Yevhen Mahda • RUSSIA’S HYBRID AGGRESSION: LESSONS FOR THE WORLD
of confrontation between the two largest countries of the former Soviet Union began long before the annexation of Crimea. Officially, Kyiv preferred to adhere to the letter and spirit of the “Big Treaty” 1 with Russia, signed by Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma on May 31, 1997, while Moscow was in full swing preparing to face down the Ukrainian “upstarts.” Our country is perceived by the Kremlin as a competitor for influence within the former Soviet Union, although Ukraine is not too successful in the issue of building a successful nation. By punishing Ukraine, Vladimir Putin seeks to resolve a number of internal problems, demonstrating the recovery of Russia’s thirsty imperial power that will stifle the Russian people’s ability to embrace their “younger brother.” This “small victorious war” that started at the beginning of the 21st century is still a relevant tool for solving problems at the center of Europe. For almost 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow brilliantly studied the behavior of its Western partners. Over the years, the Russians were able to perceive habits within the post-Soviet space mainly through the prism of Russian foreign policy interests. The European Union, and to a lesser extent the United States, has long had a “business as usual” relationship with the Kremlin, and purposefully exchanged resources from Russian deposits (mainly energy) for products with high added value. Over the years, the Kremlin's geopolitical ambitions which were generously energized in petrodollars thanks to a surge in their value at the beginning of the 21st century, has repeatedly tried to find 1
The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation is an agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation which consolidates the principle of strategic partnership, recognizes the inviolability of existing borders, respect for territorial integrity and mutual obligations, and not to use their territory to the detriment of each other's security. Signed on May 31, 1997 in Kyiv by then Presidents Boris Yeltsin (RF) and Leonid Kuchma (Ukraine). The contract is still valid (at the time of this writing). 12
INTRODUCTION
unlimited markets. For a while it seemed that they understood “how far to go” (i.e., crossing the “red” line) with respect to the punitive operations in Chechnya, 2 and from there it turned out that the civilized world was quite able to swallow without choking the Russian aggression against Georgia in early August 2008. 3 Currently, the biggest challenge over the past 20 years of conflict in Europe is one in which the Kremlin prefers to initiate violent activity while staying detached by exhibiting a feigned misunderstanding of their status and culpability as the real aggressor. Alas, Ukraine in many respects has unwittingly provoked Russian aggression. It is not only about the reign of Victor Yanukovych, 4 during which time the influence of the Kremlin agents had deliberately destroyed the army and security forces, along with the political class who often “broke the spear” in the fight for flimsy values by losing sight of the real threats to 2
This is the second Chechen war in 1999–2000.
3
The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 was an armed conflict between Georgia on the one hand and Russia and the separatist groups of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other. The war began around an armed confrontation in South Ossetia in August 2008. In military operations against Georgia, in addition to the regular armed forces of South Ossetia and Russia, the militia from Russia and Abkhazia took part. On the night of August 8 after the bombing of Georgian villages, the Georgian armed forces announced their intention to "restore constitutional order" in the territory of an unrecognized republic, and as a result of the battles took most of Tskhinvali. On the same day, Russia intervened in a conflict on the side of the South Ossetian separatists and introduced troops, including the tank brigades, into Georgian territory, and subjected the bombardment of Georgian cities, ports, and military facilities. After the occupation of Georgia by Russian troops and ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages around South Ossetia, a ceasefire was achieved with the participation of international mediators. According to the agreements reached, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory was due to end by October 1, 2008. Military losses of Georgia: 170 killed, and about 1100 wounded. Losses from the RF and allies: 155 dead, 354 wounded. Non-military losses: 192,000 refugees, and about 600 dead and 800 injured on both sides. 4
Viktor Yanukovych—Ukrainian politician. Prime Minister of Ukraine (November 21, 2002–January 5, 2005 and August 4, 2006-December 18, 2007). Former (4th) President of Ukraine (from February 25, 2010 to February 22, 2014). Accepted by the Verkhovna Rada as self-abandoned from the exercise of its constitutional powers, and subsequently deprived of the title of the President of Ukraine by special law. 13
Yevhen Mahda • RUSSIA’S HYBRID AGGRESSION: LESSONS FOR THE WORLD
1999–2009 led to the soldiers who were without a state, and so were not burdened by law and morality. Hybrid power! This is where terrorists, or mercenaries without a clear command and clear objectives emerge. There is no one with whom to negotiate, and there is nobody to blame for war crimes. Summarizing the use of hybrid methods of waging war, it is necessary to emphasize the following: — A desire to violate the rules of war has deep historical roots and is based on the principle that “the winners are not judged.” — Technological progress on the one hand, can be balanced by cunning and dexterity on the other. — Hybrid displays in military operations can be called a normal practice in military history, with another thing being that such innovations quickly become not only publicized but subject to correction of the rules and the laws of war. — In the 20th century the use of hybrid technology warfare has been gaining a stable character, affecting the balance of forces in the world. — Hybrid instruments against the leaders of the bipolar world—the USSR and the United States—were one of the attributes of competition in the military sphere. — In the multipolar world, betting on hybrid methods of war indicates the maximum desire of hiding foreign policy plans thereby achieving greater successes with less effort.
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SECTION 2 • HYBRID WARFARE THROUGH THE AGES
RESULTS Conventional wisdom has it that whatever is new—it is good, and the old approach should be forgotten. A number of principles and methods of modern hybrid wars have analogies in the history of warfare. Hybrid war for a long time was seen as a way to defeat the weakest by the strongest, to beat them from the concentration of resources needed to win “here and now,” at the right time in the right place. By and large, hybridity was a way to fight without fighting openly, thus to succeed with minimal losses. Therefore, the Achaeans, and the Gauls and Spaniards in opposition to Napoleon, and the future Americans in the Revolutionary War, and Germany in World War II, the Soviet Union, and Vietnamese guerrillas, and Islamic militants have all used such opposition elements such as irregular armed groups, information and psychological warfare, communications breakthrough, and indirect hostilities. With multiple analogies, the old effects are well forgotten but does not deny the very concept of a hybrid aggression. Modern warfare conditions bring new elements and principles of their relationship. In the 21st century, the use of hybrid technology fighting acquires a stable character, affecting the balance of power in the world. In a multipolar world, one can bet that hybrid warfare is the desire to maximize and hide a nation’s foreign policy plans to achieve more with less effort.
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SECTION 4
INFORMATION—A KEY FACTOR IN HYBRID AGGRESSION
The role of the information component in hybrid aggression. Basic methods of distortion and falsification: forcing panic on social networks, information sabotage on the national level, speech-raising in enemy territory, and the establishment of social homogeneity in Russia. Features of the Russian information policy, public-private partnership in the sphere of misinformation, the phenomenon of Russia Today, the direction of the information policy of the Russian Federation.