Detailed analysis of islamic state propaganda video

Detailed Analysis of Islamic State Propaganda Video: Although the Disbelievers Dislike It

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. - 2 -

SEGMENT ONE: ISLAMIC STATE ON THE MARCH .............................................................................. - 3 -

SEGMENT TWO: A PSEUDO-DOCUMENTARY .................................................................................... - 4 -

SEGMENT THREE: THE MASS SIMULTANEOUS BEHEADING ............................................................. - 6 -

IDENTIFYING THE EXECUTIONERS.................................................................................................... - 10 -

SEGMENT FOUR: ALLEGIANCES ....................................................................................................... - 22 -

SEGMENT FIVE: ABDUL RAHMAN (PETER) KASSIG ......................................................................... - 25 -

CONCLUDING REMARKS................................................................................................................... - 31 -

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INTRODUCTION Since its inception, the Islamic State (IS) propaganda machine has repeatedly demonstrated its sophistication and complexity. IS has abandoned the often ramshackle methods of international outreach common to its rivals (e.g. bin Laden's cassette tapes) in favour of meticulously planned, highquality videos. In one of its most recent releases, Although the Disbelievers Dislike It, IS attempts to provide a graphic cinema-quality experience to its viewers, something which, at first sight, it succeeds in achieving. However, upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that discrepancies were overlooked in the editorial process, leading to telling anomalies. ***Please note, pages 25-30 contain screenshots from the video that some readers may find distressing. They are present to illustrate inconsistencies within the production***

The video can be split into five sections, outlined below. Each of these will be dealt with separately in the following pages.

1. Map Moving in Time: Displays territories in which IS has official affiliates (large or small), followed by countries in which it suggests it plans to expand; 2. Documentary-style Narrative: An amalgamation of clips that depict the emergence of the Islamic State over the past 11 years; 3. Parade of Knives & Execution of the 22: Twenty-two Syrian hostages are paraded by their executioners through an olive grove, past a box of knives, and simultaneously beheaded; 4. The Bay’at (Pledges): Return to the map, highlighting (with audio) countries in which groups pledged allegiance to Baghdadi; and 5. Abdul Rahman (Peter) Kassig’s Death Announced: An image of the executioner known as “Jihadi John” (henceforth JJ) standing over the head of the American aid-worker Abdul Rahman (Peter) Kassig, followed by a short clip of JJ alluding to the prophesied "final crusade" showdown in Dabiq, Syria.

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SEGMENT ONE: ISLAMIC STATE ON THE MARCH

Screen shot of Islamic State "spreading of light" throughout the world.

The larger significance of Although the Disbelievers Dislike It is not difficult to decipher: it is an attempt to project IS’ political influence, theological legitimacy and military prowess. If one looks through a technical lens, there are noteworthy anomalies, changes that only become apparent with closer examination.

SPREADING OF THE CALIPHATE Though translations differ slightly, this video was released on the heels of Baghdadi’s audio message by the same title, Although the Disbelievers Dislike It (November 13, 2014). The title of the video release, produced by IS’ Mu’assassat al-Furqan, is taken from the Quran, chapter 9, verse 32: “They want to extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths, but Allah refuses except to perfect His light, although the disbelievers dislike it”.

The first 00:07:35 minutes illustrate this reference, showing the “light” of IS spreading across the world from its origin in Iraq, south to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, west to the Iberian Peninsula and Rome, east across Southwest Asia to China, the Koreas and Japan, and finally across the Atlantic to Mexico and the United States. The implication is that IS intends to expand its caliphate across the world. This is not the propagandists proposing that Islamic State is currently ready to control these territories but rather, it is intended to inspire the audience into action and convince them there is opportunity to usher in the global caliphate wherever they live. Their message is clear: “the caliphate is inevitable and unstoppable."

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SEGMENT TWO: A PSEUDO-DOCUMENTARY

Screen shot at minute mark 1:40 featuring bin Laden.

