The Spectrum - Issue 2 (2012)

THESPECTRUM

Edition 02 | August 2012 A publication by King’s College London Think Tank Society - London’s first student-led policy institute

‘Made possible by donations to the King’s College London Annual Fund’

Edition 02 August 2012

A publication by King’s College London Think Tank Society - London’s first student-led policy institute

Table of Contents About the KCL Think Tank A note from the Founder A note from the President Editor’s note 01 | Defense and Diplomacy Pakistan: Perpetrator or Victim of Terror?

1

Would a Nuclear Iran Destabilise the Middle East?

5

How to Avoid another Mistake in Iran

9

Is Terrorism a Continued Cause for the War in Afghanistan?

12

An Evaluation of contest’s Prevent Strategy

17

Is the Threat of CBRN Terrorism Overblown or Underestimated in the UK?

21

Negotiating the Internet: Diplomacy, Security and Governance in the Information Age

24

Strategic Defence: the People’s Republic of China’s Stance in the South China Sea

27

02 | Business and Economics Social Entrepreneurship: A solution to Many Problems?

33

The International Arms Trade and the UK’s role

38

03 | Energy and Environment The World on Our Plate – The Impact of Our Current Food Culture

42

East Africa’s Famine: How Did We Let it Happen?

47

04 | Healthcare The Challenge ‘Global Health’ Poses to Health Systems Strengthening in Conflict-Affected Countries 51

05 | Current Affairs National Service: The Solution to the Root Problem of the London Riots

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Copyright Notice Permitted Uses; Restrictions on Use Materials available in this publication are protected by copyright law and have been published by the King’s College London Think Tank Society (“KCL Think Tank Society” or “KCL Think Tank”), a member of the King’s College London Student Union.

Copyright © 2012 KCL Think Tank. All rights reserved.

No part of the materials including graphics or logos, available in this publication may be copied, photocopied, reproduced, translated or reduced to any electronic medium or machine-readable form, in whole or in part, without specific permission.

To request permission to use materials, please contact our editorial team on editor@kingsthinktank.com. Distribution for commercial purposes is prohibited unless prior agreed upon with the KCL Think Tank Society.

Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed in the articles that form this publication are those of their respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the KCL Think Tank. The authors of the articles retain full rights of their writings, and are free to disseminate them as they see fit, including but not limited to reproductions in print and Web-sites. The KCL Think Tank does not endorse, warrant, or otherwise take responsibility for the contents of the articles.

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The first student-led policy institute in London Founded in 2011, KCL Think Tank is the first fully student-led, independent policy institute in London. As one of the very first and most successful student think tanks in Europe, KCL Think Tank now counts seven independent policy centres, several hundreds of members and a highly successful academic journal, The Spectrum, that was downloaded over 2000 times in 2011 alone.

About the KCL Think Tank The King’s College London Think Tank is a unique student society and the first student led policy institute in London. The society was founded in late 2010 in the wake of the student protests as a way of giving students another means of getting their voices heard by using the skills and subject knowledge that we learn at KCL practically. Students from all disciplines are invited to come and contribute to problem solving on a wide variety of issues such as foreign policy, energy and environment, business and finance, immigration, defense, healthcare, education, crime and many other areas of public policy.

The recommendations we generate will be published in a journal at the end of each academic year. Our discussions will be supplemented by presentations from guest speakers throughout the year. The best thing about the society is that every public policy issue has a wide variety of different aspects, meaning that medics are just as important as historians and engineers can provide as much insight as lawyers.

The past year has seen a series of high profile speakers, the publication of a journal and the offering of internship and work placement opportunities at leading think tanks in London. Be sure to join the mailing list at http://www.kingsthinktank.com to get updates in your inbox about our exciting events and how you can get involved in a fascinating project that will not only let your voice be heard but will also provide a great addition to your CV.

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A note from the Founder Dear all,

A year and a half after the KCL Think Tank was founded, it gives me great pleasure to present another edition of The Spectrum. This journal is the culmination of a year of conferences, seminars and research and I very much hope that you will find it both interesting and eye-opening.

I would first like to thank all those who have made this possible. To begin with, of course, those who have contributed articles to the journal. Their contributions make the KCL Think Tank what it is. Next, I would like to thank those who have made the printing of this journal possible; the King’s College London Annual Fund and Pinsent Masons. Furthermore, the hard work of the KCL Think Tank’s committee must be acknowledged; bringing almost fifty distinguished speakers to King’s and organizing forty events and seminars is no small feat.

Finally, I would like to thank all those who came and spoke at our events. These events have not only provided the impetus for the articles in this journal, but have also served to bring current affairs to a wider audience of students. We have been honoured to welcome a wide variety of academics, researchers, ambassadors, government representatives, politicians, activists, doctors and scientists.

The King’s College London Think Tank Society has big plans for the coming year, with new policy centres and even more events. As a founding member of CampusPolicy, the new international association of student think tanks, the KCL Think Tank’s influence will only grow over the coming years. The huge reception that it has received over the past two years has shown that student think tanks are in the process of redefining student politics for our generation.

Benedict Counsell KCL Think Tank Founding President 2010-2012

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A note from the President Dear reader, In the wake of the 2010 student riots, a group of idealistic and driven King’s students took it upon themselves to found the KCL Think Tank. They did so with a grand ideal in mind: to create an open forum for debate and reflection, through which students could actively contribute to solving the issues with which our society grapples. It is only fair to say, however, that all of us involved with the KCL Think Tank had never imagined that a student-led policy institute would be so well-received, and that so many students from such a wide variety of backgrounds would get involved.

This society is driven by its members, and thus only exists because of all those that write policy recommendations for The Spectrum, attend our events or write to their MPs to ask specific and wellinformed questions about pieces of upcoming legislation. For us as a committee, it is humbling and inspiring to witness just how much this generation of students wants to make a difference for the better.

We can only express our greatest gratitude for the efforts that all of you have made.

Exactly a year and a half after the KCL Think Tank’s first event, we are now running 5 to 6 events per month, organized across 5 policy centers. Over 2000 students have granted us their support by becoming members of the KCL Think Tank. We have had the great honor to receive some of Britain’s finest minds and most influential policy-makers. Our members have had thought-provoking discussions with diplomats, CEOs, directors of think tanks, journalists, campaigners and academics. By contributing their visionary ideas for a different tomorrow to this publication, our members can pride themselves on re-invigorating one of Britain’s most outstanding traditions: the celebration of independent thinking and innovation.

I firmly believe that this is only the beginning of the exciting journey ahead for student think tanks. Within King’s, over 30 committee members have worked tirelessly to lay a solid foundation upon which our policy institute can flourish for the decades to come. As student-led think tanks are now being founded across Europe, it is becoming ever more apparent that their legacy will also go beyond the confines of our alma mater. In a changing world, the policy process itself will inevitably have to change. In light of the overwhelming challenges that our societies face, politics will have to mutate into an ‘incubator of innovation’. Students offer exactly the creativity and original thinking that is needed to address the demographic, legal and economic challenges of the 21st century. Policy recommendations such as those included in this journal should and will provide an impetus to new forms of thinking that yield new solutions.

In 2012-’13 we are expanding from 5 to 7 policy centers, which will each be holding between 3 and 5 events. This means that our members will be tackling societal challenges in areas as far and wide as Business/Economics, Current Affairs, Defence/Diplomacy, Education, Energy/Environment, Healthcare and Law. As such, the year ahead shapes up to be ‘une année de grand cru’ for the KCL Think Tank - and I sincerely hope that you too will be a part of it!

Sebastiaan Debrouwere KCL Think Tank President 2012-2013

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Editor’s note The KCL Think Tank Society is like a spark that spread into a wildfire.

From just a handful of students with an idea, it flourished into a fully constituted society with more than hundreds of members, regular events with wonderful speakers and engaged students who contributed by writing policy recommendations. This has been an amazing journey.

I want to start off by thanking all those who made this project possible: first, the talented students who have taken the time and energy to write policy recommendations for this journal, and without whom it would not have existed. I want to thank my team of amazing editors who have spent so much effort in making sure the Spectrum looked perfect. It wasn’t easy, but we made it. I would also like to thank the King’s College Annual Fund and Pinsent Masons, whose contributions made the printing of this journal possible. The success of this year would not have been what it was without the incredibly devoted and hard working members of the committee, who ensured that events were organized with speakers on different topics. Finally, I want to thank all the speakers who joined our events.

The purpose of The Spectrum is to serve as a forum where students can learn, debate and reflect on worldwide issues in different spheres. Through these articles, they express their own views and offer some recommendations to address those matters. As such, I have to stress the fact that the policy recommendations below have not been altered, as our think tank has no political or ideological affiliation.

This year, the journal’s focus was mainly on defense and diplomacy, at both national and international levels. With the tumult of events that has occurred this past year, it is amazing to see so many students getting involved in those debates and trying to suggest solution to those issues. These articles are not only extensive on the topics that they address, but they also show the level of deep reflection students engaged in, and the desire to make their voices heard, which is what the Think Tank Society is all about. I feel truly honored to have had the opportunity to work with such inspiring minds.

My hope is that the Think Tank Society will continue to strive in this direction, gaining in impact and influence. After all that has happened this year, it is becoming increasingly important that we continue to engage in debates on topics such as those addressed below, and find solutions to these issues. This is what we wish to achieve.

I hope you will find this collection of policy recommendations both interesting and eye-opening, and that it might lead you to reflect on those matters. Thank you for taking the time to read this compilation, and I hope you enjoy it as much as I did.

Juliette Vix KCL Think Tank Society Editor in Chief 2011-2012

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01 | Defense and Diplomacy Pakistan: Perpetrator or Victim of Terror?

Camille Maubert

The decay in US-Pakistan relations has now become common knowledge. Every recent crisis has had a detrimental impact on the ‘artificial’ cooperation between the two countries, and widened the gap of mistrust and mutual defiance. The shift in American rhetoric highlights the fractures in the friendship.

Pakistan has been demoted from a ‘key partner’ and an ‘indispensable’ ally in the war against terrorism, to a ‘traitor’ and a ‘double player’ whose brinkmanship is responsible for the current stalemate in Afghanistan.

It is difficult to objectively determine whether Pakistan’s inability to tackle its homegrown transnational terrorism is the result of incapacity, negligence or unwillingness. Yet such unilateral and uncompromising condemnation of Pakistan is misleading in that it doesn’t account for the geopolitical realities with which Pakistan is confronted. Indeed, Pakistan is a direct neighbor of Afghanistan, and as such has to bear the consequences of the conflict’s shock-waves. Therefore, before sentencing Pakistan, one ought to place the policies in a wider context; one that is shaped by an extremely complex regional environment.

Bilateral ties between Pakistan and the US are too often viewed through the single prism of the Afghan conflict and the unconditional commitment demanded by the US. This approach, however, ignores critical elements such as Kashmir, poor governance, political instability, and weak institutions – these shape Pakistan’s foreign policy and restrict its capacity to respond proactively. Given its geographical position, the spread of Pakistan’s Pashtun minority across the uncontrolled Pakistan-Afghanistan border allows the Taliban to operate in both countries, and Pakistan simply cannot afford to be squeezed between a potentially unfriendly Afghanistan and a hostile India. Therefore, like it or not, it is in Pakistan’s national interest to preserve good relationships with the Taliban - all the more given the increased probability of the latter’s being included in any peace settlement and becoming a permanent feature of Afghan political life.

As a result, Pakistan is both a perpetrator and a victim of terror. It is a perpetrator in the sense that its laissez-faire attitude regarding the Taliban’s infiltration and use of Pakistani territory as a safe haven allows the protraction of regional instability.

Yet it is also the victim of its own negligence, as shown by the steady increase of terrorist activity inside the country and the mounting pressure from China to tackle Islamic militancy more proactively. 1

1

Lieven, 2011

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Diverging Strategies The heart of the crisis lies in a deep-rooted divergence in policy between Pakistan and the United States. This is not to say that they have incompatible agendas. There is little doubt that both states share the same end goal: a secure Afghanistan and a stable region. Yet they disagree over how to reach this outcome, and over the causes of the problems within the area.

For the Americans, the reason for the International Security Assistance Force’s (NATO’s operational body in Afghanistan) failure in defeating the Taliban lies in Pakistan. There seems to be a consensus among the US military and policy-makers that safe havens within Pakistan’s Western provinces - left deliberately under-ruled - are the source of the Taliban’s constant reinvigorated power. 2 On the other hand, Pakistan claims that the problem lies in Afghanistan itself - in tribal and ethnic divisions, American power politics, and Karzai’s corrupt government. For Pakistan, sanctuaries are a consequence, not a cause, of the insurgency. Although this looks like wishful thinking, it is true that the United States’ deeply revisionist agenda, protracted presence and hazardous strategy in Afghanistan have helped strengthen the insurgency from the inside. Indeed, because the American presence is being perceived as an occupation, it induces rejection from the population.3 Additionally, there seems to be some inconsistency between the American official discourse of ‘ongoing progress’, and the reality on the ground which is far more complex. This reflects divisions within the American administration and army. While some administrative figures push for a political settlement and negotiations with the Taliban, others (including the military) seem to associate reconciliation with defeat. On the one hand the US clings to the idea of military victory by escalating the conflict and urging Pakistan to harden its policy toward the Taliban. On the other hand, Obama has started a process of reconciliation whereby the US exhorts Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table. 4 Such conflicting demands not only damage the relationship by creating a cooperation deficit, but they also refrain and compromise the whole exit process of ISAF from Afghanistan. As long as the US doesn’t settle for one policy Pakistan will not take the risk of losing its leverage on the Taliban, and the much needed political space for negotiation will not be created.

'Shake Hands With the Devil': An Alliance of Strategic Necessity When analyzing the current escalation of tensions, one has to bear in mind that both the US and Pakistan are subject to intense domestic pressure. Upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012 have resulted in the crystallization of discourses whereby decision makers cautiously stand their ground in order not to lose votes. Indeed, while Pakistani leaders cannot appear to be pushed around by the US, Obama must be seen as a strong leader asserting authority over a rogue Pakistan. These domestic priorities create a situation in which parties strengthen their arguments to conquer votes, but do not translate them into policies for fear of losing votes.

Yet behind its hyperbolic rhetoric the US does not have much room for maneuver. Obama’s cautiously distancing himself from General Mac Mullen’s recent comments, which openly accused Pakistan of complicity with the Haqqani terrorist network, shows how limited the US is vis-à-vis Pakistan. Indeed, while Mac Mullen was merely expressing a widespread American view concerning the Inter-Services Intelligence - Pakistan’s secret service - allegedly helping the Taliban by providing them with safe havens and funding, 5 the divulge of this view by a high army official was controversial. This event further strained US-Pakistan relations, which the United States cannot afford. ISAF’s mission is, to a large extent, reliant on air bases and supply routes coming from Pakistan for the conduct of America’s war 6, and the closing of some of these key logistical structures would have disastrous effects on the military campaign.

2

Cornwell, 2011

3

Euronews, 2011

4

Dombay, 2011

5

Northam, 2011

6

Radin, 2011

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The one leverage that the US has over Pakistan is the billions in military aid that is being poured into the coffers of the stateand the pockets of its leaders.7 This rent is critically needed by Pakistan to keep its crumbling economy afloat, provide basic public services and maintain its arm8 Nevertheless, the US urgently needs to stop lecturing Pakistan on its behavior and considering its politico-military establishment to be amateurish, because Pakistan might turn its back on the West. 9 In fact, should the US continue with its intransigent stance and decide to end its military aid to Pakistan, one can safely assume that China would fill in with more cash and fewer political demands. 10 Therefore, if the US genuinely values a regional peace settlement – in which Pakistan will have to be included – it needs to restore an acceptable level of tension with its ally. This will in turn create the political space that is needed for negotiations with the Taliban to start. Until then, the cracks in the two countries’ relationship will encourage spoilers to exploit these breaches and increase instability in the region.

2014 2014 is, in many aspects, a political deadline. It is the date at which Afghan forces will be ready to take control of their country, according to reports produced by the American Department of Defense and ISAF which emphasized the successes of the counterinsurgency. In that context the United States’ critical stance toward Pakistan may well serve as a means of saving face during its exit process. By putting the blame on Pakistan the US creates a narrative which presents it as the victim of spoilers, thereby justifying its exit strategy and avoiding responsibility for post-2014 troubles. The shift in the American discourse on Pakistan can also be understood in relation to its grand strategy. While the assassination of Bin Laden should have led to a decrease in military activity, the recent escalation of drone attacks and special operations across the Pakistani border suggests a different story. Indeed, the framing of the conflict as ‘AfPak’ is based on the assumption that Afghanistan cannot be secure as long as Pakistan’s homegrown terrorism is not tackled. As D. Markey from the Council of Foreign Relations claims, “if Pakistan does not end its ties with the Haqqani network, the US will expand its unilateral actions to destroy that network, whether Pakistan likes it or not.”11 This suggests that, through the framing of Pakistan as an enemy unable or unwilling to control its periphery, the US is taking ownership of its national security issues. Pakistan being perceived as an irresponsible neighbor provides justification for the 20,000 troops that will possibly remain in Afghanistan after 2014; and Haqqani becoming the new face of the War on Terror may also legitimize an American intervention against its host – Pakistan. The recent NATO attacks on Pakistani soil and the strong rhetoric used by Western, Pakistani and Chinese politicians indicates that one should not take 2014 for granted.

7

Perkovich, 2011

8

Lodhi, 2011

9

Escobar, 2011

10 11

Ibid.

Northam, 2011

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Bibliography Cornwell, Susan.“Pakistan safe havens challenge US Afghan effort.” Reuters. Last modified October 28, 2011. http:// www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/28/us-usa-afghanistan- idUSTRE79R5O520111028.

Escobar, Pepe. “Do the China Pakistan pipeline shuffle.” Al Jazeera. Last modified May 27, 2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/ indepth/opinion/2011/05/2011527104451497291.html.

Euronews. Afghans Protest Against US Occupation. Last modified October 6, 2011. http:// www.euronews.com/ 2011/10/06/afghans-protest-against-us-occupation/.

Dombay, Daniel. “Obama presses for Afghan Taliban talks.” Financial Times. Last modified May 22, 2011. http:// www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d92fa222-846c-11e0- afcb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1paIngO3o.

Kronstadt, K. Alan. “Pakistan-US Relations.” Congressional Research Service. Last modified July 1, 2009. http:// fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/68795.pdf.

Lieven, Anatol. “China is Key to America’s Endgame.” New York Times. Last modified May 25, 2011. http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/opinion/26iht-edlieven26.html.

Lodhi, Maleeha. “Lecture at Kings College University.” Paper presented at King's College London November 14, 2011.

Northam, Jackie. “Fragile US-Pakistan Relations on Downward Spiral.” npr. Last modified September 26, 2011. http:// www.npr.org/2011/09/26/140791165/fragile-u-s-pakistan-relations-on- downward-spiral.

Perkovich, George. “Changing the Direction of US-Pakistan relations.” Los Angeles Times. Last modified September 19, 2011. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/19/opinion/la-oe-perkovich- pakistan-20110919.

Radin, C.J. “Analysis: The US-Pakistan Relationship and the Critical Factor of Supply.” The Long War Journal. Last modified December 4, 2011. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/us_pakistani_relatio.php.

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Would a Nuclear Iran Destabilise the Middle East?

Philip Lewis

The Middle East’s strategic system provides a complex and unstable environment of unresolved political disputes.1 This instability and complexity are compounded when examining nuclear weapons in the region due to the limited geographic space between states and the concentration of rival populations.2 This proximity has two consequences. First, it makes containing a nuclear strike within one country almost impossible and would inevitably draw in other states into a nuclear conflict. Second, it may force nuclear powers to launch their weapons only when they have a warning of an attack rather than an attack itself.3 Both of which lower the threshold within the region for the outbreak of nuclear war. Iran becoming nuclear would thus increase the possibility of the vulnerabilities of the region’s strategic system being exposed.

