The Spectrum - Issue 11 (2021)

Issue 11 • May 2021

The Spectrum

King's Think Tank's Annual Policy Journal

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EDITORIAL

Letter from the Editors We are excited to share the 2021 version of The Spectrum with you! Here at King's Think Tank we strive to publish innovative policy, devised by the brilliant minds of the students at King’s College London. Despite a difficult year of online meetings, the members of King’s Think Tank have come together to put forward creative solutions to the problems we are facing in the present day.

As the world slowly recovers from the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, this edition provides a diverse range of policy that addresses issues that vary from the impact of the pandemic on mental health to the increase in cybercrime fomented by the move to online business. While there is a strong emphasis on policy in a post-COVID world, we also address equally relevant contemporary issues like the improvement of UN peacekeeping forces and expanding access to green finance.

It should be noted that these policy papers are not meant to be exhaustive and none of the authors claim to provide complete solutions to the problems being tackled. Nonetheless, as you progress through this edition, you will find a variety of educated and original policies being put forward by our colleagues in each of our seven policy centres. An important aim of King’s Think Tank is to encourage students to get involved with policy and we hope that as you read The Spectrum, you are also inspired to think out of the box to solve complex, real-world problems.

Finally, we want to extend our thanks to the core committee of King’s Think Tank as well as all of the Policy Center Directors and their working groups for drafting policies that we can only hope will leave a positive footprint behind.

Paakhi Bhatnagar and Julia Bennett Head Editors King’s Think Tank

Founded in the wake of 2010’s student protests, The Spectrum is the UK’s oldest student-run policy journal. It offers students the opportunity to devise original solutions to today’s political, military, economic, and social issues, and helps students develop the skills necessary to develop policy in both business and government. The views expressed in The Spectrum are uniquely their authors’ and do not represent the King’s Think Tank or King’s College London. The King’s Think Tank is a neutral organisation that enables and encourages students to explore and discuss policy. Full endnotes for each paper can be found in the references section. All images used are referenced and cite their copyright in the Image References section.

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CONTENTS

european affairs

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Towards a Crisis-Proof Schengen Area: Post-Covid and Beyond

by Joao Bessa Pereira, Virginia Izzo, Claudia Quinn and Ela Rautner

8 Freedom in Europe: Access to Sexual and

Reproductive Health Rights

by Natalia Vasnier, Noe Amelynck, Léo Sgambato, Catherine Burke, Jonas Decker and Mirjam Seiler defence & diplomacy

12 The International Community's Response

to China's Human Rights Abuses in Xinjang

by Nicola Hope and Anonymous 16

New York to N'Djamena: How should France Negotiate American Involvement in the Sahel?

by Noah Trowbridge

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Blue Doves in Flight: Towards a New Model of Peacekeeping Communications

by Justine Fung and Matthew Ader

business & economics

23 A Suggestion for Social Housing Policy in England

by Oliver Brufal energy & environment

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Access to Green Finance for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the UK

by Rebecca Flowers and Irina Tabacaru

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Loss and Damage in the Global South: The Struggle for Support and Climate Justice on the International Stage

by Andrew King

34 Expanding Usage of Electric Vehicles in

London Through a State-led Mission

Innvoation Approach

by Patrick Geddis, Maxime Sommerfeld Antoniou, Irina Tabacaru, Aimel Waseem education

38 COVID-19 and the Education Crisis:

Using the 'A-Level Fiasco' as a Catalyst

for Regulatory Reform

by Udit Mahalingam and Michael Head 41

Addressing the Educational Needs of Refugee Youth in the Face of COVID-19

by Lameez Siddiqui

global health

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What Policies Should High-Income Countries Implement to Combat the Impact of COVID-19 on Population Mental Health?

by Gursharan Khera, Kunzang Selden, Coralie Gauvin-Bélair, Eleanor Pace

48 Why do the Health Inequalities in Ethnic

Minority Populations Still Exist?

by Siobhan McShane, Rupali Lav, Nadia Dohadwala, Enya Khan, Ben

jamin Zuckerman and Pedra Rabiee technology and innovation

53 COVID-19 Vaccine Rollout and Online Misinformation

by Gabriel Pérez Jaén 57

Bridging the Economic Gap Through Digital Literacy

by Megan Low & Medina Rahma Putri

60 61 62

letter from the president image references references 3

European Affairs

Towards a Crisis-Proof Schengen Area: Post-Covid and Beyond by

Joao Bessa Pereira, Virginia Izzo, Claudia Quinn and Ela Rautner

Freedom of movement has been enshrined as one of the European Union’s (EU) four freedoms in Article 3 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome.1 The right to travel, live, and work in any Member State thus became a fundamental pillar of the European Community. Despite the Treaty of Rome’s commitment to freedom of movement, border controls persisted. It was only with the 1985 Schengen Agreement that national governments formally committed themselves to eradicating all border controls by 1995.2 However, since then, the borderless Schengen area has often been challenged.

Since the 2015 Migrant Crisis many Member States have “temporarily” reintroduced border controls, pursuant to Article 25 of the Schengen Border Code (SBC).3 In 2019 alone, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Germany, France, and Sweden closed their external borders citing reasons that ranged from large migrant influxes, to terrorist threats and cross-border crime.4 However, it is the Coronavirus crisis that marked the closest case that the Schengen Area has ever been

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to disintegration.5 The Coronavirus pandemic saw unprecedented rates of internal border closures across the European Union. As of March 2020, 21 Schengen Area states had closed their borders.6 The following period ushered in restricted or prohibited travel and was marked by instances of EU citizens being stranded abroad, as well as, delays, traffic congestion, and difficulties transporting goods across borders.7 In the face of these various cross-border crises, the EU’s reflex was to allow the benefits of open internal borders to ebb into the background.

In its place emerged uncoordinated, unilateral solutions by Member States.

Though there are many lessons to be learned from the Coronavirus crisis, the value of open borders within the EU might be the most significant. Indeed, between 2015 and 2017, 82.4% of EU citizens reported that they support the freedom of movement8, whilst, economically, a two-year suspension of

THE SPECTRUM the Schengen Agreement would be forecast to cost €51 billion.9 Open internal borders pertain to the core principles of the European project, are valued by its citizens, and have clear economic benefits. These are three components needed to maintain European cohesion, which we should surely protect. In the words of Carlos Coehlo, “If Schengen perishes, the Europe of citizens that we have today will vanish”.10

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

CURRENT POLICIES

To this date, the Commission has failed to effectively ensure the proportionality and the time restraint of borders reintroduction, ensuring Member States compliance with the Schengen Acquis and the SBC. Furthermore, it has not utilised SEM mechanisms, such as unannounced visits to Member States, to evaluate the adherence to SBC regulations by Member States.

Additionally, the Council has also failed to criticise Member States for these infringements, with the Parliament being the only institution to scrutinise the results of SEM.

In face of the migrant crisis, cross-border crime, and the global pandemic, the unilateral closure of national borders demonstrates the need to reform current policies. This is needed not only to ensure better coordination at the European level, but also to safeguard the fundamental right of freedom of movement in the Schengen Area.

Overall, the current policies do not go far enough to retain open borders in times of crisis and do not ensure that, where border closures are necessary, they are done in a coordinated, Europeanised framework. In light of the fundamental nature of the right to intra-Schengen free movement, it will be argued that significant policy changes are needed.

The main policy in place regarding internal border regulation is the SBC. However, it often remains vague in establishing the criteria for when border closure is legitimate. Article 25 provides for the closure of internal borders pursuant to a “serious threat to public policy or internal security of the Member State concerned”11, but provides no clear criteria for what constitutes such a situation. Nor is it clarified how to ensure that the reintroduction of border controls is actually a “measure of last resort”.12

POLICY PROPOSALS

In recognition of the potential dangers of removing border controls, the Schengen Agreement also created the Schengen Information System (SIS) for inter-state communication pertaining to crime in Europe. Europol was also set up in 1999 as the EU’s law enforcement agency, focusing on cross-border crime (terrorism, drug trafficking and money laundering, as well as human trafficking amongst other issues). Today, Europol’s membership includes each Member State of the EU, all Member States of the Schengen area except Liechtenstein, and a mixture of third parties. The scope of Europol has increased hugely after it became an EU Agency in 2010. Indeed, between 2011 and 2018, the number of operational reports produced by Europol increased from 1,324 to 8,266.13 However, practical improvements in cross-border policing have failed to inspire enduring trust; cross-border crime remains the most cited reason for border closures.14

At present, each Member State sends at least one liaison officer to Europol headquarters. Liaison officers aim to facilitate cooperation between authorities in Member States and Europol, ensuring more effective cross-border policing and that Member States are given more representation.16 This paper proposes a reform of the position of liaison officers, broadly based on the UK Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs).

The Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring (SEM) mechanism is in place to monitor the implementation of the Schengen acquis and to ensure the appropriate application of rules and regulations by Member States. The SEM outlines the framework for temporary reintroduction of internal border controls, which Member States should comply with. Yet, in most cases EU institutions have failed to call upon Member States for the non-compliance with regulations as set out by the SEM.15

1) Inspiring greater trust in Europol This instinct for reinstating national borders in the face of crisis generally represents a lack of trust in the EU’s ability to solve cross-border issues. Though this trust-deficit is broad in scope, this paper aims to prevent national border closures by inspiring greater trust in Europol.

Currently, Europol is accountable to the Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs.17 Like PCCs in the UK, liaison officers should be directly elected by (and hence be accountable to) citizens in their Member State. As well as their current role of liaising between Europol and Member States, liaison officers should hold the Executive Director of Europol to account for the delivery of the yearly strategy that they produce, like PCCs do for Chief Constables. As such, the liaison officers, rather than the management board of Europol, should be responsible for proposing candidates for Executive Director of Europol to the Council and recommending their dismissal.

Liaison Officers already provide a single point of contact for cooperation between Member State law enforcement, Member State decision-makers, and Europol. However, as noted by the UK government, having a single elected official to lead collaboration helps to facilitate more effective and streamlined cooperation in and implementation of policing policies.18 The

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THE SPECTRUM work of Europol (which already includes some significant successes) is also likely to become more visible due to directly elected liaison officers. Direct national election elevates Europol’s status vis-à-vis Member State authorities. When it comes to citizens, despite disappointing turnout in elections, the UK government noted that 62% of surveyed citizens were aware of the work of PCCs - a significant improvement from the 7% who recognised the previous police authorities.19 Lastly, greater transparency, representation, and ultimately, trust can come with directly elected liaison officers. The success of the UK PCC model suggests that Europol could benefit from such a reform. The vast majority of the European population already support the freedom of movement. With real-term improvements in effectiveness and enhanced visibility of cross-border policing on the one hand, and increased representation of citizens’ interests on the other, this policy proposal should then serve to make Member State authorities think twice before unilaterally closing borders. It would

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS prevent Member States from exploiting the EU’s border framework under the pretense of cross-border crime, which remains the most cited reason for border closures.

2) Reforming the Schengen Border Code To prevent uncoordinated and unnecessary border closures in face of new crises, such as a new pandemic, this paper suggests amending the Schengen Border Code to clarify and tighten the applicable rules on temporary border con­trols in the following ways.

Firstly, to ensure that internal border closures by Member States represent a measure of “last resort”20 as enshrined by Articles 22 to 24 and Article 27 (which illustrates that Member States have to notify the Commission when closing their borders21) should include an extra clause requesting the drafting of a paper exposing why other measures were not equally or better suited to maintaining internal security. However, to ensure the flexibility of border closures at the basis of the SBC, mitigating circumstances can apply in face of an unprecedented crisis22 to the extent that the drafting of the paper can be delayed to up to two weeks following the notification to the Commission.

Secondly, to ensure coordination and avoid border closures as much as possible, a section should be added with more specific criteria of risk assessment. These should be done in collaboration with other European agencies. For instance, together with the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDPC), criteria for the assessment of “threats to public health”23 should be listed, such as but not limited to, mortality rate, health system capacity and hospitalization rate. This will allow a better understanding of the risk, ensure proportionality and safeguard the Schengen area from unnecessary border closures.

3) Ensuring border closures comply with the Schengen Border Code Currently, due to the vagueness and the lack of specificity in legislature, members can easily excuse and justify inappropriate border regulations to the Commission. In order for the Commission to act more effectively, the existing legislature must be reconsidered.

Accordingly, the evaluation mechanism of Article 43 should be complemented with a more systematic “Schengen border test” which eval-

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THE SPECTRUM

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

uates the compatibility of eventual cross-border restrictions with EU law and the proportionality principle. Furthermore, the Article should call on the participation of other relevant EU Agencies to ensure the use of highly qualified experts alongside the Commission.

Overall, these proposals could enable Member States and the Union to deal more effectively with situations of force majeure, such as a pandemic, without undermining the integrity of the Schengen Area.

Simultaneously, the concrete legal impact of the SBC and evaluation mechanism should be clearly stated. The measures must then be strictly and consistently enforced, with any noncompliance penalised. Breaches of legislation should be directly referred to the Court of Justice of the EU and monetary penalties should be introduced. We suggest introducing a system similar to breaches in Environmental Law, whereby the size of the fine is calculated based on a number of factors, including the GDP of the Member State, number of votes it holds in the Council and its solvency.24 The Court should also take into consideration the seriousness of the infringement and how long it lasted. This way the penalty can be adjusted on a case-by-case basis, while also covering at least some of the financial burdens incurred on the Union as the result of the prolonged border closures.

CONCLUSION By highlighting the limits of current Schengen governance, the Covid crisis confirms the need for a more holistic approach to border management in order to avoid unilateral and uncoordinated internal border closures by Member States.

Considering a fully functional and crisis-proof Schengen of utmost importance, this paper proposes three interlocking measures to transform the Schengen border regime. Firstly, it suggests making Liason Officers directly elected to ensure greater transparency and legitimacy in cross-border policing and thus increase trust among Member States. Secondly, to reform the Schengen Border Code, tightening the criteria for internal borders closures, and more systematic evaluation mechanisms to prevent unnecessary border closures as well as greater coordination when they cannot be avoided. Lastly, it calls for the establishment of monetary penalties in case of non-compliance to avoid infringements left unpunished.

write for us!

King’s Think Tank hosts a student-run blog as well as an annual policy journal entitled The Spectrum.

Though these differ in style and purpose, both are designed to bridge the gap between students and policymakers by communicating clear analyses of current social, economic, and political developments. Students from all disciplines and backgrounds are highly encouraged to contribute their ideas and arguments to our growing community of writers. Find out how to submit a paper at: http://www.kingsthinktank.org/the-spectrum/.

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EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Freedom in Europe: Access to Sexual and Reproductive Health rights

Natalia Vasnier, Noe Amelynck, Léo Sgambato, Catherine Burke, Jonas Decker and Mirjam Seiler by

The recent events in Poland surrounding the enforcement of a near total abortion ban have put the issue of sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR) back on the agenda.1 This issue is not limited to Poland and unfortunately the lack of SRHR is present in several other EU Member States prompting discussions about how SRHR can be respected and ensured across the Union.

However, there are several challenges to assuring SRHR, which will be discussed in this policy paper, along with several proposed solutions. Firstly, there is a lack of information and awareness of SRHR-related needs and issues, and there exist cultural and religious barriers which stigmatize the issue. To combat these problems, we recommend that the EU engage in public health campaigns and partner with organizations which advocate for reproductive rights and access to reproductive healthcare. There is also an apparent discrepancy between Member States when it comes to access and financial support for sexual health services, specifically access to abortion services, which constitutes a larger problem of gender inequality and a deficit in guaranteeing sexual and reproductive healthcare. Therefore, we also propose financial support by the EU for patients engaging in cross-border travel to receive these services. The adoption of these proposed

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solutions would act as a step forward in ensuring sexual and reproductive health rights for everyone in Europe.

CURRENT CHALLENGES A significant challenge is the lack of information and awareness surrounding SRHR issues. Even though the EU advises Member States to provide adequate sexuality education in line with the World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines of 2010, there is no comprehensive framework that effectively guides "content, delivery mode and stated purpose of the sexuality education".2 The most recent issue on sexuality education across the European Union by the European Commission, for example, notes that only ten European states cover gender roles or mutual consent in their sexuality education.

Furthermore, in some Member States sexuality education is still optional in schools.3 Age and delivery mode of information on SRHR topics also differ among Member States. While in some countries, especially the Nordic states, sexuality education begins at an early age and enables awareness and understanding surrounding sexuality, gender and LGBTI issues, in most countries content of sexuality education is of national concern and appropriate information is severely limited. Lack of information on sexual and reproductive health and rights

THE SPECTRUM puts young people at a disadvantage and leads to health risks, unwanted pregnancies and also further stigmatization of the issue.4 Another challenge to people's access to sexual healthcare and rights is the overall lack of information provided on SRHR-related services. The European Contraception Atlas 2020 proves that "availability of online information" in many Member States is (sometimes significantly) below 60%.5 Further, in many Member States SRHR information is only given in the standard languages and does not include "regional or minority languages", which puts marginalized and minority communities at disadvantage in their sexual and reproductive health and agency. Ultimately, the EU fails to guarantee access to adequate information on SRHR issues, such as abortion or contraception, and lacks the policies to guide Member State’s quality of sexuality education.

The European Union does not have a clear policy about how it should address the cultural challenges of SRHR. Currently, several Member States allow doctors and medical practitioners to invoke their right of conscientious objection. This allows them to refuse to provide a service for reasons of religion or moral values. The issue of conscientious objection is defined by laws at a national, not European level.6 In Italy, the use of this right is widespread. It is estimated that 70% of Italian gynaecologists use the conscientious objection clause in the case where the patient requests an abortion.7 As a result, there are entire regions which are at risk of having few non-conscientious objectors. Therefore, this affects women who are in precarious situations and live in marginalized areas. Conscientious objectors have an obligation to refer their patients to non-objectors, but this can lead to another problem, the one of the time limit for an abortion. Most EU countries have a set time limit for abortion on request. This limit is problematic because the process of having an abortion is dependent on the circumstance of the women and the efficiency of the health system to provide the service required in the set time limit.8 Furthermore, in many EU countries there remains a social stigma attached to sexuality and reproductive rights in general. Some highly conservative societies such as Poland and Malta have the strictest laws in Europe regarding abortion rights.9 As mentioned Poland has put in place a near total ban of abortion which led to mass protests in the country in Febuary 2021. A study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs identified conscientious objection as the greatest cultural obstacle surrounding reproductive rights in Europe because it protects healthcare employees’ right, in most cases, to refuse services based on their beliefs, constituting a significant infringement of women’s reproductive rights.10

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS There are major discrepancies between SRHR access in Member States. Focussing on abortions, intra-Union travel presents an important opportunity for women to circumvent abortion laws in their home countries. The Europe Abortion Access Project finds that, within the European Union, only the Netherlands and Spain are net destinations of cross-border abortion travel.11 Indeed, cross-border abortion travel faces significant challenges, from gestational limits and mandatory consultations to the financial burden of travelling. A study by the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) finds that twelve countries in the EU require mandatory counselling and ten member states require “unnecessary waiting periods” before an abortion can take place.12 This complicates cross-border abortion travel because it prolonges the abortion procedure and makes travel more expensive. The WHO advises against both of these measures.13 Cross-border abortion travel is also a financial burden on women. While the EU permits planned medical procedures in any foreign member state to be covered by national insurance, this only applies if the procedure is part of one’s insurance plan.14 IPPF finds that usually women must possess insurance or social security in order to obtain an abortion.15 According to a study commissioned by the European Parliament, however, insurance providers in less-permissive national environments do not offer coverage and as such women have to fund abortions themselves.16 This then becomes a problem in cross-border abortion travel. In summary, while many EU countries face challenges in their national abortion legislation, time delays and financial costs make cross-border abortion travel more difficult, exacerbating existing social inequalities.

Therefore, we identify three key challenges to equal sexual and reproductive rights across the Union: the lack of adequate information on SRHR issues and services, cultural dimension of the conscientious objection and the financial difficulties women face when having to travel to access healthcare services, such as abortions. We suggest four recommendations to tackle the short- and long-term issues restricting equal sexual and reproductive rights in Europe.

POLICY PROPOSALS 1) Implement Public Health Campaigns Due to the widespread stigmatization of SRHR and absence of adequate information regarding sexual and reproductive health, the EU must engage public health campaigns to combat these issues. EU funded public health campaigns, which raise awareness for and create an open dialogue about SRHR, have the capacity to shift cultural attitudes that serve as barriers to accessing sexual and reproductive health services and reduce stigma around topics like abortion. This is especially

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THE SPECTRUM important as many women in Europe report feeling shame after receiving an abortion and feel unable to discuss their experience.17 These campaigns would present an important alternative perspective to European states’ national public policy biases, such as Poland’s promotion of traditional models of the family, which contribute to stigma and undermine access to sexual and reproductive health services, including family planning and contraception.18 Such public health campaigns could involve utilizing public figures or a cast from a popular television show, for example, to educate and inspire conversation among young people, in particular. Moreover, these public health campaigns and associated resources, like websites and apps, would centralize information on SRHR. These could include places where people can obtain contraception, access family planning and counseling, and receive abortions. The significance and efficiency of cultural campaigns was proven by the success of pro-choice activists in Ireland, whose efforts to fight abortion stigma among voters and politicians ultimately led to the legalization of abortion in Ireland.19 The Irish Abortion Rights Campaign’s successful strategies, which included holding civic engagement workshops and “speak outs” where people shared their abortion experiences, training citizens to host these events in different communities, and establishing regional networks aiming to counteract abortion stigma, especially in rural areas, provide a useful model for the implementation of public

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS health campaigns throughout Europe.20 As demonstrated in Ireland, these campaigns not only have the capacity to transform cultural attitudes, but may eventually impact politics and restrictive SRHR laws in countries like Poland.

2) Improve and Standardize Sexual Education within the EU A key issue is the wide disparity between EU countries’ sexual education curricula.21 Writing guidelines and recommendations on what topics and approaches should be used to transmit sexual education to young people would be critical in shifting behaviors and reducing gender inequality. These recommendations could be inspired by the Scandinavian countries’ more liberal approach to sexual education, which is inclusive and reduces stigma surrounding the issue.22 Further, such cultural campaigns could help “decolonize” SRHR by being more inclusive towards ethnic minorities and distributed in minority languages.23 Marginalized groups are often less aware of their rights, and often women of a minority ethnicity suffer more from discrimination.24 Such cultural campaigns have promoted inclusivity and reduced inequality in Sweden since their introduction in 1955.25 3) Prevent Abuse of Conscientious Objection by Fighting Bias within the Medical Field Despite various court cases ruling that the exercise of conscientious objection must not hinder patients’ access to services they are legally entitled to, there has been an increase in the use of conscientious objections due to a rise in anti-abortion movements across Europe over the past decade, as well as work place cultures that encourage its use and actively discourage provision of abortion services.

Therefore, the root of the problem needs to be addressed by combatting regressive societal beliefs and practices within the medical industry. In order to ensure widespread access to abortions and other necessary services, the EU should partner with organisations, such as Global Doctors for Choice, an international network of physicians advocating for reproductive rights and access to reproductive healthcare through

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EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

transnational collaboration. This organisation already operates in Ireland and Malta, helping to incentivize practitioners to operate in underserved areas dominated by conscientious objectors.26 By asserting the EU’s position on SRHR, this strategy would both provide invaluable services and inspire cultural shifts within local medical fields that currently enable conscientious objection.

4) Facilitate Intra-Union Travel for Access to Reproductive Healthcare While we recommend liberalisation in the field of reproductive rights across the Union, we also note the difficulty of implementing such reforms on a European level.27 As such, we recommend a series of solutions that aim to facilitate intra-Union travel for the sake of reproductive healthcare with a special focus on abortions. Since travel to obtain services is guaranteed within the EU, these recommendations serve to render such travel feasible.28 The online provision of counselling is one such measure. According to a 2018 EU consultation, 61% of respondents do not have access to digital health services, but two thirds of those 61% would be in favour of introducing online healthcare provision.29 Union-wide accessibility to online abortion care would allow patients to seek mandatory counselling and commence the statutory waiting period in their home country using a web portal, drastically reducing the financial burden of travelling for extensive periods of time.

CONCLUSION To conclude, we have proposed several solutions which the EU should adopt to address issues surrounding SRHR. In order to address the lack of information and awareness of SRHR-related needs and issues, as well as the cultural and religious barriers which may stigmatize these issues, we recommend that the EU engage in public health campaigns and partner with organizations that advocate for reproductive rights and access to reproductive healthcare. We also propose that the EU provide financial support for patients engaging in cross-border travel to receive any sexual and reproductive health services which may be banned in their country of origin. We are hopeful that these solutions will be a step forward in ensuring sexual and reproductive health rights for all in the Union. We believe equal sexual and reproductive rights are essential to guaranteeing women’s rights and we argue that our recommendations can further advance gender equality in the EU.

Of course, the abortion procedure would be perfomed in another Member State and as such travelling would still be necessary. We propose, therefore, EU financial support for travelling patients in the form of grant funding for regional charities through the European Social Fund within the framework of the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The EU already invests in developmental policies around SRHR in an international context, such as grant support for the IPPF.30 We recommend that a similar approach is taken within the bloc and through regional charities. Overall, while not tackling the illiberal cause of the restrictive environment in the bloc, such policies can alleviate the worst of the symptoms by drawing on the diversity and differences within the Union.

The Policy Plug This year King's Think Tank founded The Policy Plug - our very own podcast. Published on bi-monthly basis, The Policy Plug brings you interesting interviews, discussions, and insights into the global issues we are facing today. So don’t wait and go listen to the podcast today! Search "The Policy Plug" on Spotify and Apple Podcast or visit campsite.bio/kingsthinktank for the direct podcast links!

