The Spectrum The Spectrum is the policy-based journal published by King’s Think Tank on annual basis. It is the essence of our organization that was founded in the wake of the 2010 student protests. The Think Tank was designed to be the missing link between students, ever so politically active, and policy-makers. This is precisely why The Spectrum is crucial: it is the platform and mechanism for great policy recommendations and research to reach MPs, select committees, Parliament and any and all interested parties. King’s Think Tank invites students from all disciplines to contribute to problem-solving and engagement on a wide variety of issues, by attending panel discussions, roundtables and workshops throughout the academic year. The Spectrum provides an outlet for the thoughts and recommendations developed by students throughout the year. Based on how they perceive a problem and its solutions, students write policy recommendations on their own or with the help of an academic mentor, which are then professionally edited by our editorial team. Mentors are paired with students on the basis of their field of expertise and interest in the subject matter.
King’s Think Tank:
Europe’s largest student-led Policy Institute King’s Think Tank aims to empower the student body with the tools necessary to become proactive in decision making, having a say before policy is formulated. This is done through a combination of expert events, policy workshops, and training in how to write and advocate policies which communicate the student voice. We are hope to build on the work we have done in the past seven years and welcome greater participation in all our activities. As a primarily student-led institute, we strive to ensure that the voices of students are heard by giving them a platform to turn their ideas into policy. The opinions presented in these articles belong to each individual author and do not represent the King’s Think Tank or King’s College London. King’s Think Tank is a neutral organisation that facilitates and encourages students to analyse, explore, research and form policy. www.kingsthinktank.com
Editorial Team: Editor-in-Chief
Tamsin Victoria Laude
Sub-editor & design Liz Isles 2
Contents General Editor Tamsin Victoria Laude Diana-Maria Suciu Katie-Louise Marvin Eva Puzniak Camille Lalevee Marina Zabelina Charlie Collard
Editorial Student Empowerment Through Policy Fake News and the Problem of Free Speech Business and Economics Equality in Business: Seeking policy Solutions The Reconstruction of Gender Quotas in Business: An Effective Policy Solution? Education Regulating the Public-Private Dichotomy
Samantha Thomas-Domingo
Addressing inequality in education: Should companies contribute to the higher education of future employees?
Afiq Alias Fitri Onna M. van den Broek Charles Halb
European Affairs Countering Online Radicalization in Europe: The Uncomfortable Truth
Emma-Jane Behrens Miriea Raga Gomez Rafael Holder Stanislav Skryabin Guillaume Beaud Elina Solomon Luke Symons Mehr Panjawani Jonathan Higgs Olivier Peeters Ellen Newell Emma Shleifer Isabel Royce Grace Avila Casanova Aisha Naz STAR Society, KCL
Energy and the Environment Interview with Dr. George Adamson Energy and Environment Policy Paper Defence and Diplomacy The Sunni/Shia Divide: Challenging The West’s Approach to Policy-making in the MENA Global Health Our Ageing Population: Preparing the NHS for the Inevitable Brexit: Policy Implications for the NHS Law A Comparative Analysis of English and Canadian legal policy regarding a mature minor’s right to refuse life-sustaining teatment Religion, Ethics and Culture A Revision of Italy’s Integration Policies Guest Submissions Building Lasting Peace in Somalia Refugees without Refuge: Campaigning for Equal Access at King’s College London
2017: The Year of the ‘Youthquake’
Empowering Students through Policy
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The last two decades have witnessed remarkable changes and crises catalysed by the younger genera-
tion, such as the Arab Spring, the Scottish Referendum and the Catalonian crisis. It is, perhaps, because of this that the idiom ‘Youthquake’ earnt the title ‘Word of the Year’ by the Oxford dictionary. At first glance, many would immediately associate the word ‘Youthquake’ with chaos or cries of dissent and calls for change. Yet, it would be a mistake to say that the youth of today have only accomplished change through cries of dissent and hours of protest. From Facebook and the birth of social media to the discovery of the structure of DNA, some of the most successful innovations and ideas have actually been those of students and young entrepreneurs. This is where our work as the largest student-led Policy Institute in Europe fits the puzzle. King’s Think Tank provides students with an established platform where they may express themselves, develop their opinions and transform these ideas into a course of action, or in simple terms: policy. If the youth of today would like their opinions to be heard and taken seriously, they must strive to reach out to public and private authorities through the very means of commmunication that they use. This is why Policy is important. It is the tool that is used to implement almost any truly effective strategy. Through the Spectrum, King’s Think Tank has strived to bridge the gap between our student’s ideas and opinions on crises around the world. This edition of the Spectrum explemifies this through addressing a range of pressing topics from Fake News, to the NHS’s budget cuts to Sunni-Shia rhetoric in the MENA region and the establishment of a stable government in Somalia. Thereby once again, we are proud to publish yet concrete example of our endeavour: empowering students’ voices through policy.
Fake News and the Problem of Free Speech Policy Recommendations
Diana-maria Suciu
The King’s Think Tank recommends that worldwide efforts to tackle the issue of fake news should include: 1. Implementing media literacy initiatives at a State level in order to prevent the spread of false information. 2. Implementing financial sanctions to identified “fake news” to downturn the profitability of the fake news industry. The Problem On October 14th 2016, the American conglomerate ABC News published its routine roster of articles. Amongst the various titles of the day, two in particular stand out: “The history of the vibrator: From steam power to the Magic Wand” and “Donald Trump Protester Speaks Out: I Was Paid $3,500 To Protest Trump’s Rally” . At first glance, one wonders what these two articles could possibly have in common. One of them is a credible rendition of accurate historical fact whereas the other is a piece designed to attract viewership through its racy topic and, above everything, is completely false. The connection between them is limited in that they were both published by the same reputable source and both discussed controversial topics. Indeed, while the scale of protests against Donald Trump was hot news, by that point, no protester had ever stated they had been remunerated for their actions. Yet, the source and nature of the Trump story was sufficient to earn 462,972 Facebook shares while the truthful history of the vibrator was plunged into oblivion. Despite its inaccuracy, fake news seeps into our daily intake of information hidden under the umbrella of topics of contemporary interest. What is more is that once fake news has spread, debunking it does not actually guarantee disbelieving it. Surveys conducted by UK internet-based market research and data analytics firm YouGov, show that despite the publication of Barack Obama’s birth certificate, 36% of responders still believed the former US President was born in Kenya . Similarly, 31% of respondents were un-swayed by the lack of evidence linking vaccines with autism. 6
Speaking at King’s Think Tank’s 2017 Relaunch event, Conservative MP Damian Collins explained that the UK Culture, Media, and Sports Committee he chairs has identified fake news as “a threat to democracy” and has launched an investigation into the best course of action against this phenomenon. Nonetheless, because fake news only requires a publishing medium to function, this phenomenon gains a truly global dimension. Recognizing that the internet era has made worldwide transmission of information the norm, this paper will thus attempt to identify methods of dealing with fake news without confinement to a certain geographic area. Before diving into any policy initiatives to deal with this phenomenon, attention should to be devoted to why fake news exists in modern times. We propose that the reasons behind the rapid growth of the fake news industry are both political and financial. Political reasons are demonstrated by cases such as the likes of Russia’s Internet Research Agency posting fake news stories favoring Donald Trump which was viewed by 126 million Americans during the US elections .This implies that fake news has the potential of being used as a manipulation device in key political elections. Financial reasons are demonstrated by cases such as the 140 Macedonian websites which exclusively publish fake news under “US hot topic” headlines to attract high traffic and gain money from advertisers It thus becomes clear that the existence of fake news threatens to change the reputation of the media as a beacon of truth that keeps us updated about events globally.
Fake News in the Context of Existing Policies While the threat of false information is recognized almost intuitively, a semantic obstacle arises. Providing a universal definition of fake news is challenging at best, if not impossible. In the UK, the Culture, Media and Sports Committee attempts to describe fake news as ‘the growing phenomenon of widespread dissemination, through social media and the internet, and acceptance as fact of stories of uncertain provenance or accuracy’. The broadness of this definition is troubling. There is no indication preventing “uncertain accuracy” from applying to both satire and false political stories intended to influence public opinion. Equally, it is crucial to consider the policy effects of broadly defining fake news in a worldwide context. In 2013, China tightened its control over social media platforms such as WeChat, deleting “irresponsible rumors” . The impact of the policy eased the government’s control over political dissidents using social media as a medium for expressing their opinions . It follows then, that a broad definition for fake news leaves room for individual governments to read into what terms such as “inaccurate” or “irresponsible” mean.
This is especially worrying in the context of governments where freedom of expression is interpreted restrictively. Thus, the broad definition is clearly inadequate because there is little improvement in narrower attempts. In February 2017, Italy proposed criminal penalties for “false, exaggerated or tendentious news” . Italy’s proposal focused on the damaging nature that false information has on the public’s access to impartial truth, as demonstrated by the specific mention of “tendentious” news. One of the key features of the policy that was justified as an attempt to prevent the same “uncertain provenance” (resembling the one identified by the UK government) is to require bloggers and internet journalists to register with the government prior to publishing online. When delving deeper into the impact of such a provision, we see that regardless of the attempt to narrow the definition of fake news, the selection of who is allowed to publish can be as arbitrary as in the Chinese example.Both broad and narrow policy examples are connected by their inconsistency with the notion of freedom of expression. At this point, it is crucial to identify freedom of expression as the de facto existing policy regarding fake news. Indeed, it is also the most problematic of the ex-
isting policies because, by its very nature, freedom of expression is a principle rather than a clear law relating specifically to fake news. In the Italian example, critics used Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights to support their arguments that the proposed law would impede with people’s freedom to impart information and opinions “without interference by public authority”. In a more global context, critics of the Chinese approach utilized Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to enhance its inconsistency with “freedom to hold opinions without interference”. Subsequently, a single definition for fake news is counterproductive because it will inevitably rely on arbitrary terms. A third alternative, and potential solution to the semantic problem, was proposed by Stanford University as identifying fake news in terms of principles rather than specific types of media . As such, we propose that fake news is inherently dangerous because it is; (i) known to be untrue by its publishers and; (ii) intended to mislead the reader. It is possible that the use of principles is too remote from the comfort zone of modern laws, so there is one arguably irreplaceable advantage. Freedom of expression is a principle itself and therefore, it is easier to balance it against other principles. The nature of the two above-mentioned characteristics of fake news does not place focus on the nature of the information, but rather the intention behind it. Thus, opinions and justified beliefs are excluded from the narrative, preserving the spirit of freedom of expression.
Policy Proposals 1. Implementing media literacy initiatives at the State level in order to prevent the spread of false information. If there is one conclusion that can be drawn from evaluating China and Italy, it is that people are weary of governments’ attempts to regulate fundamental rights, even at the expense of the perpetration of false information. This begs the question of who is best placed to regulate expression. 8
One potential alternative is to allow social media companies to impose their own standards of conduct. Facebook pioneered a program allowing users to flag disputable news and send them to independent fact-checkers . As Facebook enjoys over 2 billion monthly users, this internal policy certainly satisfies the global dimension of the fake news threat. However, it is arguable that it is no more successful than the previously mentioned government initiatives. Even after launching the program, reports show debunked articles often fail to display the red flag for long periods of time . Moreover, once the post has been flagged it is likely that is has already become viral and debunking it will not prevent its readers from believing it . In order to surpass the paternalistic element of government initiatives and the inefficiency of social media programs, the audience must be educated to evaluate the credibility of a piece or source for themselves. By implementing mandatory media literacy courses, each State succeeds in dealing with a contemporary problem by educating itpepple rather than only taking retrospective action once the damage has occurred. The merit of this policy is that it promotes State-wide rejection of false information. Two potential counterarguments arise. Firstly, media literacy courses require personnel and teaching material. However, in the age of the internet, courses can be taught online and would thus only require one-time investments in computers. Harsher objections arise in relation to the different approaches various States take towards freedom of expression, which can be reflected in the content of such a course. This critique is pertinent but one should not fall into the trap of assuming that any one policy will be flawless. The same criticism can be made about government and social media led initiatives. The merit of the education model is that it promotes readers engaged in critical thinking while encountering fake news, as opposed to after the damage has been done. But, it is likely that such a course will take time to be composed and implemented worldwide, the long term advantages are indisputable.
2. Applying financial sanctions to identified false news to downturn the profitability of the fake news industry. While prevention should be the main objective, it is unrealistic to assume exceptions will not exist. We previously discussed the financial incentive of enticing advertisers to invest into fake news websites with high traffic. It is proposed that cutting these financial incentives will result in decreased popularity for publishing fake news with the sole purpose of financial gain. Rather than setting strict finable amounts, States can require publishers to surrender profits from debunked articles. The merits of this policy are vast, removing the profitability incentive from publishers and creating revenue that can be reinvested into the media literacy program. King’s Think Tank believes these two policies are interlinked and mutually beneficial. The costs of implementing sanctions are also minimal, as no extra mechanisms are needed. Furthermore, these fines can be implemented in the short term, supplementing the delayed implementation of the media literacy initiatives. Critics may suggest this policy neglects the political reasoning behind fake news. However, political motivation is covered by the media literacy policy for the sole reason that political motivation is intertwined with political manipulation and political manipulation cannot be solved without the citizens of a State forming their own, educated opinions.
Conclusion An analysis into the rapid spread of the fake news phenomenon signals a growing need for scrutiny of information dissemination. By proposing methods that apply both to the prevention and the sanction of fake news, the King’s Think Tank is convinced that the key to alleviating the threat of fake news lies in educating readers to engage in reflection and critical thinking. Without the exercise of thinking for oneself, no government or corporate sanction can successfully prevent one from falling into the trap of fake news again.
Business and Economics
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Equality in Business: Seeking Policy Solutions By Eva Puzniak and Camille Lalevee Abstract Most societies around the world have come a long way in order to establish an equal and just environment in the workplace. For instance, the CPIA Gender Equality Ratings (1=low; 6= high) improved from 3.474 in 2005 to a much more favourable 3.24 in 2016 (The World Bank, 2017). Nevertheless, discrimination based upon gender, ethnicity, race, religion, age and disability is still quite common, especially in a business setting. This paper advocates for equality in the workplace as this is the most efficient and desirable outcome for business environment for intrinsic and instrumental reasons. In order to implement these equality goals an extent of central regulation is crucial. 12
Hence, this policy reccomendation, proposed by the Business and Economics policy centre at King’s Think Tank, is specifically targeted at British government. In addition to proposing central regulation, this policy proposal assumes education initiatives that could be introduced from the earliest years of schooling as a robust solution that helps alter society’s perspective on women. Furthermore, since the under-representation of women in managing positions is rife, it must be tackled in a stronger manner such as by setting a kind of quota.
What is Equality?
proximately 0.55.
Although defining equality may be a problematic task, it is the first and most essential step when exploring this concept. In this context, this paper starts with the assumption of equality as the equality of considerations as described by Singer (1974), (not an absolute equality). Building upon this definition, gender equality may be best described as it was in the United Nation’s document on Women’s Empowerment Principles (2011):
Since the relation between performance and women’s share tends to follow an inverse u-shaped curve, we can easily conclude that male-dominated as well as female-dominated teams are not as successful as equally distributed ones.
‘Gender equality means that the different behaviours, aspirations and needs of women and men are considered, valued and favoured equally. It does not mean that women and men have to become the same, but that their rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born female or male.’ This paper consistently uses this afore-mentioned definition of gender equality
Equality as the Optimal Outcome Achieving Gender Equality is a desired matter of affairs in the workplace and a business environment for both moral and instrumental reasons. Equality is perceived by many as an intrinsic value. Nonetheless, economics heavily relies upon Rational Agent Theory and therefore, this text will focus mainly on this instrumental justification. Establishing a gender-equal work environment may stimulate the creativity of employees due to their diverse backgrounds. Similarly, it enables hiring from broader circles of potential applicants which in turn should lead to choosing the most talented individuals in a given field (Petty, 2016). Enabling equal opportunities for all workers then, is crucial for the establishment of a vibrant and professionally driven setting. The qualitative evidence that confirms that gender equality generates optimal results is clear; the research conducted by Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, and Van Praag (2013) establishes that the “male/female” share is an essential element for the effectiveness of teams. It has been discovered that the performance of business teams with regards to profits and sales reaches an unprecedented peak when the share of female members in teams is ap-
The Current Laws At the moment, the Equality Act from 2010 protects employment equality in the UK with the exemption of Northern Ireland. This law eliminates instances of discrimination during recruitment, by necessitating the same chances for people with protected characteristics which include: age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation, (The National Archives on behalf of HM Government, 2017). Similarly, discrimination is legally prohibited during employment. This includes providing adjustments for disabled, the challenged and new parents. In fact, this year, a new policy complementing equality laws in the UK was enacted. It introduced obligatory reports for employers hiring 250 or more employees. Employers would this be legally bound to disclose information regarding their employees’ gender and pay (Lindemann, 2017). This policy advocating for transparency is a crucial primary step towards implementing equality in the workplace. Nevertheless, all is not rosy as gender pay-gap issues are usually complex and formulating only one policy will not dissolve this multiplex problem.
The Gaps in Existing Laws and Gender Discrimination in Business The existing law in England and Wales does not address other concerns. For instance, let us take society’s perception of gender. The fundamental cultural differences in the way that boys and girls are brought up cause significant discrepancies in how they think about their capacities and their respective roles in society. This, in turn, induces different occupational decisions (ibid.). Men are more likely to land a job in highly paid industries such as engineering and technology. Whilst women (according to the research conduct-
ed by Bowles, Babcock, and Lai 2007) engage in negotiations over the higher compensation more reluctantly. This is a result of the different treatment of male and female negotiators. It was confirmed that male participants tend to penalise more women that initiated negotiation, indeed this clarified men’s preference to work with less demanding women. These results reveal an explanation that is behind men earning higher salaries than women. Indeed, Bowles & Babcock (2013) note that effective negotiations would contribute to diminishing pay-gap. Yet, as it stands the different negotiation abilities are also excluded from policy discussion on gender equality in business. Furthermore, female workers face another problem in the workplace; namely the under-representation of women who have the role of directors or managers. According to Deloitte (2017) only 15% of board seats consist of women. Indeed, women take only 4% of all CEO positions globally. Similarly, a Fortune 500 report from 2017 recorded that ‘there are 32 female CEOs on the list’, this means that as little as 6.4% of the U.S.’s biggest companies (by revenue) are run by women (Fortune, 2017). Such a small percentage of female CEOs is worrying since, as we have already established, the most efficient teams are composed of an equal gender distribution. Therefore, hiring more female CEOs and managers is a logical next step in order to maximise business firm’s performance (Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, & Van Praag, 2013).
