Ideological Polarization in Baltic Societies by LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts

IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIES

A CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEY REPORT

Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa

0 © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIES A CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEY REPORT

Mārtiņš Kaprāns Inta Mieriņa

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology University of Latvia

May, 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

METHODOLOGY

THE CONTEXTS OF IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION

WESTERN ORIENTATION ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FAILED STATE CLAIMS ATTITUDE TOWARD IMMIGRANTS ATTITUDES TOWARD PROTECTIONISM

10 24 35 45

IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION: A BIRD’S EYE VIEW

THE WESTERN ORIENTATION INDEX THE FAILED STATE INDEX THE XENOPHOBIA INDEX THE PROTECTIONISM INDEX

54 56 58 60

OPINION GROUPS

CLUSTERS OF SOCIETY

CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX A. THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE 2019 SURVEY

APPENDIX B. SURVEY WAVES AND SOURCES

APPENDIX C. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT (P<.05) SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN SURVEY ITEMS

INDEX OF FIGURES Figure 1. Attitudes toward Western countries as important allies ............................................................................. 11 Figure 2. The dynamics of public opinion toward Western countries as important allies (2016-2019) ..................... 12 Figure 3. Attitudes toward Russia as a balancing power ............................................................................................. 13 Figure 4. The dynamics of public opinion toward Russia as a balancing power (2016-2019) ..................................... 13 Figure 5. Identification with Western values ............................................................................................................... 14 Figure 6. The dynamics of identification with Western values (2016-2019) ............................................................... 15 Figure 7. Future of the European Union ...................................................................................................................... 16 Figure 8. The Dynamics of the public opinion toward the future of the European Union (2016-2019) ..................... 17 Figure 9. NATO as a threat to Russia............................................................................................................................ 18 Figure 10. EU sanctions against Russia ........................................................................................................................ 19 Figure 11. The dynamics of public opinion toward the EU sanctions against Russia (2016-2019) ............................. 20 Figure 12. Support for the statements that challenge Western orientation............................................................... 21 Figure 13. Support to anti-Western statements .......................................................................................................... 22 Figure 14. Evaluation of the state's sovereignty .......................................................................................................... 25 Figure 15. The dynamics of evaluation of the state's sovereignty .............................................................................. 25 Figure 16. Demography as a threat for the state’s existence ...................................................................................... 26 Figure 17. Opinions on economic sustainability .......................................................................................................... 27 Figure 18. Dependence on the EU's financial assistance ............................................................................................. 28 Figure 19. Evaluation of social inequality .................................................................................................................... 29 Figure 20. Emigration as an issue ................................................................................................................................. 30 Figure 21. Anti-elite sentiments in the Baltic countries .............................................................................................. 31 Figure 22. Opinions on the failed state claims ............................................................................................................. 32 Figure 23. Approval of the failed state claims ............................................................................................................. 32 Figure 24. The dynamics toward the satisfaction with life (1999-2019) ..................................................................... 34 Figure 25. Approval of the failed state claims by the life satisfaction evaluation ....................................................... 34 Figure 26. General perception of immigrants .............................................................................................................. 36

Figure 27. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners (2013-2019) ............................................................... 37 Figure 28. Immigrants as a source for crime................................................................................................................ 38 Figure 29. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as source of crime (2013-2019) ............................... 38 Figure 30. Immigrants as a threat to job market ......................................................................................................... 39 Figure 31. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to job markets (2013-2019) ................... 39 Figure 32. Immigrants as a threat to local culture ....................................................................................................... 40 Figure 33. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to local culture (2013-2019) .................. 41 Figure 34. Approval of the anti-immigrant statements ............................................................................................... 42 Figure 35. Support to anti-immigrant statements ....................................................................................................... 43 Figure 36. Economic nationalism in the Baltic countries ............................................................................................. 45 Figure 37. The dynamics of economic nationalism in the Baltic countries (2013-2019) ............................................. 46 Figure 38. Attitudes toward international companies ................................................................................................. 47 Figure 39. The dynamics of public opinion toward large international companies .................................................... 47 Figure 40. Opinions on foreigners’ right to purchase land .......................................................................................... 48 Figure 41. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners’ right to purchase land (2013-2019) .......................... 49 Figure 42. Assessment of the international organizations .......................................................................................... 50 Figure 43. The dynamics of public opinion toward the assessment of the international organizations .................... 50 Figure 44. Approval of protectionist statements ......................................................................................................... 51 Figure 45. Support for protectionism in the Baltic countries ...................................................................................... 52 Figure 46. Distribution of attitudes toward the West (2019) ...................................................................................... 54 Figure 47. Distribution of attitudes toward the West in three Baltic countries (2019) .............................................. 55 Figure 48. The Western orientation index in the Baltic countries in 2016 and 2019 .................................................. 56 Figure 49. Distribution in the perception of the country............................................................................................. 57 Figure 50. The perception of the state in the Baltics ................................................................................................... 57 Figure 51. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants .............................................................................................. 58 Figure 52. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants in three Baltic countries ...................................................... 59 Figure 53. The xenophobia index ................................................................................................................................. 59 4

Figure 54. Distribution of openness to free trade ....................................................................................................... 60 Figure 55. Distribution of openness toward competition in three Baltic countries .................................................... 61 Figure 56. The dynamics of public opinion toward the openness to free trade (2013-2019) ..................................... 61 Figure 57. Distribution of the opinion groups in the society of the Baltic states ........................................................ 62 Figure 58. Opinion groups in the Baltic countries........................................................................................................ 63 Figure 59. Opinion clusters .......................................................................................................................................... 67

INDEX OF TABLES Table 1. Following news and discussing political matters among opinion groups ...................................................... 63 Table 2. The opinion groups’ profiles........................................................................................................................... 64 Table 3. The opinion groups’ attitudes ........................................................................................................................ 66 Table 4. The profile of opinion clusters ....................................................................................................................... 68 Table 5. Differences between pro-Western and anti-Western groups in all Baltic countries..................................... 70 Table 6. Clusters in Estonia .......................................................................................................................................... 71 Table 7. Clusters in Latvia ............................................................................................................................................. 74 Table 8. Polarization of opinions - decile ratio ............................................................................................................ 75

INTRODUCTION

Ideological tensions have become a sensitive issue in Western societies over the past decade. The slogans such as “Make America great again” and “Take back control” have epitomized recent ideological unrest. The values that these slogans represent have urged political scientists to think about the end of the democratic century.1 These discourses have also resonated in the Baltic states where, along with ever present geopolitical matters, political actors and the members of civil society have problematized the understanding of Western values. Specifically, the public polemics after the European refugee crisis in 2015, the voicing of isolationist ideas, and the criticism of liberal order as well as a general sense of existential anxiety about the future of one’s country have nurtured ideological polarization in the Baltic states. This report explores the level and potential of such polarization in Baltic societies. Ideological polarization is a litmus test for democracies. This can seriously effect on democratic culture, as societies learn to elaborate controversial issues and develop coping strategies, but this can also undermine rational social discourse and cohesion. Ideological polarization can take different forms. Normally, this entails a conflict between competing worldviews and practices. If such a conflict develops into antagonistic relations between two equally strong and coherent opinion groups, it may harm democratic culture. Exacerbating antagonism via political discourse may also pose a threat to democratic regimes. If antagonism is restrained and moderated through legitimate institutions, the polarized opinion groups can be seen as crucial elements of a democratic society and policy making. Conversely, conflicting relations where more than two opinion groups intend to impose their worldviews on the larger public can yield to a pluralistic polarization. Thus, three different analytical types of polarization can be distinguished: radical, moderate and pluralistic. One of the central questions that can be asked regarding the Baltic states and other countries concerns the role of radical ideological polarization. Namely, is there an increasing salience of this pattern in public opinion? This question intertwines with our report. Acknowledging the local impact of the so-called populist parties as well as of the Kremlin’s strategic narratives, it should be noted that we do not intend to explore the discursive sources of polarization in every Baltic society. Instead this study looks at possible structural similarities or differences between competing opinion groups. This shall help us to understand the level and

See Wike, R., Silver, L., Castillo, A. ‘Many across the globe are dissatisfied with how democracy is working’. April 29, 2019. Pew Research Centre, available at https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-aredissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/ 1

potential of ideological polarization. Simultaneously, we do not intend to conflate the polarization in Baltic countries with the situation in Western Europe where formally similar ideological cleavages are rooted in different structural conditions. The report consists of two parts. The first part focuses on the descriptive analysis of survey data, outlining the country-level intricacies with respect to each survey item. This analysis is organized around four thematic contexts (Western orientation, failed state, immigration, and protectionism) that, as previous research has suggested, might be relevant for ideological polarization. The second part provides a more aggregated and deeper statistical analysis of opinion groups in the Baltic states.

METHODOLOGY

This study is based on the analysis of survey data. The survey questionnaire was designed to measure the dynamics of public opinion as well as to provide original knowledge about the possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey data that are explored in this report have cross-sectional background, i.e. they are comparable with the data that have been collected in previous years, using the same survey items (see the questionnaire and the sources of cross-sectional questions in the Appendix A and B). The survey questions were selected or specially constructed taking into account secondary sources that provide relevant and reliable empirical information about polarizing topics. These topics are at times cultivated in the Baltic states by pro-Kremlin media or populist parties.2 The 2019 survey contained 10 thematic survey questions; among them were three batteries of questions that used the same response items to measure an attitude toward different statements related to a particular issue. Survey questions address the issues of Western orientation, the failed state, anti-immigrant sentiment, and protectionism. Likewise, several control questions are used to provide additional information about the sociological profile of specific opinion groups. These control questions focus on the attitude toward Russia, the respondents’ satisfaction with life, national pride, and exposure to political discourse in everyday life. The questionnaire also contains a set of socio-demographic questions (sex, age, education etc.). However, it should be taken into account that the number of socio-demographic questions varies across countries and not always did similar questions include identical response items. Thus, a comparative analysis on the basis of socio-demographic data is limited and is often replaced by country-level analysis. The 2019 survey is a nationally representative opinion poll. The fieldwork (face-to-face interviews) in the Baltic states was conducted in January by three research agencies: SKDS (Latvia), Baltic Surveys (Lithuania), and Turu-uuringute (Estonia). The total sample that was reached in this survey is 3031 respondents: 1014 in Estonia, 1008 in Lithuania, and 1007 in Latvia.

See, for example, Berzina, I. et al. (2018) Russia's Footprint in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment. Riga: Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Available at https://www.stratcomcoe.org/russias-footprint-nordicbaltic-information-environment-0; Winnerstig, M. (ed.) (2014) Tools of Destabilization Russian Soft Power and Nonmilitary Influence in the Baltic States. Försvarsdepartementet, available at https://www.stratcomcoe.org/mikewinnerstig-ed-tools-destabilization-russian-soft-power-and-non-military-influence-baltic-states; Jakobson, M-L. et al. (2012) Populism in the Baltic States. Tallinn: Tallinn University Institute of Political Science and Governance, available at https://oef.org.ee/fileadmin/media/valjaanded/uuringud/Populism_research_report.pdf; Open Estonia Foundation; EU vs. Disninfo, available at https://euvsdisinfo.eu/; CEPA Stratcom Program, available at http://infowar.cepa.org/index/; Disinfo Portal, available at https://disinfoportal.org/ 2

THE CONTEXTS OF IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION WESTERN ORIENTATION

Identification with the Western world has been a crucial topic in the Baltic states since the restoration of independence. Belonging to the West is sometimes challenged by particular political parties and local economic actors. This is also contested by pro-Kremlin media that insist that the Baltic states are rather a bridge between the West and Russia or they are peripheral and irrelevant countries for the great Western powers. If such narratives are accepted in larger opinion groups, one should expect that the identification with the imagined Western world and its institutions may evoke the polarization of public opinion. A Western orientation in this report is operationalized as a positive attitude toward Western values, geopolitical interests and institutions that are associated with the West. The 2019 survey used six items to explore the intensity and dynamics of the Western orientation in Baltic societies. These items focus on the willingness to cooperate with other western countries, relations between traditional values and Western values, the attitude toward the EU and NATO and relations between Russia and the West. The 2019 aggregate survey data reveal that the majority of Baltic respondents (70%) believe that it is in their country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers (Fig. 1). This indicates a rather strong consensus about Western countries as important allies. However, only a small portion of (22%) express strong support toward working closely with Western countries while the majority (47%) instead demonstrate moderate support. Such results, among other things, allude to the conditional character of Baltic public opinion regarding support to close cooperation with Western countries. To be sure, the willingness to foster closer cooperation with other Western countries is much higher in Baltic societies than the weakening of such cooperation. The country-level analysis of the 2019 data shows that Lithuanians and Estonians are more likely to strongly support cooperation with Western powers than Latvians who are more likely to resist close cooperation.3 Latvians are also more likely to demonstrate uncertainty with respect to such cooperation. Thus, working closely with Western countries has a higher potential to trigger polarization in Latvia than in other Baltic states.

In this report, the statistical significance of differences between groups is tested by using dispersion analysis (ANOVA), chi-square tests, and T-tests. Only differences that are significant at the <0.05 level are described in the analysis. © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 10 3

Figure 1. Attitudes toward Western countries as important allies It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers (2019)

Hard to say/ NA

Completely disagree

Tend to disagree

15% 11%

5% 4%

11% 13%

Latvia

19%

Lithuania Estonia 44%

Tend to agree

Completely agree

44% 17%

24%

54%

28%

The cross-sectional data from the 2019 and 2016 surveys show on an aggregate level that support toward working closely with Western countries has not significantly changed in the Baltic states (Fig. 2). A country-level analysis, however, reveals more specific dynamics. Estonia’s public opinion indicates the most significant changes were a considerable drop in moderate support for close cooperation with the US and other Western countries and an increase of uncertainty by 7pp. Lithuanians have become more moderate over a three-year period concerning close cooperation with Western countries. Latvian abstention from close cooperation has weakened, though, but this has also strengthened uncertainty with respect to how important it is for Latvia to work closely with other Western powers.