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Defence & Diplomacy

The International Community's Response to China's Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang by

Nicola Hope and Anonymous

As China becomes a major global power, renewed attention has been placed on Beijing’s status as a rule-abiding member of the international community. In particular, ‘re-education camps’ for Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang province have led to growing concerns over Chinese adherence to internationally established human rights norms.1

them to engage with sanctions and boycotts. These policies additionally call for the re-enforcement of past UN procedures that addressed crimes against humanity and genocide, such as The Responsibility to Protect (R2P 2005), and also plead for the united condemnation of Chinese human rights abuses among Muslim-majority countries.

Thus far, the international community has only taken limited measures to uphold justice in the region. The task of countenancing China's rise with established global norms of human rights is complex: Any action taken will not only be condemned and denied by the Chinese government, but also by its allies and partners.

BACKGROUND

The policies suggested in this paper are written from the perspective of the international community and its leaders. It focuses on shifting the narrative on China’s activities in Xinjiang, and rallying the support of other states by encouraging

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Since 2017, the Chinese government has claimed that centres constructed in the Uyghur-majority Xinjiang region are voluntary re-education facilities for Muslims, seeking to ‘transform’ participants’ ways of thinking and prevent religious extremism.2 However, leaked documents released to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists through a chain of exiled Uyghurs have shown that these centres operate in a high security and strict discipline-manner. Like prisons, these facilities forbid escape and have an incorporated

THE SPECTRUM punishment and points-system.3 The estimated one million detainees are also not allowed to communicate with the outside world, and officials working at the centres are sworn to state secrecy.4 Furthermore, in contrast to Chinese claims stating that recruitment to the ‘education centres’ has slowed down, recent research conducted by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) reveals China’s continued investment in these facilities across Xinjiang.5 In July 2019, twenty-two mainly European nations issued the first substantial joint statement to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, urging China to ‘refrain from the arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement of Uyghurs, and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang.’6 It also asked China to permit ‘access to Xinjiang for independent international observers.’7 Furthermore, Washington added 28 Chinese companies, government offices and security bureaus to the US export blacklist.8 ‘The past three consecutive years has seen not a single terrorist attack in Xinjiang and people there enjoy a stronger sense of happiness, fulfilment and security’: These were the words spoken by a Beijing envoy during major talks regarding Uyghur mistreatment. China justifies its repression in Xinjiang with the conviction that they are preventing the ‘diffusion’ of external terrorist networks in the region.9 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also claims to have tracked linkages between Uyghurs and Islamic militant organisations.10 China’s lack of transparency towards the UN has formed an international divide regarding the implementation of appro-

DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY priate policies against the further ethnic cleansing of Uyghur Muslims.11 This became apparent with the 2019 UN talks between China and the West. When Germany called on China to respect the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, it was met with opposition by Cuba. Instead, Havana praised “China’s valiant efforts to fight off terrorism and extremism”.12 Seemingly, most Western countries are united in condemning the atrocities in Xinjiang. However, it is difficult to take any practical action against the Chinese state when its rise as a global power has influenced other countries in the international community to turn a blind eye to its human rights abuses. In 2019, China issued its own letter which was signed by 37 countries, including but not limited to Saudi Arabia, Russia and North Korea, all of whom praised China's 'remarkable achievements in the field of human rights’. 13 Notably, many of the letter’s signatories are in fact known human rights transgressors themselves.14 The situation is made more complicated by the individual gains that certain states stand to make by being acquainted with China. Most notably, that Muslim nations and members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation would condone this record is testimony to Beijing’s ability to leverage its growing economic power.15 Some signatories, including Pakistan and Tajikistan, are benefiting from billions of dollars in Chinese infrastructural investments through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) economic corridors.16 Not only do states stand to gain financially from this show of support, but changing policy for the better is made difficult by the restrictions imposed on accessing Uyghur facilities, with entry to Xinjiang being tightly controlled amid growing surveillance and a prominent police presence.17 POLICY PROPOSALS 1) Shifting the narrative from Uyghur minority mistreatment to ‘genocide’ in order to generate a more serious response from the international community.

A shift in the language used to address Uyghur camps would highlight the severity of the situation and thus encourage more countries to condemn China. The use of the term ‘genocide’ is justified given the accounts of state-sponsored re-education camps, the suppression of religious practices and testimonies about forced sterilisation.

Such acts violate UN Resolution 47, which reaffirms that ‘states shall protect the existence of ethnic, cultural and religious identity of minorities within their respective ter-

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DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY

ritories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.’18

However, given the continued human rights abuses, tighter sanctions must be implemented.

Furthermore, China has violated Article II of the Genocide Convention, which it signed alongside other UN Member States in 1948.19 Article II describes acts involving ‘killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferring children from group to group.’ It is clear that most of these acts have been carried out, justifying the narrative shift from Uyghur mistreatment to genocide.20

Sanctions may be imposed under the Global Magnitsky Act, through which the US government would freeze US assets of human rights violators, bar them from traveling to the US, and prohibit Americans from doing business with them.25 Such measures could potentially encourage other countries to follow suit.

2) To increase pressure on China through the implementation of sanctions Re-framing the Xinjiang issue as one concerned with China’s international obligations should induce states to act collectively in implementing sanctions. It is worth considering such measures on Chinese and Western companies alike, particularly those involved in building detention camps and surveillance systems used to track and monitor Uyghurs, as well as major brands who may be benefitting from forced labour of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.21 Multinational Corporations (MNCs) like Nike and Abercrombie have stated that while none of their products are manufactured in the Xinjiang province, they are nevertheless conducting investigations.22 The silence of other MNCs such as Apple and Fila signifies the need to impose stricter measures on brands suspected of production in Xinjiang.23 In 2020, the US Commerce Department responded to China’s actions by blacklisting 11 Chinese firms.24

To encourage the Middle East as well as Asia to adhere to international obligations in the battle against ethnic cleansing, we advise the withdrawal of ambassadors from embassies in China and boycotts of major Chinese organisations. By garnering the support of the UN under recommendations of the General Assembly, unity of member states would make diplomatic isolation effective in forcing China to follow UN Human Rights regulations.

3) Reinforce and emphasise the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Following the human rights atrocities committed in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, all 193 states of the United Nations made a unanimous decision to document the responsibility to protect, which rests on three equally weighted pillars: (1) the primary responsibility of states to protect their own populations from the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; (2) the international community’s responsibility to assist a state to fulfill its R2P; (3) the international community’s responsibility to take timely and decisive action, in accordance with the UN Charter, when the state in question has manifestly failed to protect its population from one or more of the four crimes.26 Whilst the decision to document R2P is seen as a milestone within the international community, there is still room for the principle to be put to further use.27 In 2018, the UN General Assembly opened the first formal discussion of the R2P policy since 2009, demonstrating the infrequent rate at which the policy is revised and debated.28 Reaffirming and revising the agreement on a more regular basis, as well as further specifying how actions against policy violators could be exercised, would lead to increased cooperation among UN Member States within the sphere of human rights, turning “words to deeds.”29 Furthermore, the UN should continue to highlight, and re-emphasise that it is each member’s responsibility as a sovereign

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THE SPECTRUM state of the international order to ensure that the principles of R2P are carried out.

Re-emphasising the points made in R2P more than fifteen years ago would not sit well with opposers to sovereign intervention, and its practical execution will most likely not be straightforward. Long, drawn-out discussions regarding R2P have already occured within the Security Council, with permanent members such as China and Russia being reluctant to take up the matter or to discuss it at length.30 However, increased debate of R2P within the General Assembly would reflect the insufficient action taken so far to fulfill their commitment, remind UN member states of their responsibilities, and potentially lead to members forming a more united front against the commitment’s abusers.

DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY for the international community: first, shifting the narrative of China’s actions in Xinjiang in order to generate more serious discussion of Uyghur treatment at a global level; second, implementing sanctions on China; third, reinforcing and emphasising R2P, and fourth, encouraging Muslim majority countries to condemn the Chinese treatment of Uyghur muslims.

4) Encourage Muslim-majority countries to condemn Chinese treatment of Uyghur minorities This paper’s fourth proposal recommends that the international community should encourage Muslim majority countries to be more outspoken about human rights abuses. This should particularly apply to potential BRI countries (Iran, Lebanon and Oman), as a boycott would add extra economic pressures to China. The best way for a BRI boycott to have a significant impact would be a joint, formal communique to entice the collaboration of more states, and to show that this issue is serious enough to warrant action. A key step in encouraging Muslim nations to engage would be to increase information flow and awareness of the human rights abuses occuring in Xinjiang. Such a measure would foster more widespread dialogue, and increase pressure on these governments to implement policies condemning Chinese actions.

CONCLUSION The issue of China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang is challenging to overcome for several reasons. The diverging discourses amongst members of the international community and the Chinese government make it difficult to generate any co-operative dialogue that could lead to change. In addition, China’s influence over a growing number of countries in Asia and Africa has made it difficult for compliance to exist. The United Nations and the International Court of Justice lack the power of enforcement to take decisive actions, or to carry out formal investigations in the Xinjiang region without China’s consent. However, in light of the social, economic and ideological proposals put forth, it is important to remember the power of the UN and International Criminal Court in voicing what is considered legitimate on the world stage. For progress to be made, nations must form a united, assertive front, and warrant international condemnation and prohibition in accordance with international law. In order to achieve such an objective, this policy paper has proposed four main actions

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New York to N'Djamena: How should France negotiate American involvement in the Sahel? by

Noah Trowbridge

‘Africa is home to the fastest growing economies and populations in the world, sits at crossroads of international commerce and trade, and watches over the world’s most important sea lines of communication’.1 General Stephen Townsend’s opening remark for the U.S. Africa Command’s 2020 Posture Statement to Congress encapsulates the growing importance that African states, economies, populations and resources will have on the global stage throughout the 21st century. Yet for the past decade, the successive administrations have made it clear that the ‘rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region’ will remain the figurehead of America’s long-term global strategy.2 To France and its European allies, this is an extremely alarming situation. Indeed, Sahelian instability exacerbates the proliferation of violent extremist organisations (VEO) and fuels major migration flows towards the Mediterranean. France must therefore advocate for continued U.S. engagement on the continent. This paper will argue that this can be achieved through negotiations with the U.S. Department of Defence to influence the formulation of its 2021 Global Posture Review.

The French negotiating strategy should integrate the three following arguments: Africa is at risk of falling within the Chinese sphere of influence, current U.S. deployment is highly cost-effective and European allies are committed to bearing the bulk of the burden.

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BACKGROUND Navigating French and American interests in West Africa is a highly complex task due to the sheer size of the region and the variety of actors that operate within it.

Despite the successive waves of decolonisation, France has always sought to maintain its old African colonies within its sphere of influence through an array of bilateral economic and military agreements. While President Sarkozy promised to bring an end to the Françafrique strategy in 2007, the continued deployment of French troops around the continent – particularly in the Sahel region through operations Serval and Barkhane since 2013 and 2014 – highlights the importance of African security on the French defence agenda. Indeed, this strategic interest in the Sahel emanates from a historical sense of special responsibility, the incentive to secure access to the regional energetic hub, but most importantly the need to counter the resurgence of VEO. This view is not completely shared by American policymakers, however, who advance that ‘the problems that manifest from West Africa will manifest into Europe before they manifest in America’.3 Despite Biden’s promise of reinvigorating transatlantic alliances, France cannot expect continued American engagement in the Sahel. Indeed, analysis of recent U.S. strategic reviews outlines three core interests: containing the rise

THE SPECTRUM of China in the Indo-Pacific, disengaging from ‘forever wars’ and increasing the cost-effectiveness of U.S. deployment in low priority regions.4 Yet when visiting NATO headquarters in March 2021, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken sustained that when ‘allies shoulder their fair share of the burden, they’ll reasonably expect to have a fair say in making decisions’, thus indicating a margin of malleability in American foreign policy in the years to come.5 Overall, considering Sub-Saharan Africa remains low on Biden’s foreign policy agenda, it is vital that French policymakers pick up on Blinken’s promise and strive to influence the writing of the Biden administration’s 2021 Global Force Posture Review and adapt their negotiating strategy to American interests.6 POLICY PROPOSALS Due to the particular setting of this policy paper – one of informal bilateral negotiations –, its policy proposals will naturally take the form of complementary bargaining arguments that can amount to a comprehensive negotiation strategy.

Furthermore, the proposals set forward in this paper rely on several assumptions: that both states are willing to maintain their current defence expenses despite the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic; that U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin acts upon his promise to consult his allies when writing the 2021 Global Force Posture Review; and that both governments’ official statements regarding African security reflect their true intentions.

1) The strategic argument: containing Chinese expansion The very reason for France’s military presence in the Sahel stems from the fragility and subsequent vulnerability of West African states: Opération Serval (2013) was desperately launched to safeguard the Malian regime as insurgents threatened to take Bamako. So long as food insecurity and socio-economic inequalities in the area provide a fertile ground

DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY for the proliferation of VEO and that the issue of Tuareg autonomy has not been addressed, Sahelian states will require assistance from external powers to achieve domestic stability.

As such, French strategists must convey the natural risk that Sahelian states turn to U.S. rivals if the European taskforce were incapable of providing sufficient support. Indeed, China’s economic and progressively military presence on the continent should inevitably alarm the Biden administration.

China’s military presence in Africa has steadily increased throughout the 21st century: Beijing has invested over $3.5 billion to African governments in security loans between 2003 and 2017,7 installed its first military base in Djibouti in 2017 and continuously promoted its ‘traditional friendly military ties’ with the continent in official statements since 2015.8 Furthermore, Chinese institutions play an extensive role in training a significant share of the continents’ newly established military elites.9 Algeria and Mauritania – who remain key players in the fight against VEO in the Sahel – have thus adopted China’s party-army model. Finally, it is of utmost importance that French policymakers disassociate Chinese economic interests from Beijing’s military ambitions. Indeed, while the Sahel is rather peripheral to China’s economic strategy on the continent, the country still contributes 413 military contingents to MINUSMA in Mali for example.10 It is thus important that French policymakers highlight the rampant Chinese military influence in the Sahel to their American counterparts to illustrate the intersection of U.S. interests in Africa and East Asia.

2) The tactical argument: providing cost-effective support It is imperative that French negotiators highlight the tactical efficiency and effectiveness of current U.S. deployment in the Sahel. Indeed, analysis of American behaviour in past negotiations shows that U.S. diplomats tend to value tangible results over relationship-building.11 With this in mind, French negotiators should insist on the practical cost-effectiveness of the light footprint tactics currently employed by the U.S. in the region. These tactics prioritise limiting the human and financial costs of intervention through the deployment of special forces and the promotion of cooperation with local armed forces (in training and joint operations). In the Sahel, the U.S. also provides crucial logistical and intelligence support to Opération Barkhane. The French Mirage aircrafts are regularly supplied mid-air by American Boeing KC-135, while the U.S. also provide C-130 Hercules transport aircrafts to convoy around 6000 European personnel to and from the area.12 Franco-American cooperation is

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THE SPECTRUM necessary for intelligence since the American drones and satellite constellation provide unparalleled coverage of the immense region. The U.S. intelligence group within the multinational coordination and liaison unit based in N’djamena shares its reports with its French counterpart on a daily basis.

While Opération Barkhane does not rely solely on American intelligence and logistical support to conduct its mission, General Carcy notes that ‘everything will take us longer: we would be able to do it, but slower, and as you know fighting Jihadists is above all a war of speed and a very short time-lapse is required between intelligence and strike’.13 As well as highlighting their importance to the effective deployment of Opération Barkhane on the long-term, French negotiators must also insist on the immediate results of light footprint tactics. Overall, the international taskforce can congratulate itself for containing the spread and strengthening of VEO in the Sahel: since the G5 Sahel’s Pau summit in early 2020, no complex large-scale terrorist operations have been successfully launched, major al-Qaeda leaders – such as Abdelmadek Droukdel, founder of AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and Bah ag Moussa, head of Al-Qaeda’s Sahelian branch – have been neutralised, and coordination with local armed forces has been improved.14 As synthesised by General Townsend, ‘what U.S. Africa Command accomplishes with relatively few people and few dollars, on a continent 3.5 times the size of the continental United States, is a bargain for the American taxpayer’.15 3) The symbolic argument: bolstering transatlantic trust Finally, it is imperative that French policymakers acknowledge the symbolic dimension of such negotiations. In light of the emergence of China on the international stage, the spread of anti-Western sentiments and the latent questioning of NATO’s relevance, President Biden will be eager to send signals of solidarity to his allies. French negotiators must channel this momentum and frame U.S. engagement in the Sahel as an opportunity to reinvigorate transatlantic trust. This can be achieved both by highlighting the increased commitments of European partners in the Sahel and showcasing France’s goodwill regarding NATO’s budget requirements.

During Antony J. Blinken’s latest visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels in March 2021, the U.S. Secretary of State declared that the U.S. would ‘treat the efforts of our allies to develop greater capacity as an asset, not a threat’.16 As such, France must overcome the taboo regarding European strategic autonomy and utilise the symbolic example of the successful deployment of the Takuba task force as a negotiating asset.

The multinational task force reached its initial operational capability target in July 2020 thanks to the deployment of French, Estonian and Czech special forces groups, which will be reinforced by Swedish and Italian contingents by mid-

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DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY 2021.17 Moreover, Denmark, Portugal and the Netherlands have already provided officers to the task force’s headquarters.

Therefore, it is crucial that French negotiators portray the Takuba task force as a promising template for future NATO multinational operations and as a symbolic initiative to bolster transatlantic trust.

Lastly, issue linkage can be an effective tool in breaking deadlocks within international negotiations. As such, French negotiators could essentially put more pressure on their European allies regarding NATO defence budget requirements in return for continued U.S. engagement in the Sahel. In fact, France has already reached the symbolic 2% of GDP mark which gives it significant leverage.18 French negotiators should thus take advantage of this symbolic high ground to amplify the aforementioned arguments.

CHALLENGES It goes without saying that these proposals would necessarily incur costs and potential risks that should be acknowledged.

For instance, light footprint tactics can only be effective as part of a long-term strategy; their results are relatively limited in scope and cannot be reaped quickly. Therefore, the promotion of light footprint tactics may eventually create a certain disconnect between the U.S. high command’s expectations and the mission’s actual accomplishments, which would in turn disincentivise engagement in the Sahel. Another major difficulty French negotiators could encounter is that U.S. officials may interpret continued American engagement as yet another ‘forever war’, which President Biden has made clear would not be an option under his tenure.19 Lastly, the proposal to secure U.S. engagement in return for assistance in pressuring NATO states to increase their defence budgets may prove unfeasible if France is unable to sustain such high defence expenditures and would undoubtedly damage European solidarity as a whole.

CONCLUSION International negotiation is inherently a game of perceptions.

Understanding the preferences, constraints and capabilities of one’s partners and opponents is fundamental to a fruitful dialogue. At a time when Pacific tensions are on the rise and VEOs continue to wreak havoc in the Sahel, it is crucial that French negotiators channel the progressive momentum induced by the Biden administration. At such a crucial turning point, it is vital that the former find an adequate balance in tone between urgency and composure. Indeed, in setting out a negotiation plan that clearly encompasses key American strategic priorities, that is backed by successful and cost-effective tactics and that is bolstered by symbolic gestures, France can reasonably hope for continued U.S. support in the Sahel.

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Blue Doves in Flight: Towards a New Model of Peacekeeping Communications by

Justine Fung and Matthew Ader

Strategic communications is a critical part of the United Nations Peacekeeping’s (UNPK) mission. However, current communications are incoherent: they do not shape the information domain to the organisation’s advantage and fail to promote a modern and relatable image of UNPK to the public.1 Moreover, their engagement with new and emerging forms of media remains relatively minimal. This is not sufficient if the UN wishes to defend and advance the cause of peace in this century. This policy paper argues that UNPK should adopt a humanising grand strategic narrative encompassing reforms to three core functional areas - internal communications, crisis communication, and external engagement. In so doing, it will ensure success and greater cohesion in the increasingly contested information battlespace of the 21st century.

“Grand Strategic Narrative” Theoretical Approach The core of UNPK’s communication challenge goes beyond poor process and coordination. It is the fundamental lack of a grand strategic narrative - the absence of a cohesive vision and an inability to shape the information operations environment to be more conducive to that vision.2 UNPK needs this overarching grand strategic narrative because it must coordinate messaging across a diverse organisation towards a broad range of stakeholders and departments. While nominally co-

ordinated by the UN Communications Group, unity of message is difficult to generate.3 More than that, though, the key source of its legitimacy and power lies in the often-neglected role of communications.

The typical peacekeeper is a Bangladeshi teenager in a blue helmet.4 But with the right narrative and public perception, said teenager becomes a larger-than-life representative of the international peacekeeping community. Peacekeeping is not and cannot be a simple matter of hard power. Lasting peace and stability stems from political mediation.5 A grand strategic narrative which taps into and enhances UNPK’s often-neglected soft power capabilities will enhance non-violent dispute resolution. This will create a more effective peacekeeping institution, and contribute substantially to the UN’s goal of helping people build better lives and countries achieve peace and sustainable development.6 What form might such a grand strategic narrative take for UNPK? We believe it should humanise peacekeepers and, perhaps oddly, emphasise their frailty. Right now, the peacekeeping communications approach - insofar as it is coordinated enough to describe as a singular object - is highly corporate. It talks about broad objectives and statistics, putting itself forward as a national-level solution. This approach can

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THE SPECTRUM be effective, but it is brittle - a single failure risks delegitimizing the effort. Instead, PK should pursue a humanising grand strategic narrative, emphasising that peacekeepers are normal people doing the best they can to protect lives and uphold peace in terrible situations. Highlighting individual voices and successes encourages stakeholders to empathise with missions and promotes diversity at the same time.

This is simple to lay out. But how do we realise these theoretical visions into practice? We propose that the UN should address communication problems in three key areas - internal communications, crisis communications, and external engagement. Each area calls for its own policy solutions, but all should be conducted with an eye towards the overarching grand strategic narrative.

POLICY PROPOSALS Internal Communications & Mission Coordination The UN secretariat is highly international. Staff share working languages but often lack community links and cultural heritage. Without significant efforts, there is a risk that they will lack a shared sense of purpose. This is doubly problematic in UN peacekeeping missions, where contributing nations generally operate their own battalions, minimising contact between different nationalities and reducing integration except at the highest level.7 Every scholar of military issues has identified common identity as essential to operational effective-

DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY ness.8 UN forces and staff do not always have this.9 That constitutes a deficit which should be corrected, and a revamped internal communications strategy can contribute towards the effort.

1) The UNPK secretariat should establish a structured reporting framework which updates and engages all personnel involved in relevant operations Part of this is an information dissemination capability - it is important for workers to be informed of mission developments, shifting situations, and technical incidents. However, internal communications go further than that. It should serve as a vehicle for genuine discussion and constructive dissent.

Internal suggestions, anonymous surveys and Q&A opportunities, and a breaking down of internal informational silos may all be part of such an effort. This would improve worker responsiveness, keep them not only informed but engaged, and contribute to a sense that their voice matters and is heard.

This also fits within the aforementioned grand strategic narrative. By empowering and uplifting the distinct, human voices of UN workers, the policy would live out the humanising concepts embedded in the grand strategic narrative.

Similar reforms should apply on peacekeeping missions. Currently, communications strategy for each mission is primarily the province of the Force Commander and Head of Mission.10 While their mandates are set by resolution, specific objectives and how these are related to stakeholders inside and outside the mission are decided locally. It is important to retain flexibility.

However, we believe a more centralised approach would pay dividends in this field. UNPK secretariat should draft overarching communications guidelines for all missions, drawing on the themes identified in the proposed grand strategic narrative - humanity, empathy, and a need to live up to the high ideals of the UN Charter.

Force Commanders and Heads of Mission will then be able to draw upon these guidelines to develop a guiding narrative for the mission which fits the global messaging strategy while also remaining appropriate to conditions on the ground. In addition, such narratives must be subject to constant review. Such narratives can apply both externally, and internally, to improve cohesion and coordina-

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THE SPECTRUM tion at the operational level. Sitting alongside this, the UNPK secretariat can continue its current tasking of advising Force Commanders and Heads of Mission on the appropriate technological means to communicate and provide specialist assistance on stakeholder analysis.

These measures would improve the morale and engagement of both secretariat and peacekeepers. They would also contribute significantly to the creation of a positive command climate, creating cohesion as well as underpinning the commitment to humanity and empathy central to the grand strategic narrative. However, this is not the only part of the puzzle.

UNPK also needs to adapt its communications in response to crises.

Crisis Communication Peacekeepers constantly grapple with crisis. However, while they may be well-equipped and trained to deal with emergent security and humanitarian issues, their communications approach is often poorly coordinated and rudimentary.11 Consider, for example, scandals over sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers in Sudan or the spreading of cholera in Haiti.1213 Both cases posed reputational risks which struck at the core of the mission. In both cases - as with many others - commanders failed to get out ahead of the issue, and belatedly denounced systemic issues as ‘the actions of a few'.14 As a consequence, the legitimacy of individual missions - and the reputation of UNPK as a whole - suffered tremendously.

Stricter standards of personnel behaviour should be applied, and multinational commanders should have greater authority to discipline troops from all contributing nations.15 However, whether it stems from peacekeeper misconduct or incidents in the field, unforeseen events requiring careful handling are bound to happen in the course of UNPK missions. Therefore, the organisation would benefit substantially from a new strategic approach to crisis communications.

2) Implement a universal curriculum on communications for all senior personnel in UNPK operations through the UN Staff College System.

Currently, Force Commanders and other personnel are not subject to a regularised training process, but rather are expected to come trained by troop contributing nations.16 Some contributing nations, like the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom place a heavy premium on strategic communications and media relations. Others, like Bangladesh, Chad, and China do not. More guidance and training would help alleviate the worst cases of miscommunication.

