ISLAM AND LOCAL POLITICS IN INDONESIA: In the Quest of Kyai, Politics and Under Development (A case study of Kebumen 2008-2010)
Laila Kholid Alfirdaus Lecturer at Government Department Diponegoro University and PhD Student at Inter Religious Studies, Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies Gadjah Mada University Ubaidillah Lecturer at STAI-NU Kebumen, Master Student at CRCS, Gadjah Mada University
Abstract Analysing kyai and politics in Indonesia today involves a complicated thinking and debate. On the one, borrowing Anderson’s theory, people see this as merely a manifestation of power accumulation. With knowledge and charisma they hold, they grab political support from the electorate in order to expand the coverage of their power. On the other hand, people argue that the involvement of kyai in practice politics is unavoidable as they believe in the idea of inseparability of Islam and politics. Politics is an important field for Islam to manifest its idealistic views of state and citizenships. However, in practice, it is not always clear that the involvement of kyai would create greater impact on public policy which maximizes the benefit for society. A case study in Kebumen found that during the leadership of kyai in government body, Kebumen experienced late development, indicated by slowering economy, the decrease in infrastructure and the slow development of public service and social service provision. Some people believe that the honesty and cleanliness the kyai practiced in the governing process had indirect impact on the decrease of investment in Kebumen. This paper tries to stimulate discussion of whether the clean government in the name of religious morality should be achieved with the cost of under development.
Key word: Kyai (ulama), politics, development, and policy implication
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A. Background The rise of democracy has provided wider opportunity for people to participate in as well as compete for political power. It becomes not difficult anymore to find lay people, religious scholars, artists and academics to go for election, both in local and national levels. Since democratization era in 1998, the faces of local political leaders have become much diverse. In relation to this, the most difficult question to answer is if it creates difference in terms of both prosperity and policy effectiveness. This paper scrutinizes the empirical experience of local politics in which kyai get actively involved in political practices. In an area in which Moslem is the majority, and most of them are santri, it is easier for kyai to grab political support for winning the election, such as Pilkada. However, it is not always the case that the figure of kyai as a local government leader would bring more equality, better life and prosperity. Empirical study in Kebumen for example shows us the fact that during the administration of kyai (2008-2010), Kebumen experienced the decreasing economic development, less infrastructure development, and difficult economic cycle. This leads to some assumptions in the discussion of kyai’s participation in practice politics and its implication in development. First, kyai which has basic role as a moral guardian seems to face difficulty to put off his socio-religious role aside to focus on local development. This does not always mean that kyai does not have skill and capability of government management. They use to have pesantren which also needs managerial skills and leadership. Outside his own pesantren, they usually have followers, forming particular religious community in their respective regions or even wider. This also leads us to believe that it would not work for those who have not skills in leadership. Secondly, related to the first point, kyai uses to prioritising moral development as a capital for the life after the death instead of the so called “worldy” economic development. Tauhid, ibadah and dakwah are the areas which are ultimately identical with the role of kyai in society,1 than those of local investment, business climate, and microbusiness. Therefore, rather than strengthening the structure of public policy, kyai uses to prefer supporting syari’a law which does not always have direct impact to citizen prosperity than to do other worldly business. Although it is understandable, moreover with the uprising findings of the rate of corruption since the decentralisation era, there are some problems following such
1
James Fox, Currents in Contemporary Islam in Indonesia, (paper presented at Harvard Asia Vision, Cambridge, 29 April-1 May 2004), p. 7.
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circumstances. On the one hand, this would raise bigger support from the advocates of traditional Islamic value. However, in the context in which society is still trapped in poverty, such style of leadership would induce a counter-productive result, including the decreasing supports from constituency. Using a combination of interview and literature research, this paper tries to elaborate this issue to gain deeper insights of the relationships between kyai as local government leader, the pace of development, and the further impact on politics and policy. In order to specify its focus, this paper limits its analysis on the role of kyai as bupati.