Figure 2. The dynamics of public opinion toward Western countries as important allies (2016-2019) It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers Hard to say/ NA

Latvia

Completely disagree

11% 5%

15% 19% 18%

Tend to disagree

44% 46%

Tend to agree

17% 17%

Completely agree 9% 9%

Lithuania

Hard to say/ NA Completely disagree

2% 4%

2019

11% 12%

Tend to disagree Tend to agree

24%

Completely agree

Estonia

Hard to say/ NA Completely disagree Tend to disagree

4% 4% 5%

2016

28%

11%

13%

15% 44%

Tend to agree

Completely agree

54%

46%

49%

28% 26%

An attitude toward the statement that ‘a strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West’ also alludes to geopolitical priorities in Baltic societies. The 2019 aggregate data illuminate a polarized attitude toward Russia as a geopolitical actor. While 41% of Baltic respondents disagree with the balancing role of a strong Russia, 38% grants approval to this. Arguably, a sense of being somewhere in between the West and Russia is still a popular frame of reference for Baltic societies. A more subtle analysis reveals a moderate association and relationship between the perception of Russia as a military threat and opinion on Russia’s balancing role as regards the influence of the West. That is to say, there is a much higher likelihood to agree with Russia’s balancing role in the opinion group who think that Russia does not pose a military threat to their country. The opposite holds true for the opinion group that perceive Russia as a military threat. Thus, the competing images of Russia are a decisive watershed in Baltic societies for competing geopolitical identities and a profoundly different understanding of one’s relations with the West. The country-level data indicate (Fig. 3) that Estonians are more likely to disagree with Russia’s balancing role (46%), whereas roughly one fifth of Latvians and Lithuanians are uncertain about their geopolitical choice (‘Hard to say/NA’). Nevertheless, cross-sectional analysis shows that disapproval for Russia’s balancing role has weakened in the Baltic states by 11pp since 2016 12

(Fig. 4). This decline has primarily translated into a growing uncertainty vis-à-vis the perceived relations between Russia and the West. The opposition to a strong Russia has most significantly weakened in Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion by 13pp and 11pp, respectively. Figure 3. Attitudes toward Russia as a balancing power A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West (2019)

Hard to say/ NA

17%

Completely disagree

22% 23%

13%

10%

25% Latvia

25%

Tend to disagree

Lithuania

29%

21%

Estonia 27%

Tend to agree

33%

25%

Completely agree

13%

11%

Figure 4. The dynamics of public opinion toward Russia as a balancing power (2016-2019) A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West Hard to say/ NA

17% 13%

Latvia

Completely disagree Tend to agree

25%

Tend to disagree

25%

Tend to agree Completely agree Hard to say/ NA

2016

33%

8% 17%

25% 21%

Tend to disagree Tend to agree

2019

29%

24%

Completely disagree

Completely agree

27%

23%

18% 10%

Completely disagree

25% 25% 24%

13% 13%

Hard to say/ NA Lithuania

21%

Tend to disagree Completely agree

Estonia

22%

11% 11%

21%

32% 27%

25%

The survey item that measures identification with Western values gives a more nuanced picture as regards the Western orientation of the Baltic societies. According to the 2019 aggregate data, almost a half of the Baltic population disagrees with the statement that there is a conflict between their country’s traditional values and Western values. Yet a sizable opinion group (33%) approves of this statement. Public opinion has a tendency to choose moderate attitudes in terms of the potential value of conflict that alludes to higher flexibility. Hence, although the polarization potential between traditional and Western values is much higher than in the item that measures support for close cooperation with Western countries, this value-based polarization has only a moderate character in Baltic societies. The country-level data indicate that Latvians and Lithuanians are more likely to see a conflict between traditional and western values (Fig. 5). A comparison of moderate answers suggests that Lithuanians are more likely to hesitate when positioning themselves vis-à-vis traditional and Western values. Estonia’s public opinion demonstrates the strongest and firmest consensus, as the majority (54%) believe that the country’s traditional values and Western values are not in conflict with each other. However, Estonians are also more likely to express uncertainty.

Figure 5. Identification with Western values There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West (2019) 16% Hard to say/ NA

14% 23%

11% Completely disagree

8% 20% Latvia

34% Tend to disagree

40% 33%

Lithuania Estonia

28% Tend to agree

33%

18% 10% Completely agree

5% 5%

The cross-sectional analysis of aggregate data reveals that the rejection of a conflict narrative as regards the country’s traditional values and Western values has declined in the Baltics by 6pp over the past three years (Fig. 6). Simultaneously, uncertainty regarding relations between traditional and Western values has strengthened. The most significant changes can be observed in Estonia where opposition to the value conflict narrative has decreased by 15pp, but society’s uncertainty has increased by 13pp. Lithuanian public opinion indicates less salient dynamics, but Latvian public opinion has remained invariable over the past three years. Although the level of polarization on the basis of the conflict between traditional and Western values has increased in Estonia, public opinion in all three Baltic states demonstrates a persistently moderate conflict potential. Namely, only a small portion of the Baltic population is eager to take extreme stances in approving or rejecting the value conflict narrative.

Figure 6. The dynamics of identification with Western values (2016-2019) There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West 16% 18%

Hard to say/ NA 11%

Latvia

Completely disagree

13% 34% 35%

Tend to disagree Tend to agree

26%

Completely agree

Lithuania

Hard to say/ NA

10% 8%

Completely disagree

14%

Tend to disagree

37% 5%

2016

Hard to say/ NA

23%

10% 20%

Completely disagree

25% 33%

Tend to disagree

43%

18% 18%

Tend to agree Completely agree

2019

40%

33% 35%

Tend to agree Completely agree

Estonia

28%

10%

5% 4%

Opinion on the European Union provides a more specific insight into the Western orientation of Baltic societies (Fig. 7). Aggregate data from 2019 show that Baltic societies are generally optimistic about the future of the EU, the majority (57%) do not believe that the EU could soon collapse. Those who support the collapse scenario form a significantly smaller opinion group (28%) that minimizes the conflict potential with respect to this survey item. Latvians are more © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

likely to be sceptical about the EU’s future and are more inclined to believe that it will soon collapse (36%), while Lithuanians and Estonians hold the equally strong consensus that the EU will not dissolve. Nevertheless, Latvian scepticism is largely expressed in moderate terms (‘tend to agree’). The cross-sectional data indicate that, along with decreasing uncertainty, the Baltic societies have experienced growing optimism during the last two years, i.e. the opinion group who disagree with the statement that the EU will soon collapse has grown by 9pp (Fig. 8). This goes in line with other data which demonstrate the growth of a positive attitude toward the EU across the member states after the Brexit referendum.4

Figure 7. Future of the European Union The European Union will soon collapse (2019) 15% 14% 15%

Hard to say/ NA

13%

Completely disagree

22%

24%

36%

Tend to disagree

Tend to agree

Completely agree

20% 19%

Latvia 39% 39%

Lithuania Estonia

28%

8% 5%

Taking up the challenge: From (silent) support to actual vote. (2018). Eurobarometer Survey 90.1 of the European Parliament. A Public Opinion Monitoring Study, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-yourservice/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2018/parlemeter-2018/report/en-parlemeter-2018.pdf © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 16 4

Figure 8. The Dynamics of the public opinion toward the future of the European Union (2016-2019) The European Union will soon collapse 15%

Hard to say/ NA

Latvia

Tend to disagree Tend to agree 8%

Completely agree

Lithuania

Hard to say/ NA Completely disagree

24% 10%

14%

18%

29% 28%

20%

Tend to agree 3% 5%

15%

Hard to say/ NA

Completely disagree

39% 39%

19% 20%

Completely agree

2019 2017

23%

21% 22% 22%

Tend to disagree Tend to agree

36%

24%

15%

Tend to disagree Completely agree

Estonia

25%

13% 11%

Completely disagree

30%

39%

The 2019 survey measured Western orientation also in terms of recent geopolitical matters that are of particular importance in the Baltic region. In 2016, responding to the anxiety caused by Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine, NATO member states agreed to deploy multinational battle groups in the Baltic states and Poland. The pro-Kremlin media and opinion leaders argued that the reinforcement of NATO positions at Russia’s Western border poses a threat to Russia. The 2019 aggregate data reveal that the majority of people (49%) in the Baltic states do not accept such an interpretation. However, a sizeable opinion group support it (36%), suggesting that the deployment of NATO forces under the alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence contains a rather high polarization potential in the Baltic societies (Fig. 9). Baltic respondents who see Russia as a threat to their countries are more likely to think that strengthening the NATO role in the Baltics does not pose a threat to Russia (56%). In other words, the popular perception of Russia as a military threat is more likely to be primarily associated with support for NATO’s defensive role rather than with NATO as a threat to Russia.

Figure 9. NATO as a threat to Russia Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia (2019)

Hard to say/ NA

13%

Completely disagree

10%

Tend to disagree

20% 34%

29%

22%

20%

Latvia

32%

Lithuania Estonia

24%

Tend to agree

Completely agree

16% 16%

39%

8% 11%

The country-level data indicate that Estonians hold a stronger consensus that the reinforcement of NATO’s presence does not pose a threat to Russia (56%). Conversely, Lithuanian support for the narrative that NATO is a threat to Russia is significantly higher (45%). This does not necessarily mean that the Lithuanians are more susceptible to anti-NATO rhetoric as promoted by Russia. Acknowledging that Lithuania’s survey results demonstrate a higher polarization potential, these results perhaps also illustrate that the association of NATO with military mightiness is more pronounced in Lithuania compared to in Latvian or Estonian public opinion. Another specific item in terms of the Western orientation focuses on support for Western economic and political sanctions that were imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s military engagement in Eastern Ukraine. In the Baltic states, the implementation of Western sanctions, at least during its initial phase, were often associated with possible economic losses due to Russia’s counter-sanctions. The pro-Kremlin media also sought to target the willingness of the Baltic societies to support Western sanctions, framing these societies as insignificant for Russia, but as severely damaging for Western economies, particularly for the Baltic economies. The 2019 aggregate data indicate the rather pluralistic attitude of the Baltic societies toward the EU sanctions on Russia (Fig. 10). While one opinion group prefer that western sanctions are tightened (20%), another equally sizable group support the idea of softening sanctions (25%). Yet the strongest support is to maintain Western sanctions in their current state (33%). The country18

level data reveal that Latvians are the least likely to support either the tightening of sanctions or the maintaining of the status quo, but are more likely to support the softening of sanctions or to express uncertainty with respect to this issue. On contrary, Estonians demonstrate significantly higher support for the tightening of EU sanctions on Russia. Lithuanians, in turn, are more likely to maintain the current form of sanctions, and they are also the least likely to support the idea that sanctions should be softened. Hence, public opinion in each Baltic country takes a different stance on the EU sanctions for Russia. On the one hand, these data suggest that sanctions have a relatively high polarizing potential in the Baltic societies, but, on the other hand, they also reveal that Western orientation as regards sanctions on Russia is more pronounced among Lithuanians and Estonians than it is among Latvians.

Figure 10. EU sanctions against Russia What should be done with the current EU sanctions against Russia? (2019) 26%

I don’t know/Hard to say

21% 17%

Softened

32% 14%

Latvia

27%

Lithuania 27%

Maintained in their current form

42%

Estonia

31%

Tightened

15% 22% 25%

Figure 11. The dynamics of public opinion toward the EU sanctions against Russia (2016-2019) What should be done with the current EU sanctions against Russia?

Latvia

I don’t know/Hard to say

26%

32%

Softened Maintained in their current form

18%

15%

Tightened

Lithuania

I don’t know/Hard to say

31% 21%

Softened

11%

14%

Maintained in their current form

2019

42%

25%

2015

22%

Tightened I don’t know/Hard to say

Estonia

44%

27%

Softened Maintained in their current form

54%

17%

18%

27% 29% 31% 25%

Tightened 0%

10%

20%

30%

44% 40%

50%

60%

The cross-sectional analysis indicates that support for the tightening of EU sanctions has deteriorated in all three Baltic states since 2015, particularly in Lithuania and Estonia where support has fallen by 22pp and 20pp, respectively (Fig. 11). These changes, however, have reinforced support to maintain the current sanctions rather than to revise and soften them. Therefore the most significant increase in support for maintaining the status quo can be observed in Lithuania (17pp) and Estonia (12pp). Remarkably, Latvian public opinion, unlike public opinion in other Baltic countries demonstrates a significant decline in support for the softening of sanctions on Russia (11pp). This shows that the sanctions have been normalized by Latvian public opinion in particular and by the Baltic societies in general. Concurrently, the level of uncertainty as regards sanctions has significantly increased over the past four years. Perhaps this topic has gradually lost its sensitivity and relevance since 2014 when the sanctions were introduced. This also suggests that sanctions on Russia pluralizes rather than antagonizes the Baltic public opinion vis-à-vis the EU/western economic and political measures taken against Russia after the annexation of Crimea. It should be also highlighted that the residents of the Baltic states who see Russia as a military threat maintain the highest likelihood to support Western sanctions. Although this relationship has weakened since 2015, it remains relatively strong, showing that insecurity, even if today less salient than four years ago, is still a relevant motif for why the sanctions against Russia hold rather strong support in all Baltic societies. 20

Figure 12. Support for the statements that challenge Western orientation Share of Baltic respondents who simultaneously agree that "it’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers''

The EU sanctions against Russia should be softened

The EU will soon collapse

53%

60%

A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West

67%

There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the Wes

67%

Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia

71%

Note: The categories of ‘Completely agree’ or ‘Agree’ with the given statement are merged into the categories ‘Agree’.

