Legal crisis in the context of the assumptions of liberalism

Legal crisis in the context of the assumptions of liberalism

Weronika Stawińska

Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie

The basic assumptions of liberal thought remains unchanged despite the changing reality. On the other hand, legal regulations are constantly changing because the law tries to meet the needs of society. However always should bear in mind that the assumptions of liberalism are the basis of the system in a democratic state ruled by law. Unfortunately, these standards are not always fully respected. It happens during introducing restrictions that for example do not realize the proportionality principle. Lawmaker introduce law amendment explaining that it is necessary or indicating that it is an action taken in the name of social justice. The aim of the article is to indicate legal areas in which there may be attempts to reject the assumptions of liberal thought. Moreover the aim of the article is to indicate that liberal constitutionalism is still under review in Europe. That is why the tenets of liberalism and liberal democracy continue to play such an important role, which should not be devalued - protecting, in fact, individual and human rights. The basic research method used in the article was analysis. The article has a review nature. The sources used in the work are mainly monographs and scientific articles but also law regulations.

Keywords: liberal thought, individualism, equality, the rule of law, limitation clauses

Weronika Stawińska – doktorantka, Wydział Prawa i Administracji, Katedra Prawa Karnego, Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie. Kontakt: stawinska.weronika@gmail.com. Recenzent: dr Katarzyna du Vall, Instytut Nauk Politycznych i Stosunków Międzynarodowych, Wydział Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych, Uniwersytet Jagielloński.

The basic assumptions of liberal thought, valid in the states of liberal democracy, remain unchanged regardless of when and where they apply. Nonetheless, given the current situation in individual countries, the crisis and the ever-present Covid-19 pandemic, the various determinants of liberalism are being contested. Given the above, it is not difficult to see a crisis of liberal thought in current legislation. In such circumstances, care must be taken to raise citizens' legal awareness and show how vital liberal assumptions are, especially in the context of protecting individual and human rights.

Foundations of liberal thought

At the outset, to ensure the order of the study, it should be pointed out that liberalism is a multifaceted intellectual current, a worldview and at the same time a political ideology that embodies the following basic principles:

- the right to liberty, which may be restricted, but this restriction is always subject to an assessment of whether it is justified or not. Liberal objections are then raised in the case of unjustified restrictions on freedom. In this respect, it is significant that a negative assessment of the conduct in question by the public does not justify restrictions; - individualism, according to which an individualistic view of the human being means that the human individual is considered autonomous and therefore can decide his or her

own destiny; - the rule of law, which is based on a balanced relationship between freedom and power. Interestingly, then the state itself is treated as an entity that is only needed to protect weaker individuals from stronger ones. In this respect, the state is supposed to guarantee them the right to be tolerated, which is not guaranteed by the law of nature85; - equality, which, however, can only be maximised within limits set by freedom (equality not in the economic sense, since this contradicts the supreme principle of freedom, but equality before the law and equal rights); - civil society, in which people regulate themselves in the exercise of their freedoms; - a free market that complements the rule of law and civil society and creates a framework for the non-arbitrary evaluation of human economic activity; - social change and development, noting that social change is always happening and motivates individuals to work harder, improve themselves and develop86 .

85 A. Miętek, Zasada demokratycznego państwa prawnego w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, „Dialogi polityczne” 2009, nr 11, s. 83. 86 P. Beniuszys, Zakres wpływu idei liberalizmu na procesy polityczne w zmieniającej się rzeczywistości kulturowej i cywilizacyjnej współczesnego świata, „Studia Gdańskie. Wizje i rzeczywistość”, t. VIII, s. 30–33.

The above mentioned catalog should be supplemented with the existence of limitation clauses, which is articulated in art. 31 sec. 3. of the Polish Constitution. The role of limitation clauses is to set standards for restrictions on the exercise of rights and freedoms. What is more the proportionality is one of the most important principles of constitutional law. It is also called the meta-principle, which specifies the application of other rules. It is used to resolve conflicts between competing values87 .