At the outset, a nuclear Iran would only be opposed by Israel in a superficially similar binary as the Cold War. Nevertheless, this would be destabilising as Israel has a strategic culture of prevention and pre-emption and believes that a nuclear Iran poses an existential threat to its existence. 4 By allowing Iran to gain a nuclear weapon Israel’s nuclear and military strategy would have to alter. The Israeli image of an irrational Iran, its strategy of military superiority and military over diplomatic means, and Israel’s own image in the region would all have to change if a nuclear Iran came into being.5 A nuclear Iran would undermine Israel’s strategic norms, particularly the Begin Doctrine whereby it is Israeli policy to prevent other Middle Eastern states gaining nuclear weapons. It is thus not only Iran’s actions that will destabilise the region but also the reactions of its neighbours including Israel that will generate a new untested and unplanned for strategic dynamic within an already unstable region with nuclear weapons now in play.

The main, if not the only, danger, in this regard, of a nuclear Iran would thus be the impact it would have on its non-nuclear neighbours. A number of states have explored nuclear weapons in the past and there are a large number presently exploring or intending to explore civilian nuclear energy. 6 The most likely candidate to attempt to gain nuclear weapons is Saudi Arabia, who would see a nuclear Iran as a direct challenge to its prestige and authority. Saudi Arabia has already taken some steps in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability and there is some confusion surrounding quite what took place when thenCrown Prince Abdullah travelled to Pakistan in October 2003. 7 If Saudi Arabia was to gain nuclear weapons this could lead to a spiral of regional nuclear weapons acquisition. The Gulf States would also then have the unenviable position of being between a nuclear Iran and a nuclear Saudi Arabia who would be working to enhance their political and military domination of the Persian Gulf.

1

Sayigh, 1993, 179 & 202

2

Ibid. 182

3

Edelman et al., 2011, 72

4

Ibid. 68

5

Adamsky, 2011, 159

6

Fitzpatrick, 2008, 72; Edelman et al., 2011, 69

7

Russell, 2005, 32-33

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Although the Gulf States have the financial means to acquire nuclear weapons they may find it difficult to find a willing provider due to the US’s reaction. 8 Nevertheless, states such as the UAE who are acutely threatened by Iran and have an ongoing territorial dispute with it, or Qatar, which has asserted itself strongly on the global diplomatic stage during the Arab Spring, may feel that in response to a multipolar nuclear Middle East they must follow the trend. In this light, it is difficult to see Egypt with its historic role and continued aspirations for regional pre-eminence not considering building on its previous nuclear work. Whilst, the other regional power, Turkey, is increasingly coming into conflict with Iran over its policies on Syria and Iraq.

The Middle East, furthermore, has a history of arms races where states have competed to achieve strategic superiority and have used weapons of mass destruction as a legitimate means of warfare. 9 The region’s multiple and diverse actors is contrary to the pattern of superpower confrontation that marked the Cold War, undermining the game theory assumptions of mutually assured destruction. If a nuclear Iran caused regional proliferation it would raise the instability inherent within the Middle Eastern system, which is already characterised by political dispute, military conflict and arms races in a limited geographic space that places states within easy striking distance of each other, to a new plateau at which its own destruction was now squarely on the table.

The threat of nuclear proliferation may force the US to offer an extended nuclear deterrence umbrella across the region so as to convince states not to follow Iran. This, however, has no guarantee that it will succeed and it would be difficult to project conceptually and operationally. Conceptually, the US would struggle to offer a full-scale nuclear deterrent to Arab States who perceive Israel as much as a threat as Iran. For Arab States therefore any US nuclear deterrent would from the beginning be flawed and incomplete. Operationally, there is, first, little agreement on what this extended deterrence and its consequent containment would entail and it is has been ruled out as a policy that is being planned for by President Obama. 10 Second, if three successive US Presidents have said that a nuclear Iran is a major US security threat but have allowed that outcome to take place it is unclear how confident regional leaders will be in the US’s commitment to extended deterrence on their behalf.11 Finally, the very act of providing extended deterrence will bind the US to the Middle Eastern strategic system more strongly. 12 This will not only raise the risks and costs of a long term US presence there but also enhance the possibilities of confrontation with Iran through the necessity of its more active, open and direct opposition to its drive for regional hegemony.

With its belligerent rhetoric and eschatological and millennial ideology some are convinced that Iran would welcome a nuclear conflict or at least be prone to considerable risk taking. 13 Nevertheless, Iran’s historical record suggests its leaders are rational actors. In its foreign policy Iran has generally tried to avoid direct conflict. This does not mean that underneath its nuclear umbrella Iran will not feel emboldened to act more aggressively. The fear within the region will be that Iran will feel a degree of insulation from retaliatory attack that will translate into an aggressive foreign policy. Nevertheless, this fear requires Iran to successfully leverage its nuclear weapons for strategic advantage which other nuclear states have found exceptionally difficult to manage.

According to the US Energy Information Administration 17 million barrels of oil passed through the Strait every day in 2011, which is equivalent to around 35% of all seaborne traded oil. 14 There are thus fears that Iran would be able to disrupt the Strait and cause vast disruption to the world economy through utilising its stockpiles of mines, torpedoes, rockets, anti-ship

8

Russell, 2005, 34-35

9

Sayigh, 1993, 185-88, 194-95

10

Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010, 43; Rubin, 2010, 163-66; Obama, 2012

11

Edelman et al., 2011, 76

12

Eisenstadt, 1999, 134

13

Rubin, 2010, 164

14

IISS, 2012, 1

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missiles, submarines and fast attack craft. 15 This is, however, far from the case. First, Iran is completely reliant on the Strait for the export of its own oil supplies, which constitute around 70% of its revenue. 16 Any disruption of the flow of traffic in the Strait would seriously damage Iran’s already fragile economy that has suffered under years of sanctions that are becoming increasingly harsher. Second, although Iran may be able to close the Strait for a period of time this would be a short period.

The US Fifth Fleet is based in the Strait and is far more capable than any force Iran has, which was apparent during the July 1987-December 1988 Tanker War and a similar outcome would be expected today. 17 Additionally, at present the sanctions against Iran have increased the oil price to around a ten-month high. 18 It appears that the markets are pricing in, to an extent, the impact of an increasingly unstable regional environment and the possibility of oil supply disruption.

A similar analysis is apparent with the argument that a nuclear Iran would strengthen Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran has undoubtedly given substantial financial, training, logistical and military support to both. 19 Hezbollah has also expressed loyalty to the Iranian Supreme Leader. 20 It is, however, highly unlikely that Iran would ever pass a nuclear device to either, as it would leave its destiny’s in other’s hands. Furthermore, the popular uprising in Syria has seriously impaired Iran’s ability to resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon and has led Hamas to depart from its Damascus base and place itself in opposition to the Syrian regime, which it has openly acknowledged has displeased Iran. Hezbollah also has considerable autonomy from Iran with significant disagreements in a growing process of Lebanonisation of the organisation.21 The growing distance between Hamas and Iran and the problems Iran faces due to the situation in Syria in supporting Hezbollah mean that Iran’s desire and ability to strengthen both has been significantly reduced.

15

Ibid. 2

16

IISS, 2012, 1

17

Ibid. 2

18

Gardner, 2012

19

El Husseini, 2010, 809-10, 93-94

20

Ibid. 809

21

Ibid. 807

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Bibliography Edelman, Eric S.; Kreinevch, Andrew F.; Montgomery, Evan Braden. “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment.” Foreign Affairs 90:1 (2011) 66-81.

Eisenstadt, Michael. “Living with a Nuclear Iran?” Survival 41:3 (1999) 124-48. El Husseini, Rola. “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran Syria.” Third World Quarterly, 31:5 (2010) 803-815.

Fitzpatrick, Mark. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis. Abingdon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008.

Gardner, Timothy. “Western Sanctions Tighten Squeeze on Iran Oil Exports.” Reuters. Last modified March 1, 2012. http:// uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/uk-iran-oil- idUKTRE8200D620120301.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Disruptive Military Options” IISS Strategic Comments 18:3 (2012) 1-3.

Kaye, Dalia Dassa and Wehrey, Frederic M. “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 49:2 (2007) 111-128.

Lindsay, James M. and Takeyh, Ray. “After Iran Gets the Bomb: Containment and Its Complications.” Foreign Affairs 89:2 (2010) 33-49.

Rubin, Barry. “The Right Kind of Containment.” Foreign Affairs 89:4 (2010) 163-166.

Russell, Richard L. “Arab Security Responses to a Nuclear-Ready Iran.” In Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, edited by Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson. Strategic Studies Institute (2005) www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ display.cfm?pubid=629.

Sayigh, Yezid. “Middle Eastern Stability and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” In Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East: Tackling the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities, edited by Efraim Karsh, Martin S Navias and Philip Sabin. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Obama, Barack. “Transcript of Obama’s AIPAC Speech.” Politico. Last modified March 3, 2012. Available at http:// www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73588.html.

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How to Avoid another Mistake in Iran Alireza Shams Lahijani

The issue of Iran’s nuclear program is once again dominating the news. Iranian officials faced representatives of five permanent members of United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P-5+1) in Istanbul to discuss the future of Iran’s nuclear program. Both sides agreed to continue negotiations to find a resolution on May 2 in Baghdad, which is a breakthrough.

Ever since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran that toppled a Western ally, the United States has pursued policies mainly focused at containment and regime change while Europe initially sought constructive dialogue but in recent years was persuaded by Americans to join in efforts of pressuring Iran.

If the West wants to control Iran, it must rethink its strategy and understand its relationship with Iran for last thirty years that strengthened roots of mistrust that were created with memories of coup, historical interferences, hostage crisis, covert operations, contradictory moves and empty promises. Iran is negotiating with America, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom but there is no doubt that the destiny of any negotiation is upon Iran. Reaching any deal with Iran needs confidence building measures from both sides and the deal must not be simplified to a nuclear program but it must embrace a comprehensive approach to counter political and strategic differences.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Iranian administration issued a condolence and the Iranian public was among the few - if not the only - Middle Eastern nation that held a public ceremony mourning the death of the people. Then Iran assisted the US and its allies in attacking against Afghanistan and managing Afghanistan after the war1 without receiving any conciliatory signs from the US and instead being labeled as an axis of evil alongside Iraq and North Korea. 2 Iranian officials - with the exception of the Supreme Leader - were surprised by this move. After 2002, Iran briefly cooperated with the US in Iraq and cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency by opening up its civil and military facilities to inspection and implementing additional protocols.

When Barack Obama took office in America, there was renewed hope for engagement and diplomacy with Iran. He called upon Iran to unclench its fist and Iran’s Leader responded by saying verbal change is not enough 3 and asked for conciliatory actions such as removal of sanctions. Now, with three years of Obama in office, Iran has faced more sanctions to weaken the Islamic Republic and force it to negotiate. The tone of the Obama administration changed from one seeking diplomacy to

1

There are various accounts for this particular incident of cooperation; the Bush administration’s special envoy for Afghani-

stan gives a unique insight on how Iran facilitated government formation in Afghanistan: James, 2010, 149-62 2

Bush, 2002

3

Khamenei, 2012

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9

one calling for weakening the Iranian regime and being a bystander in terror of Iranian nuclear scientists conducted by Israel 4.

Which Policy to Use for Iran?

There is no magic formula that can undo past mistakes, erase memories of mistrust, and be applied to normalize Iran. There is one underlying symptom that can be diagnosed for failure of every single policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that is lack of confidence on both sides. Any policy on Iran needs to clearly understand Iranian leadership, its agenda and goals.

For years, Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei has been consistent on the nuclear program and being against a nuclear weapon. As recent as February, he made Iran’s intention clear in a major foreign policy speech: “The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the decision makers in the countries opposing us know well that Iran is not after nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.”5 Also it must be noted that Western and Israeli intelligence communities are in disagreement over Iran’s so called weapon program. Iran’s Leader believes that the West is looking for excuses to challenge Iran and weaken it, and its nuclear civil program is an excuse.

For confidence building, United States and its allies must accept existence of Iran as a regional power and stop fantasying about regime change in Iran. Unlike what has been portrayed in alarmist media, Iran is a rational actor. Iran always stated interest in comprehensive talks and long term cooperation on areas such as security, while West wanted a discussion limited to nuclear program.

The threat of war against Iran should stop. Some might argue for the success of any strike on Iran for destroying facilities and infrastructure, but it has been widely doubted given the geography of Iran and location of its facilities. Moreover, the Western intelligence community cannot predict the extent or nature of Iran’s retaliation: would it be limited to the Middle East or will it be extended to other regions? But there is no doubt that any attack on Iran will have profound impact on future of Middle East. Those supporting an attack against Iran must think twice: Iran is not Iraq. From an economic perspective, the direct and indirect costs of war is not something America or any other country wants to inherit in the current economic climate. From a theoretical perspective, the threat of war might be counterproductive as it has been hypothesized “if a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests”6 and of course the success of military operations cannot be guaranteed. Also there is a misconception that an attack on Iran might be welcomed by Iranians but the West must notice that with deep religious and nationalistic roots within the Iranian society, any attack would strengthen national and religious passion to combat.

Iran is threatened by the US and more pressure on Iran would lead Iran to maintain some sort of deterrence that is in contradiction with the desired outcome of an American and European strategy7.

The West must change its agenda on Iran. Rather than defining its policy on Iran with coercive elements, it must pursue a more cooperative policy with priority on the nuclear issue and including bilateral, international and regional issues. In shaping such a policy, the West must understand its wrong perceptions about Iranian society and the Iranian elite. While there are certain criticisms within the Iranian society, and political cleavages, the Iranian nuclear issue is regarded as a source of pride and a symbol of Iranian development since the Islamic Revolution - maybe among the few issues that all political factions are

4

From 2007, attacks were conducted in Iran which killed five Iranian nuclear scientists and possibly a military sight. Two

officials from the Obama administration revealed the administration awareness of the assassination campaign directed by Israel: Richard and Windrem, 2012 5

Press TV, 2012

6

Betts et al, 2012

7

Ibid.

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in consensus with each other about. For the last thirty years, Iran faced sanctions and did not back down. And sanctions will not force Iran to abandon its nuclear program.

Another important factor in policy design on Iran is to acknowledge its regional power. Any engagement from the US with Iran would not be welcomed by Arab allies in the region, namely Saudi Arabia due to historical and geopolitical issues that Iran is perceived as a threat. This very issue has been proven by recent moves from Iran.

Just two days before the P-5+1 meeting in Istanbul, Iran’s President symbolically traveled to the Island of Abu Musa that has been disputed by the UAE. 8 With the trip Iran signaled its dominance in the Persian Gulf and its neighbors cannot confront Iran without foreign support – Iran established its dominance without making any direct move against the United States.

These policies must be accompanied by a paradigm shift that can lead to the gaining of trust for both sides. Recent sanctions and pressures have proved to escalate the situation into war-talk without any benefits. Rather than combating each other, both sides should manage contradictions not just for the sake of their relationships but for broader regional and international security.

Bibliography Betts, Richard K.; Sagan, Scott; Waltz, Kenneth. “A nuclear Iran: Promoting stability or courting disaster?”Journal of International Affairs 60:2 (2007) Bush, George W. State Of The Union Address. Transcript from speech delivered January 29, 2002. http:// stateoftheunionaddress.org/2002-george-w-bush.

Dobbins, James. "Negotiating with Iran: Reflections from Personal Experience." The Washington Quarterly 33:1 (2010).

149-62.

Engel, Richard, and Robert Windrem. "Israel teams with terror group to kill Iran's nuclear scientists, U.S. officials tell NBC News." Rock Center, NBC. Last modified Febuary 9, 2012. http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/ 2012/02/08/10354553-israel-teams-with-terror-group-to-kill-irans-nuclear-scientists-us-officials-tell-nbc-news.

Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali. Supreme Leader’s Speech in Mashhad. Transcript of speech delivered March 21, 2009. http:// english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1076&Itemid=4.

PressTv. Iran will never seek nuclear weapons: Leader. Last modified February 22, 2012. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/ 228014.html.

8

Abu Musa is an island with an area of only about 13 square kilometers, part of an Iranian Southern province with a popula-

tion of less than 2,000 in a strategic position in the Persian Gulf at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. Three years after the establishment of the UAE, UAE disputed ownership of this island among two others. This dispute has been the source of tension between Iran and its Arab neighbors but after Ahmadinejad’s visit, this tension was heightened followed by Iranian military commanders’ rhetoric against UAE. There are about 3,000 Iranian troops on the island.

The Spectrum | edition 02

11

Is Terrorism a Continued Cause for the War in Afghanistan?

Steve Townsley

Countering the threat of terrorism continues to be used as justification for the on-going UK military operation in Afghanistan. We are approaching the 11th anniversary of the conflict, one which has cost over 400 British lives and an estimated 12,500 – 14,700 civilian lives,1 as well as in excess of £20billion. The question now has to be asked: how relevant is terrorism as a cause for the war in Afghanistan? The original purpose for the UK contribution to the US-led post 9/11 intervention in Afghanistan was, to paraphrase Tony Blair, about bringing Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders to justice and eliminating the terrorist threat they posed.2 Counter-terrorism and protecting UK National Security were central factors in the decision to deploy troops. The plan was simple: destroy al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and remove the Taliban from power.

However if we fast forward ten years to the present, we can see that while the justification remains the same, the mission has evolved into a full counter-insurgency campaign. 3 Prime Minister David Cameron said in June 2010 that “we are there because the Afghans are not yet ready to keep their own country safe and to keep terrorists and terrorist training camps out of their country.”4 The statements from both Prime Ministers show the gradual development of the Afghanistan war from counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency, which demonstrates how the justifications for the war have experienced ‘mission creep’.5 This article will argue that countering the threat of terrorism is no longer a cause for UK involvement in the war in Afghanistan. It will justify this firstly through two claims: that al-Qaeda has been disrupted and has dispersed from Afghanistan, and that our actions in Afghanistan will not defeat the Al-Qaeda ideology that is so vital to the organisation.

Secondly, this article will question if it is possible to contain the threat of terrorism without having a large presence in Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda Have Been Disrupted and Dispersed It is important, when considering our continued mission in Afghanistan, to understand that the original reason for the deployment was to deny terrorists the use of safe havens. These are defined in the US Country Reports on Terrorism 2010 as “ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.”6 Some of the perpetrators of 9/11 were known to have trained in Afghanistan, as were several other high profile

1

Crawford, 2011, 1

2

Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, 76.

3

US doctrine describes COIN countering an insurgency, which is an organized movement aimed at the

overthrow of a

constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02).

4

Collins, 2010

5

Mission creep is defined by the US military as the expansion of a mission beyond its original goals, often after initial suc-

cesses.

6

U.S. Department of State, 2009, 1

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terrorists. 7 The Taliban were embroiled in this as they gave sanctuary to Al-Qaeda, which made them a legitimate target at the time.

The war in Afghanistan is no longer deterring al-Qaeda based terrorism. This is predominantly because although the groups’ presence in the country has diminished significantly, and they have simply relocated to other parts of the world. This was recognised in the UK Foreign Affairs Committee’s 2011 report The UK’s Foreign Policy Approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The report claimed that the original justification for the continued presence in Afghanistan, which was in the interests of national security, may have already been achieved. 8 The report also cites a speech in September 2010 by the Director General of the Security Service, 9 Jonathan Evans, who when referring to the threat from al-Qaeda only mentioned the tribal areas of Pakistan. 10 In October 2009 the US National Security Advisor James Jones said that the “'maximum estimate' of al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan itself was less than 100 and there were no Al-Qaeda bases there.”11 Lastly, the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, recognised in its July 2011 review that the majority of terrorist plots against the UK have emanated from Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, 12 but not Afghanistan. Certainly the US Army soldier Nidal Malik Hasan, 13 who shot and killed 13 people at the Fort Hood army base in the United States, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Detroit underwear bomber, 14 were both radicalised by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – the Yemen based Al-Qaeda franchise – and had no connections to Afghanistan.