Interestingly, the majority of those that agree within Baltic societies regarding statements that fully or partly contradict the Western orientation simultaneously support the idea that ‘it is in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers’ (Fig. 12). This outlines a syncretic form of geopolitical thinking among the Baltic respondents that are critical toward Western policies and values. This highlights the multi-layered and conditional character of their Western orientation. At the same time, these data also allude to the internal polarization of an anti-Western opinion group. The national pride variable reveals striking differences in all three Baltic societies with respect to a Western orientation (Fig. 13). While people who express strong national pride are more likely to align with the Western orientation of their country, this is quite the opposite among those who do not feel proud of being citizens of their country. A socio-demographic analysis reveals that the Western orientation in Latvia and Estonia is differentiated along ethnic and linguistic lines (see the table in Appendix C). In both countries, the respondents that identify with an ethnic majority are more likely to support pro-Western ideas than the members of ethnic minorities whose native language is mostly Russian. These attitudinal differences in Latvian and © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

Estonian public opinion are reflected by all survey items that are explored in this section. Furthermore, ethnic differences have regional implications, as the most Russophone regions of Latvia and Estonia (Latgale and Ida-Viru, respectively) are more likely to demonstrate a weaker Western orientation. Figure 13. Support to anti-Western statements Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country It is not in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers

The EU sanctions against Russia should be softened

The EU will soon collapse

32% 14% 31% 19% 58% 24%

Not proud

A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the Wes Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia

57%

Proud

42% 53% 36% 46% 33%

Note: here and elsewhere in this report answers ‘Very proud’ and ‘Somewhat proud’ are merged into the category ‘Proud’ and ‘Not very proud’ and ‘Not proud at all’ is merged into the category ‘Not proud’.

The Lithuanian public opinion rarely indicates ethnicity-based division lines as regards the Western orientation. Such differences can be observed only in terms of the EU future and the EU sanctions against Russia where non-Lithuanians are more inclined to support Eurosceptic and proRussian positions. The lower relevance of ethnic background is not surprising, because Lithuania is an ethnically homogenous country. Hence ethnic relations do not play as important a role as compared to Latvia and Estonia. Nevertheless, the Western orientation in Lithuania does significantly differ on the regional basis. Although the survey results provide a somewhat inconsistent pattern, a weaker Western orientation can be noticed in Western Lithuania (e.g. the Vilnius County and Marijampole County), particularly in smaller towns and villages. Likewise, education is also a more salient socio-demographic factor in Lithuania than it is in other Baltic countries. This suggests that Lithuanians with a university degree are more likely to demonstrate 22

a stronger Western orientation. Education is a significant differentiating independent variable in all Baltic societies with respect to the EU’s future and to the attitude toward Russia’s role in balancing Western influence. That is, the less educated residents of Baltic countries are more likely to be sceptical about the EU’s viability and more optimistic about Russia’s role in the region. The income level of Baltic households may also occasionally generate significant differences in terms of the Western orientation, meaning that the wealthiest segment of society is more likely to support pro-Western views. This is particularly pronounced in Lithuanian public opinion. The income factor is more consistent between Estonia and Lithuania, whereas in Latvia, it has considerably lower differentiating power. The most consistent results between the Estonian and Lithuanian income groups can be observed in the attitude toward the EU (future, sanctions against Russia) and toward the conflict between traditional and Western values. In both countries welloff people are more likely to support the EU sanctions against Russia and to be more optimistic about the EU future and they are more likely to disagree that there is a conflict between their country’s traditional values and Western values. Notably, the analysis of specific age groups yields the least striking fault lines within each country. The only consistent results across all Baltic countries can be seen in the perception of the conflict between traditional values and Western values. The 2019 survey results show that older cohorts (51+) are more likely to accept the conflict narrative than the youngest cohort (up to 30).

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE F AILED STATE CLAIMS

The state-building problems, including a sense that democracy does not function properly, forms an alternative context where ideological polarization may thrive. These problems nurture populist political rhetoric and undermine social cohesion, promoting anti-elite, anti-democratic or anti-western feelings in society. Casting doubts on the state’s sustainability may provoke existential anxiety and exacerbate an awareness of fragile statehood. Acknowledging the analytical problems of the ‘failed state’ concept, this report refers to the ‘failed state’ as a set of claims used by different political actors to highlight moral, economic and political motives that frame a particular state as an illegitimate and incapable entity. For the purposes of this report, special survey items were designed in order to explore to what extent the failed state claims can trigger polarization in Baltic societies. These items largely address two areas of the dysfunctional state that Call defines as the capacity gap and the legitimacy gap. 5 In order to obtain data on the state’s viability, respondents were asked to express an attitude toward the statement that one’s country ‘cannot exist as an independent national state’. According to the 2019 aggregate data, 64% of Baltic respondents believe that their country is capable of existing as an independent national state, but a significantly smaller opinion group (28%) think the opposite (Fig. 14). The country-level analysis reveals that optimism is much stronger in Estonia and Lithuania. In Latvia, one can observe a typical polarization where 54% are convinced about the country’s viability to exist as an independent national state, but 40% support the opposite opinion. It should be added though that the majority of Latvians are moderate pessimists (29%), as they ‘tend to agree’ rather than ‘strongly agree’ with the statement. The cross-sectional data show that the belief of the Baltic societies that their countries can exist as independent national states has increased by 9pp since 2017 (Fig. 15). The most salient changes are registered in Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion where optimism about the state’s national sovereignty has increased by 14pp and 9pp, respectively. In Latvia, the proportion of optimists and pessimists has remained the same as in 2017.

Call, T. C. (2010) ‘Beyond the ‘failed state’: Toward conceptual alternatives’. European Journal of International Relations, 17(2): 303–326. © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 24 5

Figure 14. Evaluation of the state's sovereignty My country cannot exist as an independent national state (2019)

Hard to say/ NA

6% 6% 5% 23%

Completely disagree

30%

Latvia

31%

Tend to disagree

Estonia 30%

22%

17%

Lithuania

36%

27%

Tend to agree

Completely agree

44%

11%

5% 7%

Figure 15. The dynamics of evaluation of the state's sovereignty My country cannot exist as an independent national state 6%

Hard to say/ NA

15% 23% 22%

Latvia

Completely disagree Tend to disagree Tend to agree

23% 11% 13%

Completely agree 6%

Lithuania

Hard to say/ NA

Completely disagree

30%

18%

36% 39%

Tend to disagree 22%

Tend to agree 5% 5% 5%

Completely agree

Hard to say/ NA Estonia

31% 27% 30%

2019 2017

29%

Completely disagree

44%

31% 27% 28%

Tend to disagree 17% 19%

Tend to agree 7%

Completely agree 0%

10%

13%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

Along with an attitude toward the state’s sovereignty, Baltic respondents were also asked to express an opinion on the statement that ‘the people of one’s country is on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years’. This statement is sometimes mentioned in connection with the demographic problems in the Baltic countries. The country-level data reveal significant differences between Baltic societies (Fig. 16). While Estonians hold the strongest consensus that they are not on the edge of extinction and will exist as a nation also in 100 years, Lithuanians and Latvians demonstrate much weaker agreement. This also suggests that polarization and insecurity on the basis of national and cultural sustainability is more salient in Latvia and Lithuania than in Estonia. The pessimistic mood of Lithuanians and Latvians, which is more often expressed in moderate terms (‘tend to agree’), can be partly explained by the negative demographic indicators of Lithuania and Latvia (e.g. depopulation, emigration) that marks the last 15 years or so. In contrast, the demographic situation in Estonia has stabilized, if not improved over the last decade.6 Figure 16. Demography as a threat for the state’s existence The people of my country are on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years (2019) 14%

Hard to say/ NA

12% 11% 16%

Completely disagree

13%

39% 33% 33% 32%

Tend to disagree

Latvia

Lithuania Estonia

23%

Tend to agree

32% 13% 13%

Completely agree

11% 5%

See Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level, available at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_gind&lang=en; Emigration by age and sex, available at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_emi2&lang=en © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 26 6

Several survey items outline an attitude toward the more specific claims of the failed state. Data on the attitude toward the statement that ‘the economy of one’s country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development’ reveal significant differences between the Baltic societies (Fig. 17). That is, Estonians demonstrate a rather moderate consensus (59%) that opposes such a statement and sees the country’s economy in more optimistic terms. Lithuanians and Latvians hold a similar moderate consensus, but this is located at the opposite side of the attitudinal scale, as the majority from each state agree upon a negative assessment of their economy’s shape and viability. Hence, two different polarization patterns emerge: between dominant optimists and minor pessimists (Estonia) and between dominant pessimists and minor optimists (Latvia and Lithuania). Interpreting these differences, one should take into account that these economic attitudes are mainly expressed in moderate terms (‘tend to agree’ or ‘tend to disagree’) which points to a possible flexibility in public opinion as well as to the temporal nature of polarizing views as regards the local economy. Figure 17. Opinions on economic sustainability The economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and longterm development of the country (2019)

Hard to say/ NA

4% 6% 8%

Completely disagree

6% 5% 20% Latvia

29% 30%

Tend to disagree

Lithuania 40%

Estonia

42% Tend to agree

44% 27% 19%

Completely agree

14% 5%

An opinion about the statement that ‘the existence of one’s country depends on the EU financial assistance’ also largely illustrates the society’s economic attitude, but it also can be read as an indicator for how Baltic societies see the economic autonomy of their countries. The 2019

data reveal that Lithuanians and Latvians hold a strong consensus that their countries existence depends on EU financial support (Fig. 18). In Estonia, this attitude also prevails, but consensus is much weaker, as a sizable opinion group (40%) support the belief that Estonia’s existence does not rest on the EU’s money. At the same time, Estonian public opinion is more polarized regarding the country’s economic autonomy. Overall, these data illustrate diverse perceptions of the country’s economic autonomy across the Baltic societies: the economic dependency narrative is more common in Latvian and Lithuanian public opinion, whereas the economic self-sufficiency narrative is more pronounced in Estonia. Figure 18. Dependence on the EU's financial assistance My country's existence depends on the EU's financial assistance (2019) 3% Hard to say/ NA

4% 6%

Completely disagree

1% 13% Latvia

14% Tend to disagree

Lithuania

13% 27%

Estonia 53%

Tend to agree

54% 40%

26% Completely agree

27% 14%

Regarding social inequality as another target for the failed state claims, Baltic respondents were asked to express their attitude toward the statement that ‘poverty and unemployment prevails in their countries’. The survey results yielded a complex picture (Fig. 19). Estonians hold a moderate consensus (60%) that poverty and unemployment do not dominate in their country. Quite the opposite attitude is expressed by Lithuanians who hold strong consensus (73%) that poverty and unemployment is endemic in their country. In comparison with other Baltic states, Latvia’s public opinion is the most polarized in terms of the perceived poverty and unemployment, 28

i. e. it is divided between two equally large opinion groups or between those who support (54%) and who do not support (43%) the poverty and unemployment claim. Nevertheless, this polarization again can be primarily characterized as moderate opposition, as extreme answers do not dominate the overall Latvian attitude. Figure 19. Evaluation of social inequality Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country (2019)

3% Hard to say/ NA

2% 3%

7% Completely disagree

2% 20%

Latvia

36% Tend to disagree

Lithuania

23% 40%

Estonia

37% Tend to agree

45% 29%

17% Completely agree

29% 8%

Since emigration is a shared issue between the Baltic states, it is often framed as an indicator of an ineffective state. The 2019 survey measured the attitude of Baltic societies toward the statement that ‘every day many residents leave one’s country and do not want to live there’. The data demonstrate a very strong consensus among Latvians and Lithuanians toward accepting this claim (Fig. 20). In Estonia, the situation is highly polarized between supporters and opponents of such claims. On a more general level, the data suggest that the emigration claims, particularly those that depict the negative consequences of emigration may have great mobilizing potential in the Baltic states. Likewise, these results show the varying impact of emigration intensity on public opinion in relation to the awareness of the failed state. Although recent migration statistics

suggest that the pace of emigration has slowed down in Lithuania and Latvia, this experience most likely continues to frame the perception that many residents are still leaving the country and do not want to live in that particular country. Conversely, in Estonia the emigration numbers are significantly smaller, thus giving limited space for ‘the everyone-is-leaving’ narrative. Figure 20. Emigration as an issue Every day many residents leave my country and do not want to live here (2019)

47%

46%

39%

35% 31%

30%

Completely agree Tend to agree Tend to disagree

18% 15% 10%

6% 1% Estonia

Completely disagree

13%

Lithuania

Hard to say/ NA 2%

Latvia

Anti-elite sentiment is one of the central elements in populist political rhetoric that intends to undermine the legitimacy of the ruling parties and the existing democratic order. The 2019 data indicate an extreme distrust in political elite in Latvia and Lithuania where the majority – 85% and 83%, respectively – agree that politicians of their countries are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the people (Fig. 21). In contrast, the Estonian public opinion is again profoundly polarized, as trust and distrust in politicians are alike. These differences between the countries can, to some extent, be explained by differences in the Corruption Perception Index, that in 2018 placed Latvia in 41th position and Lithuania in 38th position, but Estonia took a significantly higher position (18th), meaning that Estonians are less likely to think that their public institutions are corrupt.7

See Corruption Perception Index 2018, available at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 30 7

Figure 21. Anti-elite sentiments in the Baltic countries Politicians in my country are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the people (2019)

Hard to say/ NA

4% 3% 12%

Completely disagree

1% 2% 9%

Tend to disagree

Latvia

10%

Lithuania

12% 32%

Estonia 42% 42%

Tend to agree 31%

43%

Completely agree

41% 15%

A deeper analysis reveals that a sceptical attitude toward the state’s viability is strongly associated with a disapproval of the state’s performance in particular fields (social equality, economy, demography, public good (Fig. 22)). On the one hand, doubts about the state’s viability can be interpreted as issue-related discontent rather than a generic and ungrounded feeling of decay. Namely, people are inclined to generalize their specific disappointment. On the other hand, the equally strong discontent with the state’s performance that intertwines specific fields may signal an opinion group that is by nature sceptical about the state.

