This Journal is published in French under the title of Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales. Selections from it are also brought out regularly in Arabic and occasionally in Spanish and Portuguese.
Topics of forthcoming issues: Contributions to policies on population Communication in social science Biology and social sciences
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Correspondents Belgrade: Trivo Indie Buenos Aires: Enrique Oteiza Cairo: Abdel M o n e i m El-Sawi Cologne: Axel Schmalfuss Delhi: AndrĂŠ BĂŠteille Ife: Akinsola A k i w o w o Mexico City: Rodolfo Stavenhagen Moscow: Marien Gapotchka New York: David Goslin Nicosia: Elena Nikita and M . Attalides Singapore: S. H . Alatas Sydney: Henry Mayer Tokyo: Ikumi Hoshino
international social science Journal
volume X X V I 1974
unesco pans /^NESC^
international social science Journal Published quarterly by Unesco Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974 Challenged paradigms in international relations Ali Kazancigil Introduction 7 Arend Lijphart International relations theory: great debates and lesser debates 11 John W. Burton A systems approach to international relations 22 Saul Friedländer S o m e thoughts on current trends in interand Raymond Cohen national relations research 34 J. Henk Leurdijk F r o m international to transnational politics: a change of paradigms? 53 Bahgat Korany Foreign policy models and their empirical relevance to third-world actors: a critique and an alternative 70 Marcos Kaplan The power structure in international relations 95 Jerzy J. Wiatr A sociological perspective in the study of international relations 109 Asbjern Eide A value-based approach: methods and problems in peace research 119
Chadwick F. Alger and Gene M . Lyons André Béteille Gabriel Gyarmati K.
The social science sphere Social science as a transnational system 137 Institutes for research in India 150 The social sciences in Chile: professionalization, codes of ethics and ideological confrontation 152 Professional and documentary services N e w periodicals 159 Approaching international conferences 169 Materials from the United Nations System: an annotated selection 173 Books received 183 World index of social science institutions 187
Editor: Peter Lengyel Assistant editor: Ali Kazancigil
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Challenged paradigms in international relations
Introduction
Ali Kazancigil This issue of the Journal deals with some of the controversial theoretical, methodological and epistemological questions in the study of international relations. The controversy on these questions is an old one, and likely to continue. Those w h o are labelled as traditionalists on the one hand, and scientists or behaviouralists and more recently, post-behaviouralists, on the other hand, have been debating continuously, since the 1950s, the merits of their respective paradigms. O n e can, of course, adopt the optimistic view and say that this kind of debate is an indication of the intellectual vigour of the discipline and one of the conditions for its progress. O n e can equally be pessimistic and consider that the discipline has got into a rut and is unable to m o v e forward. T h e debate revolves endlessly around the same old quarrels. Indeed, 'the problems of scope, methodology, the nature of theory, and the relevance of other disciplines to the study of international relations are by n o means resolved'.1 Furthermore, specialists in international relations often express reservations as to the capacity of the discipline to be of practical use to those w h o conceive and decide the policies of the various actors on the international scene. It is unlikely, for instance, that the m a n w h o fascinates m a n y students of international politics—Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—would constantly look to existing international relations theories for explanatory or predictive elements which would help him to shape policy more effectively to obtain better results. These and other weaknesses are admitted, and must be faced. In the 1970s, students of international relations are concentrating on formulating problemoriented theories which will explain and predict international phenomena with greater accuracy. It m a y not be completely Utopian to hope that the gap between theory and practice will narrow d o w n , and the debate between traditionalists and
Ali Kazancigil, assistant editor of this Journal, is a political scientist. Before joining Unesco's Department of Social Sciences in 1972 he was assistant professor of international relations at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara and the special correspondent in Turkey for the French daily, L e M o n d e . He has published a number of articles in various political science journals.
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
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Ali Kazancigil
scientists, partisans of 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' will belong to the history of the discipline. T h e study of international relations is interdisciplinary by nature. This has been acknowledged since the State-as-sole-actor model is less relevant to the current international reality. A s long as this was the dominant paradigm, the study of international relations was considered as a branch of law and political science. N o w a d a y s most specialists consider that it transcends classical social science disciplines and its legitimacy is less and less questioned. Epistemologically, students of international relations have become aware that in the past they have almost exclusively concentrated on problems which preoccupied the great powers, and generally, the industrialized parts of the world. This ethnocentric approach has hindered the development of the discipline. T h e articles which follow deal with some of these problems. Arend Lijphart remarks in the study of international relations, the advent of a 'scientific revolution' (in T h o m a s K u h n ' s definition) in which a n e w paradigm appears, theoretically, methodologically and epistemologically different from the old one. John Burton asserts that, within the frame of this new, behaviouralist paradigm, it is systems analysis, combined methodologically with deductive reasoning, which is best able to explain the international reality and fulfil the requirements of science. T o Burton, the debate between traditionalists and scientists is a false one. M a n y behaviouralists tend to mix science with quantitative techniques, while remaining, substantially and methodologically, within the framework of the traditional paradigm, specially by following the inductive reasoning typical of the old paradigm and leading to purely descriptive generalizations. Saul Friedl채ndler and R a y m o n d Cohen, w h o analyse the current trends in international relations research from the viewpoint of the historian, agree with Burton w h e n they declare that quantitative methods should follow theory and not precede it in determining the questions to be posed and the scope of the research. They advocate the incorporation of the historical approach in the study of international relations, while they agree with maintaining the fundamental objectives of formulating explanatory theories and analysing recurrent patterns. History, that 'laboratory of h u m a n behaviour', is for them irreplaceable w h e n it comes to distinguishing the important and the relevant from the trivial in research. H e n k Leurdijk develops in his article a crucial aspect of the new international relations paradigm, which Lijphart and Burton had also underlined: the 'anarchy' model (which considers the sovereign State as the sole actor in international relations) is being replaced by another model which approaches the subject-matter from the viewpoint of the interaction, interdependence and convergence of actors and processes. This transnational paradigm puts emphasis more on interdependence than on the dependent, hierarchical and inegalitarian nature of the international system. This is due, according to the author, to the predominance of Euro-centric and American perspectives, which are those of 'a controlling centre
9
Introduction
in the network of international relations, which has determined the intellectual interests of the discipline'. T h e necessity of incorporating the perspective of the developing countries into the study of international relations is the central theme of the two articles which follow. Bahgat Korany advocates the building of an empirically relevant and operational foreign policy model. However, his main preoccupation is with putting his model within a frame of reference specific to Third-World actors and he singles out the applicable variables. Marcos Kaplan analyses the power structure in international relations, using the theory of dependence. H e furthers Leurdijk's analysis and underlines the relevance of the scientific study of this structure for Third-World countries which have to conceive international strategies to attain their national development objectives. Inspired by the theory of imperialism, the dependency approach provides a very useful theoretical framework. It maintains that 'underdevelopment at h o m e and dependence abroad—two sides of the same coin—are linked' as Kaplan puts it. A s the theory of imperialism, the dependency approach is not located within the traditional paradigm of international relations. It is, however, very different from the transnational paradigm, being dialectical, and incorporating history whereas behaviouralist approach insists on interdependence and is ahistorical to a large extent. T h e dependency theory has not yet reached maturity; it can none the less allow the study of international relations to overcome its ethnocentrism. Jerzy Wiatr analyses the methodological contribution of sociology, and particularly of Marxist sociology, to the study of international relations. H e mentions some of the points on which the Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations should concentrate in order to take fully into account the recent international developments. The last article of the issue, by Asbjorn Eide, examines methodological, ethical and epistemological problems in peace research—which is post-behavioural because of its interdisciplinary and problem-oriented approach, transcending disciplinary distinctions and the barriers between internal and external politics. These eight articles d o not claim to cover every aspect of the theme, but should be considered in the perspective of the general objectives of this Journal, i.e. to provide a link between specialists belonging to various social science disciplines, living in social science communities and countries which are not always in close contact with each other, and to inform social scientists w h o are not specialists about the theoretical debates and main trends of research on selected themes. Note 1
James E . Dougherty and Robert L . Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations,
p. 383, Philadelphia, J. C o m p a n y , 1971.
B . Lippincott
International relations theory: great debates and lesser debates*
Arend Lijphart International relations is a relatively young academic subject—its birth is c o m monly assumed to have taken place shortly after the First World W a r [1]—but it has undergone almost explosive growth especially in the post-Second World W a r years. In a new discipline with m a n y scholarly practitioners there is bound to be m u c h disagreement and controversy, and this has certainly been true of international relations. This essay will examine the major theoretical debates in the discipline and will attempt to determine to what extent they form a pattern.
T w o great debates T w o controversies have been labelled 'great debates': the realism-idealism debate in the 1930s and in the decade following the Second World W a r and the traditionalism-science debate of the 1960s. T h e former was not a true debate, however, because the idealist faith in legal institutions and moral precepts as paths to international order and peace, which prevailed in the 1930s, was discredited by the failure of the League of Nations and the outbreak of the Second World W a r . After 1945, there were hardly any idealists left, and the debate took place primarily between pure realists and those w h o tempered their realism with a touch of idealism [2]. Post-war realism was a collective reaction against idealism and, as a result, tended to exaggerate the differences between the two schools of thought. A s will be shown later, the similarities between them are actually m u c h more significant than their differences. The second great debate is concerned with more fundamental disagreements and the contending sides are more equally matched. Klaus Knorr and James N . Rosenau, the editors of the volume Contending Approaches to International
Arend Lijphart is professor of international relations at the University of Leiden (Netherlands). He is the author of T h e T r a u m a of Decolonization (1966) and T h e Politics of A c c o m m o d a t i o n (1968) and has written articles in the fields of international relations and comparative politics in several journals.
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
* A more detailed discussion of the debates in international relations theory after the Second World W a r will be published in the International Studies Quarterly in 1974 under the title 'The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations'.
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Arend Lijphart
Politics, devoted to the second great debate, arrive at two important conclusions regarding the nature of the controversy. In thefirstplace, they argue that, although there are differences both within the traditionalist c a m p and within the scientific c a m p , 'there is one point that c o m m a n d s universal agreement, namely, that it is useful and appropriate to dichotomize the various approaches to international phenomena. N o w h e r e in this symposium is it claimed that such a dichotomy is an oversimplification'. Secondly, they emphasize that the debate is an exclusively methodological one: 'the controversy is not over the substance of international politics. It is the m o d e of analysis, not its subject matter, that is the central issue' [3]. These two claims deserve to be carefully examined. The dichotomous division between scientists and traditionalists in international relations corresponds to the division between the supporters and the opponents of behaviourism in political science. T h e controversy about behaviourism is often regarded as an instance of a 'scientific revolution' in the sense in which T h o m a s S. K u h n uses this term, and behaviourism is then considered to be a Kuhnian 'paradigm' [4]. Briefly, K u h n argues that in the natural sciences periods of normal science alternate with scientific revolutions. N o r m a l science is guided by a paradigm: a generally accepted approach, model, or theory which constitutes the foundation for the cumulative growth of scientific knowledge. Scientific revolutions are 'non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible n e w one' [5]. This definition implies that there are usually two competing paradigms in scientific revolutions. Although Kuhn's theory is primarily based on the development of the natural sciences, m a n y elements of it m a y also be applied to other scholarly disciplines, including international relations. In particular, the development of international relations since the Second World W a r fits K u h n ' s description of scientific revolutions. A n d the claim by Knorr and Rosenau that the division in thefieldis essentially dichotomous is in accord with Kuhn's view that scientific revolutions are characterized by dual-paradigm research. N o t all observers agree with Knorr and Rosenau, however. A recent deliberately exaggerated c o m m e n t describes the condition of international relations as chaotic and argues that 'there are as m a n y theories as there are theorists' [6]. A clearer denial of the proposition that international relations is in a dual-paradigm condition m a y be found in Robert T . Holt and John M . Richardson's survey of the closely relatedfieldof comparative politics. They identify several of the new approaches as paradigms in K u h n ' s sense of the term: general systems analysis, structural-functionalism, psychological approaches, rational-formal models such as g a m e theory, and 'atheoretic approaches' [7]. These approaches correspond to some of the n e w developments in international relations. Similarly, Bruce M . Russett reports that a factor analysis of citations by sixty-eight international relations scholars in the period 1966-68 reveals that there are about a dozen distinct schools in the profession rather than just two large groupings [8].
International relations theory: great debates and lesser debates
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Methodological and epistemological issues This question cannot be settled without a prior examination of Knorr and Rosenau's second conclusion. D o the scientific-behavioural and the traditionalnon-behavioural paradigms indeed differ only on methodological issues, and are there indeed no other major dimensions of disagreement and controversy in international relations theory? T w o additional differences between behaviourists and traditionalists can be identified without difficulty: their divergent views on the possibility of arriving at a valid general theory and on the question of the political relevance of international relations research. In the words of Harry H o w e R a n s o m , w h o m a d e a thorough survey of thefieldin 1968, 'the behavioral school sees a general theory of politics encompassing international relations at the end of the theory road. The traditional school doubts that a universal theory is conceivable, researchable, or attainable'. Moreover, the traditionalists tend to give 'a higher priority to the relevance of analysis to the real, observable world' [9]. Although these three dimensions of disagreement are conceptually distinct, they are closely related and coincide to a large extent. T h e behaviourist with his faith in a discoverable pattern of variables is more likely to be a 'pure' scientist with regard to both his methods and the value-free character of his research than his less optimistic traditionalist colleague. These divergent methodological and epistemological stances are very fundamental, and they are typical of the differences that divide rival paradigms. According to K u h n , paradigms differ on such basic values as: 'quantitative predictions are preferable to qualitative ones' and 'science should . . . be socially useful' [10]. These examples happen to be exactly the ones that characterize the traditional-behavioural split. Because the differences over the three dimensions are so basic and because they tend to coincide, Knorr and Rosenau's description of international relations as a dual-paradigm discipline is sustained and strengthened.
Substantive issues It is strengthened further w h e n the major substantive disagreements are also taken into consideration. First of all, it is important to recognize that different methods m a y entail different substantive conclusions or at least different substantive hypotheses. K u h n describes scientific revolutions as clashes between 'world views'. Different ways of looking at the world entail to some extent seeing different worlds: 'the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trade in different worlds. . . . Both are looking at the world, and what they look at has not changed. But in s o m e areas they see different things, and they see them in different relations one to the other' [11]. T h e w a y in which the rival paradigms in international relations judge each other's empirical findings and conclusions provides an apt
Ar end Lijphart
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illustration of such tendencies. Each school considers the other's results to be not just wrong, but absurd. In fact, the result is not necessarily wrong at all; it is the problem to which the other school addresses itself that is wrong. A n d the answer to a wrong question can only be irrelevant and absurd. Traditionalist Hedley Bull condemns the behavioural paradigm not so m u c h for leading to incorrect conclusions as for its 'congenital inability . . . to deal with the crux of the subject' and its devotion to 'peripheral subjects' and 'marginalia'. The 'absurdities' that are thus 'thrust upon us' ought not to be tolerated [12]. In his rejoinder, Morton A . Kaplan uses similar language and arguments: the conclusions of the traditionalists are not clearly related to the empirical world and are 'absurdly broad'. They are meaningless rather than wrong, and often not wrong at all, but unfalsifiable [13]. The mutual charges of reification also point to the fact that the two schools are really looking at different worlds. Each side accuses the other of imposing a model upon reality and looking at the model instead of at the real world. Bull states that the behavioural model-builder is dangerous because he tends to attribute to the model 'a connexion with reality it does not have', and Kaplan replies that it is the traditionalist ' w h o is more likely to mistake his model for reality' because his models are implicit ones [14].
International anarchy Moreover, there are two explicit substantive disagreements a m o n g post-Second World W a r international relations scholars which are related both to each other and to the methodological debates between traditionalists and behaviourists: the image of international relations as anarchical v. the view that international politics as comparable to domestic politics, and an exclusive emphasis on nation-States as actors in world politics v. a more inclusive consideration of non-State and 'transnational' actors in addition to the national actors. Classical international relations theory revolved around the notions of State sovereignty and its logical corollary, international anarchy: the sovereign States, recognizing no higher authority, are in an international state of nature, and the resulting security dilemma forces them to live in a condition of mutual competition and conflict. Thefirstexplicit discussions of international relations in terms of the anarchic state of nature occur in T h o m a s Hobbes' Leviathan and, m u c h more extensively, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The State of War. But the vision of an anarchic world preceded the relatively modern concepts of sovereignty and the state of nature. A n embryonic instance of it can already be found in Thucydides, w h o reports the argument used by a theoretically inclined military c o m m a n d e r to the effect that ' a m o n g neighbours antagonism is ever a condition of independence' [15]. The twin notions of sovereignty and international anarchy provided the basis
International relations theory: great debates and lesser debates
15
for three interrelated theories: world government, collective security and balance of power. The theory of world government maintains that, since anarchy is the root of international conflict, an international social contract must be concluded to establish a single sovereign world government. Balance-of-power theory, on the contrary, submits that the struggle for power a m o n g sovereign States tends to result in a condition of equilibrium that entails a large measure of international order rather than perpetual conflict. Collective security theory, which advocates formal agreement a m o n g States to take collective action against any aggressor, can be regarded as a partial acceptance of the social contract, in which international anarchy is not abolished but only reduced and in which the separate national sovereignties are left intact. Inis L . Claude places the three theories on 'successive points along a continuum' that ranges from a m i n i m u m to a m a x i m u m of central power and authority [16]. This continuum applies to the normative objectives of the theories; the point of departure of all three is the idea of anarchy a m o n g sovereign States. In the years after the Second World W a r , the assumption of international anarchy was restated and vigorously defended by H a n s J. Morgenthau, R a y m o n d Aron, and other realist writers. Morgenthau's theory, for instance, emphasizes 'the fundamental difference between domestic and international polities', and he argues that international conflict m a y be treated as a special case of conflict in general, but only 'if one does not neglect the paramount distinctive factor that parties to international conflict are sovereign nations with a monopoly of organized force' [17]. A r o n criticizes scholars w h o fail to m a k e a sharp distinction between international and domestic politics and ' w h o count acts of violence or homicide without differentiating between murderers and soldiers'. The traditional assumption of an anarchic world seems to him to be 'closer to reality, more in keeping with experience, more instructive, and more productive' [18].
The Grotian view The opposite assumption, denying the unique character of international relations and asserting the essential similarity of politics within and between nations, was a minority viewpoint a m o n g the classical theorists. Its most important adherents were Grotius and his followers. They emphasized the existence of a c o m m o n framework of moral and legal norms, and they viewed the world as a society of States with a sufficiently strong and pervasive normative consensus to render the image of the state of nature and international anarchy inapplicable [19]. A second important set of exceptions is Lenin's theory of imperialism and other economic theories of imperialism whose explanations of conflict have almost nothing to d o with a distinction between domestic and international politics. F r o m the late 1950s on, however, the Grotian view has been reasserted with increasing force and frequency. Thefirstclear instance is the comparative study,
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Arena Lijphart
published in 1957, of integration in the North Atlantic areas by a team of investigators led by Karl W . Deutsch. Their analysis contains a two-pronged attack on the traditional notion of anarchy. First, their point of departure is a conceptual distinction between an amalgamated community, which has 'one supreme decisionmaking center', and a security-community, in which there is 'real assurance that the members . . . will notfighteach other physically'. This means that at the outset the state of nature (i.e. a non-amalgamated or pluralistic community) is deliberately separated from the state of war, actual or potential (a non-security-community). The correlation between anarchy and war is thus rendered into a mere hypothesis. Secondly, the empiricalfindingsreveal, to the surprise of Deutsch and his collaborators, that 'pluralistic security-communities [are] somewhat easier to attain and easier to preserve than their amalgamated counterparts'—that, in traditional terminology, anarchy is a better road to peace than social contract! Twelve conditions are essential for the success of amalgamated security-communities, but only three of these are vital for pluralistic ones. Furthermore, amalgamation and the establishment of a 'monopoly of violence' tends to be 'more of a burden than a help' to the attainment of lasting peace [20]. T h e traditional theories with their emphasis o n the fundamental difference between international and domestic politics necessarily view sovereignty as absolute and indivisible. W h e n Deutsch uses this notion, he characteristically turns it into a relative concept. In his earlier work on nationalism, he distinguishes between the 'legal form' and the more important 'political substance' of sovereignty, and he argues that 'there are shades and gradations of sovereignty . . . on both sides of the legal borderline' [21]. This also implies reliance on the Grotian concept rather than the traditional one. Another revealing example m a y be found in J. David Singer's well-known discussion of the level-of-analysis problem in international relations. The two levels that Singer distinguishes, the level of the national State and the level of the international system, correspond to the second and third of Kenneth N . Waltz's well-known 'images' which explain war and conflict a m o n g States. But whereas Waltz's third image is international anarchy, Singer contrasts the descriptive, explanatory and predictive capabilities of the two levels of analysis without even once mentioning the sovereignty-anarchy contrast [22]. Bruce M . Russett states this view even more emphatically: 'It simply is erroneous to think of international politics as anarchic, chaotic, and utterly unlike national politics' [23]. This approach is also adopted by most peace research scholars w h o tend to believe that international conflict can be understood better in terms of inter-group conflict in general, as suggested by the Grotian metaphor, than in terms of the traditional emphasis on the uniqueness of conflict a m o n g sovereign states. A n editorial in the first issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution expresses the 'conviction that the behaviour and interactions of nations are not an isolated and self-contained area of empirical material but part of a m u c h widerfieldof behaviour and interaction' [24].
International relations theory: great debates and lesser debates
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The actors in international politics The second dimension of substantive disagreement concerns the identification of the actors in international politics. T h e traditional approach is to regard the nation-State as virtually the only kind of actor. In recent years, however, more and more attention has been paid to other actors. For example, Singer describes the international scene as a global system with various subsystems. The subsystems are not only the national States, which he believes are usually assigned too prominent a role, but also intra-national and extra-national entities and inter-nation coalitions and organizations [25]. A n d Herbert J. Spiro argues that 'all national and other smaller political systems are component parts' of the global political system [26]. This new approach stresses the importance of 'transnational' relations, which are defined by Joseph S. N y e and Robert O . Keohane as 'contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments'. Their definition of a 'significant actor' is: 'any somewhat autonomous individual or organization that controls substantial resources and participates in political relationships with other actors across state lines' [27]. T h e two dimensions of substantive disagreement are conceptually distinct, but they are empirically and to a certain extent logically related. The traditional assumption of international anarchy logically implies that the actors are sovereign entities, that is, the nation-States. O n the other hand, the Grotian view is logically compatible with both State-centred and transnational approaches. States m a y be regarded as the actors in international politics, not because they possess sovereignty, but because they are in practice the most active and powerful actors on the international scene. However, the Grotian view is of course more conducive to the transnational approach, because it does not m a k e an a priori distinction between national and non-national actors.
The link between method and substance It has been argued so far, first, that the three methodological-epistemological debates are mutually related and, secondly, that the lines of cleavage in the two substantive debates also tend to coincide. T h e next step in the argument is to point out that there is also a close relationship between the methodological and substantive debates. A major reason w h y so m a n y traditionalists feel that is is futile to analyse international relations in the modern social-scientific manner, is the uniquely anarchical nature of the subject-matter. This makes the field qualitatively different from the otherfieldsof political science and the social sciences in general. A n illustrative, although admittedly extreme, instance is Martin Wight's wiev. After noting 'a kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being
Arend Lijphart
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theorized about', he explains that theorizing about domestic politics is possible because it falls 'within the realm of normal relationships and calculable results'. But, with the typical traditionalist emphasis on the fact of international anarchy, he continues: ' W h a t for [domestic] political theory is the extreme case (as revolution, or civil war) is for international theory the regular case.' [28] This is tantamount to saying that the fact of international anarchy necessarily entails theoretical anarchy. Conversely, the Grotian image induces receptivity to the idea that international relations is one of the social sciences and can profitably borrow from their knowledge and methods. O n e of the scholarly observers of the discipline w h o has recently called attention to this important point is Chadwick F . Alger. H e points out that the 'removal of the intellectual shackles imposed by the image of uniqueness has freed international relations scholars to borrow from the full storehouse of social science knowledge' [29]. Because each of the five dimensions of disagreement can be dichotomized and because the dichotomies tend to coincide, w e can conclude that it is justified to regard the basic division in the second great debate as a dichotomous one between two opposing paradigms. International relations scholars w h o prefer traditional methods are likely to be guided by the model of international anarchy, to use the nation-State as their unit of analysis, to be policy-oriented, and to be pessimistic about the prospects of constructing a valid general theory of their subject. Conversely, the more scientifically inclined scholars are likely to adhere to the Grotian view of international society, to use a transnational approach, to favour pure over applied science, and to be sanguine theory-builders. Knorr and Rosenau's claim of a basic dichotomous configuration of approaches in the field is therefore not only upheld, but also strengthened by the addition of substantive dimensions. At this point, w e must in all fairness recall Russett's assertion, based on empirical evidence, that about a dozen distinct schools can be identified. H e admits however, that further analysis of the ties between these schools shows that 'where there is some similarity between groups it does indeed follow [the] behavioral/non-behavioral division' [30].
Exceptions There are exceptions, of course. T h e most striking one concerns the two major protagonists in the great methodological debate, Bull and Kaplan. They turn out to be deviant cases when their views on the substantive aspects of the great debate are examined. Five of Kaplan's well-known six international systems correspond to traditional models: three are different forms of balance-of-power systems, the 'hierarchical system' is a system of world government, and the 'unit veto system' is equivalent to a Hobbesian state of nature. In describing these systems, he explicitly relies on the sovereignty-anarchy contrast. The hierarchical
International relations theory: great debates and lesser debates
19
system is distinguished from the unit veto system and the three balance of power systems by the fact that the national actors are 'territorial subdivisions of the international system rather than independent political systems' [31]. Bull, on the other hand, adopts the Grotian point of view and follows Deutsch's arguments w h e n he states: 'Formidable though the classic dangers are of a plurality of sovereign States, these have to be reckoned against those inherent in the attempt to contain disparate communities within the framework of a single government.' [32] Peace research constitutes another exception, although it does not deviate with regard to the two most important dimensions. Most peace research scholars use behavioural methods and adhere to the Grotian substantive model. But they are explicitly and self-consciously policy-oriented. They tend to share Morgenthau's conviction that a theory must not just be a 'guide to understanding' but also an 'ideal for action'; it must be 'a m a p of the political scene not only in order to understand what the scene is like, but also in order to show the shortest and safest road to a given objective' [33]. A more serious exception is the post-behavioural movement. T h e post-behaviourists are strongly policy-oriented and extremely critical of behaviourist methods. In these respects, they are neo-traditionalists. But they d o not object to the Grotian view of the international system. In fact, the popularity of neo-Marxist theories of imperialism strengthens the Grotian outlook and militates against a return to the traditional view of international anarchy. Although these exceptions are by no means unimportant, w e can conclude that by and large the second great debate is multi-dimensional but nevertheless roughly dichotomous. This conclusion has to be qualified only in the sense that every classification entails a degree of simplification.
Relations between the great debates Finally, w e must examine the possible links between the two great debates. Knorr and Rosenau are right when they state that the second debate is not an outgrowth of thefirst,and that the foci of the two debates are quite different. But their assertion that by combining the two independent dichotomous divisions one arrives at four research approaches—'whether one . . . joins the idealist or realist school . . . one can employ either traditional or scientific methods to study the subject' [34]—seems ahistorical, to say the least. Like the realists, the idealists were traditional in their methodology. Moreover, as far as the substantive disagreement between the two schools is concerned, it is rather misleading to contrast the idealists' optimism about and faith in legal institutions and moral norms with the hard-nosed power approach of the realists. T o the idealists the crucial legal institution to maintain the peace was the League of Nations or an alternative collective security organization. Collective security does entail formal institutions and legal obligations, but it is
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nevertheless squarely based on considerations of power and deterrence. Moreover, as was pointed out above, both collective security theory and the theory of balance of power, which is favoured by realists, are predicated on the assumption of international anarchy. It is significant that Morgenthau, the leading realist theorist, condemns collective security but that he accepts the anarchic model so consistently that he is forced to support the underlying logic of collective security theory: 'As a n ideal, collective security is without flaws; it presents indeed the ideal solution of the problem of law enforcement in a community of sovereign nations.' [35] The realism-idealism debate w a s therefore a debate within the traditional paradigm. Hence it was a less significant and fundamental debate than the truly great debate between the traditional and behaviourist paradigms.
References
1. See C Z I E M P E L , Ernst-Otto, Die Entwicklung der 8. RUSSETT, Bruce M . , Methodological and Theoretical Schools in International Relations, in: Lehre von den Internationalen Beziehungen, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 6, N o . 3, Norman D . Palmer (ed.), A Design for International Relations Research: Scope, Theory, September 1965, p. 274. Methods, and Relevance, p. 87-105. (Mono2. D O U G H E R T Y , James E.; PFALTZGRAFF Jr., Rograph 10 of the American Academy of Polbert L . , Contending Theories of International itical and Social Science, Philadelphia, Relations, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1971, October 1970.) p. 6-13. 3. K N O R R , Klaus; R O S E N A U , James N . , Tradition 9. R A N S O M , Harry H o w e , International Relations, and Science in the Study of International Poliin: Marian D . Irish (ed.), Political Science: tics, in: Knorr and Rosenau (eds.), Contending Advance of the Discipline, p. 57, Englewood Approaches to International Politics, p. 12, Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1968. 13-14, Princeton, N . J . , Princeton University 10. K U H N , op. cit., p. 185. Press, 1969. 11. K U H N , op. cit., p. 111-35, 150. 12. B U L L , Hedley, International Theory: The Case 4. See, for instance, W O L I N , Sheldon S., Paradigms and Political Theories, in: Preston King and for a Classical Approach, in: Knorr and B . C . Parekh (eds.), Politics and Experience: Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches . . . , Essays Presented to Professor Michael Oakeop. cit., p. 27, 28, 38. shott on the Occasion of his Retirement, p. 125—13. K A P L A N , Morton A . , The N e w Great Debate: 52, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Traditionalism vs. Science in International 1968. Relations, in: Knorr and Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches . . ., op. cit., p . 55-6. 5. K U H N , Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 92, 2nd ed., Chicago, Univer- 14. B U L L , op. cit., p. 31; K A P L A N , op. cit., p. 58. sity of Chicago Press, 1970. 15. T H U C Y D I D E S , History of the Peloponnesian War, 6. SAID, Abdul A . , Introduction and Recent TheBook 4, par. 92. Translated by B . Jowett. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1881. ories of International Relations: A n Overview, in: Said (ed.), Theory of International Re- 16. C L A U D E Jr., Inis L . , Power and International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance, p . 3, 18, lations, p. 9, N e w York, Random House, Englewood Cliffs, N . J . , Prentice-Hall, 1968. 1962. 17. M O R G E N T H A U , Hans J., Scientific Man vs. Power 7. H O L T , Robert T . ; R I C H A R D S O N Jr., John M . , Competing Paradigms in Comparative PoliPolitics, p. 50, Chicago, University of Chicago tics, in: Holt and John E . Turner (eds.), The Press, 1965; C o m m o n Sense and Theories of Methodology of Comparative Research, p. 21International Relations, in: John C . Farrell 71, N e w York, Free Press, 1970. and Asa P . Smith (eds.), Theory and Reality
21
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References (continued)
in International Relations, p . 50, N e w Y o r k , Columbia University Press, 1967. 18. A R O N , R a y m o n d , W h a t is a Theory of International Relations? in: Farrell and Smith (eds.), Theory and Reality, p . 12-13. 19. B U L L , Hedley, The Grotian Conception of International Society, in: Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, p . 51-73, L o n d o n , Allen & U n w i n , 1966. 20. D E U T S C H , Karl W . et al.. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, p. 5 - 6 , 29, 46-69, 105, Princeton, N . J . , Princeton University Press, 1957. 21. D E U T S C H , Karl W . , Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, p . 53, Cambridge, Technology Press, 1953. 22. S I N G E R , J. David, The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations, in: Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays, p . 77-92, Princeton, N . J . , Princeton University Press, 1961. 23. R U S S E T T , Bruce M . , Trends in World Politics, p. 57, N e w York, Macmillan, 1965. 24. A n Editorial, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, N o . 1, March 1957, p . 1-2. 25. S I N G E R , J. David, T h e Global System and its Subsystems: A Developmental View, in: James N . Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, p . 29-30, N e w Y o r k , Free Press, 1969.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34. 35.
S P I R O , Herbert J., World Politics: The Global System, p . 5, H o m e w o o d , 111., Dorsey Press, 1966. N Y E Jr., Joseph S.; K E O H A N E , Robert O . , Transnational Relations and World Politics: A n Introduction, International Organization, Vol. 25, N o . 3, S u m m e r 1971, p . 331, 344-5. W I G H T , Martin, W h y is There N o International Theory? in: Butterfield and Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations . . . , o p . cit., p . 3 3 . See A L G E R , Chadwick F . , Trends in International Relations Research, in: Palmer (ed.), A Design for International Relations Research . . ., op. cit., p . 24-5. Conference Discussion on Methods, in: Palmer (ed.), A Design for International Relations Research . . ., o p . cit., p . 122-3. K A P L A N , Morton A . , System and Process in International Politics, p . 49, N e w Y o r k , Wiley, 1957. B U L L , Hedley, Society and Anarchy in International Relations, in: Butterfield and Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations . . . , o p . cit., p. 50. M O R G E N T H A U , H a n s J., T h e Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations, in: William T . R . F o x (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, p . 18, Notre D a m e , Ind., University of Notre D a m e Press, 1959. Knorr and Rosenau, op. cit., p . 13. M O R G E N T H A U , H a n s J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed., p. 285, N e w Y o r k , Knopf, 1967.
A systems approach to international relations
John W . Burton System In English 'system' has m a n y different meanings, and this has led to confusion in the field of international relations. Its translation into other languages carries through this confusion: unless a specific meaning is differentiated a notion such as system cannot reliably be translated. By a 'system approach' is sometimes meant an orderly, logical or step-by-step approach, that is, 'systematic'. Sometimes a 'systems approach' implies n o more than a way of doing things: ' m y system is to go about it this way'. Thus, in thefieldof international relations different 'systems' or ways of going about things have been differentiated: balance of power, bi-polar, collective security and other 'systems'. Also different political 'systems' or forms of government, democracies and others, are distinguished. Yet another meaning, more familiar in industry, is the process or 'system' within an organization whose flows of movement and interactions can be examined with a view to improving efficiency. These are all popular uses of the term. The notion of a 'system' properly connotes relationships between units. T h e units of a system are of the same 'set', that is they have features in c o m m o n that give rise to and m a k e possible the particular relationship. Relationships imply communications, transactions, exchanges or interdependence. A 'system' can be defined, therefore, as 'a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between their attributes' [1]. States form a system of interaction, the State being the unit. But a State is not a system (except in the popular sense of a particular form of government). It is a geographical area under the legal jurisdiction of a central authority, and comprises a cluster of systems—political, economic and social. T h e distinction is important because some of these systems are
John Wear Burton is reader in international relations, University College, London. He was formerly Permanent Head of the Australian Department of External Affairs and Australian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka. His main publications are The Alternative (1954), Peace Theory (1962), International Relations: A General Theory (1965), System, States, Diplomacy and Rules (1968), Conflict and Communication (1969) and World Society (1972).
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
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contained within the State boundaries and some cut across them. T h e State, in systems terms, is not an autonomous entity. Organizations of students, scientists, tourists, religious groups, traders, form other systems of interaction. World society is comprised of all of these sets of relationships that are within and across State boundaries [2]. O n e feature that distinguishes contemporary world society from previous periods is the increased number and spread of relationships. This is the one-world, or the complex interdependence that is the characteristic of our times. W h a t w e require is some means of taking apart this total world society in a way that enables us to analyse it, or parts of it, without eliminating interactions that are significant. Traditionally this has been done by examining a region, or a group of States, or even a single State. This m a y have been a suitable process in past centuries when transactions were relatively few, and mainly concerned with defence and trade. In our more complex world an alternative means is to examine separately these networks of different but overlapping and interacting relationships. A study of any one, for example, a religious system, would deal with the whole of that system, including those parts outside any particular geographical area. This is an approach that is in sharp contrast to a study of behaviour within a defined geographical area, for example, a nation or a region. T h e two different studies lead to different perspectives, observations, and conclusions. A study of the political significance of religion in South-East Asia could be confined to that area if it were just descriptive of what happens in that region; but it would be misleading as a basis for understanding the behaviour of governments and people. For example, Indonesian policy towards the Dutch after the last war could be explained only by reference to linkages extending to the Middle East. A systems approach extends a particular study beyond regional boundaries to whatever influences are relevant. In other words, a systems analysis of a complex situation enables the preservation of wholes, while a national or regional study tends to focus on the behaviour of only parts of systems. O n e of the implications of a systems approach is that the study of international relations cannot reasonably be confined to the study of the inter-State system only. The inter-State system operates within an environment, this environment comprises m a n y other systems, and without examination it should not be assumed that the inter-State system, of recent origin, is the dominating and controlling element in the wider world society. It m a y be that State authorities are formal decision-makers and the recognized actors, but m a y in practice merely reflect or respond to decisions in non-State systems. The potentialities of applying systems thinking to international relations are fully realized only once the subjectmatter is defined as the study of world society, that is all interactions at all levels, and not just interactions within the one system comprising States.
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General systems theory Another feature that distinguishes contemporary world society from previous periods is the altered quality of these increased relationships. In the pre-war international society there were fifty or so States, some of which were major imperialist powers. T h e preservation of the State, of imperialisms, of the interState system, of alliance structures, of legal norms that reflected the practices of powerful States, was thefirstobjective of policy. In the present world society the majority of States are not in a position to play the power game, and stand to lose by the continuance of an inter-State system that reflects the interests of those that are militarily and industrially powerful. Their objectives relate to internal political stability, and to economic and social welfare. The c o m m o n l y shared goals relate to effective participation in international decisions, and to equality of opportunities for economic development. The internal problems they face, especially racial and religious tensions, tend to spill over into the wider international society, as happened in Cyprus. Consequently, the type of problem that confronts the international relations student has changed fundamentally. It is n o longer merely national security and development in an inter-State system that is dominated by great powers. It includes problems relating to the legitimization of authority, race and religious relations within States, and problems of social mobilization that were once regarded as being outside the scope of international relations. W h a t happens within States is n o w of world concern. Putting these two influences together, namely, increased transactions and the altered quality of these transactions, w e are forced to acknowledge that the study of international relations cannot be confined to the inter-State system. Other systems of interaction are the environment of the inter-State system. Whereas once it was possible to dwell on national and international institutions and their preservation, n o w h u m a n values of all kinds c o m e to the fore, and sometimes confront existing institutions. Behaviour at levels other than the State level thus become part of the study of international relations. Furthermore, progress in other disciplines has deepened the study of behaviour in world society. Even the study of traditional objectives of national security and the problems of international organization have begun to raise issues that would have once been regarded as not relevant to international relations. Whether a collective security force could in practice or in theory deter is an example. Whether m a n or groups of m e n are inherently aggressive is not something that can be taken for granted any longer. In short, behaviour in world society is behaviour of all systems, and at 'lower' systems levels h u m a n factors, values motivations, responses to threat, reactions to authorities, are n o w subject to examination in depth. The question arises, therefore, whether it is possible to take 'system' as the unit of analysis, whether it be the State or the individual, and apply some c o m m o n
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behavioural characteristics to all levels of behaviour. Are there self-maintenance, adaptation and other properties that are c o m m o n to behaviour at all levels? A r e there universal values pursued at every social level? If so, to what extent can a proposition tested at one level, for example, the small group, be applied to others, for example, the State? The notion of 'general systems theory' is that there are system properties, as for example, limitations o n rates of adaptation beyond which attempts are m a d e to alter the environment. A n analysis of integrative or conflictual behaviour at one level should tell something about such behaviour at others. A breakdown in family relationships creates conditions for socially deviant behaviour [3]. Does the alienation of a State from its normal relationships lead to similar attempts to defy the norms of world society? A r e there general propositions about behaviour that are applicable to all behavioural systems?
Method relates to field M e t h o d relates tofield.If world society, and not just inter-State relations, is the subject-matter, a systems approach seems to be necessary. A systems approach is not just a fashion or an excuse for a new jargon: it is the means by which complex circumstances can be analysed. It is possible to describe a form of government and to m a k e comparisons, and superficially to interpret events as press correspondents do day by day. 'International relations', 'diplomatic history' and 'comparative politics' were once at this level. They have been characterized by the perception of the observer, reflecting varying cultural and philosophical positions. Institutional structures, 'power relations', 'accidental' and 'unique' events and personalities have been the bread and butter of political historians; and alliances, deterrence and aggressiveness have been the meat of political scientists. But these studies have been unrewarding: prediction and policy designed reliably to achieve stated objectives have not been helped by them. W h e n one begins to ask questions about power, deterrence, aggression, authority, in order to analyse even a particular event more deeply, one is considering patterns of behaviour and responses that are c o m m o n at different levels of social interaction. Inevitably one is led to thinking about the behaviour of systems generally. T w o questions are being asked of all political scientists concerned with international relations, and both lead to systems notions. Thefirstis what is the reality w e are trying to observe and to analyse: a set of States interacting in a power framework, dominating all h u m a n behaviour, or sets of interactions of all kinds, trade, scientific, tourist, religious, ideological, fearful, sympathetic and ethnic, including interactions between States? T h e second question follows: is there an inter-disciplinary area that can reasonably be differentiated as 'international', or should one focus o n some specific patterns of behaviour in specific problem areas, such as conflict, regardless of State boundaries?
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These questions are already being answered in the international relations literature—though this fact is not yet generally recognized in the teaching of the subject. In respect of thefirstquestion, Wolfers, as far back as 1959, observed that the 'billiard ball' model of the multi-State system, in which each State represents a closed, impermeable and sovereign unit, is not an accurate portrait of the real world [4], Since this time the works of Modelski, Rosenau and others have drawn attention to the penetrated nature of the State, and the model of the world that approximates reality is one depicting cobwebs of transactions, m a n y cutting across State boundaries [5]. The second question is also answered in the literature. Teaching syllabuses n o w include writings such as those of Blau o n differentiation of power through social exchange [6], the systems thinking of Easton [7], the sociology of Lipset [8], and even those whose declaredfieldis international relations have been forced to dwell on the economics and sociology of social mobilization [9]. T h e subject-matter of international relations has, as a result of these two influences, the perception of a world society, and of a breakdown of disciplinary boundaries, shifted from defence matters, diplomatic history, power balances and State decision-making, to the study of those basic behavioural problems that underlie all relationships. The contemporary literature endeavours to deal with conflict, conflict resolution, integration, social mobilization, the nature of legitimized authority, role behaviour, sub-system dominance, consensus and other such topics. This has effectively eliminated the geographical boundaries between 'international' and domestic, and academic boundaries between 'international relations' and other behavioural studies. In short, studies in greater depth of international relations have led to the examination of patterns of behaviour at all system levels, from small groups to the nation, they have involved all disciplines, and they have, in any event been required to take into account the increased level and altered character of contemporary communications and transactions across national boundaries. Methodological problems are n o w faced that were not important w h e n the study was more descriptive and confined to inter-State relations. Furthermore, increased knowledge about methodology has re-inforced this trend toward a widerfieldof interest, and a wider definition of academic boundaries. Logically method extends the area of interest no matter what the personal preference. It is not possible to confine attention to segments merely to overcome problems of complexity. A doctor examining a patient with a stiff arm necessarily must examine neck and back. Contemporary international relations studies are in a stage of transition. T h e field of interest is wider because the nature of world society has changed; but there is still an attempt to carve off segments for separate study. In the international relations literature the c o m m u n a l conflict in Northern Ireland is a domestic matter, but Cyprus is international. The study c o m m o n to both is conflict—whether it be domestic or international.
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A systems approach, m a d e necessary by the extendedfield,implies deductive methods, that is the use of 'axiomatic' propositions or 'givens' derived at one level of analysis, as the basis for logical extensions to others. Traditional international relations studies have been descriptive, and any generalizations have been arrived at inductively. Power theorists have taken a synoptic view of history and c o m e to the conclusion that relative power is the controlling influence. Deterrent theorists have observed past practices and have found evidence that deterrence deters. In such an approach there is little if any control o n selective perception: events, such as failure of deterrence, that d o not support theories are not observed or are re-interpreted so as not to d a m a g e the theory. This is the case in most, if not all, recent behavioural studies—economics, psychology and others. T o s o m e extent the inductive method has been encouraged by the breaking up of the totalfieldof h u m a n behaviour into separate disciplines based on sizes of social groups—psychology and social psychology—and aspects of behaviour—economics and politics. Within a defined area the source of data is the description of behaviour in that area. This particular differentiation of disciplines is not based o n any reasoned plan: it is accidental and administratively convenient. A logical plan would have been to createfieldsof interest on the basis of problem areas, conflict at all levels, coercion at all levels, authority at all levels, and others. In analysing a conflict situation at the inter-State level, propositions arrived at by inductive m e a n s at lower levels of behaviour would become the axiomatic propositions for deductive reasoning at a higher level. It follows that the relevant literature for aspects of international relations, such as conflict, institutional behaviour, decision-making and others, is the literature concerning deviance and deterrence, management, politics, psychology and others to the extent that any of these studies has been able to produce hard data in the form of tested behavioural propositions. Unit response to the environment is what all studies at all social levels have in c o m m o n ; and unit response at all levels has c o m m o n features. This is the essence of general systems theory. Obtaining and processing data at higher levels of interaction, for example data about inter-State wars, is an unrewarding and unproductive task if inductive approaches are adopted. W h a t does one look for: personality problems, power relations, scarcity? N o general theory of war is likely, there being large numbers of variables that m a k e each appear to be unique. But the analysis of any particular situation deductively, that is on the basis of patterned responses discovered at various behavioural levels, is manageable. Furthermore, such an analysis gives rise to s o m e general behavioural theories applicable in all conflict situations, including theories on the handling of conflicts [10].
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The methodological problem in international relations T h e study of international relations has long been regarded as an art, where general knowledge, experience and judgement are the essential qualifications. T o be a science the following are required: (a) the availability of the totality of relevant data; (b) the total stability of relevant data; (c) the testing of provisional answers in the totality of a situation. B y employing a systems approach these requirements can be met. The availability of the totality of relevant data implies that the whole of the subjectmatter relevant to a question is available either as available empirical data, or as generalizations that substitute for data. In some simple mechanical systems all data can be available, and questions concerning function can be answered descriptively within the situation itself. W h y a key locks a door can be answered within that system. There is a descriptive rather than a theoretical explanation. M o s t systems of interest require the input of knowledge from other systems, and this is by tested generalization derived from simpler systems. Generalizations about the effect of friction or gravity can substitute for relevant data where it is not possible or convenient to acquire data directly. Calculations regarding the behaviour of aircraft are based on generalizations tested at other system levels. Tested component systems can be included in larger systems and the resultant behaviour predicted as was the case with thefirstatom b o m b . In behavioural sciences data about h u m a n , social and institutional responses, for example, responses to coercion, deterrence and compliance that are not obtainable in complex situations, such as the N A T O W a r s a w Pact relationship, can c o m e into assessments by w a y of generalizations tested at other systems levels. T h e recent literature on social conforming behaviour, deviance and deterrence is of great importance to international relations. O n this basis no discipline, behavioural or physical, can be scientific in this sense, except at descriptive levels of interaction, that are contained wholly within the system level of the discipline. For example, Piaget could scientifically hypothesize and test 'conservation theory'. H e could take a child of a given age and predict reliably his abilities to comprehend quantity and numbers in changing circumstances. This is scientific at a descriptive level. But he was not explaining. H e could offer an explanation as a hypothesis, but explanation lies outside his defined field of interests, perhaps in biology. Similarly, psychologists and social psychologists can have something descriptive to say about patterns of response in some circumstances, but they cannot say anything conclusive about aggressiveness because this involves cultural, physiological, biological and economic considerations. It follows that m u c h of all separate disciplines is an art, relying on experience and judgement, and not a science. History must always be an art because only a selection of data are available; but so too must m u c h of psychology, social
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psychology, economics, politics, diplomacy, and others. It would be unrealistic to assert that research should be confined tofieldsin which all data were available. S o m e of the most important insights and knowledge are gained in conditions in which data are not available. Art has a role. However, from a methodological point of view it is reasonable to assert that a distinction should be m a d e between conditions in which data are not available, and conditions in which a selection is m a d e from available data o n the grounds of availability within the particular discipline concerned. For example, there can reasonably be an intellectual interest in problems about which w e have as yet little knowledge, such as motivation and values, and speculation in the absence of data can contribute to working hypotheses about relationships that could be useful in practice. But it is not reasonable to study subjects such as deterrence and aggression within the academic boundaries of inter-State relations as though knowledge about these phenomena were not available at other levels. There has been a persistent tendency within thefieldsof diplomatic history, comparative politics and strategic studies to generalize, to assert, to hypothesize about behavioural p h e n o m e n a in ways little related to knowledge of these phenomena derived from studies at other levels of behaviour. T h e total availability of data is not a notion that seeks to deplore the absence of knowledge, but one that draws attention to the need to search and re-search at all system levels. International relations scholars, especially those n o w designated as 'traditional', have been remarkably uninterested in discovery at other system levels. International relations students typically are helped greatly by reading in literature outside their defined field. W o r k s o n industrial relations, social case studies, analyses of deviant behaviour, present them with tested propositions that seem to have a bearing on their studies. These propositions become part of their 'data', with which they can describe and explain integration and conflict at c o m m u n a l and inter-State levels. They find general behavioural propositions that appear to be applicable at all social levels of h u m a n interaction. The total stability of relevant data is the second requirement of a scientific analysis: the same predictions apply at different periods of time to the same sets of circumstances. Historians frequently argue that events are unique, and if this is so history is description and not explanation. Legal, social, and cultural norms change, and the study of law and of m a n y aspects of social sciences must remain an art for this reason. There can be a science of art, that is prediction and explanation in relation to art forms, but art cannot be scientific. In the behavioural sciences that which is scientific relates to repetitive patterns of behaviour, and, therefore, to fundamental and universal responses to the same conditions. In their o w nfieldspsychology and social psychology are in the area of science when, within the field of their discipline, they can reliably predict on the basis of unchanging patterned responses. In international relations there is a degree of predictability w h e n the analysis is at the level of values and
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responses that appear to be universal in time and space. Ethnic identity, security, participation, status and role position are likely to form a basis of analysis m o r e reliable than power and personality. System responses such as self-maintenance, self-regeneration, adaptation and environment alteration, are patterned responses c o m m o n at all social levels, in all societies and at all times. These, rather than comparative politics and diplomatic histories offer a basis for explanation and prediction at the inter-State level. There is here posed a type of level of analysis problem: if superficial description is what is sought, as is the case with most press reporting, personalities and historical events are sufficient. This is an art. If, however, it is explanation that is sought, interest is in more fundamental and c o m m o n l y experienced behavioural patterns. T h e scope of study is in this case extended into the field of h u m a n behaviour generally. A particular event is, in this perspective, described by reference to those aspects of social behaviour that are c o m m o n at all levels: authority, role, coercion, deterrence, decision-making, and others. In this way every event, far from being unique, can be analysed as unit response to the environment, the unique features being very largely emergent or transitory features. T h e Northern Ireland situation can be analysed as a unique event, characterized by personalities, the particular factions and groupings, the historical background of the situation and the day-by-day decisions of authorities and responses to these. Policy can be based on such descriptions, and on the assumptions which selective perception reinforce, for example, that the problem is the creation of a small minority for w h o m the majority have no sympathy. Alternatively it can be analysed more deeply in the context of repetitive patterns of violent protest in Cyprus, Viet-Nam and others, where polarization has been observed, where deterrence has failed to prevent violence. The particular analysis will in this case dwell upon levels of legitimacy of authority, participation, notions of law and order, the limitations of coercion and deterrence, the analysis of parties and issues, and matters of this kind. These relate to constants, stable data, repetitive patterns of behaviour. This is the area of science, and clearly such an analysis rests on general systems theory as applicable to behavioural systems. The opportunity to test provisional answers in the totality of a situation implies that historical settings cannot provide a test of a hypothesis: it is the on-going situation, and predictions in relation to it that are required. Political and social scientists, especially those labelled 'behavioural scientists', have been engaged in the numbers game: the belief is that if a large number of cases are taken and correlations found between variables, then something is discovered. This is a g a m e played with events in the absence of a hypothesis or theory, just to see what turns up. W a r s and the growth of international institutions m a y or m a y not correlate: whether they d o or not m a y be of n o significance. Other factors could be influential. T h e numbers g a m e is one to which history lends itself: there
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is a reservoir of events. A t best it can c o m e up with a hypothesis: it is in itself not a test. Probability of occurrence is not explanation. For explanation there must be a logical construction based on s o m e self-evident observations. T h e combination of systems thinking, deductive reasoning and reality testing meets the requirements of scientific method. However, it needs to be emphasized that this implies a total transformation of international relations studies. T h e traditional historical studies, the typical P h . D . student's data collection and case studies, comparative politics and area studies cannot be regarded as having validity in the absence of a theoretical framework, deductively arrived at, and resting upon a body of behavioural knowledge. This means that students of world society will be required, in the future, to be aware of empirical and theoretical work in m a n y fields, and to draw the boundaries of theirfieldsof interest, not on the basis of traditional disciplines, but by determining specifically the systems of interaction of interest to them. Somewhat in parenthesis, it is relevant to observe that the United States school of 'behavioural scientists' operates within a traditional framework. It is a school which emphasizes quantification, and equates quantification with science. However, it is methodology, and not the technique of using mathematics, that determines whether an approach is scientific. Indeed, it is probably that nonquantitative approaches are more 'scientific' in this sense than quantitative, because they can be less inductively committed, less limited in scope, and more influenced by deductive reasoning. T h e 'behavioural science' school is one that endeavours to m a k e the m a x i m u m use of hard data; but its fundamental assumptions and interpretations are not those associated with the wider conception of behaviour to which reference has been m a d e here. Happily, there has already occurred in the United States the 'post-behavioural revolution' which draws more attention to values and 'behaviour' in its true sense. W e should n o w look at the relationship between values and systems.