B. Kyai, politics, and government performance: a theoretical debates Anderson’s argument in the article of “The idea of Power in Javanese Culture” highlights the interrelationships of religion, culture and politics.2 Initially, Anderson tries to compare the concept of power between that of European and Javanese society. He scrutinized through the daily politics of Javanese people to identify the work of power, and how it is associated with social and cultural context. Although there is a wide critique for the comparison of Javanese and European society Anderson did, Anderson poses an important idea. Anderson does not merely try to address the influence of culture to politics in Javanese society, but more fundamentally illuminates the religious aspect of Javanese people that is reflected in their culture and social life, which further induces the way the Javanese people perceive and behave in political sphere. Power in Javanese people that is perceived as concrete for Anderson is very much influenced by the Javanese religious initial beliefs called animism.3 Anderson thesis of power accumulation sheds light on the tendency of Javanese people in general to compile power in one body.4 Anderson’s argument later on is found to be helpful by the next scholars to understand the current political dynamics in Java and Indonesia in general. Kyai in practice politics, with regards to Anderson’s concept of Power, is a clear portrait of how the power accumulation works in current Indonesian politics. Without
2
Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Culture in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1990) pp. 140-175. 3 As Anderson asserts, the word “Power” with “P” letter in capital refers to Javanese conception of power, compared to the concept of power in European conception. 4 Yogya people who support Sultan to be their ever governor for instance simply is a portrait of the integration of culture and politics the Javanese people perception. They believe that Sultan is a symbol of Jogjanese’s pride, a culmination of cultural symbol. Keeping Sultan out of political office would mean to disregard its function as a protector of society (pengayom masyarakat). Thus, Power is not to be dispersed. It should be concentrated in the one source and one figure.
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being a politician, kyai in itself is already powerful. Recalling Foucault’s idea of power and knowledge, the figure of kyai clearly represents an idea in which knowledge becomes a machine for producing and reproducing power. In daily life, kyai becomes a centre of society, and plays a crucial role in being a social reference for political behaviours and a moral guide for the society. Their fatwa is listened. Their decisions are followed. Preaches they deliver are always waited. They are generally charismatic and the charisma of kyai (using Weber’s term)5 also becomes a magnet of power which can be used to grab political support. In relation to this, Strenski more substantively argues that power and religion is inseparable, as power is embedded within, providing religious institution access to control the community and creating intangible form of social structure. As kyai is the centre of Islam in the sense of religion as an institution, it is possible to identify the work of power in religion in the figure of kyai. Therefore, it is sensible if Strenski sees that without necessarily being as or being used by political party, religion has already been powerful and structural. Religion itself is a political manifestation.6 Meanwhile, practice politics is another different arena for sources of power. Practice politics provides direct access to decision making which deals with almost every human being’s business no matter they like or not. Practice politics also provides tools for directly controlling the regulation of citizen and which commonly is deemed as the most legitimate. From the lens of power relation, the participation of kyai in practice politics can therefore be of a mission of power extension which then is united and centered in one body, regardless of some other justifications of social justice and development the kyai and his religious institution are campaigning. Referring to Turner, the involvement of kyai in practice politics in Indonesian context reflects the struggles of symbolic power (religion) within secular power (politics) which inevitably leads to the debate of authority, representation and transmission of cultural symbols into the arena of decision making.7 Aside from this, it is admitted that anybody has their own rights to either passively and actively participate in politics. However, there is a critical question towards the implication of kyai participation in politics on the citizen beings as a whole.
5
Max Weber, “The Sociology of Charismatic Authority”, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by HH Girth and C Wright Mills (New York: Oxfor University Press, 1946), pp. 245-263. 6 Ivan Strenski, Religion, Power, and Final Foucault (Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 66, No. 2, Summer 1998), pp. 345-367. 7 Bryan S Turner, Religion and Politics: Nationalism, Globalisation and Empire (American Hournal of Social Science, vol. 34, no. 2, 2006), pp. 209-224.
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The first and foremost question is, “to what extent is it realistic to rely the hope for justice and development on the kyai shoulders?.” The second question is, “whether the role of moral guidance of kyai in societal life can be applied in the political arena?”. The third question is, “as kyai’s skill is usually related to the heavenly business, is it compatible to devote such worldly political business to the kyai?” These questions challenges some common assumptions about politics and power that firsly underlined by Sir Lord Acton’s idiom of “power tends to corrupt absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Kyai, whatever it is, is a human being. Therefore, putting political responsibility into kyai’s shoulders is as equally risky as putting it to another person. Unfortunately, when kyai fails to bear his responsibility, the condemnation and complaint are usually bigger than were expected to the a non-kyai politician. People usually put greater expectation on kyai to improve social justice given long disconnection of citizen’s expectation and state’s capacity for justice fulfillment, including anti-corruption.8 This paper is not supposed to oppose any view that supports kyai’s involvement in practice politics. This rather comes up with a centre question: to what extent is kyai’s participation in practice politics effective to government performance and development? The question of to what extent is kyai’s involvement in practice politics is effective to policy implication is crucial for some reasons. First and foremost, as Christian von Luebke asserts, current Indonesian politics is still highly dependent on political leader.9 Broken down into more practical sphere, Von Luebke argues that there is associational relationship between the government performance and leadership style.10 That is why, as von Luebke argues, despite the equally strong assertion of decentralisation, local government performs differently. In his research, Von Luebke tries to find out some explanation of why there are some governments that perform well on the one hand, there are also those who perform badly on the other hand. In von Luebke’s findings, as the political system is strongly personalised it results in the governance performance inconsistency across regions and periods. Therefore, von Luebke suggests, in current Indonesian governance, government leadership is important, although often under-estimated, as policy determinant that can
8
Jennifer Epley, Voice of the Faithful: Religion and Politics in Contemporary Indonesia (A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Political Science, 2010 ) in The University of Michigan, p. 145-146. 9 Christian von Luebke, The Political Economy of Local Governance: Findings From An Indonesian Field Study (Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2009), pp. 201–30. 10 Ibid. pp. 201-202.