These factors considered, there is a strong argument that al-Qaeda attacks are no longer planned from Afghanistan. The hypothesis that Al-Qaeda no longer operates in Afghanistan makes sense, as it is likely that military action against them would have had the effect of squeezing them out of the country. Indeed, it was very telling that Osama Bin Laden was eventually located in Pakistan, and that the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, is also believed to be in Northern Pakistan. We can see further evidence of this theory with investigation of the London 7/7 bombers. Bruce Hoffman highlights how none of the bombers had ever fought in a contemporary Muslim conflict, nor had they received any training in Afghanistan. 15 Both the ringleaders travelled to Pakistan to conduct training, and then recruited extra members for their cell from inside the UK. 16 The 7/7 attacks show that using terrorism as a cause for war can even be counterproductive, as one of the bombers, Shehzad Tanweer, listed the presence of British forces in Afghanistan as a motivation for his attack. 17 These factors contribute to the argument that terrorism is no longer a continued cause for the war in Afghanistan.

War in Afghanistan Will Not Tackle the Ideology Fighting in Afghanistan will not defeat the terrorist ideology. The business model of al-Qaeda was resilient enough to survive the war against it in Afghanistan. This resilience was noted in a 2012 RAND report on the status of al-Qaeda, which explained that “whether al Qaeda is in its third decade or third century matters little to its leaders, who see the current conflict as the continuation of centuries of armed struggle between believers and infidels, and who expect it to transcend

7

The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, 225

8

Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, 77

9

Also known as MI5.

10

Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, 77

11

Ibid.

12

Home Office, 2011, 48

13

Ibid. 25

14

Ibid. 29

15

Hoffman, 2007, 425

16

Ibid.

17

The Guardian, 2006

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their lifetimes.”18 Furthermore, the report explains that although their central leadership has been “pummelled”, 19 al-Qaeda is now more dependent on its affiliates and its ability to radicalise and recruit members to conduct attacks on its behalf.20 These affiliates were recognised in the 2011 review of the UK’s counter-terrorism CONTEST strategy, which named groups such as 'Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula', based in Yemen, and al-Shabab based in Somalia.21 Such groups continue to spread Jihadist propaganda, thus ensuring a continuation of al-Qaeda based radicalisation. This raises the question: how can al-Qaeda continue to communicate internally, as well as reach out to new members, if they are deprived of the safe haven of Afghanistan? The internet offers a moderately secure platform for this activity, and provides these groups with a vast array of resources. 22 One example of this online radicalisation is the 'al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula' publication Inspire which, as well as spreading the jihadist message in a “colourful, professionally produced online magazine”,23 provides advice on bomb making. It is through online sources such as Inspire that lone-wolf24 terrorism can spawn, with individuals becoming self-radicalised through reading such material. 25 This threat has been recognised in the UK, following incidents such as the attempted murder of the MP Stephen Timms in May 2010, where the motive was revenge for his voting in favour of the Iraq war. The perpetrator – Roshonara Choudhry, a student from King’s College London26 - had had no contact with other terrorists, and had in effect been self-radicalised. 27 These collective points considered, it could be argued that the war in Afghanistan cannot defeat terrorist ideology as it does not address its root causes, such as the historic continuation of armed struggle; thus it is difficult to justify the continued cause of the war as being about defeating terrorism.

We Can Contain Terrorism Through Other Methods If terrorism is not a cause for war in Afghanistan what should be done? The UK CONTEST strategy outlines the four pillars of UK counter-terrorism as Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare. 28 Under the Pursue pillar – which is the most relevant when referring to the war in Afghanistan – the UK is encouraged to work further with “other countries and multilateral organisations to enable us to better tackle the threats we face at their source”. 29 This could be realised by sharing of intelligence with allies in order to effect disruptions of terrorist cells overseas. Indeed the US has experienced considerable success with their campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, as well as the assassination of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan (notwithstanding accusations of collateral damage and the killing of innocent civilians). One particular example of this was the killing, in September 2011, of Anwar an-Awlaki, the head of 'Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula'. President Obama described the death as “a major blow to al-Qaeda's most active operational affiliate [given that an-Awlaki took] the lead in planning and directing efforts to murder innocent Americans”. 30 If the UK could contribute to, or conduct its own targeted strikes, either using aircraft or Special Forces, then it could mitigate the need for troops to be in Afghanistan in the numbers 18

Jenkins, 2012, 9

19

Ibid. 10

20

Hoffman, 2007, 10

21

Home Office, 2011, 10

22

Ibid. 34

23

Torok, 2010, 57

24

A lone-wolf is described by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence as an “individual

pursuing [...] terrorist goals alone, either driven by personal reasons or their belief that they are part of an ideological group”.

25

Torok, 2010, 57

26

The Guardian, 2010

27

Pamtucci, 2011, 18

28

Home Office, 2011, 10

29

Ibid. 46

30

Obama, 2011

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which they are today. Of course it is important that Afghanistan does not return to being a failed state and a terrorist safe haven once troops withdraw in 2014, but this risk could potentially be reduced by properly training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). (This is easier said than done, and the several examples of ANSF infiltrating the Taliban and turning their weapons on British forces are a case in point.) However if this were successful then it would enable them to conduct the majority of counter-terrorism work on the UK's behalf.

A further example of this Pursue strand of CONTEST is the UK government investing in “developing the capability and capacity of our overseas partners”.31 While it is unclear what this actually entails, it is likely to include the training and equipping of friendly states where those terrorists groups that target UK interests are active. There is evidence that the UK is implementing this strategy in Pakistan; however in June 2011 the British team of military advisors who were training the Pakistan border police (presumably in counter-terrorism) were expelled as a consequence of the Bin Laden raid.32 Although the success of this strand of counter-terrorism is difficult to measure, and there is no data publicly available, the question has to be asked: if the UK's forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan, could they be more effective in countering the threat of terrorism by conducting this type of overseas training? It is strategies such as these that suggest our presence in Afghanistan is no longer required, as they suggest the possiblity that the objective of disrupting terrorism can be accomplished through other means.

Conclusion This article has argued that terrorism is not a continued cause for the war in Afghanistan through three points. Firstly, alQaeda have been disrupted and dispersed from the country. This analysis has been reiterated by the Foreign Affairs Committee and several high profile counter-terrorism practitioners. Al-Qaeda has continued to operate from other countries which are either fragile or failed states, and they have had moderate success in persisting with their Fatwa against the West.

Secondly, the British operation in Afghanistan will not destroy the terrorist ideology. Al-Qaeda consider the current conflict to be hundreds of years old, and merely removing them from Afghanistan – although it has damaged the organisation – will not stop it from spreading its propaganda, continuing attacks, and furthering its cause. They are already continuing this through online radicalisation, which is feeding and enabling lone-wolf terrorism. Lastly, it is possible to contain terrorism through other means and the Pursue pillar of the UK’s CONTEST strategy advocates working with multilateral organisations to tackle terrorism. The US has demonstrated a level of success with their drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere, and the UK has deployed teams in Pakistan to assist in the training of their border guards. All these factors considered, terrorism is not a continued cause for British involvement in the war in Afghanistan. The sooner this is realised by policy makers, the sooner we can stop the increasing death toll and suffering experienced on all sides, and learn a valuable lesson for the future.

31

Home Office, 2011, 48

32

Woods and Walsh, 2011

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Bibliography Crawford, Neta. Civilian Death and Injury in Afghanistan, 2001-2011. Boston University, 2011.

Hoffman, Bruce. “From the War on Terror to Global Counterinsurgency.” Current History 105:695 (2007). http:// www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=440.

Home Office. CONTEST - The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. London: Home Office, 2011.

Foreign Affairs Committee. “The UK’s Foreign Policy Approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Parliament UK. Accessed February 2011. http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/ inquiries1/parliament-2010/afghanistan-and-pakistan/.

Jenkins, Brian. “Al-Qaeda in its Third Decade – Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory?” RAND Corporation. Last modified 2012. www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP362.pdf.

Pamtucci, Raffaello. “A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists.” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Last modified March 2011. http://icsr.info/publications/papers/ 1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf.

Obama, Barack. “President Obama Welcomes New Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” The White House Blog. Last modified September 30, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/09/30/president-obama-welcomes-new-chairmanjoint-chiefs-staff.

The 9/11 Commission Report. “2004 Report.” The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the US. Last modified 2004. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm.

Collins, Nick. “David Cameron's tribute to British soldiers in Afghanistan.” The Daily Telegraph. Last modified June 21, 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/7843118/David-Camerons-tribute-to-British-soldiers-inAfghanistan.html.

Woods, Chris and Walsh, Declan. “Pakistan expels British trainers of anti-Taliban soldiers.” The Guardian. Last modified June 26, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/26/pakistan-expels-trainers-anti-taliban-soldiers.

The Guardian. Roshonara Choudhry: Police interview extract. Last modified November 3, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/ uk/2010/nov/03/roshonara-choudhry-police-interview.

The Guardian. Video of London bomber released. Last modified July 6, 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/jul/06/ july7.uksecurity1.

Torok, Robyn. “'Make a Bomb in your Mums Kitchen': Cyber Recruiting and Socialisation of ‘White Moors’ and Home Grown Jihadists.” Australian Counter Terrorism Conference. Last modified 2010. http://ro.ecu.edu.au/act/.

U.S. Department of State.“Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens and Tactics and Tools for Disrupting or Eliminating Safe Havens.”

Country Reports on Terrorism. Last modified August 5, 2010. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140891.htm.

The Spectrum | edition 02

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An Evaluation of CONTEST’S Prevent Strategy Kathryn Hale

The Prevent arm of the Home Office’s 2006 and 2009 CONTEST strategies has been subject to intense criticism by scholars, who have argued that the strategy has been counterproductive; for example, its aims have not been clear, and it has singled out Muslim communities (see Thomas, 2010; Stevens, 2011; and Gutowski, 2011). The latest 2011 CONTEST strategy has attempted to address such concerns; this essay will consider the limits of Prevent’s approach to combating the pathways into terrorism with regard to terrorist motivation, and will also explore some of the issues raised in regards to its understanding of certain issues. This essay will then suggest some improvements that would render the strategy more effective in countering terrorism.

CONTEST’s Prevent strategy focuses on what is, essentially, a re-education initiative implemented in a variety of ways.

Extremist ideas will be challenged through open debate; through using theologians and communities to explain why extremist texts justifying terrorism are wrong; and through working to counter the claims made in extremist propaganda about British foreign policy as well as police departments. 1 Central to this is the importance of a successful integration strategy that empowers communities to mobilise against terrorist ideology by marginalising and isolating extremists. 2 The implicit assumption behind these initiatives is that individuals become radicalised and progress into terrorist activity because they are misguided and that, as such, education is key to de-radicalisation. This is problematic, and arguably does not reach the root cause of individual extremist beliefs. The use of theologians in the CONTEST strategy implies that jihadist terrorism is primarily religiously motivated, rather than being a political activity expressed within the narrative framework of religion.

While some individuals will inevitably be drawn towards terrorist activity purely through an extremist interpretation of the Koran, it would be mistaken to ignore politics when considering why many individuals are drawn towards terrorism. However, CONTEST does not address the political incentives for terrorism, instead arguing that radicals exploit “real or perceived” grievances, such as “the perception of our foreign policy, the experience of Islamophobia and a broader view that the west is at war with Islam.”3 There are issues with this strategy at the community level. It seems to be assumed that Muslim communities do not share the same grievances as those radicalised. Such grievances may take the forms of social, political and economic marginalisation or prejudice, or outrage at British foreign policy. In this context, it might not be appropriate to encourage communities to argue that the aims of terrorist groups are distinct from, and not beneficial to, its constituents, and to marginalise the groups on this basis. A second issue is the assumption that terrorism is a community problem, and is related to integration issues. Biographical evidence of the July 2005 London bombers suggests that these individuals were not inadequately integrated. 4 Despite Prevent’s promise that it does not view communities as in need of being convinced that terrorism is wrong,5 this perspective nonetheless implicitly implies that Muslim communities have a duty to root out terroristsmore of a duty, perhaps, than other communities or movements whose fringes espouse radical ideologies, such as environmental or animal rights groups, or right-wing extremists.

1

Home Office, 2011, 59-61

2

Ibid. 60-62

3

Ibid. 60

4

Brighton, 2007, 2 and Githens-Mazer, 2008, 554

5

Home Office, 2011, 60

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The international elements of Prevent are also problematic. According to the CONTEST publication, Prevent will be “implemented in conjunction with communities here and overseas, who are often better able than the Government to disprove the claims made by terrorists and to challenge their views.”6 This implies that terrorist narrative is provably false; however, the undeniable suffering of Muslims- and many others- around the world would suggest otherwise. Furthermore this strategy will not be successful unless the Government chooses which voices from those international communities are used, in order to ensure that extremist ideologies are not inadvertently propounded. However, this then ultimately becomes a top-down rather than grass-roots influence on societies, which contradicts the community “empowerment and mobilisation” motif central to Prevent.

Such issues need to be addressed at both community and Government levels. Context is of crucial importance, and therefore CONTEST is correct to emphasise the need for community involvement in preventing terrorism. Local authorities are best placed to observe community dynamics and tensions; these can then be communicated to the Government so that common trends can be identified. Promoting integration is an important element in this process. More important, however, is identifying ethnic and religious tensions present in community relations as well as on a wider national scale in general. 7 Laws addressing freedom and equality of religion are related to these issues; the contradictions within these laws need to be addressed in order to help dispel the perception that Muslims are given preferential treatment over other religious believers. 8 On a related note, it is essential that the police demonstrate the same vigilance in cracking down on right wing extremist groups as they do on nonviolent Islamist radical groups; the perception that nonviolent Islamist groups are targeted while intolerant right wing groups are given more freedom may solidify the narrative that the West is against Islam.

The above recommendations range from the local to the Government level. It is also important for the Government to employ a different strategy to counter extremist narratives. It is not enough to attempt to simply disprove terrorist narrative on issues such as foreign policy and the West’s alleged 'war' against Islam. Prevent’s strategy is to challenge ideas conducive to terrorism by ensuring such ideas and narratives are subject to open debate; 9 while this is important, more progress might be made if the Government actually engaged with the grievances embedded in such ideologies. This would comprise actions such as acknowledging responsibility for the suffering for which British policies and actions are responsible, recognising past mistakes and endeavouring to adapt future policy accordingly. This may address the grievances of those vulnerable to radicalisation, and undermine the legitimacy of terrorist ideology by demonstrating that the British Government is not persecuting Muslims. It is hoped that this step would also encourage disaffected individuals to choose to work within legal parameters to have their voices heard, and to have an effect on the future.

As demonstrated by this discussion, an understanding of why and how individuals become involved in terrorist activity is foundational to counterterrorist efforts. A wealth of research has been conducted on the issue by terrorism studies scholars, which have yielded a number of relevant results which could be incorporated into policy. For example, F.M. Moghaddam illustrates the importance of the perception of available options and social mobility on an individual’s progression towards terrorism. 10 Different counterterrorism and de-radicalisation strategies must be employed at each level of what he refers to as 'the staircase from terrorism'; for the current purposes, however, his recommendations for disaffected individuals vulnerable to radicalisation are most relevant. Moghaddam argues that the ground floor, which the majority of Muslims inhabit, should be the focus of preventative programmes that encourage democratic participation in order to increase trust in Government 6

Home Office, 2011, 62

7

There are numerous examples to illustrate this point, from the demands to have the veil banned, to petitions against the

construction of mosques, and a general strong anti-immigration sentiment. Such sentiments are, to an extent, also manifested in the popularity of the English Defence League and British National Party. Although by no means representative of general opinion in Britain, consider the recent arrest of a woman for a racially aggravated public order offence after she was videotaped verbally abusing passengers on a tram (Bowater, 2011).

8

For an example of this tension, see Wynne-Jones (2011).

9

Home Office, 2011, 59

10

Moghaddam, 2005

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decision-making procedures. 11 Improvements in education will also help increase perceptions of social mobility. 12 This is particularly salient given Ofsted’s recent report highlighting continuing concern that “the more deprived the family a child comes from, the more likely they are to attend an inadequate school,”13 as well as the Sutton Trust’s disclosure that the significant difference in the quality of teaching in Britain will have a major impact on a student’s future earnings. 14 Given the impact this will have on social mobility, it is clear that the educational element of a preventative counterterrorism strategy cannot simply focus on educating individuals about why terrorism is wrong.

Conclusion This essay has endeavoured to demonstrate that the 2011 CONTEST strategy is limited because it does not address the grievances that facilitate pathways into terrorism. Such oversights may affect the success of the strategy as a whole, and it is hoped that the recommendations within this piece will provide some directions for further research. Addressing the grievances of populations will help to delegitimise the appeal of terrorist causes and encourage individuals to become more satisfied citizens, participating in British life rather than harbouring resentment against it.

11

Moghaddam, 2009, 303

12

Moghaddam, 2006, 302

13

Ofsted, 2011

14

The Sutton Trust, 2011, 5

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Bibliography Bowater, Donna. “Woman arrested over racist rant on tram,” The Telegraph. Accessed November 28, 2011. http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8921283/Woman-arrested-over-racist-rant-on-tram.html.

Brighton, Shane. “British Muslims, multiculturalism and UK foreign policy: 'integration' and 'cohesion' in and beyond the state.” International Affairs 83:1 (2007): 1-17.

Githens-Mazer, Jonathan. “Islamic Radicalisation among North Africans in Britain.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10:4 (2008) 550-570.

Gutowski, S. “Secularism and the Politics of Risk: Britain’s Prevent Agenda, 2005-2009.” International Relations 25:3 (2011) 346-362.

Home Office. CONTEST 3- The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. London: Home Office, 2011.

Moghaddam, Fathali M. “De-Radicalization and the Staircase from Terrorism.” In The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, edited by David Canter. Chichester; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

Ofsted. Press release: Raising ambition and tackling failure- The Annual Report of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s Services and Skills 2010/11. Accessed November 28, 2011. http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/news/raisingambition-and-tackling-failure-annual-report-of-her-majesty%E2%80%99s-chief-inspector-of-education-ch? news=18213Quote Stevens, D. “Reasons to be Fearful, One, Two, Three: The 'Preventing Violence Extremism' Agenda.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13:2 (2011) 165-188.

Sutton Trust, The. Improving the impact of teachers on pupil achievement in the UK – interim findings. Accessed November 28, 2011. http://www.suttontrust.com/public/documents/1teachers-impact-report-final.pdf.

Thomas, Paul. “Failed and Friendless: The UK’s 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Programme” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 12:3 (2010) 442-458.

Wynne-Jones, Jonathon. “Christian worker losers her job after being 'targeted' by Islamic extremists.” The Telegraph.

Accessed November 28, 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8917675/Christian-worker-loses-her-job-afterbeing-targeted-by-Islamic-extremists.html .

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Is the Threat of CBRN Terrorism Overblown or Underestimated in the UK? William Eastment

A credible chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack has not been attributed to a terrorist cell in the UK since the foiled Wood Green ricin attack of 2002. Of the groups identified in the UK’s 2011 CONTEST strategy for combating terrorism, Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda inspired attacks are of main concern to the UK’s Security Services.1 With the deaths of Osama Bin Laden and Anwar Al-Awlaki and, Al-Qaeda’s diminishing influence in Afghanistan and the Middle East, some analysts have declared the threat from AlQaeda as significantly reduced.2 Recent foiled attacks on Western targets attributed to Al-Qaeda and its offshoots have been marked out by their growing amateurish nature3 , and as evidence of the increased successes of intelligence operations by both MI5 and MI6 in preventing many attacks and plots before their implementation.4

It would appear, then, logical to assume that even a crude chemical attack using widely available formulas would be beyond the capabilities of Al-Qaeda. However, to underestimate the possibility of an attack of this nature would not be wise simply due to the numbers of casualties and levels of fear associated with such an attack. Matthew Bunn, Harvard Professor and former adviser to the OSTP (Office of Science and Technology Policy) has put forward the case that the risk of any given event should be calculated as the likelihood multiplied by the consequences. Since the consequences of any CBRN attack would be unacceptably high, both in terms of lives lost and damage to the economy through cleanup, quarantine and loss of business for potentially weeks, then the risk should be considered high even if the likelihood remains low.5 Yet in opposition to this is the argument that overplaying the threat from such sources can reduce the efficiency of intelligence and defence staff in pursuing more likely terrorist attacks, the likes of which have already been seen to be favoured by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Furthermore if policy makers appear too preoccupied with the CBRN threat then it may appear that an attack of this nature is the only thing required for terrorists to be taken seriously. 6 The purpose of this paper is therefore to decide how easy it would be for a large (or small) organisation to carry out an attack of this nature, whether the UK’s main terrorist adversaries would be interested in such an attack and finally, how this threat should be dealt with.