Policy Solutions
Introducing legal measures that ensure transparency and in turn will improve accountability definitely has the potential to improve the situation of women in business. Nonetheless, much more is to address the issue of the present sex stereotypes. It is for this very reason that the King’s Think Tank recommends the implementation of education initiatives that will alter current perception of women and their role in society. Indeed, the already implemented Equality Act welcomes a range of positive actions to solve the inequality issues by encouraging and training people with protected characteristics. A stellar example of this is the Women in Science, Engineer14
ing and Technology Initiative that has been undertaken by Cambridge University. ‘WiSETI supports women in STEMM at the University of Cambridge in a number of ways including: organizing activities such as seminars for early career female researchers and PhD and Postdocs, and an Annual Lecture WiSETI provides expertise and resources to help progress the University’s commitment to the Athena SWAN Charter.’ (University of Cambridge, 2017) Even though such actions have already been implemented in institutions of higher education, correcting this flaw in education at an earlier age is an important way to effectively and fully change society’s perception of women. First of all, we suggest introducing girls and boys to gender-related issues from the earliest stages of schooling. Including and making “gender studies” obligatory as part of school syllabi would reinforce the value of equality throughout the different phases of schooling. Another solution is pressuring more school to encourage girls to enter STEM industries. This may be achieved by (the government) organising campaigns, fellowships, projects, etc. incentivising more young women to enter these fields as well as gain invaluable insight and experience. Finally, in order to tackle the issue of inefficient negotiations among women, schools could offer a special negotiations training. In their research, Bowles and Babcock (2013) give the example of negotiation training as one of a potential solution that addresses the aforementioned issue. There is little doubt that the range of educating positive actions is an essential procedure addressing this issue. However, additional stronger measures should still be taken into account in order to address the under-representation of women in board seats. To tackle this problem, a set of limitations needs to be imposed on the share of men present in boards of directors. Such an extreme measure might be seen as far too radical, and it is known that quotas have numerous disadvantages such as side-lining a candidate’s qualifications. Hence, quotas must be set carefully to avoid hiring unskilled and unqualified female directors. (This is
a complex issue that is fully addressed in the second, consequent part of this paper). In short, in this paper we have attempted to prove that equality (in general) in the workplace is a desired outcome, not merely because of gender equality. Addressing one issue at a time has enabled us to conduct a thorough policy analysis as well as formulate a potential solution. Nonetheless, one cannot neglect the fact that gender inequality is only the tip of an iceberg. In the future after successfully implementing gender solutions, our focus should shift on ethnic, race, religion, age, disability and other inequalities. The newly-enforced Equality Act touches upon all these protected characteristics. However, the recent amendments that have been made are directed only towards gender pay-gap. This is also not an ideal state. Thus, we additionally suggest devoting further efforts to formulate that would promote equality in the broad sense and across all protected characteristics in the business environment. Through this paper, King’s Think Tank have advocated for equality in the workplace as the most efficient and desirable outcome for business. In order to achieve this, we have addressed the key issues related to gender discrimination in the first place. Establishing essential education initiatives that could be introduced from the earliest years of schooling for one, is a robust solution that helps alter society’s perspective on women. On another note, since the under-representation of women in managing positions is rife, it must be tackled in a stronger manner such as by setting a kind of quota. This solution will be further explored in the continuation to this paper. problem.
The Reconstruction of Gender Quotas in Business: Can this be transformed into an Effective Policy Solution? By Eva Puzniak and Camille Lalevee Abstract This paper provides an analytical assessment of the policy proposal of implementing quotas in business to remedy the impending problem of gender inequality in business management.After assessing the results of establishing electoral quotas in legislative around the world, this paper explains how a similiar quota may be introduced adn best translated into the workplace in a realistic manner. Subsequently, this paper covers the role of quotas and their potential benefits for business as well as their problems. Finally, the issues are addressed by focusing on gradual change and embracing quotas that address the appropriate group of people. In order to widen the pool of better qualified female managers and potential directors, the introduction of gender quotas for managerial positions is recommended. After a suitable period of time then, it is suggested that the government implements directorial quotas for large companies. Increasing the number of female directors and CEOs is our ultimate goal here and would be best ensured through these two consecutive steps. Furthermore, it is argued that the government should consider instituting a parent leave quotas for fathers in order to balance the gender roles in the families.In our preceding paper we identified a flaw in the quota solution. Consequently, this paper provides an analytical assessment of the policy of quotas in business as a viable response to the impending problem of gender inequality in business management. To that end, first, we will delve at the most wellknown case and most commonly applied case of quotas globally speaking. (This is quotas in parliaments.) Second, we will analyse how this can be translated into the workplace in a realistic manner. Third, we will cover the role of quotas and their potential benefits for business. Fourth, we will evaluate the problems and critique of that the proposed quotas present. Fifth and finally, we will address and overcome the aforementioned issues 16
by focusing on gradual change and embracing quotas that address the appropriate group of people.
What we can learn from the Policy of Electoral Quotas for Women The main aim of electoral gender quotas consists of assuring representation for women in political decision-making. As established by Tripp and Kang (2008), quotas are the predominant factor determining representation for women in the global context. The qualitative evidence debunked previous research and confirmed that quotas have an even greater impact on women’s representation than electoral systems. Consequently, a larger representation of women translates into various different policy outcomes. According to the executive director of Oxfam International, Winnie Byanyima, women tend to adopt policies that affect other women, children or whole families (Jarroud, 2015). For instance, Rwanda (where there are electoral quotas in place) is ranked 1st in Women in National Parliaments ranking (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017) introduced particularly unique and effective laws (like few other countries) protecting children from violence (Salami, 2017). Since electoral quotas for women provide a higher attendance of women in the legislative, the same mechanism could be used for recreating the desired outcome of the gender-balanced boards. Norway is the example of a country that was first to adopt female board quotas (Wiersema & Mors, 2016). In 2004, Norway issued voluntary quotas for women on boards set at 40%. Nevertheless, this institution had to be formalised in 2006 due to its initial lack of effectiveness. Thus, in 2009 the 40% quota has been finally reached (Sweigart, 2012).
The Role and Benefits of Quotas in Business
on the grounds of the gender bias that they generate (McGirt, 2017).
The obvious effect of board quotas is increasing the share of women in senior positions. Under-representation of female CEOs and directors is a particularly acute problem for the UK. Indeed whilst the UK was ranked 8th place in this respect in 2011, it fell to the 12th place in 2016 according to European Women on Boards ranking (Kollewe, 2016). In 2016, the European Average of Women in Board Seats was exceeded the UK’s mere average of 23.4% (ibid.). In order to provide the optimal for effectiveness in the workplace conditions there is no other option, the number of women must be promptly increased. Consequently, larger board representation amongst women leads to closing the pay gap - another major issue related to gender inequality that also exists in the UK . Furthermore, Smith (2014) highlights that gender quotas create positive effects for women in lower tiers of companies. Women in senior positions may act as catalysts to the career advancement of other women by posing as positive role models. Similarly, more women present in the decision-making process entails a different decision outcome in a similar manner to legislative systems. Smith (ibid.) suggests that gender-balanced boards improve the quality of decisions taken by providing new perspectives, new methods, a better understanding of the market and as a consequence the enhancement of business efficiency.
The engineer disapproved of Google’s aspiration to promote gender balance claiming that men are better qualified and suited for the role of engineers. Yet, such an attitude towards gender equality in the workplace only sparks hostility towards hired women. Since some claim that women can be recruited only on the basis of their gender, their qualifications can be contested by other employees. This outcome then is flawed as it may lead to increasing the discrimination rather than eliminating
A Critique of Quotas Despite the fact that gender quotas for boards ensure higher gender balance, one must be aware that there are a number of significant objections. Many people argue that implementing gender quotas signifies employing less qualified women. Although skill-set should be a determining factor in recruitment, gender quotas may perhaps lead to hiring less educated and suitable female candidates for the position. Thus, the result of gender quotas is contested by the claim that it leads to positive inequality rather than equality. Earlier this year, a Google employer sparked off much controversy by publishing a document ’Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber’. Here he criticised the gender diversity programmes present in Google
Overcoming problems
Nevertheless, this paper seeks to prove that the afore-mentioned critique can be either refuted or addressed with adequate policy measures. A nuanced version of gender quotas for business is perhaps a more appropriate policy strategy to overcome such issues. To begin with, widespread concerns about employing unqualified women can be disproved with qualitative evidence. Baltrunaite et al. (2014) has proved that electoral quotas for women have not affected the level of education of (female) politicians at all. Ironically actually, the quotas reduced the number of poorly-educated men in the legislative. Similarly, the research undertaken by Besley et al. (2017) has confirmed that in Sweden quotas have ensured that men with mediocre levels of education are excluded from the ballot. Hence, quotas ensuring more women on managing boards in business does not necessarily fuel uneducated women into executive positions. Rather, it limits the number of men who are poorly educated. Yet, we must still acknowledge that executive roles are extremely demanding and skill specific. If we implement straight gender quotas for directorial positions we may actually contribute to establishing positive inequality. Thus, first we need to supply enough women with the adequate skill set that they need in such positions. In order to achieve this, the pool of women in managerial, non-executive position must be broadened. Focusing on middle tiers in organisations will ensure the wider pipeline of qualified, prospective fe-
male leaders that in the future will take over more superior roles. Therefore, it is our recommendation that the government enforce a gender quota policy in the business sector through a careful but mandatory three-step plan. If this programme were to be obligatory for large firms and corporations then, we would avoid the initial problem of ineffectiveness of the voluntary quotas present ( initially encountered in Norway). The first step consists of implementing a midway solution, namely: gender quotas for managerial seats. New female managers will be able to learn new skills and thereafter they will become equal contestants for the superior positions. Certainly, it has to be taken into account that achieving the set quota will not be instantaneous and the whole process will take some time. After reaching the managerial quota and widening the pool of female managers we can now focus on more senior positions. Smith (2014) realises that ultimately our attention should be directed at increasing the number of women CEOs and directors. After a set period of time whereby the aforementioned has been achieved, directorial quotas must be set. These two steps then will allow to gradually transform the gender composition of managerial and directorial boards. Accordingly, women will be more able to acquire the leadership skills they need whilst still being midway positions as managers. This would not only benefit them but also hopefully encourage them to proceed to the pursuit of more senior roles. Finally, the government needs to frame policies aimed at balancing career division within the family (ibid.). Long maternity leaves help mothers return and continue their careers after having children and hence must be further championed. Yet, this is still a key factor in the difference in careers between men and women. As the traditional stereotype, women still put their careers on hold to care for their families. Another policy that should be explored to counter this is encouraging men to take parental leaves as well. Introducing quotas for parental leaves for fathers might perhaps be a solution to incentivise organisations to grant leave in a more gender-balanced way. 18
Conclusion In conclusion then, in order to achieve gender b alance in the workplace, the following approach towards introducing quotas in the business sector is recommended. This is a three-step policy approach aims to achieve a more gender-balanced environment in the workplace. First, the focus would be gradual change, such as recommending to the government the introduction of gender quotas for managerial positions in large companies. Thus, the pool of better qualified managers and potential directors is widened. After a suitable period of time then, we suggest that the government implements directorial quotas for large companies. Increasing the number of female directors and CEOs is our ultimate goal here and would be best ensured through these two consecutive steps. Finally, we argue that the government should consider instituting a parent leave quotas for fathers in order to balance the gender roles in the families.
Summary of Policy Reccomendations 1. Implementing education initiatives in order to alter current perception of women and their role in society. It shall be achieved by the following policy strategy: 2. Introducing children to gender-related issues from the earliest stages of schoolin, by including and making “gender studies� obligatory as part of school syllabi. 3. Organising campaigns, fellowships, projects concerning science, technology, engineering, and mathematics that are specifically aimed at girls to encourage them to enter STEM industries. 4. Organising special negotiations training at schools. This scheme should be designed to tackle the issue of weak negotiation skills (amongst women). 5. Imposing a limitation to the number of men in directorial positions to reassure the optimal outcome of equal gender representation on directorial boards. This should be accomplished through the gradual transformation of managerial and directorial boards 6. Implementing a mid-way solution: gender quotas for managerial seats. This stage widens the pool of female managers and potential future female directors. 7. Setting directorial quotas with the larger arm of increasing the shares of female CEOs and directors. 8. Implementing policies aimed at balancing career division with the family. Encouraging men to take parental leaves as well, challenges the traditional stereotype. The introduction of parental leave quotas might prove to be an effective solution in this instance.
Education
20
Regulating the Public-Private Dichotomy By Charles Collard
Abstract
The UK may currently boast of a per-capita GDP of around USD $43,000, placing it firmly within the 20 most prosperous nations worldwide. Whilst performing above the world average, the UK is behind many countries in terms of equal opportunities for those at the bottom of the economic and social spectrum who are nonetheless able to achieve academic success. It is also behind in terms of teacher-led learning, individualisation and the production of social equity in its educational system. British state schools are currently suffering from a chronic under-prioritisation of this route to scholastic success, whilst their private counterparts are producing a majority of the nation’s leaders and managers. There is little doubt that a policy is needed reduce this gap and dilute the level of private-public educational inequity that is dividing British children today. This paper seeks to address the aforementioned by proposing a radical policy solution encompassing: (i) An aggressive decrease in class sizes; (ii) Increased cross-sector cooperation and; (iii) More imaginative routes to investment.
tural elite. This paper proposes policies to address the structural issues preventing equalisation of educational attainment across both sectors, via both pedagogic and sociocultural approaches.
AIMS OF THIS POLICY PROPOSAL
In the UK, state schools are currently suffering from a chronic under-prioritisation of this tripartite route to scholastic success. Attendance, whilst above average, is below nations like China and France, with the motivation to attend and personal engagement in class both being cited as key factors behind this. Increasing UK class sizes would make engaging with pupils on a ‘one-to-one’ basis regularly impractical, and teacher-led didactics would become
By analysing the causes of the state sector’s inability to compete with private schools, this paper proposes a policy-led approach to tackling attainment disparities between the two systems. The current policy failures within state education that are leading to chronic underperformance shall be assessed as well as the factors allowing private schools to retain and produce a cul22
Although the UK is a major developed country. However, recent PISA scores have placed the UK behind eleven similarly wealthy countries. In this study, there are two statistics that are, for this paper’s purposes, striking. Whilst performing above the world average, the UK is behind many countries in terms of ‘resilient students’: those in education in the bottom economic and social quartile who are nonetheless able to achieve academic success. According to the data it collected, the OEDC names three factors as crucial to scholastic and economic success: regular attendance, teacher-directed clarification of concepts in class and the length of time allocated to teaching. INVESTMENT AND INDIVIDUALISATION
highly problematic as well. Education professionals have become classroom managers as the number of students exceeds an optimum level. So-called pedagogic ‘individualisation’ is a key factor in helping students to learn. However, with class sizes by the Government’s own admission regularly exceeding the British legal limit of thirty pupils, this is being neglected, and the state is having to cave in on its own requirements. This is surely unnecessary and unacceptable. An urgent rethink of the current policy is therefore needed in order to avoid any further educational neglect. The UK’s public finances are currently under strain, with the British PSNCR remaining twice that of pre-2007 levels. As such, policymakers must identify the most cost-effective way of raising capacity and performance in state schools. As Brittan notes, the taxpayer has had ‘excessive expectations’ of the state, accompanied by a public reticence to finance them for many years. The government should be able to meet the needs of all citizens conclusively, particularly within education. But, on such a fixed (and currently shrinking) budget, this seems to be unworkable. Private schools are able to utilise a greater financial capacity to deliver higher expectations and capabilities as well much smaller classes and more individualised teaching. This is because stakeholders who allow the private sector’s survival (wealthy parents) are willing to fund their expectations, which are duly delivered. State schools, however, are not able to operate in this way by dint of their natural financial restriction. Whilst competition and corporate flexibility exist within the private sector, competition is stifled between state-funded schools, leading to organisational plateauing out, resultant complacency and eventually, a box-ticking culture in
the interest of maintaining conditions attached to funding. In the state sector, parents and pupils are able to exert very little influence over the quality and nature of the education provided. This must be reversed. The aim of involving parents and pupils whilst utilising limited resources is very much workable. The chief methods of doing so are inevitably economic; parents of pupils who are educated privately are financially invested in their children, and are therefore stakeholders in the methods, practices and quality of education provided. (This is similar to regular consumers of marketised goods and services.) The parents of state-educated children should be asked to contribute, in a more limited fashion in order to achieve the same level of investment (subject to a means test). They would thus increase their so-called ‘parent power’ within the state sector. The danger of parents’ choosing to vote with their feet and directly reducing the funding received by their child’s school increases the receptiveness of this said school to stakeholders. Since 2008, Northern Ireland has had this system in place in some of its voluntary grammar schools. And, the success of this is clearly evidenced in comparison to the mainland. Indeed, about a third of pupils in Northern Ireland achieved the highest grades in state exams. On average, English schools – which by dint of their state provision are zero-valued – achieved half that figure. COMPETITION TION
AND
COLLABORA-
Nonetheless, cross-sector cooperation has already proven successful. This success has been achieved in terms of a weakening in the perceived social divide fostered between privately and publicly educated pu-
pils. It has also been achieved by narrowing the gap in attainment between them. Sharing expertise that is created through differing teaching practices has been important. Moreover, private schools have had more freedom to develop their curricula, and thus have been effective in sharing this experience with state-maintained schools. Government-sponsored independent/state school partnerships (ISSP) were in place under the Blair and Brown Governments; and a formal renewal of this scheme as core government policy would therefore be beneficial. In the absence of cooperative opportunities between the public and private sectors, such as in rural areas served by a small number of schools, competition between schools and increasing investment from parents is a clear policy solution. Private schools should be encouraged by government to establish themselves in areas where they would challenge nearby state schools. The latter should be given increased funding to ensure that they are not left behind. This could take the form of a modification in the Conservative Government’s current ‘free schools’ policy, which is delivering an increased concentration in terms of the number schools locally. The alteration in this policy would be to aid (to a limited extent) the establishment of private schools through the current mechanics of the policy. There is a reticence in government to accept a wealth of evidence across multiple countries that the presence of, and competition with, private schools has long been helpful for the improvement state education. Moreover, Hoxby observes that the very existence of a private school in any given area is as a result of either a past or pres24
ent non-satisficing of local parents’ needs through state provision. That is to say, it is a result of the‘ skimming’ of the quality of pupils going into each type of school. In such situations, wealthier pupils tend to achieve more because of their parents’ greater ability to supplement their learning in comparison to ‘resilient students’. Hence, the competition for the most able pupils provides an extraordinary motivation for state schools to improve and meet these students’ needs. This enables state schools to provide for students in lower economic quartiles who would thrive if the quality of state provision were higher ( and not just students whose parents see private education as a direct substitute for government provision). In many cases, this competition would help the establishment of better wages for staff, that would in turn lead to better education for pupils. Hoxby observes that, in Illinois, private-public competition has caused local authorities to motivate staff to remain in the public sector, and placed upward pressure raising teacher wages. It also avoids the defensive unionisation of teaching staff that aggressively compresses wages and reduces the attractiveness of this profession to many highly qualified graduates. Hence, local authorities should increase their freedom to raise staff wages in order to allow this healthy competition to occur. Yet, the inevitable caveat to this observation in our case is that school budgets in the UK are badly allocated and far too low. £34.2 billion was entrusted to local authorities for education over the last financial year. However, it is estimated that closer to £40 billion is needed over the next two years in order to finance core costs alone in the light of the funding reallocations. The current policies of the British Government are likely to augment existing social rifts.
This is because urban areas have benefitted from increased funding to help with ‘resilient students’ and their funding will be lowered given that these improvements now make deprivation data seem less striking than in other areas. CONCLUSION In short, the Education Policy Centre at King’s Think Tank has identified a number of key issues surrounding funding and attainment within state schools. As this paper has strived to demonstrate, we believe that instead of solely seeking to suppress private involvement in education, the state would do well to allow this to flourish and to implement marketisation into state education. The policy recommendation that we propose then, is threefold. First, in the light of funding reallocations for schools (that will take away funding from urban areas that need it), we recommend increasing the encouragement of private involvement in education. This would allow higher incidences of private-public competition. This should also be accompanied by increased decentralisation of education in terms of teacher’s pay, and a £6 billion rise in local authority education budgets, in order to allow this to happen. Second, we have sought to prove that a lower level of dependence on the state, and a higher level of responsiveness to parents would increase the quality and flexibility of state education. As such, the Think Tank recommends introducing a Northern Irish-style system of small fees for parents who can afford it. This would be subject to a means testing and a trial period. The removal of the zero-valuation of state education in Northern Ireland has revealed the market value
of grammar school education there. This system would introduce a level of marketisation and price sensitivity for parents and pupils alike. It would also compel schools to respond and become more attentive to the needs of their pupils, as opposed to tick boxes in exchange for funding from central government without the involvement of families and students. The evidence presented demonstrates that Northern Irish results are in excess of those on the mainland, with the financial attachment to education being the main divergence between the two systems. Finally, in this paper we have additionally proposed far more independent-state partnerships (ISSPs) in education. This would allow the best-practice learning across both sectors. Indeed, thi proved to be a success under the (former) New Labour administration, and it is recommended that the current Conservative administration renew the ISSP policy.