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compensate for (or aggravate) weak social check in transitioning economy. Von Luebke, McCulloch and Patunru highlights Solo as an instance of the associsiational relationship between the leadership style of Walikota Joko Widodo which emphasizes informality and relation-based cooperation with the constructive platform of policy reform it has been entailing.11 Strengthening this, von Luebke emphasizes in developing democracies, it is often the case that government performance would strongly rely on and be defined by the leadership not only the interest/pressure group. Von Luebke argues, “..A common finding in comparative policy analyses in Asia (Rodrik, 1996; Williams, 2002; Mahbubani, 2008), Latin America (Grindle and Thoumi, 1993; Grindle,2004) and Africa (Gray and McPherson, 2001; Rotberg, 2004) is that public leaders shape policy outcomes by initiating reforms and supervising bureaucratic practices.”12 It is therefore in the context of Kebumen, the reflection of the policy implication of the kyai involvement in politics, possessing position as government leader, needs a thorough thinking, considering that kyai in Kebumen society remains to be strong social reference for their political behaviours.
C. Kyai, politics and development in Indonesia from historical perspective Despite the big debate of kyai’s direct involvement in practice politics, historical experience has they are important in Indonesian politics since the pre independence, early independence, Old Order, New Order, until the post reformation era. The phenomenon of kyai and politics also portrays an up and down relationship between state and religion, depending highly on the nature of regime that rules the government. The below passages provides a glance look of the changing faces of kyai’s involvement in politics and development time to time. In the past, the role of kyai in politics used to be an alternative, a sub-altern, marginalised, yet at the same time an energiser for anticolonialism and anti-government movement. In current politics, kyai’s political role is expanding. It is not rare to find kyai to be a leader of political parties, a member of representative body, and even a leader of government institution (district-head/mayor
11
Christian von Luebke, Neil McCulloch and Arianto A. Patunru, Heterodox Reform Symbioses: The Political Economy of Investment Climate Reforms in Solo, Indonesia (Asian Economic Journal 2009, Vol. 23 No. 3), pp. 269–296. 12 Ibid., p. 272.
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and governor). Islam, ulama and politics have been colouring the dynamics of Indonesian politics.13 In pre-independent, kyai became the locus of anti-colonial movement. In his dissertation, Kartodirjo highlights that the role of religion in politics is an important clue for the significant role of kyai in Indonesia’s political movement.14 Kyai often stood in the front line of fighting against the colonial government which was seen as infidel, contaminating Islamic life, campaigning Westernisation, and threatening the kyai as the central figure of Moslem society. In Kartodirjo’s view, political economy seems to be more striking in the case of peasant rebellion in Banten rather than as of religious issues. Peasant rebellion purel about agrarian and agricultural conflict between the indigeneous peasants of Banten and the colonial government. However, kyai’s role in mobilising the peasant to be in confrontation with the colonial government, rising up the discourse of anti-Westernisation within, indicates the strong power the kyai had at the moment. Kyai’s resistence to the colonial government is basically a part of fulfillments of the society expectation of fighting against the injustice. Referring to Anderson, the kyai’s political distance from the center of political power heightens the charisma of the kyai, strengthening their position as the center of society. 15 In Soekarno era, the role of kyai got more apparent, can be identified from the kyai’s thick political involvement in political parties. Not only as backup, kyai also became a machine of Moslem parties. Soekarno era provided a fertile opportunity for Kyai to get actively involved in politics. Such kind of circumstances was possible to construct as Soekarno, as a president, had a very nature of leadership that is deeply compromising, which tried hardly to accomodate pluralistic views in politics, and strived to harmonize them in one national spectrum, namely Nasakom (Nasional, Agama, Komunis—nationalist, religious and communist). This indicates the crucial role the Moslem parties had and role of kyai as the main driver of those parties in Indonesian political stage.16 Meanwhile, in Soeharto era, there is a systematic exclusion of kyai’s role in politics. Kyai were isolated to handle only social and cultural matters. Soeharto’s political moveup to taking over of political power from Soekarno led to a contrasting 13
Martin van Bruinessen, “Liberal and Progressive Voice in Indonesian Islam”, in Shireen Hunter (ed.), Reformist Voices of Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity (New York, ME Sharpe, 2009), pp. 187-202. 14 Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasant Revolt of Banten in 1888 (Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam, 1966), pp. 140-175 15 Anderson, Language and Power, pp. 17-93. 16 Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indoensian Foreign Policy (New York Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 4.
