Corona-Conflicts

By Siobhan Pebody

Siobhan is an MA Student reading War Studies. She read History and Politics for her undergraduate, focusing on IR and security. Her academic interests range from comparative analysis of civil conflicts to civil-military relations. She is currently particularly interested in foreign policy decision-making processes concerning the use of force, especially within democratic states.

How the COVID crisis translates into ongoing conflicts around the world

The Coronavirus pandemic has been an enormous test of state and governmental capability. Responses have often been extremely resource-intensive, leading to economic stress, and challenged citizens’ trust in their governments and institutions. Whilst in developed Western democracies, this might take the form of searing opinion pieces or public criticism, in more politically fragile states, there can be greater ramifications. Economic decline raises the risk of civil conflict and organised crime which may be more devastating given reduced state capacity as governments deal with the pandemic. International attention and resources are similarly distracted, allowing conflict to flourish where there might otherwise be intervention. Risks of conflict, exacerbated by the pandemic, tend to be especially found among substate and local actors and transnational groups taking advantage of the absence of state attention.

Pandemic-caused economic slowdown has left states less able to provide social support when their citizens most need it. 150 million people are at risk of falling into extreme poverty by the end of 2021, the first rise in 20 years [1]. Whilst there is not a direct correlation between poverty and conflict, conflict typically increases with economic instability and makes communities and states less able to cope with it. Citizen trust in governments has been tested to its limits and will continue to be, as depressed economies attempt to fulfil unprecedented health and social care requirements. The mix of deprivation and reduced trust in governments greatly increases the risk for social unrest, and thus conflict, especially where it is felt that the impact of the pandemic has been unequally borne or exacerbating pre-existing division.

More practically, the military has been utilised in more non-traditional ways: greater logistic support rather than security provision. President Biden referenced the military’s increased logistical role within the US to support his pick of not-long retired General Austin as defence secretary [2]. This, coupled with reduced likelihood of international intervention or pressure as states are distracted at home, emboldens substate actors and organised crime units.

Importantly, while in the developed world there might be glimmers of vaccine-borne hope, global access to the vaccine is set to be shockingly unequal with poorer states unable to start vaccination until later in 2021 [3]. Though the overall impact of Coronavirus has so far been mercifully less pronounced in many African states, a new surge is a great risk given already fragile healthcare systems and economies [4]. The knock-on risks could persist for years to come.

Organised crime and transnational groups

Criminal activity in much of the world was initially stalled with a reduced movement of goods and people. However, reports suggest many criminal gangs have since taken advantage of overstretched security forces and now enjoy increased territorial control [5]. In Mexico and parts of Latin America, gangs have also increased their hold over local populations by providing vital resources [6]. With trade and movement once-more resuming, gang activity will too, and it appears that state efforts against criminal gangs in Central and South America have no end in sight.

In Africa, Islamist insurgencies continue to be a significant risk to local and regional stability and development. Sahel and western African states such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal and Ghana have grappled with attacks and incursions by Al-Qaeda and IS-affiliated militias and will continue to in 2021 [7]. Boko Haram remains a threat in Nigeria and Cameroon and seeks to exploit the pandemic [8]. It claimed responsibility (though disputed) for the kidnapping of 300 schoolboys in Kitsana last month [9]. Covid-19 and its economic impact, including depressed oil prices, will further destabilise the region, exacerbating existing pressures on governments and overstretched security forces making violence and suffering more likely, as reports of increased child trafficking in Mali illustrate [10]. This will in turn place greater pressure on contentious elections [11]. The postponed elections in Somalia, where the struggle against AlShabab reaches the 15 year-mark, demonstrate how these stresses can lead to political friction and fears of unrest [12]. Covid-19 is an additional strain many states in the region will not be able to easily bear.

Ongoing conflicts

There was some initial success in negotiating ceasefires in response to the UN Secretary-General’s call to enable effective pandemic responses. However, many ceasefires were only unilaterally agreed, and violence quickly recommenced [13][14]. The 2016 Colombian peace deal was already unravelling but the ELN, FARC and other groups took advantage of lockdown measures to seize more territory and became more violent [15]. Reduced international pressure as governments and citizens are consumed with domestic concerns may also worsen the situation, the recent ending of a decades-old ceasefire in Western Sahara is an alarming reminder how easily conflicts can flare up [16].

Yemen looks likely to continue to be the worst humanitarian disaster of recent times. Whilst the conflict itself has not changed, the risk this conflict poses has increased exponentially with the pandemic. Already impoverished, malnourished and with little to no healthcare, Yemenis are immensely susceptible to the virus and the humanitarian disaster is only set to increase, particularly as the state is unlikely to be able to rapidly purchase vaccines and foreign aid dwindles [17].

New conflicts

Ethiopia is the starkest example of new pandemic-related violence. Conflict re-emerged along ethnic lines after President Abiy postponed national elections, ostensibly as a lockdown measure. Tigrayan forces, long unhappy at Abiy’s centralising reforms and determined to retain their regional autonomy, labelled the government illegitimate and breaching constitutional values and held their own regional elections. These were subsequently deemed illegal by Abiy and the region was cut off from the rest of Ethiopia. Bloody skirmishes killed fighters on both sides and caused over 50,000 refugees to flee to Sudan [18].

Whilst the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle was captured by federal forces at the end of November, the risk of conflict has not abated. Tigrayan separatist sentiment has long been a disruptive force in Ethiopia and will not disappear, just as it did not after civil war in the

1980s. The TPLF remains a strong force of up to 250,000 with a history of successful guerrilla warfare and a stated intention to continue fighting [19].