HISTORY LESSON FROM THE ISLAMIC STATE - 2003 TO PRESENT One of IS’ most recognizable nasheeds (hymn), Ummati Qad Laha Fajrat, opens the historical section of this video. The spotlight shifts from future pursuits to past exploits through a (much-abridged) version of IS’ history dating back to 2003, when the United States led war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq began. Needless to say, it is a creative interpretation of the facts; Mu’assassat al-Furqan (the video’s production unit) gives a revisionist view of history – in reality, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the jihadists he led had been active in Iraq at least two years prior to the war.

REWRITING THE STORY TO SUIT ISLAMIC STATE Footage of coalition assaults from land and air is intermixed with images of the “sons of Islam preparing themselves for battle,” a battle that is purportedly continuing to this day, now reaching Dabiq, northern Syria. The most striking claim made in this documentary is the claim that the Iraqi jihadists of the early 2000s always intended to spread west into Syria, ultimately to stage its forces in Dabiq. This was not the case, no matter the convenience of the story to IS' documentary; it was not until recent years that the Syrian War created the opportunity for IS jihadists to look past the Sykes-Picot line.

Years progress through the highlight reel – the Iraqi insurgency advances and al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at alTawhid w-al-Jihad becomes al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, which then joined the Majlis Shura alMujahidin before it, in turn, subjugates itself to the Hilf al-Mutayyibin, the founding alliance that would later form Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Islamiyya (the Islamic State of Iraq) – and, as they do, a change occurs in the jihadists themselves.

Images of overweight civilian-dressed men toting and misfiring machine guns are followed by footage that better resembles a conventional army, with jihadists wearing military fatigues and moving in -4-

convoys. This is a blatant attempt to showcase the constant efforts by the IS leadership to “progress and advance” the global jihad, adding to its usual motto of “remaining and expanding.”

IMPROVING RELIGIO-POLITICAL STANDING IN GLOBAL JIHADI MOVEMENT The fact that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi gave bay’ah (allegiance) to Usama bin Laden in 2004 is heavily emphasized in this narrative. It seems a rather obvious attempt by IS to improve its religio-political standing within the global jihadist community. IS propagandists are trying to answer detractors and demonstrate that their group, even though it was disavowed by al-Qaeda in February 2014, is nonetheless part of the same global movement. This theme is central to the documentary portion of Although the Disbelievers Dislike It. Furthermore, it betrays the fact that this portion of the video is directed at a global jihadist audience. It is an attempt to historically legitimize itself and convince prospective adherents that it is not a “great source of sedition”, as was recently claimed by prominent figure in Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Mu’assassat al-Furqan’s propagandists are trying to depict IS as heirs of the mujahidin legacy and that they are cut from exactly the same cloth as al-Qaeda.

Screen shot minute mark 5:45 - 5:48 shows prisoners escaping what is presumably Camp Bucca.

SHIA ARE MAIN TARGETS In the last few minutes of this section, the tone changes again and images of barbarities dealt out by the Assad regime, the “Nusayri regime” are shown, before ISI’s leaders “agreed upon the necessity of openly emerging in the Shami battlefield” and ISI became ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. It is then implied that that, while ISIS was focusing on fighting injustice on behalf of Syrian Sunnis, the situation was worsening in Iraq due to the Shia ascendancy and Iran’s supposed co-optation of Baghdad.

The tone changes with clips depicting the backlash against the “blackness rising over [Baghdad] day after day” and taken from Salil al-Sawarim IV and AlaMinhaj al-Nabwa, two other productions from Mu’assassat al-Furqan.

Here, the propagandists’ intention is to portray IS and its newly appointed “caliph” as the vanguard of Sunni Muslims in the war against Shi’ite ascendancy and is communicated vividly.

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SEGMENT THREE: THE MASS SIMULTANEOUS BEHEADING

Click image to enlarge

FIRST OF ITS KIND Segment three is not merely a novel approach to a terrorist execution; the beheading a total of twentytwo prisoners simultaneously sets a new precedent for terrorist propaganda. No other non-state actor has filmed a synchronized beheading of this size or scale before. Twenty-two SAA prisoners are paraded by their executioners in front of the camera in several sequences before the actual execution occurs: first, through an olive grove, then select their knives and, finally, to their final position on either side of JJ. This procession was created on camera in multiple “takes� over no less than 4-6 hours.

