Counter extremism a decade on from 77 by Mohamed Rahumathulla Mohamed

Counter-Extremism: a Decade on from 7/7

By Jonathan Russell and Alex Theodosiou

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JONATHAN RUSSELL & ALEX THEODOSIOU

Quilliam is the world’s first counter-extremism think tank, set up to address the unique challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalized world. Quilliam stands for religious freedom, equality, human rights, and democracy. Challenging extremism is the duty of all responsible members of society, not least because cultural insularity and extremism are products of the failures of wider society to foster a shared sense of belonging and to advance democratic values. Quilliam seeks to challenge what we think and the way we think. It aims to generate creative, informed, and inclusive discussions to counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism, while simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to governments for related policy measures.

Jonathan Russell is Quilliam’s Political Liaison Officer. He holds a BA in Arabic, German and Persian from the University of Exeter and an MSc in the History of International Relations at the London School of Economics. As Political Liaison Officer, he is responsible for maintaining Quilliam’s position as a non-partisan counter-extremism think-tank, through the preservation and fostering of relations with all major political parties and civil servants in the House of Commons, the House of Lords, the European Union and the United Nations as well as with political correspondents at major news sources and other think-tanks. Jonathan currently leads two projects for Quilliam. The first is to campaign for cross-party commitment to human rights in counter-terrorism legislation and policy. The second is to promote clarity, consistency and cohesion in counter-extremism policy across the EU. Jonathan has written papers for Quilliam on The Effectiveness of Al Qaeda (2013) and a White Paper on Prevent (2014). He features regularly in the UK print and broadcast media.

Alex Theodosiou joined Quilliam as a research intern in April 2015. He has researched for a report on jihadism in Northwest and West Africa, and is currently working on a number of other research tasks. Alex holds a BA from King’s College London in History and War Studies. He is currently working towards an MA degree in Terrorism, Security and Society at the War Studies Department at King’s College London.

The authors would like to thank Eleanor Beevor, Katerina Tzvetanska and Haydar Zaki, whose contributions as research assistants were crucial to the writing of this report. The authors also thank Maajid Nawaz and Haras Rafiq, whose guidance and expertise was invaluable.

For further information contact: Quilliam Email: information@quilliamfoundation.org Tel: +44 (0)207 182 7280 www.quilliamfoundation.org

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Contents 1. Executive Summary

2. Introduction

3. The debate

3.1 What is non-violent extremism?

3.2 Is Islamism problematic?

3.3 Does Prevent spy on Muslims?

3.4 Should we partner with non-violent extremists?

4. Counter-Extremism Strategy

4.1 Vision

4.2 Structure

4.3 Policy and delivery

Partnership and engagement

Recruitment and training

Evaluation

Online

Policing

Education

Prisons

Communities

Charities

International

5. Conclusion

6. References

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1. Executive Summary The following report seeks to present to the recently elected government a series of policy recommendations to be implemented in the new counter-extremism strategy. Essentially, it posits that a change in structure is needed to complement the fresh strategic direction of the new government. Since 2011, government has identified the need to tackle the ideology of Islamism to prevent extremism, both violent and non-violent, in order to safeguard human rights and liberal principles. However, the domestic tools at the government’s disposal with which to implement this vision have proved lacking. The Prevent strategy, after its amendments in 2011, failed to offer enough to successfully challenge non-violent extremism and proffer a convincing counter-narrative around which to rally. The rapid rise of ISIL and the evolution of global jihadism, the virulence of which has accelerated the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, has made clear the shortcomings of our current policy efforts. Put simply, a new strategy is patently overdue. The key thrust of this report is the need to create a new body within government between the hard-approach to counter-terrorism and the soft-approach of community cohesion that can act as the foundation for a clear, consistent, and comprehensive strategy for tackling extremism of all kinds. It is the space in which people sympathise with extremist ideology but do not escalate to violent activism that has been so unchallenged. This body should focus on tackling the basis of the problem at hand, engaging at the grassroots of society to tackle ideology and extremist narratives, while also using this to conduct nuanced primary prevention, targeted prevention and deradicalisation programmes. All this should be grounded on an understanding of the radicalisation process’ four constituent parts: ideology; narratives; grievances; and identity crisis. The opening sections of the report deal with the debate surrounding fundamental and contentious issues in extremism and radicalisation. They attempt to clarify issues of disagreement that have long proved problematic, and evince workable solutions that can be instrumentalised within the government’s newest strategic direction. The report offers a human rights-based definition and approach to extremism, as opposed to the currently ambiguous and contentious one put forward by the government that focuses on British values. It highlights the contradictions and dead-ends that arise through defining extremism in political terms but maintaining a position of protection for liberty and belief, and advocates a universal standard with which to challenge extremism openly. Moreover, it urges an approach that does not define extremism according to current threats to national security, and instead allows for all forms of extremism (Islamist, far-right , far-left or animal rights, for example) – which beyond superficial differences, is a homogeneous social malaise – to be incorporated in a strategy that is inclusive and fair. There is a strong focus placed on targeted prevention, and for those entrenched deeper in the mire of radicalisation, deradicalisation procedures.

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The report recommends the following: 

Base all counter-extremism work around tackling extremist ideology and undermining extremist narrative to reduce the appeal of extremism, and address grievances and build resilience against identity crisis to reduce the vulnerability of individuals to radicalisation.



Define extremism in opposition to universal human rights, and apply this consistently in all counter-extremism work, including when recruiting and choosing national or local partners.

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Run the counter-extremism strategy out of the Cabinet office as an Executive NonDepartmental Public Body, in turn run by a politically neutral advisory board with counterextremism expertise. The existing Extremism Analysis Unit, along with the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) could sit within this body, which should include centralised due diligence, training, funding and evaluation capabilities.



Build relationships with a broad spectrum of community partners, prioritizing underrepresented demographics and hard-to-reach minorities.

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Deliver comprehensive in-house training for all relevant public sector staff to ensure effective counter-extremism efforts.

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Upskill counter-extremism partners, including frontline workers and other government departments, to develop online projects to catch up with the current nature of the threat, and train computer specialists in counter-extremism.

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Engage civil society to tackle all extremisms as a social ill, and to do so online as well. One way of doing this can be through building public-private-third sector partnerships.

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Treat the police like any other frontline workers in this field. This desecuritisation will unburden them, allowing a concentration of resources on sharp-end counter-terrorism measures.

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Train frontline workers such as teachers, university staff, police officers, prison staff, healthcare workers and leaders of religious and community organisations, to carry out primary prevention work, predicated on promoting human rights and raising awareness of radicalisation. They can be trained to spot the signs of radicalisation and made aware of the best courses of action to carry out targeted prevention.



Build resilience in vulnerable institutions and sectors such as schools, universities, prisons and charities to prevent extremist entryism, through clearer whistleblowing procedures, tougher requirements to be met for prospective staff, and raised awareness among those who work in these sectors about the dangers of extremism.



Work with universities to prevent extremist speakers being given unchallenged platforms and access to potentially vulnerable students. This can be done through clearer due 5

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diligence procedures, specific counter-extremism guidance, and increased engagement of third sector counter-extremism organizations. 

Develop a clearer prison-based strategy for ideological assessment, targeted deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorism-related offenders, particular in regard to returnee foreign terrorist fighters. The partners used in this regard must uphold universal human rights standards and be adequately equipped to enact this deradicalisation effectively.

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Implement prison-specific primary prevention programmes to avert radicalisation of those vulnerable in prisons to stop these institutions being net exporters of extremism.

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Ensure that national counter-extremism strategy trickles down to local government level, and that regional and local counter-extremism partners receive adequate training to fulfill their role.

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Foster relations with a broad range of community partners to promote this strategy and understand the likelihood of any work in this area being targeted by extremists. Increase the transparency of counter-extremism efforts to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel targeted, and non-Muslims do not feel that Muslims are receiving preferential treatment by the state.

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Develop the notion that Muslim communities are an important element of a wider civil society response to extremism, and have a voice and, further than this, a say in the development of counter-narratives, community-based projects, and efforts to aid vulnerable members of their communities.

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Promote counter-extremism best practice, at the level of structure, strategy and delivery, to international partners, with the aim of coordinating efforts on an EU- or UN-wide scale. Likewise, we must be willing to learn from successful counter-extremism models in other countries.



Prioritise counter-extremism work overseas in Muslim-majority countries through improving primary prevention, countering ideology, and promoting human rights. Build bridges with foreign partners to build a global alliance against extremism of all kinds.

While lacunae in our collective knowledge of the radicalisation process persist, this report offers a conceptual framework, and more importantly – at this critical time – practical recommendations to strengthen the UK’s counter-extremism efforts.

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2. Introduction Ten years on from the jihadist terrorist attacks on the London transport network on 7 July 2005, which saw four British-born suicide bombers kill 52 and injure 700 more, the UK government continues to refine its approach to tackling extremism. Quilliam was established less than three years after these attacks and has continued to publish evidence-based policy advice on counter-extremism best practice since. This report is based on academic research, the experiences of six former or current members of staff who were previously members of Islamist extremist organisations, and engagement with fellow counterextremism practitioners as well as members of the Muslim communities whose religion has been politically and ideologically exploited by Islamist individuals and organisations. The terrorist threat from those who follow the Islamist ideology remains severe. The types of attacks carried out may have changed from suicide bombings with organisational command and control to rudimentary attacks by individuals who have had little or no contact with terrorist organisations but, nevertheless, the phenomenon continues to pose a threat to our national security and way of life, both here in the UK and around the world, where we see attacks on an almost daily basis. The emergence of the self-styled Caliphate, run by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses further, new challenges, with the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon now attracting as many as 20,000 jihadists from over 90 different countries. While recruitment, communication, and attack methods may have changed, there is little evidence to suggest the broader radicalisation process is any different, nor that the Islamist ideology is any different from the one identified in Ed Husain’s seminal work The Islamist.1 This report is the culmination of two pieces of work. On the one hand, it comes after six months of research into the government’s Prevent strategy, trying to understand its evolution, and the thinking at every stage. This research tried to answer the question – ‘is the Prevent strategy likely to prevent radicalisation, extremism and terrorism in 2015?’ This is an unfair question in many ways as it only initially intended to prevent violent extremism, and was both conceived and updated in a world that is different in many ways to the one we live in now. However, it is a question that should be asked, given the preventative focus of its aims. On the other hand, my research considered what a counter-extremism strategy might look like if there were no constraints whatsoever. Would it be more repressive and intrusive or less so? Would funds be diverted in one particular direction? Who would be responsible for it? Would it even exist? The flexibility coming from working at an independent think-tank allowed me to innovate and push the boundaries in terms of strategy and structure of future counter-extremism work. But so too could I view the problem with a wider lens, consider successful counter-extremism work in other 1

Husain, Ed (2007), The Islamist (London)

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countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, take a long view of history and consider parallels with tackling other forms of extremism, and speculate about future threats worth preventing. As I then tried to marry these two elements of research together, it was necessary to add boundaries to the second element: the rules of a parliamentary democracy, budgetary concerns, and the government’s first duty to protect its citizens, for example. The result is this report and some recommendations for government that are realistic, evidence-based, appropriate to the current nature of the threat, and likely to be effective in preventing all forms of extremism. As the issue of counter-extremism remains contested, I have left in lots of my research into Prevent and tried to give a fair analysis of many of the key debates in this field, before setting out Quilliam’s recommendations to government for a new counter-extremism strategy. The Prevent strategy is one of the four elements of the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, and aims to deter individuals from becoming involved in terrorism or supporting terrorist causes. Following amendments to Prevent in June 2011, the strategy reaffirmed its aims to include the prevention of individuals from becoming involved in nonviolent extremist ideologies, which have been recognised as a gateway to violent extremism.2 This work was carried out at local government levels within communities and coordinated by central government. Revisions to Prevent in 2013 were intended to better the strategy in terms of its approach to a) ideology, b) support networks and c) working with other relevant sectors.3 The revisions were primarily aimed at responding to the ideological challenge of terrorism and extremism. Amendments also worked to provide practical help in preventing individuals from being drawn into extremism and terrorism as well as integrate the strategy into a wide range of sectors including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the Internet and health - where there are risks of exposure to extremist ideologies or which could support counter-extremism work. The 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill continues this strategy by putting the involvement of frontline workers in Prevent on a statutory footing.4 By only tackling violent extremism, Prevent struggled to have a meaningful, more long-term impact in its first phase. As many violent extremist organisations are proscribed terrorist entities, incite racial or religious hatred or promote violence, it is best for other elements of CONTEST to

See: Prevent Strategy, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, (HM government: June 2011), < https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategyreview.pdf>, accessed 12 October 2014. 3 See: ‘Prevent: 2.44’, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism – Annual Report, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (March 2013), p. 21, < https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170644/28307_Cm_8583_v0_20.pdf>, accessed 5 November 2014. 4 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2014-2015/0127/cbill_201420150127_en_1.htm (November 2014)

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deal with this. Prevent can therefore focus on the causes of this violence, and address the ideological roots of extremism of all kinds, whether it is violent or non-violent, Islamist or farright. It must therefore look beyond the traditional legal tools used in counter-terrorism and centre on civil society action, engagement with extremist ideologies and narratives, development and dissemination of counter-narratives, and addressing the grievances perceived by those vulnerable to or in the process of radicalisation. Without a short-term security focus, Prevent would be able to make more responsible decisions about partnering with organisations that are funded through Prevent to deliver counterextremism work. It remains of vital importance that legal, non-violent Islamist organisations with extremist views are not bestowed the legitimacy of government sponsorship. A failure to appreciate this and insufficient due diligence has meant that public funds, both through Prevent and other grant-making processes, have in the past gone to organisations that oppose the core values of our democratic society and who negatively impact on counter-extremism work by adding to the four main contributory factors to radicalisation, ideology, narrative, grievances and identity crisis. The strategy of empowering local government to grant Prevent funding is well-intentioned, as local governments know the particular needs of their region and communities better than central government. However, local structures require more guidance from central government and clearer strategic input on how best to tackle a broad spectrum of extremism. Currently, local government lacks the requisite resources and expertise to produce sufficient due diligence on partnering organisations.5 The failure of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) to develop a comprehensive counter-extremism strategy that focuses on countering non-violent extremism has led to insufficient guidance for local government and an over-reliance on the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) and police force to deliver Prevent. For this reason, the Home Office, responsible for counter-terrorism, has increasingly favoured counter-terrorism frameworks for tackling extremism, and has sought to change the threshold of legality in this regard. There are existing legal tools to deal with those who have committed terrorism-related offences, but there is a danger and a perception that similar legal frameworks may be used to target those who sympathise or empathise with terrorism but have not committed an offence. Separating the sharp-end work of OSCT and the police to tackle violent extremism from the softend work of DCLG and local authorities to deliver counter-extremism projects aimed to improve

This has also been the case since Prevent funding had been drastically decreased from £17 million in 2010 to £1.7 million in 2013 in parallel to decreased funding for police work tied to Prevent falling from £24 million to £18.7 million. Many programmes were also cut during this time, including in Greenwich where the Woolwich perpetrators resided. See also: ‘Funding for anti-terror programme cut by 90%’, ITV News, 8 June 2014. http://www.itv.com/news/update/2014-0608/funding-for-anti-terror-program-cut-by-90/

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the focus of the long-term aims of Prevent by minimising distractions coming from a short-term national security focus, and reducing the likelihood of kneejerk reactions after terrorist attacks. However, it remains unclear who is responsible for and who is best placed to deliver a strategy to tackle non-violent extremism, and prevent vulnerability to radicalisation – neither natural domains of either DCLG or OSCT. As the Rt Hon Hazel Blears once said when she was Secretary of State for DCLG, ‘Prevent […] must no longer be viewed as a soft and fluffy end of community engagement, but as a hard, targeted counter-ideological strategy and a counter-narrative that stops people from creating a climate for extremism.’6 Blears’ comments highlight what is missing in the UK government’s approach to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, namely that we need to develop a counter-extremism strategy that sits between sharp-end counter-terrorism measures and soft-end community cohesion efforts. This report considers the broad debates in this field and presents guidance for a counterextremism strategy in the United Kingdom. This strategy sets out the vision for counterextremism strategic direction, by considering definitions of extremism, the kinds of extremism the government should tackle, and the approaches necessary to tackle different kinds of extremism. It then makes recommendations for the appropriate structure to carry out this work, and breaks down the implementation of this strategy in the policy and delivery section, by focusing on several key areas that can be broken down into internal and external policies. In terms of internal policies, this report considers partnership, engagement, training, recruitment and evaluation. In terms of external, this report focuses on online, policing, education, prisons, communities, charities and international.

Rt Hon Hazel Blears Comments at PMs Oral Question Session 25 Nov 2014. http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2014-11-25a.747.0&s=speaker%3A10048#g757.3

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3. The debate Counter-extremism is a contentious area and several central issues must be discussed before settling with one particular approach. There are various key questions that arise regularly about counter-extremism, namely: 

‘Is Islam a religion of violence and therefore the root cause of extremism?’;



‘Is foreign policy the root cause of radicalisation and would it be prevented if we had not gone to war in Iraq?’;



‘Should we take a more legislative approach, ban more extremist groups, and remove extremist content from the Internet?’;



‘Does Prevent spy on Muslims?’; and



‘Should we partner with non-violent extremists?’.