However, piling more duties upon under-resourced, overworked, and non-specialist officers is a stop-gap solution.

DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Instead, the UN should recruit civilian or seconded military public affairs staff into the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) within the Department of Peace Operations. Such staff could provide communications support during crises in a way which is informed about the needs and culture of each ongoing peacekeeping mission. This is a more credible way to conduct crisis communications than parachuting in staff from the Strategic Communications Division (SCD) of the Department of Global Communications who do not have existing links and contextual knowledge.17 Situational awareness saves lives - this is as much true in the briefing room as on the battlefield.

Alongside this, the OMA and SCD should work together to design a set of generic crisis communication guidance. To paraphrase Tolstoy, each unhappy peacekeeping mission is unhappy in its own way. Diversity and flexibility is critical to ensuring effective responses. However, general guidance - perhaps integrated into the aforementioned Staff College Curriculum - would provide a solid baseline for force commanders to work off, and create a common language that public affairs staff at the OMA and troops in the field can use to manage situations as they emerge.

External Engagement Of course, the impact of crisis communication is limited and not effective if the public does not already have a positive perception of UNPK. Unfortunately, perspectives of the blue helmets are conflicted around the world. They are commonly derided as ineffective witnesses to atrocity.18 Some even see them as complicit. This is factually inaccurate - for every Sbrecinia, there is a Shootbat; for every Kigali, a UNITAF.1920 Even in the face of unspeakable atrocity, personnel serving under the blue flag have achieved miracles.21 This general antipathy stemming from high-profile incidents is worsened by the fundamental challenge of peacekeeping success makes for unappealing news. Few conventional outlets - especially those with substantial popular reach - are willing to dedicate substantial frontpage space to ‘UN successfully monitors ceasefire’. All are eager to cover catastrophes and disasters. If it bleeds, it leads. This is not an ideal information environment for UNPK to operate in.

The grand strategic narrative of humanisation and empathy defined above has its greatest impact here. UNPK can leverage new and modern techniques to spread this message. Social media is especially attractive, because it can allow individual voices to carve out space distinct from yet still part of the broader peacekeeping endeavour. Compare, for example, this US Army Public Affairs Officer’s twitter account with the official military accounts - the former gives a far more honest and informal picture of US Army activity than the latter,

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without compromising the need for more formal communications via official channels.2223 It is much easier to hate a faceless organisation than it is to hate another person.

3) Expand the ‘humanist image’ to new spaces of the information domain, such as social media.

flict but around the world is central to broader success. UN peacekeepers have fought and died in the service of peace.

If the UNPK does not communicate effectively, much of that sacrifice may prove in vain.

Supplementing this approach, UNPK should look towards expanding into new spaces. For example, TikTok is widely used by young people. Where is the UNPK TikTok account? Dave Jorgenson from the Washington Post, Sophia Smith Galer from the BBC, and many others have shown it has value as a platform for serious communications.2425 Similarly, Reddit is a popular site not currently being exploited by peacekeepers.

UNPK communications staff, perhaps those embedded with the OMA mentioned above, need to widen their understanding of communications capabilities.

Such concepts may even apply to engagement with Model UN programs, and the production of simulations placing participants in the shoes of UN peacekeepers. More innovation, with cheap, safe-to-fail pilot projects paving the way for further efforts, is a sure-fire way to realise the grand strategic narrative and improve UNPK’s popular standing - and to constantly refresh, challenge, and review UNPK’s strategic communications approach.

CONCLUSION In an era of increasing great power competition, rising displacement, and climate threats, peace is harder to keep - and more important - than ever before. We do not pretend that a reform to communications alone can address the sum total of challenges facing UNPK. However, embracing a grand strategic narrative accompanied by policy reforms to a range of functional areas, aimed around a central convening body that draws upon and highlights beneficial diversity, would enhance the organization's legitimacy and efficacy. Winning the battle for hearts and minds not just in the theatre of con-

write for us!

King’s Think Tank also accepts external submissions for our annual policy journal, The Spectrum. We welcome students of all disciplines and backgrounds to write about policy relating to one of our seven policy centres. Please get in touch if you would like to contribute to the journal in 2021/2022.

You can read more about our submission requirements http://www.kingsthinktank.org/the-spectrum/.

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Business & Economics

A Suggestion For Social Housing Policy In England by

Oliver Brufal

Currently, 1.16 million households are waiting for social housing in England, a waiting list which compounds currently at around 4% per year.1 This figure will only be drastically increased by COVID-19, as 80% of earners in the bottom 10% of national income work in sectors that have been shut down, at a time when over 30% of such households were unable to last a month without vocational income.2 Therefore, not only were we firmly lodged in a housing crisis, it is one which is assured to get considerably worse in the coming year.

Despite this, there is an alarming lack of consideration in government policy for this crisis. Such policy focuses on a romantic end whereby social housing acts as a funnel, pushing tenants to the end result of owning an “affordable” home, schemes which past governments have directed a large amount of funding into. Perhaps this is an illustration of how civil servants, for whom every career decision since university has been about upwards progression, are detached from the challenges faced by those in low income households. In

reality, many who require social housing are not always in a pipeline towards home ownership, and government disdain for these people who are so crucial to the functioning of everyday society needs to end.

POLICY PROPOSALS This paper proposes to address this in two ways that will enable social housing to serve all those who need it, and in an adequate manner. First it points out how government policy on social housing must readjust to one of construction and secondly how existing social housing projects must be better maintained and regulated so as to provide a higher quality of living for existing tenants.

1) Construction of Social Housing Construction and maintenance of social housing has been allocated to housing associations over the past decades, with

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THE SPECTRUM some local authorities still maintaining a presence in social housing. As Alex Schwartz pointed out ‘market mechanisms are unstable platforms for the delivery of affordable housing’, and the reliance upon loans from private markets has forced the gradual rise of rents in social housing projects, which has punished those with the lowest incomes; the antithesis of social housing’s point.3 Equally, funding has been diverted heavily towards affordable housing schemes, which enable those who no longer require social housing to buy homes at a reasonably discounted rate. This has been reflected in the relative decline of social housing as a percentage of English housing stock, and the increased dilapidation of properties under management.

To cure a current situation where 65% of families are forced to wait for over a year to secure housing, the current government policy direction must be changed in favour of a pro-construction approach. Given that there were only 314,000 new social housing lettings last year, a number that has declined 21% since 2013/4, policies rooted in a fast turnover of tenancies are detached from the evidence in front of policymakers.4 Looking at the local authority waiting lists compiled by the Ministry of Housing the spatial distribution, while higher in London than anywhere else, is consistent in urban areas throughout England, demonstrating that the shortage is chronic across the country.5 That the government clings to affordable home statistics in defending their own work shows their inability to understand the underlying issue, which is the need for long-term social housing. This is where construction is a necessity to provide the enormous number of tenements needed to cure this shortage.

A nationwide piece on social housing equally pointed out that social housing demand correlates to economic conditions, and that in worse conditions there is a far higher need for social housing, as the conditions ‘driv[e] up arrears and repossession rates, inhibiting house building’ across the wider economy.6 Indeed, the construction of social housing serves two purposes here; it provides housing for those who have been made unable to operate in private markets due to the fluctuations of the economy, and provides opportunities for the construction sector at a time where the sector has frozen due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) commented that this allowed schemes such as Right to Move in England to operate on a larger scale due to the greater number of available properties.7 Right to Move helps those in social housing move properties across the country to areas where demand for jobs is higher, which during economic recovery is an invaluable resource for tenants and employers alike. It has additionally been predicted that such schemes would actually decrease tenure periods of social housing properties through the ability to move, and thus enable greater turnover of housing for those who require it, helping to

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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS cure the current waiting list backlog further. This all illustrates the positive feedback loop for those requiring social housing that begins with construction, as well as the positive externality that is generated for house builders as a result of it.

2) Maintenance of existing properties While there is clearly a large need to develop new properties, those already in existence should not be taken as without fault. In 2015 6% of social housing units posed serious health risks to tenants8, and complaints about the dwellings have experienced ‘year-on-year increases of 17 per cent across the last five years’, something that given the increasing age of most UK social housing projects is only going to worsen.9 Since the Grenfell disaster there has been a concerted effort to tackle the issue of cladding and other clear structural faults, but it is important to note how far less obvious, relevant issues are ignored by these efforts, but still make the lives of tenants more challenging and potentially dangerous.10 Firstly, there is a tendency to re-divert funds designated for construction to renovations, which delays the creation of new projects, which as mentioned above are vital. This tendency also means that “renovictions” become more damaging, as there are fewer new properties for tenants to move to when their property is being renovated, and if they are unable to return to it, fewer for them to move into, potentially forcing them into higher rental properties or into homelessness. The government must tackle this by providing funding for renovations that does not encroach upon that required for new construction.

At the same time, the most critical challenge is to ensure that these renovations are spotted and rectified. This requires a greater level of regulation in the social housing sector than that which currently exists. This comes from the housing ombudsman service, which enables tenants to raise concerns

THE SPECTRUM about their property to a higher authority that can pressure landlords into repairing any issues. Recent reforms of the social housing charter have cut notice given for inspections, increased the usage of fines and brought in the power to arrange repairs on behalf of the landlord. These are all helpful reforms that give more teeth to regulators but still fail to punish repeat offenders with any real severity.11 To do this, regulators need to be granted the authority to strip landlords of their ability to provide social housing, the ultimate threat to ensure their compliance with the standards expected.

However, this is still reactive, as the regulators in these scenarios rely upon the complaints of tenants. This fails to address the fear that tenants may feel about complaining, not wanting to lose accommodation that is so difficult to acquire. This paper proposes that regulatory bodies utilise digital mediums to not only engage with tenants but to anonymise surveys which reveal the true conditions that they are living in, the results of which will enable them to be proactive in tackling issues before they become critical, as opposed to the traditional reactive stance, which will not only prevent disasters but will also push landlords into fixing smaller issues quickly rather than let them drag on, improving the immediate quality of life for tenants.

3) The tenant-landlord relationship Finally, there needs to be an enforcement of the pastoral role that landlords must play in social housing. As mentioned above, many of those in such housing are among the more vulnerable in society, stretching from disabilities that require supported housing to less visible or noted conditions that arise from their specific situation. Therefore, not only do they require suitable conditions to live in, but particularly during the current COVID-19 mental health crisis, landlords need to provide greater support to them. As Section 98 of the Social Housing White Paper lays out, making sure that landlords have the right professional training, updated when needed, is vital.12

BUSINESS & ECONOMICS CONCLUSION This suggestion is centred around the government taking ownership of a sector that since Margaret Thatcher’s Right to Buy policy they have so eagerly shifted away from themselves.

The onus must be on the government to provide for those who are unable to find housing that is affordable, as over the past few decades in British society such a notion has become detached from governmental responsibility and placed upon the individual, perhaps inexorably. A lack of public investment has created the chronic shortage of social housing that we are experiencing now, a situation exacerbated by rent-seeking housing policies that have inflated and protected prices so heavily. Such policy must change, especially given the economic problems we face right now, and social housing is at the forefront of this.

Government investment and regulatory reform can guarantee a better life for an increasingly large section of the population that require lower-cost housing, by giving them the opportunity to halt their exploitation at the hands of private landlords, by lowering their costs and providing them with the opportunity to have their living standards improved to an acceptable standard through better ombudsman services.

Even those who reject the idea of a compassionate government for all citizens cannot argue with the reality that such public investment would undoubtedly provide a large stimulus for the housebuilding sector, especially at a time when the sector is struggling due to the pandemic.

Where current policy goes wrong is that it does not make enough of a deal of the obligations owed by landlords, and in large scale housing projects, a singular figure whom residents can go to is not enough. To tackle the obligations, a realignment of the tenant-landlord relationship in social housing is required so that the tenant feels comfortable and correct in bringing such issues to them. In large housing projects, there needs to be multiple representatives of the landlord to whom tenants can bring their problems, so as to ensure this realignment. Outside of the remit of this specific paper, the government’s own responsibility to help aid this pressing mental health crisis with greater investment in social care services would be a good compliment to this change by landlords.

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Energy & Environment

Access to Green Finance for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the United Kingdom by

Rebecca Flowers and Irina Tabacaru

An increasing number of countries across the globe have started to seriously acknowledge the international climate emergency that society currently faces. As a response, some governments and political institutions are stepping up and declaring country-wide zero emissions targets, as well as environmental plans with the aim of creating more inclusive, resilient and green economies in the long-term. With the announcement of the UK government’s Carbon Neutrality Plan for 20501 and the UK’s Green Investment Plan2, it appears that climate change is coming to the forefront of British domestic policy. As the UK prepares to host the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) in November 2021, it is relevant to consider the steps that are being taken by the UK government from a local to a national level to mitigate the consequences of climate change.

This policy proposal will focus on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)’ access to green finance in the UK. Ac-

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cording to the G20 Green Finance Study Group, green finance represents the “financing of investments that provide environmental benefits in the broader context of environmentally sustainable development. […]”.3 We have decided to focus on SMEs specifically for two reasons. Firstly, as of 2019, SMEs, businesses with 0 to 49 employees, represent 99% of all UK businesses.4 They typically feature heavily in the supply chains and the operational make up of larger companies. SMEs also tend to be more flexible, quicker to innovate and adapt to new trends and technologies. SMEs, therefore, create spillover knowledge that improves multinational corporations.5 These are all critical elements for tackling climate change.

The extent to which SMEs can drive and deliver on the promise of a net zero emissions economy is conditioned by their access to finance. However, the well-known financial and knowledge constraints that SMEs often contend with are exacerbated in the face of explicitly green access.6 For example,

THE SPECTRUM

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT

the requirement to meet specific climate and environmental thresholds in order to access green finance places a larger financial burden on SMEs as it requires the ability to measure and report on additional metrics that fall outside the conventional financial metrics. Furthermore, such thresholds tend to target companies with larger data-reporting and provision capacity, making it difficult for companies with fewer resources to meet the defined threshold. This is coupled with SMEs’ general lack of awareness regarding the availability of sustainable investments, demonstrating the extent to which SMEs’ technical capacity and financial literacy must be addressed to ensure their participation in the transition to a net zero future.

It is true that policymakers face certain obstacles when it comes to addressing SMEs access to green finance. The lack of robust financial data, difficulty predicting future cash flow, process efficiency, system infrastructure and business model sustainability prevent investors from reliably assessing the risks and potential benefits of SMEs. This in turn makes it more difficult for policy makers to provide incentives for investors to increase their investments in smaller firms.9 Additionally, the novelty and ongoing development of impact investing and green finance means there is a lack of knowledge regarding the sustainable financing needs of SMEs, making it difficult to shape policies that promote access to green finance.

FAILURE OF CURRENT POLICY

Due to the fact that many SMEs are not listed companies, the type of finance they have access to is also more limited. Combined with the great diversity of SMEs, it makes it difficult to create impactful legislation to increase SMEs’ access to green finance. The following policy proposals have been drafted with these important issues in mind and strive to overcome such challenges and improve SMEs’ overall access to green finance.

The UK Green Finance Strategy is a strong first attempt to mobilize and accelerate finance for clean and resilient growth.

However, none of the above-mentioned challenges are acknowledged or addressed in the UK’s Green Finance Strategy.

Its brief mention of exploring the possibility of underpinning loans to SMEs by energy service companies to improve energy efficiency and nothing more, results in its failure to address a significant stakeholder. SMEs' considerable role in the UK economy and importance to the green transition means that the UK Green Finance Strategy’s failure to directly address and explicitly support SME access to green finance will significantly limit its impact.

The UK Green Finance Strategy will not address structural issues such as information asymmetries, complex and burdensome green finance frameworks for SMEs, and lack of diversity in the banking sector, all of which prevent the long-term patient capital needed for green projects. The UK is, therefore, missing a great opportunity by having the SME financing and green financing agendas operate largely in parallel rather than being explicitly integrated. Neglecting the issue of SMEs’ access to green finance limits the potential and impact of SMEs’ important contribution to sustainable growth and social inclusion.7 Access to general finance schemes for SMEs in the UK is extensive, as highlighted by the Department for Business and Innovation.8 Seven types of loans schemes are available to SMEs, ranging from the National Loan Guarantee Scheme to Start-up Loans for entrepreneurs under 30 years old. Given that the UK already has the infrastructure and the resources necessary to allow small businesses to grow and innovate, it is relevant that moving forward, the UK ought to take advantage of its supportive structure to drive the transition and further encourage green investments.

ANALYSIS OF CHALLENGES

POLICY PROPOSALS

We recommend that the UK government issue a clearer, industry-focused plan showing specifically how 1) SMEs will be assessed and supported in their access to green loans and 2) how the government aims to support the banking sector to allow investors to provide SMEs with the needed capital.

1) National Green Finance Taxonomy for Small and Medium Enterprises In order to facilitate SMEs’ access to green finance, the first step would be to establish a country-wide classification scheme that would categorize SMEs by industry, type of activity, environmental impact, technical capabilities and amount of funding needed. This categorisation would result in a ranking index that would allow banks to assess the eligibility of SMEs for green loans. Moreover, this scheme would also allow SMEs to advertise their impact and environmental efforts, as they would be able to use their ranking for advertising purposes.

The authors recommend Norway's “Eco-Lighthouse programme”10 to be used as a reference, as we believe it would facilitate the access to green loans and would incentivise entrepreneurs to make sustainable business decisions. The upcoming European Taxonomy11 would also be used as a reference, but we would expect the UK government to adapt the standard requirements and the data-reporting procedure to smaller-scale businesses’ capabilities. The renewable nature of the scheme would incentivise businesses to uphold their

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THE SPECTRUM efforts in order to keep their label after obtaining it. Additionally, the existence of this classification scheme also provides a considerable deterrence from greenwashing, given that sustainability standards, techniques and practices would be officially defined by the government.

2) Increased Banking Sector Diversity The financial and banking sector itself must also be addressed to overcome the barriers mentioned previously. The banking sector is the largest source of capital for SMEs and so by increasing the diversity of the banking sector it will be able to better service the unique and diverse needs of SMEs. Bank diversity implies the presence of banks that vary in governance (ownership), strategy and public positioning. There are four main reasons that outline the importance of such diversity in improving SMEs access to green finance. Firstly, it ensures a higher presence of banks that emphasise non-bank lending, one of the principal sources of finance for SMEs. Secondly, it promotes the presence of financial institutions that place an emphasis on branches and this increases the presence of local banks which has shown to facilitate local lending and corporate innovation. Thirdly, by increasing banking diversity we increase the presence of non-commercial banks that provide more long-term loans needed by SMEs. Lastly, banking diversity will help address the risk that comes with investing in SMEs by ensuring that not all banks are exposed to the same financial shocks. As a result, the banking sector as whole will be able to provide more stable credit provision.12 The case of Germany can be used as a reference for the diversification of the banking sector.13 The nature of Germany’s federal organization gives a greater importance to regional banking and public development banks than the United Kingdom does. The promotion of green finance in Germany has been carried to a large extent by alternative and social banks such as KfW, GLS Bank or Umweltbank AG. The Forum Nachhaltige Geldanlagen14 indicates a considerable annual growth rate of 27.6% over the previous decade for Germany’s Socially Responsible Investments, and specifies the increasing dissociation from carbon-powered activities.

ASSUMPTIONS The success of the described policy proposal relies on two principal assumptions.

First, it is assumed that there both exist SMEs whose main purpose is a more sustainable future as well as interest from other SMEs to develop more sustainable business models that do not harm the en-

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ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT vironment. A study done by Lloyds Bank (2019) showed that almost two-thirds of UK SMEs have signalled their intentions to improve environmental sustainability practices due to heightened consumer awareness.15 Secondly, it is assumed that there is both a demand from the public and from MNC for SMEs to behave ethically and respect the environment. An extensive research project into U.S consumers, arguably more climate averse than the UK, conducted by NYU Stern’s Center for Sustainable Business showed that “50% of consumer packaged goods growth from 2013 to 2018 came from sustainability-marketed products.”16 DISCUSSION AND RISK MITIGATION We acknowledge that the above-suggested policies will not resolve all the issues associated with green finance. We do believe that the introduction of a national classification scheme combined with the diversification of the banking sector in the UK would enhance SMEs access to green finance thus stimulating growth in non-urban areas. However, the considerable systemic gap between urban and rural SMEs activity and access to capital in the United Kingdom would persist if these measures are not accompanied by strong public-private partnerships. Nevertheless, we would argue that these policies would have a positive consequence on the UK’s innovation capacity. Extended support to SMEs would incentivise the development of new businesses. Moreover, the classification would act as an education tool to allow actors to better understand what constitutes a green business.

There are two central risks to our policy proposal. Although the development of a climate investment framework tailored to SMEs should help avoid greenwashing, a lack of auditing and sanctioning could lead to companies falsely reporting

THE SPECTRUM information to attain climate specific loans. The UK government must therefore ensure that there are quality checks in place and that companies who abuse the framework do not go unnoticed. This could be done by providing resources to help train and provide auditors with the skills necessary to assess climate related reporting.

Both specific proposals are also exposed to the risk of concrete implementation caused by a gap between drafting the proposals and actually enforcing them. First of all climate change is unfortunately quite a debated matter and the importance given to it therefore varies heavily between political parties.

The enforcement of this policy proposal may therefore be hindered by a change in the governing party or in situations of budgetary pressure. Furthermore, the structure and nature of a country's banking sector is highly dependent on whether the country leans more towards a liberal market economy or a coordinated market economy. As mentioned above, non-commercial and regional banks are more common in countries with a strong tradition of state intervention and may therefore hinder the implementation in a country like the UK. While we acknowledge the challenges posed by these risks, we believe that the proposals we have mentioned above are both within the UK’s institutional capacity and have also proven effective in other advanced economies. Furthermore, we believe the policy proposals will have a positive economic effect beyond that of the green transition, thus providing a strong incentive for implementation.

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT access to green finance. This will help spur green innovation and scale existing green SMEs to facilitate a successful green transition. The authors believe that the development of a less burdensome green finance framework, and the increased diversity of the banking sector will to a large extent address the limitations of the current UK Green Finance Strategy which has not provided sufficient support to SMEs.

CONCLUSION Due to SMEs’ key role in the UK economy, further attention must be given to their financial needs to help improve their

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THE SPECTRUM

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT

Loss and Damage in the Global South: The struggle for support and climate justice on the international stage by

Andrew King

The impacts of climate breakdown are intensifying and becoming more frequent year on year. Even if global warming is limited to below 2°C in line with climate goals, the unabating, destructive activity of the past three decades, principally by industrialised nations, has ensured that the impacts of climate change are locked in for years to come.

The world’s least developed countries (LDCs) are highly vulnerable to climate breakdown. LDCs typically have lower levels of resilience to climate impacts due to stronger reliance on climate-dependent industry and eco-system services, lack of disaster preparedness and prevailing socio-economic and geographic factors. Consequently, by 2050, LDCs will suffer from increased economic impacts due to climate-induced events of up to 50 per cent more GDP loss in a world with 3°C warming as compared to a 1.5°C world.1 Many of the impacts felt by vulnerable communities are not fully addressed by current mitigation and adaptation strategies, and a “protection gap” prevails in LDCs between current levels of resilience and that needed to ensure safety from the impacts of climate breakdown. This results in climate-induced impacts and risks, widely referred to as loss and damage.23 As the impacts of climate breakdown accelerate and intensify, LDCs will increasingly lack the finance, resources and coping

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capacity required to ensure both sustainable development and climate resilience. If left without international support, LDCs will suffer from increased internal displacement and migration, stranded assets, political instability, social unrest and conflict. It is estimated that international financial support amounting to $50b in 2022 and $300b by 2030 is required to support the direct economic losses of climate-induced loss and damage in LDCs, not taking into account non-economic and indirect economic losses.4 Furthermore, the group of 46 countries classified as LDCs are responsible for less than 0.4% of the world’s total historic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.5 As such, international support for loss and damage is intrinsically linked with justice and ethical considerations, due to the unequal distribution of historical and current GHG emissions, and the disproportionately high risk to climate breakdown and climate-induced loss and damage facing LDCs.6 Yet, despite the call for developed countries to increase climate finance, net official development assistance (ODA) flows declined by 2.7% in real terms between 2017 and 2018, with LDCs and Africa most affected by a decline in bilateral ODA.7 In particular, the UK, host of both the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) UN Climate Change negotiations in Novem-

THE SPECTRUM ber and the G7 summit in June, has announced it will reduce its international development aid contribution from 0.7% to 0.5% GNI in 2021, diminishing effective support for climate resilience and sustainable development.8 Loss and Damage in the International Climate Regime LDCs have been advocating for the inclusion of climate-induced loss and damage in international climate policy since the inception of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) nearly three decades ago. At COP19 in 2013, after more than 20 years of negotiations on loss and damage, the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) established loss and damage as a third stream of climate action, distinct from adaptation and mitigation. This was later enshrined in the Paris Agreement (PA) in 2015.910 However, no subsequent action has followed the establishment of the WIM or PA. The WIM lacks any provision of technical advisory or financial functions, instead putting emphasis on “identifying ways forward”.11 Similarly, the PA explicitly states that Article 8 on loss and damage “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation”.12 The inability to deliver concrete action in loss and damage negotiations reflects the continued resistance from developed nations to accept legally binding liability in order to avoid climate-related financial obligations to LDCs. Furthermore, a lack of formal definition for loss and damage has left ambiguity around the range of impacts covered, what actions can be taken to manage them, and who is responsible.

