number of strategies and plans address women’s economic empowerment. The documents covered include the National Development Plan (2011-2013), the CrossSectoral National Gender Strategy, the National Committee on Women’s Employment plan, the youth strategy, the education and higher education strategy, the agricultural strategy, the UNDAF, donor-funded Ministry of Planning projects on gender equality and women’s empowerment and finally the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat gender strategy. In the light of the discussion above on the impediments to women’s economic participation and the recommendations proposed to address them, the above strategies/plans can be classified into three main categories: 1.
2.
64
Strategies/plans that do not incorporate gender issues in their visions, concepts and proposed policy measures or at best tackle these issues superficially. Among these strategies are the housing strategy, the local governance strategy and the energy strategy. These documents do not recognize the situation of disadvantaged women in terms of access to resources. Thus, no efforts are exerted to address access to resources and the differential requirements for women within these sectors. Therefore, it is very important for the Ministries of Women’s Affairs and Planning to work with the concerned departments in these ministries to ensure they have a better understanding of the situation of women and how these strategies deal with women’s needs and priorities. Strategies/plans that recognize women’s inferior position in the economy and suggest remedial interventions. However these strategies fail to deal with the structural economic causes that lie behind women’s inferior position in the labor market. For example, the National Development Plan (20112013) provides an insight into the development trajectory in the oPt and recognizes the importance of bridging gender gaps and providing women with opportunities to participate in economic activities such as entrepreneurship and labor. However, the plan does not provide any insight into ways to address the erosion of the productive capacity of the economy, particularly the inferior position of women in labor market through a coherent and consistent set of interventions to ensure that economic agents are able to produce, market and generate profit. Most importantly, none of the measures and mechanisms included in this plan provides any protection to local producers and manufacturers from destructive competition, Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
especially from the Israeli side. On the contrary, the plan views that openness to Israel and the rest of the world improves the competitiveness of economic agents. This may be the case in some economies. However, because of the colonial reality in the oPt, failure to protect the local economy has led to the erosion of the productive capacity of the economy. It has also led to negative dependence on Israel with harmful consequences for workers, especially women. This is also the situation with regard to the National Cross-Sectoral Gender Strategy that tackles a broad spectrum of policies and recommendations dealing with the empowerment of women in the labor market. However, this strategy lacks a clear vision in terms of addressing demand-side factors that determine women’s participation in the labor market, with the exception of the following objective: “providing job opportunities for unemployed women with 13 years of education or more”. However, the Strategy does not provide mechanisms to achieve this objective in terms of addressing the economic structural determinants of women’s participation the labor market in the oPt which are at the heart of the inferior position of women in the economy. That is why it is important that the creation of job opportunities is done by enhancing the productive capacity of the economy in sectors such as manufacturing, information technology and agriculture and by reducing dependence on Israel. This should be the focal point of any strategy that aims at increasing the participation of women in the labor market. This includes making economic projects profitable by reducing production costs, creating marketing opportunities and promoting exports. This is what many countries have done over the years. However, the Israeli occupation and Israel’s ability to stifle and restrict the movement of goods and services abroad are obstacles facing this achievement. In addition to the above, there is another important factor which is the ability to protect the market from cheap Israeli goods which gradually weaken the competitiveness of Palestinian goods and commodities. These policies were implemented by the Southeast Asian countries in the 1950s and recently by emerging economies such as Israel, Brazil and India. Most importantly, focusing on the predicament of women with 13 years of education or more in the National Cross-Sectoral Gender Strategy constitutes, in part, a big problem on two levels: first; it is true that the unemployment rate among this group of women is statistically the highest, but this is partly because the labor market-share of this group is large. Therefore, their problem is more visible than the problem of other women. Instead,
the Strategy should give equal attention to the absence of women with 9-12 years of education (the largest segment of women) from the labor market. The absence of this group is associated with the employment structure in the labor market which is biased to women with low levels or high levels of education. Thus, by focusing on women with 13 years of education or more, the Strategy may perpetuate a bias that already exists in the labor market in favor of higher education and the service sector. The donor-funded projects of the Ministry of Planning on gender equality and women’s empowerment and the gender survey conducted by the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat reflect significant issues related to gender differences. Among these issues are institutional impediments, society’s perception of women’s labor, promoting better coordination on gender issues, strengthening the capacities of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs to effectively mainstream and follow-up gender issues, and supporting institutions concerned with women’s economic empowerment. None of these documents address obstacles facing the economic empowerment of women on the demand side of the labor market. These plans do not address the economy’s ability to create new forms of work for women. When these structural impediments to women’s economic participation are not tackled, the scope and effectiveness of institutional measures and awareness campaigns are in doubt. 3.
Strategies/plans that seek to address the inferior position of women in the labor market through a comprehensive approach that takes into account the need to create more employment opportunities for women. These strategies/plans include the plan of the National Committee on Women’s Employment, the strategy of Ministry of Agriculture and the UNDAF which recognizes that part of the problem that faces women in the economy is attributed to the absence of economic opportunities for women as a result of the erosion of the productive capacity of economy and dependence on Israel. It also offers some suggestions for reform. The strategy of the Ministry of Agriculture refers, for example, to the importance of supporting women’s projects and women’s production cooperatives to develop a database for women in the agricultural sector. It also refers to the importance of increasing women’s access to financial and material resources and sources of knowledge and supporting women’s creative initiatives in agriculture. In the same context, the UNDAF (2012) emphasizes that: The programs under this outcome will seek to address important issues that affect the social and economic situation of women as defined in the comprehensive analysis, including the shrinking productive base of the economy (that is why they target sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing
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and tourism) exclusion and limited and unequal access (that is why they target women and young people). Although these plans shed light on the demand-side impediments to the economic empowerment of women, there must be a process to develop the interventions addressing the backward and forward linkages in the production process and the market’s ability to absorb products of all forms of work, especially women’s work. One final point related to cooperation between strategies/plans and budgets with regard to addressing gender differences in access to economic resources, labor and employment: the strategies must stress structural impediments constantly facing women. In other words, it is important to recognize the need to improve the productive capacity of the economy and at the same time protect producers. Women must play a clear role in the various plans, such as the National Development Plan, the housing, agriculture, and donor funding plans, etc. Currently, although the targeted interventions are not contradictory, they are closer to a set of policy recommendations rather than strategic interventions.
English References:
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·
Al-Botmeh, S. (2013). Palestinian women’s labor supply: Towards an explanation of low and fluctuating female labor force participation (Unpublished PhD thesis). Economics Department: School of Oriental and African Studies – University of London.
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Al-Botmeh, S. & Sotnik, G. (2007). Determinants for female labor force participation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Ramallah: Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS).
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Akawasai, S., Ayuwat, D., & Thongyou, M. (2009). Social Security of Female Workers in Informal Sector: Perspectives of Structure and Agency. Department of Anthropology working paper, Khonkaen University.
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ASALA. (2010). Women economic empowerment in the West Bank, Palestine. Ramallah: Palestinian Businesswomen’s Association.
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Chamlou, N. (2008), The environment for women’s entrepreneurship in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
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De Soto, H. (1997). Dead capital and the poor in Egypt[Distinguised Lecture Series 11]. Egypt: The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies.
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DCAF – Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. (2010). Palestinian women and security: Why Palestinian women and girls do not feel secure.
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Economic and Social Council. (2012). Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women (No. E/CN.6/2013/6). Secretary General.
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Esim, S. &Kuttab, E. (2002). Women’s informal employment in Palestine: Securing a livelihood against all odds[ Working Papers 0213]. Economic Research Forum.
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Goldin, C. (1990). Understanding the gender gap: An economic history of American women. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Haj-Yahya, M. (2005). On the characteristics of patriarchal societies, gender inequality, and wife abuse: The case of Palestinian society. Adalah’s Newsletter. Vol 20.
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Hammami, R. (2001) Gender segregation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Explaining the absence of Palestinian women from the formal labor market. In M. Cinar (ed.), The Economics of Women and Work in the Middle East and North Africa, Vol. 4. London: Elsevier Science.
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Hilal, J., Al-Kafri, S.,& Kuttab, E. (2009). Unprotected employment in the West Bank and Gaza strip: a gender equality and workers’ rights perspective. ILO.
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Olmsted, J. (2001). Men’s work/Women’s work: Employment, wages and occupational segregation in Bethlehem’. In E. Cinar (ed.), The Economics of Women and Work in the Middle East and North Africa. Vol. 4. London: Elsevier Science.
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MOWA (Ministry of Women Affairs) & UN Women (2011). Cross-sector National Gender Strategy: Promoting Gender Equality and Equity [2011-2013]. Ramallah.
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Oppenheimer, V. (1982). Work and the family: A study in social demography. New York: Academic Press.
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PCBS, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (Various years). Labor Force Survey – Annual Reports. Ramallah (2011a) Trade Statistics. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Ramallah.
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PCBS. (2012a). Palestine in Numbers – 2011. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Ramallah.
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Roy, K., Tisdel, C., &Blomqvist, H. (1996). Economic development and women in the world community. Boulder: Westview Press.
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Shabaneh, L. & Al-Kafri, S. (2009). Palestinian women’s participation in the labor market challenges and required interventions: A quantitative and qualitative study of women’s participation in labor market. Palestinian Women’s Research and Documentation Centre.
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Standing, G. (1978). Labor force participation and development. Geneva: International Labor Organisation.
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Standing, G. (1999). Global Feminization through Flexible Labor: A Theme Revisited. World Development, 27 (3), pp. 583-602.
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
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Tabar, L. (2013). The DEEP economic empowerment Program: Learning from the grassroots forms of development of the 1970-80s.
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UN Women. (2011). Who answers to Gazan women: An economic security and rights research. Jerusalem: Palestine.
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UN Women (2012) UN Development Framework for the oPt. Unpublished.
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World Bank. (2011). World development indicators. Retrieved from: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4. and http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN
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Women’s Business Forum. (2011). Women’s access to finance in the Middle East and North Africa Region. Retrieved from: http://www.oecd.org/mena/investment/47246008.pdf
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
5 Women and Assets
The missing link
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Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
5.1. Background and Context 5.1.1. Access to assets, not just income Over the last two decades, most women’s economic empowerment initiatives in the oPt have mainly focused on enhancing women’s access to income. These activities have taken two main tracks: (1) providing training and other services in order to promote the integration of women into paid work; or (2) developing microcredit facilities to support women’s self-employment through income-generating projects. These two types of initiatives are of particular importance, but their overall impact is limited in terms of expanding economic opportunities for women. Women continue to constitute a small minority of the formal workforce, with the continuation of very high unemployment rates (the female labor force participation rate stood at 17.4 per cent in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2013, while the unemployment rate of Palestinian women stands at 32.9%). Microcredit programs continue to be of significance for providing working capital to small-scale women entrepreneurs. At the same time, the implementation of these programs is limited mainly to women who are already engaged in small-scale economic activity. As such, microcredit is not considered a mechanism for first-time women entrepreneurs and so it does not provide solutions to the large number of unemployed Palestinian women who do not have previous work experience. Women’s access to employment and income-generating opportunities will continue to pose a major challenge and therefore it should remain an important priority. The priorities should also include women’s access to and control over assets. There is a growing global recognition of the importance of asset ownership for the economic welfare of the household. This is because assets have two main functions: 1.
1.
69
As social safety nets: assets strengthen the household ability to cope with macro shocks (such as financial crises, wars and natural disasters) as well as shocks at the household level (loss of income as a result of divorce, illness or death). The ownership of land, buildings or capital goods provides security against loss of income. For example, owning a house and/ or land means stability and not having to face eviction from the place of residence as a result of the inability to pay the monthly rent. These assets can also be used for consumption or sale when there is no other source of income. As an income-generating mechanism: assets can be sources of production or serve as collateral for a loan or credit from lending institutions. For
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
example, the land can be used for a production project, and buildings can be rented to obtain income or used for work purposes. Bank loans and children’s ability to obtain higher education mostly depend on the availability of assets which can be used as collateral. Thus, it is not surprising that the lack of access to assets is strongly associated with vulnerability. Households and individuals who do not have assets are more vulnerable to poverty and destitution while households and individuals, who own assets, are more able to resist and overcome economic crises (World Bank, 2007).
5.1.2. The Gender Asset Gap Globally, women face a widespread and deep-rooted gender situation in relation to access to assets in what is called a “gender asset gap,” where men are more likely to own assets, especially productive and financial assets (Deere 2006, World Bank 2008). Men are the primary beneficiaries from asset acquisition channels, which are usually based on gender discrimination. These channels include the law or traditions (inheritance laws and/or traditions), the market (through access to income) and state transfers (retirement salaries, land distribution or other projects) (Deere 2006, Grown 2005). Access to the market may be one of the most important advantages that enable men to use their income to acquire assets, which often remain individually owned. As for women, they have less access to the market. Women are at a disadvantage as they own assets through limited channels, such as dowry or inheritance. In both cases, they usually obtain assets of less value than those available to men or are given a smaller share. In addition to the unfavorable situation of women in terms of access to assets, social traditions (and sometimes the law) often limit their access to potential or expected assets. For example, within the context of marriage, informal or household work enables husbands to acquire assets which wives have no legal share in. A common pattern observed by researchers regarding the gender asset gap is that men tend to collect and accumulate assets during the life cycle, while women tend to spend down their assets on the needs of the family and children (Doss et al 2009). Finally, even when the law gives women the right to inheritance and ownership, customs and traditions often limit their ability to claim their rights and force them to refrain from claiming their rights in inheritance and in family assets. In the Palestinian context, women are at a disadvantage regarding the channels of acquiring assets compared to men. The obstacles that women face in benefiting from any of these channels do not stem from the literal text of the law. Rather, they stem from deeply rooted gender
discrimination and biases in the economy and society. Women’s limited access to the labor market leading to their employment in low income jobs is the main obstacle to their access to independent assets through marketrelated channels. It also prevents them from being able to accumulate assets through income or pension funds or benefit from asset projects provided to employees such as housing projects. Consequently, the channels not related to the market become more important for women, although not without obstacles and restrictions. While women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have legal inheritance rights (although it is a biased legal principle where a female gets half of a male’s share), customs and social norms usually deprive women of their rights. The only way to acquire assets is through dowry upon marriage. However, as it is the case worldwide, the potential value of these socially acceptable assets is low compared to the type of assets owned by men. Also, women in Palestine – as it is the case for other women all over the world – tend to spend their dowries (which are often gold jewelry) on behalf of the family during the cycle of marriage. Main channels for acquiring assets within the Palestinian context Ways related to the market
Wages/income Pension/maintenance Employees’ housing projects
Ways not related to the market
Inheritance Dowry
5.1.3. Effects While it is an issue of gender equality and justice, women’s lack of access to assets at a global level has many negative social consequences. The impacts and consequences are clearer on women (and their children) who become economically vulnerable as a result of the loss of marriage through separation, divorce or death. In the worst-case scenario, divorced women or widows and their children are left without a home/safe haven and without a steady source of income. They do not have land or capital goods enabling them to generate income during these difficult circumstances. Even within the framework of marriage, the absence of assets increases women’s vulnerability by restricting their economic choices. Women who do not have a source of income or assets are more likely to stay in families where they and/or their children are victims of domestic abuse as a result of the absence of alternatives. Moreover, the absence of assets and other forms of independent economic resources leaves women without an influence on family decision-making, including how to use and invest economic resources for the benefit of the family (Deere, 2006). This is an important issue that is established in gender and development literature. 70
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There are gender stereotypes in how men and women in poor households determine expenditure priorities. Women tend to give priority to investment in food, health and education while men tend to give priority to “men’s goods” related to their leisure time and personal consumption (Doss et al, 2009). Since the ownership of assets is important in enabling people to generate income through the ownership of productive assets (land, machinery) or through providing collateral for loans, it explains why women are at a disadvantage regarding the diversification of income-generating opportunities (Deere, 2006). In short, it is very important for women to own assets as this significantly affects their bargaining power within the household. This becomes more important when women find themselves economically vulnerable as a result of the family dissolution through separation, divorce or death. Therefore, the ownership of assets is considered an important and decisive element of women’s economic empowerment because it increases their bargaining power within the household, gives them more choices and enhances their ability to respond to crises. In addition, it provides them and their children with security and protection in case of the loss of the income obtained from the male breadwinner (Deere & Leone 2003, Grown 2005).
5.1.4. Assets related to marriage, divorce and widowhood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip The applicable personal status laws in the West Bank and Gaza Strip provide minimum legal rights regarding women’s possession of marital assets in cases of family dissolution. Furthermore, the gaps in these laws deprive women – in cases of divorce and widowhood – of these minimum legal rights through the prevailing patriarchal social practices. In the case of divorce in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the majority of women lose the financial support and rights they enjoyed during marriage, in addition to the possible loss of the safe family home. In the absence of the tradition of common property between spouses, the main financial entitlement for women upon divorce is the unpaid dowry, and especially the deferred dowry, as well as alimony payments, as women do not have a right to the assets accumulated during the marriage. However, divorced women cannot obtain even these limited financial entitlements without legal or other types of pressure on the husband (for example, the establishment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs alimony fund was an institutional response to the difficulty women face in receiving alimony). But when a wife seeks divorce, she loses even these minimum rights in return for the husband’s consent to give her divorce. In such situation in the West Bank, the majority of women lack marital assets rights, which means that divorce leaves them
in humiliating poverty. As for women who suffer from domestic abuse, they have only two choices: to stay in a harmful marriage or face a life of extreme poverty. Also the threatened loss of physical child custody is a key mechanism through which divorced women and widows are deprived of their minimum legal financial rights in case of divorce. The 2009 UNIFEM report on war widows in the Gaza Strip provides detailed information about how the families of deceased husbands exploit young war widows and the patriarchal prejudice inherent in the current personal status law in relation to accessing rights to child custody to disinherit women and strip them of their legal rights related to marital assets and their social rights as war widows (UNIFEM, 2009). A followup study prepared by UN Women in 2011 showed that after the promulgation of a law (by the Hamas-controlled Legislative Council in 2009) widows were given the right to child custody for boys until the age of 15 and for girls until puberty. The threat of losing custody of children used by male relatives against war widows in order to disinherit them of their financial rights also ceased. But in general divorced women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continue to face threats of losing their minimum financial rights through the use of patriarchal biases in child custody laws.
5.1.5. Women’s lack of assets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Economic Effects A recent study prepared by the Palestinian Businesswomen’s Association (ASALA) cites the following main constraints facing women’s economic empowerment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Access to finance: lack of assets due to traditional intrahousehold dynamics, inheritance law and practices. Regulatory and Legal Environment: high costs and regulatory barriers, gender discrimination in the legal system pertaining to personal status law governing inheritance, marriage, divorce, etc., that control the basic freedoms of women. The company and investment laws do not serve the needs of micro, small and medium size businesses. Cultural Attitudes: disapproval of women in the working world, doubts about women’s competence, and perception of women’s income as supportive or secondary. Men remain the main breadwinners in the eyes of the society (ASALA, 2010). The above-mentioned constraints are comprehensive (social, cultural, legal and financial). They show the extent to which the overall environment reinforces gender biases against women regarding the ownership of assets. As a result, women face a difficult economic situation. For example, legal biases and cultural attitudes that consider
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women as economically dependent on men weaken women’s access to the market, which in turn leads to their lack of access to an independent income (or lack of control over their income). Accordingly, women are deprived from acquiring independent assets which they need to obtain financial loans. This means that women’s economic empowerment resources are unavailable. Even when women are economically active in running micro or small enterprises, their inferior position in terms of access to assets puts them in a very bad economic situation and leaves them unable to expand their businesses, increase their profit, or employ other women. It is not surprising that the results of microcredit surveys in the West Bank and Gaza Strip showed that compared to men, women’s micro-enterprises were in most cases non-registered and home-based, generated less income, and employed a small number of female workers (IFC, 2007). In addition, female entrepreneurs get smaller loans than male entrepreneurs and their businesses are less likely to expand and grow with time (IFC, 2007). Moreover, focus group studies about selfemployed female entrepreneurs in the Gaza Strip showed that the core assets used in the beginning were a major obstacle to the expansion of their businesses. Also, the lack of office space for their businesses means that they are forced to keep their activities within the framework of their homes. Consequently, they are unable to expand their customer base as they need to have headquarters for their commercial activities (UN Women, 2011).
5.2. Main findings 5.2.1. Women’s ownership of assets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip There are very limited qualitative and recent data regarding women’s ownership of assets in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but available information indicates mostly that women’s ownership of assets is very low. As shown in the below table, in the comprehensive survey conducted in 1999, only 5 per cent of women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip said they owned assets or a share in land (5 per cent in the West Bank compared to 4 per cent in the Gaza Strip). Only 8 per cent owned a house (or a share in a house) (11 per cent in the Gaza Strip compared to 6 per cent in the West Bank). The survey also revealed that less than 1 per cent of women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip owned a car or a share in a project. It showed that ownership of assets was slightly higher among economically active women in the West Bank. A study conducted in 2010 showed that about 30 per cent of women owned a land or a share in land, and 11 per cent owned a house.
Results of studies on women’s ownership of assets 1991/1999/2010 1991
1999
2010
West Bank and Gaza Strip
West Bank and Gaza Strip
West active
Car
-
1%
15%
Land (or share in land)
8%
5%
29%
House (or share in a house)
9%
8%
11%
Bank account
8%
12%
NA
Private investment project (or share in a project)
-
0.2%
5%
Jewelry
48%
53%
52%
Other assets
9%
9%
NA
Bank (economically women only)
Source: 1999 data: Institute for Applied International Studies; 1999 data: PCBS; 2010 data: ASALA 2010
All the surveys showed that the dominant types of personal assets owned by women are financial assets – primarily jewelry and to a lesser extent personal bank accounts. In 1994, only 8 per cent of women had their own personal bank accounts and this percentage increased slightly in 1999 to 12 per cent. There is no wonder that the majority of these women are engaged in the workforce. In all years, savings in the form of jewelry were the top category of women’s assets, because they are the only “traditional” and socially acceptable form of property provided by the society to women upon marriage as dowry. In 1994, 48 per cent of women (37 per cent in the Gaza Strip compared to 57 per cent in the West Bank) said that they owned gold jewelry which they could dispose of freely while in 1999, 42 per cent of women in the Gaza Strip said that they had personal savings in the form of jewelry or savings compared to about 74 per cent in the West Bank (PCBS, 1999). In addition, a survey conducted in 2010 that covered economically active women in the West Bank showed that jewelry was the primary form of personal/individual assets (52 per cent), but women were not asked if they had independent bank accounts or not. From the demographic perspective, the 1999 survey showed a number of important patterns. Although the percentage is low in the two regions, women in the West Bank were more likely to own a share in land, while women in the Gaza Strip were more likely to own a house or a share in a house compared to their counterparts in the West Bank. In terms of age, older women (65 and above) were more likely to own immovable property (a house, land, or a share in them) and most of them were widows. In contrast, women’s ownership of financial assets, including jewelry decreased. With respect to age, younger women were more likely than older women to own financial assets. This pattern is in line with the international pattern, where women tend over time to spend down their assets on household welfare and happiness. In the Palestinian context, women acquire 72
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
gold jewelry upon marriage and they often spend it on behalf of the household during the life cycle. The 2010 survey on economically active women in the West Bank indicates that access to the market relatively enables women in the West Bank to acquire important assets, especially in terms of land ownership. However, due to the lack of data about unemployed women or Gaza women for the same year, one must be careful in reaching conclusions based on this data with respect to the impact of women’s income on their access to assets.
5.2.2. Inheritance As mentioned previously, due to their very low labor force participation rate, the majority of women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are unable to obtain independent assets using their income. In such a situation, for the majority of women, inheritance is not only the main mechanism to obtain high-value assets (including immovable property), it is also the only and most important one. The applicable Islamic family law in the West Bank and Gaza Strip gives women inheritance rights. However, many documents show that customs and traditions in the Palestinian society have historically prevented women from claiming those rights, particularly with regard to immovable property such as a share in the family house or land (Moors). Thus, the main gap in women’s inheritance rights is not the result of religious laws, but of local customs which in fact contradict with religious beliefs. In any case, there is evidence in the last decade that women are becoming more defiant of traditions and are claiming their inheritance rights more. With respect to inheritance indicators, the 1999 PCBS survey on the ownership of and access to resources remains the baseline survey. Recent findings from a survey conducted in 2013 (by the Institute of Women’s Studies, Birzeit University) indicate that there is an increase in the number of women who demand their inheritance rights, as well as in the number of women
who enjoy their full entitlement or part of it since the end of the millennium. As shown in the table below, between the two periods covered by the two surveys, the number
of women who did not claim their inheritance rights decreased significantly from 64 per cent in 1999 to 38 per cent in 2013.
Women and inheritance: key indicators 1999 – 2013 Women only
1999
2013
% of women who had a potential inheritance claim
25%
13%
% of women who did not claim their inheritance
64%
38%
Source: PCBS; IWS, Birzeit University, 2013 * The 1999 survey asked if women had a potential inheritance at any time, while the 2013 survey asked only if they had a potential inheritance in the past five years.
The 2013 survey found that although a relatively high proportion of women (38 per cent) did not claim their inheritance, 33 per cent of them received their shares automatically and 28 per cent effectively claimed the inheritance which they were denied. This indicates that there has been significant progress towards realizing women’s inheritance rights since the end of the millennium. However, the realization of their full legal rights remains an important goal. The two surveys did not use the same questions when they asked why women did not demand their shares; but we can make some general comparisons. In 1999, the highest answer was that they simply did not claim their shares, and the second highest answer was that the amount of inheritance was not worth the trouble. In 2013, for 42 per cent of the respondents there was a variety of reasons and considerations, which included: I do not need my share; the amount of inheritance is not worth the trouble; and I see it not appropriate to demand it. All of these answers have equal proportions (13 per cent). While there is no data from any of the two surveys about the real value of the inheritance shares that the women may have received, women’s answers clearly indicated the potential value of their inheritance shares (which was usually converted to cash). A key factor for not claiming their shares was the potential problems that they could face if they did. In terms of the amount of the total share that women received, there is also a big increase in the number of women who received their full inheritance shares between 1999 and 2013. In 1999, among the total number of women who had a potential inheritance claim (including those who did not make claims), 20 per cent received their full shares and 12 per cent received part of their shares, while 67 per cent did not receive any of their shares. The 2013 survey asked only the women who automatically received their shares or who demanded their shares about the shares they received. It was found
73
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
that 51 per cent received their full shares, 19 per cent received a part of their share, and 18 per cent did not receive any of their shares (although they claimed them). 9 per cent of those women still have pending cases. Despite the overall positive trend, evidence indicates that women’s increasing access to inheritance rights may face increasing obstacles and conflicts. In 1999, the majority of women (64 per cent) did not claim their inheritance rights, which indicates that most women did not defy the prevailing traditions. In 2013 an equal majority, around (62 per cent), demanded their rights, but almost half of them (46 per cent) had to claim their rights rather than receive them automatically. A series of focus groups conducted in the Gaza Strip in 2010 with women who claimed their inheritance rights showed that women faced threats and actual physical violence from their male relatives (usually brothers) (UN Women, 2011). Moreover, women who do attempt to claim their inheritance rights usually receive only a small portion of them and only after protracted conflict often involving the courts (UN Women, 2011).
5.2.3. Gaps between women’s contribution to family income and their control over assets Agriculture As indicated in the table below, women constitute almost 22 per cent of the permanent agricultural employment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but they make up less than 5 per cent of agricultural holders. This gap between the contribution to production and ownership of agricultural assets is more visible in high-production agricultural areas in North West Bank where women constitute less than 6 per cent of agricultural holders but make up almost 30 per cent of the permanent agricultural employment.
Table: Percentage distribution of agricultural holders and agricultural employees by gender in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2004 – 2005 Distribution of agricultural holders by gender
Distribution of agricultural employees by gender
Men
Women
Men
Women
oPt
95.5
4.5
77.8
22.2
West Bank
95.3
7.4
75.7
24.3
North
94.3
5.7
70.2
29.8
Middle
95.1
4.9
80.9
19.1
South
97.0
3.0
84.1
16.9
Gaza
97.0
3.0
92.1
7.9
Source: PCBS Farm Structure Survey 2004-2005 (December 2005)
Furthermore, the survey shows that while women constitute 31 per cent of permanent workers in orchards (32 per cent in the West Bank and in 6 per cent in the Gaza Strip), they constitute less than 5 per cent of orchard owners. According to PCBS labor force surveys, the overwhelming majority of women working in agriculture in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are classified as “unpaid family members.” This proves that women work in their family farms but they do not have access to an independent income or control or own agricultural assets, which mostly remain under the control of men within the family. The gap between women’s contributions and their economic rights in agriculture also extends to donor support to agriculture as women do not benefit from this support. A survey conducted in 2008 on donor support to agriculture shows that a total of USD 36 million was expended on the agriculture sector, of which approximately USD 980,000 was expended on activities targeting women (APIS 69, 2008). The report found that “from the data, it can be determined that there is lack of focus in the agricultural sector on women and the essential role they play in agriculture” (APIS 69, 2008). In the various surveys and focus groups, female agricultural workers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip recorded low points on a number of indicators, including
education, age at first marriage and decision-making and control over income (UN Women, 2011). These results indicate a strong correlation between low-empowerment and lack of access among women working in agriculture.
5.2.4. Economic rights of divorced women and widows There is an acute shortage of data related to divorce and widowhood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. No data is available on the annual rates of divorce or widowhood since the mid-nineties when PCBS stopped collecting such data from the Sharia Court records. In addition, there is a lack of data on the economic and social conditions of divorced women and widows in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as on the welfare of their children. Finally, there is a large data gap with regard to the experience of women who seek divorce and obtain it. The available data is based mainly on qualitative studies and human rights reports. This data cannot provide a comprehensive picture (Shehadeh, 2005; Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008; UN Women, 2011). However, despite the lack of data, it is generally known that the current economic rights of divorced and widowed young women are not enough.
Perceptions of the current economic rights of young divorced and widowed women by gender and region (2013) Yes, the current applicable laws give women sufficient economic support in case of divorce West Bank
Gaza
Total
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
31.5%
26%
51%
45%
41%
35%
Yes, the current applicable laws give young widows and their children sufficient economic support and protection. 28%
28%
49%
Source: IWS, Birzeit University/ AWRAD, 2013
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Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
47%
38%
37%
In general, a significant minority of men (40 per cent) and one third of women (35 per cent) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip think that the current economic rights given to divorced women are insufficient while less than 40 per cent of men and 37 per cent of women think that the current economic rights of young widows are sufficient. There is a strong regional gap, as the number of men and women in the Gaza Strip who think that the current economic rights for young divorced and widowed women are sufficient is greater than the number of their counterparts in the West Bank. Although women (in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) support greater economic rights for divorced women more than men, there is no gender gap in the two regions in respect to the attitudes toward the current economic rights of widows.
5.2.5. Specific Challenges/Obstacles As previously mentioned, the discrimination and bias against women’s access to assets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (and women’s economic empowerment in
general) are comprehensive and create a recurrent dynamic leading to a severe and persistent socioeconomic situation for women. This requires adopting a comprehensive approach and at the same time developing practical strategies focusing on the specific obstacles facing women’s access to certain types of assets. In most cases, the law and the dominant trends are the biggest challenge. In other cases, the weak financial situation of women is an obstacle to overcoming their crippling conditions and the resulting consequences (for example, when women do not have the resources to file a lawsuit). In other cases, the applicable law can be used to challenge the social obstacles in principle. For example, regarding women’s access to inheritance rights, the main obstacles are not in the text of the law, but in the dominant traditions and trends. The findings of the survey conducted in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in 2008 indicate that one-third of the society feels that the law is enforced. This means that the society is aware of the gap between rights and implementation when it comes to women claiming inheritance (AWRAD, 2008).