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political atmosphere from those of Soekarno’s in relations to kyai’s role in practice politics. Soeharto concentrated power in his hand through the formation of government party, namely Golongan Karya (Golkar). Soeharto which imposed the repressive approach in running his administration had changed the face of Indonesian politics dramatically. The fragmentation of the orientation of kyai in politics was then started. Some kyai who were of in direct confrontation with the government had to face a threat and intimidation, being a subject of subversionism. Some of them were even brought for imprisonment. Some other, then further prefered to be silent, considering their community’s safety. Nonetheless, there were some figures of kyai who finally chose to join with Golkar but indeed without crucial role of decision making. Some people even argue that in this case the government only made use of their popularity to be vote getter. Regardless of those diverse arguments of Soeharto, people seem to affirm that kyai was a marginalized entity, excluded from politics, and being an object of Soeharto’s development policy.17 Reformasi 1998 has opened up wider opportunity for kyai to express their political aspiration. Some people see this positively as it encourages wider involvement of kyai in political stage equally with other citizen. Some others see this negatively since instead of strengthening political Islam in Indonesia, reformasi has entailed an excessive impact of the sharpening of fragmentation in Moslem political community. The formation of PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) that then splitted PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), as well as PBR (Partai Bintang Reformasi) that degraded the political support for PPP, the birth of PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional), PKNU (Partai Kebangkitan Nahdlatul Ulama), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang), and so forth clarifies the fragmenting face of Islam in Indonesia. Although some people refuse to admit that the rise of those parties is of the representation of the fragmentation of Moslem ideologies, some others remain unable to ignore this as a clarification of divided Moslem in Indonesia.18 The impeachment of Gus Dur in 2001 from his presidency, which later on fosters regretness from the pro-democractic activists as deemed as the most successful president in promoting justice, gives us a clear picture of incomplete of Indonesian political Islam. Strong fragmentation within Moslem political parties and civil society organisations for Buehler seems to be themost prominent explanation of unconcolidated Islam politics in Indonesia. 19 17
Ibid., p. 5-7. Ibid., p. 7-8. 19 Michael Buehler, Islam and democracy in Indonesia (Insight Turkey, vol.11, no. 4, 2009), pp. 51-63. 18
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In local politics, reformation opened up space for kyai to take wider part in direct political contestation. It is not rare anymore to find kyai leading the government body either as bupati/walikota or wakil bupati/walikota. Some people see this as a progress in Indonesian Islam politics. Some others do not agree with this idea as kyai is seen as only being made use by those greedy politicians as a political machine to grab the votes in the election.20 In addition, there is not yet prove that kyai can play significant role in decision making and bring greater implication in political reform.
D. Kyai, politics and development in Kebumen (2008-2010)
D. 1. A glance looks at social and political setting of Kebumen since reformation era In politics, Kebumen is widely known as one of the important ‘red’ areas in Central Java Province. ‘Red’ means to be dominated by PDIP. Besides PDIP dominance in local representative body, the success of PDIP in Kebumen, can be clearly seen in the success of its cadre, Rustriningsih, winning the Pilkada (as Bupati) in 2000 and 2005, and Pilgub (as wakil gubernur) in 2008. Southern coastal areas of Kebumen are identified as the main areas of PDIP supporters. Uniquely, the supporters of PDIP in Kebumen not only come from abangan, but also come from santri, who generally known as the Moslem parties’ masses. This is what makes PDIP in Kebumen relatively different from other areas, like Solo and Semarang. In the latest two regions, PDIP is identical with abangan voters. Some people believe, it is the success of Rustriningsih in embracing popular simpathy that she could drive the voters, including from the santri community, to vote her affiliating party. 21 However, some others argue that the role of Kyai Nashiruddin Al Mansyur , is inseparable in Rustriningsih’s success given the typical characterisctics of Kebumen society that are deeply dependent on the figure of kyai. Therefore, it is not a surprise if someone argues that no matter the success of PDIP is, NU mass is also counted as important in Kebumen politics. The socio-political characteristics in which kyai still have a role as the central figure in the society and become the reference of the voters in political decision has led the competition amongst parties, not only the Muslim ones but also the secular ones like Demokrat and 20
Concluded from several interviews in Kebumen during June 2010. One of my interviewees, Ny. Syamsul, told me that there are many members and committees (pengurus) of Fatayat NU that become PDIP voters although NU is usually associated with PKB. Ny. Syamsul herself is one of Fatayat NU committee so she can identify which Fatayat NU branch that becomes Rustri/PDIP’s supporters. 21