Causes of the crisis of liberal thought in law

In the context of this study, it should be emphasised that liberalism expresses the politicalphilosophical ambition to create a flourishing society in which the individual should develop independently of unwarranted interference by private or public authorities88 . A prominent part of liberalism understood in this way is, of course, the rule of law, also known in doctrine under the German term Rechtsstaat. It should also be noted, on the other hand, that the idea of the state involves functional apparatus and tools, which is inevitable, but which should be used for their intended purpose89 .

Bearing in mind the above assumptions of liberalism, the current situation in individual countries and the Covid-19 pandemic, it is not difficult to see that liberalism is meeting a crisis and new challenges, not only at the level of national legislation but also at the level of international law. Selected manifestations indicative of the crisis of liberal thought in the legal context will be presented below. These examples have been chosen because of the prevalence and visibility of the phenomenon for citizens living within society. In such circumstances, every effort must be made to reconcile the protection of individual rights, such as freedom or property, with the tendency of the sovereign power to outwit the rules in the name of efficiency or necessity.

a) Individualism

For the sake of clarification, it should be pointed out that the construction of liberal democracy provides for the creation of certain principles within the framework of a contract, which is the Constitution, and the empowerment of parliamentarians to represent the popular will based on these principles. Contrastingly, from a pragmatic point of view, it should be noted that the implementation of the above postulates of liberalism belongs to the domain of consensual

87 A. Śledzińska-Simon, Analiza proporcjonalności ograniczeń konstytucyjnych praw i wolności. Teoria i praktyka, Wrocław 2019, s. 23. 88 J. Jaskiernia, Władza sądownicza w warunkach kryzysu demokracji liberalnej, [w:] K. A. Wojtaszczyk, P. Stawarz, J. Wiśniewska-Grzelak (red.), Zmierzch demokracji liberalnej, Warszawa 2018, s. 220. 89 A. Krzynówek-Arndt, Państwo prawa w klasycznej tradycji zachodniej i późnej nowoczesności w kontekście sporów wokół klauzuli demokratycznego państwa prawnego, „Przegląd Sejmowy” 3/2018, s. 79-80.

law-making. It is the law that guarantees respect for the values of the people who build society. The natural outcome of this is acknowledging that an elementary value of liberal democracy is precisely the pluralism of world views. The above undoubtedly affects the degree of trust individuals have in government, including the executive, legislative and judicial powers90 .

There is, therefore, no doubt that, in a liberal democracy, values such as freedom, individualism and the rule of law should be respected. This means that the sovereign state is obliged to respect individuals' objective law and rights – and consequently, that state action should be separated from the sphere of private life. Consequently, some individual rights must remain free from state intervention91 .

Of course, continental constitutions contain declarations and definitions of individual rights, but the provisions that make these rights a reality are often lacking. When referring to the individual's rights, which are to be free from state intervention, it is important to emphasise, for example, features such as the neutrality of the state towards competing visions of the good or tolerance towards other opinions. Such a demand should be echoed continuously both in the media and in scientific discourse. It is unacceptable that those who express their views should subsequently be subjected to widespread repression in any form92. Furthermore, a liberal democratic state should allow for different, sometimes competing, ways of expressing the good, as long as the basic principles of tolerance and mutual respect are observed. Under the principle of individualism (one has equal rights compared to other individuals), the recognition of the individual is a reference point for reflection on the social order, in which world view neutrality should be ensured93 .

The crisis of liberal thought, in the context of individual rights, may also manifest itself in the newly anti-covid laws adopted by the lawmaker in individual countries. This issue is identified not only in Poland, but also in other western countries like Germany. Doctrine and jurisprudence meets difficult tasks to work out appropriate solutions. In a situation where someone suffering from covid-19 for example sneezes on another person and infects him, which will result his death, appears the question is he responsible for the murder or for an injury with a death result94 .