Trends and attitudes toward women’s inheritance rights (2008)
West Bank
Gaza Strip
Under the applicable law, a woman inherits half what a man can inherit. Do you think this law is enforced in our society? Yes
30.5%
28.9%
To some extent
39.2%
42.9%
No
28.4%
26.5%
I don’t know
1.8%
1.7%
Should the courts and enforcement bodies apply these laws by force in respect to inheritance and ensure that men and women obtain their shares? Yes
93%
93%
No
5%
5%
I don’t know
2%
2%
They should be kept as they are so that women get half the share of men
78%
80%
The law should be amended to enable all people (men and women) to receive their shares of the inheritance according to their needs and their conditions
8%
7%
The law should be amended to give equal shares to men and women
10%
10%
I don’t know
3.7%
2%
Regarding the modified inheritance laws currently in force
Source: AWRAD , 2008
Although more than 90 per cent of the respondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip agreed that the law should be implemented by force (meaning that they have a desire to provide support for women who claim their rights), every day women who attempt to claim their rights face strong social obstacles. For example, data from a focus group conducted in the Gaza Strip in 2010 showed that women who demanded their shares in inheritance faced multiple 75
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
obstacles, including threats and actual physical violence from a male family member (UN Women, 2011). The study found that women who defied threats and obtained their shares in inheritances by going to court received only a small portion of them, taking into consideration that the courts put pressure on the concerned women to take a smaller share (UN Women, 2011). Thus, it is not a surprise that the PCBS survey found that the majority of
women (64 per cent) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip did not demand their inheritance, because of the enormous obstacles they face in this regard (PCBS, 1999(. The results of the focus groups conducted by Tawasol Centers in the West Bank regarding issues of inheritance confirm that despite the fact that more women are interested in claiming their inheritance rights, social pressures are still an obstacle that faces women who claim these rights. It seems there is a growing split among women, in different age groups, on the principle of the right to inheritance. Some participants in the focus groups mentioned that older women (along with men) often encourage the traditional patriarchal norms which are against women’s access to their rights. These results also show clear differences from one region to another. Women in Salfeet area are more likely to claim their right to inheritance, even though they – according to the participants – usually receive a portion of their legal shares. Some women pointed out that when the inheritance is land, male relatives use a common trick
by apportioning lands on the Israeli side of the Barrier to women in inheritance settlements. Thus women obtain their shares “on paper” only without any practical value. In Hebron, indicators show that more women are demanding their inheritance rights. These women, however, face a stronger social reaction towards this demand. In this context, a female activist in a women’s center said that the center deals with an increasing number of women (one or two every week) who suffer from violence by brothers because they demand their inheritance right. In Jericho, on the other hand, according to participants in the focus group, the vast majority of women continues to comply with traditional social norms and do not claim their inheritance rights. While there are no legal obstacles to registering family assets in the name of a living spouse, social norms strongly oppose this trend. Recent findings (Institute of Women’s Studies, Birzeit University, 2013) indicate that men generally resist women’s right to own marital assets in case the marriage ends.
Should women have a share in marital assets in cases of divorce?
Males
Females
Yes, but only those assets to which a woman has contributed directly.
41%
46%
Yes, the law should recognize the non-financial contributions of wives and mothers in building the family wealth.
14%
25%
No, but the current applicable laws must be changed to ensure that women receive better support.
8%
10%
No, the current financial rights are fair.
36%
18%
Source: IWS, Birzeit University/ AWRAD Center, 2013
As shown in the table above, men and women support women’s rights to assets when they contribute directly to these assets (41 per cent of men compared to 46 per cent for women) unlike when they have an indirect contribution to these assets (14 per cent of men and 25 per cent of women). However 44 per cent of men and 28 per cent of women feel that women should not have any right in marital assets under any circumstances in the case of divorce.
5.3. Strategic opportunities and policy priorities The following section provides strategic opportunities to discuss policies that support women’s access to assets.
1. At the social level 76
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
· The findings of the last survey show that there is a growing general perception that the current distribution of assets based on gender considerations, the family law (personal status law) and customs and traditions are unfair and unjust to women. In spite of the gender and regional gap in specific aspects related to women’s rights to family assets (or through the family law), there is a strong trend to support the expansion of women’s rights in this area. · In addition to the survey findings, data from women’s organizations indicate that a growing numbers of women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip demand or are willing to demand their inheritance rights, compared to the past decade. These results need to be placed in local contexts as found by the focus groups conducted by Tawasol Centers in the West Bank. The increase in this phenomenon varies from one community to another. Moreover, a major source for supporting this trend is the family law that is based on religion. In other words, women’s inheritance claims have religious and legal legitimacy. Thus, it is important to put great emphasis on the implementation of these rights.
2. At the institutional effectiveness level · In terms of inheritance: many women’s organizations conduct awareness campaigns on the issue of women’s financial rights. A consortium of women’s organizations (YMCA, Palestinian Working Women’s Society for Development, Women’s Affairs Center in Gaza, and Danish Church Aid) launched a campaign titled “Inheritance is a Right ... Deprivation No” with support from the European Union to raise women’s legal literacy on their inheritance rights and to provide them with legal support. However, the women groups at Tawasol centers who participated in the awareness campaigns said that the main problem does not lie in the lack of awareness, but in the absence of legal protection and support for women who wish to claim their rights. · A public campaign conducted by women’s groups in the Gaza Strip in 2009 was able to influence members of the Legislative Council in Gaza and make them endorse an initiative to reform the applicable family law to stop the use of child custody threats to disinherit young war widows. · The Chief Justice of the Sharia courts in the West Bank established that the assets of the deceased must be registered before distributing the inheritance.
3. The survey findings also show a general social perception
that the financial rights currently given to divorced and widowed women are unfair and inadequate. This means that the expansion of their rights is possible. There is also evidence that some of the judges of Sharia courts try to minimize the economic losses for women seeking divorce. For example, in the case of Khula divorce [divorce initiated by women], Sheikh Yusuf al-Dais introduced new rules in the West Bank in 2012 to complete Khula procedures within a period of three months and prevent husbands from seeking financial compensation except the dowry .
General policy priorities 1. Inheritance rights, the rights of divorced and widowed women.
77
·
Establish legal support funds for women who want to claim their inheritance rights.
·
Provide legal support for divorced women (or those who seek divorce) to obtain their legal financial rights .
·
Support legislative reforms which criminalize depriving women of their legal inheritance rights.
·
Develop mechanisms within the courts to support women to claim their inheritance rights.
·
Develop mechanisms for civilian police to
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
enforce judgments issued by the courts and protect women from threats when trying to claim their financial rights. ·
Push for legal reforms related to women’s access to assets, as proposed by the National Coalition which is working on amending the family law.
2. In the agricultural sector: developing policies related
to international players to promote women’s ownership of and control over agricultural holdings, including but not limited to land, as part of a gender mainstreaming approach in agriculture .
3. In the microcredit sector: developing policies related
to local and international lenders to promote the registration of productive assets (small businesses) in the name of the women who receive credit.
Appendix A. Relevance to the Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy 2011 – 2013 Promoting women’s access to assets intersects with most of the Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy objectives. Therefore, it has direct relevance to Strategic Objective 1 (to enable women to enjoy family law and civil rights that ensure equality and equity). It is also linked to Strategic Objective 8 (To improve women’s participation in the labor market). This is because assets play an important role in empowerment and in generating different forms of income for women. As is globally the case, this will contribute to Strategic Objective 3 (To reduce all forms of violence against Palestinian women) as well as Strategic Objective 7 (To increase the protection of women’s health.) B. Relevance to the Millennium Development Goals Recognizing the gender asset gap as an important indicator of women’s empowerment has influenced several recent policy initiatives. The UN Millennium Project Task Force on Education and Gender Equality suggests indicators for countries and international organizations to use in monitoring the progress toward Millennium Development Goal 3 (Grown et al., 2005). To a certain extent, information on the magnitude of the gender gap will help decision makers to determine to what extent Goal 3 has been achieved. C. Research and data requirements There is an urgent need to develop and conduct studies and surveys on the different aspects of women’s access to assets in the West Bank . ·
The 1999 PCBS ownership and access to resources survey is the Palestinian baseline survey on the gender asset gap. It is necessary to conduct this survey again to collect recent statistical data about women’s access to assets. Moreover, some new elements must be added to the survey to cover issues such as the
evaluation of the obstacles faced by women who demand their inheritance rights (including courts and/or the threat to use violence by family members) and the sources of support for these women. 路
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It would be useful to carry out a number of surveys that focus on sub-categories of women (who are hard to reach through the standard sampling methods used by PCBS) and on the experiences of women who are most vulnerable to the lack of access to assets (divorced and widowed women). This would help shed the light on the social and moral cost of the absence of assets security for women and their children. Focus studies on the status of women in agriculture should also be conducted to shed light on the gap between their economic contribution and lack of access to assets ownership. Reviews of donor programs and policies in the microcredit and agricultural sectors should also be conducted to assess to what extent these programs and policies enable women to access/own assets.
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
References: ·
Al-Botmeh, Reem. 2011. A Review of Palestinian Legislation from a Women’s Rights Perspective. UNDP/ PAPP
·
Asala 2010. Women’s Economic Empowerment in West Bank, Palestine. (Palestinian Business Women’s Association: Ramallah)
·
APIS. Agricultutal Projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 2008.
·
Doss, Cheryl, Caren Grown, and Carmen Diana Deere. 2009. Collecting individual level asset data for gender analysis of poverty and rural employment paper presented at the FAO-IFAD-ILO Workshop on Gaps, trends and current research in gender dimensions of agricultural and rural employment: differentiated pathways out of poverty, Rome, 31 March – 2 April 2009. Rome.
·
Deere, Carmen Diana (2006). “The Gender Asset Gap: What Do We Know and Why Does it Matter?”. Feminist Economics. Vol. 1(2)
·
Grown, Caren et al. 2005. Taking action achieving gender equality and empowering women. London: Earthscan.
·
IFC. 2007. Microfinance Market Survey in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (International Finance Corporation/ World Bank)
·
Moors, Annelies. 1995. Women, Property and Islam: Palestinian Experiences 1920-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
·
Norwegian Refugee Council. 2011. The Shari’a Courts and Personal Status Laws in the Gaza Strip.
·
Shehadeh, Nahda. 2009. Justice Without Drama: Enacting Family Law in Gaza City Shari’a Court. Maatricht: Shaker Publishing
·
UNIFEM. 2009. Addressing the Needs of Women and Men in Gaza: A Guidebook for the Humanitarian Sector.
·
UNWOMEN. 2011. Who Answers to Gazan Women: An Economic Security and Rights Research
·
World Bank. 2008. Gender and asset ownership a guide to collecting individual-level data. Washington, D.C.
Data:
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·
PCBS. Ownership and Access to Resources Survey 1999
·
PCBS. Farm Structure Survey 2004/2005
·
FAFO. Palestinian society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: a survey of living conditions. Oslo: FAFO. 1993
·
AWRAD. Polling Data February 2008
·
Birzeit Institute of Women’s Studies/AWRAD, Survey of Attitudes Towards Prevailing Family Law. 2013
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
6 Access to justice
Towards a legal structure for women’s empowerment
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6.1. Background & Context The Palestinian National Authority has inherited a legal system made up of a combination of laws and regulations that date back to several historical periods as a result of the succession of foreign and colonial powers that occupied Palestine. The Palestinian legal system includes Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli military laws. In addition, the legal system suffers from duplication, as the laws applied in the West Bank are different from those applied in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the main objective of the Palestinian National Authority is to unify the laws governing the West Bank and Gaza Strip and adapt these laws to the changing social, economic, and political conditions and developments. In this context, mechanisms to develop the Palestinian legal system in favor of women’s and gender issues are being discussed. The women’s movement has pushed toward legislative reforms that adopt equality as a strategic principle in the legal structure (UNDP, 2012). However, legal reform, under the Palestinian National Authority, is caught in a tug of war in opposite directions. These reforms and priorities are always determined according to different interests and positions. There are the priorities imposed by international donor programs, the priorities of the ruling authority, the priorities of the civil society which seeks to expand the circle of civil rights, the priorities of businessmen who seek to increase profits and reduce oversight, and finally there are national priorities to end the occupation. In this context, several legal changes in favor of women have been made. Also effective programs have been developed to address women’s issues. One of the most prominent achievements is the adoption of legislation to achieve equality and grant women their basic rights, whether at the constitutional level or the level of ordinary laws. However, this context has also produced several obstacles, which have slowed down the reform process or pulled it in different directions. Therefore, some laws still need to be improved and modified. This paper provides basic conclusions and recommendations concerning the law and women from the perspective of women’s access to justice and the reform framework and its indicators. This paper reached these conclusions and recommendations after examining the 2008 Palestinian Women’s Bill of Rights and different literature on women and the law in Palestine in addition to the various government’s plans related to the law and its institutions, including the plan of the justice sector, the plan of the Ministry of Social Affairs, the National Strategy to Combat Violence against Women, and the Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy 2011-2013. Some programs implemented by NGOs have also been reviewed (including those providing legal assistance to women or improving women’s access to justice through legal changes). In addition, this paper draws upon the different international conventions on women’s rights 81
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
as well as the different obligations guaranteed by these conventions, including the obligations contained in the International Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), or other conventions on political action and participation as well as the various recommendations made by the different conferences. The Palestinian National Authority has reiterated its formal and legal commitment to and respect of international standards and conventions. Thus, key Palestinian legal documents have emphasized adherence to international principles and conventions even before the recognition of Palestine as an observer state in the United Nations. Under the Declaration of Independence issued by the Palestinian National Council in 1988, the State of Palestine proclaims its commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 10 of the Palestinian Basic Law states: “1. Basic human rights and liberties shall be protected and respected. 2. The Palestinian National Authority shall work without delay to become a party to regional and international declarations and covenants that protect human rights.” With regard to women’s rights, Presidential Decree No. (19) of 2009 concerning the ratification of the CEDAW was promulgated by the National Palestinian Authority. The Decree focuses on the need to respect and enforce the provisions of this Convention by all concerned parties. This report is based on an understanding of access to justice not only by identifying the procedural and technical aspects that hinder access to justice for those who seek it, but also by expanding the area ofresearch investigation and intervention. As such, this understanding is based on acknowledging that access to justice is achieved when people who seek justice are able to obtain legal advice that responds to the social, economic and political conditions in which they live (Kelly, 2005). However, the main determinants used to measure access to justice do not only depend on the extent to which laws and regulations comply with international conventions and human rights (or with the standard rules for the proper functioning of the judicial process), but also on understanding how the laws and regulations function within a specific legal framework. So they contribute either to increasing access to justice or reducing it. This study does not provide definitive conclusions on specific laws, but it calls for approaching legal reform from a broader perspective to determine the impact of the interaction between different elements within a single legal framework. As such, this paper presents these conclusions and recommendations on three levels: the first offers key conclusions related to developing the legal process and women’s access to justice; the second presents the challenges facing the development of this sector and the third presents the most important basic recommendations and intervention programs that must be developed based on these conclusions.
6.2. Issues and Trends 6.2.1. The law and women’s access to justice is considered a sensitive subject at different political levels
to justice (UNDP, 2012). Therefore, most reform trends focus on the law and its institutions to achieve equality and eliminate discrimination. Accordingly: a)
The focus is on introducing key legislative amendments to discriminatory texts, especially those contained in the penal and personal status laws. These amendments aim to make the laws more compatible with international principles and human rights standards. Recently, a new draft penal law has been developed to take into account women and their rights more than the previous laws (UNDP, 2012). Also, several drafts of the personal status law have been launched demanding fundamental changes in this law including marriage, custody, divorce, common property and legal capacity (UNDP, 2012). The Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy 2011–2013 calls for empowering women legally in order to enjoy equal family rights through a range of interventions, including enacting a unified family law and developing a system for models of the marriage contract and others. The Sharia Court Council has issued amendments concerning the issues of discord and conflict to facilitate their verification. These include the possibility to have Khula divorce in the cases in which a marriage contract is concluded but not consummated. The Council has also issued instructions concerning the mechanisms of apportionment of inheritance shares to adopt procedures that enable an inheritor who waives his share to know the real value of the property that has been waived, in order to make women more aware of the concept of waiver and its legal impact. The Ministry of Labor has conducted reviews of the labor law to assess it on several grounds, including women’s rights and empowerment (UNDP, 2012).
b)
The basic understanding of women’s issues in Palestine is based on the fact that the law plays a pivotal role in women’s advancement and empowerment. In many cases, women’s issues are summarized and understood through the legal framework only. The existence and quality of a legislative text are considered the main measure of women’s access
Legal reform programs focus essentially on building the administrative and regulatory capacity of the various judicial, legislative and executive bodies, in addition to improving the legal profession. To achieve this, the capacities of justice institutions and the judiciary need to be improved. This includes improving the infrastructure of these institutions (buildings and equipment), providing continuous training and education to their staff, raising awareness about rights and freedoms, and developing a code of conduct for each of these institutions.72 In recent years, a gender unit was established in the Ministry of Justice similar to other ministries (such as the Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Education). This unit aims to strengthen the justice sector and its various programs and offer suggestions for developing
71 Interviews conducted with women and human rights activists between February 2011 and December 2012.
72 In this regard, see, for example, the national plan on justice and the rule of law 2011-2013 issued by the Cabinet.
Discussions on the issue of the law and women’s access to justice come in the framework of the Israeli occupation, the restrictions and constraints imposed by the Oslo Accords and the reality of occupation for the Palestinian National Authority. The Palestinian National Authority is often not free to exercise full sovereignty over Palestinian land. As a result, demands for access to justice are influenced by tensions on the daily, practical level (Kelly, 2005). On the one hand, these issues affect people’s ability to access institutions of justice, particularly in areas outside the control of the Palestinian National Authority, such as Jerusalem and Area C, while on the other hand, they affect the ability of justice institutions to enforce the law. In addition, the strength of formal standard rules depends on their ability to be translated into practical steps, enforce law and guarantee its execution (Kelly, 2006). In addition, the feminist demands related to women’s rights have become subject to political bickering among different powers in the Palestinian political arena and the women’s movement (UNDP, 2012). As a result, the issue of women’s rights is influenced by ideological differences which have only led to the disruption of reform in important fields related to women (Sh’hada, 1999). One of the most important fields is the personal status and penal laws. The political division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip has expanded the legal gap between them, bringing back the issue of the duplication of laws to square one. New laws are being enacted separately in both the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Major amendments have been made to the penal and personal status laws in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip but without these amendments having any effect on each other. The political division has also disrupted access to justice in many cases where the parties involved live in the two regions. In personal status cases, many women cannot implement judgments issued by the West Bank courts in the Gaza Strip, whether these judgments are related to divorce or alimony. 71
6.2.2. Focusing on the essential role of legal changes in women’s advancement and empowerment
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policies that promote women’s rights and access to justice (Bahdi, Sawalha, and Junaidi, 2010). c)
The national plan for justice and the rule of law called for developing and institutionalizing a legal assistance system to facilitate access to legal services73 for poor and marginalized groups. Legal assistance programs – especially those related to women – are offered by nongovernmental institutions and women’s centers. For example, the Palestinian Working Women’s Society, the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling, and other institutions and societies provide legal assistance services to women, especially on personal status issues. However, there is no integrated program that provides legal assistance to poor and marginalized groups yet. The Ministry of Justice has been discussing several options and strategies related to this subject.
d)
Also many goals and interventions related to the law and access to justice, whether those contained in the national strategies or in the various programs of women’s organizations, focus on the importance of awareness of rights in deciding to seek justice. Therefore, they seek to educate women and raise their awareness about their rights through seminars and workshops. In addition, these centers provide legal evidence in an attempt to deliver simplified knowledge about legal proceedings before courts, especially Sharia courts. Perhaps one of these models, for example, is the manual on alimony developed by the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling.
6.2.3. Focusing on a formal and structural approach to understand the law In spite of the importance of existing legal programs focusing on women’s access to justice, in most cases, these programs are limited. They tend to deal with the law and its institutions from a structural perspective rather than as an interactive process. The focus on the structural aspect of the law and its institutions is based on a procedural and technical understanding of the law with an emphasis on the internal process within the legal systems rather than outside them (Kelly, 2005). On the other hand, focusing on the law and its institutions as an interactive process is based on dealing with the formal structure of the law and its legal texts while taking into consideration the different roles played by the main actors, whether litigants or legal personalities, in interpreting the law and determining the methods of its application on the one hand and the social, 73 In this regard, see the national plan for the justice and rule of law sector 2011-2013. 83
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economic and political conditions which may contribute to interpreting the true meaning of the law on the other hand. The procedural approach lacks the contextual understanding of the law, as the law is influenced by the surrounding political, economic and social forces and derives its meaning from them (UNDP, 2012). Therefore, in the technical approach the focus is on the legal text more than the legal practice (UNDP, 2012). Many of the demands related to women and the law do not take into consideration how the text is used on the ground or mechanisms to benefit from the judicial practice to enable women’s access to justice. Furthermore, the technical approach overlooks the resources to which women may resort to have access to justice. In addition, this approach overlooks the economic, social and political obstacles which may limit access to justice for women. There is also a weakness in defining the roles of key actors in enabling women’s access to justice. As a result, the judicial practice is essential to understanding the extent of women’s access to justice, and their relationship with the law and the main actors in it. The technical approach overlooks the fact that the law is a part of the process of enabling women to seek justice, not the whole process (Faundez, 2000).
6.2.4. Women, under different programs of the law and its indicators, are one unit Women belong to different economic, political and social groups. In many cases, changes – covered by legal reform and development – do not meet the needs of the different groups and their mechanisms of access to justice (UNDP, 2012). Measuring the impact of legislation on different social groups is part of ensuring the achievement of the purposes of the law (UNDP, 2012). The impact of the law which abides by international standards is not necessarily positive on all segments of society. Therefore, the development of taxonomic indicators to know who the beneficiary is and who the victim is may contribute to developing more accurate legal programs. These taxonomic indicators help us to determine for example the legal effect of the law on poor, working, unemployed, young and elderly women. This may lead to better knowledge about the law and the cases of its implementation. For example, increasing legal procedures to protect women from exploitation may benefit educated or wealthy women, but it may be a burden on poor or uneducated women. It may also limit their access to justice and limit achievement of their goals quickly and effectively. Increasing procedures may also further complicate the situation on the legal level and in terms of the number of entities that women may resort to in addition to increasing costs and financial burdens on women. One example on this is the amendments to the system of the apportionment of inheritance shares. Their aim is to protect women from being exploited and denied their inheritance rights through increasing the procedures
and requirements that enable them to know the value of what has been waived. However, this procedure may also limit women’s ability to freely dispose of their inheritance, whether through waiving their share to a man or another woman. This may lead some women to act outside the framework of the judicial system and the procedures governing this process through, for example, power of attorney or preliminary contracts that can be legally concluded for lands outside the land registration system. This procedure may have a negative effect on women in Area C while it may have a positive effect on women in Area A. Reform strategies and programs in the justice sector also focus on more representation for women in justice institutions. In some cases, this participation is considered as an indicator of a better understanding of women’s issues and consequently better access to justice. However, this indicator, although necessary to know the extent of women’s participation in the justice sector (and this participation is essential), does not provide evidence of a change in the institution’s perception of women’s issues (UNDP, 2011). In many cases, women working in the sector produce the same foundations on which the institution is established, without subjecting them to criticism on the basis of women’s issues.
6.2.5. Legal pluralism and multiplicity of conflict resolution institutions The law is not necessarily the only reference to which people resort to resolve their differences and to justify their actions. There are multiple standard rules, including customary, religious and other standard rules. In many cases, the law prohibits certain acts, but this does not necessarily mean that people will not commit these acts because the law is not the only reference to determine the legality of these acts. In this case, these people may act outside the law, but within the framework of what is religiously or customarily acceptable (UNDP, 2012). These multiple dimensions of standard rules must be taken into consideration along with their impact on law enforcement. Excluding certain rules from the framework of the law and keeping them in the circle of legitimacy leads to excluding a group of people out of the scope of the law and its protection (which, in many cases, adversely affects the institution of the law and the group that is excluded from the enforcement of the law). In addition, formal justice institutions work in parallel with other institutions and entities which mediate and provide conflict resolution mechanisms. People usually resort to these institutions (whether these institutions are official such as the governorate or unofficial such as tribal judiciary or mediators) to resolve and settle their disputes (Institute of Law, 2005). These institutions are not necessarily traditional, as they may be based on political or economic weight available on the ground. In many governorates, reconciliation committees have been established to 84
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settle disputes before going to the courts and formal justice institutions. In some cases, the reference of these institutions is not legal, meaning that these entities do not resort to the law and law enforcement. They seek to resolve the dispute by resorting to different mechanisms and compromises satisfactory to the two parties or to one party at the expense of the other (Institute of Law, 2005). Many studies indicate that in many cases, the law, its rules and texts are present as a reference to resolve conflicts (Kelly, 2006). Many development and reform strategies overlook the fact that part of conflict resolution takes place outside the formal justice institutions and that these institutions have the ability to give meaning to the law and its enforcement. Thus, they may contribute positively or negatively to producing a meaning different from the meaning intended by the lawmaker. In light of the basic conclusions above, there is a margin of important strategic opportunities which should be legally developed.
6.3. Key Recommendations 1. Less focus on conflict resolution procedures in favor of the substantive dimension of access to justice. Reform programs should take into consideration the substantive aspect in addition to the procedural aspect when developing their programs and interventions. The substantive aspect is the extent to which laws and regulations are able to achieve the purpose for which they were intended. It is not enough for the laws to call for equality or to be non-discriminatory. These laws must also be enforceable. Therefore, it is important to examine the results, not only to create an excellent text of the law. An accurate legal and procedural form is important but may not necessarily improve women’s access to justice. There is a need to develop the substantive aspect of the work of justice institutions. Therefore, it is important to develop various studies and programs with the relevant authorities to achieve the following objectives: a)
Developing interpretation and adaptation mechanisms in the judicial work for the benefit of women and their cases. Therefore, it is necessary, in this direction, to work with various entities in justice institutions to support and develop these mechanisms and to conduct in-depth studies to determine how justice institutions give meaning to the text.
b)
Developing legal practice in general, not only to help women to access justice, but also to contribute in giving a different meaning to the legal text upon implementation to give women more rights. Also, the role of female lawyers
in the legal practice must be strengthened in addition to providing mechanisms to encourage their retention in the profession. c)
It is also necessary to define the roles of key actors, including judges, lawyers and administrative staff in courts and legal institutions, in giving women their rights. There is a need for quality information on the work of the courts and actors’ role in achieving justice for women.
d)
Moreover, there is a need to develop qualitative indicators for issues that need to be resolved based on the subject at hand, taking into account the different groups of women and their attitudes toward the law and its institutions. In addition, there is a need to develop knowledge not only about the number of women who resort to the judiciary, but also about the social class, age group, educational status, geographical region and marital status of these women as well as other classifications that may provide a better understanding of women’s issues and their needs. There is a need to study the experiences of women to determine the factors and the persons that contribute to enhancing women’s access to justice or inhibiting this access.
e)
National initiatives and plans must include deeper interventions related to the core of the process of access to justice, namely the judicial practice. It is necessary to monitor this practice and to identify aspects supporting women’s access to justice to promote them, as well as aspects that limit women’s access to justice to change them. The quality of the legal text should not be the only indicator. Other indicators must be developed with regard to the quality of the daily practice of this text. For example, until now, in spite of the labor law’s emphasis on equal rights for men and women at work, in many cases, there is discrimination in the workplace between men and women. However, this discrimination is not visible in the daily work of the courts. In other words, there are no cases in the courts relating to discrimination in pay or other forms of discrimination (UNDP, 2012). This means that, for example, the obstacles facing women’s access to justice must be examined. These may not necessarily be directly linked to the legislative text, but once these obstacles are known, an amendment might be required in the legislative text or through other interventions.
2. Developing programs to accompany changes in legislation Reform programs emphasize the central role of the law and thus they ignore a set of basic interventions that contribute to giving the law its meaning. So it is necessary to: 85
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a)
Develop comprehensive intervention mechanisms in the justice sector to achieve better access for women in this sector. These interventions must include a package of structural changes in favor of women. Enhancing women’s participation in public positions requires, in addition to changing the law, the development of training programs for mid and low-level female employees. This would allow them to improve and develop their skills to assume senior management positions. Strategic plans need to determine the key interventions that must be built upon to support the law and not the opposite. For example, raising the age of marriage should not only be a legal text. The sectors and areas that suffer from this phenomenon should also be targeted through educational and vocational rehabilitation programs for girls so as to give them different roles in social and economic life. The empowerment of working women does not only require legal texts, but also programs to support these texts in ensuring equality in rights on the ground. For example, it is necessary to impose a child care system in large enterprises to facilitate care for the children of working mothers (UNDP, 2012). Therefore, the promotion of women’s rights as a strategic objective may require two types of interventions, one of them is legal related to the legal text, and the other is related to supporting this text and its application through a series of non-legislative interventions.
b)
Take into account the legislative impact on the different groups. Some groups may be negatively affected by legislative changes which we assume to be positive in accordance with the procedural and international standards. For example, some issues such as Khula’ divorce may be useful. However, they may not be useful for some poor women. So it is necessary to determine the groups that will be negatively affected and how. If, for example, we do not understand how the courts will impose the concept of the costs incurred by the husband, and what they include (i.e. how the courts estimate costs that must be recovered), we will not know how this new amendment affects the different women groups and which groups will benefit from it and which won’t. Will the poor benefit from this law or will it be a burden on them? This is not an answer but a question that must be raised for each law that is assumed to have an impact on several levels.
c)
The Ministry of Women’s Affairs must contribute to developing legislation and proposing legal amendments in favor of women to be able to execute what is contained in (a) and (b), i.e. developing the legal departments so that they not only propose technical legislative amendments, but also measure the legislative
impact of these laws on women from different groups. Besides, frameworks must be provided within institutions which contribute to the development of programs that support and strengthen the laws so that the laws are part of a package of comprehensive changes and programs.
3. Develop programs that examine and evaluate the informal justice system As noted earlier, informal institutions (official or unofficial) play a prominent role in conflict resolution. The roles of these institutions must be defined in terms of achieving access to justice for women or not. Also this factor must be considered when developing future programs, since any change in the law may be strengthened or obscured if institutions deal with it in a positive way or negative way.
4. Develop mechanisms to resort to international conventions and incorporate them in the Palestinian legal system In light of the Palestinian political conditions, the ability of the Palestinian Authority to enforce the law and affect its interpretation depends on its ability to put these principles into action. This is possible through the consolidation of the collective rights of the Palestinian people, which support the sovereign power of the state. As such, it is necessary to work at all political and legal levels to develop national legal and political strategies that are able to resort to international frameworks with regard to the collective issues of the Palestinian people by discussing Palestinian women’s issues in international fora. On the other hand, mechanisms are needed in the Palestinian legal system to localize international conventions and convert them into obligations which can be invoked before the courts. It is not enough to say that there is a presidential decree to ratify CEDAW. What is important here is that CEDAW becomes a legal document which can be invoked before Palestinian courts. It is important not to make commitments that cannot be met.
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Arabic References: ·
UNDP (2011). Palestinian Female Lawyers: Reality and Aspirations. Rule of law and access to justice project. Ramallah.
·
UNDP (2012). A Review of Palestinian Legislation from a Women’s Rights Perspective. Rule of law and access to justice project. Ramallah: Palestine.
·
Bahdi, Reem; Sawalha, Ismat; Junaidi, Amer. (2010). A report on the establishment of a gender unit at the Ministry of Justice. Institute of Law – Birzeit University: Palestine.