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Golkar, to attract kyai to be the members of their advisory board or even executive committee. In election 2009, for example, Demokrat was successful to persuade KH. Nashiruddin Al Mansyur in order to join with Demokrat left PDIP which he already had been embracing for almost a decade. KH. Nashiruddin Al Mansyur was then elected as Ketua Umum Demokrat and was successful to improve Demokrat seats in DPRD compared to that of 2004. Offcourse, PKB is still important as NU’s party. However, Nashiruddin Al Mansyur seems to still become the central figure of society and is seen as more influential than PKB itself in mobilising political support. The influence of KH. Nashiruddin Al Mansyur as Demokrat’s leader in Kebumen politics, can be simply seen in election 2009, in which the rise of Demokrat’s seats had impact in PDIP and PKB’s seats to decrease. The other important parties in Kebumen are Golkar, PAN, PKNU, PPP, PKS and Gerindra, but they never significantly defeat the dominance of PDIP and Demokrat under KH Nashiruddin Al Mansyur ’s leadership. In relation to this, in terms of social life, generally speaking Kebumen can be said as kota santri. There are hundreds of pesantren in Kebumen. In daily life we can see that almost all of the Kebumen women wear veil (jilbab) and gamis (female moslem clothes) and men that usually wear kopyah and sometime sarung. They are also very active in Islamic and social activities like koranic studies (pengajian), tahlilan (an Islamic activity that is usually collectively conducted to pray for families that have passed away), and arisan. Santri in Kebumen not only becomes the dominant ingredient of Kebumen society, they also hold important role in Kebumen economy, including in trading, infrastructure companies, and industries.22 Nonetheless, we cannot leave to account abangan because they are also significant in number in Kebumen. They consist of tukang becak, buruh tani, and kuli. Generally speaking, abangan in Kebumen is known as poor and marginalized. Abangan obviously becomes the most important voters of PDIP. In some cases, abangan are used to counter some protest against Rustriningsih’s administration in relation to corruption and social disparity. 23 When a number of people in NGOs came to Bupati/DPRD office to protest Rustri’s particular policy, abangan is the one who firstly came to defend.24 In current politics, it is no clear data how abangan orient their political support since
22
Just to mention, there are Haji Faliq who own many shops in Kebumen, Haji Yahya who own some home industries, and other Hajis who often win project tenders in Kabupaten (Syamsul, based on interview on 15 June 2010). 23 Based on interview with Rimba, Aris Panji and Murtajib, 15-16 June 2010. 24 Based on interview with Rimba, Aris Panji and Murtajib, 15-16 June 2010.
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Rustriningsih and her family had fail in 2009 and 2010 elections (legislature and Pilkada).
D. 2. General overview of government performance and development under kyai leadership in Kebumen KH. Nashiruddin Al Mansyur’s administration (2008-2010) is basically a continuation of Rustriningsih’s. Nashiruddin Al Mansyur had been accompanying Rustriningsih to be her vice bupati both in the first and second term (2000-2005 and 2005-2010). In 2008, Nashiruddin replaced Rustriningsih as bupati since Rustriningsih had to move to Semarang after winning governor election on July. Rustriningsih becomes the vice governor, accompanying Bibit Waluyo as governor in 2008-2012. Being led by two contrasting styles of leadership within short period makes it easy for the Kebumen people to compare. When firstly led Kebumen, Rustriningsih was looked as strongly encouraging to improve the government performance. She invited experts from universities to help her to construct the design of governance reform. She launched a program “Selamat Pagi Bupati” to let citizen to directly have a talk with the government everyday. She was also very active to visit people in the grass root level to absorb aspiration. This is not say that Rustriningsih is not without weakness. Many people argue that Rustriningsih was not able to maintain the consistency of her administration performance. In the second term, people started to feel the decreasing quality of Rustriningsih leadership. She started to directly involve in internal conflict of PDIP, strengthen her political dinasty but not always successful, and building a crony for tackling Kebumen infrastructure development. Nonetheless, people could still feel the impact of bureaucratic reform Rustriningsih had imposed in daily public service. However, when Rustriningsih won Central Java governor election and had to sit in vice governor seat in Semarang accompanying Bibit Waluya the elected governor, there seemed to be a sharp contrast in government performance. KH Nashiruddin Al Mansyur , her predecessor that was previously her vice Bupati, was seen to be unable to maintain the quality of government performance. To some extent, people even found that public service was getting worse. People look that the government service run very slowly, became expensive, never showed eager to serve, and was not kind/friendly (tidak ramah). There was some time when people had to wait for about 3 months to get their KTP administration. For birth certificate, people have to wait for about 1 year. The very slow response in public service had made everything difficult, as it correlated with