The first two questions about extremism and its roots are answered in this report, which argues throughout that radicalisation is more nuanced than simply being caused by ideology or simply being caused by grievance. The following section explains what Islamist extremism is and why it and its constituent parts needs to be tackled, as well as the measures currently in place that challenge the main aspects of radicalisation. The subsequent three questions are about approaches to tackling extremism and the challenges of doing so. In critically assessing Prevent, this report identifies the need to separate soft-end measures from sharp-end measures and fill the space in between with a clear, comprehensive and coherent strategy for tackling extremism of all kinds. The final question, on partnering with non-violent extremists, is something that may only be answered strategically, and so a critical assessment of Lambertism, the policy that implements this counter-terrorism approach, is included to set out the debate between short-term counterterrorism and long-term counter-extremism priorities.

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3.1 What is non-violent extremism? A key step towards making Prevent a more carefully targeted and therefore more effective strategy is increasing awareness about the Islamist ideology that is shared in various forms by a variety of groups. To be sure, most of these are not terrorist in nature, but some are. At present, there are a number of individuals, particularly those working in central government, who have a good knowledge and familiarity with this ideology. However, this expertise does not often filter down to the lower and local levels of government. It is vital that the term Islamism is correctly understood and defined, and that this knowledge is shared with all relevant branches of government. The following explanation, although it is not authoritative, aims to give an outline of what Islamism is, some of the different tactics used by Islamists and what draws some people into accepting this extremist ideology. It is hoped that, in providing this explanation, past mistakes caused by a lack of understanding of Islamism can be avoided in future. Islamism is a term that has been used by academics and Islamists themselves for many years. In the Middle East and North Africa, Islamist activists have long referred to themselves as ‘Islamiyyun’, Arabic for ‘Islamist’. Indeed, prominent UK-based Islamist, Azzam Tamimi, has even written a book about the leader of Tunisia’s Muslim Brotherhood group entitled Rachid Ghannouchi: a democrat within Islamism.7 However, many of his Islamist peers in non-Muslimmajority countries avoid the term ‘Islamist’ in a bid to present themselves as mainstream Muslims, rather than individuals with a specific political agenda. Due to their refusal to use the term in countries like the UK, Islamists have managed to create an air of confusion around its usage and, in some circles, encouraged a rejection of the term. Critics of the term ‘Islamism’ are yet to propose a meaningful or accurate alternative. Terms previously endorsed by the government have been either too vague (‘criminals’, ‘murderers’, ‘thugs’, ‘terrorism/violent extremism’)8 or too anachronistic (‘Al Qaeda-associated or influenced activity’)9 to serve a useful role in defining the ideology so that it can be addressed properly. Most alternatives fail in the dual task of describing both violent and non-violent politicisations of Islam the faith, whilst distinguishing them from said faith and from other forms of extremism not anchored within that faith. In essence, imprecise terminology used in this field has confused policy at all levels of government. The term ‘Islamism’ is used to describe a modernist approach to Islam that seeks to use the 7

Azzam Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi – A Democrat within Islamism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) All terms taken from ‘Counter Terrorism Communications Guidance’ issued by RICU, 4 September 2007. 9 This term is used in ‘Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism – Annual Report’, March 2010, p. 7-8. The association of the Islamist ideology with alQaeda is anachronistic as Islamism existed since the early/mid 20th century and Islamists became involved in violent extremism soon after that, whereas al-Qaeda came into existence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 8

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religion for political ends. Islamism, the ideology, is distinguished from Islam, the faith, by the following four main points of belief which Islamists themselves would profess: 1. The belief that Islam is not a faith but a divine political ideology, which is akin to Communism or Capitalism, but superior to both; 2. The belief that sharia must be enforced as state law because sovereignty ‘belongs to God’. This entails the codification of a single interpretation of the Islamic code of conduct, sharia, and its enforcement as law; 3. Most Muslims around the world believe in the spiritual concept that they are united as one ummah (people) through their shared faith. Islamists politicise the concept of ummah and assert that all Muslims form a political bloc, akin to the Socialist idea of the international proletariat, who require united political leadership; and 4. The belief that these first three points should be brought together in the creation of an expansionist ‘Islamic state’ which some would refer to as a ‘Caliphate’. This state would have Islamism as its ideology, sharia as its law and the ummah as its exclusive citizens. Some Muslims may have sympathy for a number of these points but the degree to which they can be described as ‘Islamist’ must be judged by their demonstrable conviction to some or all of these points. Whilst all Islamists broadly agree on the four key points listed above, they disagree widely about the best tactics for implementing them. This range can be briefly summarised as such: 1. Entryist, political Islamists. These Islamists engage with and use the current political system in order to weaken it from within and advance their goal of replacing it with an Islamist state. They target vulnerable institutions and sectors such as schools, charities and prisons. Examples include the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami; 2. Revolutionary Islamists. These groups reject engagement with the current political system while also renouncing mass violence. Typically, they instead attempt to build their support (especially among members of the military) in the hope that they will eventually be able to overthrow the existing system (potentially through the use of targeted violence) and thereby implement an Islamist state. Hizb-ut-Tahrir falls into this category; 3. Militant Islamists or Salafi-Jihadists. These groups use violent tactics to try to create their ‘Islamic state’. Al-Qaeda and ISIL are examples of such a group; and 4. Individuals or groups who move between these strands or embrace some or all these tactics during different phases of their struggle. For instance, various branches of the 13

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Muslim Brotherhood have at some stage followed several or all of the above strategies. While such a delineation is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, and some groups and individuals may not fit comfortably into any single category, this breakdown at least gives an idea of the spectrum of strategies used by Islamists. It should be noted that, whilst the ideological goals behind all Islamist groups are broadly the same, the most appropriate response to them is predominantly defined by the tactics they use. The violent Islamism practised by al-Qaeda necessitates a security-based response whereas the appropriate governmental response to political Islamism is to improve the resilience and alertness of the government to such activity and to strengthen and support citizens who can challenge the ideas of such groups. There are, also, groups which have moved away from their Islamist origins, so-called ‘postIslamists’. They have typically rejected one or all of the four points of belief listed above and so it is no longer appropriate to describe these groups as ‘Islamist’. Groups such as the Tunisian Ennahda party have shown the possibility of post-Islamism where that group dropped the condition that sharia should be enforced as state law. However, they may have some distance yet to travel before they contribute positively to society and national cohesion. To use a comparable example, ‘Perestroika’ enabled Communist countries in Russia and Eastern Europe to move towards democracy and liberalism, but it did not do so overnight; similarly, some individuals and groups that no longer fully subscribe to Islamism may require time and support to shift to supporting a citizenship based engagement with British politics and its secular, democratic institutions. Any government engagement with such groups must be predicated on the understanding that endorsement by the government, for example in the form of receiving funding or hosting ministers at events, can only follow their adoption of the view that Muslims should integrate as British citizens (with a multi-faceted personality and identity), into British society and British politics. None of what is proposed here is to deny the right of Muslims, like all other citizens, to engage in politics. Nor is it do deny Muslims’ right, if they so desire, to allow their political views to be influenced or guided by their religious convictions. Opposing Islamism is in no way an attempt to ‘depoliticise’ Muslims or to deny their right to engage in politics as British citizens who are Muslim. Rather, it is an attempt to limit the malign influence of this ideology on British society. Likewise, banning non-violent Islamists is often neither desirable nor necessary. Rather, they should be challenged, particularly by other non-Islamist Muslims who participate in public life as citizens, to show the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas. What however attracts an individual towards an extreme ideology like Islamism? In March 2010, the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) produced guidance on the ‘Channel’ programme, which is designed to support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists. This guidance reiterates the analysis that Quilliam has 14

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proposed since its inception: that four factors contribute to making an individual more likely to adopt an extreme ideology like Islamism. The four contributory factors are: 1. ‘[E]xposure to an ideology that seems to sanction, legitimise or require violence, often by providing a compelling but fabricated narrative of contemporary politics and recent history; 2. [E]xposure to people, groups or material, who can directly and persuasively articulate that ideology and then relate it to aspects of a person’s own background and life history; 3. [A] crisis of identity and, often, uncertainty about belonging which might be triggered by a range of further personal issues, including experiences of racism, discrimination, deprivation and other criminality (as victim or perpetrator); family breakdown or separation; and 4. [A] range of perceived grievances, some real and some imagined, to which there may seem to be no credible and effective non-violent response.’10 (emphasis, but not italics, added) This is not to suggest that all four factors must necessarily be in place before an individual can be considered at risk of radicalisation, nor indeed that an individual exposed to all four must necessarily or inevitably become radicalised, but the level of risk that an individual faces is directly proportional to the number of these factors they are exposed to. It should also be noted that the people and groups referred to in point two above may never actually physically meet the individuals that they influence. For example, they could operate online by using Internet forums or distributing videos. Any effective governmental effort to prevent extremism must address all four of these factors, although how these factors should be addressed will depend on which branch of government is involved. Almost every government department should be able to address, in some way at least, some of these factors. To further understand radicalisation, it is worth considering that although these factors are important, it is a human process and therefore different for various individuals. For example, some may be more motivated by fulfilling perceived religious duty and therefore driven by ideology, others motivated predominately by grievances such as the war in Iraq and driven to act in opposition to it. The ‘narrative’ factor is overwhelmingly the most important static aspect of radicalisation, as it can equally manipulate grievances by spinning personal grievances about

HM Government, ‘Channel: Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists’, March 2010, p. 10.

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foreign policy into the broad ‘The West is at war with Islam’ narrative, as it can manipulate belief in religion into an ideology, by saying, ‘through an Islamic State, we can best fight back against The West in their war with Islam’. The more dynamic factors of charismatic recruiters, influential groups, peer pressure and socialisation, and extremist content online are also significant as they increase access to extremist material and arguments, and very often tailor this to the vulnerable individual. Old models to understand the psychology of radicalisation have been overly linear. Many critics of counter-extremism work follow Borum’s 2003 model that focuses on social and economic deprivation and seeking someone to blame for this inequality.11 Wiktorowicz in 2004 focused more on cognitive openings and religious seeking and was correct to identify frame alignment and socialization as two important drivers of radicalisation, but was ultimately unidirectional.12 Even Moghaddam’s excellent staircase model, which provides opportunities for counterextremists to identify off-ramps at each stage in radicalisation, was nonetheless too linear, seeing the terrorist act as the end point of radicalisation.13 So too did Silber and Bhatt in 2007 see ‘jihadisation’ as the end point in radicalisation.14 The Transtheoretical Model of Change can be better used in understanding radicalisation and to work out how to effectively counter extremism.15 This model identifies the stages in ideational and behavioural change, moving from pre-contemplation, to contemplation, to preparation, to action, to maintenance. It recognises that individuals can move up or down this model, stop at various points, but that individuals do not reach one stage before being at the previous stage. It suggests that action-orientated guidance is ill-advised, because such measures will fail to engage those in the contemplation or preparation phases, focusing narrowly on the minority who are already at the action stage. Thus, counter-extremism that is focused on the whole transtheoretical model is likely to be more effective as it can appeal to the whole population rather than just the minority willing to take action. In short, what is unthinkable is undoable. For counter-extremism, we can assert that action need not be violent, but could include sharing extremist material, travelling to join a jihadist organization as a non-combatant, or attending a non-violent extremist group rally. Regardless of the action, the transtheoretical model shows that it is always preceded by a degree of contemplation.

Borum, R. (2003) ‘Understanding the Terrorist Mind Set’, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 72 (7), pp.7–10. Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004) ‘Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam’, The Roots of Radical Islam, Department of International Studies, Rhodes College. 13 Moghaddam, F. M. (2006) ‘The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multicausal Approach’, Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism, A. Pedahzur. London, NY: Routledge. 14 Silber, M. D. and Bhatt, A. (2007) Radicalisation in the West: The Home-grown Threat. NY: New York City Police Department. 15 Prochaska, JO.; DiClemente, CC. The transtheoretical approach. In: Norcross, JC; Goldfried, MR. (eds.) Handbook of psychotherapy integration. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press; 2005. p. 147–171. ISBN 0-19-516579-9. 12

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Drawing on Caryl Rusbult’s work, we can suggest that commitment to extremism is what prompts individuals to move up or down this transtheoretical model.16 Commitment, Rusbult argues, is expressed best in the following equation: Commitment = Satisfaction – Alternatives + Investments where: Satisfaction = Actual (Rewards – Costs) – Expected (Rewards – Costs) This equation shows various opportunities for counter-extremism work. First that by decreasing investment, we can significantly reduce commitment. It follows that the best way to decrease investment is to intervene earlier, meaning that we need a better referral system for targeted prevention, and ought to divert more resources to early stages or up-stream primary prevention. So too, must we attempt to increase alternatives. Through primary prevention efforts to raise support for ‘British values’ or universal human rights, this can be achieved, but other soft-end community cohesion and integration projects can achieve this too. Satisfaction is the most complex element of this equation as it involves actual rewards and costs as much as expected rewards and costs. It is in expected rewards and costs that counter-messaging can be most

http://carylrusbult.com/documents/6_Rusbult1980_JournalOfExperimentalSocialPsychology.pdf

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effective as we can work to decrease expected rewards and increase expected costs, driving down the satisfaction coefficient and reducing commitment to extremism. Viewing the four main drivers of radicalisation - ideology, narrative, grievance and identity crisis - alongside these equations for commitment and satisfaction, we can see the elements of radicalisation that we can counter and have a better idea of the most appropriate time to counter these different aspects.

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3.2 Is Islamism problematic? Islamism, a modern political ideology that largely originated in Egypt in the 1920s, is a movement that aspires to establish an ‘Islamic state’ in which ‘God’s law’ will replace ‘man-made’ law. As has been seen, some Islamists use political methods to reach this goal, others use violence in the form of revolutions or terrorism. Whilst the problems of violence and terrorism associated with militant Islamism are so obvious as to barely need mentioning, those associated with political and revolutionary Islamists are no less real. In practice, the ideology of Islamism entails the creation of a theocracy in which people not deemed adequately qualified to interpret ‘God’s law’ will be systematically excluded from the state’s decision-making process. In addition, Islamist groups without exception advocate the imposition of a single version of sharia as state law. To use Judeo-Christian terminology, this can be understood as the criminalisation of sin: people convicted of committing ‘immoral acts’ – such as dressing inappropriately, questioning religious orthodoxy or not observing all aspects of religious rituals (such as prayers, fasting, dietary restrictions etc.) – would be subject to trial and punishment. Furthermore, all Islamist groups believe that the creation of an ‘Islamic state’ necessitates limiting the civil and legal rights of non-Muslims and women. Where Islamists have succeeded in gaining power, whether through violence as in Iran and Taliban-era Afghanistan, or relatively non-violently as in Sudan and Gaza, widespread humanrights abuses – justified in the name of Islam – have followed. In Iran, for instance, opponents of the Islamist government are routinely put on trial in cleric-run courts for being ‘mohareb’ (‘enemies of God’) and executed. In Sudan, homosexuality is punishable by death17 and women face lashes, jail and/or fines for wearing trousers. 18 Although some Islamist groups have accepted aspects of democracy, political pluralism and the concept of universal human rights, few – if any – Islamist groups have accepted all of these principles either fully or simultaneously. For example, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, the world’s oldest and most developed Islamist movement, believes in taking power through democratic means but does not believe that nonMuslims or women should be allowed to lead the ‘Islamic state’ which it would thereby establish. Some Islamist groups, such as the Pakistani Taliban or Hizb ut-Tahrir, conversely reject all the principles of democracy and believe that they should instead use violence or revolutionary coups respectively to establish an ‘Islamic state’. Even the less extreme Islamist groups, such as some of the North African branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, which believe in achieving power 17

Jon Henley, Xan Rice and David Smith, ‘Love in the dock’, Guardian, 22 May 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/22/malawian-gay-couple-jailed-14-years>, ‘Sudanese ‘trousers woman’ jailed’, BBC Online, 7 September 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8241894.stm>. 18 Khaled Abdel Aziz, ‘Two Sudanese women face lashes for wearing trousers’, Reuters, 22 October 2009, <http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-43363520091022>.

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through the ballot-box, nonetheless say that following an electoral victory they would establish an ‘Islamic state’ and change the country’s constitution. These changes would effectively entrench them in power in perpetuity – and, among other things, would allow them to define their political secular opponents as apostates who oppose Gods’ law – and who thus deserve to be killed. In Muslim-majority countries, therefore, Islamist groups risk establishing states in which democracy and basic human rights will effectively not exist. In a UK context, where Muslims are a minority, Islamism is problematic because it preaches that a Muslim’s identity, religion and even individual personality are all incomplete unless he or she is living under sharia as state law in an ‘Islamic state’. Islamism also teaches that British Muslims should be loyal to other Muslims, whoever they are and wherever they might be, ahead of being loyal to their fellow citizens. The outcome of this process can be seen in the suicide video of Mohammed Siddique Khan, the leader of the 7 July London bombers: ‘Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation.’19 (Emphasis added) In this speech, Khan clearly identifies with Muslims worldwide (‘we’) rather than his fellow British citizens (‘you’). Although it is common for religious people of all faiths to identify with their coreligionists, it is Islamism which makes Khan’s sense of brotherhood an exclusive and strictly political one. By emphasising the importance of such trans-national loyalties and stressing the need to live under sharia as law in an ‘Islamic state’, Islamism first creates an identity crisis for Muslims living as a religious minority in a country and then fills this void by offering, in place of a harmonious Muslim-British identity, a globalised and politicised Muslim identity which trumps loyalties based on citizenship, proximity or shared humanity. In addition to the role that Islamism plays in first creating these problems and then proposing radical dystopian solutions to them, there is the closely related problem of Wahhabism. When Islamism combines with conservative Wahhabism, a retrogressive and intolerant stand of Islam originating in 17th century Arabia, it can mutate into what is often termed ‘Salafi-Jihadism’. In addition to an Islamist belief in using revolutionary violence to establish their ‘Islamic state’ (after which they will enforce an interpretation of sharia as state law), Salafi-Jihadists usually believe that they have a divine obligation to enforce moral behaviour (a process they term as ‘forbidding evil’) even before an ‘Islamic state’ has been created. The outcome of this process can be seen in 19

‘London bomber: Text in full’, BBC Online, 1 September 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4206800.stm>.

