1977 CIA Intel Memorandum: Impending Soviet Peak Oil Crisis

CIA FOu.. - THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

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THJI:IMPENDING 10147)

SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-

[THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

Irltelligel1ce J\1emord.l~dum The I1npending Saviet. Oil

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CIA FOr! - THE IMPENDING

SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

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I

路"S~路crct--' ~~ 77路10].1.7 March 1977

NATIONAL

UnquthQri;tcd

SECURITY

INFORMATION

Disdo$l,1re Subject '0 Criminal Sanctions

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CIA FOI.!. - THE IMPENDING

SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

Page 3 of 12

Impending Sov/CI Oil Crisis

lllC'

, The Sovkt oil jnd~lstry Is in trouble. Sm·jetj oil producthln wiIJ ~()()11 peak, , po!:.'iibly liS e<lrly lIS [ICXt ,'year Elnd 'c~ftain[y not !(j(cr th;\n the {~ar1y I 980s. The tcn..:::hed Is likcly to be lJ1twccn

maxiLnum level of output ' per <1<11 (bld)-up

from the

J

" not: Hkely to he maIntllIncd will f~ !iharp.

976 Icvd

for

'I

[Orl!!.

!however, ahd the declin~. wh.en

i

.

The

Sov1c[s

I [ and 12 million

of 10.4 niUlion hid. Maximum

b:HT(;[S

Icvl'1s tiro it

ram cs.

!

Imvc two bask probkms: Qne ofrcscrves :md onc of pmductiotl.

~ B:J'rlioB an extremely fidd. ncw dCPQ~iI5 ~scrv~Ho'production

disco\'crY of a mnssi~'e r.cw field <:lose to ;In existing ";ipidly ~r.Q\!~11 to ma::1t;tin ;;ccept:Jblc ra'jo~. PIHl InoslI fjdd~ th3t f.(:count ror 111(;bulk of $ovic [

unlikely

wilt not' he fou:ld

producHQn are experiencing sevc,~ water cl1crollchmcf\t. As I: resuit, ir;(':xDStH~:Y 111!,gcquantttlcs of waler mU5t be lifted for cfld~ bllrrd or oil pwdu(;cd, IIl1d rugh-capadty submersible plImp~~{)b!!lil1ilble pnlr from th~ United States-will he r!:qui~d

if Prouuclion

dccHm:s ~rc to. be st::\\'cd' off c~':m tcmpo[;Jril}'.

Dudn!:! the Ih::<t dl.!cudo. oiJ to. Ecs(crn

sU;1ply 10

wmpetc for

the current

Ilrld the West o;~ the "resent

Europe

OPEC

{Jil

situatian,

pe-tCC:l( of totll'

tr.c USSR muy well find lt5clf

far its

in which

Sovict

hJrd

owrL use.

cast

the Um]s,

0.1'

rm"

pom

sC;JI~. bu: :1[,0 hiJvif1f, <l m::1fked Ch3:1!;C from

er-rn1nB>. The USSR It:!s brg~' resem:s

cou] and !1ll!l.lrnl ~as, but, tJ1051: sch~dulcd ;If':

tll

of oil to [he West nl1rUl:Jlly pravide- 4U

cxpori~

curn:r.cy

be

-nItS would

no. mdI' Imub1c

cOf1~tlrning

for exploitation

0,' _

ov!:; thc IlC); t dec;ldr.

ccntcrs in the W,'s(eln USSR. Dist<!t1cr..

cl in~;)[e, cmI tc mitt wiil rtwkc exploitation and tn1fiSport dif,icu(t and CXp~rtsh.t" Exports of gas ••••·ill incrcils(:. bllt will no! e(!mpc~I~;;[(,'for the lus.s or c;!rI1iaJ,'!: from th(' eXiJort of oil. A1thQugh somc :WbstitlltiQIl of C(1a] und !::IS (or oil in aOJTI(',t[c U~~ will bIJ pO:>sibk

It! !I'(\!DJ1g

-- -----------..

Iho ('ffcct

or sLlch

5r;bstJI1I(/or:

will he rnklimld

..

Null,!: CO!T1 f!l'" h., directed IQ 11t· '''''3 qucrlcs lite

HIn.