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other administrative matters. For instance, if people wanted to access to social incentive programs, such as BLT, BOS, and so forth, or they get to administer their marriage, they are required to show their official ID card and other document. Therefore, this is very much unhelpful. 25 Another problem was found in relation to education and health service, as shown by the performance of Education Office and Health Office (Dinas Pendidikan and Dinas Kesehatan). Although directly dealing with the citizen basic needs, these offices looked to be left behind. They do not able to show good service and PR (public relation) as well as do not have clear policy orientation.26 Strengthening this assertion, respondents added the information that service in public hospital (RSUD) there seemed to be deliberate efforts to make an image of public hospital as bad (sengaja dibuat buruk image-nya) by its formal officers (administrative officers, midwives, doctors, etc). The goal is clear, namely in order to orient the citizen to buy health treatment in private hospitals and doctors with more expensive cost. Ironically, the paramedic in private hospitals was just the same with those in public hospital. The health equipment in public hospital was also better than those of the private hospital’s. 27
D. 3. A glance look at local economic policy and public services There is also difference accross government leaders’ policy in relation to local economic development, which strongly influences the dynamics of local business, especially those small and medium enterprises. In the late Soeharto era until early reformasi, when Kebumen was led by Amin Sudibyo up to 2000, the government looks to strongly encourage the local investment and industry. Syamsul, a respondent in the interview asserts that as an owner of genteng home industry, he knew very well the implication of government policy toward the local economy. In Syamsul’s view, Amin Sudibyo is kind of bupati which was very active in promoting local products. Amin was seen to intensively inviting the small industry owners to participate in local product exhibition. Syamsul also saw that Amin was dilligent to promote Kebumen products, such as genteng (roof), pandan leaf-made souvenirs, and banana crackers (keripik pisang), to the outside regions. However, Syamsul realised that government in Amin era
25
This is based on interview with Syamsul, Aris Panji, and Alifah on 15 June 2010. This is based on interview with Wardopo on 16 June 2010. 27 This is based on interview with Aris Panji on 15 June 2010. 26
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was more dependent to Jakarta known as typically a product of centralisation in New Order.28 In Rustriningsih era (2000-2005 and 2005-2008), people found that there was a shift in economic orientation compared to that of Amin’s. Rustriningsih tended to be very active in fostering infrastructure development including road, hospital, bus station, schools, and government offices. Rustriningsih was also known as pro active to government reform. In the first term of Rustri era, bureaucracy shifted to be more disciplined (on-time), served citizen very well (citizen had ever had experience where the government was able to complete KTP administration service within 30 minutes and free of charge), and responsive to e-government breakthrough. However, prior to the end of her term, it seems that the government experiencing the decreasing quality of performance. Documents registration got more complicated and time consuming. There is no response as well to citizen’s complaints which was sent via sms and email. “Selamat Pagi Bupati” also seems to have no impact in the government performance. There is no clear follow up to all citizen input, complaints, and ideas. People even come up with the conclusion that bureaucracy’s mindset has not yet changed.29 Prior to the end of her administration, people even were suspicious that Rustriningsih had let corruption occur. There was suspicion in transparency of disaster relief funds.30 Hospital, south coast roads, and bus station building were suspected to include unfair tender and problematic land acquisition.31 Regardless of this problem, people however see that local in economy in Rustriningsih’s term was more dynamic than was. Rustriningsih’s policy of active infrastructure development had fostered the development of home-made roof and brick industries and absorbed local employment significantly. Rustriningsih policy was seen as having important impact on local enterprises.32 A contrasting view was found during the administration of KH Nashiruddin Al Mansyur . People generally found that KH. Nashiruddin Al Mansyur seemed not to have clear orientation of economic policy.33 Nashiruddin was seen not to prioritize economic development and prefered to focus his policy on building Kebumen people’s morality.34 28
Interview was conducted on 15 June 2010. This is based on interview with Murtajib on 16 June 2010. 30 This is based on interview with Aris Panji on 15 June 2010. 31 Kompas, “PNBK NU Laporkan Dugaan Korupsi Bupati Kebumen, 11 June 2008, and “Pembebasan JLS Kebumen Terkendala Sengketa Lahan”, 19 May 2009. 32 Ny. Syamsul asserted this in the interview on 15 June 2010. 33 This is as Syamsul asserted in interview on 15 June 2010 and Yahya on 16 June 2010. 34 This statement was asserted by Syamsul and Alifah in an interview on 15 June 2010. 29