Values and systems So far w e have discussed two recent developments in the study of international relations: one, the definition of the subject area as world society, that is behavioural relationships at all levels that affect conflict and co-operation between nations and States, and two, the extension of the boundaries of the discipline to any knowledge relevant to defined problem areas. Both favour a systems approach. There is a third recent development and, without care, systems thinking could inhibit it. This is an interest in h u m a n values. Perhaps the most significant difference between classical and traditional studies, and contemporary behavioural studies, is the shift in interest from institutional values to h u m a n values. Traditionally, the preservation of the State and
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its institutions has been the main preoccupation. Classical thinking, and more recent balance of power and collective security proposals, have had the aim of preserving States and the inter-State system. Thus Coser, following Simmel, entertains propositions that suggest that internal conflict and external threat are functional to societies, either as safety valves or as cohesive influences. Whether they are functional for the members of society was not an issue [11]. In recent years attempts have been m a d e to differentiate between authorities that are legal, and those that are legitimized, meaning those which derive their power from those over w h o m they exercise authority [12]. This change implies that individual and h u m a n values are seen to be m o r e important than institutional ones. M a n y writers n o w dwell upon 'structural violence', which Galtung described as the gap between the actual and potential development of individuals and communities [13]. Systems thinking tends to concentrate o n institutional values, because the concern is with system behaviour: self-maintenance, capabilities of adaptation to change, and others. It is a tool or approach that tends to draw attention to selfpreservation, rather than to change. However, this is more because of traditional Western attitudes than to systems analysis itself. Systems thinking is applicable at all levels of behaviour, and consequently patterns of unit response to the environment at the individual level, at which h u m a n values are most conspicuous, are within its scope. A systems approach is, in this sense neutral: it does not specifically draw attention to h u m a n values, but equally it does not exclude them. This is as m u c h as can be asked of an analytical tool: the responsibility is on the scholar to ensure that it is used to best advantage. It is this third development, an interest in h u m a n values, that is the most significant aspect of contemporary thinking. T h e interest has been promoted by independence movements, by internal revolution against unrepresentative authorities, by demands for participation, by struggles for ethnic identity which sometimes take the form of secession movements, by demands for equality of opportunity in industrial development, by religious and language riots, by challenges to authority and law and order. Scholars have had to take note of these post-war developments. It was difficult to fit them into the limited and traditional approach to international relations that dwelt on States as the unit of analysis; but if system is the unit of analysis, h u m a n values can feature in political analysis.
Conclusion A systems approach in international relations is useful and rewarding only if the area of studies is defined as all behaviour at all systems levels that affect relationships between States, and it has the methodological consequence of making possible deductive reasoning. 'Data' include the tested propositions obtained from
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observations at lower systems levels, and empirical data at the inter-State level is important only in the context of hypotheses thus arrived at deductively. This is the conflictual issue of our times: it is this, not quantification, that is the feature that separates 'traditional' from 'behavioural' international relations studies.
References
1. From V o n Bertalanffy and Rappoport (eds.), 7. General Systems, Vol. 1. A n n Arbor (Mich.), Lithoprint, 1956. 8. 2. For a discussion of 'systems' see J. W . Burton, 9. Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules, C a m bridge, 1968. 3. B o x , Steven, Deviance, Reality & Society, London, Holt-Rinehart & Winston, 1971. 4. W O L F E R S , Arnold, Discord and Collaboration, 10. p . 19, Johns Hopkins, 1962. 5. M O D E L S K I , George, The International Relations 11. of Internal W a r , in: J. N . Rosenau (ed.), 12. International Aspects of Civil Strife, Princeton University Press, 1964; various writings and readings by J. N . Rosenau and J. W . Burton, 13. World Society, Cambridge, 1972. 6. B L A U , Peter, Exchange and Power in Social Life, Wiley, 1964.
E A S T O N , David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Wiley, 1965. LIPSET, Seymour, Political Man, Heinemann, 1959. For example Karl Deutsch, 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', in: H . Eckstein and D . Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics, Free Press, 1963. B U R T O N , J. W . , Conflict and Communication, Macmillan, 1969. C O S E R , L . , The Functions of Social Conflict, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956. B U R T O N , J. W . , World Society, p . 111-14, C a m bridge, 1972. G A L T U N G , J., Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2 , 1964; Vol. 3, 1969; Vol. 2 , 1972.
S o m e thoughts on current trends in international relations research
Saul Friedländer and Raymond Cohen In recent years international relations as an academic discipline has been divided between advocates of a 'traditional' approach to the subject and advocates of a 'scientific' approach. 1 'Scientists', adopting a social science perspective, have been concerned 'to treat the recurring pattern rather than the single case as a meaningful focus of inquiry'; to formulate explanatory theories and to rely o n quantitative methods for their verification.2 'Traditionalists', adopting a historical perspective, have stressed the uniqueness of phenomena in international relations and have criticized the applicability of quantitative techniques. The authors of this article should at once declare their interest in the matter; they consider that attention to theory and the recurring pattern is a legitimate and enlightening approach to the subject; but that quantitative data, while perfectly admissible as evidence, should take their place alongside other types of evidence within an over-all framework defined by historical judgement of what is or is not relevant. Quantification, in other words, should not determine the scope of research or the questions to be asked. There is n o reason to suppose that 'the scientific approach' demands the sole use of quantitative evidence,3 though it clearly requires certain standards of consistency, empirical verification and objectivity. Karl Deutsch has distinguished four waves of advance in the study of international relations: (a) a preoccupation, starting in the pre-First World W a r period, with international law; (b) stress on diplomatic history with the opening of the archives in the twenties and thirties; (c) an eclectic period in thefiftiesand sixties in which researchers drew upon the results and methods of the social sciences;
Saul Friedländer is professor of international relations and history and chairman of the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. He also teaches at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. He is the author o/Pius XII and the Third Reich (1964), Prelude to Downfall. Hitler and the United States, 1939-1941 (1965), Réflexions sur l'Avenir d'Israël (1969) and L'Antisémitisme Nazi (1971). Raymond Cohen is an instructor in the department of international relations at the Hebrew University, and preparing a doctoral dissertation on 'Threat Perception in International Polities'.
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
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(d) the present period in which rival theories are put to the test of empirical research.4 T h e 'third wave', which traditionalists found so distasteful, was a period of great enthusiasm and brought into the subject from outside m a n y interesting concepts and theories—such as systems theory, cybernetics, organization theory, cognitive theory, etc. W h a t it did not d o was to enable the emergence of a body of theory capable of explaining specific problems in international relations.5 F e w efforts were m a d e to construct formal theories.8 Studies of foreign policy decisionmaking, an area clearly of special and central relevance to international relations, restricted themselves to taxonomic and descriptive frameworks rather than explanatory theory.' Lewis F . Richardson did indeed attempt to construct a formal mathematical theory of arms races but based himself entirely on simple stimulusresponse models which ignored the internal characteristics and processes of the actors involved.8 Predictions based on his models have not proved accurate. G a m e theory enables the resolution of the problem of rational choice in situations of bargaining and conflict to be presented in mathematical terms but again sacrifices descriptive or predictive accuracy to logical closure.9 Though there m a y be a very general similarity between certain types of games and situations in international relations,10 assumptions of perfect rationality, fixed preference functions, determinate and k n o w n ranges of strategic choice, etc., are not applicable in most actual conflict situations. A s Oran Y o u n g argues: 'It is not difficult to construct logically workable models that have s o m e bearing o n international phenomena, but n o one has yet constructed models of this type that yield predictive results which are at all impressive.'11 Conscious that most so-called theory in the subject is either borrowed, and therefore not fully applicable, or over-simplified, researchers have tended 'to put aside the manipulation of various conceptual schemes and to take up, instead, the testing of limited ranges of concepts against bodies of data'.12 A n y review of the current state of international relations, therefore, is obliged to take as its theme current research rather than theory as such. Within this general orientation t w o central problems present themselves: W h a t sort of data is research to base itself on? A n d h o w are these data to be analysed? Discussion of these problems provides the unifying theme of this article. Data used in contemporary research can be separated into four distinct areas: (a) data about the attributes of a particular decision-maker, State or system; (b) action data about different kinds of events and acts; (c) data drawn from the articulations of decision-makers; (d) public opinion data.13 Each of these data areas is associated with particular sources of data and techniques for processing those data.
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Attribute data Researchers using attribute data are interested in investigating the causal connexion between the characteristics of an organism and the w a y in which it behaves. Research has proceeded in two principal directions: study of the causes of war and of the factors leading to political integration. In an ongoing study into the causes of war Singer directs his attention to twenty-four attributes at three different levels: those of the State, subsystem and international system, in the period 1816-1965. So far the project has confined itself to bivariate analysis (the relationship between the dependent variable—war—and any single independent variable). A m o n g the independent variables are factors such as population, iron and steel production and military expenditure, all at the State level; and systemic attributes such as diplomatic representation and alliance configurations. Singer avoids testing any particular theory so as to avoid prejudicing the open-endedness of his research. A m o n g his conclusions, so far, are: (a) that there is no clear point at which defeated States surrender in terms of casualties. In twenty-three out of fifty cases they surrendered with casualties at 0.1 per cent of total population, whereas in m a n y others before 0.01 per cent; (b) 'Most inter-state wars are between nations which are not only close together geographically, but quite similar in most other attribute dimensions.'14 Choucri and North focus on the period 1870-1914 and the proposition that 'differential rates of population growth in combination with differential rates of technological growth contribute to international competition and sometimes to conflict, insofar as competing nations have differential—grossly unequal—access to resources and capabilities'. The three central attributes in this theory are population, resources and technology. Factors in the different operational equations are combined additively. A m o n g their conclusions so far, are: (a) 80 per cent of the variance of the overlapping ('intersection') of major powers' spheres of interest could be accounted for by changes in defence budgets and prevailing levels of conflict; (b) in contrast to other European Powers, Sweden and the Scandinavian countries 'were inclined to rely upon trade rather than colonial expansion, for the satisfaction of demands'. 1 6 Factor analysis has also been applied to study of the causes of war. T h e technique enables large numbers of variables to be grouped in distinct, limited clusters or 'factor loadings' and has the advantage of reducing data to manageable proportions.16 Using the technique to investigate the connexion between domestic conflict or instability and foreign conflict, both Tanter17 and R u m m e l 1 8 found only slight correlations between the magnitude of a nation's position on its attribute dimensions, such as economic development, and the magnitude of its position o n behaviour dimensions, such as conflict.19 In the area of integration studies—today so extensive as to constitute almost a discipline in itself—the aforementioned methods of bivariate and factor analysis
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have been used to investigate the conditions favourable to the success of political integration. Karl Deutsch has been foremost in relating the progress of integration, or lack of it, to patterns of communication such as tourism, economic transactions, student exchanges, mail flows etc.20 Thus he has suggested that Western European integration is in doubt because of a lowering in the increase rate of various communication flows.21 Haas and Schmitter, arguing for a process of 'automatic politization'—a condition under which what were initially technical/economic decisions become progressively more controversial, leading to the expansion in competence of the central political organs of the economic union—hypothesize its association with a high score on nine independent variables including the rate of transaction between m e m b e r States, the extent of Êlite complementarity and the adaptability shown by governments in dealing with unforeseen problems. 22 Russett has m a d e use of factor analysis in an effort to identify international regions in terms of various criteria and to suggest, a m o n g other things, their fitness for political integration.23 Most of the projects referred to in this section are based upon determinist assumptions. Singer proceeds from the premise 'that research priority must be given to the ecological variables over the behavioural variables'.24 Choucri and North assume 'that m a n is m u c h more a creature of his physical environment than is sometimes conceded'.26 Haas and Schmitter talk of 'automatic politization'. Given that very general factors such as geography, population and technology set long-term bounds on an actor's freedom of action, w e would argue that the determining factors in the international system are fundamentally political: that is, they relate to things like choice, motivation, perception and h u m a n interaction. Ecological factors only play a role in so far as they enter into the political process; deprivation is only instrumental to the extent that it is recognized by decisionmakers as such. N o account of the latter half of the nineteenth century can ignore the essentially political contribution to war and peace of a Bismarck. There is nothing automatic, as has long been apparent, about political integration; progress is crucially dependent on political decisions at the highest level. Though Haas and the neo-functionalist school should be exempted from this charge, Singer, Deutsch, Russett and Choucri and North are representative of those w h o would treat war or integration as essentially natural phenomena subject to statistical regularities, just like heart disease or earthquakes. A s far as these writers are concerned, political interactions and deliberations are beside the point, just as the h u m a n interactions and patterns which precede heart-attacks or earthquakes are beside the point. Unlike natural phenomena, however, war and political integration are, in the final analysis, still the outcome of h u m a n decision; nor can the individual decision be subsumed under the general trend, as the individual decision to have children is subsumed under population statistics. Each political decision is of the essence. Another problem with this sort of research is that it is sometimes forgotten that statistical correlation does not equal explanation nor does it inform us of the
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direction of causality.26 For instance Choucri and North find that the larger the increases in the British defence budget before 1914, the more intense were the intersections between her spheres of interest and those of the other powers. It is just as plausible to reverse the direction of causality here. Singer finds that some actors surrendered in war w h e n casualties reached 0.1 per cent of total population, others at 0.01 per cent of total population. O n the other hand Israel was successful in the 1948 war though losing 1.0 per cent of her population. Clearly, casualty statistics do not by themselves account for the act of surrender and can only derive their significance within some over-all explanation of defeat and victory. Statistical correlations m a y tell us something, but they must be accompanied by a qualitative explanation of w h y they should hold." However it is hard to see h o w an aggregation of casualty statistics in all wars can be of any use. Aggregation, indeed, is the reason for the self-evidence of most of Singer's other conclusions. T h e high incidence of war between States geographically and (we should say, therefore) culturally proximate, cannot be totally unexpected. B y working at a high level of generality Singer irons out all but the most bland results; no account is or could be taken of special circumstances. Singer, anticipating this criticism, argues that he leaves the explanation of particular wars to others.28 H e seems to imply that special circumstances are of secondary importance and that general factors are of primary importance. It is, logically, just as likely that the opposite holds true. At a more technical level, research based o n factor analysis has c o m e in for a good deal of criticism, not because there is anything wrong with the technique—which is, after all, only a statistical tool—but because it has been applied beyond its true province. Performing an essentially descriptive function, in enabling variables to be grouped together, factor analysis has been claimed to possess explanatory and predictive powers. Since causation, it is argued, is nothing m o r e than concurrence, factor analysis can be applied to discern causation. 'In this sense an authoritarianism factor causes certain attitudes, a turmoil factor causes riots and an urbanism factor causes liberal voting.'29 This is an error of the most dire proportions. 'Authoritarianism', 'turmoil' and 'urbanism', in the sense they are used in factor analysis, are merely the names given to particular clusters or loadings of variables which correlate together; they are not logically distinct entities which can be described as the outcome of preceding causes. For example, R u m m e l , using factor analysis, discerned three clusters of relationships a m o n g foreign conflict variables. O n e of these clusters, the 'war dimension', grouped together the following variables: numbers killed, accusations, threats, military action and war. 3 0 Thus, according to his previous argument, war causes war! Clearly what R u m m e l considers to be causal relationships are, in fact, tautologies or absurdities. M o r e over the n a m e attached to a certain cluster of variables is purely subjective and arbitrary. A n y n a m e could be selected as well as any other.31 R u m m e l also has a very strange idea of what constitutes explanation and prediction. Explanation, he writes 'is nothing more than being able to predict or mathematically relate p h e n o m -
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ena'. 'To explain that the R o m a n Empire fell because of disunity and moral decay is to say that, given the presence of these two elements in an empire with the characteristics of the R o m a n Empire, the empire will break up or be conquered.' 32 In other words an explanation is a prediction that in identical circumstances the same outcome will occur. O n e wonders if this is quite what Gibbon had in mind. The most biting attack on the misplaced use of factor analysis has come from Oran Y o u n g w h o accuses Russett of 'puristic induction: the collection of empirical material as an end in itself una without sufficient theoretical analysis to determine appropriate criteria of selection'. The identification of empirical regularities, he points out, cannot facilitate explanation except on an ex post facto basis. 'But it is generally possible to think of numerous "explanations" on this basis, and there is no reason to favor any one of them over the others.'33
Action data Researchers using action data attempt to explain the behaviour of a given actor in terms of his responses to the behaviour of other actors. Data on 'physical events' are collected, on a day-to-day basis, from newspapers such as the New York Times. They are then ordered (possibly computerized) according to predetermined categories such as actor, type of action, date, etc., andfinallycharted in order to analyse the patterns of interaction between the parties. The foremost exponent and originator of this approach is McClelland, w h o is engaged in an ongoing project called the W E I S (World Event/Interaction Survey). M u c h recent work using this method has concentrated on the Middle East. McClelland, for example, has analysed such topics as: (a) the comparative rate of activity of different States in the Middle East and that of the whole group; (b) the ratio of hostile to friendly acts in the relations of the Arab States and Israel to the Great Powers; (c) the trend of hostilities in the Arab-Israel conflict. A m o n g hisfindingsare: (a) that the Middle East is an active region; (b) that the Arab States are more hostile to the United States and the United K i n g d o m than the reverse; (c) that military action is c o m m o n in the area; (d) that the level of conflict in the area 'rose distinctly during the June W a r of 1967'; (e) that a war was fought in the area during the period 1969-70. 34 W h o would ever have guessed as much? Wakenfeld and others used the McClelland event/interaction approach to analyse conflict in the Middle East in the 1949-67 period. They specifically addressed themselves to the question as to which factors, in which order of importance, accounted for the foreign conflict behaviour of different States in the area during this period. Their main conclusion was that 'the most important predictors of each state's foreign conflict behaviour are the conflict behaviours directed toward it by other states'. For instance, 'the most important determinant of Israel's hostility in a given month is the active hostility directed against her
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by Egypt. . . . Egypt's active hostility is explained almost entirely by the hostility directed against her by Israel. Thus w e can safely conclude that Israel and Egypt form a conflict interaction dyad36 w h e n the less overt forms of conflict are considered.'36 Wakenfeld's conclusion is unlikely to be seriously challenged.37 Thefirstdifficulty which presents itself with this approach is one of sources. The approach assumes that a reported act is an actual act and that actual acts are largely reported. Burrowes points out that the New York Times or Deadline Data (another frequently used source of information) yield data 'neither equally representative of the "real" universe of events in any given nation nor distributed in an unbiased w a y across the global set of nations'.38 Furthermore even the most distinguished newspapers are only as accurate as the news agencies which supply them. W h e n such agencies are subject to government control—as they are in m a n y countries—there can be no guarantee of either the accuracy or comprehensibility of the information they provide. For example, no analysis of this kind could have correctly traced the German-Czech and German-Polish crises of 1938-39 in which the G e r m a n Government deliberately fabricated reports about incidents in order to increase tension. Second, just as attribute analysis is deterministic, event analysis is behavioural (in the negative sense of paying attention only to externals). Both approaches ignore the questions of h u m a n choice and intention so central to the political process. A s Burns has argued, behaviour describes 'only those consequential, passive processes that necessarily accompany and follow from the political act. . .'.39 Political acts such as cabinet meetings, lobbying, informal consultation, private assessment, intragovernmental contacts of different kinds, cannot be given a numerical value. O n e act cannot simply be equated with another in terms of the significance of its contribution to the political process. N o r do these sort of transactions appear in a reliable form, if at all, in the daily press. Political behaviour—the 'physical events' which McClelland amasses—has no meaning in itself. The interactions between two States in conflict only derive their significance within the context of the strategic interplay which underlies that conflict. T o understand political behaviour w e must study the political process—not the reverse. McClelland, indeed, implicitly admits this without recognizing its methodological implications. In examining one of the Q u e m o y - M a t s u crises, and noting that Chinese shelling ceased at one point as the United States began escorting Nationalist supply ships to Q u e m o y , he comments: ' W e are tempted to go beyond the available data by saying that the response of the mainland to the United States escort m o v e was to halt its o w n operation in order to scan for further evidence of the meaning of the American move.' 4 0 The point is, surely, that it is only by going 'beyond the available data' that w e can provide an intelligible explanation for a given act; which is precisely what McClelland is compelled to d o . If, as must surely be agreed, the sort of conclusions emerging from the event/interaction approach are strikingly obvious, this is because the method treats only of
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externals. There m a y be occasions w h e n one might wish to enumerate and order facts in a systematic way; but this can only be a supplement to, and not a substitute for, a reasoned analysis of the political process.
Articulation data The third approach w e examine uses data drawn from the expressions of individuals. Content analysis, a group of techniques which lie at the centre of this approach, is an 'attempt to infer the characteristics and intentions of sources from inspection of the messages they produce'. 41 M u c h of the early work in this area was undertaken by people, w h o were or had been associated with Stanford University, within the framework of research into conflict and crisis, especially the six weeks leading up to the outbreak of the First World W a r . 4 2 The data used were the diplomatic documents of the major Powers in the period 27 June to 4 August 1914. First, documents were coded according to the relevant categories (subject and object of perception, attitude expressed). This procedure yielded over 5,000 cognitive and affective perceptions. Then there followed, depending upon the hypotheses to be tested, various stages of analysis, including (a) frequency counts of the appropriate themes; (b) intensity analyses using scaling techniques; (c) correlational analyses between perceptions and various types of attribute or action data. A n initial paper, using frequency of themes as a technique of analysis, tested two basic hypotheses about the relationships between the perceptions of threat and capability in international crises. F r o m 3,000 documents, perceptions of hostility were found to outnumber perceptions of capability by four to one, leading to the conclusion that 'perceptions of one's o w n inferior capability, if anxiety, fear or perceptions of threat or injury are intense enough, will fail to deter a nation from going to war'. 4 3 After this initial attempt researchers, conscious of the inadequacy of using frequency counts alone, went back over the documents and rated them according to the intensity of such perceptions as hostility, friendship, frustration, satisfaction and desire to change the status quo, on a scale of one to nine. Results were aggregated into twelve periods. It was found that decision-makers felt themselves threatened at the time they were making policy decisions of the most crucial nature.44 A related study tested and found some confirmation for hypotheses relating the expression of hostility to its initial perception. T h e correlation was explored over various time lags.46 Broadening the scope of research to include action data (on national mobilizations), the project then went on to examine the spiral of threat and counterthreat preceding the outbreak of war. Findings suggested that mobilizations accounted for a considerable part, though by n o means all, of the variance in hostility. There was a steady rise in hostility prior to any act of mobilization and
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thus decision-makers, it was concluded, were responding to verbal threats and diplomatic moves, rather than troop movements, in the earlier phases of the crisis.46 W h e n the action data were expanded to include all events of a military character, it was found that while the Triple Entente responded at a level congruent with the stimulus, the Dual Alliance over-responded in terms of violence; that is, they exaggerated the threat involved. At the same time financial data (such as stock prices, gold movements, interest rates, commodity futures) were found to correlate with perceptions of hostility, strongly suggesting that the virtual collapse of prices during July 1914 could be accounted for by the international situation.47 Finally, further work by the 'Stanford group' investigated the 1962 C u b a Crisis,48 and also compared it with 1914.49 Although a good deal has been claimed for content analysis in enabling the rigorous measurement of articulations, it has also been strongly criticized on various grounds. It has been pointed out that the frequency of an expression does not necessarily indicate its importance. S o m e things m a y be so self-evident as to be left unsaid. N o r does it provide any indication of the actual influences and attitudes involved in the process of decision-making.50 N o analysis, for instance, relying on published sources alone, could correctly assess the influence of the m e m o r y of the Nazi Holocaust on Israeli decision-makers in 1967 for the simple reason that instructions were given that the theme be avoided in order to minimize public disquiet. Moreover utterances m a y vary with the audience or with the context; the subject m a y not say what he thinks; the source m a y be selective; important communications m a y not have been transmitted in verbal or written form. 51 George points out that the propaganda analyst cannot assume a constant relationship between content and perception since the propagandist wishes to produce a given effect. Propaganda analysis consists of a series of inferences based upon assumptions about the strategy of the propagandist, his policy and his estimate of the effect of his propaganda upon the audience it is aimed at. All these factors m a y also be subject to change during the course of the analysis, which is an added complication.52 Underlying content analysis, as the Stanford studies m a k e explicit, is the Skinner stimulus-response model; a given perception is assumed to generate a given articulation. It is doubtful whether such a model is applicable to international relations, partly for the reasons George gives, partly because it puts into a 'black box' the mediating decision-making processes which are of such central importance. A s C h o m s k y has argued, in a refutation of the relevance of stimulusresponse for language learning: ' O n e would naturally expect that prediction of the behavior of a complex organism (or machine) would require, in addition to information about external stimulation, knowledge of the internal structure of the organism, the ways in which it processes input information and organizes its o w n behavior.'53 T o give a concrete historical example, the British and French reaction in the 1930s to a series of Nazi initiatives (1933, 1935, 1936, 1938) was to
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conciliate G e r m a n y in the hope that acceptance would encourage restraint. Instead of learning from repeated failure, as the stimulus-response-reinforcement theory would predict, the United K i n g d o m and France continued with a discredited and ineffective policy. This is only explicable in terms of internal psychological factors such as remorse for the Versailles Settlement, revulsion from war, wishful thinking etc. Finally, w e doubt whether content analysis, in the complex form applied by the 'Stanford School', repays the time, labour and expense expended on it. A s a simple device for indicating the relative frequency of different themes in the press or in the utterances of a given decision-maker, content analysis is doubtless a useful supplement to more orthodox methods of documentary analysis.64 There is some indication, indeed, that enthusiasts of content analysis are reaching the same conclusion. Holsti, the author of a study of John Foster Dulles' images of, and attitudes towards, the Soviet Union, which m a d e extensive use of content analytic techniques,65 has returned to conventional qualitative methods in a m o r e recent (and one would think better) general analysis of the American Secretary of State.66
Public opinion data Public opinion surveys require no introduction. Whatever their limitations they have become a generally accepted and useful source of information. The question to be considered here is their relevance to international relations. There have been literally hundreds of surveys conducted on public attitudes towards various aspects of foreign policy and especially the United Nations.67 S o m e have attempted to relate attitudes to personality or social attributes. Others have investigated the impact of international events on general attitudes. W h a t they have not done is to elucidate the effect of public opinion on the process of foreign policy-making or on international conduct.68 N o r , of course, could they logically d o this since it would require analysis, not of public opinion, but of the foreign policy process. There has been, it is true, an interesting theoretical suggestion about the conditions under which public opinion might be effective in encouraging decision-makers to increase regional integration.69 T o be tested, however, one would still be obliged to investigate decision-makers' responses to public opinion rather than public opinion in itself. It might turn out that subjective perceptions of public opinion (distorted according to the preferences of the observer) would be the relevant factor in influencing behaviour and not the polls in any 'objective' sense. A s one saw in the United K i n g d o m before her entry into the E E C , decision-makers have all sorts of ways of interpreting opinion polls to suit their o w n cause. Even where opinion is strongly opposed one can always argue 'that the public will c o m e round' once the decisive step has been taken. A n d it is a truism to point out that it is just as feasible
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to opt for a downward model of societal influence, in which élites shape public opinion, as an upward model in which the public determines élite views. These arguments d o not vitiate the usefulness of opinion polls in providing information about public opinion; such information m a y even perform an important polemical function in policy debate. They do indicate, however, the inevitable limitations on their use in explaining phenomena in international relations. W h a t failings are c o m m o n to the approaches w e have examined? T h e first point to m a k e is that any technique is only as helpful as the purpose to which it isfitted.It is n o fault of opinion polls, factor analysis or content analysis—essentially descriptive techniques—that they are claimed to perform functions to which they are not suited. Practitioners of these techniques have, it seems to us, tended to define the subject in terms of their special skills rather than accommodating them to the subject. A t the same time serious practical problems have arisen for the simple reason that data to feed these techniques is just not available in international relations. Researchers have, therefore, to put it bluntly, been forced to fabricate their data. A s Burrowes argues: 'The desire to apply powerful analytical routines has forced analysts to interpret their data as numeric even in the case of crudely categorized judgemental variables.60 T o give a concrete example, most of the techniques discussed above depend on the availability of data series to which statistical techniques can then be applied. Data-making involves, when the material is not already in numerical form, the translation of words or events into numbers on some constant scale. Sometimes it is assumed that each fact in a given category is numerically equivalent—ignoring considerations of date, audience, context and speaker. In more sophisticated analyses judges are used to order such facts in terms of their intensity; positions on the scale are given a numerical value; an ordinal series becomes cardinal. Data series are thus provided which can then be analysed in different ways. This fundamental procedure is open to one decisive objection. It assumes that acts, statements or events are objectively comparable; and that a given act, statement or event possesses the same meaning or significance—on the scale, numerical magnitude—whenever it occurs. There is, in other words, a defined 'pigeon hole' into which any fact can be slotted. But this is not the case. Take words: they possess no single nor constant significance. They have different significances for different people; their meaning is a function of their instrumental context. Take acts: their significance is a question of value-judgement and of context. H o w does one compare the destruction over Sinai of a Libyan plane, in which over 100 people died, with the Israeli raid on Beirut in which three Fatah leaders were killed? In terms of intentionality, number of casualties, political repercussions, objective effect... ? A n d what pigeon hole d o w e slot the 'facts' into; the one marked 'violent act', or those labelled 'invasion', 'assassination', 'threat' (to use only the most neutral words)? D o w e set up a panel of judges to m a k e the assessments? (Where d o w e find disinterested judges?) T h e judgements of such a panel are not objective; aggregating, then averaging such
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judgements cannot improve their accuracy but simply reduces them to their lowest c o m m o n denominator. Faced with the difficulty of handling 'soft' data, researchers are then tempted to rely on 'hard' data such as casualty figures, population statistics, etc., in the hope that these will reveal the underlying truth. However, stress on the measurable rather than the significant and the over-simplification of problems by breaking them d o w n into their quantifiable elements cannot evade the genuine complexity of the subject. A s Hoffman pointed out in a critique of Karl Deutsch: 'foreign trade is foreign trade, and a precise measurement of foreign trade is not a precise measurement of anything else unless an explanation is advanced as to w h y this is so.'*1 Measuring the measurable, as can be seen in examples already given, leads to the obvious. It can also lead to the trivial: for example, the researcher w h o measured the movement of delegates on the floor of the United Nations;62 or the attempt to measure international status by counting the number of diplomatic missions accredited to a particular State (Spain came out on top);83 or the conclusion that since the New York Times reported the greatest number of political demonstrations of any State in the Middle East from Israel, Israel's foreign policy was dampened by 'governmental instability'.84 Measurement, it seems, has become an end in itself. Sadder still is the attitude of those w h o dismiss the importance of anything that cannot be measured. 'There is no reason to believe', Finnegan argues, making a case for 'science', 'that values and ideologies shape political behavior any more than any other variable until it is proven.'85 Proven by whose criteria? Reliance on quantification alone rules the case out of court before the hearing. O n e of the main reasons w h y researchers have been so enthusiastic about quantification is the belief that it will enable 'statistically reliable prediction' and that this should be one of the objectives of the political scientist.66 However there are good reasons to believe that 'statistically reliable prediction' is precisely not one of the fruits of this approach when applied to international relations. The statistician seeks explanations based o n trends found over large numbers of subjects and this explanation has a probability value. Yet probability is uniquely a quality of large numbers. It is not a quality of the single case. Explanations based on statistical trends do not enable 'statistically reliable predictions' to be m a d e in the single case. T h e discovery of a statistical correlation between smoking and lung cancer does not m e a n that any particular individual w h o smokes is going to get lung cancer. In medicine and demography, for instance, statistical trends observed over large numbers of subjects can be used to predict trends over other large numbers of subjects. In international relations, though, in whatever manner w e derive our trends, w e must usually predict the probability of a unique event. This is not to say that the political scientist should not m a k e predictions. A prediction based on knowledge is presumably more useful than one based on ignorance. W h a t w e would claim is that such predictions can never achieve the status of statistical
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reliability; that approaches other than the quantitative approach are quite capable of achieving this minimal degree of certainty. Furthermore, there is no reason to include the possibility of prediction as one of the criteria of the scientific method. Kaplan points out: ' O u r knowledge, especially in behavioral science, is often limited to what is necessary for a certain kind of event to occur but does not comprise what is sufficient to produce it.'67 W e m a y be able to explain the origins of a childhood neurosis or the causes of a car accident. This does not m e a n that these antecedent factors would necessarily have led to their actual outcomes. N o psychologist or sociologist claims to be able to predict specific outcomes. W h y should the political scientist have this pretension? O n e final point should be m a d e . Most of the methods considered above have been used to investigate the causes of war or conflict (though not alone). Using 'attribute analysis' Choucri and North justify their assumption that the causes of war are largely to be found a m o n g general background factors such as competition arising from the pressure of population on resources. Using event/interaction analysis various researchers conclude that the conflict behaviour of a given State is accounted for by the conflict behaviour directed against it by its opponent. Using content analysis Zinnes confirms her hypothesis that an actor perceiving himself the object of hostility will in turn express hostility. N o surprises here窶馬or could there be. N o n e of these approaches can test hypotheses other than those set up and operationalized, so unexpected results are impossible. O n e approach finds its answer in the long term, the second in the m e d i u m term, the third in the short term. But surely any balanced analysis of the causes of war and conflict, unfettered by method, would have to take account of all three terms ? Reality cannot be chopped up into little bits this way. A n d this brings us to the historian, whose task is precisely that of integrating and assessing the relative significance of the varied levels of explanation provided by different approaches and perspectives. H e makes the unique and irreplaceable contribution of historical judgement. 68 H o w can w e incorporate the historical approach into international relations while at the same time maintaining the twin aims w e mentioned at the beginning, of formulating explanatory theory and treating of the recurrent pattern rather than the single case as a meaningful focus of inquiry? The method w e wish to suggest here would take as its point of departure the theoretical suggestions of recent years. Instead of relying on quantitative methods for proof, however, theories would be tested and problems investigated by the comparative analysis of historical case studies. W h e r e necessary, statistical techniques would be incorporated within the over-all historical framework. W h a t Mueller calls the method of 'systematic history' has already been used by a number of writers. Huntington used historical case studies to investigate the connexion between arms races and war. 6 9 Russett examined seventeen cases in the 1935-61 period of successful and unsuccessful deterrence in order to explore
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the question of what makes a commitment credible.70 D o w t y has investigated the role traditionally played by guarantees in international politics and the conditions under which they are effective.71 H e has also compared historical international systems at different periods concluding, importantly, that the conflict behaviour of States is determined not by the logic of the system but by the logic of strategic interaction.72 Friedl창nder and Cohen looked at fourteen decision-makers with reputations for intransigence in order to determine whether it w a s reasonable to talk of a 'hawk' typology in international relations and, if so, whether this type was characterized by certain c o m m o n traits and background. 73 A n important feature shared by each of these studies is that they are concerned with answering questions rather than with testing hypotheses. Unlike quantitative techniques, the historical approach does not manufacture evidence, it analyses it; the question asked determines the data to be examined and not vice versa.74 This has two advantages. First, it obviates cutting u p the subject into arbitrary and unnecessary subdivisions. For instance, researchers, faced with an analytical distinction between domestic and foreign politics (purely the result of the techniques of analysis employed), hit on the idea of 'linkage politics' to connect the two. But there is absolutely n o need to create a n e w subject artificially in order to explain the influence of internal factors on external outcomes. T h e historical approach would deal with such factors as and w h e n they appeared to be relevant to the problem in hand. Second, the historian examines the phenomenon under investigation in its historical context. In doing this he takes account of the complexity of the process or organism to be studied and assumes that it is profitable to examine the impact of m a n y concurrent circumstances on its functioning or development. This is essentially what is meant by the 'historical case study' and is analogous tofieldresearch in, say, anthropology. Comparative analysis in the social sciences is an old and accepted technique; in a sense it is the only method possible if theory is not to be inexorably tied d o w n to the particular and is to broaden its scope to an understanding of the underlying patterns and processes in the subject. Concluding his case for a comparative approach in social anthropology, Radcliffe-Brown argues that it enables one to 'pass from the particular to the general, from the general to the more general, with the end in view that w e m a y in this w a y arrive at the universal, at characteristics which can be found in different forms in all h u m a n societies'.75 T h e first requirement of the comparative approach is accurate and meaningful classification on a non-culture-bound basis. A s Sjoberg argues: 'certain "invariant points of reference" or "universal categories" are required which are not merely reflections of the cultural values of a particular social system. Only through the use of invariant points of reference is it possible to test various hypotheses in a crosscultural setting.'76 A n important point to m a k e about the comparative approach in general is that it enables the scientific analysis of historical data where the number of cases
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is too small to permit statistical manipulation." This is particularly appropriate to international relations where w e are often faced with phenomena which are either infrequent or about which adequate data are available in a limited number of cases only. While the approach described here derives both its material and its techniques for handling that material from history, there are important differences between our aim and that of the historian. T h e historian m a y seek to generalize about concepts such as imperialism or land-tenure, but his investigation is usually restricted to a single period, area or culture. H e does not seek to generalize about 'structural' features of h u m a n behaviour and relationships which are not associated with particular historical contexts. Most important, he is not interested in testing or generating theory, arguably the main purpose of comparison. 78 Traditionally, historians take the view that 'the only thing w e learn from history is that there is nothing to learn from history'. But this depends on h o w one approaches history. If history is considered to be m a d e up of complex and unique events, then n o event will repeat itself. If history is viewed as a laboratory of h u m a n behaviour, then this allows ample scope to the theorist for generalization. Discussing the role of comparative analysis in sociology, Eisenstadt c o m ments that it has been applied at every level of research from that into the individual personality, through the study of organizations and institutions, u p to the investigation of total societies.'9 In international relations, however, there is an added dimension—the systemic or international level. A t the subsystemic level comparative analysis is perhaps most easily applied, in studies of the individual, the decision-making group or the State actor. This is because at this level relevant variables and concepts can be most straightforwardly defined; at the systemic level problems arise in identifying those 'invariant points of reference' which are, as has been argued, necessary for comparison across examples. Nevertheless it would be unfortunate if the systemic dimension were neglected. There are m a n y interesting questions which deserve to be treated at this level.80 For example, it m a y be possible to apply theories of paradigm change in the sciences to the question of system transformation.81 Hopefully, definitional difficulties can be overcome, given sufficient care and consciousness that central concepts and values m a y change drastically over time. T h e historical method involves the critical and meticulous scrutiny of evidence, cross-checking of sources, selection and synthesis. All this demands flexibility and judgement. If one is dealing with topics related to the complex interaction of the political process this is the only possible approach. T h e historian k n o w s that things are not always as they appear; that the significance of an event can only be understood in its context; that articulations are m a d e at particular times and to particular audiences; that the obvious m a y be left unsaid; that what is said m a y be false. It can only be from the painstaking analysis and comparison of the evidence as it appears in the full range of historical sources that conclusions about
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aspects of the political process or the behaviour of those involved in this process can be reached. There is n o short cut to the assessment of what is or is not important; no substitute for trained judgement. Afinalpoint: quantitative methods are, as w e have seen, foreclosed to the unexpected. They verify or refute propositions already postulated. T h e historian, faced with the records of an event, is obliged to report faithfully what happened and w h y , however absurd or unexpected hisfindingsm a y be. H e is not restricted to discovering what he already suspects. Science, one supposes, is also about discovery.
Notes 1
2 3
4
5
6
7
For the terms of this debate see K . Knorr and haviour', Journal of Conflict Resolution, J . N . Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches Vol. XIII, N o . 1, March 1969, p . 75-101. to International Politics, Princeton, N . J . , 8 L . F . Richardson, Arms and Insecurity, London, Princeton University Press, 1969, 297 p . Stevens, 1960, xxv + 307 p . Richardson's ibid., p. 5. work has been helpfully analysed by Anatol '. . . the single example of Darwin is quite enough to Rapaport, 'Lewis F . Richardson's Mathematdispose of any such v i e w . ' — W . G . Runciman, ical Theory of W a r ' , Journal of Conflict Social Science and Political Theory, 2nd ed., Resolution, Vol. I, N o . 3, September 1957, p . 5, Cambridge, M a s s . , Cambridge Univerp. 249-99. 9 sity Press, 1969. A review of game theory is provided by R . D . Luce K . Deutsch, 'The Coming Crisis of Cross-National and H . Raifla, Games and Decisions, N e w and International Research in the United York, N . Y . , J. Wiley, 1957, xix + 307 p . States', American Council of Learned Societies The theory has provided a working model for Newsletter, Vol. 19, April 1968, p . 1-7. the study of conflict under controlled, labora'Theory' is defined here in the precise sense of 'an tory conditions. The effects of various perintegrated set of explanatory laws or generalsonality or attitude traits on g a m e performizations which is capable of explaining some ance have been extensively studied. See area of knowledge in coherent and systematic K . W . Terhune, 'The Effects of Personality in form. A theory is capable of generating n e w Cooperation and Conflict', in P . Swingle hypotheses, explanations and laws, as well as (ed.), The Structure of Conflict, p . 194-234, integrating existing explanations and laws'. N e w York, N . Y . , Academic Press, 1970. 1 0 — G . K . Roberts, A Dictionary of PolitiSee G . H . Snyder, ' "Prisoner's Dilemma" and cal Analysis, p . 213, L o n d o n , L o n g m a n , "Chicken" Models in International Polities', 1971. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. X V , N o . 1, March 1971, p. 66-103. The argument of this paragraph is based on 11 Young (1972), o p . cit., p. 195. O . R . Y o u n g , 'The Perils of Odysseus: O n 12 C . A . McClelland, r O n the Fourth W a v e : Past and Constructing Theories of International R e Future in the Study of International Systems', lations', in R . Tanter and R . H . Ullman in J. N . Rosenau, et al. (eds.), The Analysis (eds.), Theory and Policy in International of International Politics, p . 11, N e w York, Relations, p . 179-203, Princeton, N . J . , PrinN . Y . , The Free Press, 1972. The same point is ceton University Press, 1972. Morgenthau and m a d e by K . J. Holsti, 'Retreat from Utopia: Aron, inter alia, provided 'grand theories' International Relations Theory, 1945-1970', ('philosophies' would, perhaps, be the better Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. IV, word) of the nature of international relations, N o . 2, June 1971, p . 172. but did not set out to explain detailed areas of 13 behaviour. This is obviously not an exhaustive classification. Mueller would add to this list simulations and See R . C . Snyder, et al., Foreign Policy Decision laboratory experimentation, and roll call Making, N e w York, N . Y . , T h e Free Press, analysis—J. E . Mueller (ed.), Approaches to 1962, vii + 274 p.; M . Brecher, ' A FrameMeasurement in International Relations, N e w work for Research on Foreign Policy B e -
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Notes {continued)
York, N . Y . , Apple-Century-Crofts, 1969, 311 p . W e exclude simulation because, while 20 accepting that it is an established and valuable heuristic device, and one which m a y even generate testable hypotheses, it can never in itself disprove or confirm hypotheses about 21 the real world. Roll call analysis, which is employed to study various aspects of voting behaviour in legislative assemblies, can be applied to the United Nations but is otherwise of peripheral usefulness. 14 J. D . Singer, 'The "Correlates of W a r " Project: Interim Report and Rationale', World Politics, Vol. X X I V , N o . 2 , January 1972, p. 243-70. This article contains a biography of the extensive previous research on the subject undertaken by Singer and his associates. 15 N . Choucri and R . C . North, 'Dynamics of International Conflict: S o m e Policy Implications of 22 Population, Resources and Technology', in Tanterand Ullman (1972), op. cit., p. 80-122. 16 T h e technique is fully explained in R . J. R u m m e l , 'Understanding Factor Analysis', Journal of Conflict Resolution, V o l . X I , N o . 4 , December 1967, p . 444-80. 17 R . Tanter, 'Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations, 1958-1960', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X , N o . 1, March 1966, p. 41-64. 18 R . J. R u m m e l , ' T h e Relationship between 23 National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behaviour', in J. D . Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics, p . 187-214, N e w York, 24 N . Y . , The Free Press, 1968. 25 19 Others have used factor analysis to study the 26 correlates of internal conflict behaviour, e.g. I. K . and R . L . Feierabend, 'Aggressive Behaviour Within Polities, 1948-1962', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X , N o . 3, September 1966, p . 250-71. R u m m e l has sought to identify the major attribute and 27 behavioural patterns of States in his ' D i m e n sionality of Nations' project. See, inter alia, R . J. R u m m e l , 'Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within Nations, 1946-1959', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X , N o . 1, 28 March 1966, p . 65-73; R . J. R u m m e l , The ' Dimensions of Nations, London and Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1972, 512 p . 2 9 A general review of the literature on the 3 0 causes of war can be found in A . D o w t y and R . Kochan, 'Recurrent Patterns in the History of International Violence: T h e Constraints of the Past on the Future of Violence', in J. D . B e n - D a k (ed.), The Future of
Collective Violence: Societal and International Perspectives, Lund, Studentlitteratur, in press. The pioneering work in the field was K . W . Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton, N . J . , Princeton University Press, 1957, xiii + 228 p . K , W . Deutsch, et al., France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics, p. 218, N e w York, N . Y . , C . Scribner's Sons, 1967. For a brief statement of Deutsch's approach to research, testing hypotheses by reference to 'hard' data such as G N P , population, literacy, newspaper circulation, voting participation, calory intake, death rate, etc., see K . W . Deutsch, 'Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends in Comparative and International Polities', American Political Science Review, Vol. L I V , N o . 1, March 1960, p . 34-58. E . B . Haas and P . C . Schmitter, 'Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projection about Unity in Latin America', International Organization, Vol. XVIII, N o . 4 , A u t u m n 1964, p . 705-37. For a later attempt to operationalize and weight the suggested variables see M . Barrera and E . B . Haas, 'The Operationalization of S o m e Variables Related to Regional Integration', International Organization, Vol. XXIII, N o . 1, Winter 1969, p. 150-60. B . M . Russett, International Regions and the International System, Chicago, 111., R a n d , McNally & C o . , 1967, 252 p. Singer (1972), op. cit., p . 248. Choucri and North (1972), o p . cit., p. 86. For a graphic illustration of the ambiguity of correlation coefficients see E . R . Tufte, ' I m proving Data Analysis in Political Science', World Politics, Vol. X X I , N o . 4, July 1969, p. 641-54. O n this point see A . L . Burns, 'Quantitative Approaches to International Polities', in M . A . Kaplan (ed.), New Approaches to International Relations, p . 170-201, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , St Martins Press, 1968. J. D . Singer and M . Small, The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook, p . 5, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , Wiley, 1972. R u m m e l (1967), op. cit., p . 453. R . J. R u m m e l , 'Dimensions of Foreign and D o m estic Conflict Behavior: A Review of E m pirical Findings', in D . G . Pruitt and R . C . Snyder (eds.), Theory and Research on the Causes of War, p. 223, Englewood Cliffs, N . J . , Prentice-Hall, 1969.
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Notes (continued) 31 32 33
34
35 36
37
38 311 40 41
42
43
Mueller (1969), op. cit., p. 310-11. R u m m e l (1967), o p . cit., p . 453. 44 O . R . Young, 'Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor', World Politics, Vol. X X I , N o . 3, April 1969, p. 486-511. For similar criticisms see D . A . Zinnes, ' A n Intro- 45 duction to the Behavioral Approach: a Review', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XII, N o . 2, June 1968, p. 258-66; and R . Bur46 rowes, 'Theory Si, Data N o ! A Decade of Cross-National Political Research', World Politics, Vol. X X V , N o . 1, October 1972, 47 p. 12<M4. C . A . McClelland and A . Ancoli, ' A n Interaction Survey of the Middle East', 1970, 20 p . 4 8 ( m i m e o ) . McClelland started off by looking at the Berlin Crises: 'Access to Berlin: T h e Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963', in Singer (1968), o p . cit., p . 159-86. H e has also compared the Berlin and Q u e m o y Crises 48 using his approach: 'Action Structures and Communications in T w o International Crises: Q u e m o y and Berlin', in J. N . Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed., p. 473-82, N e w York, N . Y . , The Free Press, 1969. 80 O u r italics. T h e expression m e a n s 'war'. 51 J. Wakenfeld, et al., 'Conflict Interactions in the Middle East, 1949-1967', Journal of Conflict Resolution, V o l . X V I , N o . 2 , June 1972, p. 135-54. Other research based o n the event-interaction approach includes: R . Tanter, 'International System and Foreign Policy Approaches: I m plications for Conflict Modelling and M a n agement', in Tanter and Ullman (1972), o p . cit., p . 7-39; B . M . Blechman, ' T h e Impact of Israel's Reprisals o n Behavior of the Bordering A r a b Nations Directed at Israel', Journal of Conflict Resolution, V o l . X V I , N o . 2 , June 1972, p . 155-81. Burrowes (1972), o p . cit., p . 133. Burns (1968), o p . cit., p . 170. McClelland (1969), o p . cit., p . 478. R . Jervis, 'The Costs of the Scientific Study of Polities', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. X I , N o . 4, December 1967, p. 367. The standard treatment of the approach is R . C . North, et al., Content Analysis, Evanston, 111., Northwestern University Press, 1963, xx + 182 p. 55 D . A . Zinnes, et al., 'Capability, Threat and the Outbreak of W a r ' , in J. N . Rosenau. International Politics and Foreign Policy, 1st ed.,
p. 469-82, N e w York, N . Y . , The Free Press, 1961. O . R . Holsti and R . C . North, ' T h e History of H u m a n Conflict', in E . B . M c N e i l (ed.), The Nature of Human Conflict, p . 155-71, Englew o o d Cliffs, N . J . , Prentice-Hall, 1965. D . A . Zinnes, ' T h e Expression a n d Perception of Hostility in Prewar Crisis: 1914', in Singer (1968), o p . cit., p . 85-119. R . C . North, et al., ' S o m e Empirical Data o n the Conflict Spiral', Peace Research Society (International) Papers, V o l . I, 1964, p . 1-14. O . R . Holsti, et al., 'Perception a n d Action in the 1914 Crisis', in Singer (1968), o p . cit., p. 123-58. O . R . Holsti, et al., 'Measuring Affect and Action in International Relations Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 C u b a n Crisis', Peace Research Society (International) Papers, Vol. II, 1965, p . 170-90. O . R . Holsti, et al., 'The M a n a g e m e n t of International Crises: Affect a n d Action in American-Soviet Relations', in D . G . Pruitt and R . C . Snyder (eds.), Theory and Research on the Causes of War, Englewood Cliffs, N . J . , Prentice-Hall, 1969, p . 62-79. Jervis (1967), o p . cit. Mueller (1969), o p . cit., p . 2 2 0 - 4 . A . L . George, Propaganda Analysis, Evanston, III., R o w , Peterson & C o . , 1959, xxii + 287 p . N . C h o m s k y , ' A Review of B . F . Skinner's Verbal Behavior', Language, Vol. X X X V , N o . 1, 1959, p . 2 7 . For useful analyses of this m o r e modest type see I. A b u - L u g h o d , 'International N e w s in the Arabic Press: A Comparative Content Analysis', Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 26, N o . 4 , Winter 1962, p . 600-12; A . Coddington, 'Policies Advocated in Conflict Situations by British Newspapers', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. II, 1965, p. 398-404; B . Ohlstrom, 'Information a n d Propaganda: A Content Analysis of Editorials in F o u r Swedish Daily Newspapers', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. Ill, 1966, p . 75-88; J. C . Stein, ' A Content Analysis of Krishna M e n o n ' s View of the W o r l d ' , in M . Brecher, India and World Politics, p . 337-71, L o n d o n , Oxford University Press, 1968; M . Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel, p . 591-613, L o n d o n , Oxford University Press, 1972. O . R . Holsti, 'Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy', in D . J. Finlay, et al., Enemies in Politics, p. 25-96, Chicago, 111., Rand, McNalty & C o . , 1967.
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Notes {continued) 56
57
68
59
60 61
62
63
64 65
66
67
68
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O . R . Holsti, 'The "Operational Code" Approach Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VII, to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster N o . 2, June 1963, p. 97-109. Russett is critiDulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Becized for ignoring the historical context; see liefs', Canadian Journal of Political Science, C . F . Fink, 'More Calculations about DeterVol. Ill, N o . 1, March 1970, p. 123-57. rence', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IX, N o . 1, March 1965, p. 54-65. For a comprehensive survey of opinion studies on 71 subjects related to war and peace see W . EckA . Dowty, 'The Application of International hardt and T . F . Lentz, 'Factors of War/Peace Guarantees to the Egypt-Israel Conflict', Attitudes', Peace Research Reviews, Vol. I, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X V I , N o . 5, October 1967, p. 1-115. T w o collecN o . 2, June 1972, p. 253-67. 72 tions of studies are H . C . Kelman (ed.), A . Dowty, 'Conflict in War-Potential Politics: A n International Behavior, N e w York, N . Y . , Approach to Historical Macroanalysis', Peace Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965, xiv Research Society (International) Papers, + 626 p.; J. N . Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Vol. XIII, 1969, p. 85-103. 3 Foreign Policy, N e w York, N . Y . , The Free ' S. Friedl채nder and R . Cohen, 'The Personality Press, 1967, xiv + 340 p. Correlates of "Defection" Strategy in InterO n this point see A . Etzioni, 'Social-Psychologinational Conflict: A n Analysis of Historical cal Aspects of International Relations', in Case Studies', Jerusalem, The Institute of G . Lindzey and E . Aronson (eds.), The HandInternational Relations (unpublished research book of Social Psychology, 2nd ed., Vol. 5, paper, 1973). 74 1969; and M . B . Smith, ' A Psychologist's W e are grateful to John T u m a for elucidation of Perspective on Public Opinion Theory', Pubthis and other points. lic Opinion Quarterly, Vol. X X X V , N o . 1,75 A . Radcliffe-Brown, ' A Case for the Comparative Spring 1971, p. 36-43. Method', in A . Etzioni and F . Dubow, ComR . Inglehart, 'Public Opinion and Regional parative Perspectives: Theories and Methods Integration', International Organization, p. 24, Boston, Mass., Little, Brown, 1970. 76 Vol. X X I V , N o . 4, Autumn 1970, p. 764-95. G . Sjoberg, 'The Comparative Method in the Burrowes (1972), op. cit., p. 138. Social Sciences', in A . Etzioni and F . D u b o w S. Hoffman (ed.), Contemporary Theory in Inter(eds.), op. cit., p. 26. 77 national Relations, p. 374, Englewood Cliffs, N . Smelser, 'Notes on the Methodology of C o m N . J . , Prentice-Hall, 1960. parative Analysis of Economic Activity', C . F . Alger, 'Interaction in a Committee of the Social Science Information, Vol. VI, N o . 2/3, United Nations General Assembly', in Singer April/June 1967, p. 16. 78 (1968), op. cit., p. 51-84. G . Payne, 'Comparative Sociology: Some ProbJ. D . Singer and M . Small, 'The Composition and lems of Theory and Method', British Journal Status Ordering of the International System: of Sociology, Vol. X X I V , N o . 1, March 1973, 1815-1940', World Politics, Vol. XVIII, p. 13. 79 N o . 2, January 1966, p. 236-82. S. N . Eisenstadt, 'Social Institutions: Comparative Wakenfeld, et al. (1972), op. cit., p. 145. Study', International Encyclopedia of the Socia R . B . Finnegan, 'International Relations: The Sciences, Vol. 14, p. 421-8, N e w York, N . Y . , Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968. Disputed Search For Method', The Review of Politics, Vol. X X X I V , N o . 1, January 1972, 8 0 A suggestion for comparisons of the international p. 6C. system at different historical periods was made J. D . Singer (ed.), Human Behavior and Interas early as 1960 by Stanley Hoffman, op. cit., esp. p. 174-84. national Politics, p. 4, Chicago, 111., Rand, 81 McNally, 1965. In a recent article Hollinger has argued for the A . Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, p. 347, San application of Kuhn's theory of scientific Francisco, Calif., Chander Publishing C o . , revolutions to problems in history: D . A . Hol1964. linger, ' T . S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and its Implications for History', American HisI. Berlin, 'History and Theory: The Concept of torical Review, Vol. 78, N o . 2, April 1973, Scientific History', History and Theory, p. 370-93. H e refers to T . S. Kuhn, The Vol. I, N o . 1, 1960, p. 13-16. Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd e S. P. Huntington, 'Arms Races: Prerequisites and Chicago, 111., The University of Chicago Results', in Mueller (1969), op. cit., p. 15-33. Press, 1970, xii + 210 p. B . M . Russett, 'The Calculus of Deterrence',
F r o m international to transnational politics: a change of paradigms?