Elsewhere, emerging economies and developing countries have formed financial sources to address loss and damage outside of the UNFCCC based on climate risk insurance. Regional risk insurance pools, such as the African Risk Capacity (ARC) and Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), are composed of vulnerable communities affected by loss and damage, and provide a means to raise finance and distribute it within the insurance pool.13 However, these approaches fail to fulfil climate justice considerations, with a basis on mutual support between those affected and vulnerable to loss and damage rather than the wider international community responsible for the effects of climate breakdown felt by LDCs. Failures of Existing Loss and Damage Mechanisms 1. Loss and damage in the UNFCCC: despite the establishment of the WIM and PA, loss and damage remains a politically contentious issue, with further negotiations unlikely to yield concrete action in the timescale needed to tackle ongoing loss and damage. Hence, alternative sources and mechanisms for loss and damage finance

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT must be developed which can establish momentum outside of the UNFCCC and PA. 2. Climate justice dimension: current financial sources and mechanisms for loss and damage are centred solely on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA), with existing mechanisms placing emphasis on mutual support amongst those affected by climate-induced disasters. This fails to assign accountability for the disproportionate climate impacts suffered by LDCs, or ensure compensation for loss and damage as a result of climate breakdown. Future loss and damage provision must take into account distributive justice, based on solidarity and humanitarian principles; and compensatory justice, which seeks to provide compensation from those responsible for loss and damage, involving actors outside of the national and regional insurance pools.

3. Lack of accessibility: due to insurance premiums, the poorest and most vulnerable are unable to access the existing risk insurance approaches. To ensure that climate finance for loss and damage is distributed equitably, the “pro-poor” principle must be adopted. This principle aims to remove the barriers to loss and damage support that face the poorest communities within LDCs. 4. Polarised policy space: due to a lack of clear definition for loss and damage or distinct policy space, current approaches are polarised between those advocating for direct compensation for historic and ongoing loss and damage under climate justice considerations, and others focused on tackling future loss and damage through DRR and CCA. POLICY PROPOSALS To address these issues, this paper recommends establishing an overarching comprehensive risk management approach to loss and damage outside of the UNFCCC, incorporating both climate justice considerations and disaster risk management (DRR and CCA) in delivering climate finance to LDCs.14 Implemented sustainably, equitably and justly, this comprehensive risk management approach holds the potential to reduce vulnerability to loss and damage in LDCs and deliver climate justice, whilst uniting efforts behind one set of principles.

This approach distinguishes between two key components of financial provision for loss and damage: financial sources, and the mechanisms distributing the climate finance.

With the UK in a unique position as host of two integral climate negotiations in 2021, this author calls on the UK government to pledge support to financial mechanisms for loss and damage, and advocate for increased national provision of financial sources amongst developed countries within the OECD and G20.

1) Financial sources for loss and damage

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THE SPECTRUM In order to apply the pro-poor principle and climate justice considerations of comprehensive risk management to the existing operational risk insurance framework, it is recommended that international sources of finance from outside the insurance pool are used to reduce climate risk insurance premiums, and provide direct support for loss and damage.

Proposed sources include an International Airline Passenger Levy, a Financial Transaction Tax, and a Climate Damages Tax.151617 However, these all suffer from logistical and political challenges, and a lack of incentive for governments to enforce them.18 The best option for sourcing climate finance for loss and damage is through national or regional Carbon Pricing Mechanisms (CPMs) in developed countries. CPMs, either as a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme (ETS), are an established market measure to reduce GHG emissions and incentivise clean energy pathways, whilst preserving economic growth.19 A price on each unit of CO2 is established, with regulated firms either paying a carbon tax to continue emitting, or given a fixed amount of allowances which can be traded on an emissions trading market.

By 2018, 51 CPMs were in place covering 15% of global emissions, concentrated within the 42 countries of the OECD and G20.20 CPMs on the national level are a logistically feasible and politically favourable means of ensuring mitigation climate targets are achieved and providing countries with fiscal revenues to redirect into further adaptation and mitigation measures, or national development. This paper recommends redirecting the revenues produced through CPMs into financial mechanisms delivering loss and damage support in LDCs.

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ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT By reappropriating funds from CPMs in developed countries, this financial source applies the “polluter pays” principle to realise accountability and compensatory justice,creating a direct link between those responsible and those seeking compensation.21 Furthermore, by reducing premiums for climate risk insurance, this financial source fulfils the pro-poor principle, ensuring climate finance is distributed equitably and through a needs-based approach. The funding must be grants-based, otherwise long-term climate debt will hinder sustainable development and reduce emergency finance available in the event of a disaster, alongside failing to achieve compensatory justice.

2) Financial mechanisms for loss and damage Whilst it is desirable for international climate finance to be sourced, managed and distributed through one international organisation to ensure funding is guaranteed, this is logistically difficult. Instead, it is recommended that international financial sources are channelled into several climate finance mechanisms, overseen and tracked by a coalition of LDCs distinct from the UNFCCC such as the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF).22 Namely, this paper recommends the use of: (1) existing international funds, such as the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF); (2) multilateral development banks (MDBs); and (3) regional risk transfer facilities.

1. The LDCF, established in 2001 under the World Bank’s Global Environmental Facility (GEF), specialises in climate change adaptation for vulnerable LDCs. The Fund has a strong focus on financing the implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action developed by LDCs, and also covers climate risk reduction and risk transfer.2324 Hence, the LDCF holds potential as a financial mechanism for climate finance to reduce insurance premiums and support projects aimed at increasing climate resilience. However, as an organisation managed under the GEF and World Bank, it can be expected that changes to the LDCF mandate to support loss and damage will be met with political contention and opposition, hindering the LDCF’s ability in the short-term to manage and distribute loss and damage finance.

2. MDBs, international financial institutions aimed at promoting economic growth in developing countries, also hold potential as

THE SPECTRUM financial mechanisms for loss and damage. All MDBs are aligned with the PA and committed to supporting socio-economic development.25 Loss and damage trust funds within regional or national MDBs, i.e. the Caribbean Development Bank, can provide established delivery systems with regional expertise to distribute new funds as grants for loss and damage. These grants can be used to support climate risk insurance for vulnerable communities, or provide direct compensation and emergency funds for extreme weather events.

3. The best option for a financial mechanism to manage and distribute financial sources for loss and damage are regional risk transfer facilities, such as the existing ARC and CCRIF insurance pools. These facilities are an established approach to provide DRR, but currently suffer from a lack of funding outside of the insurance pool of those affected. Hence, international finance from CPMs and other sources will enable risk insurance pools to take into account climate justice considerations, and increase the accessibility of the current approaches by subsidising insurance premiums.

ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS Several assumptions have been made throughout this policy proposal. The first concerns the efficacy of using national CPMs to generate finance on the scale required. Failure of previous ETSs, notably the EU-ETS, was caused by the price of carbon falling below the abatement cost, and an oversaturation of allowances in the trading market.26 These issues can be mitigated by ensuring a price of carbon that remains above abatement cost and in line with decarbonisation targets, estimated at $50–100/tCO2 by 2030 for 2°C-consistent pathways; and removing any abundance of allowances from the market during excess periods.27 Furthermore, CPMs should be implemented alongside mechanisms to reduce carbon leakage, such as border adjustment taxes or product standards, and include as many GHG emitters as logistically feasible to ensure non-discriminative, compensatory justice, and to reflect climate targets and ensure sufficient finance for loss and damage.

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT Finally, it is noted that the degree of financial support needed for loss and damage is unlikely to come from one financial source or mechanism in the short-term. Hence, complementary sources and mechanisms should be combined to realise the necessary support for loss and damage.29 OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSION In order to protect, support and compensate vulnerable communities in LDCs suffering from the devastating impacts of climate breakdown, loss and damage must be placed at the heart of international climate action. Due to the slow progress of the UNFCCC and PA, this paper recommends establishing financial sources and mechanisms outside of the international climate regime which realise sustainable, equitable and just provision of climate finance to those at-risk.

This paper argues that CPMs in developed countries should be used to raise funds for loss and damage, channelling the revenues into a host of financial mechanisms. Through this, finance can be distributed to LDCs under a comprehensive risk management approach by reducing premiums for climate risk insurance and providing direct support for ongoing loss and damage. As climate breakdown accelerates, these financial mechanisms will be increasingly needed to provide support for climate-induced loss and damage to vulnerable communities.

It is also assumed that developed countries will be willing to reappropriate revenue from CPMs for loss and damage climate finance. In order to incentivise international cooperation and action on loss and damage, a movement away from “win-lose” negotiation scenarios is required, with more emphasis placed on an inclusive narrative highlighting collective ambition and mutual benefits.28 Cooperation on disaster relief in developing countries can be mutually beneficial, offering the opportunity to trial existing approaches to risk management, informing better development policies and supporting future action for loss and damage in developed countries as well as LDCs.

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THE SPECTRUM

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT

Expanding usage of Electric Vehicles in London through a stateled mission innovation approach by

Patrick Geddis, Maxime Sommerfeld Antoniou, Irina Tabacaru, Aimel Waseem

The recent project to build the Silvertown four-lane tunnel in East London has raised some pressing concerns about the consistency of the government’s actions in tackling air pollution in Greater London. The persistently high levels of air pollution in London and slow deployment of Electric Vehicles (EVs) suggest that the current policies are failing to address these urgent issues. This proposal seeks to fill the existing policy gap by providing a set of recommendations to reinforce and expand the infrastructure for electric vehicles in London, in order to reduce the emissions generated from transport, using Mazzucatto’s Mission Economy theoretical framework as the primary intervention. The paper presents the context and current status quo in London within section 1. It also identifies the policy failures and loopholes alongside challenges faced in implementation of EVs in London under the existing status-quo. Section 2 then introduces the theoretical framework of the policy proposal as the intervention followed by the policy proposal in section 3. Section 4 outlines potential limitations and risks associated with our policy proposal and suggests multiple risk mitigation methods.

Section 1: Air pollution and curent electric vehicles poli-

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cies in the United Kingdom (UK) and London This section outlines the current UK-wide and London policies aimed at reducing pollution from transport. The measures introduced by the British government to broaden the use of electric cars aim (i) to ban the sale of petrol and diesel vehicles by 2030 (Step 1) and (ii) to have all new vehicles “be fully zero emission at the tailpipe from 2035” (Step 2). To achieve this, the government has allocated £1.8 billion worth of investment into EV infrastructures and grants, alongside an additional £500 million to support industrial jobs to promote the green transition. Examples of EV infrastructures supported by the government include the setup of accessible charge points throughout the UK, investments into research and development to promote green technologies, and public support of British car manufacturing bases in the West Midlands, North East and North Wales that are expanding their EV productions.1 Moreover, the British government has also introduced policies to incentivise individuals to switch to clean vehicles. These notably include discounts of up to £2500 on newly bought low-emission vehicles.

THE SPECTRUM More specifically, the City of London has local policies that are aimed to reduce the emissions from transport in the London area. The Low-Emissions and Ultra-Low Emissions Zones both aim to reduce the presence of pollutant vehicles by imposing penalties on their daily usage. For example, the Ultra-Low Emissions Zone represents a daily charge of £12.5 for cars and motorcycles, and £100 for lorries and buses. This applies for the majority of petrol vehicles registered before 2005 and the majority of diesel vehicles registered before September 2015. This date is not arbitrary; vehicles sold after September 2015 have to comply with the Euro 6 emission standard, which means diesel cars can not emit more than 80mg of nitrogen oxide gases per kilometre driven. Moreover, the London electric vehicle infrastructure delivery plan aims to expand the use of electric vehicles, which only represent 2.81% of new sales in the London area.2 The Mayor of London’s goal is to introduce between 2,300 to 4,100 rapid charge points and between 33,700 to 47,500 slow to fast charge points in London by 2025, compared to the current 300 rapid charge points and 3,500 slow to fast charge points in 2020.3 Section 2: Challenging the status quo using the Mission Economy- Mazucatto’s Mission-Innovation Policy Approach While the policies introduced above represent an ambitious goal, it is relevant to question whether these targets are achievable within the next five years, given the status quo.

The global economy today is a rapidly evolving system where new technologies and demands emerge and so push consumers to diversify their demand and suppliers to innovate in new ways, therefore limiting the usefulness of classical economic models.4 The need to decarbonise the global transport system, with a particular emphasis on London’s transport network, under the net-zero emissions target as identified in Paris Agreement 2015, has created a demand for innovation in the form of EVs. However, aligning the decarbonising goals with demand for EVs has not been as easy as it seems.

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT of emissions.5 25% of roads in inner London have NO2 levels superior to norms. More significantly, it is estimated that 99% of the capital displays levels of particle pollution that are superior to World Health Organisation standards. The map below from the London Atmospheric Emissions Inventory shows that most areas within Zones 1 and 2, as well as the majority of roads surrounding Greater London exceed the annual mean emissions objective for NO2 emissions for the year 2016.6 Given the failure of the current policies at keeping the emissions levels below legal and health standards, it appears that fixing negative externalities through daily charges, the creation of emissions zones, and the distribution of grants for new EVs are insufficient at tackling London’s pollution issue.

It appears that market-based mechanisms to incentivize individuals to discard their polluting vehicle and allowing the deployment of infrastructure to be controlled by the private sector alone fails to provide an adequate response to the decarbonisation of London’s transport system. There seems to be a gap between the operations carried out by private companies and the targets set by the government, hence revealing the presence of coordination failures between agents.

Our policy proposal, unlike others, places emphasis on the central role of the state in rectifying coordination failures via introducing public-private partnership as the go-to approach, following Keynesian interventionist principles.7 We use Mazzucato’s conception of the Entrepreneurial State with a mis-

Despite current policies, the levels of air pollution in London remain extremely high. While the amount of nitrogen dioxide (NO2) emissions has decreased in the last decade, certain areas of Greater London remain above the European legal standards

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THE SPECTRUM sion-oriented public sector that shares a symbiotic partnership with the private sector.8 Mazucatto’s mission economy framework introduces the need for wider engagement and cooperation between multiple stakeholders as the new essential aspect of the mission innovation economy framework.

Within this framework, the focus of this proposal remains the innovation system and network through public-private partnerships for achieving effective service delivery.9 The goal here is to bring about an innovative policy which amalgamates multiple institutional and economic factors to shape the diffusion of EV infrastructures.

Section 3: Proposal to incentivise transitioning to EVs within London Here utilising the mission economy approach, we introduce the role of a London government partnership with private sectors in the following two contexts: providing directionality for the proposal, and organising the network of actors to reduce the anomalies of principal-agent issues, private agents’ discretionary powers, information asymmetries, and mitigating inherent risks in expanding the use of EVs. From a financial aspect, our policy proposal provides a new economic framework customised to London for enhancing infrastructure deployment for EVs across multiple zones in London.

Using the nation-wide Charging Infrastructure Fund (CIIF) of £400 million for EV infrastructure as a template, we would establish a public-private investment fund tailored for London composed of the central government and the major private companies including IKEA, BP and Chargemaster

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT that are taking up the responsibility of installing charging stations for EVs.10 Specifying the exact amount of the fund is not as important as ensuring that public investments are outmatched by private ones. Here, the Mayors’ office brings together multiple private partners for launching a nationwide charging infrastructure investment fund to achieve the objective of increasing the availability and use of EVs in all zones within London. The fund aims to massively finance the procurement, installation and deployment of infrastructure for EVs across London in an evenly manner. A significant portion of the fund will be dedicated to setting up charging stations for EVs across boroughs in London, and to close the infrastructure gap between the different boroughs.

We recommend that the City of London follows the model of Brussels, which has introduced a website to respond to citizens and companies’ demands for charging stations in their respective areas.11 This sub-proposal engages with the notion of the Entrepreneurial State framework outlined in Section 2.

Indeed, the public sector would be actively shaping and guiding the emerging market of EVs and related infrastructures by investing long term capital in this evolving sector.

We also aim to focus on reducing costs, especially maintenance costs, for the public and businesses to transition to EVs. For this purpose, the mayor’s office will introduce discounted schemes and subsidies as rewards for businesses, especially transport businesses, that install at least three electric chargers for vehicles at their workplace. Such schemes, together with establishment of a new cumulated London-based grant, together with the nation-wide 2500 grant for first buyers of EVs will set forth an incentivised path for the public to change their perceptions about purchase of EVs and replace their gasoline cars at reasonable prices. A crucial part of these schemes will be discounts at every charge and servicing of their EVs for the first 100 EV buyers in multiple emission-zones.

Section 4: Risk mitigation, challenges, assessment Following the above-explained proposal, several inherent key risks will need to be mitigated in order to ensure the optimal implementation of the policy proposal. Firstly, public-private partnerships imply that governmental agencies must be embedded in, and not in bed with, private business.12 A possible solution to avoid capture is to implement what Rodrik names “disci-

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THE SPECTRUM plining devices against abuse”.13 If a firm tries to manipulate the system or underperform, it shall be cut off from the benefits it can access as part of the schemes to incentivise the usage of EVs.14 Ensuring discipline in public-private partnerships requires the implementation of five distinct tools.

This includes creation of an ex ante objective for a peculiar support program.15 Doing so will keep public servants aware of their partnership commitment to the right direction.

Manyfold objectives add confusion and do not help to discipline public-private partnerships.16 Indeed, the fuzzier the objectives, the harder it will be to recognize failures, remove support, and change the course of actions. Hence, an adequate objective would be a technological one – such as the charging time of an electric charging station – which is different from profitability, employment creation, or commercial aspects.17 The second tool refers to measurable targets.18 Ensuring that a private actor is aligned with specific objectives requires using costs and penalties.19 For example, ensuring that a firm specialized in electric charging stations is meeting its technological objective might require measuring the time needed to charge a vehicle or the cost of installing the station, or charging an electric vehicle. Importantly, to avoid capture and corruption, periodic audits by professional specialists must be conducted to render independent judgements.

Once measurable targets are established, a counterfactual scenario must be created to evaluate whether a firm is meeting its technological objectives.20 What would happen if the program did not exist? As Jaffe and Van Reenen proposed, the most sophisticated evaluations of public programs include: randomized trials or regression discontinuity designs.21 If these are not applicable, establishing explicit time or cost targets ex ante enable the public sector to evaluate the outcomes of the program against a precise benchmark.22 Evidently, if targets are not met, public support to the private actors must be stopped.

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT protest in France, triggered by the implementation of a carbon tax on French drivers by the government. It reminds us of the existence of resistance and conflicts by stakeholders in projects. Ensuring that vanguard policy proposals are not blocked by politically motivated opponents or distrust from the civil society vis-à-vis its political representatives requires public accountability. Public actors must remain transparent to the citizens on how the objectives are being achieved under the proposal and on successful achievement of targets.

While permitting to keep public agencies honest and truthful, it increases the legitimacy of their activities.27 With regards to accountability, appointing a high-level political figure to implement our policy proposal would ensure that the civil society associates the on-going changes with this figure and knows who to hold politically responsible.28 Transparency over the decision-making process can also be fostered with a “proactive communication strategy” combined with periodic audits conducted by independent experts and reporting on budgets.29 CONCLUSION To conclude, this policy proposal has first analysed the current measures in the UK and in London to reduce transport pollution and increase the use of electric vehicles. Second, we used Mazzucato’s Mission Economy framework to create the theoretical foundation for our recommendations. Third, we recommended several measures to incentivise the use of EVs in London: the introduction of an investment fund and a website to facilitate the installation of charging stations, as well as discounted schemes and subsidies for transport businesses. Fourth, we assessed the potential risks faced by our proposal and introduced mitigation measures.

Furthermore, to prevent private partners from manipulating the system, well-designed rules must be identified since the start of partnership.23 For instance, Rodrik proposes to implement automatic sunset clauses which “reverse the burden of proof by requiring positive action to renew support schemes and make it harder for failing projects to be propped up”.24

Finally, the best tool to ensure that discipline is safeguarded within public-private partnerships is professionalism.25 Ensuring the independence of a public institution from capture requires professional and reputational public servants, upheld by the esprit de corps of its staff, its technical competences, and repeated successes.26 Another inherent risk takes inspiration from the yellow-vest

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Education

COVID-19 and the Education Crisis: Using the ‘A-Level Fiasco’ as a Catalyst for Regulatory Reform by

Udit Mahalingam and Michael Head

The ‘A-Level Fiasco’ In light of the Coronavirus pandemic and the cancellation of all in-person examinations, an alternative to award by assessment was required for thousands of A-Level students in the United Kingdom (UK) this summer. However, the Department for Education, and adjacent regulatory institutions, failed to establish a standardisation process which was both robust and fair, a failure which caused anger and confusion for many students across England. This policy paper will seek to outline potential remedies for these regulatory shortcomings, in the hope that the same errors in standardisation can be prevented from occuring again in the future.

An Inaccurate Algorithm At the root of the summer’s “A-Level fiasco” was an algorithm created by the Office for Qualifications and Examinations

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Regulation (Ofqual). In short, Ofqual’s algorithm calculated predictions of how A-Level grades should be distributed within a given school, rather than predicting results based on individual students’ prior attainment.1 To do this, it relied on data which prioritised each school’s historical performance, thus minimising the value of both GCSE results, as well as the student rankings provided by each school after nationwide mock examination procedures in January 2020.2 Centre Assessed Grades, based on teacher’s predictions, were largely ignored in the construction of this algorithm. Whether acting out of hubris or a genuine belief in its statistical modelling, Ofqual’s insistence was contradicted by its own analysis, which revealed that the algorithm predicted inaccurate grades at least a third of the time.3 It is worth noting that Gavin Williamson, the UK’s Education Secretary, received evidence of serious flaws within the grading system prior to results day. Nevertheless, Williamson

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EDUCATION

initially refused to follow Scotland’s example in relying solely on Centre Assessed Grades, citing concerns that boosting grades would devalue academic attainment in the long term, a conclusion that rested upon the assumption that teachers may not retain objectivity when making predictions.4 However, four days after results were released on 13 August 2020, the Department for Education announced that all students would be awarded their Centre Assessed Grades.

course of the pandemic. Condition GQCov3.2 of the Extraordinary Regulatory Framework highlights how 'awarding organisations' must ensure their compliance with the guidance and requirements either 'published [...] or otherwise specified to the awarding organisation by Ofqual'.9 Despite placing the responsibility to comply with its guidance onto the awarding organisation, Ofqual failed to effectively illustrate how best to achieve such compliance.

The immediate impact of Ofqual’s algorithm was intrinsically unfair and prompted widespread fear. The share of A-Level grades at ‘A and above’ rose by 4.7% in private, fee-paying schools – a process counter-balanced by a mere 0.3% rise at state-funded colleges and sixth forms.5 ‘Free School Meals’ students, first-generation university applicants and BAME candidates were most likely to be downgraded by the algorithm. This stemmed from its failure to account for 'outliers' – high academic achievers within historically underperforming assessment centres.6 At a long-term level, the summer’s A-Level fiasco served to reinforce the attainment gap, consolidating long-standing regional, class, and racial divides within the country’s education system.

Crucially, such standards ought to be maintained by the regulatory body itself, with Ofqual delivering and communicating advice to awarding organisations in compliance with its own statutory objectives. As such, the insufficient weight placed on readily available, individual ‘Centre Assessed Grades’ during the formulation of the ‘grades standardisation algorithm’ constitutes a breach of this specific condition, as well as Ofqual’s core objective to maintain ‘assessment standards’. Moreover, in relying on a school’s historic performance, in lieu of the individual performance of its students, Ofqual’s ‘standardisation algorithm’ contravened the fundamental obligations contained within its ‘assessment standards’ objective, whereby a reliable indication of a student’s achievement is relayed through consistent and comparable levels of attainment.

Flaws in Ofqual’s Existing Regulatory Framework Ofqual states that their core aim is 'to maintain standards and confidence in qualifications'. However, the flawed decision-making central to recent regulatory failures within Ofqual has effectively undermined both objectives. The controversy surrounding Ofqual’s ‘grade standardisation algorithm’ illustrates the lack of protective mechanisms within the regulatory body that could prevent any potential policy shortcomings. The significance of these issues became all the more apparent in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, generating broader questions concerning Ofqual’s institutional efficacy as an ‘examinations watchdog’.

Ofqual’s ‘Governance Framework’ outlines how the maintenance of 'assessment standards' and the promotion of 'public confidence' in both 'qualifications and [...] assessment arrangements' are intrinsic to the achievement of its regulatory remit.7 The Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Act (2009) codify these principles into key statutory obligations for Ofqual. These are, in turn, underpinned by administrative mechanisms within the regulatory body itself, designed to provide a 'reliable indication of achievement' through observations of 'consistent levels of attainment [...] between comparable assessments'.8 Nevertheless, COVID-specific regulations formulated by Ofqual, such as its ‘Extraordinary Regulatory Framework: General Qualifications, COVID-19 Conditions and Requirements’, failed to outline any internal procedures that could assist awarding organisations with delivering results over the

Additionally, both Ofqual and the Department of Education have failed to liaise appropriately with awarding organisations and examination centres over the course of the crisis. Robert Halfon, Chair of the Education Select Committee within the House of Commons, notably questioned the regulatory body’s fitness for purpose, given its lack of transparency over the course of the crisis.10 Nevertheless, these criticisms point towards a broader communication barrier that cannot merely be attributed to the current circumstances. Thus, the issue can be found within Ofqual’s pre-existing regulatory framework, as epitomised by the lack of specific guidance mechanisms within its ‘General Conditions of Recognition’ (‘General Conditions’).

Framing Ofqual’s institutional reach across all levels of the education system in the United Kingdom, the ‘General Conditions’ prescribe 'all regulated awarding organisations' with 'a legal obligation' to regard and comply with its standards 'on an ongoing basis'.11 More specifically, Condition A7 delineates how all institutions regulated by Ofqual must ‘take all reasonable steps’ to prevent and/or mitigate ‘any incident [...] which could have an Adverse Effect’.12 This process is wholly dependent on awarding organisations administering assessments and qualifications:

1) in a manner that is both ‘accurate and timely’; 2) in a manner proportionate to an individual’s docu mented ‘level of attainment’.13

The fundamental premise at the heart of the above obligations

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THE SPECTRUM is that Ofqual itself will actively seek to enforce this process, either through the implementation of further regulations, or through the development of relevant procedural mechanisms that ensure compliance. Nevertheless, in the words of the ‘General Conditions’, 'there is currently no guidance on complying with these conditions'.14 The obfuscatory nature of communication between Ofqual and its regulatory authorities over the course of the ‘A-Level Fiasco,’ particularly in relation to the basis of its ‘grades standardisation algorithm’, has only further reinforced the significance of these issues. It is here where systemic reform is recommended.