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A TOTAL OF TWENTY-TWO That the line-up changes multiple times during the sequences is not immediately noticeable due to editorial cuts, obscuring the number of people actually present at JJ’s side such that media reports have estimated the total number to be between twelve and eighteen.

There were in fact twenty-two executioners in total, corresponding to 22 hostages. The prisoners, who were predominantly captured after the fall of Syrian military bases such as Tabqa and Division 17 in late summer 2014, were relocated on two separate occasions from two different places in Syria, and at first glance seemed to have been chosen at random. However, be that as it may, we have good reason to believe that there was another reason to have each of these twenty-two executioners present.

THE CHOSEN FEW It is immediately clear from the footage that these young jihadists did not get a simple “how to behead” tutorial before being included in the film. They were already experienced in execution, at least on some level. However, be that as it may, we have good reason to believe that there was another reason to have each of these twenty-two executioners present. From the IS propaganda angle, the executioners were featured much more than the prisoners and each was carefully chosen for the honour of participating in this event. In contrast to previous IS productions, which have focused more broadly on IS’ political program. This sequence is motivated by a different propaganda message: the novice executioners are deliberately given a central role, almost as if this footage featured a jihadist “homecoming”, made primarily to focus on IS’ most favoured foreign fighters.

FOLLOWING PREVIOUS FOOTPRINT AND POSSIBLE NATIONALITIES This section of the video capitalizes on the media success of JJ’s solo executions in past videos. It features the twenty-two executioners as jihadists who are international, proficient, and dominant, mimicking JJ in his prior appearances. Similarly, just as speculation as to JJ’s nationality and identity captured global attention, the same is true with this “debutant” group of jihadists. There has been the same race to identify the executioners. However, besides the one confirmed French national, Maxime Hauchard, the rest have been difficult to identify.

TRAC and Quilliam have good reason to believe that there is at least one more executioner of French nationality, at least one from Kazakhstan, potentially two from near Georgia, and individuals from Switzerland, Belgium, Australia, and the Pacific Rim area. JJ himself is believed to be British.

PLANNED FUTURE RELEASES Unlike the preceding segment, this presentation does not merely target global jihadist, IS supporters and potential recruits; rather, it is aimed at international security services too and, of course, the media.

Showing the executioners’ faces was a taunt, a way of emphasizing the perceived inability of the international community to do anything to stop IS. They are now natural candidates for later releases. At least two of the executioners have microphones but only one is briefly shown speaking, suggesting that their interviews were cut and possibly saved for a later time. At the very least, the two who have been miked up, presumably, will be seen in later releases. TRAC has received reports from reliable sources that the original video might have been as long as 45 minutes, which would provide ample footage for a second release.

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MULTIPLE TAKES The parading line-up changes from scene to scene due to the splicing of multiple takes; guns are put aside off camera, and small items of clothing change. Screen shots of extremely short "in-between takes" show the executioners down the line chatting with one another, as if they are aware that they have time to kill before the beheading begins. It also appears that the executioners cleaned themselves between the killing and the after shots, in order to maintain a professional appearance.

Appearing at Minute Mark 10:38, this executioner was the very first shown in slow motion after execution (note presence of microphone on right hand lapel); #19 on chart above. It is interesting to note, he is not seen marching through the olive grove, nor, in line to get his knife. He appears briefly only one other time in the video, next to the other masked executioner (not JJ).

Screen shots above show #1 executioner and #19 executioner side by side with microphones. Based on the microphones, the hidden jihadists, and apparent length of filming time, it is clear that there is quite a bit more footage than this 15:53 video.

THE EDITING MISTAKES One of the most curious editing mistakes the Islamic State has made in the line up around JJ are three hidden jihadi executioners. It is only in transitional sequences of less than a second that each of them is partially visible: what TRAC and Quilliam consider mistakes in the editing process. On TRAC’s visual model of the line-up, produced in conjunction with Quilliam, these three men appear as numbers #18(wearing glasses), #20 (very dark skinned), and #21 (wearing a balaclava).

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Above: small screen grabs of #18, #20, and #21.

JJ’S BODY DOUBLE? The second masked man who appears at the end of the line, never meant to be featured or exposed as being present, raises more questions. He is roughly the same shape and size as JJ, which has led to some speculation that he was a double. Filming for long periods of time out in the open (as well as transportation to the location) makes JJ susceptible to drone or air strikes, making a decoy naturally advantageous.