90 Sz. Ossowski, Kryzys liberalnej demokracji w Polsce na tle innych państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej, „Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne” 2008, nr 2, s. 100-101. 91 T. Kownacki, Funkcjonowanie systemu politycznego z perspektywy demokracji liberalnej, [w:] K. A. Wojtaszczyk, P. Stawarz, J. Wiśniewska-Grzelak (red.), Zmierzch demokracji liberalnej, Warszawa 2018, s. 203204. 92 J. Jaskiernia, op.cit., s. 220. 93 K. Jasiński, Polityka państwa liberalno-demokratycznego wobec religii, „NURT SVD” 2017, nr 2, s. 283. 94 H. Schmidt, Rechtsfragen zur Corona-Krise, München 2021, s. 678.

On the one hand, the covid regulations dealt with health issues, which is understandable, while on the other hand, some regulations did not. Doubts arise in the second case, especially in the context of the assumptions of liberal thought, whether they were not, intended to limit the rights and freedoms of individuals. The above issue may arise for example when the amendand covid regulations in fact, are not aimed at ensuring safety against covid-19, but in reality hat have a different hidden purpose.

In such circumstances it should be pointed out the legitimacy of increasing the penalty for the offense of stalking, which can be contested. Pursuant to this provision, anyone who by persistent harassment of another person or their closest person causes a sense of threat, humiliation or abuse or significantly violates their privacy, is punishable by imprisonment from 6 months to 8 years. The above regulation differs significantly in terms of deprivation of liberty from the previous version. Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, the punishment was up to three years imprisonment. Therefore, it should be said that the criminal liability for the above offense has almost tripled.

Naturally, the fight against a pandemic requires certain behavioral actions, because covid19 is a contagious disease that poses a serious threat to life or health. In such circumstances, restrictions that limits the rights and freedoms of individuals are justified especially to eliminate or at least minimize risk95 .

However, it should be remembered that all adopted regulations have to implement the proportionality test and should not depreciate the assumptions of liberalism, which are the basis of a democratic state ruled by law.

b) The tripartite division of powers

The next issue to be highlighted is the tripartite division of powers in a liberal democracy derived from the rule of law. According to Montesquieu's separation of powers, the government should be regarded as the executive authority, the parliament as the rival of executive's authority, the legislative power, and the judiciary as the power that seeks to distance both the legislative and the executive powers. It is a truism that the separation of powers – the legislative, judicial, and executive functions – arose to avoid a situation in which one function dominates over the

other. Nevertheless, in the existing legal and political reality, the boundaries between the

95 T. Sroka, Ograniczenia praw i wolności konstytucyjnych oraz praw pacjenta w związku z wystąpieniem zagrożenia epidemicznego, „Palestra” 2020, Nr 6, s. 77.

different types of authorities disappear, losing sight of Montesquieu's tripartite separation of power, as the following examples will illustrate96 .

When the boundary between the different types of power begins to fade, it is extremely easy for the judicial power, which the courts and tribunals exercise, to encroach on the legislative power, if only through so-called negative legislation. At this point, the role of Kelsen's centralised model of judicial review, with the constitutional court at the head of the legal system, should be emphasised very clearly. Kelsen emphasises that the constitutional court's task is to adapt the constitution to changing social values and modernism97. In this regard, the US has made a different choice, where a diffuse model of judicial review is in place, in which courts are delegated to declare laws unconstitutional. Therefore, the only effect of the creation of the state is the loss of the competence of individuals to administer justice themselves. On the other hand, the legislation will only be justified if it operates to the extent that competence has been delegated to the state. This approach does not violate the principle of nemo plus iurisadaliumtransferrepotestquam ipse habet. Given the above, greater importance should be attached nowadays to whether the constitutional court, following Kelsen's assumption, fulfils its task of adapting the constitution to changing social values and does not replace the legislator98 .