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a covert recording of two of the would-be bombers of the 2004 ‘Crevice Plot’ to bomb nightclubs and shopping centres in the UK: ‘Jawad Akbar: ’You could get jobs like this, yeah, like for example the biggest nightclub in central London. Where now here, yeah, now no one can even turn around and say 'Oh they were innocent,' – those slags dancing around.’ Omar Khyam: ’If you got a job in a bar, yeah, or club, say the Ministry of Sound, what are you planning to do there then?’ Jawad Akbar: ’Blow the whole thing up.’ Omar Khyam: ’Right.’’20 The logic of this argument, which in this case probably also combined with an Islamist-inspired ‘us-and-them’ mentality and a belief that ordinary westerners should be held responsible for the problems of Muslim-majority countries, can be traced back to the man feted by both Islamists and Wahhabists, Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who wrote that individuals should act to ‘forbid wrong’ if this was within a person’s power and if it produced an overall benefit (maslaha). In a modern context, Wahhabist and Salafi-Jihadist preachers frequently do not specify whether such ‘forbidding wrong’ should be committed through a state or by an individual. Abu Hamza, for example, was convicted in 2006 for telling his followers to ‘bleed’ the ‘enemies of Islam’ in order to create a ‘Muslim state’ – without specifying how or where to attack these ‘enemies’, who they were or where this ‘Muslim state’ would be. 21 The consequences of such teachings can be deadly. In 2008, for example, one of Abu Hamza’s closest followers, Ali Beheshti, was jailed for trying to burning down the house of a man who published a controversial book on the Prophet Muhammad – in an apparent attempt to murder him and his family.22 Almost certainly, Beheshti was acting on the belief that he was obliged to ‘prevent wrong’ or to ‘defend Islam’, rather than the narrowly Islamist aim of creating an ‘Islamic state’. Comparably, the UK-based preacher Abu Usamah ad-Dhahabi, who was previously highly active on British university campuses, has been recorded as telling audiences, ‘Do you practise homosexuality with men? Take that homosexual man and throw him off the mountain’.23 It is clear that Abu Usamah’s statements and others like 20

‘Extracts from a conversation between Omar Khyam and Jawad Akbar about their plot to blow up the Ministry of Sound nightclub’, Guardian, 25 July 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jul/25/uksecurity.terrorism>. 21 ‘Hamza guilty of inciting murder ‘, BBC Online, 7 February 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4689556.stm>. 22 ‘Three jailed for publisher arson ‘, BBC Online, 7 July 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/8139076.stm>, Raffaello Pantucci, ‘The Tottenham Ayatollah and The Hook-Handed Cleric: An Examination of All Their Jihadi Children’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 3 March 2010 , p. 239. 23 ‘Row over 'anti-gay' college visit ‘, BBC Online, 24 November 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/8376924.stm>.

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them can easily lead to violence and damage integration and national cohesion – just as Abu Hamza’s statements did previously. In a modern, diverse society in which the concept of equal rights is paramount, the government should treat such statements made by Islamists and Wahhabist as it would treat similar calls to murder Muslim, black or Jewish people. By contrast, entryism is a political strategy that sees an institution permeated by groups with a more radical agenda, sometimes with a degree of subterfuge. It is often employed by groups that wish to augment their influence and popularise their ideology by infiltrating larger, better-known, and often more moderate factions. The historical example of entryism that most readily springs to mind in British politics is that of the Trotskyist group Militant Tendency’s (also known as the Revolutionary Socialist League) long-term attempts to penetrate the ranks of the Labour Party. The small organisation placed a number of its members within the party in the 1960s, and by the 1980s they numbered a few thousand, and had gained a large degree of control over the Labour Party Young Socialists and the City Council of Liverpool. Soon after, Labour decided that Militant Tendency contravened the party’s constitution, and its members were subsequently expelled. The term faded from common political parlance before being attributed, in recent years, to Islamist organisations both domestically and internationally. The Muslim Brotherhood, and its affiliated Islamist groups have, in Egypt and in other states in which they have a presence, practiced ‘tadarruj’, or gradualism, which has become a widely recognised term.24 This is essentially entryism by another name, and the Clarion Project defines it, within an Islamist context, as a ‘strategy often used by the Muslim Brotherhood that calls for incremental, pragmatic change of societies towards compliance with Sharia governance’. It is a method by which Islamists can ensure organisational and political survival in a hostile political environment. In November 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s chief theologian and cleric, Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, urged Muslims to adopt the approach. 25 The key to such a methodology is its incrementalism (and by extension patience); its step by step approach that seeks, in the long-run, to implement an extremist ideology, but one that seeks to avoid alarming the mainstream by doing so swiftly and comprehensively.26 This more measured style and the lack of confrontational rhetoric is seen by many in the West to be evidence of its exponents being moderate, but in itself only reflects less haste than other extremist factions. Moreover, by progressing slowly, it allows adaptation and an introspection of the methods used. ‘Tadarruj’ is seen by those who use it as the instrumental tool in bringing about their ultimate goal of creating 24

Perekli, Feriha (2014), ‘Gradualism and Islamist Experience in Tunisia and Egypt’, SETA DC [available at: http://www.setadc.org/index.php/publications/seta-dc-perspectives/555-gradualism-and-islamist-experience-intunisia-and-egypt]. 25 Mauro, Ryan (2013), ‘The Islamists Multi-Staged Strategy for Victory Over the West’, Clarion Project [available at: http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/gradualism-islamist-strategy-victory]. 26 Hasib, Abu Abdil (2012), ‘Tadarruj (Gradualism) is a licence to follow desires’, Islamic Revival [available at: http://islamicsystem.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/tadarruj-gradualism-is-license-to.html].

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a Caliphate, through first laying the foundations through infiltration and eventual dominance of the political system, and the implementation of Sharia governance.27 In December 2013, Mohammed Badie, Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, summarised the six phases of the gradualist strategy. The first four stages, increasing in scope and importance, outline the necessity to implement Sharia over the individual, the family, society, and government. Following this comes the restoration of the Caliphate, and lastly, ‘[m]astership of the world’.28 The Muslim Brotherhood currently claims to oppose secular democracy, but does not reject democracy in wholesale fashion. A document known as ‘the Project’ was uncovered in 2001, which calls for the Muslim Brotherhood to exercise ‘flexibility at the local level’ and ‘to reconcile political engagement and the necessity of avoiding isolation on one hand, with permanent education and institutional action on the other’ (Mauro, 2013). It also urges the group to ‘support movements engaged in jihad across the Muslim world’, while avoiding ‘confrontation with our adversaries, at the local or the global scale, which would be disproportionate and could lead to attacks.’29 There are suggestions of Islamist entryism within the UK’s borders too. Gilligan reports that the last coalition government, through a ‘working group’ within the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), headed by Baroness Warsi and former Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, handed official positions to people with Islamist connections, some of whom are pressing Whitehall to engage with Islamist and extremist groups, one of which the Prime minister has referred to as ‘a political front for the Muslim Brotherhood’. 30 Others accused of entryism include those that have acted as ‘Special Muslim Advisors’ to the DCLG, such as Mohammad Abdul Aziz. Aziz had links to the Muslim Council of Britain, the Islamic Forum of Europe, and in 2010 was found to be an honorary member of the East London Mosque, an institution that has provided a platform for the espousal of beliefs incongruous with liberal values. 31 Anwar alAwlaki spoke there in 2009, long after he became radicalised. One member of the group is Iqbal Bhana, who has praised the Islamic Human Rights Commission, a body that has defended Abu Hamza al-Masri, the cleric convicted of terror offences. Other members of the group have connections to various non-violent extremist organisations, prompting questions and arousing suspicions of an entryist strategy among a number of the UK’s Islamist organisations. However, despite the history and links of some individuals within this 27

Amos 3.7 (2013), ‘Gradualism: the Islamic strategy’, How do you see the world [available at: http://amos37.com/gradualism-the-islamic-strategy/]. 28 Mauro (2013) 29 Ibid. 30 Gilligan, Andrew (2015), ‘Islamist ‘radicals’ at the heart of Whitehall’, the Telegraph [available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11427370/Islamic-radicals-at-the-heart-of-Whitehall.html]. 31 Maher, Shiraz (2010), ‘UK: Islamist Entryism 101’, Gatestone Institute [available at: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1368/uk-islamist-entryism-101].

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milieu, Matthew Goodwin, an expert on far-right extremist groups and member of the ‘working group’, claimed that he was unaware of any endeavour to further an Islamist agenda. Outside the high-profile arena of politics, other sectors are susceptible to entryism. Of grave concern is the potential for educational establishments to fall prey to the strategy. In March 2014, an anonymous letter that allegedly showed how schools could be influenced into adopting a more Islamist culture, was made public. Though the letter is believed by many to be a hoax, a former head teacher at a Birmingham school, Sarah Hewitt-Clarkson, said that ‘[e]verything in that document was familiar to me’. 32 Another head teacher claimed the problem had been apparent since the 1990s. 33 Peter Clarke, former chief of the Metropolitan Police’s counterterrorism command, was sent by former Education Secretary Michael Gove, to investigate the claims. He discovered evidence of ‘coordinated, deliberate and sustained action to introduce an intolerant and aggressive Islamist ethos into some schools’. Another area in which people are known to be vulnerable to the allure of Salafism and rigid religious conservatism is prisons. There were for a time a number of extremist imams frequenting prisons and disseminating subversive material. This was greatly curtailed after the measures taken to curb the problem in light of the notorious case of Richard Reid seemed inadequate. The radicalisation problem in prison was became increasingly severe. Even efforts at counterradicalisation themselves could fall victim to Islamist entryism. The debate has also raged for over a decade about how best to tackle the growing problem of home-grown radicalisation. On the one hand, there are those that believe that non-violent extremists are best-placed (or even the only ones capable) of presenting an effective buffer against the lure of jihadism. This approach became known as Lambertism, due to the work of Robert Lambert, the head of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch’s Muslim Contact Unit (MCU). On the other stand those that believe that engaging with non-violent extremists legitimises an interpretation of Islam at odds with British liberal democratic values, which will serve to alienate moderate British Muslims and in the longterm erode social cohesion and impede integration. Essentially the latter camp believe such partnership is tantamount to the government facilitating Islamist entryism into British political institutions, which in their minds is wholly counter-productive and detrimental in countering radicalisation. The prevailing attitudes and motives of many of these Islamist organisations is unclear. It is possible that their actions are motivated by good-will and borne of a desire to counter violent-extremism. It is also possible that their enthusiasm for partnership is evidence of a long-term entryist approach to popularise Salafist and fundamentalist Islam in the UK. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but one is certainly more insidious and troubling for the 32

Williams, Rachel (2015), ‘Warnings of Trojan horse complacency risk’, The Guardian [available at: http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/may/12/trojan-horse-reports-birmingham-schools]. 33 BBC (2014), How will government shut out the Trojan Horse? [available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-27024881].

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government than the other. Islamist entryism, regardless of its current prominence, presents a potential, or real, problem for the government and therefore for British society as a whole. It is as much of a threat as jihadist violence, not to national security, but to social cohesion. Even for those that believe non-violent extremists channel radicalised individuals towards violent activism, it is erroneous to tackle the two problems in the same way, exposing the need for a more nuanced approach to counterradicalisation. Islamism is therefore a threat to a secular, democratic and tolerant society in a number of important aspects. For this reason it is repeatedly rejected by Muslims. This is not just the case in the UK but also in Muslim-majority countries around the world. In free elections in countries like Indonesia and Bangladesh, for example, Islamist parties were overwhelmingly rejected by the electorate. 34 In the UK similarly, Islamist-leaning and Islamist-backed candidates such as George Galloway, Salma Yaqoob and Osama Saeed have all recently been roundly defeated at the polls in areas with large Muslim populations – including by other Muslim candidates. 35 Islamist parties repeatedly show themselves to be adept at mobilising and campaigning, yet their political agenda clearly only ever has a minority appeal. The reasons for this lack of support are clear. The ideology of Islamism is based around the idea that Muslims are religiously obliged to create a totalitarian and anti-democratic ‘Islamic state’ which will enforce a supremacist system in which non-Muslims and women will be officially discriminated against and afforded less rights than Muslims – and in which one interpretation of sharia will be forcibly imposed on Muslims themselves. Most Muslims naturally reject this vision of Islam and do not wish to live in a state in which the minutiae of their lives, and their religious beliefs, are dictated to them by Islamists. Equally importantly, the majority of Islamist extremist groups are, to a greater or lesser extent, exclusivist and therefore do not get on with other Islamist groups, preventing mass mobilisation. Despite these issues, there remain advocates for a strategy of empowering non-violent Islamists. As discussed in a subsequent section, this threatens integration and national cohesion by encouraging the spread of a supremacist ideology. This is increasingly being recognised by foreign 34

Harun ur Rashid, ‘Indonesians reject Islamic parties at polls’, The Daily Star, 29 April 2009, <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=86020 >, Jyoti Thottam and Haroon Habib, ‘A Secular Victory in Bangladesh Election’, TIME, 30 December 2008, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1869083,00.html>. 35 George Galloway came third in Poplar & Limehouse, with just 17.5% of the vote. Salma Yaqoob performed better in Birmingham, Hall Green, coming second with 25.1% of the vote. ‘George Galloway's Respect Party defeated by Labour’, BBC Online, 7 May 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/8669056.stm>. Osama Saeed contested Glasgow Central for the Scottish National Party. He was defeated by Anas Sarwar (Labour) and received just 17.5% of the vote. ‘Labour hold Glasgow Central’, STV, 7 May 2010, <http://news.stv.tv/scotland/175518-labour-holds-glasgow-central/>.

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security services. For example, the Director-General of the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands states in his foreword to a report by the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) of the Netherlands: ‘The AIVD has established that the non-violent version of radical Islam is being evangelised on an ever increasing scale in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, and that that activity is becoming more and more organised. Despite its non-violent form, this ideology is still disrupting the relationships within and between ethnic groups. This can result in radicalisation, polarisation and social isolation.’36 As most Muslims around the world recognise, and as counter-extremism workers also need to realise, Islamism is deeply problematic in itself. Islamist plans to create a totalitarian state based on a system of sectarian and gender apartheid are no better than plans of far-right white supremacists who long to create an anti-democratic, fascist state based on comparable doctrines of racial apartheid. Furthermore, as Muslims in countries such as Algeria, Pakistan and elsewhere – which are routinely targeted by Islamist terrorists – have recognised, Islamism’s teachings that everybody has a divine obligation to establish an ‘Islamic state’ opens the way to terrorist violence by Islamists. Once individuals accept Islamism’s message they can all too easily be persuaded that ‘the end justifies the means’ and move from political or revolutionary tactics to Islamism’s militant wing. The chances of such attacks occurring increase whenever Islamism combines with those elements of Wahhabism that encourage individual Muslims to independently use violence in order to either bring about an ‘Islamic state’ or to punish and correct perceived acts of ‘evil’ or immorality in lieu of such a state. It is to discourage the spread of such discriminatory and sectarian ideas, prevent religiously-justified vigilantism, minimise the risk of potentially catastrophic terrorist violence and to preserve the UK’s position as a free, open and democratic society that Prevent was initially established, and counter-extremism strategies should continue to work to these aims.

‘The radical dawa in transition: The rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands’, General Intelligence and Security Service, October 2007, <https://www.aivd.nl/aspx/download.aspx?file=/contents/pages/90126/theradicaldawaintransition.pdf>, p. 7.