Additionally, JJ’s role has become more than just his character; he is a figurehead of the Islamic State. The longer he remains unknown the longer he can strike fear and awe into his audience and the longer he remains an idol for potential recruits. He is legendary, IS’ version of Hollywood’s “Dread Pirate Roberts”, a character whose symbolism is more important than the actual person.

No one besides this individual and JJ was allowed to cover their face in this video sequence (something most Western foreign fighters take seriously). Hence, his significance is distinct from the rest. Furthermore, his uniform is slightly out of sync with the rest, his boots are black (not beige) and his pack straps are army green (unlike the others’ camouflaged packs). If he is not serving as a body double/stand-in/understudy/decoy, then his presence is demanded for a more important reason, he may in fact have an authoritative or sensitive position in the Islamic State. Indeed, important figures from within the IS administration regularly appear in propaganda, just with their faces blurred out post-production. Hence, the presence of this balaclava could well be an extension of that.

Click Image to Enlarge (This screen shot appears for less that a tenth of a second at minute mark 9:47 immediately before the mass beheading begins.)

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IDENTIFYING THE EXECUTIONERS One of the most compelling aspects of the video is that it features nineteen bare-faced (and one masked) executioners of various ethnicities, in addition to JJ. Other note-worthy aspects include the effects, the apparent use of indoor “green screen” filming in part of the video, extremely high quality cameras and editing tools, and sound effects that may be able to help identify the studio that produced this video.

Some sources suggest ISIS may have switched from Asia to the Gulf for production in their propaganda campaign. The parade to the knives cuts from two angles, suggesting two cameras, unless the scene was shot twice. One of the men, officially identified as Frenchman Maxime Hauchard, aka Abu Abdullah al-Faransi, mostly appears with his long hair tucked into his hat. However, he is shown after the beheadings with his hair down over his shoulder and the sky is clearly stormier. Both of these changes suggest that a significant off-camera time has elapsed and that the execution scene was shot outdoors, as the darkness and wind coming from behind suggest.

THE VICTIMS Not surprisingly, the video highlights the unnamed “Syrian pilots and officers” as human victims. The three featured at right, left, and centre at the foot of JJ appear to be the youngest, the highest ranking and the most appealing, respectively. All are in navy jumpsuits with distinctive zippers with a “D” shaped cut-out at the bottom. They are also all barefoot, well-groomed, of healthy weight, and do not look drugged. At least some are wearing clean, brightly-coloured civilian clothes under their uniform.

Click image to enlarge

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EXECUTIONERS FROM JJ’S RIGHT HAND, INSIDE TO OUTSIDE #1 "ABOU OTHMAN - SOME ACCOUNTS"

Name: Unknown – (though initially reported as Mickaël Dos Santos aka Abou Othman) Nationality: Variously reported as Australian, Palestinian, or French Description: Light skinned male, 20s, average height, full beard, no moustache, spiral curly hair is collar length, small mouth, bridged nose. He is one of 2 or 3 executioner with a green label hat. Like Hauchard, he wears tan fingerless gloves, but without the black over big knuckles. Green Polka dot or shamrocks on navy socks.

#21 "GLASSES"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Light skinned male, late 20s or 30s, below average height, short beard, and black undershirt. He is the only executioner that wears glasses.

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#2 "REDDISH BEARD"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Chechen, suspected Description: White male, late 20s, average height, full reddish beard, small bent ears, lean cheek, unpronounced nostrils. Black band watch.

#3 "PATCHY SIDEBURNS"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Light skinned male, 20s, average height, chin hairs & patchy sideburns, lean build, slight beak nose. He is one of 2 or 3 executioner with a green label hat. Black band watch.

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#4 "SQUARE BEARD"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Dark skinned male, 20s, average height, small beard cut with square bottom, lean build, full lower lip, pronounced eyelids.

#4 "ABU DUJANA AL-MUHAJIR – SOME ACCOUNTS"

Name: Unknown – (though initially reported as Abdelmajid Gharmaoui, aka Abu Dujana Al-Muhajir (28)) Nationality: Belgian Description: Light skinned male, 20s, low average height, small beard, lean build, flared nostrils, slight beak nose, close-together eyes.