Addressing inequality in education: Should companies contribute to the higher education of future employees? By Samantha Thomas-Domingo and Marina Zabelina There is little doubt that Education has a large role to play in the creation of equitable, cohesive, secure and prosperous nations. In the last thirty years, neo-liberal market mechanisms have increasingly been applied to sectors such as education and health that largely fall under the jurisdiction of the state. In England, the government’s publicly announced intention to reduce public sector spending, increase competition, consumer choice and quality has led to the development of academy trusts, free schools, league tables and a teaching excellence framework. However, what is becoming increasingly evident, is that this marketization of knowledge has and is continuing to deepen social inequality and reduce social mobility in English society . This paper is specifically concerned with the manner by which the introduction of tuition fees in Higher Education (HE) coupled with the changes to student finance in England have caused the highest student debt in Europe for these students (that come from the most disadvantaged backgrounds and graduate with HE qualifications). The Education Policy Centre at King’s Think Tank believes that these existing reforms must be changed to subvert the widening inequality gap and ensure that the ‘price of knowledge’ does not create an unfair burden on those who are least capable of paying this price.
26
Background Tony Blair’s Labour government first introduced tuition fees of £1,000 per annum in 1998, in order to increase HE participation and to meet the predicted finacial needs of providing mass market higher education as outlined in the Dearing Report. Students from low-income families were eligible for fee waivers and income contingent maintenance loans were introduced to replace maintenance grants. Following the introduction of the Higher Education Act in 2004, English universities were given the power (in 2006) to introduce tuition fees of up to a cap of £3000 per annum. Income contingent tuition loans were introduced, repayable at interest rates of the Retail Price Index (RPI) + 1% and means-tested maintenance grants were re-introduced alongside existing maintenance loans. However, by the time the ConservativeLiberal Democrat Coalition government led by David Cameron (and Nick Clegg) came into power, a period of worldwide economic instability ensued. This was exacerbated by the subprime mortgage crisis, bank bailouts, and increasing recession. Austerity was prescribed as the answer to England’s growing deficit and hence widescale public sector budget cuts began. In 2012, maximum tuition fee caps were increased to £9000, this move nearly made all HE institutions opt to charge the maximum. The most recent reforms have seen the removal of means-tested maintenance
grants and the freezing of the tuition cap for four years at £9250. The maintenance grant acted as a socio-economic levelling device, its removal for the second time since 1998. Coupled with the introduction of maintenance loans, it has deepened the social divide within the student populace. Current issues of student debt Due to these reforms, the poorest students may now expect to graduate with debts of up to £57,000. This is because all students who require help with living costs will need to borrow an additional credit between £3928 and £11002 (depending on their family incomes and locations) through maintenance loans. This will result in students from the lowest income backgrounds graduating with the largest debts. Overall then, students in England will be burdened with the highest student debt among Anglophone countries. Additionally, current student loans compound interest from the start of HE until graduation of RPI + 3% which currentl y equals 6.1% until the April of graduation. This puts part-time students at great disadvantage, due to the longer duration of their studies. This is, in fact, evidenced by a 50% decrease in part-time course applications. The interest accrues at RPI until the graduate reaches the current earning threshold of £21000 (due to the increase to £25000 in April 2018) and begins repayments at a rate of 9% of income. At this point interest is then RPI + 0-3% depending on income. All unpaid student loans will be written off after 30 years, which will be a reality for 72% of students and 81% of students from April 2018. The current funding system assumes that graduate wage growth will be evenly distributed but Bahram Bekhradna, Director
of HEPI reasons: “…that has never happened in the recent past, and there is no reason to think that it will in the future”. This point is supported by a Social Mobility Commission report which found that privately educated graduates are likelier to be paid more and be promoted than working-class graduates throughout their professional career. Disproportionate impact of student debt Children from low-income and black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) families are historically under-represented at university and a great deal of positive work has been done to widen participation at university with innovative solutions and government widening participation funds. Despite tuition fees of £9000, the proportion of young people from low socio-economic backgrounds continues to trend upwards but the details are in need of closer inspection. While participation rates have increased for BAME students, the outcomes in terms of grade qualifications and course completion are worse on average compared to non- BAME students. Student debt not only disadvantages graduates from poorer families but as undergraduate fees are set as standard across courses and institutions, it means that the fees are the same whether the student attends an elite university or a low tariff, less selective one. Therefore, it is inevitable that not all graduates will enter the most competitive, high salaried jobs, nor will all progress in their career beyond the low-median earnings bracket. This, in turn, has a knock-on effect on loan repayments and future mortgage opportunities. Students at present are penalised for investing in their education despite the outcomes being beneficial to both employers and the
economy. During the recent Treasury Select Committee meeting on student loans, Dr. Helen Carasso questioned why there is no employer contribution and whether students are being unfairly burdened in a system that does not encourage proportional contribution. Carasso goes on further to suggest that tuition fees are probably set too high. Jonathan Douglas, at the National Literacy Trust, echoes this by calling on UK Business to ‘take up the mantle of creating the type of society where anyone can gain the same opportunities to fulfill their potential, irrespective of background’. To further compound the bleak student debt situation, students who plan to work throughout their studies may find themselves disadvantaged. While work can be advantageous when the decision to work is down to financial necessity rather than an option, the negative impact on academic outcome and social life can be significant. Policy Recommendations In order to remedy this, a multi-focal approach must be taken to consider the shortterm and long-term benefits to the individual, society, institutions and the economy. Through this paper, the Education policy centre at King’s Think Tank recommends the following budgetary changes to decrease the student debt burden: 1. Returning the Corporation Tax to 20% 2. Introducing a 1% future workforce levy on all UK-generated revenue not pay bills and ring-fence income generated by future workforce levy for HE and apprenticeships 3. Reducing tuition fees from £9250 to £3000 per year and increase teaching grants to institutions to mitigate lower home student income 4. Removing interest rates from loans for low socio-economic status students 5. Capping interest for all student finance 28
at Consumer Price Index (CPI) rate to reduce the student debt burden 6. Restoring maintenance grants for low-income students. Returing the Corporation Tax to 20% The current level of student loan debt is estimated to be £89 billion , and it is anticipated to increase to approximately £330 billion by 2044. It is estimated that 45.1% of this debt will never be repaid which through fiscal illusion will cause what is likely to be a sub-prime level crisis in student loans for a future government. This forms an unsettling juxtaposition against existing and planned corporation tax cuts which have reduced government revenue by approximately £16.5 billion a year and represents the biggest parliament giveaway in austerity since 2010. By reversing this policy, the public-sector purse could gain up to £16.5 billion to address severe underfunding across multiple sectors including education, healthcare, and housing. Additionally, a 20% corporation tax is still competitive compared to international corporate tax rates , without undercutting other markets or unnecessarily depleting UK income. While there may be corporate flight, the realised risk is likely to be small considering the UK’s standing for economic wealth and its developed and marketable population. (Plaigirism?) Introducing a Workforce Levy The apprenticeship levy was introduced in April 2017 to increase UK employer uptake of new apprentices. However, the 0.5% levy is only applicable to UK employers with a pay bill of more than £3 million, the net effect is that less than 2% of employers are required to pay. We believe that this system should be modified and widened significantly to include all employer-generated revenue on UK territory and used to target
HE as well as apprenticeships which are mutually beneficial to business, society and the economy as a whole. It is currently paid through Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system, we recommend that the levy is increased to 1% and chargeable through HMRC concurrently with corporation tax to decrease bureaucratic inefficiency. We propose that it be renamed, the ‘Future Workforce Levy,’ in recognition of the fact that apprenticeships, training, further education and HE develop individual potential which motivates and allows them to make valid contributions to the workforce and economy. We estimate that the 1% levy on revenue would generate £2.6 billion based on projections of a 1 percentage point increase in corporation tax. Reducing Tuition Fees A reduction in tuition fees would have multiple benefits in reducing student debt, making university more accessible to mature students and increasing the probability that student loans will be repaid within the thirty-year term. The decrease in income for universities could be offset by increasing HE teaching grants. Both policies would incur a large short-term expense but the long-term balance sheet of the Exchequer would be improved by less total student loan debt overall. We suggest tuition fee reduction rather than scrappage as research on Scottish HE funding suggests social inequality is not improved by free tuition. Remove Interest Rates from Loans for Low-Income Students We recommend the removal of interest rates on fees for low-income students due to its impact on debt and use to flatter the budget deficit.
Cap Interest Rate at CPI We propose to change the use of RPI to CPI for interest rates on student finance, to better reflect static wage growth and the 0.5% bank base rate. Restoring Maintenance Grants The King’s Think Tank strongly recommend the reintroduction of the maintenance grant for home students from disadvantaged backgrounds to counteract the advantage that other students have and will continue to have throughout their professional careers. Conclusion Inequality in education has been a recurring topic in policy debate over the last thirty years but presently political debate means that there is a window of opportunity to improve and make student finance fairer. While inroads have been made in widening participation and access to HE, improvements have been small and reveal worrying detail when analysed in a larger context. These measures have been undermined by the changes to student finance, the evolving crisis of student debt and its unclear future consequences. It is clear that there is no magic solution to fix disparities within education to address social inequality that will be palatable to all groups. Our policy recommendations recognise that enabling more people to prosper and drive economic growth for the nation benefits the greatest number of people and thus should be implemented.
30
European Affairs
Countering Online Radicalization in Europe: The Uncomfortable Truth By Onna M. van den Broek Abstract Few would argue that the internet has reshaped modern society. Currently, 85 percent of European house-holds have access to the internet at home. At the moment, 71 percent of European individuals use the internet daily. This offers various extremist groups plenty of opportunities to communicate, indoctrinate and ultimately collaborate with others to promote their ideologies at a global level. The new online environment accelerates the radicalization process and allows this process to be achieved without physical contact, as well as overstepping previous boundaries such as time and geographical distance. The internet functions as an echo-chamber where individuals find support for their ideas and have them echoed by other like-minded individuals. Indeed, many terrorist groups, such as Daesh (or the Islamic State), use the internet as a tool to spread their respective ideologies and recruit foreign fighters. It is no surprise that since the beginning of the Levantine conflict in 2014, a total of 800 UK-origin fighters have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join Daesh. This paper provodes a critque of the current policies in place with regards to counteing online radicalisation in England and Wales. Having proved how the current approach is far too passsive and inadequate, this paper proposes a more pro-active strategy that includes monitoring web behaviour and promoting a counter-narrative that reflects Western values. Policy Proposl Breakdown: - This paper argues that the current strategy adopetd by the British Home office towards countering online radicalistation is insufficient. Consequently, this paper argues that a more proacteive approach must be adopted in order to adquately counter online extremism. This proposed proactive approach shoudl consist of; (i) Monitoring Web Behaviour 32
and; (ii)Creating and implenting a counter-narrative that upholds and reflects Western values. The internet created a new environment that revolutionised the radicalization process. It is an urgent and pressing matter in the wake of increasing owing to this threat’s ever-evolving nature, finding a suitable policy is quite challenging. Speaking in his] capacity as Head of Communications and Engagement for the Home Office’s Prevent Delivery Unit, Mr. Abu Ahmed for one affirmed that the way Daesh is using the internet has changed how extremists operate altogether. The British government currently undertakes various measures to counter online radicalization, such as notably taking down internet content inherent that is laden with terrorist characteristics and developing a positive counter narrative. Even though both these policies might sound effective, this paper argues that the ‘Water-bed Effect’ and the confirmation bias renders these policies ineffective in practice. As controversial as this may seem, this paper argues that the British government should move towards gathering and monitoring online-content and behavior. This would be a much more pro-active approach to counter terrorist narratives. Policy Proposal I: Monitoring Web Behaviours The first measure that the British government has undertaken in response to online radicalisation, is removing content that breaches terrorism legislation. During an average week, a special unit (in the Home Office) removes over 1,000 online-pieces. Although this policy may offer short-term results, it fails to take into account the global and hybrid nature of the internet. This argument stems from the so-called ‘Water-bed Theory’, sometimes referred to as the ‘Balloon Theory’ as well. This assumes that the eradication of production in one area, leads to the relocation of the same production in another area. This effect is best illustrated by the US’s war against drugs in Latin America, where the elimination of one drug supplier led to the rise of new, often more violent, drug suppliers. There is no doubt that the internet provides an even more challenging environment because of its global scope and lack of supranational control. In terms of radical internet content then, it follows that the removal of terrorist content will lead to online re-location instead of permanent removal.
In light of the fact that the removal of online-con tent leads to relocation instead of eradication, this paper argues that we must move towards collecting data on online behaviour and monitoring suspicious individuals’ online activities. When radical online-content is discovered, it can be used to gather further information on key issues such as: who post this content, who reads it, who shares it and what it states. National and international law should be translated to in order to legally permit these kind of hardline counter-terrorism measures. This would be a measure that consciously acknowledges limiting online privacy and calls for international cooperation on countering violent extremism online. However, this should be carefully done as governments must still strive to balance the effective enforcement of minimum online privacy rights, (as can be expected from any democratic government). The British government may then combine this strategy with their mentoring programme in which individuals vulnerable to radicalization obtain offline support. As research by Open Society has proved: ‘the (most effective) way to combat online radicalisation is actually offline’. To execute this much more productive strategy, a larger budget must be allocated to monitoring online behaviour as an anti-radicalisation tool. Policy Proposal II: Upholding Western Values The second measure that the British government undertakes in response to online radicalisation is developing and spreading a specially-designed counter narrative to counter violent and extremist propaganda. To support this policy, the government has publicly stated : ‘there was an urgent need for strong narratives to counter the evil but effective messages which terrorist organisations are disseminating, particularly Daesh.’. However, old-standing theories within communication, psychology and marketing teach us that this approach is ineffective. The selective exposure theory predicts that people will expose themselves primarily to information that supports their opinions and beliefs. If individuals do get exposed to non-supportive information, they will seek or interpret information in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs, (referring to the so-called confirmation bia). A counter narrative will therefore not reach people with existing violent and extremist beliefs and assumptions.
This policy then will only reach individuals who already agree (to some extent) with the specific counter narrative. The strategy of developing and spreading a counter narrative to violent-extremist propaganda is based on and guided by the positively-framed communication of Western ideology. It refers to a historic-cultural dimension encompassing Western-oriented norms and values such as the adaption of universal human rights. However, actions speak louder than words. Instead of formulating counter narratives which can easily be perceived as unreliable, Western states should uphold their values within day-to-day actions. The only way to effectively change these dangerous mind-sets and beliefs is to create an inconsistency between these assumptions and the daily actions of Western states. The underlying argument here is that we should ensure that people try to avoid cognitive dissonance – the inconsistency between what they believe is truth and the reality. Upholding Western-based values is challenging and reflects a long-term commitment, however, it increases the much-needed credibility of the Western system and is ultimately the only way to counter terrorist narratives. Conclusion The internet has created given terrorism a completely new dimension. It has broadened the scoop of opportunities for radical extremists who desire to expand their ideology globally. Whilst exploring the current CVR policies in England, this paper has strived to demonstrate how two of the policies in place are quite limited in their effectiveness. Instead, we have proposed two more effective policies .As outlined above, the first policy would consist of allocating a portion of the state budget to a programme that hinges upon collecting data and monitoring individual online behaviour with regards to violent extremist groups’ propaganda and teachings. This could be combined with existing mentoring and support programmes to give more people the support that they need. The second policy is focused upon upholding old Western values, instead of merely communicating them, to retrain credibility so that we may let our actions speak for themselves. Both these policies might be the harder route, but the uncomfortable truth is that hardline policies like these are the only effective way to combat online radicalisation and terrorism.
Energy and Environment
34
Interview with Dr. George Adamson Dr. George Adamson is an interdisciplinary geographer and Lecturer in the Department of Geography at King’s College London. Mireia Raga Gómez is Energy & Environment Editor at King’s Think Tank. In the midst of a heated international climate with environmental disasters and talks on climate change, I met with Dr. George Adamson, lecturer in the Department of Geography at King’s College London, who is also active outside academia, participating in projects of public outreach activity such as the Royal Meteorological Society and the “Pint of Science” project in order to examine the importance of the Paris Agreement. Our discussion initially centred on the agreement’s focus on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as an effective strategy to fight climate change. Addressing climate change is a broad phrase that is commonly used. Yet, climate change is primarily caused by carbon dioxide emissions, so the Paris Agreement represents a means through which governments can shift their countries’ economies away from high emissions. In essence, Dr. Adamson argued that the focus of the agreement on this type of emissions is adequate at the top governmental level, yet this strategy remains important alongside a list of other equally important strategies. Additionally, the lack of financial resources of less economically developed countries (LEDCs) brought the question of the viability of the agreement for these countries. Climate change is a priority for them, but cutting emissions is not due to their lack of financial resources. In this sense, there is a difference between medium developed countries who defend the gravity of climate change but do not cut emissions and island countries who also prioritise cutting emissions due to the immediacy of climate change effects upon them.
36 Yet, from a broader perspective, development is a
century idea set up for richer countries to help poorer countries become richer. This process is based on a model of economic growth that dates back to the Industrial Revolution that so heavily relied on fossil fuels. Therefore, in Dr. Adamson’s words, “is it possible to achieve the economic growth countries have achieved from the Industrial Revolution without fossil fuels?” The true essence of climate change is not moving away from emissions but rather “finding a solution that we do not yet have.” In other words, finding alternative forms of development for LEDCs to transition them into more economically developed countries (MEDCs) while reducing or not producing any carbon emissions. On the technological front, Article 10 of the Paris Agreement promotes the development of clean technology and facilitated access to it. On a first glance, intellectual property law could present a problem for LEDCs to obtain access to this new technology that is often produced in MEDCs with high levels of research and development. Yet, Dr. Adamson argued the opposite; intellectual property law could be a “real driver,” an incentive for the reduction of carbon emissions. Nevertheless, there is no means by which the international community can ban countries from implementing intellectual property law on their products. In this sense, the Paris Agreement represents a “carrot” without a “stick;” if countries miss the specified targets, there is no international repercussion on them. Another aspect of the agreement we discussed was climate change awareness and education. Educating the public about the dangers and urgency of climate change is crucial, but it should be done through a solid communication basis, in other words, in a way that the public not only has the information it need but also the means of how to understand it and take action. Overall, Dr. Adamson is optimistic about the significance of the agreement for the inter-
national community; he believes its spirit pushes countries towards a goal and creates a common mindset on decarbonisation. However, the specificities the agreement presents, that is, the percentage targets it sets, are too over-optimistic. Focusing on these would represent a failure as not all countries will meet them or some will meet them to different degrees than others. Thereupon, the success of the agreement lies on its united spirit; the cooperation of all signatories to reach larger environmental goals through means that are feasible to them. In this way, Trump’s administration’s withdrawal from the agreement only implies that this spirit of joint cooperation among all signatories has been slightly fissured. Dr. Adamson holds that the United States will still meet its environmental targets given that the world has strongly reacted against Trump’s decision. Moreover, Trump can be considered an exception in the United States’ politics, and his future in presidency is yet to be determined in the following 2020 Presidential Elections. Thus, moving forward from the agreement means finding a solution to climate change that has not yet been found. Dr. Adamson defends the idea of a collective vision based on norms to find a way by which to address this issue. “Climate change should be as accepted and unchallenged as child slavery.” It is currently a politicised topic with divided opinions, but it is neither inherently political, nor scientific, nor ethical. “We should all agree on it; we should reach a point where we cannot go back.”
Implementing Renewable Energy in Developing Countries: Solar energy in Africa Abstract
By Emma-Jane Behrens, Rafael Holder and Mireia Raga Gomez
Energy plays an essential role in a country’s economy and technological advancement. Yet this often depends on how that energy is used and its type. Generally, non-renewable energy sources were thought to be more efficient than renewable resources such as solar and wind power, but this is slowly changing. In Africa, for a variety of different reasons, renewable energy is not conceivable to advance economies; hence government policy focuses away from renewable energy resources. An average African utilises less energy today compared to someone in England over a century ago. Within Africa, there is a wide disparity between the urban and rural population, for instance in Ghana 62% of the urban population have access to electricity, whilst only 4% of rural areas can use electricity. Solar power capacity is growing across the planet, with the most potential in Africa. In order to promote the use of solar energy in Africa, this paper advances the following policy reccomendations; 1.Richer countries should invest more money into solar energy in Africa to create viable markets for it; 2. Improve infrastructure for solar energy, particularly in rural areas; 3.Educate local people to install, maintain and repair solar energy equipment; 4.Consumers should be educated on the benefits of renewable energy and drawbacks of non-renewable energy.5.Feed-in tariffs or tenders should be set on solar energy.