J. Henk Leurdijk
I The theoretical analysis of international relations proceeds o n the basis of certain assumptions, of great relevance for research and teaching, although mainly implicit rather than explicit. Recent literature, however, reveals that these assumptions are no longer generally held to be valid. T h e criticism of these assumptions m a y amount to a n e w approach to theorizing on international relations. The change from an international to a transnational model of international politics is the subject of this article. After analysing the theoretical implications and consequences of the traditional inter-State model of international politics especially with reference to the balance of power theory, this essay will continue with a short survey of recent theoretical writings dealing with those international trends which challenge the assumptions of traditional analysis. Finally, it will try to synthetize recent theory concerning a transnational and hierarchical model of the world political system. A s a discipline in its early stages of development, international politics is confronted with a number of important methodological problems: the definition of its boundaries, the choice of a unit of analysis and the level of analysis. Although the study of national politics is n o longer institutionally defined as the actions of national governments but, in accordance with the Eastonian approach, as the authoritative allocation of values for a society, thefieldof international politics is still defined by the relations between States. T h e State as the focus of theorizing in political science w a s a plausible choice because it was regarded as the most significant and inclusive form of political organization, and because in international relations it is the only legitimate yielder of physical power. A third
J. Henk Leurdijk, who teaches international relations at the University of Amsterdam, is a specialist in general theories of international politics, strategic analysis, arms control and disarmament studies. He is currently writing a book on intervention in international politics.
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important problem of methodology is the level on which to approach the empirical phenomena in international relations. A scientificfieldm a y be approached in two waysâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;in micro-analysis through the smallest unit and in macro-analysis through the whole as points of departure. According to this division it is possible to approach thefieldof international politics either through the study of the foreign relations of the sovereign States or through the study of the whole of these relations, constituting the international system (Singer, 1969). T h e division of the field between foreign policy and international politics is n o w generally accepted, both dealing with the same empirical phenomena although from different analytical angles. A m o n g students of international politics with as divergent methodological backgrounds as Hoffmann, Burns, Kaplan, Claude, Morgenthau, Rosenau and others there is n o w a clear consensus that the subject of the study of international politics is the international system. The locus classicus of the dominant model of international politics is the description by Wolfers of a system in which '. . . the stage is pre-empted by a set of states, each in full control of all territory, m e n , and resources within its boundaries. Every state represents a closed, impermeable, and sovereign unit, completely separated from all other states' (Wolfers, 1959, p. 100-1). T h e relations a m o n g these States constitute thefieldof international politics. Structural and functional aspects are implied in the theories based on this model. According to this model there is no supranational authority to govern the relations a m o n g States; each State is its o w n judge and, in keeping with h u m a n nature, each seeks to expand its power to ensure its security resulting in an international system characterized as a 'state of nature'. It explains w h y relations a m o n g States in this anarchical international system are marked by conflict and war (Aron, 1967, p. 5; Morgenthau, 1960, p . 31, 33, 38). Theories of international politics deal with the security dilemma of States in terms of balance of power, collective security and world government. Because the relations a m o n g States are supposed to be based on considerations of power, the study of international politics is mainly concerned with conflict and war. Recent methodological innovations, such as systems analysis, simulations, g a m e theory and foreign policy decision-making do not add up to a new model of international politics but take the national actor and the inter-State system as starting-points for their analysis. F r o m the traditional model one can derive certain conclusions about theories of international politics. First, theories of international politics only explain the actions of States as international actors, which are interpreted in terms of general h u m a n drives, such as Morgenthau's 'power drive' (Morgenthau, 1960, p . 4), or are seen as determined by 'State capabilities'. Such an approach to international politics is strongly actor-oriented rather than process-oriented (Sondermann, 1961, p. 11). Explanations are sought for the actions of States and m u c h less for the processes in international politics. T h e State as a conceptual entity is not only the unit of
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analysis in international politics but it is theoretically also the only relevant actor. Theories of international relations are mainly based on great power behaviour. Second, States in this model are supposed to be well-defined and territorially determined entities in which the political process proceeds autonomously, isolated from external influences and based on a consensus about the internal rules of the g a m e and the external orientation of each. Third, the image of the State implicit in the model has m u c h in c o m m o n with the nineteenth-century liberal conception of the night-watchman State: its main function being pacification, internally to maintain law and order and externally to defend national security. Fourth, international politics is defined as the study of the relations a m o n g States that constitute the international system and the external relations of States are explained in terms of the stimuli that originate within that system. T h e international political process also has an autonomous character and can be explained in terms of its o w n dynamic. M o r e than any other doctrine, the theory of the balance of power clarifies the theoretical consequences of this model: 1. T h e actions of the State in the international system are predetermined. T h e subordination of individual preferences to the decisive impact of systems influences is very clear from Wolfers' statement that 'If it is true that the anarchical multistate system creates a condition of constant danger to national core possessionsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;specifically, to national survivalâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and, at the same time, provides frequent opportunity for n e w acquisitions, the actors can be said to act under external compulsion rather than in accordance with their preferences' (Wolfers, 1959, p. 93). 2. Theories based on this model postulate, as the guiding principle of the external behaviour of States, a relatively constant national interest resulting from (a) the preoccupation of each State, independent of time or place, with problems of national survival, (b) the relative constancy of the international environment and (c) the limited n u m b e r of policy alternatives available in the pursuit of power (Robinson, 1969, p. 186). This national interest determines the continuity of the external policies because the way a country perceives its interests is predominantly shaped by constant factors beyond its control. 3. Finally, the theory postulates that all States, because they are predisposed in the same way by national interests, will react similarly to stimuli from the movement of forces in the international system. This leads to the conclusion of a high level of uniformity in the behaviour of States without regard to existing differences (Rosenau, 1969, p. 2; Singer, 1969, p. 23; Wolfers, 1959, p. 84).
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II F r o m the model of a system as compounded by relations between States it is clear that domestic political processes and those between States are clearly distinguished. This division has been sustained by three factors: (a) specialization within the discipline of political science between the study of domestic and the study of international politics; (b) working with ideal constructs of political systems; and (c) the preoccupation with the formal aspects of this division. Theoretically, the distinction between the study of domestic and international politics had two consequences. First.it was assumed that the political processes in both systems had an autonomous character and could be explained in terms of that system's o w n dynamics. Little attention was paid to the interaction and interpenetration of the two systems. Second, the difference between the two systems was given a theoretical basis by assuming a fundamental difference to exist as between the political processes in the two systems. The formulation of an anarchy-order dichotomy, characterizing respectively the international and the national political systems, served to strengthen the assumption of the autonomy of the political processes in both spheres because this dichotomy was supposed to exclude an explanation of processes in the same terms. The claims of the study of international politics to autonomy are mainly based on such arguments (Sondermann, 1961, p. 9). The theoretical importance of this division of labour further emphasized the formulation of ideal-typical constructs of both systems in terms of the 'state of nature' of the international political system and of the centralized setting of domestic politics. The decisive criterion was the presence in the domestic system of a government endowed with sovereignty and invested with the monopoly of legitimized violence and the absence of these in the international system (Dulles, as quoted by Alger, 1966, p. 303). Morgenthau has referred to this distinction in the following terms: ' W h a t sets international society apart from other societies is the fact that its strengthâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;political, moral, socialâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;is concentrated in its members, its o w n weakness being a reflection ofthat strength' (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 55). T h e most important manifestations of this difference are supposed to be the different positions these systems occupy o n the independent/interdependent continuum (Deutsch, 1968, p. 89; Waltz, 1970, p. 206) and the frequency of violence which is thought to be m u c h higher in the international environment. T h e supposed contrast between domestic and international politics is more a question of a different organization of the political process (that is, the presence or absence of an authority with a monopoly of legitimate power) than a difference in the nature of the political processes. According to Morgenthau the similarities can be ascribed to the bio-psychic elements of h u m a n nature (Morgenthau, 1960, p. 33, 34) while the differences can be defined in terms of the functional distance between the actors in the two systems (Milbrath, 1967, p. 231; Rosenau, 19716, p. 211; Sondermann, 1961, p. 9). The presumption of the legitimacy of domestic political power and the
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conditioning of the external policies of nations by considerations of the national interest have been major obstacles to the analysis of the interaction and interpenetration of national and international phenomena.
m Having examined the assumptions of the model of the inter-State system, w e arrive at the central problem of this essay. In the traditional analysis of international politics on the basis of this model the concept of the State occupied an important place as actor and unit of analysis and the international system was conceived as the collectivity of States. T h e characteristics of the traditional approach are then the 'State-centric view' and the 'actor approach' best summarized by Wolfers as 'the state-as-sole-actor approach' (Wolfers, 1959, p. 83). This paradigm of international politics runs increasingly counter to our experience of international reality and therefore appears inadequate for its analyses. T h e two concepts which best convey this experience of inadequacy are 'the nuclear age' and the 'transnational society'. The general notion which subsumes the qualitative changes in the international system implied by these terms is the concept of interdependence: 'The theorists of increased interdependence usually have a global, or, at least, a regional and transnational perspective. For them interdependence has arisen not only because of the possibility of mutual destruction but also because higher levels of transnational exchanges have resulted in the establishment of cross-national political and economic structures' (Morse, 1969, p. 312). Both phenomena are of quite recent origin as compared with the traditional model which dates from 1648 and have resulted in a qualitative change of the international system and in the attributes of the State as actor and unit of analysis. T h e notion of 'nuclear age' refers to a qualitative change in the nature of relations between States due to the introduction of nuclear weapons. The paradox of this age is the contrast between the global dimensions of national security and the obvious need for national decision-making in nuclear problems. In the present international system the principal causes of conflict are no longer wars between States but the spill-over of internal conflicts into the international system as a result of the impact of foreign involvements in domestic conflicts on structures of political authority (Kende, 1971). Equally relevant is the concept of 'transnational society'. This particular manifestation of international interdependence has as yet escaped a clear definition that delineates the boundaries of the concept and determines the nature of the transactions and the acting units. The transactions of the transnational society are often described as an exchange of goods, capital and services and movements of people and ideas. The actors are individuals (Aron, 1967, p. 105), 'forces' (Hoffmann,
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1960, p. 180), 'social units' (Mendershausen, 1969, p. 253) or 'societal actors' (Kaiser, 1971, p. 793). Clearly, interactions are initiated not by governments but by non-governmental actors, though a clear definition of what range of interactions ought to be considered is still lacking. In line with the main trends in the literature, Kaiser defines transnational society as 'a system of interaction in a specific issue area between societal actors in different national systems' (Kaiser, 1971, p. 802). The political relevance of the transactions of transnational society is often cast in terms of the relationship between the areas of 'high politics' and 'low politics' (compare Gilpin, 1971, p. 404-13; Kaiser, 1971, p. 804; N y e & Keohane, 1971è, p. 337-42), the most explicit stand being taken by Morse w h o has c o m e to recognize that the allocation and exchange of economic values is a central aspect of the political relations a m o n g States, even the central aspect: '. . . the politics of wealth and welfare have overshadowed the politics of power and position, which in the relations a m o n g modernized societies are played out in economic terms' (Morse, 1970, p. 378). In the classic model of the inter-State system the relations a m o n g States are characterized by the threatened or actual use of force, while relations in the transnational system are mainly peaceful. In thefirstmodel the aims of politics are transcendental (power, prestige, influence), while in the second model they are more empirical (wealth, economic growth). In the literature m u c h confusion exists as to the empirical referents and theoretical relevance of the concept of interdependence, which is often badly or not at all defined. According to Rosenau, in the framework of what he calls 'across systems theory' this concept is especially used 'as the context in which phenomena at one level m a y be posited as fostering outcomes at another level' (Rosenau, 1971c, p. 7), while Morse sees interdependence w h e n 'goal achievement is contingent upon activities pursued elsewhere' (Morse, 1971, p. 380). A much-discussed problem is whether interdependence is decreasing or increasing (Deutsch, 1968, p. 87-90, and Waltz, 1970, p. 207-20, versus Morse, 1969, p . 317-19, 1971, p. 389-95, and Y o u n g , 1969, p. 733), but on a more basic level no great attention has been paid to the confusion which results if interdependence is interpreted as mutual dependence or as what in fact is unilateral dependence. Both these interpretations m a y be contrasted with the concept of independence or autonomy. But interdependence and autonomy are opposites in a horizontal relationship of units of the same size or power, while dependence and autonomy are opposites in a vertical relationship of unequal units. In the first case there is reciprocity on the basis of a relationship of co-ordination (equality of rank), while in the second case there is a unilateral relationship of dependence on the basis of subordination (inequality of rank). In the literature there is a gross neglect of this distinction. Theoretically one proceeds on the basis of the relevance of symmetrical power relations as in the case of the balance of power theory, but little theorizing assists on the basis of relationships of dependence implied in a hierarchy of power.
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IV W e m a y n o w examine the theoretical constructs which have been devised to take the new reality into account. A number of authors, starting from the assumption of a certain structural isomorphy between the domestic and international systems, have tried to analyse the two political processes in similar terms using concepts from the more advanced study of domestic politics for the analysis of the conceptually less-developed international relations (Alger, 1966; Masters, 1969; Narroll, 1966; Riggs, 1961; Russett, 1969), but failing to notice that the hypothesis of parallelism does not necessarily carry the interaction of political processes across national boundaries (Hanrieder, 1969). The idea of the boundary-crossing character of political processes, however, challenges the assumption of the autonomy of political processes within their o w n spheres of competence. T h e overlap of both systems, referred to in terms of interaction, interdependence and convergence, adds a new dimension to the study of political phenomena and requires a new conceptual framework for their analysis. This interdependence is manifest in two ways: (a) the interconnectedness of political processes and events in the national and international systems, analysed by Rosenau in terms of 'linkage polities', and (b) the presence of transnational political processes working throughout the international system, analysed by Kaiser in terms of 'transnational polities'. These two writers are a m o n g the most inventive in creating relevant theoretical constructs to analyse the n e w problems, though a thorough review of their work cannot be undertaken at this point. Rosenau's conceptual framework, embracing such concepts as linkage, penetrated political system and issue areas, m a y be regarded as an important theoretical innovation that can free analysis from excessive emphasis on territorial criteria for delimiting political processes and systems. Kaiser, in elaborating Rosenau's conceptual scheme, makes an effort to link existing transnational society with the analysis of international politics. O n the basis of his concept of transnational politics Kaiser constructs a typology of forms of transnational politics taking into account the power structure in the international system (Kaiser, 1971, p. 812-15). Finally, the assumption that States in international politics are equal and equally motivated, implying that theorizing in international relations m a y proceed on the basis of symmetrical relations of co-ordination, has been abandoned by a number of authors w h o have tried to arrive at a better understanding of the structural relations of dependence which distinguish international relations in a hierarchical system (Bodenheimer, 1970; Galtung, 1971; Sunkel, 1970). They try to conceptualize problems of inequality, underdevelopment and dependence. Lumping these together under the heading of the prosperity gap between the rich and the poor countries, it can be assumed that the perception the less-developed countries
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have of the international system is based on this dichotomy rather than on the perspective of power and security o n which, at least in theory, the perceptions of the developed countries are based. This paradigm of structural dependency is becoming m o r e relevant to the understanding of international politics just as the North-South dimension is becoming more relevant as compared with the EastWest interaction pattern. A m o n g aspects of the traditional model which these authors do not regard as relevant any longer are the following assumptions: (a) the symmetry of relations between States; (b) the image of States as unitary actors; (c) the primacy of political-military relations; (d) the autonomy of political processes in two systems.
V In this section w e will analyse the changes which have taken place in the concept of the State in international politics. In the traditional model the State occupied a central position as actor and as unit of analysis, a combination which w o n quasi-general acceptance because it was strongly actor-oriented and because it was supposed that the model and reality were nearly identical in the sense that the main theoretical attributes of the State (its sovereignty and its territoriality (Herz, 1959)) were clearly empirically observable. Yet the traditional approach has certain shortcomings. First, in deciding and executing its policies a State is confronted with other actors w h o are not territorially bound, that is defined by their geographical dimension, and with w h o m it collaborates or competes in order to achieve its goals. A s a result a complicated pattern emerges of relations between national, subnational, transnational and international actors of different kinds, incompatible with the simple inter-State model (compare Y o u n g , 1972). Second, likewise experience shows that the international system possesses dimensions defined as issue areas in which the political process functions variously as a result of different actors participating, the different nature of the issues and different ways of taking and executing decisions. The geographical delimitation of political processes is becoming less relevant as a result of their increasingly transnational character. The international system embraces more than the sum total of relations a m o n g States because political processes are not confined to relations between States and because national and international politics converge. If the geographical scope of political processes is a function of those factors which have resulted in the emergence of the transnational society and the production of nuclear weapons, it m a y be concluded that, in principle, they are n o longer spatially confined. A s a consequence of the impact of new technologies the only geographical dimension that seems to be adequate for the analysis of political processes is the total world system. This applies to the violent as well as to the
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peaceful aspects of h u m a n relations. Consequently, a disequilibrium emerges between the geographical dimension of the State and the geographical dimension of the political processes States endeavour to control. T h e gradual extension of political organization to regional and global proportions m a y eliminate the international relations strictly defined as relations between States but not their substantive contents. The distribution of technological k n o w - h o w in the international system, however, is not equal. The logic of differentiation between States on the basis of control of technology and k n o w - h o w is thrown into further relief if w e recognize that those States which o w n nuclear weapons or are the seats of multinational firms, which happen to be m u c h the same, are in a quite different position from the non-nuclear weapon States and the small and underdeveloped countries in respect to the traditional decision-making powers in security and in economic matters. The concept of a State represents an abstraction that stands for a great diversity of national actors. The model of an international system composed of homogeneous and equally motivated actors is simply absurd: rather, the heterogeneity of States should be of decisive influence for analysis. A s regards internal organization, a revision of the traditional concept of the State affects two factors. First, the State is not a self-contained unit which enters into external relations as such, but often the embodiment of a polarized or fragmented political system. With regard to its external function (national security maintenance) it is treated as a closed unit because survival as a State is supposed to be an overriding national interest. But conflicts of interests and values within States m a y reinforce or create 'linkages' with situations and events abroad, or m a y be vulnerable to external involvement and manipulation. The status of domestic political authorities is often of doubtful legitimacy and internal conflicts concerning the structure of political authority often have widespread international consequences. All this indicates the existence of penetrated systems whose boundaries do not conform to the divisions between national and international systems. Second, in the traditional model of international politics the State is conceptualized in a simple governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;society dichotomyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;both being autonomous systems and acting in qualitatively different fields, international relations being reduced to intergovernmental relations. The State, however, not only has a power function, it also acts as a participant in transnational interactions in the interests of certain societal groupings and contrary to the interests of others, or else it is itself manipulated by these groups. W e m a y try to solve the problems implicit in the foregoing analysis by drawing a distinction between the two analytical functions traditionally performed by the state concept. Since the geographical, horizontal delimitation of political processes is becoming less relevant while the functional, vertical delimitation is becoming more important to international relations theorists, the State as unit of analysis is losing status, which does not imply a judgement on it as an actor, it
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being recognized that as such it still shows considerable viability. N o r does it imply the obsolescence of the actor approach, but merely of the 'State-as-sole-actor' approach. T o analyse international politics w e should draw functional, vertical lines through the international system, that is, try to isolate issue areas o n the basis of criteria relevant for political analysis. At the same time, to arrive at a theory of foreign policy, w e can combine the different issue areas from the perspective of the State as actor. T h e analysis of the foreign policy of States continues to be based on the actor approach and from the perspective of the State as actor the study of foreign policy represents the horizontal co-ordination of the actions of States in different issue areas. T h e functioning of territorial and non-territorial actors can only be analysed in the context of a differentiation of issue areas in international politics.
VI M a n y authors are also beginning to depart from the traditional perspective on the structural aspects of the international system. In their view the international system cannot be seen exclusively as a collection of nation States aiming at equilibrium positions and survival as such. It must be supplemented by consideration of the hierarchical structure of dependence based on differences of power between unequal and differently motivated States, m a n y of which d o not possess the means for defending their security. Superimposed on this system is a similarly structured transnational society, in various ways linked to the hierarchical structure of the international system. The main characteristics of this approach are (a) the recognition of the theoretical importance of great power inequalities between States, (b) the asymmetrical relations between the units in the system and (c) the preeminence of vertical interaction relations. Theoretical inquiries based on the nineteenth-century model of the European inter-State system originated from the proposition that States aim to arrive at positions of equilibrium by pursuing their natural inclination to expand power. In our day, the major European powers have lost their global influence and international politics is being determined by power centres outside Europe, while the former European colonies are n o w formally independent States. A s a result the international system has become a global community in the sense that its boundaries are those of the whole world. T h e formal political emancipation of colonized or semi-colonized countries has not, however, been accompanied by their economic and social emancipation. Power differentiation under the impact of nuclear armaments and the bipolar structure of the international system since the Second World W a r have created n e w relationships between the older countries which also must be accounted for theoretically. Areas of limited sovereignty have c o m e into existence: in the northern hemisphere, alliance networks and in the Third World neo-
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colonial structures and spheres of influence. The importance of horizontal relations of co-ordination at the apex of the international structure, which dominated the balance of power analyses, have diminished and the importance of vertical relations of supremacy and dependency have increased. W a r and the threat of war characterize the confrontation between equal powers at the horizontal level (Modelski, 1912b), while intervention and neo-colonial relationships are typical of the vertical relations of dependence between unequal partners. That States seek national security and expansion of power in a competitive international system is less relevant than the understanding that most States simply do not have the resources toward that end and have had to compromise their independence by entering into relationships of dependence with superior powers. O n e consequence of this hierarchical structure is that relations are marked by asymmetries. If w e conceive of the international system as a system of decisionmaking then the asymmetrical nature of the interactions implies a vertical structure of international decision-making in which States participate differently both qualitatively and quantitatively. Decisions are taken at the top and passed d o w n to the lower echelons without adequate participation. This applies to all politically relevant decisions, perhaps especially to those taken unilaterally by the most powerful countries or by international organizations which they can monopolize or dominate. Finally, in a hierarchical system there is more emphasis o n the vertical relations of dependence than on the horizontal relations of interdependence. In a strictly hierarchical system there are only vertical and no horizontal relations between actors; in a pyramid-shaped system of international relations the vertical relations are predominant and the horizontal relations become relatively less significant as w e m o v e from the higher to the lower levels of the structure. Interdependence supposes a certain equality of power and is characteristic of States that occupy a similar position in the hierarchy of power. Dependence is the hallmark of unequal power relations. Each country has vertical relations of supremacy and subordination with States on a lower or higher level in the power hierarchy and horizontal relations with States which occupy a similar position. A s the differences of power become greater and increase in number, the importance of vertical relations increases. It is characteristic of a hierarchical structure that each State has more (or at least more important) relations with those that occupy a higher position in the hierarchy of power than with those that occupy a similar position. This tendency becomes more pronounced the lower the position of a State in the hierarchical structure. The demarcation of spheres of influence, of alliance relationships and neo-colonial structures are the main mechanisms used by the dominant powers to organize client States that are dependent upon them. At the top w e can note a certain multilaterality of relations; on a somewhat lower level the same takes place within spheres of influence and alliances, but in general bilateral relations dominate in the foreign policies of dependent States. Linkage on a horizontal level is
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often opposed by the dominant powers in order to maintain the vertical structure. At the apex intersystemic horizontal relations are clearly more important than vertical intrasystemic relations. The concentration of power at the base of a hierarchical structure could be an important corrective of the predominance of vertical relations. Examples are the Group of 77 within U N C T A D , the O P E C countries as a coalition against industrialized countries and the conference of non-nuclear weapon countries.
VII A number of theorists have tried to construct new theoretical frameworks which might constitute the basis of a new paradigm for the study of international politics, labelled by N y e and Keohane the 'world politics paradigm'. The heart of the argument is whether the approach in which the State is both actor and unit of analysis must be replaced by a model m a d e up of parts that do not necessarily conform to geographically defined State boundaries. Important characteristics of this n e w approach are: (a) that the framework of a world political system as geographically the widest possible one corrects the hypothesis that international politics only take place in an area defined as relations between States; and (b) that the emphasis on analysing political processes that transcend national boundaries corrects the hypothesis that the only way to understand international politics is by analysing the behaviour of actors. This approach seems to have obvious advantages over the traditional one with its o w n advantage of simplicity: in an increasingly interdependent world it is more in accordance with reality, and avoids the dangers of 'nationalism'. These dangers result from the pre-eminence of Euro-centric and American perspectives: 'It has thus been the perspective of a controlling center in the network of international relations, which has determined the intellectual interests of the discipline' (Van Benthem van den Berg, 1971, p. 32). It m a y be suggested too that in view of some of the most pressing problems with which the world is confronted (the nuclear arms race, underdevelopment, the environment) this world political model seems to be the only viable one: it is supported by several authors (Modelski, 1972a, p. 10; Morse, 1969, p. 312; Sprout & Sprout, 1971, p. 11), but only N y e and Keohane (1971a), Jenkins (1970) and Burton (1972) have worked out alternative conceptions which imply rejection of the traditional 'billiard ball' model: the world politics paradigm, the octopus model, the cobweb model. Such a model m a y have the following consequences in the analysis of international relations. First, political processes can only be conceptualized in the framework of a world political system that takes into account the interaction and overlap of national and international systems, and the existence of a system of transnational
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relations. Because political processes d o not necessarily conform to the spatial demarcations of political systems, their analysis on this basis is replaced by one based on the vertical delimitation of political processes in issue areas. Although a number of authors have adopted Rosenau's concept of issue area (Kaiser, 1971; N y e & Keohane, 1971), there is, except for R u m m e l ' s empirical typology ( R u m m e l , 1972), no adequate typology of issue areas, Rosenau considering his o w n typology rather arbitrary (Rosenau, 1971 ¿, p. 142). Second, the inequality of States being recognized, the analysis seeks to explain the structural relations of dependence in a hierarchical structure of subordination and dominance. This cannot be interpreted only as an international relationship of unitary actors but has to be viewed also as a combination of intra- and international relationships between fragmented political systems. Third, international relations can n o longer be analysed only in terms of relations between States but extend to the impact of non-territorial actors. It is often argued that States have available superior juridical and military power to enforce conformity in confrontations with transnational forces and non-territorial actors. But this argument ignores the fact that co-operation and negotiation are normal aspects of world political relationships. A s N y e and Keohane put it: ' M o r e relevant than " w h o wins" direct confrontations are the new kinds of bargains, coalitions, and alliances being formed between transnational actors and between these actors and segments of governments and international organizations' (Nye & Keohane, 1971a, p. 723). Fourth, analysis does not concentrate exclusively on those conflictual relations between States which involve the actual or threatened use of force (war, armaments, alliances). The traditional demarcation of thefieldhas been widened in two respects: on the one hand one takes into consideration the intra-State stimuli and consequences of political actions which m a y be aimed at attaining certain domestic objectives, while o n the other hand the importance of transnational relations and structures that usually take the form of co-operation and negotiation is recognized. Morse is correct in noting that ' A good theory of international politics must account for the 90 percent plus of h u m d r u m as well as the 10 percent minus of dramatic scenes' (Morse, 1969, p. 313). Often the dualism between the transnational system of apolitical interactions reduced to environmental factors which only have a marginal impact on the field of power relations, and inter-State relations which are essentially power relations are adhered to. This formulation overlooks the emerging understanding that these factors not only help to determine and sustain or change the structure of the international system, but are also becoming increasingly important aspects of the international allocation of values and as such enter into political disputes. In this context w e m a y think of the pattern of trade and economic relations, the use and distribution of natural resources and raw materials, monetary and financial problems, the uses of nuclear energy and environmental problems.
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A s a result of the diminishing availability of physical force in a nuclear international system (Morse, 1971, p. 377) and the increasing economic interdependence and the activities of powerful transnational actors (Hoffmann, 1970, p. 401; N y e & Keohane, 1971a, p. 724) the importance of transnational relations has increased. But m a n y authors are reluctant to accept the allocation and distribution of economic values as an important focus of international political activiteis (Morse, 1969, p. 319; Strange, 1970, p. 307). There is no compelling reason however to approach this problem dogmatically by adopting an exclusive demarcation of thefieldof international relations. The delimitation of political processes according to issue areas makes it possible to link these economic and other politically relevant relations to the traditional issue area of national security. This relationship m a y be apprehended under the concept of 'bargaining' (Gilpin, 1971, p. 414; N y e & Keohane, 1971a, p . 729-30; Rosenau, 1971ft, p . 138-40). Bargaining relationships can not only be found within the different issue areas but also between issue areas, which can only be linked in bargaining situations by the actors, mostly States, w h o play an important role in the different vertical systems. That is w h y States perform a central role as actors, being the only units to perform functions in the different issue areas, and also w h y the foreign policies of States can be conceived as the horizontal co-ordination of vertical issues areas.
VIII Summarizing w e notice that the emphasis o n political processes implies renunciation of the institutional definition of international politics as relations between States, the spatial demarcation of political processes within and between States being replaced by an issue area delimitation in which the territorial boundaries are not necessarily relevant, while the distinction between two levels of analysis is becoming less and less relevant as the increasing importance of processes of interaction across boundaries is recognized. F r o m this standpoint the study of international politics can n o longer claim to be an autonomous discipline, rather the unity of political analysis restored. While in the traditional paradigm the object of study (the inter-State system) was distinguished from the study of foreign policy on the basis of a higher level of analysis of the same empirical material (the actions of States), according to the new concept the object of study defined as the world-political system is divided into vertical spheres of issue areas, foreign policy implying the study of the horizontal co-ordination of State behaviour in different issue areas. O n e m a y ask whether the basis on which theorizing on international politics proceeds needs revision, whether the horizontal analysis of international relations needs to be replaced, or at least supplemented, by a vertical analysis. Under horizontal analysis political phenomena are examined o n the basis of the geographical demarcation of political processes, the boundaries of the subject
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being determined by the territorial criterion. The analysis of foreign policy in such a system starts from the assumption that the defence of national security is the basis of foreign policy. In vertical analysis p h e n o m e n a are studied o n the basis of a delimitation of political processes in issue areas, their boundaries being determined by typology. It is assumed that decision-making differs markedly according to different issue areas, since States and non-territorial actors act differently according to issue areas. The analysis of political processes throughout the world system assumes the survival of an international system to be the prime value.
References ALGER,
Chadwick. 1966. Comparison of IntraInternational Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N . J . , national and International Politics. In: Prentice Hall Inc. R . Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to ComH O F F M A N N , Stanley. 1970. International Organization parative and International Politics. Evanston, and the International System. International 111., Northwestern University Press. Organization, Vol. X X I V , N o . 3, S u m m e r . A R O N , R a y m o n d . 1967. Peace and War. A Theory of J E N K I N S , Robin. 1970. Exploitation. The World International Relations. N e w York, N . Y . , Power Structure and the Inequality of Nations. Praeger. L o n d o n , MacGibbon & K e e . B O D E N H E I M E R , Suzanne J. 1970. Ideology of DevelK A I S E R , Karl. 1971. Transnational Politics: Toward a opmentalism. Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Theory of Multinational Politics. International Vol. X V . Organization, Vol. X X V , N o . 4, A u t u m n . B U R T O N , John W . 1972. World Society. Cambridge, K E N D E , Istvan. 1971. Twenty-Five Years of Local Cambridge University Press. W a r s . Journal of Peace Research, N o . 1. D E U T S C H , Karl W . 1968. The Impact of CommuniK N O R R , Klaus; R O S E N A U , James N . 1969. Tradition cations upon Theory of International Reand Science in the Study of International lations. In: Abdul A . Said (ed.), Theory of Politics. In: Klaus Knorr and James N . R o International Relations. The crisis of relevance. senau (eds.), Contending Approaches to InterEnglewood Cliffs, N . J . , Prentice Hall Inc. national Politics. Princeton, N . J . , Princeton E A S T O N , David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political University Press. Life. N e w York, N . Y . , John Wiley & Sons M A G D O F F , Harry. 1969. The Age of Imperialism. The Inc. Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy. N e w York, G A L T U N G , Johan. 1971. A Structural Theory of ImN . Y . , Monthly Review Press. perialism. Journal of Peace Research, N o . 2. M A S T E R S , Roger D . 1969. World Politics as a Primitive G I L P I N , Robert. 1971. The Politics of Transnational Political System. In: James N . Rosenau (ed.), Economic Relations. International OrganizInternational Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ation, Vol. X X V , N o . 3, S u m m e r . ed., N e w York, N . Y . , The Free Press. H A N R I E D E R , Wolfram F . 1969. Compatibility and M E N D E R S H A U S E N , Horst. 1969. Transnational Society Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual vs. State Sovereignty. Kyklos, Vol. X X I I , N o . 2. Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions M I L B R A T H , Lester W . 1967. Interest Groups and of Foreign Policy. The American Political Foreign Policy. In: James N . Rosenau (ed.), Science Review, Vol. L X I , N o . 4. Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. N e w H E R Z , John H . 1959. International Politics in the York, N . Y . , The Free Press. Atomic Age. Princeton, N . J . , Princeton UniM O D E L S K I , George. 1972a. Principles of World Po iversity Press. tics. N e w York, N . Y . , The Free Press. . 1969. The Territorial State Revisited: R e . 19726. W a r and the Great Powers. Peace flections on the Future of the Nation-State. Research Society (International) Papers: The In: James N . Rosenau (ed.), International London Conference, 1971, Vol. XVIII. Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed., N e w M O R G E N T H A U , Hans J. 1960. Politics among Nations. York, N . Y . , The Free Press. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd rev. ed. H O F F M A N N , Stanley. 1960. Contemporary Theories of N e w York, N . Y . , Alfred A . Knopf.
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References (continued) R O S E N A U , James N . 19716. The Scientific Study of M O R G E N T H A U , H a n s J. 1962. T h e Commitments of Foreign Policy. N e w York, N . Y . , T h e Free a Theory of International Politics. In: Hans Press. J. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Cen. 1971c. Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politury, V o l . I: The Decline of Democratic Politics Revisited. (A paper prepared for delivery tics. Chicago, 111., University of Chicago Press. at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American M O R S E , Edward L . 1969. The Politics of InterdepenPolitical Science Association, Chicago.) dence. International Organization, Vol. XXIII, R U M M E L , R . J. 1972. U . S . Foreign Relations: C o n N o . 2 , Spring. flict, Cooperation, and Attribute Distances. • . 1970. T h e Transformation of Foreign Policies. In: Bruce M . Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Modernization, Interdependence, and ExterNumbers. Beverly Hills and L o n d o n , Sage nalization. World Politics, Vol. X X I I , N o . 3, Publications. April. . 1971. Transnational Economic Processes. Inter- R U S S E L L , Frank M . 1955. Theories of International Relations. N e w York and L o n d o n , Appletonnational Organization, Vol. X X V , N o . 3, Century-Crofts Inc. Summer. N A R R O L L , Raoul. 1966. Scientific Comparative Politics R U S S E T T , Bruce M . 1969. Toward a Model of C o m parative International Politics. In: James N . and International Relations. In: R . Barry Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , The International Politics. Evanston, 111., NorthFree Press. western University Press. N Y E , Joseph S . , Jr; K E O H A N E , Robert O . 1971a. S I N G E R , J. David. 1969. The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. In: James N . Transnational Relations and World Politics: Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and A Conclusion. International Organization. Foreign Policy, rev. ed. N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , T h e Vol. X X V , N o . 3, S u m m e r , p . 721-48. Free Press. . 19716. Transnational Relations and World Politics: A n Introduction. International Or- S O N D E R M A N N , Fred A . 1961. The Linkage between Foreign Policy and International Politics. In: ganization, Vol. X X V , N o . 3, S u m m e r , James N . Rosenau (ed.), International Politics p. 329-49. and Foreign Policy. N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , T h e R I G G S , Fred W . 1961. International Relations as a Free Press. Prismatic System. In: Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System. Theor- S P R O U T , Harold; S P R O U T , Margaret. 1971. Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth. N e w Y o r k , etical Essays. Princeton, N . J . , Princeton N . Y . , V a n Nostrand Reinhold C o m p a n y . University Press. R O B I N S O N , T h o m a s W . 1969. National Interest. In: S T R A N G E , Susan. 1970. International Economics and International Relations. A Case of Mutual James N . Rosenau (ed.), International Politics Neglect. International Affairs, Vol. 46, N o . 2 , and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. N e w York, N . Y . , April. The Free Press. S U N K E L , Osvaldo. 1970. Intégration Capitaliste TransR O S E N A U , James N . 1967. Compatibility, Consensus, nationale et Désintégration Nationale en and an Emerging Political Science of A d a p Amérique Latine. Politique Étrangère, 35 e antation. The American Political Science Review, née, N o . 2. Vol. L X I , N o . 2, June. V A N B E N T H E M V A N D E N B E R G , G . 1971. International . 1969. Toward the Study of National-InterRelations as a Discipline and Development. national Linkages. In: James N . Rosenau Paradogma, Tijdschrift voor Politiek en Poli(ed.), Linkage Politics. Essays on the Convertikologie, Jaarg. 2-4, November. gence of National and International Systems. N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , The Free Press. W A L T Z , Kenneth N . 1970. The M y t h of National Interdependence. In: Charles P . Kindleberger . 1970. Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behavior. (ed.), The International Corporation. A SymComparative Politics, Vol. 2 - 3 , April. posium. Cambridge, Mass., and L o n d o n , T h e . 1971a. Adaptive Strategies for Research and M I T Press. Practice in Foreign Policy. In: Fred W . Riggs (ed.), International Studies: Present Status andW O L F E R S , Arnold. 1959. The Actors in International Future Prospects. Philadelphia, T h e American Politics. In: William T . R . F o x (ed.), TheorA c a d e m y of Political and Social Science. etical Aspects of International Relations. Notre (Monograph 12.) D a m e , Ind., University of Notre D a m e Press.
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References {continued) W O L F E R S , Arnold. 1969. T h e Pole of Power and the Y O U N G , Oran R . 1969. Interdependencies in World Pole of Indifference. In: James N . Rosenau Politics. International Journal, Vol. 24, N o . 2 , (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, Autumn. rev. ed. N e w York, N . Y . , T h e Free Press. 1972. T h e Actors in World Politics. In: James W R I G H T , Quincy. 1955. The Study of International N . Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice A . Relations. N e w York, N . Y . , AppletonEast (eds.), The Analysis of International PoliCentury-Crofts Inc. tics. N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , T h e Free Press.
Foreign-policy models and their empirical relevance to third-world actors: a critique and an alternative Bahgat Korany The problem This article concerns a recognized problem—the 'underdeveloped study of underdeveloped countries'. For over two decades n o w economists have singled out 'development economics' as a special subdiscipline. Similarly, students of comparative politics are increasingly using 'developmental politics' to study the political process and structure of non-Western political systems. Students of foreign-policy analysis, however, still elaborate (supposedly universal) models to explain the foreign policies of G h a n a as well as Sweden, Indonesia as well as the Federal Republic of Germany—with the implicit assumption that all these actors are interchangeable. This is merely a reflection of the general assumption of m a n y researchers w h o maintain a rigid distinction between national and international political systems despite mounting evidence that the distinction is breaking d o w n . If this were not the case, the tendency to view nation-States as monolithic units whose value systems and internal processes are of secondary importance for understanding their external conduct would not have been upheld for so long. W e question this all-pervasive assumption. M o r e generally the field of foreign-policy analysis is criticized for its inadequate theoretical content, its lack of rigour in analysis and—as far as 'third-world' actors are concerned—its failure to establish a link in the proposed analytical constructs between the international behaviour of these new national actors and the societal-psychological variables that constitute the essence of their identities. W e start with an overview of the foreign-policy literature concerning thirdworld actors.1 Then w e proceed to a more detailed critical analysis of the decisionmaking model and Rosenau's efforts at theory-building in foreign-policy analysis.
Bahgat Korany, formerly a staff member of the Presidency of the Republic in Egypt, has been working since 1970 at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. He has published a number of articles on non-alignment and contributed to T h e African Meaning of Nasser (1973) edited by Ali Mazrui and Okello Oculli.
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
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T h e last part of the article suggests some hypotheses and an alternative model (the 'situation-role' model) for the analysis of foreign policy-making amongst thirdworld actors, based on these actors' frame of reference. W e conclude with a note on the place of the proposed model in current international-relations theory.
Foreign policy and third-world actors: a general critique Theoretically-oriented research on foreign policy has only evolved during the last two decades. This explains the problems of the subdiscipline, which is still establishing taxonomies and still searching for applicable models with adequate theoretical content and rigour in analysis. It also explains the predominance in the field of the case-study approach. Such studies go to an extreme by being factual and amass a lot of data to emphasize the individuality of the actor's foreign policy at the expense of general propositions. They can be categorized as follows:2 Studies that emphasize the idiosyncratic sources of policy-making, for example the personalities and psychological variables of leaders. Thus one of the very few complete studies published recently on the foreign policy of a n e w State (Ghana) begins with an examination of N k r u m a h ' s role, 'for Ghana's foreign policy was from thefirsthis in character and stamp. It was most significantly a reflection of N k r u m a h ' s characteristics and desires, of his perceptions of h o w the international system worked and of his reaction to external events'.3 T h o m p s o n is supported in this emphasis by another scholar of n e w State politics, according to w h o m the different conflicts and feuds between Mali and the Ivory Coast (1958-60), Guinea and Ivory Coast (1957-63), Upper Vol ta and Ivory Coast (1961), G h a n a and Ivory Coast (1957-63), G h a n a and Togo (1957-63), Mali and Senegal (1960-63), Morocco and Algeria (1962-64) and Tunisia and Algeria (1962-63) were 'either caused or prolonged by personal reactions of pride or anger usually felt by the head of a State'.4 A n opposite tendency emphasized the m o r e 'permanent' variables shaping foreign policy such as size, geographical location, historical and cultural background, industrial and military capabilities. Representative studies of this tendency as far as third-world actors are concerned are those on the foreign policies of B u r m a 6 and the K h m e r Republic." Thus in the treatment of Burma's international behaviour, the 'permanent' determinants are duly emphasized: religious-cultural (Buddhism), historical ('colonial-capitalist experience'), geographical (closeness to China), societal (problems of national unity), and economic (state of underdevelopment). These historical and case-oriented studies were already popular before the 1960s.
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Between 1958 and 1963, for example, two standard texts appeared: the first a 420-page treatment of the foreign policies of ten different countries, both 'Western' and 'non-Western', 'developed' and 'underdeveloped', 'democratic' and 'totalitarian',7 the second volume, even longer, examined the foreign policies of twenty-four States.8 T h e objective was as ambitious as it was laudable: 'the study of foreign policy must not only include the new countries of the non-Western world, but it must be a depth study of social forces, the political process, and political attitudes and expectations as well as of the overt patterns in contemporary diplomatic behaviour and foreign policy decisions'. This meant that the treatment could embrace the 'broad range of subjective and objective factors which limit choices'. In this w a y , the comparative study of foreign policy could 'take us beyond the crude distinctions m a d e today' and on to the major goal: 'the discovery of the most significant types of foreign policy "actors" and the conditions associated with their emergence, persistence and transformation'.9 O n this basis it might be argued that this single-country orientation is thefirststep in a slow progression toward general theory, that analyses of the external behaviour of m a n y countries constitute bases for the construction of systems of testable generalizations about the foreign policies of general classes of countries, thus leading to the eventual development of if-then models accounting for the behaviour of any country.10 But this historical and case-study approach has not always fulfilled its promises. For instead of at least a concluding chapter that attempts to identify similarities and differences or codify general propositions resulting from the separate case histories, w e generally end u p with juxtaposed treatments and conflicting theses laid side by side. These studies then are neither committed to the canons of scientific propositions nor are they cumulative.11 Hence w e m o v e to a sample of those studies that claimed to contribute to the establishment of a body of systematic and cumulative knowledge and see h o w they fare as far as third-world actors are concerned. T w o contributions c a m e to mind for their influence in thefield:the decision-making model and Rosenau's theoretical formulations.
The decision-making model 12 Snyder and his colleagues exposed their ideas privatelyfirstin 1954, w h e n they offered an outline of categories for the collection and processing of data on foreignpolicy analysis; before publication in b o o k form in 1962, excerpts from it had been widely reprinted and the study w a s soon cited in different works ranging from treatment of disturbed communication to publications on judicial behaviour.
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In addition to the decision-making model that it elaborated, the study's popularity was due to its 'explicit concern with a n u m b e r of issues in methodology and the philosophy of science that were current in American political science in the 1950s'.13 S o m e important difficulties c o m m o n to research in international relations are cited and discussed: for instance the absence of a frame of reference for relating the several aspects of thefield;the random nature of the search for important variables; the tendency to construct entire systems of explanation around single factors (for example, power); the lack of a clear definition of purpose and the consequent tendency for policy, empirical, value, and scientific questions to be thoughtlessly thrown together in the same investigation; the failure to make explicit the assumptions and concepts employed in research; the habit of confusing analytic and concrete structures; the preoccupation with questions that are not stated in researchable form. . . ,14 A n illustration of the popularity and enormous impact of the decision-making model is that the phrase was used not only in standard textbooks o n international relations and related subjects but w a s also appropriated in the everyday language of both politicians and the laymen. Moreover, historical material was studied in terms of this approach. 15 The assumption of Snyder and his colleagues is that 'the nation-State is going to be the significant unit of action for m a n y years to come' 1 6 and thus strategies of action and commitment of resources will continue to be decided at the national level. Consequently, action in international relations can be best understood by focusing on the 'decisions' of these basic actors, and a strategic focus for research is the point at which the inputs are transformed into outputs, through the decision-making process. Thus rather than concentrating primarily on ends or forms of foreign policy, the authors are concerned with the process of foreign policy itself. In fact, decision-making is defined as 'a. process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited n u m b e r of problematical, alternative projects of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by decision-makers'.17 This selection or choice process is determined by certain variables which can explain h o w and w h y the actors behave in the international system as they do, and which embrace a wide range of concepts and disciplines, for example the e c o n o m y , psychology, sociology, besides, of course, political science. T h e diversity and multiplicity of variables can be easily seen in Figure 1 overleaf. In order to reduce the inherent complexity of investigating a number of psychological, social, economic and political variables, the authors suggested a w a y of handling the possible influences on decision-making. They elaborated three clusters of variables.
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E
External setting of decision-making
N o n - h u m a n environment
1
N o n - h u m a n environment
2
Society
2
Other cultures
3
H u m a n environment Culture. Population
3
Other societies
4
Societies organized and functioning as States G o v e r n m e n t action
C
Decision-making process Decision-makers
D
Action
A
Internal setting of decision-making
1
(r
~7F~
多te. B
Social structure and behaviour
1
Major c o m m o n value orientations
2
Major institutional patterns
3
Major characteristics of social organizations
4
Role differentiation and specialization
5
Groups : Kinds and functions
6
Relevant social processes (a) Opinion formation (b) Adult socialization (c) Political
FIG. 1. The decision-making diagram.
i
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Spheres of competence 'The totality of those of the activities of the decision-maker relevant and necessary to the achievement of the organizational objective,'18 including problems of role structures, role relations, formal and informal roles, legitimacy. Communication and information1* Referring both to the communication network by which information is channelled, and to the information (including meanings, values and preferences) actually available to the actors at the time they m a k e their decisions. Motivation2" Inspired by psychology and social psychology and encompassing personality and value variables. It purports to answer the ' w h y ' question: ' w h y does the actor act . . . that is, w h y is a decision made? W h y does action take the particular form that it does in a particular situation? W h y d o patterns of action evolve from decision-making?' O u r exposition here is oversimplified for the sake of clarity and communication, for each of these 'major determinants' is in itself a complex cluster of variables with potential ramifications and expanding proliferation. For from these 'major determinants' one would deal with a host of questions concerning such matters as the general setting in which a decision is made; the actors' perceptions of their roles and the actual authority they are free to exercise; the information, attitudes, and beliefs they bring to the decision-making event; the actors' views of the alternative choices and consequences; the actual and perceived goals of the organization and its actors; the personality, skills, and needs of the decisionmakers; and dozens of other matters of a similar order.21 T h o u g h lacking in parsimony as a model, the continued impact of the decisionmaking model almost twenty years after its exposition is due not only to its pioneering aspect but also to s o m e of the advantages which it offered by providing a scheme rich in concepts and constructs: 1. T h e study proposed uniform and comparable categories for the collection of data, thus making comparative foreign policy research feasible. 2. T h e authors explored in depth the psychological environment or the perceptual orientation of the foreign policy ĂŠlite. 3. They provided in rigorous conceptual terms an analysis of the decisionmaking process.
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4. Because of the importance the authors attached to methodological-conceptual issues, they avoided such problems as the reification of the State. A s the authors affirm: ' w e need to . . . rid ourselves of the troublesome abstraction "State" '. It's one of our basic methodological choices to define the State as its official decision-makersâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the State. State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the State'.22 Such a stand has permitted the authors to combine m a n y assets: (a) Operationally, they have given form and substance to such a widespreadâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;but controversialâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;concept as that of 'national interest' and have indicated the w a y to discern and investigate it. ' T h e key to the explanation of w h y the State behaves the w a y it does lies in the w a y its decision-makers as actors define the situation. T h e definition of the situation is built around the projected action as well as the reasons for the action.'23 (b) Methodologically, by identifying the State with its top political officials they have reaped the benefit accruing from combining two levels of analysis: the individual and the collective entity. They thus attempted to link, at this early stage of theoretically oriented foreign-policy research, the gross characteristics of States to the individual's behavioural attributes in a unified model. (c) Conceptually, their dual level of analysis has enabled and facilitated the borrowing of some basic organizing concepts from two pioneering social sciences: sociology and psychology. These borrowed concepts were a source of enrichment for a young, empirical political science, such as some of the vocabulary of the n o w well-known Parsons-Shils scheme. This might however be a source of weakness. For as the authors themselves are perfectly aware: As new schemes of social analysis are developed (mostly outside of political science) there is a great temptation to apply such schemes quickly, one result being the use of new words without comprehension of the theoretical system of which they are a part.24 This brings us to the model's limitations: 1. T h e number of variables is simply overwhelming: the political subsystem, the economy, the actors, perceptions, motivations, values, the goals, communications problems. Thus, though w e have a single framework, almost everything is treated as a variable and n o constants are specified.25 This inordinate complexity explains w h y in almost two decades only one study that purported to apply this model has been published,26 and in spite of the heavy investment of time, skill andfinancialresources few testable hypotheses seem to have emerged.
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2. T h e decision-making model offers n o help on h o w to limit the number of variables, and even if the researcher manages to do this on his o w n , the model does not indicate h o w to proceed in actually carrying out research.27 3. The model does not provide the means of analysing the relationship a m o n g the listed variables. This is a task tackled in Paige's empirical study on the Korean decision which 'does describe some relationships, but at the same time reminds us that the Snyder framework is really designed for the analysis of policy-making in complex organizations'.28 Since he was dealing with the United States, Paige rightly emphasized the significance of organizational relationships and communication networks. Such categories, however, would be difficult to apply in the analysis of actors w h o do not have the same level of organizational complexity, structural differentiation, and formalized, identifiable communication networks as the United States. This is w h y some foreign-policy analysts expressed doubts as to the immediate applicability of the decision-making model to developing countries. 4. Even if all, or at least most, of these problems are overcome, it would still be quite difficult to amass the needed data29 to produce a study as detailed as Paige's. In m a n y third-world actors, the press, for instance, is less widespread, less technically developed and in some cases more 'guided' than in m a n y of the developed actors. This makes it very hard to get detailed accounts of decisions. N o r is this problem going to be solved with the passage of time; on the contrary, it might be aggravated because of 'the scantiness of documentary materials and the inadequacy of archival facilities'.30 5. Optimistically assuming that all these difficulties are solved and that w e have found the organizational complexity and formalized communication networks as prescribed by the model, and that w e could and did investigate them, the effort would none the less be so back-breaking that w e would be discouraged from investigating and analysing the interaction a m o n g the 'permanent' domestic determinants, the external pressures and the personality variables. 6. Worse still, the researcher would realize that the decision-making model is destinedâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;as indeed its appellation indicatesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;for the analysis of a 'once-andfor-alP decision rather than the wider process of foreign policy-making. In other words, the possible pay-offs might not compensate for the exorbitant research effort deployed. This is an important criterion of applicability in any researchable model.
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Rosenau's comparative foreign-policy project Starting from the decision-making model, J a m e s Rosenau deplores the absence of a comparative framework for the analysis of foreign policy.31 Unlike economics, sociology, and other areas of political science, thefieldof foreignpolicy research has not subjected its materials to . . . preliminary processing. Instead . . . each country and each international situation in which it participates is normally treated as unique and nonrecurrent, with the result that most available studies do not treat foreign policy phenomena in a comparable w a y . Thus it assumes that the same data pertaining to the external behavior of the Soviet Union are interpreted by one observer as illustrative of Khrushchev'sflexibility,by another as reflective of pent-up consumer demands, and by still another as indicative of the Sino-Soviet conflict.82 Since 'there can be n o real flourishing of theory until the materials of thefieldare processedâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;i.e. rendered comparableâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;through the use of pre-theories of foreign policy' R o s e n a u assumed the task of elaborating a pre-theory which would provide 'a basis for comparison in the examination of external behavior of various countries in various situations'.33 It is based o n five sets of variables: the idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal and systemic sets of variables. But rather than stopping at establishing a list of foreign-policy variables, Rosenau goes a step further a n d tries to assess the relative influence of the variables b y ranking t h e m according to three criteria: size of the country (large v. small), state of the e c o n o m y (developed v. developing) and type of political system (open v. closed), summarized in Table 1. T A B L E 1. A n abbreviated presentation of Rosenau's pre-theory of foreign policy, in which five sets of variables underlying the external behaviour of societies are ranked according to their relative potencies in eight types of societies Geography and physical resources State of the economy State of the polity
Large country
Developed
Small country
Developing
Open
Closed
Open
Rankings of the variables
Role Societal Governmental Systemic Idiosyncratic
Role Idiosyncratic Governmental Systemic Societal
Idiosyn- Idiosyncratic cratic Role Role Societal GovernSystemic mental Govern- Systemic mental Societal
Closed
Illustrative examples
United States
U.S.S.R.