Figure 22. Opinions on the failed state claims Share of Baltic respondents who think that their country cannot exist as an independent state (2019) The people of my country are on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years

50%

Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country

71%

Economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development

74%

Country's politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the nation

81%

Every day many residents leave my country and do not want to live there

82%

My country's existence depends on the EU financial assistance

86%

Figure 23. Approval of the failed state claims Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country

My country cannot exist as an independent state The people of my country are on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country Economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development Country's politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the nation Every day many residents leave my country and do not want to live there My country's existence depends on the EU financial assistance

25%

52%

66%

27%

78%

49%

Not proud

77%

45%

Proud

72%

68%

70%

89%

85%

The national pride variable on the aggregate level indicates a conspicuous fault line between those who strongly feel proud to be the citizens of their country and those who express no pride at all (a relatively smaller group). While the former disagrees with the failed state claims, the latter accepts them (Fig. 22). One’s satisfaction with life also provides significant explanatory data as regards to susceptibility with failed state discourse (Fig. 24). Although in Lithuanian public opinion this factor shows a less consistent differentiating role, one can also see that generally people who are the most satisfied with their lives in a 10-point scale (assess satisfaction between 6 and 10) are more likely to disagree with failed state claims, whereas those who are less satisfied (between 1 and 5) are more likely to accept these claims (Fig. 25). A socio-demographic analysis again shows the different role of ethnicity in the Baltic states. While those who identify as ethnic Latvians and ethnic Estonians are less likely to support the failed state claims, the attitude of Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians do not reveal significant differences. As a matter of fact, the regional factor provides more consistent results across the Baltic societies, but here again one should take into account the underlying ethnic differences in Latvia and Estonia. The survey data indicate that almost all failed state claims have triggered regionally diverse reactions. In Latvia and Estonia, the failed state claims are more often accepted in Russophone regions or counties (the Latgale region and the Harju and Ida-Viru counties). Nevertheless, some less Russophone areas have also contributed to generating significant differences, such as the Zemgale region in central Latvia and Hiiu County in Estonia. This suggests that regional attitudinal differences have not only ethno-linguistic, but perhaps also a socioeconomic explanation. Moreover, the Estonian and Latvian data show that the failed state thinking is more often supported outside capitals or other big cities, which reinforces the argument that the ethno-linguistically marked area should be combined with other territorial variables in order to better understand the structural conditions that constitute this polarization context. Lithuanian public opinion approves such asymmetry, indicating that people who live in less populated areas (towns, villages) are more likely to accept failed state claims. In particular, the residents of Western Lithuania (Telsai, Taurage, Marijampole counties) are more likely to agree with such claims.

Figure 24. The dynamics toward the satisfaction with life (1999-2019) Mean satisfaction with life as a whole in a 10-points scale (1 dissatisfied - 10 satisfied) 7.59

7.26

6.69

6.45

6.36

5.9

6.69

5.27

5.09

1999

2008

2019

2 1 0 Estonia

Lithuania

Latvia

Figure 25. Approval of the failed state claims by the life satisfaction evaluation Quartiles of Baltic respondents who assess their satisfaction with life as a whole in a 10points scale (1 - dissatisfied, 10 - satisfied) (2019) 90% My country's existence depends on the EU financial assistance

80%

70%

Every day many residents leave my country and do not want to live there

60% Country's politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the nation

50%

40%

Economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development

30%

Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country

20%

The people of my country are on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years

10%

My country cannot exist as an independent state

0% 1-5

8-10

Education is the most consistent socio-demographic indicator across the Baltic states, this generates differences concerning all failed state categories. According to this indicator, the most educated part of Baltic societies is less susceptible to the failed state discourse. In contrast, the household income variable yields less consistent findings, showing that the income level has a rather conditional character in supporting or opposing the failed state claims. The most consistent results of income groups across the Baltic states are associated with socio-economic topics, revealing that the wealthiest segments in Baltic societies are less likely to agree that their country’s economy is underdeveloped and cannot ensure a sufficient and long-term development, or that poverty and unemployment prevails in their country or that every day many residents leave their country and do not want to live there. The differences between age groups, again show the least significant and consistent results, which means that a generational perspective will hardly contribute toward explaining failed state thinking and that this mindset largely intertwines with society as a whole.

ATTITUDE TOWARD IMMIGRANTS

An anti-immigrant sentiment is currently a very prominent issue in European societies. The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe also exacerbated this feeling in the Baltic states. Simultaneously, massive emigration over the last 15 years and aging societies evoke discussions about the necessity for labour migrants. Hence, the immigration issue has created a relatively new context for ideological polarization in Baltic societies. The 2019 survey included four items that provided data concerning attitudes toward immigrants. The first item deals with the perception of foreigners in general. Respondents were asked to express an attitude toward the statement that ‘it is impossible for people who do not share the customs and traditions of one’s country to become fully attached to this country’. The aggregate data show that the majority of Baltic respondents (46%) agree with such a statement, but a much smaller portion (22%) disagrees (Fig. 26). The country-level data reveal that Latvians are more likely to associate the acquisition of Latvia’s customs and traditions as a profound precondition for belonging to Latvia, whereas Lithuanians are less likely to support such a maximalist acculturation practice. Thus Lithuanians, ethnically the most homogenous society in the Baltic states, appear more open to cultural diversity in their country compared to Latvians, ethnically the most diverse society.

Figure 26. General perception of immigrants It is impossible for people who do not share my country's customs and traditions to become fully attached to my country (2019) 2% Hard to say/ NA

3% 4%

18% Disagree

24% Latvia

26%

Lithuania 28% Neither agree or disagree

Estonia 31%

25%

51% Agree

42%

45%

Note: a compressed scale is used in all charts of this section and the next section. ‘Completely agree’ and ‘Agree’ are merged into the categories ‘Agree’, and ‘Disagree’ and ‘Completely disagree’ is merged into the category ‘Disagree’.

The cross-sectional aggregate data indicate that support for the statement about the necessity to share the customs and traditions of one’s country has declined by 16pp over the last six years (Fig. 27). This means that tolerance toward cultural pluralism has increased in all three Baltic societies. Country-level analysis reveals that Estonian public opinion has experienced the sharpest decline in the assimilationist attitude (19pp). In the Latvian case, this decline has significantly increased (13pp) indifference toward the requirement that people should share Latvia’s customs and traditions if they truly want to belong to Latvia. Namely, Latvians have become less opinionated about the proper way for how foreigners can become fully attached to Latvia, which may allude to the increasing tolerance to other cultures as well as about increasing reluctance toward expressing an assimilation-oriented opinion about the members of other cultures who live in Latvia.

Figure 27. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners (2013-2019) It is impossible for people who do not share my country's customs and traditions to become fully attached to my country 2% 1%

Latvia

Hard to say/ NA

18% 17%

Disagree Neither agree or disagree

28%

15%

51%

Agree

Lithuania

Hard to say/ NA Disagree

15%

Neither agree or disagree

24% 27%

2019

31%

2013 42%

Agree

56%

4% 4%

Hard to say/ NA

Estonia

67%

3% 2%

Disagree

26%

14%

Neither agree or disagree

18%

25% 45%

Agree 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

64% 60%

70%

80%

In order to measure the attitude toward immigrants, three specific statements were used. The 2019 aggregate data reveal that support for the statement that ‘immigrants increase crime rates’ (Fig. 28 and Fig. 29) is much higher than the approval of statements that ‘immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in one’s country’ (Fig. 30 and Fig. 31) or that ‘the culture of one’s country is generally undermined by immigrants’ (Fig. 32 and Fig. 33). The least accepted statement across the Baltic societies is that ‘immigrants are a threat to the country’s culture’, which means that anti-immigrant sentiment is more likely to be rooted in the social order narrative (crime, jobs) than in fear from intercultural encounters. Perhaps willingness to maintain the extant social order can be more prone to triggering defensive thinking and polarization with respect to immigrants. The 2019 aggregate data exposed a strong association between all three immigrantrelated statements, which means that people who express a negative attitude in one context (socially deviant behaviour) are quite likely to maintain this attitude in another context (threat to the labour market). This shows that the anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant opinion groups represent a somewhat coherent rather than just a conditional attitudinal segment within the Baltic societies. Moreover, as the cross-sectional data show, attitudinal coherence has even strengthened since 2013.

Figure 28. Immigrants as a source for crime Immigrants increase crime rates (2019)

Hard to say/ NA

4% 6% 9% 20%

Disagree

27%

Latvia

22%

Lithuania

26%

Estonia

Neither agree or disagree

38% 22% 50%

Agree

29% 47%

Figure 29. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as source of crime (2013-2019) Immigrants increase crime rates 20%

Latvia

Disagree Neither agree or disagree

33% 23%

26%

Agree 27% 28%

Lithuania

Disagree Neither agree or disagree

31%

2019 2013

22% 24%

Disagree Estonia

38%

29% 27%

Agree

22%

Neither agree or disagree

29%

Agree

37% 0%

50%

39%

10%

20%

30%

40%

47% 50%

60%

Figure 30. Immigrants as a threat to job market Immigrants take jobs away from people that were born in my country (2019) 3% 3%

Hard to say/ NA

33% Disagree

29% 39%

Latvia Lithuania

29% Neither agree or disagree

Estonia

33% 21%

35% 36% 34%

Agree

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Figure 31. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to job markets (2013-2019) Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in my country

Latvia

Disagree

33%

23%

Neither agree or disagree

29%

18%

35%

Agree

Lithuania

Disagree

29%

17%

Neither agree or disagree

27%

33%

2019 2013

36%

Agree

Disagree Estonia

57%

39%

28% 21%

Neither agree or disagree

52%

32% 34% 32%

Agree 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

The relationship analysis between the three anti-immigrant statements indicates that the opinion on immigrants as job stealers is more likely to be shaped (reinforced/weakened) by the people’s opinion of immigrants as criminals or cultural invaders rather than the other way around. Taking into account the relatively small share of new immigrants in the Baltic societies and thus a rather limited experience, the relations between different stereotypes alludes to a possible priming effect. That is, inter/nationally mediated negative images become a major source of one’s anti-immigrant opinion that continues framing immigrants in less sensitive contexts, e. g. immigrants as a workforce for the local economies. Overall, though, these data suggest that the level of polarization as regards immigration is somewhat moderate in the Baltic states and that it leans toward pluralistic rather than antagonistic polarization. The presence of a large group of people who neither support nor oppose the prejudice about immigrants is a crucial factor that reinforces a pluralistic pattern in Baltic public opinion. Moreover, this reluctant segment is surprisingly persistent in time. Figure 32. Immigrants as a threat to local culture My country's culture is generally undermined by immigrants (2019)

Hard to say/ NA

4% 4% 6% 37% 38%

Disagree

44%

Latvia Lithuania

29% Neither agree or disagree

Estonia 32%

20% 30% Agree

26% 30%

Figure 33. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to local culture (2013-2019) My country's culture is generally undermined by immigrants 37%

Latvia

Disagree Neither agree or disagree

29%

21%

30%

Agree

34% 38% 37%

Lithuania

Disagree 32%

Neither agree or disagree Agree

2019

36%

2013

26%

19%

Disagree

Estonia

42%

40% 20%

Neither agree or disagree Agree

29% 30%

18% 0%

10%

15%

20%

44%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

The country-level analysis reveals that significant differences exist between the Baltic societies only with respect to the statement that ‘immigrants increase crime rates’. Lithuanians are less likely to agree with this statement. Thus, Latvian and Estonian public opinion might be more susceptible to the socially deviant image of immigrants. The cross-sectional data generally indicate that the association of immigrants with an increasing crime rate and with a threat to country’s culture has strengthened in Baltic public opinion by 8pp and 5pp, respectively. On the contrary, the link between immigrants and job losses has weakened by 8pp. From these results, one may tentatively conclude that the attitude toward labour migrants from culturally familiar countries has a higher likelihood to develop into a more migrant-friendly attitude while refugees/immigrants from culturally and socially unfamiliar countries have a higher likelihood to increase anti-immigrant sentiment. The country-level analysis also reveals quite complex dynamics since 2013. In Latvia and Estonia, support for the statement that immigrants increase crime rates has risen by 11pp and 9pp, respectively, whereas it has remained unchanged in Lithuania. Conversely, the approval of the statement that immigrants take jobs away has declined in Latvia (23pp) and Lithuania (17pp), but has remained unchanged in Estonian public opinion. Finally, support toward framing immigrants as a threat to national culture has increased in Estonia (12pp) and Lithuania (6pp), but has slightly fallen in Latvia (5pp). These dynamics hence illustrate that the Latvian attitude toward © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

immigrants has experienced the most extensive changes in relation to the strengthening of the deviant and asocial representation of immigrants and with the weakening of other negative representations, e.g. immigrants as job stealers or a threat to local traditions and customs. According to these data, the smallest increase in resentment toward immigrants can be observed in Lithuania. In contrast, Estonian public opinion demonstrates the most salient increase in anti-immigrant sentiment since 2013. This perhaps explains why the Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE), which secured the third place in the 2019 national elections, used antiimmigration rhetoric as one of the central issues during their election campaign. Regardless of the different attitudinal patterns that can be detected in Baltic societies in relation to immigrants, a common characteristic in all three countries is the presence of a somewhat steady and neutral, if not improving, opinion on immigrants as a labour force that can contribute to local economies.