POLICY PROPOSALS 1) Provide specific guidance in relation to Condition A7 of the ‘General Conditions’, ensuring that all Ofqual-regulated institutions can effectively comply with its standards.

Ofqual’s failure to provide procedural guidance on ‘incident management’ within its regulated institutions, as mandated

by Condition A7 of the ‘General Conditions’, casts a shadow over the mismanagement of ‘A-Level’ examinations in summer 2020. This particular policy gap has been made all the more apparent by the extensive guidance provided to antecedent mechanisms, such as the ‘conflicts of interest’ and ‘risk identification’ clauses contained within Condition A4 and Condition A6 respectively. As such, providing specific guidance in relation to Condition A7 would effectively enhance the scope and efficacy of the ‘General Conditions’, consolidating the statutory objectives outlined within ‘Ofqual’s Governing Framework’, such as the maintenance of ‘assessment standards’ and ‘public confidence’.

Moreover, outlining specific ‘incident management’ mechanisms for regulated institutions would facilitate Ofqual’s broader social obligations, particularly in view of the COVID-19 pandemic and its crippling effects on the education system within the United Kingdom. This process would facilitate the necessary cooperation between awarding organisations and local authorities where historically underperforming schools are based, ensuring that high academic achievers within these schools are not disadvantaged by their background. Given the long-term reinforcement of regional, class and racial barriers across the education system – a process inevitably catalysed by Ofqual’s own ‘grades standardisation algorithm’ – such guidance is intrinsic to Ofqual’s long-term survival as a neutral ‘examinations watchdog’ in a post-pandemic sociopolitical climate.

2) Reintroduce modular forms of assessment Concerns regarding the inflated value of Centre Assessed Grades during the A-Level Fiasco were compounded by a resounding lack of official attainment data for cohorts na-

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EDUCATION tionwide. This can be attributed to the recent linearisation of many A-Level programmes of study, whereby students sit final in-person exams after two years of study. Alongside Ofqual’s publication of specific guidance relating to Condition A7, the Department of Education should consider reintroducing modular courses and/or controlled assessments within programmes of A-Level study, in cooperation with various awarding bodies, and subject to regular review, as a means of consolidating existing indicators of ‘prior attainment’. This should apply to those students who commenced A-Level programmes of study in September 2020. Ultimately, this would provide Ofqual with a source of consistent and robust attainment data, placing less pressure upon individual teachers if an incident is likely to have a potentially adverse effect on typical forms of teaching and assessment. COVID-19 was a development that no one could predict. What is clear, however, is that disruption to educational assessment is likely to continue. A structural modification of this nature may provide a long term safety net for students, teachers and higher authorities, ensuring that any shortcomings in regulation or communication are mitigated during unprecedented times.

CONCLUSION The COVID-19 pandemic has shone new light on the structural inequalities within the UK’s education system, framing how long-standing regulatory gaps have had a material, and often devastating, impact on students across the country.

For many young people, their prospects for employment and the potential for personal development, as promised by standards of educational attainment, were stymied by Ofqual’s inaccurate ‘grade standardisation algorithm.’ By negating the documented achievements of individual students across the country, Ofqual’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the failure of Britain’s education system to serve as an avenue for social mobility, placing broader concerns surrounding the 'attainment gap' into focus. Indeed, Ofqual’s inability to provide guidance on specific provisions within its ‘General Conditions’ bear further testament to this issue, facilitating the regulatory body’s miscommunication with regulated institutions over the course of the ‘A-Level Fiasco’.

Given the historic barriers within the UK’s education system surrounding race, class, region, and gender, this paper ultimately proposes that the scope for regulatory reform within Ofqual must extend beyond the parameters of the ongoing pandemic. Such a process would inevitably catalyse crucial policy changes within each section of the education system (e.g. schools, awarding bodies, further education institutions, etc.). This will foster an educational climate that is both fairer and more accessible for students across the country, irrespective of their socioeconomic status.

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EDUCATION

Addressing the educational needs of refugee youth in the face of COVID-19

By Lameez Siddiqui

Globalisation is an increasingly prominent feature of our world today, enabling not only the spread of ideas or people, but also of risks. Within this context, the COVID-19 pandemic has spread across countries at an exponential rate, exacerbating gender inequality, poverty and gaps in education. With regards to the latter, those students from privileged backgrounds have been better equipped to deal with the transition to online learning, both mentally and physically.1 These students were given, or already had, the sufficient materials to cope with online learning as well as the emotional support needed for this transition. In contrast, those from underprivileged backgrounds, particularly the refugee youth, have faced significant struggles in the transition process to online learning. This situation has only been exacerbated by the fact that these students have to undertake their education in a foreign language. It is likely that going to school was an outlet for these children to develop in a supportive environment and build strong relationships; one which many may not be fortunate enough to experience at home. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the major inequities already prevalent in the education system, such as access to certain technologies as well as supportive familial systems which facilitate learning.2 BACKGROUND In the United Kingdom, periodic school closures have tak-

en place since 19th March 2020. Whilst this is undeniably a challenge for all groups of children, refugee youth have been disproportionately impacted. Official figures reveal that of the 126,720 refugees in the country, 10,295 are children.3 These children were already faced with an unfavourable position in society, with many schools being unwilling to enrol them over fears it would impact the schools’ academic performance, or their position in league tables.4 Since the inception of remote learning, children across the UK have struggled to cope; many have reported feelings of emotional distress and other detrimental impacts on their mental health as a result of remote learning.5 Refugee youth, in particular, have faced a plethora of barriers to learning via online education. Firstly, the majority of refugee youth in the UK do not have access to the sufficient technology required to participate in online education, including laptops and broadband connectivity.6 Where the youth do have access to these materials, such as through support schemes or donations, they struggle to navigate with online teaching platforms. This is an especially pronounced issue for those who do not have adequate support from their families or guardians, or where their guardians are currently learning English.7 Most of these children already faced difficulty learning English during in-person teaching, and now must cope with doing so online.

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THE SPECTRUM Moreover, whilst the impact of school closures on children’s mental health across the UK has been acknowledged, the consequences for refugee youth are mounting and often overlooked. Many refugee children already struggled with conditions related to past trauma, experiencing symptoms such as headaches, nightmares and trouble managing their behaviour in ordinary situations. School closures have only exacerbated such symptoms, by worsening feelings of uncertainty, fear and re-traumatisation. This is because lockdowns and school closures mimic characteristics of conflict-affected areas, hence triggering past traumatic memories. Moreover, building relationships is a key part of children’s development. Indeed, schools provided an essential outlet for refugee youths to socialise, an experience of particular importance to those who have lost their support networks at their home countries.8 Overall, while children across all ages and groups have been affected, the impact on refugee youth has been particularly detrimental.

Considering the prolonged nature of the COVID-19 crisis, it is reasonable to assume that online learning is likely to co-exist with in-person teaching for the foreseeable future. As a result, developing solutions to alleviate the adverse impacts of online schooling for refugee youth is of utmost importance.

POLICY PROPOSALS 1) Increase access to online learning In order to minimise the negative effects of school closures for refugee youth, measures should be taken to ensure that

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EDUCATION refugee children do not experience additional challenges to online learning by lacking the sufficient equipment and technology required. The impact of school closures and the transition to online learning could be somewhat mitigated by providing the essential equipment and technology required for refugee children to attend and make the most of online education. This could be achieved through handout schemes; whereby eligible refugee children are offered the suitable equipment. In order to maximise the benefits of the scheme, training should also be provided, either remotely or in-person where possible, to ensure the equipment provided is correctly used to maximise the benefits for the children’s education. For example in Bangladesh, the UNHCR has provided training programmes for parents to enable them to support children’s remote learning.9 Moreover, it is imperative to note that not all refugee youth have been successfully enrolled in school. Therefore, for those children who have not been allocated a place in school, measures should be taken to ensure that these children are able to access online learning materials and the relevant devices until they are able to be enrolled. Doing so will ameliorate the impact of being out of the education system for extended periods of time whilst also preparing the children for online learning in the foreseeable future.

2) Provide financial aid Whilst the majority of the population across the UK faces mounting financial struggles in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, refugee youth have been disproportionately impacted by the outbreak. Many refugee youth are likely to try to obtain employment during this time, as they struggle to cope financially. Doing so would likely jeopardise their educational careers, as they may be driven to withdraw from education in order to earn an income. Refugee youth already remain particularly susceptible to dropping out from school, for example in Pakistan where the dropout rate for refugee children, particularly girls, reaches levels as high as 90%.10 To prevent this from happening, measures should be taken to ensure that refugee youth have the sufficient funds to continue their education.

This could be achieved through financial support schemes which could increase their funding, by the government. Moreover, grants could be allocated for specific refugee youth groups.

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EDUCATION

3) Take measures to cope with specific mental health challenges Finally, in addition to the consequences of school closures and remote learning, refugee youth have had to cope with their own unique set of challenges, owing to their experiences living in and fleeing from areas affected by conflict. Therefore, it is important for these distinct challenges faced by refugee youth to be addressed, in order to ensure that they are not overlooked by the wider plan set forth by the government addressing children’s mental wellbeing in the era of COVID-19.

Targeted programs could be launched which address the specific mental health challenges faced by refugee youth, for example by offering services to address the children’s re-traumatisation as a result of lockdown and school closures. Moreover, in order to help children cope with the lack of social relations and feelings of isolation, programmes could be launched allowing for the children to socialise with other similarly aged children, or with children who have shared similar experiences. This could be achieved either in-person under controlled guidelines following social distancing measures, or online.

CONCLUSION All age groups across the UK have experienced a unique set of challenges in the face of COVID-19. The struggles faced by all children across the UK have been overlooked amidst the pandemic, with minimal efforts in place to ease the transition to online learning. Whilst all children have faced challenges, refugee youth face a unique set of obstacles, which have been consistently disregarded. A targeted response is required to address the unique challenges faced by this group of children, in order to prevent further hardship. This policy paper has recommended increasing access to online learning resources, providing financial aid, and unveiling a targeted mental health response. Whilst each policy would be effective on their own, in order to maximise their benefits and enable students to meaningfully participate in education, it is recommended for the three policies to be used in tandem.

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Global Health

What Policies Should High-Income Countries Implement to Combat the Impact of Covid-19 on Population Mental Health? by

Gursharan Khera, Kunzang Selden, Coralie Gauvin-Bélair, Eleanor Pace

It is currently estimated that roughly 13% of the global population suffer from mental illness1, and this figure is climbing.

According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the demand for mental health services is increasing on the background of a global pandemic that has not only disrupted service provision in 93% of countries worldwide, but introduced a host of its own risk factors.2 The psychological weight of social isolation, fear of contagion, bereavement and economic hardship have the potential to trigger or exacerbate mental health issues. These factors occur as both a direct result of the Covid-19 pandemic and governmental measures and restrictions that have emerged in response.

Furthemore, though a vaccine may be a solution to more practical issues and restrictions brought about by Covid-19, the biopsychosocial effects of this pandemic are deeply permeating and not so easily abated. It is essential, therefore, that governmental policies are in place to effectively address the

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mental health needs of populations. This is particularly pertinent for high-income countries, which have the resources to implement and deliver the mental health services necessary to mitigate against a second– mental health– pandemic.

Short-Term Implications of Covid-19 on Mental Health I. Lockdown “Quarantine is the separation and restriction of movement of people who have potentially been exposed to a contagious disease to ascertain if they become unwell, so reducing the risk of them infecting others.”3 Separation from daily activities, loved ones, freedom, and overall disruption to societal normalcy can and has led to disastrous impacts on mental health since the Covid-19 outbreak. It has been proven that epidemics, in general, induce stress in populations. Evidence from past pandemics with similar quarantine features, like

THE SPECTRUM SARS, H1N1, Ebola, etc., along with data from the current Covid-19 crisis all point to its detrimental effects on psychological well being.

Lockdown-induced loneliness, confinement and social isolation are the most obvious links to poor mental health, including depression, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), insomnia, intrusive thoughts and acute stress as shown by a study conducted in the United States between February and March 2020 with a nationwide sample of adults. The study also shows that, specifically, depression and anxiety symptoms elevated with the spread of the virus and its consequent increase in quarantine periods.4 Longer quarantine periods tend to show a correlation with high post-traumatic stress symptoms. This can be attributed to boredom and frustration caused by loss of routine, reduced social and physical interactions. Stress also escalates with fear of infection, for the individual and their family members. Inability to carry out daily tasks like grocery shopping, and social activities are also other examples of stressors that cause these issues.5 Similar results were seen in a survey-based study carried out in China with more than 50,000 respondents. Here, almost 35% of the participants reported trauma related stress symptoms. Significantly higher psychological distress was seen in the females, health workers, and young adults cohort in comparison to males.6 II. Stigma Another major cause of psychological conditions post lockdown is the stigma that comes from people who have contracted the virus. A survey conducted during the time of the SARS outbreak shows that healthcare workers who were quarantined were far more likely to report stigmatization, ostracization and avoidance from society.7 Studies show that people who have faced stigma have been found to face issues like sleep disturbance, anxiety, panic attacks, depression and post-traumatic stress symptoms, among others.8 Long-Term Implications of Covid-19 on Mental Health I. Social Isolation Although the short-term impacts of Covid-19 on mental health are numerous and have been studied to a wider extent, the long-term impacts are less well-known due to the recent nature of this issue. Studies have highlighted the reality that governments should “expect spikes in depression, PTSD, substance use, domestic violence, and a broad range of other issues''9 due to prolonged social isolation. Models have also predicted “75,000 additional deaths” attributed to the effects of Covid-19, more specifically due to “alcohol and drug misuse and suicide” used as coping mechanisms.10 II. Financial Stress

GLOBAL HEALTH The psychological effects of lockdown seem to be longer lasting and spillover even after stay-at-home notices have been lifted. A main cause for this is financial stress. Socioeconomic distress caused by financial insecurity due to job loss in quarantine was seen to be a huge risk factor in causing psychological disorders.11 This is seen mainly in the forms of hike in anxiety, anger, stress, low self-esteem and sometimes even suicide.12 In the UK, unemployment caused by the pandemic and financial stress could even result in an increase in suicide rates and it is estimated that an additional 500,000 people are to experience mental health conditions.13 Further, it is often seen that households in low income categories experience psychological distress, like post-traumatic stress and depressive symptoms, of greater magnitude.14 III. Fear of the Other Finally, the Covid-19 pandemic has led to a fear of the other15 and a fear of catching the virus. Governmental measures taken to combat the virus, including social distancing and the use of facemasks, have normalized the concept of distancing oneself from strangers and avoiding close contact. Meanwhile, the nature of the virus being able to spread without being symptomatic has triggered a fear of strangers as anyone could be a potential carrier. As such, social distancing has been described as a phenomenon which “presents the dangers of increasing social rejection, growing impersonality and individualism, and the loss of a sense of community”,16 three factors which contribute to the worsening of mental health as physical interactions are deemed essential for the human social experience.17 POLICY PROPSOSALS 1) Prevention and Promotion of Mental Health in Education Young adults are also more inclined to experience mental health issues such as intrusive thoughts, and are also prone to developing early mental health conditions that can escalate further in the long run.18 This not only leads to stress and depression from loneliness and social detachment, but is also depriving some from having access to key mental health services that are usually provided by universities and schools. This is further proven by data from the UK showing that individuals between the ages of 18-24 record the highest proportion of adults experiencing loneliness in lockdown.19 If left unnoticed, adolescents and young adults can resort to substance abuse, drinking and other such unhealthy coping mechanisms that are bound to exacerbate mental health problems. Evidence has previously shown that prevention and promotion-based strategies for approaching mental health are valuable. Strategies that merge these approaches to mental health with general public health strategies can act to reduce

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stigma, reinforcing the mindset that mental health is health, as well as being more economical in the long run.20 Something known as ‘task-shifting’, which involves the delivery of health care by trained lay health workers, has been previously highlighted as a successful strategy in mental health globally, and as such has been ear-marked as a useful strategy for use during the pandemic, along with utilizing digital health technology.21 In addition, school-wide approaches to increasing mental health awareness for young people have previously been shown to reduce suicidal ideation in this group.22 Across the board it is clear that any initiatives to improve mental health services need to be bolstered by proper funding.

Where proper funding investments are made, evidence shows rewards can be gained- US$5 are gained for each US$1 put into evidence-based depression and anxiety interventions.23 2) Increase Funding for Mental Health Support A recurring theme throughout the period of social isolation was that of uncertainty.24 More specifically, the uncertainty in one's “own future occupational situation was associated with a bigger reduction in mental well-being”.25 Uncertainty has also been exacerbated over the course of the final few months of 2020 due to the new lockdown measures taken in many high-income countries, therefore pointing to the risk of mental health issues’ prevalence also being heightened. Although short-term impacts included a rise in the prevalence of anxiety, depression and stress, the long-term effects of Covid-19 are as likely to carry these mental health repercussions in the future years as well and intensified unless addressed promptly.26 In terms of policies already enacted during the current pandemic in England, there have been temporary changes to the Mental Health Act 1983, named ‘The Coronavirus Act

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GLOBAL HEALTH 2020’, early on during the pandemic. These temporary changes meant only one doctor was now required to section a patient to reflect the potential difficulties with short-staffing arising from the pandemic. The doctor must still be a section 12 approved doctor, meaning they would likely be a psychiatrist, but there is no need for them to have known the patient prior to sectioning as was previously the case.27 In March 2020 a £5 million grant, to be given to the mental health charity Mind, was announced by the UK government, as extra funding for mental health and wellbeing services during the pandemic.

Another £4.2 million was announced in May 2020 to be divided amongst several other mental health charities.28 Although news of this extra funding for mental health charities was well received, it has been noted that it still falls short of making up for previous funding reductions.

Also in line with this are concerns that the £2.3 billion of mental health funding announced in 2019 to enact the ‘NHS long term plan’ is now insufficient to deal with the fallout from the pandemic.29 Additionally, in the UK a phase-based NHS response strategy was devised, including recommendations such as ensuring open access crisis helplines and services were available for all age groups, and promoting these services via local authorities, voluntary and 111 services. It also highlighted that those already known to mental health services should receive proactive contact and support.30 3) Increase the Availability of Mental Health Services The result of numerous lockdowns thus incited a high prevalence of sudden unemployment which has been directly linked to higher stress levels and a higher likelihood of facing mental health difficulties. Those whose unemployment immediately puts their survival at risk are most at risk.31 The loss of employment has also been linked to lower feelings of self worth in some instances and thus to the use of unhealthy coping mechanisms,32 a reality which is at risk of becoming more prevalent with the rate of unemployment rising in many high-income countries. To combat this, the United States enacted the ‘Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act’, involving a US$2 trillion package to allow mental health providers to deliver enhanced services during the pandemic.33 An example of changes to existing policies made in the US due to the pandemic is relaxing the rules around blood test monitoring for the antipsychotic drug Clozapine, meaning that pharmacies were allowed to dispense clozapine for patients who have not been able to have their blood monitored during this time. This was based on the recognition of the fact that the risk of becoming very unwell with Covid-19 probably outweighs the risk of complications due to taking

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clozapine- for which the patients bloods are usually monitored.34 The Australian government announced a package in March costing $74millionAUD, including measures such as a 24/7 over the phone counselling service, to be staffed by mental health professionals and run by the organization Beyond Blue. The extra funding to support digital services would also create jobs for Australians who could be trained in counselling, as well as aiding existing services to deal with more complex cases.35 Similarly, the Canadian government for the province of Ontario provided up to $12 million of extra funding to increase capacity of virtual mental health services, with $2.6 million to employ more psychologists and mental health workers.36 A WHO survey showed that over 80% of high-income countries have been using telemedicine and teletherapy to provide mental health services during the pandemic. Of the countries included in the survey, 89% included mental health in their Covid-19 strategies, yet only 17% of these had allocated extra funding to support this. This emphasizes an issue pre-dating the pandemic of global underfunding of mental health services, with the WHO stating that 2% of a national budget dedicated to mental health is simply not sufficient to address the scale of mental health needs.37 It has been argued that the current pandemic presents a unique opportunity to make mental health services better,38 and this is something we should consider.

King's Think Tank events Every year King's Think Tank also organises and hosts events. This year we have held events that include a panel discussion of International Climate Policy in the Global South and a Policy Hackathon centred on the issue of European Populism. Keep an eye out for our events in the 2021/2022 academic year.

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Why do the health inequalities in ethnic minority populations still exist?

Siobhan McShane, Rupali Lav, Nadia Dohadwala, Enya Khan, Benjamin Zuckerman and Pedra Rabiee by

The issue of Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) inequalities in the healthcare sector has existed within the policy agenda for a number of years, both globally and within the UK. On paper, policy activity within this arena in the UK has been evident for a while with directives such as the Equality and Health Inequalities Hub.1 However, the COVID-19 pandemic has been instrumental in pushing the issue of these inequalities to the forefront of the national agenda with key players contributing to research on the issue in light of the pandemic. Public Health England’s report2 highlighted the scope of the problem with reference to key stakeholder concerns, while the Office of National Statistics provided key figures on increased death rates of ethnic minorities compared to the white population (see Figure 1). Further calls from prominent voices in health policy such as The King’s Fund have also called for action.3 Ongoing research has uncovered the underlying drivers behind these inequalities in the UK. The second quarterly report from the Racial Disparity Unit in the UK4 explicitly acknowledges inequalities are driven by risk of infection. More specifically, structural and occupational factors as well as considerations such as denser households in terms of individuals living under the same roof, and not ethnicity itself,

are at fault for disparities. Overall, there are a number of key themes which emerge from the research done on inequalities in health among BAME populations during the pandemic, which broadly correlate to the social determinants in health.

These are drivers that conceptualise the wider socio-economic and environmental factors dictating people’s educational status, employment, housing and living conditions, among others. Such factors then feed into an individual’s health.

Within the UK, a promising vehicle for change has emerged in the form of the NHS Race and Health Observatory5 which was created in May 2020 in response to the emerging evidence on BAME inequalities in health both within the pandemic and more widely. Constituting an impressive body of experts in health and health inequalities and directed by Dr Habib Naqvi, the aim is to provide evidence-based actionable policy recommendations. We present this policy paper within the framework of problem-based policy development to align with the aim of the Observatory and recognition of their role as a focal point for policy change. The multifactorial nature driving inequalities warrants the ethos behind this framework, which is to focus on key areas to solve based on a clear diagnosis of current challenges with separate means and ends. To this end, this paper focuses on four key areas that relate to structural elements of inequality identified in the research thus far. These are: tackling the discrepancies in engagement and health communication within BAME communities, the gap in health data collection, underrepresentation of BAME populations in UK health research, and finally, migrants’ experiences of healthcare in the UK.

Figure 1.

Comparison of death rates for COVID-19 among ethnic minorities in UK relative to white population 2 March to 28th July 2020.

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POLICY PROPOSALS 1) Health Communications and BAME: miscommunication, misinformation, disinformation • • •

Stakeholders need to incorporate the lessons learnt so far to ensure broader engagement with the BAME community.

Tailored health communication strategies should reflect local communities Prompt redressal of misinformation and addressing knowledge voids through clear, verified, accessible and reliable communication is paramount to lower perceived risk and foster trust in public health institutions.

The enormous health inequity exposed by the Covid-19 crisis can in large part be attributed to the lack of clear and consistent messaging and the failure to engage vulnerable communities through a targeted public engagement strategy. Tailored community outreach has immense potential to empower people to adopt protective behaviour and make informed decisions about their health such as wearing masks, washing hands and getting vaccinated.6 The absence of a targeted approach can stifle the progress of large-scale public health initiatives and vaccination programs. Over the years, numerous studies have consistently reported a lower uptake of vaccines (Figure 2) in members of the BAME community.78 The hesitancy to comply emanates from low trust fostered by these communities and is rooted in historical issues of unethical healthcare research and systemic racial discrimination.9 This lack of trust is further compounded by the rampant spread of misinformation that is easily accessible to everyone via various social media platforms and fills knowledge voids left by uncertainty and delays in the communication of verified information.10 Underlying this reality is that of vaccine hesitancy in the BAME community. In the UK, the roll-out of a large scale COVID-19 vaccination program was swift and pioneering.

Despite its early start,11 there remain challenges in vaccine equity across different ethno-cultural communities.

Studies have shown young black adults, mostly females, are more hesitant to receive the vaccine than other minority groups. This age skew is inversely linked to education as these young ethnic minority populations groups have mistrust in the public institutions and politicians.1213 This is due to the absence of clear, reliable and relatable messaging from the government, resulting in knowledge voids that led to the spread of the COVID-19 ‘infodemic’. This furthers the mistrust in public institutions, resulting in rejection of public health recommendations and vaccine hesitation, and underscores the importance of open dialogue and targeted health education programs.14

Figure 2.

Willingness to be vaccinated in the UK Household Longitudinal Study by ethnic group

Moving forward, re-evaluation of the health communication strategy from an equity perspective is imperative to achieve a uniform health outcome and overcome the information gap.

Continued surveillance to identify and monitor high-risk groups and adapting health promotion strategies based on real-time evidence will help deliver a more effective response to health crises such as the current COVID-19 pandemic.