Policy Recommendations 1. Investment by richer countries on solar energy in Africa There is a failure in markets towards the production and use of renewable energy, especially in Africa. Often, this is due to the commercialisation of the existing non-renewable energy sources such as oil and coal. To improve markets’ production and use of renewable energy in Africa, it is necessary to invest more money. The Paris Agreement stipulated that developed countries should amass $100 billion to donate to developing countries for the mitigation and adaptation of climate change. 38
Investing in solar energy markets would definitely help to mitigate the impacts of global warming, since solar energy technology does not emit greenhouse gases. Whilst this investment represents a large amount of money, it would be a substantial contribution to the implementation of solar energy in Africa and even possibly result in a positive feedback mechanism. However, an improvement in renewable energy markets is likely to be detrimental to the oil and coal markets with strong presence in this continent. It is highly likely that in the short-term, whilst the renewable energy markets develop, oil and coal would still be viable options, but in the long-term, especially as the impacts of climate change intensify, and the finite sources of oil and coal, the renewable energy sector in Africa is likely to flourish. 2. Improving infrastructure for solar energy, particularly in rural areas Most countries in Africa do not have a viable infrastructure for solar energy; yet they do for oil and coal. Often, countries attempt to obtain solar energy infrastructure by connecting it to a grid, but this is far more difficult method, especially in remote rural areas with low electrification rates. It is therefore more feasible to acquire off-grid systems. Solar off-grid systems are created to work independently with no connection to a power grid or other means of power supply; they rely primarily on the solar panels, which are then stored in batteries. Not only does this system reduce the chance of power outages, but it also extends their use since they can be installed in any place with direct sunlight. Nevertheless, there is still very little interest in solar energy markets in African rural areas. As this is done on a very small-scale, if equipment gets damaged, it is harder to repair given the lack of knowledge in these areas, as was seen in Mozambique and Tanzania. 3. Education with regards to maintainance and repair of solar energy equipment Another major issue about solar energy is the lack of skilled technicians able to install the
equipment. There is a need to maintain infrastructure and repair it when the equipment gets damaged. As a result, people tend not to buy technology that they would deem too complicated. Due to poor road infrastructure in Africa, particularly in remote countryside areas, consumers could find themselves out of electricity for a significant period of time due to equipment failure. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that this technology is difficult to implement in unstable countries suffering internal conflict, such as Somalia. Therefore, the establishment of training programmes for local consumers to provide them with the capabilities to install, maintain and repair this solar energy technology is necessary. To ensure the viability of this programme, training centres should be created in local villages, where a technician or mechanic could visit rural villages and conduct training sessions. Whilst these centres can represent an expensive endeavour, locals could benefit in the long term as they acquire proficiency with this technology, thus being able to enter its market and consequently reduce the price of these solar energy systems. 3. Educating consumers on the benefits of renewable energy and drawbacks of non-renewable energy As previously discussed, markets fail to exploit the benefits of using renewable energy technologies, and so the general public may be unaware of their benefits. This can often result in the misuse of information as consumers are provided with inaccurate information about both non-renewable and renewable technology to the benefit of oil and coal companies. In many areas of Africa, such as Kenya, government policy focuses more on oil and coal than renewable energy due to its perceived unreliability. For instance, clouds can affect the amount of solar energy received and hydropower can be impacted by the velocity of water. Whilst this is true, the benefits are usually not discussed. It is for this reason that the general public in the different African nations should be educated on the advantages of renewable energy and the issues with the use of non-renewable technology, even from a young age at the local schools. Furthermore, institutional and non-governmental representation should visit the different countries to promote the importance of renewable energy. Yet, it is crucial to stress that renewable energy does have its disadvantages, but in the long term it is a more feasible option for the future.
4. Establishing feed-in tariffs or tenders on solar energy Finally, there are high taxes placed on the use of renewable energy compared to oil and coal, hence their reduced use. Therefore, feed-in tariffs should be set on solar energy to make solar energy technology more viable to consumers. 5. Feed-in tariffs are a scheme whereby consumers are paid for creating “green electricity� such as renewable energy. This method has been implemented around the world and has encouraged the use of renewable energies such as solar power. In Sub-Saharan Africa, feed-in tariffs have already been fomented that have led to a reduction in the costs of solar power installation and the creation of local renewable energy industries and markets. Yet, feed-in tariffs could be applied on a larger, continental scale. Some countries, such as South Africa have moved away from feed-in tariffs to an auction system, since feed-in tariffs proved unsuccessful due to low inflation and a decrease in debt costs. However, feed-in tariffs would not prove useful in rural areas where off-grid solar energy technology could be installed given that these tariffs are more effective for national grids. The tender system in South Africa, which started in 2011, has prompted private investment of USD 19 billion and has triggered the price of photovoltaic electricity to decrease by 71% and the price of wind energy to plunge by 46% up to 2015. There have been four tenders since this system was introduced in South Africa. Hence, this measure is a strong option through which to exploit solar energy in Africa. Conclusion In light of the previous points, the potential for solar energy in Africa is huge, but the drive is very slow. The aforementioned policy recommendations can enable African populations to obtain significantly more energy, particularly in rural areas, and even produce more job opportunities as markets open and consumers learn about the use of solar energy systems. As the impacts of climate change intensify, and energy requirements grow, renewable energy will pave the way for new opportunities for Africans.
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Defense and Diplomacy
The Sunni/Shia Divide:
Challenging The West’s Approach to Policy-making in the MENA Written by Guillaume Beaud and edited by Elina Solomon
Western states tend to interpret the majority of Middle-Eastern turmoil as the consequence of theological differences between Shias and Sunnis. From the Syrian civil war to the inter-state oppositions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and their so-called proxy conflicts, western policy is based on the assumption that Sunnis and Shias are politically irreconcilable. Iranian and Saudi political leaders, as well as the al-Assad regime and Houthi rebels, use a similar framework for understanding and explaining regional conflicts. This is a mistake. Devising and justifying foreign policy on the basis of the Sunni/Shia divide is actually ill-founded and highly destructive. This policy review aims to understand the origins of the Sunni/Shia rhetoric that has underpinned the majority of Western countries’ policies in the Middle East since 1979. Therefore, this policy review does not assess a specific policy per se, but criticises the analytical grid that has served as the foundation for most Western countries’ policies in the region. To understand this, this paper will refer to past conflicts in Iraq and current conflicts in Syria and Yemen. 1979: POLITICISATION OF THEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES The Sunni and Shia branches of Islam are based on two visions of who should be recognized as Prophet Muhammed’s successor: Whereas Sunnis see his legitimate successor as the tribe’s most influential leader, Shias demand that the successor be a direct descendent. According to most modern states, this – along with other theological differences – have made the Sunnis and Shias irreconcilable competitors since the 7th century. This is not true. In actual fact, theological differences between Sunnis and Shias were broadly irrelevant in Middle Eastern politics until the 1979 Iranian Revolution. After Nasser’s death in 1970 and the six-day war in 1979, authoritarian Arab states started developing closer ties to the West, resulting in Pan-Arabism and Marxism disappearing in the region. 42
At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the financial consequences following the second oil shock provided Saudi Arabia with the financial ability to sponsor Sunni Islamism worldwide, notably in regions where Sunni and Shia populations coexist. This was an attempt to ‘contain’ the Islamic Revolution (a policy which, during the Cold War, complemented broader anti-communist initiatives). Since the 1980s, Iran and Saudi Arabia have both artificially created and used communitarian oppositions between Sunnis and Shias into order to expand their influence in the Persian Gulf. CONTEMPORARY USE OF SUNNI/SHIA DIFFERENCES TO JUSTIFY CONFLICT In recent years, Sunni/Shia rhetoric has become even more prominent in the Middle-East, notably due to economic and political challenges. Firstly, the Arab Spring has shaken authoritarian regimes which aim to survive at all costs. Secondly, the growth of Iranian power has bolstered and revived geostrategic competition between Tehran and Riyadh – the latter of which has to handle collapsing oil prices. Finally, American support to Saudi Arabia has declined following Obama’s new ‘leading from behind’ policy towards the al-Saud regime. Today, countries such as Syria, Yemen, or Bahrain experience the consequences of Sunni-Shia rhetoric and its impact on policy. In Syria, Bashar el-Assad defines its Alawi minority in power as a branch of Shi’ism in order to both gain support from the Alawi community on the ground and play the game of Iran in order to ensure its financial and military dependency so as to survive. Meanwhile, Iran uses religious amalgams as a political instrument to enhance its geostrategic interests, namely accessing the Mediterranean and keeping territorial continuity with the Hezbollah in South Lebanon. The fact that Alawis’ affiliation to Shi’ism has always be contested by Shia institutions demon-
strates the instrumental nature of such a rhetoric. In Yemen, despite the theologically ambiguous connection of Zaydism with Shi’ism, Zaydi Houthi rebels benefit from associating themselves to Shi’ism in order to get Iranian support, while Iran is eager to sponsor a proxy war in Yemen in order to prevent Saudi Arabia from effectively accessing vital Red Sea shipping routes. Ali Zakani’s announcement in September 2014 that Yemen will be the 4th capital to join the Iranian Revolution triggered the Saudi-led GCC military intervention in 2015 as the Kingdom feared a possible decrease in its regional influence.Evidently, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have exploited theological differences between Sunnis and Shias in order to justify conflict or tilt the regional balance of power in their favour. INFLUENCE ON WESTERN POLICY-MAKING However, the actual issue lies in the West’s rhetorical use of Sunni/Shia analytical grids. This past decade, Western powers have often overestimated the Sunni/Shia divide both in their official rhetoric and in the formulation of their foreign policies in the region. The consequences of such actions have been devastating in the Middle East. This has notably been the case regarding conflicts occurring in Syria and Yemen. Repeatedly, Western powers have analysed the political and military oppositions through the lens of the Sunni/Shia divide. Perhaps countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom rely so heavily on the supposed Sunni/Shia division because of a guilty conscience after their intervention and overthrow
of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, largely considered to have destabilised the region and engendered many of the regional problems witnessed today. Alternatively, countries like France maintain a ‘divide and rule’ foreign policy tradition based on an analytical study of a country through confessional lenses. While this foreign policy tradition still shapes policy formulations at the French Quai d’Orsay (Foreign Ministry), it also led the former Syrian mandatory elites to associate themselves with a confessional identity to pander to French officials. This allowed the el-Assad family to gain power and associate themselves to a religious minority as a primary identity marker. Moreover, Western powers’ rhetoric is also influenced by the rhetoric of other actors that ideologically support the thesis of a confessional conflict for geopolitical reasons. For instance, the Gulf countries have an interest in dividing Syrian communities along confessional lines. Here, it is important to note that growing economic and military links between the West and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have contributed to propagating their rhetoric to western foreign ministries. Additionally, the West embedded this rhetoric in thir foreign policy formulations after long-standing Western ally, the Hashmite King of Jordan Abdullah II warned about a “Shia crescent” after the fall of Saddam, as the Middle-Eastern tri-polar system morphed into a bipolar opposition between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
CASE STUDY: POST-BAATHIST IRAQ Iraq constitutes the best case study demonstrating the consequences of the West’s flawed interpretations of Middle Eastern religious and political dynamicsIndeed, Sunni-Shia communitarian oppositions were primarily induced not only by Saddam’s former politicisation of confessional differences, but by America’s own confessional analytical grid. Following Saddam’s destitution in 2003, the USA’s forced “de-baathification” led to the restructuration of the Iraqi political sphere following religious and communitarian affiliations. Shias – especially through the Dawa party – were encouraged to take control of the State institutions and progressively excluded Sunnis from institutions, resulting in decades of authoritarian rule and ostracism. Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, supported by the United States, effectively used these confessional differences to assert his power. Al-Maliki and America’s Sunni/Shia grid of analysis started to materialize itself within the society only a few years later, when civil uprising started to oppose the two communities in 2006-2007. Nowadays, social and political frustrations of Shias cause many former officers of the Baathist party – originally secular – to use this confessional grid of analysis when joining the Islamic State. Samir Mohammed al-Khleifawi’s membership in the Islamic State’s leadership is an example of the “Return of the Sacred” induced by the intensive use of confessional rhetoric, which now materializes itself on the ground. A cyclical process therefore appears, as the Islamic State is now using this confessional grid as an instrument to achieve its political goals. Analysing the conflict through a religious angle is exactly what Daesh wants. Local actors, abused by the propaganda, now tend to identify themselves with their religious community. Foreign fighters joining the Islamic State are notable victims of this self-fulfilling prophecy. Therefore, Iraq aptly demonstrates the destructive impact of a biased analytical grid employed to formulate their state-building polic
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CONCLUSION Unfortunately, decision-makers, analysts, media observers and even the public gradually interiorize the Sunni/Shia analytical grid as the key explanatory variable to regional violence and policy-making. Therefore, Western powers have been fuelling a perverse and ill-founded vicious cycle, transforming the artificially-built Sunni/Shia dichotomy into material inter-communitarian conflicts on the ground. Although the problem originates from within Middle-Eastern regional competitors, Western powers are also responsible for legitimizing this misguided analytical grid. As the graph provided attempts to illustrate, both Western and Middle-Eastern powers reinforce misguided policy. Trying to define alternative analytical grids to understand regional oppositions is key to provide effective foreign policies which facilitate democratization and peaceful mediation. Western powers should work on defining alternative and – most importantly – more relevant analytical grids to understand Middle-Eastern dynamics.
Global Health
Brexit: Policy Implications for the NHS Written by Luke Symons and edited by Mehr Panjwani
Abstract
Policy Recommendations:
The result of the Brexit referendum engendered a great deal of political, social, and economic uncertainty. Few doubt that the outcome of the Brexit negotiations will surely resonate throughout Britain in the near future and these results shall manifest themselves in a variety of ways, including within the NHS. In the subsequent section,
In order to salvage the current situtaion, this paper proposes a new policy approach that includes the following strategies:
EU national health and social care workers residing within the UK and for firm commitments protecting any new EU national health and social care workers from any migration restrictions post Brexit in order to safeguard the sustainability of our NHS. We also call for the continuation of reciprocal type agreements, such as the S1 agreement, in relation to cross border healthcare and also propose staying under the regulative authority of the EMA post-Brexit. Lastly, we implore the current government to stand by pledges made during the general election and in the build up to the Brexit referendum as these should effectively combat any negative implications to NHS funding resulting from Brexit; with the only alternative being the increase of taxation and implementation of Austerity measures.
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The establishment of firm commitments that ensure the protection of the legal status of EU national health and social care workers residing within the UK and legal protection from any migration restrictions that will be implemented post-Brexit for EU doctors, nurses, health and social care staff. •Additionally, regarding cross border healthcare, we recommend the negotiation of a deal as similar to the EU member agreements as possible, allowing for continued reciprocal health care initiatives and arrangements such as the S1 agreement. This allows for reciprocal health care of expats between Britain and European countries and the European Health Insurance Card which provides cover for travelers. • Finally, we propose that upon leaving the EU we remain part of the European Medicines Agency. To not do so would mean that new drugs and treatments coming to the UK would have to submit to testing by the regulatory agency MHRA in addition to the standard EMA testing, which is somewhat time consuming.
The Brexit Dilemma Britain’s decision to leave the EU will unquestionably have a large effect on the NHS and in turn all health and social care throughout the country. Nonetheless, how severe the backlash is, will depend upon what type of deal is brokered and what policy the current government chooses to adopt. This paper considers the backlash that Brexit shall have on the NHS, (Nuffield Trust, 2017). Brexit will have a sizable impact on the British economy, the projections from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) currently stand at a £15.2 billion reduction in public finances by 2020/2021 (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2016). Moreover, if this is spread proportionally throughout the public sector based on their current make up, this means that there will be a cutback of £2.4 billion to NHS spending in England (Nuffield Trust, 2017). Finances and funding, however, are the only issue at stake for the NHS ( as a result of Brexit.) As McKenna notes, employment, cross border healthcare, and access to markets for medicines and pharmaceuticals may also be affected (Mckenna, 2017). (This shall all be examined in turn, before this paper turns to potential solutions.) From a more practical light, it is commonly known that employment of EU nationals plays a vital role in supporting our NHS and social care services. As of 2016-2017, there are currently 55,000 EU nationals working for the NHS and 80,000 EU nationals who are employed in the adult social care sector (Mckenna, 2017). One of the de facto implications of Brexit (that was widely campaigned for) is opting out of/ the Disapplication of the Free Movement of EU Nations. This disruption to the Free Movement of EU nationals shall have a detrimental impact for an already critically understaffed NHS, as well as the social care sector in Britain (which would be felt for years to come (Nuffield Trust, 2017; Mckenna, 2017; Blitz, 2017). The only other alternative policy option would be to allow the continued free movement of EU nationals which would lead to a dramatic increase in domestic training of doctors, nurses, and health and social care staff (Blitz, 2017; Nuffield Trust, 2017). This is unviable because even if this were to be implemented immediately, it would
still take a minimum of 3-4 years of training these individuals. This policy option would take us up to 1-2 years past the Brexit date. This is not to mention the funding that would be necessary for this, which in itself is practically impossible for the government to provide in the current economic climate (Nuffield Trust, 2017).
Failures of the Current Policies The policy as it stands for cross border healthcare must also come under examination, as the new policy needs to be written with the consideration that Britain will no longer be able to provide this as a non-EU member. (Mckenna, 2017; Nuffield Trust, 2017). Access to treatment for expats is of paramount importance as currently 1.2 million expat Britons live in Europe, with 190,000 of them being pensioners (Mckenna, 2017; Nuffield Trust, 2017). It currently costs the Department of Health approximately half a billion pounds a year to pay other countries to cover the cost of treatment for our expat population throughout Europe (Nuffield Trust, 2017; Blitz, 2017). If our expats had to return to access treatment to healthcare it could amount to as much as an extra £1 billion annually for the NHS (Nuffield Trust, 2017). Another area of consideration within cross border healthcare is access to information through centres such as the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. This centre aids and assists the quick sharing of expertise and information to help control and respond to pandemics and threats which transcend national boundaries, with which Brexit may well interfere (Mckenna, 2017). The last area under scrutiny is access to markets for medicine in the European Economic Area (EEA), as with Britain leaving the EU this may mean new pharmaceuticals will have to maneuver through two regulatory boards instead of one; both the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) (Mckenna, 2017; Taylor, 2016). This would consequently mean longer waiting times for new treatments & drugs, and means they would become more expensive; moreover, this could potentially drive the exodus of pharmaceutical companies from the UK (Hawkins, 2017; Tay-
lor, 2016).
