Non-Proliferation in the 2020s

By Emma Visentin

Emma Visentin is a final year Master student in International Security Studies at Trento University. Her research interests within geopolitics are area-focused on China and Africa, and on nuclear proliferation as a subject. She is currently a Junior Analyst at Analytica for Intelligence and Security.

How I started worrying about the bomb (again)?

The Cold War was marked by the never-ending fear of the nuclear threat and by deterrence strategies, leading to an unprecedented nuclear arms race that could have proved deadly for the entire planet. The collapse of the USSR seemed to have put an end to it, with a significant decline in the number of warheads (from 70,300 in 1986 to an estimated 13,410 in early-2020 [1]) and to frenetic developments in the non-proliferation and arms control domains. But did it really? Or was the world just letting the sleeping dogs lie? This report will analyse the current standing of four main actors in nuclear arms control (the United States, Russia, China and the EU) and examine the contemporary trends that, if not carefully observed, could lead to a renaissance of the nuclear arms race.

In international relations, nuclear deterrence is still a “currency of power”: that is, nuclear weapons are still considered both powerful military instruments and means to acquire political influence and prestige [2]. In other words, the nuclear threat was never really gone, but lurking in the shadows. The 2020’s started with concern as the last arms control treaty binding the US and the Russian Federation, the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), was to expire in February 2021 with little to no negotiations from either part. President Trump’s aggressive determination in including China [3] determined the entrance of the PRC in the restricted club of arms control negotiators, even though the estimated number [4] of its warheads is extremely small compared to those of the other two. It seems evident that the US considers China a threat, particularly after the 2019 Department of Defence report [5] noted that the PRC was modernizing its arsenal to possibly develop the capability to “launch on warning” of an incoming nuclear attack. However, it is unlikely that China will throw itself in a full-blown nuclear arms race, given that it would need to undertake a massive economic effort to catch up.

Up till now, China has repeatedly refused to be part of any arms control agreement [6] as they impose verification mechanisms that would require the disclosure of exact numbers, types and locations of its nuclear warheads, thus endangering its current strategic advantage, based on unpredictability [7]. China does have a No-First-Use policy but has often been often criticized time and time again by Western governments for not being dependable on, even though it has been respected thus far [8]. The underlying risk, given the lack of precise information about its arsenal, is that a

possible attack would be difficult to assess and prevent.

China is not alone in the modernization trend: according to SIPRI, all Nuclear Weapons States have continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals [9] in 2019, above all the United States. Under Trump’s presidency, the US nuclear weapons industry has boomed: with the budget for manufacturing and maintenance rising more than 50% from the Obama era and projected to increase again in 2021 by 3 billion [10]. The Trump administration also introduced a budget line for a new warhead (W93) that, if developed, would directly challenge the notion of “no new capabilities” by the precedent administration [11]. The resurgence of the nuclear-industrial complex doesn’t necessarily mean that the US plans to engage in a new arms race, but it does raise questions on its continued adherence to the no-test policy and on how far the increased competition with China and Russia, given the current hostile environment for bilateral arms control, will go [12].

Likewise, the Russian Federation is trying to keep its foot in the door in the competition: its nuclear arsenal is arguably one of the most important factors contributing to its still-standing superpower status. President Putin is well aware of the need for parity with the US, even if more for a political than strategic reason [13], given the chronic stagnation of the Russian economy since the 2008 financial crisis.

In June 2020, for the first time, Russia has publicly released its previously classified nuclear deterrence policy, described as “defensive by nature” [14]; however, its modernization efforts, combined with an increase in the number and size of military exercises adds to the uncertainty [15] about Russia’s long-term intentions. As a consequence, it leads to the continuous expansion of nuclear modernization programs and to political opposition to further nuclear weapons reductions in Western Europe and the United States.

The noticeable modernization trend has been converging with the collapse of bilateral arms control, as negotiations for the New START have been tortuous and are currently stalled due to a Russian refusal of a framework that would also include China. Newly-elected President Biden is expected to re-engage in talks immediately after being sworn into office and has signalled to being open to the 5 years extension provided by the treaty [16].