Offic:: of

Ecmwmk:

n,'l~Llrdlt)gtltl" l11emD:andlill:

ilrc

Wl'kn Il1C, Th(')' IU;'''

Re.<;t~":ch

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CIA FOIA - THE IMPENDING

Page 4 of 12

SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

tn the shon run. Neither hydrocll!ctric power tr[]t1smlncd from the cust nor c(mstrllction of nudear cledtic plants (mahlly in thi:' westcrn USSR) can be expected to nfford fnt.1ch relief in the: Sovlct energy situation for r~()fi~ than :1 d{'cade.

,

---The Problem L Unlike the United StQIL's. whkh has long restricted production for rea~On5 of conservation and profit. the USSR ~avQrs u forced draft appro:Jch. Short-term nt'rr......r.ilro':",n

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CIA FOlPJ- THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

1··'Vu"' •••••.• "

015"'''''' •.•,••

""U"~I ••••.••I,;U

cKccedll1!: them with (HUe regard

IIVU,".

Page 5 of 12

\;!;Hlngs, lino rcwaras

JlU~

are given

[Or

over the longer to:ran. Und"1' these

to productivity

conditions, Sovi~t productlon has expanded much morc rapidly In the last 20 years thlln that of the United States.

Soviet and US Crude 011 Production 1I11l101

fIGURE

1

BrD

I~

D

80

1Bse

2.

The

815

Soviet

70

stnkhllnovire

"

:.Jpproach

has

76

led

to

l--

no

811

proJltCtl'd--"

(a) :!I'I emphasis

on

development drming ovcr CXplOflllion. with thc rcsult thut new discoveries arc failing to keep pl\CC with output growth: (b) O\'crprodLlctJon of existing wells und fields through

rapid water

injection

j)il In place is ultimately will run f!if beyond

productIon-such plan-clIn rnpld.

only worsen

recovered;

the Soviet

1111Ilrc

nnd other

methods.

with

the res\J(t that less of the

IInd (c) new capadt)\: requirements

011 indu$try's

cnpubility,

Efforts

that soon

to further

im:reilsc

dcri'umdl!d by the gOllts of the reccntly annoLlnced S;ycor the :dluatlon und mnk\! Iho Cycntulll downward slide morc

L

~J

USSR: PtlJdm:lion of Crud~ Oil.'