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3.3 Does Prevent spy on Muslims? Much of the literature and opinions that exist on Prevent strategy are critical. Dominic Casciani of the BBC, for example, assesses Prevent as deeply flawed and controversial, stigmatizing Muslims and as having more than one ‘total policy disasters along the way’ – the spying cameras installed in Birmingham, for example, which are said to be part of a government initiative to collect information.37 The spying conspiracy is central to the criticism of Prevent, especially in its original form, largely due to the fact that much of the information collected by Prevent workers was passed on to the police. In 2009, Arun Kundani wrote in a report ‘Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism’ that imposition of information sharing requirements is a breach of professional norms of confidentiality and destroys trust and ultimately undermines the strategy’s efforts. 38 A 2010 report by the Communities and Local Government Committee (CLGC), which is highly critical of the strategy, talks about how the information collected for the purposes of project monitoring and community mapping under Prevent constitutes 'spying' or 'intelligence gathering' and any attempt on the government’s part to review the strategy should justify why it does not constitute spying on people.39 Garry Hindle of RUSI, while stating that the assertion that Prevent is being used as an intelligence tool is wrong, expresses an opinion that there is indeed a potential for abuse when it comes to information being shared with the police. He stresses that trust between the community and the police is very important if Prevent is going to work and that there must be instruments to ensure that information gathered for the purposes of Prevent is not exploited.40 The element of lost trust is another prevalent point of discussion in many of Prevent’s evaluations. Rachel Robinson of Liberty joins Kundani, Hindle and Casciani in her concern that some of Prevent’s programmes destroy people’s trust in the police and undermine cooperation between local authorities and communities, which is a vital instrument in the fight against extremism. 41 This is taken further by Kundani, who is of the opinion that Prevent has undermined many existing community cohesion programs and has created a rift between local

Casciani, Dominic (2014), BBC – http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28939555

Kundani, Arun (2009), Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism, Institute of Race Relations, London; http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf 39 Communities and Local Government Committee: Prevent programme backfiring in local communities, Report of 2010 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/clg/clgpn100330/ 40 Hindle, Garry (2009), Prevent and Intelligence, RUSI Analysis, London; https://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C4ADEF3390A96C#.VXlUNPlVikp 41 Rachel Robinson (2010), Liberty’s response to the Home Office consultation on the Prevent strand of the UK counterterrorism strategy, Liberty, London; https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/response-to-home-officeconsultation-on-prevent-january-2011.pdf

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authority and Muslim communities. In its report, CLGC states a similar view saying that much of its work has been undermined by association with Prevent. Association with Prevent can be perceived by some of the workers as an obstacle to their work, as people were adamant not to take part due to the negative association. During an evaluation of the original strategy, the Youth Justice Board (YJB) conducted a number of interviews with practitioners of Prevent, many of whom stated that people felt uncomfortable with the label imposed on them by Prevent.42 As a result the practitioners were careful how they described the interventions to people, especially to young people (and sometimes even to colleagues and partners in the community), and couched it in terms of community cohesion, youth inclusion or reducing social disadvantage. The YJB also noted another problem with the strategy, namely the focus on al-Qaeda and the ignoring of other types of extremism. This in turn had a number of ramifications, the biggest one being the creation of a ‘suspect community’ and the marginalization of the Muslim population. This view is shared by many Prevent researchers and, according to Douglas Murray, this policy had another unfortunate consequence – while the Muslim community was feeling victimised by all the programmes aimed at them, other faith communities started to feel alienated, ignored, without proper funding for their programmes and feelings of resentment started to emerge, which further exacerbated the rift between communities.43 Murray is also of the opinion that the strategy was focused too much on teaching what some labelled MI5 Islam – it was focusing on one interpretation of Islam over others and favoured it. Kundani expressed a similar view, also saying that there was a perception that the government was sponsoring Muslim organisations on the basis of theological criteria and this way promoting only one aspect of Islam. The CLGC agrees with that, stating that the strategy created the feeling that the Government was trying to engineer a specific, pre-approved form of Islam by promoting and funding only those groups which conform to this model and stigmatizing those that do not. According to Kundani, the atmosphere promoted by Prevent is one in which to make radical criticisms of the government is to risk losing funding and facing isolation as an ‘extremist’, while those organisations which support the government are rewarded. Another thing that Kundani and Robinson are critical of is the lack of transparency, when it comes to decision-making and the training given to practitioners. The 2011 review of Prevent noted some of the above-mentioned problems. A persistent challenge identified has been choosing partners in the Muslim community. Sometimes this lack 42

Youth Justice Boards (2012), Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People; http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/16233/1/preventing-violent-extremism-process-evaluation.pdf 43 Douglas Murray (2010), The Prevent strategy: a textbook example of how to alienate just about everybody, The Telegraph; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7540456/The-Prevent-strategy-a-textbook-example-of-how-toalienate-just-about-everybody.html#disqus_thread

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of guidance allowed Prevent workers to judiciously interact with a wide range of Muslim actors in order to advance overall counter-radicalisation goals. In other instances, this absence of guidance led to Prevent workers making decisions that some believed increased radicalisation and the power and influence of Islamist groups.44 The review stated that it ‘found evidence that some Prevent funding from central Government and local authorities had reached a small number of organizations who had expressed (or employed people who had expressed) extremist views’. Further analysis on this policy of Lambertism is included below. The evaluation of Prevent is also said to be challenging, a view also held by Frank Gardner, who says that of all the CONTEST strands Prevent is the harder to evaluate because its results are not quantifiable – therefore it is difficult to point out undisputed successes to mitigate the failures.45 The review of 2011 notes that it was long overdue and that money has been wasted. The review also states that auditing and recording had been so poor that the Home Office was even unable to assess how much Prevent money was given to extremists.46 Shiraz Maher of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) published an article in 2011, which talks about the changes made in Prevent following the 2011 Review.47 The author does note that key terms such as ‘extremism’ or ‘Islamism’ are still poorly defined – too broadly in some cases, and too narrowly in others - but the overall changes are welcomed and have potential. There is a greater emphasis on the promotion of liberal democratic British values, and the commitment not to allow extremism to go unchallenged. The author praises the clearer objectives set out in the new strategy, which might bring an end to the ambiguity in the previous one and the attempts to have more transparency. The identification and challenging of Islamist ideology, something that the government had been reluctant to do before, is also a new element and part of a wider strategy of disrupting propagandists, including the exclusion of those from Britain whose presence is not deemed conducive to the public good. The vague definition of extremism, the attempts to cover all forms of extremism and the emphasis placed on British values is also noted by the YJB (2012) and Valentina Soria.48 Soria praises the distinction in the strategy between prevention and deradicalisation work. She, however, remains critical of the strategy, saying that its approach to cut funding to some Islamic groups that espouse extremist views and do not support essential British values – something that 44

Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon (2012), Countering Radicalisation in Europe; http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalisation-in-Europe.pdf 47 Shiraz Maher, ICSR Insight – Summary of revised Prevent strategy (2011), http://icsr.info/2011/06/icsr-insight-summary-ofrevised-prevent-strategy/ 48 Valentina Soria (2011), The New PREVENT Strategy: Establishing Realistic Expectations, RUSI Analysis, London; https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4DF08BD1BB00F/#.VXlORvlVikp

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the YJB praises as an improvement49 – once again creates the risk of narrowing down Prevent’s remit to target Muslim communities only. The new partnerships created by Prevent are also criticized by Bill Durodié, who says that they encourage the infiltration of Muslim communities and justify a culture of suspicion and surveillance.50 He claims that the new Prevent has made it difficult for the police to work with Islamic organizations, which they have found useful in the past, and are forced to work with softer groups, which may be ineffective. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (the Act) placed Prevent Strategy on statutory footing and some of its provisions sparked further debate. Critics are concerned about the requirements for local authorities and front-line workers ‘when exercising their functions...to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. Conversely, supporters of the Act recognise that these provisions take responsibility away from the police and other law enforcement bodies, desecuritising the agenda and simultaneously allowing for greater capacity for this work and further engagement with those vulnerable to radicalisation, through the instructing of frontline workers like teachers and prison officers. The National Union of Students (NUS) published its concerns about this provision, emphasizing the roles of Prevent and Channel project.51 Overall, the NUS is concerned how Prevent strategy will affect the students and education overall. It is critical of the government’s expectation that the teachers will monitor and report on its students. Talking about the new counter-terrorism bill, NUS says that rather than winning the support of minority communities, this Bill could serve to isolate many students who already feel that the only avenue through which the Government will engage them is ‘anti-radicalisation’ initiatives, resulting in further alienation and disaffection. Stephen Exley expresses a similar view, adding further that Prevent is essentially shutting down the debate on hot topics in schools, making students unable to get a better understanding of the volatile world.52 Schools should be a forum for discussion, but Prevent is topping that discussion in an attempt to promote British values, which further alienates vulnerable students. The author also notes that the focus on these values could leave room for discrimination and abuse. Durodié shares Exley’s opinion, further talking about the concerns expressed by the front-liners about

Youth Justice Boards (2012), Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People; http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/16233/1/preventing-violent-extremism-process-evaluation.pdf 50 Bill Durodié (2015), Prevent: A Very Risky Strategy; http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/prevent-a-very-riskystrategy/16793#.VX_hiflVikp 51 Statement on Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, NUS, 2015; http://beta.nusconnect.org.uk/articles/statement-oncounter-terrorism-and-security-bill#.VLhyssQbvQ.gmail 52 Stephen Exley (2015), Teachers expected to police extremism as 'frontline stormtroopers', conference told; https://www.tes.co.uk/news/school-news/breaking-news/teachers-expected-police-extremism-frontline-stormtroopersconference

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these provisions and the alienation experienced by the targeted people, which limits the potential for genuine dialogue between communities and exacerbates their relations. There is also a concern over what the revised strategy will do to freedom of speech on campuses and online, as well as to the government’s relationship with some organizations and institutions.53 Cavanagh is of the opinion that the government is not very clear why it is tackling non-violent extremist groups – as a matter of principle, or because it thinks this will reduce the risk of terrorism. He is also critical of the decision to make it mandatory for front-line workers to do the same. Gardner and Casciani hail Channel as one of Prevent’s successes, which has ‘turned some lives around’.54 Maher also points out some of Channel’s achievements from 2007 until 2010, saying that more than 1000 people have been referred and have received the help they need. However, not everyone is happy with the way Channel operates. While results speak for themselves, there are concerns over information sharing and intelligence gathering. According to Robinson, the referral aspect of Channel is an example of how information, sometimes confidential, is passed on by front-liners to law-enforcement and intelligence units.55 She is also of the opinion that Channel tends to blur the line between crime prevention and freedom of expression, especially because some practitioners are not given the proper training to help them differentiate between people who are really at risk and those exercising their legitimate right to freedom of expression. Kundani shares that opinion as well, pointing out that Channel is an example of how Prevent programmes involve the embedding of counter-terrorism police officers within the delivery of local services, the purpose of which seems to be to gather intelligence on Muslim communities. Nevertheless, according to Vidino and Brandon, although Channel work has sometimes been controversial, both in Muslim communities where it is sometimes perceived as ‘spying’ and among politicians who fear it has empowered extremists, in general it has the clearest successes of the UK’s Prevent strategy and is held as a good example of counter-radicalisation efforts.56 As was discussed at a roundtable event organised by Rt Hon Hazel Blears in January 2015, hosting James Brokenshire, government Security Minister, and over 40 counter-extremism academics and practitioners, including several members of Muslim communities, the branding of Prevent is 53

Matt Cavanagh (2015), Terror prevent strategy is muddled - and potentially dangerous; http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/06/strategy-groups-government 54 Dominic Casciani (2014), BBC – http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28939555 55

Rachel Robinson (2010), Liberty’s response to the Home Office consultation on the Prevent strand of the UK counterterrorism strategy, Liberty, London; https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/response-to-home-officeconsultation-on-prevent-january-2011.pdf 56 Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon (2012), Countering Radicalisation in Europe; http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalisation-in-Europe.pdf

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a particular weakness of the government’s approach to counter-extremism. As Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe said of accusations of racism in the Metropolitan Police: ‘If other people think we are institutionally racist, then we are. It’s no good me saying we’re not and saying you must believe me.’57 Perception is as important as fact when it comes to branding, and so it is clear that if Muslim communities believe they are being targeted by Prevent, then this is a misconception that needs to be addressed. The roundtable event also identified the ‘Preventing Prevent Lobby’ as an informal coalition that actively targets counter-extremism practitioners and smears all efforts to challenge extremism, regardless of the approach taken. This coalition is spearheaded by many Islamist individuals and organisations including CAGE and MEND, and organisations they have influenced through entryist strategies, such as the NUS. For this reason, while we should be objectively critical of Prevent, we should not be swayed by ideological or strategic criticisms of it. In a forward-facing strategy that requires buy-in from Muslim communities, who may themselves be influenced by the very people the strategy seeks to challenge, this is incredibly difficult. If the government seeks to rename the ‘Prevent’ agenda in the hope that this will increase its popularity then it must be realistic about this tactic’s likelihood of success. Any negative connotations that the name ‘Prevent’ may have acquired are not a result of the name itself but are the inevitable consequences of an incessant campaign that has been waged by Islamists, their supporters and sections within the media to discredit the whole agenda. Any new name for Prevent, however initially attractive its terminology, will face the same fear-mongering and deliberately negative attacks. The government needs to appreciate that many of those who orchestrate these attacks reject the very idea that the government should tackle Islamist extremism, in both its violent and non-violent forms. However, so long as there is a programme focused on challenging the four factors that increase risk of radicalisation, as outlined in this paper, ultimately it is unimportant whether this programme is called ‘Prevent’ or something else.

http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/05/met-chief-admits-institutional-racism-claims-have-some-justification

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3.4 Should we partner with non-violent extremists? Debate in the United Kingdom over the wisdom and efficacy of government partnerships with non-violent extremists, as part of the Prevent strategy, has been heated over the past decade. To provide evidence of success within the field of counter-radicalisation is a thankless task, because to do so requires proof of a negative – that is, proof that an individual was dissuaded or diverted from the path to extremism. Central to the government’s efforts to curb violent extremist activism, predominantly in the form of global jihadism, was a policy that saw the state and the police forge partnerships with non-violent extremists. The paragon of this approach was former Detective Inspector Robert Lambert. The MCU was tasked with establishing trust-based relationships with community leaders who could help prevent terrorist attacks and counter the radicalisation of local Muslims, and he remains a staunch proponent of the approach, which has become known as Lambertism58. Offered here is a précis of the arguments for and against the policy and a judgement of its success, provided by academics and commentators. Subsequently, a hypothesis on whether the approach would prove a success in today’s volatile climate is put forward. The theory of Lambertism, at its core, seeks to instrumentalise the knowledge and credibility of non-violent extremists in nullifying the threat of violent extremists, a policy which its critics claim facilitates Islamist entryism into British institutions. The debate fundamentally rests on understandings of radicalisation. On the one hand, the process is a long one, and all violent extremists, argue the opponents of the approach, are at one time non-violent extremists. They contend that the short-termism of the strategy fails to grasp the nuance of radicalisation and the extremist milieu, which has damaging and destabilising effects on societal cohesion. On the other hand, supporters of Lambertism argue that cases of engagement that have proven manifest successes exist, also pointing to the fact that it is now widely accepted that the conveyor belt analogy for radicalisation is antiquated and inaccurate. The issue of engagement threw up a host of questions and obstacles for the government, the most crucial of which was deciding who to engage with. This has essentially formed the basis of the debate at hand. Klausen adroitly depicts the situation facing the state in this regard: When government officials look for a responsible interlocutor, they find that the Muslim voice is a cacophony rather than a chorus’.59 The Metropolitan Police was, as a body, in favour of engaging with Islamists, accepting the premise that they represented the most effective buffer to violent extremism. Former Assistant 58

Vidino, Lorenzo (2009), ‘Europe’s New Security Dilemma’, Washington Quarterly [available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09octobervidino.pdf]. 59 Klausen, Jytte (2005), The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (New York).

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Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Andy Hayman, claimed, ‘[t]he very people who are best placed to advise on how to reach those in the community who are most susceptible to extremism are those whose own backgrounds may present a security risk. This is where the dilemma sits. The most valuable advisers are those likely to fail the vetting process and be barred from Scotland Yard’.60 This grasps the notion that a partnership with such groups has the uneasy potential for difficulty, and even hypocrisy. Lambert himself went further, stating that he encouraged partnership with ‘Muslim groups conventionally deemed to be subversive to democracy; and negotiation by those groups with Muslim youth drawn to Al Qaeda terrorism’.61 He was not alone in this view. Support for such an approach came from the United States too. CIA official Reuel Marc Gerecht said ‘Bin Ladenism can only be gutted by fundamentalism… Muslim ‘moderates’ can’t defeat bin Ladenism since they don’t speak to the same audience with the same language and passions’.62 Lambert criticises his opponents, calling them an out-of-touch elite that lack experience who adopt a top-down view of the problem, and claims that the ‘ideal yes-saying’ Muslim figureheads lack credibility and lack the requisite knowledge of the radicalisation process and radical milieu.63 He argues that his purportedly bottom-up approach appeals to popular sentiment because the Islamist groups partnered with command respect and have credibility. Simcox puts it well: ‘Lambert believes that Salafi and Ikhwani ‘street’ legitimacy and religious knowledge work as a safety valve in reducing the threat’.64 Lambert is keen to point out that Islamist organisations are not a monolithic entity, and cautions against ‘lump[ing] all Islamist groups together’.65 He urges that they can be powerful allies’, and that while ‘issues that are most troubling to people like the oppression of women and gays mustn't be swept under the carpet… they also shouldn't be treated as a block on engagement’.66 Indeed, Abu Hamza al-Masri, who Lambert worked to dislodge from Finsbury Park Mosque, was

Hayman, Andy (2008), ‘Comment: The risk of good policing intelligence’, The Times [available at: http://www.timesonline. co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5 348490.ece]. 61 Lambert, Robert (2008), ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study’, Political Science & Politics 41. 62 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEIPPR) (2004), An Interview With Reuel Marc Gerecht [available at: http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21739/ pub_detail.asp (press release)]. 63 Lambert, Robert (2008), ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study’, Political Science & Politics 41. 64 Simcox, Robin (2010), ‘Why Lambert and Githens-Mazer are wrong on radicalisation’, Harry’s Place [available at: http://hurryupharry.org/2010/10/21/why-lambert-and-githens-mazer-are-wrong-on-radicalisation/]. 65 Milne, Seumus (2008), ‘We need to listen to the man from Special Branch’, The Guardian. 66

Ibid.