Another point is to see that the exercise of executive power should be limited within the formal framework guaranteed by the rule of law. On the other hand, the free market should operate above politics and not be dependent on legislative or executive power. Of course, to a certain extent, some interference, even in the form of free-market intervention, is unavoidable to ensure fair competition. However, the existence of separate entities to protect competition and consumers, for example, raises some questions in this regard. Such entities are often a government administration body and, therefore, an executive authority. Meanwhile, it can be said that it is actually exercising judicial power to a certain extent, as it imposes enormous fines on businesses for breaking the rules. This is a perfect example of how specific functions of power-sharing are currently intersecting. In fact, in the example presented, the judiciary and the executive power intersect. The problem is that huge fines are imposed in administrative proceedings where not even all the breach circumstances are investigated, including at least the element of fault. Meanwhile, the element of fault in this liability regime is as essential as in

96 T. Bekrycht, Kryzys idei trójpodziału władzy. Kilka uwag na tle współczesnego sporu o Trybunał Konstytucyjny w Polsce - perspektywa filozoficznoprawna, „Studia Prawno-ekonomiczne”, 2017, t. CIV, s. 17. 97 K. Kaleta, Sądownictwo konstytucyjne a refleksyjny konstytucjonalizm (przeszłość – teraźniejszość – przyszłość), [w:] S. Biernacki (red.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w pierwszych dekadach XXI wieku wobec wyzwań politycznych, gospodarczych, technologicznych i społecznych, Warszawa 2013, s. 35. 98 J. Jaskiernia, op.cit., s. 226.

criminal or civil law99. The liability model is de facto more severe, as sanctions are imposed, which are much more restrictive than in criminal proceedings. At the same time, those on whom penalties are imposed are not afforded the same extensive guarantees as those provided for in criminal proceedings100 .

c) Property rights

Moving on to the next point, another critical element of liberalism is property rights. According to John Locke's classical liberalism, there was a belief that a law of nature determined what was wrong and what was right. These laws are applied independently of financial institutions and the precepts of the legislator. It was emphasised that humans are capable of identifying these laws of nature. Moreover, everyone is obliged to respect natural law for deontological reasons. According to this concept, people enjoy perfect and absolute freedom to direct their behaviour and dispose of their property. Nevertheless, the property acquired should not be so large that it leads to waste101. It is important to note here that during the epidemic emergency, laws were introduced to combat COVID-19, commonly known as crisis shields. In this respect, it should be pointed out that specific provisions are controversial, precisely from the point of view of property rights, and confirm a crisis of liberalism that manifests itself at a legal level.

Some of the provisions introduced are of procedural nature, such as the provision on confiscation of objects of public health or safety importance. Under Article 232b of the Code of Criminal Procedure102, in a state of epidemic threat or a state of epidemics, seized items of significance for public health or safety may be handed over free of charge to medical entities, the State Fire Service, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, the Police, the Border Guard and state and local government institutions. Article 192 of the Criminal Executive Code103 shall apply accordingly. On the one hand, this provision undoubtedly interferes with ownership rights, while on the other hand, it is an expression of how the law responds to society's needs, which is also an essential and desirable feature. The law is not a string of dead rules but rules that can adapt to society's changing needs104 .

99 O. Lagodny, Strafrechtvor den Schranken der Grundrechte, Tübingen 1996, s. 403. 100 M. Niezgódka-Medek, M. Szubiakowski, Przepisy dotyczące kar administracyjnych (art. 260g–260n) [w:] Z. Kmieciak (red.), Reforma prawa o postępowaniu administracyjnym. Raport zespołu eksperckiego, Warszawa 2016, s. 268. 101 Ł. Machaj, Liberalizm a prawa człowieka, „Wrocławskie Studia Erazmiańskie” 2010, nr 4, s. 30-31. 102Ustawa z dnia 19 kwietnia 1969 r. Kodeks postępowania karnego, Dz. U. z 1969, nr 13, poz. 96. 103Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. - Kodeks karny wykonawczy, Dz. U. z 1997, nr 90, poz. 557. 104 T. Burdzik, Prawo jako narzędzie kontroli społecznej, [w:] E. Moczuk; B. Sagan (red.), III Forum Socjologów Prawa „Prawo i ład społeczny”, Rzeszów 2010, s. 66.