·
Institute of Law – Birzeit University. (2005). Informal Justice System: Rule of law and Conflict Resolution. Birzeit: Palestine
English References:
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FAUNDEZ, J. (2000). Legal reform in developing and transition countries – Making haste slowly. Law, Social Justice and Global Development No. 1. Retrieved from: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/ lgd/2000_1/faundez/
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KELLY, T. (2005). Law, culture and access to justice under the Palestinian National Authority. Development and Change, 36(5): 365
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KELLY, T. (2006). Law, violence and sovereignty among West Bank Palestinians. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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SH’HADA, N. (1999). Gender and politics in Palestine: Discourse analysis of the Palestinian Authority and Islamists (Working paper 207. Institute of Social Studies. Retrieved from: http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/ asset/19052/wp307.pdf
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7 Political participation
Beyond numbers
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7.1. Introduction and general theoretical framework Many international conventions and various studies underscore the importance of women’s political participation. Democracy realizing political participation is defined as a process that aims to influence public decisions, policies and strategies, in addition to the selection of rulers and members of representative institutions and influencing them to serve public interest. There are several forms of political participation, including the exercise of the right to vote and to stand for election, participating in debates and discussions, addressing criticism, joining partisan and nonpartisan organizations, and finally accession to power (Al-Zubaidi, 2003: p.75). Some believe that political participation is important because it consolidates democracy in the concerned society while others link it to higher development rates or consider it a right of full citizenship for women. Out of twelve countries where women representation in parliament is more than 33 per cent, nine of them are ranked in the high human development category. (Bari, 2005). Many factors affect women’s political exclusion, including: 1– Political and social discourses in the society (ideological factors); 2 – Political structures and institutions; 3 – Socio-cultu ral and functional constraints facing women (Bari, 2005). The first factor is associated with extent of entrenchment of patriarchy as a system that constructs a hierarchy of gender relations, which means: “a familialsocial, ideological, political system in which men by force, direct pres s ure or through ritual, tradition, law, and language, customs etiquette, education, and the division of labor, determine what part women shall or shall not play in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male” ( R ich, 1977 in Bari, 2005). Patriarchy is not static rath e r remained in a flux while intersecting with economic, s ocial and political systems of a particular society and the status of women in society. Political factors are related to the traditional view of politics that defines it as “an activity, a conscious, deliberate participation in the process by which resources are allocated among citizens” (Randall , 1987, p.8). This conception of politics restricts politica l activity only in the public arena and the private sphere (of women and family) life is rendered as apolitical. Even when women are brought into politics they are entered as mothers and wives. In addition, men dominate the politics, political parties and culture of political structures that have a perspective on issues of national importance which does not co n sider the issues of women as political issues and ignore them in the politics of their parties. Politics is practiced through structures usually controlled by men and is held in odd timing s conflicting with women’s domestic responsibilities (fami l y and home). Also the nature of the political system 89
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(open and democratic versus conservative) affects women’s participation, where it is observed that the participation of women in the first model is greater. Socio-cultural factors which perpetuate the subordinate stat u s of women are related to the prevailing gender role ideology in society which allocates more resources to men (as breadwinners) than women. This is reflected in t h e varying degrees of gender disparities in health, educ a tion, employment, ownership of property and poli tics. Additionally, gender is mediated through class, ethnicity, age, health status, etc. Women also find it hard to participate in politics due to limited time available to them because of their dual roles in the productive and reproductive spheres. Moreover, economic factors limit this role as more and more money is needed to participate in p olitics. Women lack access to and ownership of productive resource, limiting the scope of their political work. Women often lack social capital because they are often not head of communities, tribes or kinship groups, res ulting in the absence of constituency base for them and means of political participation such as political skills, eco nomic resources, education, training and access to inf ormation (Bari, 2005). The previous elements interact with other elements sup porting discrimination, for example the society bei ng subject to the domination of other powers, be the y colonial powers or economic and political powers at the global level. This is the case of the Palestinian soc iety which is subject to Israeli settlement expansion and economic and political dependence on international decision-making bodies. These factors significantly affect the policies and capabilities of the Palestinian Authority. So poverty increases among larger groups of people, with further marginalization for some of them, which lead to the weak political participation of poor and marginalized gro ups. The above-mentioned elements mean that the active pol itical participation of women cannot be achieved by relying on strategies that do not take into consideration the impact of these elements combined.
7.1.1. Enabling environment for women’s participation in politics and development Cre ating an enabling environment for women’s participation in politics cannot be viewed only within the boundaries of a society. It must be linked to global and external factors which affect this society and which may lea d to poverty and marginalization for many groups. The refore, it is important to face and challenge these factors to create a supportive environment for women’s participation. This must be linked to the rights of people to defend themselves and be free from all forms of subordination and exploitation. Without changing sociocul tural, political and economic structural barriers, the goal of gender equality or women’s equal participation in
politics and development will remain impossible to attain. The presence of a democratic system and the participative and decentralized form of governance creates greater space for citizens to participate in governance processes and structures. This is another element in the enabling environment of women’s participation. Human capacities are dependent on the availability of resources such as education, health and employment that build capabilities and enlarge human choices. Access to education, health and employment is directly linked with women’s ability to create space for themselves in politics and development. Con sciousness of political rights and building transformative communities such as strong and effective wom en’s movements are significant conditions for creating an enabling environment that can influence the direction of politics and development in favor of women. Thi s cannot be done without taking into consideration the various roles of women (in reproductive, productive, soc ial and political spheres). Provision of childcare and care work is vital to enabling women to participate in the pol itical and development processes.
7.1.2. General political framework of the political participation of Palestinian women. The demand for women’s equal political participation is found in the Declaration of Independence of 1988, the Basic Law of the State of Palestine, the Palestinian Women’s Bill of Rights of 2008, international conventions, particularly CEDAW, and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which addresses the impact of war on women. The Isr aeli occupation hinders the realization of citizenship in the Palestinian context. In addition, limitations and constraints imposed by Oslo accords restricts the ability of the Palestinian Authority to define Palestinian citizenship and determine who has the right to participate in politics and enjoy the different rights as determined by the Con stitution. This means that: · There is always tension in the demands related to citizenship and equality. In many cases, these may contradict with the narrow definition of citizenship imposed by Oslo accords (Hammami & Johnson 1999). The Palestinian National Authority is restricted in many cases from exercising full sovereignty on Palestinian land, whether as a result of the requirements of the Oslo accords or through procedures imposed by Israel on the ground. The occupied Palestinian territory is divided, according to the Oslo Accords, into three areas: (A), (B), and (C). Area A are the only areas under the control of the Palestinian National Authority, but, at the same time, they are not outside the scope of Israeli control. · Palestinians in Jerusalem and in the Diaspora are still outside the control of the Palestinian National Authority. The same applies to the movements 90
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between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in addition to the lack of control over borders and internal and external crossings. In other words, the Palestinian National Authority does not possess sovereignty over the population, land or resources (Jad, 2004). · The Oslo accords have reinforced the political and legal separation between Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory through checkpoints, the Barrier, identity cards, permits, restrictions, and closures that form the daily life of the Palestinians. These arrangements gave the occupation authority the power to determine what rights can be demanded by any group and where (Al-Botmeh, 2011). · The international community did not recognize the results of the legislative elections, in spite of their integrity. The political conflict (and the resulting split between Fatah and Hamas, and between the authority in the Gaza Strip and the authority in the West Bank) has led to many violations of civil and political rights. Political participation through elections, in spite of its importance, has had limited impact. Although some women have assumed political positions at the local and national levels, the political conflict has weakened other women. Many resignations or dismissals affected women who reached decisionmaking positions for the first time in their lives. · The expansion of women’s political participation is linked to the ability to deepen the concept of democracy and democratization in the concerned society to achieve political stability and development. In the Palestinian case, the Palestinian National Authority was not established, according to the Oslo Accords, to achieve democracy, but to negotiate on the land and constitutional borders to function as a quasi-state in light of a balance of power strongly tipped in favor of the Israeli side. Israel set conditions to structurally prevent the realization of a true democracy by linking control over the Palestinian economic sources to the ability of the new authority to achieve security, as defined by Israel. Therefore, the contradiction between achieving democratic rights for the Palestinians, especially those who opposed the agreements, and achieving security is a dilemma with no real solution (Khan et al, 2004). · In light of the weakness of the Palestinian National Authority (its executive, judicial and security bodies) due to escalating occupation measures against it and against its political organizations during the second Intifada, in addition to imposing new measures to further divide the Palestinian society through the deployment of security checkpoints and building the Barrier have consolidated local propensity as a fait accompli. This was seen in tribalism and local loyalties. The customary justice system expanded at the expense of the formal justice system. Moreover, the platforms of political parties began to focus on the “tribal” and family loyalties in local elections.
While we must not underestimate the impact of kinship and tribalism, this role should not be exaggerated and viewed outside of its political and situational context. Tribalism is utilized by individuals or political organizations in certain cases (local elections within electoral systems not based on proportional representation) as social capital, which is available only for some citizens; so it is always a subject of dispute. It is also linked to the elections law and the extent of the central authority’s strength or weakness (Hilal, 2006). · Questioning the legitimacy of the national elite (the middle class), including women’s movement. Before the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, the middle class gained its legitimacy from its national political and media roles and from paying attention to the problems and concerns of the people. After the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, this role weakened and little attention was paid to social problems associated with the impact of the occupation on different segments. This affected the Palestinian women’s movement. After the Oslo Accords, the legitimacy of these movements (Hilal, 2006) was not considered to be derived from within the Palestinian community, as it was before Oslo, but from international conventions and financiers. · The women’s movement became fragmented because women did not come together around unified social issues, as they came together around the issues of national liberation and against external aggression. In addition, conservative thought spread dramatically among women, and women from most sectors supported the Islamic currents in the various elections. · Democratic traditions in political life and in Palestinian political institutions weakened compared to preOslo. Monopoly of power and decision-making, autocracy, weak institutional traditions, clinging to the narrow factional quota system, and lack of real accountability and transparency mechanisms (Zubaidi, 2003) weakened the institutions of the PLO and factions under its banner in general. As this was the body responsible for completing the stage of national liberation and independence, this weakened the PLO’s representation of all segments of the Palestinian people, especially in the Diaspora, as well as its representation of their interests on the international and regional levels. The impact of the legacy of the PLO on the Palestinian political system continued in the form of weak institutions, the absence of accountability, the promotion of factional division, and weakness of the necessary mechanisms to protect human rights and achieve development and effective management of public affairs (alZubaidi, 2003). · The Palestinian political culture is characterized by a sense of disempowerment in regards to changing the 91
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course of political life. Disempowerment is not limited to the different social groups, but goes beyond them to include various forces and civil society organizations such as political parties, trade unions and other associations. Thus, many members have left these bodies and joined a growing army of political outsiders (Al-Zubaidi, 2003). The effects of the deepening sense of disempowerment include the emergence and spread of selfish and defeatist attitudes such as flattery and nepotism in the ranks of several segments of the society (al-Zubaidi, 2003) in addition to intolerance, rejection of criticism, and viewing criticism as an attack on characters and dignit y rather than an expression of variation in visions and programs (Al-Zubaidi, 2003). These effects also include the widespread lack of political trust, and the increasing number of people who do not trust the political system and its institutions, parties, orientations and structures as well as society institutions and frameworks. · Participation in the elections, (which is one of the forms of political participation) is not, in itself, a sufficient guarantee for political participation that achieves democracy and change, especially if the results of those elections are not recognized, similar to what happened in the Palestinian case in 2006, which intensified the economic siege on the Palestinian people. · The Palestinian National Authority depends on international aid, which somewhat affects the volume and purposes of this aid. Consequently, the whole development process is affected negatively. The great part of the Palestinian National Authority’s budget is spent on salaries and operating expenses, which stands in the way of implementing strategic plans at the national level. This negatively affects the implementation of plans, programs and activities, in general, and plans and programs related to the Palestinian women in particular. Although the Palestinian National Authority received a pledge of support of USD 7.7 billion to implement the Strategic Plan 2008-2010, only 30 per cent is dictated to development projects and projects contributing to the implementation of reform programs in the different institutions of the Palestinian National Authority. The remaining 70 per cent is used to offset the Palestinian National Authority’s budget deficit in the previous years. Yet, after examining the Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010, we found that the differences between men and women are not taken into account in general. The Plan only refers to the commitment of the Palestinian government to gender issues through incorporating this dimension at the target level (the goals and objectives document of the Palestinian National Authority); the goal of enhancing the quality of life of citizens: justice in distributing services, as one of the policy pillars within the framework of developing social capital. In other words the gender dimension was not one of the main
factors in devising the three-year national plan.74
increased to 12.9 per cent75 from 5.6 per cent. This percentage is lower than what was demanded by women and approved by the elections law of 2007 (a 20 per cent quota for women). This percentage is also lower than the global average (which amounted to 19.5 per cent) but higher than the rate of participation of women in Arab parliaments, which amounts to 10.7 per cent, the lowest in the world, according to the UN Women and IPU Map of Women in Politics 2012. The turnout in the first legislative elections, in 1996, reached 75.9 per cent (70.13 per cent in the West Bank and 87.18 per cent in the Gaza Strip). In the last legislative elections held in January 2006, the turnout was 77.18 per cent, and the percentage of voters by district was 45.75 per cent females and 54.25 per cent males. The candidacy rate, at the level of districts, was 15 female candidates out of a total of 343 candidates (4.3 per cent) but none of them won. This shows the importance of political parties for the nomination of women. At the lists level, the candidacy rate was 70 women of a total of 414 candidates (16.9 per cent) and 17 women won. Thus, the nomination of women in districts and lists reached 11.2 per cent (the Central Election Commission, 2006).
· Settlements expansion and the increasing settler violence threaten the security of the population, as well as their livelihoods. Home demolitions, lack of access to services, and dependence on aid are among the factors that threaten the lives and welfare of many women, especially in the regions near settlements and Jerusalem (UN, 2013). Food insecurity among female-headed households reached 39 per cent in Area C in the West Bank (UN, 2013). · Some women are still in Israeli prisons and some released women suffer from social integration problems after their release.
7.2. Trends and indicators on women’s political participation: Beyond the numbers 7.2.1. Women in decision-making positions Strategic Objective 5 of the Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy highlights the importance of women’s political participation and access to decision-making positions. There are three indicators to measure the achievement of this objective relating to increasing women’s representation in the Palestinian Legislative Council, local councils, and professional institutions. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs in collaboration with women’s institutions and organizations has achieved a lot in terms of increasing the representation of women in various political positions. Women in the Palestinian National Authority and in the civil society, in line with the orientations of international development institutions (most importantly, the United Nations), have raised the slogan of women’s political empowerment and increasing their political participation through access to decisionmaking positions whether in the authority or in the various civil society institutions. This is reflected in the “women’s quota” trend which has led to an increase in women’s political participation as candidates and representatives in many municipal and local councils and in the Palestinian Legislative Council. The general trend was to increase the number of women in these councils from one election to another, as seen in the following indicators: 1.
The rate of women’s participation in the Palestinian Legislative Council, in 2006,
74 The mentioned figures are provided by the donors in the database of Ministry of planning. Therefore, they do not reflect all the obligations given to the authority in respect to woman empowerment. 92
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
2.
The rate of women’s participation in local councils in the West Bank in 1997 did not exceed 0.5 per cent. It reached 1.8 per cent in 2000, 18 per cent in the 2004-2005 local elections (in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and 20.6 per cent in the 2012 elections, which took place only in the West Bank, according to the opposite table.
3.
68.8 per cent of female registered voters in the 2004-2005 local elections voted compared to 71.5 per cent for male registered voters. The percentages are close. The percentage of women voters reached 47.8 per cent, which indicates a high political participation. The percentage of women candidates reached 30 per cent of all candidates. In addition, women in the West Bank occupied chairmanship positions in municipal and local councils for the first time. This changes the stereotype about the role of women in politics. It should be noted that the Palestinian refugee camps which include large concentrations of population (9.3 per cent of the population) (PCBS, 2011, Palestinians Population Status in the Palestinian territory) do not participate in local elections and they are not represented in them. Plus most of the camps are run by committees with no representation for women and the quota system does not apply to them.
75 The percentage now is 12.4% after four members – three men and one woman – died.
Results of local elections 2010\ 2012 by gender and electoral district in the West Bank
Electoral district
Total number of winners
Total number of winners by acclamation
Men
Women
Total
Ratio of women to the total number of women and men
Men
Women
Total
Ratio of women winners by acclamation to the total number of women and men winners
Number of women who won by quota not by competition
Jerusalem
183
45
228
19.7
163
41
204
20.1
1
Jenin
315
85
400
21.3
180
49
229
21.4
9
Tulkarem
137
35
172
20.3
72
19
91
20.9
8
Tubas
67
17
84
20.2
28
8
36
22.2
2
Nablus
316
85
401
21.2
202
58
260
22.3
13
Qalqilya
140
35
175
20.0
101
26
127
20.5
2
Salfeet
134
34
168
20.2
31
9
40
22.5
13
Ramallah El Bireh
415
113
528
21.4
265
73
338
21.6
14
Jericho
40
11
51
21.6
21
6
27
22.2
1
Bethlehem
267
69
336
20.5
188
50
238
21.0
4
Khalil
226
53
279
19.0
145
36
181
19.9
4
Total
2240
582
2822
20.6
1396
375
1771
21.2
71
Source: Central Elections Commission (2006). Report of the second legislative elections January 25, 2006. Ramallah: Palestine.
93
4.
The percentage of women employed in public services in the government sector is 40.5 per cent, according to 2013 data. The percentages of women decrease in senior positions, increase in mid-level positions and again decrease at the bottom. This is an indicator that women have higher degrees, as shown in the following table.
6.
The percentage of female judges reached 11.3 per cent until 2010 (12 per cent in the West Bank and about 10 per cent in the Gaza Strip). Two women were appointed in the position of Sharia judge for the first time in February 2009, in addition to appointing a female Shariah Chief Prosecutor (PCBS, 2011, men and women).
5.
The number of female ambassadors reached five in September 2009 (4.7 per cent), out of 106 missions of the Palestinian Authority all over the world. This percentage decreased to 4.3 per cent in 2011 (PCBS, 2012). For the first time, women were appointed to serve as governor of Ramallah and Al-Bireh and deputy governor of Nablus. Also for the first time a woman was appointed as president of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and as acting president of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
7.
The percentage of women ministers in the thirteenth Palestinian government was 22.7 per cent (5 out of 22 ministers).
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
Statistics of civil service employees by gender Professional Rank
Male
Female
Percentage
Total
A1
38
6
13.6%
44
A2
85
5
5.5%
90
A3
83
10
10.7%
93
A4
630
81
11.3%
711
A
1324
256
16.2%
1580
B
1393
375
21.2%
1768
C
2300
781
25.3%
3081
First
2242
1015
31.1%
3257
Second
5038
3291
39.5%
8329
Third
7009
6407
47.7%
13416
Fourth
8748
9107
51%
17855
Fifth
10430
9783
48.3%
20213
Sixth
2875
1929
40.1%
4804
Seventh
2561
649
20.2%
3210
Eighth
2318
519
18.2%
2837
Ninth
2247
555
19.8%
2802
Tenth
2578
806
23.8%
3384
Others
822
450
35.3%
1272
52721
36025
40.5%
88746
Total
Source: General Personnel Council, unpublished data, 2013
7.2.2. Women’s representation in civil society organizations In the general framework (as in the government) the number of women in civil society institutions is increasing, but the situation is not better than in the government. Women comprised 25 per cent of the General Conference of Fatah Movement, 0 per cent of its central committee (in 2009), 33 per cent of the Revolutionary Council of the Movement, and 11 per cent of the expanded council. The Revolutionary Council of the Movement took a decision (based on the recommendations of the General Conference) that the representation of women shall not be less than 20 per cent in the Movement’s organs. The representation of women in the Popular Front is: 10 per cent in the Central Committee, 20 per cent in the Branch Central Committee, 11 per cent in the Branch Leadership, and 10.2 per cent in the Branch Conference. In the Democratic Front, women make up 19.5 per cent of the Central Committee in the West Bank, 16.5 per cent of the Central Committee in the Gaza Strip, 18 per cent of the Central Command in the West Bank, 13 per cent in the Central Command in the Gaza Strip, 17 per cent of Branch Committees in the West Bank, 9 per cent in the Gaza Strip and 6 per cent of Politburo. In the Palestinian 94
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
Democratic Union (FIDA), women make up 30 per cent of the Executive Politburo and 19 per cent of the Central Committee. It is worth mentioning here that FIDA elected on April 20, 2011 the first ever female secretary-general of a Palestinian faction, Zahira Kamal (Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy 2011 – 2013). These data indicate that the number of women in leadership positions in left-wing parties is larger than in the centrist Fatah movement. However, this does not translate into political power and influence due to the low and declining popularity of left-wing parties since the Oslo Accords of 1993. Only one woman won at the constituency level from the Democratic Front and the Popular Front and one from the Popular Front won at the party lists level in the legislative elections of 2006. The electoral coalition which brought together the Democratic Front, the People’s Party and FIDA failed to get a single woman elected. Thus, increased representation of women in those parties did not translate into increased participation of women in general political life. This may mean that increasing women’s representation in these parties is not necessarily reflected positively on women’s representation in public political life, or on increasing the female popular base of those parties.
Islamic parties: Islamic parties, which include Hizb Al-Tahrir, Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), are opposition parties. On the whole, these parties work underground, except, to some extent, in the Gaza Strip. The numbers of women in these parties are unknown, but women participated actively and intensively on behalf of these parties in the 2004 local elections and the 2006 legislative elections. Women are active within these parties and bring to them some general women’s issues (Jad, 2008). Regarding the representation of women in the institutions of the PLO, there are 65 women in the National Council (8 per cent), 10 women in the Central Council, and one woman in the Executive Committee out of 18 members (5.5 per cent). One of the new forms of political participation that have emerged over the past decade is the emergence of youth groups. Young women play a prominent role by participating in political action outside the traditional regulatory frameworks for women across the social networks. This movement has attracted a large segment of young women, including school and university students, who played a prominent role after the Israeli aggression on Gaza in 2008/2009. They organized the “We are all Gaza” campaign by printing the slogan on their shirts. Also those young people contributed in the campaign launched in March 15, 2011, which coincided with protest movements and revolutions in surrounding Arab countries such as Egypt and Tunisia in what became known as the “Arab Spring”. They raised slogans such as “the people want to end the division “ and “the people want to elect a new national council”, etc. This popular movement was important to reject the static situation, in which the split began to widen further on the Palestinian level. What is important here is that this movement attracted groups of young people from different areas (Bethlehem, Nablus, Hebron, Jenin, Qalqilya, and also some of the surrounding villages, especially Bil’in). Then the same activity was coordinated by Gaza youth. These initiatives and campaigns faced interference and suppression by the Palestinian security services, both in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A number of them were arrested for participating in the campaign or because of their role on the censored social networks. Also, the protesters in the Gaza Strip were attacked and beaten. It is worth noting here that the role of young women in social networks has created new forms of political expression and organization, including organizing demonstrations, sit-in, hunger strike tents, the use of music, and cleaning the demonstration areas after finishing. As such, vigor characterized their demonstrations. Female participation in student councils in Palestinian universities averages 26.8 per cent compared to 73.2 per cent for males (PCBS, 2012). However, it must be taken into account that some universities in the Gaza Strip have separate student councils for women, which increases their proportion. Also, there are no females in some major 95
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
universities such as the Al-Najah University in Nablus, and the Arab American University in Jenin. Female representation in student councils is of special importance as this is the first place that produces future women leaders and provides political training to women. Thus, this is the best place to apply the quota system to give more opportunities to young women to be trained on political and social action. Many youth movements have spread as a result of the low popularity of traditional parties, especially after the “Arab Spring”. A lot of young women – members and leaders – participate in these movements, but outside the traditional frameworks of women’s organizations.
7.2.3. Women in decision-making positions – Beyond the numbers Strategy to ensure women’s representation in decisionmaking positions through quotas Since the mid-twentieth century, the quota system for women has been widely implemented as an effective and quick approach to involve women in politics and to rectify a historical injustice that has led to their marginalization. This is reflected in many international conventions such as the Beijing Platform for Action and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which focus on the need to ensure women’s representation in decision-making positions in the formal political structures as one of the strategies to empower women, either through legislation or in practice. Yet, in the face of this consensus, this strategy has been widely criticized in the literature. The most important points can be summarized as follows: 1.
The presence of women in political structures does not necessarily mean mainstreaming gender issues in politics or even the empowerment of women in politics. In the local councils in the West Bank, for example, the percentage of women chairpersons is 0.2 per cent and deputy chairpersons 1 per cent. The percentage of women appointed after the resignation or dismissal of a number of women elected in local elections 2004-2005 was 8 per cent (70 women compared to 795 men (92 per cent). In addition, women’s attendance, whether effective or non-effective, in local council meetings did not exceed 13 per cent compared to 87 per cent for men. Only 11 per cent of women signed the minutes of meetings of local councils compared to 89 per cent for men. The percentage of women chairpersons of committees in local councils was 5.7 per cent (PCBS 2010, unpublished data). Along with the increase of women quotas in local councils, there is an increase in control over these councils by the Ministry of Local Government to dismiss or keep the elected councils. This
limits the control of these councils in terms of their resources and decisions related to the development of the local framework, besides the new appointments (UNDP, 2009). So the result is marginalizing the role of these councils in general and the role of women in particular (UNDP, 2009). Accordingly, it is important to protect the democratic principles of participation in the Palestinian political system and to create an enabling environment to continuously develop women’s capacities in the elected councils. 2.
Engaging women in politics through quotas in the presence of structures and systems that discriminate against them would not be effective without making a change in the distribution of economic and social resources. Women who do not enjoy their civil and economic rights will not be able to exercise their full political rights (Rai, 2007). This is reflected in the low percentage of women (52.2 per cent) who said that they intend to run again for elections, and 27 per cent who said they have not decided yet. Only 20.8 per cent expressed a desire to run again (PCBS 2010, unpublished data). The Ministry of Women’s Affairs took an important step regarding the importance of the distribution of economic resources when it introduced gender budget audits to ensure a fair distribution of economic resources for women. So this step reflects the need to focus on this aspect.
3.
The quota system is based on established assumptions not confirmed by reality. These assumptions see women as a homogeneous group while women are divided according to class, race, religion, political affiliation, age, social background (rural/urban areas, married/ unmarried, health status etc.). This was confirmed by the Palestinian reality after the legislative elections of 2006 and the political division in 2007, which made some countries stop funding councils and municipalities won by Islamists. This has led to an imbalance in the distribution of resources and to difficulty in achieving the government reform plan. As a result some elected women, who were affiliated with different political factions, resigned or were dismissed. Consequently, the role of these women was marginalized and the impact of their first experience in political participation was weakened as well.
4.
96
The quota system cannot stand alone without supportive mechanisms such as affirmative action that create an enabling environment for women. This is what the gender unit in the Ministry of Local Government does, for example, in establishing the gender and local
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
governance forum to coordinate between the ministry and civil society organizations concerned with women and local governance to develop a feminist vision and strategy for local work. 5.
The quota system for women cannot be separated from the general political framework in which this system works. If this general framework is based on relations of power and hierarchy (because of political affiliation, class, etc.), women cannot achieve equality or overcome the existing barriers, because they play by the dominant rules of the game. They cannot change these rules without changing their foundations and without developing common threads to demonstrate that they are marginalized because they are women. The results of the municipal elections in 2012 indicated that the general political framework – because of the continuing political divide – led to a real lack of competition between the different movements and lists. This increased the number of people who won political positions by acclamation, weakening the ability of women to compete democratically. In the 2004-2005 local elections, 56.5 per cent of women were elected, 37.3 per cent won by quota, and only 6.2 per cent won by appointment. The percentage of women who won by quota and appointment was 43.5 per cent. The 2012 election results indicated that the proportion of women who won by quota amounted to 2.5 per cent of the total number of winners and 12.1 per cent of the total number of women winners. The percentage of women who won by acclamation reached 21.2 per cent of the total number of winners, and 64.4 per cent of the total number of women winners. This means that the overwhelming majority of winning women were elected by quota or by acclamation (76.6 per cent). This weakens the ability of women to have political training, present electoral programs and form electoral bases when they run for elections (PCBS, unpublished data).
7.2.4. Female prisoners The Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy underscores the importance of improving the status of women prisoners as stated in Strategic Objective 4. Indicators were developed to measure the achievement of this objective, including the extent to which the experience of women prisoners and released prisoners from Israeli prisons is documented and the extent to which psychological, social and educational services are provided to women prisoners and released prisoners. In considering the situation of prisoners in recent times, we see that the
number of Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons differs from one year to another. In 2010, Israeli forces detained approximately 6,500 Palestinians, with an average of 11 detentions per day. The number of women prisoners ranged between 34 and 39 (0.06 per cent), including women held, serving a sentence, detained or held in administrative detention, without charge. Most of them were from the West Bank and Jerusalem (Addameer Association, 2011). The prevailing political division in the Palestinian territory has led to a significant decline in the rights of men and women prisoners in Israeli prisons. This is reflected in the violation of men and women’s rights, including: ·
Strip searchs of women prisoners;
·
Physical and psychological torture in harsh investigation and arrest conditions;
·
Deprivation of their right to contact the outside world, especially lawyers;
·
Attacks of special units, and sabotage of their property;
·
Heavy fines that drain the resources of men and women prisoners and the Palestinian Authority (in 2010 the Ministry of Detainees spent USD 3,895,395 to assist prisoners in purchasing basic necessities from prison canteens);
·
Solitary confinement, and holding them in cells with criminal women prisoners;
·
Denial of health care and of family visits;
·
Denial of university education, books or newspapers, in addition to denial of family letters and confiscation of paper and pens.
In spite of the importance of providing women prisoners and released prisoners with different services, discussing the political situation of men and women prisoners in the local, regional and international forums is one of the most important priorities, as required by the continuous demands of men and women prisoners. Therefore, it is important to end the division in order to form a unified Palestinian strategy to support the issue of men and women prisoners by enforcing international legal accountability against occupation forces. ·
Activating social solidarity and support for the cause of men and women prisoners.
·
Discussing the suffering of prisoners in international forums, in an attempt to expose the Israeli policies and activate international solidarity and support for the prisoners’ movement.
7.2.5. Women in separated families (Reunification) Objective 2 of the Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy 97
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
stresses the need to ensure that Palestinian women of Jerusalem preserve their rights to residency, movement and nationality. Some indicators were developed to measure progress in achieving this objective, including determining the number of ID cards that have been withdrawn, and the number of ID cards that have been recovered. A proposal has been made to put these indicators in a broader context related to supporting women in Jerusalem to prevent the withdrawal of their and their families’ right to reside in Jerusalem and in other areas. The Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling is preparing a comprehensive study on the situation of women in separated families. A study conducted by Miftah shows that: ·
45,000-50,000 persons were approved for family unification between 1967 and 1972. The original requests amounted to 140,000.
·
Over 150,000 families put in requests for unification from 1973 – 1982, but only 1,000 requests were approved annually.
·
From 1983 to 1992 only a few hundred requests were approved annually, based largely on humanitarian needs. This was slightly amended in 1985 to include a provision that stipulates that an applicant must remain away until his or her request is approved. Before 1987, children were automatically registered in their father’s Jerusalem ID, regardless of the status of their mother. After 1987 a new military order forbid registration of a child whose mother is not already a resident in Jerusalem.
·
Israeli authorities resorted, in 1995, to impose an annual quota of 2,000 requests for family unification.
·
After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1995, unification requests from throughout the occupied Palestinian territory (including areas under the Palestinian Authority’s control) were not accepted.
·
A Human Rights Watch report indicated that since 2000, unregistered Palestinians who have traveled abroad have become systematically prevented from returning to the West Bank. Those who remained inside the West Bank became threatened by checkpoints that hold them on charges of illegal residence (Miftah, 2007; Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling under preparation, pp. 3-10).