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#6 "SQUARE JAW"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Light skinned male, 20s, average height, small beard mostly under chin, very broad at eyes.

#7 "FRIZZIEST HAIR"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Light skinned male, 20s, average height, small beard with soul patch.

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#8 "SNEERER"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Algerian / French, suspected Description: Dark skinned male, 30s, below average height, full beard with soul patch.

#9 "GOATEE"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Khazakhastan Description: Light skinned Asian male, 20s, average height, dark hair is collar length, chin hair only, lean build. He is one of two executioners with a black undershirt (one turtleneck).

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EXECUTIONERS FROM JJ’S LEFT HAND, INSIDE TO OUTSIDE: #10 "(NOT) NASSER MUTHANA #2"

Name: Unknown (misreported as Nasser Muthana (20)) Nationality: Unknown Description: Dark skinned male, 20s, average height, neck beard with slight mustache.

#11 "HARDLY SEEN"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Dark skinned male, 20s, average height, small beard, wide-set eyes.

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#12 "MAYBE KHAIRUL ANUAR"

Name: Unknown - aka Khairul Anuar (name of Mayla pro archer) Nationality: Mayla or Filipino (Kurdish forces IDed his as Filipino, which fits his features) Description: Dark skinned Asian male, 20s or 30s, much below average height, no beard, and wide bridgeless nose. His hat has a unique lable with a CK, CX, or OX emblem.

Source Khairul Anuar Facebook; Capital Bay

#13 "MAYBE ABU SULAYMAN GHURABA SWISSERY"

Name: Unknown, maybe Swiss national of Algerian descent aka Abu Sulayman Ghuraba Swissery (in charge of a small brigade in IS, area of Raqqa) Nationality: Unknown, Algerian-Swiss Description: Dark skinned male, 20s or early 30s, below average height, small beard and mustache, wide diamond-shaped nose. Blue carabiner on left shoulder strap.

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#14 "(NOT) NASSER MUTHANA #1"

Name: Unknown (British press mistakenly circulated a picture of this man's profile as "1st to the left of Jihad John," when in reality was much farther down the line. Muthana's father spoke to the press saying he did not think this was his son, after initially saying it looked like him) Nationality: unknown Description: Dark skinned Southwest-Asian male, 20s or early 30s, average height, short beard and moustache, dark around eyes. Red something on silver key-ring loop in left shoulder strap.

#15 "ABU ABDULLAH AL-FARANSI"

Name: Maxime Hauchard, aka Abu Abdullah Al-Faransi (22) Nationality: French Description: White male, 20s or 30s, average height, beard with slight mustache, full lips, and thin eyebrows. Like Anu Uthmar, wears tan fingerless gloves, but with black over big knuckles.

Source The Guardian

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#16 "CHINSTRAP"

Name: Unknown Nationality: North African, suspected Arrived in Syria: Unknown Description: Dark skinned male, 20s, average height, beard, long face, lean cheek and build.

#17 "SUSPECTED CHECHEN"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Chechen, suspected Description: White male, late 20s or 30s, average height, soft reddish beard, nose narrow at top and wide at bottom.

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#18 "HIDDEN EXECUTIONER"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Chechen, suspected Description: Dark skinned male, 20s or early 30s, average height, moustache, low bridged nose, forehead angles back. Wears black turtleneck.

#19 "LAZY EYE"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: White male, late 20s or 30s, kinky hair, lazy right eye, pronounced brow, maybe light eyes, scar or scowl crease between eyebrows.

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#20 "BALACLAVA"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Lighter skinned male, lean build. Wears a large silver watch on left wrist.

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SEGMENT FOUR: ALLEGIANCES

This segment can best be understood in the context of a TRAC article that includes a list of countries in which groups have given a their allegiance to Baghdadi, “Islamic State (ISIS) : The Islamic Caliphate, An Invisible Shura and A New Slate for Jihadist.” In this segment, the blue and black map from the introduction is displayed, beginning in Rome. Arab names for various regions of the Levant, Middle East, North Africa and the rest of the world are provided, along with audio clips of pledges of allegiance. IS mujahidin, it is implied, are not just participants or supporters of the so-called caliphate, they are its “citizens”.