Health policy enforcement must be decentralised and local authorities must be supported with tool kits to facilitate the delivery of multi-facilitated, reliable health information at the community level. Comprehensive community engagement can encourage inclusive dialogue through tailored messaging, involvement of community champions and faith leaders, and multi-language accessible messaging. Lastly, empowering the people to spot and report misinformation, make informed decisions about their health, and work with public health institutions will go a long way in eliminating current health inequities.

To mitigate the health inequities revealed by the COVID-19 crisis, we need to incorporate the lessons learnt so far to ensure broader engagement with the BAME community. This is essential to raise health awareness and knowledge to enable informed decision-making, whilst also reducing the risk of catching COVID. Prompt redressal of misinformation and addressing knowledge voids through clear, verified, accessible and reliable communication is paramount to lower perceived risk and foster trust in public health institutions.

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THE SPECTRUM 2) Gaps in health data collection for ethnic minorities and the role of healthcare professionals • •

The NHS should consider streamlining the data collection system into a nation-wide one and updating the list of ethnic categories The NHS should consider a short training program for healthcare professionals to advise them on how to go about collecting ethnicity data in a respectful and comfortable manner, and how to communicate what the data collection is for to patients.

Currently the UK is seeing a significant gap in healthcare provision and an increased susceptibility to certain illnesses based on ethnicity. The paucity in health data collected from individuals from ethnic minorities has prevented BAME inequalities from being addressed at the root of the cause.

Some ethnicities are predisposed to certain illnesses due to socio-economic factors. Additionally, exposure, survival and risk factors are also varied based on different groups of ethnicities. Without enough information available, the extent of these inequalities cannot be understood, and therefore cannot be fully addressed.15 This issue is not due to a lack in ethnicity data, but rather because the ad-hoc manner in which it is collected has led to patchy and incomplete data.16 There are multiple reasons for this and one such example is the fact that the system used

by GPs and mass vaccination centres to record vaccinations, Pinnacle, does not require ethnicity records as part of its data collection. Several papers have called for the mandatory collection of ethnicity data, and the launch of the NHS Race and Health Observatory and the recent addition of mandatory recording of ethnicity in the death certification process is a step in the right direction.1718 However, this does not factor in health professionals’ mindsets which do not prioritize ethnicity data collection.19 Research shows that the majority of healthcare professionals regard ethnicity data collection as important, yet it is rarely collected. Some of the cited reasons include a lack of resources or time to collect data, a fear of offending patients, the assumption that data collection was not required, confusion over the categories of ethnicity as they are deemed outdated, and feeling uncomfortable asking patients about their ethnicity.20 On the same line of ideas, Iqbal et al.21 found that patients of BAME ethnicities had in majority similar issues with ethnicity data collection. Most understood that ethnicity data collection was needed but expressed a wish for more clarity regarding the need for such data and how it would be used.

Secondly, those who did express dissatisfaction about giving

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GLOBAL HEALTH their data felt that they were not given adequate reasoning for the data collection, or, felt frustrated by the lack of adequate ethnicity categories, forcing them to tick the “other” category.

This suggests that the main reason for patchy ethnicity data is due to a lack of a streamlined system that all healthcare professionals can follow and a lack of clear communication to patients about the collection of their data. Lambeth Primary Care Trust is an example of a successful programme. Through introducing an “Individual Patient Registration Profile” programme which used substantial cash incentives, GP practices were pushed to to collect ethnicity data and provided 1.5 days of staff training in doing so.22 A similar system is needed across the UK that streamlines the process of data collection, trains healthcare professionals in collecting data respectfully and comfortably for both parties and has an updated categorisation of ethnicities.

3) Impact of ethnic minority underrepresentation in UK research on health inequalities • •

The NIHR should identify a methodology to assess whether the objectives from the INCLUDE project improve ethnic minority representation in UK research.

NICE must consider whether the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities in research causes their guidance to propagate health inequalities.

Identifying that there is inappropriate collection of ethnicity data in clinical practice it is important to address whether there are such problems in clinical research. Treweek et al (2020) found that of the 1518 registered COVID-19 clinical trials, only six record data on ethnicity. However, a larger problem is the poor depiction of ethnic minorities within clinical research.23 The National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) published ethnicity data from the UK COVID-19 related studies they supported in 2020 (Table 1)24, showing that ethnic minority representation was below the 12.8% UK population average.25 This became a common reason for COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy within minority ethnic populations.26 The factors influencing the underrepresentation of ethnic minority groups are summarised in Figure 3.27 However, how could a smaller population of minority participants in research affect health inequalities?

The National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) provides evidence-based guidance, to influence the practice of healthcare professionals across the NHS, public health and social care services. NICE states that they aim to reduce health inequalities in the UK through their recommendations.28 However, a study by Gama et al (2020) showed that current NICE Chronic Kidney Disease (CKD) guidance opposes these ambitions. NICE recommends that CKD is diagnosed using the CKD epidemiology collaboration creatinine equa-

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Table 1.

The proportion of ethnic minority participants in National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) supported studies in 2020.

Figure 3.

The proposed reasons for ethnic minority group underrepresentation in research.

Figure 4.

The four key objectives generated

by INCLUDE for their future work to make research more inclusive.

tion to estimate kidney function. However, to estimate this in Afro-Caribbean populations or individuals of African family origin, an ethnicity adjustment is used. The authors demonstrated that this overestimated kidney function in Black patients compared to their White counterparts. Concluding that NICE recommended guidance could increase the proportions of undiagnosed CKD. As a result, treatment opportunities may be missed, increasing the CKD-related mortality in these groups. These findings reproduced results from previous studies2930; however, the NICE guidance has not changed. The

most likely reason for this is that there is not enough evidence to institute a reform, which is a problem in itself.

Recognising that health inequalities could be propagated by minority group underrepresentation, the UK’s NIHR created the Innovations in Clinical Trial Design and Delivery (INCLUDE) project. INCLUDE aims to improve research inclusivity for under-served groups such as ethnic minorities by implementing four objectives (Figure 4).31 These will create the infrastructure needed to engage with and retain these

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THE SPECTRUM participants; however, the NIHR has not addressed how these changes will be monitored. Auditing this work may show barriers to implementation that had not been considered, as well as quantify the impact of this initiative on improving minority group representation in research.

The underrepresentation of ethnic minority populations in clinical research can limit the evidence available for health policy creation. This can worsen health outcomes in those groups, propagating the health inequalities that COVID-19 brought to the forefront. The objectives outlined by the INCLUDE project are necessary steps to provide better healthcare delivery for a wider range of groups.

4) Migrants and healthcare •

• • •

The impact of CRP on migrant access to healthcare should be mitigated by adding more exemptions, including preventive care, and communicating better about exemptions.

The NHS should cease sharing information about CRP debt with the Home Office.

The NHS and Home Office should seriously consider removing CRP altogether.

The NHS and Home Office should consider the impact of NRPF on migrant and especially BAME health, especially in the context of job loss during the pandemic.

Communication, data collection, and inclusion in research are challenging enough for BAME people who have a stable status in British society, as shown above. However, a subset of the BAME community includes migrants of various kinds. This group may struggle to access healthcare due to their immigration status or experiences related to immigration, including heightened communication difficulties due to language barriers, difficulty transferring data across borders, and deeper exclusion from treatment, let alone research.3233 Importantly, immigration policies also affect white communities,34 but BAME people make up a large proportion of those impacted. For example, in the twelve months until the 1st May 2020, 82% of Citizens Advice clients seeking advice about No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF), a condition on some forms of leave to remain in the UK, were people of colour.35 The key immigration policy directly affecting healthcare is the Visitor and Migrant Cost Recovery Programme (CRP), introduced in 2015, which requires overseas visitors and migrants of many kinds to pay for secondary care.36 Research shows that migrants make less use of the NHS than the UKborn population, but that this increases in a linear fashion as one spends more time in the UK.37 This may suggest that newer migrants miss out on preventive healthcare due to apprehension about treatment costs, which encourages them to

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GLOBAL HEALTH avoid health services.3839 A related issue is NHS data sharing with the Home Office.

NHS Digital was criticised in 2019 for an agreement to share patients’ immigration details and personal information with the Home Office.40 The agreement was ended, but NHS trusts are still required to inform the Home Office about patients with unpaid debt resulting from CRP.41 This creates a combined fear in patients of debt and investigation by the Home Office.42 There are exemptions to CRP, including infectious diseases such as Covid-19. However, exemptions appear to be ineffective. A study on tuberculosis, which is exempt, found that time to treatment increased from 70 days to 89 days following the introduction of CRP, with the increase only significant for non-UK-born patients.43 Finally, migration policies detrimentally affect individuals’ social determinants of health, including food security, housing, and employment factors. No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF), a clause attached to certain visas and forms of leave to remain, prohibits access to the majority of the UK benefit system (41).44 Consequently, migrants who face an economic shock such as redundancy are at risk of food poverty, destitution, and homelessness, all of which are detrimental to physical and mental health.45 Income reduction due to Covid has caused a 110% increase in calls to Citizens Advice concerning NRPF and 82% of callers were people of colour. Citizens Advice also reports that NRPF forced some migrants with key worker jobs to continue working despite having health conditions that require shielding.46

Technology & Innovation

Covid–19 Vaccine Rollout and Online Misinformation by

Gabriel Pérez Jaén

Almost a year on from the outbreak of Covid-19, the scientific community has broken historical records with the fastest ever developed vaccine. Scientists from every corner of the world working tirelessly, combined with significant amounts of public and private investment, have made this remarkable achievement possible.

Along with the great efforts made by the scientific and business community, a parallel regulatory approval process needed to rise to the occasion. Medicine and health agencies in the US and UK have been the first in the Western world to approve the Pfizer-BioNTech and Astrazeneca vaccines, with the EU closely following their steps. More vaccines are expected to be approved in 2021.

While it may be tempting to think that the battle is over, there is yet another challenge that authorities in the UK (and elsewhere in the world) need to tackle. The vaccine may be avail-

able, but it will always be the public’s choice to get vaccinated.

As a result, public willingness to get the vaccine will depend on their trust of its safety. Communication is key to achieve this.

One of the threats we are currently facing in the pandemic is misinformation spread across digital communication channels. Within the context of the Covid-19 vaccine, this issue is critical, and the battle against misleading content that prevents society from acquiring immunisation is far from over.

This policy paper discusses a series of proposals directed at the UK government, intending to restore public mistrust in the Covid-19 vaccine.

BACKGROUND Fake news, and disinformation are, unfortunately, common-

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THE SPECTRUM place concepts in today’s society, especially if you are a user of digital channels of communication. They have the power to alter voting behaviour, polarise societies, and incite violence. With the Covid-19 pandemic, the effects of misinformation have proven to be far more dangerous. They now have an immediate impact on the general population’s health and economic wellbeing.1 Examples of this range from Chinese officials accusing the US of creating the virus,2 or rumours that recommended drinking water regularly to prevent contracting the virus.3 In May 2020, the World Health Organisation passed resolution WHA73.1 in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic response.4 Together with other initiatives, it called member states to manage the significant wave of mis- and disinformation that has accompanied the pandemic, what the WHO has denominated the ‘infodemic’.5 Such is the importance of this issue that just weeks after the WHO officially declared the Covid-19 pandemic, No. 10 and the Cabinet Office brought back to life the ‘Rapid Response Unit’.6 Created in 2018 to fight fake news, this team has been repurposed to identify and tackle misinformation related to Covid-19. The RRU operates as part of a wider Counter Disinformation Cell led by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.

Now, after researchers, pharmaceutical companies, and regulators have ensured that the supply and use of vaccines is feasible, the extent to which a significant share of the population

TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION across the UK is willing to get vaccinated remains unclear.

A survey carried out in July 2020 by IPSOS Mori in partnership with King’s Policy Institute suggests that 16% of the interviewees were ‘unlikely’ or would ‘definitely not’ receive the vaccine once it became available.7 Another poll carried out in November 2020 by YouGov suggests similar results, with 21% of the respondents stating they were ‘very unlikely’ or ‘fairly unlikely’ to take the Pfizer vaccine once it became available via the NHS.8 Fortunately, this shows that vaccine scepticism is still a minoritarian view. However, this sentiment can grow and hinder the efforts made by the authorities.

Furthermore, a study published in July 2020 by the Reuters Institute at Oxford University shows that the UK’s public trust in the government’s Covid-related communications, as well as those of mainstream media, has steadily declined since the start of the pandemic. Fortunately, trust in doctors, scientists, and national health organisations has only declined slightly, with 82-85% of the sample stating that they trust them as a source of information for Covid-19.9 If the extent of mistrust towards the Covid-19 vaccine lies within a small share of the general population, why is there a concern among government and health officials? The answer lies within herd immunity. This refers to the phenomena by which a substantial share of the population has been immunised against a disease, and therefore they indirectly protect those who have not. The issue at stake is that the share of the population that is required to be inoculated to reach herd immunity varies across illnesses, and there is yet no certainty what that number is in the context of Covid-19.10 If the government and society as a whole allow the anti-vax wave to penetrate across larger sectors of the population, the efforts made by the scientific community and those receiving the vaccine will be in vain.

Given this, what is the role of the UK government in a context where public confidence in vaccines seems to be at risk? Part of the solution resides in what is the largest source of misinformation: social media platforms.

Understandably, we have placed great concerns over the responsibility of these tech giants to regulate the content on their platforms and take action against the spread of misinformation that has potentially devastating effects for a sector of the public. For instance, one in three residents in the UK has been exposed to anti-vax messages. Among the minority who believes in Covid-19 vaccine conspiracy theories, there is a significant overrepresentation of the younger population and those who frequently use social media as a source of news.11 When it comes to managing the disinformation crisis, the public’s view as to who should manage it is of large impor-

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tance too. A Eurobarometer survey run in 2018 attempted to identify European citizens’ views of fake news. The data suggests that UK citizens may be more hesitant to hand the government the power to filter what information is being published online. It is quite noticeable that journalists, press, broadcasting management, and online social networks were all more popular options in the UK public’s view.

This is evidence that the government needs the support of other actors, such as media channels and scientific communicators, if it wants to seriously commit to fighting vaccine misinformation.

Putting together what we already know about public confidence in the government’s Covid-19 communications and management, there are three significant trends that are key to fight the misinformation campaign that jeopardises the vaccination efforts in the country: •

The UK public holds a very high level of trust in the NHS, national health authorities, and the scientific community.

Any efforts made by the government to fight vaccine misinformation should leverage the power of these agents.

•

The UK government is instrumental in fighting fake news, although the UK public is likely to expect other actors, such as media outlets, social media platforms, and journalists to be involved in the process.

•

Social media platforms are the main source of anti-vax misinformation. Their responsibility over this issue is of primary importance.

Can we expect the massive online anti-vax campaign to stop any time? The answer, unfortunately, is no. While it is important to collaborate with media platforms to take down this kind of information, this approach is mostly reactive. It does work to delete existing content, but it cannot do much to prevent content from being published in the future. This is why the government needs a proactive approach to anti-vax misinformation.

The UK government has started implementing innovative solutions for public health in the Covid-19 context. As an example, it contracted social media influencers in 2020 to promote the NHS track and trace system.12 From a global perspective, the Red Cross is partnering with influencers worldwide to reach younger audiences with trustworthy content about the pandemic.13 Other national examples that en-

compass different actors from civil society are The Vaccine Confidence Project, based at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, or Infotagion, an online fact checker that was funded by Members of Parliament and that relies on experts from several disciplines.

In light of the latest initiatives in the UK and globally, and the dangers that the vaccine misinformation wave pose to the speedy recovery from the pandemic, I deem appropriate that the UK government leverages the existing resources and information to restore some of the lost public confidence in the Covid-19 vaccine.

POLICY PROPOSALS 1) Relocating the RRU No.10 and the Cabinet Office should relocate the Rapid Response Unit, currently under the supervision of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to the Department of Health and Social Care, under the direct supervision of the government. This would help the efforts of the unit team to gain legitimacy, shifting away its public image of “fake news fighter” to a public health promoter.

2) Reorganising the RRU The UK government should reorganise the Rapid Response Unit, integrating every campaign and initiative that aims to restore public confidence in the Covid-19 vaccine. This initiative would involve liaising with the public sector, academia, industry, and other non-governmental actors. The new organisation would likely create synergies among partners, promoting the sharing of information and best practices.

3) Cross-agency approach to vaccine communication

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THE SPECTRUM The UK government should collaborate with public opinion research bodies, public health communicators, and social media platforms to understand what channels and population groups should be more intensively targeted in their communication strategies. With a better understanding of who is more likely to fall for vaccine misinformation, the existing resources can be better directed at gaining back some of the public’s confidence.

4) Proactive communication The UK government should create and promote the creation of simple, digestible communication campaigns that clearly explain the workings of the vaccine, including its development, safety, and other notable issues addressed by anti-vax messaging. The UK government could make use of social media influencers, both in the scientific and conventional spaces, to reach audiences who would otherwise not actively seek for information in conventional channels.

5) Verification badges for online content The UK government should create an online verification badge, in partnership with the DHSC and NHS that independent entrepreneurs and content creators can apply to guarantee the credibility of the content. This measure would be very inexpensive, while its effects – the ability for the public to trust online content about the Covid-19 vaccine – would deliver results in the near term.

CONCLUSION Within the current context, the UK authorities' ultimate aim is to reach a significant level of immunisation in the popula-

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TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION tion to return to a state of affairs that most resembles that we knew before the Covid-19 pandemic started. With vaccines being approved in record times, and the improvement of the logistical efforts that will accompany their rollout, the critical challenge the UK government will face in 2021 and beyond is to reach a level of immunisation that can provide acceptable sanitary and economic outcomes. Online content that misinforms the population about the benefits and risks of the Covid-19 vaccine is harming this effort. Therefore, it is paramount that the UK government rethinks its communication strategy when it comes to the Covid-19 vaccine. This policy proposal has highlighted several plausible options by which the UK government can leverage existing platforms and resources to fight the vaccine 'infodemic' proactively.

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Bridging The Economic Gap Through Digital Literacy by

Megan Low and Medina Rahma Putri

This proposal aims to provide the EU body with potential solutions to improve digital literacy at the secondary school level. As we move towards a more digital world, obtaining a good education and good job prospects relies heavily on one’s proficiency in information and communication technologies (ICT). We must ensure that the less fortunate are not left behind. With Covid-19 expediting this transition process, it has exposed the urgency for the EU to step in and prevent less privileged students from falling further behind. Working within the broad framework the EU has established to support digital education between 2021-2027, we propose specific policy recommendations for schools in low-income neighbourhoods within European Union country members.

BACKGROUND With the rapid expansion of the e-commerce market and the shift from face-to-face to remote learning and working, digital literacy is an imperative skill every student in the EU should be equipped with to ensure he or she has the best opportunities when entering the future labour market.1 The World Economic Forum has warned governments that global inequality is going to worsen unless effective policies are implemented to protect the vulnerable in society from being left behind in a rapidly digitizing global economy.2 The Global Risks Perception Survey echoes these fears, ranking digital inequality as one of the top ten critical threats to growing economic inequality in the next five years.3 It is thus imperative for governments to focus on equipping students today with the tools needed to be digitally proficient.

A review of the EU’s Digital Education Action Plan in 2019 indicates that at the secondary school level: 79% of EU students have never been exposed to digital skills such as programming or computing, less than 40% of educators felt equipped to use digital tools and only 20% of EU schools have access to high-speed internet.4 As schools around the world close their doors during the Covid-19 pandemic, it has forced students and educators to rely heavily on digital tools and technology in order to facilitate a continuation of school curriculum online. The World Bank predicts that Covid-19 could lead to a permanent loss in learning due to ineffective online learning tools.5 The economic impact is expected to translate to approximately a $16,000 loss in income over a student’s lifetime and $10 trillion in the global economy”.6 With the events of the pandemic expediting the need to digitalize, the EU plays a vital role in ensuring that no one is robbed of a good education or future because of their lack of digital proficiency.

JUSTIFICATIONS Experts have observed the correlation between educational attainment and job opportunities. A ‘wage-boosting’ skill development is obtained from the education an individual receives at the secondary school level or higher.7 The effects of educational attainment towards job prospects extends to the issue of economic inequality. Data from EU countries has shown the significant influence of education inequality towards income inequality, with the EU labour market being responsive towards qualifications of individuals.8 Technological progress allows education to be easily accessible via digital platforms. Having digital platforms could be an efficient solution in equalising education.9 Online education allows for direct interaction with peers around the globe, allowing better learning experience, reducing education inequality, and accommodating education accessibility.10 However, the link between reducing economic inequality with online education remains weak. Online learning has made education equally accessible for individuals with access to the technology.11 Concerns of education inequality in virtual learning experience have come to light since 2016; implying that online education platforms do not necessarily solve the issue of education inequality, and in the long run, economic inequality.12 The drastic shift to online platforms during the Covid-19 pandemic has shown the concerns mentioned previously to be true. Online learning is proven to be a weak alternative compared to in-person teaching.13 Some schools are not prepared for this transition, causing weak education quality. Additionally, poorer children are more likely to perform weaker

57

THE SPECTRUM in online education compared to in-person teachings; this is because home environments and parental support for their children’s online education are crucial in improving performance.14 We believe this is a cause for concern and a justification for our policy proposal. Minimal spread in digital education access may grow more barriers among social groups and slow the reduction of education inequality. When educational inequality continues, threats of limited job prospects and risks of increasing economic inequality remains.

CURRENT POLICY FRAMEWORK Our aim is to provide greater specificity in targeting the EU’s two strategic priorities for their 2021-2027 Digital Education Plan. Hence, the following is an explication of what the EU has proposed thus far: 1. Fostering the development of a high-performing digital education ecosystem. This includes investments in infrastructure, staff training, and improving quality of learning materials.

•

•

Part of the first strategic priorities includes the encouragement of Member States to increase school connectivity by investing in internet connectivity, digital equipment, and online learning applications. However, the recommendation does not discuss where these resources should be allocated to.

The commission also proposes a Council recommendation to improve the efficiency and inclusivity of online, distanced, or hybrid learning by the end of 2021. However, the abrupt shift to online learning due to Covid-19 has shown concerns of poor education quality in online learning experience. This suggests that improving online, distanced, or hybrid learning requires more than investing in teacher training, equipment, and learning

TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION platforms. There needs to be a further strategy in distributing equipment to improve accessibility and strategies to improve home environments for better education quality.

2. Enhancing digital skills and competences for the digital transformation. The proposal includes introducing technology from an early age and encouraging the development of advanced digital skills.

•

•

The second strategic priority is to enhance digital skills and competencies by introducing technology at an early age. However, this goal is very broad and does not provide any clear direction as to how schools should educate and train its students and educators for the digital transformation.

Given the European Commission's research focused primarily on understanding the structures of digital education programmes for students at the secondary school level15, we will target our policy responses towards this age group as well.

POLICY PROPOSALS 1) Access to digital infrastructure The EU should implement a strategy to better distribute digital equipment and infrastructure. One strategy is to distribute digital equipment to schools that need funding. However, with the concept of remote learning, distributing digital equipment only to schools seems inefficient. Some strategic solutions include: 1. Provision of computer laboratories or device loaning schemes in libraries by the government.

2. Providing and investing in software and programmes for school devices and devices provided in public spaces.

This may allow individuals to freely access software on public devices and develop the necessary skills.

3. Privately funded schools with more advanced equipment could assist by loaning or donating equipment or opening their facilities for students outside the school communities at a designated time In 2019, 90% of the EU-27 population have access to the internet in their household, a 26% increase from 200916, and 88% of the population are accessing the internet from their households. The data may indicate a degree of readiness in shifting to distanced online learning.

However, remote learning can instead

58

THE SPECTRUM increase inequality due to the lack of infrastructure and training. One key solution is to provide the required technology and facilities for online learning and training.17 With these policy suggestions, we aim to improve technology accessibility.

2) Compulsory standardised ICT training programme for secondary school teachers With greater digital equipment and infrastructure, it should make technology more accessible to all students. However, this requires strong competencies in navigating the various technologies. We propose a compulsory standardised ICT training programme for secondary school teachers. Currently, only 6 out of 10 teachers have some level of proficiency in ICT which was obtained on their own time and resources.18 Given it requires teachers to use their leisure time and own resources to pay for ICT courses, there is little incentive for teachers to undergo the necessary training. The European Commission should enforce a compulsory ICT training programme for all teachers – this can be done standardising certain tools and techniques each teacher should be taught such as learning to operate hardware, software and network communications tools. The course should cover specific skills such as how to complete assignments online, facilitate collaboration through video call platforms and scheduling appointments to communicate with students.

The training not only ensures teachers can successfully use technology platforms to supplement or replace face-to-face curriculum, but allow them to pass down the knowledge to help their students in their use of digital tools as well. A standardised programme ensures that every student is given equal opportunities at school to obtain a good foundation in the use of digital tools. In order to achieve this, the European Commision should work with Member States to develop a broad guideline curriculum which can then be filtered down in collaboration with each nation's education ministry to create a programme catered more specifically to their demographic.

However, the European Commission should set a compliance threshold to ensure that Member States are able to achieve the objectives.

3) Initiate a parent support programme While technology provides endless opportunities to learn, parents should and will be wary about how children are using the internet and what they are being exposed to online. It is thus important for the EU not to focus solely on improving digital literacy but ensure that these skills are nurtured in a safe environment. Research suggests that parents who take an active role to help their child’s learning can significantly improve their academic performance.19

TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION As students transition online, such a programme is needed to provide parents with the tools on how to create a safe and productive working environment for children at home by teaching parents how to protect their children from dangerous and inappropriate content as well as reducing distractions online. Such tools include: how to set content filters, how to start a conversation with your child on using the internet in a safe manner and how to set ground rules on appropriate digital activity and the duration spent online.20 In order to reduce the financial burden of another training programme, the EU can work to create a course outline which can then be passed on to city/town representatives that organise potential volunteers and parents suitable in facilitating, managing and running the programme. This may be a more effective means of conducting a parent support programme given it will be suited to the needs of the town and may be more enticing to other parents since it is catered by its own people.