·
Although the Palestinian National Authority continued to refer requests, the Israeli side refused to process them. Israel received approximately 120,000 requests between 2000 and 2005 and did not process them after the end of the second Intifada (“Human Rights Watch calls on Israel to reverse its policy of
denying Palestinians the right to travel and residence” (2012 in Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling, under preparation). ·
·
·
98
In 2003, the first law on nationality and entry into Israel was enacted. This law prohibits granting residency or citizenship to any person from the occupied Palestinian territory who is married to an Israeli citizen, whether this Israeli citizen has an Israeli passport or a residency permit in Jerusalem or not. This means that unification is not possible, except in the case that members of those families decide to live in areas or move to live in places where such limitations on residence and unification are not applied. In 2007, the law was again extended by the Knesset to include nationals of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran (hostile states), and anyone who lives in any place where operations posing a threat to Israel’s security and the security of its citizens take place. In 2008, the Israeli government decided to add the Gaza Strip to this list. The law was defined as a temporary order i.e. a temporary law (this clarification was provided the first time the concept was used). The law has been extended nine times since 2008. On 2 January 2011, the occupation authorities, represented by the Ministry of Interior, extend the law, which aims to freeze family reunification procedures for another six months. The Supreme Court of Justice ratified this law, which prevents Palestinians in Israel from the right to establish a family life because of spouse nationality. A study of the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling (under preparation) shows that a small percentage of women (3.3 per cent) resorts to institutions to help them in their reunification request, while the overwhelming majority of women rely on themselves (35 per cent) and on their husbands (33 per cent), or on a lawyer (22 per cent). 8.3 per cent indicated that there is no follow-up. Also about 76 per cent said they knew the legal procedures while 24 per cent said they didn’t. About 78 per cent indicated that they would not marry their sons or daughters to people carrying a different identity, while only 22 per cent said they would. This means that it is necessary to raise the issue of families suffering from reunification problems at the political level and in international forums, especially Jerusalem women. Also, support should be provided to these women and their husbands until these institutions are activated. Also, it is important to document and update these cases to be used in international forums to expose the discriminatory Israeli policies
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
and exert pressure on the Israeli government to cancel these laws and procedures. It is worth mentioning here that foreign funding to support women in Jerusalem (suffering from Israeli policies) did not exceed EUR 320,000 in 2011-2012 (Ministry of Planning, 2013). This means that there is a need to increase sustainable support for the above-mentioned women groups.
7.2.6. Gender mainstreaming: the role of national mechanisms Objective 9 of the Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy calls for mainstreaming gender concerns and issues in the work of Palestinian governmental ministries. Four indicators have been mentioned to measure progress in achieving this goal related to: increasing the proportion of women employees in the Palestinian ministries, the number of gender units in the various ministries, and the number of gender-sensitive interventions in the various projects and programs of the concerned ministries, in addition to disaggregating the data of all concerned ministries by gender. According to reviews of several studies, the national mechanisms face many challenges (MoWA and gender units). The most important challenges are related to those units with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs: ·
The roles, structures and capacities of gender units vary, despite the issuance of a ministerial decision to unify their structures and roles.
·
The absence of a budget dedicated to gender units. The heads of gender units do not know their budget, which affects their activities and plans and undermines the implementation of gender-sensitive budgets.
·
The cognitive capacities to transform information into knowledge that is used in planning and policy-making are still weak.
·
The performance of the unit is determined, in many cases, by the character of the minister, whether it is supportive, obstructive or indifferent.
·
The financial crisis experienced by the Palestinian National Authority is creating feelings of insecurity and threat and a fear from the shift in priorities, as gender mainstreaming is not considered a priority because of the financial difficulties.
On the level of challenges and obstacles affecting the relationship between the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and gender units: ·
Lack of clarity of Ministry of Women’s Affairs’ vision of the gender units in practice, that is on the level of implementation and the mechanisms of action. There are documents on the vision for the units and the relationship
among them, but they remain in the theoretical framework. ·
·
Linking these units to one department in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs puts a heavy work load on this department, which impairs coordination with the different units, in addition to depriving them of the multiplicity of experiences and knowledge in other departments (planning, policy, training, etc.). Lack of effective communication between the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the various units through regular meetings and panel discussions on the experiences of the units, whether successful or unsuccessful, in addition to their concerns and needs. Also, part of the exercises carried out by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs on gender mainstreaming was theoretical and not based on systematic needs assessment, and thus there is no follow-up to evaluate training on the ground.
This requires the following: ·
·
·
99
Establishing a coordinating entity by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs to work with other ministries and gender units. This entity should have various experiences and capabilities beyond the scope of the gender units. For example, the planning official in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs should communicate with the planning officials in the concerned ministries about ways to mainstream gender issues in plans with the establishment of permanent gender units. Finding an effective mechanism to facilitate the flow and exchange of information, reports and experiences between the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the different units; Merging gender units in security agencies with ministries and civil institutions to exchange knowledge and experiences;
·
Holding periodic sessions to review, evaluate, and amend plans. This includes overcoming the obstacles facing gender units, evaluating capacity-building experiences through various trainings and building upon gaps to come up with more practical and systematic trends;
·
Developing self-support resources to achieve the approved strategic objectives in order to reduce funding agencies’ control, conditions and agendas. This would be done through the consolidation of such goals in the Palestinian context and priorities (Odeh, 2013).
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
7.3. Strategic opportunities and policy priorities The priorities, referred to in this section, are related to the availability of strategic opportunities contributing to their realization, such as a clear political will by the government, support from the women’s movement to the agreed priorities, and financial support for these priorities. This does not mean neglecting the other priorities as these may be addressed when strategic opportunities are available to achieve them as follows: 1. Promoting Security Council Resolution 1325 as an essential mechanism to increase pressure on the Israeli occupation authorities to activate protection for women who suffer from discriminatory Israeli reunification laws, women prisoners, women whose homes were demolished or threatened with demolition orders, and land confiscation. Legal, social and guidance services should also be provided for these women. Opportunities: increasing the effectiveness of the Palestinian women’s movement to use the abovementioned resolution as a mechanism to seek protection for Palestinian women. Council of Ministers decision no. (01/20/14/ف. ���س/ م. )وof 2012, stipulates developing mechanisms to employ released men and women prisoners, increase popular activities to support men and women prisoners, and shed more light on their situation in political fora and the media. The activation of this decision may also be one of the important mechanisms used by women to overcome the political and social impact of the Palestinian division. 2. Increasing support for women affected by the blockade and the barrier. The barrier deprives large numbers of women from access to health, educational, employment, social, and cultural resources. Opportunities: The women’s movement should support women who are most affected by the barrier, in addition to increasing popular events supporting villages and affected groups affected by the barrier and land confiscation. Resolution 1325 calls for the protection of civilians, which may expose the settlement policy and the security threats facing the population by settlers. In addition, efforts should be made to raise awareness and political and financial support from international institutions for these groups, as shown by the gender survey of the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS) (2012) (2012, Reinprecht). 3. Increasing the representation of women in decisionmaking positions through the quota system. A document presented by the women’s movement, led by the General Union of Pa l estinian Women, calls for increasing the representation of women to 30 per cent in all councils,
committees and bodies of the PLO. Negotiations are ongoing among the various political forces to restructure and activa te their role in the future along with the instituti ons of the Palestinian National Authority, led by the Legislative Council, local councils, as well as civil society organizations, especially political parties, trade and pro fessional unions, and student councils. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs has also adopted this issue. Opportu nities: Increase public acceptance of the presence of women in decision-making positions; Palestinian women’s movement, with the support of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, to raise its demand to the President of the Palestinian National Authority; increase the number of women in decision-making positions. 4. Contributing to the consolidation of democratic values in the Palestinian political practice by enhancing coordination with the Ministry of Local Government to establish mechanisms for women’s access to decision-making positions in local councils, and signing a document to prevent the dismissal or appointment of women in these councils without elections. Opport unities: Activation and effectiveness of gender units in the Ministry of Local Government, with the support o f some opposition parties (in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) to consolidate the results of the elections. This approach helps in bridging the current political division. 5. Enh ancing political and social knowledge about the importance of changing the stereotypes related to the roles of women and men in the household and society to provide more opportunities and possibilities for women’s politi cal participation, especially in political parties and institutions and various professional unions. Opportunities: Include this demand in the document of the Palestinian women’s movement presented to the President and political parties. There are successful women models that have proven themselves in political life. Also there are many women employees in the various mini stries and in the different political parties. 6. E nhancing the activation and institutionalization of the relationship between the Ministry of Women’s Affair s and gender units in the various ministries and othe r government’s institutions (the judiciary, security agen cies, the Council of Ministers, and the Legislative Council), by linking the policy-making and planning levels in these ministries and institutions with the policy-making and planning levels in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. However, this relationship should not be limited to these levels in managing gender units in the ministry. Monitoring and follow-up of efforts to mainstream gender issues in ministries and various government institutions should be f urther activated in addition to increasing in-depth and specialized knowledge – in each sector and ministry – of the importance of gender mainstreaming. Oppo rtunities: gender units in different ministries and institutions should support this trend. Opportunities for 100
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
central planning and funding should be provided to enhance this trend in addition to activating and supporting the role of gender mainstreaming by LACS, in whose meetings the Ministry of Women’s Affairs will participate.
Arabic References: ·
Jad, Islah. (2008). The Palestinian Feminist Movements between Nationalism, Secularism, and Islamic Identity. Ramallah: Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy (Muwatin).
·
PCBS. (2012). Women and men in Palestine: Issues and statistics, 2012. Ramallah: Palestine.
·
PCBS. (2011). Women and men in Palestine: issues and statistics, 2011. Ramallah: Palestine.
·
PCBS. (2011). Conditions of Palestinians living in the Palestinian territories 2011. Ramallah: Palestine.
·
Al-Zubaidi, Baseem. (2003). Palestinian political culture. Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy (Muwatin). Ramallah: Palestine.
·
Addameer. (2011). Violations against Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees in Israeli Prisons, 2010. Ramallah.
·
Odeh, Shatha (2013). The relationship between the main national mechanism and gender units in the Palestinian National Authority (seminar paper on gender and development in Palestine, unpublished). Birzeit: IWS, Birzeit University.
·
Central Elections Commission (2006). Report of the second legislative elections January 25, 2006. Ramallah: Palestine.
·
Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling (under preparation), Separated Families, Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling, Jerusalem.
·
Hilal, Jamil. (2006). The Palestinian Middle Class: A Research into the Confusion of Identity, Authority and Culture. Ramallah and Beirut: Muwatin and the Institute for Palestine Studies.
·
Ministry of Women’s Affairs. (undated). Indicators to measure the achievement of the strategic objectives of the Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy. Ramallah.
·
Ministry of Women’s Affairs. (undated). Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy (2011-2013) . Ministry of Women’s Affairs and UN Women. Ramallah.
·
Human Rights Watch calls on Israel to reverse its policy of depriving Palestinians of the right in residence and travel. (2012, February 6). Al-Ayyam newspaper. Mentioned in the study of the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling. (Under preparation). Separated Families. Jerusalem.
English references: ·
Al-Botmeh, R. (2011). A review of Palestinian legislation from a women’s rights perspective. Jerusalem: UNDP.
·
Bari, F. (2005). Women’s political participation: Issues and challenges. In Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) Expert Group Meeting Enhancing Participation of Women in Development through an Enabling Environment for Achieving Gender Equality and the Advancement of Women 8-11 November. Bangkok.
·
Hammami, R. & Johnson, P. (1999). Equality with a difference: Gender and citizenship in transitional Palestine. Social Politics, 3,.
·
Jad, I. (2004). Citizenship under a prolonged occupation: The case of Palestine. University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection. Retrieved January 20, 2011, from: http://www.kit.nl/smatsite.shtml?ch=FAB&id=6184
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·
Khan, M. (et. all) (2004). State formation in Palestine – viability and governance during A social transformation, London and New York: Routledge Curszon.
·
Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development. (2013). The ongoing projects related to gender equality and empowerment of women (internal unpublished document). Ramallah.
·
Rai, S. (2007). Achieving gender equality in public offices in Pakistan. Islamabad: UNDP.
·
Randall, V. (1987). Women and politics: An international perspective basingstock: Macmillan 2nd edition, 1994.
·
Reinprecht, K. (2012). Gender in the Local Aid Coordination in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (draft).
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
路
UNDP. (2009). Update of Diagnostic Report for the Local Governance System in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) PART 1 Update on Major Interventions in the Local Governance Sector since 2004. OPT: United Nations Development Programme / Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP/ PAPP) Local Governance Support Programme (LGSP) in the Occupied Palestinian territory (oPt.) Funded by the Kingdom of Denmark.
路
UN. (2013). Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women, Commission on the Status of Women, Report of the Secretary-General, Economic and Social Council, Fifty-seventh session, 4-15 March 2013.
路
UN Women & IPU. (2012). Women in politics map 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap12_en.pdf.
路
Miftah. (2007). Family Reunification, Fact Sheet, August 6 2007,Available at: http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=14464&CategoryId=4, mentioned in WCLAC study (forthcoming).
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8 ACCESS TO PUBLIC SPHERE
A main determinant of political participation
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8.1. Background and context
life by the government of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
As previously mentioned in section 7, the poor political participation of women is not the result of the biases of the political system only, but also of the inherently gendered ideology and socio-cultural factors (Bari, 2005). The gender role ideology places women in the private arena, thus limiting their access to the public arena where politics is performed. Moreover, socio-cultural factors value the male sex more and thus allocate more resources to men, including education, employment, money, or social capital. As men have more control over these resources, they have more access to and control over the political domain, compared to women (Bari, 2005). Thus, women’s political participation can be enhanced mainly by recognizing these obstacles and developing strategies to overcome them. The above analysis must be translated into practical steps to promote women’s political participation. The following points must be taken into account:
Political theorists indicate that the historical appearance of democratic political systems in Europe depended on the emergence of what is called the “public sphere” (Habermas, 1989). Public sphere is the sphere of active citizenship and civic participation outside the state authority. It is different from the private sphere. It is also the sphere in which individuals and groups come together to discuss and raise issues of public concern and interest thereby creating dialogue and public opinion through which the state authority is kept in check. According to this theory, the state does not create a democratic system. Instead, the public sphere creates and preserves a democratic state. Moreover, voluntary associations, labor unions and syndicates are considered to be among the organizational structures through which, historically, the public sphere has been organized. The press, public arts and culture were the medium used to express and spread public opinion. At present, social and mass communication has become a primary forum for the dialogue needed to maintain a democratic public sphere.
1.
The broad framework of the gender ideology and discrimination that limits women’s access to public space in general, including access to culture and public space, social networks and civic participation.
2.
The interaction between exclusion from the public domain and lack of access to social and material resources, which further consolidates the subordination of women and their lack of political voice.
3.
The interaction between the lack of access to culture and public resources and the social gender transformations. Marginalizing women in the early stages of the life cycle (especially in adolescence) puts them in a situation where it is difficult to have access to the resources necessary for political participation in the later stages (Mensch, Bruce & Greene, 1998).
In the Palestinian context, a masculine ideology dominates gender roles. As a result, women’s roles are entrenched in the private sphere and men’s roles in the public domain. In practice, this division is not rigid. For example, understanding women’s legitimate access to the public domain differs according to whether women had a higher education or work. Age is also considered a significant factor, where older women have more access to the public world compared to girls and young women, as fear of their physical integrity often limits their access to the public sphere. Moreover, the larger political context has its role – military violence of the occupation creates situations which the public views as dangerous for women and girls. At the same time, political ideology can strengthen the existing social ideologies, such as the general policy to promote gender segregation in public 104
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Related monetary concepts: the public domain and social capital
On the other hand, political feminist theories refer to the public sphere which emerged in Europe in the 18th century in which men had the upper hand and women were marginalized (Fraser, 1990). Also, the public sphere defines politics as a male domain and reinforces the ideology that the roles of women are restricted to their domestic domain (Benhabib, 1997). This meant that not only were women excluded from participation in the dialogues of that time but also public opinion did not reflect women’s concerns and priorities. Only through the feminist movement and the increasing engagement of women in the labor force in the second half of the 20th century that the exclusion of women from public spheres in Europe was challenged and overcome leading to the advancement of women’s issues in the public sphere. The concept of “social capital” which focuses on the importance of social networks for individuals and the society in general is closely linked to the public sphere theory (Bourdieu, 1990: Putnam, 2002). Social capital theory emphasizes that the resources needed to achieve wealth and political integration are not only economic but also include social relations and networks. In the Palestinian context, the importance of social capital for access to opportunities appears clearly in its negative form (nepotism) where social relations are effective in the possibility of getting a job, political positions or wealth. Acknowledging the importance of social capital for employment and integration may take us in another direction, by emphasizing the importance of social networks and integration in enabling women’s political participation. Social capital theorists indicate that social capital tends to vary depending on gender where the social networks of women are usually based on local,
informal and family relations while men’s networks are formal and their geographical reach extends beyond the family and local community (Molyneux, 2005; Norris & Inglehart, 2003). These differences are the result of gender roles and general/specific ideologies which put women and girls in a weak and unfavorable position to access a set of social, economic and political resources (Molyneux, 2005; Norris & Inglehart, 2003). In short, women’s exclusion from the public sphere limits their ability to build social networks, and consequently access decisive resources to join the political and civil public sphere. Public sphere and social capital theories remain closely relevant when addressing contemporary obstacles to women’s political participation in various geographical and cultural contexts. Also, they show how women’s integration in formal politics cannot be understood by concentrating only on legal obstacles and the structural biases of political regimes. Instead, integration depends on reaching broader areas of public and civil life as well as the ability to build social networks which extend beyond the family and local community. Moreover, these theories draw attention to the fact that political participation and social integration are strongly interconnected. This means we must expand our understanding of political participation to include direct access to nonpolitical activities (such as public culture and sports). This also means that the social and symbolic resources needed for political participation are established through life experiences. The exclusion of females from public and civic life at an early stage puts them in a continuously weak position compared to males in developing the skills and social capital required for political participation.
8.2. Main findings – trends and challenges This section addresses women and girls’ access to public life including civic participation and public culture as a major obstacle to political participation. If women do not have access to the different types of civic participation and the public sphere, their ability to participate fully in political life will remain highly restricted regardless of whether they enjoy the formal political rights to vote or stand for elections. The previous section provided data about women’s membership in formal political action, including political parties, national and local elections and municipal councils. This section tackles women’s participation in three domains of public life, namely access to civic institutions and civil society organizations; access to practical public domain through access to information and communication technology; and access to sports.
8.2.1 Access to public culture and civic institutions Institutional infrastructure Palestinian men, women and youth in the West Bank and Gaza Strip suffer from the lack of public culture infrastructure. According to the PCBS, in 2010, there were only 370 public cultural institutions in the West Bank compared to about 53 institutions in the Gaza.Strip Available data show that while the number of public cultural institutions increased in the West Bank in the
The number and type of public cultural institutions in 2005 compared to 2010 West Bank
Gaza Strip
oPt
Year
2005
2010
2005
2010
2005
2010
Cultural centers
145
350
68
52
213
471
Theatres
7
14
8
1
14
15
Museums
1
6
2
0
7
2
Total
153
370
78
53
234
498
According to the PCBS definition, cultural centers are institutions which offer activities in arts, crafts and sports. Source: Cultural Survey, PCBS, 2005, 2010
period between 2005 and 2010, the number of these institutions decreased sharply in the Gaza Strip during the same period (PCBS, 2005, 2010). In the period between 2005 and 2010, the institutional framework of public culture in the Gaza Strip dramatically declined while it expanded in the West Bank in the same period. In general, the number of cultural institutions in the Gaza Strip decreased from 78 to 53 while the number of theaters decreased from 8 in 2005 (which is already low) to 1 in 2010 (PCBS, 2005, 2010). 105
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These figures indicate the extent to which the context of the ongoing crisis and sanctions on the Gaza Strip have affected the public cultural life, as economic priorities (including the priorities of international donors) focus on basic human needs, which means that public culture is viewed as a luxury rather than a fundamental right. Another factor is the influence of the current government ideology opposing mixed-sex spaces and secular culture. With the beginning of 2012, the informal social policy in the Gaza Strip has taken a formal governmental shape, clamping down on and sometimes shutting down cultural
life and sports events (which involve women and girls). In 2013, the government took a decision banning mixed-sex schools for all children over the age of nine and barring male teachers from teaching girls and vice versa. This trend, which currently affects young males as well, may have a greater impact on women and girls who already have limited access to the public cultural sphere, because the government considers activities such as sports as unsuitable for females and because segregation in public life usually means the marginalization of women and girls.
Gender-friendly institutions? The cultural surveys conducted by PCBS do not provide data on gender-targeted programs in cultural centers or on the distribution of employees in these centers by gender. However, the distribution by gender in the management and activities of these centers, indirectly, shows how activities are shaped by gender identities and ideologies. Male employees and volunteers may find themselves in a sensitive position with respect to the needs and interests of young girls and women. This does not create a friendly environment for the participation of women and young girls.
Workers in cultural centers by gender 2005, 2010 West Bank
Gaza Strip
oPt
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
2005
1103
374
454
129
1195
583
2010
1653
1569
577
301
2230
1870
Source: Cultural Survey, PCBS, 2005, 2010
Between 2005 and 2010, the big gap between male and female workers disappeared in cultural centers in the West Bank and improved significantly in the Gaza Strip. This indicates that there is a clear policy or investment in increasing women’s role in cultural institutions over time. In the Gaza Strip, although the number of women doubled during the same period, it is lower than the number of their male counterparts. In addition, due to the social/political environment in the Gaza Strip since 2010, it is likely that the gains achieved by women will not last as the data above show. Participation in civil institutions As the number of public cultural institutions per capita is very low in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it is not strange that membership in these institutions is very low among the population. The PCBS cultural survey of 2009 shows that except for sports clubs and unions, less than 5 per cent of the population are members in civil institutions such as cultural clubs, public libraries and societies. But even within the generally low membership levels, there are also differences which have to do with generations and gender where young people (10-19 years old) are more likely to be members of civil, non-political and nonunion institutions than the older age groups. Also, males are more likely to be members of these institutions than females. The highest membership rate in civil activities was among males in age group (10-19) years in sports clubs (17 per
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cent) compared to 4 per cent for females in the same age group in sports clubs. It is notable that younger persons (10-19 years old) are more likely to be members in cultural clubs (5 per cent males and 4 per cent females) than adults who belong to the same gender (4 per cent males and 2 per cent females). Young females have the highest membership rates in libraries (4 per cent) but they are the least likely to be members in trade unions (0 per cent). Moreover, young males are the least likely to be members of societies (0.7 per cent) (PCBS, 2009). While this data measures only “membership� rather than participation, other data show that participation in these activities, (measured through the use of free time) is very limited among the population. While the membership levels are low for all ages and genders, it is obvious that older women are the least likely group to have membership in cultural institutions as domestic and childbearing burdens do not allow them enough time to be members in civil institutions. However, we should not be heedless of the effect of the cycle of life experiences as women who do not have access to such institutions are not likely to develop an ability to participate in such institutions when they grow older. In respect of the regional differences among youth in terms of civil membership, there is a remarkable disparity between the highest level of membership of males and females in the Gaza Strip compared to their counterparts in the West Bank (however, we should take into consideration that available data date back to 2009).
Membership in civil institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by gender in 2009 (10 years old or more compared to 10-19 years old) Males
Females
10-19 years old
All ages (+10)
10-19 years old
All ages(+10)
Sports clubs
18%
12%
4%
2%
Cultural clubs
5%
4%
4%
2%
Public libraries
3%
3%
4%
3%
societies
0.7%
5%
3%
3%
unions
1%
7%
-
2%
Political parties
3%
6%
1%
1%
Others
1%
2%
4%
2%
Source: PCBS, 2009
Youth in the age group 10-19 years old and membership in public institutions by region, 2009 Males
Females
West Bank
Gaza Strip
West Bank
Gaza Strip
Sports clubs
14%
13%
1%
4.5%
Cultural clubs
2%
5%
2%
4%
Public libraries
1%
4%
3%
6%
Societies
1%
1.5%
0.5%
1%
Source: PCBS, 2009
Although the institutional infrastructure of public culture is declining, it seems that there is a higher level of participation among youth in the existing institutions. In terms of sports, although there is a gender gap among youth in favor of males, female membership in sports clubs is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. The survey also showed that young males and females in the Gaza Strip were more likely than their counterparts in the West Bank to be members of sports clubs and public libraries. Perhaps one of the effects of the shrinking public sphere of cultural and sports activities in the Gaza Strip is driving males and females to seek activities performed within an organized framework i.e., through membership. Depending on the type of local community, the survey showed that rural areas have the highest rate of male and female membership in sports clubs (males 16 per cent, females 5 per cent) and in cultural clubs (males 7 per cent, females 5 per cent). The survey also showed that membership of both genders in civil institutions is the lowest in urban areas. (Source: PCBS, 2009)
8.2.2. Gender and sports Between the first world conference on women and sport in 1996 and the sixth conference in 2012, the perception of women and girls’ access to sports changed from being an issue of gender equality and justice to an 107
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
empowerment and social integration tool. Over the past decade, studies have shown that the positive effects of women and girls’ access to sports exceed health and psychological benefits. Four of the above five effects show that participation in sports activities plays an important role in providing women and girls with skills and experiences that enhance their civil participation and social integration. Therefore, when analyzing gender biases in access to sports in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it is necessary to understand how this is connected with the dynamics of exclusion from a number of necessary skills and resources for participation in civic and public life. Gender and sports results in the West Bank and Gaza Strip show that sports clubs have the highest level of male membership among civil institutions. The membership rate among males aged 10 – 19 years was 18 per cent in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (12 per cent among adult males) (PCBS, 2009). However, we saw also the biggest gender gap in the membership of sports clubs (4 per cent for young females and 2 per cent for adult females). Moreover, there is a wide gap between actual membership in sports clubs and males and females who practice sports as a main activity during free time. (PCBS, 2009).
Participation of women and girls in sports ·
Boosts their psychological and mental state.
·
Provides them with opportunities to develop leadership skills.
·
Builds self-confidence and organizational abilities.
·
Enables their social integration.
·
Challenges gender stereotypes.
Membership of youth aged 10-19 years in sports clubs compared to sports as a main activity in free time Males
Females
West Bank
Gaza
West Bank
Gaza
Membership in sports clubs
14%
13%
1%
4.5%
sports as a main activity in free time
19%
22%
5%
4%
Source: PCBS, 2009
Data show that participation in sports activities among male youth does not depend on membership in sports clubs but young girls’ participation in sports depends on their access to an organized and institutional framework. The participation of male youth in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who practice sports as a main activity to spend free time is higher by 5 per cent and 9 per cent respectively than the participation of members in sports clubs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As for females in the Gaza Strip, there is no difference between the proportion of females who are members in sports clubs and those who practice sports as a main activity during free time. In the West Bank, although there is a similar trend among females and males, the great majority of girls who practice sports as a main activity during free time live in refugee camps where it is obvious that sports take place in an organized framework. However, gender differences are visible even in the presence of an organized framework. According to the 2013 data provided by the Palestinian supreme council for youth and sports, the number of active males in clubs and sports centers is about 10 times higher than the number of females (63,965 for males compared to 7,038 for females). This big gender gap is reflected in the
recruitment pattern of employees in sports clubs and centers. Again, the number of males is 10 times higher than the number of females in the administration of these institutions and frameworks (3,144 for males compared to 306 for females).
8.2.3. Access to information and communications technology and actual communication There is an international recognition that access to information and communications technology, especially the internet, is an important indicator of access to knowledge, employment and political voice in the contemporary world. (Bridge, 2004; Hafkin, 2002). Moreover, lack of access to information and communications technology, especially the internet, places individuals and societies in a weak and unfavorable position in the globalized economies which are based on information exchange. As for women, access to information and communications technology has been associated with a number of effects on their capabilities and empowerment.
The effects of access to the internet on women and girls Building respect and selfexpression
· A voice in the exchange of ideas and opinions through the internet (in the household, society and political field) · Increasing self-respect and self-esteem
Offering opportunities
· Learning new skills or getting an informal education · Becoming an entrepreneur or getting a job. · Expanding political, civil and social participation.
Building knowledge and networks
· More access to information. · Relations inside and outside the local community to participate with ideas, offer support and boost social relations.
Source: Bridge, 2004 108
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
In comparison with developing countries, the West Bank and Gaza Strip show a high level of access to and use of computers and the internet. Moreover, access rates
among males and females do not show an obvious digital gap based on gender.
Access to computers– West Bank and Gaza Strip– 2011 Percentage of households that have a computer
51%
Percentage of households that have access to the internet
30%
Percentage of individuals (10+) who use the computer
54%
Source: PCBS, 2011
Half of the households in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have a computer and one third of them have internet access. Many individuals who are 10 years old or more (54 per cent) use computers. In terms of gender, there is a small gap in computer literacy (10 per cent) and in
the use of the internet (7 per cent). However, there is a more significant gap related to the frequency of internet access/usage. The number of males who use the internet daily exceeds the number of females in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by about 17 per cent (PCBS, 2011).
Percentage of access to computers and the internet by age and gender Age
10-19 years old
10+
Gender
Males
Females
Gap
Males
Females
Gap
Computer usage
78%
74%
4%
58.5%
49%
10%
% of computer users who use the internet
78%
72%
6%
73%
66%
7%
% of Internet users who use the internet at least once daily
49%
36%
13%
56%
39%
13%
% of those who say that they use the internet as a main activity during free time
17%
7%
10%
25%
6%
19%
Source: PCBS, 2011
However, all gaps in the four indicators to access to information and communications technology are related to age and gender. It was found that older women have the least access to computers and the Internet. When compared to men from the same age group, we find a gap of 10 per cent in access to computer and a bigger gap (13 per cent) in the frequency of internet use. However, the gap in computer use increases to 25 per cent when compared to young women (while the gaps in the use of the internet and the frequency of the use of the Internet are much smaller) (PCBS, 2011) Young males and females (10-19) have greater access to and use of information and communications technology than their counterparts from all age groups and genders. However, within the same generation, males have greater access than females. Among young males and females, there is no big gap in the basic use of computers (4 per cent) and the Internet (6 per cent), but there is an important gap in terms of the frequency of internet use (13 per cent). Moreover, it is more likely for females from all age groups who use Internet to use it only once a week, while males are likely to use it daily (with an obvious higher percentage among adult males than 109
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
younger males)(PCBS, 2011). Available data about the use of the internet as a main activity during free time show that older males have more internet access than all other age groups and genders. Moreover, the wide gender gap across generations in terms of using the internet as a main activity during free time indicates a degree in which the digital gap in the West Bank and Gaza is mainly about the frequency of use as opposed to access. Also, the frequency of using the internet, as a main gender gap in access to information and communications technology, is considered an important issue for social integration and civic participation of women and girls. Information and communications technology researchers notice that the frequency of use is considered to be an important indicator of the extent to which the Internet can develop an individual’s social capital. Only through organized and frequent access that effective social communication is achieved, social networks are set up and group voices are united in meaningful political ways. All these potentials cannot be achieved if women and girls cannot regularly benefit from the Internet even if
they know how to use it. In fact, remote communication and social networking remains an obstacle for women and girls and this is what data confirm concerning women and girls’ use of social media. According to Sharek Youth Forum 2011, there is an important gender gap in using social media among males and females where male use (45 per cent) of this type of technology is about 11 per cent higher than female use (34 per cent).
8.2.4. Obstacles and challenges In light of the analysis above, it is obvious that many obstacles face women and girls’ access to public life and culture. 1.
2.
Human resources: there are also limited human resources available for training and supervision in the field of public culture. Human resources for women and girls sports are even more limited.
3.
Geographical and categorical prejudice of culture/arts: most cultural activities and institutions are concentrated in city centers and they rarely reach rural areas or camps. In terms of sports, camps offer the highest access while urban areas have the lowest access.
4.
