CIA FOu.. - THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
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THJI:IMPENDING 10147)
SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-
[THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
Irltelligel1ce J\1emord.l~dum The I1npending Saviet. Oil
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+OIL+CRISIS-J06/05/31
CIA FOr! - THE IMPENDING
SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
Page 2 of 12
I
路"S~路crct--' ~~ 77路10].1.7 March 1977
NATIONAL
UnquthQri;tcd
SECURITY
INFORMATION
Disdo$l,1re Subject '0 Criminal Sanctions
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+OIL +CRISIS 06/05/31
CIA FOI.!. - THE IMPENDING
SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
Page 3 of 12
Impending Sov/CI Oil Crisis
lllC'
, The Sovkt oil jnd~lstry Is in trouble. Sm·jetj oil producthln wiIJ ~()()11 peak, , po!:.'iibly liS e<lrly lIS [ICXt ,'year Elnd 'c~ftain[y not !(j(cr th;\n the {~ar1y I 980s. The tcn..:::hed Is likcly to be lJ1twccn
maxiLnum level of output ' per <1<11 (bld)-up
from the
J
" not: Hkely to he maIntllIncd will f~ !iharp.
976 Icvd
for
'I
[Orl!!.
!however, ahd the declin~. wh.en
i
. The
Sov1c[s
I [ and 12 million
of 10.4 niUlion hid. Maximum
b:HT(;[S
Icvl'1s tiro it
ram cs.
!
Imvc two bask probkms: Qne ofrcscrves :md onc of pmductiotl.
~ B:J'rlioB an extremely fidd. ncw dCPQ~iI5 ~scrv~Ho'production
disco\'crY of a mnssi~'e r.cw field <:lose to ;In existing ";ipidly ~r.Q\!~11 to ma::1t;tin ;;ccept:Jblc ra'jo~. PIHl InoslI fjdd~ th3t f.(:count ror 111(;bulk of $ovic [
unlikely
wilt not' he fou:ld
producHQn are experiencing sevc,~ water cl1crollchmcf\t. As I: resuit, ir;(':xDStH~:Y 111!,gcquantttlcs of waler mU5t be lifted for cfld~ bllrrd or oil pwdu(;cd, IIl1d rugh-capadty submersible plImp~~{)b!!lil1ilble pnlr from th~ United States-will he r!:qui~d
if Prouuclion
dccHm:s ~rc to. be st::\\'cd' off c~':m tcmpo[;Jril}'.
Dudn!:! the Ih::<t dl.!cudo. oiJ to. Ecs(crn
sU;1ply 10
wmpetc for
the current
Ilrld the West o;~ the "resent
Europe
OPEC
{Jil
situatian,
pe-tCC:l( of totll'
tr.c USSR muy well find lt5clf
far its
in which
Sovict
hJrd
owrL use.
cast
the Um]s,
0.1'
rm"
pom
sC;JI~. bu: :1[,0 hiJvif1f, <l m::1fked Ch3:1!;C from
er-rn1nB>. The USSR It:!s brg~' resem:s
cou] and !1ll!l.lrnl ~as, but, tJ1051: sch~dulcd ;If':
tll
of oil to [he West nl1rUl:Jlly pravide- 4U
cxpori~
curn:r.cy
be
-nItS would
no. mdI' Imub1c
cOf1~tlrning
for exploitation
0,' _
ov!:; thc IlC); t dec;ldr.
ccntcrs in the W,'s(eln USSR. Dist<!t1cr..
cl in~;)[e, cmI tc mitt wiil rtwkc exploitation and tn1fiSport dif,icu(t and CXp~rtsh.t" Exports of gas ••••·ill incrcils(:. bllt will no! e(!mpc~I~;;[(,'for the lus.s or c;!rI1iaJ,'!: from th(' eXiJort of oil. A1thQugh somc :WbstitlltiQIl of C(1a] und !::IS (or oil in aOJTI(',t[c U~~ will bIJ pO:>sibk
It! !I'(\!DJ1g
-- -----------..
Iho ('ffcct
or sLlch
5r;bstJI1I(/or:
will he rnklimld
..
Null,!: CO!T1 f!l'" h., directed IQ 11t· '''''3 qucrlcs lite
HIn.