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COUNTRIES IN WHICH GROUPS HAVE DECLARED THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO ISLAMIC STATE: 33 REGIONS; OVER 60 GROUPS

IRAQ

GERMANY

SYRIA

MOROCCO

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

NEW ZEALAND

NETHERLANDS

TURKEY

DENMARK

UZBEKISTAN

PALESTINE

ALGERIA

GAZA

LIBYA

EGYPT

NIGERIA

BAHRAIN

SOMALIA

YEMEN

MALI

JORDAN

SUDAN

LEBANON

TUNISIA

INDIA

PHILIPPINES

AFGHANISTAN

INDONESIA and MALAYSIA

PAKISTAN

MALDIVES

BANGLADESH

INDIVIDUALS

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***Please note, pages 25-30 contain screenshots from the video that readers may find distressing.

They are present to illustrate inconsistencies within the production***

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SEGMENT FIVE: ABDUL RAHMAN (PETER) KASSIG

LOWER PRODUCTION QUALITY & DIVERGES FROM POPULAR PREVIOUS "FOOT PRINTS" The fifth and final section – one in which a picture of the disembodied head of Abdul Rahman (Peter) Kassig appears at the feet of “Jihadi John” – is remarkably inconsistent with the rest of the video and, indeed, all previous IS executions of Western hostages.

Unlike other segments, the lower quality of the production makes it seem disjointed, tacked on almost as if it were an afterthought. So significant a deviation from the four previous beheadings of Foley, Sotloff, Haines, and Henning, this image suggests the execution of Kassig did not go as planned.

FAILURE TO INTEGRATE WITH REST OF FILM This scene fails to integrate with the message of Although the Disbelievers Dislike It, the "progress and advance" of the global caliphate, in two ways.

First, it is a step backwards in terms of technical prowess; secondly, it is a direct communication with the United States (the rest of the video has a clear global audience - e.g. the light spreading across nations, the group of international executioners, global declarations of bay’at,etc).

Every single one of JJ's sentences centres around "you" and "your," challenging the United States to face IS at Dabiq and to fulfil the prophecy of the infidels’ demise there. He does not focus on the coalition at all, but speaks almost exclusively of the US’ role in all this, and the fact that it has always intended to occupy Iraq and will be vanquished in doing so. Hence, the message of the overall video and this tacked on segment are not only inconsistent, they are mismatched.

NO INITIAL STATEMENT FROM KASSIG There are many divergences from the established pattern of previous Mu’assassat al-Furqan executions videos featuring JJ. Most importantly, there is no initial statement from the hostage. Given the 25

circumstances, the hostages' words are undoubtedly scripted by their captors, who have used them to communicate demands and priorities. The statements are a valuable tool that IS would not pass over without an overriding interest. Therefore, IS either had a compelling reason to kill Kassig before recording his message, or the opportunity was taken from them.

JJ whitewashes over the obvious omission of Kassig’s last words in saying, "his previous cell mates have already spoken on his behalf." Indeed, in the online jihadist community, rumours abound that Kassig again declared his faith in Allah instead of issuing the prescribed statement, something that made his execution impermissible by Islamic law. For the Islamic State to behead someone while they are making the shahadah would have been a publicity disaster.

MISSING BODY Another equally plausible explanation for the absence of a statement is that Kassig died in captivity before his time of execution was to take place. Indeed, the absence of his body is just as significant as the fact that he made no statement. The body is nowhere to be seen. Historically (and invariably), all jihadist executioners take great care to provide the body as evidence that the execution was not faked.

This absence is deeply important and is another example that the execution did not go to plan. Perhaps, then, the body was absent because he was killed elsewhere or while in captivity and his body deemed not presentable or even unobtainable, and the head simply brought to the place where it was photographed. Even more interesting is the fact that Kassig’s head is only shown twice, each time for a just a few seconds as the camera pans upwards from what we believe to be – with a high degree of certainty - a still photo. Presumably, if JJ was having a “photo op” with Kassig before or after the beheading, there would be multiple photos taken from different angles (after all, we seen in the motion shots of JJ in same segment).”