Social norms/gender biases: gender bias is regarded as an obstacle on the level of the perceptions and priorities of the household, social and institutional programs and national strategies as well as investments in different fields of public life and culture. There are strong social customs and traditions against women and girls’ participation in sports with fears that have to do with their physical safety as well as deep-rooted assumptions concerning the inappropriateness of women and girls’ participation in public physical activities. Moreover, family and society worry about girls reaching inappropriate content on the internet or building inappropriate social networks, restricting their access to information and communications technology.
5.
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Shortage of infrastructure and financial resources: there is a shortage in infrastructure and financial resources for public cultural activities offered to the population including at the community level of sports, youth and cultural activities.
Social and political environment: the social and political environment in the Gaza Strip has narrowed the space of public secular culture or culture that is not organized by the authorities in the Gaza Strip This environment is accompanied by policies and campaigns of gender segregation in public institutions and a general trend to exclude women and girls from
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the public sphere. 6.
Conceptual frameworks in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: the dominant frameworks which concentrate on youth development are dealing with gender issues in an ineffective way where the prevailing approaches to sports do not build connections with development or with a deeper understanding of gender. Moreover, the dominant approaches of information and communications technology concentrate mainly on their association with education and employment but they are not based on gender. Lastly, the dominant approaches of public culture consider culture in terms of civic education or free time but they do not connect it to skills or broader life resources.
8.3. Strategic opportunities and policy priorities 8.3.1. Opportunities While many obstacles stand in the way of expanding women’s access to public life and culture. The current context offers a number of opportunities to build on, including: · The emergence of a high quality cultural and artistic production in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the previous decade in addition to an increase in international interest in the Palestinian cultural and artistic production. · The remarkable growth in the youth movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the previous decade and the growth of youth networks on the national level (such as Sharek Youth Forum) in addition to an increasing focus on youth by development, donors, mass media and the government. · The existence of a developed infrastructure of information and communications technology: despite the obstacles that this sector faces from Israel, it can offer a sound and accessible technical infrastructure for the majority of the population. · A number of national strategies aimed at promoting women’s access to public life include an explicit commitment to gender equality. These include the national sports and youth strategy and the strategy of the culture ministry. Also, the national plan of information and communications technology contains an explicit commitment to bridging the gender gap in information and communications technology literacy.
8.3.2. General strategic interventions
3. Information and communications technology
Interventions aimed at increasing women’s political participation need to unify the following visions:
· Comparing declared and explicit commitments in national plans concerning gender mainstreaming with actual investments in women and girls friendly infrastructure and training.
· How access to different fields of public life and culture is associated with developing strong abilities needed for political participation. Women and girls’ exclusion from political life is connected with the limited opportunities to develop skills and experiences in the public space generally. · How obstacles to women’s political participation begin in the early stages of life. The integration of girls in public life and culture is regarded as an important investment in building their capacities to engage in politics throughout the cycle of life. · How participation in sports and cultural life does not only provide entertainment and psychological and physical benefits but it also offers life skills as well as social and intellectual resources needed for civic and cultural participation. · How women and girls’ exclusion from public life leads to their inability to build strategic social networks, which limits their access to social, economic and political resources.
8.3.3. Special interventions: 1. Culture · Comparing declared gender empowerment/equality commitments with increasing financial and human resources investments in women and girls friendly activities in social and cultural centers. · Investing in female human resources such as female coaches and managers in the public cultural sector including at the community levels. · Promoting clubs and social networks for girls and at the national level as well. · Enhancing access to cultural activities through the formal schooling system. 2. Sports · Putting annual targets to increase the number of girls in sports clubs and centers. · Promoting organized frameworks for women and girls’ sports especially in city centers. · Launching public awareness campaigns on the many positive effects of sports on women and girls. · Investing in female human resources in sports and offering a wide range of sports activities for women and girls. · Using of school facilities to promote sports for girls.
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· Offering community frameworks to promote more Internet access and use for women and girls. · Promoting clubs and networks which aim at strengthening women and girls as producers of information and communications technology content. · Using school facilities to increase girls’ access to information and communications technology after school hours.
References:
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Bari, F. (2005).Women’s political participation: Issues and challenges. United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW)
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Benhabib, S. (1997). The Embattled Public Sphere: Hannah Arendt, JuergenHabermas and Beyond. Theoria, 44 (90): pp. 1-24.
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Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
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Bridge. (2004). Overview: Gender and ICT’s. Institute of Development Studies. Sussex.
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Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy Social Text (25/26): pp. 56-80.
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Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
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Hafkin, N. (2002). Gender issues in ICT policy in developing countries: An overview. United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW).
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International Platform on Sports and Development (IPSD). (2009).Thematic profile: Sport and gender. [Available at www.sportanddev.org].
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Mensch, B. S., Bruce, J.& Greene, M. E. (1998). The uncharted passage: girls’ adolescence in the developing world. New York: Population Council.
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Meier, M. (2000). Gender equity, sport and development: working paper. Biel/Bienne: Swiss Academy for Development.
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Molyneux, M. (2005). Understanding women’s social capital. Global Exchange Forum Report 2005.
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Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2003). Gendering Social Capital; Bowling in Women’s Leagues? in B. O’Neill & E. Gidengil (Eds). (2006). Gender and social capital. New York: Routledge.
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PCBS. (2005). Youth, culture and spare time survey 2005.
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PCBS.(2009). Household culture survey 2009.
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PCBS.(2010). Status of cultural institutions survey 2010.
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PCBS.(2011). Household survey on information and technology 2011.
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Putnam, R. D. (2002). Democracies in flux: The evolution of social capital in contemporary society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Saavedra, M. (n.d). Women, sport and development [Available at www.sportanddev.org ]
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Sharek Youth Forum.(2013). The status of youth in Palestine 2013.
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9 Violence against women
Changing perceptions
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9.1. Introduction Combating violence against woman became a topic of interest in Palestine in the beginning of the 1990s. This interest was accompanied by a rise of human rights calls to eliminate violence, most importantly the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in Vienna in 1993, which adopted the CEDAW definition of violence (Al-Masri, 2000). The debate on violence against women has been addressed mainly due to the prevailing political situation caused by the Israeli occupation and its repressive practices, and due to indulgence of women in the national struggle which led to the development of their leadership capabilities on one hand, and on the other, has opened a broader window for women to interact globally at the different social, economic and legal dimensions. Thus, the analysis of the different components of the patriarchal society has become an area of interest for women and interested feminist circles, which – among other factors – led to paying more attention to the issue of violence against women specially that women’s rights have been linked directly with human rights and violence against women is now considered a flagrant violation of their basic human rights (Al-Masri, 2000). In a study published by the Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development, Al-Masri demonstrates that the Palestinian society views violence against women as a problem that falls under the domestic sphere and therefore must be addressed within the family. As such, its short and long-term social and psychological dimensions and effects are overlooked. Violence against woman is perceived as a momentary suffering which goes away when the abuser apologizes and expresses his regret. In his study, Al-Masri indicates that violence against women is accepted and justified by both men and women. Victims of domestic violence make excuses for the abuser and in many cases blame themselves (Al-Masri, 2000). Al-Masri provides evidence from the findings of two different surveys conducted by Mohamed Haj Yahya on 425 married women and 489 men from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which explores the opinions and perceptions of the Palestinian men and women regarding the violence against the wives. One of the two surveys found out that 47 per cent of men and 35 per cent of women see wife beating as permitted if a wife does not obey her husband (Haj Yahya in Al-Masri, 2000). 49 per cent of men and 43 per cent of women accuse the wives of being responsible for their husbands’ violence and believe that they must have done something wrong that had provoked their husbands’ anger (Haj Yahya in Al-Masri, 2000). According to Al-Masri, these findings must not be understood in isolation from religious, cultural and social dimensions even though these findings create confusion and raise concerns (Al-Masri, 2000). Al-Masri explains that men and women’s acceptance of violence against women is the result of the patriarchal Palestinian society that is based on masculinity, hierarchy and male 114
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dominance. It is also the result of the cultural, political, social, and economic systems and the interaction of these patterns in a continuous and complementary way that supports the dominant patriarchal system and promotes the superiority of men and the inferiority of women. Consequently, women’s way of thinking is stereotyped to fit these patterns and the hierarchical/patriarchal system. Women are the ones who give men the right to practice violence against them. They justify and make up different excuses for the violence committed against them. According to this, the responsibility placed on the shoulders of women’s rights defenders is a difficult and complex responsibility as this issue centers on the mentality of men and women. Also, the defenders of women’s rights, specifically on violence against women, should seek to transform violence against women from a domestic issue confined to a specific category of people into a general concern with serious social dimensions (Al-Masri, 2000). According to Al-Masri’s study, mentalities, customs and traditions and the masculine, patriarchal way of thinking are regarded as the main cause of violence against women. In regard to the causes of violence against women, a study published by the Women’s Studies Center entitled “Palestinian women in the violence circle” explains violence against women through the traditional division of roles between men and women. Women’s roles are mostly limited to the private sphere of the family, namely childbearing and caring for the family and the home. The role of men is associated with the public sphere, namely productive and political work. Values and behaviors are defined according to this distribution where the public sphere requires power, domination and social status. Members of a man’s family are obliged to abide by the social values as the man is responsible for his family’s behavior and will be blamed when the behavior of one of his family members does not fit with the established social values. The decision-making role which a man plays outside the family, is also played inside the family and adjusts the family behaviors, especially children and women’s behaviors, in order to maintain his social status and acceptance. On the other hand, women are required to obey and surrender. In the meantime, women are caught in a struggle between their desires and the options available to them. However, in the end they choose the behavior which fits the social culture and play the role defined for them to preserve the family and provide satisfaction and means of comfort for it (Omar and Owaida, 2012). This reason also falls within the scope of the patriarchal system which is based on division of roles and men providing protection to the rest of the family. A study by Penny Johnson on domestic violence indicates that analysis of survey data shows that 30 per cent of women whose husbands have lost their jobs are exposed to at least one incident of physical abuse as opposed to 21 per cent of women whose husbands did not lose employment. This means that men’s unemployment affects spousal violence (Johnson, 2011). Focus group discussions in the Gaza Strip confirm that long-term male
unemployment is linked to increased domestic tension and violence. They also show men trying to avoid venting their anger and frustration on family members by staying outside the house (Johnson, 2011). It is important, in this paper, to discuss the different definitions of violence provided by international declarations and conventions as well as local charters and the different definition approaches. The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women adopted by the United Nations in 1993 defines violence as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.” The 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women defines violence against women as “any act of genderbased violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.” In Palestine, the main findings of the 2011 violence survey in the Palestinian society define violence against women as “all forms of behaviors or actions taken against woman causing a physical, psychological, sexual, verbal abuse and social and economic deprivation, it also includes the threat of doing such acts and all sorts of coercion and deprivation of liberty all because they are females, whether directly or indirectly, and that causes damage or pain physically, sexually, mentally, socially or economically, whether it happened in public or private life (PCBS, 2011). The PCBS definition of domestic violence and violence against women is very similar to the definitions articulated in the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women. The PCBS definition covers different types of violence including physical, psychological and sexual violence and the threat of causing harm and deprivation of rights and liberty. An analytical study published by the Institute of Women’s Studies at Birzeit University in 2006 entitled “Domestic Violence in the Palestinian Territories” criticizes the adoption of the definition of violence articulated in international conventions. The study analyzes the findings of the violence survey conducted during the period from December 18, 2005 to January 18, 2006. The analytical study considers that violence is a controversial topic and that the controversy begins with the definition of violence. The study criticizes the adoption of international standards to measure violence, as international concepts hinder the understanding of the Palestinian context in which violence takes place. They also stand in the way of addressing violence. According to the study, adopting international standards to measure the prevalence of 115
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violence could mean considering certain types of behavior as forms of violence without taking into consideration the opinion of those affected by this behavior. This could also mean excluding some acts that may constitute a form of violence because they are not mentioned in the adopted international standards (IWS, 2006). The study also indicates that the international community adopts a modernist and reformist approach in dealing with violence which calls for replacing traditional culture with laws. The international community does not know that the cases that reach the courts are very few. The study also suggests that the international human rights discourse has failed to deal with the political, social and economic reality that leads to the subordination of women and discrimination and violence against them. This is a capitalist system that is essentially based on controlling and exploiting vulnerable and marginalized groups, including women (IWS, 2006). Taking into account the criticisms in the analytical study, we may agree that by adopting international standards the violence survey and its findings may have overlooked behaviors that would be considered as forms of violence and classified some acts as forms of violence without taking into consideration the point of view of the persons affected by these acts. We cannot ignore the fact that violence is present in the Palestinian society and is on the rise. The definition of violence in the 2011 PCBS violence survey takes into account various forms and causes of domestic violence and violence against women. This definition can be adopted at the Palestinian level. Domestic violence is defined as “any act or failure to act on part of a household member against another member in the household for the purpose of causing physical, sexual or psychological abuse, or the threat of physical, sexual or psychological abuse, or generating fear. It also includes the deprivation of basic rights such as shelter, food, drink, clothing, education, freedom of movement and loss of self-determination and self security. “
9.2. Trends and indicators The main findings of the 2011 survey indicate that 37 per cent of ever-married women were exposed to one form of violence by their husbands, 29.9 per cent in the West Bank compared to 51.1 per cent in the Gaza Strip. The rate of those who were exposed to psychological violence “at least for one time” among those women was 58.6 per cent. 55.1 per cent were exposed to economical violence, 54.8 per cent were exposed to social violence, 23.5 per cent were exposed to physical violence, and 11.8 per cent were exposed to sexual violence. The results showed that one third of women exposed to violence prefer silence and resorting to their family is their second choice. 30.2 per cent of ever-married women who were exposed to violence by their husbands have resorted to the house of
their parents or one of their brothers or sisters and 65.3 per cent preferred to remain silent regarding the violence practiced against them by their husbands, while the rate of women who were exposed to violence and resorted to a women’s institution or center did not exceed 0.7 per cent. Women’s silence about violence confirms what is mentioned in Penny Johnson’s study that understanding and addressing gender-based violence in the Palestinian society is complicated by both too much silence and too much exposure. (Johnson, 2011). This shows that the percentage of women who resort to specialized institutions is very small compared to the number of women exposed to the different forms of violence. This requires studies and research to investigate why women who are victims of violence do not seek the help of these institutions. On the other hand, it may be useful for these specialized institutions to target and empower members of the household as part of their programs as victims of violence turn to their families for help and advice as a second option. Therefore, equipping household members with skills and knowledge on domestic violence may be useful for women exposed to violence. In a study on the role of women’s institutions in combating domestic violence, Nadera Kevorkian mentions that women’s institutions are not firm in dealing with state institutions including the police and prosecution because they want to maintain good relations with the government. According to the study, 50 women who were exposed to violence in the last three months said that women’s institutions show no consideration for them and when abused women resorted to these institutions, they were uncertain and reluctant to interfere. The researcher believes that women’s institutions seek to maintain good relations with decision-makers while they should protect and defend abused women. This attitude of women’s institutions puts women in danger. What distinguishes the last survey conducted by PCBS in 2011 is that it addresses occupation violence. Details about areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were provided in addition to the percentage of individuals exposed to occupation violence by age and sex (reference is made to the differences depending on age and marital status. It was found that violence is practiced also largely against unmarried girls by household members). However, the relationship between occupation violence and domestic violence was not addressed. The survey provides the percentage of never-married women who were exposed to psychological, physical, sexual and economic violence by a household member. It also provides the percentage of ever-married women who were exposed to violence by someone other than the husband and the percentage of exposure to violence outside the family in the street, workplace, shopping places, checkpoints, transportation means, places providing health, social and cultural services and in schools and universities. 116
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In comparing the two surveys of 2005-2006 and 20102011, we find that the percentage of ever-married women who were exposed to different forms of violence by the husband increased by 4.8 per cent, from 31.9 per cent in the 2005-2006 survey to 36.7 per cent in the 20102011 survey. The percentage of exposure to physical violence by the husband decreased by 0.9 per cent and the percentage of exposure to sexual violence by the husband increased by 0.9 per cent. Also, the percentage of exposure to psychological violence by the husband decreased by 3.1 per cent. The percentage of ever-married women who resorted to women’s institutions for advice decreased by 1 per cent, from 1.7 per cent in the 2005-2006 survey to 0.7 per cent in the 2010-2011 survey. This comparison raises questions concerning the effectiveness of the efforts exerted to reduce and eliminate violence against women whether by governmental or non-governmental institutions. Also, the already low percentage of women who resorted to specialized institutions based on the 2005-2006 statistics decreased. It is necessary for the specialized institutions to revise and evaluate their work and examine the real reasons behind women’s reluctance to resort to these institutions. The most extreme form of violence against women is femicide. Although there is no accurate or comprehensive information about this phenomenon in the Palestinian society, available information indicates that these crimes are frequently committed against Palestinian women and girls. The Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling documented 29 murder cases and 9 suicide cases between 2007 and 2010 (Abu Ghoush, 2010). According to the Al-Muntada Coalition – Forum to Combat Violence against Women, femicide increased in 2008 with 19 cases in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The youngest female to be killed was three months old. She was killed because her father suspected that she was not his daughter. The eldest woman to be killed was 75 years old without knowing the reason why she was killed. The reasons for murder were indicated as mysterious circumstances in some cases. 10 cases were registered as honor killings (8 cases in the West Bank and 2 cases in the Gaza Strip). This indicates that the number of killings in the West Bank is higher than in the Gaza Strip. However, this may not be the reality because not all killing cases in the Gaza Strip are documented because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate information and the real numbers of femicide cases are not available. According to the statistics of the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling, 13 women were killed for different reasons in 2012 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Concerning the situation of violence in the Gaza Strip, in a telephone interview with Ms. Nadia Abu Nahla, director of the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee, she said that the Gaza Strip is a special case in addition to all the forms of violence committed against women. A campaign called
the “virtue campaign� was launched to put pressure on women and girls and forbid them from going to the beach and participating in sports and entertainment activities. Moreover, they are chased by the police and asked to show their identity cards to check their marital status and make sure that they are married to the men accompanying them. Abu Nahla stated that women are not allowed to go to public cafes. They are pressured to wear Jilbab and exposed to various harassments.
9.2.1. Violence in the Palestinian laws The applicable laws, especially those which have to do with women, discriminate against women and perpetuate their subordination. (This paper will shed light on some provisions concerning women in the Jordanian personal status law no. 16 of 1976 applicable in the West Bank. It will also tackle some provisions in the Jordanian penal law of 1960). Personal status law: Article 5 of the personal status law stipulates that eligibility for marriage is conditional on both parties being of sound mind. The groom must be at least 16 and the bride at least 15 years of age. This article explicitly allows early marriage for both genders. Early marriage is considered to be a form of violence against both genders. Jordanian penal law of 1960 Article 62: the law permits disciplinary beating of children by their parents in a manner allowed by public customs. Article 98: Extenuating circumstances: He who commits a crime in a state of great anger resulting from a wrongful and dangerous act on the part of the victim shall be liable to a lesser penalty. Article 285: Incest: A prison sentence for a period of two (2) to three (3) years shall be imposed in the case of incest committed between ascendants and descendants, whether they are legitimate or not, brothers and sisters, half-brothers and half-sisters, all relatives by marriage in the same position, or if one of the offenders has legal or de facto authority. This punishment is very simple compared to the crime committed. This is also considered a violation and an act of violence against girls. Article 308: Discontinuance and Resumption of the Prosecution 1. If a valid marriage is concluded between the perpetrator of one of the crimes provided in this Chapter and the victim, the prosecution shall be discontinued, including any previous sentences rendered against the perpetrator. This article acquits a person who rapes a girl when he marries her. This is an extreme form of violence and a grave violation of a girl’s human dignity. Article 340: Excuse 1. A husband who surprises his wife or a close female 117
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relative in the act of adultery with another person, and kills, injures or harms either of them, or both, shall benefit from a mitigating excuse. 2. The perpetrator of a killing or an injury shall benefit from a mitigating excuse if he surprises a spouse, ascendant, descendent, or sibling with another person in an unlawful bed. This article is considered an explicit endorsement of the practice of femicide. This is regarded as the most extreme form of violence, namely the deprivation of the right to life.
9.2.2. The relationship between violence from the occupation and domestic violence Although few data are available on the prevalence of domestic violence and its association with the occupation violence, the limited information that is available shows that households in which men have lost employment because of occupation measures may suffer from higher rates of domestic violence, although this remains inconclusive and requires further investigation (World Bank, 2010). Researcher Nadera Kevorkian mentions that the division of Palestinian territories into areas A,B and C and the Israeli administrative and security control on areas C, which constitute 64 per cent of the West Bank, have caused many perpetrators of violence to escape to areas C where the Palestinian Authority is unable to pursue them. These areas are considered to be a safe haven for offenders. In another study prepared by Abu Bakr and Owaida, the relationship between violence against women and girls inside the family and occupation violence is addressed. Public violence affects private violence. Exposure to political violence is closely associated with domestic and spousal violence. Also, other studies indicate a connection between exposure to political violence and girls reporting higher levels of domestic violence and lower levels of performance for males in the family. After the invasion of the West Bank in 2002, some issues related to the economic situation emerged such as depriving girls from continuing their education, not allowing women to choose their husbands and early marriage. Domestic problems increased also leading to more patriarchal violence. Service providers for abused women have said that there is an increase in the cases of abortion, sexual harassment and sexual assault. In the study, the reasons behind this increase are not provided or explained. In a survey carried out on 31 women in Nablus and Bethlehem, 35 per cent of the surveyed women believed that psychological and emotional violence against women increased during the second Intifada, 25 per cent believed that sexual harassment against women increased, 23 per cent believed that physical violence against women
increased; and 19 per cent believed that rape increased. However, the study does not tackle the reasons behind this increase from the women’s point of view. (Abu Bakr et al, 2004). Concerning donors’ interest in the issue of violence, Johnson indicates that donor’s gender agendas and their funding interest in gender-based violence included individual male violence but often seemed to exclude the pervasive colonial violence in which Palestinian women, men and children lived their lives, and sometimes meet their deaths (Johnson,2011).
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The Ministry of Women’s Affairs was established in 2003 as a quality addition to develop policies to empower women. The Ministry is the leading and formal umbrella body on domestic violence issues. The ministry has adopted a Strategic Plan to Combat Violence against Women. It also heads the National Committee to Combat Violence against Women.
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Al-Muntada Coalition – Forum to Combat Violence against Women was established in 2000. It consists of 15 human rights and women’s institutions. Al-Amal Coalition to Combat Violence Against Women was established in the Gaza Strip in 2009. It consists of civil human rights and women’s institutions. Al-Muntada and Al-Amal Coalition aim to eradicate all forms of violence against women and combat femicide.
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The National Committee to Combat Violence against Women headed by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs was established in 2008 by a cabinet decision. The committee comprises representatives from governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including the Ministries of Women’s Affairs, Social Affairs, Justice, Health, Labor and Religious Endowments in addition to the Supreme Judge Department, the Palestinian Ifta’ Department, the Governorates Affairs Department in the President’s Office, the General Union of Palestinian Women and Al-Muntada Coalition – Forum to Combat Violence against. This committee is basically responsible for preparing the national strategy to combat violence against women and overseeing its implementation.
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The President signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and endorsed the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which are important mechanisms to safeguard women’s rights and protect women against violence.
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A penal law coalition was established. It consists of a group of women’s organizations and the General Union of Palestinian Women. It aims to amend the articles which have to do with discrimination against women in the penal law.
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A nationwide referral system has been set up. It includes procedures and systems to effectively refer and follow-up on violence cases. Although, this system has not been adopted yet, efforts are underway to implement this system at the national level. The Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling and Juzoor for Health and Social Development in Palestine created this system in cooperation with governmental and non-governmental organizations. Work on this
9.2.3. Achievements and opportunities A review of the work already accomplished and underway shows the main achievements and opportunities which may contribute to the elimination of domestic violence as follows: ·
The Palestinian Declaration of Independence consolidates the concept of gender equality. Article 9 of the Basic Law states that “Palestinians shall be equal before the law and the judiciary, without distinction based on race, gender, color, religion, political views or disability.” Basic Law of 2004.
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Palestinian Women’s Bill of Rights was prepared by the General Union of Palestinian Women and women’s institutions. It was announced in Jerusalem in 1994. The Palestinian Women’s Bill of Rights tackles a number of rights especially political, economic and social rights which do not include the protection of women from violence in addition to criminal rights and rights which have to do with capacity. In 1997, a national strategy for the Palestinian women was formulated with the participation of the General Union of Palestinian Women and women’s institutions and centers. The Bill of Rights was developed and submitted to the Legislative Council in 1997, 2000 and 2002.
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The Personal Status Law Coalition was established in 1998. It comprised political institutions, centers, groups and powers to examine the quality of the Personal Status Law. The coalition depended in its work on the Palestinian Declaration of Independence and the Palestinian Basic Law that stipulate equality between men and women. Also, the coalition relied on international charters and treaties agreed to by the Palestinian National Authority. The work of this coalition focuses on amending articles of the Jordanian personal status law applicable in the West Bank pertaining to early marriage, guardianship and custody, polygamy and community property, that is, amending articles which allow the subordination of and violence against women.
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system began in 2009. ·
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Television and radio programs and periodicals address and discuss violence against women. Examples include “Breaking the Silence” program which is produced by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, “Raise Your Voice” program and “The voice of women” magazine published by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, in addition to other radio and television programs which discuss the issue of domestic violence and violence against women. A family violence protection draft law was prepared by the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling in cooperation with other governmental and non-governmental organizations and with the support of the Ministries of Women’s Affairs and Social Affairs. This draft was submitted to the cabinet and is under discussion. Domestic violence and femicide cases are documented. The PCBS comprehensive national survey provides information and data concerning violence against women. There are a number of analytical studies which discuss the issue of violence. This helps in understanding the problem and its dimensions. Consequently, this contributes to formulating programs and interventions to reduce and eradicate domestic violence and violence against women. However, the available data are limited and insufficient. Also, there is contradiction in the figures provided by the different stakeholders. Shelters to protect women from violence, especially women whose lives are in danger, are available. There are three centers in the West Bank; two of them are supervised by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the third, which is an emergency center, is supervised by the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling. A shelter was established in the Gaza Strip but it does not receive cases. There is a need for such shelters as they provide protection for women whose lives are in danger. These shelters also need to be examined and evaluated to improve their work.
9.2.4. Challenges ·
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The Palestinian National Authority respects and adopts human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It has also signed and ratified conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). However, the contents of these
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conventions are not included in the applicable laws in Palestine. As discussed above, some articles of the Penal Law and the Personal Status Law which are applicable in Palestine still discriminate against women and perpetuate their subordination. This is regarded as a form of violence against women. It also means that there is no political will to amend the applicable laws which discriminate against women. ·
The Palestinian Declaration of Independence and the Palestinian Basic Law call for gender equality and reject discrimination. These documents are supposed to be the main reference in formulating laws. However, some articles pertaining to women in the applicable laws contradict with the contents of these documents.
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There is still a problem in defining violence. Therefore, it is important to agree on a definition which takes into account the social, political, cultural, and economic circumstances of the Palestinian society to accurately determine the scope of this phenomenon and the prevalence of domestic violence.
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Although data are available, there are no specialized bodies that regularly and systematically document cases of domestic violence and violence against women. Therefore, the available data are not comprehensive and accurate.
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There are no studies and investigations about the relationship between the Israeli occupation and domestic violence and violence against women. Although reference is made to this issue here and there, the relationship and connection between the forms of violence and how the occupation violence affects violence against women are not addressed.
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The Palestinian legislative council is currently not functional which hinders the amendment of laws and the review and reading of proposed and submitted laws.
9.3. Recommendations ·
Agreeing on a definition of the concept of violence which takes into consideration the Palestinian context at the political, social, economic and cultural levels.
·
Conducting qualitative and quantitative studies and research to understand the relationship between the violence of the Israeli occupation and domestic violence and violence against women.
·
A specific body, the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs (MoWA) for instance, should undertake the documentation and collection of data and information on domestic violence. This should be done in a systematic, continuous and comprehensive fashion to create a database to which the concerned institutions may refer for information.
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·
Prevention programs targeting both men and women should be implemented in order to raise awareness about violence against women and change the perceptions and beliefs which permit violence against women.
·
As violence is associated with the social, cultural, legal and economic context, it is important to consider all these aspects when formulating interventions to combat Israeli violence. Interventions are needed at the education, curriculum and media levels. Efforts need to be made to improve the economic situation of Palestinian households and women. Also, it is important to engage religious institutions to raise the awareness of people about domestic violence so that domestic violence is viewed as public rather than a private problem.
·
Amending the applicable laws which discriminate against women. These laws must be consistent with international conventions as well as local instruments such as the Declaration of Independence and the Basic Law which call for gender equality and justice. These include the Jordanian personal status law applicable in the West Bank and the Egyptian law applicable in the Gaza Strip as well as both the Jordanian and Egyptian penal laws.
·
Ratifying and bringing into effect the draft family protection law.
·
Adopting and implementing the national referral system which is concerned with violence across all health, social and legal sectors.
·
Donors should not interfere in the formulation of projects aimed at supporting institutions concerned with combating domestic violence. Work should be done as part of sustainable programs. This is because creating change in this field takes a long time.
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
Arabic References ·
Abu Ghoush, Hanan (2010) – Women without Names – Report on Femicide in the Name of Honor in Palestinian Society. Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling. PCBS (2006) Violence Survey in the Palestinian Society – Main Findings.
·
PCBS (2011) – Violence Survey in the Palestinian Society – Main Findings.
·
Al-Masri, Ibrahim (2000) – Violence against Women. Analytical study. Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development
·
Omar, Sahar; Owaida, Sama (2012) – Palestinian women in the circle of violence – Jerusalem – IWS.
·
IWS, Birzeit University and PCBS (2006) – Domestic violence in the Palestinian territories – analytical study.
English References ·
Johnson.P. (2011)-Violence, gender-based violence and protection: A dangerous decade – Institute for Women’s Studies-Birzeit University.
·
World Bank – (2010). Checkpoints and barriers: Searching for livelihoods in the West Bank and GazaGender dimensions of economic collapse.
·
Violence against Palestinian women and girls-Fact sheet
International charters ·
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
·
Beijing Platform for Action
Local instruments
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·
The Palestinian Basic Law
·
The Jordanian personal status law no. 61 of 1976
·
The Jordanian penal law no. 16 of 1960
·
The Declaration of Independence
·
Women’s Bill of Rights
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International aid and policy questions
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10.1. Introduction This section seeks to review international aid mechanisms and their impacts in the oPt, and the extent to which aid may be effectively directed to gender mainstreaming. Understanding the impact of international aid and donor agencies on national policies, programs and interventions requires first to understand the process of decision-making within the relevant Palestinian Authority ministries represented in the LACS as follows: ·
·
·
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The Quartet (the United States, the Russian Federation, the European Union, and the United Nations) was established in Madrid in 2002 to mediate the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Quartet is the governing body to which the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) is affiliated. The AHLC is chaired by Norway and the World Bank is the Secretariat. Members include: the Palestinian Authority, Canada, Egypt, the International Monetary Fund, Japan, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Nations and Israel. These are the two principal mechanisms for international aid. The AHLC reviews the policies and strategies of international aid. This means that the Palestinian Authority is one of many parties that have a stake in the process of revising the policies and strategies according to which international aid is determined. The Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) follows up on the decisions of the AHLC and coordinates with the Israeli government. The Local Development Forum (LDF) follows up on aid and international support issues in the oPt. The LDF oversees the social sector including education, health, social protection and humanitarian assistance. Every sector has a local and international coordinator. For example, the education sector is supervised by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, France and UNESCO, while the health sector is supervised by the Ministry of Health, USAID and the World Health Organization, and so on. The LDF coordinates with the Task Force on Project Implementation (TFPI). The two bodies liaise with the LACS, which supports the LDF, the Strategy Groups (SGs), the Sector Working Groups (SWGs) and the TFPI. Also, it supervises the sectors of governance, infrastructure and economic policy. The SGs, which focus on policy formulation and programmatic coordination, are co-chaired by a Palestinian body and an international funding body. The same applies to all the details related to the four sectors referred to above. This means that the international support agencies do not confine their relationship to the Palestinian National Authority on the general level but
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
work with every Palestinian party on the partial planning level. ·
The mentioned committees and bodies seek to improve the effectiveness of the aid offered to the Palestinians in line with the Paris Declaration of 2005 which outlines the following five fundamental principles for making aid more effective: Ownership: for aid recipients to have their own national development strategies and strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and annual budgets. Alignment: establishing effective financial administration systems and aligning aid with national priorities. Harmonization: joint analysis of the local reality and directing part of the aid to program support development. Managing for results: establishing transparent performance assessment frameworks to measure results. Joint accountability: monitoring the progress achieved toward approved goals.