Offic:: of
Ecmwmk:
n,'l~Llrdlt)gtltl" l11emD:andlill:
ilrc
Wl'kn Il1C, Th(')' IU;'''
Re.<;t~":ch
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CIA FOIA - THE IMPENDING
Page 4 of 12
SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
tn the shon run. Neither hydrocll!ctric power tr[]t1smlncd from the cust nor c(mstrllction of nudear cledtic plants (mahlly in thi:' westcrn USSR) can be expected to nfford fnt.1ch relief in the: Sovlct energy situation for r~()fi~ than :1 d{'cade.
,
---The Problem L Unlike the United StQIL's. whkh has long restricted production for rea~On5 of conservation and profit. the USSR ~avQrs u forced draft appro:Jch. Short-term nt'rr......r.ilro':",n
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_no=0000498607 &title=THE+IMPENDING+SOVIET
..J
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CIA FOlPJ- THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
1··'Vu"' •••••.• "
015"'''''' •.•,••
""U"~I ••••.••I,;U
cKccedll1!: them with (HUe regard
IIVU,".
Page 5 of 12
\;!;Hlngs, lino rcwaras
JlU~
are given
[Or
over the longer to:ran. Und"1' these
to productivity
conditions, Sovi~t productlon has expanded much morc rapidly In the last 20 years thlln that of the United States.
Soviet and US Crude 011 Production 1I11l101
fIGURE
1
BrD
I~
D
80
1Bse
2.
The
815
Soviet
70
stnkhllnovire
"
:.Jpproach
has
76
led
to
l--
no
811
proJltCtl'd--"
(a) :!I'I emphasis
on
development drming ovcr CXplOflllion. with thc rcsult thut new discoveries arc failing to keep pl\CC with output growth: (b) O\'crprodLlctJon of existing wells und fields through
rapid water
injection
j)il In place is ultimately will run f!if beyond
productIon-such plan-clIn rnpld.
only worsen
recovered;
the Soviet
1111Ilrc
nnd other
methods.
with
the res\J(t that less of the
IInd (c) new capadt)\: requirements
011 indu$try's
cnpubility,
Efforts
that soon
to further
im:reilsc
dcri'umdl!d by the gOllts of the reccntly annoLlnced S;ycor the :dluatlon und mnk\! Iho Cycntulll downward slide morc
L
~J
USSR: PtlJdm:lion of Crud~ Oil.' by Rt'gloll MnUan Dnrnb
1'1<'1
DDl
CiA F.stlm~tc:.s
n___,
Tllrtnr Kllybysltev . UrnlsVol!:1I, Wcskrn region and Unll$ TOI;\I
1;70 DlIsnklt
12.80 COli 2.8S 9.82 NAI . 0.81 0.69 5.71 1975 6.00
.1.06
0.8( : !4.17 .' 0.70 .2,0 I5.80
or Puk Oul~ 19&0_
tU
5.6 1.9 4.1
~~~ )
..:. . I:.f!gb
4.9 3.:5 O.rLaw 11.0
L.S 0.5
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+OIL+CRISIS
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CIA FOIAI- THE IMPENDING
SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
n:rm
U.:.J;Z
U.45
Orcn bu rx
0.1 5
0.14 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.47 0.35 0.23
, 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.69 0.41
wWl:r Volgn Udmurt
&nllov !kJorus.11" Cnuc:ns.us
lv.~fb31'd7.h31\
i
1.74
0.6
05
0.6
0.4
0.2 ) 0.4
1.0
0.1:7
Otbcr
O.Oj
0.07
Kornl :lOd Arklumgel'sk
0.15 1.26 0.63 0.58
0.22 3.82
(!.SO;
0.4
1.09:
6.1
2.Q6
6.16;
5.2
S.l
0.82
Ni\.
0.9
0.8
West S!bcr.13
Cenlrlll Ad::!
j
0.62,
Ukflllne
Eutem r~glon
j,.
Page 6 of 12
;).2
MiJl'ip-s..'IIlIk
O.2t
Ernba TurkmcCl
O.OS
0.40 } 0.08
0.29
0.31
Ollwr
O,QJ
Snkhlllln
: 0.05
0.04
Other
. Nest
N~gI J O.OJ
IrwllloJillJ
j
Ne!!! OJ
1
0.4
("I
0.54 0.28 .
i.