How Easy is it to Make a CBRN Weapon for a Terrorist Group?

There are ample resources on the internet for any determined terrorist to make a Chemical Weapon and only a Bachelors level degree in Chemistry is needed to succeed. There is no specialist equipment or large scale production costs. In practice it is not that simple. The marginally successful chemical attack by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995 had a team of nearly 300 engineers who produced up to 30 litres of Sarin Nerve gas. Yet, whilst the attacks on the Tokyo Subway killed 5 people, they had not nearly the devastating impact that the group had hoped for. The determination to make large quantities of chemical agent

1

Home Office, 2010

2

Brandon, 2011

3

The foiled Christmas Day bombings of 2009 are a notable example of this, as is apparent by the BBC's coverage:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8433151.stm 4

Again, not the BBC's coverage of the Cargo Bombing attempt: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11703355

5

Bunn and Martin, 2010, 166-200

6

Ibid.

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reduced its quality and subsequent potency.7 There appears to be a negative correlation between the amount produced and its quality. For many terrorist groups, in terms of destructiveness per dollar it may be more economical to focus on conventional explosives in a volatile environment such as an enclosed tube or airplane. As for Biological and Nuclear weapons the same trend occurs. The more agent you produce the less potent or powerful it becomes.8 Do Terrorist Groups See CBRN Weapons as a Useful Alternative to Traditional Means of Terror?

It must first be noted that terrorist organisations have a wide array of incentives and motives, many of which cannot be served by CBRN weapons. Due to the indiscriminate nature of these weapons, it becomes impossible to use them in discriminate ways such as the targeting of a certain company or individual or of military and government facilities. The only plausible use is to cause mass casualties and to break the political will of the established regime. 9 For the purposes of this section I shall focus primarily on Al-Qaeda (and Al-Qaeda inspired attacks), as they have been determined as the most likely threat to the UK and, in closing, compare their motives to smaller groups who may have more incentive to use CBRN weapons for different purposes to Al-Qaeda.

It is clear that the acquisition of CBRN weapons is of importance to Al-Qaeda and its offshoots. The instructions on how to make homemade poisons are widely cited in the Encyclopaedia of Jihad and the Mujahedeen Poisons Cookbook, for any inspired individual to make use of. Copies of both appear online regularly. Al-Qaida itself has been found in possession of plans for a “Nagasaki-Style Bomb” as well as base agents for a variety of Chemical and Biological Weapons,10 yet no delivery mechanisms were ever discovered. It appears that whilst CBRN provides an alternative to conventional means, AlQaida does not have the capability to weaponise these base agents to a level that could inflict more damage than conventional weapons. Indeed, much of the literature that is so “widely available” is fraught with errors. 11 Indeed, as a point of comparison, the only successful mass casualty CBRN attack was that by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995 which, compared to other mass causality attacks, killed fewer people than similar attacks by conventional means. Aum Shinrikyo was fascinated by the idea of poisons and toxins and pursued a programme to develop these capabilities akin to that of a nation-state.12 There is a trend that those seeking to develop CBRN capabilities tend to have a fascination with the idea of poisoning and/or infection and pursue this goal as their only end. If Aum Shinrikyo could only muster such minimal success with the resources it has, it shows how large a task it would be for a group such as Al-Qaeda who have such multifarious goals relating to global jihad, none of which show any fascination with chemical or biological agents beyond their ability to kill a large amount of people. So far evidence has shown that conventional means of terror are still the most economical way to kill large amounts of people.

However, with recent plots increasingly being foiled by greater intelligence successes and increased public vigilance, terrorist groups may reach the conclusion that conventional means of inflicting mass-casualty attacks are no longer as effective by conventional methods and this is where policy issues come in to play.

Policy Implications The difficulty in policy making in regards to CBRN Terrorism lies in the interpretation of the aforementioned formula, ‘risk= likelihood x consequences’. Since the consequences of a successful CBRN attack are so high the risk is always likely to be high too. Yet if one follows this formula too rigidly there is a danger of inordinately spending money on what is most difficult

7

Cole, 2011

8

Cole, 2011. 34-64

9

Ibid. 65-88

10

Ibid. 60-63

11

Stein, 2005

12

Tu, 2001, 78 and Parachini, 2001, 389- 406

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to handle, not on what is most likely, 13 at the expense of more likely attacks with smaller consequences. This produces a quandary for policy makers. The implications of a CBRN attack to national infrastructure are far greater than isolated bombings. Should monetary and structural resources therefore be reflective of this higher risk? At the moment, when most evidence outlined above points to the paucity of a reliable alternative to conventional means for a terrorist group, it would appear foolish to follow this suggestion.

Conclusion The UK currently faces a substantial threat of a terrorist attack according to the most recent JTAC assessment. This assessment does not discriminate between a conventional or non-conventional attack and nor should it. Whilst there is a difference between conventional and non-conventional attacks, to prioritise the risk of one over the other sends too clear a signal of how best to target UK infrastructure. Despite the perceived ‘risk’ to national infrastructure being higher than an attack by conventional means, to guide policy too closely on this perceived risk makes the UK seem more vulnerable and preoccupied with the threat. Whilst CBRN remains a significant threat it should not be treated as more or less of a risk than a conventional attack for both practical reasons, and so as not to invite this very attack upon ourselves by revealing unique fears or weaknesses. Terrorism as a whole should be seen as a risk and CBRN as one element of this risk.

Bibliography

Brandon, James. “Terrorism in 2011: Extremism at home and abroad.” Talk delivered to the Kings College Think Tank Society, London October 24, 2011.

Bunn, Matthew and Martin, Susan. “Is Nuclear Terrorism a Real Threat?” Debating Nuclear Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, edited by Stuart Gottlieb, 166- 200. Washington: CQ Press, 2009.

Cole, Benjamin. The Changing Face of Terrorism: How Real is the Threat from Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons?

Cambridge: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2011.

Home Office, The. “The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Combating International Terrorism: Annual Report 2010,” Statewatch.org. Last modified March, 2010. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/apr/uk-nss-contest-annualreport-2010.pdf.

Parachini, John V. “Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24:5 (2001). 389-406.

Stein, Jeff. “Chemist Derides Qaeda Germwar Skills Touted by Manual.” GlobalSecurity.org. Last modified August 8, 2005. http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050808-qaeda-germwar.htm.

Tu, Anthony T. “Anatomy of Aum Shinrikyo’s Organization and Terrorist Attacks with Chemical and Biological Weapons” Archives of Toxicology, Kinetics and Xenobiotic Metabolism 7:3 (2001). 45-84.

13

Parachini, 2001, 395

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Negotiating the Internet: Diplomacy, Security and Governance in the Information Age Tim Stevens

Since the release by WikiLeaks of US diplomatic ‘cables’ beginning in the autumn of 2010 many claims have been made as to the long-term effects of such unauthorised disclosures on the practice of international diplomacy.

It is argued that the ability of WikiLeaks to obtain and publish documents

revealing the inner workings of a diplomatic corps irrevocably changes the way in which diplomats can and should conduct their affairs in future. No longer, perhaps, can national secrets be truly secret when the Internet and those committed to radical transparency combine to expose international diplomatic arcana to the global gaze1 .

Whatever the long-term effects of the Internet on diplomatic process, less attention has been granted to the Internet as an object of diplomacy, rather than as an external and disruptive influence on the experience and practice of diplomacy as per WikiLeaks. Specifically, the relationships between ‘cyberspace’, security and governance have become the focus of diplomatic negotiations at the highest levels. These discussions revolve around concepts like ‘cyber security’, ‘cyber war’, ‘cyber espionage’ and ‘cyber crime’, and aim to mitigate threats to national and international security by those seeking to exploit the vulnerabilities created bysocietal dependence on cyberspace.

One of the more concerted efforts at present is the explicit attempt by the US and its allies to pursue the development of international norms of cyberspace behaviour. One recent example is that of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, whose November 2011 London Conference on Cyberspace “launched a focused and inclusive dialogue to help guide the behaviour of all in cyberspace”2. This path—actually established well before the London conference—is in part a diplomatic one, in which ‘like-minded nations’ can be persuaded to develop a normative regime in which one another’s sovereignty is respected, the established ‘laws of armed conflict’ are applied in conditions of ‘cyber warfare’, cyber criminals are pursued with collective vigour, and in which an ‘open’ Internet is held to be of paramount importance to the pursuit of economic and social vitality, as well as being demonstrative of Western liberal and democratic values. By these measures is it hoped that individual and collective security can be enhanced without recourse to international treaty mechanisms 3.

Despite occasional claims that such actions constitute something awkwardly termed ‘cyber diplomacy’, the negotiations thus entered into are nothing but old-fashioned diplomacy conducted with respect to sociotechnical systems of rather more recent origin. No clumsy linguistic sleight-of-hand is required to describe the ancient art of massaging the balance of power in one’s national interests, even if the topics on the table are often slippery and somewhat elusive by virtue of their novelty and technical complexity.As with all diplomacy, negotiation, albeit only one of the suite of potential diplomatic functions, is necessary because not all parties agree on any given issue 4.

Although, for example, the Cold War might long be over, there remains a degree of mutual suspicion between the US and Russia that keeps diplomatic relations between the two on cyber security issues very much cooler than between the US and

1

Page and Spence, 2011, 234-243

2

Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011

3

Stevens, 2012a, 148-170

4

Bull, 1977, 170-172

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her Anglophone allies, or between Russia and her Asian allies in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and amongst the non-aligned countries of the United Nations. Sharp boundaries can be identified between these various communities as to what, for instance, constitute the appropriate norms of state behaviour, both in domestic and foreign policy terms. Broadly caricatured, the US and its strategic allies are committed to free trade and information exchange, whilst also not wishing to sign international treaties that would hinder their abilities to pursue national security interests in and through the Internet 5.

Conversely, Asian and other rivals of the US draw more directly on internal security concerns, often linked to the perceived negative effects of Western cultural influences on domestic populations, and desire international agreements that would preserve their rights to determine what measures they take with respect to the Internet within their sovereign boundaries 6.

Such disagreements are played out in a variety of international fora, such as the United Nations International Telecommunication Union, and are unlikely to be resolved any time soon.

The differences between these perspectives, however, need not be over-dramatized. On one level, such divisive rhetoric tends to become self-sustaining and reify the very impasse diplomacy should be seeking to resolve. Equally important is the observation that in terms of the systemic relationships between diplomacy and ‘cyberspace’, the disagreements between international rivals on these and similar issues are far less significant than are the points on which all state parties agree. At the heart of all state actions with respect to the governance and regulation of the Internet is the assumption that this is an environment in which states should and must intervene.

States should intervene, so the argument runs, because this is an environment in which political gains may be made in the national interest. Similarly, states must intervene because not to do so would be a derogation of the responsibility to protect and promote the interests of the citizens to whom governments are responsible. In effect, cyberspace has become an environment in which the exercise of state power is normalised, even as the long-term effects of this process, fuelled by this double imperative, are not yet clear. That said, there is little doubt that as we are witnessing the infiltration of information technologies into every part of human life, so too can we trace the complementary movement of state politics into those same environments. Where technology goes, there politics follow. This process is assisted by a standard narrative in which cyberspace is presented as a ‘domain’ over which dominion must be sought and through which national interests may be pursued. All the traditional levers of state power—diplomatic, informational, military, economic—are brought to bear in pursuit of those interests 7.

Diplomats do not have an easy task ahead of them. Aside from the ideological differences between parties to high-level biand multi-lateral discussions, the role of the diplomat itself may be subtly changing. At the beginning of the 17th century, the English diplomat Sir Henry Wotton is recorded as saying that an ambassador is “an honest man, sent to lie abroad for the good of his country”8. How one views the integrity of individual diplomats in the shadow of WikiLeaks is a matter of personal interpretation but in general terms this formulation may require some slight alteration. Given the interconnectedness and interdependence of contemporary information systems and the reliance of societies and economies upon them, it may be that diplomats will be required to act in the interests of all countries rather than just their own. To aim for an open and free Internet, for example, is illogical—not to mention undeliverable—if purely national interests are put ahead of the collective good. This is not to suggest that national interests, particularly expressed as concerns over security, be demoted but that they can best be pursued within a positive-sum framework of mutually supportive aims and intentions. Whilst this may not be a new idea it will require new loci and modalities of networked cooperation9.

Evidently, it will also require careful disaggregation of the security issues involved. All threats are not equal and nor should all responses be considered through the lens of national security. Diplomats often seem either ill-at-ease or glib when

5

White House, 2011

6

Anderson, 2011

7

Betz and Stevens, 2011

8

Walton, 1796, 151

9

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 194-227

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confronted publicly about cyber security concerns. This is not because they are not capable and committed individuals but because the sheer range of issues germane to cyber security and allied fields like Internet governance—much of which is highly technical—is, frankly, beyond most individuals to comprehend fully. Diplomats will likely require increasingly specialised assistance in order to fulfil their roles, a need for which the growing epistemic community of cyber security professionals will doubtless be well placed to satisfy10.

Information technologies pose significant challenges to diplomacy. Not only can they directly affect the ways in which diplomats operate but they have become a new field of diplomatic responsibility through the emergence of the global Internet and the cyberspaces thus enabled. This is clearly seen in contemporary discussions about global cyber security and Internet governance, for which traditional diplomatic talents will be as greatly in demand as they have ever been in order to resolve satisfactorily. These complex sociotechnical and transnational issues require that national interests are pursued in tandem with those in the common weal. How far such aspirations can be realised depends upon a wide range of state and non-state actors but at the inter-state level it will, as ever, be diplomats that shoulder the burdens of avoiding conflict and negotiating mutually acceptable courses of action.

Bibliography Anderson, Nate. “Russia, China, Tajikistan propose UN ‘code of conduct’ for the net.” Wired. Last modified September 21, 2011. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-09/21/code-of-conduct.

Betz, David J. and Stevens, Tim. Cyberspace and the State. London: Routledge. 2011.

Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette. “Varieties of cooperation: Government networks in international security.” In Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance, edited by Miles Kahler. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Conference on Cyberspace. Last modified 2011. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/ london-conference-cyberspace/ Page, Mark & Spence, JE. “Open secrets questionably arrived at: the impact of Wikileaks on diplomacy.” Defence Studies 11:2 (2011). 234-243.

Stevens, Tim; “A cyberwar of ideas? Deterrence and norms in cyberspace.” Contemporary Security

Policy 33:1

(2012a) 148-170.

“Norms, epistemic communities and the global cyber security assemblage.” e-International Relations. Last modified March 27, 2012b. http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/27/norms-epistemic-communities-and-the-global-cyber-security-assemblage/ Walton, Izaak. The Lives. York: Wilson, Spence & Mawman, 1796.

White House, The. International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World.

Washington, DC: White House, 2011.

10

Stevens, 2012b

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Strategic Defence: the People’s Republic of China’s Stance in the South China Sea Lars G. Backstrom

The South China Sea has recently come into the spotlight as a geopolitical hotspot because of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) tremendous economic growth in recent years. The PRC’s economical and political heartland is the SE coastal plain, where 41% of

the population lives, 70% of GDP is

generated, and 90% of its exports originate. This has made the PRC dependent on long and potentially vulnerable Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs), and has created an economic heartland in the south east coastal plane of the PRC that is potentially vulnerable to strikes from Taiwan and the sea. To defend its SLOCs and heartland, the PRC is in the process of expanding and modernising the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The PLAN has adopted a doctrine of forward defence with a tactical offense; therefore, other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries bordering the South China Sea have begun upgrading their naval forces and forming defensive alliances. A conflict could damage the regional economy and could involve the US, because of its wish to protect the freedom of the seas and its desire to back up allies.

The Economic Growth and Importance of the PRC Since 2000 the PRC’s GDP has increased six-fold, see chart 1. In 2010 its GDP was second only to the US and by 2030 its GDP will be the world’s largest. 1

The PRC is a major regional and global trader, see chart 2. This increase in the PRC’s economy corresponds to an increase in energy consumption, as shown in charts 3 and 4.

1

Tung, 2010, 2; World Bank, 2012

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The PRC’s main source of energy is domestic coal, but its share is projected to decrease from 70% to 55% by 2030. Its dependency on oil will remain static at around 18%. 2 Most of this oil demand is met by foreign imports, and by 2030 this dependency is projected to be around 80%. 3 At present around 60% of the PRC’s oil imports come from the Middle East, and 30% from Africa. 4 90% of this oil passes through the Malacca Strait.5 To secure its oil supply the PRC is developing diplomatic, cultural, and economic ties with oil producing nations in Africa and the Middle East6, and nations along its SLOCs in the Indian Ocean7. To achieve full control of its energy supply the PRC has also embarked on an extensive ship construction programme 8. The PRC’s apparent aggressive claims on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea can partly be seen as a way to secure a source of energy without long and vulnerable SLOCs, since the PRC believes the region to be rich in hydrocarbons. 9 The Strategic Problem of the PRC and how the PRC Intends to Solve it The PRC’s SLOCs pass through the choke points of the Malacca and Taiwan Straits and past its regional rival, India.10 The Spratly Islands also dominate the SLOCs passing through the South China Sea. 11 SLOCs are historically very sensitive for Asian countries because, by controlling them, the western powers dominated Qing China and South East Asia during the nineteenth century. The strategic position of the PRC is shown in map 1.

Map 1. The PRC is hemmed in by the two Island Chains. The First Island Chain runs from the Japanese Archipelago via Taiwan to the Indonesian Archipelago. The definition of Second Island Chain is not as clearly defined, but it stretches between the Japanese Archipelago to the Marshall Islands. Apparent from the map is the choke point of the Malacca Strait and the importance of India for the PRC’s SLOCs (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007)

2

BP, 2012, 47 & 78

3

Ibid.

4

Obi, 2010, 182

5

Garofano, 2008, 172

6

Obi, 2010, 182-186; Shaw, 2010, 15; Aning, 2010, 146; Kaplan, 2010, 242

7

Prabhakar, 2006, 52; Kaplan, 2010, 24

8

Wood, 2011, 9

9

GlobalSecurity.org, 2011a

10

Green and Shearer, 2012, 179-180

11

Buszynski, 2012, 146

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It then becomes apparent that the strategic problem for the PRC is essentially maritime, which puts the focus on the PLAN. The PLAN has in recent years undergone a rapid expansion and modernisation. 12 However, it is important to remember that the PRC lacks a real maritime tradition and the PLAN lacks experience with modern naval operations and logistics. Its sailors suffer from poor training, education, and seamanship.13 It is also possible that the totalitarian political system of the PRC will stifle the individual initiative necessary among commanders of ships and fleets for long distance operations. The PLAN is attempting to remedy some of these shortcomings by participating in anti-piracy operations in the waters outside Somalia. 14 Despite its long coastline the PRC possesses only a few harbours capable of providing bases for the PLAN.15 The PRC has established a naval base at Sanya on Hainan Island capable of basing the PRC’s growing arsenal of nuclear submarines to ease the situation. This base opens up the South China Sea for PLAN operations. However, the Sanya base is potentially vulnerable from the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea,16 see map 2.