A New Approach Due to the turmoil surrounding Brexit negotiations and its implications for the NHS, we the King’s Think Tank have decided to provide policy recommendations to help guide negotiations, specifically on the four aforementioned topics of immigration and employment of EU nationals for our health and social care services, cross border healthcare, accesses to new medicines and treatments, and general funding of the NHS. First, we propose that firm commitments are made to allowing the protection of the legal status of EU national health and social care workers residing within the UK and legal protection from any migration restrictions that will be implemented post-Brexit for EU doctors, nurses, health and social care staff. This is of paramount importance to the sustainability of not only our NHS, but all health and social care services throughout the UK (Nuffield Trust, 2017; Mckenna, 2017). Second, with regards to cross border healthcare, we the King’s Think Tank recommend the negotiation of a deal as similar to the EU member agreements as possible, allowing for continued reciprocal health care initiatives and arrangements such as the S1 agreement which allows for reciprocal health care of expats between Britain and European countries and the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC), which provides cover for travelers (Expat Focus, 2017). Third, we propose that upon leaving the EU, we remain part of the European Medicines Agency (EMA). To not do so would mean new drugs and treatments coming to the UK would have to submit to testing by the regulatory agency MHRA in addition to the standard EMA testing, which is somewhat time consuming (Mckenna, 2017; Taylor, 2016). This is vital to not only allowing the accesses to new treatments and medicines to go unhindered, but to also preemptively curtail the potential withdrawal of pharmaceutical companies from the UK (Mckenna, 2017; Taylor, 2016). Finally, the last area of consideration is NHS funding. Due to the aforementioned projections by the 48
OBR and how they will impact upon our NHS, the Conservative party must not only ensure they fulfil the promise of delivering an £8 billion increase in real terms for the NHS over the next 5 years as stated in their party manifesto for the general election, but they must also ensure the fulfillment of the £100 million per week pledge of the Vote Leave group (Conservative Party, 2017; Mckenna, 2017; Heilpern, 2016). Alternatively we propose that, the only viable option to help lessen this burden to the NHS funding would be the increase of income tax across the board and implementation of austerity measures in other public sectors. Allowing the unrestricted movement of EU national health and social care staff is paramount in safeguarding the sustainability of the NHS and our health and social care services (Mckenna, 2017; Nuffield Trust, 2017). With a marked decrease in of 96% in post-referendum arrivals, if firm commitments are not made allowing the continued immigration of EU national health and social care staff then it is estimated that the NHS will experience a shortage of up to 20,000 nursing staff by 2025/26 (Nuffield Trust, 2017; Pearson, 2017). This projected shortfall, when coupled with the results published by a recent study that the NHS is already chronically understaffed with up to 50,000 clinical roles left vacant, is something we cannot afford to allow happen as it would be detrimental to the long term sustainability of our health and social care services (Nuffield trust, 2017; Pearson, 2017). The alternative, of a rigorous increase in domestics services which although would make us much more self-sufficient and would mean the NHS would rely less heavily on EU nationals to staff it, is as aforementioned unviable due to time restrictions and funding limitations (Nuffield Trust, 2017). With regards to Cross border healthcare, if our proposal for the continuation of reciprocal agreements on health care is not heeded then this could result in our expats needing to return back to the UK to receive health care. This is not a viable option as the Department of Health believes that not only would this cost our government about double what is paid currently (under agreements such as S1), it would also require the building of 2 new hospitals and the employment of a further 1,600 nurses and healthcare staff; something that, given the current and projected crisis of chronic understaffing of the NHS, seems wholly unlikely we we be able to cater too (Nuffield Trust, 2017). As such,
continued reciprocal healthcare deals are the best option for the UK, post-Brexit (Nuffield Trust, 2017; Mckenna, 2017). Securing a deal in which we remain part of the EMA is also of real importance as due to the aforementioned necessity of 2 regulatory bodies, for new medicines and treatments to pass through if we leave the EMA, then this would not only delay our accesses to new drugs and technologies it may actually deter pharmaceutical companies from launching new products as they will have to “jump through extra hoops to win approval” (Taylor, 2016), something they may not be willing to do (Mckenna, 2017; Taylor, 2016). Moreover, we know it is possible, as shown by Norway and Iceland, to leave the EU and remain under the umbrella that is the EMA, something that is in the common interest of both the UK and the EU (Taylor, 2016). Finally, with regards to the funding of the NHS, the pledges by both the Conservative Party during the general election and the Vote Leave campaign in the build up to the referendum (an £8 billion increase in NHS funding over the next 5 years and £100 million per week in additional funding for the NHS, respectively) (Conservative Party, 2017; Heilpern, 2016). These pledges, if fulfilled as promised will go a long way in combatting the Brexit associated economic slowdown and any implications this slowdown has for NHS funding, moreover cash injections such as these could potentially negate any impact felt by the aforementioned £2.4 billion decrease in NHS funding, projected to occur by 2020/21 (Conservative Party, 2017; Heilpern, 2016; Office for Budget Responsibility, 2016; Nuffield Trust, 2017). As aforementioned the only alternative, if promises are not kept, would be implementation of increases in taxation and austerity measures in other sectors; a wholly unpopular choice nationwide, given the strict austerity measures that have been implemented under previous governments (Conservative Party, 2017; Heilpern, 2016).
Conclusion Through this paper, the Global Health policy centre at King’s Think Tank proposes a number of immediate measures to alleviate the dire situation of the NHS, that has been exacerbated by Brexit. The measures that we have proposed include: (i) the establishment of measures that ensure the-
protection of the legal status of EU national health and social care workers residing within the UK and; (ii) the establishment of firm commitments protecting any new EU national health and social care workers for any migration restrictions post Brexit. In this paper, we have aslo argued that the continuation of reciprocal type agreements, such as the S1 agreement, are vital with regards to the issue of to cross border healthcare. Staying under the regulative authority of the EMA post-Brexit is also necessary in this respect. Finally, we strongly advise the current government to stand by pledges made during the general election and in the build up to the Brexit referendum as these should effectively combat any negative implications to NHS fundings resulting from Brexit; with the only alternative being the increase of taxation and implementation of Austerity measures (Conservative Party, 2017; Heilpern, 2016)
Our Ageing Population: Preparing the NHS for the Inevitable Researched by Jonathan Higgs and edited by Mehr Panjawani Abstract: In 1948, there was little doubt that William Bryan’s proposal of the National Health Service would solve all the healthcare needs of England. By 2017 however, the demands of our country have changed significantly, and the once successful NHS appears to be ailing. As the “Baby Boom� generation rapidly approach old age, it is apparent that the NHS will struggle to cope with this ageing population and the sudden increase in patient needs if their current policies are not rapidly altered.In order to prepare the NHS for this impending issue, this paper proposes a person-centred system of care: a culture shift from the current geriatric healthcare which aims to give patients autonomy in their own healthcare and take the focus away from medical care places more importance on social care and 50
improving quality of life. Although this may prove to be expensive and difficult to implement similar policies such as the Eden Alternative demonstrate that a person-centred health care system can be highly successful and has the potential to reduce spending. In the longrun, the policy we have proposed aims to change how we culturally view what it means to grow old. We would be allowing elderly people who are at their final stage of life to retain increased autonomy with respect to their health and well-being rather than the current culture of than relying on State services to determine what is the best for the elderly.
An Unfeasible Situation for the NHS Whilst in 1948 there were only 5.5 million people aged over 65 in England, by 2045 this number is expected to increase to over 18 million people (Office of National Statistics, 2017). It is certain that a solution for necessary long-term care of the ageing population (who have increasing non-communicable and chronic conditions) is crucially needed. Although Phillip Hammond’s Green Paper promises to solve the issue of long term stability, (Spring Budget, 2017), this paper presents another solution on how to tackle this crisis. We at King’s Think Tank propose the development of a person-centred care approach which entails providing high quality care which respects the preferences, needs and values of patients to guide clinical decisions (so that respectful and responsive care can be provided in the long-run). The ageing population is defined as ‘the change in the overall age structure of society as the number of elderly people in relation to other age groups rises’, (Future of Ageing Populations, 2017). For the past 40 years, the average fertility rates have been below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per couple. This means that the children of the 1960’s “Baby Boom” are approaching old age more rapidly than the children of future generations are being born, (Future of the ageing population). In fact, by 2045 it is estimated that 24.6% of the population will be aged 65 and over and the numbers of people aged 85 and over is expected to double over the next two decades (AGE UK, 2017). Yet, technological advances have managed to increase the average life span. Hence, it is likely that a large proportion of the health and social care demands in Britain will need to focus on the long-term treatment and maintenance of NCDs and chronic conditions often found in geriatric healthcare. These conditions include problems that require substantial social care rather than medical attention, such as dementia, which is projected to have a substantial rise in the number of cases from 822,000 current cases to over 1.7 million by 2051, (BBC, 2017). Furthermore, despite the fact that people are now living longer, their lives are not necessarily happier. Loneliness coupled with social exclusion and depression associated with geriatric health prob-
lems has been become increasingly prevalent. This in turn has led to earlier entry into care homes, higher levels of emergency admissions, and increased mortality. The high demand for social care alongside medical care then, is a unique problem specific to geriatric populations for which the NHS is currently unprepared. As the “Baby Boom” generation rapidly approach old age, it is apparent that the NHS will struggle to cope with the sudden increase in patient needs if their current policies are not rapidly altered, (The Lancet, 2017).
Failures of the Current Approach Under the current policy, the total spending on adult social care by local authorities has reached £17.5 billion in 2016-17 (Health UK, 2017) Whilst planned spending for the Department of Health stands at approximately £123.8 billion in 2017/18 (Health UK, 2017). These numbers are rapidly reducing local authority spending on adult social care in England falling by 8% between 2010 and 2017 (Health UK, 2017). In fact, the NHS in unique in its lack of adaptation to the current issues of the ageing population. This is because Britain spends less of its GDP on healthcare relative to 8 other European countries including Germany, France and Belgium, (Health UK, 2017). Over the next 15 years, both health and social care face a £64 billion funding gap with cost pressures on the NHS rising by 3.8% every year. Pressure on hospitals is also increasing as inpatient episodes significantly rise by 8.9% from 14.9 million a year in 2010 to 16.2 million in 2015/2016 (AGE UK, 2017). In addition, older people now account for 65% of hospital admissions. They generally spend longer in hospital with people over 75 staying an average of 9.1 days per admission compared to an average of 5 for other ages (AGE UK, 2017). Currently, the organisations that commission geriatric health and social care consist of : (i) 211 clinical commissioning groups for hospital care; (ii) Emergency care; (iii) Community care; (iv) Mental health groups; (v) 152 local authorities for social care and; (vi) NHS England for primary and specialist care. Whilst all these services exist, they are currently completely uncoordinated, making healthcare for groups such as the geriatric population difficult.
This lack of coordination between services has made the medical and social care of the elderly inefficient and inaccessible. Indeed, there has been a 27% decline in the number of people receiving social care since 2006 even though the geriatric population increased in this period (AGE UK, 2017).
Indeed, the Institute for Fiscal Studies calculates that this alone could raise ÂŁ1.4 billion. By shuffling around the existing budget and utilising the increase in taxation that is a likely result of Brexit policies, we suggest that a person-centred system (such as the one that has been outlined) could be plausibly funded. This would provide a more sustainable, cost-effective solution to the burden of the ageing population in the long-term.
A New Approach
Weaknesses
Hence the ageing population poses a huge problem and the current policies are financially inadequate, poorly coordinated, and will inevitably result in many unmet needs. Therefore, the King’s Think Tank recommends that a more sustainable solution is needed. This would need to implemented quickly and easily to relieve the burden caused by ageing populations. To that end, this paper proposes a person-centred care approach of amalgamating health care and social systems together. Both these systems are intrinsically linked, especially in the case of geriatric healthcare and thus a solution that takes this into account would undoubtedly be well-founded.
Nonetheless, the proposed approach still contains a number of weaknesses. First, the procedure of implementing person-centred care may prove to be a complicated one as it requires a step-by-step process of implementation that relies on the active involvement and collaboration of local authorities, nurses and patients.
This is also because the elderly often require many of these services in unique combinations.
The policy of person-centred care would mean a culture shift from the current geriatric healthcare. This is because giving patients autonomy in their own healthcare and taking the focus away from medical care places more importance on social care and improving quality of life. To enforce this culture shift, we propose taking a similar route to the route taken in the Barker Commission (2014). The results of the Barker Commission suggested that the barrier between health and social care should be removed to create a single, ring-fenced budget and commission together. This would make personal and social care free at the highest level of need and offer increasing personal budgets to promote independence. To create a budget for these systems, the Barker Commission (2016) suggests releasing existing resources more efficiently, namely diverting money away from affluent pensioners, and into health and social care. For example, free TV-licenses and winter fuel payments for over-75 year olds should no longer be provided on a universal basis. Instead, we recommend that this are limited to those on pension credit. 52
As this policy requires more of a culture shift then, the length of time taken to implement this would depend upon the organisational culture as well as the mind-set of nurses, and care staff. (These individuals may seek to delay employment measures that make the patient responsible for their own healthcare.) This could mean that implementation of our policy would vary between hospitals, as different patients adapt differently to the culture shift. Furthermore, for health care professionals, a commonly cited barrier is that many believe that the care they provide is already person-centred. (This is contrary to a significant amount of evidence that suggests that this is not actually the case). On another note, the expenses of implementing this policy would still be hefty as this requires the implementation of a great deal of physical changes. Nevertheless, it is difficult to quantify an exact cost as the policy would induce a culture shift after all. It is already estimated that treatment and care for geriatrics with long-term conditions already accounts for 70% of the primary and acute care budget in England (Department of Health, 2011c). Indeed, this spending will most likely have to increase in order to cope with the new demands of the ageing population. A culture shift in healthcare then, would still financially benefit the NHS in the long-run.
Furthermore, similar policies such as the Eden Alternative demonstrate that a person-centred health care system can be highly successful and has the potential to reduce spending. This non-profit organisation is dedicated to improving the quality of life for elders by utilising collaborative partnerships with the elderly in order to maximise quality of life outcomes. A year after the implementation of this set of policies, a drop in the quantity of prescription drugs for mental health ensued. The subsequent, successful outcome was cheaper medication bills with 38% fewer costs per resident (Thomas, 1996). Hence, if implemented correctly, person-centred care could help improve the sustainability of both the NHS and social care. This is because a reduction in spending and reliance on medication to improve patients’ wellbeing helps the NHS prepare adequately for the increasing long-term future demands. Such a policy would also reduce the unmet needs of hospitals and staff, as well as help people become more active in taking care of their own health. (This undoubtedly reduces demands on health and social services). In the long-run, our policy aims to change how we culturally view what it means to grow old. That is to say we would be viewing elderly people who are at their final stage of life retain increased autonomy with respect to their health and well-being. (This is radically different to the culture of than relying on State services to determine what is the best for the elderly). Furthermore, our policy is an innovative approach because the concept of person-centred care puts patients at the heart of care in a manner that few approaches have ever accomplished before. It may be that the only way to realistically relieve the burden of healthcare, (with respect to the ageing population,) is to change our mindset towards the types of care needed. But, this is a necessary step and as this paper argues it can be achieved by emphasising the intrinsically linked relationship of both social and medical care.
Assessment In conclusion, there is little doubt that the NHS is ill-equipped to deal with the burden of caring for the ageing population. In light of the impact of Brexit in particular, the NHS needs to adopt a
new more feasible, more effective and more adequate strategy. In an attempt to remedy that, this paper proposes that the British government adopts a radically different healthcare strategy for the elderly. As explained above, this approach favours providing personalised treatment towards each senior patient/individual in need of care. At first, his policy recommendation may seem to be challenging becuase it requires a complete culture shift and the costs are quite hefty. However, as this paper has strived to prove, the proposed approach would ensre the establishment of a more stable and sustainable healthcare system that actually (for a change) raises the quality of life (and the health) of all the ageing population (from those who are inflicted with terminal illnesses, to those who have mental health conditions or who simply need basic care in the final years of their lives. Indeed, it is our moral imperative to ensure that the care/ the future of the ageing population is guaranteed and protected- this simply cannot and will not be achieved without a drastic policy shift.
Law
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LESSONS FROM ACROSS THE POND A Comparative Analysis of English and Canadian legal policy regarding a mature minor’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment Written by Olivier Peeters and edited by Ellen Newell Abstract
Policy Proposal Summary:
Legal Critics such as Lyons , Gilmore and Herring have observed that the current de facto legal policy in English Common law with regards to a mature minor’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is highly problematic because it does not distinguish between cases whereby a minor is not yet of legal age to make their own decision and cases where he/she has sufficient maturity to decide whether to consent to or to refuse treatment. As it stands, the age of majority is 18 in England and Wales and thus a combination of several legal instruments is used to determine the validity of a minor’s decision to refuse life sustaining treatment. The Common law states that minors of any age may consent to medical treatment, notwithstanding parental opposition if they demonstrate maturity to understand the proposed treatment (also known as the ‘Gillick-competence’ principle). The ‘Gillick-competence’ introduced a distinction between consent and refusal and maintained the principle that parental rights to consent are concurrent to those of the minor, by invoking the court’s inherent parens patriae jurisdiction. The Family Law Reform Act 1969 states that the consent of minors over 16 is equivalent to that of an adult. Nonetheless, subsequent case law has significantly limited the application of Gillick-competence and by extension a minors’ right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Thus, as it stands, English medical law recognises the right of mature minors to consent to proposed treatments, but does not recognise their right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
This paper proposes the introduction of the following general principles into English Common Law. • A rule stating that the minor must demonstrate the following to decide: (1) understand the information for their diagnosis and the risks and benefits of the potential treatments (2) sufficient reasoning to compare outcomes based on their potential to further one’s values (3) a set of internally consistent, stable, and self-affirmed values, developed by a process of reflective self-evaluation. If the patient reflects these conditions, then they can decide if they want to refuse treatment. • Consequently, a minor should satisfy Gunn’s third test of capacity, the ‘rationality test,’ which assesses how decision is made. The assessor, therefore, evaluates if the decision made by the minor is a ‘fairly logical product’ of their value base. • If the minor’s values are sufficiently stable, then minors should be able to make ‘best desire’ decisions which demonstrate their values. Therefore, this approach advocates using age as a proxy for intelligence, rationality, perception, and experience, not just as a factor.
Medical law is marked by the interaction of two fundamental principles: the individual patient’s autonomy interest on the one hand, and the state’s interest in the preservation of life on the other. In the case of capacitious adults, the balance comes down clearly in favour of patient autonomy. As clarified above, the situation is less clear-cut for mature minors who refuse life-sustaining treatment, and hence the English Common law position to medical decision-making by minors has been heavily criticised. Having established the fact that the de facto legal policy in England is in dire need of legislative intervention, this paper aims to find a solution to the problem regarding a minor’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Specifically, through observing the success of Canadian legal policy in this regard, it is argued that the Canadian model may be emulated and adapted into English Common Law (and by extension legal policy). The policy recommendation that this paper advances hinges upon a modified conception of patient autonomy. This conception specifically reflects the minor’s limited ability to make maximally autonomous choices, and should be the theoretical starting point of any legislative reform. THE PROBLEM AS IT STANDS As clarified in the abstract the main legal principle in this regard is the ‘Gillick-competence’. Yet, Gillick has only been applied to cases of minors seeking contraceptive treatment or an abortion without parental knowledge when Gillick-competence is determinative, and the minor’s objective best interests are irrelevant. Lord Donaldson interpreted the “parental right to determine” in Gillick to mean a parental right of veto. In light of this reading, Gillick-competence merely precludes a parent from overriding a mature minor’s consent, without affecting a parent’s concurrent right to consent to treatment refused by the minor. The distinction between consent and refusal has become a settled part of the law. Even though courts have stressed the important of adolescent autonomy, in An NHS Foundation Hospital v P, the court still overrode a 17-year old’s refusal of treatment for a paracetamol overdose. This was found to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights. 56
This demonstrates precisely how English law regarding the right of mature minors to refuse treatment is problematic. The distinction between a mature minor’s ability to consent to or refuse treatment has become the subject of recent academic debate. Lyons notes that, by leaving the ethical question of whether to treat against the competent minor’s wishes to the medical profession, the court allows the physician to impose their values on the minor. Gilmore and Herring attempt a similar justification. They argue that, to give a valid consent, Gillick merely requires a minor to demonstrate that he or she understands ‘the nature of the treatment proposed’. Given that such an understanding is not assessed under Gillick, a Gillick-competent minor may well be competent to consent, but not to refuse. In those circumstances, the court or parents validly retain concurrent powers of consent. An understanding of the consequences of not having treatment would also be required under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, albeit subject to the diagnostic criterion, limiting the applicability of Gilmore and Herring’s analysis to minors under 16, who are not subject to the Act. Looking to Re W itself, Lord Donaldson’s conducted no separate assessment of the minor’s understanding of the consequences of not having treatment. Gilmore and Herring’s analysis is thus best understood as a justification, not an interpretation, based primarily on a pragmatically asserted qualitative difference between consent and refusal. Similarly pragmatic attitudes motivate judges to apply exceedingly high and unachievable thresholds in competency assessments, arguably as an ‘easy way out’ of overruling a competent minor’s express refusal of medical intervention based on sincerely held convictions. THE CANADIAN CASE STUDY Canadian medical law offers a different approach to the conflict between the state’s desire to preserve life and the autonomy of the individual over their own potential treatment. The state’s interest in “preserving the life or health of a competent patient must generally give way to the patient’s stronger interest in directing the course of her own life”.