O.II}'
0.1
0.1
~I eon~n~E~.
I 3.: As the ruUtl of resoryt! 10 output hus f{lUen, the bulk of SO'o'kt OI,l(I'I(lt has come Increaslng!y from Odd!! npprotlching ckhtlusUon. Tbo rc~;ult IIIIS been o.n
or drillirtg rCClllircment~. whkh wil! !evel oN' or decline onl)' when-and If-v..:'ry 路!tlr~!,) new nflditiOfl~ urd mude to the producing reserve bl1sc, llH~ SOIt'i~t.s
Dc~cleri1tion
51>.:o:lkof this prOblem
In terms
br
fhe depl~tion
of(.<;ct-thc umollot
of new CII/lllcity
rcqilit~d 10 oft'sct dr:j'lll'1ion of! old ('u]lm:itr : In c.nch S-ycor plnn p~rlod.
4. During the 1961路65 pl:m period. ol1ly Ij l11il!Jojt bId (67 mi1lion hms per !/\'ar) of c~rJlH;111' had to be rcplac.:d, In 1971-15,5.1 million bl<! (254 miliim1 tQn~ per y~ur) of f'CIII,lcclfll:nt cnpndty. Wjl,.'I required b\!C1lll~r: of mph! dcplctJon. Viewed in. Linother WLlY, about 72 ~rccm of 1970 cllpuciry h"d to b<: rcpla~ed by the end of 1975. 11111 target for the 1976路80 plun is 10.6-/0.8 million bId {S30-S40 miUion tOrts per ycarLof new, capacity; 7.8 million b/<J-cq:!ul t.o IIbout BD. percent of the c:!podty on !in., In .t975.-i!tlo 1?rf~el dcpTi:t!on. If dcph:tion record, it may Is more rapId thu!! the SOViets expect-nnd. based olflhclr-past wdl bu-oonsidcrably more of thc 1975 capacit):wHl have to be replaced.
5. There is unccrt;\inty :!bou[ thc Si7-C I,f thc USSR's r~crvcs. becausc of definition:!1 problems as welt as Soviet sccrr::y. Our best estim:Hc is that Soviet proved rescrves are )D-)S, billion balTcls, rOl,lghly comparable with those of the United States. There is tlO doubr that Russinn proved reserves have bccn ramng in recC'nt yca~. and tbere is very little chance that cnouWllicW oil will be discovcred during the next few y<.',m to apprcci:Jbl>' improve tile rcscrves-ta-production ratio. Inde-cd. despite rncJor efforts it wHl probably dctcriotrltc further. potcnti<ll tcscrves in Arcti~. Easl 6. AlthDUgh Ihe USSR has nbund.mt Sibcri.:m. and offshore arcaS. development of such rescrvcs is at least a decade away.
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+OIL +CRISIS 06/05/31
CIA FOIAI- THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
Thu~.· during the ncxt 8·10 yellPl. almost existing
fields
cnd
from
new fields
in
all Soviet OUll1tH will Imllc 10 come from C~
The Outlook f(lt OL.ltput from Exhtirlg 7. ,r:,.om World either
from
Urals·Volgn
Wllr
the Caspian
Page 7 of 12
~srin8 producing
Production
Rl.'gluns
U through 1970, the wowth In'Soviet oil output came-
fields
Of. ofto'r the
mid·19SOs,
"e!lft~ :111output
rt!l):ion. Since ,1970.
from the idant SnmoUcir field. Current
aggregate
!lenrty comtLlnt
west
~f ,
We
the, Urals wilt
I:wll1
whilo that
of W1..'st I Slbcrlll
~
in the
Soviet pl::ms ~1!1tfor hOlding
the Urnls. while ' doubling
West Slb"nll. Becuuse or a variety of problems. docllne.
from Inr~~ fields
growth hns comc (rom West
Slbcrill, primarily output
rcs:iol'\$.
production
It,
bcHcve thut output w('st of
~.
fnll fat ~hort of doublln~.
i~
8. Production from I1cld5 in t1'l6 wc5tcrn p~rt of the COll11try <:omln~ inc~lIilngly from (tI'CO!C!f dapth!l and from In-Oil drilling which allows mOfl: Intcn:;l\'c exploitation
of already
tapped
rcscf\'oln. All growth
.