India
China
Developed
Developing
Open
Closed
Open
Closed
Role Systemic Societal Governmental Idiosyncratic
Role Systemic Idiosyncratic Governmental Societal
Idiosyncratic Systemic Role Societal Governmental
Idiosyncratic Systemic Role Governmental Societal
Netherlands
Czechoslovakia
Kenya
Ghana
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Moreover, Rosenau developed t w o innovative concepts which can be particularly applicable to third-world actors. T h efirstconcept is that of a penetrated political system defined as one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals.34 T h e second concept is that of an issue-area which R o s e n a u develops to account for variations in the pattern of decision-making from one foreign-policy issue to another. Following Dahl's example in his data-based analysis of politics in N e w H a v e n , 3 6 Rosenau suggests dividing foreign-policy behaviour into different issue areas rather than lumping it together as one uniform monolithic behaviour in all cases and situations. A s Rosenau remarks: National societies can be organized as penetrated political systems with respect to some types of issuesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;or issue-areasâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and as national political systems with respect to others... [this] is consistent with mounting evidence that the functioning of any type of political system can vary significantly from one issue-area to another. Data descriptive of local, party, legislative, national and international systems are converging around the finding that different types of issue-areas elicit different sets of motives on the part of different actors in a political system, that different system members are thus activated in different issue-areas, and that the different interaction patterns which result from these variations produce different degrees of stability and coherence for each of the issue-areas in which systemic processes are operative.36 T h u s a key element in Rosenau's conceptualization is his rejection of the independence of national and international political systems and his emphasis o n their 'linkage' as a unit of analysis. Rosenau defined linkage as 'any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another', and he thus aims to analyse both the influence of domestic politics on international systems as well as the influence of the latter o n the former. 37 In January 1966 the Center of International Studies of Princeton University convened a two-day conference o n 'linkage theory'. Three years later, eleven papers attempting to explain foreign policy-making, based o n Rosenau's framework of national-international linkages, were published.38 But the framework never developed in the literature beyond this point.39 Rosenau himself admits that after trying 'the linkage strategy . . . [he] found it wanting . . . [for] a theoretical breakthrough did not occur, and the walls of our conceptual jail remain as solid as ever'.40 Consequently, R o s e n a u felt justified in moving o n and developing yet another 'escape route' from the present 'conceptual jail' in foreign-policy analysis: the m o d e l of 'national adaptation' or 'adaptive actor strategy'. T h e conceptual basis of the n e w model is described as follows:
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Any foreign policy behavior undertaken by the government of any national society is conceived to be adaptive when it copes with or stimulates changes in the external environment of the society that contribute to keeping the essential structures of the society within acceptable limits. A behavior is regarded as maladaptive when it copes with or stimulates changes in the external environment that contribute to changes in the essential structures that are outside acceptable limits. By essential structures w e mean these interrelated patterns that constitute the basic political, economic and social life of a national society. By acceptable limits w e mean those variations in the essential structures that do not prevent the society from maintaining its basic forms of life or from altering these forms through its own choices and procedures.41 T h o u g h Rosenau insists that his n e w 'national adaptation' model is not unrelated to his previous 'linkage framework', one imagines that the n e w model runs counter to his original idea of the relative independence of issue areas in foreign policy. This indeed is the problem in evaluating Rosenau's work: in spite of his prolific writings o n the subject he has not stuck to the elaboration of a unified operational model for the analysis of foreign policy. O f course Rosenau has gone beyond the establishment of pure taxonomies and directed his attention not only to the relationship a m o n g foreign-policy variables but also to their hierarchy according to the kind of polity. This shows that Rosenau (at least) realizes the untenability of the assumption of actors as freely interchangeable. Yet Rosenau did not go beyond the elaboration of some concepts in order to link them into a coherent theoretical system. For instance, in the 1966 Princeton Conference, he proposed that colleagues apply his 'linkage framework' based on a matrix of 144 cells which would indicate the points at which national-international linkages might be found. But, as he himself admits, 'only a few vague clues were offered as to the p h e n o m e n a the investigator could find in each cell and as to h o w he should proceed u p o n having uncovered them' .42 N o t surprisingly, the result was 'the failure of the linkage strategy . . . [which] stemmed from . . . m y o w n failure to provide any theoretical substance to the 144 types of linkage that formed the basis of the strategy'. In addition to 'barrenness of theory', Rosenau's foreign-policy variables are not operationalized, and some foreign-policy scholars find them both ambiguous and overlapping. Moreover, because Rosenau assumes that any foreign-policy behaviour can be explained on the basis of thefivesets of variables (see Table 1), s o m e important distinctions are missed. For example, students of comparative politics and others emphasize the importance of problems of social change and 'modernization' amongst third-world actors,43 yet in the Rosenau model these issues are all buried amid a host of other non-governmental sets of variables. In other words, the distinction between third-world actors—where these issues are basic—and other actors—where these issues are not so basic—is at least blurred. O n e can suspect here that the interchangeable actors assumption is not duly questioned, and that
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the model's empirical relevance is centred o n developed polities and perhaps even on the United States alone. For lack of space, but also because Rosenau's n e w 'national adaptation' model is still evolving and incomplete," w e cannot discuss it in detail here. Suffice it to say that: First, there are the usual problems of theory-building and operationalization. A s Rosenau candidly states: That the concept of adaptation poses a serious obstacle to a theoretical breakthrough is demonstrated by the results of a search for meaningful formulations of it in other disciplines. There is a paucity of general definitions of adaptation, and virtually no operational definitions can be found. Hardly less scant are abstract models that set forth basic principles believed to govern the behavior of adaptive organisms. The search yielded a tendency to use the term in loose, contradictory, and undefined ways, as if each external challenge to an organism posed a different adaptive problem that was solved through a different adaptive process with different adaptive consequences. Indeed, in one especially ambitious formulation, twenty different types of adaptation were identified in such a way that often the word was used to define itself, as if merely labeling a phenomenon as adaptive gives it meaning. 45 T h o u g h one hopes that Rosenau's awareness of these problems might help h i m to avoid them, a detailed analysis of the 'national-adaptation' model stated that it is characterized by conceptual confusion.48 Moreover, the data-based assessment of 'behavioural' international-relations research concluded that 'the organizing concept of adaptation . . . is primarily a restatement of the concept of national interest',47 which Rosenau himself severely criticized. Is comparative foreign-policy research, then, back to square one? Second, the organizing concept of adaptation, i.e. the basis of the model, is believed to be strongly biased in favour of introducing subjective evaluation, heavy moralistic and judgemental overtones which would impede its employment as a scientific concept. In Rosenau's statement of the model, one in fact encounters words like 'acceptable', 'benefit', etc.48 Third, m o r e serious, however, is the fact that the model smacks of structuralfunctional analysis which has been the accepted orthodoxy in the other social sciences and the methodological-conceptual shortcomings of which are increasingly criticized.49
The search for an alternative A n applicable alternative should be based o n the postulate of complementarity between model-building and empirical relevance. Consequently, this alternative should take as its starting-point of conceptualization, not the frame of reference of
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other (developed) actors, but the perspective and the specific situation of thirdworld actors.60 It is here that situational analysisâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;as used in sociology, anthropology and social psychologyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;can be of immense help in thefieldof foreign-policy analysis. David Easton referred to 'situational analysis' w h e n he started his 'Inquiry into the State of Political Science'61 as early as 1953. At that time, Easton remarked that few scholars use the concept of 'situation' deliberately and clearly and 'yet the ideas underlying it constantly appear'. Simply defined, 'situational analysis' stipulates that the action or behaviour of an actor is a function of the situation he confronts. Yet this seemingly straightforward definition does not eliminate all problems, for the dilemma has arisen about whether this 'situation' is internal or external to the actor, 'subjective' or 'objective'. Psychologists, typically, tend to emphasize the personality variables in the definition of the situation; the policy-maker acts 'not on the basis of [objective] surrounding forces but on the basis of the [subjective] integration he has fashioned'.62 Sociologists, o n the other hand, tend to emphasize the confluence of external or outer forces that act upon the actor, i.e. societal determinants in the definition of the situation. This paper suggests that this is a false dilemma, as false as the polarization dilemma of 'holistic' versus 'atomistic' approaches in m o d e r n social theory.53 In other words, one does not have to choose between the subjective and objective determinants in the definition of the situation but can emphasize one aspect rather than the other. This difference in emphasis is an empirical question and cannot, of course, be decided a priori or in absolute terms. Conceptually, then, one can only adhere to the principle that subjective and objective aspects of the situation are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. In this case w e can reiterate our definition provided at the beginning of this section and express it, with K . Lewin, 6 4 in terms of an equation:
B = F(AE) where behaviour (B) is a function (F) of the interaction between the actor (^4) and his environment (ÂŁ). In this equation then both the actor and the environment are viewed as two sets of mutually dependent variables. There is a bias in this definition of situational analysis; it puts the emphasis on the 'constellation of interdependent factors' as perceived by the national actor. Thus the policy-maker's perception could become the important variable influencing his country's foreign policy. But this bias can be justified in two ways: (a) if m e n define situations as real, they are real in their consequences; (b) this is especially applicable in the case of active third-world actors, whose foreign policy-making process is dominated by 'charismatic' personalities. W e will c o m e to this point later, for w e have n o w to specify the 'components of the situation' which determine the foreign policy of our actors. A s indicated, and in order to prevent the treatment from being one-sided, the situational
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components or variables have to be multi-level and thus embrace the domestic political subsystem, the international system, as well as the personality variables of the policy-maker. Social mobilization, economic development and systemic strain A characteristic of the domestic component of the situation of these actors is the pressure of social change, leading to strain not only in the political subsystem but in the social system as a whole. Deutsch, for instance, has operationalized this concept of social change by translating it into quantifiable indicators and establishing an over-all index to see the effect of the process on political behaviour. H e used the concept of social mobilization rather than social change, and defined it as the name given to an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life. It denotes a concept which brackets together a number of more specific processes of change, such as changes of residence, or occupation, of social setting, of face-to-face associates, of institutions, roles, and ways of acting, of experiences and expectations, andfinallyof personal memories, habits and needs, including the need for new patterns of groups affiliation and new images of personal identity. Singly, and even more in their cumulative impact, these changes tend to influence and sometimes to transform political behavior.55 A s Deutsch clearly implies, this over-all process of social change is universal both in time and space. But there are two (interdependent) characteristics peculiar to the process in third-world States. First, perhaps because of increased communication and a demonstration effect, the rate of change in these States is very fast. If w e take C . Black's criterion of the time that the 'consolidation of modernizing leadership' took as the measure of this rate of change, 66 w e find that in England (Black's first modernizer) the process stretched from 1649 to 1832 (183 years), and in the] United States (Black's second modernizer) from 1776 to 1863 (89 years). But for thirteen countries which entered this phase of consolidation of modernizing leadership during the Napoleonic period, the average time was only seventy-three years.57 A m o n g thirdworld actors, Egypt took thirty years, India twenty-eight and Indonesia twentyseven. N o r are these States untypical examples, as for twenty-one of the twenty-six countries which began this consolidation of modernizing leadership during the first quarter of the twentieth century and had emerged by the 1960s, the average was only twenty-nine years. Deutsch confirms this acceleration in the rate of social change for he estimates that 'during the 19th century the principal indicators of social mobililization in modernizing countries changed at about the rate of 0.1 % per year, while in 20th century modernizing countries they change at about the rate of 1 % per year' ,68
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Second, these countries meet the problems of social change, national integration, centralization of authority, economic development, political participation, or social welfare simultaneously rather than sequentially. The result of this rapid and all-pervasive process of social change in the developing countries of today is political instability. This correlational relationship is based on D . Lerner's theorem. 69 Social satisfactions -——, : — = systemic frustration Social expectations and also corresponds to the Feierabends' and Huntington's empirical findings.60 If w e take one indicator of social mobilization, education, and see its effect on political instability it is found that for seventy countries the correlation between the rate of change in primary enrolment and political instability w a s sixty-one. According to the Feierabend-Nesvold-Conroe index, Sri Lanka—where the school system expanded rapidly—witnessed instability increasing from 3 : 012 during 1948-54 to 4 : 089 for 1955-62. 61 N o r is the positive correlation between social mobilization and political instability weakened if w e take another indicator: the rate of literacy. If w e compare two countries, Ethiopia and B u r m a , which had equally low per capita incomes in the 1950s, the relative stability of Ethiopia compared to B u r m a reflected (at least partially) the fact that whereas in Ethiopia less than 5 per cent were literates, in B u r m a the percentage was 45 per cent. Burma's situation is not an untypical sample of the seemingly paradoxical but c o m m o n one of a country in which skilled labour is a scarce resource, but highly educated persons are in superabundant supply. Perhaps economic development can solve this dilemma of rising literacy coupled with increasing political instability since it is supposed to increase the capacity of the political subsystem to satisfy the rising level of expectations. Yet m a n y economists d o not think so and emphasize 'Rapid G r o w t h as a Destabilising Force', 62 at least beyond a certain subsistence level. It is mainly because of the pressure of social change and the primacy of systemic strain that a plausible hypothesis is to be based on the societal function of foreign policy in third-world actors. N e w states achieve juridical recognition of statehood far in advance of their capacities to perform as states. This is the salient fact to hold in mind when analysing the foreign policy of a new state. For frequently, foreign policy is recruited to the state-building task—or is intimately affected by the immensity of that task.63 G o o d in fact went as far as to consider the foreign policy of a n e w State 'domestic policy pursued by other means: it is domestic policy carried beyond the
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boundaries of the state'. T h e utility of these 'hypotheses' was perhaps limited because the author did not provide 'hard data'. This job was performed by Michael Haas w h o collected the data to test the correlation hypothesis between systemic strain and foreign-policy behaviour. In his study on a sample often countries and nine indicators for the period 1900-61, H a a s dealt with the degree of correlation between 'Social Change and National Aggressiveness'.64 In spite of the small size and 'skewness' of the sample which limit the validity of the study, H a a s ventures the following proposition: 'Internal malintegration of rural countries encourages decision-makers to display non-aligned, non-involved and only occasionally warlike patterns of behavior.' H a a s has thus provided a theoretical-empirical basis, which can be built on in order to 'retest' his proposition as far as third-world actors are concerned. For this purpose, rather than using primarily individual-oriented indicators (for example Haas' homicide, suicide, alcoholism) one can use more system-oriented indicators directly related to the measurement of systemic strain, for example protest demonstrations, riots, number of deaths from domestic violence, governmental sanctions, frequency of cabinet changes. N o t only d o these indicators enjoy superior validity in measuring political instability, but also data about them should be more easily available for third-world actors. Perception of, and position in, the international system Alongside the (domestic) systemic strain, there is the other major determinant in the third-world actors' 'definition of the situation': their perception of the general structure and functioning of the international system. This perception is based on their situation in the system, for theirs is a position of demanders of 'aid', of economic dependence and frequently of political subordination. This relationship of subordination-superordination,86 dependence-dominance or periphery-centre is typical of a system of social stratification. W h a t determines or changes the position of an actor in this stratified system? Sociological theory on social stratification divides the criteria determining the actor's position into two categories: (a) objective material criteria (for example material wealth), and (b) subjective criteria (for example deference, esteem). Adapting these sociological formulations to our specific concerns as students of foreign-policy analysis, w e can decide on three criteria that determine the actor's position in the international system: 1. Level of socio-economic development: this criterion can be easily translated into measurable indicators (for example G N P , economic ranking, literacy rate, physicians per million inhabitants, etc.). 2. Level of military capabilities (such as technological advance, percentage of world military expenditures, etc.). There remains a third (subjective) criteria which is: 3. Prestige, defined as essentially 'a sentiment in the minds of m e n that is
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expressed in . . . [intergroup] interaction'. Prestige is thus the image that one has of an actor, w h e n this image is associated with a positive evaluation, i.e. imbued with social esteem, honour or admiration.66 T h o u g h a national actor might occupy the same position on each of these three ranking criteria, this need not be the case. In fact, the relative positions of the actor on each of these scalar criteria might well not coincide. That is w h y the actor's status-set is the s u m of adding distinct positions on the objective-material criteria (socio-economic development and military capability which establish a 'measurable scale of social differentiation a m o n g national actors, for example big v. small, developed v. developing, rich v. poor) and the subjective one (i.e. social ranking of the national actor according to the prestige that is conferred on him by the system's members). Applying these theoretical formulations to the position of developing actors within the stratified international system, there is a point to be emphasized. T h e norms of the international system (for example as incorporated in international law or in the United Nations Charter) bestow formal equality of status o n all m e m b e r s of the system. Yet looking at the ranking of third-world actors along the easily measurable, material criteria of stratification, w e find that they occupy a low status. Moreover, if the discrepancy between their formal and real status is not halted, it will end by affecting the third criteria of the status-set, i.e. prestige. In other words, the continuation of this discrepancy will result in a process of atimiaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the deterioration or loss of status. Thus the fear of atimia, the need for recognition,67 and the awareness of underdevelopment constitute crucial variables of their 'definition of the situation'. This atimic process can be halted through a deliberate policy to modify the actor's position on, for instance, the material criteria of ranking: socio-economic development or technological advance, but these are long-term processes. N o t only are actors aware of their incapacity to modify their (low) ranking on the material criteria of status in the immediate future, but also, because of the scientifictechnological revolution and mass communication leading to global interaction within the contemporary international system, third-world actors are frequently reminded of the distance separating them from the developed actors. This is w h y a specific form of (foreign-policy) orientation toward the international system can try to consolidate the third criteria of ranking (esteem, prestige). Consequently, another plausible hypothesis is: third-world actors' perceptions of the structure of the international system, of the norms governing its functioning, and their position in it have determined their foreign-policy orientation of national self-assertion through nonalignment. Indeed, 'when the scales are evenly balanced', Nehru said, 'even a single country can m a k e a difference'. India's influence and prestige during the settlement of the Korean conflict were disproportionate to its level of socio-economic development or military capability.68 A n d if the size of aid given by the two super-powers can be used as an indicator of
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the international importance of a certain developing actor, India and Egypt received the greatest amount of Soviet aid a m o n g third-world actors ($1,011 and $1,022 million respectively). Moreover, United States economic aid to Egypt amounted to $945 million and to India $4,893 million (compared with $2,360 million, the amount given to a m e m b e r of the Western alliance system, Pakistan).69 If the number of diplomats received in the national capital is another indicator of influence or prestige, Egypt received 559 diplomats, India 530, compared to Pakistan's 321. Even countries plotted higher o n material criteria of ranking, such as Switzerland, Sweden, D e n m a r k or Czechoslovakia, received 315, 287, 231, 321, respectively.70 Other examples could be mentioned to illustrate h o w third-world actorsperception of the international system, their position in this 'stratified' system, and their fear of the atimic process determine their foreign-policy orientation. But it is time n o w to deal with the problem of linking our proposed dual-level foreign policy determinants (position in the international system and internal systemic strain). This will be done through role analysis. National role conceptions Methodologically, this role variable links the global systemic to societal determinants of foreign policy, since foreign policy-makers occupy the middle position linking the international system to the national (sub) system. National role conceptions as a focus of conceptualization in foreign-policy analysis can perform another function. Since observers and international organizations group countries as diverse as India, Malawi, Saudi Arabia and Ecuador under one category labelled 'third world', developing, underdeveloped, less-developed (depending o n one's preference), it is assumed that members of this category share c o m m o n attributes. W e have tried to identify these c o m m o n attributes as regards their position in the international system and the structure of their social (sub) systems in order to link them to their c o m m o n foreign-policy orientation (for example nonalignment). But one need not be a specialist on African politics, for instance, to notice the wide differences between the Ivory Coast and Algeria in their foreign-policy behaviour (as distinguished from foreign-policy orientation). Specific national role conception must explain specific foreign-policy behaviour.71 Theorists of international relations, historians and even policy officials72 thought and think of members of the international system as nonaligned, 'balancers', bloc participants, bloc leaders, 'satellites'â&#x20AC;&#x201D;properties which denote certain role prescriptions. However, no conceptualization in terms of role analysis was offered by these specialists. This is w h y w e have found it necessary to borrow contributions from the other social sciences as was the case with the concept of stratification and indeed the general model of situational analysis. The application of the role concept in foreign-policy analysis helps to answer
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m a n y of the 'relevant' questions. For instance, what is the policy-maker's conception of his country's national role? Does 'nonaligned' adequately delineate all the roles and functions which the leaders of Afghanistan, B u r m a , Senegal or Guinea perceive their States fulfilling in different sets of relationships or indicate their important differences of perception? Is a government's behaviour committed only to a certain role or to a multiplicity of roles? Is there a 'role-strain' or 'roleconflict' in foreign policy-making and what is its effect o n actual foreign-policy behaviour? H o w does the formation of the foreign-policy ĂŠlite, the w a y of acquiring independence, public-opinion ' m o o d ' , technical and economic resources, national values or ideologies, mass movements and interest groups affect the policy-maker's national role conceptions? H o w m u c h correlation is there between declared national role conceptions and actual national role performance? T h e easily available foreign-policy statements of the actor's top leadership (for example general foreign-policy reviews, speeches at the United Nations General Assembly, and statements from government-'guided' mass media) help to answer m a n y of these questions. This is generally the research strategy Holsti used in studying the different national role conceptions of about seventy-one actors in the contemporary international system in the three-year period from January 1965 to December 1967. The analysis of the 972 sources resulted in a typology of 17 national role conceptions arranged along an activity-passivity continuum ranging from 'bastion of revolution' to 'protectee'. T h o u g h Holsti was not specifically concerned with third-world m e m b e r s he did not mention research difficulties in finding data. In fact, one might surmise that research through role analysis might be even easier for third-world States than for developed ones. In the former a 'charismatic' leader tends to play a monopolistic part in the definition of the national role conception and in the policy-making process, with little possibility that he will be contradicted by other high officials. In other words, sources of national role conceptions would not be dispersed a m o n g the statements of m a n y different personalities as is the case in the highly differentiated, bureaucratically complex organizations of developed actors. Indeed, m a n y scholars examining the politics of the third world have emphasized this 'personalized' aspect of the policy-making process, and link it not only to present societal characteristics of these actors, but also to their age-old cultural traditions and religious precepts. Thus, for instance, it was found that Islamic constitutional theory emphasizes as its sole important proposition the personal qualifications of the ruler. Therefore, 'most Islamic constitutional lawyers, in speaking of political leadership, emphasized specific personal qualifications. This emphasis w a s closely connected throughout Islamic history with military ability and prominence. There was rarely any serious discussion of checks to be placed u p o n the ruler, so he came to be accepted as the law-maker, dispenser of justice and chief executive.' If the leader combines with these personal qualities effective control over the sources of physical force (i.e. military leadership) his
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position is even stronger. These factors, then, help to explain w h y 'the type of leadership has always been more important in Arab-Islamic societies (e.g. Kassem in Iraq, or Khadafi in Libya) than the type of political institutions', and w h y 'a charismatic leader is more important in Egyptian politics than the mechanisms, checks and balances that loom large in Western political practice'. Precisely, the pattern of policy-making in Nasser's Egypt can be cited as a revealing example. Indeed there was a National Assembly, but it only recorded 'its approval of [foreign] policies already decreed by the executive', and indeed there w a s a cabinet, but cabinet status w a s not the most important criteria for collaboration in policymaking; for President Nasser continued 'to m a k e policy in consultation with a core of Free Officers closest and most loyal to h i m but not necessarily with their real participation1 (italics added). Moreover, President Nasser w a s 'not constitutionally responsible to any institutional checks u p o n his authority'.73 While this hypothetical positive correlation between a 'personalized' policymaking process and an Arab-Islamic culture merits further testing, w e must none the less agree that this 'personalized' policy-making process is not limited to Arab-Muslim m e m b e r s of the third world. F o r it w a s found that international relations in the n e w Africa follow the same pattern. T h u s the decision-making process . . . is focused on the president and the presidency. The declarations of the president become the national ideology, consecrated into "-isms" formed on the leader's nameâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;such as Bourgibism, Nkrumahism, and ben Bellaism. Specific, even minute decisions are made by the President. . . . His anger and his ardor, his whims and his convictions become the m o o d of his country's policy, and his friendships and acquaintances mark its limits. W h e n the chief is absentâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;he must attend conferences and take vacationsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;or occupied with other problems, the progress of African relations awaits his return, for there is no alternative person or institution qualified to handle them. . . . O n the other hand, because of the personal nature of decisions, short-term bursts of energy, rapid action, and equally rapid changes are also possible. Within this pattern of relations and decisions, the roles and influence of all other groups and institutions work through the presidency and must be seen primarily as modifications of the rule of centralised personalised power. 74 N o r is the pattern of a 'personalized' foreign-policy-making process reversed, as one might imagine, in those third-world countries which still apply substantially a form of the Western democracy model. Thus in the Indian multi-party political system which is supposed to check and restrain personal monopoly of the foreignpolicy-making process, Nehru remained supreme. The influence of a Foreign Minister varies widely from one state to another. Nowhere does one m a n dominate foreign policy as does Nehru in India. Indeed, Nehru is the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the
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outside world. This does not mean that he is entirely a free agent. It does mean, however, that he has impressed his personality and his views with such effect that foreign policy may properly be termed a private monopoly. . . ." It is because of the importance of this 'personalized' policy-making process in these actors that it is m o r e appropriate to talk about a situation-role m o d e l , " rather than simply 'situational analysis'. This article has dealt with some of the specific deficiencies in thefieldof foreignpolicy analysis, especially as regards third-world actors. T h e proposed alternative model is based on a sort of empathy, for it takes as starting-point the frame of reference of the third-world actors, focuses conceptualization on their 'situation' and attempts operationalization of some specific components of this situation; (sub) systemic strain, position in a stratified international system, and national role conceptions. Moreover, this model offers a w a y to build upon the contributions of other approaches to foreign-policy analysis, while helping to minimize their drawbacks. T h e situation-role model advocated here is superior, for it contributes not only to the improvement of foreign-policy analysis but also to the development of the study of international relations, in t w o ways: First, students of international relations are mainly interested in the structure and functioning of past and contemporary international systems, and they use a m o d e of systems analysis to meet their concerns. But this m o d e of analysis 'tends to regard behavior as a reflection of the characteristics of a social system containing a series of impersonal processes which are external to the actors and constrain them'." In emphasizing the situation-role model, students of foreign policy are attracting attention to the fact that the assumption of interchangeability a m o n g the actors of the international system isâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;beyond a certain pointâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;dysfunctional. In this w a y the student of foreign policy is contributing to balance the picture offered by the student of international systems, and that is by seeking to underline the fact that the actor does not merely react to the 'machine-like character', or 'mechanical laws' of the system, but that rather it has its o w n objectives, its o w n perception of 'reality' and both determine its means-end formula. Second, the treatment of this means-end formula would not be primarily (as the decision-making model advises) through the detailed inquiry into 'the decision-making processes of a single government in one brief, atypical scene (usually crisis situation)', which would not, in any case, be of m u c h interest to the student of the theory of international relations. The latter's interest is international systems, and he is thus concerned with 'the typical behavior of all states over a considerable period of time, changes in critical variables and the totality of foreign policy decisions and actions conceived as resulting in identifiable interaction patterns'. The situation-role model, through its emphasis on the actor's general
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orientation and type of commitments as well as his actions, attains a level of generality appropriate for both foreign-policy frameworks and internationalsystems studies. Thus in foreign-policy analysis, it can be used as the dependent variable explaining the actor's output (i.e. his foreign-policy orientation and/or behaviour) which is—for the student of international systems—one input or independent variable in international systems analysis.78 With such multi-level, empirically relevant 'linkages' and refinements, let us hope to m o v e from a semi-eternalized tradition of 'heuristic' studies o n to the conceptual questions and data-based answers which would bring us nearer to a cumulative science of international relations.
Notes 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10
Since the subject is wide and largely uninvestigated, limitations of a practical order have to be imposed. Consequently, a m o n g 'third-world' members I a m centring m y analysis on the 1 1 12 nonaligned States since they form the majority (seventy-six States at the Fourth Nonaligned Summit, Algeria, September 1973) and are also supposed to represent—by definition— 'independent' foreign policy. Franklin Weinstein, 'The Use of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: A n Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries', World Politics, Vol. X X I V , 1972, 13 p. 356-82. Scott T h o m p s o n , Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-66, Princeton, N . J . , Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 415. William Zartmann, International Relations in the1 4 New Africa, Englewood Cliffs, N . J . , PrenticeHall, 1966, p . 54. 15 William Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy, C a m bridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963. Roger Smith, Cambodia's Foreign Policy, Ithaca, N . Y . , Cornell University Press, 1965. Claude Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, Evanston, 111., Northwestern University Press, 1964, also falls in this category. R o y Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics, Englewood Cliffs, N . J . , Prentice-Hall, 1958, p. 1-9. 16 Joseph Black and Kenneth T h o m p s o n (eds.), Foreign Policies in a World of Change, N e w 17 Y o r k , N . Y . , Harper & R o w , 1963, p. 1-22. 1 9 19 Macridis, op. cit. 20 James N . Rosenau, 'Pre-Theories and Theories of 21 Foreign Policy', in R . Barry Farrel (ed.),
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evanston, 111., Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 27-93. Macridis, op. cit., 1962 (2nd ed.). Richard Snyder, H . W . Brück and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, N e w York, N . Y . , T h e Free Press, 1962. Though the most well-known work in this field, the work of Snyder et al. is not the only one. Joseph Frankel has written an important book: The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making, London, Oxford University Press, 1963. James Robinson, 'Decision-Making: Political A s pects', International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, op. cit., Vol. 4, p . 55-62. Also Snyder et al., op. cit., p . vi. Herbert McClosky, 'Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Polities', World Politics, Vol. VII, January 1956, p . 281-95. Dina Zonnes, Robert North and H o w a r d K o c h Jr., 'Capability, Threat and T h e Outbreak of W a r ' , in James Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , The Free Press, 1961, p . 469-83. For a c o m m e n t on the Stanford project, see Robert Jervis, 'The Costs of The Quantitative Study of International Relations', in Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (eds.), Contenting Approaches to International Politics, Princeton, N . J . , Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 177-218. Snyder et al., o p . cit., p. 60-74. ibid., p . 90. ibid., p . 106-24. ibid., p . 124-37. ibid., p . 137-53. McClosky, op. cit.
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Notes (.continued) 22 23 21 26 26
27 28 29
30
31
32
33 34 35
36
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41 op. cit., p . 65. 42 ibid., p . 60-74. 43 ibid. McClosky, op. cit. Paige, The Korean Decision, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , Praeger, 1968. Weinstein, o p . cit. ibid. Written materialâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;even if easily availableâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;might not be sufficient to reveal the exact m e m b e r 44 ship of the decision-making group. ibid. Moreover, 'content analysis of written c o m munications, for example, would have an imperceptible statistical base w h e n dealing with a state which has traditionally not m a d e very m u c h use of written materials'. Abdul A . Said, 'The Impact of the Emergence of the N o n - W e s t U p o n Theories of International Relations', in Abdul Said (ed.), Theory of International Relations, Englewood Cliffs, 45 N . J . , Prentice-Hall, 1968, p . 93-107. For the evolution of Rosenau's conceptualization, 46 see his collection of writings in James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , T h e Free Press, 1971. Rosenau, 'Pre-Theories. . . .', in Farrel, Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, op. cit., p . 40. 47 ibid., p . 4 3 . ibid., p . 65. Robert Dahl, Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City, N e w Haven, C o n n . , 48 Yale University Press, 1961. Rosenau, 'Pre-Theories. . . .', in Farrel, Approaches to Comparative and International 4 9 Politics, op. cit., p . 71. For an insightful treatment of this problem by various social scientists, see Herbert K e l m a n (ed.), International Behaviour: A SocialPsychological Analysis, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965. James Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , The Free Press, 1969. See, however, Stephen Hoadley and Sukehiro Hasegawa, 'Sino Japanese Relations 1950-1970: A n Application of the Linkage M o d e l of International Polities', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. X V , 1971, p . 131-59. James Rosenau, 'Adaptive Strategies for Research and Practice in Foreign Policy', in Fred Riggs (ed.), International Studies, American A c a d e m y of Political and Social Science, October 1971, p. 218^16.
ibid., p . 239^*0. Rosenau, Linkage Politics, o p . cit., p . 16. For an attempt to analyse international relations as it is influenced by 'modernization' within national actors, see J. P . Nettl and Roland R o bertson, International Systems and the Modernization of Societies, L o n d o n , Faber, 1968. T h e originality of the study lies in its objective to apply 'hitherto neglected sociological theory to international relations'. With a group of colleagues, Rosenau is working in the Inter-University Comparative Foreign Policy Project for operationalization and datacollection to test the model. Moreover, he is at present completing a projected manuscript, 'The Politics of National Adaptation', which was summarized in his Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political System Behavior and Transformation, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , McCaleb-Seiler, 1970. Rosenau, 'Adaptive Strategies. . . .', o p . cit., p . 235-6. Walter Carlsnaes, 'International Interaction and Foreign Policy: A Critique of James N . Rosenau's Model of National Adaptation', a paper presented to the E C P R W o r k s h o p on ' Models of International Relations' (Mannheim, G e r m a n y , April 1973). John Handelman, et al., 'Color it Morgenthau', Prince Research Studies, Paper N o . 11, International Relations P r o g r a m m e , Maxwell School, Syracuse University. Frederick Frey, 'Area Studies: A Commentary', in Riggs, International Studies, op. cit., p. 254-67. Structural-functional analysis has been 'imported' to the analysis of 'third-world' political systems through Gabriel A l m o n d and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, N . J . , Princeton University Press, 1960, and especially Almond's framework: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics, p . 3-65. For a discussion of Almond's framework as well as of the application of structural-functional analysis in political science, see R o y Jones, The Functional Analysis of Politics, L o n d o n , Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967. For a m o r e general discussion of structural-functional analysis in anthropology, economics, sociology and also political science, see D o n Martindale, Functionalism in the Social Sciences, Philadelphia, T h e American Academy of Political and Social Science, Monograph 5, 1965. For a recent and lengthy criticism of Parsons' model of structural-functional analysis, see Alvin Gouldner,
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Notes {continued)
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
68 59
60
61 82
63
The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, L o n don, Heinemann, 1971, especially p. 138-341. 64 For the nearest approximation to the m o d e of conceptualization adopted here see Georges Balandier, Sociologie Actuelle de l'Afrique Noire, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1963 (2nd ed.), especially p. 3-39. This is the sub-title of David Easton's The Political System, N e w York, N . Y . , Knopf, 1953. A s expressed by Gordon Allport in 'Prejudice: A 65 Problem in Psychological and Social Causation', in Talcott Parsons and Edward A . Shils (eds.), Toward A General Theory of Action, N e w York, N . Y . , Harper & R o w , 1962, Torchbook edition, p. 365-87. In politi66 cal science, Easton dealt with psychological and sociological approaches to the 'definition of the situation'. Easton, op. cit., p . 152, 194. Percy Cohen, Modern Social Theory, L o n d o n , 67 Heinemann, 1968, p . 13-15. Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science (edited by D . Cartwright), N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , Harper & Brothers, 1951, especially Chapter 10. Karl Deutsch, 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', The American Political Science Review, Vol. L V , 1961, p . 493-514. Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, N e w York, N . Y . , Harper Torchbook, 1967, p. 67-94. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing 6 8 Societies, N e w Haven, C o n n . , and London, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 46. Deutsch, op. cit. Daniel Lerner, 'Modernization', in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 10, p . 386-95. Also, The Passing of 6 9 Traditional Society, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , T h e Free Press, 1958. Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend, et al., 'Level of Development and International Behavior', in Foreign Policy and The Developing Nation (edited by Richard Rutwell), Lexington, K y , 7 0 University Press of Kentucky, 1966, p . 13589. Huntington, op. cit., p . 47. Huntington, op. cit., p. 47-8. This is the title of Mancur Olson Jr.'s article, Journal of Economic History, XXIII, December 1963, p. 529-52. Robert G o o d , 'State-Building as a Determinant of 71 Foreign Policy in The N e w States', in Laurence Martin (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment, N e w York, N . Y . , Praeger, 1962, p. 3-13. G o o d deals with other societal determinants, for example recent colonial rule, search for identity, governmental consoli-
dation which, unfortunately, w e cannot treat separately here. This is the title of Michael Haas' article in J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , The Free Press, 1968, p. 215-47. Haas' concerns are similar to ours in emphasizing the linkage between the national and international systemic levels: do States' foreign policies reflect social and cultural conditions within borders? T h e subordination-superordination relationship makes the transferring of the class-conflict concept to the international level very plausible, and Sekou Toure, for once, has adopted this point of view. Gustavo Lagos, International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries, Chapel Hill, N . C . , The University of North Carolina Press, 1963, p . 132. In the first international conference organized by Asians, the Asian Relations Conference (Delhi, March 1947), Nehru expressed this need for recognition: 'For too long', he said, 'have w e of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. . . . That story must n o w belong to the past. . . . W e do not intend to be the playthings of others.' See Michael Brecher, Nehru, L o n d o n , Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 129. For a treatment of India's role in the Korean conflict, see Baghat Korany and N a g y Tawfik, 'Nonalignment: its Conflict-reducing Function in the International System', Annals of International Studies, Vol. Ill, 1972, p . 47-84. Dates for United States aid are 1958-63, and for Soviet aid 1954/5-65. Charles Taylor and Michael H u d s o n , et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, N e w Haven, C o n n . , Yale University Press, 1972 (2nd ed.), p . 36-65. Chadwick Alger and Steven Brams, 'Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations', World Politics, Vol. X I X , 1967, p . 646-63. Also Taylor and Hudson, World Handbook, p . 357-9. Dates for all data are 1963-64 (number of countries: 102, the m e a n 224, standard deviation 228, range 1,400). For instance the difference between Mehru's conception of India's role and Sukarno's conception of Indonesia's role. For a discussion of the latter, see George Modelski (ed.). The New Emerging Forces, Canberra, The Australian National University, 1963.
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Notes (continued) Not only implicitly, but also explicitly third-world policy-makers have used a national role conception. A n example is this quotation from Nasser: 'For some reason', Nasser said very early in his political career, 'it seems to m e that within the Arab circle, there is a role, wandering aimless in search of a hero. A n d I do not k n o w w h y it seems to m e that this role exhausted by its wanderings, has at last settled d o w n , tired and weary, near the borders of our country and is beckoning to us to m o v e , to assume it as nobody else can do so.' (italics added) The Philosophy of The Revolution (the Arabic edition), Cairo, 1954, p. 62. P . J. Vatikiotis, 'Foreign Policy of Egypt', in R o y C . Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in
74 76
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77
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World Politics (2nd ed.), 1962, op. cit., p. 335-61. Zartmann, op. cit., p. 65. Brecher, Nehru, op. cit., p . 216. See also his treatment of policy-makers' images as a 'the' determinant of foreign policyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;significantly entitled: India and World Politics, Krishna M e n o n ' s View of the World, L o n d o n , Oxford University Press, 1968. A good example from psychology of the 'linkage' between 'role' and 'situation' is Gordon Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality, L o n d o n , Holt, 1963, p. 165-96. David Silverman, The Theory of Organisations, L o n d o n , Heinemann, 1970, p. 141. Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions. . . .', op. cit.
T h e power structure in international relations
Marcos Kaplan The object of this study is to explore possible approaches to, and to put forward a number of suggestions concerning, the formulation of a theoretical and analytical framework and its application to the study of the present power structure in relation to the newly emerging international system. This is of direct relevance for assessing the situation of the Latin American and Third World countries and for devising a possible alternative strategy designed to attain the objectives of internal developmentâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;in the broadest sense of the term, not understood simply as growth, regional integration, national independence and autonomous, meaningful participation in the world system.
Reflections on the 'Theory of dependence' Latin American social scientists have increasingly tended to focus their thinking, research and discussion upon the question of Latin American countries' dependence. This concern has, as a rule, been both warranted and constructive, in view of its relevance to the problems of Latin American development and to the c o m parative assessment of the methods and strategies proposed, and also because of the corrective effect it has had on certain inappropriate approaches to international relations which were employed in analysing the international relations of Latin American countries. In particular, the 'theory of dependence' implicitly challenges the atomistic, mechanistic, and legalistic conception of international relations, according to which the world system is a conglomeration of 140 units, the sovereign nationStates, competing and conflicting with one another for space and resources, and
Marcos Kaplan, an Argentinian political scientist, is professor of political law at the Faculty of Law; visiting professor at the Research Centre for Education Sciences, Buenos Aires; Secretary of the Science and Technology Commission, Latin American Social Science Council (CLACSO). He currently works on science policy issues in developing countries. He has published several books in Spanish and a number of articles in various journals.
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whereby these nation-States are represented as monolithic, as h u m a n groups possessing their o w n clearly identifiable national characteristics, homogeneous in their culture, occupying a recognized geographical area and possessing their o w n political and legal institutions. Political systems and governments are reduced to institutional abstractions, not determined or conditioned by any other factors, and whose sole function is to process inputs and produce socio-economic, socialcultural and socio-political outputs. These outputs, regarded as given, unalterable resultants of other factors, are incorporated into the foreign policy of the State in question, a policy which is different in quality from its domestic policy, and through which it operatesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;by a process of psychological reductionismâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;like a h u m a n individual. Internal matters are regarded as a given quantity, thus creating an analytical dissociation, which tends to be reified, between the internal and external levels. This type of approach, which has underlain and continues to underlie m u c h research in thefieldof international relations, is open to various criticisms, s o m e of which have been taken up by or embodied in the so-called 'theory of dependence'. First, n o nation exactlyfitsthe above configuration of characteristics. There are a host of phenomena which d o not lend themselves to analysis in terms of nation-States or of the relations between them. Taken at their face value, the legal entities are arbitrary and transitory in nature: nations have existed, and still exist, without States of their o w n , just as there are States without nations, i.e. political and administrative areas, extremely heterogeneous and unintegrated, which have remained and remain in existence by predominantly coercive means, both internal and external. T h e interaction of internal and external forces continues, as in the past, to m a k e and u n m a k e nations. Second, a key feature of the world system today is the close interrelationship between the agents, interests, forces and structures of the majority of nations, and of the exchanges between them, trends and processes working towards economic, social, cultural and military integration between States co-existing with trends and processes of disintegration. Third, States are not equal, either in their internal structures and dynamics or in their positions in relation to the world system, nor d o they function or interact as if they were. I therefore consider essential that analysis should not substantiate, but rather reduce to the bare m i n i m u m or even eliminate altogether, the analytical dissociation between the internal domain of the nation-States and that of the international system, and should regard them as quantitatively and not qualitatively different, re-establishing their continuity and coherence and restoring the interrelation and interaction between internal and external dynamics. Once the positive aspect of the 'theory of dependence' is granted, it should be pointed out that most versions of it suffer from certain limitations which m a y result in distortions having an adverse effect u p o n the orientation, content and
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results of the work which has been done, is in progress or is being planned. Excessive concern with this category of problems has been partly responsible for the emergence of theories, analytical frames of reference and diagnoses which distort the apprehension of reality, which over-emphasize external factors to the detriment of internal ones, attributing the former the exclusive role of explaining everything (a role which in turn requires to be explained), which transfer the basic responsibility for the subordinate, backward and critical situation of Latin American (and Third World) countries to the outside, and thereby contribute to the emergence of an over-simplified mechanistic and Manichaean view of the problems involved. O n the one hand, therefore, it seems reasonable to claim that the global system of interdependence, which c a m e into being in the nineteenth century and has been intensified in the twentieth, is asymmetrical in shape, characterized by structural disparities and disparities of placing on the hierarchical scale and in the world system of domination-dependence relations between the developed, central, dominant countries on the one hand, and, on the other, the underdeveloped, marginal, subordinate countries. A s a result of the evolution of the global system, and of the activities of the capitalist metropolitan States and the multinational corporations which use them as their bases of operation, ties of a particular kind have been imposed upon Latin American countries, they have been incorporated into the dynamics of the developed centres and of the world market, which is to a great extent controlled by these centres, and their internal socio-economic, cultural and political structures have been adjusted to conform with external interests, needs and demands. T h e general laws governing the structure and development of the capitalist system as a whole are imposed with decisive effect upon the national communities of Latin America. T h e different phases through which capitalist development is passing in the metropolitan States and indeed throughout the world, and the predominance of one or other of the major powers, affect the pattern and forms of dependence. O n the other hand, although this is a decisive aspect of the question, it is not the only one. External action is not the sole factor which should be taken into account, nor does it operate in a one-sided, direct and mechanical manner, in one direction or indeed in one dimension only. It is a multidimensional and m a n y faceted process. The relationship of dependence is, therefore, one which presupposes two orders of forces, forms and dynamics which are constantly interacting upon one another. This complex, changing relationship is one of the main factors (within the Third World, this is particularly true in the case of Latin America) shaping national communities and States which m a y have existed before the establishment and modification of dependence, with their o w n socio-historical patterns and dynamics, their o w n systems of production, social stratifications, cultural and political patterns, and with specific and at the same time changing interrelations. These internal factors and levels have their o w n inherent existence
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and dynamics. They generate clusters of interests, and determine the varying degrees of relative independence. They interlock and interact with one another and with external factors, which they can influence, indeed to a considerable extent. T h e internal dynamism reflects and embodies the activities of the capitalist metropolitan States and the impact of the international system, but also has its o w n distinctive historical and social features, its o w n particularities and modalities, its circumstances and contingencies. A t the same time, it serves to integrate and to modify the composition, orientation and operation of the external agents, forces and processes. The evolution of internal and external agents and forces, levels and factors does not always proceed at roughly similar or convergent rates, in roughly similar or convergent directions or even with roughly similar or convergent implications. External dependence presupposes the existence of national communities and States, and needs to be established, operated and modified by means of links and alliances between the dominant classes and groups of the metropolitan States and of the dependent country, with the resultant possibility of divergences, tensions and conflicts. In turn, the dominant groups and classes of the dependent countries also establish relations of identity, disparity and conflict of interest with other intermediate or dominated national groups through processes which also at the same time affect, and are affected by, the relationship of dependence. The close, dialectical relationship of internal and external factors, with all its implications and consequences, influences the pattern of socio-economic, cultural and ideological forces and structures, the power structure, the organization and functioning of the political and institutional system and the mechanisms and processes of decision-making, all of which affect the relationship and the dynamics of dependence. Having acknowledged the importance of external relations, particularly in the world of today, in which the trend is towards the 'planetary' scale, one cannot, conversely, overlook the fact that external relations are nevertheless not determinant in an absolute sense. They speed up or slow d o w n , modify or arrest for a time the processes of nation-building and of change in national communities, but are never so powerful as to constitute the sole factor involved. T h e distinctive features of national communities arise both from their o w n history and from their relations with other societies and with the international system. The foregoing observations m a y help to provide a more cogent introduction and a more general framework to the subject of this study. The problems which will be considered below are drawn essentially from the present-day situation. Although it is not possible to devote to them here the detailed attention which they merit, it has been assumed in our discussion of these problems that the international system which has operated since 1945 has been evolving and continues to evolve, passing from the initial phase of bipolarity and 'cold war' to a possible n e w phase in which the bipolar system is breaking d o w n and trends towards multipolarity are emerging.
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The concentration of world power A series of factors and mechanisms, which can be expressed as indicators, explain and define, in quantitative and qualitative terms, the differences between the communities that m a k e u p the international system and the forces and relations that create and perpetuate a hierarchically organized and asymmetrical world. By combining the various interrelated dimensions of power, it is possible to assess the average international power of a country and compare it with that of others. The factors to be considered for this purpose are: the level of development already reached; potentiality for independence and world influence; and the vector sum of these expressed in terms of the hierarchically structured concentration of political power. Level of development already reached Factors and indicators relating to productivity achieved and possibilities of increasing it, to the capacity for expanding the economic surplus, and to living standards are grouped together and considered under this head. These include: Territory (size, location, natural resources). Population (size, density, quality of h u m a n resources). Per capita consumption of electricity or steel. Gross National Product, as a yardstick of total production, wealth, or resources, in absolute terms and without any necessary relation to the quality of h u m a n life. Gini distributions, which seek to measure inequality within the various nations, between them, and throughout the world. They d o not specify w h o obtains what but h o w m a n y obtain h o w m u c h of which things (money, land, cars, radio and television sets, and so on) on a scale that ranges from complete equality to complete inequality. Additional indicators which help to give a picture of the quality of living conditions: expectation of life at birth, infant mortality rate, rural or urban way of life, education and literacy, access to newspapers, radio, mail, 多tc. Other indicators seek to determine and compare life styles, a more descriptive and elusive parameter, particularly dependent on subjective factors such as participation, availability and use of leisure, degree of independence and creativity of individuals, and so on. National integration, assessed in terms of levels and indicators of homogeneity of language, culture, ideology, values and beliefs, attitudes and behaviour patterns; of totals or cross-sections illustrating differences and conflicts; and of the frequency or intensiveness of the use of coercive integration measures. Its value as an expression of the degree of development must vary in accordance with existing conditions with regard to the admissibility and official recognition of group, individual and regional differences.
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Potentiality for independence and world influence Trade and investment. F r o m the economic point of view, the international system increasingly resembles a system of neo-mercantilist relations, operating in favour of the capitalist metropolitan States and their vast business corporations, and taking concrete form in an international division of labour. The Socialist bloc has tended to operate along similar lines within its o w n limits and in other areas where it exerts a strong influence. A country's position in terms of foreign trade and investmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;two factors which are interdependent and reinforce each otherâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;helps to establish its place in the international power pyramid. This can be expressed and evaluated by different elements and indicators: (a) division of the G N P by foreign trade; (b) import coefficient, i.e. value of imports as a percentage of the G N P or of another comparable measure of the total production of goods and services; (c) number of nations with which the country has import and export dealings; (d) use of foreign trade by certain countries to impose conditions on others, to bring their economies within the international circuits that they control, to modify their internal structures, m a k e them specialize, and exploit them; (e) amount of capital invested outside the metropolitan States; proportion of foreign investment to domestic investment; volume of capital accumulated abroad and controlled by corporations in relation to exports from the metropolitan State; metropolitan firms' share of the foreign market in proportion to total domestic production; rate of expansion of the external sector in comparison with the domestic, etc.; (f) rise of the multi-national corporation and its emergence as the main protagonist in the international system, and as a specific factor in producing, spreading and deepening the impact of the classic consequences of foreign investment; specialization which distorts the economy, exploitation and decapitalization, colonial subjugation. In the socialist bloc, this phenomenon has had its equivalent in the mixed enterprises with Soviet participation. Aid. Policies and operations which are usually grouped under the ambiguous title of aid (investment, loans and other forms of credit, donations, technical assistance) constitute an extremely important factor and indicator in the world-wide process of concentration of power. A b o v e and beyond minor differences and the different justifications advanced, the motivations and behaviour of the capitalist and socialist powers are in this respect similar. T h e capitalist powers limit and distort their aid by giving it a predominantly bilateral character and by attaching political strings to it, in keeping with closely connected government and business interests. T h e Socialist powers seek, through trade and foreign aid, to achieve several aims: to obtain goods and services that they cannot or d o not wish to produce at h o m e ; to encourage specialization within C O M E C O N ; and to establish contacts with other countries that will enable the extension of their political, diplomatic and military influence. In the choice of countries as trading partners and recipients of
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assistance, the socialist countries tend, moreover, to prefer small and/or strategically placed countries. Military power. Military power and its world levels of concentration are revealed by indicators such as national defence expenditure and its share of the Gross National Product; present strength and reserve capacity of the armed forces (army, air force and navy); quantity and quality of available armaments and capacity for rapid innovation in this respect; the destructive power that is held and that can be brandished at suitable times. Military force, in turn, gives possibilities the effect of which is to increase the over-all power of the country possessing it, at the level of military force itself and at a great m a n y other levels. Possession of such force, the threat of its use and its actual use confer u p o n a country independence and e n d o w it with a capacity for negotiation, dissuasion and aggression vis-Ă -vis other countries and internationally. All this makes it possible for it to draw into its o w n orbit the military resources of other countries by means of alliances which the dominant powers are in a position to establish, organize and lead. It also facilitates direct intervention in the internal affairs of countries whose political and diplomatic development is considered to endanger the interests of the great power in question. Systems and activities of this nature, with the complex pattern of internal and external expenditure which they entail, serve m a n y purposes which coincide with the interests of the major corporations and governments in developed capitalist countries and of the governing bureaucracy in developed socialist countries. A m o n g such purposes particular mention should be m a d e of: the protection of world sources of raw materials; the safeguarding of foreign markets and investments, and sea and air routes; the preservation of spheres of influence; the finding of new clients and investment opportunities abroad (military aid combined with economic assistance); and, in general, the maintenance or modification of the structure of world markets, of spheres of influence and the balance of power a m o n g the superpowers and between them, the lesser powers and the Third World. Social alliances. The concentration of power, at various interrelated levels, with which this analysis is concerned, enables the metropolitan States to penetrate more deeply and more effectively into relatively less-developed countries, establish links and alliances of various kinds with national classes and groups, and thus set up and maintain the mechanisms and agents of the underdevelopment/dependence syndrome. The United States and the lesser capitalist powers have operated in this w a y in relation to the oligarchic groups in the Third World, considerable sectors a m o n g the middle classes (the traditional type and those that have emerged from developments during recent decades, in particular the new technical and scientific professions, and private and State bureaucracy), and also the working class 'subaristocracy' of skilled workers w h o have found employment in focal points and
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enclaves of foreign investment. The counterpart of this in the other bloc is to be found in the network of c o m m o n interests and the m a n y ties of solidarity that link the top leadership and the political, police and military apparatus of the Soviet Union with the leaders, cadres and bases of the State bureaucracy and party machine in the East European countries. Cultural and ideological power. The superpowers, and the advanced countries in general, have acquired their position, a m o n g other reasons, because of their ability to create a culture of an autonomous, complex and diversified kind, developed in accordance with their specific circumstances and requirements but at the same time possessing a high capacity for permeating and influencing the rest of the world, in particular the Third World. The culture and the ideology of the advanced countries, particularly those of the dominant States, have tended to become the culture and ideology of the dependent and underdeveloped countries. This, in turn, contributes to the concentration of political power in the world, expresses and maintains it, strengthens and justifies it. This has occurred in the capitalist sphere of influence and, under correspondingly different circumstances, within the Soviet bloc. In the Third World countries, the officiai culture and ideology of European and North American capitalism have, in varying degrees and with minor variations, allotted to the upper, middle and working classes (particularly in the towns) the determining elements and influences, the framework and content of their consciousness, their information, attitudes and behaviour patterns. These classes accept and assimilate forms of production and distribution, techniques, knowledge, images, symbols, patterns of consumption, fashions, customs, ideas, educational methods, values, norms, institutions, approaches and policies that are the product of advanced capitalism. T h e mechanisms and agents of this process are, in general, those identified with the system of relations and structures that form part of the w e b of external dependence; more particularly, they include religious sects with headquarters in the developed capitalist countries, the mass media, technical assistance and the educational sub-system. The Soviet leaders have extended to East Europe, and, to a lesser degree, Asian countries and C u b a , the methods and systems used to establish their cultural and ideological hegemony within Russia, using such means as the imposition of the officiai ideology, compulsory adoption of Russian as the official language of socialism, special propaganda sections in the mass movements, the organized press, the regimentation of the 'producers of culture'. Scientific and technological power. A s a result of the modern revolution in science and technology, the survival of any country and its possibilities of progress inevitably depend on the possession of these techniques, in adequate qualitative and quantitative measure, and on the capacity to develop them on an independent
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basis. Whereas science and technology have become increasingly universal in scope by virtue of the problems they are tackling, the scale on which discoveries, inventions and innovations are disseminated and the degree of impact that they have, their distribution between different regions and countries has, o n the other hand, become extremely uneven in so far as concerns their points of emergence, channels of diffusion, productivity and the use of their results. Scientific and technological progress is concentrated in the United States and the Soviet Union, to the detriment of the rest of their respective blocs, and accompanied by the increasing backwardness of the dependent, underdeveloped or developing countries. The scientific and technological gap results from differences in the degree and rapidity of the establishment of mastery, both theoretical and practical, over the natural and social environment, a mastery which serves the specific aims of societies and/or certain of their principal groups. It is not the result of a historical accident, but of an evolutive and cumulative process which cannot be ascribed to any single, simple cause. It forms part of a more general gap which includes social, economic, cultural, political and military disparities, and is closely related to organized production and the systematic use of knowledge and processes. In turn it constitutes one of the basic factors that account for differences between countries; it helps to concentrate power at the top within each country and at the international level; it reinforces the division of the world into central, pivotal or primary nations, and a large number of peripheral, satellite or secondary nations, by means of a system of interdependence based o n the inequality of scientific and technological structures. With the complicity of their research workers and inventorsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;who justify themselves as the neutral servants of objective and irresistible scientific developmentâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the superpowers and advanced countries profit from rapid scientific or technological advances, which are used at the expense of the Third World and with adverse effects for the underdeveloped countries, for w h o m there is no system of genuine aid to provide compensation. Political power: concentration and hierarchy The combination of the various dimensions of power that w e have considered enables us to evaluate the average power of a nation-State compared with that of others and thus assess the degree of concentration and centralization of power on a world scale, and establish the resultant stratification and hierarchy. It also facilitates analysis of the behaviour of countries in terms of their objective position in the world, of the causes and effects of their status and the image that the dominant classes and the governing ĂŠlite have of that status. Position in the hierarchy relates essentially to the capacity or incapacity of the various countries to adopt internal policies of their o w n choice and to develop them in the w a y they wish; to decide their international policy for themselves; to maintain international relations; to influence, dominate and exploit other countries. A nation-State with a high status
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in one significant dimension tends to have similar status in others as well. Selfdetermination in foreign affairs and freedom of choice at h o m e are interdependent and reinforce each other. International relations tend to vary according to the average power of national States. A State possessing concentrated international power will tend to adopt the spirit, logic and Realpolitik of a great power. At the summit of the emergent hierarchy w e find the two pivotal powers. Their dominant classes and governing élites are able to adopt—within the parameters of their respective systems and the accepted rules of the game—the domestic policies of their choice and the development model that suits their interests. They also adopt, with a large measure of independence, foreign policies consonant with the objective facts of their internal situation and their world position, with the causes and effects of their status and of their sphere of influence, with their basic ideology with regard to international relations, and with the dynamics of their relations with the other superpower, the m o r e advanced and powerful countries and the rank and file of less important countries. Because of the high degree of total power that they possess, there is an increasing volume of interaction between the superpowers themselves, which does not detract from, but is based on, the self-assertion of each, their relations being marked by a dialectical interplay of diverging and similar interests, the impossibility of either imposing its will on the other, and the maintenance of the status quo in their mutual relations and in the existing structure of the world system. At the same time, the resources, forces and mechanisms that w e have analysed provide the superpowers, and, to a lesser extent, the secondary powers, with an armoury of incentives and disincentives in the form of threats, sanctions a n d rewards—varying in their substantiality, coherence and credibility—the use of which enables them to determine and influence the internal and external policies of the theoretically independent small and medium-sized countries, and justify their demands and acts to themselves, their o w n peoples and the rest of the world, including their victims. T h e superpowers' high degree of total power moreover enables their dominant classes and governing élites to m a k e their subjective theories materialize, particularly in regard to international relations and the structure of the world system, and thus change reality to fit in with subjective images. T h e world image itself, involving suppositions and options, implicit and explicit, with regard to the structure of the international system, the way in which it is emerging, its present dynamics and the future pattern that is desired, thus becomes selffulfilling. This image is, of course, a dogmatic view, unchecked by any criticism or empirical verification and indeed strongly hostile to them, being designed for the purposes of self-justification. Its basis is strongly ethnocentric. Set u p as the main principle for the interpretation of relations and differences between societies, ethnocentrism establishes a n artificial and arbitrary hierarchical system, based on a combination of criteria (race, nation, class, civilization, culture, previous economic and military achievements) and expressed in stereotyped images, theories
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and behaviour patterns. A minority of the h u m a n race (United States, Western Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, and perhaps China) considers itself to be, and sets itself up as, the would-be civilizing and guiding centre of the world, a paradigm of excellence against which it tends to classify and evaluate all other countries, particularly those in the Third World, as inferior outsiders, beset by every defect and vice, deserving of discrimination, domination and exploitation or, at best, redeemable only by submitting to the hegemony of the power in question and thus becoming part of a single necessary pattern of h u m a n progress, identified by the features displayed by the model country or system as development indicators. Ethnocentrism thus combines the features and effects of racism, xenophobic nationalism, intolerance and discrimination, the will to dominate and the presumptuous claim to be able to recognize a single, exclusive path of social organization and historical progress, the same for all, and to force others to follow it. Lastly, the superpowers—and to a lesser extent the minor powers—can create economic, military and diplomatic alliances and international organizations and m a k e them work in their favour. The international organizations are a product of the present international system; they support and reinforce that system, helping to create, regulate and adjust the balance of power in favour of the wealthy nations, and increasing power where it already exists. For the vast majority of the 140 nations, the combination of the various dimensions of power gives a low average capacity for national freedom of choice in the adoption of models of social development and of domestic policies, or for an independent line in international affairs. Their subordinate relationship vis-à-vis the superpowers and the lesser powers represents, for almost all the other countries, the fundamental system of reference, the primary determining factor in their structures and lines of conduct—internal and external. It imposes on them the dynamics of submission, exploitation, and conformity with the patterns created by the developed countries, whereby everything is reduced to a c o m m o n level and lumped together. T h e weaker and smaller the nation, the greater the extent to which its foreign policy is determined by external factors. A colony has n o foreign policy, and that of an ex-colony is determined by the former colonial power or whatever power has replaced it in that role. A small, weak nation, though theoretically independent, will tend to adopt a foreign policy attuned to the interests of the superpower, within whose sphere of influence it lies. Furthermore, the relations of the small, weak nations are mainly with the superpower that dominates them and with the other members of the same bloc, but their direct relations with countries in a similar position are minimal. At best they m a y c o m e together in slow developing organizations with rudimentary structures, meagre resources and limited aims. T h e difficulties and vicissitudes of the processes of regional integration in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the long series of conflicts between countries in the Third World which the superpowers and lesser powers provoke or turn to their o w n advantage are a sufficient illustration of this.