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caustic in his dismissal of the Brixton Salafis, stating, ‘[t]hey're a group of West Indian converts… very low level, practicing a half-baked Islam''.67 Bright, however, adopts a different point of view, criticizing what he sees as ‘engagement for engagement’s sake’ with groups like the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), who falsely claim to represent all British Muslims. He argues that groups like this are factional and sectarian.68 Critics of the policy also argue that one of Lambertisms’ failings has been its high degree of moral relativism, and this is one of the areas of greatest division. Supporters, in contrast to this view, claim that it is characterised by its impartiality, with Lambert saying that the aim was ‘a nonjudgmental approach [to] persuade young Muslims that al-Qaeda propaganda is wrong’.69 Its proponents in fact encourage the government to hold off from making value-judgements on Islamism, believing that this will ensure security. Vidino, in 2005, was damning of the policy’s logic, writing that what ‘most European politicians fail to understand is that by meeting with radical organisations, they empower them and grant the Muslim brotherhood legitimacy…There is an implied endorsement to any meeting, especially when the same politicians ignore moderate voices…This creates a self-perpetuating cycle of radicalisation because the greater the political legitimacy of the Muslim brotherhood, the more opportunity it and its proxy groups will have to influence and radicalise various European Muslim communities’.70 This indictment of Lambert’s methods captures a main thrust of the opposition to Lambertism. There is also the issue of questionable awards of funding and partnership by the government. Tower Hamlets funded a London Muslim Centre, joined to the East London Mosque, which was home to leading members of the MCB, and was described by Ed Husain as a place dominated by affiliates of Jamaat-e-Islami.71 Nonetheless, funding was provided for a Muslim Youth Council.72 Maher and Frampton are strongly condemn this, calling the appropriation of public funds to such initiatives ‘perverse’, because it creates platforms for the likes of Hizb-ut-Tahrir to espouse their ideology.

Hoge, Warren (2001), ‘A NATION CHALLENGED: THE CONVERT; Shoe-Bomb Suspect Fell in With Extremists, New York Times [available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/27/world/a-nation-challenged-the-convert-shoe-bomb-suspect-fell-in-withextremists.html?pagewanted=all]. 68 Bright, Martin (2006), ‘When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries: The British State’s flirtation with radical Islamism’, Policy Exchange. 69 Lambert, Robert (2008), ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study’, Political Science & Politics 41. 70 Vidino, Lorenzo (2005), ‘The Muslim brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe’, Middle East Quarterly, 12, 25-34). 71 72

Husain, Ed (2007), The Islamist, (London). Maher, Shiraz, and Martyn Frampton (2009), ‘Choosing our friends wisely’, Policy Exchange.

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By 2009, Vidino noted that most agree that ‘engaging nonviolent Islamists for security purposes without empowering them seems the best strategy’.73 Lambert challenges the point made by Moore and others that Islamists are not representative of most British Muslims, stating that ‘the Finsbury Park Islamists and Brixton Salafis (and most other London Islamists and [S]alafis) had more community legitimacy and support than either Militant Tendency or Policy Exchange and their respective allies in two separate periods of London politics. Moreover, he retorts to Vidino and those he interviewed in the government for failing to account for the possibility that the ‘War on Terror’ contributed to the terrorist threat in the UK. This, he claims, is the reason why they fail to understand that opponents of the ‘War on Terror’ may have been opponents of London-based al Qaeda apologists in equal measure.74 Griffith-Dickson posits the benchmark for cooperation in counterterrorism measures along a scale of ‘how hostile to co-operation with non-Muslims’ a Muslim is, and ‘how far is the person or group willing to co-operate with non-Muslims in areas of shared concern?’.75 Lambert points to the Brixton Salafis and Finsbury Park Islamists routinely demonstrating willingness in these fields as an indicator of the success of his approach, when coupled with evidence of practical results. 76 This, however, underlines another key denunciation of Lambertism, that is still a grievance of British Muslims today – the view and representation of Muslims. The placing of emphasis on collaboration with Islamists and not more moderate voices has been construed by some to suggest advocates of Lambert’s approach have low expectations for British Muslims.77 Khan understands it as a policy built on an underlying assumption that all Muslims, by virtue simply of being Muslim, are extreme in a way. The crux of the matter here is that Lambertism, by its very logic, brands moderate Muslims as ineffective in dealing with violent extremism, and thus its focus on partnering with Salafis precludes partnerships with these people, who do not regard their faith as their primary identity marker but do adhere to many values that the government seeks to defend through its endeavours. Many critics attack what is perceived to be the antiquated nature and overly short-term priorities of Lambert’s methodology, with Khan going as far as to call it ‘colonial’.78 The thrust of this 73

Vidino, Lorenzo (2009), ‘Europe’s New Security Dilemma’, Washington Quarterly [available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09octobervidino.pdf]. 74 Lambert, Robert (2011), Countering al-Qaeda in London (London). 75

Griffith-Dickson, Gwen (2008), ‘Countering Extremism and the Politics of Engagement’, Gresham College lecture [available at: http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/countering-extremism-and-the-politics-of%E2%80%98engagement%E2%80%99]. 76 Lambert, Robert (2011), Countering al-Qaeda in London (London). 77

Khan, Amjad (2010), ‘A Dummy’s Guide to Lambertism’, Harry’s Place (available at: http://hurryupharry.org/2010/10/22/adummy%E2%80%99s-guide-to-lambertism/). 78 Maher, Shiraz, and Martyn Frampton (2009), ‘Choosing our friends wisely’, Policy Exchange.

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repudiation of Lambertisms’ efficacy is that it is willing to forgo the protection of human rights in pursuit of immediate gain. This has parallels with the central thesis of Paul Wilkinson’s ‘Terrorism and Liberal State’, which argues that a liberal democracy must only employ methods to counter the threat of terrorism that remain within the legal and ideological remit of its system of governance. The state is fighting to uphold these values, so a willingness to breach them in a counter-terrorism campaign defeats the purpose of fighting at all.79 So in this case, critics argue that despite the potential for the short-term gain of deterring terrorist activism through the pursuit of Lambertism, the long-term consequences of such partnerships will be detrimental, because it forces the government to compromise, and will ultimately undermine the principles that Western society is allegedly working to uphold through such enterprise.80 This is precisely what Maher and Frampton argue. They also claim that many Islamists in the UK condone domestic violence and advocate involvement within the political machinery of the modern state ‘in order to present themselves as interlocutors for British Muslims and to make sectarian demands on our liberal democracy, arguing we should become less liberal and less free in order to accommodate them’.81 The stance of Islamists on foreign policy issues such as the violence in Gaza and Palestine, and their position on homosexuality and women’s rights, raises doubts about the compatibility of Islamists with Western societies. Critics also claim that these partnerships serve to legitimise and popularise Islamists that could have negative effects on societal cohesion in the long-term. Lambert refutes this last assertion however, asserting that the opposite is true. He claims that the Islamists and Salafis the MCU partnered with ‘(and the many Muslim Londoners they exemplify)’ served as bulwarks against the terrorism and hate crimes planned and perpetrated by those within the violent extremist milieu.82 The jewel in the Lambertist crown is the ousting of the demagogic Abu Hamza and his followers from Finsbury Park Mosque in February 2005. The architect of the approach maintains that this was a great success of his policy and that the clerical firebrand was brought down through MCU collaboration with British Muslim Initiative leader Azzam Tamimi.83 British authorities, including Lambert himself, regard this as a major achievement. The takeover of the mosque deracinated Hamza’s support base, and it now operates as a community centre, with interfaith forums existing with groups in its vicinity. Removing Abu Hamza was undoubtedly necessary, and it is clear that the authorities managed to rid the country of a jihadist hub, 79

Wilkinson, Paul (1977), Terrorism and the Liberal State (London).

Vidino, Lorenzo (2009), ‘Europe’s New Security Dilemma’, Washington Quarterly [available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09octobervidino.pdf]. 81 Maher, Shiraz, and Martyn Frampton (2009), ‘Choosing our friends wisely’, Policy Exchange. 82

Lambert, Robert (2011), Countering al-Qaeda in London (London).

Ibid.

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connected within a network to nodes across Europe, which served as a base for the incitement and indeed the planning of attacks on British sovereign territory. Given the circumstances, it seems that only an organisation like MAB would have proved successful in taking over, because it was more moderate than Hamza’s clique, but had enough legitimacy within the local Muslim population to be accepted.84 But this legitimacy is garnered through positions on issues that have caused policymakers to reject partnership in the past, because of their incongruity with British values. So this raises the problem of promulgating an interpretation of Islam that is in many ways divergent with basic societal values, which could spell rifts in the societal fabric, making integration impossible, and discredit the government itself.85 However, Lambert also highlights the victory of the Brixton Salafis over Anjem Choudhury’s Islam For The UK group at a ‘Shari’ah Roadshow’ in Brixton in 2010 and stresses that targets of jihadist vitriol, like homosexuals and Jewish people, were in fact protected by the community work of the Islamist groups he worked with.86 Moreover, he further contends that the Brixton Salafis strived to counter homophobic street gang culture. He claims that the Islamists’ sense of civic duty was central to their successes, along with their experience. These are things which, in his view, most Prevent policies lacked, meaning they also lacked the legitimacy and popular support necessary to realise their goals.87 He states the key problem with the Prevent strategy as a whole is its topdown nature, and that policies must be grassroots-based to work. Leiken and Brooke agree with Lambert and view his efforts in this vein as a success, writing that the Muslim Brotherhood ‘works to dissuade Muslims from violence, instead channeling [sic] them into politics and charitable activities’.88 Crucial to the debate is a state’s definitions of radicalisation and extremism. Cooperation with non-violent Islamists is more likely to be endorsed in countries in which the definition is more closely associated with the use of violence. This was the case in the UK, where the aim of Prevent was to ‘stop people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists.’ The Dutch adopt a broader definition of the terms, and as a result are more reluctant to partner with Islamists, because of the potentially illiberal, undemocratic values that could be sewed, and the effects this could have on social unity in the long-term.89 Essentially, from a governmental perspective, the top priority is security, and so violent radicalisation takes precedence over the longer-term, more nebulous and less tangible threats of erosions to societal harmony. So, it follows that the graver 84

Vidino, Lorenzo (2009), ‘Europe’s New Security Dilemma’, Washington Quarterly [available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09octobervidino.pdf]. 85 ibid. 86

Lambert, Robert (2011), Countering al-Qaeda in London (London).

ibid.

Leiken, Robert S., and Steven Brooke (2007), ‘The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood’ Foreign Affairs, 86.

Vidino, Lorenzo (2009), ‘Europe’s New Security Dilemma’, Washington Quarterly [available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09octobervidino.pdf].

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the threat of violent extremist activism, the lower the threshold is for a potential partner meeting acceptable standards for cooperation. By this logic, Britain’s status as the largest European partner of Islamist organisations makes sense, given the continued severity of terrorist threats against it. Moreover, the miniscule number of terrorist plots carried out to their conclusion as a proportion of the number planned also suggests that the policy was a success, when looking at the situation through this purely security-oriented lens. Conversely, DCLG– whose mandate is to discover long-term counters to radicalisation – opposed this approach, stating that the government should target all forms of extremism, not just its violent manifestations. Ruth Kelly, a former member of the DCLG, stated in 2006 that ‘It is only by defending our values that we will prevent extremists [from] radicalising future generations of terrorists’.90 Mostly damningly of all, Khan, among a host of others, denigrates Lambertism by stating that it simply does not work. Within the extremist milieu, goes the argument, non-violent extremists play a key role in inciting others to violence by affirming their ideology. Khan writes that jihadism is ‘merely a symptom of the failure of Islamists to achieve power’.91 The two concepts, while they diverge in their prognostic assessments of the challenges they face, are aligned in their desired goals. From an ideological standpoint, it is the respective views on the instrumentality of violence that fundamentally separates Islamism from jihadism. Violence may be used in a multifaceted strategy by Islamists, whereas it is for jihadists an ideological raison d’être. Where Khan is correct is that all jihadists are necessarily, at their core, Islamists, but Islamism does not always metastasise into jihadism. Partnership has served to popularise Islamist ideology and therefore expose many to a point of view that, while perhaps not encouraging violent activism directly, places an individual in closer proximity to a mind-set that justifies such action than would otherwise have been the case. Khan summarises this by stating that ‘mainstreaming Islamist thought…increases the pool from which violent extremists recruit’. Similarly Alain Chouet, former head of France’s Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure embodied the position of many of Lambertism’s opponents when he said that al Qaeda ‘is only a brief episode and an expedient instrument in the century-old existence of the Muslim Brotherhood. The true danger is in the expansion of the Brotherhood, an increase in its audience. The wolf knows how to disguise itself as a sheep’.92

Naughton, Philippe (2006), ‘Funding Cut-off Threat by Minister Angers Muslim Groups’, Times [available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article668544.ece]. 91 Khan, Amjad (2010), ‘A Dummy’s Guide to Lambertism’, Harry’s Place (available at: http://hurryupharry.org/2010/10/22/adummy%E2%80%99s-guide-to-lambertism/). 92 Fourest, Caroline (2008), Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan (New York).

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Lambert believed partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood would erect a buffer against the proliferation of jihadiism in the UK. But the Cage Prisoners and Abdulmuttalab cases, (both of which had ties to Anwar al Awlaki) have, for some, shown that the boundaries between jihadists and so-called moderate Islamists are too often too hazy. For many, however, the distinction is clear. Abdul Haqq Baker, Chairman of the Brixton Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre, claimed that ‘Salafist ideology is considered by many to be one of the significant contributory causes to violent extremism’, but that ‘[a]dherents of this particular branch of Islam consider their practices mainstream, away from the extreme spectrums of both liberalism and violent extremism’.93 Lambert and the police believed him to be an appropriate partner as a result, despite Salafism’s incompatibility with liberal democracy. Despite this clarification in ideology, the effectiveness of Islamism as a counter to violent extremism is called into question by the high-profile case of Richard Reid. The ‘Shoe Bomber’ frequented Brixton Mosque, and Baker and his congregation were unable to turn Reid away from jihadism. This, Maher and Frampton claim, demonstrates that Reid’s encounter with Salafism did not deter him from jihadism.94 Detractors of a Lambertist approach often liken it to a scenario in which the government calls upon the services of the British National Party to counter more virulent far-right extremism. This points towards the root of the problem being a lack of comprehension by proponents of Lambertism, as to the nature of the challenge. The threat of Islamism is not solely that is can become violent, but also that it stands on one side of an ideational struggle between, what are at heart, competing and incongruent ideological constructs. It is in essence totalitarian and rejectionist in its political makeup, theocratic and intolerant, and on the opposite side stands western democracy, which is liberal and pluralist. Some opponents go further, impeaching those that partner with Islamists as engaging in the suppression of moderate Muslims that do advocate the values upheld in liberal societies. To highlight the effects of the policy on the UK’s democracy, on which it has ‘profound implications’, Maher and Frampton point to the case in 2007 when the policy led to West Midlands Police reporting Channel 4 to Ofcom after a programme revealed results of a clandestine investigation into sermons given in British mosques, due to concerns that that it could harm ‘community cohesion’. 95 One imam, Abu Usama, amid a host of sectarian and discriminatory speeches, was recorded saying ‘[t]ake the homosexual man and throw him off the mountain’.96 93

Baker, Abdul Haqq (2008), ‘A view from the inside’, Criminal Justice Matters, 73.

Maher, Shiraz, and Martyn Frampton (2009), ‘Choosing our friends wisely’, Policy Exchange.

ibid.

Hardcash Productions (2007), Transcript from ‘Undercover Mosque’, Channel 4.

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The pattern of events reflects what Haines calls the ‘positive radical flank effect’.97 This states that moderate clusters within a political movement improve their bargaining position when a more extreme wing comes into play. Chouet and others like him argue that the threat of jihadism has seen governments lower the bar of acceptability for collaboration, and this has led to them essentially supporting extremist organisations, which is portrayed as a grave error.98 Dr Matthew Wilkinson, director of the Curriculum for Cohesion think-tank and expert on Islamic ideology, said in 2015 that the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy has been very successful with regards to security (quantified in terms of the protection of citizens) with a huge number of terror plots thwarted and convictions made. But the issue of changing viewpoints, tackling the root of the malaise, and – to employ phraseology common in counter-insurgency – winning hearts and minds, ‘Prevent has been largely unsuccessful’.99 This encompasses a judgement of Lambertism too. On a slightly different note, Maher and Frampton criticise the open-endedness of the Prevent programme for vitiating the MCU’s efforts. The guidelines make continual reference to ‘mainstream voices’ and ‘alternative narratives/messages’, but what is actually incorporated within these parameters is uncertain. It is not made clear whether these voices should be ‘mainstream’ in relation to British Muslim communities or in relation to wider British society.100 In addition, they point out the dearth in specific guidelines for engagement. And while it is stated that ‘[p]reventing violent extremism includes prevention of the funding of ideologues,’ the question of defining an ideologue is left unanswered. This lack of gumption on the part of the government does alleviate the burden of blame from the police and the MCU to a degree, if Lambertism is deemed a failure. The state’s vacillation between working with Islamists and with counter-extremist organisations, and sponsoring some Islamists but not others even at times partnering both factions concurrently, illustrates the lack of clear direction in policy. Also questioned by Maher and Frampton is the decision to place such politically and ideologically charged matters in the purview of the police.101 One Westminster councillor interviewed by the pair claims that the police’s preoccupation with countering solely violent extremism resulted in

Haines, Herbert H. (1997), ‘Black Radicalisation and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957—1970’ in Social Movements, ed. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (Los Angeles). 98 Vidino, Lorenzo (2009), ‘Europe’s New Security Dilemma’, Washington Quarterly [available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09octobervidino.pdf]. 99 Gardner, Frank (2015), ‘Prevent strategy: Is it failing to stop radicalisation?’, BBC [available at:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31756755]. 100 PREVENT Strategy, HMG (2011) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf 101 Maher, Shiraz, and Martyn Frampton (2009), ‘Choosing our friends wisely’, Policy Exchange.