by Rt'gloll MnUan Dnrnb

1'1<'1

DDl

CiA F.stlm~tc:.s

n___,

Tllrtnr Kllybysltev . UrnlsVol!:1I, Wcskrn region and Unll$ TOI;\I

1;70 DlIsnklt

12.80 COli 2.8S 9.82 NAI .

0.81 0.69 5.71 1975 6.00

.1.06

0.8( : !4.17 .' 0.70 .2,0 I5.80

or Puk Oul~ 19&0_

tU

5.6 1.9 4.1

~~~ )

..:. . I:.f!gb

4.9 3.:5 O.rLaw 11.0

L.S 0.5

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CIA FOIAI- THE IMPENDING

SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

n:rm

U.:.J;Z

U.45

Orcn bu rx

0.1 5

0.14 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.47 0.35 0.23

, 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.69 0.41

wWl:r Volgn Udmurt

&nllov !kJorus.11" Cnuc:ns.us

lv.~fb31'd7.h31\

i

1.74

0.6

05

0.6

0.4

0.2 ) 0.4

1.0

0.1:7

Otbcr

O.Oj

0.07

Kornl :lOd Arklumgel'sk

0.15 1.26 0.63 0.58

0.22 3.82

(!.SO;

0.4

1.09:

6.1

2.Q6

6.16;

5.2

S.l

0.82

Ni\.

0.9

0.8

West S!bcr.13

Cenlrlll Ad::!

j

0.62,

Ukflllne

Eutem r~glon

j,.

Page 6 of 12

;).2

MiJl'ip-s..'IIlIk

O.2t

Ernba TurkmcCl

O.OS

0.40 } 0.08

0.29

0.31

Ollwr

O,QJ

Snkhlllln

: 0.05

0.04

Other

. Nest

N~gI J O.OJ

IrwllloJillJ

j

Ne!!!

OJ

1

0.4

("I

0.54 0.28 .

i.

O.II}'

0.1

0.1

~I eon~n~E~.

I 3.: As the ruUtl of resoryt! 10 output hus f{lUen, the bulk of SO'o'kt OI,l(I'I(lt has come Increaslng!y from Odd!! npprotlching ckhtlusUon. Tbo rc~;ult IIIIS been o.n

or drillirtg rCClllircment~. whkh wil! !evel oN' or decline onl)' when-and If-v..:'ry 路!tlr~!,) new nflditiOfl~ urd mude to the producing reserve bl1sc, llH~ SOIt'i~t.s

Dc~cleri1tion

51>.:o:lkof this prOblem

In terms

br

fhe depl~tion

of(.<;ct-thc umollot

of new CII/lllcity

rcqilit~d 10 oft'sct dr:j'lll'1ion of! old ('u]lm:itr : In c.nch S-ycor plnn p~rlod.

4.

During the 1961路65 pl:m period. ol1ly Ij l11il!Jojt bId (67 mi1lion hms per !/\'ar) of c~rJlH;111' had to be rcplac.:d, In 1971-15,5.1 million bl<! (254 miliim1 tQn~ per y~ur) of f'CIII,lcclfll:nt cnpndty. Wjl,.'I required b\!C1lll~r: of mph! dcplctJon. Viewed in. Linother WLlY, about 72 ~rccm of 1970 cllpuciry h"d to b<: rcpla~ed by the end of 1975. 11111 target for the 1976路80 plun is 10.6-/0.8 million bId {S30-S40 miUion tOrts per ycarLof new, capacity; 7.8 million b/<J-cq:!ul t.o IIbout BD. percent of the c:!podty on !in., In .t975.-i!tlo 1?rf~el dcpTi:t!on. If dcph:tion record, it may Is more rapId thu!! the SOViets expect-nnd. based olflhclr-past wdl bu-oonsidcrably more of thc 1975 capacit):wHl have to be replaced.

5. There is unccrt;\inty :!bou[ thc Si7-C I,f thc USSR's r~crvcs. becausc of definition:!1 problems as welt as Soviet sccrr::y. Our best estim:Hc is that Soviet proved rescrves are )D-)S, billion balTcls, rOl,lghly comparable with those of the United States. There is tlO doubr that Russinn proved reserves have bccn ramng in recC'nt yca~. and tbere is very little chance that cnouWllicW oil will be discovcred during the next few y<.',m to apprcci:Jbl>' improve tile rcscrves-ta-production ratio.

Inde-cd. despite rncJor efforts it wHl probably dctcriotrltc further. potcnti<ll tcscrves in Arcti~. Easl 6.

AlthDUgh Ihe USSR has nbund.mt Sibcri.:m. and offshore arcaS. development of such rescrvcs is at least a decade away.

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CIA FOIAI- THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

Thu~.· during the ncxt 8·10 yellPl. almost existing

fields

cnd

from

new fields

in

all Soviet OUll1tH will Imllc 10 come from C~

The Outlook f(lt OL.ltput from Exhtirlg 7. ,r:,.om World either

from