Map 2. The South China Sea showing the strategic locations of the Paracel Island with regards to Hainan and the Spratly Islands with regards to the PRC SLOCs. Noticeable here is also Taiwan’s position to threaten the PRC heartland (U. S. Energy Information Administration, 2008) The PLAN doctrine calls for an ‘off-shore’ strategic defense, but an operational offense in depth. 17 The goal is to deny enemy forces in case of a future conflict access to PRC waters, or waters the PRC considers vital to their survival, such as SLOCs. Adding strength to that doctrine, the PRC is also developing advanced long range missiles like the DF-21C medium range ballistic missile,18 the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, 19 and attack submarines 20 that could be used as sea-based platforms for the CH-10 land attack cruise missile. 21

12

O’Rourke, 2012, 7-29

13

Yoshihara and Holmes, 2010, 216

14

Green and Shearer, 2012, 179

15

Buszynski ,2012, 146

16

Ibid. 151

17

GlobalSecurity.org, 2011b

18

Kristensen, 2010

19

DefenseTech, 2010

20

GlobalSecurity.org, 2012

21

GlobalSecurity.org, 2011c

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The comparative weakness in logistics, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Air Defence capabilities of the PLAN is also an indication that its primary role will not be convoy duty, but to threaten enemy forces, supply lines, and shore installations in a possible conflict. 22 Recommendations and Conclusion The spectacular growth of the PRC economy has lead to new strategic challenges, as it is now dependent on long Sea Lines of Communications for its trade and energy needs. Seen in this light the PRC modernisation and expansion of the PLAN and its development of advanced missile systems have become not only tools for expansionist dreams, but also necessary tools for an in-depth defence with a tactical offensive doctrine. However large the expansion of the PLAN, the fundamental problems of the lack of experience and poor manpower quality will prevent it from being a serious challenger to the US Navy. It is not then desirable for the US to become too involved, since it is not even a member of the ASEAN. Therefore, the member states might take such involvement as expansionist attempts from the US. However, the PRC stance, while not aggressive, is very assertive and must be met assertively. This means that the US cannot abandon its allies or show weakness, but it cannot let itself be drawn into an arms race in the area, partly because it is not an area of vital interest to the US, and partly because an arms race might drive the PRC to adopt a truly aggressive stance. If the PRC feels threatened, this could possible provoke it to attempt a pre-emptive first-strike. The best policy for the US in the South China Sea region would then be to ‘Speak softly, but carry a gun’ and as much as possible let the ASEAN countries solve their issues among themselves.

Bibliography

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Green, Michael J. and Shearer, Andrew. “Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy.” The Washington Quarterly 35:3 (2012).

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Kaplan, Robert D. “The Geography of Chinese Power - How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?” Foreign Affairs 89:3 (2010). 22-41.

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Tung, Chen-yuan, Mah, Amy T. and Wang, Guo-Chen. China economic world ranking report Issue 3. Taipei: National Chengchi University, 2010.

Wood, Al. “Tanker Ownership in non OECD countries and the Rise of Government Owned Fleets.” In Institute for International Economic Policy Working Paper Series, IIEP WP 2011 07. Washington: The George Washington University, 2011.

Yoshihara, Toshi and Holmes, James R. Red Star over the Pacific - China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010.

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02 | Business and Economics Social Entrepreneurship: A solution to Many Problems?

Christian Kolb

Uncertainty reigns when it comes to defining the concept of social entrepreneurship. In vain will one trawl through academic commentary, and other sources of opinion, searching for a uniform definition of what this frequently used phrase truly encompasses. We can safely say however, that this 'third sector'1 has undergone much change both in terms of its size and scope since the term came into widespread use in the 1980s and 1990s, 2 and now provides multi-national support to people who often live at the margins of society. After an account of the concept of 'social entrepreneurship', the author will dive into an analysis of its positive impacts on social welfare, some relevant criticisms and a possible outlook for the future.

The Search for a Good Definition Society's rapidly changing perception of the concept of social entrepreneurship complicates the search for a definition. This leads to the common contention among academics that the term is ill-defined. 3 The meaning of social entrepreneurship has indeed changed with time, and it is far from similar to that which people used ten or twenty years ago. Today, the term is much more widespread and common in ordinary language, so the concept is ripe for reconsideration.

The dominant economic system, which most of the developed and even most developing nations have now enshrined, is capitalism. On the face of its principles, the phrase 'social entrepreneurship' almost appears to be an oxymoron. How can social welfare and entrepreneurship, which is usually profit-driven and encapsulates the individual's desire to improve his personal financial standing, be reconciled?

1

The other two being the private and the public sector.

2

Early promoters of this movement were Bill Drayton, founder of Ahoka: Innovators for the Public, Charles Leadbeater and

Michael Young.

3

Barendsen and Gardner, 2004, 43; Weerawardena and Sullivan Mort, 2006, 21

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Social entrepreneurship is, in many regards, very similar to its profit-driven cousin because its foundation rests on the same three elements: 4

‣Entrepreneurial Context5 ‣Entrepreneurial Characteristics 6 ‣Entrepreneurial Outcome 7 Having established these fundamental congruences, we now need to consider the possible differences between the two concepts. For if there is not any significant difference, how can social entrepreneurship be the solution to many of the problems which the other concept fails to solve? The notion that the most fundamental distinction lies within the motivation for setting up a business is misconceived. Putting financial gain on one side of the scale and altruism on the other would not constitute a fair reflection of the difference between the two. The motivation behind social entrepreneurship is better ascribed to the that of self-realisation. That we are striving for pleasure and trying to avoid pain is most fundamental to our human nature. It is precisely this prospect of pleasure in self-realisation that encourages entrepreneurs to take on the many risks and hurdles involved in setting up a business.

The crucial distinction rests in the value proposition 8 itself. 9 The entrepreneur's value proposition is designed to create financial profit by introducing a new product or service into a market which is already in the position to afford it. The value proposition of a social entrepreneur stands in stark contrast. The value he is looking for may not even be quantifiable, but is more "in the form of large-scale, transformational benefit that accrues either to a significant segment of society or to society at large."10 The product is launched into a market which tends to be under-served and comprised of potential buyers who are usually in a rather miserable financial position in which they lack the means to acquire the transformative benefits for themselves. Samer Abu-Saifan's proposed definition is very accurate:

The social entrepreneur is a mission-driven individual who uses a set of entrepreneurial behaviours to deliver a social

value to the less privileged, all through an entrepreneurially oriented entity that is financially independent, self-

sufficient, or sustainable. 11

While this definition does not resolve every uncertainty that currently clings to the phrase 'social entrepreneurship', absolute certainty is not necessary and in fact might be detrimental to its purpose. Flexibility is a characteristic of social entrepreneurship that has contributed to its growth and success over the past decade. A balance needs to be struck between defining the essential elements of this notion on the one hand, but on the other hand keeping it, to an extent, ambiguous and adaptable to ensure that it can evolve over time.

4

Osberg and Martin, 2007, 34

5

This is usually a suboptimal equilibrium.

6

These include inspiration, creativity, direct action, courage and fortitude, all encouraging the entrepreneur to correct the

suboptimal equilibrium.

7

A successful entrepreneur creates a new stable equilibrium and "engineers a permanent shift from a lower-quality equilib-

rium to a higher-quality one." (supra, n 4) 8

See generally, Emerson, 2003, 35

9

Ibid. 4

10

Ibid.

11

Abu-Saifan, 2012, 22

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Beneficial Impacts Critics contend that there is no need for social entrepreneurship in virtue of the numerous welfare services and public goods which are now provided by modern welfare systems. 12 However, what these critics do not (fully) acknowledge is that the welfare state, as currently in place, was designed in a completely different environment with different values underpinning it.

The post-second World War period was characterised by full employment,13 stable families and low female employment. 14 Modern societies are now challenged by completely different issues, such as drug dependency and long term unemployment. 15 Most welfare systems are ill-equipped in both tools and resources to deal with these problems.

In recent years, due to major upsets to economic and financial stability, states are attempting to cut costs wherever possible.

The welfare system, which often represents a very large proportion of state expenditure, is, of course, a major area in which to undertake these cuts. The taxpayer does not make these cuts easier. In fact he opposes higher taxes, but on the other hand views the suffering of the poor with discomfort. The author is not disputing that the cuts are necessary to ensure sustainable growth and stability in the long-term, but is showing that relying merely on the state-welfare system will not achieve a high degree of social welfare. Wide-ranging supplements to the public sector are needed, shaped by social innovation and the determination to bring about change. This impact, it is argued, can be made by social entrepreneurs.

Improvements ought to be made on a professional level to distinguish social entrepreneurship from mere charitable work, which is often vulnerable due to its dependence on external funding and sponsorships. Three arguments will illustrate my point. ‣Social Capital Far from merely creating tangible assets such as schools, community centres or hospitals, the investments of social entrepreneurs create social capital.16 Similar to the notion of social entrepreneurship, there is not a uniform definition for the term 'social capital'. Proposed definitions do, however, share the core idea that social networks are at the centre of its importance, as expressed by Robert Putnam:

Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a university education (human capital) can increase productivity, so do

social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups. 17

Social entrepreneurs heavily rely on such relationships to gain access to different kinds of resources, which in turn further develop the size of the social network, highlighting the importance of social capital for the successful social enterprise. The dividend that both the community and the individual may derive from this capital is hardly financial, nor otherwise quantifiable, but is simply "a stronger community, more able to look after itself, with stronger bonds of trust and cooperation". 18 This feature of society has fallen more and more into oblivion, but can now be revitalised again with the increasingly popular model of social entrepreneurship. ‣Efficiency Projects launched by social entrepreneurs can increase efficiency in the provision of social benefits. The high level of bureaucracy currently inflates the price of many welfare goods or services provided by state institutions. Social enterprises 12

Good examples include the UK, Germany and the Scandinavian countries, such as Norway or Finland

13

If there was unemployment, it was largely in the short-run.

14

See Leadbetter, 1997, 12-13

15

Ibid.

16

See generally Bankston and Zhou, 2002; Coleman, 1988

17

Putnam, 2000

18

Leadbetter, supra at ft 15

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could offer equal services at a lower price through less administration costs, and additionally through highly committed staff who have chosen to enter this profession themselves. The objection may be raised that this proposed increase in costefficiency can only be achieved because social enterprises often employ unpaid, volunteering labour.19 However this proves to be an untrue proposition in light of empirical evidence demonstrating that many such organisations already employ staff, who are paid similar rates of salary as those in the private sector. We should be careful not to let this argument undermine the higher productivity which comes from "greater commitment and flexibility rather than markedly lower pay."20 ‣Employment Many of these organisations create paid working opportunities, particularly for those who express a genuine interest in this field. Simple economic analysis shows how lower levels of unemployment, even on a smaller scale, may have a positive impact on the national economy as a whole. Critics tend to neglect this line of argument and rather focus on attacking the benefits, which most certainly exist but are more difficult to measure. While it is conceded that one will have difficulty in attaching a numerical value to, for instance, a higher level of skills among the people involved in these schemes, this does not diminish the beneficial nature of the social enterprises at all. Higher skills again mean greater flexibility which then can be translated into higher cost-efficiency and qualitatively better services. Surely no-one with a sound economic understanding is going to dispute that such benefits, despite being difficult to quantify, will contribute to a more stable economic climate both in the short and in the long run.

Criticism We must not turn a blind eye on the objections that are raised against this concept, and fall too quickly into overwhelming enthusiasm in light of its many positive impacts. ‣Reputation There is the potential risk that some firms might take advantage of the valuable reputation that comes with the term "social entrepreneurship" simply to boost their reputation. They may change their business model not to commit themselves to this innovative idea, but rather to convey a better, more socially acceptable picture of themselves to potential buyers, or to satisfy their stakeholders. ‣Problems with decentralisation21 If social enterprises were to provide most of our welfare services, there is the likelihood that, depending on the companies in different areas, the level of welfare might vary on a geographical basis. Social enterprise start-ups may also occur more frequently in wealthier areas, where people are more likely to possess the education and the funds necessary to realise such enterprises. Higher entrepreneurial activity in one area will create advantages for this particular section of the community, but the opposite might leave some parts at a great disadvantage. Moreover, there is the danger that services might become too personalised22 and therefore lose the much-required impartiality. This almost inevitably increases the risk of discriminatory treatments, or at least raises such allegations.

These objections are indeed valid. However, particularly regarding the second criticism, the author argues that such problems will be unlikely to arise since it is not suggested that social entrepreneurship completely replace the state welfare system, but shall supplement a minimum level of social welfare which would still be provided by a centralised system. To reduce the risk of geographical dissimilarities, state-funded subsidies could be given to encourage new social enterprises in areas in which only a few are in existence, or to encourage existing social entrepreneurs to expand into these areas. Onetime investments like these would very likely pay-off quickly. Furthermore, an independent commission could deal with 19

Compare Leadbetter, fn 15, at 23

20

Ibid.

21

Cook, Dodds and Mitchell, 2002

22

Ibid.

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allegations of discrimination and hence resolve potential problems that critics currently see in implementing this concept on a wider basis.

Conclusion The author has sought to bring some clarity to the uncertainty that surrounds the concept of 'social entrepreneurship' and attempted to give an insight into the positive impacts this concept could have on our welfare system. Innovation and reform are what is needed to bring about improvements and to help to ensure that social welfare is achieved on a large scale. This is not to say that the concept is completely flawless and can instantly be put into practice, but collaboration and interdependence between the public sector, social entrepreneurs and society could ensure the reform of our current welfare system, which the author believes is not equipped with the necessary tools and resources to withstand the numerous challenges arising out of the economic crisis and structural changes within society.

Bibliography

Abu-Saifan, Samer. “Social Entrepreneurship: Definition and Boundaries.” Technology Innovation Management Review 22 (2012). http://www.timreview.ca/sites/default/files/article_PDF/Saifan_TIMReview_February2012_2.pdf.

Bankston, Carl L. and Zhou, Min. “Social Capital as Process: The Meanings and Problems of a Theoretical Metaphor.”

Sociological Inquiry 72: 2 (2002). 285-317.

Barendsen, Linn and Gardner, Howard. “Is the social entrepreneur a new type of leader?” Leader to Leader 34 (2004).

43-50.

Coleman, James S. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988). S95-S120.

Cook, Beth; Dodds, Chris; Mitchell, William. “The false premises of Social Entrepreneurship.” Centre of Full Employment and Equity. Last modified March 1, 2002. http://apo.org.au/node/8782.

Emerson, Jed. “The Blended Value Proposition: Integrating Social and Financial Returns.” California Review Management 45:4 (2003). 33-52.

Leadbetter, Charles. “The rise of the social entrepreneur.” Demos. Last modified January 1, 1997. http://www.demos.co.uk/ publications/socialentrepreneur.

Osberg, Sally and Martin, Roger L. “Social Entrepreneurship: The Case for Definition.” Stanford Social Innovation Review 27 (2007). http://www.skollfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/2007SP_feature_martinosberg.pdf.

Putnam, Robert. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.

Weerawardena, Jay & Sullivan Mort, Gillian. “Investigating social entrepreneurship: A multidimensional model.” Journal of World Business 41:1 (2006). 21-35.

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The International Arms Trade and the UK’s role Johanna Grusch

Since 2011, thousands of Syrian citizens have been killed and, despite seemingly endless efforts in peace negotiations, the fighting continues. When the international community pushed for a military intervention in order to end the bloodshed, China and Russia vetoed the resolution in the United Nations Security Council. The fact that both the regime and its opponents have vast amounts of weapons at their disposal renders the conflict even more difficult to resolve and extremely deadly. Over the last 10 years, Syria’s imports of major weapons have increased by 580% 1. Interestingly, 78% of these imports where provided

by Russia2.

Not only in Syria, but all around the globe, the arms trade is big business. Throughout the last two decades arms exports have reached approximately $60 billion worldwide 3 - levels which are worryingly reminiscent of Cold War arms races. Ever greater sophistication in technology produces highly advanced weaponry, ranging from machine guns, rifles, tanks and armoured vehicles, to radar systems, fighter aircraft, helicopters and warships equipped with guided missiles. While countries worldwide are recipients of these goods 4, there is only a small number of producing countries which together account for nearly 80% of arms exports 5. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US has been in the leading position, providing 30% of arms exports. Russia follows with 24% and also Germany, France, the UK and China, whose arms production has risen considerably over the last decade, hold a significant share of arms exports 6.

While some of these countries already have high standards of controls, the international trade is still a patchwork of regulations with numerous loopholes and a large amount of grey area. The problem with international arms trade is not the illegal transfer of dangerous goods but the fact that most of the arms sales, even to undemocratic and oppressive regimes, are in fact legal. Because of this, over 150 members of the United Nations voted for the establishment of stronger international arms trade standards (only one nation, Zimbabwe, voted against). In July 2012, a UN Conference will meet in order to draft an Arms Trade Treaty, which will establish international criteria for the licensing of arms exports. However, drafting a treaty text and convincing countries to sign will not be enough. In the international context, where instruments for law enforcements are very limited, designing effective rules and obligations will be a challenging task for the UN. Especially, when the issue concerned is as explosive as the international arms trade.

Selling arms is not only economically profitable but also a highly influential political tool. While the arms transfer’s share in the global economy remains comparatively small, its political impact is tremendous: arms deals strengthen and create military alliances, impact state behaviour, economic stability and development 7. Military capacities are a crucial part of every

1

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012

2

Ibid.

3

Grimmett, 2008, CRS-4

4

The bigger part of arms exports goes to developing countries, see: Ibid.

5

Holtom et al, 2012

6

Ibid.

7

Stohl and Grillot, 2009

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country’s power and national security considerations. Governments which are the biggest customers of the arms industry are also essential for subsidising arms production. Following the tradition of realpolitik, five of the six biggest arms exporters – US, UK, France, Russia and China – also constitute the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Unfortunately, power and national security considerations often outweigh human security risks. Economic advantages and profits derived from the weapons industry are fundamentally built on conflicts and political tensions. The arms business is an inherently deadly one. The lack of international regulations and the quest for profits brings ever more sophisticated weapons into the hands of corrupt, oppressive regimes and terrorist groups. Far too often, arms transfers go unchecked, undermine the efforts of humanitarian peace-keeping organisations and result in countless civilian deaths. Even liberal democratic countries, whose aim is the promotion of peace and democracy, although sometimes indirectly, are guilty of providing weapons to conflict zones and thus further intensify oppression and killings. UK arms, as the Campaign Against Arms Trade states, were used in order to fight the Arab Spring in Libya and Bahrain, in Israeli attacks on Gaza in 2009, by the Indonesian military in East Timor and by Argentina in the Falkland Wars8. Out of the sixteen countries, which were identified as locations of major armed conflict in 2009, the UK sold weapons to twelve9. Moreover, despite the fact that inimical relations and armed conflicts between India and Pakistan continue to bring shockingly high levels of violence to the region, the UK supplies both countries with weapons 10. The Financial Times cited UK industry officials stating that the “regional tension between the nuclear-armed neighbors is a unique selling opportunity”11 and even high ranking politicians were accused of working in the interests of arms producing companies in peace negotiations 12.

The ease with which arms can be brought into areas of tension may be economically profitable for the arms industry and also some politicians, but it also makes conflicts more likely, more deadly and more difficult to resolve. Evidence of British arms used in bloody conflicts around the globe led to a call for stricter controls of arms exports. UK politicians, together with numerous NGOs, have been at the forefront of fighting for an arms trade treaty. But the strengthening of regulations is very difficult since political ties between the UK’s biggest arms companies and the government considerably influence arms control and export limitations. BAE Systems, which produces for example military aircraft, defence electronics and land warfare systems, is a major actor influencing British politics. In 2006, when Serious Fraud Office investigations due to major corruption allegations threatened an Al-Yamamah deal, a multi-billion pound sale of Eurofighter Typhoons to Saudi Arabia, the government suddenly discontinued all investigations. Prime Minister Tony Blair justified this decision in terms of national security concerns 13. In 2010, BAE Systems PLC was sentenced to $400 million criminal fine because of corruption and violations of the Arms Export Control Act14. But BAE Systems deals are not the only cases of corruption. In fact, the arms trade is considered one of the most corrupt businesses in the world15. The US Department of Commerce estimated that 50% of all bribes are paid for defence contracts 16.

However, despite major cases of corruption, UK arms exports already have very high standards in comparison to other countries. Companies have to apply for export licences at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, which approves or refuses applications according to the Consolidated EU and National Export Licensing Criteria. The respect for

8

Campaign Against Arms Trade, 2011

9

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010; Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2010, HC 202

10

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012

11

Financial Times, 2002

12

Ibid.

13

BBC News, 2006

14

US Department of Justice, 2010

15

Courtney et al, 2002

16

Ibid.

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fundamental freedoms and human rights in destination countries is one of the mandatory criteria 17. But as soon as arms are exported, they are only subject to a patchwork of other national arrangements which were often set up during the Cold War in order to impede military advantages for the enemy. Today, the lack of international regulations in the arms trade is a serious issue which has to be addressed as soon as possible.