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groups unfit for partnership regularly ‘slipping through the net’, and crucially (in that it runs counter to Lambert’s account), local voices of opposition were ignored.102 As has been mentioned above, measuring the success of counter-radicalisation policies is difficult, and lacunae in our knowledge of the radicalisation process persist, but indicators do exist. It cannot be ignored that the allure of ISIL among British youth over the past two years is alarming. Indeed, record numbers of individuals have travelled to Syria and Iraq from the UK (an ICSR estimate lies at around 500). Despite many competing agendas and much political meandering, it seems that this is fundamentally a reflection of the failure of Lambertism. Too many of the Islamist groups associated with Lambert did not condemn violence abroad, and this ties into the problem of returning foreign fighters who have been exposed to jihadism while overseas, who bring back the ideology to the UK’s shores. They may have not gone intending to commit violence in the UK, but they may return with that very inclination or desire. This is another potentially longer-term failure of Lambertism. Many of the Muslim Association of Britain’s members have publicly stated their past membership to organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas, and while condemning violence in the UK, advocate ‘suicide bombings’ in Palestine and other theatres in which Muslims are, in their eyes, oppressed.103 Islamists can be seen to be aiming for goals that perpetuate the idea of a separate Muslim identity. Many also promulgate narratives of the persecution of Muslims that has led to violence being justified in other cases. 104 The Quilliam Foundation claims that Islamists ‘advocate separatist, confrontational ideas that… provide the mood music to which suicide bombers dance’.105 An interesting idea to explore is whether the policy would work better in today’s context. In the past, it led in part to a conflation between Islamism and Islam, which has resulted in misunderstanding across society that in turn has manifested itself in underlying anti-Muslim hatred. To once more partner with Islamist groups would serve only to fuel this situation, which would have two adverse effects. Firstly, it would further an extremist interpretation of Islam, giving it government-backed legitimacy and a platform to disseminate its illiberal ideas. This would both contribute to the already prevalent feelings of frustration among the moderate British Muslim majority at their lack of representation and clout at the top political levels, and

102

ibid.

103

Vidino, Lorenzo (2009), ‘Europe’s New Security Dilemma’, Washington Quarterly [available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09octobervidino.pdf]. 104 ibid. 105

Quilliam Foundation (2008), Pulling Together to Defeat Terror, [available at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/pulling-together-to-defeat-terror.pdf].

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also, more alarmingly, risk popularising among the British Muslim demographic this form of Islam. Secondly, the publicity and prominence of Islamism would further polarise those in opposition to it, engendering more anti-Muslim sentiment born of ignorance as to the differences between the two concepts. At present jihadist propaganda, predominantly those pieces disseminated by ISIL, is more professional than it ever has been, and the situation explained here – in which extremist ideas are widely circulated and intolerance for Islam is more overt – engenders and supports the narrative of victimisation, of a war between Islam and the West. It would seem reasonable to suggest that a Lambertist approach is more precarious a strategy than ever, given the rise of ISIL. Despite many Islamist groups in the UK condemning ISIL as a false Caliphate, its slick propaganda distribution and continued existence and success grant it legitimacy and credibility. With a key goal of Islamism, violent or not, being the creation of a Caliphate, government partnership with Islamist groups seems a risky tactic in preventing radicalisation, an approach in which the line between acceptability and prohibition is even closer than before. In light of ISIL’s emergence and rise to prominence, the debate surrounding policy responses to counter jihadism abroad and at home has redoubled. There have been calls for the West to engage in a form of partnership with al-Qaeda to tackle the expansion of ISIL. This approach, seeming to embody the adage ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, reveals the persistence of a Lambertist mind-set and its continued prevalence at high levels of policymaking, believing those closest to an enemy are best placed to bring about their downfall. This is an ill-informed line of reasoning, which lacks appreciation of nuance, contextual clarity and, crucially, the disparity between the proposed partners. But aside from suggestions of collaboration with jihadists, the situation highlights the greatest peril of Lambertism – the relativity of moderation. To determine if a view is moderate, it must be judged in relation to something else. ISIL’s extreme brutality and recent success has altered the relative balance of perception with regard to al-Qaeda, in the same way that the truculence of jihadists served to temper views of the non-violent extremists partnered by the MCU. This raises questions about how far this will go, and to what degree a government is willing to temporarily compromise on its cherished principles to uphold them in the long-term.

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4 Counter-extremism strategy When shaping a new strategy, it will be necessary to consider the vision and the aims of the government in doing so, the structures required to implement the strategy, the policies that might be delivered under the strategy, and to provide guidance for choosing organisations and individuals that the government might be willing to partner with. As part of this, we must think about which departments and public bodies will need to have buy-in to this strategy, consider the role of international collaboration in this predominately domestic work, and seek to mitigate some of the risks attached to implementing such a strategy, many of which will be clear from our experiences with Prevent. One significant factor is costing and it will be necessary to produce a holistic strategy that is within the realms of affordability, understanding the economic situation of the country and the likelihood or otherwise of enormous investment in this policy area. Lastly, comprehensive and consistent evaluation will be necessary in order to assess various policies and projects that fall under the strategy, helping the government to continually refine it, and assess its short and long-term effectiveness.

4.1 Vision Definition Rather than just defining extremism in opposition to British values, which has all the makings of a selective legal ambiguity that we absolutely cannot afford to base policy on, this report recommends a human rights-based definition. The appeal of trying to link opposition to terrorism with a feel-good patriotism is understandable. However, an awkward reinvigoration of British identity for the purpose of policy creation is misplaced. An article in The Conversation points out that policing ideology has the unintended consequence of forcing it behind closed doors, where discussions cannot be challenged so easily.106 We are far more likely to become casualties of our own security policy if free speech is made one too. The government currently defines extremism as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;The vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;107 This definition is wrought not only with ambiguity, but with self-contradiction. This bill is being crafted in reference to Islamist extremism, but should be broad enough to tackle all forms of 106

https://theconversation.com/teachers-on-the-frontline-against-terror-what-should-schools-do-about-radicalisation-43942

107

www.bbc.com/news/education-33328377

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extremism and focused enough to do so effectively. The British character of the definition limits this significantly, as is more political than policy-focused, something that should be avoided when building strategy and certainly when crafting legislation. Herein lies the trouble of an uneven definition of extremism. The English Defence League hardly pretends to stand for ‘tolerance’, but it does claim to stand for England. It’s hard to believe that far-right extremists, though they act against religious freedom, won’t find some ‘wiggle-room’ in a clause that purports to defend ‘British values’. Simply put, we cannot define ‘extremism’ in political terms, and simultaneously claim to protect individual liberty and belief. It is therefore preferable to put forward a new definition that removes the politics and is based on human rights: ‘Extremism: An ideology or worldview, which when implemented, would significantly and negatively impact the universal human rights of certain sectors of society, such as women, religious or ethnic groups, sexual minorities, persons with disabilities, and so on, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ The Conservative government has toyed with repealing the 1998 Human Rights Act, largely on the grounds that it has hindered extradition processes against extremists. But we should be worried if the words ‘human rights’ are becoming touted as a hindrance to extremism; the opposite is true. For one thing, the majority of values described as ‘British’ above are, in fact, defended in the Human Rights Act. Crucially, though, in using human rights, we remove the illiberalism from our own, supposedly liberal definition. In doing so, we also weaken the extremists’ stance. Those branded ‘extremists’ under a human rights lens would not so easily be able to paint themselves as victims of political intolerance and illiberalism, but would instead have to acknowledge a fundamental opposition to human rights within their own viewpoints. The language of persecution is a powerful dimension of recruitment among all extremists, but if they are labelled persecutors themselves by dint of the ‘extremist’ label, garnering appeal and sympathy would likely prove trickier. The strength of retaining not only the standards of human rights, but the language of them in fighting extremism, should not be underestimated. Redefining extremism does not necessarily get us out of the free speech quagmire, particularly as far as our public institutions are concerned. It could be argued, for instance, that extending the extremist bracket would actually further damage free speech in institutions like universities, where student bodies have previously attempted to prevent the addresses of far-right speakers, such as when Marine Le Pen addressed the Oxford Union. 108 Suppressing an ideology’s expression does not tend to weaken it, and more likely achieves the opposite. The best counter to ideologies we find loathsome is to challenge them openly. If all extremism is able to be 108

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/05/marine-le-pen-front-national-oxford-union-universityspeech-delayed-protesters

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scrutinised equally, according to a universal standard rather than a ‘British’ one, we might be less afraid that we are endorsing a position with the simple act of allowing it a platform. Moreover, if we are to look to export progressive and proportionate counter-extremism to other countries who share the common challenge posed by extremists, then it will become important to have a universal human rights-based definition, devoid of references to Britishness. This is not to say that British Values should not have a role in primary prevention work that seeks to improve integration and build support for democracy, the rule of law, and tolerance for those who are different from us. These are all values to be admired and to be encouraged among young people, but not best used to negatively define extremism. What kind of extremism? The counter-extremism strategy must tackle extremism of all kinds, whether far-right, far-left or Islamist. The rationale behind this is threefold: first, it should not be counter-terrorism strategy that makes an assessment of the current nature of the threat to UK national security. Rather, it must see extremism as a social ill more comparable to anti-Semitism or homophobia, to be tackled because it goes against our values. If we are to take a values-based approach to a definition of extremism, and define it in opposition to universal human rights, then it is clear that far-right extremism meets this definition as much as Islamist extremism. Secondly, it has been shown how far-right extremist ideas and behaviours become more pronounced after jihadist terrorist attacks, with trends of violent anti-Muslim attacks spiking in the days after Lee Rigby’s murder by jihadists.109 In turn, anti-Muslim hatred is one of the key grievances that is exploited by charismatic recruiters to radicalise young Muslims. Moreover, it is clear that Islamist and anti-Muslim extremists share a worldview, namely that ‘the West is at war with Islam’ or ‘Islam is at war with the West’, that ‘Muslims are not welcome in Britain’ and that ‘Islam is incompatible with universal human rights’. Lastly, for a counter-extremism strategy to be effective, it is very important that the strategy is perceived by society as being fair and proportionate, and not targeting one particular group. On top of this, as will be discussed later, Muslim communities are an important part of society and will be necessary in any civil society-based response. Although the majority do not follow extremist ideologies and should be convinced of the value of tackling Islamist extremists who pervert their faith, if their overriding sense is that the strategy targets their community, they will be unlikely to cooperate with the strategy and the government will lose an important ally. For some, this perception of the government targeting Muslims may be a grievance that is spun by extremist organisations into their broader aforementioned Islamist narrative. Apologists for 109

http://tellmamauk.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Tell%20MAMA%20Reporting%202014-2015.pdf

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Islamist extremism are then likely to show a causative link between counter-extremism and radicalisation, and the effectiveness of the strategy will be undermined. This, and the other risks mentioned above, can be avoided if the strategy tackles all extremisms. What approach should we take? As set out above in the brief history of Prevent, there remains a gap between soft-end community cohesion measures currently pursued by the Department for Communities and Local Government and the sharp-end measures implemented by the Home Office and associated bodies. DCLGâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s work includes efforts to address or reduce grievances through initiatives such as TELL MAMA, an organisation that raises awareness of and improves the reporting methods for antiMuslim hatred. The Home Office has worked in the pre-criminal Prevent space to take mechanical and legislative steps to prevent terrorism, though not extremism, through Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, which tags those suspected of planning terrorist activities, and the Royal Prerogative, which can be used to remove the passport of those reasonably believed to be intending to travel to join a jihadist organisation abroad. It has also implemented the Channel Programme, a voluntary deradicalisation programme that people are referred to if they are believed to exhibit extremist views or behaviours. While the work of both departments is excellent in those regards, little is done in between these two areas, and it is this space that the counter-extremism strategy must target. People who sympathise or empathise with extremist ideology or violent strategies do not commit a crime, and we must not change the law to make such thought a crime, but we do need to accept that jihadist organisations recruit from a pool of people who think like this. This counter-extremism strategy must find ways of preventing these people from escalating their extremist contemplation towards extremist action, but must also consider how to move these people away from extremist contemplation in the first place. The strategy must also consider how to engage with people who subscribe to extremist ideologies and who oppose one or more universal human rights, even if they are opposed to violence. This must be done by understanding the radicalisation process and challenging its main constituent parts: ideology, narratives, grievances and identity crisis. Beyond this targeted prevention, the counter-extremism strategy should pursue upstream primary prevention. This makes no ideological assessment of individuals nor their vulnerability to extremism and radicalisation, but instead builds resilience among key constituencies through a number of early stages interventions. These include raising awareness about the dangers of 47

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radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism; educating about extremist ideology and narratives; promoting core skills such as critical thinking to prevent exploitation by propaganda or charismatic recruiters; and promoting British values such as tolerance, pluralism, democracy and the rule of law and universal human rights such as equality before the law and religious freedom to ensure discrimination is minimised, identity crisis is managed, and grievances are addressed in constructive ways. Finally, deradicalisation must be implemented in order to undo trends of extremism. This may be similar to targeted prevention in the cases of non-violent extremists, but should also be consistent with approaches taken in prisons, as the aim should be to rehabilitate and reintegrate many of those incarcerated for terrorism-related offences. This will reduce recidivism and will also help prevent prisons becoming net exporters of extremism, for even if the prisoner does not reoffend, if he is to go on to radicalise others or to promote non-violent extremist views, the picture is likely to continue getting worse. Effective deradicalisation will rely on assessment of the individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s radicalisation path, his motivation for pursuing extremism, and current commitment to extremism and violence, and understanding that it might be multifaceted and could change over time. This will be followed by targeted disengagement from violence, deradicalisation from the extremist ideology and narratives based on the findings of this assessment, then efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate the individual over time. A secondary goal of such work could be to engage the individual in counter-extremism work due to the credibility that his personal experience gives him, and that he is likely to have with those vulnerable to radicalisation. The red diagram below shows a representation of views among British Muslim communities and suggested action. While not to scale, it shows that there will be some who commit illegal violent extremist actions and a larger percentage who will support those actions but not commit violence themselves. More still may sympathise with the ideology or narratives in whose name these acts are carried out, but do not support the use of violence. Beyond this, there are likely to be even more individuals who share many of the grievances or some of the worldview and prejudices of those who act, but who do not support violent acts nor the groups or individuals who carry them out. The vast majority of British Muslims fall to the left of W% and do not have empathy for Islamist extremism, whether violent or non-violent. The counter-extremism strategy must develop different plans for different people, and these policies have been separated into primary prevention, targeted prevention, and deradicalisation, beyond the existing soft-end community cohesion measures and sharp-end law enforcement. There will of course be overlap, and this is important to ensure that no individual slips through the system.

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The overall aim of a counter-extremism strategy should be to shift the red diagram to the left so that ever fewer people empathise or sympathise with, support, or act in the name of Islamist extremism. Primary prevention is designed to build resilience to stop the majority of British Muslims ever becoming empathisers (or worse) for Islamist extremism. Targeted prevention is designed to ‘win hearts and minds’ of those who do buy in, to a greater or lesser extent, the Islamist ideology. Deradicalisation is intended to acknowledge that no-one is ever lost to this system and that individuals can disavow the Islamist ideology, and reintegrate into British society.

The counter-extremism strategy and the diagram above can work for the spectrum of any extremist ideology. For example, Dylann Roof, the young man who shot nine black Americans in Charleston in June 2015 in the name of his White Supremacist ideology, and who would clearly fall under Z%, has been arrested by law enforcement agencies, and should receive deradicalisation engagement at some point in the future to get him to disavow violence and the White Supremacist ideology, and reintegrate him into American society by getting him to understand the equal rights of all citizens regardless of skin colour. Many fellow White Supremacists would support Dylan Roof’s actions but be unwilling to commit such violence themselves - they would be Y% - and are equally in need of targeted prevention and deradicalisation engagement. If we were to implement broader targeted prevention projects, it would be sensible to focus on those who sympathise with White Supremacist ideology 49

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and continue to fly the Confederate Flag, are openly racist or post extremist content online that is prejudiced against non-whites. These people have not broken the law, and may even condemn Dylann Roof’s violence, but to do not subscribe to universal human rights values as they are willing to discriminate against people who are not white. A broader range of people may be racist against black people, other ethnic minorities or sexualities or may buy into conspiracy theories about black people. These people may even condemn White Supremacist organisations but nonetheless silently condone or harbour bigoted views. A robust counter-extremism strategy would engage with these people, and a nuanced counter-extremism strategy will engage them differently to the other groups mentioned. Broader primary prevention work in wider American civil society can help promote equality, counter discrimination, raise awareness of White Supremacist groups and teach about the dangers of joining such organisations. It can educate people to be tolerant of others, to be resilient and challenge those who espouse such views and can teach white people their particular role in credibly countering violent and non-violent White Supremacists. It can also show ethnic minority communities who think the state is silent and inactive in the face of White Supremacist bigotry that it is doing something to make them safer and protecting their equal rights, which in turn may prevent further extremism and a cycle of violence. A counter-extremism strategy should seek to move the red ‘Actual’ diagram towards the blue ‘Aim’ diagram, where a much greater proportion of people neither empathise nor sympathise with extremism, let alone support or are willing act in the name of it. If we see radicalisation as a mixture of push and pull factors, then it is reasonable to suggest that we should seek to reduce the push factors by building resilience through primary prevention measures, and reduce the pull factors through targeted prevention measures. If we understand non-violent extremism to be worthy of countering, it is important to consider its various manifestations and the various strategies that non-violent extremists might use to promote their ideology and worldview. The most prominent approach is entryism of various kinds. Some institutions and sectors may employ or deliver services to individuals who are vulnerable to extremist ideology and narratives and, in doing so, may inadvertently provide extremists with a position of influence or a platform that enables them to operate with little scrutiny or challenge. As set out in an earlier chapter, Islamist entryists have been successful in the last decade exploiting weaknesses in some institutions and sectors to promote their worldview. Most notable was the Trojan Horse affair in Birmingham schools; however, universities, local government, charities, and even Prevent itself have been vulnerable. So too, has it been noted that prisons are relatively ungoverned spaces where extremists have influenced vulnerable individuals and radicalised them by promoting extremist ideology and narratives. 50

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Therefore, while primary prevention is focused on building resilience among populations and targeted prevention is focused on engaging with people already sympathising or empathising with extremist views or exhibiting extremist behaviour, a robust counter-extremist strategy must invest in building resilience in institutions and sectors to ensure that they are not exploited by extremists, as this can undo much of the good work carried out in other areas. Work must go into further research and resources in to challenging extremist ideologies, countering extremist narratives, avoiding exacerbating grievances through ensuring counter-terrorism legislation and counter-extremism policy are themselves consistent with human rights norms, and through improved communication of policies to help avoid misunderstanding. This can be best seen as tackling extremism and radicalisation rather than preventing radicalisation and extremism among vulnerable people, and that distinction is central to effective counter-extremism work. In sum, the vision of the strategy should be to better understand extremism and radicalisation, actively challenge extremist ideologies and narratives, promote alternatives to extremism through the lens of universal human rights, engage civil society to challenge all extremism as a social ill, train frontline workers to build resilience among the population through primary prevention to reduce vulnerability to radicalisation, build institutional resilience to prevent extremism infiltration of vulnerable sectors and institutions, and continue to build robust frameworks for clear and consistent targeted prevention and deradicalisation when individuals are showing commitment to extremist ideas or behaviour.