Urals·Volgn

Wllr

the Caspian

Page 7 of 12

~srin8 producing

Production

Rl.'gluns

U through 1970, the wowth In'Soviet oil output came-

fields

Of. ofto'r the

mid·19SOs,

"e!lft~ :111output

rt!l):ion. Since ,1970.

from the idant SnmoUcir field. Current

aggregate

!lenrty comtLlnt

west

~f ,

We

the, Urals wilt

I:wll1

whilo that

of W1..'st I Slbcrlll

~

in the

Soviet pl::ms ~1!1tfor hOlding

the Urnls. while ' doubling

West Slb"nll. Becuuse or a variety of problems. docllne.

from Inr~~ fields

growth hns comc (rom West

Slbcrill, primarily output

rcs:iol'\$.

production

It,

bcHcve thut output w('st of

~.

fnll fat ~hort of doublln~.

i~

8.

Production from I1cld5 in t1'l6 wc5tcrn p~rt of the COll11try <:omln~ inc~lIilngly from (tI'CO!C!f dapth!l and from In-Oil drilling which allows mOfl: Intcn:;l\'c exploitation

of already

tapped

rcscf\'oln. All growth

.

~

.t .

i

.

II ;i I

in output

through

1 ~80 wUl

i'

,

I

__i_~

I

USSR: Additions to 011Producing Capacity

FIGURE

2

10.8

,

;I, ; 1.8

,i

'1.1,

,!jIiII;I ,j

5.1 i

,

I

--,iIIi. ;

,

!

i

;Iii '. 'r;

jI i" •

I Tl

.:

:

GROY/TH

MtLUON BARRELS OF' OIL PER DAY

. r •..

, f

J

-

I I'

uI

I

~o

7.!1

DEPWI~~OHm

:'I

• D

3.2

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CIA FOIAI- THE IMPENDJNG SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

,.~

Page 8 of 12

,

!

I

'.'

I' i '!

I

i .:

;

:1.8

.: ~

s~ "

comc

from

Wl,:st Silx·rh,. wlwrc Ih •.•il1hIlSI~itllbl(;' dimJltc.

greAtly compllent ••• opcrntions.

distanccs

dlfl1cult

tCfr:rin, imo vust

In 1976. Ilpproxim:Jtl.!!y 60 pcrcclil or West

Sib~rian Ol,tput .md toughly onc-fifth of natiol1rsl proulH:tiC'[1 !..'om•. fraln the gb!1t SurnoUor field on the middle Ob',Sovict $O\.1rccs indicate tlmt this field will rCi1ch peak production In the next ycar or so and wHl hold pcn" Ic\'~I!' for no rnore ropld wuCcr Incllrslon. The .water t!lIt rcached than 4 YCUI'$, It .is already cx~tlst1cJng 47, percent in 1975. :md; incre;:Jsing ,q~l:Jntitics '"Of lJu,id (WZltcr plus ""'oii)' must be. "lifted to recover any givcn:qmmtity of oil. Although new'f'jl.'ltts arc bci'ng discovered In Wes.t Siberia. no gioot: nclds compornble to Samotlor have been found.

The Drilling Problem 9.

The USSR does not have

dcvclopment

IInd cxploration

active dgs., about

U1C

dr1lHng capability

prQgrumsslmultLlncously.

.he same: liS the Untkd

States.

to pursue

adeqW'rtc

The Soviet!' hove soma

I,GOQ

In terms or mctcrs drillt!d, howcvl:r,

thc Sovicl effort amol.lnt$ to only about onc-fifth U13t or Ihe United St:ltes.ln IQ71-75. the Sovjet Ministry of the Oil Industry drilled a lotal of about 52 lI1i!lion m Ncrs.

In 1975

),700

1)10l1c, U:.e United

rigs. Wc estimlltc

SllIlcs drilled

53 million

thl.\t. even with a m:udmum

be: able to come close to drilling by 1980 the their current S·year plan.

7S

effort,

metcrs

with nb-out

the Soviets

will n<)t

miIHon meten: called for by

10.

The poor Sovjet drilling record is in PM! the rc!1.ult of th~ foet (hul 80 percent of their drHHng is done with turbodrilling rigs that :lrc highly inefficient for dcep drilling Or for use in soft form:Jtions.. Grctllcr access to advanced Westcrn tt'Chnology nnd rotary drilling equlpmont could help nltcvllHu the Soviet driIU,,~ ' problem.

The Fluid Uftlng Probl~m 11.

In the 19S0s, wh1:n well!! In the Umls.vo!ga region began 10 stop flowing naturally, tha Soviets were forced t£1 begin pumping. .,At that lime, however, pumping equipment W;1:i in short supply, To foreStall a s'iawdowl1 In th •• growth , of 011 Qutput,