Although this is widely acknowledged, the dangers of UK arms trade are still underestimated and even ignored by those who argue for the need of the arms industry to grow and globalise. Accordingly, arms exports are essential tools in order to meet challenges of the financial crisis, employment shortages and national security concerns. However, economic profits based on arms exports to conflict zones should raise major moral questions. Moreover, since the arms exports constitute only 1.5% of British exports 18, the industry’s ability to boost the economy and create jobs is highly overstated. In fact, the industry and its jobs are reliant on state subsidies. As an editor of the Financial Times stated, “you can have as many arms export jobs as you are prepared to waste public money subsidising”19. Both subsidies and skilled workers which are currently employed by the arms industry could be used for tackling other major security concerns. For instance, the development of renewable energy technologies would not only create jobs and bring economic advantages but it would also further British energy security and promote environmental protection. Thus, stricter controls on the arms trade would neither harm the British economy, nor employment rates or national security. In fact, global security would be significantly enhanced.

Consequently, in July 2012, the international community has to draft a treaty, which standardizes and regulates the international arms trade. Since international law enforcement architectures are limited, an arms trade treaty also has to include rules and obligations which ensure that all members comply. International criteria which prohibit arms transfers to countries where weapons undermine peace, stability and human rights, have to be established. In order to fill loopholes and colour grey areas, an international arms trade treaty has to include all weapons, transactions and trainings. Instead of further legalising the arms trade, the UN has to put strong and effective restrictions on buyers and sellers. In addition to this, market as complex and dangerous as the global arms market has to be more transparent and its actors held accountable. The UN recognizes the right of every nation to arm and defend itself but in order to fulfil its main purpose - “to maintain international peace and security”20 - stricter arms trade regulations are imperative.

The character of war is changing. In contrast to former wars, more and more conflicts take place within states, rather than between. Arms are no longer provided by national industries but part of globalised markets. In addition to this, weapons become more deadly and sophisticated and result in an increasingly high proportion of civilian deaths. As past experiences have shown, more weapons do not automatically increase security. In fact, uncontrolled flows of arms intensify conflicts and undermine peace-keeping efforts. Due to a lack of control, economic and human developments are reversed, political systems destabilised and people killed. With the globalisation of the arms trade, national or regional regulations are no longer effective and far from sufficient.

17

Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2010, HC 202

18

Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2010, HC 202

19

Beattie, 2010

20

UN, 1945

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Bibliography BBC News. Blair defends Saudi probe ruling. Last updated December 15, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ politics/6182125.stm.

Beattie, Alan. “Promoting exports full of risk for world economy.” The Financial Times. Last updated August 20, 2010. http:// www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2b8b272e-a4b4-11df-8c9f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1rnyST7gc.

Campaign Against Arms Trade. Introduction to the Arms Trade: The Impact of the Arms Trade. Last modified August 2, 2011. http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/introduction/impact-conflict.php.

Courtney, Catherine; Cockcroft Laurence; Murray, David. “Corruption in the Official Arms Trade: Policy Research Paper 001.”

Transparency International UK (2002). http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/2002-publications/23-corruption-in-theofficial-arms-trade.

Department for Business Innovation & Skills. Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 2009. London: The Stationary Office Limited, 2010.

Financial Times. Quoted in “The Arms Trade is Big Business.” Global Issues. Date of original article February 27, 2002. http://www.globalissues.org/article/74/the-arms-trade-is-big-business.

Grimmett, Richard F. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 2000-2007. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008.

Holtom, Paul; Bromley, Mark; Wezeman, Pieter D; Wezeman, Siemon T. “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2011.”

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011). http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=443.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; SIPRI

Yearbook 2010. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Press Release 2012. Last modified March 19, 2012. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/measuring/

embargo_press_release_2012.

Stohl, Rachel. and Grillot, Suzette. The International Arms Trade. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009.

UN, The. “Charter of the United Nations.” The Un.org. Date of original document June 26, 1945. http://www.un.org/en/ documents/charter/intro.shtml.

US Department of Justice. BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine. Last updated March 1, 2010. http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html.

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03 | Energy and Environment The World on Our Plate – The Impact of Our Current Food Culture Tamara Dimova

Food’s impacts range from health concerns to environmental problems. Environmental issues linked to food cover a broad field, extending from the agricultural to energy sectors. This paper examines the environmental and health impacts of food by explaining Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) and carbon footprint, then assessing food’s impact on the environment and health, and what constitutes a healthier and sustainable diet. We explore packaging and resource depletion, two contributors to foods’ environmental impact. We turn to climate change (CC), a threat to food production, health and energy, and suggest CC mitigation policy action for European policy.

LCA is an environmental accounting framework that examines products’ environmental impact from production to their selling1 and it has gained importance in agro-food production2. LCA is useful for producers to improve their product’s environmental performance, for consumers to responsibly choose what to buy, and for policy-makers to form long-term food strategies. 3 Carbon footprint is a measure that calculates the total set of Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions caused by a product 4. Wiedmann and Minx define carbon footprint as “a measure of the exclusive total amount of CO2 emissions that is directly or indirectly caused by an activity or is accumulated over the life stages of the product”.5 The measure can be calculated in two ways, one of which uses the LCA framework.

Food’s Environmental and Health Impacts This section focuses on food’s impact on environmental degradation and health. Food production depletes resources, degrades land and air quality, and generates vast amounts of waste.6 Certain foods, e.g. livestock, have a greater environmental impact than others. Livestock and dairy products have the highest environmental impacts as they require a lot of resources (e.g. land). This requirement and the nature of livestock translates into major contributions to CC, water and air pollution, land degradation, and biodiversity loss. 7 Additionally, increased meat and dairy consumption can have diverse

1

Pelletier, 2008; Vazquez-Rowe et al., in press

2

Cellura, et al., 2012

3

Ibid.

4

Pathak, et al., 2010

5

Wieldmann and Minx, 2008, 4

6

Cellura, et al., 2012

7

Pelletier, 2008; Virtanen, et al., 2011; McMichael, et al., 2007

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negative health effects, e.g. increased risk of cardio-vascular diseases.8 Conversely, vegetables have lower GHG emissions and carbon footprint as well as contain less fat, meaning they are healthier.9 These differences are further amplified by the diets that people have as people in high-income countries consume more meat, whereas people in low-income countries consume more vegetables 10.

A traditional part of nutritional diets has been insects. They contain high contents of protein, carbohydrates, lipids, and vitamins.11 Insects also have a low environmental impact, requiring little land and other resources to grow and mature.

Considering the high prices of meat, prevalent poverty, growing populations, and number of malnourished people in developing countries, 12 eating more insects could be a potential solution to improving people’s nutrition in the developing world as well as reducing their diet’s environmental impact.13 The environmental impact of food extends beyond the production of the food itself. The impact is also influenced by packaging, transport, etc. Cellura, et al. found that packaging and design account for the highest environmental impact in terms of waste generation during food production. Packaging and design do not influence the product’s nutritional value and can be easily re-designed to use environmentally degradable materials or less packaging.14 Economic incentives in the form of policies could stimulate action to reduce the environmental impact of food packaging.

Most estimates concerning the environmental impact of food products have been made using LCA and the carbon footprint.

However, problems arise due to the incomplete nature of these measures. For example, Ridoutt, et al. conducted a LCA to estimate the impact of agriculture on freshwater availability. Despite concluding that agriculture threatens freshwater availability, they conducted an incomplete water LCA. For complete LCAs and to be able to assess the overall environmental impact of agriculture on resource depletion (freshwater availability here), experiments, results and statistics should be based on an extensive database of individual cases of food. 15 Such exercises would allow for more rigorous and scientifically accurate assessment of the impact of food on resource depletion.

Climate Change (CC) This section focuses on the two-fold relationship between CC and food: 1. food and agricultural production contribute considerably to CC, and 2. CC will negatively impact food yields. 16 CC involves rising temperatures and global circulation system changes that will perturb human-made systems like markets, economies, countries, and populations. The food sector adds to CC by increasing the atmospheric GHG emissions. These emissions include CO2 from fuel combustion, CH4 from animal husbandry and rice cultivation, and N2O from the turnover of nitrogen in soil. 17 These impacts have mostly been measured through the carbon footprint and LCA. The repercussions of the changes that global warming will cause on human-made systems are worrying. These environmental changes will disrupt the food sector by altering the conditions, in which we grow food. The rising

8

McMichael, et al., 2007

9

Pathak, et al., 2010

10

Ibid.

11

Premalatha, et al., 2011

12

FAO, 2011

13

Premalatha, et al., 2011

14

Cellura, et al., 2012

15

Ridoutt, et al., 2012

16

McMichael, et al., 2007

17

Kramer, et al., 1999

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temperatures will cause water shortages, soil exhaustion, biodiversity loss, and droughts. 18 The changes will be accompanied by physical hazards, more frequent extreme events, air quality problems, and altered patterns of infectious disease transmission. All of these will reduce agricultural yields, ultimately raising food security concerns. 19 These concerns are aggravated by worsening living conditions, which will also give rise to health problems. 20 Before addressing mitigation and adaptation measures however, we need to consider two key contributors to CC from the food sector – international trade and energy. With open trade between nations, food travels across the globe every day.

Food transport majorly contributes to foods’ GHG emissions.21 Considering that food production constitutes a large part of developing countries’ GDP, countries prioritise the economy over the environment, posing problems for long-term food production and security. International trade here portrays the complex relationship between the economy and the environment, where one prospers at the cost of the other.

Energy is another contributor to high food emissions. Traditionally, food has been produced with a reliance on non-renewable energy resources. 22 Fossil fuels play a key role in the food’s environmental impact. Considering the depletion of nonrenewable energy resources, traditional food production needs to be altered. Reducing food’s environmental impact needs to integrate energy efficiency into food production. 23 Climate Change Mitigation Problem

Existing Policy to Improve

Policy Recommendation

Incomplete and inaccurate coverage of EU 2020 target 2. Invest in R&D

Further development of the indicators

indicators (LCA, carbon footprint as

and specialisation

well as others) Resource depletion in food production EU 2020 target 2. Invest in R&D

Develop more efficient production strategies to minimise waste and

Fuel combustion for food production

resource use EU 2020 target 3. Climate change and Replace with renewable energy

Climate change worsening living

renewable energy sources; reduce emissions EU 2020 target 3. Climate change and Change cropping rotations; instigate

conditions and posing concerns for

renewable energy

food insecurity Packaging

techniques EU 2020 target 3. Climate change and Use recycled materials for packaging,

climate change adaptive farming

renewable energy

less packaging, and biodegradable

Meat production and consumption:

EU 2020 target 4. Education and

materials - reduce emissions Restrict livestock production

High environmental impact, Health

awareness

risks, Climate change contribution

CAP subsidies for alternative sources of protein

Stimulate vegetable consumption In developing countries, encourage traditional sources of protein such as insects

Table 1. Problems, Corresponding Policies, and Recommendations for Policy Direction.

18

McMichael and Lindgren, 2011

19

Jankowska, et al., 2012

20

McMichael, et al., 2011

21

Virtanen, et al., 2011

22

McMichael, et al., 2007

23

Cellura, et al., 2012

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The EU 2020 has a target commitment to 10% of transport energy to be renewable. For this to happen, further research into national potential modelling is required. 24 The European Commission responded to this emphasis by increasing the research funding by 45% between 2012 and 2020, from €55 to €80 billion. 25 We summarise these and other suggestions in the Table 1 (see above).

Although the policy suggestions (Table 1) to the problems outlined above seem simplistic, they could enhance food’s environmental performance and provide better understanding of the relationship between the environment, health and food.

Conclusion In sum, the food sector degrades the environment considerably. We use only LCA and the carbon footprint, which provide a general idea of the impact of food products. Modernised diets portray problems with unhealthy eating, such as processed foods, and high contents of fats and sugars. While developed countries experience obesity, people in the developing world lack nutrients like proteins as a result of the high prices of foods. Further, packaging and resource depletion contribute to food’s environmental impact. CC aggravates some of these problems by threatening food security and human health. The European Commission could implement various policies to improve elements from the outlined situation.

Bibliography Cellura, Maurizio; Longo, Sonial; Mistretta, Marina.“Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) of protected crops: an Italian case study.”

Journal of Cleaner Production 28 (2012). 56-62.

European Commission (EUROPA). Food Safety. Last modified 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/sustainability/ index_en.htm.

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation). “World Food and Agriculture in Review.” The State of Food and Agriculture 2010-2011 (2011). http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i2050e/i2050e00.htm Jankowska, M Marta; Lopez-Carr, David; Funk, Chris; Husak, Gregory J.; Chafe, Zoe A. “Climate change and human health: Spatial modelling of water availability, malnutrition and livelihoods in Mali, Africa”. Applied Geography 33 (2012). 4-15.

Kramer, Klass Jan; Moll, Henry C.; Nonhebel, Sanderine; Wilting, Harry C. “Greenhouse gas emissions related to Dutch food consumption.” Energy Policy 27 (1999). 203–216.

McCarthy, Mark; Aitsi-Selmi, Amina; Banati, Diana; Frewer, Lynn; Hirani, Vasant; Lobstein, Tim; McKenna, Brian; Mulla, Zenab; Rabozzi, Giulia; Sfetcu, Raluca; Newton, Rachel. “Research for food and health for Europe: themes, needs and proposals.” Health Research Policy and Systems 9 (2011). 37-51.

Macilwain, Colin. “Europe lines up hefty science-funding hike.” Nature 475 (2011). 14-15.

McMichael, Anthony J and Lindgren, E. “Climate change: present and future risks to health, and necessary responses.”

Journal of Internal Medicine 270:5 (2011). 401-413.

McMichael, Anthony J; Powles, John W.; Butler, Colin D.; Uauy, Ricardo.“Food, livestock production, energy, climate change, and health.” Lancet 370 (270).1253-63.

Pathak, H.; Jain, N.; Bhatia, A.; Patel, J.; Aggarwal, PK. “Carbon footprints of Indian food items.” Agriculture, Ecosystems, and Environment 139: (2010). 66-73.

Pelletier, N. “Environmental performance in the US broiler poultry sector: Life cycle energy use and greenhouse gas, ozone depleting, acidifying, and eutrophying emissions.” Agricultural Systems 98 (2008). 67-73.

24

Smyth, et al., 2010

25

Macilwain, 2011

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Premalatha, M.; Abbasi, Tasneem; Abbasi, Tabassum; Abbasi. SA. “Energy-efficient food production to reduce global warming and ecodegradation: the use of edible insects.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 15 (2011).

4357-4360.

Ridoutt, Bradley G.; Sanguansri, Peerasak; Freer, Michael; Harper, Gregory S. “Water footprint of livestock: comparison of six geographically defined beef production systems.” International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment 17 (2012). 165-175.

Smyth, BM.; Gallachoir, BO; Korres, NE.; Murphy, JD. “Can we meet targets for biofuels and renewable energy in transport given the constraints imposed by policy in agriculture and energy?” Journal of Cleaner Production 18 (2010). 1671-1685.

Tukker, Arnold; Bausch-Goldbohm, Sandra; de Koning, Arnold; Verhejden, Marieke; Kleijn, René; Wolf, Oliver; Pérez Domínguez, Ignacio; Rueda-Cantuche, Jose. “Environmental impacts of changes to healthier diets in Europe.” Ecological Economics 70 (2011) 1776-1788.

Vazquez-Rowe, Ian;, Moreira, Ma Teresa; Feijoo. Gumersindo. “Inclusion of discard assessment indicators in fisheries life cycle assessment studies. Expanding the use of fishery-specific impact categories.” International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment (2012). doi: 10.1007/s11367-012-0395-x Virtanen, Yrjö; Kurppa, Sirpa; Saarinen, Merja; Mäenpää, Ilmo; Mäkelä, Johanna; Grönroos, Juha. “Carbon footprint of food – approaches from national input-output statistics and LCA of a food portion.” Journal of Cleaner Production 19 (2011).

1849-1856.

Wiedmann, Thomas and Minx, Jan. “A Definition of 'Carbon Footprint'.” Ecological Economics Research Trends, edited by C.C. Pertsova 1-11. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2008.

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East Africa’s Famine: How Did We Let it Happen?

Steven Forrest

In 2011 the world witnessed the first famine of the 21st century in the Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions of Southern Somalia. Neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia and East Djibouti were also affected by widespread malnourishment and large parts of these countries were deemed to be at 'Emergency' and 'Crisis' food levels. It is estimated that in this crisis approximately 50-100,000 people died and a further 13.3 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in the region known as the Horn of Africa.1 The humanitarian crisis was due to a two season long drought and the absence of early rains in 2011, which caused a decrease in food production; however, a history of conflict and delays in first sanctioning and then delivering international aid led to the subsequent famine. Early warning systems had predicted food insecurity back in 2010, but aid was not delivered until people started to die and a humanitarian crisis was called. Previous responses by the international community to drought have been similarly slow, such as in the Sahel (2005 and 2010) and Kenya (2005/6 and 2008/9). This article will explore the 2011 famine, not only as being triggered by the prevailing drought conditions but also as a result of the underlying problems that previously existed in the areas. In doing this it will look at the difficulties faced in Somalia, where a famine was officially declared, and those faced by politicians authorising aid donations, in particular the short-term nature of aid donations and the lack of funding for the enactment of long-term disaster risk reduction measures.

Causes of Food Insecurity Food security is “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life”. 2 Food insecurity exists when people do not have access to food and can then suffer from malnourishment.

In Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and East Djibouti food insecurity was primarily caused by the drought conditions from 2010. The drought was caused by a La Nina event that resulted in a cooling of sea surface temperatures in the Pacific Ocean. 3 This event resulted in prolonged dry periods in the rainy season of East Africa. The additional failure of the March/May 2011 rains led to widespread harvest failures. However, it was not the drought alone that caused the disaster. Disasters occur when natural hazards, such as the drought, meet social systems. 4 Thus, while the 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa was initiated by a drought causing a reduction in food production by farmers, what ultimately caused the famine was the history of conflict that had resulted in inadequacies in governance and an inability to deliver humanitarian aid. 5 Whilst these factors were also partially responsible for the slow international aid

1

DFID, 2011

2

WHO, 2012

3

FEWS NET, 2010a

4

Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon and Davis, 2005

5

Sheeran, 2011

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response, the international community could have done much more to prevent this humanitarian crisis from occurring. The resulting disasters expose the underlying inequalities and injustices that exist in the affected areas.

Famines Do Not Occur in Functioning Democracies This famous belief of Nobel Peace Prize winner Amartya Sen can be applied to Somalia. Large parts of the country have not been under central government control since the Somali Civil War began in 1991 and those that are have been run by a 'Transitional Federal Government'. Different factions and groups govern geographical areas of Somalia and even the capital Mogadishu is still only partially controlled by the government.

Aid delivery attempts by several international non-governmental organisations were hampered and often hijacked by the Islamist militant group al-Shabab. 6 The group, operating in the south of Somalia, initially restricted access and aid distribution by the UN World Food Programme and other aid agencies in the areas that they control. Al-Shabab also disrupted relief operations in nearby Kenyan refugee camps built for Somalis fleeing the southern areas. Their attacks killed several aid workers and led to the evacuation of many others. 7 The ongoing conflict between government forces and al-Shabab militants also disrupted the efforts of charity organisations within Somalia’s capital city. A charity-run hospital in Mogadishu was just one aid operation that closed due to the instability and subsequent staff deaths.8 A Slow International Response The international community was slow to respond to warnings about the growing food insecurity in East Africa. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), funded by the US Agency for International Development, is designed to warn of food security crises before they occur. FEWS NET predicted that the La Nina would negatively affect food security in East Africa back in August 2010 9 and issued a ‘Food Security Alert’ for the area in November 2010. 10 The latter alert predicted poor harvests and suggested interventions to support those in the affected countries.

At the beginning of July 2011 only 51% of the US $1.293 billion requested had been raised. 11 Significant international aid contributions did not begin until June/July 2011 after both the major media networks and the UN had declared a famine. 12 Many humanitarian and development agencies, including the Kenyan Red Cross, were also ignored in their appeals for aid donations in the months leading up to the disaster. 13 Oxfam and Save the Children published a report in 2012 analysing why the international community had been slow to pledge aid donations to the affected countries. The reluctance to offer a faster and earlier response was primarily due to a fear of uncertainty. Despite the early warnings there was a fear of taking action based on predictions that might then turn out to be false. This could result in undermining farmer’s livelihoods by flooding their markets with food aid as well as causing reputational damage to politicians were they to send aid to a country that didn't need it.