In this paper, the Gillick-competence merely precludes a parent from overriding a mature minor’s consent, without affecting a parent’s concurrent right to consent to treatment refused by the minor. Canadian medical law, however, recognises a capable adult patient’s fundamental right to make their own treatment decisions . To provide a valid consent or refusal, the patient must have capacity and by introducing Gillick-competency into Canadian law, courts came to assess both a minor’s understanding (i.e. capacity) and intelligence (i.e. maturity) . Compared to England, human and constitutional rights play a larger role in Canadian judicial reasoning. As is apparent from the case of An NHS Foundation Hospital v P, English courts take the minor’s inability to refuse treatment as a starting point, assess the minor’s best interests, and only subsequently analyse the compatibility of their decision with the ECHR. Canadian courts engage in a far more thorough assessment of the mature minor doctrine’s constitutionality. They begin by asserting the minor’s autonomy interests, and explicitly acknowledge the tension with the state’s interest in ensuring welfare, highlighting their respect for a sufficiently mature minor’s exercise of their autonomy. At the Common law level, a minor’s capacity is assessed in the same manner as an adult’s. A parent or guardian may provide substitute consent on behalf of an incapacitous minor. The Supreme Court in C (A) stressed that where courts had in the past allowed a mature minor to refuse life-sustaining treatment, they had done so because it was in the minor’s best interest. The minor’s maturity did no more than define the weight to be attached to the minor’s preferences. The Supreme Court explained that whenever a refusal was contrary to the minor’s best interest, courts relied on a wide range of factors to find the minor incapable, for example, from overbearing parental influence . LESSONS TO BE LEARNED What emerges from the discussion so far is the clear need for legislative intervention in England. By adopting legislation concerned specifically with a minor’s ability to consent to and refuse medical intervention, Parliament can establish a stricter framework within which courts can carry out their assessments.
The democratic process can achieve a socially acceptable balancing of these values. Where a mature minor refuses life-sustaining treatment, the state’s interest for preserving the welfare of the people and the minor’s autonomy interest, come into confrontation. The fact that the autonomy of the adolescent is not absolute, distinguishes a minor’s refusal from an adult’s. This approach turns age into a legitimate proxy or maturity. The use of age is only morally legitimate so long as the minor retains the ability to prove his or her maturity, which is the underlying quality that confers a right to autonomous decision-making. There are pragmatic reasons for exercising caution before allowing a minor to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Some commentators focus on the ‘physical and mental differences between children and adults’, including the fact that minors’ emotional and cognitive faculties are still in a state of development. To achieve this, commentators have developed may frameworks within which autonomy is balanced against competing values. Applying Beauchamp and Childress’ four general norms of common morality to the context of adolescent refusals, Huxtable argues that courts favour non-maleficence and beneficence over respect for autonomy. Eekelaar conceives of three categories of rights that children, upon attaining the necessary ‘ability to-appreciate what will serve them best’, may retrospectively claim: basic interests, developmental interests, and autonomy interests. These theories are characterized by the search for a justification to circumscribe the exercise of a minor’s present autonomy interest. It is necessary to recognise that patients of any age cannot be fully autonomous in a healthcare context, as they must rely on expert medical opinion, and the intricate consequences of the proposed treatment which they may not fully understand. In addition, autonomy is not a state, but a dynamic process whereby a person defines themselves and evolves their self-perception according to their social interactions. This requires a person to engage in a process of self-reflection and develop an ability to identify higher order desires. Adolescent autonomy is thus perceived as “an evolving, rather than absolute concept”, a period during which the minor struggles to attain auton-
omy while confronting their continued reliance on parental support. This significantly strengthens the case in favour of respecting only ‘richly autonomous choices’, which are made with ‘full understanding of the consequences’ and reflect a ‘genuine part of the person’s life vision’. In other words, to act autonomously, the minor must make a decision that reflects his or her values. According to Buchanan and Brock, the minor would have to demonstrate the following to evidence a competent choice: (1) an understanding of the information relevant to his or her diagnosis and the risks and benefits of proposed treatments; (2) sufficient reasoning to compare outcomes based on their potential to further one’s values; (3) a set of internally consistent, stable and self-affirmed values, developed by a process of reflective self-evaluation, and an ability to decide on the relative weight accorded to these values. In essence, a minor would have to satisfy Gunn’s third test of capacity, the ‘rationality test’, which assesses the process by which a decision is made, not its outcome. Where a minor’s values are sufficiently stable, minors should be allowed to make ‘best desire’ decisions which reflect their values and satisfy Gunn’s ‘rationality’ test. Where the minor’s values lack the necessary stability and self-reflective qualities, an ‘ideal desire’ decision must be made on their behalf, reflecting their religious and cultural heritage as far as possible. This approach uses age as a proxy for intelligence, rationality, perception, and experience, not as a factor in itself. A sufficiently mature minor’s decision is qualitatively equal to that of an adult, and deserves the same respect. Therefore, English law should adapt and follow the Canadian example to allow mature minors the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. CONCLUSION There is little doubt that English approach is in direne ed of legislative intervention, and although Canadian experience is not free of its own imperfections, it offers valuable lessons in this regard. Additionally, a more nuanced and realistic understanding of adolescent autonomy provides a justification for a thorough assessment of the maturity of a minor who refuses life-sustaining treatment. Such an assessment should be incorporated into a targeted legislative framework, as in New Bruns58
wick and British Columbia. Such a codified functional approach ensures the minor is awarded a degree of self-determination commensurate with his or her maturity, and does not rely on age as an arbitrary or conclusive factor.
Religion, Ethics and Culture
60
A Revision of Italy’s Integration Policies Written by Emma Shleifer, Grace Avila Casanova and Isabel Royce PART 1: Economic integration Background:
Potential Solutions:
In September 2017, Italy introduced the ‘National Integration Plan’ (NIP) aimed at the nearly 75,000 individuals holding refugee status. With 2.3 million foreign workers as of January 2017, Italy is the only EU country whose immigrants’ employment rate is higher than that of native workers. This is because immigrants concentrate in low-income areas where the labour market is tighter (Eurostat, 2017), performing 76.8% of medium-low qualified jobs. This is reflected in their low salaries and disadvantaged socio-professional status: 79.8% of immigrants’ monthly income remains below €1200. Prior to the NIP, Italy’s economic integration policies were limited to a subsection of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) covering two aspects; The first aiming to improve employability and qualifications of workers in the care and domestic sector. The second, providing a service network for the prevention of undeclared work and providing internship experience, mostly in the tourism sector.
Participation in the labour market is the most significant factor that aids long-term integration as it is central to immigrants’ fiscal contributions to their host society. Additionally, promoting fair employment opportunities will reduce immigrants’ reliance on local welfare systems. Therefore, in order to achieve overall social integration, this paper recommends the implementation of the following integration mechanisms into the labour market:
Indeed, immigrants continue to be segregated into low-qualified jobs due to the mismatch between the low demand of qualified labour and the high supply of manual jobs. This is also because in Italy, higher education does not guarantee employment or non-manual work. Most Italian companies and organisations do not recognise non-EU qualifications, and the language barrier often prevents the successful use of numerous professional skills. Integration policy is largely a responsibility of the central government and it may be devolved to subnational governments. However, when considering the scale and pace of new arrivals, integrating newcomers into the labour force may be challenging.
1. The formal delegation of authority to subnational governments: This would allow greater flexibility in terms of economic integration. This would also encourage liaising with local partners and hence capitalise on the opportunities available in each region,. 2. The establishment of increased flexibility for regions or cities in choosing which partners to work with. (Partners here could include but would not be limited to public employment services, educational institutions, civil society organisations, chambers of commerce or trade and local businesses). Although these private and civil society actors may be considered less “traditional”, working with these actors would allow the government to benefit from their expertise in areas such as labour market needs and opportunities, employers hiring newcomers, service providers for certain refugee communities and additional funding that can help stretch limited local budgets. A challenge here might be sustaining partners’ engagement in lending their expertise. 3. Ensuring that all ALMPs available to documented immigrants in order to foster better matching of labour demand and supply among this group. It is particularly important to increase immigrants’ participation in activation programmes as the Italian labour market may be becoming ethnically polarised.
4. The strategic mapping of all the academic and professional qualifications immigrants have earned abroad immediately after arrival. This would offer urgent and tailored support to each individual in their search for employment. Subnational governments may partner with educational institutions and employers to connect them with further training or placements. A successful example of this exists in Helsinki, Finland ( whereby funding comes from the Ministry of Education).
7. The establishment of programmes fostering migrant entrepreneurship in order to create alternative pathways to social integration via opportunities to become economic self-sufficient, especially for non-trained immigrants. This requires addressing the challenges they face by providing legal and administrative advice, information on credit access and exposure to professional networks.
Here, directly involving industry or employer in the design and implementation of recognition procedures lays the groundwork for their support when it comes to training and hiring immigrants. Another efficient case where this has been implemented exists in Munich, Germany: The German Federal Institute for Vocational and Professional Education works with the chambers of industry and trade on a programme that evaluates and certifies qualified refugees to practice in Germany. Although the programme is small in scale, the chambers endorse and provide quality assurance (Daimler, 2016).
This has been successfully established in Barcelona, Spain: Barcelona Emprenedoria, a branch of the Local Development Agency of the City Council, provides particular groups (refugees, women and young adults) with information and tools to develop their business ideas. The range of services offered and provided by the municipal agency through their innovation environments, is also complemented by a virtual innovation platform made up of local companies who provide specialised services to aid their consolidation and growth (Barcelona Emprenedoria, 2015)
5. The revision of the logistics of language training is another necessary strategy. The existing policy in Italy is efficient. However improvements are needed in order to avoid overlap between services provided across different levels of government as well to ensure that needs are adequately met. Additional courses could be designed in the framework of vocational training in order to create stronger job-specific skills.
Policy Proposal Assessment
6. The establishment of additional support for vocational training and internships through engaging potential employers. This is crucial in order to facilitate employment transition by bridging training and placement opportunities. Directly involving industry or employers in the design and implementation of recognition procedures will lay the groundwork for their support when it comes to training and hiring immigrants. This has been successfully implemented in Stuttgart, Germany: In 2015 Daimler, a multinational automotive corporation, partnered with a local employment agency and the Stuttgart’s job centre to offer a 14 week internship programme for 40 asylum seekers, comprising practical experience, language training and assistance finding jobs afterwards (City of Stuttgart, 2014) 62
The following proposals hings upon providing the substantial long-term support that is required to help newcomers if they are to enter and thrive in local labour markets and training systems. Early access to decent work is essential to social inclusion. However, it may take a long time for these policies to produce the intended results, and it for this very reason that is essential that these policies are sustained over time. With regards to funding constraints, subnational governments may fund integration activities using their own annual budgets or using funding from the national government. However, the financial crises that is currently affecting the national economy might lead to regional budget cuts and a reprioritisations of integration policies at various levels of government.
PART 11: Cultural aspects of Integration: Religion, traditional practices, language
Policies targeting the labour market can be further aided to fuel integration through policies targeting religious and cultural strife within communi-
ties. In the NIP (2017), Italy follows the example of France, targeting education in both language and ‘Italian values’. In return for immigrants upholding traditional Italian values and co-operating within the community, they are being put on waiting lists for housing and work. Moreover, to tackle the language barrier, it must be made clear that learning the Italian language must be necessary upon arrival, hence it becomes ‘a right but also a duty.’ However, by only addressing those who gain refugee status, this cannot tackle the immigration issue as a whole as there are many who are refused this status. If adjusted to include all newcomers, this policy could go some way to bridge the social gap between migrants entering the country on an educational level. Potential Solutions: Hence policies that are focused on religious integration and equality across Italy must also be implemented. This paper suggests to the following approach: 1. The introduction of communal prayer spaces across Italy, in places of worship and more importantly in schools and workplaces. This would establish common values and a mutual respect for all ethnicities and religions. However, it should be coupled with education on different religions, stressing common points and values. It is difficult to insert a new or more proportionally present religion without tension. Multi-faith spaces are already a controversial issue in countries with a high level of tolerance, such as Denmark. As a very Catholic nation, Italy would most likely encounter heavy challenges to incorporate such measures that are also sometimes argued to be inadequate for the multiple religions present. Thus, education would be a key tool to encourage tolerance and sharing of different religions. As this involves a change in the social consciousness, this requires media campaigns in the area of popular culture, so that films and books are included as well as advertisements, and cultural education in schools. 2. With regards to religion, interreligious and intercultural dialogue initiatives should be implemented. This will provide immigrants with the opportunity to openly discuss and share their backgrounds and beleifs with other communities in order to prevent racism.
Policy Proposal Assessment Although the aforementioned measures are fairly inexpensive, they could potentially cause friction if oversubscribed to by one group and/or if they are not effectively policed to ensure they are not seen to favour one religion over another. To tackle this concern, the Italian government should introduce a strict anti-discrimination policy to ensure that the state and other institutions reflect the wider society’s acceptance of diversity. This is an absolutely vital step, particularily because in recent years the number of recorded hate crimes has risen from 71 incidences in 2012 to a stifling 803 in 2016. However, despite this potential issue, the proposed policy would go a long way to promote common values and further integrate migrants into Italian society, especially when complemented with efforts to bridge the language, education and labour discrepancies. Conclusion This policy proposal combines two essential aspects for individuals’ successful, overall integration: participation in the country’s economy and cultural life. While the process of integration is complex and long, it is necessary to achieve harmony and co-habitation between communities. However, rather than either erasing or highlighting differences, this proposal aims to transcend them. Successful integration relies on building on common ground, namely safety and peace.
Guest Submissions
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Building Lasting Peace in Somalia By Aisha Naz On the 14th of October 2017, a deadly truck bomb exploded in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu killing over three hundred people. It was the deadliest attack since the rise of Al-Shabab in 2007 . After the attack, President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (known as President Farmajo) declared three days of national mourning . The attack added to the mountain of criticism facing the government as President Farmajo came under fire for the Transitional Federal Government’s (TFG) inability to provide adequate security . Government failings, are of course, at the heart of Somalia’s problems. The TFG continues to struggle to forge a relationship with its citizens, establish security and justice and provide livelihoods for its citizens. Al-Shabaab have been quick to play on these fears. Therefore, if peace is to be secured in Somalia, it is vital that the TFG establish themselves as a legitimate government and meet the key needs of the country’s citizens. Background Somalia continues to be a country plagued by civil war, terrorism, and weak governance . The collapse of Somalia’s military dictatorship in 1991 and the civil war that followed, resulted in a clan based governance structure in Somalia . Communities relied on traditional institutions, customary laws, and community elders to resolve disputes . This system ran with some success and businesses in telecommunications and livestock began to emerge . Yet, it was not until 2000 that headway was made in creating a new centralised Somalian government in the form of the Transitional National Government (TNG). However, the TNG was short lived. Despite the fact that it had aimed to be inclusive by implementing proportional representation for Somalian clans, it became associated with Mogadishu’s clans and the business class. It also failed to gain support from the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation council (SRRC) which was supported by Ethiopia, in which Abdullahi Yusuf held a leadership role. As a result, it was eventually re-
placed by the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) and Abdullahi Yusuf was appointed as the transitional president. This only served to transform the government from a Hawiye clan and Islamist dominated administration to a federalist Darod clan and Ethiopian supported government . In 2006, the already fragile TFG faced a new challenge – the rise of Islamist groups. In April of that year, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) drove the U.S backed warlord alliance (known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism) out of Mogadushu. They quickly won public support based on their ability to provide a high degree of security and they appeared to offer an alternative to the failing TFG . Efforts were made by the Arab League to reconcile the ICU and the TFG ,but when this failed, Ethiopian forces, backed by the U.S , invaded Somalia in 2006. They forced out the ICU and re-established the TFG as the central government. The ICU leaders, however, pushed back against the Ethiopian occupation and established the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and mobilised support for their cause . Eventually the UN mediated talks between the ARS and the TFG in Djibouti reached an agreement to withdraw Ethiopian troops by late 2008. Abdullahi Yusuf resigned and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former Chair of the ICU, replaced him as President. The country saw this as an opportunity to establish a new and more unified TFG as a moderate Islamic government, which had considerable backing from both Somalians and the international community. However, the rise of Al-Shabaab, who denounced the Djibouti agreement and viewed it as a betrayal by the ARS, meant peace was short lived in Somalia . Even today, the government continues to fight for legitimacy in the face of constant attacks orchestrated by Al-Shabaab.
Imminent Challenges A.
Representative Governance
Somalia is a country with deep rooted clan affiliations, an Islamic heritage, and a history of conflict that has resulted in the establishment of warlords and terrorist organisations. In addition, Somalia also has an extremely young population who seek progress. Therefore, if the TFG is to be fully accepted by Somalians, it needs to continue to draw on both clan ties and religious communities, but it also needs to forge a relationship with young Somalians interested in progress and change . 70% of Somalians are below the age of 30 and therefore, it is important that the government draws on this pool of young people to help build Somalia’s future . While the TFG provides an equal number of seats to Somalia’s four major clans and includes both religious and secular members , the government has put little emphasis on the need to recruit young Somalians. Therefore, even though the government is supported by external backers, it has not been able to fully develop a relationship with its citizens. It cannot represent its core voter base, so the government is likely to struggle to embed itself in society. At the same time, if the international community does want to see Somalia stabilise and the threat of terrorism to subside, it needs to allow the government to incorporate moderate Islamic elements . Rebel groups include both extremists who follow a takfiri view of Islam and moderates who are more interested in political power . 66
Many of these moderates served with current TFG members during the time of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) . To establish strong governance which is accepted by the people, it is important to include the country’s Islamic heritage and for the international community to distinguish between moderate and extremist ideology
B.
Security and Justice
The ability to provide security and justice are part of the core services expected of a government and without establishing authority within this area, the government will continue to lack legitimacy. Al-Shabaab is arguably better at providing security and justice than the government. It operates mobile courts that are seen to work at cases both quickly and effectively throughout the country, even in Mogadishu . Land disputes are commonly brought to the group because they are seen to provide the most consistent, and therefore fair, response . They have also been able to operate checkpoints far more effectively and fairly than the Somalian National Army (SNA) . National security has been a priority for President Farmajo. He has continued to push for international support to defeat Al-Shabaab . The U.S has increased the numbers of soldiers on the ground from 50 a year ago to 400 and in March, U.S President Donald Trump, increased the U.S military’s power to carry out anti-terror operations in Somalia . Since then there have been 13 missions with U.S participation .
Therefore, to gain legitimacy, national security must be seen to be directly provided by the TFG. For this to occur, reforming the SNA needs to be a priority. The army is currently marred by corruption . Checkpoints are used as an opportunity to extort money from citizens and have been the source of internal conflict in the SNA . Predatory behaviour by the SNA has fuelled a deep distrust of official forces. According to a former AlShabaab member from lower Shabelle, ‘in the areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, people fear the military will loot and rape – and Al-Shabaab has become skilled at tapping into those fears.”
C.
Creation of Employment Opportunities
As it currently stands ( Jan. 2017), 67% of Somalian youth are estimated to be unemployed . President Farmajo needs to continue to encourage investment in Somalia, particularly in the start-up of small and medium businesses. The country has historically relied on agriculture and the livestock industry but it is important that the country diversifies. Farming has proven to cause much instability in Somalia due to drought. In 2011, famine resulted in the death of over 250,000 people and the country is currently considered to be ‘pre-famine’ due to the failure of 4 consecutive rainy seasons. According to officials, 80% of Somaliland’s livestock has died . Investing in emerging Somalian industries will go a long way in generating much needed employment. Somalians have proven to be extremely entrepreneurial and willing to build businesses in spite of their unstable environment . The country has a number of promising industries with enormous job creation potential. Services such as telecommunications, financial services (money transfer), and construction, are just some of Somalia’s fastest growing industries . The country also has promising oil reserves off the coast of Somalia which with careful management, have the potential to boost the country’s economy. Somalia, however, has one of the most difficult climates for businesses to operate in . If President Farmajo is to encourage investment and make a success of Somalia’s economy, the government must ensure that investor protections are in place through enforceable property laws and contracts .