It is worth noting that the decision on the free transfer of objects is issued by the prosecutor in the pre-trial proceedings or by the court at the trial stage. Interestingly, the order may be appealed against, but the lodging of a complaint does not prevent the execution of the contested decision. From a practical point of view, the provision can be applied, to confiscated alcohol which can be used, for example, in the production of disinfectant.

Although the new solution is similar to the confiscation institution provided for in the Criminal Code, it should be pointed out that it is a different option. From the point of view of the liberal assumptions presented at the beginning of the study and the right to property, which is of paramount importance, at this point, it is necessary to mention Article 46 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland105, which stipulates that the forfeiture of the property may take place only in cases specified by law and only based on a final court decision. It is worth noting that since this ruling can be made by the prosecutor or by the court and, moreover, can be executed immediately, the forfeiture may ultimately turn out to be unjustified after all. In such a situation, the items must be returned to the holder. If this proves impossible, the State Treasury shall be liable for the damage according to Article 192 of the Criminal Executive Code. As is well known, the legislator indicates the reasons - ratio legis for each provision in the act's explanatory memorandum. In this case, it has been pointed out that, in a pandemic, the destruction of objects would be considered a waste of resources, and for this reason, the provision commented on should be considered to fit, at least in part, with the assumptions of liberal democracy. Moreover, as recent pandemic experience has shown, dealing with Covid-19 requires decisive and rapid action, so the use of these measures remains justified as it can immediately increase the level of public safety. However, on the other hand, in any situation, it must be borne in mind that capitalism and the right to property should not be restricted by implementing social policies and creating a welfare state, state interference should be minimal, so the options indicated, once they are the law in force, should be applied with great caution106 .

Summary

In conclusion, liberal constitutionalism is still under review in Europe107. Liberal thinkers try to link the protection of individual rights with the tendency of the sovereign power to circumvent the rules, explaining that it is necessary or indicating that it is an action taken in the

105Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. uchwalona przez Zgromadzenie Narodowe w dniu 2 kwietnia 1997 r., przyjęta przez Naród w referendum konstytucyjnym w dniu 25 maja 1997 r., podpisana przez Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 16 lipca 1997 r., Dz. U. z 1997, nr 78, poz. 483. 106 W.S. Zgliczyński, Polityka społeczna w Europie – ewolucja i rozwiązania modelowe, „Studia BAS” 2017, nr 2, s. 51. 107 T. Dobrowolski, „Ucieczka od wolności” – kryzys zaufania do demokracji liberalnej. Zjawisko przejściowe czy długotrwała tendencja?, „Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe” 2017, nr 4, s. 164.

name of social justice108. Moreover, liberalism has been associated with the state's self-restraint, according to which the action of the sovereign state is detached from private action, and certain individual rights must be free from state intervention. That is why the tenets of liberalism and liberal democracy continue to play such an important role, which should not be devalued protecting, in fact, individual and human rights.

108 J. Jaskiernia, op.cit., s. 221.

Book publications

Source literature:

Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. uchwalona przez Zgromadzenie Narodowe w dniu 2 kwietnia 1997 r., przyjęta przez Naród w referendum konstytucyjnym w dniu 25 maja 1997 r., podpisana przez Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 16 lipca 1997 r., Dz. U. z 1997, nr 78, poz. 483. Ustawa z dnia 19 kwietnia 1969 r. Kodeks postępowania karnego, Dz. U. z 1969, nr 13, poz. 96. Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. - Kodeks karny wykonawczy, Dz. U. z 1997, nr 90, poz. 557.