tho SovlOh adopted

the; practico

of mnsslvc Wllter Injection

within

aM along the edge~ of ~Bch field. If;I cnollgh water fs forced loto n formation. ' , It raiscs Soviet

I'C9crvoir pressures

5Iys.tclTI

diffcrs

so Ihllt wells once Ilgtlin now

from the standord

WC'!i'.tcrn

without

~ccQndD.ry recovery

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CIA FOIAI- THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

r

~GRfr--

watcrflooding

ill that the object

MUCQ mON

Page 9 of 12

: J

i

:

Is to inclcll~c r~lhcr t;um just to maIntain

prC'ssure.

t'l h\i~l;tcd thlln oil rrod"ced.

wllter

I

12. ' Althoul::h cycntuuU)' tho wote: the oU-producing

wat~r Injection ciln; boo~t ~rodllctlon for c time, will find 11chllnncl of ICIl~t rcs[stllnc~ :md bred: throllsh'to

ml1<is[vc

well. a prOCLlS that leaves bc~ind

m:H:h 011 In the less rc:t:Jl1cal'.h;

portions of the form;:J.t!~n. When the welts begin I to show -water in large qUlmtWcs. I --.'. the

nlltufC) now

wlU \lslIlll1y stop

and

the wells rnustbc

·pumped.

In this

case,

nowc\'cr, conventional pumping equipment submersible

pumps

arc needed

oil) must be lifted.

because

cQ~not be uscd: special hlgh.cnpncU)o' much lireat~r volumes of fluid (water plus

,

, .

I Such pump~ began to be uscd extensively

13.

In the USSR In the Iiltc 1960s.

In ] 973, t!lc5c pUmp~ provided 2~S million bId of th~ So~ct

tot:ll of B.6 miUion

j j

USSR: Fluid LlttJng RequJrements~ lUn~

IIETillC

FIGURE 3

TD~£

3

J.IOO

.

I~

B~I.!18

-I

I j

I

WATER'

,

.1

,

.j

, iI

a

Df!

IDU

1978

: 11178

11180

plan r.~.1

"'ru.~" "".tII ••. , .,un' r. hlu;~1

1'101_U'.iI;., ••. n

'.'11.' .~I" ••.•••. '~!I.~I••

k

'ioI,

~ •• I!

1111.1 ••

Itn ~

!!'it.

t. CC: ,.'nll' ill nu. '!tI11f •.'t.,. • JUt.

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CIA FOIAl- THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

'--'

(lit 1-

The StJ••.j~t;;. h>ld

bid.

:Ioudt cQUi)1T11cnl

111more

and

mon:

it,;clr manufuc!mc HiLI! the only

12,000 of thes\: pumps in 1915, .md their nced for tJj'lidly a.s water cncroachmcnt becomes a pmhlcm

$01111;

is IncrelJ1i1ng

fields .. Allhougl1 some Wt;::;.tEurofl~un lIation~ und the USSI, 11 lower:

pumps

capacity version of th~sc pumps, the Soviets to dcal with their UrHng problcm

ndequate

rccogni7.c

lire made in the

Un.i!cd States. The 1,000. pumps alrcady purchased from the Unitcd States have higher toted lifting cnpoclty. -[hart the II,aOO-pumps of domestic "'Ofh:;ln. Even In tllC United States, such pumps are nuinufacturcd ·1iy-only-two compllnles and· 11

are· in short

supply,

As

alternative

IIn·

to high-cBpa9lty

submcl'$ible

pumps. at lenst

in some fields, the Soviets are considering wider. use of gas·lift equipment. The kind

of

projects

they

have

In mind :would

retlulre

IIITgc-scalc

Imports

of

US

i

technology nnd lang lead times.'

The Longer Tenn Ou lIook

Th~ Jnit1pl rulloff, wh~n,!t C(lmes, will nlmost certQlnly

14. output

maY continue

to fnll sharply.

level off, or perhaps

even Increasc

fields tire brousmt Iuto production in frontier areas. There Is fields-some

quite

eventually

IUfgl..'-wiU

be discovered,

00 sharp; thcuJnftcr a.•• new

qucstion that new Given tllc rapid ratc or !IO

depletion of exbtlng fields nnd the techn.ical difficulties IIssocllUo::d with c~p!Qrntlon and ex·ploite.tlon In frontier llrens, howcvcr, wc doubt that the new discovcrics