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T h e questionable generic term 'Third World' covers a wide range of underdeveloped and dependent countries, ranging from those that have but recently emerged from 'barbarism' to those that combine aspects of backwardness with features characteristic of the advanced countries, presenting atypical cases which are difficult to classify. All these, in some w a y or other, share a specific set of problems, determined ultimately by the interweaving of the forces, structures and processes of domination and exploitation of an internal and an external type, and by the contradictions and conflicts resulting from the two dynamics and their interaction. Underdevelopment at h o m e and dependence abroadâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;two sides of the same coinâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;are superimposed and linked, and one inevitably generates and strengthens the other in a complex, integrated structural situation. T h e underdevelopment of national communities in the Third World arises from, and can be defined as the product of, extreme structural heterogeneity, the existence side by side of various asynchronous elements at the main points and levels in those communities, the general rigidity of the structures and the predominance of the traditional forces associated with the status quo, the proliferation and interweaving of factors working against progress and of bottle-necks, the lack of incentive and the difficulties encountered in everything to do with invention and innovation, in the widest sense of both words. Moreover, these national communities of the Third World have been in the past and/or still are as a whole anachronous in relation to the economies and societies, cultures and States of the advanced countries, capitalist or socialist. Their disproportionate situation in relation to the superpowers and lesser powers is the result of an inherited past which is being perpetuated, and of existing circumstances. It is maintained and intensified by the alliance of internal forces with others of an external kind and by the external-internal relationships of domination and exploitation that stem from this. Forces, structures and dynamics operating from outside, combine with internal ones, interweave with them, maintain and strengthen them or change and destroy them, and become factors of oppression, exploitation and alienation o n the scale of whole nations. These countries become objects moulded and swayed by alien forces. They are dispossessed and demeaned materially, culturally and politically; they become incapable of exerting any real influence on their o w n circumstances or their o w n history. The resulting rift is self-perpetuating and constantly goes on increasing. There are limits to the maintenance and expansion of the subordinationdomination relationship. It exists and operates in objective forms, but the subjective reaction it produces in the peoples of the underdeveloped and dependent nations is one of realization of the situation to which they are subjected; this reaction helps to create and give direction to attitudes and behaviour patterns challenging that situation. Here again international and internal processes interact. F r o m the international viewpoint, w e have to bear in mind: (a) the rivalry between the dominant societies (among the capitalist societies, a m o n g the socialist
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societies—the U . S . S . R . and China—and between the capitalist and socialist societies); (b) difficulties in the control of nations and regions which are complex in character, are spread over vast areas of the world, and which carry weight because of the size of their population and its explosive growth, and because of the wealth of their actual and potential resources, which give them greater scope for manœuvre and an incentive to take advantage of it; (c) the attraction of the zones lying further away from the superpowers towards poles of power to which they are physically, socially and culturally closer (e.g. China and Japan in Asia); (d) the growing cultural and physical communication between societies through the proliferation and intensification of flows and exchanges, the dissemination of information, images and models. (This results in a clearer insight by the advanced and the developing societies into each other's problems, reveals the various differences, alternatives and possibilities of development, and influences basic options, current conceptions and conceptions guiding future projects.) International forces, processes and p h e n o m e n a interact with the changes occurring within the dominated societies. T h e processes of colonization do not operate in one direction only—they raise issues and bring forth activists that introduce a questioning attitude and a desire for revolt and change. They m a k e for a better knowledge of other societies and of the world order and its critical evaluation. They help to create opposition to, and rejection of, the rationale of uniformity of which the developed societies hold a monopoly and which they seek to impose. Forces of secession and forces asserting pluralism thus arise, clamouring for emancipation and the repossession of the means of material production, social and cultural identity and political decision. There is a reassertion of the desire for autonomous national development—the historical heritage which ensures the authenticity and uniqueness of the collective identity being meanwhile maintained—and for preserving the possibility of shaping one's o w n future, free from the influence of external models or precedents, so that hitherto u n k n o w n societal forms and forms of civilization m a y emerge as the expression of therightto differ, the right to heterodoxy and schism. These trends are reinforced by an awareness of past experience which appears to justify the claims for independent development. H u m a n progress has, indeed, been achieved by breaks with the past, by sudden severances and leaps forward, and by the shifting of the main centres of development in time and in space. A t various essential points in the history of mankind, the countries and systems that had previously been most successful in achieving a higher stage of evolution seem for that very reason to lose the capacity for change and the ability to m o v e on to the next stage. For other countries, their backwardness m a y act as a particularly effective stimulus to a higher development potential, transforming them into agents w h o trigger off a new phase of progress. Furthermore, the criticism formulated and the designing and attempted implementation of alternative models in certain backward countries provide
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dissidents in the developed societies with arguments against the internal situation in those societies and external points of reference for their redefinition projects. Thus, in the three colonized continents of the Third World there has been, particularly since the Second World W a r , a powerful, though contradictory, urge for emancipation, and they have m a d e their entrance on the world scene as a force in confrontation with the advanced countries of the other two worlds and which threatens to destroy them along with the whole system. [Translated from Spanish]
A sociological perspective in the study of international relations
Jerzy J. Wiatr Regardless of whether one considers the theory of international relations to be an independent discipline—a question I a m not going to discuss here—one can easily agree that the study of international relations is by definition an interdisciplinary one. Almost two decades ago, Quincy Wright listed as m a n y as twenty-three disciplines concerned with international relations1 and since, new disciplines (such as 'peace research') have entered thefield.A s a result, w e are too often confronted with arguments for 'interdisciplinary co-operation' in the study of international relations—arguments which are not always accompanied by a more detailed discussion of the role which various disciplines do or can play, of their limitations and advantages, as well as of their mutual interdependence. It is an underlying assumption of this paper that the perspectives of fruitful interdisciplinary co-operation in the study of international relations call, above all, for a clear definition of the place various social sciences occupy in thisfieldand particularly of the specificity of approaches which distinguishes them from other disciplines concerned with the same object. A s a political sociologist, I should like to approach the problem from the point of view of m y o w n discipline; there is n o assumption, however, that the sociological approach is the only or the best one to the study of international relations. Moreover, in contrast to certain recent publications in the so-called 'sociology of international relations', I prefer to consider the sociological approach more as a methodology (or a 'point of view') in the study of international relations than as a contributing discipline. Whether there is a place for a sociology of international relations, seems to m e m u c h less important than whether a sociological approach can give us new insights into the problem under study.2 The sociological approach itself must be defined. There are two ways in
Jerzy J. Wiatr is professor of sociology at the University of Warsaw. He is a past President of the Polish Political Science Association and member of the Executive Committee of the International Political Science Association. His main publications are: O n Historical Materialism and Sociology (in Polish, 1961); Military Sociology (in Polish, 1964); T h e Nation and the State (in Polish, ¡969); Marxist Theory of Social Development (in Polish, 1973); T h e State of Sociology in Eastern Europe Today (1971).
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
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which sociology can be useful for the study of international relations: (a) as a theory, and (b) as a set of research concepts and methods. T h e sociological approach sensu largo includes both an application of theory and the use of methods. For m y present discussion it is, however, more important to define in what w a y sociological theory can contribute to the study of international relations than to discuss technical questions of research methodology. 3
The potential uses of sociological theory In the study of international relations States are treated as basic units of observation and their behaviour towards each other constitutes the central analytical, variable.4 International relations can be defined as relations resulting from the interaction of the foreign policies of sovereign States; such a definition does not exclude international organizations (like the United Nations) or multinational alliances, since in both these cases the organizations or alliances result from an interaction of foreign policies of sovereign States. It doesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;on the other handâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;exclude non-governmental relations between nations (for instance, scientific and cultural contacts if they are conducted independently of foreign policy relations between States) as well as relations between non-sovereign nations within a multinational State. O n e can, however, observe two current tendencies which lead to the expansion of the scope of international relations. First, there is a growing tendency to incorporate various spheres of international contact under foreign policy; a century ago economic relations between nations were largely external to foreign policy, but nowadays they constitute one of its central focuses. Similarly, as recently as two inter-war decades, contacts between scholars, writers or artists were almost completely left to these professional groups themselves; it was only after the Second World W a r that they began to form part of the sphere of foreign policy (and even n o w only partially). The second reason w h y thefieldof international relations has expanded in the past two decades is the process of emergence of newly independent States as well as growing awareness that the remaining enclaves of colonialism constitute violations of internationally accepted principles of relations between nations. Relations between former centres and former peripheries of multinational empires are n o longer internal problems in so far as they have already become, or are becoming, relations between sovereign States. O n e can perhaps even extend this notion by incorporating into the scope of international relations those borderline cases which result from advanced, albeit as yet incomplete, processes of national liberation of former colonies or dependent nations; to the extent to which this process has attracted international support, relations between centres and peripheries should be considered part of international relations. Having defined international relations as those relations which result from
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the interaction of foreign policies of sovereign States I propose to m a p the central aspects of these relations, and ultimately to identify those elements in the study of which sociological theory can be of particular use. T h e central concept around which the whole structure revolves is the foreign policy of sovereign States. O u r diagram locates major variables dynamically connected with national foreign policy, either as factors influencing it or as its outcomes. Multiplied by the number of sovereign States, the diagram below can illustrate problems proper to international relations. Domestic conditions
External constraints
I
> Perceptions <
â&#x20AC;˘
I ^ I Domestic foreign policy feedback
Foreign policy I Formulation
ç
.
1 Execution Foreign policy environment
In terms of theoretical propositions the diagram can be explained as follows: 1. Foreign policy formulation and execution depend on: (a) domestic conditions (such as the type of social and economic order, political institutions, psychological characteristics of the nation, etc.); (b) external constraints (size and geographical location of the country, size and relative strength of its population, geopolitical position vis-Ă -vis other nations etc.); (c) perceptions of domestic conditions and external constraints by policy-makers, influential circles and the general public; (d) the foreign policies of other nations (labelled 'foreign policy environment'). 2. Foreign policy execution results in: (a) changes in the foreign policy environment, i.e. the reactions of other States in their respective foreign policies; (b) domestic feedback of foreign policy (such as political support or opposition, changes in social, economic and political conditions etc.); (c) modifications or strengthening of previous perceptions. T o avoid terminological confusion, 'change' is understood here in the broad sense, which includes 'zero-change', i.e. the maintenance of the status quo. N o t all linkages shown in the diagram belong to the sphere of sociological theory. However 1(a), 1(G), 2(b) and 2(c) are most certainly questions frequently discussed in sociological literature and can therefore be considered as the sociological aspect of international relations. In other words, sociological theory cannot
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explain the totality of international relations: in particular, it is not its task to explain processes and consequences of the interplay of the foreign policies of two or more States. Sociological theory can be useful in explaining domestic conditions and the domestic consequences of foreign policies. A s such it deals with a part of the problem only. It is, however, the part which probably explains the most important components of international relations.
The Marxist hypothesis reconsidered It is particularly from the point of view of Marxist sociological theory that the importance of the sociological approach to the study of international relations can be fully grasped. The main hypothesis suggested by the writings of M a r x , Engels and Lenin is that foreign policy is determined by domestic policy and, m o r e specifically, by the socio-economic order. It is this hypothesis which leads to fruitful studies of class interests in foreign policies and to an awareness of the importance of the internal, domestic order of a society for the successes or failures of foreign policies.6 The Marxist hypothesis, however, requires some elaboration in the face of contemporary problems. It can perhaps be argued that, w h e n formulated in the nineteenth century, it reflected relatively simple relations between nation-States; in the contemporary world s o m e aspects of international relations call for a modification of the Marxist hypothesis. There are also problems, the importance of which became evident only recently, as well as questions which the Marxist hypothesis did not originally take into account. Broadly, the Marxist hypothesis postulating the dependence of foreign policy on domestic, particularly socioeconomic conditions, constitutes the most comprehensive and, in terms of its predictive power, the strongest sociological theory of international relations, but it is so general as to require specification and modifications. Four such areas call for particular attention. First, there is the need to define the extent to which domestic socio-economic structure determines foreign policy and to identify other factors which m a y restrict or modify its impact. Second, attention should be paid to lasting features of national life, particularly to the national character. Third, the micro-factors of foreign policy formulation and execution must be considered in their relationship to macro-factors, such as socioeconomic structure. Fourth, ideological and psychological conditions must be accounted for, both in so far as their relationship with the socio-economic structure can be demonstrated and to the extent to which they can be considered as autono m o u s forces in international relations. The impact of domestic socio-economic structure on foreign policy is traditionally seen in terms of the projection of domestic social (particularly class) interests into the international sphere. This type of interdependence w a s par-
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ticularly obvious in the period of colonial expansion, competition for foreign markets, etc. It is an open question to what extent domestic group interests are still dominant in shaping foreign policies, particularly under the conditions of advanced industrialization. T h e dependence of the affluence of industrialized countries o n transfers from colonies and client States is by n o means what it was one hundred years ago; it is sometimes argued that nineteenth-century types of motivation of foreign policy have become altogether obsolete under conditions of advanced industrialization. If this argument is accepted, a modification of the classic Marxist hypothesis would be necessary. Rather than direct considerations of profit, other elements of socio-economic structure become central to the explanatory scheme. A m o n g them one can point in particular to the tendency of States of identical or similar socioeconomic order to form political and military alliances particularly manifest in the years immediately following the Second World W a r . The uniqueness of postWorld-War-II international relations consisted of the fact that the two principal alliances were based o n alternative socio-economic and political orders and in this sense constituted different type of blocks than the traditional constellations of States which dominated international relations in the nineteenth century and before the First World W a r . Recent developments, however, suggest that there is no inevitable link between domestic socio-economic order and foreign policy orientation; in fact, since the 1960s w e can observe a growing differentiation of foreign policy orientations between certain States which share similar socioeconomic systems, Finally, the impact of domestic socio-economic orders on international relations must be evaluated in the global context of other factors: in other words, external constraints, resulting from the size and geopolitical position of a State, can substantially modify the relationship between domestic order and foreign policy. Even if the extremism of the Realpolitik approach opens it to criticism, its lasting influence on the interpretation of international relations is explained by the fact that it has strongly emphasized the importance of external factors in foreign policy making. 6 Studies to c o m e m a y show more precisely h o w domestic and external factors combine in shaping international relations, enabling us to define more precisely the impact of domestic orders on foreign policy. N o t less important, however, is the impact foreign policy has o n the domestic socioeconomic and political order. The years after the Second World W a r provided us with m a n y examples of the linkage between foreign policy and domestic orders, the intense international conflict of the early 1950s particularly seemed to confirm Herbert Spencer's hypothesis on the impact of war or preparations for war o n domestic social and political life. All this seems to suggest that the hypothesis according to which foreign policy is determined by the socio-economic structure must be carefully tested in comparative studies and modified by analysis showing the limitations of this particular
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linkage. It remains, to m y w a y of thinking at least, a very important and potentially highly predictive theoretical hypothesis, which needs further elaboration in the light of international developments. The second problem results from the fact that, in emphasizing the linkage between socio-economic structure and foreign policy, the Marxist theory paid m u c h less attention to other, in particular cultural, determinants. T h e problem can be further narrowed d o w n to the impact of national tradition o n nation-specific psychological and behaviouristic characteristics. In the rich literature concerned with national character7 one can identify two main lines of argument. First, it is shown that nations differ in their respective 'modal personalities', i.e. in the statistically dominant psychological and behavioural characteristics. Second, it is also well k n o w n that different cultural heritages, as well as different current systems of socialization tend to produce different normative types, which then constitute yardsticks for evaluating individual behaviour. In spite of the decline of comparative studies of national character in this century,8 there is no reason to believe that these national differences do not play an important role in international relations. Rather, more systematic research should be done in thisfieldin the hope of showing m o r e precisely h o w , and to what extent, national traditions, cultures and character influence relations between States. The linkage between this problem and the Marxist hypothesis is provided by the theory of national culture and its class characteristics. Lenin's analysis of 'two trends' within each national culture has been generally accepted as the foundation of the class interpretation of national tradition. This interpretation postulates that every dominant class leaves its specific imprint o n the culture of a nation, though at the same time is influenced by the accumulated national tradition. T h e dominated and oppressed classes oppose the dominant ones within the context of national culture; their class struggle enables them to evolve alternative cultural patterns, which then become dominant elements of the national culture and tradition. This dialectical process of internal contradictions and continuity leads to considerable cultural and psychological differentiation between nations, to different historical experiences. It is therefore important to consider the potential impact of nationspecific patterns of behaviour as one of the factors determining foreign policy. A t present, the Marxist literature on international relations neglects this aspect almost completely. In m y opinion, this omission, totally unjustifiable from the point of view of the traditional interests of Marxist theory, makes it less possible to adequately explain and predict trends in international relations. Certain trends are to a large extent results of h u m a n reactions to changes which take place in the international environment; it is easy to appreciate the resulting patterns o n dispositions inherited from centuries of c o m m o n experience and strengthened by culturally accepted norms and values. Our third problem concerns micro-factors of foreign policy. T h e older schools of diplomatic history tended to overestimate the importance of purely
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individual factors in shaping international relations; m o r e recently, the reaction to this has sometimes taken the form of a total lack of interest in micro-factors of foreign policy making. T h e Marxist hypothesis, emphasizing the impact of macrosocial factors on foreign policy, has also neglected the micro elements. T w o sociological subdisciplines seem to be particularly useful to fill the gap. T h e sociology of organizations can give us useful insights into the mechanism of foreign policy making and the functioning of bureaucratic structures which are particularly influential in its shaping, while the sociology of professional groups, such as diplomats, soldiers, etc., m a y provide us with a better understanding of factors which determine their relevant behaviour. In other words, the structures and individuals involved in foreign policy-making should be considered as autonomous actors, whose behaviour cannot be fully understood without a study of the social conditions under which they operate. Such studies would not replace those of macro-systemic determinants of foreign policy, but supplement them. Finally the Marxist hypothesis must be modified by the introduction of ideological and psychological factors, which might be called the perceptions of international relations. They include: (a) value judgements; (b) evaluations of o w n aims and means; (c) images of other partners in international relations; (d) assumptions concerning the probable effectiveness of specific actions. In each of these areas the way in which people perceive reality m a y differ very considerably from the abstractly optimal one. It is well k n o w n , for instance o n the basis of simulated international conflicts,9 that people tend to misconstrue the intentions of their partners and adversaries. The role which is played by national stereotypes and ideological prejudices in this connexion can be very important. A s a result, the real world of international relations m a y include quite a substantial n u m b e r of irrational suppositions, which, in spite of their incorrectness, function as elements in the situation. A n y realistic study of international relations has to take this factor into account. People behave not o n the basis of their objective interest, but on the basis of their perception of their interest; in so far as this perception is at variance with reality it constitutes an autonomous factor in international relations. T h e sources and consequences of ideological and psychological distortions in the conduct of foreign policy constitute a very important and potentially rich field of study. Three principal types of distortions can be hypothetically identified. First, w e are confronted with erroneous evaluations of the situation due to lack of information. It is most interesting to note that, recently, considerable efforts have been m a d e to limit the impact of this factor; easing of contacts between governments and the exchange of information are motivated by the acknowledgement of the dangers which can result from inadequate knowledge of the state of affairs, including the intentions of the principal partners. Second, due to different ideologies and cultures, even sufficient information m a y lead to perceptions which d o not correspond to reality. In a world where n e w ideological systems play a great role, this type of misperception is potentially important. Third, various
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forms of psychological warfare—particularly, but not exclusively during periods of international tension—produce simplified or totally false images of partners and issues in international relations. It is of particularly great importance—not only for theory but for practical policy as well—to study these subjective factors of international reality and to incorporate them within the broader context of sociological explanations for international relations. All this suggests that the Marxist hypothesis of international relations as determined by domestic socio-economic factors can very well serve as the core of sociological interpretation of international relations, providing, however, that it is constantly confronted with new problems and data, as well as modified in the light of further theoretical analysis. In a sense, it is the core of any sociological theory of international relations, since it concentrates on the impact sociological factors have on international relations. It must, however, be constantly enriched by introducing n e w dimensions.
Sociological theory and research T h e sociological perspective in the study of international relations calls for a critical evaluation of existing theories from the point of view of their potential contribution to the understanding of international relations. Sociological theories can contribute to the study of international relations both directly and indirectly. Their direct contribution occurs w h e n they are concerned with problems of international relations. In addition to the Marxist Spencerian hypothesis, one m a y quote as examples Novikov's theory of war or Gumplowicz's theory of conquest. T h e indirect impact of sociological theories on international relations emerges w h e n concepts derived from general sociological theories are being applied to the study of foreign policies, as for instance in attempts to explain involvement in war in terms of status inconsistency between States.10 While it is extremely doubtful whether theories about individual and group behaviour can be translated into the language of theories about the behaviour of States, one should not rule out the possibility that in this indirect w a y sociological theories can also contribute to the study of international relations. In addition to the use of sociological theories the study of international relations can only benefit from using the results of sociological research for its o w n purposes. M u c h sociological data is of potential use for secondary analysis oriented toward problems in international relations. National stereotypes, aspirations, hopes and worries for one's o w n nation and for the world, values and standards of behaviour, contacts with other countries and cultures, military institutions, mass communications, patterns of decision-making are s o m e areas in which sociologists have already accumulated a considerable a m o u n t of data potentially useful for the study of international relations. Moreover, the present
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state of data retrieval makes it increasingly possible to use them in the analysis of problems related to international relations. Quite possibly, the future of the sociological study of international relations lies in skilful analysis of existing data combined with fresh research where data are not sufficient. There is, moreover, one aspect of contemporary sociological research which m a y be of special importance: comparative, cross-national research. Perhaps n o social science has m o v e d as decisively in the direction of cross-national research as did sociology in the 1960s. This comparative, cross-national orientation of sociological research does not inevitably produce information relevant to the study of international relations. M a n y studies (like multi-national projects on time budgets, innovation in agriculture or juvenile delinquency) have no c o m m o n points with the study of international relations. Others do, for instance the study of images of the world in the year 2000, the study of opinions on international affairs, the civic culture study, or the study on the impact of local leaders' values on c o m munity activity. The main point, however, is that the expansion of cross-national research in sociology (as well as in political science) has prepared the ground for comparative studies of the sociological aspects of international relations.
Notes 1
2
3
Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations, p . 506, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , Appleton Century Crofts, 1957. The International Sociological Association established (in 1970) its research committee o n international relations, chaired by Professor Fedor Burlatskii from the Academy of Sciences of the U . S . S . R . O n e can easily consider this committee as a step towards the establishment of a new sociological discipline, or as a forum for interdisciplinary analysis of international relations in which sociological perspectives would be widely used. S o m e of Burlatskii's concepts on the study of international relations are interestingly presented in his book: Lenin, Gosudarstwo, Politika [Lenin, State, Politics], M o s c o w , Progress, 1970. M y o w n discussion of the sociological problems of international relations, on which the present paper is partly based, is included in the latest (fifth) edition of m y book Spoleczenstwo [Society], W a r s a w , Scientific Publishers, 1973. In a sense, there is no special methodology of sociological study in international relations. Methodological problems are principally questions of applicability of concepts and methods, and have to be resolved on the basis of practical
experience. Even the problem of the level of analysis, which occupies an important place in the methodological literature, is not basically different from that which sociologists encounter in studies conducted within a nation (cf. William B . M o u l , 'The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited', Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. V I , N o . 3, September 1973, p. 494-513). Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations, p . 8, Englewood Cliffs, N . J . , Prentice-Hall, 1960, quite correctly points to the fact that the term 'theory' can be used in three meanings: normative, explanatory (or, as he calls it, 'empirical' or 'causal') and 'policy science'. In m y present discussion I confine myself to explanatory theory, which in no way demonstrates a lack of interest on m y side for the two other types of social science theory. Neither M a r x , Engels nor Lenin ever wrote a fullscale study of international relations. Their opinions on them were presented mostly in journalistic comments on current international developments. It partly results that they did not present a comprehensive theory of international relations but emphasized points of particular importance. Perhaps the
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Notes (continued)
6
7
Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, clearest formulation of the Marxist hypothesis 1951; H . C . J. Duijker and N . H . Frijda, of the impact of domestic socio-economic National Character and National Stereotypes, conditions on international relations can be Amsterdam, 1960; Morgenthau, op. cit., found in Lenin's article 'Socialism and W a r ' p . 118-24,1959 ed. (1915). 8 R . M . March, 'ComparativeSociology, 1950-1963', Hoffmann (op. cit., p . 30) criticizes the 'realist' Current Sociology, Vol. X I V , N o . 2 , 1966, theory for separating the concept of power p . 17. from all other social variables. Moreover, the 9 realists overemphasized the international balcf. Jean Laponce and Paul Smoker (eds.), Experance of forces at the expense of other deterimentation and Simulation in Political Science minants of international relations, cf. parToronto, Toronto University Press, 1972. ticularly: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among 1 0 cf. Michael D . Wallace, 'Power, Status and InterNations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, national W a r ' , Journal of Peace Research, N e w York, N . Y . , Alfred A . Knopf, 1948 and Vol. 8, 1971, p . 23-5; Hubert M . Bialock, 1954. 'The Identification Problem and Theory Building: The Case of Status Inconsistency', cf. Margaret Mead, ' T h e Study of National American Sociological Review, Vol. 31, N o . 1, Character' in Daniel Lerner and Harold D . 1966, p . 375-82. Lasswell (eds.), The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Methods, p . 70-85,
A value-based approach: methods and problems in peace research
Asbjorn Eide Introduction T o inform science with conscience was one of the purposes of the new enterprise called 'peace research', initiated in the mid-1950s and which has n o w grown into a world-wide movement. 1 A more specific purpose was to harness the power of scientific investigation to understand, and if possible help to prevent large-scale violence in international and domestic society. Different approaches have been developed and the priorities are not the same everywhere. It is, therefore, not a homogeneous movement, 2 though certain characteristics distinguish it from otherfieldsof research. Not being a traditional academic discipline, those taking part have various scientific backgrounds. W h a t distinguishes them, however, is a combination of at least the following features: normative orientation, the central value to be promoted being that of peace; interdisciplinarity; and policy-orientation. While the two last features are c o m m o n to m a n y scientific activities, the first is less widespread. Peace research is n o w becoming popular, and m a n y activities seek to use its n a m e . Whether an activity can properly be called peace research depends in part on whether scientific methods are being used, but mainly on whether the guiding value is that of peace. Strategic analysis does not fall within peace research, because such analysis still considers war as a possible instrument that can be rationally used for political goals. This Clausewitzian conception is alien to peace research since it contravenes its basic value orientation.3 Conflict analysis, however, to a large extent falls within peace research, except where the purpose is to find ways by which a dominant
Asbjorn Eide is Executive Director of the International Peace Research Institute and SecretaryGeneral of the International Peace Research Association. Formerly, he was a lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Oslo University and Rockefeller Fellow in International Organization at the School of International Affairs, Columbia University. He has published books and articles on constitutional and international law, United Nations peacekeeping operations, human rights and peace research.
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actor can retain control over a weaker one, even by non-violent means. 4 A r m s control, also, to s o m e extent belongs within peace research. This is the case w h e n the aim is to m a k e specific arms control measures stepping-stones to disarmament. Occasionally, arms control research aims only at stabilizing armaments at the present high level, which would not be consonant with the basic value underlying peace research.5 O n e of the five tasks of peace research is to clarify the guiding value orientation and the normative framework to which it gives rise; the other four, closely related, being the following: empirical, investigation of observable reality, both past and present, with regard to p h e n o m e n a of conflict and peace; critical examination of this reality and of established theories and policies in the light of the guiding value; constructive development of proposals by which to transform reality to m a k e it conform to the basic values; action to have these proposals applied in operating social and political processes. It is the combination of these tasks which give peace research its special methodological and institutional orientation. In this article, I shall describe some of the intellectual, methodological, institutional and political problems arising in this researchfield.I shall not, except by w a y of illustration, go into the substance of the researchâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the analysis of specific issues, the findings and their application.
The normative framework W h a t do w e m e a n by research that is value-based? First, it determines the selection of questions to be asked, and problems to be investigated. Second, it requires more than an understanding of processes actually taking place, their causes and consequences. It also means that possible alternatives be explored, by which the basic value can be safeguarded or promoted. This requires very careful clarification of the basic value, a difficult task, for at least the following reasons: 1. Values are closely related to the objective interests of their individual or collective holders. This m a y not be clear even to them unless they seek to apply their values to concrete circumstances. 2. Since interests differ widely, due to structural inequalities in the international system as well as in domestic systems, w e cannot expect to reach wide consensus o n precise values except through structural transformations leading to the harmonization of interests. N o t surprisingly, w e can observe the development of three m o r e or less distinct schools within peace research. T o all of them, peace means absence of violence. But what violence? Is peace a goal, a means towards a goal, or both? T o the 'minimalist' school, that which gives the narrowest definition of peace, it means absence of international war. For purposes of operationalization, 'war'
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has been defined as military confrontation between entities recognized as sovereign States with casualties amounting to more than 1,000." Admittedly, this is an arbitrary definition, but operationalizations d o need somewhat arbitrary delimitations. W h a t is important in this context is that the operationalization equally expresses a value orientation: what is to be prevented are military confrontations between recognized, sovereign States in which the casualties reach the indicated magnitude. B y this definition, one would be faced with the question whether a deterrence (threat) system, characterized by heavy militarization and the existence of weapons of mass destruction, could be consonant with peace. For the minimalist school this would be a question for empirical research. If deterrence can prevent wars, a deterrent system is in conformity with the quest for peace. There is, however, a 'middle' school which escapes this empirical problem by defining its values in a more comprehensive way. Peace, according to this school, means not only the absence of war, but also the absence of threat systems (heavy instruments of coercion posed against opponents). This school considers it highly doubtful that deterrence can prevent wars, particularly w h e n account is taken of the range of weapons at present existing and the tremendous inequalities in weapon technology. In addition, however, this school considers military machineries of coercion evil in themselves. A set of arguments m a y be adduced to support this position: the systems of deterrence create centralization of power, rigid disciplines and lack of genuine freedom, and continuous psychological stress because of its inherent dangers. Therefore, the 'middle' school argues, peace is the absence not only of war but also of instruments and institutions for war. O n e of the major proponents of this view is Anatol Rapoport. 7 Kenneth Boulding comes close to the same position, w h e n he writes that: 'the problem of h o w w e m o v e from threat systems to stable peace systems is, I think, the number one problem of our days; indeed, the solution to this is the prerequisite to the solution of all our problems'. 8 A n important question here is whether it is sufficient to dismantle the military apparatus alone, or whether domestic instruments of coercion, if of excessive proportions (overdeveloped police and para-military forces) should also be affected. This is related to another one: whether peace researchers should be concerned with international conflicts only, or include also the domestic ones. Partly, again, this is an empirical question: is it possible to eliminate the international threat system and still retain a substantial apparatus for domestic coercion? Empirical analysis would be difficult, but strong indications point to a negative answer. Domestic establishments of coercion, if they exceed certain limits, also represent an international threat to disarmed neighbours. But apart from this, which m a y be a debatable point, the value definition of peace excludes social structures upheld by machineries
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of coercion for m a n y peace researchers. S o m e of the 'middle'-school proponents would therefore define their concept of peace as the absence of organized violence, internationally and domestically, not only actual violence, but also potentially organized violence, which would m e a n that organized instruments of coercion would have to be eliminated or kept at a very low level.9 This obviously requires a substantial harmonization of interests, internally and internationally, which would be the prerequisite for the willingness to dismantle apparatuses of coercion and for the prevention of their reappearance. In principle, it is also an empirical question whether it would be possible to have stable peace in an internationally and domestically disarmed world, while seriously conflicting interests exist. Empirical research could provide little information on this, however, since w e d o not have m a n y historical examples of internationally and domestically disarmed situations. It might be possible, however, to investigate what distinguishes societies with a heavy coercive component from those with small components, provided they are at the same level of industrialization. Yet, their international environments would differ and thus m a k e it impossible to draw firm conclusions from purely empirical investigations. A third school goes beyond this difficult empirical question by redefining the concept of peace to m e a n the absence of all kinds of violence, actual and potential, direct and structural. This requires, in fact, that social organization be restructured to bring about the harmonization of interests at all levels, internationally and domestically. It should be noted that this is a value choice, not an empirical conclusionâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;it is not claimed that structural violence necessarily leads to physical (direct) violence. While in most cases it is highly probable that it does so, structural violence should according to this school of thought be eliminated even if it did not threaten to erupt into direct violence.10 T w o variants of this school exist; thefirstmaintains that both physical and structural violence represent non-peace and are to be averted. In other words, there should be n o clearcut distinction between a distant goal (peace in the wide sense) and the means employed in the transition period. The normative framework would require that direct violence should not be used even for the purpose of creating future peace.11 The other variant maintains that, in order to bring about a restructuring of international and domestic societies to bring about full harmony of interests and justice, liberating violence against oppression m a y occasionally become necessary and acceptable.12 This m a y sound like abstract speculation with little relevance to reality. W h a t I wished to emphasize, however, is that research which purports to proceed from a value orientation, is bound to m a k e its values relatively precise, all the m o r e since the choice of a normative framework determines the empirical investigations to be carried out and the methods to be used. It should be noted that the difference revolves around a narrow or wide definition of peace. These are not opposing definitions, since there is general
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agreement that peace excludes war. Hence, it is always a relevant part of investigations to examine the causes of war. T h e 'middle' school adds to this, however, investigations on the causes of 'armamentism' and sometimes on the forces conditioning domestic coercion. T h e maximalist school embraces all of these tasks and in addition investigates the occurrence and causes of structural violence. That all peace researchers aim at the elimination of war, and most of them also seek the elimination of direct large-scale violence which does not take the form of war, shows that there is a general consensus on the most important issue facing humanity today. It is this consensus which has m a d e it possible to develop a worldwide research movement. It is also this general consensus which makes it possible to co-operate in a quest for the harmonization of interests through the structural transformation of the international system. Increasing equality would m a k e consensus greater, and create the conditions for a gradual disappearance of differences between schools.
Empirical investigation Like all science, peace research combines the three normal elements of empiricism: fact-gathering, analysis and explanation. Here, I shall c o m m e n t briefly on some aspects which are particular to peace research. The collection and documentation of data is in some cases a goal in itself, as for example on the question of armaments. Most arms development takes place in a few countries, and is surrounded by considerable secrecy. It is often difficult to k n o w what is taking place in arms production and transfer. The lack of such knowledge m a y have seriously negative impacts, for instance in disarmament negotiations. The compilation and documentation of facts m a y in such cases in itself be a contribution to improved negotiations, hopefully opening u p better prospects for disarmament. Similarly, information on the very existence and use of certain terrible weapons m a y itself result in political pressures for their prohibition. Documentation in thesefieldsis carried out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute;13 its k n o w n reliability has m a d e it a highly useful source for researchers as well as for politicians, and can potentially contribute to a more peaceful world. Most research goes beyond this, however, to an analysis of the trends taking place and the consequences of such trends.14 The final and most ambitious step is the explanation of the causes and dynamics of the processes taking place. For this, there must be an interchange between facts and theory. In peace research, as in other disciplines, there is some disagreement on what comes first, but there is no disagreement on the view that theory and facts have to be combined for purposes of explanation. Explanatory models can be mathematically constructed and then tested against facts, but
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explanation can also be expressed in non-mathematical language. In this respect, peace research does not differ substantially from other research fields. Where it does differ, however, is in the integration of different disciplines. A s long as one remains at the purely documentary level, it is sufficient to have researchers from different disciplines taking part, each collecting information from thefieldwith which they are most familiar. For such purposes, peace research is multidisciplinary and none of its practitioners is obliged to break out of the confines of his o w n discipline. But for explanation the problem becomes acute. Scientific disciplines are partly ordered according to level of analysis. In the social sciences, they are ordered around individuals, groups, nations, regions and the world. S o m e disciplines are also centred on problem areas. Initially, there is a tendency for each discipline to seek explanations for observed phenomena in terms of accepted paradigms. But peace research must seek causes which transcend both the various levels and the various problem areas which have given rise to separate disciplines. T h e effort to reach a comprehensive understanding of the ways in which processes on one level influence those on another level and reach into different problem areas, cannot be carried o n simply by a multidisciplinary effort. It has to emerge through a creative process in which all participants learn from the others h o w to interpret the questions raised within their disciplines and which can only be properly explained in a wider setting.
Critical evaluation At any given time there exists a conventional wisdom on questions related to peace and war. Such wisdom is inherent in ideologies or political beliefs, and consists of assumptions about causes, facts, desirable policies and probable outcomes. It exists not only a m o n g non-academic people, but also a m o n g researchers. It is the task of peace research critically to examine such wisdom and its relevance to reality as well as to the basic values underlying peace research itself. O n the simplest level, researchers can document that facts are sometimes different from what m a y be c o m m o n l y assumed. M o r e important, they can create awareness of facts which are c o m m o n l y overlooked or disregarded. It is more difficult to examine and, if necessary, demonstrate the invalidity of notions on causes. This requires an explanation of facts, and explanations can be provided only in the context of consistent theories. It is most difficult to replace theories imbedded in traditional ideology or beliefs with new theories, however solidly they are founded empirically. O n e illustration is the usual explanation for armament. There is a widespread notion that armament is the result of a relationship between two States or blocs. T h e main reason for armament, according to this notion, arises from the insecurity
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of the two States or blocs in the absence of a world government or any other power beyond themselves which can safeguard their respective security. Since they have to rely on themselves, they prepare to defend themselves against possible attacks. Such preparations, in turn, can be seen by the other side as a threat to which there is a precautionary response. In this way armament proceeds as an action-reaction process, usually called 'the arms race'. This notion is widespread not only a m o n g the public at large, but also a m o n g m a n y researchers. Sophisticated mathematical models have been constructed to provide a theoretical description of the process, which in turn is tested by examining the actual arms races which have taken place.16 Recent work, however, has indicated that this model is m u c h too simple and in important cases actually misleading. Another set of explanations has been given, under the n a m e of 'autism'.18 T h e essential point in this theory is that the armament of a given State is not externally induced, but caused by domestic factors. Theoretical and empirical work has been carried out over a couple of years which has given m u c h credibility to this alternative explanation in regard to certain historical cases of armament, the evidence being particularly strong with regard to the United States since 1950 and the U . S . S . R . since 1965.17 There is one particular point about these two sets of explanations which should be stressed here. Thefirstexplanation—that of the arms race—is more to the liking of governments and decision makers involved. They are seen as caught up in a difficult dilemma, in which they have problems finding a better solution to the external threat than to arm themselves in defence. This explanation, therefore, does not challenge the legitimacy of arms policy. The other explanation is m u c h less acceptable to governments and other members of the political and economic élites. It implies that they are actively pushing the production of armaments, in their o w n domestic interests, and that they are therefore themselves to blame for the fact that armaments are piling up. This also poses a problem for researchers. Those w h o , for various reasons, prefer to be close to governments and other elements of the political and economic élite, m a y prefer to rely on the arms race explanation. T o choose the other and politically less acceptable explanation can cause misgivings and in some cases even deprivation of the economic resources for research. Obviously, committed peace researchers cannot choose their explanation for reasons of expedience, but must challenge conventional wisdom whenever their investigations show that it is not tenable.18 Critical research is relevant not only to the relationship between facts and theory, but also to the relationship between theory and values. T o illustrate, w e m a y examine developments which have recently taken place within peace research circles with regard to the so-called 'North-South' problem. In the first stages of peace research, the concept of conflict was given a narrow definition. T h e focus was on the perceptions of the actors (parties to the conflict) when they were pursuing incompatible goals. T h e main interest was directed towards finding ways
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in which misperceptions could be avoided—primarily by improved c o m m u n i cation—which would lead, so it was thought, to more 'rational' policies—which was assumed also to m e a n that they would be more peaceful. Underlying analyses of this kind were a number of assumptions; some deliberate, others not even consciously thought through, since they had not previously been questioned. O n e deliberate and basic assumption posited the need for value-neutrality in the analyst towards the parties to a conflict. This was a clear departure from strategic thinking, which aims at identification with the set of actors with w h o m the strategist sides so as to better the chances of 'winning' or getting the upper hand in a conflict. Peace researchers from the very beginning challenged strategic thinking, and, in so doing, chose a symmetrical way of understanding conflict, that is to say that any conflict involves at least two parties, and whatever the relative merits of their positions, there can be no solution to the conflict if the parties d o not all benefit from it. Hence there is no point in discussing w h o is 'right' or 'wrong'. Such moral judgements are even dangerous, because they can be used as justification for increasing the military apparatus. This symmetrical conception of conflict was probably conditioned by established ways of analysing competition. The prevalent view had been that conflicts are outcomes of competition between actors, and the point is not to eliminate the competition, but tofindways by which it can be carried out in a peaceful w a y . If such conceptions of conflicts are carried over to what has been called the 'North-South' conflict formation, the relationships between the highly industrialized parts of the world on one hand and the developing countries on the other, they prevent a true appraisal of processes and can lead to distorted peace policies. Peaceful competition between the strong and the weak does not give desirable results in terms of justice, nor does it remain peaceful. The physical violence which ultimately grows out of it, however, does not normally take the shape of international war but rather of internal violence. Over the past years, peace research has devoted m u c h attention to a critical reappraisal of conventional wisdom on the causes and consequences of these processes. This had led to a comprehensive expansion and partly a reorientation of the theory of conflict, of violence, and of dominance/dependence. 19 Such theories are increasingly supported by empirical research and are therefore gradually undermining the traditional—and superficial—understanding of the nature and consequences of'North-South' interaction. This has considerable impact on the questions of constructive peace policies and their applications—questions to which w e n o w turn.
Constructive development of proposals The problems of peace, as w e have seen, can be related to different systems levels and to different stages of conflict and also be seen from different time perspectives. First, there is the distinction between global peace and local peace. This is,
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of course, a continuum with m a n y possible intermediate points. Differences arise out of the domain of interests affected by a given conflict. The Biafran war was one of the most costly since the Second World W a r , in terms of h u m a n suffering, but it raised no threat to global peace. Escalation of the Middle East conflict, on the other hand, affects global interests. Secondly, there is the distinction between an acute, violent conflict on one hand and a latent conflict on the other, again with a series of intermediate points. The distinction, as w e k n o w , has something to d o with the degree of consciousness, and the degree of organization and formation of parties to the conflict. A n d then there are the different time perspectives. Efforts aimed at the separation of two warring parties can succeed very quickly through the interposition of a peacekeeping force. The initiation of a self-propelling disarmament process m a y require a number of years. A n d the creation of a global peace structure requires a m u c h longer time perspective. The three dimensions above show not only that different approaches are needed but also that the actors with w h o m communication should take place are different, depending on which aspect of peace is actually being dealt with. If faced with symmetric, but limited, conflicts relatively well insulated from the outer world, one commendable approach can be to help the parties (i.e. their respected, legitimate leaders) re-establish or improve communication between each other. A host of techniques exist including that of controlled communication, which serves as one very good illustration of the link between peace research and communication between the parties.20 If the focus is on substantially larger, complex conflicts, though remaining essentially symmetric, it must be accepted that there are m a n y more actors involved and that a highly complex pattern of interaction comes into play. The Cold W a r , in the sense of the massive polarization centring around the United States and the Soviet Union, involved superpowers and lesser powers, bloc members and neutrals, supranational actors (like the European Economic C o m m u n i t y ) and subnational and transnational ones (business enterprises and a variety of nongovernmental organizations). In a particularly tense situation, for instance during confrontations over Berlin, the only possible approach might be to help bring United States and U . S . S . R . leaders into communication. A s a more long-range approach, however, one must seek to transform the war structure in Europe into a pattern of co-operation. This is what is aimed at through efforts to develop an all-European security system. This effort requires communication with the very m a n y different actors involved, not (only) bilaterally but mainly multilaterally. It requires extensive research on economic and security matters in order to present to the parties sets of alternatives by which their interests could reasonably be safeguarded over a process not only of dĂŠtente but also of demilitarization.21 It m a y well be, however, that elements of the present political ĂŠlite in some
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of the major countries are not seriously interested in all-European co-operation and security. Peace researchers m a y then have to look at the substratum of the political milieux to identify those groups which are likely, in the immediate future, to form or influence the political élite, and to try to develop a commitment to all-European co-operation, security and demilitarization a m o n g them. Such efforts m a y m a k e the next generation of political leadership more receptive. T h e quest for disarmament and demilitarization poses a serious problem which illustrates the difficulty of formulating constructive proposals. A s already mentioned, research has shown that m u c h militarization and arms development is attributable to domestic causes. T h e existence of military-industrial complexes is n o w well documented, and the impact of these on decision-making leaves little doubt that not only the military élite, but also the political élites preside over societies which have become functionally adapted to, and dependent upon, the existence of a comprehensive military apparatus. T h e consequences are diffused throughout society: in value orientation, in the uses of the mass media, in education, in the formation of interest groups, and so on. There is consequently little or n o receptiveness to constructive proposals emerging out of peace research, however well substantiated. The same applies to m a n y aspects of the relationship between North and South. In the course of penetration (by external powers) into the developing countries and their subordination to an unequal division of labour under the international order, there is a tendency for the dominant élites both in the rich and the Third World countries to develop strong interests in the maintenance and indeed extension of such processes. This has its impact also on mass media and education, creating a dominant value orientation which is sceptical of or negatively attuned to social justice. Under such circumstances, it becomes most difficult to formulate constructive proposals which will be well received by the dominant élites. There are some, both on the left and the right sides of the political spectrum, w h o challenge the idea that peace research should try to develop constructive proposals. O n the radical side, the fear is expressed that this becomes a kind of social engineering, with impact only w h e n the proposals are consonant with the goals of dominant élites.22 The conservative argument is that such proposals imply meddling in politics, which does not belong to research. In part, these arguments can be backed u p by threats that resources and other prerequisites for research can be cut off if the output is seen to displease the controllers of these resources.23
Applications This discussion in the foregoing section has touched upon one of the most difficult problems for peace research, that of applications. Peace research is not motivated by curiosity for its o w n sake or by careerism in universities or elsewhere. Its driving
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force is a value commitment. Hence it is crucial that the insights gained through research are applied. Yet, there is often serious doubt that research can indeed be applied. A profound analysis of this question has been m a d e by Rapoport (1970), which sparked off a discussion still reverberating in the international peace research movement. According to Rapoport, one might proceed from the hypothesis that war, far from being an aberration, is a normal activity of military establishments, in the same way that organized crime is a normal activity of criminal syndicates. If one proceeded from this hypothesis, the task of research would be to reveal the normal functioning of an organic system, which is directed towards war as one way of pursuing policies. The application of such research would imply changing the system in a fundamental way. Proposals to d o so, however, d o not initially find a sympathetic hearing a m o n g policy-makers because they d o not aim at dismantling the military machinery inherent in the structure of a society as it has developed. The point has been supported by later research, particularly on the domestic causes of armaments, which have been referred to above. Similar reasoning m a y be applied to the 'North-South' conflict formation; the pattern of dominance and dependence is an inherent feature of the processes of development n o w taking place, and politicians to a large extent hold their positions as a consequence of their acceptance of these processes. The response to Rapoport's challenge has varied. There are those w h o hold that peace research should seek actively to advise central policy-makers. In an effort to analyse the necessary conditions, Tanter (1972) points out that the first requirement is that the knowledge provided be consistent with the organizational interests of the policy-maker and the next is to seek out an organization or individual whose priorities require the particular researchfindinga scholar has to offer. By improving the information base of policy-makers, a researcher can ultimately effect policy decisions in desired directions. Tanter's main point, however, is that advice must be consonant with the goals of the politician, which does not really respond to Rapoport's point because the politician, embedded as he is in the war structure or in the structure of dominance/dependence, does not have the goals of the peace researcher. Another possibility is not to seek to advise the powerful policy-maker, but to communicate with peace movements and with the weak in society, to encourage them to withdraw their support or acceptance of the policies of the strong where these are destructive of peace.24 T h e problem is a vast one, and there are no simple answers. It should be strongly underlined, however, that the main task of peace researchâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and here it resembles other researchâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;is to collect, systematize and disseminate knowledge. This should be done in the same rigorous and reliable way as for any other science. This is thefirstprerequisite for credibility, and a major condition for potential application.