Beyond the sizeable risk of civil war and political disintegration of Ethiopia, the conflict threatens a humanitarian disaster and to destabilise the region. The 50,000 refugees in camps present a severe risk of malnutrition and diseases including Covid-19. Eritrea and Sudan risk being drawn in. The TPLF considers Eritrea an enemy and there have been reports of rockets fired at the Eritrean capital- actions which will severely undermine the Ethiopian-Eritrean peace of 2018 [20]. Several Sudanese troops were also killed near the border [21]. More widely, Ethiopia plays a key leadership role in the Horn of Africa and the AU and a step back risks critical ramifications for the whole area [22]- Ethiopia has already withdrawn troops from the AU mission against al-Shabab due to Tigrayan unrest [23].

Conclusion

It is difficult to directly attribute conflict to the pandemic, however, it cannot be denied that it has exacerbated many of the risk factors associated with conflict, particularly economic crisis and stained state capability. In many fragile states this might simply be one stress too many and it remains to be seen how states deal with it longterm.

Sources

[1] The World Bank. ‘COVID-19 to Add as Many as 150 Million Extreme Poor by 2021’, The World Bank, October 7, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/ news/press-release/2020/10/07/covid-19-to-add-as-many-as-150-million-extreme-poor-by-2021. [2] Joe Biden, ‘Why I Chose Lloyd Austin as Secretary of Defense’, The Atlantic, December 8, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/12/ secretary-defense/617330/. [3] Cara Anna, ‘African health official blasts ‘terrible’ vaccine inequality’, AP News, December 10, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/public-health-africa-kenya-coronavirus-pandemic-9fac8abbee08b4eb75169864f49a926f. [4] Cara Anna, ‘African health official blasts ‘terrible’ vaccine inequality’. [5] Drazen Jorgic and Uriel Sanchez, ‘As Mexico focuses on coronavirus, drug gang violence rises’, Reuters, June 18, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/ article/uk-health-coronavirus-mexico-cartels/as-mexico-focuses-on-coronavirus-drug-gang-violence-rises-idUKKBN23P1T5?edition-redirect=uk. [6] Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Mexican cartels are providing COVID-19 assistance. Why that’s not surprising’ Brookings, April 27, 2020, https://www. brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/27/mexican-cartels-are-providing-covid-19-assistance-why-thats-not-surprising/. [7] Crisis24 and WorldAware, ‘Global Risk Forecast 2021: Executive Summary’, GardaWorld, 2020, https://crisis24.garda.com/sites/default/ files/2020-12/2021-Global-Risk-Forecast-Executive-Summary-Crisis24.pdf. [8] John Campbell, ‘Beyond the Pandemic, Boko Haram Looms Large in Nigeria’, Council on Foreign Relations, June 11, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/inbrief/beyond-pandemic-boko-haram-looms-large-nigeria. [9] The BBC, ‘Nigeria’s Katsina school abduction: Boko Haram says it took the students’, BBC News, December 15, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-africa-55295701. [10] Lisa Schlein, ‘Conflict and COVID Trigger Upsurge in Mali Child Trafficking’, Voice of America, December 10, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/africa/ conflict-and-covid-trigger-upsurge-mali-child-trafficking. [11] Crisis24 and WorldAware, ‘Global Risk Forecast 2021: Executive Summary’. [12] Robert Malley, ’10 Conflicts to Watch in 2021’, Foreign Policy, December 29, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/29/10-conflicts-to-watch-in-2021-ethiopiairan-yemen-somalia-venezuela/. [13] Richard Gowan, ‘What’s Happened to the UN Secretary-General’s COVID-19 Ceasefire Call?’, International Crisis Group, June 16, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup. org/global/whats-happened-un-secretary-generals-covid-19-ceasefire-call. [14] https://pax.peaceagreements.org/static/covid19ceasefires/. [15] Crisis Group, ‘Colombia: Peace Withers amid the Pandemic’, International Crisis Group, September 30, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/colombia-peace-withers-amid-pandemic. [16] Heba Saleh, ‘War brews in Western Sahara as Trump strikes Morocco-Israel deal’, Financial Times, December 7, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/1ee096027f01-4227-a787-0b3c07728cf8. [17] Bethan McKernan, ‘Yemen: in a country stalked by disease, Covid barely registers’, The Guardian, November 27, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/nov/27/yemen-disease-covid-war. [18] Crisis Group, ‘Clashes over Ethiopia’s Tigray Region: Getting to a Ceasefire and National Dialogue’, International Crisis Group, November 5, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopias-clash-tigray-getting-ceasefire-and-national-dialogue. [19] The BBC, ‘Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis: PM claims capture of regional capital Mekelle’, BBC News, November 29, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-55111061. [20] Reuters Staff, ‘Tigray forces claim to have shot down Ethiopian plane, taken town’, Reuters, November 28, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-conflict/ ethiopia-says-military-operation-in-tigray-region-is-over-hunt-for-tigray-leaders-begins-idINKBN288098. [21] Khalid Abdelaziz, Ali Mirghani, and Nafisa Eltahir, ‘Analysis- Spillover from Tigray conflict adds to pressure on Sudan’, Reuters, December 18, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-conflict-sudan-analysis-int-idUSKBN28S1X1. [22] The BBC, ‘Viewpoint: How Ethiopia is undermining the African Union’, BBC News, November 29, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-55099908. [23] Robert Malley, ’10 Conflicts to Watch in 2021’.

Image Credits

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-54904496