will eome on stream rapidly enough to do mqre thur. temp<)ranJy arrest lhe rapid slide 'of So\'lct output •.

15.

A'!I wO stated earlier, only small nmounts of So••• i!!t production dt.1ting the next decade will come from outside ex.isting prorltldr\g nrc~s. In the early 1980s offshore Cuspl.lln reserves mJ1~' make some small contribution WIll new dlscovcdC!! on th~ Mnngyshhtk Peninsula on the CaSf shore

QUlput, Us the Cospinn and in the PCc!1C>rn region west of the Urals. The Soviets also hope to find oil in dCi:p stru.ctures in the northern part of West Slberia.'s Tyumcn' Oblos(. Limited neW

exploration

to

f'l1-

In this region. how('Vcr. hQ'; ;so fBr yielded 'mainly nalurnl

gas cnd

!

com.lcmiatc.

I j

16. Geo!oglcal conditions of the Arctic offshore l'iglOn!i East Slborlan

lOWland!!,

to Ijtf~ future disco\'crics exist over much (cspcc1a!1y in the Burents and Kara Seas), In the

favClrahlc

In deep

structu~s

lu the Caspil1n nma, ur:d rll:rhupJi. off

nnd Sakhlln in the Sen or Okhotsk. Protlllctlon from most of thcsc arCII:>. howevcr, Is ut lcRst 11 decade away. In. the off~hore Arctic. environment;;!l KI,\I11~llIItkil

7

~;

,

I conditions

arc mucI1 more

SL'Vl;ro

than III thl! North S~i.1:tc-dmolo~y

fot I.'X[1I(]ralion

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+OIL +CRISIS 06/05/3]

CIA FOIAI- THE IMPENDING

SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)

Page 11 of 12

prulJul,;uon coma t",KO pLace Un!iI 10 YC:lts after LI m~lor dis;.covcry-which nul:.y~t

to be m;ujc. The lead time would b~_*ortcr for production irom d~p w~l~ _in the Cusplan region.: the USSR; howcvcr. lacKs the' cqUipt!1cnt an'it cxp~rience' nccc~ary to undertOikc fJ deep :drill1ng program withlJut c"fcnsivc-Wcstcm help.

Economic ImpUcnt!om ,

17.

When oil praductiorl st()PS growing. and perhaps even bt;f()fC. profound repercussions will be fclt on the domestic. economy of the USSR and on Its intctnrlUOlUt'

economic

relations. The c)(tcnt of 1iuch rc(lcrcu!;sion~ c:Jn he only

gue1iScd at wHhoUl rurther

t1.Jscl1rch. At u minimum.

flm USSR will find it extremely

-"difficult

to continuc to simullaneout:1y meet its ('wn requiremcnts and (hose oi En:'ltern Europe white cxpotCing:to non·Communis.t countries on the prC'~cnt !tcllle.

More pcs.~imlsticl3lJy. the USSR wjJI it5dr become 1111 oil importer.

18. I The~ arc Import:Jnt consldcration'! ror tbe S(n;ct Unioll. ] t now supplies three-fourths of the oil required bi' the Cummunist countries of Eastern Europe; nnd It undoubtcdly wi:thc~ to nltull1 the politlcalll!1d economic levcrage Ihut gOC! with being' thclr prJncipll1 ~upplicr. For many years. the cxport or oil to non-Communist countri~~. mllinly in Wcstcm Europe. litis Ir--cH the USSR's IJfj;cst single J;ourcc of IuIrd currency •.

19. ! In the 10n8 run, considernble su,bstltutlon for oil will be p~ ••iblc J. __ • _. _ u , •••• domcstlca1lvnnri .,..,.hll M ;'1 ••••nnrt •••••••••••a ;,.••••• 11 "'M.;' 11C'.:-.•..•...

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transmJS$!on tm~st be ~olycd before such resources can be fully cKploited.Th,:, Soviets -co1'L1ldernucienr power to be the best !iource of new electric PO'.\Il'r in Is under WD!I,but Europqlln areas. A program ror constructing nuclclu' powerplants It will 00 qultG some time bdol'G thc!!c plants ca~;hav~. an tmportant effect 01"1 the; power base. In 1975 nuclear power: repr~sented 2 pe~nt of tOla! pOWer " pnxtuctIon. and .it will reach. Qply about 6 percent In' t 980'--1:. ;. _ . .

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