LUFTFORSVARET OG FELLESOPERASJONER
02 - 31
04.09.03
16:12
Side 24
AIR DOMINANCE KEY TO COMBINED JOINT
JOINT FREED Military conflicts are no longer what they used to be. Recent operations have witnessed a spectacular advance of new technologies for surveillance, target acquisition, situation assessment, information sharing and precision engagement. Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom sug-
TEKST:
Joris Janssen Lok International Editor, Jane´s International Defense Review
I
In the perception of the average television viewer, the quick success of Operation Iraqi Freedom was very much determined by main battle tanks such as the American Abrams and British Challenger. During late March and early April, TV screens worldwide showed the armour dashing through the desert, taking Saddam Airport, then dominating Baghdad’s bridges — their immediate presence being vehemently denied, to no avail, by the Iraqi information minister. The reality was not how it was portrayed by the major
gest primarily that US-led coalition forces now have the ability to fully integrate their air, land, sea and special forces to conduct effects-based operations. There is a catch, however. Everything depends on air power.
networks. Sure, the armour of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division did traverse 475 km of desert (from Kuwait to Karbala) in ten days. And certainly, the US tactic of sending tank raids from the captured airport downtown proved remarkably effective. But not reported by the newsmen and –women embedded with the frontline troops was why the advance went as smoothly as it did. It was the total aerospace dominance enjoyed by the Coalition over the whole of Iraq that made this possible. The integrated air defence system of Iraq had been effectively suppressed during the preceding months (and years) as a side-effect of Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch. The Iraqi Air Force
Temporary runway: – Deployed airmen of the 447th Air Expeditionary Group lay a portion of a temporary runway at a forward-deployed location during a driving wind storm. The group's job is to provide a place from which warfighters can operate. PHOTO: USAF
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was no factor. Positions occupied by Iraq’s conventional ground forces were well known thanks to thorough intelligence preparation and non-stop overhead surveillance from space- and airborne sensors, manned and unmanned. The US was able to maintain continuous air presence over Iraq with B-1 and B-52 long-endurance bombers and other strike aircraft. These could attack ground targets minutes after they had been detected by aerial sensors, by ground forces, by special operations teams, or by the pilots themselves.
SHOCK AND AWE Many analysts had anticipated the campaign to start off with a «shock and awe» aerial offensive aimed at achieving a strategic paralysis of Iraq. After all, simultaneous attacks (parallel warfare) on the centres of gravity of Iraq’s armed forces, industry, population, infrastructure, energy supply and ultimately its leadership (as preached by America’s post-Gulf War air doctrine) could only be performed by air power. Observers were surprised to see that few hours after the 20 March surprise decapitation attempt against Saddam by two US Air Force F-117A Stealth fighters and a volley of US Navy cruise missiles, massive Coalition ground forces pushed into Iraq. Air strikes against downtown Baghdad only started the next day’s evening. What had happened to «shock and awe»?