Figure 34. Approval of the anti-immigrant statements Share of Baltic respondents who believe that it is impossible for people who do not share their country’s customs and traditions to become fully attached to their country (2019)

My country's culture is generally undermined by immigrants

Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in my country

Immigrants increase crime rates

40%

44%

55%

A comparative analysis of the aggregate data reveals that the residents of the Baltic states that can be analytically categorized as ‘cultural assimilationists’8 are divided into those agreeing with anti-immigrant statements and those disagreeing (Fig. 34). Thus, support for the

They believe that it is impossible for people who do not share their country’s customs and traditions to become fully attached to their country. © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 42 8

assimilationist strategy toward foreigners does not necessarily mean higher support for to stereotypical anti-immigrant statements. Moreover, the national pride variable indicates an inconsistent pattern across the Baltic states. On the one hand, a strong sense of pride about belonging to one’s country is a characteristic feature for cultural assimilationists. On the other hand, stronger national pride is again not associated with a higher likelihood to support antiimmigrant claims. In fact, this significantly reduces such likelihood (Fig. 35). Simultaneously, one should take into account that Latvian public opinion vis-à-vis two out of three anti-immigrant statements does not indicate any statistically significant differences among those that express strong national pride and those that do not. Thus national identification, in general, is a weaker differentiating factor in the Latvian attitude toward immigrants.

Figure 35. Support to anti-immigrant statements Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country (2019)

My country's culture is generally undermined by immigrants

Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in my country

36% 29%

46% 32% Not proud

Proud

Immigrants increase crime rates

People who do not share their country’s customs and traditions cannot become fully attached to their country

51% 43%

41% 53%

The analysis of socio-demographic data reveals that the area (county or region) where people live generates the most consistent differences across the Baltic states. Latvian public opinion shows that the people that live in the capital of Latvia, Riga, are more likely to disagree with anti-immigrant sentiment. In Estonia, the differences between big cities and smaller towns

are even more salient than in other Baltic countries. The residents of Harju County demonstrate the most consistent anti-immigrant attitudes within the Estonian context. In Lithuania, the residents of medium-sized cities are more likely to accept anti-immigrant sentiment, but the most consistent anti-immigrant attitudes can be observed in Kaunas County. Ethnic background is a less important differentiating factor in terms of attitudes toward immigrants. The most considerable attitudinal differences are registered in Estonia where the respondents that identify with the ethnic Estonian majority are more likely to be reluctant toward the statement that immigrants increase crime rates and more likely to disagree that immigrants take jobs away from people that were born in Estonia. The education indicator reveals significant differences only in Latvia and Estonia where people with a university degree are more likely to disagree with anti-immigrant statements. Respondents from this category generally demonstrate a more welcoming attitude toward foreigners. The household income groups also indicate less significant and regular differences. However, incomes are an important determinant in Lithuania, revealing somewhat surprising results. That is, the second highest income quintile (an average household income 1001 – 1401 EUR) is more likely to agree with anti-immigrant statements, whereas the representatives of the highest quintile are more likely to disagree with these statements. In comparison previous two polarization contexts, anti-immigrant sentiment shows that age groups play a more crucial role for generating cleavages in public opinion. This can be specifically observed in Estonia and Lithuania where three anti-immigrant items indicate significant differences across age groups. These reveal that the youngest generation of Lithuanians (up to 30) are more likely to disagree with antiimmigrant discourse. Conversely, in Estonia, the oldest generation (62 and above) are more likely to express a negative attitude toward immigrants. The only consistent findings across all Baltic societies indicate that the oldest generation is more likely to agree that it is impossible for people that do not share national customs and traditions to become fully attached to one’s country.

ATTITUDES TOWARD PROTECTIONISM

Protectionism can also become a source of ideological polarization. As long as neo-liberal values clash with locally embedded thinking and needs, a protectionist ethos fits well within a populist agenda. The election of Donald Trump as the US president and the Brexit referendum are two landmark events that have globally illustrated and legitimized protectionist discourse. To be sure, in the Baltic states and elsewhere, the localized versions of such a discourse have been in existence in their own right. Furthermore, the pro-Kremlin media have keen to remind that the Baltic states are vassals of EU and US commercial interests and do not have their own national economies. In this section, four survey items are used to measure the level and nature of protectionism in Baltic societies. The first item focuses on economic protectionism, stating that ‘one’s country should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy’. The 2019 results show a fragmented sociological picture that indicates significant differences between the Baltic states. According to the 2019 data, Latvians are more likely to agree that the import of foreign products should be limited, whereas Estonians demonstrate the lowest support for such an idea (Fig. 36). In other words, while Latvians hold a moderate consensus on economic protectionism, Estonians demonstrate an equally moderate consensus on trade openness. Lithuanians, in turn, seem to be the most pluralistic, as there is not a dominant opinion group as regards the proposal to revise Lithuania’s import policy. Figure 36. Economic nationalism in the Baltic countries My country should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy (2019)

Hard to say/ NA

3% 3% 9% 21%

Disagree

32%

Latvia

43%

Lithuania 28% Neither agree or disagree

Estonia

32% 20% 48%

Agree

32% 27%

Figure 37. The dynamics of economic nationalism in the Baltic countries (2013-2019) My country should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy

Latvia

Disagree

12%

Neither agree or disagree

21% 28%

14%

48%

Agree 32% 28%

Lithuania

Disagree Neither agree or disagree

32%

Agree

20%

2013 43% 43%

31%

Neither agree or disagree

2019

32%

23%

Disagree Estonia

72%

30% 27% 30%

Agree 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

The cross-sectional analysis reveals changes in all Baltic countries since 2013 that, on an aggregate level, indicate decreasing support for the idea of limiting the import of foreign products (Fig. 37). The data show that support for limiting the import of products in order to foster the national economy has fallen by 14pp over the last six years, and this has strengthened opposition toward such protectionist measures. Latvia’s public opinion displays the most conspicuous decline, and this holds true even if one takes into account the results from the 1995 and 2003 surveys (Estonia and Lithuania were not included in these survey waves). Likewise, with weakening support for protectionist ideas, the number of reluctant respondents in Latvian public opinion or those that approve neither sides has increased by 15pp. Similar dynamics can be observed in Lithuania. Contrary to the previous two cases, Estonian public opinion has instead demonstrated the strongest increase in opposition toward the revision of import policy. The survey item that measures attitudes toward the statement that ‘large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in one’s country’ also measures the economic dimension of protectionism. The 2019 data reveal that Latvians are more likely to take a negative perspective on international companies, whereas Estonians and Lithuanians demonstrate equally low support and higher pluralism toward such statements (Fig. 38). Since 2013, cross-sectional analysis indicates that public opinion in the Baltic states has been rather steady in its framing of international companies as a damaging factor for local businesses (Fig. 39). In Lithuania and Latvia, the negative attitude toward international companies has slightly deteriorated by 6pp and 4pp, respectively. In the Latvian case, where three survey waves are available, one can notice that this incremental decline is a continuous trend over the last 15 years. 46

Figure 38. Attitudes toward international companies Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in my country (2019) 8% 7%

Hard to say/ NA

15% 14% Disagree

24% 23%

Latvia Lithuania

22%

Estonia

Neither agree or disagree

34% 22% 56%

Agree

36% 40%

Figure 39. The dynamics of public opinion toward large international companies Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in my country 14% 15%

Latvia

Disagree

22% 20%

Neither agree or disagree

56%

Agree

Lithuania

Disagree

20%

Neither agree or disagree

24%

Estonia

34%

2019 2013

36%

Agree Disagree

19%

46%

23%

22%

Neither agree or disagree

61%

27% 40% 40%

Agree 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

The third protectionism-related item measures an attitude toward the proposal that ‘foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in one’s country’. In this statement, the economic (land as a recourse) and symbolic (land as a part of the nation’s territory) dimensions of protectionism overlap. The aggregate data show that support for restricting the land ownership rights of foreigners is a somewhat popular idea in the Baltic states. Yet this topic has only a limited possibility to trigger antagonistic polarization. This is because pluralistic public opinion dominates in all countries. These findings do suggest that large opinion groups within Baltic societies are susceptible to protectionism-induced discourse. The 2019 country-level results again mark Latvia as the most protectionist-minded country where 61% support the ban on foreigners’ rights to purchase land (Fig. 40). These results also mean that protectionist thinking in terms of land ownership can generate a much stronger consensus in Latvia compared to the idea of limiting the import of products. Arguably, this is because the former consensus is triggered by a mixed motif (economic and symbolic), whereas the latter emerges from purely economic considerations. Estonians and Lithuanians are, to a similar extent, both less likely to accept restrictive measures with respect to land ownership. However, the explicit disapproval of a restrictive policy is higher in Estonia than in Lithuania (26% vs. 14%, respectively). The cross-sectional aggregate data show a rather stable public opinion picture regarding land ownership. In particular, this applies to Latvia and Lithuania (Fig. 41). Estonians, in turn, have become more inclined to think in protectionist terms, i. e. demonstrate support toward restricting land ownership rights has increased by 13pp since 2013. Figure 40. Opinions on foreigners’ right to purchase land Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in my country (2019)

Hard to say/ NA

Disagree

5% 5% 6% 13% 15%

Latvia

26%

Lithuania 21% Neither agree or disagree

Estonia

28% 19% 61%

Agree

52% 49%

Figure 41. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners’ right to purchase land (2013-2019) Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in my country 13% 13%

Latvia

Disagree

21% 19%

Neither agree or disagree

61%

Agree 15%

Lithuania

Disagree Neither agree or disagree

19% 19%

28%

2019 2013 52% 55%

Agree 26%

Disagree

Estonia

66%

33%

19% 21%

Neither agree or disagree Agree

36% 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

49% 50%

60%

70%

The last protectionism-related item focuses on the sovereignty issue. This measures respondents’ attitudes toward the statement that ‘international organizations are taking away too much power from the government of one’s country’. 2019 survey results reveal somewhat fractured and pluralistic public opinion in the Baltic states (Fig. 42). Although Latvians are more likely to think that international organizations eliminate their country’s sovereignty (46%), there is a sizeable opinion group that is either reluctant or opposes such an assumption (41%). Lithuanian public opinion is the least likely to accept and the most likely to explicitly oppose the same claim about the influence of international organizations. Arguably, in this respect, Lithuanians have a higher awareness of their country’s sovereignty compared to Estonians and Latvians. In Estonia, one may observe the highest level of uncertainty vis-à-vis the influence of international organizations; this means that Estonian public opinion may have the highest potential for change as regards assessment of the role of international organizations.

Figure 42. Assessment of the international organizations International organizations are taking away too much power from my country's government (2019) 13% Hard to say/ NA

9% 21% 14%

Disagree

22%

Latvia

18%

Lithuania 27% Neither agree or disagree

Estonia 32%

18% 46%

Agree

37% 43%

Figure 43. The dynamics of public opinion toward the assessment of the international organizations International organizations are taking away too much power from my country's government 14% 13%

Latvia

Disagree Neither agree or disagree

21%

27% 46%

Agree

Lithuania

Disagree

22%

14%

Neither agree or disagree

29%

Disagree

Estonia

32%

2019 2013 37% 37%

Agree

14%

18% 18% 20%

Neither agree or disagree

43% 44%

Agree 0%

60%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

The cross-sectional aggregate data indicate that public opinion in Baltic societies has maintained a rather stable attitude toward the influence of international organizations (Fig. 43). The most significant changes are registered in Latvia where a negative perception of international organizations has decreased by 14pp since 2013. Nevertheless, such attitudinal changes have strengthened Latvian reluctance or uncertainty as distinct from outright opposition toward the claim that international organizations are taking away too much power from the government of Latvia. Moreover, a critical attitude toward the influence of international organizations, as the first wave data on Latvia demonstrated, has been even lower at the beginning of the 2000s. In other words, the cross-sectional analysis does not suggest that Latvians’ trust in international organizations per se has increased. Conversely, explicit opposition to the claim that international organizations usurp too much power has risen in Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion by 4pp and 8pp, respectively. Overall, cross-sectional analysis suggests that the image of international organisations portrayed by protectionist claims has higher polarization potential today than this did six years ago. Figure 44. Approval of protectionist statements Share of those Baltic respondents that agree that their country’s economy is underdeveloped and cannot ensure sufficient and long-term development (2019)

My country should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

International organizations are taking away too much power from my country's government.

Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in my country.

Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in my country.

42%

50%

51%

57%

Interestingly, around half of the Baltic respondents that believe that their country’s economy is underdeveloped and cannot ensure sufficient and long-term development also simultaneously support protectionist policies (Fig. 44). That is, a progressive economic policy, in their understanding, is most likely associated with protectionism. These findings suggest that the protectionist solutions to economic problems in the Baltic states may trigger polarization between

protectionists and ‘internationalists’. The national pride variable reveals an inconsistent link with protectionism. The data on Estonia shows the strongest association in this context, suggesting that people that express the strongest national pride are less likely to accept protectionist claims (Fig. 45). In Latvia, such an association has a weaker character, but in Lithuania, national pride largely does not generate significant differences between diverse opinion groups. Hence, national identification in Baltic societies yields a somewhat limited contribution to protectionism as a context for ideological polarization. The socio-demographic analysis shows that regional variation within a country again creates the most significant and consistent differences across all Baltic states. In Latvia, these differences have an inconsistent character with respect to protectionism, as regions with the strongest differentiating power vary in line with survey items. In contrast, no significant variations can be observed among the capital, bigger cities, and villages. This means that protectionism is supported by an opinion group that is embedded in nationally rather than locally specific thinking. However, these findings show that protectionism is not exclusively supported in regions which are dominated by ethnic Latvians or in Russophone areas. In Estonia, the residents of Tallinn are less likely to support protectionist ideas, whereas those that live in villages are more likely to align with the protectionist claims. According to data, the residents of the Harju County display a consistently higher likelihood to agree with protectionist statements. In Lithuania, the residents of Marijampole and Taurage counties, once again, differ significantly from other areas of Lithuania. These areas demonstrate higher support for protectionism. Figure 45. Support for protectionism in the Baltic countries Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country (2019) My country should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

International organizations are taking away too much power from my country's government.

Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in my country.

Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in my country.