Minute Mark 14:00 The first of the two (2) times Kassig's head is shown from exact same photo -- not part of filming with JJ. First photo is seen from mm13:59 - mm14:02 = 4 seconds; the second time the photo is seen is mm15:15-mm15:27= 7 seconds.

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SHADOWS ADDED TO PHOTO Moreover, the one photo that we see only twice has odd characteristics. The shadows of both JJ and Kassig’s head do not match the shadows created by the buildings in Dabiq seen in the back ground later in the motion section. The second giveaway that the photo has been digitally altered is the fact that the shadow of the head does not cross JJ’s shoe. If one places a compass on any of the shots, it is plain to see that the shadows were added, and added poorly. Looking at JJ as a sort of sun-dial, based on geometry, we can assume that the shots were taken at end of day. However, how the scene is lit, the lighting is not right for dusk; it should be low and is not.

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MEDICAL REVIEW Analysis from one of the top eye surgeons in the United States: "... looks like an entry wound above the eye and a very unlikely way to remove a head, much easier and more efficient a few inches [to remove a head from torso] further down the neck. Kassig appears to be dead before head was removed... a small entry wound above the eye would likely have a large exit wound responsible for all the blood and gore seen. I also can't visualize successful decapitation in the manner that they present in this one photo."

Analysis from head and neck surgeon #1 "From my view of the stills the dark wound over the left eye (and resultant non-oxygenated drainage medially) seems to be older than the beheading facial spray which was marked with oxygenated arterial blood. The wound over the eye was marked with dark, even possibly crusted arterial or venous blood. Thus, we concur with your opinion that this was a post facto attempt at creating a beheading event when he was likely already deceased. I also feel that the wound above the eye appears to be older, and the fresh blood, with the dependent drainage pattern would appear to have been added for the purpose of the photograph.

Analysis from head and neck surgeon #2 "I can tell from this photo is that the cause of death was more than likely the gunshot wound above the brow."

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POOR ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL WOUND Close-up images of Kassig’s head reveal a prominent injury—probably a gunshot wound-- on the forehead.

Just above his left eye there is an apparent penetration wound with devitalized skin and dried blood extending from it, across the forehead. The wound on Kassig’s head is inconsistent with past releases in which hostages have always appeared groomed and without visible bruises. Based on the photo, it is undeniable that Kassig was injured before his death, whether by IS or some event outside the control of his captors. There does appear to be an attempt to distract from Kassig’s injury, using several layers of blood that appear to be super-imposed across his face.

It is also debatable whether or not the photo that we see is actually a decapitated head. The photo is missing tissue and an angular decapitation – in other words, the wound below the chin is too “clean”. This could mean a couple of things. Either, the image of the disembodied head was photo-shopped or produced via green screen, or a much less plausible option, the executioner took the head and "re-decapitated" it, cutting off both muscle and tissue at a very awkward angle. In our view, it is far more likely that a photo of Kassig’s dead body was taken separate to the video’s filming, at any point in time or place. After this, his body could easily have been removed digitally, using something like an Avid machine, which we know IS has possession of. Indeed, this is something eminently achievable, given what we have seen from IS propagandists in the past.

THREE VENUES LIKELY UTILIZED The forensic digital analyst who stripped down the Kassig section of the video for TRAC and Quilliam, strongly believes that decapitation took place in a low-end studio hut-compound, where someone took a photo of the head, and then photo-shopped it there. That picture was transferred to another facility where it was built into the video. In total, our analysis suggests that three venues were utilized in total: the place of decapitation; the studio of the executioner with green screen; and a third place that holds the “B-roll” of the agit-prop - songs, military footage etc - where it is then integrated into the main release

Screen grab at minute mark 14:00 a split section before the scene moves from still to video of JJ speaking, note the right hand is completely black, not in shadow but is a "cut out" on top of an image.

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NO PRESENTATION OF NEXT VICTIM The final section missing in this execution is the presentation of the next victim. Unlike any of the other execution videos released by IS, there is no identification or warning of the next beheading. There are a number of possible reasons for this, broadly stemming from a handful of distinct possibilities. First, that Islamic State is unable or unwilling at this time to behead additional Western hostages. Other reasons include the possibility that the decision has been made that they're more valuable alive for propaganda than dead, like Cantlie. Another possibility is that they were unable to get the next victim to the place of filming in time for the production (e.g. the individual was not in the physical or mental condition to be presented, there were urgent time constraints, or influential people disagree about who will be next).