Final Assessment It is certain then, that if lasting peace is to be established in Somalia, the TFG must gains legitimacy. This can only be achieved through establishing a representative government, monopolising the provision of security and justice, and providing Somalian citizens with viable livelihoods. The government must include young Somalians in building the country’s future by encouraging them to take up positions in government. This is the country’s best hope for embedding the government into Somalian society by allowing it to organically evolve with its people. At the same time, the international community, particularly the U.S, needs to recognise the difference between moderate and extremist Islamic ideologies and allow the government to reflect the moderate majority. Furthermore, the government must be seen to directly provide security and justice. Thus, reforming the Somalian armed forces must be a priority which can be remedied through the provision of adequate and timely salaries. Finally, if the government is to gain the trust and support of the Somalian people, it needs to directly improve people’s living conditions by addressing the exceptionally high unemployment rates. To do this, the government needs to continue to ask for foreign investment and put in place enforceable property and contract laws to protect and encourage investors.
Refugees without Refuge: Campaigning for Equal Access at KCL Written and proposed by STAR society, King’s College London At present, 65.6 million people according to the UNHCR have been the victims of forced migration worldwide. As one of the world’s leading universities, King’s College London (KCL) is aware of the critical levels the crisis has reached. In response, the university implemented the Sanctuary programme which seeks to empower forced migrants in the UK with equal access to Higher Education. Through this paper, the Student Action for Refugees (STAR) society at KCL will present existing initiatives on the university’s accessibility policy for forced migrants.This paper aims to outline the university’s position at the forefront of active engagement and commitment to accessibility in Higher Education by offering the Sanctuary Scholarships and, due to recent developments, will soon provide more scholarships. KCL STAR defines Equal Access as the support to ensure that people in the UK seeking refugee protection have equal access to higher education and can join us at university as equals. This paper specifies two key issues for KCL efforts of advocacy must focus on: 1. Leadership: In terms of the commitment and coordination of support, we point to the Equal Access Pledge, Article 26 and partnership with external actors. 2. Funding: We welcome solutions such as the existing Sanctuary scholarships and upcoming scholarships. 68
Leadership
Apart from being one of the world’s leading universities, KCL is also at the forefront in ensuring Equal Access to forced migrants through its Sanctuary Programme and are constantly evaluating its policies to mitigate the changing dynamics of the refugee crisis. To this end, this paper seeks to outline the university’s ongoing efforts in ensuring that the most vulnerable members of our society are given a chance in Higher Education at a top 25 university.
Equal Access Pledge
In September 2016 King’s College London signed he Equal Access Pledge developed by National Union of Students (NUS) and STAR.The underlying aim of the Equal Access Pledge is to allow “all those seeking refugee protection to be able to study as home students” in order to provide, and effectively advertise, a target of 10 scholarships. While universities are making significant progress in concrete policy formulation, a critical issue of the financial status of beneficiaries remains unresolved. Categorised as international students rather than home students, this policy precludes access to student finance loans crucial for the literal survival of tens of thousands of students in London, no less an asylum-seeker looking to build a new life. This is further exacerbated by the fact that asylum-seekers are barred from working in the UK and forced to look for alternative means of income as a result.
Article 26
According to Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “Everyone has the right to education ... and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.” KCL is currently collaborating with Article 26 researching ways to standardize the application process with other participating universities. In addition, the Article 26 Conference in August 2018 hosted by KCL will be a three day-long conference to celebrate student-led efforts, a best practice seminar for practitioners and an academic symposium. As such, KCL’s continued commitment to improving the lives of forced migrants through an education at a world-class institution is commendable, and STAR is committed to playing a supporting role in improving existing policies.
Liaison with Organisations
An important actor within KCL leading this effort is the Widening Participation (WP) office, which is “committed to finding the brightest minds regardless of background” and offer a range of support for Care leavers, estranged students, forced migrant students and others disadvantaged people- current and prospective. WP have made important steps in reaching out to relevant refugee organisations such as Refugee Support Network and Refugee Youth. KCL have organised several outreach events for forced migrants to inform them about issues regarding applications to university and the various support they can receive while studying at KCL.
Funding: Tuition & Maintenance Fees Sanctuary Scholarships
In 2016, KCL introduced the Sanctuary Scholarships. The eligibility criteria include potential students who are asylum seekers or those granted a temporary form of leave following an asylum claim or their dependants. For the 2017/18 Academic Year KCL offers two such scholarships which comprise of the full tuition fee support, as well as support towards living costs, per each academic year of an Undergraduate degree. The eligibility requirements are the same as those specified by other London institutions, with the addition that: 1. All applicants must be currently attending a school, college, community, or voluntary group which can provide a reference in support for their
applications 2. Applicants must have received an offer of a place at King’s on an eligible programme, which includes: ○ Any 3 or 4 year-long Undergraduate degree, with the exception of: Professional courses which require a work placement and/or Any programme which attracts funding from the NHS (Medicine, Dentistry, Nursing, Midwifery, Physiotherapy, Nutrition & Dietetics) ○ Foundation Programmes with a clear pathway to a 3 year Undergraduate degree ○ Courses which include a Year Abroad, provided that the student’s immigration status will not be affected by studying overseas These Sanctuary Scholarships dovetail perfectly with the living cost scholarship of £11,000 and present a clear indication of KCL’s commitment in taking advantage of their leading position on the world stage to mitigate aspects of the refugee crisis. The university has also displayed its administrative flexibility in response to the complex dynamics of forced migration by opening up the scholarship to children of asylum-seekers and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children in the UK. This paper commends the university’s efforts thou gh we believe there is room for improvement. Overall this is in line with KCL’s Service strategy and a defining factor within the college’s Strategic Vision 2029, which is the priority to ‘Serve to shape and transform’, specifically highlighting the university’s potential impact on a national and international level with regards to norm-building.
New developments
King’s has recently been gifted a large sum from its alumni, which WP is planning to use to create 24 further scholarships. These would include full tuition support and a living cost grant equitable to the maximum student loan commensurate to London living standards. These potential new scholarships, called ‘Jesus The Light Scholarships’ due to the donor’s religious belief, are open to students regardless of their faith and will be begin in September 2018 thereby increasing the number of Undergraduate scholarships to potentially 7 or 8 per year. Also, WP has stated they “will consider the potential for funding postgraduate courses for future years.”
While these scholarships are a fantastic initiative and a step in the right direction, this paper argues that the sustainability of these scholarships must be examined and planned for well in advance. In this respect, we urge the university to immediately explore innovative solutions to ensure the project’s sustainability. The university is in no shortage of a politically active student body; drawing upon these resources to solve one of the most pressing issues of our time is perfectly in line with the university’s mission of combining praxis and theory.
Conclusion
Through its commitment to Equal Access and Article 26, KCL has responded to forced migrants’ difficulties in accessing Higher Education. KCL STAR embraces the current opportunities given to those individuals: the Sanctuary scholarships, the active role of Widening Participation and the new scholarships. However, despite the current and newly approved systems there are still major gaps in King’s approach. In the future, the student-led efforts of KCL STAR will aim to collaborate with staff-led efforts with recommendations in line with King’s 2029 Strategic Vision. Enhancing Higher Education accessibility for forced migrants provides King’s with a platform to demonstrate its position as a leading global Higher Education Institution (HEI) for civic responsibility. In King’s 2029 Strategic Vision, it is stated that “the essence of King’s is to serve society;” we ask KCL to demonstrate this by continuing to serve a valuable but disregarded part of our society-forced migrants. This critical moment, where there are the greatst number of refugees on record, is the opportunity for KCL to prove their commitment to this statement. We call on KCL to fulfill their promise to “make the world a better place” by continuing to enhance accessibility for forced migrants, who will only continue making King’s a leading international institution. As Principal Byrne recognises, it is “deeds that define us,” so let us work towards making King’s College London the leading global Higher Education institution for forced migrants.
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This policy paper has been written by STAR society as a policy reccomendation, targetted at the authority of King’s College London. This paper was specifically written and researched by Niki Manoledaki, Anya Jhoti Giulia Mazzu, Marion Sauzay, Yasmin Baldi, Afiq Fitri and Oleg Rogoza.
Credits We would like to acknowledge and thank our academic sponsors and our patron for their support of King’s Think Tank’s research and publications.
Academic Sponsors: 1. The Department of Political Economy The Department of Political Economy at King’s College London is a diverse academic institution, made up of world class researchers and lecturers. Specialising in philosophy, economics and political theory, the department strives to install its students with the tools and knowledge to excel in both academic and professional life. They are closely integrated with the student body, supporting various societies as well as the Think Tank.
2. Our Patron We would also like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to our ever-supportive patron, Tim Hailes. Alderman Tim Hailes Mr. Hailes is Alderman for the Ward of Bassishaw in The City of London, a liveryman of the Worshipful Company of Solicitors, a freeman of the Worshipful Company of International Bankers, a magistrate (Justice of the Peace) on the Central London bench and a member of The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). Mr. Hailes graduated from King’s College London with a B.A. (Hons) degree in History. He is a Jelf medallist (1990) and served as a member of College Council and a sabbatical officer in KCLSU from 1988-89. He has spent his entire legal career specialising in derivatives and structured products and is currently a Managing Director & Associate General Counsel in the Legal Department of the Investment Banking Division of JPMorgan Chase & Co. based in London.
3. The King’s College London Students’ Union The Student Union at King’s College London has been been particularily supportive of our initaives and events this year and we would like to thank them for their continued support.
Letter from the President
King’s Think Tank 2017-2018
Once again, this year has been an uncertain one: It began with another General Election and a number of dreadful terrorist attacks. Globally, there is an increasing shift to the political right, with emerging states leading the changing international order. Regionally, the European Union faces ongoing challenges, with the continuing threat of terrorism, supporting refugees, and respecting the needs of its citizens. Locally, the UK continues to bolster its economy, provide healthcare to all, and support a politically unified, multicultural society.
Core Committee President – Lawrence Calton Vice President – Diana-Maria Suciu Head of Presidents- Stanislav Skryabin General Editor – Tamsin Victoria Laude Treasurer- Daphne Friedrich Head of Communications – Meg Joseph Wamithi Directors – Antara Dasgupta & Maddy Sampson Social Secretary – Guillaume Vichard Strategic Marketing- Nicolas Salaun & Yurri Clavilier
For King’s Think Tank, we continue to progress from strength to strength. This year saw for us one of the most successful years to date. For the first time, we have published the Spectrum bi-annually. The year also began with a very successful relaunch in September 2017 at which the Damian Collins MP gave the opening address. In October 2017, we hosted visiting US Senator Jon Kyl, former Republican Senator from Arizona. We have also established the new policy centre of Religion, Ethics and Culture to address current affairs. Our eight policy centres –Business & Economics, Defence & Diplomacy, Education, Energy & Environment, European Affairs, Global Health Law, and Religion, Ethics and Culture – have all surpassed themselves. This year King’s Think Tank hosted countless expert panels and policy workshop events, reaching both the King’s student community and beyond. We remain recognised for our outstanding contribution within King’s College London, which is reflected in our membership numbers, our representation on key strategic groups, and our policy and blog outputs.
Lawrence Calton- President 20172018
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Policy Centres Business & Economics President – Katie-Louise Marvin Editor – Eva Puzniak Researcher – Camille Lavelle Defence & Diplomacy President - Stanislav Skryabin Liaison – Clara Laviale Editor –Elina Solomon Researcher – Guillaume Beaud Education President – Marina Zabelina Researcher – Samantha Thomas-Domingo Liaison – Timmy Sanusi Editor- Charles Collard Energy & the Environment President - Emma-Jane Behrens Liaison – Sincere Chen Editor- Miriea Raga Gomez Researcher- Rafael Holder European Affairs President –Afiq Fitri Liaison – Lakshimi Dharmavasan Editor- Charles Halb Researcher – Onna Van de Broek
Global Health President – Luke Symons Liaison – Antonio Reymao Editor – Mehr Panjawani Researcher – Jonathan Higgs Law President – Joseph Lai Liaison – Onyinyewchukwu Udokporo Editor – Ellen Newell Researcher – John Cheung Religion, Ethics and Culture President – Emma Shleifer Liaison – Danielle Forest Editor – Isabel Royce Researcher – Grace Avila Casanova
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Wiersema, M. & Mors, M. L. (2016). What Board Directors Really Think of Gender Quotas. [Online] Harvard Business Review. Available at: https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-board-directors-really-think-of-gender-quotas [Accessed 21st November 2017
Education Regulating the Public-Private Dichotomy 1. Blatchford, Peter and Peter Mortimore. “The Issue of Class Size for Young Children in Schools: What can we Learn from Research?” Oxford Review of Education 20, no. 4 (1994): 411-428. 2. Brittan, Samuel. “The Economic Contradictions of Democracy.” British Journal of Political Science 5 (1974): 1-3. 3. Ferguson, Ronald. “Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on how and Why Money Matters.” Harvard Journal on Legislation 28 (1991): 1-3. 4. HM Department for Education. Research Report DFE-RR169. London: Government of the United Kingdom, 2011. 5. HM Treasury. Public Sector Statistical Analyses 2017. London: Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 6. Hoxby, Caroline. “Do Private Schools Provide Competition for Public Schools?” NBER Working Paper 4978, (December 1994): 1-5. 7. Meredith, Robbie. “A-Level Results in Northern Ireland show Big Rise in Top Grades.” BBC News,17th August 2017. 8. OECD. Gross Domestic Product. Paris: OECD, 2017. 9. OEDC. PISA 2015: Results in Focus. Paris: OEDC Publications, 2016. 10. Office for National Statistics. Public Sector Finances, UK: September 2017. Newport: ONS, 2017. 11. OFSTED. Independent/State School Partnerships. Manchester: OFSTED, 2005. 12. RAND Corporation. “Effect of Teacher Pay on Student Performance: Findings from Illinois.” RAND Education Working Papers 378 (2006): 15-21. 13. Roberts, Nerys and Paul Bolton. “School Funding in England: Current System and Proposals for Fairer School Funding.” House of Commons Briefing Paper 6702, (2016): 6-10. 14. Williams, Richard and Sally Weale. “A*-C Grades in Dramatic Decline as GCSE Results are Published.” The Guardian, 2016. Addressing inequality in education: Should companies contribute to the higher education of future employees? 1. Ball, Stephen J. The Education Debate. 3rd ed. Bristol: Policy Press, 2017. 2. Belfield, Chris, Jack Britton, Lorraine Dearden, and Laura van der Erve. Higher Education Funding in England: Past, Present and Options for the Future: The Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2017. 3. Blackburn, Lucy Hunter. “Student Debt Provides a Window on the State of the HE Debate in Scotland.” (2017). 4. Bolton, Paul. Tuiton Fee Statistics. London: House of Commons Library, 2016. 5. Business, Innovation and Skills Committee. Student Loans. London: House of Commons, 2014. 6. Cullinane, Carl and Rebecca Montacute. Fairer Fees: Reforming Student Finance to Increase Fairness and Widen Access. London: The Sutton Trust, 2017. 7. Douglas, Jonathan. “Tackling the UK’s Illiteracy Epidemic.” Citya.m,2017. 8. Friedman, Sam, Daniel Laurison, and Lindsey Macmillan. Social Mobility, the Class Pay Gap and Intergenerational Worklessness: New Insights from the Labour Force Survey. London: Social Mobility Commission, 2017. 9. Higher Education Funding Council for England. Higher Education in England 2017: Key Facts, 2017. 10. Higher Education Policy Institute. Where Next for Widening Participation and Fair Access?: HEPI & Brightside, 2017. 11. HM Revenue and Customs. “Policy Paper: Apprenticeship Levy.” HMRC. Accessed November/7, 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/apprenticeship-levy/apprenticeship-levy. 12. Humphrey, Robin. “Pulling Structured Inequality into Higher Education: The Impact of Part-Time Working on English University Students.” Higher Education Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2006): 270. 13. Malcolm, David. “Cutting the Cake: Fairness in Student Fi-
nance.” (2017). 14. Miller, Helen. What’s been Happening to Corporation Tax?: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2017. 15. Tice, Richard and Tariq Al-Humaidhi. Defusing the Debt Timebomb: A Fair Deal for Students and the Taxpayer: UK2020, 2017. 16. Treasury Select Committee. Oral Evidence: Student Loans, HC 478. London: House of Commons, 2017.