46% 35%

56% 46%

Not proud 55%

Proud

47%

57% 59%

Estonia is the only country where ethnic identification can be associated with relevant differences concerning protectionism. Nevertheless, data reveal an inconsistent pattern in terms of different protectionism-related items. That is, depending on the particular protectionist claim, ethnic Estonians can be either more likely to support or to disagree or to take a reluctant position in terms of protectionist ideas. Thus, regardless of the salience of the ethnic identification, this analysis does not indicate that Estonia’s ethnic majority or ethnic minorities are more inclined to support protectionism. The education indicator in this polarization context also unveils inconsistency between the countries. The country-level results, though, show that education plays a significant and consistent differentiating role in Estonia as people with a university degree are more likely to disagree with protectionist ideas, whereas Estonians who have secondary or vocational education are more likely to accept these ideas. Household income groups are able to generate results that illustrate the Baltic states in a more consistent light. Overall, these findings show that the wealthiest people in all countries are more likely to disagree with the protectionist ideas. The income factor in creating attitudinal differences is particularly relevant in Estonia and Lithuania. The protectionism context creates the most significant and consistent differences between age groups. These differences mostly insist that the youngest generation (up to 30) in Baltic societies are more likely to disagree with protectionist ideas, whereas the oldest generation (62 and above) are more likely to support them. Arguably, this relationship is stronger in Latvia and Estonia and is more pronounced in terms of the proposal to limit the import of foreign products in order to protect their country’s national economy and to prohibit foreigners from buying the country’s land.

IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION: A BIRD’S EYE VIEW THE WESTERN ORIENTATION INDEX

The attitudes of respondents can be broadly characterized as pro-Western or anti-Western. They were captured in our questionnaire by using a battery of items from the block Q1 (see Appendix A). In order to reduce the complexity of data that arises from the use of many related items, a principal component analysis (PCA, Varimax rotation) was used. The analysis reveals that all the aforementioned questions are significantly, although moderately, correlated, and if they are compiled into one summary factor, this explains 42% of variation in the data. Crombach’s Alpha value of 0.65 confirms that the five questions, taken together, form a reliable scale. Accordingly, using these five questions, the Western orientation index was calculated. It ranges from 1 to 5, with ‘1’ meaning an extremely cold feeling toward the West, and ‘5’ – an extremely warm feeling.

Figure 46. Distribution of attitudes toward the West (2019)

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely anti-Western) to 4 (extremely proWestern). For example, 59 respondents of the 2019 survey had extremely pro-Western attitudes.

According to the T-test, the attitude of Baltic respondents toward the West is significantly warmer than it is colder. The mean value is 2.8. Country-level analysis shows that a pro-Western stance is more common in Estonia (2.93), whereas an anti-Western orientation is most pronounced in Latvia (mean value 2.7). Notably, 16% of Latvians hold very strong anti-Western attitudes (a score of 2 or lower), but in Estonia and Lithuania this opinion group is much lower (7%). Overall, in Lithuania, ‘somewhat warm’ feelings often dominate (mean value 2.69).

Figure 47. Distribution of attitudes toward the West in three Baltic countries (2019)

18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%

Estonia

Lithuania

Latvia

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely anti-Western) to 4 (extremely proWestern) in each of the Baltic states.

The cross-sectional analysis shows that the general feeling in the Baltic societies toward the West has become somewhat colder since 2013. The independent-samples T test indicates that the aggregate changes from 2.84 to 2.77 are not statistically significant. However, these are significant on the country level for Estonia and Lithuania.

Figure 48. The Western orientation index in the Baltic countries in 2016 and 2019 The Western orientation index 2.97 2.92

2.81 2.74 2016

2.69 2.65

Estonia

Lithuania

2019

Latvia

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely anti-Western) to 4 (extremely proWestern) in each of the Baltic states in year 2006 and 2019.

THE FAILED STATE INDEX

In order to test the concept of Latvia (Estonia/Lithuania) as a failed state, several additional questions were included in the questionnaire (questions in the Q5 block, see Appendix A). The analysis shows that all seven questions correlate very well, and the one factor solution suggested by the Principal component analysis explains 53% of the variation in our data. Moreover, Crombach’s alfa (0,85) confirms that they form a coherent scale. Therefore, on the basis of these questions, an index from 1 to 5 was calculated where ‘1’ means that a respondent aligns with the failed state discourse, but ‘5’ means that a respondent sees the state as a successful and viable social system.

Figure 49. Distribution in the perception of the country

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative perception, i.e., a failed state) to 4 (extremely positive perception).

This comparison of the Baltic states reveals that Estonians perceive their country much more positively than the inhabitants of the other two Baltic states (mean evaluation 2.76). In Lithuania, the value of the index is 2.19, but in Latvia it is 2.17. Overall, in Estonia there are many more people that have a positive rather than a negative view of their country, whereas in Latvia and Lithuania a skeptical opinion predominates. A profoundly negative perception of their country (evaluation 2 or lower) is characteristic to 44% of Latvians, 41% of Lithuanians and just 13% of Estonians.

Estonia

Lithuania

Latvia

3.9

3.7

3.6

3.4

3.3

3.1

3.0

2.9

2.7

2.6

2.4

2.3

2.1

2.0

1.9

1.7

1.6

1.4

1.3

1.1

Failed state

14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%

Successful…

Figure 50. The perception of the state in the Baltics

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative perception, i.e., a failed state) to 4 (extremely positive perception) in each of the Baltic states.

THE XENOPHOBIA INDEX

Four questions in the questionnaire aimed to capture respondents’ attitudes toward immigrants (questions 1 to 4 in the Q8 block, see Appendix A). As the first item, “It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY]” did not correlate well with other items, it was excluded from the index. Using the remaining three items, an index of xenophobia was created that ranges from 1 to 5, and where ‘1’ means an extremely negative attitude toward immigrants and ‘5’ – an extremely positive attitude toward immigrants. According to the Principal component analysis, these three variables explain 74% of the variation in the data, and the Crombach’s Alpha test value of 0.81 confirms that they form a reliable scale in all three Baltic countries. According to this index a very negative attitude toward immigrants (2 or less on the xenophobia scale) is shared by 26%-27% of Latvians and Estonians, and by 21% of Lithuanians. This suggests that, under normal circumstances, attitudes are moderately negative, but not extremely negative in Baltic societies. Figure 51. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative attitude) to 5 (extremely positive attitude).

Figure 52. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants in three Baltic countries 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0%

Estonia

Lithuania

Latvia

Figure 53. The xenophobia index 3.10

3.01

3.00

2.93

2.94

2.98 2.84

2.90

2.80

2.83

2013

2019

2.80 2.70

2.60

2.60 2.50 2.40 2.30 2013

2019

Estonia

2013

2019

Lithuania

1995

2003

Latvia

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative attitude) to 5 (extremely positive attitude) in all Baltic states.

In general, as confirmed by a one-sample T test, attitudes toward immigrants in the Baltic states are more negative than positive (mean value in the xenophobia index–2.9). Moreover, they are rather stable over time, as the only notable changes can be observed in Latvia where an attitude toward immigrants has become more positive since 1995. Beyond this, over recent times in the Baltic states, there have not been any notable changes in the generally negative attitudes held toward immigrants.

THE PROTECTIONISM INDEX

The last index illustrates a general attitude toward protectionism in the Baltic states (questions 5 to 8 in the Q8 block, see Appendix A). Considering that all four protectionism-related items are strongly correlated, and the Principal component analysis suggests a one-factor solution (the variables explain 53% of the variation in the data and all have high factor loadings), an index was created that ranges from 1 to 5. In this case, ‘1’ means that a person strongly supports protectionism, whereas ‘5’ means complete openness to international competition and cooperation. Crombach’s Alpha of 0.7 confirms that variables form an acceptable scale. The data reveal a relatively high level of support for protectionism across the Baltic countries. The average value on the protectionism scale is 2.63.

Figure 54. Distribution of openness to free trade

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely protective) to 5 (fully open to competition).

Cross-sectional analysis demonstrates that Latvians are more prone to accept protectionist claims compared to Estonians and Lithuanians. However, the dispersion analysis (ANOVA) shows that Baltic populations are also becoming more open to free trade. 60

Figure 55. Distribution of openness toward competition in three Baltic countries

20% 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%

Estonia

Lithuania

Latvia

Figure 56. The dynamics of public opinion toward the openness to free trade (2013-2019) 3.00

2.78

2.69

2.62

2.73 2.38

2.50

2.48

2.39

2013

2019

2.19

2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 2013

2019

2013

Estonia

2019

Lithuania

1995

2003 Latvia

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely protective) to 5 (fully open to competition) in all Baltic states.

OPINION GROUPS

This section focuses on the composition of particular opinion groups that are behind the ideological attitudes of Baltic societies, outlined in the previous sections. The 2019 survey used two items for the purpose of controlling the survey items related to polarization topics. These control variables measure one’s engagement with political information, indicating the level of exposure to political news and informal discussions about politics.9 Three opinion groups can be distinguished on the basis of these items: opinion leaders, opinion seekers, and politically alienated people. The logic that determined the coding of these groups is shown in Table 1. The distribution for these groups is similar in all Baltic countries with the caveat that in Lithuania there are slightly more opinion leaders (16%, Fig.58). Figure 57. Distribution of the opinion groups in the society of the Baltic states 50

46%

41%

40 35 30 25 20 15

13%

10 5 0 Opinion leaders

Opinion seekers

Politically alienated

Note: The figure shows the proportional distribution of society of the Baltic states into the three defined opinion groups.

‘How often do you follow political events via television, radio, newspapers or through internet sites, including social media (Facebook, Twitter, VKontakte u. c.)?’ and ‘When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?’. The latter question is from the European Value Survey. © Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 62 9

Table 1. Following news and discussing political matters among opinion groups When meeting friends, how often do you discuss political issues? Often How frequently do you follow political events in the media?

Every day

Sometimes

Never

13.3%

30.2%

6.8%

1.5%

15.1%

3.8%

One or two times a week

.3%

8.4%

3.9%

Less often

.2%

5.0%

6.1%

Never

.1%

1.3%

4.0%

Several times a week

Note: The table shows the proportion of respondents in the Baltic states whose answers fall within a particular cell. For example, 13.3 per cent follow political events in the media every day AND discuss political issues with friends often. The highlighting shows to which opinion groups respondents with such self-assessment belong, e.g. the previously mentioned 13.3% of respondents are categorized as opinion leaders (the red color area). The orange cells mark opinion seekers, and the blue cells designate the politically alienated group.

Figure 58. Opinion groups in the Baltic countries 50.0

45.3

45.0

46.8

46.2

43.0

42.0 37.5

40.0

35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0

16.3 11.7

11.2

10.0

5.0 0.0 Opinion leaders

Opinion seekers

Politically alienated

Opinion leaders

Estonia

Opinion seekers Lithuania

Politically alienated

Opinion leaders

Opinion seekers

Politically alienated

Latvia

Note: The figure shows the percentage distribution of opinion groups in the Baltic states

Looking at their respective attitudes, one can notice that Estonian and Lithuanian opinion leaders in general tend to harbor more pro-Western attitudes and a more positive view of their own country. Opinion leaders are less exposed to the failed state discourse, and, considering their impact on the development of others, we can expect more positive dynamics in the future. However, the more pro-Western orientation of opinion leaders has not stopped the rise of skepticism against the West in Lithuania and Estonia. This could be associated with targeted content provided by certain media channels that opinion leaders are unable to fully counteract. In Latvia, however, opinion leaders cannot be particularly associated with pro-Western orientation or with weaker exposure to the failed state discourse. In fact, they are even more skeptical toward the Latvian state than opinion seekers (though less than the politically alienated group). In all Baltic countries, opinion leaders do not express a more positive attitude toward immigrants and they are not more open toward international trade competition. The skepticism toward immigrants that is expressed among opinion leaders is one of the reasons for why anti-immigrant feeling tends to persist in the Baltic states, and, judging from the data, we cannot expect significant changes to occur in the near future. Table 2. The opinion groups’ profiles

Politically alienated

Opinion leaders

Opinion seekers

Politically alienated

Opinion leaders

Opinion seekers

Politically alienated

Latvia

Opinion seekers

Lithuania

Opinion leaders

Estonia

Western orientation

2.98

2.94

2.91

2.81

2.76

2.67

2.72

2.77

2.57

Exposure to failed state discourse

2.89

2.77

2.70

2.31

2.13

2.20

2.18

2.28

2.05

Attitude toward immigrants

2.96

2.98

2.88

2.95

2.96

3.01

2.79

2.82

2.86

Protectionis m

2.79

2.78

2.70

2.66

2.80

2.35

2.37

2.44

Note: The table shows the mean answers of the members of various opinion groups in different Baltic states

Opinion leaders in all Baltic countries demonstrate a stronger pride in their citizenship, and they are more often convinced that people who do not accept the traditions and habits of the country cannot fully become a part of it, i.e., these individuals can be considered more nationalistic. The Latvians and Estonians that can be identified as politically alienated most often refrain from blaming Russia in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and think that both countries are equally responsible for the conflict. This suggests that reluctance to support Ukraine is related to an overall disengagement from political discourse. Nevertheless, the survey data cannot disentangle causal relationships, i.e. it is also possible that people whose opinion differs from the majority of others tend to become more cynical and alienated from the political process. It is also important to note that Latvian and Estonian opinion leaders are, compared to other opinion groups, much more often inclined to believe that Russia constitutes a military threat to their country, and that sanctions against Russia should be strengthened. In Lithuania, however, three opinion groups do not differ with respect to these items. Hence it is possible to argue that the attitude of Lithuanian society toward Russia will not change in the near future, unless Russia’s political leadership also radically changes. In Latvia and Estonia, however, opinion leaders could further strengthen a critical attitude toward Russia in the public opinion.