10.2. Main results – Trends and Challenges The Paris Declaration was criticized for not addressing the issue of gender equality, which led to the adoption of the Accra Declaration in 2008. However, gender equality was tackled in more detail in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (BOD) 2010 which calls for: 1.
Accelerating and deepening efforts to collect, disseminate, harmonize and make full use of data disaggregated by sex.
2.
Ensuring that public expenditures are targeted appropriately to benefit both women and men.
3.
Integrating targets for gender equality and women’s empowerment in accountability mechanisms.
4.
Addressing gender equality and women’s empowerment in all aspects of our development efforts, including peace-building and statebuilding.
A follow-up survey on monitoring the Paris Declaration was conducted to assess progress in aid effectiveness. The Ministry of Planning participated in the survey in 2011, but without referring to the part related to gender mainstreaming. In line with above-mentioned declarations, LACS has
recently started to mainstream gender in all its operations by unifying the strategic goals based on which funding is determined, as follows: Achieving development/progress and economic growth based on broad participation, equality and environmental sustainability in: 1.
Human rights and gender equality.
2.
Good governance (including the justice and security system).
3.
The social situation of the population.
4.
Political participation and conflict resolution (Reinprecht, 2012).
share of 1.3 per cent of overall development aid from this selection registered in the database (UN Women, 2012). Concerning bilateral cooperation projects between donors and Palestinian parties, the above-mentioned study refers to a mix of awareness, understanding and implementation of gender mainstreaming in donors’ policies. As for evaluating international aid effectiveness in the light of the principles of the Paris Declaration, the study indicates some aspects of progress especially in relation to the implementation of strategies which take into consideration some gender issues. However, in respect of the other principles, there is still a huge gap especially concerning the alignment of goals and the harmonization of efforts.
The Palestinian Authority depends on international aid. In 2010, development assistance accounted for 31 per cent of GDP (UN Women, 2012). The oPt is one of the highest recipients of official development assistance in the world. European Union countries are the major donor with almost 55 per cent of oPt aid followed by the United States with 32 per cent. Major donors are Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Egypt, Qatar and Russia. These countries contributed a combined total of USD 260 million in 2009 (UN Women, 2012).
· LACS approved the Ministry of Women’s Affairs’ membership in SGs and SWGs as the national mechanism responsible for mainstreaming gender issues in the plans, programs and budgets.
Breaking down aid flows by sectors, social sectors receive 53 per cent, followed by humanitarian aid (23 per cent), program assistance (8 per cent), health and education (3 per cent each), and economic infrastructure and services (2 per cent) (UN Women, 2012). The main aid modalities to oPt are budget support and humanitarian assistance. Aid reached its highest level in 2008 to reach about USD 1.7 billion. Following the drop in 2009/2010, it reached USD 1 billion in 2011. The UN Women study found a difficulty in determining the proportion of aid directed to gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment, let alone measuring and evaluating its impact even though several international organizations have started to use the gender marker to track the amount of resources devoted to gender equality and women’s empowerment such as UNDP, UNICEF, and OCHA.
· Although the LACS gender survey report indicates that issues such as the occupation, refugees, Jerusalem, and Area C are the most urgent and most important issues, making them an ideal entry point to address issues of equal access of men and women to state institutions and services, financial commitments to support these urgent issues remain an important challenge facing the Palestinian parties represented in the Secretariat.
The Ministry of Planning developed the online aid management system with donors’ support. However, the system does not provide indicators to measure the volume of aid directed to gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment except for one code which has to do with support for institutions and organizations (governmental and non-governmental) working for gender equality and women’s empowerment. The system therefore does not track donor allocations to projects focused on gender equality and women’s empowerment. A customized database report provided by the Ministry of Planning lists 23 gender equality projects with a reported project start in 2006 until January 2011. The overall amount allocated to these gender equality projects (commitments) for the whole period was USD 14.1 million out of a total of USD 1,082,000. Gender equality projects represented a 124
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
· Despite the importance of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs’ participation in this framework, there are some challenges as follows: · The varying capacities and expertise of LACS members may put those who are responsible for it in a leading position.
· In reviewing international aid trends for the period between 2007 and 2014 through some internationally funded projects, we find that funding priorities do not necessarily take the above-mentioned priorities or urgent issues into consideration. Rather, they focus on aspects such as: violence against women, mainstreaming gender in security agencies and supporting the reproductive health sector, etc. This does not correspond to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs strategic plans in general. · There is no local or international mechanism to determine the amount of foreign aid directed to gender equality, women’s empowerment or gender mainstreaming in general.
10.3. Recommendations · Policy and strategic priorities of funding should be developed based on a comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the Palestinian context and in broad consultation with different women’s groups and defending them based on comprehensive knowledge. · International parties should not be viewed as funding agencies only but also as political supporters. This support should be activated in the most urgent issues (Jerusalem, refugees and sovereignty). · The Ministry of Women’s Affairs should monitor and evaluate the flow of international aid to make sure it is directed toward Palestinian priorities. · A mechanism should be created between the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and AHLC to determine the proportion of aid devoted to gender mainstreaming and equality. ·
An accountability system should be developed based on ongoing internal assessment between actors in the women’s movement (MoWA and civil society organizations) to monitor the flow of aid and its impact and how to affect its course in cooperation with the parliament when its role is activated.
· The Ministry of Women’s Affairs should seek, in partnership with PCBS and the Ministry of Planning, to establish information systems which provide accurate data on the funding of gender equality issues.
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References:
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Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development General Directorate of Aid Management and Coordination. (2013). The ongoing projects related to gender equality and empowerment of woman. Ramallah. Palestine.
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Reinprecht, K. (2012). Gender in the local aid coordination in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (draft).
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UN-Women. (2012). Cooperation for development effectiveness in the occupied Palestinian territory: Addressing the gender equality gap. Jerusalem.
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Annexes Annex 1: Interviews and consultations Annex 2: Overview of focus group discussions with MOWA Tawasol Centers
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Annex 1: Interviews and consultations 1. List of Meetings with Key Informants Date
Organization
Interviewees/Positions
Focus Areas
1-11-2012
Ministry of Local Government
Hanan Emseeh/
Resignation reasons of female members of local councils
Right to Play
Jamil Sawalmeh/
Girls’ participation in the NGO’s activities
Program Officer
Approaching conservative communities
Fatina Wathaefi/
The national gender strategy: obstacles and priority areas
5-11-2012 6-11-2012
Ministry of Women’s Affairs
Head of Gender Unit
General Director of Planning and Policies
MOWA’s monitoring and evaluation system
22-112012
Ministry of Women’s Affairs
Fatima Radaydeh/
27-112012
Sawa Center
LinaSaleh
Sawa’s awareness campaigns at schools
24-122012
Ministry of Women’s Affairs
Fatemah Botmeh/
Tawasol Centers: general information & activities they implement
Gender Units: tasks & obstacles & tactics
Head of Gender Unit
Person in charge of Tawasol Centers
Coordination process with Tawasol Centers
21-2-2013
UN Women – Gaza Office
HebaZayyan
Gaza briefing; planning joint consultation meeting
24-2-2013
Christian Aid
Azzam El-Saqqa
Gaza – general context
24-2-2013
Bureij Women’s Health Centre, Culture & Free Thought Assoc.
Maha Al-Akkad
Gaza – general context
25-2-2013
Community Media Center
Andaleeb Hussein
Gaza – general context
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Date
Organization
Interviewees/Positions
25-2-2013
Community Media Center
AndaleebAdwan/
PWWSD
Wejdan El-Bayoumi/
Director Office Coordinator
Al-Ataa Society
JamilaAlzaanin
WAC
Amal Siam
MAAN
Laila Al Bayoumi/
Focus Areas Joint Consultation with Experts and Activists on Women’s Issues Joint Consultation with Experts and Activists on Women’s Issues
Community Development Officer PCHR
Mona Shawa/ Director of Women’s Unit
PCDCR
AbedelMonemTahrawy/ Projects Manager
AISHA
Reem Frainah/ Executive Manager
AISHA
Mariam Abu Atta/ Projects Officer
WATC
Faten Al-Bayoumi
4-4-2013
Accreditation and Quality Assurance Commission
Mirvat Bulbul/ Director
Education
8-4-2013
UN Women –Gaza Office
HebaZayyan/ Head
Gaza situation – general, VAW
11-4-2013
UN Women –Gaza Office
HebaZayyan/ Head
Gaza situation – follow-up on report gaps
15-4-2013
MOE – Gender Unit
Jamil Shatayeh
Education – gender, statistics
17-4-2013
MOE – Planning and Development
BasriSaleh/ Assistant Undersecretary
Education – policies, trends, priorities
22-4-2013
MOE
RabihaElyan/ Acting Director, Monitoring and Evaluation
Education – statistics
SaadehHamoudeh/ DG, Planning MunjedSliman/ Head, Statistics MamounJaber/ Director, Information and Studies Mahdi Al-Qarud/ Head, School Map
2. List of Steering Committee Meetings 7 June 2012 (preparatory) 16 August 2012 5 September 2012 129
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
7 September 2012 1 October 2012 10 October 2012 23 October 2012 28 November 2012 18 December 2012 19 February 2013 (MOWA workshop) 27 February 2013 13 March 2013 2 April 2013 9 April 2013 10 April 2013
3. Information and Capacity Building Workshops Wednesday, 27 March 2013 – Presentation and discussion on report findings related to health and education Thursday, 28 March 2013 – Presentation and discussion on report findings related to Economic participation and empowerment, Social Protection and International Aid Tuesday, 2 April 2013 – Presentation and discussion on report findings related to Political and public participation and Access to Justice Tuesday, 7 May 2013 – Gender Analysis in Planning: Economic Participation and Access to and Control over Assets Wednesday, 8 May 2013 – Gender Analysis in Planning: Social Services – Health and Education Thursday, 9 May 2013 – Gender Analysis in Planning: Social Protection and VAW Monday, 13 May 2013 – Gender Analysis in Planning: Political Participation and Access to Justice Wednesday, 15 May 2013 – Gender Analysis in Planning: Using Power Analysis and Social Change Theory in Planning Monday, 28 May 2013 – Briefing on key report findings for LACS
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Annex 2: Overview of focus group discussions with MOWA Tawasol Centers In accordance with the participatory approach of this research, 3 focus groups were organized in three governorates: Salfeet, Hebron and Jericho. The target group was women members of Tawasol. The latter is a coalition of local governmental and non-governmental women and academic organizations operating within the same governorate. It is a project which the Ministry of Women’s Affairs started to implement in 2005 by opening 4 centers in the governorates of Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus and Jenin. Now, there are 11 Tawasol Centers in the West Bank to enhance communication and partnership between governmental and non-governmental bodies. Therefore, these centers are located in the governorates’ premises at Women and Child Departments whose directors are also the coordinators of Tawasol. Methodology To know about Tawasol Centers and facilitate the coordination process, a meeting with the coordinator of Tawasol centers at the Ministry of Women’s Affairs was held. The latter talked about the idea of Tawasol, how it started and provided a list of all Tawasol Centers, the coordinators names and their telephone numbers. When asked about the most active centers, she nominated Tawasol Centers in Salfeet, Hebron and Jericho. Accordingly, contact with the coordinators in these governorates was made to arrange for focus groups of maximum 6 active female members of Tawasol per group. However, in Salfeet the number of women who attended the discussion was 11 whereas in Jericho it was only 4. The focus groups’ discussion varied in duration; a minimum of 1 hour and a maximum of one and a half hour. The focus group discussions approach adopted the positive deviance theory.76 Thus, the aim behind arranging focus group discussions was to identify the most successful activities or initiatives which Tawasol Centers had implemented and their elements and reasons of success in addition to understanding the relationship between Tawasol Centers and their local community. Accordingly, the guiding questions focused on knowing the most successful activities/initiatives, why and how these activities in particular succeeded while the others did not, and what was the reaction of the local community (below are the guiding questions). Challenges, obstacles and limitations ·
The public employees’ strike has limited the scheduling options of FDGs to two or three days per week (Sunday, Monday and Tuesday) as the public employees were always on strike on Wednesdays and Thursdays. Moreover, the FGD in Salfeet was once postponed because of the transport strike.
·
Because of the long delay in securing a permit to the Gaza Strip and the absence of Tawasol Centres in the Gaza Strip, the meeting of local women activists in the Gaza Strip was re-designed as group consultation reflecting on factors contributing to/hindering successful initiatives for greater equality of rights and opportunities for women with current contexts in the Gaza Strip and identification of policy priorities, strategic opportunities.
·
Given the number of FGDs held (3 FGDS) and the limited geographical distribution of the participants, the FGDs should not be taken as representative. Rather, the FGDs should be understood within the framework of the Steering Committee’s commitment to ensure stakeholders’ reflection on study findings through the FGDs, group consultations and interview along with the series of consultative workshops and to lay the foundations for an ongoing participatory process for the development of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs’ new strategic plan. The location-specific nature of the FGDs allowed for checking back with local women activists regarding the study framework in terms of perceived priorities and focus of community-based activities. Results generally affirmed study parameters as well as suggesting several areas for further research not (for example the link between inheritance and honor killings and the practice of apportioning lands near the Wall to women in inheritance settlements).
Questions for focal groups General Questions: ·
As women’s activists, what are the urgent issues and topics for women in the governorate?
·
As a Tawasol center, how do you deal with such issues? Give examples.
Activities: ·
As a Tawasol center, what activities do you implement?
76 The positive deviance approach to social change is “based on the observation that in any community, there are people whose uncommon but successful behaviors or strategies enable them to find better solutions to a problem than their peers, despite facing similar challenges and having no extra resources or knowledge than their peers. These individuals are referred to as positive deviants” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positive_Deviance). 131
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
·
What is the most successful activity?
·
What are the success factors for this activity? Why did it succeed?
·
Why weren’t the other activities as successful?
·
At the personal level, how does your work at Tawasol center affect your lives?
Local community:
132
·
How do you assess the interaction of the local community with your activities?
·
Have you encountered any difficulties in implementation?
·
Who usually supports you? Groups? Sectors?
Building Ties, Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
Research Report
Building Ties Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women
UN Women oPt Alami (UNOPS) Building, Rosary Sisters School Street, Dahyet Al Barid PO Box 51359 East Jerusalem
May 2013
Tel.: +972 (0) 2 628 0450 Fax: +972 (0) 2 628 0661 Email: opt.co@unwomen.org http://palestine.unwomen.org www.unwomen.org
State of Palestine Ministry Of Women's Affairs
S/RES/1325 (2000)
United Nations
Security Council
Distr.: General 31 October 2000
Resolution 1325 (2000) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000 The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and recalling also the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women’s Rights and International Peace (International Women’s Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816), Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled “Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century” (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict, Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation, Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution, Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,
00-72018 (E) `````````
S/RES/1325 (2000)
Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls, Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693), Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations, Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all 1. decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict; Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of 2. action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decisionmaking levels in conflict resolution and peace processes; Urges the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special 3. representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster; Further urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and 4. contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel; Expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into 5. peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component; Requests the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training 6. guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, invites Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training; Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and 7. logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children’s Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;
2
S/RES/1325 (2000)
Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace 8. agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary; Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law 9. applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; 10. Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict; 11. Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions; 12. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000; 13. Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants; 14. Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions; 15. Expresses its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women’s groups; 16. Invites the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and further invites him to
3
S/RES/1325 (2000)
submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations; 17. Requests the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls; 18.
4
Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Partners for Peace
Partners for Peace:
A
Women in Israel and Palestine Working for an End to the Conflict and Lasting Reconciliation
Advocating for peace, justice & equality
B
N o b e l W o m e n ’s I n i t i a t i v e
Delegates Janaan Hashim and Amy Eilberg
The Nobel Women’s Initiative uses the prestige of the Nobel Peace Prize and courageous women peace laureates to magnify the power and visibility of women working in countries around the world for peace, justice, and equality.
Our advocacy is organized around three main pillars: Women Forging Peace—We advocate building long-term peace supporting women who are engaged in nonviolence and other alternatives to ending war and militarism, and support the inclusion of women in peace negotiations and other peace building efforts. Women Achieving Justice—We support work to achieve justice for women, including accountability for crimes committed against women and an end to widespread impunity. Women Advancing Equality and Human Rights—We support human rights defenders, including those working for women’s equality and climate justice.
Partners for Peace
1
table of contents
02 04 05 11
26 28 30
A Message from Nobel Peace Laureates Jody Williams & Mairead Maguire
Map of Israel/Palestine indicating the delegation’s route
I. Introduction: The Peacemaking Women of Israel and Palestine – Jaclyn Friedman
II. Partners for Peace: Kayan-Feminist Organization Parents Circle-Families Forum Naomi Chazan Isha L’Isha Zahira Kamal Mada al-Carmel: Arab Center for Applied Social Research Robi Damelin New Profile Haneen Zoabi Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel Sahar Vardi Coalition of Women for Peace
III. At a Glance: More Partners for Peace
IV. Endnotes: Delegation Participants
V. Acknowledgements
2
N o b e l W o m e n ’s I n i t i a t i v e
A Message from Jody Williams and Mairead Maguire Checkpoints litter the roads as young men stand guard with guns, relaxed and prepared to take the life of another. Children are raised fearing their neighbours. Whole communities become refugees as bulldozers turn their homes to dust. Hate, pain, and death hang like clouds, casting shadows of suspicion on the land below. These are the images of two nations struggling to live side by side on the same piece of land. The evening news often brings us stories from Israel and Palestine, yet they usually focus on male political leaders in the region engaged in what appears to be a futile peace process. They are brought together on carefully manicured lawns far from the chaos of everyday life, shaking hands and posing for cameras. They repeatedly assure the public that every meeting is a step forward in sorting through the labyrinth of this protracted conflict.
Partners for Peace
3
Delegation listening to displaced people in East Jerusalem
What is missing from most of these newscasts is what is happening on the ground, with civil society, in Israel and Palestine. In particular, women are emerging in inspiring numbers to challenge decades of war and militarism. While their leaders sit in office, far from the realities of a society at war, the women of Israel and Palestine are making tangible, positive strides toward peace. So, in September-October 2010, the Nobel Women’s Initiative led a delegation to the region. We wanted to connect with the numerous women who have made it their mission to build peace within the turmoil. In a world where militarism is almost sacred and anxiety reigns, there are countless courageous Israeli and Palestinian women who have made it their life’s work to bridge the conflicted groups. They look past the divisiveness of the two distinct narratives history has handed the nations, and rather, they consider the future. In the face of violence and discrimination, they’re organizing peace rallies and building incredible movements. They’re taking communities torn apart by decades of violence and creating better futures from the rubble. Frustrated with the ineffectiveness of their leaders, they’re forming their own networks and promoting open dialogue. They build understanding, tolerance, and most importantly, forgiveness. Together, they mourn lost sons,
counsel daughters, protest in the streets, challenge laws, and work toward a day when the walls between the two nations will disappear. The seeds for peace are being sown by the women of Israel and Palestine every single day. During the Second Intifada – the Second Palestinian uprising – Israel left negotiations claiming there was “no partner for peace” in Palestine. Yet the reality was that politicians simply had no interest in seeking a sustainable peace. The following report profiles a number of Israeli and Palestinian individuals and organizations who we met during the delegation and who rally against traditional perceptions of hate. They stand up for the human rights of members of both nations, often facing backlash and persecution. They promote alternatives to militarism, contribute to policy and research, promote women’s rights and needs, and nurture reconciliation in the troubled region. They work across lines of gender, nationality, and religion for a just, equal, and nonviolent society. If the leaders of Israel and the international community are serious about seeking a lasting peace in Israel and Palestine, they will find the women within these pages are waiting for them.
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Map
F G
of Israel/Palestine indicating the delegation’s route
Legend Israel/Palestine
The delegation visited: A
Jerusalem
B
German Colony, East Jerusalem
C
Ramallah, West Bank
D
Hebron, West Bank
E
Bil’in, West Bank
F
Haifa
G
Nazareth
H
Gush Etzion, West Bank (Israeli Settlements)
I
Beit Jala, West Bank
J
Sheikh Jarrah, East Jerusalem
K
Old City, Jerusalem
E H
C
J
A
B I
D
K
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Introduction The Nobel Women’s Initiative regularly leads delegations to places of conflict or where sustainable peace still has not been achieved. The delegations are a means to bring women from different sectors – corporate, academia, media, policy, and the arts – to meet and support women activists who are promoting peace and justice in other parts of the world. After the delegations, the Nobel Women’s Initiative and delegation members share what they have learned to their networks around the world, with a particular focus on highlighting the powerful strategies being employed by women’s groups to advance peace. The delegation to Israel and Palestine in September-October 2010 witnessed the decades of violence the region has suffered, and was undertaken to show solidarity with the women who have dedicated their lives to creating peace. Led by Nobel Peace Laureates Mairead Maguire and Jody Williams, the delegation included American women from various walks of life; a rabbi, a lawyer, a journalist, and two philanthropists.
This powerful group of women spent ten days in Israel and Palestine visiting organizations, politicians, and individuals in the communities of Ramallah, Hebron, Nil’in, Bil’in, Haifa, Nazareth, and Jerusalem. In these pages, we’d like to introduce you to some of the extraordinary women and organizations we met during the delegation.
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The Peacemaking Women of Israel and Palestine Jaclyn Friedman
When I was invited to join the Nobel Women’s Initiative’s delegation to Israel and Palestine, I was like many well-meaning citizens of the global community. When I did think about the region’s ongoing conflicts, I felt great sadness and unease, but never urgency or hope. I had been hearing about “the crisis” — and attempts to resolve it — for decades. There seemed little reason to imagine that anything I could do could make a difference there, one way or another. So I focused my energies elsewhere, until the Nobel Women came calling. When I first returned from our week in the region and friends and colleagues asked me the inevitable “how was it?,” I found myself delivering the same message over and over. It’s the message I want you to remember as you read the stories in this report. It surprised me the first time it fell out of my mouth, because it sounds so contradictory, and yet I knew it was true. It’s simply this: things are so much worse than I’d even imagined. And there’s so much more hope than I could have dreamed. That both my assessment of the nature of the crisis and my understanding of what could be done about it were so muted in comparison to the realities on the ground has everything to do with the anti-feedback loop much
of the Western media has built around the region. Like a soundproofed studio from which only carefully curated tracks are amplified, censorship runs deep. Nowhere is this phenomenon more pronounced than in my home country of the U.S.A., where justification of our political and financial “investments” in the region is always job one. Whatever you’ve heard or haven’t, make no mistake: the situation is desperate, and the window of opportunity for real international intervention is closing fast. If the Israeli government continues to build illegal settlements on Palestinian land, there will soon be little incentive for Palestinians to negotiate at all. There’s also the looming risk that, if the conflict is left unresolved, it will be referred to the UN Security Council, where neither Israelis nor Palestinians will have a say in their future. That’s not an outcome that anybody wants. Meanwhile, conditions are unconscionable. Palestinian children and pregnant women are dying at checkpoints
Jacyln Friedman
while they wait to be allowed through to seek medical care. Two-thirds of the residents of Gaza are refugees and eighty percent are reliant on UN food aid. Gazan women are forced into early marriages, and, in the words of one Gazan woman, kept in a “vicious circle of ignorance and submission.” Palestinian citizens of Israel face 23 Israeli laws guaranteeing them unequal treatment in housing, employment, access to social services and more. Israeli mothers watch their children be raised by the state to be soldiers and sent off to arm the border. Young people who refuse to serve are jailed. Israeli activists who dare to speak publicly for peace are targeted by vicious smear campaigns, their organizations targeted and undermined by the Israeli government. Palestinians in the West Bank lose their homes, their land, their shops, access to school for their children — anything they have can be seized by the Israeli government, at any moment, for any reason. These circumstances are not accidental, nor are they inevitable. They are the direct result of the unchecked rule of corrupt, entrenched governments, enabled by a potent cocktail of Western political machinations and the soulless opportunism of global capitalism. When international diplomats throw their hands up in frustration and say “There are no partners for peace in Israel and Palestine,” they mean the governments of Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. It’s true that these few powerful leaders and their enablers are not partners for peace. The preservation of their power is contingent on war. But they don’t represent the wishes of the majority of their peoples. Given all of this, it’s not surprising to discover that the crisis underlying all of the violence, poverty, insecurity, corruption and desperation is a crisis of hope. Over and over we heard and witnessed the same thing: the majority of both peoples want peace, and the majority of both peoples believe it can’t be done, or that the “other side” doesn’t want it. This fear of the other runs deep. Many Palestinians can see no difference between an individual Israeli and the occupying force that bombs their cities and seizes their land. The Israeli settlers we met believed that if they went into Ramallah they’d be murdered in the street – a belief we checked with numerous peacenik Israelis who said it just wasn’t true. In fact, we met with many Israelis in Ramallah, as it is hard for Palestinians to leave the West Bank, so most Palestinian-Israeli coalition work must take place there. One study quoted often to us by our guides showed that seventy percent of Israelis want a two-state solution, and
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“Things are so much worse than I’d even imagined. And there’s so much more hope than I could have dreamed.” Jaclyn Friedman
seventy percent of Israelis believe it will never happen. It’s not hard to see why – each time peace has been promised over the years and decades, the situation has only worsened. That kind of profound and continual heartbreak does permanent damage to the heart’s ability to hope. And yet, even in the face of this, hundreds — probably thousands — of women on this little stamp of ancient, embattled land get up every day and work for peace on behalf of the rest of the seventy percent who can’t bring themselves to hope. Israeli mothers and grandmothers spend their days observing the Israeli soldiers at the border, documenting their behaviour and calling on them to treat Palestinians with respect and dignity. Haneen Zouabi, a Palestinian citizen of Israel, serves every day as a Member of the Knesset, knowing full well she doesn’t have a coalition powerful enough to pass or block a single law, but insisting on giving voice to her community in the halls of power anyhow. Israelis and Palestinians gather together to stand in front of Israeli government bulldozers, refusing to allow communities to be separated from their olive groves and schools by the illegal border wall. Women who have lost loved ones in the conflict — women who have suffered that unimaginable loss — meet together in pairs, one Israeli, and one Palestinian, and learn not only to forgive but to love one another. While we were there, hundreds of Palestinian women met together to address the gender oppression in their communities and governments, and to organize for equality and justice. These extraordinary women — many of whom we met with — don’t lack solutions. They lack resources and power. They are our partners for peace, if only we will partner with them.
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It is perhaps bold to suggest that the experts and politicians are wrong, that other paths are possible, that there are partners for peace eager and waiting for the world to join them in the crucial work of Tikkun Olam – a Hebrew phrase meaning ‘healing the world.’ It’s certainly bold to imagine we can succeed when so many have already given their lives trying. But if these women can get up every day and work for peace in the face of that inescapable history, then we must be bold enough to work for their success. Think of what these women have already accomplished. They have stopped bulldozers. They’ve created and aired a prime-time soap opera modelling ways Israelis and Palestinians can reconcile. They’ve paved the way for Palestinian women to start their own businesses and pursue higher education. They’ve made it easier to resist the Israeli draft. They’ve organized a global campaign for boycotts, divestment and sanctions in pursuit of justice. They’ve worked together in coalition for decades, despite overwhelming global forces bent on tearing them apart. Now imagine what they could accomplish if just a fraction of the international resources — money, media, and influence — that currently flow into the region to enable and profit from the status quo were redirected toward their already heroic efforts. It’s possible, but only if we all act together. When we embarked on our delegation, some of us were long-time collaborators and compatriots to each other, and others of us were strangers. Some of us were already intimately involved in efforts to resist the relentlessly violent conflict between Israel and Palestine, others of us having never set foot in either land. Though we travelled together, we each had our own responses to what we witnessed and experienced, sometimes building on each others’ insights, other times disagreeing vehemently. But we came away with several key agreements about how to move forward. The first is that, in order to forge a way forward, Israelis and Palestinians must agree to disagree about the past. Those of us in the international community must follow this advice as well — rehashing who started what when, whose violence was most justified, and whose losses have been greatest keeps us in an endless cycle of violence and loss. We can only start from now, and build on the landscape that exists in the present, with the conditions as they are now. This is easier said than done, of course, but if women who have buried their own children due to the conflict can practice the kind of forgiveness that
Robi Damelin of the Parents’ Circle defines as “the giving up of one’s just right to revenge,” then surely we can learn how to follow their lead. Once we’ve begun to see conditions as they are, we must insist on consequences for those who create and enable these conditions. The Israeli government must face consequences for continuing to build illegal settlements on Palestinian lands, for evicting Palestinian citizens of Israel from their homes on false (or no) pretences, for ongoing war crimes and violations of United Nations rules in Gaza, and for building the border wall far inside the agreed-upon border with Palestine. The Palestinian governments — Hamas in Gaza, and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank — must be sanctioned for their anti-democratic, anti-woman regimes. And the people and corporations profiting from the ongoing violence and occupation must be made to pay instead. In the end, the people of Israel and Palestine want what all people want. They want their children to have access to education, they want to be able to support their families, they want safe homes and safe bodies and freedom of movement and freedom from fear. They want to have hope again. When 120,000 Palestinian women were surveyed as part of a three-year women’s empowerment project, the women identified the following main problems: unemployment, lack of health care, equal rights in the labour market (including vocational choice), and affordable higher education — social priorities that will likely sound familiar to all of us, no matter where we live. Despite all history to the contrary, the peacemaking women of Israel and Palestine believe in us. Everywhere we went, when we asked, “what can we do to support your efforts for peace?,” the answer was the same: tell our story. Tell everyone that we are here, that we’re doing the hard work of peacemaking every day, that we can prevail, but we need help. Even though the world has thrown their hands up and left them to struggle on their own for so long, they not only believe that we can help them, they believe that if we understand both what’s at stake, and what’s possible, that we will help them. Against all odds, these women believe both in peace and in us. We could do nothing more important than to return the favour.
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Partners for Peace Kayan-Feminist Organization The mission of Kayan starts with a simple premise – that social change can be achieved when women are empowered to take a more active role in both the private and public sphere. The group’s name, meaning “being” in Arabic, is basic to the idea that change will occur once women can make decisions about their own lives and exert influence within greater society. Made up of Arab-Israeli feminists, Kayan tackles the significant inequality within its community. Only one in five Arab women are part of the Israeli workforce. Many do not have access to education and are trapped in traditional household gender roles. With no decision-making power, access to resources, or platform for their voice to be heard, women’s needs are too often neglected and completely ignored. For Arab-Palestinian women living in Israel, the already desperate situation is worse; “they suffer double discrimination – once as Palestinians and again in their own community because of their gender,” observed Shirin Batson-Khoury, coordinator of Kayan’s Legal Department.