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People indeed do not argue that such kind of policy is not important. However, people also need something real to improve their state of beings. People also urge law enforcement for anti corruption and social justice in the conflict of land with military and mining companies in Soutern Kebumen.35 Such a slow response to economic problem, for some people had caused the slowering pace of economic activities in Kebumen.36 There are nonetheless people who see that Nashiruddin is better than Rustriningsih in terms of promoting clean government. The decrease in infrastructure projects is seen as a result of Nashiruddin’s carefulness in undergoing government. Some people believe that Nashiruddin is a clean man.37 Nashiruddin deliberately chose not to be too active in triggering infrastructure projects because he knew very well how dirty this sector in Kebumen is. He tried to avoid the risks of practicing bad government (corruption and unfair project competitions) which he believes as not right. In addition, people believe that this does not mean that Nashiruddin did not care of his citizen. Nashiruddin was widely known as humble and kind. Informality in government he brought had made it easier for Kebumen citizen to see him without complicated bureaucratical procedures. This is something rare to find in current Kebumen bupati. Although was often referred as pro reform government, some local businessmen admit that it remained uneasy to register the business license during Rustriningsih-KH Nashiruddin Al Mansyur ’s administration in Kebumen.38 The process of licensing business is often time consuming, complex—not as easy as the leaflet said—and there is uncertainty in terms of cost and time-range information. Price is negotiable depending on how fast would we like the license registration to get finished.39 KPPT (Kantor Pelayanan Perijinan Terpadu—one stop services office) does not function properly. In relation to this, some people see that the government needed to be more strongly assertive in responding to local investment. However, instead of creating some breakthroughs, the government experimentation to apply 5-working-days system, Monday-Friday 07.30-16.00, was seen contra-productive to investment climate. Meanwhile, businessmen are usually very busy during Monday-Friday, and have their 35
This is asserted by Syamsul, Aris Panji, and Alifah, in interview on 15 June 2010. Suara Merdeka, “40 Persen Perajin Genteng Sokka Gulung Tikar”, 8 May 2008 and “Pabrik Menjamur, Pamor Kian Turun”, 11 May 2010. 37 Kholid Anwar asserted this in interview on 16 June 2010, strengthened by Alifah, 15 June 2010, and Irma Susanti, 22 February 2012. 38 Yahya, based on interview on 16 June 2010, and Dariman based on interview on 15 June 2010. 39 Joko, based on interview on 15 June 2010. 36
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spare time to survey investment potential during weekend. If government is not available on these days, offcourse, the government would lose opportunity to expand its economy.40 Different people nonetheless have different experience. There are people who see that nowadays, business licensing is easy. What is not easy for them is to start and run a business. It is in this case the role of government to support and protect the local business seemed to be absent. 41 Equally, people feel that there is no crucial breakthrough in health policy despite the intense effort to rebuild new hospital in Kebumen. There is still some extra payment asked by the officers although there is already an Askeskin (Asuransi Kesehatan untuk Rakyat Miskin—health insurance for the poor) that is basically aimed to guarantee the poor family to access to health without charges. There is also difficulty in administering Askeskin for patients who come from the poor family. People clearly understand that the good infrastructure is not enough if services provided were not good. 42 Weakness can also be found in education policy. The government had placed people with insufficient capability in education office that is why it he/she could not tackle the complexities in education issues. In addition, people still face difficulty in accessing to education. Although there is already BOS (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah) to assist the school’s financial resources, free education was never proved. Meanwhile, teachers employed by contract also face big problem of salary. They are paid very low, about 100rb per month while there is no guarantee for being recruited as formal gvernment officers. 43 Those complexities are indeed not exclusive to be deemed as KH. Nashiruddin Al Mansyur failure. However, there is continuity of problems which Nashiruddin was unable to answer and deal with. People put their great expection in Nashiruddin in order to be more assertive in controlling and improving government performance, but there was no clear answer for this fulfillment in Nashiruddin’s administration. As the slowering pace of government reform occured quite significantly in Nashiruddin’s term, it is not a surpsrise if people tended to believe that Nashiruddin was not effective enough in managing Kebumen’s governance.