There is uncertainty, too, in the donor reports that take months to compile and do not accurately reflect the current situation on the ground. There is also the distinction between scientists and policy makers. Scientists can form forecasts based on the data that they have gathered, but they are still making predictions. Predictions carry levels of uncertainty. Policy makers

6

Day, 2011

7

Moszynski, 2011

8

Ibid.

9

FEWS NET, 2010a

10

FEWS NET, 2010b

11

Loewenberg, 2011a

12

Oxfam, 2012

13

Oniang'o, 2011

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have to make the decision and the responsibility of the outcomes rests on their shoulders; they may therefore be reluctant to make a decision without ‘hard’ evidence. This ‘fear of getting it wrong’ by politicians resulted in delayed aid responses.

In this humanitarian crisis the aid donations were a reactive response to the unfolding famine and widespread food insecurity in the region. Donations and support did not increase until there was confirmed suffering and death. This in turn led to increased media coverage that forced the international community into action. This short-term approach needs to be changed; we should not wait until a humanitarian catastrophe has been declared before we deal with a crisis. This point, in addition to the politicians' ‘fear of getting it wrong’, suggests the need for longer-term measures in order to prevent a catastrophe from happening at all. Long-term measures can be implemented through disaster risk reduction.

Disaster Risk Reduction As opposed to short-term emergency responses that are reactive, disaster risk reduction is proactive (Pelling, 2010).

Investment in long-term disaster risk reduction is crucial in order to reduce the impacts of future disasters such as this famine. 14 This can be in the form of building a more effective early warning system that is able to initiate action at an international level. It can also involve measures to help farmers to reduce the impact of droughts on their livestock, crops and income levels. It was not just a lack of food, but a lack of affordability of food as food prices had increased by more than 200% over the two seasons of drought. 15 These price increases were compounded by the loss of income for farmers due to poor harvests.

One example of effective disaster risk reduction is in Ethiopia, where Oxfam have strengthened the livelihoods of those in the Guji zone through a small-scale irrigation project. 16 The increased access to water has enabled people to increase food production for themselves, even making surplus to sell. The project has consequently eliminated their previous reliance on food aid and ensured that women, who in this region are the first to go hungry, were food secure. Disaster risk reduction is cost-effective and, in strengthening people’s ability to survive and withstand the shocks caused by natural hazards, it is reducing the impact of disasters as well as addressing underlying inequalities.

Conclusion Approximately 50-100,000 people died and over 13.3 million people were affected by the 2011 humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa. However, the drought was not the only causal factor, with the instability and violence in Somalia contributing to the famine.

The slow international response, despite repeated warnings from famine early warning systems and non-governmental organisations, allowed preventable suffering and deaths to occur. Uncertainty in the predictions and a fear of making wrong decisions resulted in slow and late aid responses. Only when media coverage increased and a humanitarian crisis was declared by the UN did aid donations increase. Media coverage has decreased dramatically since the peak of the humanitarian crisis in 2011, despite there still being areas at 'Emergency' and 'Crisis' levels, and the famine itself only having been officially declared ended in February 2012 (DFID, 2012). 17 International donors may be suffering from the effects of the economic crisis, but if an opportunity to prevent the deaths of thousands and suffering of millions arises then there exists a responsibility to do so. The mindset of donors needs to be changed away from short-term emergency responses to long-term disaster risk reduction. This longer-term process will enable communities to strengthen their own resilience to natural hazards and reduce their dependence on international food aid. Whilst future droughts cannot be prevented, perhaps disaster risk reduction measures will mean that, next time, a famine can.

14

Oxfam, 2011

15

Loewenberg, 2011b

16

Oxfam, 2011

17

DFIF, 2012

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Bibliography Day, Michael. “Charities criticise rich countries’ 'shameful' response to famine in Horn of Africa.” BMJ 343 (2011).

Accessed April 10, 2012. doi: 10.1136/bmj.d4799.

DFID. “Horn of Africa – UK response to the crisis.” UK Aid, Department for International Development (2012). http:// www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/Horn-of-Africa-UK-aid-factsheet-28-Jan-2012.pdf.

FEWS NET. “EXECUTIVE BRIEF: La Niña and Food Security in East Africa August 2010.” US AID, Famine Early Warning System Network (2010a). http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT163.pdf.

FEWS NET. “EAST AFRICA: Food Security Alert November 2, 2010.” US AID, Famine Early Warning System Network (2010b). http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/EA_Regional%20Alert%20Oct%202010_Final.pdf.

Loewenberg, Samuel. “Global food crisis takes heavy toll on east Africa.” The Lancet 378:9785 (2011a). 17-18.

Loewenberg, Samuel. “Humanitarian response inadequate in Horn of Africa crisis.” The Lancet 378:9791 (2011b) 555-558.

Oxfam. “Briefing on the Horn of Africa Drought 2011: Disaster Risk Reduction – fundamental to saving lives and reducing poverty.” Relief Web (2011b). http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fullreport_132.pdf.

Oxfam (2012) “A Dangerous Delay: The cost of late response to early warnings in the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa.

Oxfam and Save the Children (2012) http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/a-dangerous-delay-the-cost-of-lateresponse-to-early-warnings-in-the-2011-droug-203389.

Oniang’o, Ruth. “Our Children need to be saved from Hunger!” African Journal of Food, Agriculture, Nutrition and Development, 11:4 (2011): Editorial.

Pelling, Mark. Adaptation to Climate Change: From resilience to transformation. Oxon: Routledge. 2011.

Moszynski, Peter. “Militant attacks are jeopardising famine relief in Horn of Africa.” BMJ 343 (2011). doi: 10.1136/bmj.d6729 Sheeran, Josette. “Preventing Famine.” Finance & Development (2011). http://www.ieo-imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/ 2011/12/pdf/sheeran.pdf.

WHO. “Glossary: Food Security.” World Health Organisation. Last accessed April 10, 2012. http://www.who.int/trade/ glossary/story028/en/.

Wisner, Ben; Blaikie, Piers; Cannon, Terry; and Davis, Ian. At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters 2nd edition. Oxon: Routledge, 2005.

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04 | Healthcare The Challenge ‘Global Health’ Poses to Health Systems Strengthening in Conflict-Affected Countries Philip Lewis

The challenges facing health systems strengthening (HSS) in conflict-affected countries are multi-faceted and exceptional. 1 They pose a huge development challenge with twenty-two of the thirty-four countries furthest from reaching the Millennium Development Goals in or emerging from conflict and amongst a series of appalling statistics comprise half of all children who die under 5 years in developing states despite only accounting for one-fifth of the total population. 2 HSS’s importance has been recognised by the World Health Organisation (WHO), which has developed a six building block framework comprising service delivery; the health workforce; information; medical products, vaccines and technologies; financing; and leadership and governance.3 These building blocks, however, are problematic, particularly in conflictaffected countries, because they are distinctly apolitical and lack context. Post-conflict countries are only very briefly mentioned in the WHO’s HSS Framework for Action published in 2007 and then only to acknowledge that the WHO may act as a coordinator in such situations.4 This has led to a proliferation of alternative issues, priorities, and frameworks being developed although with no agreed indicators on how to measure HSS.5 Rather than enter this definitional debate any further this essay will focus on the contextual factors absent from the WHO’s HSS framework, which are vital for understanding the dynamics surrounding HSS in conflict-affected countries.6

Capacity There are two interlinked aspects to health system capacity. These are the management, organisational and personnel capacities in a Ministry of Health itself and those same capacities to provide service delivery across the country. In conflictaffected countries it is almost uniformly the case that this capacity is at best severely diminished and often simply non-

1

Pavignani, 2005,165-71; Waldman, 2006, 6; Waters et al, 2007, 12; Kruk et al, 2010, 89-90; Pavignani, 2011, 662-63

2

DFID, 2010, 10; WDR, 2011, 1-2, 5-6; Zoellick, 2008, 68

3

WHO, 2007, 3

4

Ibid. 28-29

5

Balabanova, 2011, 270; GHLC, 2011b, 16; GHLC, 2011c, 341; Macrae, 1997, 183; Newbrander et al, 2011, 645, 651;

Newbrander, 2007, 14; Waters et al, 2007, 6; Percival and Sondorp, 2010, 3; USAID, 2009, 6 6

Balabanova, 2011, 298; GHLC, 2011b, 16-17; Waters et al, 2007, 2, 17; Newbrander et al, 2011, 658

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existent. 7 The limited capacity of the Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in 2001 led to it implementing a Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS). Through this the MoPH focused on managing and regulating health system financing whilst NGOs were contracted for service delivery.8 This contracting enabled healthcare to be provided swiftly and widely to a population that had some of the world’s worst health indices whilst allowing the government to focus the contracts on its health priorities.9 Contracting despite its advantages early in the health system recovery process is far from being a panacea for long-term HSS. Firstly, it is not necessarily the case that if a ministry has a limited capacity to provide health service provision it will have a capacity to procure services from NGOs and that NGOs will be willing to take up these contracts as has been highlighted in South Sudan.10 Secondly, although the BPHS is predicated on standardised priorities this does not mean it is delivered through standardised contracts. In Afghanistan there has been a clear difference in the quality of NGOs contracted by various international actors. 11 Health contracting to NGOs in the early post-conflict stages of development is meant to act as an enabler and multiplier of government, as has been the case in Bangladesh. 12 It is, however, far from always being the case. NGOs shortterm contracts in Afghanistan have acted against the development of a long-term health system vision with contract management and results measurement differences fragmenting the health system. 13 Furthermore, health contracting has political ramifications beyond the sector. In East Timor the perceived loss of sovereignty and legitimacy led to the government focusing on repatriating service delivery within the public sector. 14 In Afghanistan, health centres and health workers have become targets for the insurgency. 15 This underscores that the international complexion of health contracting to external NGOs through funding from outside donors can actively support a corrosive slide in state legitimacy and capacity in the face of ongoing conflict and the contest for power. In conflict-affected countries therefore analysing the health system’s capacity in terms of its own inherent capabilities is important but insufficient to understand the challenges HSS faces. This is because HSS occurs in an extraordinarily difficult and insecure environment where the health sector alone is not responsible for its own deliverance. The main difficulty for HSS in conflict-affected countries is the security of the environment in which it has to work. This has very little if anything to do with HSS or health system capacity but nevertheless is the essential ingredient for success.

Contracting therefore has particular intrinsic technical and political difficulties in developing health system capacity.

Nevertheless, it is an attempt to work with the state and work to its priorities. This unfortunately is frequently not the case with global health initiatives. Since 2000 a series of global health actors have been established to eradicate with overwhelming funding the scourge of diseases such as AIDS. This is a laudable goal but for HSS it has had a distortionary and adverse impact even when these actors purport to be supporting HSS. 16 In Liberia, in a study in Nimba county, there was a clear disparity in service provision of mental healthcare, Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI), Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC), HIV testing and Artemisinin Combination Therapy (ACT). Only 12%, 15% and 25% of the population had access to mental healthcare, IMCI and EmOC respectively whilst HIV testing was available to more than

7

Lanjouw et al, 1999, 236; Cometto et al, 2010, 889; Shuey et al, 2003, 301; Macrae et al, 1996, 1098; Leather et al, 2006,

1120 8

Palmer et al, 2006, 719-720

9

Acerra et al, 2009, 78-79

10

Cometto et al, 2006, 900-902

11

Sabri et al, 2007, 2007

12

Koehlmoos et al, 2011, 59, 65-66

13

Sabri et al, 2007, 715-716

14

Alonso and Brugha, 2006, 211-212

15

Acerra et al, 2009, 79; PLoS Medicine Editors, 2011, 1

16

Macrae et al, 1996, 1103; GHLC, 2011a, 6; Marchal et al, 2009, 2-3; Rushton, 2011, 7

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50% of the population and ACT, which tackles malaria, enjoyed 100% coverage. IMCI and EmOC are more complex and expensive services than HIV testing or ACT whilst mental healthcare requires specialised diagnostic and counselling skills along with the availability of psychopharmaceuticals and ongoing follow-up.17 This technical disparity, however, is not the full picture. In 2004 the Global Fund gave more than $12 million over two years for malaria prevention and treatment. UNICEF, WHO and USAID contributed $4 million in 2007 and the US President’s Malaria Initiative gave $12 million in 2008.

Additionally, from 2004-2008 the Global Fund, the Clinton Foundation, USAID and the UN Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS gave around $30 million for HIV/AIDS control programmes. To put that into perspective Liberia’s Ministry of Health and Social Welfare’s total budget in 2008 was $12 million.18 This overwhelming funding for two diseases at the top of global health donors priorities does not, however, fit the priorities of Liberia’s North Central region that includes Nimba county which in a 2007 survey had a HIV infection prevalence rate of 0.5%, the lowest in the country.19 Global health actors priorities mean that huge funding is directed at creating a distorted service provision instead of building capacity to deliver an equal and equitable health system that would provide adequate funding to cover the extra costs of IMCI and EmOC and funding for training health professionals in the use of these more complex services whilst focusing on mental healthcare as a priority.

This highlights that health system capacity building is frequently not the primary goal of international donors who finance the overwhelming majority of health interventions in conflict-affected countries. The limited absorptive capacity of their ministry’s of health enable donors to introduce and implement programmes that suit their political interests rather than aligning their funding with national health strategies for holistic HSS that supports and is aligned with domestic capacity constraints. The main challenge thus is less developing the capacity of the health system itself but rather ensuring that these political concerns are aligned, harmonised and coordinated.

Coordination In the abstract, coordination between donors, states, UN implementing agencies, bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies and NGOs appears a technical exercise, albeit a large and complex one, of ensuring a common plan, implementing procedures accordingly and measuring results to an agreed framework with extensive communication along the way. In reality coordination faces immense challenges due to the political context in which it occurs. This is highlighted by the dilemmas created by the relief to development continuum, which roughly follows the attempted war to peace transition of conflict-affected countries. A country experiencing a civil war may receive humanitarian aid, which will be focused at the level of the individual, is predicated on the greatest need and impartiality, and will mostly been provided by international NGOs working independently.20 The problem comes when the war ends and a country begins the war to peace transition, thus in the terminology of this essay it becomes a conflict-affected country, and requires development aid that is based on the premise of building state capacity, which in a post-conflict environment may still be contested, not considered legitimate, or simply not be there resulting in major coordination dilemmas.

The relief to development continuum raises two major challenges for HSS coordination. Firstly, relief and development are financed through different models. Relief funding mechanisms disburse money far more quickly and with less accountability and provide their funding directly to NGOs. 21 In conflict-affected countries this means that donors often continue, due to uncertain state legitimacy and weak capacity, to provide humanitarian aid rather than make the transition to development funding with all the subsequent state and institutional building this entails. 22 In South Sudan to overcome the difficulties in transitioning from humanitarian to development-oriented financing a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was created in 2005 to coordinate donor development funding through a single disbursing mechanism that was administered by the World Bank in partnership with the Ministry of Health. As all donors apart from USAID agreed to use the MDTF as the main vehicle for 17

Kruk et al, 2010), 531-532

18

Ibid. 532

19

Ibid.

20

Macrae, 2001, 114

21

Waldman, 2006, 7; Newbrander et al, 2011, 647

22

Macrae, 2001, 170

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reconstruction programmes donor coordination should not have been a major problem. 23 The inherent difficulties, however, of disbursing development funding in conflict-affected situations meant the MDTF was very slow in disbursing funds and was ineffective in operationalising the health system recovery. This resulted in the previous bilateral humanitarian aid channels prior to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement remaining the main financing modality of the health system three years after the signing of the agreement. 24 This delay in disbursing development funding meant that the fragmented and uncoordinated humanitarian aid approach continued to dominate due to the far greater ease donors have in providing project funding to actors such as NGOs rather than coordinating policy strategy and development funding with nascent conflict-affected state ministries to HSS’s detriment. This continued humanitarian funding approach to what is fundamentally a development task simultaneously de-funds and disenfranchises the state’s ability to coordinate health system recovery whilst perpetuating transient, fragmented and unaccountable health interventions that undermine the HSS approach.

Secondly, there is no agreement where along the continuum immediate post-conflict health system recovery aid exists and whether it counts as relief, development or somewhere in between such as the interim rehabilitation aid that the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) provided between the Paris Peace Accords of 23 October 1991 and elections in May 1993. 25 This highlights that there is a tension between urgent humanitarian needs and long-term development or to phrase it in a manner closer to its underlying political competition, it is a struggle between the humanitarian imperative versus state legitimacy. The urgent needs of a population is a vital consideration but this stress too often lends itself to an internationalising of health service provision and strategy whilst neglecting HSS, undermining the state’s ability to move on from its conflict-marred past. This tension was clear in the lack of a coordinated HSS approach in Cambodia. HSS coordination was the responsibility of UNTAC’s Rehabilitation Component (RC) working in collaboration with a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) composed of the four main Cambodian political factions. HSS coordination, however, was undermined by major donors taking advantage of a loophole in the TAC’s mandate that exempted the work of NGOs from its purview to work outside the formal UNTAC coordination regime. This lack of coordination between donors and between donors and the state led to an unequal and inequitable distribution of funding and service provision. This led to a vast growth in NGOs in Cambodia to which donors responded to by establishing a proliferation of ad hoc coordination bodies.26 By acting outside the UNTAC HSS coordination mechanism they had established at the Paris Accords international donors helped entrench transient and fragmented health programmes at the expense of long-term HSS. Donors believed, however, this was necessary due to the political context of Cambodia post-peace but pre-elections. The vacuum of state legitimacy combined with the tensions between the Cambodian political factions led donors to perceive no other major route to aid coordination than through humanitarian channels to NGOs so as not legitimise and empower any political faction, particularly the Cambodian People’s Party, which dominated the public administration with the inevitable consequence that HSS was largely ignored due to the political context on the ground.

HSS coordination in conflict-affected countries faces multiple and reinforcing political challenges that undermine and constrain its planning, development and implementation. It occurs in a complex political environment where health is often the arena for multi-layered political struggle that inhibits effective coordination. Where donors do not align and coordinate their objectives and funding with conflict-affected countries HSS is simply not possible. After all, to strengthen a state health system coordinating with a state is required even if only at a most minimal level. The fundamental problem for HSS coordination, however, is that the state is often not capable of even that minimal capacity to coordinate and the international community often does not wish to coordinate with an entity that is often weakly legitimate and/or weakly capable. In that context the challenge for HSS is immense.

The Politics of Health

23

Cometto et al, 2010, 890

24

Ibid. 896-897

25

Macrae, 1997, 187; Lanjouw, 1999, 232

26

Lanjouw et al, 1999, 232-235

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The challenges faced by HSS as shown through the analytical lenses of capacity and coordination strongly emphasise the importance of understanding that health in conflict-affected countries is both a political exercise and operates in a political environment. This can be further underlined at national and international levels. From a national perspective, HSS is a challenge for the state attempting to emerge from war to a more settled and peaceful society but is still marked by conflict.

The health system is however only one of many vital activities that the state is concerned with and security is usually the overriding objective. In this jostling for priority HSS requires political commitment and judgement to be successful. Where political commitment has been apparent such as in Bangladesh HSS has worked. 27 Where it has been absent such as Uganda from 1986-90 it has failed. Health was not a prominent political priority in early Ugandan rehabilitation plans where it was assumed the health system would recover as part of the economic recovery process.28 This led to a lack of national ownership and systemic government policy that enabled donors to implement uncoordinated health programmes that failed to develop Uganda’s health system. 29 Political judgement is also a vital determinant in health system recovery. In South Sudan, a health assessment report that urged a focus on organising the management of health human resources before strengthening the skills and increasing the numbers of workers was put aside for political reasons and was replaced by an unrealistic plan calling for a dramatic increase in health workers despite the obvious weakness of the Ministry of Health to manage and deliver the training required. 30 This underlines that HSS occurs in a broad political context nationally alongside competing priorities for recovery, in a complex insecure environment and is susceptible to the whims of political leaders who may not conceive it as a priority or view it as a means for political advantage.