“I hope that the Israelis and Palestinians could see us as a model and see that it is possible for us to live together.” Shirin Batson-Khoury, Coordinator, Kayan Legal Department
Delgates with the International Women’s Commission for a Just and Sustainable Palestinian-Israeli Peace
Kayan advocates for Arab women – Israeli and Palestinian alike – to have full and equal rights within all legal, economic, and social spheres. Yet Shirin noted that religious courts continue to discriminate against women, especially in cases involving family law or sexual harassment. The group has also found that despite Arabic being an official language in Israel, most legal information continues to be published only in Hebrew, making Arab women vulnerable to an abuse of their rights. To address this, Kayan provides much needed legal aid and advice to low-income Arab women. The group also works to overcome basic barriers generating poverty and dependence, such as a lack of job training. They provide workshops, seminars, and easy-to-read guides in Arabic, as well as one-on-one counselling. This brings information about household finances and social rights directly to women who would otherwise be without it. A Kayan member explained, “We see that women can quickly improve their situation if they have access to relevant information and are encouraged to take an active approach towards their personal economy and savings.” Making Arab-Israeli women proactive members of society, Kayan encourages knowledge-building and personal development. Grassroots organizing at the community level chips away at the gender gap within the governing leadership by empowering women to become more actively involved. A testament to their success, Kayan continues to grow and join with fellow women’s coalitions in the region to promote dialogue across communities. K AYAN-FEMINIST ORGANIZATION was established in 1998 to promote the rights of Arab women in Israel. The feminist grassroots group strives to empower Arab women to become effective leaders and become part of the decision-making process – both in the private and public domain. • www.kayan.org.il • www.facebook.com/KayanFeministOrganization • kayan@netvision.net.il
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Members of the Parents Circle-Families Forum
Parents Circle-Families Forum
“Any meeting between the Palestinian and Israeli members of the group has an element of a miracle… If we, who have lost the most precious of all, can sit and talk, then surely others could use this as an example.” Member of the Parents Circle-Families Forum
For members of the Parents Circle-Families Forum, the craft of paper-making is a form of not only artwork, but also peacebuilding. Aesha Faress is a shining example of the power of creative healing. As she sits among groupmates – both Palestinian and Israeli – she holds a newspaper clipping describing the arrest of her uncle during the First Intifada. “This was the beginning of our tragedy,” she says, while crushing the news clipping and adding green leaves of lemon and sage. By sharing her story and creating something beautiful from her tragedy, Aesha breathes new life and new hope into her uncle’s memory. Aesha is just one of the many raised in an occupied state, with her family’s basic freedoms limited. She weaves childhood photos demonstrating the hardships of growing up in Palestine into her art and optimistically remarks, “I still await and hope for a beautiful life of peace and freedom.” Paper-making is not an activity that comes to mind when thinking of peacebuilding projects. And yet, the creative art form is one of many programs initiated by the Parents Circle-Families Forum to bring Israelis and Palestinians together. The group fosters open dialogue and mutual understanding between families from both sides of the conflict who are experiencing loss and grief. Women – mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters – have a strong influence in both Israeli and Palestinian communities, and members of the Parents Circle-Families Forum view their role in the national reconciliation process as vital. Initiatives such as paper-making are a small beginning, allowing each woman an opportunity to share her story, to tell of “our pain and our prayers for change.” A lack of trust and empathy between the Israeli and Palestinian communities are driving forces allowing the cycle of violence to flourish. But for Parents Circle-Families Forum members, the idea of revenge must stop, replaced instead by the idea that through conversation we can all find the humanity in others. “You have many choices of what to do after loss,” one member stated. “Each time we meet, hand in hand, we will make it better. It gives me hope.”
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Delegates listen to members of the Parents Circle-Families Forum
Initiating meetings and classroom dialogues, the Parents Circle-Families Forum brings together members of the other community to discuss their own experience and break down the wall of the unknown. Always looking for new ways to engage the warring groups, the Parents Circle-Families Forum launched the “Crack in the Wall” project in 2010. The project harnesses the power of social media to break through barriers and create a space for conversation and engagement between Israelis and Palestinians. Through Facebook, those seeking peace have an opportunity to challenge racism, hatred, and injustice, and reflect on the challenges of living in a deeply militarized society. For many, this type of meeting is the first time they are exposed to the other’s narrative and serves to humanize the group as a whole. One member commented, “Before, seeing the violence, I hated all the Israelis. Then my husband was killed, and I hated more. I thought – ‘how can I talk with them?’ After I told my story, many Jewish people were crying and some came to me and wiped away my tears, and it was different.” The group’s greatest strength is their resilience; even in the face of renewed fighting in early 2009, Parents Circle-Families Forum members continued to visit schools and the group cemented their close ties with one another, giving them courage to continue. Day by day, person by person, the Parents Circle-Families Forum is creating a framework for reconciliation – and fostering a new generation to achieve sustainable peace. ARENTS CIRCLE – FAMILIES FORUM was established in 1995 to bring together P Israelis and Palestinians grieving for a family member, killed due to the conflict. The group fosters dialogue between the two communities, using public and media outreach, to begin and encourage the process of reconciliation. • www.theparentscircle.com • www.facebook.com/ParentsCircleFamiliesForum • www.twitter.com/ThePCFF • office@theparentscircle.org
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Naomi Chazan “Women have always been at the forefront – the most consistent and the most persistent,” declared long-time activist and academic Naomi Chazan on the role of women in Israel’s peace movement.
“If we don’t succeed, we destroy not only each other, but ourselves.” Naomi Chazan, Israeli Activist and Politician
Naomi Chazan
Founder and President of the New Israel Fund, Naomi has focused her work around the core principles of freedom, justice, and equality. She stressed that these are the same principles on which the state of Israel was founded. Naomi mobilizes Israeli and Palestinian women to move ahead together, rather than being separated by negative societal and political pressures. Separation can lead to apathy about the current state of affairs – and that is why in-person meetings between the two communities are necessary. “People-to-people interaction is vital,” Naomi said, “but not just for the sake of talking – it must be for the sake of making change.” For Naomi, both civil society and political leaders need to be involved in forming sustainable peace – precisely why she became involved in politics. In 1992, Naomi was elected into Israel’s legislature – the Knesset. For a decade, she served as a legislator for the Meretz, a social democratic party. During her time in office, Naomi continually faced the problem of peace negotiations collapsing under the stress of conditions and constraints placed upon each party. Doubt about people’s true intentions prevailed and almost always ensured failure. “Do not underestimate how much scepticism undermines progress…Scepticism is a prescription for inaction,” she explained. Naomi’s New Israel Fund – a partnership of Israeli, North American, and European groups - provides financial and technical support to community-based peace organizations. Over 800 civil society groups working for peace have been jump-started through the Fund. Naomi is continually working to find common ground upon which peace negotiations can find their footing. She advocates for increased civil society presence at peace negotiations in order to minimize the gap between people and leadership. Naomi has also drawn attention to the roots of the conflict to ensure that the underlying issues of violence and equality are addressed in any agreement. Despite widespread mistrust, Naomi continually emphasizes that respect for “the other” and a mechanism for a reconciliation process are key components for lasting peace. ew Israel Fund was founded in 1979. The group provides funding to N community-based organizations in Israel promoting peace, justice, and equality. Through its efforts, the Fund has become a leader in advancing democracy in Israel and is credited with helping over 800 local organizations get their start. • www.nif.org • www.facebook.com/newisraelfund • www.twitter.com/newisraelfund • nif@nif.org.il
Delegates touring Old City, Jerusalem
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Isha L’Isha
“Because we are women and we are vocal against the occupation, they call us radicals and dismiss us as feminists. We have to constantly remind the public that we don’t live a normal life here in Israel, that it’s not normal or natural to oppress other people.” Isha L’Isha Activist
One of the oldest grassroots feminist organizations in Israel, Isha L’Isha began in the city of Haifa as just a few women coming together for open conversation. The group has now grown to a coalition of five organizations and its members laugh off the “radical” designation they have been given. As one woman mentioned, “In Israel, anyone who opposes the government is considered a ‘radical.’” Among the group members, all have been personally affected by the ongoing conflict and seen their families torn apart. Many of the women’s close relatives are serving in the armed forces and some have children who have been imprisoned for refusing enlistment. One woman, whose son would change out of his Israeli military uniform before her Palestinian friends came to visit, explained, “There are things we’re not talking about and there are things that need to be said. How do you raise your sons and daughters in this context? How do you get through the day in a way that doesn’t make you lose sleep? It’s incredibly difficult to discuss this, some might even say politically incorrect to discuss this, but these are our lives.” Isha L’Isha activists emphasize that in a country plagued by conflict, women’s voices and needs have been marginalized and silenced in the name of “national security.” Through the organization’s core program, they work to redefine security to include the personal, social, economic, cultural, and health aspects – all from a women’s perspective. They bring issues that are not on the public agenda to the forefront, such as human trafficking, prostitution, and reproductive rights. One of their most successful endeavours is the Guns Free Kitchen Tables Campaign – an initiative to end the bloodshed caused by the unsanctioned use of security weapons by off-duty guards. In a nation where militarization is so deeply embedded in the collective conscience, campaigning against the right to bear arms was no easy task. But as a result of their dedication and unabashed advocacy, the group succeeded in bringing the issue to the Israeli government, who agreed to strictly enforce the law that security weapons must not leave the worksite – undoubtedly saving countless lives from careless death.
Delegation members with Isha L’Isha in Haifa
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Even with great success in the political and policy arenas, Isha L’Isha remains passionately committed to grassroots change. Each and every day, at least two of the organization’s grandmothers travel to the border checkpoints with cakes and messages of peace for the young soldiers. As one Isha L’Isha activist remarks, “You should see the little children - they are 18 years old, but are children. We have to always remind them to find the humanity in the ‘other.’ The occupation corrupts our young people terribly.” The women travelling to the checkpoints also take turns documenting the realities of the border conflict. They record everything – from children denied access to critical medical care to soldiers’ abuse of power – and publish it in a daily newspaper for all to see. In doing so, they expose injustices and bring the humanity of the conflict to life. The group’s ongoing documentation, education, research, and legislation efforts have led to a number of projects evolving into independent organizations through the years. Describing the value of the work they are undertaking to Israeli-Palestinian society, one member said, “The issue of how the political is personal and the personal is political is an incredible weight we carry here.” The group undertakes research and public outreach in the form of seminars and brings women from both Israeli and Palestinian communities together in safe spaces to discuss personal dilemmas. Apart from providing a larger communication network, it allows for trust to be built between women from the conflicted nations. Though the process may be slow, Isha L’Isha activists know that by promoting nonviolence and advocating against discrimination, they are creating change – and with that, a brighter future for everyone. Isha L’Isha was founded in 1983 and as the oldest grassroots women’s organization in Israel, is one of the leading feminist voices in the country. Based in Haifa, the group promotes the rights of all women and girls in the country. It provides a safe environment to address issues relevant to women including reproductive rights, violence against women, discrimination, and sexual identity. • www.isha.org.il • isha@isha.org.il • www.facebook.com/pages/Isha-LIsha-Haifa-Feminist-Center/194056310615412
Delegates listen to members of Isha L’Isha
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Zahira Kamal “It is not strange that historical events of Palestine were the driving force that has determined my life. I grew up hating the Israelis without even knowing or meeting them,” explained Zahira Kamal, a renowned Palestinian author. But this childhood filled with hate eventually turned into a life dedicated to mending the unease between the splintered communities.
Zahira Kamal
“I believe that women have a strong desire and need for peace. I also believe that we are able to work out our relationships and live with each other, or next to each other – in peace and harmony.” Zahira Kamal, Author, Politician, and Activist
Zahira has been the predominant woman’s voice in Palestinian literature for over three decades. Writing on gender and Israeli-Palestinian relationships, her thoughts are often transformed into active dialogues with Israeli groups. Her experiences growing up in Palestine have had a direct influence on her work. Zahira emphasizes – both in her writing and in lectures – that the two communities have to meet face-to-face and get to know one another. She explained that the settlements, the walls, the checkpoints, and the resulting forced separation results in apathy; “If I don’t know anything about you, why would I bother about you?” Emphasizing the significant role women play in the political arena, whether for the promotion of women’s rights or for overall democracy, Zahira noted that women’s political participation has grown within Palestine in recent years. Zahira herself has been actively involved, both as the first Minister of Women’s Affairs in the Palestinian National Authority and a member of the leadership of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Her political activities earned her a jail sentence in 1979 followed by six years of town arrest in Jerusalem in 1980. Despite this unjust discrimination, Zahira continued on in politics. When there was a split in her party, she left with the Palestinian Democratic Union (PDU), supporting the Madrid and Oslo peace negotiations with Israel. Representing the PDU, she led the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee at the Madrid Conference, monitoring women’s issues in the interim peace agreement. In 2011, Zahira became the first woman elected as leader of a Palestinian political group, representing the Palestinian Democratic Union as secretary-general. Despite a long and undoubtedly tiring political career, Zahira continues to be an active advocate for women’s rights, working with women’s organizations in Gaza. These independent, non-profit Palestinian groups empower women and advocates for gender equality through advocacy, capacity-building, and action-focused research. Zahira has won numerous awards for her work promoting peace and, in 2005, was one of the 1000 women proposed as a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.
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Mada al-Carmel: Arab Center for Applied Social Research The first research center in Israel gathering data from the perspective of Palestinians, Mada al-Carmel continues to this day to be the only group conducting research from the outlook of the nation’s women. Himmat Zu’Bi, the Center’s Gender Studies Project Coordinator, explained that the organization “fills the critical gap in knowledge.” Highlighting that it is not the identity of the researcher that is significant, but rather the researcher’s perspective, Mada al-Carmel promotes analytical evaluation rather than simply accepting mainstream “orientalism” or the “other-ing” of Palestinians.
“Peace will never be long-lasting unless it is a just peace.” Einas Odeh-Haj, Associate Director, Mada al-Carmel
The Center’s goal is to be a hub for critical research, providing Palestinian students and analysts with a place to discuss their findings and possible implications for human and national development. Building relationships with researchers around the world, Mada al-Carmel staff create public policy proposals designed to improve the political, economic, and social conditions of the Palestinian peoples. The group has found that Palestinians, especially women, are vastly underrepresented in Israel’s labour force. A lack of infrastructure, public transportation, and daycares in Arab villages impede Arab-Israeli women’s ability to work outside of the home. The low employment rates contribute to Palestinian families living below the poverty line in Israel. Mada al-Carmel researchers highlight the necessity of having Palestinian citizens at negotiation tables with Israel. They also underline the need to recognize the long-term rights of Palestinians in Israel, rather than just addressing issues arising from the occupation. As one Palestinian researcher asked, “If the occupation ended today, what would be changed in our situation?” The backlash the center has faced for its work is significant – from local and international institutions alike. Recently Mada al-Carmel had funding revoked for two projects by Canada’s International Development Research Center despite having no complaints about quality or progress. After the Nobel Women’s Initiative intervened on Mada al-Carmel’s behalf, the group was able to reach a settlement and has been able to continue its work. Mada al-Carmel generates and provides information, critical analysis, and diverse perspectives on the social and political life and history of Palestinians. They are committed to supporting Palestinian and other academics to develop critical approaches, exchange ideas, and advance their research. • www.mada-research.org • https://www.facebook.com/MadaalalCarmel • https://twitter.com/mada_alcarmel • mada@mada-research.org
Einas Odeh-Haj
Members of Mada al-Carmel speak with delegation
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Robi Damelin Personal loss is often at the heart of many activists’ struggle for peace in the Israel-Palestine region. While revenge by grieving family members can spur attacks, the sadness also motivates mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters to seek dialogue with the opposing community. The process of reconciliation, and forgiveness – for an individual, a family, or an entire nation – takes patience, time, and much internal effort.
Robi Damelin
“The word ‘forgiveness’, when it comes from some place genuine, is an extremely powerful word. Nations can be changed with this word.” Robi Damelin
In the spring of 2002, Robi Damelin’s 28 year-old son David was killed by a sniper while serving in the Israeli armed forces. Upon hearing of her son’s death, Robi declared that no blood would be shed in David’s name. She dedicated herself to fostering an open exchange between Israeli and Palestinian families through the Parents Circle-Families Forum. The group provides grieving families with an opportunity for discussion and promotes an understanding of “the other” – the first step towards any type of reconciliation. Yet, when the young man who killed David was apprehended and jailed, Robi’s own grief was tested. Despite advocating for reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, she now had to directly face forgiveness herself. “How can I go around the world talking about reconciliation and peace, if I myself am not ready to start on this path,” she questioned. After months of reflection, Robi wrote a letter to the family of the sniper, which was delivered by Palestinian members of the Parents Circle-Families Forum. “…After your son was captured, I spent many sleepless nights thinking … about what to do, should I ignore the whole thing, or will I be true to my integrity and to the work that I am doing and try to find a way for closure and reconciliation,” she wrote. “Our lives as two nations are so intertwined, each of us will have to give up on our dreams for the future of the children who are our responsibility.” Born in South Africa and with activist roots in the country’s anti-apartheid movement, open and honest dialogue between conflicted communities shapes Robi’s work. Pushing the importance and involvement of political leaders in the reconciliation process, Robi understands the struggle that comes with convincing anyone to steer away from the path of anger and towards forgiveness.
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New Profile “I think Israeli youth are voting with their feet. We don’t trust the establishment anymore. We don’t want to be in war. We don’t want to be in Gaza. We don’t want the world to look at us thinking we’re those terrible, vicious Israelis. We want to be part of the MTV generation, we want to be just like everybody else”. Ruth Hiller, Cofounder, New Profile
New Profile begins with the mandate that war is a matter of choice and therefore, change needs to come from within. As one activist remarked, “We are turning our attention inside, towards Israeli society. If we don’t change, nothing will.” The group strives for a transformation of the nation – from militarization to peace, from oppression to equality, from occupier to respectful neighbour. After having moved from the United States and raising her family in an Israeli collective community, Ruth Hiller’s 15 year-old son declared he was a pacifist. While still three years away from his 18 birthday and enlistment in the Israeli army, Ruth realized she would be unable to help her son evade the mandatory draft. Ruth put her efforts into being a vocal opposition against the war – joining demonstrations and groups for peaceful activism and eventually cofounding New Profile. Working with youth, New Profile aims to instil the idea of peace in the younger generations with the hope that critically thinking about conflict will lead to long-term changes in society. Operating youth groups in several regions of the country, New Profile forums provide a safe space to reflect and openly deliberate current events and political decisions – such as whether or not to enlist in the army. As the movement grew and gained momentum, Ruth’s activism allowed her son – and others like him – to evade imprisonment. Even today, there is little support available for conscientious objectors despite the fact that almost a quarter of every graduating high school class chooses not to serve in the military. Those who make this decision face a possible prison sentence as punishment. New Profile provides a counselling network for those who choose not to enlist, as well as necessary guidance and support. In 2009 alone, New Profile assisted approximately 2000 conscientious objectors. Still, three quarters of youth do choose to enlist, whether willingly or as a result of social pressure. A large part of the problem is the deeply ingrained militarism in Israeli society. From playgrounds filled with cannons and warplanes, to ‘educational’ lectures from military leaders, to advertisements glorifying military service, the message that war is good is everywhere. For entire generations raised in this environment, the notion of a world without conflict doesn’t even register. In 2008, New Profile led the “Making Militarism Visible” campaign to expose the subtle ways that war and aggression have been naturalized in Israel. The Campaign has transformed into a roaming exhibit, instigating dialogue one person and one community at a time. This progressive organization also operates a legal aid network that involves a number of law firms offering legal support for resisters and their families. The legal branch advocates for the universal human right to conscientiously object enlistment to be enshrined in Israeli law, while also dealing with the day to day legal complications of an embattled clientele.
Artwork collected by New Profile from an Israeli nursery school colouring book
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Despite the much needed and highly successful side projects, New Profile’s focus remains empowering the next generation. The heavy emphasis on security in Israel has significant implications on a young population constantly surrounded by the idea they are under threat. As one member commented, “I’m still realizing what I’ve been brought up with.” New Profile is a group that actively works to decrease militarism in Israel’s society by supporting youth who choose not to participate in the mandatory military service. New Profile provides legal and counselling services to those who identify as conscientious objectors and are often jailed as a result. • www.newprofile.org • www.twitter.com/NewProfileOrg • info@newprofile.org
Haneen Zoabi When the state of Israel was formed in 1948, the Palestinian population significantly outnumbered its counterparts. Since then, the numbers have changed and Arabs are a minority within the country – with heavy restrictions placed on their freedoms. Within the political system their presence in Israel’s governing Knesset is even smaller. Haneen Zoabi
“You can’t enter negotiations without asking the occupiers to end the occupation… How can you discuss negotiations without challenging reality on the ground?” Haneen Zoabi
For women, the situation is worse: they face discrimination as Arabs and then again as women in a deeply patriarchal society. In spite of this, women – like Haneen Zoabi – are challenging the status quo and entering politics. Haneen is the first Arab woman from a party representing Arabic interests to sit on the legislative body of the Knesset. Paving the way for others, her party, Balad, now has a one-third minimum of women candidates. A priority for Haneen is the need to recognize Palestinians as equal citizens in Israel. The state cannot view granting citizenship as a favour, Haneen argues; “I am not an immigrant. This is my homeland. We are the indigenous people.” Citizenship rights, however, are continually ignored, and students are not even allowed to study Palestinian history in Arab schools. Yet the idea of equality is a complex one that stands in the way of any successful peace agreement. Haneen explained that Palestinians cannot be equal in a “Jewish State,” as this is both a religious and political statement. “I am not Palestinian in the Knesset. I’m a non-Jew. No Palestinians or Arabs are mentioned in the law. They are referred to either as non-Jews, Israeli Arabs, or minority peoples,” Haneen stated. Underlining that this requires a transformation of the basis under which negotiations take place, Haneen argues that there needs to be a challenge to the occupation – not just a freeze of further settlement. Negotiations have been approaching the idea of peace with a flawed logic, spurred by the refusal to acknowledge the unequal situation created by the occupation. Refusing to broach the subjects of equality and citizenship, negotiators act as if each side comes to the table on equal terms while in reality the opposite is true. Within this frame of inequality between Israelis and Palestinians lies the marginalization of women. Yet Haneen believes the two are intimately connected; when people learn to reject discrimination, all marginalized groups are liberated. Despite being a small group in the Israeli government, Haneen insisted that “real negotiation is taking place on the ground” and that her party represents an important voice that needs to be heard.
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Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel In October 2000, Israeli police shot and killed 13 Palestinians during street demonstrations. With no support or signs of redress from the government, the families of the dead turned to Adalah for help.
“It’s very easy to grow up in the JewishIsraeli majority community and be totally ignorant, totally blind. And if you don’t see it, it doesn’t exist. I think the biggest thing we at Adalah are doing is not letting them be ignorant.” Orna Kohn, Senior Attorney, Adalah
Meaning “justice” in Arabic, Adalah promotes and defends the rights of Palestinian and Arab citizens in Israel. The organization is the only independent human rights organization providing legal support for their community, and uses international law to bring cases in violation of Palestinians’ constitutional and human rights to Israel’s Supreme Court. Adalah maximizes resources by taking on cases with broad impact. For example: the lawsuits of individual Palestinian prisoners who are denied their basic rights are used to demonstrate that Palestinian prisoners suffer discrimination as a group due to racist policies and laws. According to the organization, there are over 6,500 Palestinians classified as “security” prisoners – from those convicted of murder to affiliating with certain groups. They are imprisoned in harsh conditions, prohibited physical contact with outside visitors, denied education or rehabilitation, and undergo severe isolation. Over 200 of these prisoners are women, and more distressing – some 300 are children under 18. In contrast, Adalah found that Israeli prisoners convicted of organized crime are allowed access to a telephone, and even a noted assassin was allowed visitors. Despite this, the discrimination in Israel’s justice system is difficult to prove and Adalah activists continually face resistance – not only from authorities, but also their fellow community members. One lawyer mentioned that her work has angered friends, as they had become conscious to the inequality present in their daily lives. They complain, “We were ignorant and you forced us to see. We were able to live here and not see it; look what you’ve done to us,” she says.
Delegation with the Adalah legal team
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Even with so many obstacles, Adalah has made strides in challenging unfair Israeli laws – especially in promoting the rights of imprisoned Palestinians. After a six-year struggle, prisoners who have young children are now allowed visits and physical contact. The organization also provides legal commentary on proposed and pending legislative bills in the Knesset, as well as offering consultations to individuals, student committees, non-profit groups, and institutions. Adalah continues to advocate on behalf of the most basic rights of Palestinians. The organization launched a challenge against a Citizenship Law banning unification of Palestinian citizens of Israel and those in the Occupied Territories – which forces families to live apart. Even though the Supreme Court dismissed the suit, Adalah persists with its fight against the restrictions, challenging new amendments, and submitting documents to the United Nations. Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel was established in 1996 to promote and defend the legal rights of Palestinian and Arab citizens in Israel. The group provides consultations, brings legal interventions to Israeli courts, and appeals judgements to international institutions. • www.adalah.org • www.facebook.com/Adalahpage • www.twitter.com/adalahcenter • adalah@adalah.org
Reporters interview delegates in Hebron
Displaced peoples speak with delegates in East Jerusalem
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Sahar Vardi As a child, Sahar Vardi often accompanied her father in the countryside as he worked with Palestinian villagers. The peace activist would share stories of Palestinians attempting to cross checkpoints and the reprehensible treatment they endured – instilling activist roots in the young girl. “The shock was not from the brutality of the occupation or of a specific soldier,” Sahar recalled, “but from witnessing the day to day situation of going through checkpoints, fearing the demolition of their homes, and knowing that every 18 year-old soldier has the power to control their life. I could not bring myself to be that soldier and to hold such power over people who are my equals.” After graduating from high school, the teenager wrote a letter to Israel’s Minister of Defence and other government officials detailing the reasons for her refusal to serve. In her letter she recounted her early experiences with the Palestinian villagers; “They did not seem to be any different to me than most people I saw walking down the streets. The only visible difference was that they had green IDs... I did not understand the full meaning of the different colour of the ID, but I did understand the simple meaning: separation.” Sahar was imprisoned for six months.
Sahar Vardi speaking with the delegation
“The bloody cycle in which I live…. is a vicious circle that is sustained by the choice of both sides to engage in violence. I refuse to take part in this choice.” Sahar Vardi, Shiministim Activist
Now in her early 20s, Sahar is part of Shministim, a group of conscientious objectors who refuse to enter the mandatory Israeli military service. Believing in peace and the possibilities of reconciliation, the Shministim are repeatedly imprisoned for refusing the draft. Sahar is also an active voice against the eviction of Israeli Arabs to build more Jewish settlements. While walking through the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood in East Jerusalem, she noted that four large families of over 200 people have already been evicted. The area has become a place for weekly joint Israeli-Palestinian protests. Families who are evicted are given no new housing and no compensation, becoming refugees as their property is seized. Her work is not without its risks: Sahar has endured being spit on, sworn at, and physically assaulted. Despite having been arrested multiple times, with three indictments to her name, the young activist’s resolve to continue her work remains steadfast. It is her responsibility as an Israeli, Sahar stated, to be vocal in resisting the government’s occupation of Palestine.
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Coalition of Women for Peace During the Second Intifada, or Second Palestinian Uprising, then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak returned from failed negotiations and said that there was simply no partner for peace in Palestine. The countless women who had spent years promoting dialogue, equality, and nonviolence between the two nations were left feeling stunned and bitterly disappointed that the Israeli government had been unable to find common ground with the Palestinians.
Eilat Maoz speaks with delegates
Peace Activist Eilat Maoz said that while some of her allies gave up hope, the peace movement regrouped and grew stronger; “It was crucial to create a platform in which women who were working against the occupation and for peace and justice for many, many years could come together to increase their visibility and their possibility to influence the public discourse.” The Coalition of Women for Peace was established in 2000 as a result, bringing together independent women and feminist peace organizations. The group creates a platform for women to join together and influence public discourse by bringing women’s issues to the forefront of the mainstream anti-occupation movement. Eilat, who serves as General Coordinator, noted that coming together into the coalition “was like creating a megaphone, a speaker for our little voices.”
“In Israel, the concept of ‘security’ is a powerful one. It is used to justify all military activity and the occupation of Palestinian territories. ‘National security’ is a phrase invoked not just to increase military budgets, but also to silence critics and prevent transparency.” Member of Coalition of Women for Peace
The women of the Coalition have continued to promote peace and nonviolence in the region. In 2006, they mobilized against the Second Lebanon war, holding daily demonstrations in Haifa in addition to organizing national peace protests. The Coalition continues to campaign against the occupation of Palestine and the militarization of the Gaza strip – with the activists dedicated to ensuring all citizens are allowed to live without restrictions. Inspired by the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, one of the Coalition’s main undertakings is the Occupation Industry Research Projects to determine what makes the occupation profitable and for whom. Eilat, who called it “activist research,” said it was designed to deepen the discussion surrounding boycotts and divestment from Israel. With the dominance of a masculine militarism in Israeli society, Eilat emphasized the importance of women being front and center as actors for peace. The Coalition is not only committed to end the occupation and find an alternative to militarism, it is also actively engaged in advocating for the full involvement of women in peace negotiations. The group focuses on coalition-building between organizations as a way to build room for dialogue and ensure the peace movement is inclusive – often reaching out to marginalized groups such as the large Russian-speaking minority. The Coalition is committed to capacity building within its member organizations, providing assistance in raising and managing funds for projects such as the political empowerment of young women, as well as leading workshops focused on eradicating racism and advocating for peace. Coalition of Women for Peace was founded in 2000. A feminist organization against the occupation of Palestine, the Coalition is a leading voice in the peace movement within Israel bringing together women from diverse identities together for a just society. Activities include capacity-building, media outreach, legal assistance, and research. www.coalitionofwomen.org • www.facebook.com/pages/Coalition-of-Women-for-Peace/94205446262 • www.twitter.com/cwp_live • cwp@coalitionofwomen.org
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At a Glance: MORE PARTNERS FOR PEACE
’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center B for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories was established in 1989 by academics, lawyers, journalists and members of the Knesset. The group documents human rights violations within the Occupied Territories in an attempt to transform policy and ensure that Israel complies with international law. • www.btselem.org • mail@btselem.org
J erusalem Center for Women was established in 1994 as a direct result of discussions between prominent Israeli and Palestinian women on how to include more Palestinian women in civil and political society. The center provides leadership training for young Palestinian women, as well as draws international attention to violations of Palestinian women’s rights. • www.j-c-w.org • info@j-c-w.org
Stop the Wall is a coalition of Palestinian organizations that coordinate action against the Israeli separation wall. Established in 2002, it has been the main grassroots body to mobilize collective efforts. It is also known as the Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign. • www.stopthewall.org • www.facebook.com/stop.the.wall.campaign • mobilize@stopthewall.org
Just Vision was formed in 2003 in response to the lack of media coverage of Israeli and Palestinians working for peace. Just Vision uses film to share the stories of peacebuilders on the ground, reaching audiences around the world. • www.justvision.org • www.facebook.com/JustVision • www.twitter.com/justvisionmedia • info@justvision.org
Amim: For an Equitable and Stable Ir Jerusalem with an Agreed Political Future was founded in 2000 and seeks a sustainable political solution for Jerusalem. The group monitors developments which could affect the stability of Jerusalem, and is actively involved in outreach on current policies affecting the city. • www.ir-amim.org.il • mail@ir-amim.org.il
Machsom Watch: Women against Occupation and for Human Rights have been reporting daily on the activities at Israeli checkpoints and military courts since 2001. Their reports are published online and sent to elected officials. • www.machsomwatch.org • machsomwatch@gmail.com
Partners for Peace
alestinian Medical Relief Society is a P health organization founded in 1979. The group of Palestinian medical professionals seeks to improve access and quality of healthcare Palestinian peoples receive. • www.pmrs.ps • www.facebook.com/pages/ Palestinian-Medical-ReliefSociety/121621501194412 • www.twitter.com/pmrsonline • pmrs@pmrs.ps Palestinian Working Women Society for Development was established in 1981 and works to end discrimination against women. The group bridges the grassroots and works to develop information and outreach programs to empower women to become leaders in Palestinian society. • www.pwwsd.org • www.facebook.com/PWWSD • www.twitter.com/PWWSD Palestinian Youth Association for Leadership and Rights Activation was established in 1999. Its activities are geared towards Palestinian youth, giving them the tools needed to become upstanding citizens and leaders in society. • www.pyalara.org • www.facebook.com/PYALARA • pyalara@pyalara.org
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abbis for Human Rights was founded in R 1988 to advocate for human rights in the Jewish tradition. It has over 100 members in Israel who are ordained Rabbis and students. • www.rhr.org.il • www.facebook.com/RabbisForHumanRights • www.twitter.com/rhris • info@rhr.israel.net Programme of Assistance to the UNDP Palestinian People began field operations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1980, after the General Assembly adopted Resolution 33/147 mandating the United Nations provide economic and social assistance to the Palestinian peoples. • www.undp.ps • www.facebook.com/pages/UNDP-Palestinianterritory/210952098927077 • www.twitter.com/undppalestinian • info.undpps@undp.org omen’s Centre for Legal Aid and W Counselling was established in 1991. The group seeks to address gender-based violence within the private and public spheres of Palestinian society. The group has an advocacy program, as well as a service unit for women who are victims of violence. • www.wclac.org • www.facebook.com/pages/ Womens-Centre-for-Legal-Aid-and-CounsellingWCLAC/256930734377028 • www.twitter.com/wclac_english • info@wclac.org omen in Black is a global movement of vigils W organized by women wearing black to protest the military policies of government. A vigil in Jerusalem is held every Friday from 1-2:00pm at Paris Square. • www.womeninblack.org/en/jerusalem • gsvirsky@netvision.net.il
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Endnotes
DELEGATION PARTICIPANTS Rabbi Amy Eilberg Co-Director, Yedidya Center for Jewish Spiritual Direction Amy is a frequent speaker in congregations across the United States on Jewish spirituality, peace-making, and Jewish feminism. In 1985, she became the first woman ordained as a Conservative rabbi by the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Amy remains deeply engaged in the peace and reconciliation efforts in Israel-Palestine, as well as on wider issues of conflict in the Jewish community. Ann Patterson Trustee, Peace People Ann is a family therapist at the Quaker Center in Belfast where she provides counselling and support for families from divided communities. She co-founded Peace People, a pacifist movement that played a critical role in promoting the peace process in Northern Ireland. Ann has acted as an independent observer in numerous war-torn countries, previously visiting Palestine in support of the local peacebuilders and human rights activists. Jaclyn Friedman Executive Director, Women, Action, Media! Jaclyn is a writer, performer, pundit, activist, and editor of the hit book Yes Means Yes: Visions of Female Sexual Power and A World Without Rape. A commentator on numerous radio and television shows, her writing has appeared in The Washington Post, The American Prospect, Feministing.com, and Huffington Post. The New Leaders Council named Jaclyn one of 2009’s Top 40 Progressive Leaders Under 40.