European Affairs Countering Online Radicalization in Europe: The Uncomfortable Truth 1. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ Internet_access_and_use_statistics_-_households_and_individuals 2. Von Behr, I., Reding, A. Edwards, C. and Gribbon, L. (2013). Radicalisation in the digital era: The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism. Full-text available at: https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/internet-and-radicalisation.html 3. On the topic of echo chambers: Garrett, R. K. (2009). Echo chambers online?: Politically motivated selective exposure among Internet news users. Journal of ComputerMediated Communication, 14(2), 265-285. 4. Rt Hon John Hayes MP, Minister of State for Security: https:// publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf 5. Based on Mr. Ahmed latest talking points for King’s College Student Think Tank’s event on online radicalisation, 14 November 2017, Franklin-Wilkins Building Stamford Street London. 6. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-radicalisation/online-radicalisation 7. Vijlbrief, M. F. (2012). Looking for displacement effects: exploring the case of ecstasy and amphetamine in the Netherlands. Trends in organized crime, 15(2-3), 198-214. On the same topic: Kleinhans, R., & Varady, D. (2011). Moving out and going down? A review of recent evidence on negative spillover effects of housing restructuring programmes in the United States and the Netherlands. International Journal of Housing Policy, 11(2), 155-174. 8. MacCoun, R. J., & Reuter, P. (2001). Drug war heresies: Learning from other vices, times, and places. Cambridge University Press. 9. Murray, A., & Scott, C. (2002). Controlling the new media: Hybrid responses to new forms of power. The Modern Law Review, 65(4), 491-516. 10. Based on Mr. Ahmed latest talking points for King’s College Student Think Tank’s event on online radicalisation, 14 November 2017, Franklin-Wilkins Building Stamford Street London. 11. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/ truth-about-terror-and-youth-radicalization 12. http://www.publicfinance.co.uk/news/2017/06/budget-homeoffice-terrorist-unit-drop-ps32m 13. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-radicalisation/online-radicalisation 14. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf 15. Sears, D. O., & Freedman, J. L. (1967). Selective exposure to information: A critical review. Public Opinion Quarterly, 31(2), 194-213. On the same topic: Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. Journal of Communication, 59(1), 19-39. 16. Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of general psychology, 2(2), 175. 17. Based on Mr. Ahmed latest talking points for King’s College Student Think Tank’s event on online radicalisation, 14 November 2017, Franklin-Wilkins Building Stamford Street London. 18. On the topic of human rights: Sen, A. (2005). Human rights and capabilities. Journal of human development, 6(2), 151-166. 19. Festinger, L. (1962). A theory of cognitive dissonance (Vol. 2). Stanford university press. A case study of Denmark’s Countering Violent Radicalisation Policy 1. Crouch, D., & Henley, J. (2015, February 23). A way home for jihadis: Denmark’s radical approach to Islamic extremism. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/23/home-jihadi-denmark-radical-islamic-extremism-aarhus-model-scandinavia 2. Niessen, L. S. (2015). “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical.”. Noah Rosenberg. 3. Reuters, P. E., & 1, E. (n.d.). “Probablement” 500 djihadistes français en Irak et Syrie. Retrieved November 19, 2017, from http:// www.europe1.fr/international/probablement-500-djihadistes-francais-en-irak-et-syrie-3456545
4. Grant, M., & Sharkov, D. (2016, February 26). ‘Twice as Many’ British Muslims Fighting for ISIS Than in UK Armed Forces. Retrieved November 19, 2017, from http://www.newsweek.com/twice-many-britishmuslims-fighting-isis-armed-forces-265865
Defence and Diplomacy The Sunni/Shia Divide: Challenging The West’s Approach to Policy-making in the MENA 1. Amir-Moezzi, M.A. & Jambet, C. (2014) Qu’est-ce que le shî’isme, Fayard. 2. Brumberg, (2001) Reinventing Khomeiny: The Struggle for Reform in Iran, University of Chicago Press. 3. Cvach, D. & Curmi, B. (2015) Sunnites et chiites: la fabrique d’un conflit, Esprit n°10. 4. Fuller, G. (2004) The Future of Political Islam, Palgrave MacMillan. 5. Gozlan, M. (2008) Sunnites, chiites, Pourquoi ils s’entretuent, Seuil. 6. Kepel, G. (2000) Jihad, Gallimard. 7. Kimyongür, G. (2016) La Guerre en Syrie: un conflit entre Sunnites et Chiites? SIREAS, Analyses et Etudes, Politique Internationale. 8. Makdisi, Ussama (1996) , Reconstructing the Nation-State : The modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon, Ussama Makdisi, Middle East Report, No. 200, Minorities in the Middle-East : Power and the Politics of Difference, Middle East Research and Information Project. 9. Minority Rights Group, Still Invisible, the stigmatisation of Shi’a and other religious minorities in Saudi Arabia, 3rd December 2015. 10. Nakash, Y. (2003) The Shi’is of Iraq, Princeston University Press. 11. O’Driscoll, D. (2017) Authonomy impaired : Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State, Ethnopolitics. 12. The Sunni/Shia Divide, Council on Foreign Relations. Available on: http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict- and-human-rights/sunni-shia-divide/ p33176#!/?cid=otr-marketing_url-sunni_shia_infoguide 13. Atrache, S. (13 November 2015) Beirut Bombings Widens Lebanon’s Shiite-Sunni Divide, International Crisis Group. Available on: http:// blog.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/2015/11/13/beirut-bombingwidens-lebanons-shiite-sunni-divide/
Global Health
Our Ageing Population: Preparing the NHS for the Inevitable 1. AGE UK (2017). Briefing: Health and Care of Older People in England 2017. [ebook] Available at: https://www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/ EN-GB/For-professionals/Research/The_Health_and_Care_of_Older_People_in_England_2016.pdf?dtrk=true [Accessed 24 Oct. 2017]. 2. Barker, K. (2014). A new settlement for health and social care Interim report. [ebook] London: King’s Fund. Available at: https://www. kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/field/field_publication_file/commission-interim-new-settlement-health-social-care-apr2014.pdf [Accessed 23 Oct. 2017]. 3. Barker, K. (2016). A New Settlement for Health And Social Care. [ebook] London: King’s Fund. Available at: https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/ sites/default/files/field/field_publication_file/Commission%20Final%20 %20interactive.pdf [Accessed 23 Oct. 2017]. 4. Gov.uk. (2017). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/535187/gs-16-10-future-of-anageing-population.pdf [Accessed 20 Nov. 2017]. 5. Gov.uk. (2017). Spring Budget 2017 - GOV.UK. [online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spring-budget-2017-documents/spring-budget-2017 [Accessed 20 Nov. 2017]. 6. Government Office for Science and Technology (2016). Future of an Aging Population. 7. House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee (2017). Adult social care Ninth Report of Session 2016–17. House of Commons. 8. Kingsfund.org.uk. (2017). [online] Available at: https://www. kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/field/field_publication_file/10PrioritiesFinal2.pdf [Accessed 20 Nov. 2017]. 9. Ons.gov.uk. (2017). Population estimates - Office for National Statistics. [online] Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulation-
andcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates [Accessed 20 Nov. 2017]. 10. The Health Foundation (2017). Health and Social Care Funding Explained. [Blog] Available at: http://www.health.org.uk/node/10302 [Accessed 23 Oct. 2017]. 11. Thomas, W.H., 1996. Life worth living: How someone you love can still enjoy life in a nursing home: The Eden Alternative in action. Publisher: Vander Wyk & Burnham. Brexit: Policy Implications for the NHS 1. Mckenna, H. (2017). Five big issues for health and social care after the Brexit vote. [online] The King’s Fund. Available at: https://www. kingsfund.org.uk/publications/articles/brexit-and-nhs [Accessed 22 Nov. 2017]. 2. Hawkins, R. (2017). Brexit ‘may mean cancer drugs delay’. [online] BBC News. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-38922366 [Accessed 22 Nov. 2017]. 3. Expat Focus. (2017). How Changes To The European S1 Scheme May Affect Your Expat Healthcare In France. [online] Available at: https:// www.expatfocus.com/c/aid=4049/articles/france/how-changes-to-the-european-s1-scheme-may-affect-your-expat-healthcare-in-france/ [Accessed 22 Nov. 2017]. 4. Taylor, K. (2016). What would Brexit mean for the pharma industry?. [Blog] Health Solutions. Available at: http://blogs.deloitte.co.uk/ health/2016/02/what-would-brexit-mean-for-the-pharma-industry.html [Accessed 22 Nov. 2017]. 5. Heilpern, W. (2016). Leave campaign: Brexit would give the NHS £100 million a week. [online] PoliticsHome.com. Available at: https://www. politicshome.com/news/europe/eu-policy-agenda/brexit/news/75748/leavecampaign-brexit-would-give-nhs-%C2%A3100-million [Accessed 22 Nov. 2017]. 6. Nuffield Trust (2017). Getting a Brexit deal that works for the NHS. General Election 2017. [online] London: Nuffield Trust, pp.1-17. Available at: https://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/resource/getting-a-brexit-dealthat-works-for-the-nhs [Accessed 1 Sep. 2017]. 7. Office for Budget Responsibility (2016). Economic and fiscal outlook. [online] Office for Budget Responsibility. Available at: https:// www.gov.uk/government/publications[Accessed 8 Sep. 2017]. 8. Conservative Party (2017). The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2017. London: Conservative Party, pp.66-73. 9. Blitz, J. (2017). The Brexit risk for the NHS. Financial TImes. [online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/7658ec98-202f-11e7-b7d3163f5a7f229c [Accessed 1 Sep. 2017]. 10. Pearson, A. (2017). Forget the nursing crisis. Here’s how Brexit can save the NHS. The Telegraph. [
Law
A Comparative Analysis of English and Canadian legal policy regarding a mature minor’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment Barry Lyons, ‘Dying to be responsible: adolescence, autonomy and responsibility’ (2010) 30 Legal Studies 257, 269; Andrew Bainham, ‘The judge and the competent minor’ (1992) 108 LQR 194, 196; Gillian Douglas, ‘The Retreat from Gillick’ (1992) 55 MLR 569, 573; Caroline Bridge, ‘Adolescents and Mental Disorder: Who Consents to Treatment?’ (1997) Medical Law International 51, 55 Stephen Gilmore and Jonathan Herring, ‘‘No’ is the hardest word: consent and children’s autonomy’ [2011] CFLQ 3 11 s. 1 Family Law Reform Act 1969 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 (UKHL) 188-9 s. 8(1) Regina (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] QB 539 (EWHC Admin) 559; An NHS Trust v A, B, C, A Local Authority [2014] EWHC 1445 (Fam) [10]; In the matter of X (A Child) [2tattttternklejfelagjnol014] EWHC 1871 (Fam) [8]-[10] Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 190 (EWCA) 197 ibid, 198 Re K, W and H (Minors) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 854 (EWHC Fam) 854-5; Re M Re P (Minor) 2003 EWHC 2327 [10] An NHS Foundation Hospital v P [2014] EWHC 1650 (Fam) Barry Lyons, ‘Dying to be responsible: adolescence, autonomy and responsibility’ (2010) 30 Legal Studies 257, 269; Andrew Bainham, ‘The judge
76
and the competent minor’ (1992) 108 LQR 194, 196; Gillian Douglas, ‘The Retreat from Gillick’ (1992) 55 MLR 569, 573; Caroline Bridge, ‘Adolescents and Mental Disorder: Who Consents to Treatment?’ (1997) Medical Law International 51, 55 Stephen Gilmore and Jonathan Herring, ‘‘No’ is the hardest word: consent and children’s autonomy’ [2011] CFLQ 3, 11 Ibid, 8 Caroline Bridge, ‘Adolescents and Mental Disorder: Who Consents to Treatment?’ (1997) Medical Law International 58, 59 Grubb; Freeman; Lyons; Jackson, 302 Malette, fn 67, [35]; see also Starson v Swayze [2003] 1 SCR 722 (SCC) [7] Parmley v Parmley [1945] SCR 635 (SCC) [26] Trainor v Knickle 141 Nfld & PEIR 234 (PEI SC 1996) [125]; Starson C (JS), fn Error! Bookmark not defined., [10], [16] Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust v JB [2014] EWHC 342 (COP) [7]; s. 1(4) Mental Capacity Act 2005 78 Walker v Region 2 Hospital Corp 116 DLR (4th) 477 (NB CA 1994) [26] R v W (DD) 114 CCC (3d) 506 (BC CA 1997) [28]; Ney v Canada (Attorney General) 102 DLR (4th) 136 (BC SC) [20] C (A), , [2009] 2 SCR 181 (SCC) [47] [62], [63], referring to: Re K (LD) 33 ACWS (2d) 417 (Ont Prov Ct Fam Div 1985); Re Y (A) [1993] WDFL 1220 (NL Fam Ct); Walker, fn 78; the same is stated by Irvine et al, fn 77, 540-1. C (A), [2009] 2 SCR 181 (SCC) [47] , [115] C (A), [2009] 2 SCR 181 (SCC) [47], [60]; Re D (TT) 171 DLR (4th) 761 (Sask QB 1999) Victoria Chico and Lynn Hagger, ‘The Mental Capacity Act 2005 and mature minors: a missed opportunity?’ (2011) 33 JSWFL 157, 160-1 Michael Freeman, The rights and wrongs of children (Pinter 1983) 45-6; Jane Fortin, Children’s rights and the developing law (3rd ed, CUP 2009) 5; Caroline Bridge, ‘Religious Beliefs and Teenage Refusal of Medical Treatment’ (1999) 62 MLR 585, 592-3; Priscilla Anderson, ‘Everyday and medical life choices: decision-making among 8- to 15-year old school students’ in Michael Freeman (ed), Children, Medicine and the Law (Ashgate/Dartmouth 2005) 457-8 Respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice: Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (OUP 2013) Richard Huxtable, ‘Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) - Time to remove the ‘flak jacket’?’ (2000) 12 CFLQ 83 John Eekelaar, ‘The Emergence of Children’s Rights’ (1986) 6 OJLS 161, 170 Alfred Tauber, Patient autonomy and the ethics of responsibility (MIT Press 2005) 18 Tauber, 7 Bland, 857, Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 (EWCA) 432, 126; Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (CUP 2002) 42-4 Tauber, 7 Bland, 857, Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 (EWCA) 432, 85, 115 ibid, 114, 129 Bridge, see fn i, 56 Gilmore and Herring, Stephen Gilmore and Jonathan Herring, ‘‘No’ is the hardest word: consent and children’s autonomy’ [2011] CFLQ, 21 Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock, Deciding for others (CUP 1990) 23-5, 229 Michael Gunn, ’The meaning of incapacity’ (1994) 2 Med LR 8, 16 Willard Gaylin, ‘Competence: No Longer All or None’ in Willard Gaylin and Ruth Macklin (eds), Who Speaks For The Child (Plenum Press 1982), 37
Religion, Ethics and Culture
Renewing Italy’s integration Policies 1. Eurostat. (2017). Migrant integration statistics – labour market indicators. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ index.php/Migrant_integration_statistics_–_labour_market_indicators. Last accessed 19th Nov 2017. 2. Borjas, G. J. (1995). “Assimilation and Changes in Cohort Quality Revisited: What Happened to Immigration Earnings in the 1980s?” Journal of Labor Economics. 13(2), 201-245. 3. 4. Hatecrime.osce.org. (2017). Italy | OSCE - ODIHR. [online] Available at: http://hatecrime.osce.org/italy 5. 6. The Conversation. (2017). The long, troubled history of assimilation in France. [online] Available at: http://theconversation.com/ the-long-troubled-history-of-assimilation-in-france-51530 7. 8. migrationpolicy.org. (2017). Migration Policy Institute. [online] Available at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org 9. 10. Horowitz, D. (2017). Italy, Going It Alone, Stalls the Flow of Migrants. But at What Cost?. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www. nytimes.com/2017/09/17/world/europe/italy-libya-migrant-crisis.html?_r=0 11. Ec.europa.eu. (2017). Migration and migrant population
statistics - Statistics Explained. [online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics 12. 13. Martin A. Schain. “Managing Difference: Immigrant Integration Policy in France, Britain, and the United States.” Social Research: An International Quarterly 77, no. 1 (2010): 205-236. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed November 20, 2017). 14. 15. Thelocal.it. (2017). Italy launches first official migrant integration plan: Five things you need to know. [online] Available at: https://www. thelocal.it/20170927/italy-launches-first-official-migrant-integration-planfive-things-you-need-to-know 16. 17. Benton,M. (2016) Digital Humanitarianism: how tech entrepreneurs are supporting refugee integration. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/ digital-humanitarianism-how-tech-entrepreneurs-are-supporting-refugee-integration 18. 19. Bianchi, M., Buonanno, P. and Pinotti, P. (2008). Do Immigrants Cause Crime?. [ebook] Available at: http://www.coll.mpg.de/economix/2009/Bianchi.pdf 20. 21. International Organisation for Migrants, 2017. Mixed Migration Flows In The Mediterranean: Compilation of Available Data and Information, September 2017. pp.17-20. 22. 23. Horowitz, D. (2017). Italy, Going It Alone, Stalls the Flow of Migrants. But at What Cost? Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes. com/2017/09/17/world/europe/italy-libya-migrant-crisis.html 24. City of Stuttgart (2014). Stuttgarter Uternehmer mitt Migrationshintergrund: Eine Studie zur Stuttgarter Migraneokonomie. Stuttgart: City of Stuttgart, Department of Integration. Available at: http://www. stuttgart.de/img/mdb/item/357586/103278.pdf 25. Daimler (2016). Internship at Daimler Builds Bridge into German Job Market for Refugees. News release, 4 March 2016. Available at: http://media.daimler.com/marsMediaSite/en/instance/ko.xhtml?oid=9920072 26. Barcelona Empreedoria (2015). N.d. Business Start-Up: Programs. Available at: http://emprenedoria.barcelonactiva.cat/emprenedoria/ en/emprenedoria/tailor-made-programs/oferta_programes.jsp
Guest Submissions Building Lasting Peace in Somalia 1. Gayle, Damien. “Somalia: deadly truck bombing in Mogadishu.” The Guardian. October 14, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2017/oct/14/somalia-several-killed-in-mogadishu-truck-bomb. (Accessed November 26, 2017) 2. BBC News. “Somalia: At least 230 dead in Mogadishu blast” October 16, 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-41621660. (Accessed November 26, 2017) 3. Aljazeera. “Somalia declares three days of mourning after blast.” October, 16, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/death-tollmogadishu-truck-bomb-rises-50-171015072558816.html (Accessed November 26, 2017) 4. The Economist. “A bomb blast in Somalia’s capital exposes the government’s failures” October 17, 2017. http://www.economist.com/ news/middle-east-and-africa/21730345-truck-bomb-passed-two-checkpoints-without-being-searched-bomb-blast?zid=304&ah=e5690753dc78ce91909083042ad12e30 (Accessed November 26, 2017) 5. Isak, Sagal. “3 challenges, 3 solutions for Somalia’s youth” January 24, 2015. World Economic Forum.https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2015/01/3-challenges-3-solutions-for-somalias-youth/ (Accessed November 26, 2017) 6. Bruton, E. Bronwyn. “Somalia a New Approach” Council on Foreign Relations: Centre for Preventative Action. Council Special Report No. 52. March 2010. https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/02/Somalia_CSR52.pdf (Accessed: November 26, 2017) 7. Healy, Sally., Bradbury, Mark. “Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict” Conciliation Resources: Working Together for Peace. 2010. http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/endless-war-brief-history-somali-conflict (Accessed November 26, 2017) 8. Bruton, E. Bronwyn. 2010. 9. Healy, Sally., Bradbury, Mark. 2010 10. Ibid 11. Ibid
12. Bruton, E. Bronwyn. 2010. 13. Healy, Sally., Bradbury, Mark. 2010 14. Ibid 15. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/magazine/How-to-fix-Somalia/434746-1334284-3wthe7/index.html 16. Isak, Sagal. 2015. 17. Ibid 18. The East African. “Have an Inclusive inter-clan conference with a neutral arbiter” February 24, 2012. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/ magazine/How-to-fix-Somalia/434746-1334284-3wthe7/index.html (Accessed November 26, 2017) 19. Bruton, E. Bronwyn. 2010. 20. The East African. 2012 21. Ibid 22. Bananay, Mustafa. “Can Military Might Alone Defeat AlShabaab?” IPI Global Observatory. March 21, 2017. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/03/al-shabaab-amisom-extremism-afgoye/ (Accessed: November 26,2017) 23. Ibid 24. Ibid 25. The Economist. 2017. 26. Ibid 27. Petersmann, Sandra. “New beginning for failed state Somalia?” DW News. September 27, 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/new-beginning-forfailed-state-somalia/a-40709615 (Accessed: November 27, 2017) 28. Ibid 29. Bananay, Mustafa. 2017. 30. Ibid 31. Petersmann, Sandra. 2017. 32. Isak, Sagal. 2015. 33. Harper, Mary. “How do you solve a problem like Somalia?” BBC News. May 11, 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39855735 (Accessed: November 27, 2017) 34. Farah, Sharmarke and Hadley, Stephen. “Somalia Economic Growth Strategic Assessment” USAID. July 2014. http://pdf.usaid.gov/ pdf_docs/PA00JXG7.pdf (Accessed: November 27, 2017) 35. Ibid 36. Petersmann, Sandra. 2017. 37. Farah, Sharmarke and Hadley, Stephen. 2014. 38. Ibid Refugees without Refuge: Campaigning for Equal Access at King’s College London UNHCR (2017). Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Note that the term forced migrants is being used throughout all work in this area to encapsulate all students with varying immigration status including those with refugee status. However it is important to stress that students with refugee status are eligible for Student Finance and thus exempt from the current Sanctuary Scholarships. The Widening Participation Department will support any student who applies to the university regardless of their immigration status and will signpost them to suitable organisations and third parties as required. Top Universities (2017). QS World University Rankings® 2016-2017. [online] Available at: https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/ world-university-rankings/2016 [Accessed 29 Nov. 2017]. Student Action for Refugees, (2017). Template Motion for Equal Access. [online] Available at:http://www.star-network.org.uk/images/uploads/documents/Template_Motion.pdf [Accessed 29 Nov. 2017]. Murray, R. Hope, J. Turley, H. (2014). Education For All: Access to higher education for people who have sought asylum; a guide for universities. Article 26, pp.10, 17 [online] Article 26. Available at: http://article26.hkf.org. uk/_/uploads/Article26-SSG-FINAL.pdf [Accessed 29 Nov. 2017] United Nations. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 26 (1) [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ [Accesses 29 Nov. 2017] Murray, R. Hope, J. Turley, H. (2014). Education For All: Access to higher education for people who have sought asylum; a guide for universities. Article 26, pp.10, 17 [online] Article 26. Available at: http://article26.hkf.org. uk/_/uploads/Article26-SSG-FINAL.pdf [Accessed 29 Nov. 2017] King’s College London, (2017). Sanctuary Scholarship 2017-2018. [online] Available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/study/undergraduate/fees-and-funding/ student-funding/scholarships-and-bursaries/scholarships/sanctuary-scholarship.aspx [Accessed on 29 Nov 2017] King’s College London, (2017). Sanctuary Scholarship 2017-2018. [online] Available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/study/undergraduate/fees-and-funding/
student-funding/scholarships-and-bursaries/scholarships/sanctuary-scholarship.aspx [Accessed on 29 Nov 2017] Henderson, A. ‘Widening Participation King’s College London 2017 Draft’, King’s College London, (2016). King’s Strategic Vision 2029. p 6.[online] Available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/aboutkings/strategy/Kings-strategic-vision-2029.pdf [Accessed 29 Nov. 2017] King’s College London, (2016). King’s Strategic Vision 2029. p 4.[online] Available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/aboutkings/strategy/Kings-strategic-vision-2029.pdf [Accessed 29 Nov. 2017] King’s College London, (2016). King’s Strategic Vision 2029. p 2.[online] Available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/aboutkings/strategy/Kings-strategic-vision-2029.pdf [Accessed 29 Nov. 2017]
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