Table 3. The opinion groups’ attitudes Estonia

39.0 50.4 46.6 49.7 20.3 7.8 6.4 8.1 40.7 41.8 47.0 42.2 27.1 28.6 26.6 30.2

48.3 21.1 30.6 29.3

48.2 17.4 34.5 22.9

33.4 21.3 45.2 12.8

33.7 30.5 30.7 22.7 25.9 20.7 25.1 27.7 20.6 17.9 8.7 48.0 42.7 9.3 0.0

38.7 31.4 21.0 29.4 21.7 27.9 19.3 26.0 26.9 20.6 7.1 41.0 45.9 10.4 2.8

36.7 36.2 18.9 27.1 22.2 31.8 21.3 25.5 26.0 18.9 8.3 33.6 47.2 12.4 6.8

50.1 21.2 15.3 38.1 34.6 12.0 14.9 32.5 28.4 17.7 6.5 53.5 27.4 16.2 3.0

54.2 19.2 15.2 33.4 38.0 13.4 9.8 35.1 35.2 16.7 3.2 35.4 43.4 15.0 6.2

53.9 15.8 14.9 37.7 32.2 15.3 14.0 26.3 31.1 22.5 6.1 32.2 41.0 16.5 10.4

28.3 42.4 22.6 33.7 20.3 23.4 34.3 28.7 23.3 10.9 2.8 45.2 29.9 13.8 4.5

38.3 38.8 13.2 30.3 28.9 27.6 20.6 37.9 26.7 11.9 2.9 35.7 37.4 14.1 5.5

36.1 51.1 8.4 26.8 28.8 36.1 11.8 30.6 33.3 19.7 4.7 22.8 33.9 19.4 13.1

0.0

6.6

7.4 10.7

6.5

6.3

6.2

6.5

5.9

6.2

Politically alienated

51.9 18.0 30.1 30.0

Opinion seekers

59.4 16.6 24.0 35.8

Opinion leaders

Politically alienated

Life satisfaction

Opinion seekers

How proud are you to be a citizen of (COUNTRY)?

Opinion leaders

It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

Politically alienated

Do you think that Russia presents a military threat for [COUNTRY]?

Opinion seekers

Should the current sanctions against Russia by the EU be:

Mostly Russia Mostly Ukraine Both countries equally Tightened Maintained in their current form Softened Yes Rather yes Rather no No Completely agree Agree Neither agree or disagree Disagree Completely disagree Very proud Somewhat proud Not very proud Not proud at all I am not a citizen of (COUNTRY) (average on a scale from 1 to 10)

Latvia

Opinion leaders Who do you think bears the most responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine conflict which began in 2014?

Lithuania

6.2

Note: The table shows the mean answers or the percentage of answers of the members of various opinion groups in different Baltic states. For example, 30.7% of opinion leaders in Estonia have said ‘Yes’ to the question on whether Russia presents a military threat.

CLUSTERS OF SOCIETY Populations in the Baltic states tend to have a complex set of attitudes. In order to obtain an informative overview of this complexity and how a set of different opinions form more or less cohesive opinion groups, a hierarchical cluster analysis (Between-groups linkage method, Squared Euclidean distance) is used in this report. The grouping is conducted on the basis of the aforementioned opinion items, including those on Ukraine and Russia, but excluding the national pride item. To summarize these findings, two distinct opinion clusters can be outlined for the Baltic states. The first cluster is characterized by pro-Western stances, but the second cluster is marked by anti-Western orientations (Table 4). Pro-Western respondents tend to be less exposed to the failed state discourse, this category holds a more positive attitude toward immigrants and people with different traditions and customs; it is a social category that is also more open to globalist and anti-protectionist ideas. A clear majority of pro-Western respondents (88%) believe that Russia is mostly responsible for the Russia-Ukraine conflict, whereas only 4% of the anti-Western cluster does. Likewise, the majority believe that sanctions against Russia should be tightened (48% support with only 6% opposing). Overall, pro-Western respondents tend to see Russia as a military threat, whereas the anti-Western cluster mostly does not (Table 7). The country-level analysis reveals large differences between the Baltic states (Figure 14). In Estonia almost two-thirds (63%) of society have a pro-Western orientation, whereas in Latvia only 46% report having the same. Figure 59. Opinion clusters 100% 90% 80% 70%

63.4

58.2

36.6

41.8

Estonia

Lithuania

46.5

60% 50% 40% 30% 20%

53.5

10% 0%

Anti-Western

Latvia

Pro-Western

Note: The figure shows the proportional distribution of pro- and anti-Western groups in different Baltic states.

These clusters also differ from each other demographically. Pro-Western respondents are younger than anti-Western respondents. They more often hold higher education (40% vs.28%); whereas the anti-Western cluster more often encompasses those with professional education (42% vs. 31%). Similarly, pro-Western respondents have a higher personal and household income and are happier with their life in general. Large differences can be observed in terms of ethnicity and citizenship. Anti-Western respondents are more often representatives of ethnic minorities and are more likely to be found among those that are not the citizens of the country. Fewer of them tend to follow political events on a daily basis (50% among anti-Westerners vs. 60% among pro-Westerners respondents). Pro-Western respondents hold greater pride in being a citizen of their country. One can conclude that various factors are responsible for anti-Western views, such as education, ethnicity, personal income and life satisfaction. However, among these sociodemographic factors, either citizenship or ethnicity is the main determinant of ideological polarization in the Baltic countries. Table 4. The profile of opinion clusters

Attitude toward immigrants Openness toward competition

(index from 1 to 5) (index from 1 to 5) (index from 1 to 4) (index from 1 to 4)

Western orientation Perception of the state It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

Who do you think bears the most responsibility for the RussiaUkraine conflict which began in 2014? Should the current sanctions against Russia by the EU be:

Do you think that Russia presents a military threat for [COUNTRY]?

Completely agree Agree Neither agree or disagree Disagree Completely disagree Mostly Russia Mostly Ukraine Both countries equally Tightened Maintained in their current form Softened Yes Rather yes Rather no No

AntiWestern 2.7 2.4 2.5

ProWestern 3.1 2.9 3.1

2.2

2.6

16.7% 37.6% 21.8% 18.2% 5.6% 4.3% 29.5% 66.2% 5.6%

23.7% 26.2% 26.1% 19.8% 4.2% 87.9% 3.5% 8.6% 47.1%

37.6%

47.6%

56.8% 5.6% 21.0% 35.1% 38.3%

5.3% 31.4% 44.4% 21.8% 2.4%

Age (mean) Gender Citizenship Education

How frequently follows political events in the media

How frequently discusses political events with friends

Respondent's income

Household income

Ethnicity (Lithuania)

How proud are you to be a citizen of (COUNTRY)?

Life satisfaction (average)

48 51.2% 48.8%

44 51.9% 48.1%

Citizens of the country Not citizens of the country No education Primary education Secondary education Professional secondary education Higher education Every day Several times a week One or two times a week Less often Never Frequently Sometimes Never

78.6% 21.4% 0.0% 10.8% 19.0%

95.0% 5.0% 1.2% 8.1% 19.5%

42.5%

31.1%

27.7% 50.3% 24.0% 12.0% 9.2% 4.4% 21.3% 57.9% 20.8%

40.2% 60.4% 16.9% 10.5% 8.4% 3.8% 20.1% 63.5% 16.4%

Low Medium low Medium high High Low Medium low Medium high High Lithuanian Russian Polish Other

34.6% 27.8% 22.0% 15.6% 12.6% 30.2% 30.3% 26.9% 85.2% 7.1% 6.2% 1.5%

27.2% 25.8% 24.8% 22.3% 20.4% 30.8% 14.0% 34.8% 93.2% 2.1% 2.0% 2.8%

Very proud

27.7%

47.3%

Somewhat proud

38.7%

39.2%

Not very proud

20.2%

9.8%

Not proud at all

7.5%

3.0%

I am not a citizen of (COUNTRY)

6.0%

.7%

(scale from 1 to 10)

6.7

7.3

A man A woman

Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of pro- and anti-Western groups’ answers or their mean answers.

As Table 5 demonstrates, pro- and anti-Western groups across the Baltic states are more similar in some opinions and less similar in others. For example, the pro-Western and anti-Western groups in Latvia are equally xenophobic and protectionist, but they differ very strongly in their perception of Russia as a military threat and in their willingness to soften Western sanctions. A pro-Kremlin versus an anti-Kremlin attitude is ultimately the main point of contention between these groups in Latvia. In Lithuania, the opinion of different groups is generally less diverging than in Latvia or Estonia, except that Lithuania’s anti-Westerners overwhelmingly believe that both Russia and Ukraine are to blame for the conflict, whereas pro-Westerners mostly blame Russia. Thus, a pro-Kremlin attitude within the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict again plays a decisive polarizing role. In Estonia, these groups contrast more than in other Baltic countries in terms of how strongly pro-Western or anti-Western they are, and also in terms of their attitudes toward immigrants. Table 5. Differences between pro-Western and anti-Western groups in all Baltic countries Estonia 1 Western orientation Perception of the state Attitude towards immigrants Openness towards competition It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

Lithuania 2

2.60

3.24

Diff. 0.64

2.53

2.95

2.58

Latvia 2

2.50

2.92

Diff. 0.41

0.41

2.02

2.35

3.18

0.60

2.68

2.44

3.07

0.63

Completely agree Agree

15.0% 38.8%

23.7% 20.8%

Neither agree or disagree

16.3%

Disagree

21.1%

2 2.43

2.99

Diff. 0.56

0.33

2.03

2.47

0.44

3.21

0.53

2.77

2.91

0.13

2.37

3.02

0.64

2.31

2.45

0.14

0.09 -0.18

18.3% 40.6%

17.2% 29.6%

-0.01 -0.11

17.9% 33.2%

33.5% 30.6%

0.16 -0.03

30.7%

0.14

25.1%

22.3%

-0.03

23.2%

24.1%

0.01

20.8%

0.00

13.7%

24.9%

0.11

20.0%

11.2%

-0.09

Completely disagree

8.8%

4.0%

-0.05

2.3%

6.0%

0.04

5.8%

.6%

-0.05

Who do you think bears the most responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine conflict which began in 2014?

Mostly Russia

4.1%

87.6%

0.84

3.4%

86.7%

0.83

4.7%

91.8%

0.87

Mostly Ukraine

32.7%

1.8%

-0.31

15.4%

3.9%

-0.12

37.4%

5.3%

-0.32

Both countries equally

63.3%

10.6%

-0.53

81.1%

9.4%

-0.72

57.9%

2.9%

-0.55

Should the current sanctions against Russia by the EU be:

Tightened

Do you think that Russia presents a military threat for [COUNTRY]?

8.2%

50.0%

0.42

6.3%

51.1%

0.45

4.2%

42.4%

0.38

Maintained in their current form

34.0%

46.0%

0.12

46.9%

46.4%

-0.01

27.4%

47.6%

0.20

Softened

57.8%

4.0%

-0.54

46.9%

2.6%

-0.44

68.4%

10.0%

-0.58

Yes Rather yes Rather no No

10.2% 20.4% 27.2% 42.2%

32.1% 44.2% 22.3% 1.5%

0.22 0.24 -0.05 -0.41

3.4% 24.6% 50.3% 21.7%

32.2% 42.9% 21.9% 3.0%

0.29 0.18 -0.28 -0.19

4.2% 17.4% 25.8% 52.6%

28.2% 48.2% 21.2% 2.4%

0.24 0.31 -0.05 -0.50

Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of answers among pro- and anti-Western groups, or the mean of their answers in different Baltic states.

Finally, considering that we found stronger differences between pro- and anti-Western groups in some countries (Latvia, Estonia), and weaker differences in others (Lithuania), we also ran the analysis separately for each of these countries to see if the same pro-Western and antiWestern clusters emerge in each case. If we use such analysis to look deeper, we can find that in Estonia the attitudes and opinions fall into three broad groups. The largest group (51%) can be labeled as the “liberals”. They are open to free trade and international cooperation, they are not xenophobic, see their country as successful and have a pro-Western orientation. The vast majority within this group hold Russia responsible for the conflict with Ukraine; see Russia as somewhat of a threat; and believe that sanctions should either be increased or kept at the current level. The second largest group (40%) can be labeled as “nationalists”. They differ by their xenophobic, nationalist, and protectionist attitudes. They usually see Russia as a military threat, hold either Russia or both Ukraine and Russia responsible for the conflict ongoing since 2014, and have diverse attitudes toward Western sanctions. The third group (8%) – “pro-Russians” – tend to see Estonia as a failed state, have anti-Western attitudes, usually hold Ukraine solely responsible for the conflict with Russia, do not see Russia as a threat and think that Western sanctions should be weakened. They also disagree that people that do not accept the traditions of Estonia cannot fully belong to Estonia. Table 6. Clusters in Estonia Clusters 1

Western orientation

2.50

3.04

3.07

Perception of the state

2.17

2.42

2.69

Attitude toward immigrants

2.69

1.97

3.51

Openness toward competition

2.36

1.95

3.22

Completely agree

17.0%

68.0%

8.9%

Agree

37.4%

31.4%

24.6%

Neither agree or disagree

21.9%

.6%

34.9%

Disagree

18.2%

0.0%

26.5%

It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

Who do you think bears the most responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine conflict which began in 2014?

Should the current sanctions against Russia by the EU be:

Do you think that Russia presents a military threat for [COUNTRY]?

How proud are you to be a citizen of (COUNTRY)?

