Yevhen Mahda • RUSSIA’S HYBRID AGGRESSION: LESSONS FOR THE WORLD
of confrontation between the two largest countries of the former Soviet Union began long before the annexation of Crimea. Officially, Kyiv preferred to adhere to the letter and spirit of the “Big Treaty” 1 with Russia, signed by Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma on May 31, 1997, while Moscow was in full swing preparing to face down the Ukrainian “upstarts.” Our country is perceived by the Kremlin as a competitor for influence within the former Soviet Union, although Ukraine is not too successful in the issue of building a successful nation. By punishing Ukraine, Vladimir Putin seeks to resolve a number of internal problems, demonstrating the recovery of Russia’s thirsty imperial power that will stifle the Russian people’s ability to embrace their “younger brother.” This “small victorious war” that started at the beginning of the 21st century is still a relevant tool for solving problems at the center of Europe. For almost 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow brilliantly studied the behavior of its Western partners. Over the years, the Russians were able to perceive habits within the post-Soviet space mainly through the prism of Russian foreign policy interests. The European Union, and to a lesser extent the United States, has long had a “business as usual” relationship with the Kremlin, and purposefully exchanged resources from Russian deposits (mainly energy) for products with high added value. Over the years, the Kremlin's geopolitical ambitions which were generously energized in petrodollars thanks to a surge in their value at the beginning of the 21st century, has repeatedly tried to find 1
The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation is an agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation which consolidates the principle of strategic partnership, recognizes the inviolability of existing borders, respect for territorial integrity and mutual obligations, and not to use their territory to the detriment of each other's security. Signed on May 31, 1997 in Kyiv by then Presidents Boris Yeltsin (RF) and Leonid Kuchma (Ukraine). The contract is still valid (at the time of this writing). 12
INTRODUCTION
unlimited markets. For a while it seemed that they understood “how far to go” (i.e., crossing the “red” line) with respect to the punitive operations in Chechnya, 2 and from there it turned out that the civilized world was quite able to swallow without choking the Russian aggression against Georgia in early August 2008. 3 Currently, the biggest challenge over the past 20 years of conflict in Europe is one in which the Kremlin prefers to initiate violent activity while staying detached by exhibiting a feigned misunderstanding of their status and culpability as the real aggressor. Alas, Ukraine in many respects has unwittingly provoked Russian aggression. It is not only about the reign of Victor Yanukovych, 4 during which time the influence of the Kremlin agents had deliberately destroyed the army and security forces, along with the political class who often “broke the spear” in the fight for flimsy values by losing sight of the real threats to 2
This is the second Chechen war in 1999–2000.
3
The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 was an armed conflict between Georgia on the one hand and Russia and the separatist groups of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other. The war began around an armed confrontation in South Ossetia in August 2008. In military operations against Georgia, in addition to the regular armed forces of South Ossetia and Russia, the militia from Russia and Abkhazia took part. On the night of August 8 after the bombing of Georgian villages, the Georgian armed forces announced their intention to "restore constitutional order" in the territory of an unrecognized republic, and as a result of the battles took most of Tskhinvali. On the same day, Russia intervened in a conflict on the side of the South Ossetian separatists and introduced troops, including the tank brigades, into Georgian territory, and subjected the bombardment of Georgian cities, ports, and military facilities. After the occupation of Georgia by Russian troops and ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages around South Ossetia, a ceasefire was achieved with the participation of international mediators. According to the agreements reached, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory was due to end by October 1, 2008. Military losses of Georgia: 170 killed, and about 1100 wounded. Losses from the RF and allies: 155 dead, 354 wounded. Non-military losses: 192,000 refugees, and about 600 dead and 800 injured on both sides. 4
Viktor Yanukovych—Ukrainian politician. Prime Minister of Ukraine (November 21, 2002–January 5, 2005 and August 4, 2006-December 18, 2007). Former (4th) President of Ukraine (from February 25, 2010 to February 22, 2014). Accepted by the Verkhovna Rada as self-abandoned from the exercise of its constitutional powers, and subsequently deprived of the title of the President of Ukraine by special law. 13