CONCLUSION We believe that equal access to equipment, digital literacy training programmes, and home support are the three main strategies to bridge economic inequality in the digital era. We acknowledge that implementing these policies have limitations such as its costs. However, we believe this policy will yield a positive net benefit for the economy and society as a whole. These policies could lead to an increase in productivity and sustain economic growth.

Letter from the President

THE TEAM

King's Think Tank (KTT) has now, for over a decade, championed student voices in policymaking. Since our inception in the wake of the 2010 student protests, we have steadily grown into Europe's largest student-led policy institute. We firmly believe that students should have a meaningful voice in policymaking and participate in solving the thorniest issues of our time. The Spectrum especially exemplifies this vision, and I hope the insightful and innovative policy recommendations in this issue are read and shared as widely as possible.

Like everyone else, KTT had to adapt to the challenges presented by the pandemic. While I am sad that we did not have the opportnity to host in-person gatherings, I am immensely proud of how the team responded to the challenge, and we were able to move virtually all our functions online. In total, we organised 16 events or discussions, ranging in topic from automation of the labour force to the future of the liberal world order. Although operating virtually has its advantages, such as reaching a more diverse audience and attracting speakers from across the globe, I am hopeful that come next term, KTT will return to hosting events on campus.

Even though 2020-2021 has been a challenging time to run a society, we did not stagnate but innovated to adapt to this new environment. Last autumn, we launched The Policy Plug podcast, which under the stewardship of Vice-President Katharina Fletcher, has been a tremendous success. Episodes have both included topical interviews with leading experts about Brexit and the NHS, as well as highlighting the work done by students across our seven policy centres. It is a new tool that allows KTT to communicate in a whole new way, and I hope the podcast will continue to grow and expand in the years to come.

Lastly, I would like to thank all the immensely talented students who have been part of KTT this year. It is your voluntary work, fuelled by a desire to change things for the better, which makes KTT a genuinely unique society. I would also like to extend my gratitude to our academic partners at the Policy Institute and the Department of Political Economy, as well as to our patron, Tim Hailes. On a personal level, the past year has been eventful, challenging, inspirational, but most of all, fun. I am honoured to have had the opportunity to work with such an excellent team of people. I have total trust and confidence that going forward, KTT is in good hands and will continue to reach new heights.

Matias Salo President King's Think Tank

Special Thanks

Thank you to our patron, Alderman Tim Hailes.

Mr. Hailes graduated from Kings College London with a BA (Hons) degree in History in 1990. Whilst at university he served in a political capacity for two members of Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet. Mr. Hailes is a Jelf medalist (1990) and served as a member of College Council and a sabbatical officer in KCLSU from 1988-89. Mr. Hailes has been the Alderman for the Ward of Bassishaw since May 2013 and served as Aldermanic Sheriff of the City of London in 2017/18.

Thank you to our academic sponsor, the KCL Department of Political Economy.

Founded in 2010, King’s College London’s Department of Political Economy is the only one of its kind in the United Kingdom. Its teaching and research recognise that one cannot fully understand political processes without understanding the economic context in which they operate, just as sound economic analyses require some appreciation of how resource allocation is conditioned by political institutions, ethical values, and the way these have been understood by different traditions in social thought.

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19 Ibid, 3.

20 Schengen Borders Code, (2016), Articles 22, 23, 24.

21 Schengen Borders Code, (2016), Article 27; it reads “Procedure for the temporary reintroduction of border control at inter

nal borders under Article 25”.

22 Unprecedented meaning a threat the Member State has never experienced before, as it has been Covid-19.

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Freedom in Europe: Access to Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights

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2 Natalie Picken, 'Sexuality Education across the European Union: An Overview', Publications Office of the European Union,

(2021), 6.

3 Ibid, 7.

4 Dunja Mijatovic, ‘Comprehensive Sexuality Education Protects Children and Helps Build a Safer, Inclusive Society’, Commis

sioner for Human Rights (2020).

5 ‘European Contraception Atlas 2020 EPF’, accessed 9 March 2021, https://www.epfweb.org/european-contraception-atlas.

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15 Gibbons et al., 'The IPPF EN Partner Survey', 16.

16 Anedda et al., 'Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights and the Implication of Conscientious Objection', 8.

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Knowledge file' Rutgers (2018) 12.

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Health and Human Rights, 21 (2019), 109-120.

20 Ibid.

21 Pierre-André Michaud, Annemieke Visser, Johanna Vervoort, Paul Kocken, Sijmen Reijneveld, Mitch Blair, Denise Alexan

der, Michael Rigby, Martin Weber, and Danielle Jansen, ‘Do European Union Countries Adequately Address the Healthcare

Needs of The Adolescents in the Area of Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights?’ Archives of Disease in Childhood, 105,

(2020), 40–46.

22 Swedish National Agency for Education, 'Sex Education: Gender equality, sexuality and human relationships in the Swedish

Curricula', (2014).

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Amir Muzur, Zvonka Zupanič-Slavec and Florian Steger, 'Social diversity and access to healthcare in Europe: how does Euro

pean Union’s legislation prevent from discrimination in healthcare' BMC Public Health, 20, (2020).

24 Ibid 25 'Sex Education: Gender equality, sexuality and human relationships in the Swedish Curricula'.

26 'About Us', Global Doctors For Choice, accessed 20 March 2021, https://globaldoctorsforchoice.org.

27 'Glossary of Summaries', European Union, accessed 21 March 2021, https://europa.eu/!UU39wR 28 'Summaries of EU Legislation: Rules on Crossing EU Borders' European Union, accessed 21 March 2021, https://europa. eu/!RW38Ww. 29 European Commission, 'Consultation: Transformation Health and Care in the Digital Single Market' European Union (2018), 15.

30 'International Partnerships' European Union, accessed 21 March 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/

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DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY The International Community's Response to China's Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang

by Nicola Hope and Anonymous P. 12 - 'Z-9 Light Attack Helicopters' from Flickr by rhk111. Image in the public domain.

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1

'Data leak reveals how China ‘brainwashes’ Uighurs in prison camps', BBC News, 24 November 2019, https://www.

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2 Ibid.

3 ICIJ, 'Read the China Cables Documents', China Cables, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 24 No

vember 2019, accessed 14 November 2020, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-En glish.html.

4 Ibid.

5 Nathan Ruser, 'Explaining Xinjiang’s detention system', The Xinjiang Data Project, Australian Strategic Policy Institute,

last modified September 2020, accessed 14 November 2020, https://xjdp.aspi.org.au/explainers/exploring-xinjiangs-deten tion-facilities/.

6 HE Ms Sally Mansfield Permanent Representative of Australia et al, “Joint statement to the High Commissioner for Hu

man Rights,” Letter 8 July 2019, accessed 14 November 2020, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resourc es/190708_joint_statement_xinjiang.pdf.

7 Ibid.

8 James Griffiths, 'US blacklists 28 Chinese organizations and companies over Xinjiang camps, CNN Business, 8 October

2019, accessed 14 November 2020 https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/08/business/us-china-xinjiang-black-list-intl-hnk/index. html.

9 Sheen Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee and Emric Yazici, 'Understanding China’s "Preventative Repression" in Xinjiang',

Brookings, March 4 2020, accessed 14 November 2020 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/04/under standing-chinas-preventive-repression-in-xinjiang/.

10 Greitens et. al, 'Understanding China’s "Preventative Repression"'.

11 Ibid.

12 Murray Tanner, 'China’s Response to Terrorism' U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2016).

13 Nick Cumming-Bruce, 'More than 35 Countries Defend China over mass detention of Uighur Muslims in UN Letter', The Independent, 13 July 2019, accessed 14 November 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-mass-deten tions-uighur-muslims-un-letter-human-rights-a9003281.html.

14 'Russian Federation' Amnesty International, accessed 2 December 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-

central-asia/russian-federation/; 'G20; Hold Saudi Arabia Accountable for Abuses', Human Rights Watch, accessed

2 December 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/09/g20-hold-saudi-arabia-accountable-abuses; 'Rohingya', Human

Rights Watch, accessed 2 December 2020, https://www.hrw.org/tag/rohingya.

15 Rhea Mahbubani, 'Pakistani Leader Imran Khan Admitted he Refuses to Criticises China’s Treatment of its Uighur mi

nority because they "helped us when we were at rock bottom"' Business Insider, 22 January 2020, accessed 2 December 2020 https://www.businessinsider.com/imran-khan-pakistan-wont-criticize-china-on-uighurs-2020-1?r=US&IR=T;

Matt Schiavenza, 'Why Aren’t More Countries Confronting China over Xinjiang?' ChinaFile, 14 January 2020, accessed

14 November 2020, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/why-arent-more-countries-confronting-chi na-over-xinjiang.

16 Ibid.

17 'A Surveillance State Unlike Any the World Has Ever Seen' SPIEGEL, accessed 4 December 2020, https://www.spiegel.de/ consent-a-?targetUrl=https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-s-xinjiang-province-a-surveillance-state-unlike-any- the-world-has-ever-seen-a-1220174.html&ref=https://www.google.com/.

18 UN General Assembly, Prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, 9 December 1948, A/RES/260, accessed

4 December 2020, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0873.html.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 'China: 83 major brands implicated in report on forced labour of ethnic minorities from Xinjiang assigned to factories

across provinces; includes company reponses' Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 1 March 2020, accessed 4 Decem

ber 2020 https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/china-83-major-brands-implicated-in-report-on-forced-la bour-of-ethnic-minorities-from-xinjiang-assigned-to-factories-across-provinces-includes-company-responses/.

22 '83 Companies Linked to Uighur Forced Labor' Save Uighur, 10 March 2020, accessed 15 November 2020, accessed 2 Decem

ber 2020 www.saveuighur.org/83-companies-linked-to-uighur-forced-labor/.

23 Ibid.

24 'US Blacklists 11 Firms over China’s Treatment of Uighurs' Al Jazeera, accessed 15 November 2020, www.aljazeera.com/econo my/2020/7/20/us-blacklists-11-firms-over-chinas-treatment-of-uighurs.

25 'The US Global Magnitsky Act', Human Rights Watch, 28 October 2020, accessed 4 December 2020, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2017/09/13/us-global-magnitsky-act.

26 'Responsibility to Protect', Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, accessed 2 December 2020,

https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml; Alex J. Bellamy, 'The Responsibility to Pro

tect- Five Years On', Ethics and International Affairs 24, (2010), 143.

27 Ibid, 145.

28 'UN General Assembly on Responsibility to Protect, 2018', Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2

July 2018, accessed 03 December 2020, https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-general-assembly-debate-on-the-responsibili ty-to-protect-2018/.

29 Bellamy, 'Responsibility to Protect', 144.

30

Ibid, 145.

New York to N'Djamena: How should France negotiate American involvement in the Sahel?

by Noah Trowbridge P. 16 - 'RAP Embarquement' from Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under - CC-BY-SA-4.0.

P. 17 - 'Operation Barkhane' from Flickr by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa. Licensed under - CC BY 2.0.

1 Stephen Townsend, '2020 Posture Statement to Congress', United States Africa Command, (2020), accessed March 2021 https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/2020-posture-statement-to-congress.

2 U.S. Department of Defense, 'Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense',

Defense Strategic Guidance (2012).

3 Ibid.

4 Joseph R. Biden, 'Interim National Security Strategic Guidance', (2021).

5 Antony J. Blinken, 'Reaffirming and Reimagining America’s Alliances', U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia, 24 March 2021 6 U.S. Department of Defense, 'Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the Initiation of a Global Force Posture

Review', 4 February 2021.

7 Michael Pauron, 'Chine/Afrique, une stratégie militaire militaire agressive', Mondafrique, 3 July 2020, accessed April 2021, https://mondafrique.com/chine-afrique-ii-une-strategie-militaire-militaire-agressive/.

8 Xinhua, 'State Council of the People’s Republic of China', China’s Military Strategy, 27 May 2015, accessed March 2021, http:// english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.html.

9 Paul Nantulya, 'China Promotes Its Party-Army Model in Africa', Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 28 July 2020.

10 United Nations, 'Troop and Police Contributors', United Nations Peacekeeping, 28 February 2021, accessed April 2021, https:// peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

11 Brigid Starkey, Mark A. Boyer and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, International Negotiation in a Complex World, (Lanham, 2016).

12 Alain Barluet, 'Opération «Barkhane» : le soutien indispensable du puissant allié américain', Le Figaro, 2017.

13 Murielle Delaporte, 'U.S. Support for the Barkhane Operation: A Case Study in Effective U.S.-Allied Cooperation', Defense Info, 15 May 2020, accessed March 2021, https://defense.info/re-thinking-strategy/2020/05/us-support-for-the-barkhane-op eration-a-case-study-in-effective-u-s-allied-cooperation/.

14 Aude Mazoue, 'G5 Sahel: quelques succès militaires de Barkhane au milieu du chaos terroriste', France 24, 15 February 2021,

accessed April 2021, https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20210215-g5-sahel-quelques-succ%C3%A8s-militaires-de- barkhane-au-milieu-du-chaos.

15 Stephen Townsend, '2020 Posture Statement to Congress', United States Africa Command, 30 January 2020, accessed March

2021 https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/2020-posture-statement-to-congress.

16 Antony J Blinken, 'Reaffirming and Reimagining America’s Alliances', U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia, 24 March 2021.

17 G5 Sahel, 'Communiqué final du Sommet de N’Djamena', Elysée, 16 February 2021, accessed March 2021, https://www.elysee. fr/emmanuel-macron/2021/02/16/communique-final-du-sommet-de-ndjamena.

18 GlobalData, 'French defense spending to reach US$56.1bn in 2021 as it bolsters its domestic defense industry, says GlobalData', GlobalData, 23 March 2021, accessed April 2021, https://www.globaldata.com/french-defense-spending-reach- us56-1bn-2021-bolsters-domestic-defense-industry-says-globaldata/.

19 Joseph R. Biden, 'Interim National Security Strategic Guidance', 2021.

Blue Doves in Flight: Towards a New Model of Peacekeeping Communications

by Justine Fung and Matthew Ader P. 19 - 'UN Peacekeepers Receive Medals' from Flickr by United Nations Photo. Licensed under - CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

P. 20 - 'Contingent of Nepalese Peacekeepers Arrives in Juba from Haiti' from Flickr by United Nations Photo. Licensed under - CC

BY-NC-ND 2.0.

1 Paul Williams, ‘Strategic Communications for Peace Operations’, International Peacekeeping, 26, (2019), 383-407.

2 Sebastiaan Rietjens and Chiara Ruffa, ‘Understanding Coherence in UN Peacekeeping: A Conceptual Framework’, Interna

tional Peacekeeping, 26, (2019).

3 UN Information Centre, United Nations, accessed 13 February 2021, https://unic.un.org/aroundworld/unics/en/part nerships/communicationGroup/index.asp.

4 'Bangladesh: Three decades of service and sacrifice in UN Peacekeeping', (2018), United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed

13 February 2021 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/bangladesh-three-decades-of-service-and-sacrifice-un-peacekeeping.

5 Katia Papagianni, ‘Mediation, Political Engagement, Peacebuilding’, Global Governance, 16, (2010).

6 UN Operations, United Nations, accessed 13 February 2021, https://www.unops.org/about/our-story/mission-vision-pur pose#:~:text=Our%20mission%20is%20to%20help,achieve%20peace%20and%20sustainable%20development.

7 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), ‘United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Vol 1’, United Nations, (2012),

48, accessed 13 February 2021, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping/en/UNIBAM.Vol.I.pdf.

8 Aivars Purins, 'Uncle Bill of the Forgotten Army', 2008, 12, accessed 13 February 2021, https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/ documents/Research/9_%20Aivars%20Purins-Uncle%20Bill%20of%20the%20Forgotten%20Army-Leadership%20of%20 Lord%20Slim.pdf.

9 Raymond Saner and Lichia Yiu, 'Organisational Culture of UN Agencies', 5, accessed 13 February 2021, https://www.diploma cy.edu/sites/default/files/IC%20and%20Diplomacy%20%28FINAL%29_Part15.pdf.

10 DPKO, ‘Authority, Command, and Control’, 8, 2008, ccessed 13 February 2021, https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/author itycommandandcontrolinunpkos_2008.pdf, 11 Nick Birnback, ‘Under the Blue Flag’, Challenges Forum, 11, accessed 13 February 2021, http://www.challengesforum.org/ PageFiles/9832/Policy%20Brief%202019%204%20Leadership%20and%20Strategic%20Communications%20in%20UN%20

Peace%20Operations.pdf.

12 AFP, 'UN Peacekeepers Accused of Child Rape in South Sudan', The Guardian, accessed 13 February 2021 https://www. theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/24/un-peacekeepers-accused-of-child-in-south-sudan.

13 Johnathan Katz, 'The UN’s Cholera Admission and What Comes Next', New York Times, accessed 13 February 2021, https:// www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/magazine/the-uns-cholera-admission-and-what-comes-next.html.

14 General Assembly, 'Addressing Sexual Exploitation, Abuse Cases Involving Peacekeepers Requires Swift Accountability, Deci

sive Action, Speakers Tell General Assembly | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases', (2016).

15 Edith M Lederer and Paisley Dodds, 'US Envoy Says UN Peacekeepers Must Be Punished for Sexual Abuse”, TIME, accessed

13 February 2021, https://time.com/4739564/ un-peacekeeping-haiti-abuse-nikki-haley/.

16 UN Peacekeeping Resources Hub, United Nations, accessed 13 February 2021, https://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-com munity/pre-deployment.

17 Strategic Communications, United Nations, accessed 13 February 2021, https://www.un.org/en/sections/departments/depart ment-global-communications/strategic-communications/index.html.

18 Chris McGreal, 'What’s the point of peacekeepers if they don’t keep the peace', The Guardian, (2015), accessed 13 February

2021 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-peacekeepers-rwanda-bosnia.

19 Tony Ingesson, 'Trigger-Happy, Autonomous and Disobedient', The Strategy Bridge, (2017), accessed 13 February 2021,

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/9/20/trigger-happy-autonomous-and-disobedient-nordbat-2-and-mis sion-command-in-bosnia.

20 Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention', Foreign Affairs, accessed 13 Febru

ary 2021 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/1996-03-01/somalia-and-future-humanitarian-intvention.

21 Mark Doyle, 'A Good Man in Rwanda', BBC, (2014), accessed 13 February 2021, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/2014/ newsspec_6954/index.html.

22 Cochran, Twitter, accessed 13 February 2021, https://twitter.com/LadyLovesTaft.

23 U.S. Army, Twitter, accessed 13 February 2021, https://twitter.com/USArmy?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eser p%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor.

24 Jorgenson, Twitter, accessed 13 February 2021, https://twitter.com/davejorgenson?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Es

erp%7Ctwgr%5Eautho, 25 Smith Galer, Twitter, accessed 13 February 2021, https://twitter.com/sophiasgaler?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5E

serp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor,

BUSINESS & ECONOMICS A Suggestion for Social Housing Policy in England

by Oliver Brufal P. 23 - 'Sunset over St Paul's Cathedral and City of London' from Flickr by JackPeasePhotography. Licensed under - CC BY 2.0 P. 24 - 'Council House bridge removal' from Flickr by Coventry City Council. Licensed under - CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

1 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, ‘Social Housing Lettings: April 2018 to March 2019, England’,

Housing Statistical Release (London, 2020), 1, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at tachment_data/file/861471/Social_Housing_Lettings_in_England_April_2018_to_March_2019.pdf.

2 Torsten Bell, ‘In the coronavirus jobs wipeout, the young and low earners suffer most’, The Guardian (London, 2020), https://

www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/05/covid-19-jobs-wipeout-young-low-earners-hardest-hit; Richard Blundell,

Robert Joyce, Monica Costa Dias and Xiaowei Xu, ‘Covid-19: the impacts of the pandemic on inequality’, The Institute for

Fiscal Studies (London, 2020), https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14879.

3 Alex Schwartz, ‘The credit crunch and subsidized low-income housing: the UK and US experience compared’, Journal of

Housing and the Built Environment, 26, 3 (2011), 371.

4 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, ‘Social Housing Lettings' 3.

5 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, ‘Table 600: numbers of households on local authorities’ housing

waiting lists, by district, England, from 1997’, Statistical data set: Live tables on rents, lettings and tenancies, https://www.gov. uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-rents-lettings-and-tenancies.

6 Joe Beswick, Duncan McCann and Hanna Wheatley, ‘Building the Social Homes we need’, New Economics Foundation, 13,

http://www.nationwidefoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Building-the-social-homes-we-need_191120_150504.

pdf ; M. Stephens, ‘Tackling housing market volatility in the UK’, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, https://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/ default/files/jrf/migrated/files/housing-markets-volatility-full.pdf.

7 OECD, ‘Social Housing: A key part of past and future housing policy’, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Policy Briefs

(Paris, 2020), 19.

8 Ibid, 20.

9 Housing Ombudsman Service, ‘Business Plan 2020-21’, 2, https://www.housing-ombudsman.org.uk/wp-content/up loads/2020/11/Housing-Ombudsman-business-plan-2020-21.pdf.

10 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, ‘The Charter for Social Housing Residents: Social Housing White

Paper’, Section 1, 6.

11 Ibid, Section 67, 40.

12 Ibid, Section 98, 49.

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT Access to Green Finance for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in the United Kingdom

by Rebecca Flowers and Irina Tabacaru P. 26 - 'Crop farmer showing money in green summer field in countryside' from Pexels by Karolina Grabowska. Licensed under the

Pexels License.

P. 28 - 'Bank of England' from Flickr by Diamond Geezer. Licensed under - CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

1 UK Government, 'The Carbon Plan: Delivering Our Low Carbon Future', (2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/47614/3751-carbon-plan-executive-summary-dec-2011.pdf.

2 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 'UK GOVERNMENT OUTLINES 10-POINT PLAN

FOR A GREEN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION' Sustainable Recovery 2020, (2020), https://www.iisd.org/sustainable-recovery/ news/uk-government-outlines-10-point-plan-for-a-green-industrial-revolution/.

3 G20 Green Finance Study Group, 'G20 Green Finance Synthesis Report' United Nations Environment Programme, (2016), https://unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Synthesis_Report_Full_EN.pdf.

4 Chris Rhodes, 'Research Briefing: Business Statistics', - UK Parliament House of Commons Library, (2020), https://common slibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn06152/.

5 J. Thomä et al. 'Green SMEs and Access To Finance: The Role of Banking Diversity' UNEP Inquiry (2015) https://unepin quiry.org/publication/green-smes/.

6 J. McDaniels and N. Robins, 'MOBILIZING SUSTAINABLE FINANCE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED EN

TERPRISES REVIEWING EXPERIENCE AND IDENTIFYING OPTIONS IN THE G7' UNEP Inquiry (2017) https://unepin quiry.org/publication/mobilizing-sustainable-finance-for-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises/.

7 SME Ministerial Conference, 'Enhancing SME access to diversified financing instruments: Plenary session 2'

OECD (Mexico City, 2018) https://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/ministerial/documents/2018-SME-Ministerial-Conference-Plena ry-Session-2.pdf.

8 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 'SME ACCESS TO FINANCE SCHEMES: Measures To Support

SME Growth' (2013) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/192618bis-13-p176b-sme-access-to-finance-measures.pdf.

9 Moody’s Analytics, 'Seven key challenges in assessing SME credit risk' (2016) https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/ whitepaper/2016/seven-key-challenges-assessing%20small-medium-enterprises-sme-credit-risk.pdf.

10 'Eco-Lighthouse (ELH) Certification Scheme' Eco-Lighthouse (Norway), (2020) http://www.eco-lighthouse.org/.

11 'EU Taxonomy For Sustainable Activities' European Commission, (2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-eu ro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-finance/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities_en.

12 J. Thomä, et al. 'Green SMEs and Access To Finance' 13 Henry Schäfer 'Green Finance And The German Banking System' University of Stuttgart, (2017) https://www.bwi.uni-stutt gart.de/abt3/files/forschung/BF7_GreenFinance_Banks_Germany_2017.pdf.

14 Forum Nachhaltige Geldanlagen (FNG) 'Marktbericht Nachhaltige Geldanlagen 2016 - Deutschland, Österreich Und Die

Schweiz' (2016), http://www.forum-ng.org/images/stories/Presse/Marktbericht_2016/FNG_Marktbericht2016_online.pdf.

15 Lloyds Bank Commercial Banking’s Business Baromete, 'UK SMEs aiming to ramp up sustainability actions', (2019) https:// www.edie.net/registration/regwall.asp?mid=131190&origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eed.ie%2Enet%2news%2F7% 2FUK%2DSMEs%2Daiming%2Dto%2Dramp%2Dup%2Dsustainability%2Dactions%2F&title=UK+SMEs+aim ing+to+ramp+up+sustainability+actions#:~:text=Lloyds%20Bank%20Commercial%20Banking's%20Business,in%20the%20 past%2012%20months.

16 T. Whelan and R. Kronthal-Sacco, 'Research: Actually, Consumers Do Buy Sustainable Products' (2019) https://hbr. org/2019/06/research-actually-consumers-do-buy-sustainable-products.

Loss and Damage in the Global South: The struggle for support and climate justice on the international stage

by Andrew King

P. 30 -

P. 32 -

'Brazil Environment: Pantanal in Flames' from Flickr by Gustavo Basso and is being used with permission from the owner.

'Bangladesh - Flooding, 2019) from Flickr by UN Women Asia and the Pacific. Licensed under - CC BY- NC-ND 2.0.

1 'The economic damages of 3°C warming for SIDS and LDCs', Climate Analytics (2019).