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4.2 Structure To implement this vision, a firm structure is required. This is even truer for a strategy that needs buy-in from multiple government departments and various other public bodies such as the Charity Commission, Ofcom, and the National Offender Management System (NOMS), each with their own priorities. They will need to be part of the writing process from the beginning and we therefore recommend consultation with each department as the strategy is developed. That said, there is a dearth of expertise in this relatively new field and, as set out above, a wide range of opinions in the debate about counter-extremism ranging from apologia to alarmism, and it will be important that experts who agree with the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strategic direction are hired in each of these departments. As will be discussed later, there is a significant risk of extremist entryism within this field and government departments and this should be mitigated from the beginning. Due to the national security priorities of the Home Office and the community cohesion focus of the Department for Communities and Local Government, both departments will need significant buy-in to a counter-extremism strategy, but neither should be ultimately responsible for the strategy given their respective priorities. So too, should the Department for Education, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Ministry of Justice, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Department for Health understand that they have important roles in ensuring the counter-extremism strategy is integrated into their broader work, however, if any are in overall control of the strategy, it is likely to be to its detriment. One possible solution could be for this strategy to be run out of the Cabinet office as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body. This counter-extremism body could then be run by a counterextremism tsar and an advisory board that could include members of the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s counterextremism taskforce, and cross-party representation from the House of Commons or House of Lords to ensure political neutrality. The already established Extremism Analysis Unit could sit within this public body, as could the existing Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), and would also have centralised due diligence, training, funding and evaluation capabilities. It would be much quicker to react to the changing nature of radicalisation and the changing manifestations of extremism, be able to take a values-based approach without national security or community cohesion distractions, and build a model that can be adapted by other governments around the world who continue to look to the United Kingdom as pioneers in counter-extremism. Indeed international collaboration is an important aspect of the counter-extremism strategy, for it is clear in the foreign fighter phenomenon that many other Western countries and indeed some other allies in North Africa such as Tunisia are faced with the same challenges as the United Kingdom. Through bodies such as the European Commissionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s favoured Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), the exchange of ideas and best practices in counter-extremism has been possible 52

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since its inception in 2011. However, as this report shows, policies and projects are not the most important aspect of counter-extremism; rather, structure and strategy should be shared across borders too. With the increased trend of the Internet being used in radicalisation and recruitment, this is even more important. Due to the borderless nature of the Internet, a legislative approach to online extremism is unlikely to be taken up universally, nor is likely to be effective in tackling the phenomenon. As Quilliam set out in Jihad Trending in 2014, increased attention for positive measures rather than solely negative measures is to be recommended, but this too will be most effective if there is international collaboration on online counter-narrative strategy, for example. 110 While this report advocates a civil-society approach to tackling extremism of all kinds, the best way for this strategy and approach to be taken up internationally is if it is advocated for centrally, a further reason for the establishment of a new Executive NonDepartmental Public Body. As this report advocates a civil society strategy for tackling extremism, the government should set the strategic direction and establish requirements for all relevant government departments and agencies, and should ensure that the centralised strategy filters down to a local government level. This localisation will be necessary as although the challenges faced by extremism are common to all corners of the country, the particular manifestations of the problem differ significantly between Dewsbury, Cardiff, Luton and Portsmouth, for example. Likewise, many of the organisations able to make a difference to counter extremism only exist on a local level and are unlikely to be known in Whitehall. Engagement with communities, whether Muslim or white working class, and the organisations, religious centres and educational establishments they encompass, is very important to the success of a counter-extremism strategy, and these too are very much localised. A key challenge, then, is to ensure that a centralised strategy feeds down into localised implementation. While this has been tried since 2010 in Prevent, it is clear from the results of two neighbouring London boroughs, Newham and Tower Hamlets, that Prevent is not implemented consistently and has been victim to mismanagement of funds and Islamist entryism, both to be avoided in a future counter-extremism strategy. The risk of too much autonomy for local government in implementing a counter-extremism strategy is a lack of due diligence for partnering organisations, a lack of consistent evaluation, and entryism posed by the very extremist organisations this strategy seeks to counter. Much counter-extremism work delivered in the last decade has been implemented by the police. The two main problems with this relate to trust and capacity. On trust, if the counter-extremism strategy is to be placed between soft-end community cohesion and sharp-end law enforcement, and the police are on the front-line of law enforcement, then it will be unclear whether they are tackling a non-violent and legal phenomenon or a violent and illegal one. As was found in Prevent, 110

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because the police are also in part responsible for Pursue, Protect, and Prepare, it was unclear whether they were seeking information on offenders and focusing on short-term crime prevention with a national security focus, or seeking to deliver primary prevention and raising awareness with a longer-term social cohesion focus. This was confusing to practitioners and beneficiaries of Prevent alike. Moreover, it meant that organisations and individuals who Prevent engaged with were unsure if they were being monitored and interrogated or educated, which contributed to a sense of mistrust and a perception that Prevent was spying on them. Secondly, in terms of capacity, it has been impossible for the police to engage with everyone on a regular enough basis to prevent radicalisation and extremism. If we take the case of the three girls from a school in Bethnal Green who went to Syria to join ISIL, the police went in to their school in December 2014 and concluded that they were not vulnerable to radicalisation, yet by February 2015, they had travelled to join a jihadist terrorist organisation. It is unreasonable to expect that the police would have been able to notice this possibility three months previously, just as it is unreasonable to expect the police to return to that school regularly enough to have enough engagement with the same individuals to be able to notice a change in their ideas and behaviours, given that the police would have to also visit countless other schools in the same area, let alone carry out the rest of their work. Regardless of how we view the radicalisation process, it is accepted that violent extremists (those who break the law) were previously non-violent extremists, who subscribed to the same extremist ideas and opposition to universal human rights, but had not yet gone on to, nor ever go on to in many cases, action. It is also accepted that no-one is born an extremist and that views oppositional to human rights are developed over time due to various factors. As we can say that the changes in thinking and behaviour develops over time in the lead up to action, it is clear that the best chance of spotting such changes will be through regular engagement with an individual. Rather than trying to build capacity in new bodies or law enforcement bodies that donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t naturally fit in this field, it is therefore worth looking at existing frameworks to find people in the field of ideational and behavioural change who will naturally have regular engagement with the target audience, those potentially vulnerable to radicalisation and extremism. Frontline workers such as teachers, youth workers, prison officers, pastoral staff at universities and religious leaders all fit this bill perfectly. There is no issue of capacity, they do not have carry the same negative perceptions as law enforcement, they have already built up trust with the target audience, and they are therefore the perfect civil society partners to deliver much of the counter-extremism work recommended in this report. Therefore, this report recommends requirements for these frontline workers to engage with a counter-extremism strategy, and adequate resources and training for them to carry out their role effectively. With localised delivery and engagement of frontline workers, there remains the challenges of entryism, lack of evaluation, and insufficient resources. This therefore reiterates the reportâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s 54

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earlier recommendation that training and due diligence are conducted centrally, evaluation frameworks are consistent nationally, and counter-extremism funds that trickle down to local level are ring-fenced for use in this area. Further explanation of the roles of the different departments, public bodies, agencies and frontline workers will be included in the subsequent section â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Policy and Deliveryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.

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4.3 Policy and delivery Partnership and engagement A new counter-extremism strategy should learn from previous mistakes of being over-reliant on Wahhabist-influenced Salafists and their non-Muslim sympathisers. This former strategy reflects a wider problem of government reliance on unrepresentative figures whose views are not reflective of those of British Muslim society and whose ideology is often incompatible with universal human rights, therefore making them imperfect partners for counter-extremism work. Such partnerships risk legitimizing the extremist ideological spectrum and should be avoided. So too did partnership with the Muslim Council of Britain, on grounds of their perceived credibility and ability to engage with a large proportion of British Muslims, ultimately fail due to their inability to uphold the values set out in this report. The minimum threshold for partnership should be a commitment to universal human rights standards, and this values basis for partnership should be considered as important as credibility, or ability to deliver, both important aspects too. A national security lens might deem it necessary to go against this baseline for engagement, so we recommend that the counter-extremism strategy is implemented by a new Executive NonDepartmental Public Body mentioned above, which will have a counter-extremism lens. This body can implement a consistent standard for engagement and ensure all partnerships are in the long-term interest of the strategy. A strong counter-extremism body can then act as a natural counter-balance to those working with a national security focus and those working with a community cohesion focus. Counter-extremism engagement (as opposed to partnership) with non-violent extremist organisations and individuals may be necessary from time to time, either to reach individuals for targeted prevention work, or to increase the transparency of the strategy. Private meetings with extremists can be manipulated by them and risk being misrepresented as a governmental endorsement of the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s views or recognition of the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s importance and influence, boosting the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s profile and prestige in the eyes of its constituents. This can be avoided if the body responsible for counter-extremism strategy is clear in its aims and also meets with, supports and partners with non-extremist organisations that can take a more active role in primary prevention and enabling engagement with traditionally hard-to-reach constituents.

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Recruitment and training Improvements need to be made to the processes for recruiting civil servants to roles involving sensitive counter-extremism work. Checks should be upgraded in order to not only ensure that government employees have no links to terrorist organisations, but also that they are not supportive of any key aspects of these organisationsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; ideology or worldviews. In the same way, the government should consider retaining individuals who have a good understanding of extremism and its causes within the body responsible for counter-extremism strategy, and seconding them on to other departments to carry out counter-extremism strategy functions rather than rotating them on to other sectors. In other areas, where ability to carry out a job is mainly reliant on (transferable) skills, rotation may bring benefits, but on more ideas-based agendas, this rotation policy has a negative impact. Comprehensive in-house training for staff working in this area is necessary to ensure the continued effectiveness of the counter-extremism strategy as very often there has been a knowledge and expertise gap between management and delivery, meaning work has been inconsistently carried out. This training should go to the proposed counter-extremism body, to all relevant partnering departments, associated bodies, and frontline workers who will be asked to deliver some of the work.

Evaluation Due to debate about the process of radicalisation and imperfect structures for carrying out the counter-extremism strategy as advised above, there has been inconsistent evaluation of output, outcomes, impact, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in this field in the last decade. The consequence of this has been a limited evidence-base for policy advice and thus a slow rate of improvement. Compounding this problem has been the nature of the agenda â&#x20AC;&#x201C; firstly, much of it was intelligence-led and therefore some evaluation has not been available to academics; secondly, it has been difficult to map individual behavioural change because preventative work requires evaluators to measure a negative, and it is hard to draw conclusive causative links between counter-extremism work and the non-extremist behaviour of those who were engaged with. With a firm structure and strategy, it is therefore recommended that consistent evaluation is carried out at all levels and in all projects. If this can be extended internationally, then governments will be able to reach consensus on counter-extremism best practice. Through this, we can reduce the unintended negative consequences of counter-extremism work, divert resources to the most effective methods, build capacity in key areas, and react more quickly to the changing nature of the threat.

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Online As set out in Quilliam’s White Paper on ‘The Role of Prevent in Countering Online Extremism’, it is clear that the radicalisation phenomenon is very similar, whether online or offline, and that the Internet is simply a vehicle for giving exposure to extremist ideologies.111 The Internet must therefore be seen as a valuable tool to be used in challenging extremism (both violent and nonviolent) and terrorist organisations. RICU should be the public sector lead in supporting challenges to extremist radicalisation online, and should do so by focusing on the main drivers of radicalisation – ideology, narrative, grievance and identity crisis. Online counter-extremism efforts must identify the Islamist ideology as one root cause of violent Islamist extremism. Failure to do so risks widespread confusion within central and local government and in wider society and can serve to directly empower Islamists. The strategy must support groups which engage in outreach by debating with Islamists online and providing online skills to counter-extremism practitioners and frontline workers to ensure their excellent work is replicated online. RICU, under the proposed counter-extremism body, must work with other government departments to ensure that counter-extremism work is carried out online. For example, they can work with the Department for Education on projects to provide young people with critical consumption skills and to engage them in countering extremist narratives, and with other government departments to clearly set out government policy and engage everyone in democracy, preventing the manipulation of grievances by extremists. In this work, the government must present a positive alternative to extremism. This would be by proposing a democratic, liberal and secular narrative in place of extremist narratives and by promoting positive British Muslim role models. This would do much to address the identity questions which are exploited by Islamist and other extremist recruiters. They must also directly challenge ideology and narratives online by providing strong and compelling counter-narratives. The message, messenger and mode for counter-narratives must all fit the target audience, and they must be willing to be flexible in all areas to achieve their aims. With this in mind, the strategy need not over-emphasise the concept of ‘credibility’. This approach is particularly unhelpful as it confuses authority with popularity and neglects the role which ideology and narrative play in radicalisation. This failure would neglect the obvious fact that Islamist organisations routinely reject individuals, such as traditionally trained scholars whose reputation and learning most Muslims would respect, on the narrow grounds that they

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oppose political Islamism. A stronger values-based approach in the counter-extremism strategy will allow for more strategic thinking in online counter-extremism work, and greater challenging of extremist ideas that clash with universal human rights. Given that a civil society-based response to online extremism is the most effective way of challenging all extremisms, this report advocates that while RICU leads from the public sector perspective, private companies such as technology companies may also have an interest in countering extremism, and the general public should be encouraged to challenge extremist ideology and narratives too. Through the sharing of resources, the provision of funding and training, and the building of public-private-third sector partnerships, we can build the capacity of online counter-extremism work. So too, is it important that the evaluation of online counterextremism work is consistent so that different approaches can be compared and their effectiveness quantified, leading to an ever improving evidence-based policy approach in this field.

Policing The police have many roles that touch on various aspects of a counter extremism strategy. Rather than treating them as the principal providers of counter-extremism work, this report recommends using them like any other frontline workers, in accordance with their skills. Their intelligence and information gathering responsibility fit with a counter-terrorism strategy and will therefore not be covered, as counter-extremism is best kept separate from this area. This clear delineation can help desecuritise the agenda and improve public perception of this policy area. The police must be trained in counter-extremism, to understand the ideologies and narratives of extremist organisations as well as their various strategies and tactics. This will help them to avoid doing harm, quicker spot the motivations behind attacks, and enable them to take the correct course of action. When it comes to building relationships with all British citizens to help prevent crime, the police may find it useful to meet with individuals and mosques associated with political Islamism. Such outreach should not imply an endorsement of these groups nor allow the groups to gain prestige or power from their relationship with the police; it is simply a way of facilitating cooperation on crime prevention. Although great strides have been made in this area, some police forces still do not reflect the varied ethnic and religious backgrounds of the British people. Ensuring that the police more accurately reflect the diverse make-up of the British population will help to foster a shared sense of belonging in this country and will be a visible embodiment of successful integration.