In addition, President Biden will have to deal with another critical arms control issue, the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), the infamous Iran deal [17]. The much trumpeted end to the Iranian nuclear crisis, negotiated with the crucial diplomatic and technical assistance of the EU in the E3 format (France, Germany and UK), came to an abrupt end in August 2018. Since the US unilaterally withdrew from the agreement [18], tensions between Washington and Teheran have been accelerating, up to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announcement in January that Iran was starting to enrich uranium at 20% once more [19]. Biden has declared his determination to resume consultations with Iran, but the unpredictable variable is Iran’s willingness to further pursue the deal. The risk would be a prolongation of the crisis and the indiscriminate proliferation of nuclear weapons in the area, which would be extremely destabilizing for the strategic interests of both the US and the EU.

In fact, the JCPOA is a pivotal issue on the EU’s agenda: foreign policy concerns aside, its efforts have not been sufficient to manage the crisis. Despite its ambition and its commitment to the international non-proliferation regime, the EU is still a nuclear actor “in the making”, mainly due to the difference among the security cultures [20] of its member states and the intra-institutional competition. The crisis of multilateralism and of the relationship with

the Atlantic ally, compounded with Russian warheads increasingly deployed near the borders with the EU, have prompted President Macron to propose the creation of an European deterrent by “Europeanizing” French nuclear weapons [21], the only arsenal left in the EU after Brexit. Even if the scenario can be considered just a proposal, it is a sign of the desire of independence that cannot be ignored, especially given the security threats the EU faces.

The modernization of arsenals of all Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), coupled with the substantial failure of bilateral agreements between the two main nuclear superpowers and the escalation of the Iranian crisis highlights how nuclear weapons are today a silent but present geopolitical risk for the entire international community. We are still considerably far away from the aim of article VI of the NPT, which provides for negotiations in good faith for nuclear disarmament [22]. As of today, the main variable to watch out for will be the conduct of President Biden’s foreign policy, but the developments in the field need to be closely monitored as not to risk another arms race.

Sources

[1] Status of World Nuclear Forces, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation Of American Scientists, 2019 [2] Tom Sauer, “Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 3, no. 1 (January 2, 2020), 41–59, https://doi.org/10. 1080/25751654.2020.1764260. [3] Reuters Staff, “Trump Calls for Arms Control with Russia and China in Putin Call,” Reuters, May 7, 2020 [4] “Status of World Nuclear Forces” [5] US Department of Defence, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” May 2019 [6] Xinhua, “Envoy: China Won’t Take Part in U.S.-Led Trilateral Arms Control Negotiation,” newsus.cgtn.com, October 2020 [7] Zhenqiang Pan, “A Study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 115–36, https://doi.org/1 0.1080/25751654.2018.1458415 [8] Ibidem [9] SIPRI, “Modernization of World Nuclear Forces Continues despite Overall Decrease in Number of Warheads,” www.sipri.org, June 2019, [10] R. Jeffrey Smith, “Under Trump, America’s Nuclear Weapons Industry Has Boomed,” Los Angeles Times, December 24, 2020 [11] Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. Nuclear Warhead Modernization and ‘New’ Nuclear Weapons,” www.csis.org, December 10, 2020 [12] Ibidem [13] Rose Gottemoeller, “Russia Is Updating Their Nuclear Weapons: What Does That Mean for the Rest of Us?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2020 [14] Shannon Bugos, “Russia Releases Nuclear Deterrence Policy,” www.armscontrol.org, August 2020, [15] Gottemoeller, “Russia is updating” [16] Julian Borger, “Nuclear Stand-off: Can Joe Biden Avert a New Arms Race?,” the Guardian, January 11, 2021, [17] Ibidem [18] “Special Briefing: U.S. Withdraws from Iran Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, May 8, 2018, [19] Francois Murphy, “Iran Tells IAEA It Plans to Enrich Uranium to up to 20% at Fordow Site,” Reuters, January 1, 2021 [20] Şebnem Udum, “Towards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: EU Policy on Nuclear Non-Proliferation” (ENTER Policy Brief Series, June 2020) [21] Michel Rose, “Amid Arms Race, Macron Offers Europe French Nuclear Wargames Insight,” Reuters, February 7, 2020 [22] Nobuyasu Abe, “The NPT at Fifty: Successes and Failures,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 3, no. 2 (September 30, 2020): 1–10, https://doi.org/10.1080/2575 1654.2020.1824500.

Image Credits

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50671003 https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/13/china-nuclear-arms-race-mystery/