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Yet knowledge implies not only the documentation of facts but also understanding. W h e r e it seems required to draw more specific guidelines for action from the investigations carried out by researchers, and where it cannot be assumed that such guidelines will not be developed by those w h o receive knowledge, the researcher m a y have a difficult task. There are short-range tasks where the goals of policy-makers m a y temporarily c o m e close to those of peace researchers, and policy advice can then easily be proffered. There are also long-range or m o r e profound tasks, such as demilitarization and reduction or elimination of d o m i nance/dependence relationships, for which one cannot expect receptive ears in central places. There is a need for deep-seated value reorientations and changes in loyalties a m o n g the public at large. For this purpose, it is not sensible to develop specific proposals, but rather to stick to revealing the actual course of events and its inherent dangers and injustices, possibly supplemented by scenarios of a m o r e peaceful world.26 But the precise policies of transformation will have to evolve gradually, by those directly affected, and only with time will there emerge politicians w h o are committed to the values informed by this reorientation, w h o can take the lead in the pursuit of the policies proposed.26 Peace research must be based on an understanding of h u m a n nature which assumes that h u m a n self-realization, the growth of the h u m a n being, has at least two components which are frequently, but not necessarily, in conflict. O n e is selfinterest in pursuing individual material interest. The other is the understanding that full self-realization can be achieved only in a community with others, w h o are given equal possibilities for their self-realization. T h e increasing communication in world society means that this community eventually has to embrace the whole of mankind. Inherent in the individual's quest for self-realization and growth is therefore the wish, however vague, to m a k e this similarly possible for others. Peace research aims at the demonstration of the ways in which existing structures and m a n y of the conventional policies are disfunctional to the self-realization of the individual in community with the rest of mankind. Eventually, peace research should be a contribution, however modest, to a more peaceful and just world.
Notes 1
2
Information about its growth and composition can be found in Everts (1973). M o r e information is available from the International Peace Research Association, P . O . B o x 5052, which publishes a newsletter. This can be seen in the volumes of discussion on the nature and priorities of peace research. See, in particular, Proceedings of the Third International Peace Research Association, Third Conference, Vol. I, entitled 'Philosophy of
Peace Research', published by V a n G o r c u m , Assen (Netherlands). Contributions to this discussion can also be found in the collections by Senghaas (1971, 1972), and in the major periodicals in the field (Journal of Conflict Resolution, United States, Journal of Peace Research, Olso (Norway), Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Oslo (Norway), Science et Paix (Belgium), Ă&#x2030;tudes PolĂŠmologiques (France), Instant Research on Peace and Violence (Fin-
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Notes (continued)
3
4
5
6 7 8 9
10
11 12
13
14
15
16 17
land), the Yearbook Peace Research in Japan, Yearbook of the Indian Council for Peace Research. A socialist evaluation of this research (which, however, deals only with the more traditional conflict resolution research and not the more comprehensive, modern peace research) is to be found in Barsegov and Khairov (1973). For important surveys, see also the Peace Research Abstracts, published by the Canadian Peace Research Institute. This has been well substantiated by a number of authors, including Rapoport and Senghaas. Papers on the Viet-Nam war, published as Volu m e X of Papers, Peace Research Society (International) in 1968, were claimed to have this orientation and were met with demonstrations by the majority of peace researchers at a conference in Copenhagen in 1969, organized by the Peace Research Society (International). That arms control in fact can lead to an increase in armaments, is demonstrated by Dieter Senghaas in his recent book Aufrüstung durch Rüstungskontrolle, Verlag Kohlhammer, 1972. Singer and Small (1971). See also Deutsch (1973). Rapoport (1970, 1973). Boulding (1963). For a discussion and clarification of the various concepts of violence, see, in particular, Gattung (1969) and Derriennic (1972). Gattung (1969). This view has found wide support in the peace research movement. This is Galtung's approach (1969). The possibility is hinted at in Senghaas (1973), based on a penetrating analysis of the socioeconomic background of such violence. This discussion is, on a more moralistic level, taking place also outside peace research. For a very carefully reasoned statement, see Church and Society Sub-Unit (1973). SIPRI Yearbook 1973, Chapter V and various other publications of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. This is gradually developing, e.g. on the basis of the comprehensive documentation presented by SIPRI. Richardson (1960a and, in particular, 1960¿>) was a pioneer in this field. His work has been followed up, amongst others, by the present director of the Richardson Institute in London, Michael Nicholson (1971). Senghaas (1969, 2nd ed. 1972), Gantzel (1972). Senghaas (1969), Gantzel (1972).
18
19
20
21 22 23
24
25
26
This is not to say that scientists choose this reasoning because of expediency. Those w h o developed the arms race model for scientific investigation, such as those mentioned in note IS, did so because they considered this a highly useful way of exploring the matter. The insight gained from their work has been considerable. The problem is that they m a y have a number of followers with less scientific commitment w h o use this as an expedient explanation. A s noted in the text, the arms race model provides some explanation, but not all—in some cases not even the most important aspects of armaments. Involved in this reorientation have been: Galtung (1969), Dencik (1970), Eckhardt (1971), Carroll (1972) and manyo thers. For a collection of contributions, see Senghaas (1972). M u c h insight has been gained from Dasgupta (1972). The North-South conflict has been analysed, in terms of dominance and dependence, by A m i n (1971), Frank (1971), H v e e m (1973), Krippendorff (1973), Lagos (1963), Mushakoji (1973), Palloix (1973), Sunkel (1972), Szentes (1970). Most important in this connexion is the work carried out by Burton (1969) and his associates. O f great value is also the work carried out by U N I T A R in the field of conflict resolution analysis, see, amongst others, Pechota (1971). Galtung and Lodgaard (1970). Schmid (1970). Such arguments are rarely openly expressed in writing, but they form very m u c h a part of the intellectual climate in some countries. See discussions by Eckhardt (1971), Stohl and Chamberlain (1972), Wernette (1972), and, in particular, Carroll (1972). The latter contains a strong critique of the tendency of peace researchers to look for those with power, instead of focusing on the powerless. Such scenarios are developed, in particular, in the World Order Models Project—a project carried out by the Institute for World Order, N e w York, under the chairmanship of Saul Mendlovitz. It is carried out by research teams from different parts of the world—also operating inside different ideological traditions—and is n o w in the process of publishing a series of'relevant Utopias'. In this effort, it is important to develop adequate priorities for peace research. T h e task will not be the same everywhere. Criticism has justly been levelled against some tendencies in
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Asbj0rn Eide
Notes (continued)
traditional peace research to seek to present general definitions and models, applicable to the whole world, when they in fact stem from preoccupations in some special areas of the
world. See, for such criticisms and contributions to a priority discussion, Adiseshiah (1971), Dasgupta (1972) and Dasgupta and Khan (1972).
References
A M I N , S. 1971. VAccumulation à l'Échelle Mondiale.E C K H A R D T , W . 1971. Symbiosis between Peace Research and Peace Action. Journal of Peace Paris. Research, Vol. XII, N o . 1, p . 77-80. ADISESHIAH, M . S . 1971. Vistas of Peace Research. Perspectives of Peace Research, Gujarat . 1973. Toward a Science of Value, p . 1-2. Vidyapith, p. 14-18. Mimeo. B A R S E G O V , Y . ; K H A I R O V , R . 1973. A Study of the E M M A N U E L , A . 1970. Unequal Exchange. A Study of the Imperialism of Trade. N e w York. Problems of Peace. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. X , N o . 1-2, p. 71-80. EVERTS, Ph. P . 1973. Developments and Trends in B E R G S T R Ö M , L . 1970. What is a Conflict of Interest? Peace and Conflict Research: 1965-1971. Proceedings of the International Peace Research Journal of Peace Research, Vol. VII, N o . 3, Association 4th Conference, Oslo, p . 137-68. p. 197-217. B O U L D I N G , K . E . 1963. Is Peace Researchable?, F R A N K , A . G . 1971. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. London. p. 1-10. Center for Research on Conflict Resolution. Mimeo. G A L T U N G , J. 1969. Violence, Peace and Peace ReB U R T O N , J. W . 1969. Conflict and Communication: search. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. VI, N o . 3, p. 167-92. The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations. London. . 1971. A Structural Theory of Imperialism. C A R R O L L , B . A . 1972. Peace Research: The Cult Journal of Peace Research, Vol. VIII, N o . 2 , p. 81-117. of Power. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. XVI, No. 4, p. 585-615.
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J.; L O D G A A R D , S. 1970. Cooperation in
Europe. Universitetsforlaget Oslo. MITTEE OF THE W O R L D COUNCIL OF C H U R C H E S . G A N T Z E L , K . J. 1972a. System und Akteur. Beiträge zur vergleichenden Kriegsursachenforschung. 1973. Violence, Nonviolence, and the Struggle Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag. for Social Justice. The Ecumenical Review, . 1972¿. The Armament Dynamics in the East/ Vol. X X V , No. 4. CURLE, A . 1971. Making Peace. London, Tavistock West Conflict: A n Arms Race? Proceedings of the Peace Science Society (International). Publications. Rotterdam. D A S G U P T A , S . 1972. Peace Research. Report of a Seminar, p. 15-18. Gandhian Institute of G E O R G E , K . 1971. The Application of Peace Studies. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 17, N o . 1, Studies. March, p. 47-54. D A S G U P T A , S.; K H A N , R . 1972. Problems of Peace and H A Y T E R , T . 1971. Aid as Imperialism. London. Conflict Resolution. Perspectives of Peace Research. Gandhian Institute of Studies. H V E E M , H . 1973a. The Global Dominance System. D E N C I K , L . 1970. Peace Research: Pacification or Journal of Peace Research, Vol. X , N o . 4 , p. xx. Revolution? Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association, Third Conference. . 19736. Peace Research—Historical Development and Future Perspective. Proceedings Vol. 1. Assen (Netherlands), Van Gorcum. of the International Peace Research Association D E R R I E N N I C , J. P. 1972. Theory and Ideologies of 4th Conference, Oslo. Violence. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. IX, JENKINS, R . 1971. Exploitation. The World Power StrucN o . 4, p. 361-74. ture and the Inequality of Nations. London. D E U T S C H , K . 1973. Was wissen wir vom Krieg? KAISER, K . 1970. Friedensforschung in der BundesDGFK-Informationen 1-2/73 June, p. 10-11. republik. Zukunfts- und Friedens-Forschung, (Mitteilungsblatt Deutsche Gesellschaft für Information 70, Vol. 6, April, p. 4-5. Friedens- und Konfliktforschung.)
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References (continued) Pacification. Proceedings of the International K L I N E B E R O , O . 1969. Report by Universities and the Peace Research Association, Third Conference, Quest for Peace, p . 35-9. Vol. 1. Assen (Netherlands), Van Gorcum. K R I E G E R , D . M . 1972. Peace Action Groups as Peace Research Consumers. Paper presented to S E N G H A A S , D . 1969. Abschreckung und Frieden. the Peace Research Society (International), Frankfurt. Western Region Meeting, 14-15 February, . 1970. Friedensforschung und GesellschaftsVancouver (Canada). kritik. München, Carl Hansen Verlag. . 1971. Kritische Friedensforschung. Frankfurt, . 1973. Peace Research is not Academic, p . 1-11. Suhrkamp Verlag. Mimeo. K R I P P E N D O R F F , E . 1973. Peace Research and the . 1972. Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt. Industrial Revolution. Journal of Peace ReAnalysen über abhängige Reproduktion. search, Vol. X , N o . 3, p. 185-202. Frankfurt. L A G O S , G . 1963. International Stratification and . 1973a. Conflict Formations in Contemporary Underdeveloped Countries. Chapel Hill, North International Society. Journal of Peace ReCarolina. search, Vol. X , N o . 3, p. 163-84. . 1973¿>. Friedensforschung und Dritte Welt. M U S H A K O J I , K . 1973. Structures for Peace in the North-South Perspective. Proceedings of the Mimeo. International Peace Research Association S I N G E R , D . ; S M A L L , M . 1971. The Wages of War. 4th Conference, Oslo. N e w York. N I C H O L S O N , M . 1971. Conflict Analysis. London. SIPRI Yearbooks of World Armaments and Disarmament. Stockholm, London, N e w York, N e w PALLOIX, C . 1973. Les Firmes Internationales et le Delhi. Appeared so far for the years 1969/70, Procès d'Internationalisation. Paris. 1971, 1972, 1973. P E C H O T A , V . 1971. Complementary Structures of Third-Party Seulement of International DisS T O H L , M . ; C H A M B E R L A I N , M . 1972. Alternative putes. N e w York, U N I T A R . futures for Peace Research. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X V I , N o . 4, p. 523-30. R A P O P O R T , A . 1970. Can Peace Research Be Applied? Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X I VS, U N K E L , O . 1972. Big Business and 'Dependencia'. N o . 3, p. 277-86. Foreign Affairs. •. 1973. Problems of Peace Research. Proceedings SZENTES, T . 1970. The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. Budapest. of the International Peace Research Association 4th Conference, Oslo. T A N T E R , R . 1972. The Policy Relevance of Models in World Politics. Journal of Conflict Resolution, R I C H A R D S O N , L. 1960a. Arms and Insecurity. Pittsburgh Vol. X V I , N o . 4, p. 555-84. and Chicago. W E R N E T T E , D . R . 1972. Creating Institutions for . 19606. Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. Pittsburgh Applying Peace Research. Journal of Conflict and Chicago. Resolution, Vol. X V I , N o . 4, p. 531-8. S C H M I D , H . 1970. Peace Research as a Technology for
The social science sphere
Social science as a transnational system
Chadwick F. Alger and Gene M . Lyons A seminar on 'Social Science as a Transnational System' was held at the Bellagio, Italy, Study and Conference Center of the Rockefeller Foundation from 16 to 21 July 1973. While initiative for holding the seminar was taken by Chadwick Alger of Ohio State University and G e n e Lyons of Dartm o u t h College,* participants were selected and the agenda developed with the collaboration of scholars from m a n y countries, including a number w h o were not able to be present at the seminar. In a similar spirit, the seminar had n o sponsor, except the scholars collectively present. The report that follows attempts to report faithfully the key issues raised in the seminar, identifying the source of contributions wherever possible. This thematic report was developed from summaries of each session and written m e m o r anda which participants contributed in elaboration of their oral interventions. The report is organized around five themes: asymmetry and dependency, nationalism, ideology, pluralism and community. The report should be viewed as the collective work of all participants.
Asymmetry and dependency The historical analysis of international social science prepared by Peter Lengyel had shown that there have usually been dominant centres of social science and that these have m o v e d , or shifted, at various times. The situation is n o different to that in physical, or biological sciences, or, for that matter, in the arts. Centres of excellence grow up around major thinkers, or artists, or scientists; around a major educational or research institution, or cluster of institutions; around a new intellectual movement, generated by a conceptual, or technical breakthrough and exciting the imagination of brilliant young people. They rise out of a configur-
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
ation of political, social and economic pressures, as well as scientific, or artistic, forces. Sometimes they result from deliberate political action to strengthen intellectual resources for national or ideological purposes. Sometimes they emerge out of intellectual movements that arise in response to ideological and social conflict. The centres of social science, originating in Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and shifting, at various times, between Britain, France and G e r m a n y â&#x20AC;&#x201D; m o v e d to the United States before the Second World W a r . Until most recently, they have generally remained in North America, though traditional centres in West Europe began to rise out of the war's destruction by the 1950s, and new centres were developing in both East and West Europe by the 1960s. Outside of Europe and North America, educational and research institutions in Africa and Asia had, by and large, been extensions, or appendages, of institutions in the metropolitan centres. In Latin America, as Lagos and Stavenhagen pointed out, the social sciences failed to develop partly because of the obstacles of the Hispanic cultural tradition
* The other participants were: Professor Satish Arora, India; Professor Silviu Brucan, University of Bucharest; Professor Rodolfo A . Bulatao, University of the Philippines; Dr Henry David, National Research Council, Washington, D . C . ; D r Henning Friis, Danish National Institute of Social Research; Professor Gino Germani, Harvard University; Professor Dharam Ghai, University of Nairobi; D r Ricardo Lagos, F L A C S O , Santiago, Chile; Professor Paul Lazarsfeld, Columbia University; M r Peter Lengyel, Unesco; Professor K . H . Silvert, The Ford Foundation; Professor Rodolfo Stavenhagen, El Colegio de Mexico; and Professor Yosumasa Tanaka, Gakushuin University, Tokyo.
138
and narrow legalistic approaches that dominated university development. These historical movements have left transnational social science highly asymmetrical and this asymmetry leads to dependency relations between social scientists in developing countries and social scientists in developed nations. Dependency relations derive from the dominant theories and methodologies in developed countries which serve as world-wide reference points for research and teaching, from the resources that are available in developed countries for advancing knowledge, the availability of means for publishing and distributing research findings, and the existence of major academic centres in Europe and the United States which continue to attract, and often retain, firstrate social scientists from all parts of the world. T h e elements of asymmetry and dependency underscored again the observation that Alger had m a d e early in the seminar that transnational relations in social science mirror to a considerable degree relations in other sectors of the international systemâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;political, military and economic. Dependency relations in the social sciences are an outgrowth of colonial empires whose institutions persist even after the political independence of countries of Africa and Asia. M o r e recently they have grown up as an adjunct to the efforts of great powers to influence the economic, political and social development of nations within their spheres of influence. Dependency is also a consequence of the continued gap between developed and developing countries and the pressures on the small number of social scientists in developing countries to take on administrative and political responsibilities which reduce the time and resources they can devote to advanced research and teaching. Participants from developing countries described a number of ways in which unequal relations with social scientists in developed countries grow up and become pervasive. Lagos underscored the significance of so m a n y social scientists having been trained in developed countries. A s a result, their training has emphasized techniques, values and problems that are m o r e relevant to conditions in developed countries than they are to conditions in less-developed countries. Moreover, students trained abroad, including m a n y w h o spend at least a few years there after completing their training, sometimes develop a strong identity with the social science profession in a developed country. Their
definition of a competent social scientist is one w h o can achieve the approval of peers in the country in which they were trained, rather than those in his o w n society. 'The crowning feat of a budding Latin American social scientist,' as Stavenhagen put it, has, until very recently been 'the acceptance of a paper for publication by a respected international journal, preferably in the English language.' In s o m e cases, a returning social scientist will maintain a strong identity with a specific department in a university in the United States or Europe. Ties between a department in a developed country and its counterpart in a developing country m a y , for that matter, be exceedingly close because a number of the qualified social scientists in the less-developed country have been trained in the same department abroad. Thus an entire department m a y tend to seek the validation of a foreign department and adopt its prevailing theoretical orientation. At the same time, despite trends toward nationalization, m a n y social science departments in Africa, as D h a r a m G h a i reminded us, are still dominated by expatriates from developed countries w h o also endeavour to acquire the approval of their peers in the country of their origin. T h e dependency relation w a s also described in terms of an unequal exchange between social scientists in developed and less-developed countries, remarkably similar to unequal exchange in trade and commerce. Developing countries bec o m e resource bases to exploit sources of information processed abroad after being gathered and refined into elaborate hypotheses far from the original site. A s Rodolfo Bulatao said: '. . . all one has here is one-way dependence, the importation of theories, methods and philosophies of science and export of hardly anything, or occasionally of primary products, i.e. raw data, as opposed to the "high technology" exports of theories and methods.' Unequal exchange is also perceived because so m a n y more social scientists from developed countries are studying less-developed societies than there are social scientists from less-developed countries doing research on developed countries. A s Stavenhagen put it: 'they study us, but w e don't study them'. Moreover, for Latin Americans, he emphasized, an understanding of what is happening in their o w n countries might require an
Social science as a transnational system
understanding of h o w United States foreign policy is formulated and h o w United States-based multinational corporations operate. Yet there are few opportunities for Latin American social scientists to undertake this kind of research in the United States. (There are, also, it should be noted, fewer Latin American social scientists.) Another aspect of asymmetry is the control in developed countries of resources that affect the development of social science in less-developed countries. In an example offered by Lagos, m a n y social scientists in developing countries must distort their research to questions which they do not consider priority problems, but which are given emphasis by those w h o control research support from abroad. Likewise, m a n y scholars from lessdeveloped countries are often required to study in places where they cannot pursue their o w n research objectives, in order to be granted foreignsponsored graduate fellowships. Later these recipients often join a foreign social science community, or an international agency, as they are attracted to jobs outside their o w n country and region. Another dimension of asymmetric and dependency relations stems from relations between social scientists in national societies. There is a tendency for those w h o participate in transnational activities to constitute an ĂŠlite that can tap resources and opportunities not available to the run of social scientists in their o w n country. Those involved in transnational social science activity m a y have interests and perspectives which d o not reflect those c o m m o n to their colleagues and compatriots. Those social scientists w h o identify with groups opposed to official policy, or those from ethnic or racial groups deprived of equal professional opportunity, for example, m a y not be represented in transnational activities. Certainly those w h o work in one of the world languages, particularly English or French, are m u c h m o r e likely to have opportunities to participate in transnational activity than those w h o d o not. India provides but one example, a country of m a n y languages but one in which those working in English, as Satish Arora emphasized, are at the apex of the social science establishment. The result of asymmetry and dependency is thus more than continued inequality in the distribution of resources for teaching and research. It is, perhaps more importantly, the continued dominance of theories and methodologies developed out of the special cultural traditions and
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historical experiences of the West. These are certainly not monolithic or above criticism. They include a range of philosophical views and, especially today, considerable uncertainty about the fundamental bases for h u m a n behaviour and social structure. Marxist, neo-Marxist, or anti-Marxist, behavioural, or historical, structuralist, or functionalist, they none the less favour a high degree of empiricism, and a tendency to examine social systems as self-contained units. They are addressed, moreover, to the problems of industrialized societies and, in the view of m a n y intellectuals in developing societies, are instruments not only of scientific advancement, but also of political power that tends to perpetuate the existing structure of international relations. Dependency for social scientists means being forced to work within dominant theories and methodologies without the resources, incentives, or anticipation of professional rewards to create competing centres of research and teaching in a more global transnational community. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that several participants raised questions about the desirability of international co-operation in the social sciences. N o n e raised questions about the existence of a transnational social science system; indeed, the elements of asymmetry and dependency only assume importance in the context of such a system. Yet, as Bulatao argued, increasing co-operation under present conditions would only strengthen existing patterns of dependency. 'It becomes a question of strategy and tempo,' he said: to m o v e toward greater co-operation only as autono m o u s centres grow u p in developing countries, or through networks of co-operation that help m a k e them autonomous. This scepticism toward international cooperation was reinforced by the critical comments of Ghai, Lagos and others, on the international professional associations in the social sciences. They fully appreciate the historical reasons w h y the headquarters of these organizations are located in developed countries and w h y their councils are dominated by social scientists from these same countries. The associations play an important role in helping bring dominant centres into contact and continuing communication. But, in doing so, they also tend to institutionalize the existing pattern and, unless deliberate action is taken, to perpetuate, or at least to m a k e m o r e rigid, the dependency
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relations with social scientists outside the dominant centres. In effect, social scientists from less-developed countries see n o likelihood of joining in a truly co-operative transnational community unless the asymmetries of their relations with colleagues in developed countries are corrected. Indeed, they see the likelihood that their dependence o n developed nations will be intensified and the responsiveness of social science to the needs of developing countries, as they perceive them, significantly diminished. For them, the prerequisite for transnational social science is the creation of strong national, or regional, social science communities.
graduate students in almost every part of the world. Those w h o are engaged in transnational social science activities are still only a small fraction of the total professional population. W h e n abroad, m o r e over, they can hardly escape a preoccupation with national identity, willingly or otherwise, given the imposing weight of the United States in world affairs. T h e description that Silvert and David provided of the social sciences in the United States gave precision to this preliminary note. T o David's observation that the social sciences in the United States had 'gone public' in recent years, Silvert inventoried the m a n y settings within which social scientists work in addition to the university teaching department: government agencies, from the top Nationalism presidential advisory bodies to administrative bureaux and specially sponsored government research It is important to distinguish between national, or institutes; private foundations; the mass media and regional, social science communities and a national, the influential magazines that set the tone and or regional, social science. The first is a factor in questions of public debate; private consultant the sociology of transnational social science; the firms; university contract research and consulting second has potential consequences for the philosophy of the social sciences, a denial of univer- groups; and the publishing houses. For David, 'going public' meant not only heavy involvement salities. The discussions at Bellagio were centred in public life and public institutions (and thus on the sociological reality of national, or regional, preoccupation in national affairs) but also incommunities. There is a national orientation a m o n g creased public financing for research and legissocial scientists which is not limited to developing lative influence on the organization and general countries, however; social science is, in the broadest environment within which research is carried sense, nation-centric. out. There is n o single explanation of the national orientation of social scientists. For some, Lazarsfeld added that the United States it is a matter of size: a large and complex national educational system, taken in its totality, m a d e society offers so m a n y opportunities for teaching heavy demands on trained social scientists, the and problems for research that one need not be large majority of w h o m were thus engaged in teachprofessionally concerned with the outside world. ing and play no part in research. The undergradFor others, it is a matter of geographic, cultural, uate college, for one thing, including as it does linguistic, or ideological isolation. For still others, the equivalent of the last two years of the lycĂŠe or the national orientation m a y c o m e from the degymnasium, requires enormous teaching m a n m a n d s placed o n them by the State, or by their power for general courses. Furthermore, elemeno w n commitment to social change which takes tary and secondary school education, so important shape in national development. A national, or in and extended, has to be serviced and nourished some cases, regional, social science development, with ideas and information and, in recent years, as a prerequisite to a sense of self identity in transhas become increasingly oriented to a sociological national activities, is only one manifestation of perspective. nationalism in contemporary social science. In India, as Arora explained, size and Early in the seminar, there w a s frequent reference to the 'inwardness' of social scientists. Alger and Lyons, in introducing the agenda, had observed 'inwardness' as a characteristic of most social scientists in the United States, despite the obvious presence of United States researchers and
culture both tend to m a k e social scientists less 'outward'-looking than in, say, Latin America where they cannot examine internal problems without accounting for external influences. India has a civilization of its o w n and foreign influences are likely to be m o r e transitory than in Latin
Social science as a transnational system
America. T h e major thrust, moreover, is increasingly focused on contemporary problems in India with little concern for other regions. For Arora the most important issue is the kinds of questions being asked by Indian social scientists. T h e selection of questions has often reflected the felt need of social scientists for approval outside the country. While those outside influences continue, there is n o w a small and growing community of scholars w h o design their work in terms of national needs. There is also under w a y a self-conscious assessment of the state of research and resources in India and of the analytic needs of an enormous domestic data base. For Japan, Tanaka emphasized the problems of geographic isolation and linguistic difficulty, especially a m o n g an older generation that was neither educated abroad nor has travelled m u c h outside of the country. T h e multiple roles social scientists increasingly play in Japanese society, as in the United States, focus their attention and energies on national concerns: as social science 'technocrats'; as intellectuals addressing themselves to large, influential publics; and as professionals administering the needs of growing educational and research institutions. In West Europe, the growth of the social sciences since the Second World W a r , as Friis described it, has been nationally institutionalized, with the governments as the main source of funds, national agencies being principal consumers of research, and national research councils being set u p to administer developmental resources. A n d in East Europe, Brucan identified nationalism as a basic characteristic of social science development, both as a response to earlier, externally imposed ideological rigidities and to present internal demands for research to support government programmes. These 'national' tendencies reinforced Silvert's insistence that there cannot be a true international social science community without strong national communities. Only members of strong national communities have the capacity to participate effectively in international activities. For him the issue is: h o w do w e help social scientists in lessdeveloped countries to m a k e their o w n decisions on what they want to d o , in an order decided by them and at a speed determined by them? It was a question, and an attitude, shared by Bulatao. T h e major problem in the Philippines, he had maintained, is to create a 'critical social science
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mass' in terms of numbers, institutions and standards. Until there is such a 'critical mass', involvement in transnational activities only maintains dependencies. Thus, 'priority should be given to the development of autonomous centres of social science, toward helping them reach critical m a s s . . . . ' Developments in Latin America described by Lagos and Stavenhagen were m o r e regional than national, and here complicated the analysis. At the same time, there is clearly a self-consciousness a m o n g Latin American social scientists that is not yet present in other parts of the developing world and which in fact is in the process of crystallization. While it was impossible to explore the issue fully, certain elements did emerge. T h e instability of national institutions and especially of universities, brought intellectuals in Latin America together across national boundaries. Their contacts have been enhanced by the c o m m o n use of Spanish, by the c o m m o n core of European tradition, by the institutional framework available to them through United Nations and regional organizations, and by the importance of the United States as an external force in Latin American development. Their cohesion has n o w been further deliberately strengthened with the establishment of the Latin American Social Science Council, a regional organization stronger and more influential than any single national group. Nationalism in the social sciences, in effect, wears m a n y faces. It is pervasive because w e live in an age of strong nationalism and social science does, in fact, mirror the larger political system within which it works. Knowledge, including social and economic knowledge, is increasingly an instrument of national development and social change, while national or regional organizations provide social scientists with positions and independence from which to engage in international activities. But the effects of nationalism o n transnational social science can be various. Exerted at the centres—in Europe and North America, at the present time—it can create rigidities. At the peripheries—in Latin America, Asia and Africa—it m a y create n e w cultural and historical centres of independent thought and expand the scope and grasp of social science. Nationalism could also, in both developed and developing countries, build barriers to exchange and distort knowledge in the cause of political goals.
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Ideology Ideological differences m a y be seriously divisive forces a m o n g social scientistsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;domestically as well as across national frontiers There were, indeed, suggestions to base professional international relations o n the more neutral grounds of data and technique. T h e working agenda had, however, asked participants to identify major influences o n contemporary social science developments and, in describing the situations in their o w n countries, or regions, to explain w h y certain theoretical approaches were more attractive than others, w h y certain methodologies, rather than others, were more usually taught and employed in research. Lagos, discussing trends in Latin America, m a d e the point early that all theory begins in ideology, even though individual social scientists m a y not be conscious of it. H e thus set the stage for relating ideology to theory-building and then to the whole social science enterprise. Lagos' position was strongly rooted in local experience; and he distinguished three phases of Latin American social science: a traditional period marked by historical, institutional and descriptive approaches; a scientific period, beginning as late as the 1950s and highly influenced by empirical social science movements in the United States; and the present period of 'dissatisfaction' w h e n dominant paradigms are being rejected and efforts m a d e to explain what is going o n in terms of the region's unique historical experience, by social scientists committed to w o r k for change in their societies. Stavenhagen supported Lagos' position, emphasizing that, in Latin America, the model of the social scientist as a 'technocrat' is rejected and that he must be an 'intellectual' in the 'old tradition'. ' W e arefirstcitizens and then social scientists,' he stated; ' W e need our social science in order to be effective citizens.' T h e sense of commitment, nevertheless, frequently weakens research standards and creates divisiveness a m o n g social scientists, contending groups of w h o m , as Lagos pointed out, often cannot engage in discussion, let alone co-operation. Germani went further to describe the situation in Latin America as a 'crisis of social science'. But it was not a 'crisis' that could be met by calling for the elimination of ideology. Ideology was a fact of social science. W h a t Germani criti-
cized was the unquestioning acceptance of theories, or ideologies, in Latin America: n o w of Marxism and M a o i s m , earlier of United States and European models. In doing so, he anticipated the importance of the 'ideological critique' which Brucan was to bring up later and underscored the debilitatinge ffects of ideological, or theoretical, ' d o g m a ' o n both scientific standards and scholarly co-operation. The role of ideology had emerged during the Latin American discussion out of two sets of issues: criticism of dominant trends in the social sciences; and assertions about the place of the social scientist in society. It emerged less directly, but n o less clearly as the need for theorybuilding and integrative approaches in research were confronted. Ghai, for example, criticized the dominant social science for being fragmented, compartmentalized, and oriented toward routine microstudies. W h e n carried out in Africa, such studies assumed the cultural and historical contexts within which their methodologies and hypotheses had originally been tested. There was little or n o effort to deal with the special experience of African societies as an essential conceptual framework for sectoral studies. Here Ghai did not assert the need, or assumption, of an ideology. H e was speaking more of historical and cultural experience. But his call for n e w theoretical investigation and integrative approaches raised the issue of ideology if, indeed, Lagos was right that all theory begins in ideology. Similar theoretical deficiencies were e m p h a sized by Silvert in evaluating social science in the United States. Along with others, he pointed out that criticism of dominant trends was as prevalent and valid in the United States and Europe as in the developing countries. O n e of the most profound failures of American social scientists, he maintained, is that, despite the scope and richness of research, there is n o body of thought, or c o m monly accepted 'whole system' of propositions, to explain the recent crises in United States experience. H e illustrated n e w shifts in Europe from prevailing research trends, moreover, by referring to an article which has thus characterized the state of social psychology in Europe: . . . rejection of the positivistic epistemology of social science, emphasizing instead the intrinsic importance of prior assumptions or
Social science as a transnational system
stipulations concerning the nature of m a n and society: doubt about the possibility or desirability of value-free social science; rejection of the linear, one-way-traffic concept of causation implicit in m u c h experimental social psychology in favor of an interactive view; and emphasis on meaning and symbolic communication as the hallmark of the social, with criticism of current social psychology as stopping short of its proper task in this respect.1
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with ideologies. T h e problem was not simply, as s o m e had suggested, whether new or special techniques were needed to deal with n e w or changing situations. The problem was one of methodology, of deciding what data to generate and order and h o w . In the processes that link methods to methodologies and to theories, micro-questions could bec o m e macro-questions. Pursuing this point further, Lagos pointed out that techniques can be used for any purpose, trivial or important; if there is no over-all model, there is n o framework in which to examine micro-problems.
Germani put the present re-assessment of social science in historical perspective w h e n he remarked The question is: is there a basis for an 'overthat recurring crises and change in the social sciall model' other than ideology? Is a 'model' ideoences could be identified over the past century. T h e logical if conceived in terms of special historical crises form a kind of pattern. Periodically social and cultural experience? D o e s it b e c o m e 'ideological' because its purpose is to evaluate change scientists have tried to m a k e their research m a n or continuity? Moreover, h o w value-oriented is ageable by splitting the work up, in effect fragthe 'intuition' or 'introspection' that Lazarsfeld menting it. After some time, a reaction sets in, calling for a n e w integration, a n e w holistic ap- said had to be used in relating quantitative techniques to qualitative methodologies? proach. This kind of reaction has n o w occurred again, in response to the neo-positivism that domiT h e questions were raised once again when nated the scene, principally from the United States. Brucan broached the reality of ideology. 'Every W h a t is significantly different at present is that the social scientist', he stated, 'is influenced by an reaction is complicated by the centre-periphery ideology, whether deliberately, or not.. . . Starting issue, as well as by the conflict between continuity with the subjects w e select for research, the variables w e choose to investigate, the data w e collect, and change. and the interpretation w e give to the facts, there is Lazarsfeld also provided a historical peralways an ideological ingredient involved. It is . . . spective to the discussion. T h e prevalence of quanan ingredient that contributes to the relativism of titative methodology in the United States, he noted, cognition in the social sciences, as compared with was only s o m e forty years old. Prior to that, the Chicago school dominated sociology and w a s the process of cognition in the natural sciences. Yet it is a fact of life and rather than ignoring it, highly qualitative in direction. Certainly what was proclaiming its death or end . . . w e [had] better needed—and has been for s o m e time—is a m o v e see what w e can do about it.' ment from quantitative to qualitative methodologies through the deepening of contemporary Brucan's o w n solution was premised by his description with historical connexions, the linking statement that 'as a Marxist, I consider all ideolof micro-macro relationships, and the use of inogies as partial and as containing an element of what M a r x used to call false consciousness. . . .' tuition and introspection to relate quantitative While one ideology ' m a y be less permeated by techniques to qualitative methodologies. false consciousness than another', none—despite Lazarsfeld's emphasis o n methodologies what its proponents might wish—could lay claim brought up again a set of distinctions that Silvert to full 'scientific truth'. Under these circumstances, had m a d e earlier between methods and methodthe key to a transnational social science community ology. Methods he defined as techniques to genlay in 'ideological confrontation and critique': erate data, and methodologies as schemes for first, so as to be able to separate the ideological ordering data. Methodology is the connexion befrom the non-ideological ingredients of theory, or tween methods and theories—and consequently research; and second, as a 'first step toward the elimination of relativism in social knowledge'. 1. M . Brewster Smith, 'Criticism of aSocial Science', Science, Vol. 180, 11 M a y 1973, p. 611.
Brucan's approach had, in m a n y respects, been anticipated by Germani and w a s carried
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forward by him, but from a different startingpoint. Germani was searching for a w a y to respond to neo-positivism and the need for a n e w integration. H e was pessimistic; but he urged that, as social scientists, w e should not fall back into irrationalism. Reason was still the best, if not the only guide w e had. T h e only w a y to respond was to recognize that, since every view is partial, there are differences in perspectives which w e must try to understand and to which w e must relate our concrete research. There appeared little hope of eliminating 'false consciousness' entirely. But Germani had insisted earlier that m o r e important than ideology in guiding research is the quality of work within different ideological contexts. This could be applied m o r e broadly, even globally, against the thrust of Brucan's intervention.
Pluralism A number of central themes n o w began to converge and, as they did so, they and their articulations were clarified. While social scientists generally work within national frameworks, there is a significant range of transnational activities in which m a n y are involved and which influence the nature and directions of research and teaching. General theories and hypotheses are transferred and subsequently tested in different historical and cultural settings. Techniques and methodologies become accepted and used across national frontiers. T h e transmission belts through which these transnational transfers take place include the exchange and translation of major scholarly works; the use of standard texts; the education of foreign students in major universities; foreign area research projects and international seminars; and international associations which sponsor journals, congresses and continuing research committees. These activities are part of a legitimizing process through which dominant paradigms are circulated and, in this way, affect the work of social scientists far beyond those w h o are directly engaged in research and teaching outside their o w n countries. Lengyel, in his paper, had traced the evolution of this system of transnational relations from the central university establishments in Britain, France, G e r m a n y and the United States, in which the social sciencesfirstdeveloped and from which they were originally diffused. B y the 1930s 'the world situation of social science w a s dominated
by the patterns established through the chief university systems' of Europe. During the Second World W a r and in the immediate post-war period 'the preponderance of the [United States], both overt and covert, m a d e itself felt... partly through academic channels, partly through military and diplomatic channels and partly through foundation and governmental initiatives, beginning with Western Europe, extending to Latin America, later also to such traditionalfiefsof other systems as India, and dominating Japan.' M o r e recently, the beginnings of autonomous growth in the developing countries following de-colonization, the emergence (or re-emergence, in s o m e cases) of the social sciences in Eastern Europe, and the strengthening of professional communities in smaller countries like Australia, N o r w a y , Israel and Holland have continued to change the earlier centre-periphery pattern and to create the present more pluralistic system. This more pluralistic system, while still tending toward asymmetry and heavily conditioned by the national orientations of social scientists in all countries, nevertheless creates the environments within which dominant theories and methodologies are m o r e critically tested and evaluated than ever before. Germani established the connexions between changing forces in social science w h e n he said that the present reaction against neo-positivism is complicated by the centre-periphery issue, as well as by the conflict between continuity and change. T h e complication, in fact, m a y be brought about by the break-down of centre-periphery patterns. It is n o accident, as Germani also pointed out, that concepts of 'dependency' emerged from the peripheryâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;in this case, Latin America: they derived from the search for integrative approaches to development and for a better understanding of obstacles to social and economic change. Here the intellectual role of social scientists in national societies merged with their professional role in a transnational community. If social science is in a state of upheaval, if not 'crisis', the reasons m a y originate from the pluralism that is beginning to replace thĂŠ older, m o r e rigid centre-periphery arrangement.- There is n o w a greater variety of theories and hypotheses emerging from the different environments within which social scientists w o r k and by which they are affected. Different research problems are important at different stages of economic and social
Social science as a transnational system
development. T h e basesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;whether they be identified as ideological or simply experientialâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;on which social scientists m a k e research choices and direct investigations are n o w complex and diverse. Under the earlier dispensation, the links between social scientists at the centres, however divergent their ideological differences, were cultural, as well as scientific. These links, moreover, were tighter the fewer the centres. But as the centres multiply and as those at the former peripheries pursue autonomous routes to theoretical and methodological experiment, the links of a transnational community become m o r e complex and interacting. At thefirstmeeting, Lyons had projected several elements in a changing transnational community, further developed as the discussion continued: broad participation in social science activities by scholars from different cultural and historical experiences, the establishment of increasing numbers of centres of theoretical and methodological innovation; further exploitation and refinement of technologies both in serving theoretical and methodological advancement and in contributing to the processes of cumulative growth; and continuing pressures on social scientists for 'social usefulness' to justify resources, to respond to problems, or to satisfy social consciousness. Against these changes, he had suggested, the problem still remained of settling o n the bases for constructing an operational model of social science as an international system. T h e experience of the physical and biological sciences provided two possible bases: thefirst,an assumption of the universality of truth; and, the second, the idea of the Kuhnian paradigm. Either basis generated a series of institutional, procedural and normative requirements, but whether either could be validly and completely transposed to the social sciences had to be seriously examined. T h e question w a s h o w to conceive a transnational system of social science that provided both for universalities and cultural and historical specificities. The seminar did not arrive, or even try to arrive, at an agreed model. There is, for that matter, too m u c h that w e still d o not k n o w about w h y and h o w social scientists go about their work. Nevertheless, three important sets of issues can be drawn from the discussions, issues that begin to give some sense of the significance of pluralism for transnational social science relations. They involve
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methodological experiment, ideological critique, and standards of research. Very early in the seminar, Tanaka and David cautioned of trouble ahead if one spoke of 'social science' in an over-all sense. T a n a k a went o n to suggest the possibility of examining different disciplines or even sub-fields, as transnational systems. Certain fields, for example, provide more effective opportunities for co-operation and thus for the construction of transnational systems of scholarly relations, a point frequently reinforced. But Friis commented o n several occasions that there apparently exists a greater ability by economists and demographers from different countries and social systems to agree o n collaborative research than, for example, amongst sociologists and political scientists. W h a t appears to be essential is that international research is facilitated w h e n there is a concentration o n technique or agreed problemsolving, w h e n the parameters within which the research is carried out limit, or leave untouched, assumptions that would intrude into broader theoretical, or even ideological implications. F o r some, this is a useful and realistic w a y to proceed; for others, it is not only partial, but tends to maintain the fragmented character of social science which weakens the advancement of both basic and applied research. It was Lazarsfeld's concern, moreover, to m o v e beyond quantitative techniques a n d to harness the emerging pluralism to the task of renewing and strengthening qualitative analysis. H e urged that the n e w variation of social situations and perspectives be used for increasing experimentation with methodologies m o r e and more qualitative as contrasted with the quantitative methodologies most highly developed during the past years. T o this, he joined the possibility of an interdisciplinarity, not in the simple terms of the several disciplines, but in terms of the adaptation of three methodological traditions: behaviourist, statistical and experimental. Lazarsfeld's emphasis o n qualitative methodologies related back to Silvert's identification of methodology as the link between methods, or techniques, and theoriesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and, in the perspective of Lagos, and others, to ideologies. Ideology, so often divisive, again could not be ignored. In m a n y respects, Brucan had set a pattern for viewing ideology as a constructive, rather than divisive,
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force in transnational social science relations, however. His argument was based o n the importance of ideological critique as (and it is important to repeat) 'the first step toward the elimination of relativism in social knowledge'. But he went further to suggest that ideological critique, often difficult within a national society in which political interests are based o n ideological positions, m a y be possible in relations across national borders; '. . . ideology', he said, 'does not play the same role and function in foreign policy as in domestic policy, just because international relations differ from internal social relations.' Brucan's challenge raised questions that remained open. Ideology m a y play a different role in foreign than domestic policy, but did this difference free social scientists from the consequences of stating ideological positions outside their country that could be judged a political threat internally? W a s the rejection of d o g m a a prerequisite of his position, the acceptance of the view he had earlier expressed that all ideologies, at the present stage, are partial? Did his view of ideological critique assume an objective truth that would be revealed once all false consciousness was unmasked? Did the n e w pluralism in social science provide n e w possibilities of weakening d o g m a where it exists, and of exposing 'false consciousness'?
T h e questions Lyons had raised about the applicability of other scientific models to the social sciences, however, still needed thinking through. W h a t seemed certain, for the m o m e n t , w a s that social scientists, before understanding the nature and demands of their involvement in a transnational community, must become m o r e selfconsciously part of a system that extends beyond national boundaries. A n d here again, the n e w pluralism, however nationalistic its orientation, might help bring about that self-consciousness.
Community
Throughout the seminar, Germani expressed a sense of pessimism that was significantly matched by his idealism; both, moreover, are rooted in a recognition of conflicting realities. Social science, he observed at one point, is a reflection of the world itself, increasingly interdependent, but still divided into separate nation-States. For Germani, there is n o alternative to transnational co-operation, for however different and varied our ideological perspectives, w e must, as social scientists, confront the larger issues of humanity, which are increasingly global in scope. H e understood the argument of Bulatao that co-operation could intensify dependencies and of Stavenhagen that social theories are also political weapons in interA s the threads of a transnational social national relations. But he insisted that w e could no science m o v e from techniques to methodologies and through theory-building to ideology, the el- m o r e wish away 'internationalism' than w e could nationalism, or ideology: they are all realities that ements which bind social scientists, as social scienaffect our work. T h e problem is to recognize that tists, still remain loose and unattached. Again, w e social science is a collective enterprise that, in itself, are reminded of Germani's remark that the quality has n o geographic or political boundariesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;even of work carried out in diffeient ideological contexts though geographic and political boundaries affect is more important than ideology. Stavenhagen, in social science because they affect what social sciena different vein, after arguing that theoretical ideas, tists doâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;again, w e are confronted with conflicting at every level, become political instruments, said realities. that what w e could achieve in transnational relations is only respect for each other as social T h e discussions had surveyed the widescientists, n o more. spread diversity of m a n ' s efforts to accumulate, T h e question is whether such respect must be based only o n what Germani called the 'quality of work'? Yet what are to be the measures of 'quality'? This is not a question that can be answeied in the abstract. T h e history of science demonstrates the importance of institutions and standards, of methods of criticism and evaluation, through which a community finds its w a y to a sense of 'quality' which then becomes a central point of loyalty for its members.
disseminate, and apply knowledge about his o w n behaviour, the diversity of roles and organizations that m a k e up social science around the globe, the variety of the environments in which social scientists w o r k , and the different perspectives from which this activity is perceived. Yet evidence of the interdependencies of social scientists in different parts of the globe permeated every session of the seminar: frequent discussions of asymmetric relationships; the personal references of participants,
Social science as a transnational system
almost all of w h o m had studied, or worked in countries other than their o w n ; c o m m o n k n o w ledge of a variety of theories and methodologies; c o m m o n membership in international professional organizations; and the very ability, and willingness, of the participants, from all parts of the world, to carry on for five days a searching dialogue on social science as a transnational system. It is not surprising that the diversity and the unity of mankind are both reflected in the activities of social scientists; yet concrete examples of simultaneous pulls in opposite directions were fascinating to observe in the seminar. There was, at once, advocacy of the strengthening of individual disciplines and the vital need for increased interdisciplinary collaboration. The need for deeper concern of social scientists with the application of their knowledge in both teaching and policy-making was asserted, yet w e were also warned that social science must maintain a certain independence from government and other institutions. T h e need for a transnational social science community was strongly advocated, yet equal fervour was expressed for national and regional social science communities. T h e discussion tended toward the view that the social scientist must be at the same time disciplinary and multidisciplinary; he must be relevant to, and involved in, the major problems of his society, and yet in some ways separate from it; and he must, at the same time, play a role in national, regional and global societies, or at least be sensitive to the fact that he inevitably affects a variety of national, regional and global institutions and relations whether he intends to or not The discussion of asymmetry and dependency in transnational relations especially underscored this latter point. M a n y social scientists in developed countries are simply not cognizant of the part they play in creating dependency relations because they lack selfconsciousness about the social structure reflected in their o w n scientific activities. T h e seminar underscored ways in which demands upon social scientists vary in different contexts. While there is considerable variation even within countries, in general the smaller and the less wealthy the country, the m o r e varied the roles the social scientist is expected to play. T h e larger and the richer the country, the easier it is for the social scientist, for example, to d o laboratory experiments o n the effect of cultural differences o n
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communication and leave application of results to others. But the social scientist in a less-developed country would probably be required to justify his research on such a subject as immediately relevant to national development. Furthermore, he might find it necessary to become involved in broad issues of national development that inevitably require him to combine research and politics. T h e seminar discussions themselves provided participants with insight o n the ways in which differences in role impinge o n transnational communication in the social sciences. While the interests of the social scientist from a developed country m a y be broad, in general he earns his livelihood from a more narrowly defined set of roles than his colleague from a less-developed country. Furthermore, the social scientist from a less-developed country tends to be under great pressure to produce solutions to broad problems of development rapidly. If he cannot, his livelihood as a social scientist m a y be threatened because of his unavoidable involvement in a mix of science and politics. O n the other hand, the economic and professional survival of social scientists in developed countries is only marginally affected by the usefulness to society of the knowledge they produce, by trends in the national economy or by political upheaval. It is inevitable that the more extreme uncertainties and role conflicts encountered by the social scientist from less-developed countries produce tensions and anxieties that impinge upon his transnational relationships, particularly those with colleagues from developed countries. O n the other hand, the tensions and conflicts that occur in transnational communication between social scientists playing different roles can be essential to broadening the scope of social science as a global enterprise. A s seminar participants discussed the condition of social science in their countries, the individual cases could be viewed as experiments in the creation and application of knowledge about h u m a n behaviour. Systematically observed, national and regional variation in the character of social science institutions and their relationship to government and society could m a k e an important contribution to the sociology of social science. This expanding enterprise should be of considerable value to social scientists in all countries concerned with developing the application of social science knowledge.
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It became clear that social scientists vitally need knowledge about the social science enterprise on a global scale for at least three reasons. First, all of them are in some w a y linked to a global system, whether they are aware of it or not. They have an obligation, therefore, to become aware of h o w they affect this system and to test their impact o n it against their personal values. Second, the diversity of the social sciences around the world provides a multitude of laboratories from which its practitioners can learn, through the experience of others, about alternative methods for the generation and application of knowledge. Third, m a n kind will not be able to cope with global problems without a transnational community (or c o m m u n i ties) of social scientists to provide a global framework within which issues can be conceived and analysed. But h o w can such a global view be acquired? F o r participants in the seminar, the required perspective came largely through personal experience: study and teaching abroad, participation in international conferences, responsibility in a variety of international governmental and professional organizations, and, in several cases, m i gration under political changes. Beyond personal experience, there is a small literature o n social science in specific countries, o n cross-national collaboration in social science, and occasional articles on international professional associations in the social sciences. But this material is scattered and often published in journals or books that only reach a very narrow segment of the profession. T h e history and sociology of social science lags far behind the needs of social scientists to develop a sense of their o w n community. There is need for materials, published in m a n y languages, to provide social scientists with a global view of their profession: it is particularly critical for the younger ones in graduate training, w h o d o not have an opportunity to participate directly in transnational activity. T h e seminar could only m a k e a preliminary s u m m a r y of materials that ought to be prepared in order to provide social scientists with a global view. K e y elements grew out of the agenda of the seminar and the discussions that flowed from it. First, they could include perspectives o n social science in specific countries and regions as viewed by social scientists working in that country or region. This would, of course, include their
views o n social science in other parts of the world and views of transnational relations. These views would both inform o n variation in professional activities around the globe and help to show h o w others perceive their domestic activity as well as their contributions to transnational activity. A second element would be a description of the international organizations, non-governmental and governmental, that link social scientists in different countries. This would include regional governmental and non-governmental organizations such as the Latin American Social Science Council and the International Political Science Association and inter-governmental organizations such as Unesco and O E C D . T h e programmes of these organizations would be discussed in the light of regional and global problems confronting social scientists. In addition, they could be discussed in terms of membership and influence in the organizations and h o w these impinge o n their capacity to cope effectively with these problems. O f course, these organizations would be analysed by social scientists from different parts of the world so that different perspectives and interests were brought to bear. Third, in the light of these largely descriptive materials, analyses might be m a d e of the importance of issues such as ideology and asymmetry in transnational social science relations. If not at the first stage, then eventually, comparative studies might be carried out of social science practice in different countries, with evaluations, from more than one point of view, of the contributions that flow from different practices. A n d , finally, social scientists with widely different perspectives might be asked to develop alternative futures for social science at various levelsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;national, regional and global. Such materials would help social scientists to develop m o r e self-consciousness of w h o they are, from a global perspective; and would confront them with images of what they might become, in the light of a global panorama of alternative futures. Out of this kind of activity a global c o m munity of social scientists m a y emerge that is responsive to the lengthening agenda that faces mankind as a whole. U p to n o w , as the seminar m a d e very clear, there is only an international system of social scientistsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;i.e. scholars w h o are linked so that they affect each other and to s o m e
Social science as a transnational system
degree share a c o m m o n fate. But there is neither sufficient consciousness of interdependence nor enough mutual responsiveness to call it a c o m munity. Certainly, in the immediate future, such a community cannot be created unless those in the dominant centres can by their deeds dissipate the
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perceptions of colleagues of asymmetry in transnational social science. H o w is this to be achieved? W e should all be seeking answers as each, in his o w n professional activity, conducts his o w n private 'experiments' in the building of a social science community.