Completely disagree

5.5%

0.0%

5.1%

Mostly Russia

4.1%

99.4%

84.6%

Mostly Ukraine

28.6%

.6%

4.4%

Both countries equally

67.3%

0.0%

11.1%

6.1%

59.9%

44.6%

Maintained in their current form

36.0%

34.3%

50.7%

Softened

57.9%

5.8%

4.8%

5.7%

45.9%

26.1%

Rather yes

20.7%

43.6%

45.1%

Rather no

34.4%

8.1%

26.5%

39.1%

2.3%

2.2%

Very proud

28.7%

47.4%

48.9%

Somewhat proud

38.0%

32.2%

41.1%

Not very proud

20.0%

15.8%

7.3%

Not proud at all

7.6%

3.5%

2.2%

I am not a citizen of (COUNTRY)

5.7%

1.2%

.4%

Tightened

Yes

Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of the three groups’ answers, or their mean answers in Estonia.

In Latvia, opinion categories fall into two major groups – very similarly to those described in earlier analysis where all three countries were taken together. The largest can be labeled “antiWesterners” (55%). They largely see Latvia as a failed state; have an anti-Western orientation; and support protectionism and xenophobic claims. They usually hold both Russia and Ukraine, or sometimes only Ukraine, responsible for the conflict ongoing since 2014, they think that Russia does not possess a military threat to their country and most within this group believe that the Western sanctions against Russia should be weakened. The “anti-Russia nationalists” (44%) are 72

also xenophobic and protectionist, but not as skeptical about the state of affairs in Latvia and the West as the “anti-Westerners”. Unlike the anti-Westerners, almost all within the anti-Russian nationalist cohort blame Russia for the conflict with Ukraine, and are generally more nationalist. Likewise, most of them think that Russia is a threat and that the Western sanctions should be either increased or at least kept at the same level. There is also a very small group (just 2%) of “liberals” that express profoundly liberal views in terms of immigration and globalization, demonstrate highly pro-Western views, do not think that it is necessary to accept Latvia’s traditions to become fully attached to Latvia, and see the viability of Latvia’s statehood more positively than others. Lithuanians seem to be, more or less, one uniform opinion group, as only one cluster is suggested by our statistical analysis. The analysis suggests that Lithuanians are the most ideologically cohesive society among the Baltic states, with the lowest potential for ideological fragmentation. A simple yet efficient way to explore the polarization of opinions is to calculate the ratio between the top and bottom deciles of the distribution – similarly to how it is done in some of the widely used inequality measures. The calculation is done by taking the top 10% of individuals and dividing their average by the average of the bottom 10% of individuals. The resulting measure provides a mathematical expression of the polarization in answers to the particular question between the top and bottom 10%. Moreover, besides the 90/10 ratio it is common to calculate the 90/50 or 10/50 ratio to see how far removed from the ‘average’ or how extreme - the top or bottom 10% are.

Table 7. Clusters in Latvia Clusters 1

Western orientation

2.98

2.44

3.53

Perception of the state

2.49

2.02

2.81

Attitude toward immigrants

2.79

2.84

4.17

Openness toward competition

2.32

2.37

4.04

Completely agree

36.9%

16.8%

0.0%

Agree

36.9%

28.9%

0.0%

Neither agree or disagree

21.0%

26.4%

0.0%

4.5%

22.3%

100.0%

.6%

5.6%

0.0%

98.7%

2.0%

100.0%

Mostly Ukraine

1.3%

39.6%

0.0%

Both countries equally

0.0%

58.4%

0.0%

Tightened

42.7%

5.1%

50.0%

Maintained in their current form

47.1%

29.4%

16.7%

Softened

10.2%

65.5%

33.3%

Yes

29.9%

4.6%

0.0%

Rather yes

51.0%

17.8%

0.0%

Rather no

17.8%

25.9%

100.0%

1.3%

51.8%

0.0%

It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

Disagree Completely disagree Who do you think bears the most responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine conflict which began in 2014?

Should the current sanctions against Russia by the EU be:

Do you think that Russia presents a military threat for [COUNTRY]?

Mostly Russia

Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of the three groups’ answers, or their mean answers, in Latvia.

Table 8. Polarization of opinions - decile ratio Western orientation

Perception of the state

Attitude toward immigrants

Openness toward competition

Estonia

90/10

1.73

1.79

2.60

2.67

Lithuania

90/10

1.55

2.00

2.14

Latvia

90/10

1.89

2.33

2.40

2.70

Western orientation

Perception of the state

Attitude toward immigrants

Openness toward competition

Estonia

50/10

1.36

1.80

1.83

Lithuania

50/10

1.27

1.60

1.50

1.57

Latvia

50/10

1.44

1.67

1.80

Our analysis suggests that overall Lithuanians hold the most homogenous public opinion. Opinions on openness to competition and protectionism form the most polarizing context in all Baltic countries, i.e. people strongly believe in one or in other side of the same issue. Data about Latvia reveal the biggest polarization in regards to Western orientation and the perception of the state, as the decile ratio is higher than in other countries (Table 8). The 50/10 distribution confirms that there is a group that has quite extreme opinions in terms of seeing Latvia as a failed state and holding anti-Western views. In Estonia, the polarization of public opinion on immigrants is more pronounced than in other countries, i.e. some part of the society would gladly welcome them while others are strongly against. In Latvia and Lithuania, the views on immigrants are more homogeneously negative.

CONCLUSIONS

This report unveils the varying level and potential of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. It has been insisted that it is essential to separate country-specific trends from the regional polarization patterns that have been molded in particular contexts. Rarely can a countrylevel ideological polarization be characterized as antagonistic. In other words, moderate or pluralistic polarization patterns prevail in Baltic public opinion. This does not necessarily create healthy conditions for democracy. Neither can a strong consensus that demoralizes the democratic order and opposes to democratic values create favorable conditions. Simultaneously, the differences between the Baltic societies should also be taken into account, as these might limit the generalizability of the explanations and strategies for coping with the trends of antagonistic polarization. The Western orientation context indicates that Baltic societies are inclined to support proWestern views and institutions. It also suggests that anti-Westerners are less coherent as an opinion group than pro-Westerners. Nevertheless, the pro-Western consensus significantly varies across the three Baltic states. Latvian public opinion demonstrates the highest level of ideological polarization, whereas Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion holds a stronger consensus toward the Western orientation. Estonian public opinion is however more consistent by comparison, as polarization within Lithuanian public opinion increases when Western influence is juxtaposed to Russian influence or when Lithuanian traditional values are confronted with Western values. Moreover, the Western orientation index suggests that the pro-Western consensus in both Lithuania and Estonia has weakened over the last three years, thus increasing the potential for polarization. The failed state context also highlights profound differences between Baltic societies. While Estonians hold a moderately positive consensus about the Estonian state, their public opinion is highly polarized, particularly on emigration; the country’s financial autonomy; and the perception of the political elite. In contrast, Latvians and Lithuanians are extremely pessimistic about their country’s viability and performance. Hence, two different polarization patterns can be observed: one between dominant optimists and minor pessimists (Estonia) and another between dominant pessimists and minor optimists (Latvia and Lithuania). The xenophobia context that is largely limited in this report to the attitude toward immigrants also exhibits a rather inconsistent pattern. Despite the fact that slightly negative opinion toward immigrants prevails in the Baltic states, and that Latvians and Estonians hold a 76

relatively stronger consensus about the positive or negative characteristics of immigration, the 2019 data reveal a rather polarized public opinion in all Baltic societies. A moderate polarization is particularly salient in Lithuania. This analysis suggests that inward labor migration and labor migrants, particularly from familiar cultures, might trigger the highest polarization risk in society. In contrast, other migrant groups from more unfamiliar cultures would likely provoke a more dominant anti-immigrant attitude in Baltic societies. Nevertheless, the attitude toward immigrants has not changed over the past decade. This perhaps means that the recent refugee crisis in Europe has not significantly increased the level of anti-immigration sentiment in the Baltic states. The economic protectionism context indicates a considerable level of support for protectionist ideas in all Baltic societies. However, this attitudinal pattern is again not consistent. While Latvians express a strong consensus toward support for protectionist ideas and Estonians demonstrate a somewhat moderate support by comparison, Lithuanian public opinion reveals the highest level of polarization. Acknowledging that support for free trade and international cooperation has increased slightly in the Baltic states over the last six years; this analysis also suggests that polarization as regards protectionism might nevertheless strengthen in the next years. This is especially likely should this trend be systematically cultivated by incumbent political parties and if the economic situation was to considerably deteriorate. This report has also sought to outline the various dimensions and features of the major opinion groups that generate polarization in the Baltic societies. On the most aggregate level, two large clusters of pro-Western and anti-Western opinion groups can be identified. According to our data, the major ideological fault line appears to be the attitude toward Russia and the Kremlin’s strategic narratives. Nevertheless, the size and sociological portrayal of these clusters may ideologically vary on the country level. While Estonians and Latvians display strong differences between nationally-minded and pro-Kremlin opinion groups, the potential of ideological antagonism is less pronounced in Lithuanian public opinion. Hence a pluralistic ideological polarization is more characteristic in Lithuania than in Estonia or Latvia. Various socio-demographic factors are responsible for separating opinion groups, such as: education; ethnicity; household income; and satisfaction with life. However, among these factors, ethnicity and country-level regional differences are the most consistent determinants of ideological polarization. In Estonia and Latvia, ethnic identification and country-level regional differences occasionally overlap. This highlights significant ideological polarization between the ethnic majority and the Russophone minority. While these differences are more significant in terms of the Western orientation indicator, their importance declines in other polarization contexts where geopolitical self-positioning is less relevant. In Lithuania, ethnicity does not play an important differentiating role at all. Instead, internal regional and socio-economic differences

(income, education) become more significant socio-demographic factors with the ability to predict differences between pro-Westerners and anti-Westerners. In order to highlight the potential sources of social attitudes, this report has sought to extrapolate more specific opinion groups. This has taken the relations between political socialization and exposure to political discourse into consideration. Our findings show that the most politically socialized opinion group in the Baltic states (‘opinion leaders’) are more Westernoriented compared to the groups that are less exposed to an everyday political discourse. ‘Opinion leaders’ also express stronger national pride and are more optimistic about their country when it comes to the failed state claims. At the same time, their Western orientation does not translate into a more positive attitude toward immigration. Such relations between political socialization and ideological attitudes is more noticeable in Estonia and Lithuania, whereas Latvian ‘opinion leaders’ are inclined to align with the attitudes that characterize groups that are less socialized politically.

APPENDIX A. THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE 2019 SURVEY

Q1 Please tell me if you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statements? Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

The EU will soon collapse

A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West

It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers

There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West

Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia

Q2 Who do you think bears the most responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine conflict which began in 2014? Mostly Russia

Mostly Ukraine

Both countries equally

I don’t know/Hard to say

Q3 Following the Russian annexation of Crimea and the military engagement in Eastern Ukraine, the US and EU have imposed economic and political sanctions on Russia. Should the current sanctions against Russia by the EU be: Tightened

Maintained in their current form

Softened

I don’t know/Hard to say

Q4 Do you think that Russia presents a military threat for [COUNTRY]? Yes

Rather yes

Rather no

I don’t know/Hard to say

Q5 I am going to read a list of popular statements. Some people completely agree, some tend to agree or tend to disagree. Others completely disagree. What do you think? Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Every day many residents leave [COUNTRY] and do not want to live here

The people of [COUNTRY] is on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years

[COUNTRY’S] politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the nation

[COUNTRY] cannot exist as an independent state Poverty and unemployment prevails in [COUNTRY] Economy of [COUNTRY] is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and longterm development of the country [COUNTRY’S] existence depends on the EU financial assistance

Q6 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Dissatisfied 1

Satisfied 2

Q7 How proud are you to be a citizen of (COUNTRY)? Very proud

Somewhat proud

Not very proud

Not proud at all

I am not a citizen of (COUNTRY) (DO NOT READ)

Don’t know (DO NOT READ)

Refused (DO NOT READ)

Q8 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Completely agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

Immigrants increase crime rates.

Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY].

[COUNTRY’S] culture is generally undermined by immigrants.

[COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [COUNTRY].

Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [COUNTRY].

International organizations are taking away too much power from the [COUNTRY’S] government.

Q9 How often do you follow politics in the news on television, radio, in the press or on the Internet sites and social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, VKontakte etc.)? Every day

Several times a week

Once or twice a week

Less often

Never

Don’t know (spontaneous)

No answer (spontaneous)

Q10 When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never? Frequently

Occasionally

Never

Don’t know (spontaneous)

No answer (spontaneous)

APPENDIX B. SURVEY WAVES AND SOURCES

Survey items Q1.1 Q5.1 Q1.2 – Q1.4 Q7 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q6 Q10 Q8

Previous waves 2017 2017 2016

1999, 2008

Source Latvian Institute of International Affairs, research “Euroscepticism in the Baltic States” Pew Research Center, survey “Religion and social life” Institute of Public Affairs, Poland; research “Baltic Group: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In search of common interests” European Value Survey

1995*, 2003*, 2013, 2019

The National identity module of International Social Survey Program

2015

*Data are available only for Latvia

APPENDIX C. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT (P<.05) SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN SURVEY ITEMS

Ethnic identification

Q1.1 EU will soon collapse

Q1.2 A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West

Region/county

Education

Age

Q1.3 It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers

Q1.4 There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West

Q1.5 Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia

Q3 Attitude toward the EU sanctions against Russia

Q5.1 [COUNTRY] cannot exist as an independent state

Q5.2 Poverty and unemployment prevails in [COUNTRY]

Q5.3 Economy of [COUNTRY] is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development of the country

Income

x x x

Q5.4 [COUNTRY’S] existence depends on the EU financial assistance

Q5.5 Every day many residents leave [COUNTRY] and do not want to live here

Q5.6 The people of [COUNTRY] is on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years

Q5.7 [COUNTRY’S] politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the nation

Q8.1 It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

Q8.2 Immigrants increase crime rates.

Q8.3 Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY].

Q8.4 [COUNTRY’S] culture is generally undermined by immigrants. Q8.5 [COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

Q8.6 Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [COUNTRY].

Q8.7 Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [COUNTRY].

Q8.8 International organizations are taking away too much power from the [COUNTRY’S] government.