Janaan Hashim Lawyer, Amal Law Group LLC Janaan is a criminal lawyer at the first law firm founded in the United States by Muslim women. Previously she served as an assistant defender at the Illinois State Appellate Defender’s Office. Janaan often appears as a guest speaker on issues affecting Muslims, Islam, and women’s rights in Islam. Her talk show can be found on the first radio call-in show produced by Muslims for mainstream America. Jody Williams Nobel Peace Laureate Jody received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for her work to ban antipersonnel landmines through the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Since 2006, Jody has channelled her efforts for promoting sustainable peace through the Nobel Women’s Initiative, which she chairs. She is a prolific writer and recently completed her memoir, My Name is Jody Williams, detailing her work for social justice. Kathleen McIntire Philanthropist & Healer Kathleen is a passionate teacher and healer, committed to women’s issues. With a background in business, she is the owner and founder of MoonBear Sanctuary, a retreat center located on 28 acres in Northern California. Kathleen is currently writing a book, “The Healing of Humpty Dumpty,” that focuses on bringing the feminine back into wholeness.
Partners for Peace
Lauren Embrey President, Embrey Family Foundation Lauren takes issues that particularly affect women – including domestic human trafficking, leadership development, and gender equity – and tackles them through strategic funding. As President and CEO of the Embrey Family Foundation, she directs grants and supports multiple organizations that provide services to mothers, women and children. In 2009, Lauren received the Women that Soar Award for Philanthropy and the Champion of Human Rights Award. Mairead Maguire Nobel Peace Laureate Mairead was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1976 for her extraordinary actions to end the sectarian violence in her native Northern Ireland. She has since dedicated her life to promoting peace and justice around the world. Mairead regularly travels to Palestine and Israel to support local activists in their struggle for human rights, equality, and nonviolence.
Nobel Women’s Staff and Consultants Liz Bernstein Executive Director Liz is the founding Director of the Nobel Women’s Initiative. Previously, Liz served as Coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) for eight years. She lived in Thailand and Cambodia for a decade, where she co-founded the Coalition for Peace and Reconciliation, the Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines, and worked with local peace, justice, and women’s rights organizations.
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Janhabi Nandy Manager of Policy and Advocacy Janhabi is the Manager of Policy and Advocacy for the Nobel Women’s Initiative. Previously, Janhabi worked as an attorney serving the Pacific island nation of Micronesia as an Assistant Attorney General, working as a disability rights attorney on the Navajo Nation in New Mexico, and representing plaintiffs in civil rights and toxic tort cases in New York. Lesley Hoyles Coordinator of Events and Operations Prior to joining the Nobel Women’s Initiative team in June 2010 as the Coordinator of Events and Operations, Lesley worked for a number of non-profit organizations, including Planned Parenthood Toronto and Citizen Advocacy of Ottawa. Lesley is passionate about women’s rights and reproductive rights. She is also a musician and a cyclist. Kim MacKenzie Advocacy and Communications Program Associate Kim is the Program Associate for Advocacy and Communications with the Nobel Women’s Initiative. Prior to this she worked for five years at the Ottawa Community Immigrant Services Organization. There she was the founding Coordinator of the Public Education Program, responsible for devising and implementing public education, cross cultural training, advocacy and communications strategies for the organizations. Judy Rand Photographer, J. Rand Images A freelance photographer and videographer, Judy has worked extensively with the Nobel Women’s Initiative documenting delegations, conferences, and media events. A member of the Professional Photographers of America and the Association of Media Photographers, Judy provides professional videography and photographic services for private, corporate and nonprofit clients. Her portrait studio is located in Huntington, NY.
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Acknowledgements This report would not be possible without the courage of many women in Israel and Palestine who face daily violence and threats for their remarkable work. We dedicate this to them. We would like to thank the organizations and individuals that welcomed us and facilitated our visit, shared their extensive knowledge on the issues facing women in the region, and who contributed so much hard work and thoughtful planning to ensure our visit would have the most impact possible. We would also like to extend our deepest appreciation to Ashley Armstrong, Shannon Sommerauer, Bonnie Thornsbury and the other interns who contributed their talents and passion to this report.
We thank the following for their generous support of this delegation: Cynda Collins Arsenault Gloria Joseph Lauren Embrey Kathleen McIntire Kay Wilemon Margot Pritzker Nancy and Emily Word Sara Vetter Sarah Cavanaugh Trea Yip Funding Leadership and Opportunities for Women (FLOW) of Netherlands Global Fund for Women Kalliopeia Foundation MDG3 Fund of the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs University of Houston Graduate College of Social Work
Delegates passing through a checkpoint in Hebron
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Advocating for peace, justice & equality
Come & See A Call from Palestinian Christians
A Journey for Peace with Justice Guidelines for Christians Contemplating a Pilgrimage to the Holy Land 2
Come & See
Come & See A Call from Palestinian Christians
A Call from Palestinian Christians
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Introduction These guidelines were developed in 2010 at a consultative meeting in Geneva to promote justice tourism for pilgrims to PalestineIsrael. Representing 14 countries, a group of 27 theologians, Palestinian Christian activists and professionals in the tourism industry called on Christian pilgrims to live their faith as they visit the Holy Land, going beyond homage of ancient sites to show concern for the Palestinian people living there whose lives are severely constricted by the Israeli occupation of their lands. The meeting was organized by Alternative Tourism Group (ATG) in cooperation with the Ecumenical Coalition on Tourism (ECOT), Kairos Palestine and the World Council of Churches (WCC) through its initiative the Palestine-Israel Ecumenical Forum (PIEF). ATG is a Palestinian NGO specializing in tours and pilgrimages that incorporate critical examinations of the Holy Land’s history, culture and politics.
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Affirming our Common Humanity: A Pilgrimage of Transformation The decision to visit the Holy Land is the first step in an amazing journey. Whether this will be your first pilgrimage to the Holy Land or you have visited many times before, we ask you to consider how Christians might best reflect the teachings of Jesus Christ when they are in the land where He walked. This journey will reveal —in contrast to daily headlines that make us feel helpless and inured to suffering and violence— that there is hope for bringing the fruits of peace to all. What is yet needed is the momentum and commitment of people of faith and courage. This pilgrimage of transformation will show us how each of us can be a peacemaker in our own small or large ways.
“If you want peace work for justice” Pope Paul VI
“If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor. If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a mouse and you say that you are neutral, the mouse will not appreciate your neutrality” Archbishop Desmond Tutu
These guidelines has been written for visionary pilgrims and visitors seeking an authentic, face-to-face human encounters in the Holy Land, who wish to connect with the Palestinian Christians -- the “Living Stones” who share their faith. It contains tools including Biblical reflection (page 10) and a Code of Conduct for Tourists in the Holy Land (page 16) to help plan and prepare—practically and spiritually-- a Pilgrimage of Transformation. Additional detailed planning and education resources are listed on pages 18-22. Today you are invited to a journey of truth and transformation that will reveal the love of God to you through the eyes of the Palestinian people who, despite having suffered decades of occupation and dispossession-- maintain their dignity, faith, and capacity for hope.
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The Kairos Call from Palestinian Christians: In a Land Holy to Three Faiths, Occupation is a Sin Kairos (
): an ancient Greek word meaning the right or opportune moment
In December 2009, Palestinian Christian leaders launched the Kairos document, a statement that shares their daily realities of life under occupation and calls on Christian sisters and brothers and churches worldwide to be witnesses to these realities, to be in solidarity, and to take action. The following are excerpts. Today we have reached a dead end in the tragedy of the Palestinian people. The decisionmakers content themselves with managing the crisis rather than committing themselves to the serious task of finding a way to resolve it…It is a policy in which human beings are destroyed, and this must be of concern to the Church… These days, everyone is speaking about peace in the Middle East and the peace process. So far, however, these are simply words; the reality is one of Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, deprivation of our freedom and all that results from this situation…
“They say: ‘Peace, peace’ when there is no peace” (Jer. 6:14).
We believe that our land has a universal mission. In this universality, the meaning of the promises, of the land, of the election, of the people of God open up to include all of humanity, starting from all the peoples of this land... It was the initiation of the fulfillment of the Kingdom of God on earth.
“The earth is the Lord’s and
God sent the patriarchs, the prophets and the all that is in it, the world, and apostles to this land so that they might carry forth a universal mission to the world. Today those who live in it we constitute three religions in this land, (Ps. 24:1). Judaism, Christianity and Islam…It is the duty of those of us who live here, to respect the will of God for this land. It is our duty to liberate it from the evil of injustice and war. It is God’s land and therefore it must be a land of reconciliation, peace and love...
”
Our appeal is to reach a common vision, built on equality and sharing, not on superiority, negation of the other or aggression, using the pretext of fear and security.
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We say that love is possible and mutual trust is possible. Thus, peace is possible and definitive reconciliation also. Thus, justice and security will be attained for all. In order to understand our reality, we say to the Churches: Come and see. We will fulfill our role to make known to you the truth of our reality, receiving you as pilgrims coming to us to pray, carrying a message of peace, love and reconciliation. You will know the facts and the people of this land, Palestinians and Israelis alike. At the same time we call on you to say a word of truth and to take a position of truth with regard to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land. The entire document along with other resources can be found on the Kairos Palestine website: www.kairospalestine.ps
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Justice Tourism and the Palestinian Tourist Sector Transformational pilgrims to Palestine are also justice tourists, seeking to understand and make a positive difference in the lives of people whose lands they visit. Meeting Palestinians who are living under occupation is an act of solidarity that brings hope to the people and contributes to their economic development. Like the rest of the Palestinian economy, tourism faces unique difficulties caused by the Occupation. Israel controls all entrances into Palestine and, favoring its own tourist industry, Israel severely restricts business in Palestine. However, while more tourists still visit only Israel, the number of visitors to Palestine has been increasing annually. The Palestinian community has developed compelling and unique tour itineraries and programmes for visitors and pilgrims. The Code of Conduct for tourists to Palestine provides information, guidelines, and protocols for visitors while publications such as the excellent Palestine and Palestinians Guidebook are tremendously informative resources for trip planning. Justice tourism to Palestine has as its ultimate goal: “promoting peace with justice for the people in the Holy Land.” Engaging churches, social movements and faith-based organizations to promote Pilgrimages for Transformation, it is hoped that pilgrims will be inspired by and will work for justice-based peace and reconciliation for the Palestinians and Israelis.
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“Justice tourism, one of the most effective means of promoting understanding, mutual education, economic exchange and environmental protection, has a central role to play in these efforts…tourists with a commitment to social justice – justice tourists - have the opportunity, not only to make positive contributions to the communities they visit, but to become holders of the knowledge that will one day lead to equality, democracy, and
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human rights for all. Rami Kassis Alternative Tourism Group
Affirming the Love of God for All
We know that certain theologians in the West try to attach a biblical and theological legitimacy to the infringement of our rights. Thus, the promises, according to their interpretation, have become a menace to our very existence. The “good news” in the Gospel itself has become “ a harbinger of death” for us. We call on these theologians to deepen their reflection of the Word of God and to rectify their interpretations so that they might see in the Word of God a source of life for all peoples. [2.3.3]
“My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge…” Hosea 4:6a (RSV)
“...It is a call to repentance, to revisit fundamentalist theological positions that support certain unjust political options with regard to the Palestinian people. It is a call to stand alongside the oppressed and preserve the word of God as good news for all...God is not the ally of one against the other, nor the opponent of one in the face of the other. God is the Lord of all and loves all,
Our connectedness to this land is a natural right. It is not an ideological or a theological question only. It is a matter of life and death. There are those who do not agree with us, even defining us as enemies only because we declare that we want to live as free people in our land. We suffer from the occupation of our land because we are Palestinians. And as Christian Palestinians we suffer from the wrong interpretation of some theologians. Faced with this, our task is to safeguard the demanding justice from all Word of God as a source of life and not of death, so that “the good news” remains what it is, “good news for us and for all. In face of those who use the Bible to threaten our existence as Christian and Muslim Palestinians, we renew our faith in God because we know that the word of God cannot be the source of our destruction. [2.3.4] from Kairos Palestine, an appeal from Palestinian Christians
...”
Beyond the rhetoric and the media spin is a reality of suffering that has been denied for decades. Churches have done a grave disservice to their flocks by ignoring the plight of millions of dispossessed Palestinians. As Christians living in the Holy Land, we have faith
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that when our fellow Christians from around the world gain access to a more comprehensive picture of our reality, they will no longer be able to ignore our cry for peace with justice. In many countries today, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands and the oppression this brings to their daily lives is not well understood and is often obscured in the media and by powerful interests. While some are misled and disempowered to speak or act, many Christians and other people of conscience feel disturbed by a one-sided narrative that justifies the ongoing occupation and its gross human rights violations. With this background, some come to the Holy Land as spectators, touring holy sites as they would museums, not caring or realizing that for Palestinian Christians these are living places of worship. Reflecting the pious practices of the Pharisees, they search for a personal blessing, seeking to renew an egocentric, individualistic faith. What they choose to see and do only reinforces their prejudices, preconceived notions, and limited understanding of a complex situation. Yet true faith requires more from a Christian than purveying stereotypes and untruths and supporting injustice. The genuine Christian pilgrim seeks the living Christ in the now, in solidarity with the oppressed, the poor, and the imprisoned. They look for truth and seek justice, supporting and blessing both Palestinian and Israeli peacemakers.
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Spiritual Elements of an Authentic Pilgrimage A true Christian pilgrimage to Palestine is an invitation to “come and see”: a journey to find new and deeper truths about ourselves and the meaning of our Christian faith and be transformed so that we may test and approve what is the will of God – what is good and well-pleasing and perfect.” (Romans 12: 2).
“ Justice denied anywhere
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diminishes justice everywhere Martin Luther King Jr.
We embark on a purposeful and respectful journey with the Palestinian Christians through their land and history, taking sufficient time to listen, reflect, and pray with them. Hearing their stories may challenge us to unlearn much of what we “know” and “understand” about Palestine and to relearn through experiencing the realities of Palestinian life and their struggle for justice. Christian pilgrimage must comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable. Based on the relationships we build with Palestinian Christians on our pilgrimage, we can seek truth and paths to peace and reconciliation by: 1. Listening to the Biblical reflections of local Christians, the descendants of the first Christians, whose experiences have given them a deep and personal understanding of the Scriptures that forms the basis of Palestinian Christian theology. 2. Making connections between our lifestyles and the national policies of our countries and the injustices Palestinians live with each and every day. As these connections become clear, accept the responsibility to respond by working for a transformation in our own lives and home communities. 3. Experiencing the diverse environment of Palestine by accompanying Christian Palestinians on visits to their Muslim brothers and sisters to share and learn from each other. 4. Offering a voice of comfort to the Palestinian people as we hear about their daily humiliation, anger, frustrations, and struggles. 5. Committing to stand with Palestinians in their struggle for dignity and freedom.
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Biblical Insights for a Pilgrimage of Transformation Too often, we can be like the dead Lazarus, wrapped in cloth, unaware of the world around us, and the people in it. Jesus calls us to come out, to come back to life, to make the difference we are meant to make in the world. As St Paul says in 2. Cor, 5:17: “Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old has gone, the new has come!” The story of Lazarus reminds us that for God nothing is impossible —even death is not an obstacle— and that we must not accept the premise that a just peace in Palestine-Israel is beyond reach. The Bible itself is an inspiration to see our entire lives as a pilgrimage and to live like a pilgrim every day. The whole Bible is about God’s determination to bring his creation back to a new relation with the divine, to “…a better country, that is, a heavenly one.” (Hebrews 11: 16) In Hebrews 13 we also learn about “...brotherly love and hospitality to strangers, for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.” What should be even more important to Christians than the holy sites are the communion of living saints at the pilgrimage places. Journeying to a place of divine blessing, presence, and power should be done in the context of human living. Because we are all members of Christ’s body, we cannot be witnesses to other Christians’ lives without caring about their expressions of faith, their traditions, their joys and struggles.
“Jesus looked up to heaven and prayed to his Father, closing with these words: “Lazarus, come out!” When Lazarus came out of the tomb, Jesus told the people to remove his
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grave clothes. John 11:43-44
“He has told you, O mortal, what is good and what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly
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with your God? Micah 6:8
“Rejoice with those who rejoice; mourn with those who
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mourn
Roman 12: 15
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God intervenes in human history whenever life is threatened, abused and destroyed– for the slain Abel, Uriah, Naboth, the slaves in Egypt, the poor and the widows. God revives the dry bones that “come to life, stand on their feet and become a great army” (Ezekiel 37:10). The reign of God is present wherever life is set free, the blind see, the lame walk and the good news of liberation is announced. God sends the prophets to liberate people from oppression and speak words of judgment. God is on an eternal pilgrimage into our here and now for the sake of justice and love. God’s incarnation in Christ is God’s way of entering into the moral struggles of the world and showing us how to live a truly human life. Jesus identifies himself with all those unjustly treated in order to expose injustice. (See the Parable of the Last Judgment, Matt.25: 25-35)
“The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable
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year of the Lord. Luke 4:18ff (RSV)
“If you love God, you would love the people of God, the people that God created. Many of us Christians love the church - our buildings, monuments, traditions, relics, liturgies, and symbols. In the name of God, we love what we have created but fail to love what God has created – the human being and the rest
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of creation.
Deenabandhu Manchala World Council of Churches
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Connecting with Palestinian Christians For decades, millions of Christian have journeyed to the Holy Land and returned home without even realizing that their pilgrimage was missing something very important: face-to-face human encounters with those who share their faith. Palestinian Christians’ continuous presence for more than 2,000 years in the land of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection gives them a unique connection to Christianity and its traditions. They also share, along with the rest of the Arab world, a culture of hospitality renowned for its warmth and generosity. In addition, Palestinian Christians have vast experience welcoming pilgrims to their land, continuing a tradition their ancestors began centuries ago. As hosts, the Palestinian Christians are able to show visitors holy sites rarely seen by ordinary tourists and can illuminate these sites with a faith that is physically linked to these places. For Palestinian Christians, the holy sites are not mere tourist destinations —they are often their own local churches— places that have meaning in their every day worship. The people in these communities -- the “Living Stones” -- are the keepers of sacred tradition in the Holy Land and protectors of the places that mark events in the life of Christ and the prophets.
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“Come to him, a living stone, rejected by men but approved, nonetheless, and precious in God’s eyes. You too are living stones, build as an edifice of spirit, into a holy priesthood, offering spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus
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Christ.
1 Peter 2:4-5
“Palestinian hospitality is a long lasting tradition dating back to the times of Jesus Christ some
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2000 years ago. Father Richard Potts, editor of The Liguorian. www.TravelPalestine.ps
Who Are the Palestinian Christians ? No one knows exactly the numbers of Palestinian Christians since the great majority of them live in the Diaspora and there is no proper census to know their numbers. Their estimated number, living in Palestine, Israel and the Diaspora, is estimated between 800,000 to one million. They are an integral part of the indigenous Palestinian population and their mother tongue is Arabic. Their history is linked with the early church established in Jerusalem some 2000 years back and their presence never been disconnected in this land. At present, around 50,000 Christians live in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip and make up about 1.2 percent of the total population. In Israel their number is estimated at around 160,000 people. Despite this small percentage, the Christians in Palestine lead a very dynamic community and very active in the field of social services and education. Approximately 45% from the NGOs in Palestine are run by churches or church-related organizations. The majority of Palestinian Christians living abroad are found in USA, South America, Australia, Canada and Europe. This situation is due to the expulsion of around 750,000 Palestinians, including 150,000 Christians, who became refugees in the year 1948, the year of Nakba (Arabic for “catastrophe�). The dispersal of Palestinians since 1948 has spared no one family or group including Palestinian Christians. Palestinian Christians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip belong to the four Christian families: Oriental Orthodox Churches, Eastern Orthodox (Caledonian) Churches, Catholic Churches, and Evangelical Churches. In addition to 13 officially recognized denominations, there are some smaller ones, mainly evangelicals. Palestinian Christians live almost in every governorate in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, although the majority of them live around the holy sites in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. There are approximately ten town and village councils headed by Christian mayors in addition to a number of legislators and ministers in the Palestinian authority.
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Meeting the People of Palestine: Suggestions for meaningful face-to-face encounters with “the living stones.” 1. Visit Palestinian churches, attend their services, and worship with them. Stay and talk. More than a dozen denominations -- representing all four Christian families -exist in Palestine, so it will not be hard to find your church. 2. Choose to tour with a Palestinian tour group and/or guide (see Resources, page 19) for all or at least some of the time. Israeli tour companies are permitted to come into the West Bank, but tourists have found that Israeli tour guides have a very different interpretation of the Palestinian reality, and will discourage tourist from having contact with any “Arabs.” 3. While Israeli tour companies regularly bring their tourists to Bethlehem to visit the Church of Nativity, rarely do their busses spend more than an hour there and no money is circulated into the local economy. You can support the Palestinian economy by enjoying the town of Bethlehem and beyond -- eating in restaurants, visiting shops and staying in hotels. 4. Visit Palestinian social, cultural, educational or theological centers. 5. Make contact with one of the numerous Palestinian civil society groups and organizations who focus on women’s issues, children, human rights, or people with disabilities. Ask if you may visit their programs. 6. Arrange to stay with or visit a Palestinian family. Local tourist companies are happy to match you with a host family whether that is for just one meal or for several days as an overnight guest. 7. Obtain a Palestinian guidebook such as Palestine and Palestinians to give you more ideas and guide you through the country (see Resources, page 19). 8. Explore the country on foot. A journey on the “road less traveled” is an opportunity for encounters with nature, landscape, and culture that would otherwise be inaccessible by vehicle.
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A Code of Conduct for Travelers to the Holy Land This code was developed with input from Palestinian and international organizations in order to present a unified message about responsible tourism in the region. Below are excerpts that we belief are most important for Christians to incorporate into their pilgrimages.
Preparation
To prepare your trip to Palestine, we encourage you to consider including the following in your preparation: 1. Choose an inclusive and balanced itinerary that allows you to visit and stay in different places. 2. Educate yourself by reading guidebooks, travel accounts and articles about current news and events. [See Resources, page 19-23] 3. Establish contact with Palestinians to get up-to-date information about the current situation, safety, local history, culture and customs. 4. Approach travelling with a desire to learn rather than just observe. Leave prejudices behind.
Your trip
Adopting a considerate attitude towards the people you encounter, the environment, and host communities when travelling in Palestine helps to make sure that your trip is beneficial both for you as a tourist and for the hosts.
5. Your attitude
• Respect and learn about the local culture. Although taking pictures is in general welcome, be aware of people›s sensitivity about being photographed: always ask first for their approval. • Observe local customs. Respect local dress codes and dress modestly. • Interact and spend time with local people. Be aware that your cultural values may differ from theirs. They may, for example, have different concepts of time, personal space, communication and society. Other values are not wrong or inferior, just diffeent.
6. Your behaviour:
• Be aware of shortsighted emotional reactions, such as giving money out of compassion. This can be offensive. A Call from Palestinian Christians
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• Make sure that you encounter and engage with the local communities who are struggling for the respect of their dignity. • Support communities in a responsible way, without encouraging them to change their customs in order to adopt yours. • When visiting holy sites, allow members of the respective religious community to guide you.
7. Your use of natural resources:
• Co-operate with locals in conserving precious natural resources. Commit yourself to a moderate use when possible • Be open to experience local standards rather than expecting to find the same conditions as in your home town and/or country.
8. Support the local economy:
• Appreciate local expertise by paying adequately. • Buy local products. • Contribute to ensuring that tourism has a beneficial outcome for the local community.Use local transportation, guides, accommodation, restaurants and markets to benefit the local economy. • Consider giving tips where customary. 9. Remember that the people you encounter have lived under military occupation for many years. Be sensitive when discussing related topics and listen to their points of view. 10. Be inspired by the pilgrim›s journey: take your time to live and experience the daily life of the local people.
Returning home
When you return from Palestine do not hesitate to share your experiences with friends and relations. Your Palestinian hosts will be very happy to know that you keep them in your mind and that you tell their and your stories. In this way, you can strengthen the human side of tourism and enhance its benefits to communities and individuals.
11. Share your experience
• Think of creating links between your community and the community you visited. • Tell the stories of the people you met. • Discuss and debrief with other members of your group (if you travelled together with others). • Share with your family; inform your community; write articles.
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12. Stick to the commitments you made during your trip: • Remember the promises you made to the local people you met and honour them. • Keep the people in your thoughts, pray for them and act when your actions are needed. 13. Allow yourself to be enriched by learning experiences: • Question your stereotypes/generalisations, both the ones you had before the trip and the ones emerging from your experience abroad. • Address prejudices and injustice where you meet them.
14. Take action
• Learn about the involvement and responsibilities of your home country in the Middle East. Expose and confront them when they have been unfair. Address statements you do not agree with, such as inaccurate tourism brochures, stereotyped views of Palestine in conversation and inaccurate or biased media portrayals.
Excerpted from: A Code of Conduct for Tourism in the Holy Land: A Palestinian Inititive, printed by the Palestinian Initiative for Responsible Tourism (PIRT) in 2009. For the complete Code of Conduct or for more information about PIRT, please visit www.pirt.ps
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LEARNING ABOUT THE ISSUES SELECTED RESOURCES For additional resources, please visit
www.pirt.ps to view our expanding list.
PALESTINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS: Al Haq
Independent Palestinian non-governmental human rights organization www.alhaq.org
Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ)
Promoting sustainable development in the occupied Palestinian territory http://www.arij.org
Badil
Resource Center for Palestinian Residency& Refugee Rights www.badil.org
Defence for Children International – Palestine Section
Promoting and protecting the rights of Palestinian children in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) www.dci-pal.org
International Center of Bethlehem
Lutheran-based, ecumenically-oriented institution empowering the local community www.annadwa.org/dar
International Middle East Media Center Independent media coverage of Israel-Palestine www.imemc.org
Joint Advocacy Initiative (JAI) of the East Jerusalem YMCA and YWCA of Palestine
Working for peace with justice in Palestine, based on humanitarian and Christian values. www.jai-pal.org
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Kairos Palestine
Christian Palestinians’ word to the world about what is happening in Palestine www.kairospalestine.ps
Palestine Center for Human Rights
NGO based in Gaza dedicated to protecting human rights www.pchrgaza.org
Palestinian Bible Society
Committed to making the Word of God available to Palestinians www.pbs-web.com
Sabeel
Palestinian Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center www.sabeel.org
ISRAELI HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS: Alternative Information Center
Promoting the human and national rights of the Palestinian people www.alternativenews.org
Breaking the Silence
Israeli soldiers document their time in the Occupied Palestinian Territories www.shovrimshtika.org/index_e.asp
B’tselem
The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories www.btselem.org
Gisha
Legal Center for Freedom of Movement www.gisha.org
Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
Non-violent, direct-action organization to resist Israeli demolition of Palestinian houses www.icahd.org
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Rabbis for Human Rights
Seeks to prevent human rights violations in Israel and in areas for which Israel has taken responsibility www.rhr.org.il
Who Profits?
Exposing the Israeli occupation industry www.whoprofits.org
Zochrot
Israeli citizens working to raise awareness of the Nakba www.nakbainhebrew.org/index.php?lang=english
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT)
Faith-based non-violent support in situations of lethal conflict www.cpt.org
The Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI)
Accompaniment and advocacy efforts to end the occupation (An initiative of the World Council of Churches) www.eappi.org
International Solidarity Movement
Non-violent resistance though international solidarity www.palsolidarity.org
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Reports on the Occupied Palestinian Territory http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/MENARegion/Pages/PSIndex.aspx
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BOOKS: Of the Middle East (2005) by Robert Fisk I am a Palestinian Christian (1995) by Mitri Raheb Palestine—Peace not Apartheid (2006) by Jimmy Carter Palestine in Pieces: Graphic perspectives on the Israeli Occupation (2009) by Kathleen & Bill Christison The Question of Palestine (1992) by Edward W. Said DOCUMENTARIES: Hope in a Slingshot (2008)
www.roninfilms.com.au/feature/1706.html
Occupation 101 (2006) www.occupation101.com
Slingshot Hip Hop (2008) www.slingshothiphop.com/dvd
With God on our Side (2010) www.withgodonourside.com
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PALESTINIAN PILGRIMAGE AND TOURIST RESOURCES: Alternative Tourism Group
Palestinian NGO specializing in justice tourism www.atg.ps
Travel Palestine
The Official Website for Tourism in Palestine www.travelpalestine.ps
Palestinian Initiative for Responsible Tourism
A network of organizations advocating responsible tourism in the Holy Land www.pirt.ps
Visit Palestine
«Your guide to Palestine» www.visitpalestine.ps
GUIDEBOOKS: Palestine and the Palestinians (Second edition 2008)
Published by and available from Alternative Tourism Group: www.atg.ps
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Issued by :
Alternative Tourism Group In cooperation with
Palestine-Israel Ecumenical Forum Ecumenical Coalition on Tourism (PIEF)
A Call from Palestinian Christians
Kairos Palestine
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