From an international perspective the starkest example of the use of health for political means is its subordination to the ends of stabilisation in order to win hearts and minds as an element of force projection. 31 The issue is less that healthcare is used for political means but the manner in how it is used and for who’s political ends. There is no evidence that health reconstruction through quick-impact projects gains or does not gain support for hearts and minds whilst it undoubtedly further complicates the already complex development task of HSS and undermines the greater long-term policy of statebuilding. 32 This highlights the tension within a conflict-prone environment of attempting to satisfy short-term needs whilst building a legitimate and effective state. In the long run the “strategic” use of healthcare only acts to undermine the broader strategy of recovery by imposing an externally conceived and operated framework that is not responsive to domestic needs.

This leaves the country both reliant on and antagonistic to external support whilst creating an unequal and inequitable health system, which the strategy of HSS - that international actors are rhetorically committed to - was meant to overcome.

Similarly the notion that a conflict affected country provides a window of opportunity for substantial and rapid health system reform is problematic. 33 In Kosovo the WHO adopted such a mentality and the subsequent health system reform has been considered to largely fail as it did not adequately consult domestic stakeholders or take into account the weak capacity to undertake such reform. 34 The destruction of a health system may be an opportunity for donors to pour in funding and override the need to consult with domestic stakeholders but it is not an opportune moment to implement HSS. The insecurity, poor infrastructure, weak capacity and economic instability that characterise conflict-affected countries means that HSS, and any other essential reform, have not found an opportune moment but a moment of necessity. This is a crucial distinction, which is frequently ignored to the cost of long-term sustainable HSS and development in general in conflictaffected countries. The fact that it is ignored illustrates the underlying appeal within the international community of following

27

Koehlmoos, 2011, 58

28

Macrae et al, 1996, 1102

29

Ibid. 1103

30

Pavignani, 2011, 670-71

31

Rubenstein, 2009, 32; Waldman, 2006, 2-5; Newbrander et al, 2011, 650; Waters et al , 2007, 1; Kruk et al, 2010, 94

32

Rubenstein, 2009, 30; Goodhand and Sedra, 2010, 79; Rubenstein, 2011, 687

33

Newbrander et al, 2011, 643; Pavignani, 2011, 662-663

34

Shuey et al, 2003, 302-304; Percival and Sondorp, 2010, 13-14

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template technical frameworks, such as the WHO’s health system building blocks framework, without consideration and any understanding for the diverse and complex political contexts, interests, and actors that shape, drive, diminish, and neglect HSS, and development generally, in conflict-affected countries. HSS is a political exercise operating in a political environment that is greater than a narrow health system framework can envisage and thus why the challenges it faces are so considerable and widespread.

Conclusion The variety of conflict-affected contexts analysed in this essay belies the utility of a standard technical formula, which has no context specificity and domestic and international political understanding. In policy terms, this means that HSS in conflictaffected countries takes place in a dual operational environment that is contextually unique: the conflict itself and the health system in the conflict-affected country. In such an environment a one-size-fits all policy template will simply not suffice.

The challenges HSS faces in conflict-affected countries can only be fully appreciated when it is considered fundamentally as a political exercise with technical attributes. Contracting out health services may enable a state in the short-term to provide healthcare to its population but at the risk of diminishing the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its people as well as in the long-term developing an unsustainable fragmented health system that acts against the capacity of the state to deliver HSS in the long run. The countervailing forces opposing HSS are considerable. The weak position conflict-affected countries find themselves in enables a variety of domestic and international actors to impose and implant their own priorities such as vertical disease programmes, however well meaning, that create a distortionary and inequitable affect within the health sector undermining the state’s already weak capacity to implement HSS. The challenge for a successful HSS policy therefore is not only the extraordinarily difficult political environment in which HSS occurs where the success of a HSS programme relies ultimately on a broader governance and security framework, which is largely outside of its control, for its support, effectiveness and eventual success but also that multiple competing actors along the relief to development continuum frequently implement policies that circumvent and delegitimise the state, neglect domestic stakeholders and emphasise short-term priorities to fit short-term funding cycles over effective coordination and long-term development. This is corrosive to HSS, which is fundamentally slow and generational in nature. 35 HSS in conflict-affected countries therefore is not a window of opportunity but a viscerally political environment both internally and externally that is far from promising for delivering its goals. These difficult and complex environments require an understanding beyond a narrow conception of health system reform that recognises that HSS occurs in a violent political maelstrom and that it is engaged with a politically charged international community. An understanding of this dual political context and the risks that it poses for HSS indicates the inadequacy of the WHO framework whilst highlighting the unique and diverse nature of conflict-affected countries that face exceptional challenges that require context specific and distinctive HSS initiatives that incorporate a broad political, socio-economic, security and cultural perspective to HSS within a wider post-conflict development framework that aligns, harmonises and coordinates development funding, which is normally external in origin, with domestic state and institutional capacity-building. HSS policy should thus be considered as a political not a technical intervention. Policy frameworks such as that of the WHO’s only serve to depoliticise and decontextualise HSS policy providing an abstract paradigm that can rarely engage with HSS normally and fails to do so completely in the complex and intensely political environment of conflict-affected countries. In such an environment HSS policy must be grounded in an broad appreciation of the conflict dynamics within which it is operating to be relevant to the people it is attempting to serve.

35

WDR, 2011, 10

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Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations: Briefing Paper I – Monitoring and Evaluation (2010k). http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/governance/building-peaceful-

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Harmer, Andrew. “Improving the Lives of 'Half The Sky': How Political, Economic and Social Factors Affect the Health of Women and Their Children.” In 'Good Health at Low Cost' 25 Years On: What Makes a Successful Health System? Edited

by Dina Balabanova, Martin McKee and Anne Mills. London: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2011. http:// ghlc.lshtm.ac.uk/files/2011/10/GHLC-book.pdf.

Koehlmoos, Tracey Pérez; Islam, Ziaul; Anwar, Shahela; Hossain, Shaikh A.; Shahed, Gazi; Rukhsana, Streatfield; Peter Kim; Bhuiya, Abbas Uddin. “Health Transcends Poverty: The Bangladesh Experience.” In 'Good Health at Low Cost' 25 Years On: What Makes a Successful Health System? Edited by Dina Balabanova, Martin McKee and Anne Mills. London: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2011. http://ghlc.lshtm.ac.uk/files/2011/10/GHLC-book.pdf.

Kruk, Margaret E.; Rockers, Peter C.; Williams, Elizabeth H.; Varpilah, S. Tornorlah; Macauley, Rose; Saydee, Geetor; Galea, Sandro.“Availability of Essential Health Services in Post-Conflict Liberia.” Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 88 (2010).

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Leather, Andrew; Ismail, Edna Adnan; Ali, Roda; Abdi, Yasin Arab; Abby, Mohamed Hussein; Gulaid, Suleiman Ahmed; Walhad, Said Ahmed; Guleid, Suleiman; Ervine, Ian Maxwell; Lowe-Lauri, Malcolm; Parker, Michael; Adams, Sarah; Datema, Marieke; Parry, Eldryd.“Working Together to Rebuild Health care in Post-Conflict Somaliland.” The Lancet 368 (2006).

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Macrae, Joanna; “Dilemmas of Legitimacy, Sustainability, and Coherence: Rehabilitating the Health Sector.” In Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance, edited by Krishna Kumar. Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.

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Marchal, Bruno; Cavalli, Anna; Kegels, Guy. “Global health Actors Claim To Support Health System Strenghening – Is this Reality or Rhetoric?” PLoS Medicine 6:4 (2009).1-5.

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Newbrander, William; Waldman, Ronald; Shepherd-Banigan, Megan. “Rebuilding and Strengthening Health Systems and Providing Basic Health Services in Fragile States.” Disasters 35:4 (2011). 639-660.

Palmer, Natasha; Strong, Lesley; Wali, Abdul; Sondorp, Egbert. (2006), “Contacting Out Health services in Fragile States.”

BMJ 332 (2006). 718-721.

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Pavignani, Enrico; “Health Service Delivery in Post-Conflict States.” High Level Forum on the Health Millennium Development Goals (2005) http://www.who.int/hdp/publications/hlf_volume_en.pdf.

“Human Resources for Health Through Conflict and Recovery: Lessons from African Countries.” Disasters 35:4 (2011). 661-679.

Percival, Valerie and Sondorp, Egbert.“A Case Study of Health Sector Reform in Kosovo.” Conflict and Health 4:7 (2010).

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Rubenstein, Leonard S.; “Post-Conflict Health Reconstruction: New Foundations for US Policy.” United States Institute of Peace Working Paper (2009). http://www.usip.org/publications/post-conflict-health-reconstruction.

“Post-Conflict Health Reconstruction: Search For a Policy.” Disasters 35:4 (2011). 680-700.

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Shuey, Dean; Qosaj, Fatime Arenliu; Schouten, Erik J.; Zwi, Anthony B. “Planning for Health Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Situations: Kosovo 1999-2000.” Health Policy 63:3 (2003). 299-310.

Suhrke, Astri.“The Peace In Between.” In The Peace In Between: Post-War Violence and Peacebuilding, edited by Astri Suhrke and Mats Berdal. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2012.

PLoS Medicine Editors, The. “Health Care Systems and Conflict: A Fragile States of Affairs.” PLoS Medicine 8:7 (2011). 1-2.

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05 | Current Affairs National Service: The Solution to the Root Problem of the London Riots David Tan

The London riots that took place in the summer of 2011 were an unprecedented display of social disorder that sparked public outrage in Britain. Many law abiding citizens were suddenly brought face to face with chaos and anarchy; in the words of the Prime Minster, we saw: “scenes of people looting, vandalising, thieving, robbing, attacking police officers and even attacking fire crews in action.” These scenes were all witnessed in real life or through television news feeds. The cost of the damage was significant, but the damage to the social fabric of the nation was even greater. In this paper, I will primarily address two questions: what caused these riots, and what can be done to prevent them from happening again? In my answer to these questions, I will first provide a brief analysis of the situation. I will attempt to demonstrate that these riots point to deep rooted structural problems within our society, namely the failure of social structures, institutions and contemporary culture to provide for the needs of certain groups of people. I will demonstrate this by drawing primarily on concepts from the fields of psychology and criminology.

Thereafter, I will recommend the reintroduction of national service as a solution to this problem, and will attempt to justify this recommendation.

Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding Since the riots, many people have attempted to answer the question of what their cause was. To this question, answers in the media have included lack of respect, opportunism and alienation (The Guardian), 1 the failure of policing (The Telegraph) 2 as well as the nature of ‘black culture’ as proposed by Dr. David Starkey during a live discussion aired on the BBC. 3 In my view most of the points that have been made are, to differing extents, valid, and most of them point towards issues that contributed to the outbreak of disorder as witnessed earlier in the year. However, these points in themselves are insufficient to provide us with a comprehensive understanding of the situation that took place. In order to develop a better understanding of the whole situation I will first start from the basic component of society, the individual, and develop my theory from there by explaining how the factors that have been mentioned in the media fit into my framework, gradually progressing towards the larger picture.

The basic building blocks to my theory are the following concepts: a revised version of Rational Choice Theory, Bounded Rationality and Marslow’s hierarchy of needs. What this translates to is the thought that human beings have different levels of needs, as displayed in Figure 1. Human beings are rational creatures and seek to satisfy their needs bounded by the 1

Addley, 2011

2

Riddell, 2011

3

Quinn, 2011

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knowledge which they possess. Hence society, as we know it, is a perpetual conflict that takes place between the individual and sectional groups in the pursuit of satisfying their needs.

!

Figure 1. Marslow’s hierarchy of needs The problem concerning insufficient policing, according to the media, is that social institutions have failed to provide a sufficient deterrent to the perpetrators of these acts of disorder. The cost to the perpetrators of satisfying their needs through illegal means has not been high enough to deter them from doing so. On this subject, an article published by the BBC suggests that social psychological perspectives, especially the concept of 'de-individuation' in crowd situations, are a possible explanation for this.4 This explanation fits in well with my theory, as the literature on this subject suggests that people in crowds who experience 'de-individuation' act in a manner whereby they perceive themselves to be under ‘a cloak of anonymity.’ Thus, they believe that they are exempt from the consequences of their actions. 5 This in itself is not a root problem, however; issues of deviance find their root in many other problems. Sutherland's theory of 'differential association' has been used quite often in explaining the causes of deviance. Sutherland’s theory suggests that criminality is something that is learnt, and that the values and motives therein are transmitted socially from a group to a person. 6 It is in the view of this that the issues of opportunism, alienation, lack of respect and Starkey’s points on ‘black culture’ find their context in my own proposed theory. 7 All these factors are related to the issue of culture, defined as “the social habits of the community.”8 These habits are formed in view of the distributional issues concerning the resources that are required for individual members of a community to attain and satisfy their needs. So, in my opinion the issue of opportunism stems from the lack of realisation that the actions that one performs have an impact of those around her. This is thus a product of culture, an individualistic culture that has perpetuated the notion of the self as the centre of everything, and from a society that has failed to place sufficient deterrents on such self-centred behaviour. Similarly, the identification of a general lack of respect is somewhat tied in with these factors concerning the issue of opportunism.

The idea of alienation relates to the idea of culture in a rather different way. Alienation in this context occurs when a person is unable to relate to the established culture of her day. In this situation the established culture of the day can be generalised by the consumerism of most post-industrial Western nations (including Britain), which function by the slogan 'I consume, 4

De Castella and McClatchey, 2011

5

Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, 421

6

Downes and Rock, 2007

7

The author of this article nor the KCL Think Tank Society support Starkey‘s claim that black culture encourages deviance.

8

Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, 605

therefore I am.' Christian Smith notes, in his research on emerging adults in the USA, that 50% to two thirds of emerging adults said that their well-being can be measure by what they own. 9 Furthermore, Pakulski suggests that class in contemporary post-industrial societies is no longer differentiated along the lines of employment, but along the lines of consumption.10 When we look at the data that has been reported in the media concerning the demographics of those who have been charged for their actions during the riots, we find that 73% of the 1715 offenders were below the age of 25. 11 Of these, more than a third had been excluded from school; 30% were perpetual absentees from school; 1 in 10 achieved 5 or more C grades at GCSE level, and 2/5 were recipients of free school meals. 35% of those over 25 were claiming benefits, and, of all those convicted, 3/4 had received previous convictions or cautions. 12 All of this, in general, points towards the underclass of society, 13 which does not possess the means to participate fully in a post-industrial consumerist society, and is hence unable to satisfy its needs according to the way in which the established culture prescribes.

The Policy Recommendation: Reintroduce National Service It is in view of this analysis that I make the recommendation that Her Majesty’s government should reintroduce national service. I refer to national service here as a year or two of military conscription, as opposed to the Prime Minister’s proposal for a two month summer programme. 14 In my view, national service is a solution to the root problems of the riots which we have witnessed. It is an opportunity for British values and identity to be transmitted to the younger members of society. It is a good way to provide a sense of belonging for young people who may look towards gangs to satisfy that need for belonging.

It is a way in which we can teach them a sense of respect for authority, and to encourage people who have been living in an individualistic society to start thinking about the greater good of society and about the needs of one another. It is a way to get the younger generation to understand that citizenship confers rights but at the same time requires them to fulfill their duties to the country. It is a way to build an affinity that transcends traditional class boundaries. And finally, it is a way to reduce the alienation of an underclass in a consumerist society by virtue of the fact that the military subjects all enlistees to the same experience in basic training.

This policy is currently in use in quite a few Asian countries, for example the republic of Singapore, where national service is mandatory for all male citizens. After completing their tertiary education, male citizens join one of the three services: the military, the police, or the Civil Defense Force. Here, citizens undergo three to six months of basic training where they spend prolonged periods of time away from their families. During this period, citizens learn the basic skills of the services, and more importantly learn how to live together with one another in an environment that crosses class and racial boundaries. Due to the regimented nature of the training citizens learn what it means to be responsible, and they generally do come to realize that their individual actions have an impact upon the whole community. After this initial period, citizens move on to advanced training, where the focus shifts to vocational skills (for example training in infantry leadership, or tactics for army officer cadet trainees). The remaining period of national service is dedicated to giving citizens an opportunity to practice the vocational skills that they have learnt. The scheme has gone a long way to create a sense of Singaporean identity amongst the males of its multi-cultural society.

For the above policy recommendation to work in the UK, there are many details that will have to be looked at so as to ensure that the programmes carried out ultimately achieve the aims that I have mentioned. The very real danger is that national service, if not properly administered, could end up discriminating against the underclass and thereby perpetuating the problem that Britain is currently facing. In terms of monetary concerns, it is my view that although military spending would increase as a result of this policy, this would be compensated by resources being freed from other areas such as social 9

Smith, 2011, 72

10

Pakulski, 1996

11

Casciani, 2011

12

Johnson, 2011

13

The conviction of both a graduate and a social worker are considered by the author to be outliers in the sample.

14

Mulholland, 2011

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housing, and the payment of unemployment benefits. The construction work that would be necessary to prepare facilities for such a policy would provide a boost to the UK economy in this period of slow economic growth. Furthermore, the reintroduction of national service will drive down the unemployment rate by the removal of a section of society from the employment market.

Conclusion To conclude, the root of the problem concerning the social disorder that was experienced by Britain during the London riots stems from cultural issues concerning how individual needs are met within British society. My recommendation, in light of this, is for Her Majesty’s government to reintroduce National Service. This will provide a means to impart British values and identity to the next generation, as well as to provide a means of reducing the alienation that is currently experienced by the underclass. This is, in my view, the way forward to a better tomorrow.

Bibliography Addley, Esther. “London riots: 'A generation who don't respect their parents or police,'” The Guardian. Last modified August 9, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/09/london-riots-kids-parents-police.

Casciani, Dominic. “Analysis: The riots data so far,” BBC News. Last modified September 15, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/uk-14931987.

De Castella, Tom. and McClatchey, Caroline. “UK riots: What turns people into looters?” BBC News. Last modified August 9, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-14463452.

Downes, David. and Rock, Paul. Understanding Deviance: A Guide to the Sociology of Crime and Rule-Breaking. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Hogg, Michael A. and Vaughan, Graham M.; “Intergroup Behavior.” In Social Psychology, by Michael A. Hogg and Graham M. Vaughan, 391-443. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008.

“Culture.” In Social Psychology, by Michael A. Hogg and Graham M. Vaughan, 603-637. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008.

Johnson, Wesley. “Data reveals lives of young rioters,” The Independent. Last modified October 25, 2011. http:// www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/data-reveals-lives-of-young-rioters-2375212.html.

Riddell, Mary. “London riots: the underclass lashes out,” The Telegraph. Last modified August 8, 2011. http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/8630533/Riots-the-underclass-lashesout.html.

Mulholland, Hélène. “General election 2010: David Cameron outlines national service plans –backed by Michael Caine,” The Guardian. Last modified April 8, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/blog/2010/apr/08/david-cameron-nationalservice-michael-caine.

Pakulski, Jan. The Death of Class. California: Sage Publications Ltd, 1996.

Quinn, Ben. “David Starkey claims 'the whites have become black,” The Guardian. Last modified August 13, 2011. http:// www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/13/david-starkey-claims-whites-black.

Smith, Christian. “Captive to Consumerism.” In Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of Emerging Adulthood, by Christian Smith, 70-110. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Acknowledgements KCL Think Tank Committee 2011-’12 Core Committee President – Ben Counsell

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Our sponsors

“In this, the Society’s second publication, I should like to take the opportunity to express my gratitude to this year’s sponsors: Pinsent Masons LLP, MVF Global, and the King’s College London Annual Fund. Without their financial support the important work of the Think Tank would not be possible. In particular, the grant from the Annual Fund has enabled both the publication of this journal and the acquisition of much needed recording equipment, which will see the Society go from strength to strength in the coming years.”

James Hart (Treasurer, 2010-2012)’

Contributors Camille Maubert

Philip Lewis

Alireza Shams Lahijani

Steven Townsley

Kathryn Hale

William Eastment

Tim Stevens

Lars Backstrom

Christian Kolb

Johanna Grusch

Tamara Dimova

Steven Forrest

David Tan

The Spectrum | edition 02

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