Institutes for research in India
AndrĂŠ BĂŠteille Social science research in India has undergone substantial expansion during the last twenty-five years. This expansion must be seen in the light of a newly independent country's desire to apply the available social science talent to the task of national reconstruction. Given this context, there is understandably a strong emphasis on the 'practical' side of research in contrast to what m a y be described as its purely 'academic' side. Research tends increasingly to be conceived in terms of projects with direct relevance to planning and development. India has a growing body of social scientists at a fairly advanced level of professional competence. In the pre-independence period, when there were far fewer social scientists, they were mostly located in the universities. Since independence m a n y of them have found employment in government. But more important than that, from the viewpoint of the profession as a whole, is the creation of a number of institutes of research which have attracted m u c h talent in the social sciences. These research institutes differ in their character from departments of the government as well as of the universities. It is not unlikely that in the years to come the best research output will flow not from the university departments but from the institutes of research. In that case social science research and the social sciences themselves m a y well c o m e to acquire a different character from that which they have had so far. In the first two decades after independence a number of research institutes were established in Delhi. W e n o w seem to be entering a new phase with the creation of important research institutes in the various regional centres. Three such institutes have been recently established: the Centre for Development Studies set up in Trivandrum in September 1970, the Institute
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I . N o . 1, 1974
for Social and Economic Change established in Bangalore in January 1972, and the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences started in Calcutta in February 1973. While each of these institutes has its o w n distinctive features, there are certain general characteristics which they all share. The n e w institutes are well financed, securing their funds from government as opposed to private sources. The characteristic pattern seems to be to draw on both the union government and the government of the State in which the centre is located. T h e institute at Bangalore has a stable annual income of 1 million rupees, of which half is provided by the Government of India and the other half by the Government of Mysore. T h e position is the same for the Centre at Calcutta; it has received 500,000 rupees from the Government of West Bengal in itsfirstyear and there is a c o m mitment from the Government of India to provide an equal amount. T h e Trivandrum Centre has depended more o n the State government for financial support in its initial phase. The Trivandrum Centre is the most m o d est in scope: it has a small research team, consisting mainly of economists. The Centre at Calcutta seeks broader coverage: it has positions at the highest level for economists, geographers, historians, sociologists and political scientists. T h e Bangalore Centre is so far the most ambitious in design. Its staff is grouped into eight separate units: economics (general); public finance; public enterprises; agricultural development and rural transformation; demographic communication and action research; sociology; education; and h u m a n geography and ecology. There are, in addition, the Bangalore City Survey Project and Mysore's Perspective Plan Project. The staffing pattern in the institutes closely follows the pattern in Indian universities. T h e same
Institutes for research in India
salary scales prevail, and s o m e posts carry the same designations. A t the Calcutta Centre there are professors in the same scale as university professors, and fellows w h o m a y be placed anywhere o n a scale which combines the scales for lecturers and readers in universities. At Trivandrum there are fellows w h o m a y be placed anywhere on scales offered by universities to readers and professors, and research associates on the scale of university lecturers. Bangalore has senior fellows (corresponding to university professors), fellows (corresponding to readers) and research associates (corresponding to lecturers). There clearly is an attempt to establish s o m e kind of equivalence between universities and institutes. For m a n y social scientists a career in an institute of research is becoming an attractive alternative to a career in a university. A n advantage which the research institute enjoys is that it allows a particular problem to be investigated without its being artificially divided between different disciplinary specializations. T h e division between departments in Indian universities tends to become rigid, and there is in fact very little interdisciplinary research in the universities. O n the other hand, the problems of development are such that they can be most effectively handled in an interdisciplinary framework. T h e w a y in which the n e w institutes of research are organized is, a m o n g other things, a response to this kind of need. O n e measure of the success of these institutes will be the extent to which they are able to develop a framework for interdisciplinary research within the Indian context. N o t all the institutes described above have the same range of social science skills. T h e Centre at Trivandrum has a predominance of economists. A t Bangalore also economists outnumber other social scientists, but there are distinguished scholars representing the fields of sociology, geography and education. T h e distribution at Calcutta seems to be more evenly balanced between the various social science skills. T h e style and organization of work, including research w o r k , differs between university departments and institutes of research. In the latter, research is conceived, formulated and executed as a 'project' or a series of projects. T h e project m a y be one person's responsibility or the responsibility of several, but it is usually operated through a team. It has a specific budget, a specific time schedule and a commitment to produce a report. Clearly,
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this w a y of doing research is very well suited to certain types of problems. Further, in a society with limited resources, expectations will naturally arise that those w h o devote themselves solely to research must produce definite results within specified time limits. Since the institute as a whole has to produce results, each unit within it and each research worker within a unit is under s o m e pressure to keep u p a high level of output. Research itself can of course be conceived in a somewhat different way. It can be conceived as a quest which does not necessarily lead to a definite result; or as a pursuit which leads to results that are occasionally trivial, or commonplace, or not worth reporting. This kind of research can be done by m e n of independent means; or as a part-time occupation in combination with some other occupation such as teaching; or in very wellendowed institutions which can be supported only in relatively affluent societies. In countries like India research institutes must be productive in a fairly concrete w a y ; in other words, their work must be 'practical' and not merely 'academic'. Academic research continues to be done in the university departments. Here the resources are m o r e limited but the demands are also fewer. There are certain advantages in this kind of w o r k which are often lost sight of in the urge to m a k e research relevant, practical and policy-oriented. It enables people to raise basic and fundamental questions whose relevance m a y not be immediately apparent. It permits the re-examination of approaches, orientations and ways of thinking whose validity might otherwise be taken for granted. In countries like India which have depended greatly o n imported frames of reference and have not developed an independent social science tradition, this kind of pursuit m a y be just as important as what is generally regarded as the m o r e practical kind of research. T h e content of the social sciences cannot be conceived independently of their organization. Clearly there is need in countries like India to build institutions through which social science research can be effectively carried out. Given the fact that these countries generally suffer from a shortage of resourcesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;both h u m a n and materialâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;it is most essential for the social scientists themselves to give thought to the kind of institutional set-up which in their view is best suited to the kind of work they seek to do.
T h e social sciences in Chile: professionalization, codes of ethics and ideological confrontation* Gabriel Gyarmati K . Readers of social science journals, especially those published in the industrialized, or developed, countries, will have noticed for some time past a growing interest in two closely related phenomena: the professionalization of the social sciences, and the formulation of codes of ethics to govern their practice. In view of these tendencies, it m a y be of interest to c o m m e n t briefly o n what is happening in this respect in Chile. T h e political changes that have taken place in the country over the past five or six years have had an appreciable effect o n the practice there of the social sciences, so that the facts observed m a y serve as antecedents for possible comparative studies o n the development of the sciences. In thefirstplace, it should be pointed out that, as regards their formal professional organization (and codes of ethics, or even their discussion, for which a certain sub-structure is a prerequisite), the social sciences in Chile, with very few exceptions, are notably weak. In fact, only economists, psychologists and social psychologists belong in any significant numbers to formal colleges or associations, and two of these only in a •dependent' way, since economists are m e m b e r s of the Colegio de Ingenieros and social psychologists are m e m b e r s of the Colegio de Psicólogos. (In Chile, colleges—as opposed to associations which are voluntary—constitute professional bodies with legal powers relating to the exercise of the profession.) Following the French tradition, in Chile the discipline of economics is legally designated as ingeniería comercial, divided into two branches: administration and economics. Consequently, economists are members of the Colegio de Ingenieros
* This article was written before September 1973.
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
and form a specialized branch within the college. (The other specialized branches are mechanical, electrical, mining, civil, chemical engineering, etc.) Thus, the same law that set u p the college and defined the rights and obligations of the professions constituting the college likewise applies to the economists. A m o n g the articles contained in this law, there is a special group of provisions called code of professional ethics. It should be pointed out that, while the code covers the relations between the practitioner and his clients or employers (although barely one article of the nine is concerned with this), it does not contain a single mention of the social roles and/or obligations incumbent o n the profession. A n omission of this kind is b o u n d to seem curious w h e n w e consider that economics, as a social science, has responsibilities and c o m mitments going beyond the limits of the mere relations between the employer and the practitioner w h o executes the work entrusted to him. It is less surprising if w e bear in mind that the code dates from 1961. (The law setting u p the Colegio de Ingenieros w a s in fact promulgated in 1958, but the code of professional ethics w a s not added until three years later.) T h e economists defined their discipline as a profession,1 and in those far-off times (scarcely twelve years ago in 1. This was a perfectly natural decision at that time, since until comparatively recently there were practically no scientific courses, as such, provided in Chilean universities. Students prepared for a profession, such as engineering, law, medicine, secondary school teaching, etc. If interested in science, they would later take up physics, astronomy, sociology, biology, chemistry, etc. Courses of study specifically devoted to the sciences, whether natural or social, as opposed to studies for the professions, are of comparatively recent date.
The social sciences in Chile
fact but, as regards outlook, some centuries back) any attempt to define formally the role and social responsibilities of a profession (apart from the rhetorical statement that a m e m b e r of a profession should serve society) would have been deemed to be 'tainted with politics' and unworthy of any serious profession. In any case, the matter would seem to be of little importance, since hardly anyone is acquainted with the content of the code. Indeed, the great majority of economists have n o idea that a formal code of ethics exists for their profession. They k n o w that doctors have a code and that its observance is obligatory; they believe that lawyers are probably in the s a m e situation. But, where their o w n profession is concerned, they display a total ignorance and lack of interest o n this point.1 This fact would probably be considered fairly significant if one wished to examine the real function—not only the official, obvious function—of codes of professional ethics. With regard to the psychologists, their college dates from 1968. T h e law setting it up does not contain a formal code of ethics, nor any article or regulation that could be considered as such. (Curiously, the Consejo de la Orden is authorized to apply disciplinary measures, but the acts or the types of acts that constitute misdemeanours are not clearly specified, except, of course, acts constituting c o m m o n offences.) T h e question of a code was not discussed until 1970 when, as a temporary measure, it was decided to abide by the provisions of the code of professional ethics of the National Psychological Association (United States), but only as a recommended code without giving it m a n d a tory force. In the present year (1973), an ad hoc committee was appointed to draw up a draft code, with a view to its eventual incorporation in the law setting up the college. So far, however, the committee has not submitted a formal draft. T h e social psychologists are m e m b e r s of the College of Psychologists, so that they are in a similar situation. T h e anthropologists have n o col1. This conclusion was reached after a survey which I conducted a m o n g economists (in both branches) engaged both in research and in teaching in universities on a professional basis. Although the survey had no formal structure, it was sufficiently broad, and revealed so clear and uniform a tendency, that it undoubtedly reflects very closely the real state of affairs.
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lege; they have a voluntary association but its regulations d o not include a formal code of ethics. Political scientists, demographers, etc., have neither colleges nor professional associations; consequently they have not held an organized discussion regarding codes of professional ethics. A s for the sociologists, their affairs are as usual m o r e complicated. T h e y have neither a college nor a professional association; nor, therefore, a code of professional ethics.2 H o w e v e r , this is not due to a lack of interest in the matter. O n the contrary, meetings have been organized o n at least three different occasions with the object of building u p s o m e kind of association as a starting point for the subsequent creation of a college. T h e most important of these attempts took place as a result of the scandal arising from the 'Camelot Project' of unhappy m e m o r y , which caused an outburst in Chile in 1965. 3 T h e ethical and political problems of sociological research were studied, together with ways of organizing the profession so that it could be endowed with machinery calculated to ensure strict compliance with the rules that would be laid d o w n in a future code of ethics. However, this effort, like those m a d e earlier, gradually died a w a y without leading to practical results. These are the bare facts. It will be noted, as was mentioned at the beginning of this article, that, despite the comparatively intense activity in the social sciences in the country, little practical action has taken place with regard to their professional organization (as opposed to the academic structures). A n d , apparently, there is little concern over an important aspect of the professions—the 2. T o be precise, there is an Asociación Chilena de Sociología, founded about 1950, but very few professional sociologists belong to it. It was set up before sociology in Chile was institutionalized as a university discipline. 3. O n e of the many consequences of the Camelot Project was that for two years it was almost impossible to carry out any surveys in Chile, since even the most innocuous questionnaire immediately aroused suspicions of obscure and evil hidden intent. Although this situation had m a n y ill effects, it also had a salutary effect in that it broke the habit of reducing sociology to the preparation, distribution and analysis of questionnaires, and thus, through the force of circumstances, helped sociology gradually to build up in the country a certain specific character of its o w n .
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codes of ethics that establish standards to be o b served in their practice. This situation would seem to differ from that observable in other countries, particularly in the industrialized countries. H o w can this p h e n o m e n o n be explained? Obviously, the various social sciences have followed very different courses in their evolution in Chile, so that n o explanation or set of explanations is equally valid for all. Nevertheless, at risk of oversimplifying a very complex p h e n o m enon, it is possible to identify certain factors which, it seems to m e , have played a leading part in bringing about the state of affairs described. O n e of these factors is the ambiguous situation of the social sciences according as they are 'sciences' in the strict sense of the term, such as astronomy, biology, etc., devoted to the seeking and advancement of knowledge with society in general as their public, or as they are 'professions' such, for instance, as engineering or medicine, the primary function of which is the application of knowledge to the solution of specific problems at the request of clients or employers w h o are also clearly specified. These two groups of activities present very different characteristics in certain essential areas, such as internal relations between their practitioners, external relationships with other occupational groups, the definition of their aims and responsibilities, the direct and indirect effects of their activities, etc. Consequently, it will be necessary to d r a w u p separate codes of ethics for each group, and also to establish control mechanisms for the sciences which will differ from those usually applied in the case of the professions. Economics and psychology c o m e within the group of professions, the former being integrated with the engineers, and the latter having adopted a structure identical with that of the other professional organizations. O n the other hand, the situation of those social sciences which, instead of being answerable to a specific client or employer, have society in general as their 'public', is m u c h m o r e complex. In their case, the 'correct' or 'ethical' position in regard to the definition and practice of scientific activities cannot be separated from ideological positions.1 At a time of sharp conflict 1. Naturally, professional ethics are also bound to be rooted in a specific view of society, but the problems arising from this have relatively little effect on the essence of professional
between deeply divided ideological groups, such as Chile has experienced over the past ten years, this fact m a k e s it very difficult for the social scientists to agree to unite in c o m m o n professional organizations or to accept a single definition of the rules that should govern their activities directed to the seeking and advancement of knowledge. Another factor conducing to the s a m e effect is that, through their associations, the professions constitute powerful political pressure groups. In times of relative political and social calm, this does not greatly affect the internal structure of the professions; their representative bodies then tend to exert pressure mainly in defence of the direct interests of the m e m b e r s of the profession, so that nothing disturbs its internal unity. But in times of violent and prolonged change which substantially modify the existing power structure of a society, the professional organizations, like all the organizations and institutions of that society inevitably assume a m u c h m o r e direct political roleâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;partly intentionally, in defence of specific ideological positions, and partly for the simple reason that in such periods any collective action has political causes and repressions. This p h e n o m e n o n of the intense politicization of professional bodies has been clearly discernible in the past few years in Chile, and, in fact, has led to serious internal conflicts within the professions, and to increasingly violent confrontations between them and other organizations and social sectors. While this occurs in professions that are traditionally considered as being politically 'neutral', such as engineering, medicine, architecture, etc., it likewise occurs, but in a m u c h higher degree, in the social sciences, which are m o r e or less directly concerned with social and political happenings. It therefore seems safe to predict that, in the case of those disciplines whose m e m b e r s have not yet succeeded in grouping themselves in professional associations or colleges, it will be very difficult for them to d o so in a foreseeable future, having regard to the deep division that exists a m o n g social scientists due to differing ideological positions. H o w e v e r , this does not m e a n that concern for the ethical a n d professional aspects of the work, namely, direct relations with clients. O n the other hand, those problems do very directly and permanently affect the work of the social scientist.
The social sciences in Chile
social sciences is absent in Chile. The problem has merely been defined in different terms. A subject that is being discussed, especially a m o n g sociologists, is 'commitment'. T h e problem is not new. Reference m a y be had, for example, to a book entitled Del Soci贸logo y su Compromiso (Buenos Aires, E d . Libera, several authors), published in Argentina in 1965, which to s o m e extent reflects the concern of sociologists throughout Latin America. W h a t is different in the present case of Chile is that the problem has gone beyond the level of abstract discussion to become a concrete determining factor in the daily activity of sociologists. Following on this fact, it is possible to m a k e a few remarks with regard to the main ideological trends with which social scientists in Chile are at present becoming identified. These trends mainly differ from one another by reason of (a) the degree of importance assigned to the variable 'social class' in the interpretation of social phenomena, and (b) the form in which and the extent to which the social scientist considers that the discipline itself and his personal scientific work should be 'committed', or, in other words, aimed at facilitating and promoting change towards more freedom and justice in society, as opposed to the conception of the social sciences as essentially 'neutral'. In Chile, these variables combine at present in three main
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trends which, in a way, correspond in the scientificacademic sphere to the three trends which in the strictly political spherefindexpression in the parties of the Right, the Christian Democrats, and the Unidad Popular (comprising parties of the Left, both Marxist and non-Marxist), though there can be n o question of complete equivalence. For students of the development of the sciences, the important fact that emerges from the foregoing is that w h e n politics cease to be the preserve of politicians and become the basic and continuous concern of the entire population, as inevitably happens w h e n the power structure in a country is changing, neither the sciences nor the professions, nor even the concepts of professional ethics, can evade the immense social pressures that c o m e into existence and that confront one another. N e w definitions and n e w practices are worked out, in accordance with the ideological standpoint from which the events are described and interpreted. T h e link between concepts, theories and methods, on the one hand, and the ideological substratum, on the other, always exists, of course; the case of Chile, with its tensions, merely serves to bring it to light, to reveal the face behind the m a s k . [Translated from Spanish]
CD &
Professional and documentary services
N e w periodicals1 As a service to readers seeking to keep up with the African Research and Documentation is intended burgeoning periodical literature in the social sciences, to unite the functions of Library Materials on this Journal carries an annual descriptive listing Africa of and the bulletin of the African Studies new periodicals received by Unesco's Social Science Association of the United K i n g d o m ; bibliographiDocumentation Centre. The titles that follow were cal articles and reviews will be combined with those received during 1973. news about African Studies in the United Kingdom The fourth revised edition of the World List and elsewhere, and with information about research in progress. It is hoped increasingly to be of Social Science Periodicals/Liste Mondiale des able to give advance notice of conferences and Périodiques Spécialisés dans les Sciences Sociales will be published in 1975. This will include both pri- seminars which m a y be of interest to Africanists and to keep them in touch with new developments. mary and secondary (abstracting) periodicals. Specimen copies of new journals or prospectuses giving information on which entries can beAmerican Politics, Vol. 1, N o . 1, January 1973 based are welcome and should be addressed to the Published quarterly in January, April, July Social Science Documentation Centre, Unesco, B. P. and October by Sage Publications, Inc. 3.07, 75700 Paris (France). Address in United States: 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90212 (United States). In Europe: St. George's House, 44 Hatton Garden, L o n d o n E C 1 N 8 E R (United Kingdom). Editor: Harlan H a h n . Subscription rates: Regular institutional rate, $18 per year; professionals and Affari Sociali Internazionali, Vol. 1, N o . 1, teachers, $12 per year; full-time college March 1973 and university students, $9 per year. Published quarterly by Franco Angeli EdiA d d $1 for subscriptions outside United tore. States and Canada. Address: Viale M o n z a 106, Casella PosThe journal offers a regular and continuous forum tale 4294, 20100 Milan (Italy). for the presentation of ideas and research concernEditore (Redattore Capo): Antonio L o m ing American Government and politics, including bardo. urban, state and national politics. It will publish Subscription rate: 1973, 10,000 Lire; single significant studies concerning political parties, pubcopies 2,000 Lire. The main interest of this review is to bring to the lic opinion, political theory, legislative behaviour. open Italy's social problems—like internal and The legal process, public policy administrative organizations, intergovernmental relations and external emigration—seen from its historic aspect related fields. and from the viewpoint of an international perspective. Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. 1, N o . 1, June 1971 Published monthly by the Asia Research African Research and Documentation, N o . 1, 1973 (Private) Ltd. Journal of the African Studies Association of the United K i n g d o m and the Standing Address: P . O . B o x 91, Alexandra Post Commission o n Library Materials o n Office, Singapore 3. Africa. Editor: John Drysdale, Director. Subscription rate: Annual, standard rate, Address: c/o Centre of West African $100; institutional rate (non-profit instiStudies, University of Birmingham, P . O . tutions), $50; multiple rate (each additional Box 363, Birmingham, B15 2 S D (United copy), $22. Kingdom). The Bulletin offers systematic coverage of all imH o n . Editor: Marion Johnson. portant political, economic and social developments Subscription rate: N o n e given.
1. For a listing of new journals received in 1968, see Vol. X X I , N o . 2, 1969, p. 314-28; in 1969, see Vol. X X I I , N o . 1,1970, p. 12940; in 1970, see Vol. XXIII, N o . 1, 1971,
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
p. 116-30; in 1971 see Vol. X X I V , N o . 1, 1972, p. 169-75 and in 1972 see Vol. X X V , N o . 1/2, 1973, p. 213-23.
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in East and South-East Asia. It is published monthly in four parts as follows: Part I: 'Background subjects'; Part II: 'Special focus highlighting the main topic of the month'; Part III: 'Systematized information collated under 8 headings' and Part IV: 'Statistical tables by countries' and 'Documentation'. All parts are fully indexed.
manuscripts in psychology. Gives full bibliographic citations and from 100 to 300 authorprepared abstracts of all manuscripts accepted by the service.
Cuadernos de la Cátedra de Derecho del Trabajo de Valencia, Vol. 1, N o . 1, June 1971 Published by the Facultad de Derecho de The Bureaucrat, Vol. 1, N o . 1, Spring 1972 Valencia, Universidad de Valencia. Published quarterly by the National Capital Address: Apartado 2.282, Madrid (Spain). Area Chapter of the American Society for Editor: Luis Enrique de la Villa. Public Administration ( A S P A ) . Subscription rate: N o n e given. Address: P . O . Box 664, Washington D . C . A university publication on research and teaching 20044 (United States). of the rights of labour. A i m s to give a forum for Editor: T h o m a s D . Lynch. all opinion that contributes to the defence of Subscription rate: per year, libraries and h u m a n labour. institutions, $10; students, $6; other indiThefirstissue presents a structure which viduals $7; single issue, $2. the journal will maintain in future numbers: a The publication of the National Capital Chapter basic estudio (study) on a theme of principal of the A S P A is designed to further the objectives interest animated by discussions; some brief notas of the association and serve as the forum to discuss (notes) on different aspects of labour problems; a problems of public administration. noticiaro (news section) withfixedsections of information on professorships, labour laws, biblioCahiers Zaïrois d'Études Politiques et Sociales, graphy and book reviews. N o . 1, April 1973 Published by the Centre de Recherches en Cultural Hermeneutics, Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1973 Sciences Politiques et Sociales. Published four times a year by D . Reidl Address: Faculté des Sciences Sociales, Publishing C o m p a n y . Université Nationale du Zaïre, B . P . 1825, Address: P . O . Box 17, Dordrecht (NetherLubumbashi (République du Zaïre). lands). Editor: Nguyen V a n Chien. Editor: David M . Rassmussen, Subscription rate: Per copy, 180 F B ; 18 F ; Subscription rate: Annually, Dfl.75 or «4. U.S.S26.78, including postage. The editors hope to m a k e the Cahiers the organ The journal provides a forum where scholars with through which the professors and researchers in predominant interests in the meaning of h u m a n the social sciences of the university could exchange culture can contribute, debate and benefit from a point of views a m o n g themselves and with other c o m m o n interchange of ideas and interpretations, specialists o n problems of development of Africa a task the journal calls 'cultural hermeneutics', and particularly of Zaire, and in so doing contriband so doing contribute to the development of a ute positively towards the edification of the country body of critical cultural theory which incorporates and its society. not only the praxis of h u m a n culture but its telos as well. Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, Vol. 1, A u t u m n 1971 Die Dritte Welt, Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1973 Published quarterly by the American Published quarterly by Verlag Anton Hain. Psychological Association's Journal SupAddress: Postfach 180, D-6554 Meisenheim plement Abstract Service. a m Glan (Federal Republic of Germany). Address: 1200 Seventeenth Street N . W . , Editor: Wolfgang Slim Freund. Washington D . C . 20036 (United States). Subscription rate: Annually, D M . 68, plus Editors: J. Orlansky, J. Senders, L . E . Bourpostage; for students annually D M . 42, ne, F . A . King, J. T . Spence, D . E . Linder, plus postage. T . H . Balu, J. K . Hemphill and B . Baxter. Trilingual periodical (German, English, French Subscription rate: 1972, quarterly issues, with main emphasis on German-written articles) $10; reprint of full text of manuscript abconcerned with the entire range of interest and stracted, $2. problems having to do with the development in the Third World on an interdisciplinary basis, Chief vehicle for dissemination of information o n with emphasis on a social scientific approach. Each selected (high quality 'fugitive' or unpublished)
New periodicals
issue contains research reports, theory articles, book and periodical reviews, as well as reports on important international conferences, meetings, symposiums devoted to development problems. Each volume is accompanied by an independently published 'special number' devoted to an important question of development strategy, so for instance in 1972 thefirstspecial number was o n 'Aspects of Foreign Cultural Policy in Developing Countries'. Estudios Sociales Centroamericanas, Vol. 1, N o . 1, January-April 1972 Published three times a year by the Programa Centroamericano de Desarrollo de las Ciencias Sociales. Address: Apartado 37, Ciudad Universitaria 'Rodrigo Fació', San José (Costa Rica). Director: Edelberto Torres-Rivas. Subscription rate: inquire from secretary of the journal—Paulino Gonzalez V . A i m s to be a journal on the social sciences for Central America. Contains four basic sections: (a) articles and essays; (b) theorico-methodological problems and discussions; (c) bibliography and documentation; (d) news. Ethnies, Vol. 1, 1971 Yearly publication of the Institut d'Etudes et de Recherches Interethniques et Interculturelles. Address: 34, R u e Verdi, Nice (France). Director: Pierre Bessaignet. T h e purpose of Ethnies is to publish results of studies completed, briefly in the form of articles, and proceedings of seminars devoted to special questions. Notes, news and reports of meetings will find their place in the publication. It hopes to be a tool for work, for reflection and exchange at the disposal of those—researchers and theoreticians—interested in thefieldof interethnic and intercultural relations. Eure, Revista Latinoamericana de estudios urbanos regionales, Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1971 Published three times a year by the Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Regional, C I D U , de la Universidad Católica de Chile. Address: Revista E U R E , Casilla 16002, Santiago (Chile). Editor: Consejo Editorial—Jorge E . Hardoy et al. Subscription rate: Annually, U . S . $ 8 ; single copy, U.S.Í3. This review publishes studies and essays in Spanish on urban and regional social problems, particularly concerning Latin America, but does not exclude
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general theoretical ones. H a s section reviews on policies, programmes and projects and information. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 1, N o . 1, April 1973 Published quarterly by Elsevier Scientific Publishing C o m p a n y . Address: P . O . B o x 211, Amsterdam (Netherlands). Editor: Arend Lijpart. Subscription rate: Personal pre-paid subscription, $12.50; libraries, institutions, etc., $25. T h e official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research has for its principal objective to foster communication and collaboration a m o n g European political scientists and the dissemination of research findings and information about ongoing research across national and linguistic boundaries in Europe. Will publish articles from European scholars, reviews articles, short research notes, and n e w announcements of the consortium's activities. European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1971 Published in four issues per volume by Mouton and C o . N . V . Address: P . O . Box 1132, The Hague (Netherlands), or 7 R u e Dupuytren, 75006 Paris (France). Editors: M a u k Mulder, Gustav Jahoda, Serge Moscovici, Peter Schönbach. Subscription rates: Per volume, for institutions, libraries, etc., £7.50; $18; individuals, £5; $12; students, £3.30; $8; single copies, £2.10; $5. This journal provides social psychologists in Europe with a c o m m o n forum and is intended as a source of information about current empirical research and n e w theoretical developments. T h e term 'European' designates the major focus of the journal. T h e contents will include empirical research, theoretical papers and articles in related fields but dealing with psychological topics, review articles, short research notes, brief features like reviews of European books, summaries of theses, short abstracts of articles appearing in national journals, notes on institutions, planned and ongoing research and other relevant matters, short conference reports. T h e text is in English with summaries in French, G e r m a n and Russian. Humanizm Pracy, N o . 1/2, 1972 Published bi-monthly by the Zakdad Prakseologii (Praxeology Centre) Polska A k a demia N a u k (Polish A c a d e m y of Sciences).
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Address: Palac Staszica, vi. N o w y Swiat 72, W a r s a w (Poland). Editor: Stanislaw Kowalenski. Subscription rate: Per copy, Zl. 40. A Polish journal devoted to the study of philosophical and humanistic problems of work and the place of m a n in the h u m a n organization, the industrial enterprise in particular. Summaries in Russian and English are given at the end of each article. The Hungarian Economy, Vol. 1, N o . 1, D e c e m ber 1973 A special quarterly publication of the economic weekly Figyelo. Address: Kultura, P . O . B o x 149, Budapest 62 (Hungary). Editor-in-Chief: Jozzef G a r a m . Subscription rate: Annually (4 issues), U.S.Î6; £2.40. Reviews the economic situation in Hungary. In folio format, profusely illustrated. Indian Psychological Abstracts, Vol. 1, N o . 1, January-February 1972 Bi-monthly journal published under the auspices of the Indian Council of Social Science Research and the Indian Psychological Association. Address: Somauja Publication Private Ltd., 172 Naigaum Cross R d . , Dadar, B o m b a y 14 D D (India). Editor: Udai Pareek. Subscription rate: Institutions, $6 or equivalent; students and teachers, $4 or equivalent; single copy $1.50 or equivalent. A n abstracting journal of psychological literature published in India or on India, starting from 1971 publications.
m Address: B o x 211, Amsterdam (Netherlands). Exclusive editors: G . F . Brieske, R . W m . Smith. Subscription rate: Individual, U.S.S14.20 including postage; libraries, research institutions, others, U.S.$27.30 including postage. A journal intended for those w h o are interested in educational research or talk about teaching as it is in real life. It will publish papers that would point the ways in which the reader's approach to instruction might be changed—coming as the editors hope from a cross-section of people besides teachers, for example from politicians, lawyers, churchmen, anthropologists, the mass media, the theatre, etc.—on the whole range of processes and considerations which can influence directly or indirectly the impact and effectiveness of attempts to instruct. Naturally, the journal will be interdisciplinary. International Journal of Sociology, Vol. 1, N o . 1, Spring 1971 Published quarterly by the International Arts and Science Press Inc. Address: 901 North Broadway, White Plains, N . Y . 10603 (United States). Editor: Stephen P. D u n n . Subscription rate: Annually, for institutions, $50; individuals, $15. Contains translations of material on sociology and social anthropology which has either appeared in foreign journals and books or, in some cases, not yet published in the original language. T h e intention is to provide a balanced picture of the state of sociology and social anthropology in the world.
Instant Research on Peace and Violence, N o . 1,1972 International Review of Sociology, Vol. 1, N o . 1, March 1971 Published quarterly by Tampere Peace R e Published twice a year in March and search Institute ( T A P R I ) . September at the L u c k n o w Publishing Address: Tammelanpuistokatu 58 B V , House. 33 100 Tampere 10 (Finland). Address: 37 Cantonment R o a d , L u c k n o w , Editor-in-Chief: R a i m o Väyrynen. Uttar Pradesh (India). Subscription rate: Annually, for individuals Editor: M a n Singh Das. U . S . $ 5 ; for institutions, U . S . $ 7 (or equivSubscription rate: Institutions and lialent in other currencies). braries, $7.50; individuals, $6.50; students, A n interdisciplinary and international journal of $5; single issue, $3.50; special rates scientific reports in thefieldof peace research. The for Asian, African and Latin American journal concentrates on actual problems and countries upon request. phenomena related to questions of peace and war, H a s for editorial policy the publication of articles of open and structural violence. of a theoretical and empirical nature, book reviews, Instructional Science, Vol. 1, N o . 1, March 1972 letters to the editor, comments and rejoinders, annotated bibliographies, news and announcePublished quarterly by Elsevier Publishing ments. Particularly encourages cross-national, Company.
New periodicals
cross-cultural and inter-disciplinary research and exchange of information concerning significant developments in sociology of national development, sociology of mass communication, political sociology, sociology of religion, sociology of science; race and ethnic relations, social change, stratification and mobility, education, poverty, social welfare and social policy, population and h u m a n ecology, community, rural sociology and other areas of sociology. Interpretation, N o . 1, S u m m e r 1970 Published two issues in a volume in s u m m e r and winter by Martinus Nijhoff. Address: 9-11 Lange Voorhout, P . O . B o x 269, T h e H a g u e (Netherlands). Editorial address: T h e Executive Editor, Interpretation, Jefferson Hall 312, Queens College, Flushing, N . Y . 11367 (United States). Executive Director: Hilail Gildin. Subscription rates: Institutions and libraries, Dfl.36; individuals, Dfl.28.80. A journal devoted to the study of political philosophy, regardless of orientation. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 1, N o . 1, September 1970 Published four times annually—in September, December, M a r c h and June by Sage Publications Ltd. Address: For correspondence from United K i n g d o m , Europe, Middle East and Africa: Sage Publications Ltd, St George's House, 44 Hatton Garden, L o n d o n E C 1 N 8 E R (United K i n g d o m ) . For others: Sage Publications Inc., 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90212 (United States). Editor: Arthur L . Smith. Subscription rate: Institutional, $15 per year; professionals and teachers, $10 per year; full time university students (United States and Canada), $7.50 per year (no discounts outside United States and C a nada). A d d $1.50 for subscriptions outside United States; single issue $5. The journal seeks to sustain a full analytical discussion of issues related to persons of African descent. Original scholarly papers are invited o n a broad range of questions involving black people: economic, political, sociological, historical, literary, and philosophical. While encouraging innovation, articles showing rigorous and thorough research in an interdisciplinary context are favoured. B o o k reviews explore in depth important new publications.
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Journal of East African Studies, Vol. 1, N o . 1,1972 Published three times a year. Address: c/o D r Walter Abilba, Sociology Department, B o x 2058, Wilberforce University, Wilberforce, Ohio (United States). Editor-in-Chief: Wosene Yefru. Subscription rate: $1 per year. T h efirsttwo numbers came out in newspaper, in quarto format of eight pages each. Contain editorials on current events affecting East Africa, short studies, articles and comments. T h e policy is to publish articles o n East African history, religion, education, economics and social and political affairs. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Spring 1973 T o be published twice a year in spring and autumn. Address: c/o Editor, JPMS, Department of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois 60115 (United States). Editor: George A . Kourvetaris. Subscription rate: Individual/institutional, $7.50; student, $6.50. This journal will publish scholarly articles dealing with vital social, political, economic and military issues of a theoretical, methodological and e m pirical nature, book reviews, essay and review symposia, letters to the editor, comments and rejoinders, annotated bibliographies, news and announcements. The major objective of JPMS is to advance sociological knowledge in political and military sociology through interdisciplinary and comparative approaches. Kidma, Israel Journal of Development, Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1973 Published by the Israel Chapter of the Society for International Development in cooperation with the following institutions: David Horowitz Institute for Research of Developing Countries of Tel Aviv University; Harry S. T r u m a n Research Institute of Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Settlement Study Centre, Rehovot; Technion—Israel Institute of Technology; the Weizmann Institute of Science; University of Haifa. Address: Society for International Development, 123, Hashmonaïm, Tel Aviv (Israel). Editorial Board: Chairman, David Tanne. Subscription rate: 4 issues, $6.00 or £(1)25; single copy, $1.75 or £(1)7. Kidma (the Hebrew word for 'Progress') is a
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journal devoted to questions of social and economic development in Israel and around the world. It will focus mainly on Israel's o w n experience in development and on Israel's co-operation with developing countries subjecting both these areas to analysis. Will also devote pages to discussion on mutual assistance between developing countries. Maritime Studies and Management, Vol. 1, N o . 1, July 1973 Published quarterly for the Department of Maritime Studies; University of Wales, Institute of Science and Technology. Address: Editorial, King Edward VIII Ave, Cardiff, C F 1 3 N U (United Kingdom). Publishing, John Wright & Sons, Scientechnica Distributors, 42-44 Triangle West, Bristol, BS8 1 E X (United Kingdom). Editor: A . D . Cooper. Subscription rate: Four issues, Library, £8; £6 for additional subscription; private, £6. This multi-disciplinary journal will bring together the papers and results of maritime research being undertaken by economists, lawyers, social scientists, geographers and maritime studies specialists within universities and colleges, and by managers and planners in industry, governments and international agencies which otherwise are inaccessible, other than through specialist publications. E m phasis will be placed on economic, legal management and social topics at port, community, shipping company and shipboard levels. The journal will also provide notices of book reviews and short items of interest to research workers and professional m e n ashore and afloat. Mondes en Développement, N o . 1, 1973 Published four times a year for the Centre d'Études Internationales pour le Développement (11 Bid de Sebastopol, 75001 Paris) by the Éditions Techniques et Économiques. Address: 3 R u e Soufflot, 75005 Paris (France). Editor: François Perroux. Subscription rate: Regular subscription, 105 F; $21; supporting subscription, 115 F ; $22; single issue, 29 F . The journal is a trilingual (articles are either in English, Spanish or French) scientific and technical review on 'development', with an international vocation and subscribing to the thesis that in the heart of development problems is m a n himself for 'as soon as growth makes m a n , it engenders development'. The editor aims at m a k ing the review an international forum where theories and methods are confronted—an instrument of reflection and a vehicle of permanent exchange.
New Priorities, Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1972 Published in four issues per volume by G o r d o n and Breach. Address: 440 Park Avenue South, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . 10016 (United States). Editor: M . Vincent Hayes. Subscription rates: Per volume, for individuals in United States and Canada, $7.50; elsewhere, £4.55; for libraries and institutions in United States and Canada, $18; elsewhere, £8.70 Presents reassessments of America's foreign and domestic policies aimed at a re-examination and a re-ordering of America's national goals Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society,Wo\. 1, N o . 1, March 1973 Published quarterly by the University of San Carlos. Address: Cebu City, J-217 (Philippines). Editor: Rudolf R a h m a n n , S V D . Subscription rate: Annually, U.S.$8; single issue, U.S.$2. The PQCS will concentrate on the humanities of Philippine culture and society, on existing conditions and problems, on their historical antecedents, their present implications as well as their interconnexions with general national and international situations, particularly those with the neighbouring countries. M o r e specific emphasis will be put on the problems of the Visayas and Mindanao region. T h efieldsto be covered are prehistory, archaeology, anthropology, linguistics, folklore, literature and history. Politeia, Vol. 1, 1972 Published annually by the Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Venezuela. Address: Apartado 61.591, Caracas (Venezuela). Director: Manuel García-Pelays; Comité de Redacción: Hans-Joachim Leu, Humberto Njaim, Graciela Soriano de Garcia-Pelayo. Aims principally to diffuse the studies completed by the members of the institute, but will accept others as well, especially from those within the Ibero-American circle. Population Dynamics Quarterly, Vol. 1, N o . 1, Winter 1973 A publication of the International Program for Population Analysis issued in winter, spring, summer and autumn, by the Interdisciplinary Communications Program of the Smithsonian Institution. Address: 1717 Massachusetts Ave, N . W . ,
New periodicals
Washington D . C . 200036 (United States). Editor: Shirley Sirota Rosenberg. Subscription rate: Free on request. A n average sixteen-page periodical containing items and communications on the contributions of social sciences and the humanities to population dynamics sub-titled 'Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Population Programs and Policies'. In English, French and Spanish.
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Revista Uruguaya de Ciencias Sociales, Vol. I, N o . 1, April-June 1972 Temporary address: Luis Lamas, 3274 bis Apto 1, Montevideo (Uruguay). Director: Alfredo Errandonea. Subscription rate: Write to above postal address stating the form of mailing preferred. Special rates for professors and students. T h e first issue of the review seeks to take firm steps toward the institution in the country of n e w working methods in the social sciences. T h e review believes that the social sciences cannot remain uninvolved or neutral; they must take sides but their decisions have to be scientifically based. In brief, the review aims to k n o w scientifically the reality that has to be changed, through accumulated facts, scientific intercommunication and interchange of findings.
Prospectives, N o . 1, June 1973 Semestral journal published by the Presses Universitaires de France. Address: Administration, 108 Bid SaintGermain, 75006 Paris (France); subscription, 2 R u e Jean-de-Beauvais, 75005 Paris (France). Editor: Daniel Malkin. Subscription rate: France (two numbers) 36 F . Revue Zaïroise de Psychologie et Pédagogie, Vol. 1, Prospectives takes over the Cahiers de ProspectiveN o . 1, 1972 issued in the sixties by the team of Gaston Berger. Published quarterly by the Centre de R e The development of the prospective thinkcherches Interdisciplinaires pour le Déveing, its echo on the wide public, on universities, loppement de l'Éducation (CRIDE). on international instances and large enterprises, Address: Faculté des Sciences de l'Édushow the need to continue this publication under cation, Université Nationale du Zaïre a n e w form. Prospectives will continue to question ( U N A Z A ) , B . P . 2012, Kisangani (Republic the present society which could in turn throw light of Zaire). on possible future societies. The questioning will Editor: P . Erny. not be resolved through the research of a consenSubscription rate: Four numbers, 4 Zaires; sus, but possibly by bringing to the open various $8; 40 F . conflicts—political, economic, ideological—which A i m s to diffuse studies of interest to thefieldsof play a decisive role in social life. Prospectives will psychology and education. T h e Revue is none the devote each number to a particular topic, the first less open to other disciplines of the h u m a n scione reading: 'International Relations'. ences, biology, mathematics and medicines in so far as their matters are relevant to the main fields of study and particularly concerning Africa. Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 1, N o . 1, January 1973 La Ricerca Sociale, N o . 3, M a y 1973 Published quarterly in January, April, July Published quarterly by the Centro Studi and October by Sage Publications Inc. sui problemi délia Città e del TerritoAddress in United States: 275 South rio—Istituto di Sociología—Université di Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California Bologna. 90212 (United States); in Europe: St George's House, 44 Hatton Garden, Address, editorial: Ce.P.Ci.T., Via del London E C 1 N 8 E R (United K i n g d o m ) . Guasto 5 / B , Bologna (Italy). AdminisEditor: Irving J. Goffman. tration: E d . Crisan, Via Monte Leone 2 , Subscription rate: Regular institutional Milano (Italy). rate, $18 per year; professionals and Subscription rate: For three issues, L.2,500; teachers, $12 per year; full-time college $5; single copy, L . 1,000; $2. and university students, $9 per year (add $1 A multi-lingual quarterly devoted to large-scale for subscriptions outside United States and social research, with specific attention to urban Canada); single copies, $5. and rural sociology and co-operation. T o fill in the need for a journal in thefieldof public finance. Will cover all aspects of the subR.S.; Cuadernos de Realidades Sociales, N o . 1, ject—from highly abstract theories to detailed M a y 1973 matters of contemporary public policy to assure Published by the Instituto de Sociología balance in coverage. Aplicada de Madrid.
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Address: Claudio Coello, 141, 4°, Madrid 6 (Spain). Editor: Jesús Maria Vazquez, O P . Subscription rate: Write to the abovementioned institute. The objective for publishing R.S. is to maintain a convenient equilibrium between the theoretical and the applied, the thinking and the action, the research and the publication, the generic and the specific, the enlightened pronouncements and the empirical verifications, and so on, pondering upon them with as humanistic spirit as possible and from the point of view of sociologists. Savanna, Vol. 1, N o . 1, June 1972 Published twice per year by A h m a d u Bello University. Address: c/o Department of Geography, Zaria (Nigeria). Editor: Michael Mortimore. Subscription rate: Personal, $8; £3 per a n n u m ; institutions $13; £5 per a n n u m . Sub-title is ' A Journal of the Environmental and Social Sciences'. T h e journal aims to focus attention on the savannah regions of Africa, with special emphasis on Nigeria and the neighbouring countries. It brings together research and c o m ments from the whole range of the environmental and social sciences, written by scholars w h o have lived and worked in the areas of which they write. Each issue contains the following sections: articles, notes and comments, conferences, reviews and bibliography. Abstracts are provided for each article. Science, Medicine and Man, N o . 1, M a y 1973 Published quarterly by Pergamon Press, Inc. Address: Fairview Park, Elmsford, N . Y . 10523 (United States). Editor: P . J. M . M c E w a n . Subscription rate: Annual subscription, £12; $30; two years subscription, £21.60; $54. A quarterly journal devoted to promoting and disseminating discussion o n all matters of social importance arising from current scientific k n o w ledge and practice and likely to arise from technological development and innovation. S o m e areas of interest are: the pursuit of science viewed in its social context; social factors influencing the direction and implementation of scientific thought, including the political and moral dimensions arising from the application and development of science, questions about h u m a n values and their reciprocating dynamics with technological developments, environmental studies affecting the quality of h u m a n life, ethics of medical practice and research, priorities within medicine, social responsibilities of scientists, strategies of science
involving, e.g. the administrative boundaries of government agencies, the roles of national and international government of (a) professionally qualified individuals, (b) their organizations and (c) research. Articles are in English, French, G e r m a n or Spanish; English abstracts are provided. Sistema, Revista de Ciencias Sociales, N o . 1, 1973 Published every four months by the Instituto de Técnicas Sociales de la Fundación F o n d o Social Universitario. Address: Joaquín Costa 61, 5 o , Madrid, 6 (Spain). Editor: Elias Diaz, director. Subscription rate: Annually, Europe, 475 Pts; others, 600 Pts. Publishes articles and notes on all aspects of the social sciences. Each issue contains in addition two regular book sections: 'Critica de Libros' and 'Noticias de Libros'. Social Change, N o . 1, 1973 Published four times a year for the Center for the Study of Social Change by G o r d o n & Breach. Address: O n e Park Avenue, N e w York, N . Y . 10016 (United States); or 41-42 William IV Street, London W C 2 (United Kingdom). Editors: Victor Gioscia and Philip Slater. Subscription rate: Four issues, Libraries, United States/Elsewhere, $24; United K i n g d o m , £8.75; individuals for their o w n use and direct order from publisher, United States/Elsewhere, $12; United K i n g d o m , £4.37; students, United States/Elsewhere, $6; United K i n g d o m , £2. T h e editors of the journal believe that the principal illusion responsible for the terminal condition in which species m a n is found, is the separation of fact from value and, therefore, they would attempt through the journal to share the facts and values of people-who-know to help m a n live and experience ways that are species enhancing, not destructive. The journal also intends to serve as a critical information resource; it will publish opinion, analysis, exhortation, review, speculation, experiment, criticism, poetry and/or denunciation as long as it is of critical h u m a n benefit. Following this policy it will publish hard science only when it will benefit m a n . Social Praxis, Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1973 Edited at Atkinson College, Y o r k University, D o w n s View 463, Ontario (Canada), and issued four times in a volume.
New periodicals
Address: Subscription, Mouton & C o . , P . O . B o x 482, T h e H a g u e 2076 (Netherlands); or 7 R u e Dupuytren, 75006 Paris (France). Editor: K . T . Farm. Subscription rate: Institutions, libraries, etc., Dfl.60 (approx. U.S.$19) per vol.; private persons, Dfl.24 (approx. U.S.$8) per vol.; students, Dfl.16 (approx. U.S.S5) per vol.; single issue, Dfl. 19.50 (approx. U.S.$6). A n international and interdisciplinary quarterly of the social sciences publishing contributed papers. Each paper is provided with a summary in English at the beginning and a résumé in French at the end. Thefirstnumber reviews only one title at length and provides a listing of forthcoming articles on the inside back cover.
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Editor: John Lofland. Subscription rate: Institutional, $15 per year; professionals and teachers, $10 per year; full-time university students (United States and Canada), $7.50 per year; subscriptions outside United States add $1.50. Publishes works on urban ethnography—social scientific writing that simultaneously displays three main features: (a) the materials deal with aspects of urban societies; (b) such material seeks to provide close-up and detailed, qualitative depiction of social life; and (c) the research strives to be analytic—to search out patterns and regularities in the context of close-up depiction of urban lives and culture.
Viitorul Social: Revista de Sociologie, Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1972 Sociological Methods and Research, Vol. 1, N o . 1, Published quarterly by the Academy of August 1972 Social and Political Sciences and the National Committee of Sociology of the Published quarterly in August, November, Socialist Republic of Romania. February and M a y by Sage Publications Inc. Address: Str. Onesti, N r . 11, Bucarest Address in United States: 275 South (Romania). Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California Editor: C . Nicuta. 90212 (United States); in Europe: St George's House, 44 Hatton Garden, Subscription rate: Annually, 40 lei; one London E C 1 N 8 E R (United Kingdom). copy, 10 lei. Editor: Edgar F . Borgatta. Social Future is a journal of sociology reviewing Subscription rates: Institutions, $18 per the future of society in Romania. It contains reyear; professionals and teachers, $12 per searchfindings,methodological trend and training year; full-time college and university studies, news items, interviews and statements, students, $9 per year (add $1 for subscriporganizational news, book reviews and notes. tions outside United States and Canada). A journal devoted to sociology as a cumulative Women's Studies, Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1972 empirical science. Emphasis is placed on articles Published in two issues per volume by that advance the understanding of thefieldthrough Gordon & Breach. systematic presentations that clarify methodAddress: 41-42 William IV Street, London ological problems and assist in ordering the k n o w n W C 2 (United Kingdom); or 440 Park facts in the area. Will publish review articles parAvenue South, N e w York, N . Y . 10016 ticularly those that emphasize a critical analysis (United States). of the status of the arts; also original presentations Editor: W e n d y Martin. though broadly based and providing new research. Subscription rate (per volume post paid): Will assess the scientific status of sociology. Libraries and institutions, $29 or £12.10; in United Kingdom, £10.60; abroad, $29 or £12.10; individuals (direct from pubUrban Life and Culture, Vol. 1, N o . 1, April 1972 lisher for personal use) in United Kingdom, Published four times annually in April, £2.65; abroad, $10 or £4.15. July, October and January by Sage PubA semi-annual publication providing a forum for lications Inc. studies on w o m e n in thefieldsof sociology, law, Address: For correspondence from United political science, economics, anthropology, literaKingdom, Europe, Middle East and Africa: ture, history, arts and the sciences. Also publishes Sage Publications Ltd, St George's House, poetry, shortfiction,filmand book reviews. 44 Hatton Garden, London E C 1 N 8 E R (United Kingdom); for others: Sage P u b lications Inc., 275 South Beverly Drive, Working Papers for a New Society, Vol. 1, N o . 1, Beverly Hills, California 90212 (United Spring 1973 States). Published quarterly (spring, summer and
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â&#x20AC;˘
QP winter) by the Cambridge Policy Studies Institute Inc. Address: 123 M t Auburn Street, C a m bridge, Massachusetts 02138 (United States). Editorial board: Mary Jo Bane, John Case, Allen Graubard, Christopher Jencks, Nancy Lyons. Subscription rate: O n e year, $8; two years, $15; foreign rate $12 per year. A n eclectic journal covering a wide range of subjects including policy analysts, cabinet makers and futurologists, doctors, housewives and urban revolutionaires. Working papers will try to provide a forum for all these people w h o still have ideas on h o w America might be reconstructed along more humane, more egalitarian, more participatory, less violent, and less expansionist lines. These ideas will include Utopian visions and liberal reforms as well as current efforts to implement them. N e w books on a better society and h o w it might actually be created will also be discussed.
World Development, Vol. 1, N o s . 1 + 2, February 1973 Published monthly by World Development (Publishers) Ltd. Address: Robert Maxwell & C o . Ltd, Headington Hill Hall, Oxford O X 3 O B J (United Kingdom). Editor and Editorial Board Director: D o n Taylor. Subscription rate: N o n e given. A multidisciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development. It believes that the world has become 'one' family in which all are part of an interdependent world community; that development means an attack on the chief evils of the world today: malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, slums, unemployment, inequality. The journal will explore the forces m a k ing for international integration and disintegration and present new ideas of constructive co-operation with the Third World.
Approaching international conferences1
1974 1-6 April
Washington
11-13 April
Apherst
18-24 April
New York
22-24 April
26-28 April
May
15-18 M a y
Boston
Worcester
Bangkok
Montreal
31 M a y to 11 June Vancouver
5-27 June
Geneva
24-28 June
Tel Aviv
Summer
July
5-9 July
14-20 July
Grenoble
France
Addis Ababa
Nairobi
International Association of L a w Libraries: 5th Course in L a w Librariansbip International Association of Law Libraries, Universit채tstrasse, 6, D-355 Warburg (Federal Republic of Germany) American Association of Physical Anthropologists: Annual Meeting Jack Kelso, Department of Anthropology, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80302 ( United States) Population Association of America: Annual Meeting / . W. Brackett, PAA, Box 14182, Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044 (United States) Society of Operations Research: Forty Fifth American National Meeting Arthur D. Little, Inc., 35 Acorn Pk, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02140 (United States) Northeastern Anthropological Association: 14th Annual Meeting Standford N. Gerber, Program Chairman, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, 01610 ( United States)
E C A F E Expert Group Meeting on Social and Psychological Aspects of Fertility Behavior ECAFE, Sala Santitham, Bangkok 2 (Thailand) Administrative Management Society: Meeting William Russell, Director, Willow Grove, Pa. 19090 (United States) U N Conference on H u m a n Settlements: Conference-Exposition
International Labour Organisation: International Labour Conference, 59th Session ILO, 1211 Geneva 22 (Switzerland) Second International Symposium on Sex Education Dr E. Chigier, Secretary, 2nd International Symposium on Sex Education, Box 16271, Tel Aviv (Israel)
Econometric Society: Meeting Ms C. K. Stiglitz, Econometric Society, Box 1264, Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520 (United States) Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs: Conference 9 Great Russell Mansions, 60 Great Russell St, London WC1B 3BE
International Association of Schools of Social Work, Inc.: 17th International Congress Dr K. A. Kendall, International Association of Schools of Social Work, Inc., 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017 (United States) International Council on Social Welfare: 17th International Conference Mrs Kate Katzki, ICSW, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017 (United States)
1. N o further details concerning these meetings can be obtained through this Journal.
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
170
15-19 July
Cardiff
28 July to 2 August Montreal
August 5-9 August
Copenhagen Amsterdam
12-16 August
Abidjan
12-16 August
Elsinore
13-19 August
Tokyo
18-24 August
Toronto
It
Society for the Study of Fertility: Annual Conference SSF, 141 Newmarket Road, Cambridge (United Kingdom)
International Association of Applied Psychology: Meeting Mr G. Desautels, Secretary General, 242 Station Youville, Montre Quebec (Canada)
International Economic History Association: 6th Congress Professor Dr J. F. Bergier, Rindermarkt 6, 8001, Zurich (Switzerland) International Humanist and Ethical Union: 6th Congress Oudegracht 152, Utrecht (Netherlands) Society for International Development: 14th World Conference W. P. J. Boichel, International Headquarters, Society for Internatio Development, 1346 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (United States) Social Science & Medicine: 4th International Conference
Dr P. J. M. McEvan, SSM
18-30 August Vancouver 19-20 August
New York
19-24 August
Budapest
26-29 August
Montreal
28 August to 2 September Baden
30 August to 3 September New Orleans
International Federation of University W o m e n : Triennial Conference IFUW, Case Postale 398, 1211 Geneva 2 (Switzerland) International Sociological Association: 8th World Congress of Sociology. (Theme: Sociology and Revolution in Today's Societies) ISA, Via Daverio 7, 20122 Milano (Italy) Pacific Science Association: 13th Congress University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8 (Canada) United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Third World Population Conference The Secretary General, World Population Conference, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017 (United States) Hungarian Economic Association: 4th World Congress of Economists. (Theme: Economic Integration) Hungarian Economic Association American Sociological Association: Annual Meeting ASA, 1001 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Washington D.C, 20036 (United States) Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs: 24th Conference. (Theme: Disarmament, Energy Problems, International Collaboration) 9 Great Russell Mansions, 60 Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3BE ( United Kingdom)
American Psychological Association: Annual Meeting Dr K. B. Little, Exec. Secretary, 1200 17th Street, N.W., Washington D.C, 20036 (United States)
United States Econometric Society: 3rd World Congress P.O. Box 1264, Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520 (United States) The Athenian Institute of Anthropos: 6th International Congress of 1-7 September Athens Social Psychiatry Dr G. Wassiliou, c/o The Congress Secretariat, The Athenian Institu of Anthropos, 8 Demetriou Douydou Street, Athens 602 (Greece) International Federation for Documentation: Seminar, International 4-19 September Berlin Congress, Conference FID Secretariat, 7 Hofweg, The Hague (Netherlands) September
Approaching international conferences
17 September to 20 December New York
171
United Nations: General Assembly, 29th Session United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017 (United States)
3-4 October
Budapest
International Council for Building Research, Studies and Documentation (CIB): 6th Congress Professor Dr G. Sebestyen, Institute for Building SCI-ETI, Budapest XI, David Ferenc u.6 (Hungary)
30 October to 2 November
Portland
Gerontological Society: Annual Meeting E. Kaskowitz, Executive Director, 1 Dupont Circle, Washington, D . C . 20036 (UnitedStates)
November
Bangkok
E C A F E Expert Group Meeting on Measures beyond Family Planning for Fertility Reduction ECAFE, Sala Santitham, Bangkok 2 (Thailand)
3-9 November Buenos Aires 8 November Buenos Aires
16-20
December Dubrovnik
International Federation of Fertility Societies: 8th World Congress IFFS, Vicente Lopez, 971, Martinez F . C . N . M . , Buenos Aires (Argentina) World T o w n Planning Day: 25th Anniversary Secretary, WTPD, Ombu 2905, Buenos Aires (Argentina)
Pugwash Conferences o n Science and World Affairs: Conference. (Theme: Science and Ethics) 9 Great Russell Mansions, 60 Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3BE (United Kingdom)
1975 Hong Kong
Canberra
January
February/March
Kioto
International Council of Social Welfare: Regional Asian and Western Pacific Seminar Miss Shirley Lian, Hong Kong Committee ICSW, Ann Black Red Cross Building, Harcourt Road, Box 474 (Hong Kong) Australian and N e w Zealand Association for Advancement of Science: 46th Congress Executive Secretary, ANZAAS (?) Union of International Associations: Japan National Tourist Organization. First Congress on Congress Org. in Asia and the South Pacific DÊpartement Congrès de VU AI, 1 Rue aux Laines, 1000 Bruxelles (Belgium)
9-13 March Williamsburg
16-19
April
Society of Toxicology: Annual Scientific Meeting Dr R. A . Scale, c/o Med. Res. Division Esso R & E Co., Linden, New Jersey 07036 ( United States)
Seattle Population Association of America: Annual Meeting PAA, Box 14182, Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D . C . 20044 (United States)
m
172
22-27 June
Tel Aviv
20 July to 10 August Djakarta
18-30 August
Vancouver
25-28 August San Francisco
December
United States
International Association of Gerontology; Israel Gerontological Society. 10th International Congress Professor S. Bergman, FOB 16271, Tel Aviv (Israel)
World Council of Churches: 5th Assembly World Council of Churches
Pacific Science Association: 13th Pacific Science Congress. (Theme: Mankind's Future in the Pacific) Thirteenth Pacific Science Congress, University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8 (Canada) American Sociological Association: Annual Meeting 1001 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (United States)
Econometric Society: Conference Box 1264, Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520 (United States)
1976 France
December
United States
International Union of Psychological Science: 21 st International Congress Mme H. Gratiot-Alphandery, Laboratoire de Psychologie, UniversitĂŠ de Paris, 28 Rue Serpente, Paris-6' (France)
Econometric Society: Conference Box 1264, Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520 (United States)
Materials from the United Nations System: an annotated selection1
Population, health, food, environment Population Preparations for the World Population Conference, 1974. Progress report o f the SecretaryGeneral of the W o r l d Population Conference. 20 February 1973. 3 2 p . , including annexes. (UN/E/CN.9/275.)
differentials in Africa. 17 October 1972. 13 p . , including annex, tables, ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / P O P / 7 2 . ) [St.]. Levels and trends of fertility in the countries of Africa. Prepared b y the United Nations Population Division. 17 October 1972. 23 p . , including a n n e x , tables, ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / P O P / 7 5 . ) [St.] Covers the period 1 9 6 0 - 7 0 .