Supporting literature

Monographs and compilations:

Lagodny O., Strafrechtvor den Schranken der Grundrechte, Tübingen 1996.

Chapters in collective works:

Burdzik T., Prawo jako narzędzie kontroli społecznej, [w:] E. Moczuk; B. Sagan (red.), III Forum Socjologów Prawa „Prawo i ład społeczny”, Rzeszów 2010, s. 63-72. Jaskiernia J., Władza sądownicza w warunkach kryzysu demokracji liberalnej, [w:] Wojtaszczyk K.A., Stawarz P., Wiśniewska-Grorzelak J. (red.), Zmierzch demokracji liberalnej, Warszawa 2018, s. 217-236. Kaleta K., Sądownictwo konstytucyjne a refleksyjny konstytucjonalizm (przeszłość –teraźniejszość – przyszłość), [w:] Biernacki S. (red.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w pierwszych dekadach XXI wieku wobec wyzwań politycznych, gospodarczych, technologicznych i społecznych, Warszawa 2013, s. 27-44. Kownacki T., Funkcjonowanie systemu politycznego z perspektywy demokracji liberalnej, [w:] Wojtaszczyk K.A., Stawarz P., Wiśniewska-Grzelak J. (red.), Zmierzch demokracji liberalnej, Warszawa 2018, s. 195-216. Niezgódka-Medek M., Szubiakowski M., Przepisy dotyczące kar administracyjnych (art. 260g–260n) [w:] Z. Kmieciak (red.), Reforma prawa o postępowaniu administracyjnym. Raport zespołu eksperckiego, Warszawa 2016, s. 268-272. Schmidt H., Rechtsfragen zur Corona-Krise, München 2021. Śledzińska-Simon A., Analiza proporcjonalności ograniczeń konstytucyjnych praw i wolności. Teoria i praktyka, Wrocław 2019.

Articles in academic journals:

Bekrycht T., Kryzys idei trójpodziału władzy. Kilka uwag na tle współczesnego sporu o Trybunał Konstytucyjny w Polsce - perspektywa filozoficzno prawna, „Studia Prawno-ekonomiczne”, 2017, t. CIV, s. 11-26. Beniuszys P., Zakres wpływu idei liberalizmu na procesy polityczne w zmieniającej się rzeczywistości kulturowej i cywilizacyjnej współczesnego świata, „Studia Gdańskie. Wizje i rzeczywistość’, t. VIII, s. 30-44. Dobrowolski T., „Ucieczka od wolności” – kryzys zaufania do demokracji liberalnej. Zjawisko przejściowe czy długotrwała tendencja?, „Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe” 2017, nr 4, s. 151-168. Jasiński K., Polityka państwa liberalno-demokratycznego wobec religii, „NURT SVD” 2017, nr 2, s. 283-302. Krzynówek-Arndt A., Państwo prawa w klasycznej tradycji zachodniej i późnej nowoczesności w kontekście sporów wokół klauzuli demokratycznego państwa prawnego, „Przegląd Sejmowy” 2018, nr 3, s. 79-102. Machaj Ł., Liberalizm a prawa człowieka, „Wrocławskie Studia Erazmiańskie” 2010, nr 4, s. 2741. Miętek A., Zasada demokratycznego państwa prawnego w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, „Dialogi polityczne” 2009, nr 11, s. 75-85.

Ossowski S., Kryzys liberalnej demokracji w Polsce na tle innych państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej, „Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne” 2008, nr 2, s. 99-114. Sroka T., Ograniczenia praw i wolności konstytucyjnych oraz praw pacjenta w związku z wystąpieniem zagrożenia epidemicznego, „Palestra” 2020, Nr 6, s. 77-94. Zgliczyński W.S., Polityka społeczna w Europie – ewolucja i rozwiązania modelowe, „Studia BAS” 2017, nr 2, 37-58.