2 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (2015).

3 E. Boyd, R.A. James, R.G. Jones, H.R. Young, F. Otto, 'A typology of loss and damage perspectives', Nat. Clim, Change 7,

(2017), 723–729.

4 CAN, 'Climate Action Network Submission on the Scope of the Technical Paper Exploring Sources of Support for Loss and

Damage and Modalities for Accessing Support' (2018), accessed 10 April 21, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/ CAN%20Loss%20and%20Damage%20Submission_%20022018.pdf.

5 Calculated using data from: Our World in Data, 'Who Has Contributed the Most to Global CO2 emissions?' (2019); and UN

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 'LDCs at a Glance' (2021) accessed 15 April 21 https://ourworldindata.

org/ contributed-most-global-co2, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-catego ry/ldcs-at-a-glance.html.

6 R. Mechler et al., 'Science for Loss and Damage. Findings and Propositions' (2019), in R. Mechler, L. Bouwer, T. Schinko,

S. Surminski, J. Linnerooth-Bayer (eds), Loss and Damage from Climate Change. Climate Risk Management, Policy and Governance (2019), 3-37.

7 OECD Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development, 'Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2020' (2020).

8 William Worley, 'Breaking: UK cuts aid budget to 0.5% of GNI', Devex (2020).

9 UNFCCC, 'Decision 2/CP.19, Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts',

UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add (2018).

10 UNFCCC, 'Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1' (2015).

11 M.J. Mace and R. Verheyen, 'Loss, Damage and Responsibility after COP21: All Options Open for the Paris Agreement', REI CEL, 25 (2), (2016).

12 UNFCCC, 'Decision 1/CP.21. 59 Decision 1/CP.21, para. 51, Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associ

ated with Climate Change Impacts', UN Doc. FCCC/2015/10/Add.1, 29 (2016).

13 T. Hirsch, 'Study: Climate Finance for Addressing Loss and Damage', Brot für die Welt (2019).

14 R. Mechler et al., 'Science for Loss and Damage. Findings and Propositions' in R. Mechler, L. Bouwer, T. Schinko, S. Surmins

ki, J. Linnerooth-Bayer (eds), 'Loss and Damage from Climate Change. Climate Risk Management, Policy and

Governance', (2019), 3-37.

15 S. Huq, 'Making polluters pay for loss and damage', Daily Star (2019).

16 S. Griffith-Jones, A., Persaud, 'Financial Transaction Taxes ‒ a Report Produced for the Committee on Economic and Mone

tary Affairs' (2012).

17 J.A. Richards and K. Boom, 'Big Oil, Coal and Gas Producers Paying for their Climate Damage', Climate Justice Programme

(CJP) and Heinrich Böll Foundation, Ecology 39 (2014).

18 T. Hirsch, 'Study: Climate Finance for Addressing Loss and Damage', Brot für die Welt (2019).

19 J.E. Aldy and R.N. Stavins 'The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience', The Journal of Environment

& Development 21 2, (2012), 152-180.

20 UNEP, 'The Emissions Gap Report 2018', United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi (2018).

21 R. Mechler, 'Finance for Loss and Damage: Towards a Principled Approach?', Powerpoint presentation at ACT Alliance, Brot

für die Welt, German Institute for Development workshop on 25 June 2019, Bonn (2019).

22 Climate Vulnerable Forum, “About”, (2021), accessed April 2021, https://thecvf.org/about/.

23 T. Hirsch, 'A Resource Guide to Climate Finance', ACT Alliance and Brot für die Welt (2018).

24 Global Environmental Facility, 'Least Developed Countries Fund - LDCF', (2021), accessed April 2021, https://www.thegef. org/topics/least-developed-countries-fund-ldcf.

25 T. Hirsch, 'Study: Climate Finance for Addressing Loss and Damage', Brot für die Welt (2019).

26 T. Laing, M. Sato, M. Grubb, C. Comberti, 'Assessing the effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading System', Centre for

Climate Change Economics and Policy, Working Paper 126; Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Envi

ronment Working Paper 106 (2013).

27 UNEP, 'The Emissions Gap Report 2018', United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi (2018).

28 R. Mechler et al., 'Science for Loss and Damage. Findings and Propositions' (2019) in R. Mechler, L. Bouwer, T. Schinko, S.

Surminski, J. Linnerooth-Bayer (eds) 'Loss and Damage from Climate Change. Climate Risk Management, Policy and

Governance' (2019) 3-37.

28.

A. Durand, V. Hoffmeister, J.T. Roberts, J. Gewirtzman, S. Natson, R. Weikmans, and S. Huq,'Financing options for loss

and damage: A review and roadmap (Initial Provisional Draft)' Climate and Development Lab (CDL), Brown University

International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD) (2016).

Expanding usage of Electric Vehicles in London through a state-led mission innovation approach

by Patrick Geddis, Maxime Sommerfeld Antoniou, Irina Tabacaru, Aimel Waseem

P. 34 - 'Cars on Road Near Building' from Pexels by Yelena Odintsova. Licensed under the Pexels License.

1 'PM Outlines His Ten Point Plan For A Green Industrial Revolution For 250,000 Jobs' GOV.UK. (2020), https://www.gov.uk/

government/news/pm-outlines-his-ten-point-plan-for-a-green-industrial-revolution-for-250000-jobs; 'Government Takes

Historic Step Towards Net-Zero With End Of Sale Of New Petrol And Diesel Cars By 2030' GOV.UK. (2020), https://www. gov.uk/government/news/government-takes-historic-step-towards-net-zero-with-end-of-sale-of-new-petrol-and-diesel-cars- by-2030.

2 'London Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Delivery Plan' Transport For London, 2019, https://lruc.cont ent.tfl. gov.uk/london-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-taskforce-delivery-plan.pdf.

3 Ibid.

4 M. Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myth (London, 2014).

5 European Commission 'Standards - Air Quality - Environment' (2020) https://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/quality/stan dards.htm.

6 'Air Quality Data – London Datastore' GOV.UK. (2021), https://data.london.gov.uk/air-quality/.

7 J.M. Keynes, The End of Laissez-faire (London, 1926) 8 M. Mazzucato 'Building the Entrepreneurial State: A New Framework for Envisioning and Evaluating a Mission-oriented

Public Sector', Levy Economics Institute: Working Paper (2015) 9 M Jutting, 'Exploring Mission-Oriented Innovations’ Ecosystems for Sustainability: Towards a literature based typology',

Review MDPI, (2020) 3- 4.

10 GOV.UK. 'London Electric vehicles Infrastructure delivery plan', June 2019, https://lruc.con tent.tfl.gov.uk/ london-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-taskforce-delivery-plan.pdf.

11 Charge.Brussels Pitpoint Clean Fuels, (2021) https://www.charge.brussels/.

12 Dani Rodrik, 'Green Industrial Policy' Oxford Review Of Economic Policy 30, 3 (2014), 469-491.

13 Ibid, 485.

14 M. Mazzucato, Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide To Changing Capitalism, (London, 2021).

15 Rodrik, Green Industrial Policy, 2014.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 A. B Jaffe, 'Building Programme Evaluation Into The Design Of Public Research-Support Programmes' Oxford Review Of

Economic Policy 18, 1 (2002), 22-34; , J. Van Reenen, 'Evaluation of State Aid' Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, presen

tation before DG-COMP, (2013).

22 Rodrik, Green Industrial Policy, 2014.

23 Ibid 24 Ibid, 487.

25 M. Mazzucato, Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide To Changing Capitalism, 2021.

26 Ted Greenwald, 'Secrets Of DARPA's Innovation Machine' Forbes Magazine, (2013) http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedgreen wald/2013/02/15/secrets-of-darpas-innovation-machine/.

27 Rodrik, Green Industrial Policy, (2014) 28 Ibid.

29 Ibid, 488.

EDUCATION COVID-19 and the Education Crisis: Using the 'A-Level Fiasco' as a Catalyst for Regulatory Reform

by Udit Mahalingam and Michael Head P. 38 - 'A Level results day 2012' from Flickr by City of Stoke on Trent Sixth Form College. Licensed under - CC BY 2.0.

1 Alex Hern, 'Ofqual's A-Level Algorithm: Why Did It Fail To Make The Grade?' The Guardian (2020), https:// www.theguard ian.com/education/2020/aug/21/ofqual-exams-algorithm-why-did-it-fail-make-grade-a-levels.

2 Ibid.

3 Camilla Turner, 'A-Level Algorithm Predicts Inaccurate Grades At Least A Third Of The Time, Exam Regulator’s Analysis Re

veals' The Telegraph (2020), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/08/16/a-level-algorithm-predicts-inaccurate-grades-

least-third-time/; Ofqual, 'Awarding GCSE, AS, A level, advanced extension awards and extended project qualifications in

summer 2020: interim report', (2020), 76-82.

4 Richard Adams and Heather Stewart, 'Williamson Told About Flaws In A-Level Model Two Weeks Before Results' The Guard

ian, (2020) https://www.theguardian.com/education/2020/sep/01/williamson-told-about-flaws-in-a-level-model-two-weeks- before-results.

5 Michael Goodier, 'Top A-Level Grades Soar at Private Schools as Sixth Form Colleges Lose Out' NewStatesman (2020) https:// www.newstatesman.com/politics/education/2020/08/top-level-grades-soar-private-schools-sixth-form-colleges-lose-out.

6 Catherine Lough, 'Ofqual Knew GCSE and A-Level Results Were 'Unreliable'' Tes.com (2020), https://www.tes.com/news/ ofqual-knew-gcse-and-level-results-were-unreliable.

7 Ofqual, 'Ofqual’s Governance Framework' GOV.UK, (1 April 2010, last revised Nov 2019) https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/864633/Ofqual_Governance_Framework_Nov_2019.pdf.

8 Ibid.

9 Ofqual, 'Extraordinary Regulatory Framework: General Qualifications, COVID-19 Conditions and Requirements', GOV.UK )

(11 June 2020, last revised Oct 2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/930810/6704_-_Extraordinary_regulatory_framework_-_General_Qualifications_COVID-19_Conditions_ and_Requirements.pdf.

10 Jessica Elgot, 'Senior Tory MP calls for abolition of Ofqual over exam grades crisis' The Guardian (2020), https://www.google. co.uk/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/politics/2020/aug/18/senior-tory-mp-robert-halfon-calls-for-abolition-of-ofqual-over-ex am-grades-crisis.

11 Ofqual, 'Ofqual Handbook: General Conditions of Recognition', GOV.UK. (12 October 2017 last revised 11 November 2020), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ofqual-handbook.

12 Ofqual, 'Ofqual Handbook: General Conditions of Regulation: Section A: Governance' GOV.UK. (12 October 2017 last re

vised 11 November 2020) https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ofqual-handbook/section-a-governance.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

Addressing the educational needs of refugee youth in the face of COVID-19

by Lameez Siddiqui P. 41 - 'Syrian refugee children in a Lebanese school classroom' from Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under - CC-BY-SA-2.0.

P. 42 - 'Turkey: Assisting Refugees in Need' from Flickr by EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid. Licensed under CC BY-NC-

ND 2.0.

1 A. Scleicher, 'The Impact of COVID-19 on Education Insights from Education at a Glance 2020' OECD (2020).

2 Ibid.

3 Refugee Action, 'What are the real facts about refugees?' (2020), https://www.refugee-action.org.uk/about/facts-about-refu gees/#:~:text=in%20the%20UK%3F-,No.,of%20the%20UK's%20total%20population.

4 S. Weale, 'Refugee children face long delays accessing education in the UK' The Guardian (2018) 5 Mind 'How is coronavirus affecting the mental health of students?' (2020), https://www.mind.org.uk/information-sup port/coronavirus/student-mental-health-during-coronavirus/#:~:text=Mind's%20coronavirus%20survey%20results%20re vealed,health%20declined%20during%20the%20lockdown.

6 Refugee Action, 'Insights into EU citizens and EUSS, Access to vaccinations and learning in lockdown' Bulletin 08, (2021)

https://www.ragp.org.uk/blog/bulletin8.

7 Refugee Support Network 'COVID-19 crisis: emerging impact on young refugees’ education and wellbeing in the UK' Policy Brief, (2020).

8 C. Heeke, N. Stammel, M. Heinrich and C. Knaevelsrud, 'Conflict-related trauma and bereavement: exploring differential

symptom profiles of prolonged grief and posttraumatic stress disorder' BMC Psychiatry (2017).

9 UNHCR, 'Supporting continued access to education during COVID-19: Emerging Promising Practices' Issue 2, (2020).

10 UNESCO (n.d.) 'Refugee children are five times more likely to be out of school than others' https://en.unesco.org/news/refu gee-children-are-five-times-more-likely-be-out-school-others]

GLOBAL HEALTH What Policies Should High-Income Countries Implement to Combat the Impact of Covid-19 on Population Mental Health

by Gursharan Khera, Kunzang Selden, Coralie Gauvin-Bélair, Eleanor Pace P. 44 - 'Checking Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in the fight against Ebola' from Flickr by DFID - UK Department for Interna

tional Development. Licensed under - CC BY 2.0.

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1 Global Health Metrics, 'Global, regional, and national incidence, prevalence, and years lived with disability for 354 dis

eases and injuries for 195 countries and territories, 1990–2017: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017' The Lancet (2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6227754/pdf/main.pdf.

2 World Health Organization 'COVID-19 disrupting mental health services in most countries', WHO survey, (2020),

accessed 8 December 2020. https://www.who.int/news/item/05-10-2020-covid-19-disrupting-mental-health-services-in- most-countries-who-survey.

3 Samantha K Brooks, Rebecca K Webster, Louise E Smith, Lisa Woodland, Simon Wessely, Neil Greenberg, and Gideon James

Rubin, 'The Psychological Impact of Quarantine and How to Reduce It: Rapid Review of the Evidence' The Lancet, 395

(2020), 912–20.

4 Brett Marroquín,Vera Vine and Reed Morgan, 'Mental Health During The COVID-19 Pandemic: Effects Of Stay-At-Home

Policies, Social Distancing Behavior, And Social Resources' Psychiatry Research 293, (2020) 5 Brooks et. al. 'The Psychological Impact of Quarantine'.

6 Jianyin Qiu, Bin Shen, Min Zhao, Zhen Wang, Bin Xie, Yifeng Xu, 'A nationwide survey of pscyhological distress among Chi

nese people in the COVID-19 epidemic: implications and policy recommendations' BMJ, (2020).

7 Brooks et. al. 'The Psychological Impact of Quarantine'.

8 Shobhit Kumar Prasad, Aarti Karahda, Priti Singh, and Rajiv Gupta 'Role Of Mental Health Professionals In Dealing With The

Stigma Attached To COVID-19' General Psychiatry 33 (5) (2020).

9 Cameron Fox, 'COVID-19 will have longterm effects on mental health. This expert explains how to limit the damage'

World Economic Forum, 9October 2020, accessed 8 December 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/covid-19- will-have-longterm-effects-on-mental-health-this-expert-explains-how-to-limit-the-damage/.

10 Wellbeing Trust & Robert Graham Center, 'The COVID Pandemic Could Lead to 75,000 Additional Deaths from Alco

hol and Drug Misuse and Suicide' Wellbeing Trust (2020), https://wellbeingtrust.org/areas-of-focus/policy-and-advocacy/re ports/projected-deaths-of-despair-during-covid-19/.

11 Brooks et. al. 'The Psychological Impact of Quarantine'.

12 Nirmita Panchal, Rabah Kamal, Kendal Orgera, Cynthia Cox, Rchel Garfiled, Liz Hamel, Ciley Munana, and Priya

Chidambaram, 'The Implications of COVID-19 for Mental Health and Substance Use' KFF. Kaiser Family Foundation,

(2020) https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/the-implications-of-covid-19-for-mental-health-and-s

ubstance-use/.

13 'The Impact Of COVID-19 On Mental Health In England' The British Medical Association, (2020), https://www.bma.org.uk/ what-we-do/population-health/mental-health/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-mental-health-in-england.

14 Brooks et. al. 'The Psychological Impact of Quarantine'.

15 Alphonso Lingis, 'The New Fear of One Another' Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 17, (2020), 471-472.

16 Kevin Sikali, 'The dangers of social distancing: How COVID‐19 can reshape our social experience' Wiley Public Health Emer

gency Collection (2020).

17 Ibid.

18 Phillipa Roxby, 'Covid: What Is The Mental Health Cost To The Young?' BBC News (2020) https://www.bbc.com/news/ health-54449149.

19 'Impacts Of Lockdown On The Mental Health Of Children And Young People' Mental Health Foundation (2020) https://www. mentalhealth.org.uk/publications/impacts-lockdown-mental-health-children-and-young-people.

20 World Health Organization 'COVID-19 disrupting mental health services'.

21 Lola Kola, 'Global mental health and COVID-19' The Lancet Psychiatry (2020).

22 Ellen Townsend, 'COVID-19 policies in the UK and consequences for mental health' The Lancet Psychiatry (2020).

23 World Health Organization 'COVID-19 disrupting mental health services'.

24 Harvard School of Public Health, 'COVID-19 pandemic may cause long-term mental health issues' Harvard News, (2020),

https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/hsph-in-the-news/covid-19-pandemic-may-cause-long-term-mental-health-is sues/.

25 Tessa M. Pollard, 'Changes in mental well-being, blood pressure and total cholesterol levels during workplace reor

ganization: The impact of uncertainty', An International Journal of Work, Health & Organisations 15, 1, (2010), 14-28.

26 Syed Z. Iqbal, Benjamin Li, Edor Onigu-Otito, Mohammad Faraz Naqvi and Asim A. Shah, 'The Long-Term Mental

Health Effects of COVID-19' Psychiatric Annals 12, 50 (2020), 522-525.

27 Elizabeth Parkin, 'Mental health policy in England', UK Parliament: House of Commons Library (2020), accessed

December 2020, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7547/.

28 Ibid.

29 NHS Confederation 'Mental health services and COVID-19: preparing for the rising tide', NHS Confederation, (2020),

accessed 10 December 2020, https://www.nhsconfed.org/resources/2020/08/mental-health-services-and-covid19-preparing- for-the-rising-tide.

30 Parkin, 'Mental health policy in England'.

31 Frances McKee-Ryan, Zhaoli Song, Connie R. Wanberg, and Angelo J. Kinicki, 'Psychological and physical well-be

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32 David Blutstein, Sliha Kozan and Alice Connors-Kellgren, 'Unemployment and underemployment: A narrative analysis

about loss' Journal of Vocational Behavior 82, 3 (2013), 256-265.

33 Matthew L., Goldman, Benjamin G. Druss, Marcela Horvitz-Lennon, Grayson S. Norquist, Kristin Kroeger Ptakowski, Amy

Brinkley, Miranda Greiner et al. 'Mental Health Policy in the Era of COVID-19' Psychiatric Services (2020) 34 Ibid.

35 Australian Government Department of Health, 'COVID-19 National Health Plan – Supporting the mental health of

Australians through the Coronavirus pandemic' Australian Government Department of Health (2020), accessed December

10, 2020. https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/covid-19-national-health-plan-supporting-the-mental-health- of-ausralians-through-the-coronavirus-pandemic.

36 Ontario Newsroom, 'Ontario Increasing Mental Health Support During COVID-19' 2 April 2020, accessed 12 December

2020, https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/56547/ontario-increasing-mental-health-support-during-covid-19.

37 World Health Organization 'COVID-19 disrupting mental health services'.

38 Carmen Moreno, Til Wykes, Silvana Galderisi, Merete Nordentoft, Nicolas Crossley, Nev Jones, Mary Cannon et al. 'How

mental health care should change as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic' The Lancet Psychiatry (2020).

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6 S. Van den Broucke 'Why health promotion matters to the COVID-19 pandemic, and vice versa' Health Promot Int, 35(2)

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12 'Survey says 64% of young black people in England are 'vaccine hesitant'', The Guardian, 16 March 2021 accessed

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20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

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TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION Covid–19 Vaccine Rollout and Online Misinformation

by Gabriel Pérez Jaén P. 53 - Image from Unsplash by DocuSign. Licensed under the Unsplash License.

P. 54 - Image from Unsplash by Daniel Schludi. Licensed under the Unsplash License.

P. 55 - 'Facebook' from Flickr by Book Catalog. Licensed under CC BY 2.0.

1 Samia Tasnim, Md Mahbub Hossain, Hoimonty Mazumder, ‘Impact of Rumors and Misinformation on COVID-19 in So

cial Media’ Journal of Preventive Medeicine and Public Health 53(3) (2020), 171-174.

2 Steven Lee Myers, ‘China Spins Tale That the U.S. Army Started the Coronavirus Epidemic’, New York Times, 17 March 2020.

3 Zaria Gorvett, ‘No, drinking water doesn't kill coronavirus’, BBC, 20 March 2020.

4 World Health Organisation, ‘Covid-19 Response’, Directive No. WHA 73.1, 19 May 2020.

5 World Health Organisation, ‘Managing the COVID-19 infodemic: Promoting healthy behaviours and mitigating the harm

from misinformation and disinformation’ 23 September 2020.

6 UK Government, ‘Government cracks down on spread of false coronavirus information online’, 30 March 2020. https:// www.gov.uk/government/news/government-cracks-down-on-spread-of-false-coronavirus-information-online 7 King’s College London, ‘Who's least likely to say they'll get a Covid-19 vaccine?’, 9 August 2020 https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/

whos-least-likely-to-say-theyll-get-a-covid-19-vaccine.

8 Adam Mcdonnell, ‘ How many Britons are willing to take a coronavirus vaccine?’, YouGov, 16 November 2020. https://you

gov.co.uk/topics/health/articles-reports/2020/11/16/how-many-britons-are-willing-take-coronavirus-vacc.

9 Richard Fletcher, Antonis Kalogeropoulos, Felix Simon, ‘Information Inequality in the UK Coronavirus Communications

Crisis’, Reuters Institute, Oxford University, 23 July 2020, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/information-inequali

ty-uk-coronavirus-communications-crisis.

10 World Health Organization, ‘Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Herd immunity, lockdowns and COVID-19’, 31 December

2020, https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/herd-immunity-lockdowns-and-covid-19.

11 King’s College London, ‘One in three people exposed to Covid anti-vax messages’, 13 December 2020, https://www.kcl.

ac.uk/news/one-in-three-people-exposed-to-covid-anti-vax-messages.

12 Sky News, ‘Coronavirus: Government paid reality TV stars to promote NHS Test and Trace’, 30 August 2020, https://news.

sky.com/story/coronavirus-government-paid-reality-tv-stars-to-promote-nhs-test-and-trace-12059587.

13 France 24, ‘Red Cross looks to global influencers to fight virus 'infodemic', 5 May 2020. https://www.france24.com/ en/20200505-red-cross-looks-to-global-influencers-to-fight-virus-infodemic.

Bridging the Economic Gap through Digital Literacy

by Megan Low and Medina Rahma Putri P. 57 - P. 59 -

'Isaac's 1pm check-in on WebEX, Liam' from Flickr by Alpha. Licensed under - CC BY-NC 2.0.

Image from UNESCO, 'startling digital divides in distance learning emerge', accessed 16 May 2021 https://en.unesco.org/ news/startling-digital-divides-distance-learning-emerge. Licensed as All Rights Reserved but is available for personal, non-commerical use.

1 World Economic Forum, 'Markets Of Tomorrow: Pathways To A New Economy' (2020).

2 World Economic Forum, 'Social Mobility Report 2020' (2020).

3 World Economic Forum, 'The Global Risks Report 2021' (2021), 29-30.

4 European Commission, '2nd Survey Of Schools: ICT In Education' (2019).

5 World Bank, 'COVID-19 Could Lead To Permanent Loss In Learning And Trillions Of Dollars In Lost Earnings' (2021).

6 Ibid.

7 J. Walker et al., 'The Power of Education to Fight Inequality: How increasing educational equality and quality is crucial to

fighting economic and gender inequality' Oxfam International (2019), 16.

8 A.R. Pose and V Tselios, 'Education and Income Inequality in the Regions of the European Union' SERC Discussion Paper

(11 November 2008), 4.

9 J. Wong, 'The rise of the digital economy and tech-driven inequality: Can the tech revolution be an equaliser instead?' United

Nations Economic and social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Blog, (2020) https://www.unescap.org/blog/rise-digi tal-economy-and-tech-driven-inequality-can-tech-revolution-be-equaliser-instead 10 M.B Tiven et al., 'Evaluating Global Digital Education: Student Outcomes Framework' Global Cities Inc. (2018), 19.

11 'Online learning cannot just be for those who can afford its technology' Nature, 585 (2020), 482.

12 K. Waddell, 'Virtual Classrooms Can Be as Unequal as Real Ones' The Atlantic, (2016).

13 The Economist, 'The pandemic is widening educational inequality (2020), https://www.economist.com/graphic-de tail/2020/07/27/the-pandemic-is-widening-educational-inequality.

14 Ibid.

15 European Commission, 2nd Survey Of Schools: ICT In Education' (2019).

16 Eurostat, 'Digital Economy and Society Statistics - Households and Individuals' (2020).

17 European Commission, 'Remote learning: lessons from COVID-19 and the way forward' (2021), https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/

news/remote-learning-lessons-covid-19-and-way-forward.

18 European Commission, 2nd Survey Of Schools: ICT In Education' (2019).

19 Cheng Yong Tan, Meiyan Lyu, and Baiwen Peng, 'Academic Benefits from Parental Involvement are Stratified by Parental

Socioeconomic Status: A Meta-analysis' Parenting, 20 (4), 272-273.

20 Karina Zaiets and Janet Loehrke 'These Online Learning Tips Will Help Parents Prepare For A Successful School Year,

Even If It Is Virtual' Usatoday.com, https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2020/08/06/covid-19-tips-parents-successful- online-learning-virtual-classes-zoom/3303918001/.