~
.t .
i
.
II ;i I
in output
through
1 ~80 wUl
i'
,
I
__i_~
I
USSR: Additions to 011Producing Capacity
FIGURE
2
10.8
,
;I, ; 1.8
,i
'1.1,
,!jIiII;I ,j
5.1 i
,
I
--,iIIi. ;
,
!
i
;Iii '. 'r;
jI i" •
I Tl
.:
:
GROY/TH
MtLUON BARRELS OF' OIL PER DAY
. r •..
, f
J
-
I I'
uI
I
~o
7.!1
DEPWI~~OHm
:'I
• D
3.2
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CIA FOIAI- THE IMPENDJNG SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
,.~
Page 8 of 12
,
!
I
'.'
I' i '!
I
i .:
;
:1.8
.: ~
s~ "
comc
from
Wl,:st Silx·rh,. wlwrc Ih •.•il1hIlSI~itllbl(;' dimJltc.
greAtly compllent ••• opcrntions.
distanccs
dlfl1cult
tCfr:rin, imo vust
In 1976. Ilpproxim:Jtl.!!y 60 pcrcclil or West
Sib~rian Ol,tput .md toughly onc-fifth of natiol1rsl proulH:tiC'[1 !..'om•. fraln the gb!1t SurnoUor field on the middle Ob',Sovict $O\.1rccs indicate tlmt this field will rCi1ch peak production In the next ycar or so and wHl hold pcn" Ic\'~I!' for no rnore ropld wuCcr Incllrslon. The .water t!lIt rcached than 4 YCUI'$, It .is already cx~tlst1cJng 47, percent in 1975. :md; incre;:Jsing ,q~l:Jntitics '"Of lJu,id (WZltcr plus ""'oii)' must be. "lifted to recover any givcn:qmmtity of oil. Although new'f'jl.'ltts arc bci'ng discovered In Wes.t Siberia. no gioot: nclds compornble to Samotlor have been found.
The Drilling Problem 9.
The USSR does not have
dcvclopment
IInd cxploration
active dgs., about
U1C
dr1lHng capability
prQgrumsslmultLlncously.
.he same: liS the Untkd
States.
to pursue
adeqW'rtc
The Soviet!' hove soma
I,GOQ
In terms or mctcrs drillt!d, howcvl:r,
thc Sovicl effort amol.lnt$ to only about onc-fifth U13t or Ihe United St:ltes.ln IQ71-75. the Sovjet Ministry of the Oil Industry drilled a lotal of about 52 lI1i!lion m Ncrs.
In 1975
),700
1)10l1c, U:.e United
rigs. Wc estimlltc
SllIlcs drilled
53 million
thl.\t. even with a m:udmum
be: able to come close to drilling by 1980 the their current S·year plan.
7S
effort,
metcrs
with nb-out
the Soviets
will n<)t
miIHon meten: called for by
10.
The poor Sovjet drilling record is in PM! the rc!1.ult of th~ foet (hul 80 percent of their drHHng is done with turbodrilling rigs that :lrc highly inefficient for dcep drilling Or for use in soft form:Jtions.. Grctllcr access to advanced Westcrn tt'Chnology nnd rotary drilling equlpmont could help nltcvllHu the Soviet driIU,,~ ' problem.
The Fluid Uftlng Probl~m 11. In the 19S0s, wh1:n well!! In the Umls.vo!ga region began 10 stop flowing naturally, tha Soviets were forced t£1 begin pumping. .,At that lime, however, pumping equipment W;1:i in short supply, To foreStall a s'iawdowl1 In th •• growth , of 011 Qutput,
tho SovlOh adopted
the; practico
of mnsslvc Wllter Injection
within
aM along the edge~ of ~Bch field. If;I cnollgh water fs forced loto n formation. ' , It raiscs Soviet
I'C9crvoir pressures
5Iys.tclTI
diffcrs
so Ihllt wells once Ilgtlin now
from the standord
WC'!i'.tcrn
without
~ccQndD.ry recovery
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pumplf'lR,' The technique
+OIL+CRISIS
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CIA FOIAI- THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
r
~GRfr--
watcrflooding
ill that the object
MUCQ mON
Page 9 of 12
: J
i
:
Is to inclcll~c r~lhcr t;um just to maIntain
prC'ssure.