Plans relating to the p r o g r a m m e a n d arrangements for the Conference. List of basic d o c u m e n t s .
Interim report on conditions and trends of fertility in the world, 1960-1965. Summary of findings. 27 November 1972. 13 p . , tables, ( U N / E / C N . Report on the African Census Programme (as of 14/POP/76.) IS February 1973). N o t e b y the Secretary[St.]. General of the United Nations. 5 M a r c h 1973. 9 p . , table, including annexes, ( U N / E / C N . 9 / Activities of the Latin American Demographic Centre 277.) carried out in 1971-1972 and programmed for 1973-1974. Note of the Secretariat. Report of the 2nd Asian Population Conference. 11-23 30 January 1973. 27 p . ( U N / E / C N . 1 2 / 9 5 0 . ) April 1973. Tokyo. 83 p . , fig. ( U N / E / C N . Instruction given at the centre. N u m b e r of students 11/1065.) and teachers. Subjects taught. Plans for the future. [Bl.] T h e demographic situation in Asia since 1963. Its implications for agricultural and industrial develSeminar on the status of women and family planning. o p m e n t . Family planning. (Istanbul). July 1972. 44 p . , including annex. ( U N / S T / T A O / H R / 4 6 .) Review of available evidence on fertility differentials in Africa. 10 N o v e m b e r 1972. 25 p . , tables. Effects of present trends in population growth on the status of w o m e n . ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / P O P / 7 1.)
[St.] Deficiencies in statistics for the 1960s. Possible remedies. Trends over the last twenty years.
Health
Indications of current and future methodological trends Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World in the collection of data on fertility levels and Health Assembly and of the Executive Board.
As a general rule, n o mention is m a d e of publications and documents which are issued more or less automatically: regular administrative reports, minutes of meetings, etc. W h e n the content of a text is self-evident n o description has been provided. Free translations have been given of the titles of some publications and documents which w e were unable to ob-
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
tain in time in English and are indicated by an asterisk in the margin. T h e following conventional abbreviations have been used: BI: Contains a particularly interesting bibliography. St.: Specially important or rare statistics. Currencies: $ = U . S . dollar; F F = French Francs; S F = Swiss Francs.
174
Vol. I: 1948-1972. 1st to 25th World Health Assembly. 1st to 50th session of the Executive Board. 1973. 621 p . $6; S F 20. ( W H O . )
Energy and protein requirements. Report of a Joint FAOjWHO A d H o c Expert Committee. 1973. 123 p . $2.10; S F 7. (Technical report series, 522.) ( W H O . ) * Model for the allocation of resources for publicTerminology. Determination of energy and protein health planning: case studies in the control of requirements. Practical application to a specific poputuberculosis. Supplement to Vol. 48 of thelation. Recommendations for future research. Bulletin of the World Health Organization. 1973. 110 p. $4.80; S F 16. ( W H O . ) W H O Expert Committee on Drug Dependence. 1973. 38 p . $1.75; S F 5. (Technical report series, The model and its application in Korea in recent years. Statistics 1955-65. Conclusions. 526.) ( W H O . ) Activities of the various Specialized Agencies in this * Principles of health planning in the USSR. 1973. sphere. Epidemiological study: approach, methods, 177 p . $3; S F 9. (Public health papers, 43.) terminology. Development of comparative methods. Internationa] control of two drugs: preparations based (WHO.) on dephenoxylate and nicodinicotine. The Soviet approach to health: theory, statistical methods, staff training. Various bibliographies: T h e following documents are lists of references (from 100 to approximately Approaches to national health planning. 1973. 122 p . 400 depending on the subject): $1.75; SF 7. (Public health papers, 46.) (WHO.) Methods applied in a number of widely differing countries: United States, India, U . S . S . R . , Sweden, Peru, Taiwan and Turkey.
Delivery of health care in developing countries of Asia, Africa, Central and South America. April 1973. (WHO/LIB/BIB/118.)
Evaluation of community health centres, by I. Roemer. Prevalence of nutritional disorders in the Eastern Mediterranean: 1970. April 1973. ( W H O / L I B / 1973. 40 p . $1.25; S F 5. (Public health papers, BIB/120.) 48.) ( W H O . ) Health centres (first aid centres, specialized services, Emigration and immigration of physicians and nurses: polyclinics). T h e different methods of evaluation. 1970. M a y 1973. ( W H O / U B / B I B / 1 2 2 . ) Costs. Results. Health practice research and formalized managerial methods. 1973. 193 p . $3; S F 10. (Public health papers, 51.) ( W H O . ) The use of formal methods such as systems analysis and analysis of work, objectives or performance.
Utilization of health services and forces affecting it: 1970.
M a y 1973. ( W H O / L I B / B I B / 1 3 0 . )
Evaluation studies in medical education and use of questionnaires: 1970. June 1973. ( W H O / L I B / BIB/132.)
Development of educational programmes for the health services. Geneva. 1973. 103 p . $2.10; S F 7 . Measurement of health services performances: 1970. June 1973. ( W H O / U B / B I B / 1 3 6 . ) (Public health papers, 52.) ( W H O . ) The prevention of blindness. Report of a W H O Study Group. 1973. 19 p . $0.90; S F 3 . (Technical report series, 518.) ( W H O . ) Diseases leading to loss of sight. Methods of recording causes. Recommendation: international action, coordination, national action.
Medical research policy: August
1972-June 1973.
June 1973. ( W H O / L I B / B I B / 1 3 7 . )
World Health Statistics Report ( W H O ) : V o l u m e 26, N o . 2, 1973, 44 p. $3; S F 10. V o l u m e 26, N o . 3, 1973, 149 p. $7.50; S F 25. V o l u m e 26, N o . 4 , 1973, 31 p . $3; S F 10. Training and preparation of teachers for schools ofVolume 26, N o . 5, 1973, 21 p . $1.50; S F 5. medicine and of allied health sciences. Report V o l u m e 26, N o . 6, 1973, 22 p. $1.50; S F 5. Volume 26, N o . 7, 1973, 158 p . $7.50; S F 25. of a W H O Study Group. 1973. 34 p. $1.20; Volume 26, N o . 8, 1973, 117 p . $7; S F 20. S F 4 . (Technical report series, 521.) ( W H O . ) World qualitative and quantitative requirements. [St.] Fascicles of a permanent collection of statistics on the incidence of various diseases. Covers the whole Responsibilities which staff must be trained to assume. world. In addition to basic tables which are reTraining and research work. Long-term programme peated regularly, each fascicle contains special studies. of W H O .
175
Materials from the United Nations System: an annotated selection
A m o n g the latter there are data on suicides in N o . 3 , classed according to the method used (1950-70), tables o n homicides (1950-70) in N o . 4 and in N o s . 7 and 8 the two parts of a work o n malignant tumours based o n the most recent statistics, giving figures according to sex and age, per 100,000 inhabitants. Food
* Technical guide. Vol. II: Employment, unemployment, working hours, wages: description of series published in the Bulletin of Labour Statistics. 1973. S F 10. (ILO.) Supplements the brief information given in the notes to tables published in the Bulletin of Labour Statistics. Coverage and value of these statistics. Methods of calculation used.
The World Food Programme and its activities in Asia Report of the Conference of Asian Statisticians (11th session). 13 N o v e m b e r 1972. 39 p . and the Far East, 11th report. 23 March 1973. (UN/E/CN.11/1057.)
22 p . ( U N / E / C N . 1 1/1075.)
List of development and emergency operations carried out by the W F P over the last ten years infifteenAsian countries.
[Bl.].
[St.] Inventory of all types of statistical data in the possession of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. Storage.
Report on a unified approach to development analysis and planning. Preliminary report of the Secretary-General. 25 October 1972. 71 p . ( U N /
Report on the Working Group on Household Sector Statistics, Addis Ababa, 27 November1 December 1972. 30 p . , including annex, Economics tables, ( U N / E / C N . 14/586.) [St.] Problems in African statistics. Concepts, defiStatistics, statistical methods nitions, sources. Particular difficulties experienced in this continent in applying the United Nations acInventory of data bases of economic and social stat- counts system adopted in 1968. istics. Draft report prepared by the Secretariat in co-operation with the Specialized Agencies. Economic planning (including planning in 29 January 1973. 99 p . , tables, including general) annexes, ( U N / S T / S T A T . 6 4 . )
E/CN.5/477.)
Yearbook of national accounts statistics, 1971.The various types of development. Strategies. January 1973. 3 Vols. $36. ( U N / S T / S T A T / S E R . Methods of observation, indicators and information 0/1 and Adds.) systems. [St.] Comparison of national accounts of most United Nations M e m b e r States. Report on a unified approach to development analysis and planning. Report of the SecretaryRevision of the Standard International Trade ClassifiGeneral on the Expert Group Meeting on a cation (SITC). Draft Standard International Unified Approach to Development Analysis Trade Classification, Rev. 2. Report of the and Planning, held at Stockholm from 6 to Secretary-General. 31 August 1972. 204 p . , 10 November 1972. 23 January 1973. 17 p . tables, including appendixes, ( U N / E / C N . 3 / 4 2 9 . ) (UN/E/CN.5/490.) [St.] List of the sections, divisions, groups and subBackground information. T h e concept of a unified groups of all products in which international trading approach to development analysis and planning. is carried o n . Methodological aspects of its use. Recommendations. Statistics of the distribution of income, consump-Report on the activities of the Latin American Institute tion and wealth. Report of the Expert Group for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) on Statistics of the Distribution of Income, in 1972. Note by the Secretariat. 20 January 1973. Consumption and Accumulation, 28 July53 p . , tables, ( U N / E / C N . 12/951.) 7 October 1972. Various pagings, tables. Technical assistance to various Latin American ( U N / E / C N . 3 / 4 2 6 and Annexes 1 and 2.) countries. Concomitant economic and social research. [St.] Methodical observations. Results of a meeting of the expert group held at Geneva in April 1972. Lectures given at the bilingual training course in budget-plan harmonization, Addis Ababa, 5Sample surveys of current interest. 12th report. 28 July 1971. 26 M a y 1972. 157 p . ( U N / E / January 1973. 477 p . $ 1 0 . ( U N / E / 7 3 / X V I I . 5 . ) CN.14/BUD/17.) [Bl., St.] Social studies through surveys of various [St.] T h e function of central planning in Africa. problems, carried out in approximatelyfiftycountries. Relationship between planning and budget. Different
176
>=& approaches. T h e point of view of governments, nationalized firms and private firms. * Participation of employers and workers in planning. 1973. 267 p . S F 18. (ILO.) [Bl.] T h e concept of participation. Structures for participation in planning; mechanisms, problems and application of planning. Conclusions. Economic development (including development in general), industrialization United Nations Development Programme. Report of the Governing Council, 14th session, 6-27 June 1972. October 1972. 88 p . , including annexes. Ă?3. (uN/E/5185/Rev.l.) Country programmes. Multinational programming. United Nations volunteers. Examination of the organization, activities, role andfinancialsituation of the U N D P in 1971.
development strategy. 9 January 1973. 90 p . , including annex. ( U N / E / A C . 5 4 / L . 5 2 . ) [St.] Measures relating to trade, effects of domestic policies. Legal information. Implementation of the international development strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade: preliminary papers for the first overall review and appraisal of progress. Centrally planned economies and the international development strategy. 4 January 1973. 42 p . , including annex. ( U N / E / A C . 5 4 / L . 5 3 . ) [St.] Trade: trends and future outlook, expansion of trade with developing countries. Industrial cooperation programmes.
Implementation of the international development strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade: preliminary papers for the first overall review and appraisal of progress. Economic co-operation schemes in developing regions: an appraisal of mechanism, policies and The role of modern science and technology in the deproblems. 6 February 1973. 43 p . ( U N / E / A C . velopment of nations and the need to strengthen 54/L.54.) economic and technico-scientific co-operation among States. Report of the Secretary-General. Co-operation and the economic integration of developing countries. 25 January 1973. 10 p . ( U N / E / 5 2 3 8 . )
Implementation of the international development strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade: preliminary papers for the first overall review and appraisal of progress. National development strategies and the Second United Nations Development Decade: a selecDisarmament and development. Report of the group of tive review of targets indicated in recent plans experts on the economic and social consequences of developing countries. 24 January 1973. of disarmament. December 1972. 37 p . $1. 37 p . (UN/E/AC.54/L.55.) (UN/ST/ECA/174.) [St.] T h e relationship between disarmament and development. Methods of mobilizing public opinion. T h e The international development strategy:firstoverall effects of formulae for re-allocating military expendireview and appraisal of issues and policies. ture on the economy of the United States of America. Preliminary report of the Secretary-General. 14 M a r c h 1973. 90 p . ( U N / E / A C . 5 4 / L . 6 0 . ) Implementation of the international development strat- Changes in development priorities. Changes in production methods and problems. Trends in trade egy for the Second United Nations Development Decade: preliminary papers for the first relations. overall review and appraisal of progress. Developing countries and the international develop- Proposals for action onfinancefor housing, building ment strategy. 29, 31 January 1973. Various and planning. December 1972. 89 p . $3. pagings. ( U N / E / A C . 5 4 / L . 5 1 and A d d . l . ) (uN/E/c.6/106/Rev.l(sT/ECA/168).) [St.] M a i n achievements and main obstacles to devel[Bl.] T h e problem. Possible solutions. Methods of opment in the period 1960-70. Degree of mobilization financing in developing countries. T h e role of foreign of h u m a n , financial and physical resources. A d d e n aid, regional and international programmes. Recd u m gives tables of global and national data, 1965-70. ommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The application of space technology to development. December 1972. 78 p . $1.50. ( U N / S T / E C A / 1 6 1 . ) Communications and observation of the earth by satellite in the service of development.
Implementation of the international development strat- Science and technology in the Second United Nations egy for the Second United Nations DevelopDevelopment Decade. International development Decade: preliminary papers for the first ment strategy. Note by the Secretary-General. overall review and appraisal of progress. Devel31 January 1973. 18 p . ( U N / E / C . 8 / 1 0 . ) oped market economies and the international Definition of objectives.
177
Materials from the United Nations System: an annotated selection
basins. Report of the Secretary-General. Action programmes in science and technology for developing countries. Application of computer 27 October 1972. 58 p . , including annexes. technology. 30 January 1973. 15 p . ( U N / E / (UN/E/C.7/35.) c.8/11.) [St.] Review of bilateral and multilateral co-operation. Conclusions and recommendations. An Asian plan of action for the application of science and technology to development. February 1973. Projections of natural resources reserves, supply and 114 p . ( U N / E / C N . 11/1071.) future demand. Note by the Secretary-General. 5,19 December ¡972. Various pagings, tables. Asian Institute for Economic Development and ( U N / E / C . 7 / 4 0 A d d . l and 2.) Planning: report of the Governing Council. Trends and projections for energy consumption, esti14 March 1973. 20 p. ( U N / E / C N . 1 1 / 1 0 8 3 . ) mated reserves, proposed measures. Training, research and advisory services in 1972. Latin America and the international development strategy:firstregional appraisal. 5, 7 F e bruary 1973. Various pagings, tables, ( U N / E/cN.12/947andAdd.l.) [St.] Social changes, economic growth. External economic relations. External financing. Regional integration. Analysis of 1960s.
World energy supplies, 1961-1970. 373 p . $8. ( U N / S T / STAT/SER.J/15.)
[St.] Collection of statistics covering production, trade and energy consumption for approximately 185 countries. Coal, coke, petroleum, natural gas and electricity, nuclear and géothermie energy.
Electricity costs and tariffs: a general study. December 1972. 230 p . $5. ( U N / S T / E C A / 1 5 6 . ) World plan of action for the application of science and Factors affecting costs. Examples taken from twentytechnology to development. Summary of the refive countries. gional plan for Latin America. 3 January 1973. 59 p . ( U N / E / C N . 1 2 / 9 4 9 . )
Application in the variousfields:health, education and economics in particular.
Agriculture, basic commodities
Report of the seminar on ¡ntra-sub-regional economic co-operation and trade in agriculture in West Co-ordination of activities of the United Nations system Africa. 15 January 1973. 33 p . ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / in thefieldof industrial development. Second 566.) analytical report. 25 April 1972. 122 p . , Analysis of forms of co-operation practised in the including annexes, ( U N / I D / B / 1 0 2 . ) [St.] Activities classified by origin, function and re- sub-region at present. gion (Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, Index, FAO Conference and Council Decisions. Latin America). Table and analysis. 1945-1972. 1973. 498 p . ( F A O / M D / D 5 9 2 0 / E / 6.73/1/3100.) Interrelationship between health programmes and socioeconomic development. 1973. 61 p . $1.25, FAO Commodity review and outlook 1972-1973. 1973. S F 5. (Public health papers, 49.) ( W H O . ) 261 p . $7.50. ( F A O . ) [Bl.] Report on technical discussions held at the World Situation and general outlook as regards commodities. Health Assembly in 1972: text of the basic document. Trends and problems in international trade. Situation Report o n the discussions themselves and annotated and outlook for each commodity. bibliography. Agriculture: Report of the Intergovernmental Meeting on the Establishment of an Asian Rice Trade Fund. 20 March 1973. 18 p . ( U N / E / C N . 11/ Developments in thefieldof natural resources—water, L.373.) energy and minerals. Recommendations of the Text of the draft. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment relating to natural resources. Note by the Secretary-General. 16 October- National grain policies: 1972. 1973. 206 p . $4. ( F A O . ) [St.] Covers all F A O M e m b e r States. 18 December 1972. Various pagings, including annexes, ( U N / E / C . 7 / 3 2 and A d d . l . ) The Green Revolution: an economic analysis, by Keith Griffin, October 1972. 153 p . ( U N . R I S D . ) Developments in thefieldof natural resources—water, [St.] T h e influence of mechanization and of the intenenergy and minerals. Technical and economic aspects of development of international river sive use of fertilizers on world agricultural production. Natural resources, raw materials, energy
178
& Building, industry, transport Report of the UNECA Task Force on Financing of Housing, Building and Physical Planning. 14 December 1972. 17 p . , including annex, table, ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / 5 8 5 . )
T h e situation in Africa as a whole. Recommendations to Governments. Shipping in the seventies. August 1972. 42 p . $1. (UN/TD/177.)
The present situation and the future outlook. International strategy in the development of shipping.
Review and appraisal of the implementation of the international development strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. Report of the Secretary-General. Social objectives and related policies and programmes in national plans of selected developing countries for the Second United Nations Development Decade. 27 October 1972. 48 p . , including annexes, ( U N / E / C N . 5 / 4 7 6 . ) Recommendations on public participation in development activities and decisions. T h e fruits of development and their distribution.
Report on national experience in achieving far-reaching social and economic changes for purposes of social progress. Report of the SecretaryRegional co-operation study on regional structures. ReGeneral. 8 December 1972. Various pagings, port of the Secretary-General. 15 N o v e m including annex, tables, ( U N / E / C N . 5 / 4 7 8 and ber 1972. 36 p . ( U N / E / 5 1 2 7 . ) Add.l,2and3.) Existing regional structures. W a y s of encouraging Replies offiftygovernments to questions on their co-operation. Activities of the Specialized Agencies in social policy. this sphere. Economic co-operation
Regional co-operation. United Nations export promotion and development efforts. Report of the Secretary-General. 8 March 1973. 20 p . , tables,
(UN/E/5254.)
Reports on the work of the four regional economic commissions and of the nine Specialized Agencies for 1971-72. Plans for 1973-74.
Integration of women in development. Report of the Secretary-General. 14 November 1972. 9 p . ( U N / C N . 5/481.)
T h e w o m a n ' s role in rural society, business and the family. Recommendations. Studies on social development in the Middle East, 1971. M a r c h 1973. 106 p . $3. ( U N / S T / E C A / 1 7 5 . )
Report of the panel of experts on intra-African Problems connected with youth, housing and buildeconomic co-operation and Africa's relations ing. Agrarian reform. Social security in industry. with the European Economic Community. 16 February 1973. 14 p . , including annex. Planning for youth development: the Hong Kong ( U N / E / C N . 14/584.) experience. 30 October 1972. 59 p . $2.50. [Bl.] List of documents issued by the panel of experts (UN/TAO/HOK/1.) on this subject. Social policy The impact of regional economic groupings of the developed countries on international trade inThe aged and social change. Progress report of the cluding the trade of developing countries. Secretary-General. 4 December 1972. 10 p . Comparison of the major groupings. Report by (UN/E/CN.5/482.) the UNCTAD Secretariat. 28 March 1972. Demographic trends and the social effects of the 18 p . , tables, ( U N / T D / 1 3 1 . ) ageing of the population in industrialized countries. [St.] Comparison of E F T A , the E E C and C O M E C O N . The roles of the M e m b e r States in each organization. Relations with the Third World from 1960 to 1970. Society, living and working conditions, e m ployment, social policy Social planning, social development
Multinational enterprises and social policy. 1973. 182 p . S F 17.50. (ILO.) T h e nature and importance of multinational enterprises. Their relations with the labour force. Working conditions. Staff relations within this context. I L O standards. Report of an I L O meeting o n this subject.
Social development. Promotion of the co-operative Employment policy in the Second Development Decade : movement during the Second United Nations a United Nations family approach. 1973. Development Decade. Progress report of the (ILO.) Secretary-General. 21 February 1973. 11 p . , Characteristics of a concerted employment policy. including annexes, ( U N / E / 5 2 4 6 . ) Appraisal.
179
Materials from the United Nations System: an annotated selection
Migrant
workers. Report VII (1). International Labour Conference (Geneva 1974). 1973. 78 p . S F 12.50. (ILO.) Labour migrations. Abuses. Social policies applied. International standards for employment and residence.
Major problems of rural workers today. Organizations classified according to the origins of their members and the nature of their activities. O b stacles to their development. Measures which would intensify the participation of these organizations in development.
* Urban unemployment in developing countries. B y * Second technical tripartite meeting for the timber Paul Bairoch. 1973. 99 p . S F 12. (ILO.) industry (forestry): General report. Action The nature of the problem. Factors in urban u n taken on conclusions offirstmeeting. 1973. employment. Inflation. T h e drift to the towns. 76 p . S F 10. (ILO.) Recommendations. Measures taken in the different countries: accidents, Social Services
living and working conditions, labour-management relations. Measures taken by the I L O . Surveys.
Labour
inspection: purposes and practice. 234 p . Second technical tripartite meeting for the timber S F 16. (ILO.) industry (forestry) : problems relating to stabPurpose: technical, legal, economic, social and adility of employment in the timber industry. ministrative responsibilities. Practical methods and Geneva. 1973. 59 p . S F 10. (ILO.) rules. Elaboration of statistics. Structure of employment. Main factors in the instability of employment, in particular rationalization. * Encyclopaedia of medicine, health and safety at Comparison between industrialized countries and dework. V o l u m e I: A - K . Geneva. 1973. 893 p . veloping countries. (ILO.) [St. Bl.] List of factors causing accidents and illness General report: recent events and development in the at work. T h e different techniques and products and textile industry. 1973. 128 p . S F 12.50. (ILO.) the risks connected with them. [St.] Situation of the various branches of this industry. Social aspects: unemployment, wages, working hours. Labour problems, labour conditions Recent trends in collective bargaining. Directory of labour relations institutes. 1973. 248 p . S F 17.50. Safety and health in the textile industry. Geneva. 1973. Country by country list. General information. Teach47 p . S F 8 . (ILO.) ing and research activities. Conditions of admission. Publications. Industrialization and wages in Japan. 1973. 45 p . S F 8. (ILO.) Labour relations institutes: structure and functions. Before and after 1945. General trends. R e c o m m e n 1973. S F 15. (ILO.) dations. Region by region study: North and South America, Asia, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa. OrganizLegal and political questions, h u m a n rights ations, activities and research work of these institutes. * Minimum age for admission to employment. Report IV (2). International Labour Conference (1973). 1973. 61 p . S F 10. (ILO.) Replies of governments. Texts of draft conventions and recommendations.
International law
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Yearbook. Vol. Ill: 1972. M a r c h 1973. 311 p . $6.50. ( U N / A / C N . 9 / S E R / A / 1 9 7 2 . ) Major events in the development of international law * The social repercussions of new handling methods in 1972. Examination of specific subjects: inter(docks). Report V (2). International Labour national sale of goods, international payments, c o m mercial arbitration, international legislation governConference (1973). 1973. 49 p . S F 10. (ILO.) ing shipping. Government replies and comments. Draft convention and recommendation proposed at the conference. Commentary on the draft convention on prescription (limitation) in the international sale of goods, Organizations of rural workers and their role in econMay 1972. 6 N o v e m b e r 1972. 68 p . ( U N / A / omic and social development. 1973. 67 p . CN.9/73.) S F 12.50. (ILO.)
180
dĂś
International payments. Negotiable instruments. Draft Seminar on human rights and scientific and technouniform law on international bills of exchange logical developments. Vienna, Austria, 19 Juneâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; and international promissory notes. Report of 1 July 1972. September 1972. 33 p . ( U N / S T / the working group on international negotiable TAO/HR/45.) instruments on the work of its 1st session. The effects of technological development on various 30 January 1973. 34 p . ( U N / C N . 9 / 7 7 . ) h u m a n rights, particularly the right to privacy. Measures which should be taken to safeguard these rights. Tax treaties between developed and developing countries. 3rd report. N o v e m b e r 1972. 147 p . $3.50. ( U N / S T / E C A / 1 6 6 . ) Commission on Human Rights. Question of the realizTaxation of carriers. International tax evasion. ation of the economic, social and cultural rights Royalties. contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Peace, independence and the study of special problems relating to human rights in developing countries. Note by Youth, its education in the respect for human rights and the Secretary-General. 10 N o v e m b e r 1972. fundamental freedoms, its problems and needs, 33 p . (UN/E/CN.4/1023/Add.6.) and its active participation in national developInformation obtained from governments and Specialment and international co-operation. Implemenized Agencies. tation of the declaration on the promotion among youth of the ideals of peace, mutual respect and understanding between peoples: Periodic reports on human rights. Reports on civil and report of the Secretary-General. 1 Novemberpolitical rights, including the right of self7 December 1972. Various pagings, including determination and the right to independence, annex. (uN/A/8782/Add.l-3.) for the period 1 July 1968-30 June 1971, receivedfrom Specialized Agencies under EconC o m m e n t s m a d e by three governments: United States omic and Social Council resolution 1074 C (White House Conference on Youth, April 1970), (XXXIX). 6 July 1972. Various pagings. Barbados, Greece. ( U N / E / C N . 4 / 1 1 0 0 and A d d . l . ) Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to ob- Transmit replies from I L O , Unesco and W H O . serve the elections to the Papua New Guinea House of Assembly in 1972, together with the Report of the sub-commission on prevention of discrimirelevant resolutions of the Trusteeship Council. nation and protection of minorities to the ComN o v e m b e r 1972. 47 p . , including annexes, mission on Human Rights on its 25th session, m a p s . $1.50. ( U N / T / 1 7 3 9 . ) New York, 14 August-1 September 1972. 28 September 1972. 71 p . ( U N / E / C N . 4 / 1 1 0 1 . ) T h e country, the terms of reference, the elections: the mission's comments and recommendations. A n example of a society in transition. Periodic reports on human rights. Subject and country index to reports on civil and political rights. Note by the Secretary-General. 3 January 1973. 15 p . ( U N / E / C N . 4 / 1 1 0 2 . ) Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Inter-[Bl.] Bibliography of United Nations documents national Year for Action to Combat Racism and relating to civil and political rights, issued 1968-70. Racial Discrimination. 25 October 1972. 52 p . Analytical table of contents and country index. Human
rights, discrimination
(UN/A/8813.)
Replies of approximately fifty governments, United Nations organs and Specialized Agencies regarding arrangements to m a r k the International Year. Capital punishment. Report of the Secretary-General. 23 February-19 March 1973. Various pagings, including annexes, tables, ( U N / E / 5 2 4 2 . ) [St.] T h e present situation. Guarantees given to the accused. L a w and practice. List of countries which have abolished capital punishment in law and in fact. Countries where it is maintained.
Review of studies of problems of race relations and of the creation and maintenance of racial attitudes. Report by the Secretary-General. 14 N o v e m b e r 1972. 68 p . ( U N / E / C N . 4 / 1 1 0 5 . ) The widening gap. A study of the realization of economic, social and cultural rights by Manouchehr Ganji, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. Preface and Introduction. First part. 17 January-5 February 1973. Various pagings. ( U N / E / C N . 4 / 1 1 0 8 and A d d . 1 - 9 . )
Materials from the United Nations System: an annotated selection
181
Study of equality in the administration of justice. Report on the meeting of consultants on administration Report of the Secretary-General. 12 Januaryof public enterprises. 19 January 1973. 26 p . , 8 March 1973. Various pagings. ( U N / E / C N . 4 / including annexes, ( U N / E / C N . 1 2 / 9 4 6 . ) 1112 and A d d . 1 ^ 1 . ) Public enterprises in Latin America. Their administration. Transmit comments and views of twenty-three governments. Social defence, delinquency Human rights and scientific and technological developments. The impact of scientific and techno-A policy approach to planning in social defence. logical developments on economic, social N o v e m b e r 1972. iv+306 p . $6.50. ( U N / S T / and cultural rights. Report of the SecretarySOA/114.) General. 24 January 1973. 38 p . ( U N / E / C N . 4 / Crime prevention and the treatment of criminals. T h e 1115.) role of planning in these spheres. T h e policy of the Positive and negative effects of these factors o n the United Nations. right to work (conditions, wages, trade unions) and the right to housing. Work programme for 1974-1975 and report on activities 1971-1972. Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Conference of European Human rights and scientific and technological developMinisters Responsible for Social Welfare. ment. Respect for the privacy of individuals and 1 December 1972. 7 p . ( U N / E / C N . 5 / 4 7 9 . ) the integrity and sovereignty of nations in the light of recording and other techniques. Report The evaluation and improvement of manpower training of the Secretary-General. 23 January 1973. programmes in social defence. Prepared by 82 p . ( U N / E / C N . 4 / 1 1 1 6 and A d d . 3 . ) R . W . Burnham. United Nations Social D e fence Research Institute. 33 p . ( U N S D R I / 2 . ) Human rights and scientific and technological developments. Respect for the privacy of individuals Perceptions of deviance. Suggestions for cross-cultural and the integrity and sovereignty of nations in research. B y Graeme N e w m a n . United the light of advances in recording and other Nations Social Defence Research Institute. techniques. Report of the Secretary-General. R o m e , 1972. 86 p . ( U N S D R I / 3 . ) 5, 19 March 1973. Various pagings. ( U N / E / CN.4/1116/Add.l, 2.) Regulations at present governing listening and watchRefugees ing devices. Measures to be taken. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. September 1972. 61 p . , including annexes. $1.50. ( U N / A / 8 7 1 2 . ) [St.] International protection of refugees. General United Nations directory of national agencies and principles, review of the present situation. Material institutions for the improvement of public adassistance in Africa, particularly Burundi, and in ministration. Revised edition. February 1973. Asia, Europe and Latin America. 59 p . (uN/ST/TAo/M/47/Rev.l.) Public administration
Inter-regional Seminar on Electronic Data Processing Education, Science in Government. March 1973. 262 p . $ 6 . (UN/ST/TAO/M/63/Add.l.) Research on peace and conflict A review of the present situation by experts from five continents. T h e problems of developing countries. International repertory of institutions for peace and conflict research. Reports and papers in the Report of the Inter-regional Seminar on ElecSocial Sciences series. No. 28. 91 p . 1973. tronic Data Processing in Government, 2210 F ; $3.20. (Unesco.) 30 November 1971. Volume I: report and (St. BI.] Supplemented and updated version of the technical papers. November 1972. 112 p . $3. first repertory which appeared in 1968. Since then the (UN/ST/TAO/M/63.) number of institutions for peace and conflict research The adoption, use, organization and management of has increasedfivefold.Theoretical definition of the computer science in government, particularly as subject by Johan Galtung. Developments and trends regards developing countries. Technical co-operation. in research (1965-71) by Philip P . Everts. List of
182
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QP institutions catalogued with a brief description of their organization and activities. Selection of specialized periodicals.
D r a w n up under the auspices of the Centre de D o cumentation sur l'Enseignement ProgrammĂŠ of the Institut National pour la Formation des Adultes and revised with the assistance of the International Centre for Advanced Technical and Vocational Training in Education Turin. Covers all aspects of the use of modern Practical guide to functional literacy. In the 'Exper- technology in education. A list of institutions, associations, publishers and specialized periodicals in imental World Literacy Programme' series. the different countries. Bibliography of works and 170 p . Ă?2.50; 10 F . (Unesco.) articles published since 1968. Conferences and other Functional literacy seen as an instrument of developmeetings. Research completed or n o w being carried ment. Description of the most effective methods, out. based on actual examples. The teaching of reading. Edited by Ralph C . Staiger. Education and the employment problem in developing countries. By M a r k Blaug. 1973. 81 p . 213 p . 1973. $7.50; 30 F . (Unesco/Ginn.) SF 12. (ILO.) [Bl.] A collection of studies o n the development of Conclusions reached by experts in the economics these methods in primary education. of education regarding the link between education International directory of programmed instruction. and forms of employment. Traditional and contemporary solutions. 191 p. 1973. $5.75; 18 F . (Unesco.)
Books received
Social sciences
F R I E D M A N N , John. Urbanization, planning, and national development. London, Sage Publications, 1973. 351 p . , figs., tables, m a p s . C L A R K , Terry Nichols. Prophets and patrons: the £6.25. French university and the emergence of the social sciences. Cambridge, M a s s . , Harvard H U N D , W u l f D . Strukturalismus, Ideologie, und DogUniversity Press, 1973. 282 p . ,figs.,tables, mengeschichte. Darmstadt, H e r m a n n Luchgraphs, index. terhand Verlag, 1973. 526 p . , index. D M . 4 8 . N A T A N S O N , Maurice (ed.). Phenomenology and the K A U F M A N N , Franz-Xaver. Sicherheit, als soziolosocial sciences. Evanston, III., Northwestern gisches und sozialpolitisches Problem. 2. University Press, 1973.2 vols. Bibliog.,index. umgearbeitete Auflage. Stuttgart, Enke VerSet of 2 vols., Í25. lag, 1973. 407 p . , tables, graphs. P E S T I E A U , Joseph. Essai contre le défaitisme politique. Lexikon zur Soziologie. Herausgegeben von Werner Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université, 1973. Fuchs, Rolf Klima, Rüdiger L a u t m a n n , 2SS p . , bibliog., index. Otthein Rammstedt, H a n s Wienold. Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973. 783 p . D M . 4 5 . W I G G I N S , Lee M . Panel analysis, latent probability models for attitude and behavior processes. M A C Q U E E N , Donald R . Understanding sociology Amsterdam, Elsevier Scientific Publishing through research. Reading, M a s s . , AddisonC o m p a n y , 1973. 255 p . , tables, bibliog., Wesley Publishing C o m p a n y , 1973. xix index. + 5 3 9 p . , tables, graphs. U . S . $ 5 . 5 0 . P A U S E W A N G , Siegfried. Methods and concepts of social research in a rural developing society: a critical Sociology. Social psychology appraisal based on experience in Ethiopia. Munich, Weltforum Verlag, 1973. 214 p . A L - W A R D I , Ali. Soziologie des nomadentums, Studie P I M E N T E L S E V I L L A , C a r m e n . Vidas marginales. Sanüber die iraqische Gesellschaft. Darmstadt, tiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1972. H e r m a n Luchterhand Verlag, 1972. 455 p . 297 p . , photos. D M . 42. R A Y N A U T , Claude. Structures normatives et relations B I A R E Z , Sylvie et al. Institution communale et pouvoir électives. Étude d'une communauté villageoise politique: le cas de Roanne. Avec la collaboHaoussa. Paris, M o u t o n , 1972. 314 p . , illus., ration de Pierre K u k a w k a . Paris and L a H a y e , tables, graphs, m a p s , bibliog., index. M o u t o n , 1973. 208 p . , bibliog., tables. R E Z S O H A Z Y , Rudolf. Action et changement, méthode B O U D O N , R a y m o n d . Mathematical structures of social d'analyse des dynamismes sociaux et histomobility. Amsterdam, Elsevier Scientific riques. Louvain, Institut des Sciences PoliPublishing C o m p a n y , 1973. 168 p . , figs., tiques et Sociales, 1973. 69 p . , figs. tables, bibliog., index. 35florins;U . S . $ 1 2 . R O U S S E A U , G . ; R O U S S E A U , G . La Communication. Toulouse, Edouard Privat, 1973. 178 p . , figs. C O I N G , Henri. Rénovation urbaine et changement social ; l'îlot no. 4, Paris 13'. Paris, Les S P E C K , R O S S V . et al. The new families: youth comÉditions Ouvrières, 1973. 303 p . , tables, munes, and the politics of drugs. N e w York, graphs, m a p s . N . Y . , Basic Books Inc., 1972. 190 p . , index. D U R K H E I M , Emile. Erziehung, Moral und Gesellschaft. T A R D E , Gabriel. Écrits de psychologie sociale. T o u Eingeleitet von Paul Fauconnet, übertragen louse, Edouard Privat, 1973. 202 p . und eingerichtet von Ludwig Schmidts. T H I R Y , Jean-Pierre. Théories sur le phénomène urbain. Darmstadt, Herman Luchterhand Verlag, Bruxelles, Office International de Librairie, 1973. 339 p . D M . 34. 1973. 253 p . , bibliog. 400 Belgian Francs.
184
WiEHN, Erhard R . Ungleichheit unter Menschen als Economics. Co-operative movement soziologisches Problem. Konstanz, Konstanzer Universitäts Verlag, 1973. 66 p . B E R N O U X , Philippe; M O T T E , Dominique; S A G L I O , Jean. Trois ateliers d'OS. Paris, Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1973. 215 p . , tables, graphs. 24 F . Statistics. Demography B R Ü D E R L I N , Kurt. Freiheit ohne Geldherrschaft, Gerechtigkeit ohne Staatswirtschaft. H a n COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES. OFFICE STATISTIQUE. nover, Hans Pfeiffer Verlag G M B H , 1971. Statistiques de base de la communauté. 304 p . Luxembourg, Office des Publications OffiH E S S E L B A C H , Walter. Les entreprises d'intérêt général. cielles des Communautés Européennes, 1972. Instruments de politique structurale et compé218 p . , tables. titive des syndicats et coopératives. Avec un D A V I S , Kingsley. World urbanization 1950-1970. épilogue terminologique par Karl Kühne. Volume II: Analysis of trends, relationships Paris and La Haye, Mouton, 1973. 231 p . , and development. Berkeley, Calif., Institute index. (École Pratique des Hautes Études, of International Studies, University of VI e Section: Sciences Économiques et Sociales. California, 1972. Tables, graphs. $3. (PopuRecherches coopératives, 8.) lation monograph series, no. 9.) H O L B I K , Karel (ed.). Monetary policy in twelve K U M A R , Joginder. Population and land in world industrial countries. Boston, Mass., Federal agriculture: recent trends and relationships. Reserve Bank of Boston, 1973. xxvii + 587 p . , Berkeley, Calif., Institute of International tables, graphs, bibliog. Free. Studies, University of California, 1973. K Ü H N E , Karl. L'entreprise d'intérêt général — un 318 p . , tables, bibliog. $3.95. (Population facteur correcteur des formes de marché. monograph series, no. 12.) Franckfort, Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1973. 65 p . L A D D Jr, Everett Carl!; LIPSET, Seymour Martin. Political science Professors, unions and American higher education. Berkeley, Calif., Carnegie Foundation COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE. for the Advancement of Teaching, 1973. Building peace: reports of the Commission 119 p . 81.75. (1939-1972). Metuchen, N . J . , The Scarecrow M C Q U E E N , Matthew. The Economics of'development : Press Inc., 1973. 2 vols. problems and policies. London, Weidenfeld T A L E B IBRAHIMI, A h m e d . De la décolonisation à la ÄNicolson, 1973. 130 p . ,figs.,tables, graphs, révolution culturelle r (1962-1972). Alger, bibliog., index. Cloth: £2.50; paper: £1.35. Société Nationale d'Édition et de Diffusion, M U T T I , Antonio. Sociología dello sviluppo e paesi 1973. 228 p . sottosviluppati. Torino, Loescher Editore, K L A U S , H . Gustav. Markistische Literaturkritik in 1973. 256 p . England. Dannstadt, Hermann Luchterhand P E T T M A N , Barrie O . Training for the future and after; Verlag, 1973. 261 p . , bibliog., index. a selected and annotated bibliography. BradD M . 10.80. ford, Yorkshire, Institute of Scientific BusiM Ü N S T E R , Arno. Trotzkis Theorie der permanenten ness, 1973. 12 p . Revolution. Darmstadt, Hermann Luchterhand PINTO S A N T A C R U Z , Aníbal. Chile, un caso de desarVerlag, 1973. 120 p . , bibliog., D M . 7.80. rollo frustrado. 3a ed. Santiago de Chile, R E Y N O L D S , Charles. Theory and explanation in interEditorial Universitaria, 1973. 390 p . national politics. London, Martin Robertson, H E I N Z , Walter R . ; S C H Ö B E R , Peter. Theorien kollek1973. 367 p., bibliog., index. £5.50. tiven Verhaltens, 2 vols. Darmstadt, Hermann S T O C K H O L M I N T E R N A T I O N A L P E A C E R E S E A R C H INSTILuchterhand Verlag, 1973. Vol. 1: D M . 9.80; T U T E . The problem of chemical and biological vol. 2 : D M . 7 . 8 0 . •warfare. Vol. 2: CB weapons today. Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1973. 420 p . , V O I G T , Dieter. Montagearbeiter in der DDR. D a r m stadt, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1973. tables, bibliog., index. 5 vols., 75 kronor. 266 p . , tables, graphs, bibliog. S T O C K H O L M I N T E R N A T I O N A L P E A C E R E S E A R C H INSTIT U T E . Ten years of the partial test ban treatyW A L L R A F F , Hermann Josef. L'actualité d'une écono1963-1973. Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, mie d'intérêt général opérationnelle. Avec un 1973. 34 p . épilogue terminologique par Karl Kühne. Franckfort, Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1973. V I L M A R , Fritz. Strategien der Demokratisierung. 23 p . (Série Économie d'Intérêt Général, Band 1: Theorie der Praxis. Darmstadt, no. 5.) Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1973. 463 p .
Books received
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W I N D S T R A N D , Carl Gösta (ed.). African co-operatives and efficiency. Uppsala, T h e Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1972. 239 p . , fig., tables, bibliog. . Co-operatives and rural development in East Africa. N e w York, N . Y . , Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970. 201 p . , tables.
and the schools. N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , M c G r a w Hill B o o k C o m p a n y , 1973. 115 p . . Higher education: who pays? who benefits? who should pay? a report and recommendations. New York, N . Y . , McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973. 189 p . , tables, graphs, bibliog. «3.95. M O R R I S O N , Jack. The rise of the arts on the American campus. N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , McGraw-Hill Law B o o k C o m p a n y , 1973. 223 p . , tables, index. $8.95. (Series of profiles, n o . 13.) CENTRE DE FORMATION ET DE RECHERCHE DE L ' É D U COOMBS, Philip H . ; PROSSER, Roy C ; A H M E D , C A T I O N S U R V E I L L É E . Droit de l'enfance et de Manzoor. New paths to learning, for rural la famille. Textes législatifs et réglementaires, children and youth. E d . by Barbara Baird jurisprudence et doctrine. Vaucresson, ImpriIsrael. N e w York, N . Y . , International merie Administrative, Melun, 1972. 218 p. Council for Educational Development, 1973. UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT O F HEALTH, E D U 133 p . , bibliog., appr. index. $2. C A T I O N A N D W E L F A R E . Records, computers G U I G O U , Jacques. Critique des systèmes de formation: and the rights of citizens. Report of the Secanalyse institutionnelle de diverses pratiques retary's Advisory Committee on Automated d'éducation des adultes. Paris, Anthropos, Data Systems. Washington, D H E W , 1973. 1972. 214 p . , bibliog. 346 p . , bibliog., biogs., index. (Publication L Y N C H , James; P L U N K E T T , H . Dudley. Teacher eduno. (OS) 73-94.) cation and cultural change: England, France and Germany. L o n d o n , Linnet Books, Allen & U n w i n Ltd., 1973. 197 p . , bibliog., indexes. Administrative science M A Z U M D A R , Vina. Education and social change: three studies on nineteenth-century India. Simla, D U N S I R E , Andrew. Administration, the world and the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1972. science. Bristol, Martin Robertson, 1973. 88 p . 9 rupees. 262 p . , bibliog., indexes. £1.50. F R A N Ç O I S , A i m é (ed.). The application of information M E I G N A N T , Alain. L'Intervention sociopédagogique dans les organisations industrielles. Paris, processing in public administration. Brussels, M o u t o n , 1972. 218 p . International Institute of Administrative N O T , Louis. L'Éducation des débiles mentaux: éléSciences, 1973. 105 p . ments pour une psycho-pédagogie. Toulouse, G R A V E S , D e s m o n d . Management research: a crossPrivat, 1973. 178 p . cultural perspective. Amsterdam, Elsevier P E R K I N S , James A . Is the university an agent for social Scientific Publishing C o m p a n y , 1973. 349 p . , reform? N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , International figs., tables, graphs, bibliog., indexes. Council for Educational Development, 1973. S Z A M E L , Lajos. Legal problems of socialist public 28 p . ( I C E D occasional paper, n o . 8.) administrative management. Budapest, A k a démiai Kiado, 1973. 233 p . $11. Social and cultural anthropology Social welfare B E R D I C H E W S K Y S C H E R , Bernardo. En torno a los J A C O B , Pierre. Schizophrénie et délinquance juvénile: orígenes del hombre americano. Santiago de le devenir social des grands handicapés mentaux Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1972. 163 p . , et sociaux. Toulouse, Edouard Privat, 1973. illus., tables, m a p s , bibliog. 272 p., tables, graphs, maps. K A S H A M U R A , Anicet. Famille, sexualité et culture; L E M O A L , Paul; D O M E N A C H , Jean-Marie; M O R V A N , essai sur les mœurs sexuelles et les cultures des Yves. Information et relation: Le rôle actuel peuples des Grands Lacs africains. Paris, de la communication informative dans le travail Payot, 1973. 214 p . , m a p s , bibliog. social. Toulouse, Edouard Privat, 1973.121 p . Yivo Bieter. Journal of the Yivo Institute for Jewish Research. Vol. 44. N e w Y o r k , Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, 1973. 350 p . (In Education Hebrew.) CARNEGIE COMMISSION O N HIGHER EDUCATION. Continuity and discontinuity: higher education
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cation technology, communication in the future. Papers of a conference sponsored by C o m G E M Z E L L , Carl-Axel. Organization, conflict, and innomunications Institute of the East-West Center, vation. A study of German naval strategic the Social Science Research Institute, and planning, 1888-1940. Lund, Esselte Studium, Communications Department of the Uni1973. 448 p. 99.75 kronor. versity. Honolulu, East-West Center, 1973. 96 p. J A K O B S O N , R o m a n . Main trends in the science of W A A R D E N B U R G , Jacques. Classical approaches to the language. London, Allen & Unwin Ltd., study of religion. Vol. 1: Introduction and 1973. 72 p., bibliog., index. anthology. The Hague, Mouton, 1973. 742 p. R I C H S T A D , Jim; H A R M S , L . S. (ed.). World communi50 florins. cation: population communication, communi-
World index of social science institutions: research, advanced training, documentation and professional bodies A special service of the International Social Science Journal The basic edition of this card index, published in 1970, and its supplements contain systematic data on over 1,S00 social science research, advanced-training and documentation institutions and professional bodies. The index is bilingual, the English version appearing o n the recto of each card, and the French on the verso. It is arranged in alphabetical order by n a m e of institution (in the appropriate language) for international bodies and subsequently under country headings and names of national institutions. A regular updating service is provided, free of charge, to subscribers to the International Social Science Journal, with which are issued n e w cards for additional institutions and cards containing more recent information on institutions previously included in the index; no other updating service is available. The thirteenth set of such cardsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;to be cut
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X V I , N o . 1, 1974
out and inserted into the original indexâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;is supplied with the present issue. Information, giving details under as m a n y of the categories set out in the key as appropriate, concerning institutions and bodies not included in the present index, as well as corrections to existing entries m a y be addressed to: Social Science Documentation Centre, Unesco, 7 Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris (France). T h e index is available with or without a special ring binder of a format identical with that of this journal and m a y be ordered directly from the Distribution Division, Unesco, 7 Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris, or through the national distributors listed at the end of this journal. Price: without ring binder, 36 F ; with ring binder, 60 F .
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Past topics1 F r o m 1949 to the end of 1958, this Journal appeared under the n a m e of International Social Science Bulletin, not all issues of which were devoted to a main topic. Microfilms and microcards are available from University Microfilms Inc., 300 N . Zeeb R o a d , A n n Arbor, Michigan 48106 (United States of America). Reprint series are available from Kraus Reprint Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . (United States of America).
Vol. XI, 1959 N o . 1. Social aspects of mental health* N o . 2. Teaching of the social sciences in the U . S . S . R . * N o . 3. The study and practice of planning* N o . 4. N o m a d s and nomadism in the arid zone* Vol. XII, 1960 N o . 1. Citizen participation in political life* N o . 2. The social sciences and peaceful co-operation* N o . 3. Technical change and political decision* N o . 4. Sociological aspects of leisure*
N o . 2. Compromise and conflict resolution N o . 3. Old age N o . 4. Sociology of development in Latin America Vol. XVI, 1964 N o . 1. Data in comparative research* N o . 2. Leadership and economic growth N o . 3. Social aspects of African resource development N o . 4. Problems of surveying the social sciences and humanities Vol. XVII, 1965
Vol. XIII, 1961 N o . 1. Post-war democratization in Japan* N o . 2. Recent research on racial relations N o . 3. The Yugoslav c o m m u n e N o . 4. The parliamentary profession
N o . 1. M a x Weber today/Biological aspects of race* N o . 2. Population studies N o . 3. Peace research* N o . 4. History and social science Vol. XVIII, 1966
N o . 4. Economics of education*
N o . 1. H u m a n rights in perspective* N o . 2. Modern methods in criminology* N o . 3. Science and technology as development factors* N o . 4. Social science in physical planning*
Vol. XV, 1963
Vol. XIX, 1967
N o . 1. Opinion surveys in developing countries
N o . 1. Linguistics and communication*
Vol. XIV, 1962
No. 1. Images of w o m e n in society* No. 2. Communication and information
No. 3. Changes in the family*
1.
T h e asterisk denotes issues out of print.
N o . 2 . The social science press N o . 3. Social functions of education* N o . 4 . Sociology of literary creativity*
N o . 3. Controlling the h u m a n environment
Vol. XX, 1968
N o . 1. Understanding aggression N o . 2 . Computers and documentation in the social sciences N o . 3. Regional variations in nation-building N o . 4 . Dimensions of the racial situation
N o . 1. Theory, training and practice in management* N o . 2 . Multi-disciplinary problem-focused research* N o . 3. Motivational patterns for modernization N o . 4 . The arts in society* Vol. XXI, 1969 N o . 1. Innovation in public administration* N o . 2 . Approaches to rural problems* N o . 3. Social science in the Third World* N o . 4 . Futurology* Vol. XXII, 1970 N o . 1. Sociology of science* N o . 2 . Towards a policy for social research
Vol. XXIII, 1971
Vol. XXIV, 1972 No. No. No. No.
1. 2. 3. 4.
Development studies Youth: a social force? The protection of privacy Ethics and institutionalization in social science
Vol. XXV, 1973 N o . 1/2. Autobiographical portraits N o . 3. The social assessment of technology N o . 4 . Psychology and psychiatry at the cross-roads