40
Wardopo in an interview on 16 June 2010. Interview with Syamsul, 15 June 2010. 42 As asserted by Syamsul and Aris Panji, in an interview on 15 June 2010. 43 As asserted by Syamsul, in an interview 15 June 2010, Eko, 16 June 2010, and Wardopo, 16 June 2010. 41
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E. Short Reflection on Kyai, politics and under-Development: a choice between mores and prosperity? The phenomenon of kyai to be involved in political contestation since reformasi is something unavoidable. Historically, kyai used to be marginalised and being used by the authority to support their development policy, but not to gain power distribution. The critique toward the political exclusion of kyai to be active in politics is great during the Soeharto era. As kyai was seen as a threat for Soeharto’s ruling government for the potential of social movement kyai might undergo—to fight against injustice and repression Soeharto committed—it is not rare for Soeharto to judge kyai as subversive. The dakwah of kyai was often spied, anticipating the widespread of the discourse of anti-government. Kyai during Soeharto era was massively weaken.44 Therefore, reformasi was seen as bringing good news for the future of dakwah. Some kyai positively responded democracy the reformasi has offered to get their power back by being active in politics to promote a more Islamic regulation. Political transformation has shed new light for the revival of dakwah in the wider scope. In relation to this, political arena is seen as strategic to establish Syari’a-by law to build a more Islamic community. There is strong wave of ulama since reformasi to formalise the implementation of syari’a, begun from Aceh as a part of responses of special status of decentralisation given by the central government, 45 which then followed by some regencies in West Sumatra, West Java, Central Java including Kebumen, and so forth. 46 In relation to the Kebumen context, the mission of KH Nashiruddin in promoting religious values can be clearly seen from the Kebumen vision 2000-2005, 2005-2010, when KH Nashiruddin sit as vice bupati in 2000-2005 and 2005-2008 and as bupati in 2008-2010. It is formally stated that Kebumen has a vision of building prosperous society that has strong foundation of religion. The vision is stated as the following, “Visi Kebumen 2005: Dengan dukungan masyarakat yang agamis dan berkualitas untuk mewujudkan perekonomian Kebumen yang mandiri dan berdaya saing tinggi”. The implementation of the vision is broken down into the formulation of local regulation of anti perjudian dan minuman keras (about gambling and liquor). This is
44 Johan Meuleman, Dakwah, competition for authority and development (Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde Vol. 167, no. 2-3, 2011), p. 242 and p. 257. 45 Arskal Salim, Challenging the secular state: the Islamization of law in modern Indonesia (Honolulu, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), p. 143. 46 http://blog.re.or.id/para-pendekar-pemberantas-kemaksiatan-bermunculan.htm, downloaded 25 February 2012, 8.28.
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totally different with the vision of new elected bupati (2010-2015) which states that “Visi Kebumen 2010 adalah Mewujudkan Kebumen yang Mandiri dan Dinamis Berbasis Agrobisnis” without the assertion of religion (agama) within it. People can therefore understand that priority in government between the people is different. For some people, religion-based vision can be seen positively as it offers some solutions for tackling the problem of moral degradation in society. However, some others see that this is not enough. People also need a clear answer for their daily problems including accessing to food, health, education and occupation. To judge the 2year-experience of being bupati as failing indeed is not fair, but people really need a breakthrough. Not to mention an impact on majority-minority relationship in social life, such Syari’a-by law however is seen as not an answer for the quest of policy initiatives on local development. The empirical experience from Kebumen leads us to propose some question: whether the supreme of Syariah-by-law should undermine the worldly business of public policy, such as economy, health, and (formal) education? In addition, as the scope of Syari’a-by-law is usually too narrow, including pornography, liquor and gambling policy, this raises a question of the clear response of Syari’a-by-law to the problem of law enforcement, such as corruption. Syari’a-by-law is even seen as not answering the real problem of the syariah of political institution namely the just government. It is unavoidable therefore if people see Syari’a-by-law as partial and to some extent selective, in the sense that only covering the “minor” issue in society, and not including the root of problem of injustice in Indonesia. This indeed does not mean to undermine any supporting discourse of Syari’ah-by-law. This poses a challenge whether those supporting the formalisation of Islamic value is able to touch teh root of problem of injustice in society.
Conclusion This paper does not try to discuss the impact of Syari’a-by-law promoted by kyai or ulama in formal political arena on religious life and minority rights. This rather however an effort to trace the real impact of such policy for the society. This does not undermine the importance of regulating and encouraging the establishment of society that is aware of morality and religion, with whatever the name, Syari’a for instance or another, nor to challenge it. This rather tries to encourage the policy makers, including those who are from particular religious backgrounds, to be more aware that policy
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needs to be directed to be a real answer for society’s problems. Empirical experience which suggests us that people generally do not support Syari’a-by-law in the cost of slow response to anti-corruption and poverty reduction shows us that people have great expectation for the government to prioritise development and law enforcement in their policy.
Ackowledgement Data in this paper is mainly taken from an Indonesian research project entitled “Gauging Governance: the political economy of public reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia” between April and September 2010, in which Laila Kholid Alfirdaus acted as key collaborator—conducting interviews, collecting data, and managing surveys in Tuban (East Java), Surakarta and Kebumen (Central Java). The research was led by Dr. Christian von Luebke, a post-doc fellow under Shorenstein-DFG Research Fellow, AsiaPacific Research Center, Stanford University, USA.
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