t'l h\i~l;tcd thlln oil rrod"ced.
wllter
I
12. ' Althoul::h cycntuuU)' tho wote: the oU-producing
wat~r Injection ciln; boo~t ~rodllctlon for c time, will find 11chllnncl of ICIl~t rcs[stllnc~ :md bred: throllsh'to
ml1<is[vc
well. a prOCLlS that leaves bc~ind
m:H:h 011 In the less rc:t:Jl1cal'.h;
portions of the form;:J.t!~n. When the welts begin I to show -water in large qUlmtWcs. I --.'. the
nlltufC) now
wlU \lslIlll1y stop
and
the wells rnustbc
·pumped.
In this
case,
nowc\'cr, conventional pumping equipment submersible
pumps
arc needed
oil) must be lifted.
because
cQ~not be uscd: special hlgh.cnpncU)o' much lireat~r volumes of fluid (water plus
,
, . I Such pump~ began to be uscd extensively
13.
In the USSR In the Iiltc 1960s.
In ] 973, t!lc5c pUmp~ provided 2~S million bId of th~ So~ct
tot:ll of B.6 miUion
j j
USSR: Fluid LlttJng RequJrements~ lUn~
IIETillC
FIGURE 3
TD~£
3
J.IOO
.
I~
B~I.!18
-I
I j
I
WATER'
,
.1
,
.j
, iI
a
Df!
IDU
1978
: 11178
11180
plan r.~.1
"'ru.~" "".tII ••. , .,un' r. hlu;~1
1'101_U'.iI;., ••. n
'.'11.' .~I" ••.•••. '~!I.~I••
k
'ioI,
~ •• I!
1111.1 ••
Itn ~
!!'it.
t. CC: ,.'nll' ill nu. '!tI11f •.'t.,. • JUt.
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CIA FOIAl- THE IMPENDING SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
'--'
(lit 1-
The StJ••.j~t;;. h>ld
bid.
:Ioudt cQUi)1T11cnl
111more
and
mon:
it,;clr manufuc!mc HiLI! the only
12,000 of thes\: pumps in 1915, .md their nced for tJj'lidly a.s water cncroachmcnt becomes a pmhlcm
$01111;
is IncrelJ1i1ng
fields .. Allhougl1 some Wt;::;.tEurofl~un lIation~ und the USSI, 11 lower:
pumps
capacity version of th~sc pumps, the Soviets to dcal with their UrHng problcm
ndequate
rccogni7.c
lire made in the
Un.i!cd States. The 1,000. pumps alrcady purchased from the Unitcd States have higher toted lifting cnpoclty. -[hart the II,aOO-pumps of domestic "'Ofh:;ln. Even In tllC United States, such pumps are nuinufacturcd ·1iy-only-two compllnles and· 11
are· in short
supply,
As
alternative
IIn·
to high-cBpa9lty
submcl'$ible
pumps. at lenst
in some fields, the Soviets are considering wider. use of gas·lift equipment. The kind
of
projects
they
have
In mind :would
retlulre
IIITgc-scalc
Imports
of
US
i
technology nnd lang lead times.' The Longer Tenn Ou lIook
Th~ Jnit1pl rulloff, wh~n,!t C(lmes, will nlmost certQlnly
14. output
maY continue
to fnll sharply.
level off, or perhaps
even Increasc
fields tire brousmt Iuto production in frontier areas. There Is fields-some
quite
eventually
IUfgl..'-wiU
be discovered,
00 sharp; thcuJnftcr a.•• new
qucstion that new Given tllc rapid ratc or !IO
depletion of exbtlng fields nnd the techn.ical difficulties IIssocllUo::d with c~p!Qrntlon and ex·ploite.tlon In frontier llrens, howcvcr, wc doubt that the new discovcrics
will eome on stream rapidly enough to do mqre thur. temp<)ranJy arrest lhe rapid slide 'of So\'lct output •. 15. A'!I wO stated earlier, only small nmounts of So••• i!!t production dt.1ting the next decade will come from outside ex.isting prorltldr\g nrc~s. In the early 1980s offshore Cuspl.lln reserves mJ1~' make some small contribution WIll new dlscovcdC!! on th~ Mnngyshhtk Peninsula on the CaSf shore
QUlput, Us the Cospinn and in the PCc!1C>rn region west of the Urals. The Soviets also hope to find oil in dCi:p stru.ctures in the northern part of West Slberia.'s Tyumcn' Oblos(. Limited neW
exploration
to
f'l1-
In this region. how('Vcr. hQ'; ;so fBr yielded 'mainly nalurnl
gas cnd
!
com.lcmiatc.