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Education Educational institutions are central to communities. They must be core to our promotion of universal human rights standards and, in this regard, are on the frontline for much primary prevention work. The proposed counter-extremism body must therefore train teachers to promote these values, teach critical consumption skills, and raise awareness of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. The tenor of the message must be tailored to the age group to ensure that we are sympathetic to childrenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development needs, and the medium used (whether videos, presentations or interactive content) must also suit the target audience to be most effective. Religious studies classes, particularly those in state-run faith schools, can have a greater role in providing pupils with information about other faiths. Teaching children of all backgrounds about the variety of faiths in the UK and, in particular, diverse and tolerant interpretations of Islam, is a powerful way to undermine far-right and Islamist rhetoric about Islam. Teaching pupils even the most rudimentary details of the differences between Islamism, the modernist political ideology, and Islam, the ancient faith, would not only help protect children from being groomed by Islamist recruiters but would also undermine far-right extremists, such as the ostensibly nonviolent BNP and its violent counterparts such as the National Front and the EDL, who try to argue that Islam itself is inherently a problem. We must also train teachers to spot the signs of radicalisation. As they have regular contact with young people, they will be best placed to note changes of ideas and behaviour that are very often indicators of this process. Much of the guidance that has been given to teachers has acknowledged the ideological origins of terrorism without actually giving teachers information and guidance about how the Islamist ideology may also manifest itself in non-violent ways. Teachers must then be given advice on the appropriate course of action to take in different circumstances, understanding that both being over-cautious or over-paranoid are unhelpful approaches with attached negative consequences. Some teachers may wish to take further training to learn how to conduct targeted prevention, should they identify those most vulnerable to radicalisation, extremism or violence, and this should be readily available. Technology such as Imperoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s software that is a database to help teachers safeguard children from extremism during computer-based lessons is to be encouraged, and can be dovetailed with other proposed measures.112 Educational institutions should be prioritized for building resilience to ensure they are more able to withstand attempts to undermine or subvert it. Teachers, governors and parents need to feel 112

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confident about reporting any safeguarding concerns regarding extremism. We recommend extending whistleblowing and complaints procedures to allow for this. Parallel educational systems such as supplementary schools operate outside the scope of education legislation. Through engaging with local authorities, the police and the Charity Commission, for example, we can ensure that these schools are also not promoting extremist ideology and narratives, nor are they victim to the same sort of extremist entryism that we must seek to prevent. Universities and further education colleges are key partners in counter-extremism work, and must receive similar attention for building resilience to prevent entryism and providing unchallenged platforms for extremist speakers. The National Union of Students produced excellent guidance on responding to tensions between different student faith groups, and countering the risks posed by some external speakers, in its excellent report on external speakers, hate crime and good campus relations. These guidelines must be applied consistently for all kinds of extremism. Particularly for external speakers, student unions must ensure that information about them is given to the university in good time to allow for thorough due diligence, that extremist speakers are not given unchallenged platforms, and that audiences are given comprehensive background information about speakers. So too, can universities engage in primary prevention and targeted prevention. At universities and FE colleges, we must provide pastoral support to students who are potentially vulnerable to extremism. Where possible, universities should avoid responding to campus extremism with increased police presence, if the extremism is non-violent. Instead, we recommend the employment of one counter-extremist specialist, who can draw up specific guidance for the implementation of the counter-extremism strategy at each university, liaise with teaching staff and student union staff as regards their responsibilities, train students and staff members in targeted prevention, conduct due diligence on external speakers, ensure balance in debates in this area, and promote primary prevention activity. As institutions of free enquiry, this report recognizes that the government has a limited role in active counter-extremism on campuses, but this does not negate its responsibility to provide leadership with guidance on safeguarding. Beyond a public role, we encourage third sector organisations to actively engage with student bodies to promote progressive counter-extremism approaches among young future leaders who can take these approaches with them in their professional careers. There is also a concern amongst many staff at universities that they are being asked to engage in ‘spying’ on students, that extremism is ‘the government’s problem’ and that it is not their job to ‘police’ students. Whilst this attitude is sometimes understandable, it is also misplaced. Students and universities are being targeted by extremists for radicalisation. It is not a question of spying on students but of safeguarding vulnerable young people and simultaneously empowering them 61

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to present a civic challenge to extremism. Not enough has been done to inform key university staff about the realities of extremism, to dispel misconceptions about Prevent and to encourage â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;buy-inâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; from a wider range of people. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) must, however, follow the central counter-extremism bodyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s proposals when choosing partners. Like in other sectors, providing legitimacy to the extremist spectrum will make it harder to comprehensively tackle extremism and, through applying values consistently, they can avoid this. Assessment and inspection regimens need to be improved to ensure that lecturers and teachers who subscribe to an extreme ideology are not using their academic positions to spread their ideology to students, as is currently the case in several university campuses. Lecturers, like all citizens, have a right to their own beliefs and this fundamental right should not be compromised. At the same time, extremist ideologies must not be allowed to undermine the academic standards within a university, to threaten the right to equality of treatment for students, nor to create an atmosphere in which intolerance and extremism may thrive. Just as any reasonable person would baulk at the idea of a member of the BNP teaching citizenship classes or the history of nationalism, so members of Hizb ut-Tahrir should not be teaching modules on Muslim empires or trends in modern Islam. Prisons Prisons are also a vulnerable sector for a number of reasons. First is a key question about how to deal with the growing numbers of terrorism-related offenders currently incarcerated. With a counter-extremism lens, we should focus on the most effective way of engaging with terrorismrelated offenders to carry out targeted prevention and deradicalisation. Treating prisons as a place for rehabilitation, the counter-extremism body must work with the Ministry of Justice to develop a structure that can assess the ideological state of those incarcerated, the key drivers of their individual radicalisation processes, and therefore the most suitable deradicalisation messages and methods. This is most important for returning foreign fighters, an increasing cohort of prisoners, but is also important for all terrorism-related offenders and all those deemed to be radicalized or most vulnerable to radicalisation. This work should be carried out by specialists in counter-extremism, rather than necessarily managed by prison chaplains or the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), who while providing excellent pastoral support and expertise in preventing recidivism respectively, know less about radicalisation and extremism. Deradicalisation should be followed by more conventional rehabilitation and reintegration methods by NOMS, to help prevent prisons being net exporters of extremism. Non-violent extremism must be a priority for NOMS, and they have the opportunity to keep counterextremism work throughout the prison and probation term consistent. 62

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Common criminals may be susceptible to extremist narratives as their anti-state grievances can be exploited by extremists and they can be convinced of the perceived benefits of belonging to a gang. Religious conversion in prison is a well-known phenomenon and is not to be discouraged, but it must be acknowledged that converts are at the mercy of their teachers, and if their teachers are promoting an extremist interpretation of religion, it is likely that they will pick up a version of religion that is antithetical to universal human rights values. This is emphatically not just an issue for terrorist-related offenders, but rather applies across the prison estate. NOMS has developed capabilities to contain the threats from terrorist prisoners, including through educational programmes intended to deal with radicalisation, but more focus is needed on primary prevention to reduce the vulnerability of all prisoners. It is equally important in prisons not to empower partners who fail to subscribe to human rights norms. In the past, hard-line Salafists and Islamist supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood have been empowered in place of more mainstream Muslims for research and counter-extremism engagement work. While such Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood do oppose violent jihadism, this should not be the only criteria for choosing government partners â&#x20AC;&#x201C; especially if empowering them may potentially cause long-term damage to counter-extremism, cohesion and integration. Just as non-violent homophobes would not be employed to deal with violent manifestations of homophobia, non-violent Islamists are not the solution to militant Islamism, unless as part of a comprehensive overall strategy to challenge Islamism on a step-by-step basis. Communities The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) should have two principal functions in work related to counter extremism. The first is to ensure the local delivery of a national counter-extremism strategy, to facilitate training and funding for groups that may not exist on a national scale but nonetheless have an important counter-extremism function. The second is to engage with communities that may traditionally be considered vulnerable to extremism such as Muslim communities and white working-class communities. Through responsible engagement with groups and populations in these communities, DCLG has had a responsibility under Prevent to work at the soft-end to improve community cohesion and integration and reduce the appeal of extremism. This is entirely sensible and will help build longterm resilience among British civil society to prevent future radicalisation, so should continue. Under Prevent, however, DCLG was also tasked with coming up with a strategy to tackle nonviolent extremism which was not forthcoming, leaving much vital work uncompleted and eventually even prompting the Home Office to take the lead in this work, to the detriment of the agenda. Under these proposals for a counter-extremism strategy, it is recommended that neither they nor the Home Office be tasked with this important function, due to the perceived difficulties 63

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of simultaneously countering extremist ideology and narratives and building relationships with community organisations. DCLG should work with the counter-extremism body to ensure the synergy between the counterextremism strategy and the integration strategy, in much the same way that it should work with the Home Office to ensure compatibility with counter-terrorism work. Most important is that DCLG buys into the counter-extremism strategy and that clear guidance is given to local councils about who to empower, fund and legitimise as partners for counter-extremism work, and who not to. Failure to grasp this point could mean that local government is victim to entryism, or makes mistakes in counter-extremism that continues to provide the government’s counterextremism body with difficulties about the branding of the strategy. DCLG, with its local relationships with community populations and organisations, can help the government’s counter-extremism body access traditionally hard-to reach parts of the population such as women, children and minorities within minorities. So, rather than building relationships with conservative or majority groups, DCLG can play a really positive role in building bridges with all parts of communities. To do this effectively, the department must stop viewing integration and Muslim communities, for example, solely through a religious lens, but instead for the plurality of identities individuals may hold. Transparency about counter-extremism projects and their goals is the best way of ensuring that Muslims do not feel as though they (rather than Islamists) are ‘targeted’ by this work, and similarly that non-Muslims do not feel that Muslims are receiving preferential treatment by the state. If local counter-extremism projects are not carefully handled then they may risk exacerbating two of the four factors associated with increased radicalisation: grievances, by encouraging a narrative of victimhood and underachievement, and identity, by fostering a sense of discrimination. This can be exploited by extremists of all varieties. Charities Extremist organisations have abused their charitable status, raised money through charity collection, or made use of facilities from other charities. Whether negligent or nefarious, charities have a duty under the rules of the Charity Commission not to use their privilege for terrorist purposes. We recommend that this is expanded to include extremist purposes, as the taxpayer should not be subsidising extremism. While the Charity Commission can suspend a trustee of a charity if they have been convicted of terrorist offences or have links with extremist groups, these individuals can pursue other ‘charitable’ endeavours. We recommend that the government consider disqualifying trustees 64

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should they be found to maintain links with extremism or terrorism. Simultaneously, we must consider extending whistleblowing and complaints procedures to promote transparency and a commitment to human rights standards. Increased support for charities on legal requirements, good governance, financial management and due diligence will help with this. The Commission needs to make itself more open to members of the public who have concerns about individual charities. For example, on the Commissionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s website it is not easy to find information about what a member of the public can do if they have concerns about a charity or its activities. It would be helpful if, as well as providing a complaint form, the Commission had a helpline that individuals, whether they are involved with a charity or not, could call if they have concerns that it is being abused by extremists but are not sure whether there are grounds to make a complaint. To set up as a charity in the first place, we recommend that the government continue the proposed threshold of commitment to universal human rights standards as part of the requirement. Existing charities must be asked to comply with these standards and new definitions of extremism and should be placed into special measures if they fail to meet these requirements, and given a reasonable opportunity to address the concerns raised. International Extremism is a global challenge. With jihadist groups engaged in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and East Africa, and the rise of ISIL attracting foreign terrorist fighters from over 90 countries across the world, there is no place untouched by this phenomenon. While partnerships are in place to counter terrorist threats, we recommend the improvement of structures to facilitate collaboration on counter-extremism with international partners. This should build greater co-ordination of efforts to counter extremist ideology and challenge their narratives, both online and offline. We must engage supranational bodies like the UN and the EU to use their resources better to tackle extremism. As the UK develops a more robust and effective counter-extremism structure and strategy, international partners will continue to look to us as an example. The UK should be willing to share its best practice with international partners to help them tackle the extremist threat. So too, should the UK be open to learning from other countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; experiences with tackling extremism, whether that is the integration and prevention model from the Netherlands, the deradicalisation model from Denmark, or the counter far-right experiences from Germany. The UK must prioritise counter-extremism overseas through the work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. Current work promotes democracy, supports job creation, provides education, tackles corruption, improves the rule of law, and strengthens civil society, but further work to improve primary prevention in 65

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these institutions and to challenge extremist ideology, counter narratives and promote human rights would be welcome. We recommend that the focus of this work is the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and East Africa, where extremist organisations are particularly prevalent. The FCO should identify and build bridges with foreign secularist and pro-democratic individuals and groups in Muslim-majority countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sudan and Egypt. Encouraging these groups to work together and introduce them to comparable UK-based groups will help create a global alliance against Islamism and extremism. While it may be possible for domestic counter-extremism to dovetail with international efforts through the FCO and DfID, there will naturally be different and sometimes conflicting priorities. Just as sharp-end counter-terrorism officials may wish to engage with extremists to prevent terrorist attacks and ensure national security, the FCO may wish to engage with Islamist opposition parties around the world for diplomatic reasons. A strong counter-extremism structure and strategy can prevent these relationships from having a negative long-term impact domestically in the UK.

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Conclusion and recommendations

This report argues for a change in structure to supplement the strategic direction that the government has been advocating in recent months. While the Prime Ministerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2011 was excellent on the need to tackle the Islamist ideology that binds jihadists all around the world and even non-violent Islamists closer to home, he found that the domestic structures to implement this vision were lacking. The Prevent strategy, which was updated in 2011, had the right idea by separating the sharp-end from the soft-end, but ultimately ended up as being incomplete as a strategy to tackle non-violent extremism, challenge ideology and counter-narratives was not forthcoming. Following the emergence of ISIL as a major player and their declaration of a caliphate that has sped up the radicalisation process for many vulnerable recruits, this strategy is overdue. Western jihadists who are inspired by the very same ideology as ISIL, and motivated by the charismatic leaders of that organization, continue to pose a threat to UK national security, and the emergence of the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon whereby as many as 5,000 European Muslims have decided to leave their home nations and travel to the jihadist theatre of Iraq and Syria to join ISIL, show that the manifestations of violent extremism are increasingly multifaceted.113 What they all share, however, is prior contemplation of extremism before they act, and it is at this level that we must respond. This report advocates the creation of a new body between the sharp-end of counter-terrorism and the soft-end of community cohesion that can develop a clear, consistent and comprehensive counter-extremism strategy. This body should challenge ideology, counter narratives, conduct comprehensive primary prevention, engage vulnerable people with targeted prevention, and pursue nuanced deradicalisation programmes. Internally, this body should work with other government departments and bodies to ensure the effective implementation of this strategy, host a due diligence unit, a training unit, an evaluation unit, and should second staff to all other government departments and local government bodies, that are in need of expertise in this field. This report therefore recommends the following: ď&#x201A;ˇ

ď&#x201A;ˇ

Define extremism in opposition to universal human rights, and apply this consistently in all counter-extremism work, including when recruiting and choosing national or local partners.

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

Run the counter-extremism strategy out of the Cabinet office as an Executive NonDepartmental Public Body. This counter-extremism body would then be run by a counterextremism tsar and an advisory board that could include members of the government’s counter-extremism taskforce, and cross-party representation from the House of Commons or House of Lords to ensure political neutrality. The already established Extremism Analysis Unit could sit within this public body, as could the existing Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), and would also have centralised due diligence, training, funding and evaluation capabilities.



Build relationships with a broad spectrum of community partners, prioritizing hard-toreach sectors such as women, young people and minorities within minorities, who may prove to be valuable counter-extremism partners.



Deliver comprehensive in-house training for all staff working in the public sector in this area to ensure effective delivery of all counter-extremism work.



Engage civil society to tackle all extremisms as a social ill, and to do so online as well. One way of doing this can be through building public-private-third sector partnerships.



Treat the police like any other frontline workers in this field. Through the desecuritisation of this agenda and the moving away from a national security lens, the police will naturally have fewer responsibilities, allowing them to focus their resources on sharp-end counterterrorism measures.



Train frontline workers such as teachers, university staff, police officers, prison staff, healthcare workers, and leaders of religious and community organisations, to carry out primary prevention work as part of their natural work. They should be taught how to promote human rights values as an antidote to extremism, teach critical consumptions skills to reduce vulnerability to radicalisation, and raise awareness of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. The very same frontline workers can be trained to spot the signs of radicalisation and made aware of the best courses of action to carry out targeted prevention.



Build resilience in vulnerable institutions and sectors such as schools, universities, prisons and charities to prevent extremist entryism, whereby extremists seek to infiltrate and promote their ideology. This can be achieved through clearer whistleblowing procedures, increased checks and balances through counter-extremism responsibilities for inspection bodies and for institutions when hiring staff, and raised awareness among those who work in these sectors about the dangers of extremism and its multifarious manifestations. 68

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

Work with universities to prevent extremist speakers being given unchallenged platforms and access to potentially vulnerable students. This can be achieved through clearer due diligence procedures at universities, specific counter-extremism guidance for universities, and increased engagement of third sector counter-extremism organizations in universities.



Develop a clearer prison-based strategy for ideological assessment, targeted deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorism-related offenders, particular in regard to returnee foreign terrorist fighters. The partners who deliver this work must, like in other sectors, uphold universal human rights standards and be given adequate training to carry out this deradicalisation effectively.



Identify the vulnerability to radicalisation of common criminals in prisons, who may be attracted to extremist ideology and narratives, and exhibit identity crisis or grievances that increase this vulnerability. Implement prison-specific primary prevention programmes to prevent radicalisation in prisons and stop prisons being net exporters of extremism.



Ensure that national counter-extremism strategy trickles down to local government level and that regional and local counter-extremism partners receive adequate training to fulfill their function.



Build bridges with a broad range of partners in communities to promote this strategy and understand the likelihood of any work in this area being targeted by extremists. Improve the transparency of counter-extremism work and its aims to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel targeted by this work, and that non-Muslims do not feel that Muslims are receiving preferential treatment by the state – both common accusations againstf Prevent.



Develop the notion that in a civil society response to extremism, Muslim communities are an important element of civil society, and have some appropriate expertise to develop theological counter-narratives, access to build community-based projects, credibility to influence potentially vulnerable members of their communities, and a responsibility to seize back their religion from those who wish to do us all harm.



Promote counter-extremism best practice, at the level of structure, strategy and delivery, to international partners. Co-ordinate efforts to counter ideology and narratives with these international partners and leverage the UN and the EU to take the lead on this work. Likewise, we must be willing to learn from successful counter-extremism models in other countries.

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