I j
16. Geo!oglcal conditions of the Arctic offshore l'iglOn!i East Slborlan
lOWland!!,
to Ijtf~ future disco\'crics exist over much (cspcc1a!1y in the Burents and Kara Seas), In the
favClrahlc
In deep
structu~s
lu the Caspil1n nma, ur:d rll:rhupJi. off
nnd Sakhlln in the Sen or Okhotsk. Protlllctlon from most of thcsc arCII:>. howevcr, Is ut lcRst 11 decade away. In. the off~hore Arctic. environment;;!l KI,\I11~llIItkil
7
~;
,
I conditions
arc mucI1 more
SL'Vl;ro
than III thl! North S~i.1:tc-dmolo~y
fot I.'X[1I(]ralion
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_no=0000498607 &title=THE +IMPENDING+SOYIET
ChaC signi1ir;;mt
+OIL +CRISIS 06/05/3]
CIA FOIAI- THE IMPENDING
SOVIET OIL CRISIS (ER 77-10147)
Page 11 of 12
prulJul,;uon coma t",KO pLace Un!iI 10 YC:lts after LI m~lor dis;.covcry-which nul:.y~t
to be m;ujc. The lead time would b~_*ortcr for production irom d~p w~l~ _in the Cusplan region.: the USSR; howcvcr. lacKs the' cqUipt!1cnt an'it cxp~rience' nccc~ary to undertOikc fJ deep :drill1ng program withlJut c"fcnsivc-Wcstcm help. Economic ImpUcnt!om ,
17. When oil praductiorl st()PS growing. and perhaps even bt;f()fC. profound repercussions will be fclt on the domestic. economy of the USSR and on Its intctnrlUOlUt'
economic
relations. The c)(tcnt of 1iuch rc(lcrcu!;sion~ c:Jn he only
gue1iScd at wHhoUl rurther
t1.Jscl1rch. At u minimum.
flm USSR will find it extremely
-"difficult
to continuc to simullaneout:1y meet its ('wn requiremcnts and (hose oi En:'ltern Europe white cxpotCing:to non·Communis.t countries on the prC'~cnt !tcllle. More pcs.~imlsticl3lJy. the USSR wjJI it5dr become 1111 oil importer.
18. I The~ arc Import:Jnt consldcration'! ror tbe S(n;ct Unioll. ] t now supplies three-fourths of the oil required bi' the Cummunist countries of Eastern Europe; nnd It undoubtcdly wi:thc~ to nltull1 the politlcalll!1d economic levcrage Ihut gOC! with being' thclr prJncipll1 ~upplicr. For many years. the cxport or oil to non-Communist countri~~. mllinly in Wcstcm Europe. litis Ir--cH the USSR's IJfj;cst single J;ourcc of IuIrd currency •. 19. ! In the 10n8 run, considernble su,bstltutlon for oil will be p~ ••iblc J. __ • _. _ u , •••• domcstlca1lvnnri .,..,.hll M ;'1 ••••nnrt •••••••••••a ;,.••••• 11 "'M.;' 11C'.:-.•..•...
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transmJS$!on tm~st be ~olycd before such resources can be fully cKploited.Th,:, Soviets -co1'L1ldernucienr power to be the best !iource of new electric PO'.\Il'r in Is under WD!I,but Europqlln areas. A program ror constructing nuclclu' powerplants It will 00 qultG some time bdol'G thc!!c plants ca~;hav~. an tmportant effect 01"1 the; power base. In 1975 nuclear power: repr~sented 2 pe~nt of tOla! pOWer " pnxtuctIon. and .it will reach. Qply about 6 percent In' t 980'--1:. ;. _ . . I·I I
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+OIL +CRISIS 06/05/31