The anomalies of this final segment of Although the Disbelievers Dislike can be summed up as thus: rather than video footage, it seems that a photograph of the victim's injured head is shown. There is no body at the beginning of a clip, nor any statement of substance, besides JJ’s polemical taunts towards the US. No arguments are given, nor any demands made. In a sense, IS has created for itself a dead-end; an invitation without any leverage to a nation that refuses to play into IS' eschatological aspirations.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS Undeniably, the production effort behind Although the Disbelievers Dislike It was formidable. It is clear that the content of the video was carefully considered and the individual (or individuals) who directed it were obvious perfectionists. The fact that they took between four and six hours to film a single scene using a number of different takes demonstrates this.

However, no matter how much time was spent filming or in the post-production process, mistakes were made. Most of these were missed on account of the foreign fighter executioners and the race to identify them that ensued. In a sense, that they appeared, bare-faced, was a red herring, designed to distract and steer any analysis. Upon closer inspection though, looking beyond the identities of the executioners, there are some clear inconsistencies and anomalies in the footage. In isolation of each other, these inconsistencies are interesting. However, when aggregated together, they are illuminating.

Upon consideration of them in their totality, we can glean some important information that IS does not want known.

In terms of the logistics of the IS media operation, our analysis of the video has betrayed the fact that there is a substantial amount of capital (economic and human) behind the propaganda. Given the extreme wealth of IS, the financial side aspect is not so surprising. However, the equipment that IS attempted to keep out of shot – the cameras, in particular – demonstrates the professionalism of the operation. Furthermore, our analysis has shed light on the fact that IS has access to, and knowledge of, complicated post-production technology. In the video, there are a number of hallmarks for one system in particular – Avid. This is not something that an amateur photographer can learn through trial and error.

Based on what we know from the above, it is thus likely that the post-production side of Mu’assassat al-Furqan, the side of the IS propaganda machine that requires the expensive machinery, software and, most importantly, human expertise, is not based in Syria or Iraq. To have a propaganda production centre within which was gathered all of these resources would make an easy target for airstrikes (whether intentional or not) and, were it to be bombed, IS would be extremely damaged in the long term. Hence, we can posit, with confidence, that post-production for this kind of IS propaganda is carried out outside of the warzones that are now Syria or Iraq.

Furthermore, given that we know that the size of the refined footage runs into the high hundreds of megabytes, and that there is much more raw footage that we do not see, we can make a further hypothesis, that the location of the post-production team is regional. It is widely known that internet download and upload speeds have been rendered slow due to the crisis in Syria and Iraq. Hence, it would be impractical for the raw high definition footage to be uploaded through an internet connection; this would take a huge amount of time and would fail the minute the connection dropped.

Thus, what is more likely is that the footage is transported manually, saved on hard-drives and couriered to the post-production studio in one of the surrounding countries.

In terms of its strategic objective, this video, in particular, betrays the fact that IS is striving – and struggling – to increase its legitimacy. The documentary section of the video, which is directed at jihadists, emphasises the relationship with al-Qaeda that IS has, while implying that what is happening now in Iraq and Syria is an inevitable extension of bin Laden’s jihadism. IS is trying to get in the global jihadist community’s good books, something which it has failed at doing to date.

The simultaneous beheading is indicative of IS’ intention to garner appeal among the regional population, as well. By this, we do not simply mean jihadists. Rather, in beheading specifically members

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of the Syrian Arab Army, IS is attempting to demonstrate that it is fighting fire with fire and, of course, acting as the protective vanguard for the world’s Sunni Muslims.

The appearance of Kassig’s head at the feet of JJ is an obvious extension of a past motivation for Mu’assassat al-Furqan – JJ’s mocking tone as he taunts the viewer is just another attempt to lure intervention from the West, specifically the US. It is what is missing from this final section that matters, far more than JJ’s polemics. Clearly, something went wrong with Abdul Rahman Kassig’s execution.

Perhaps it was not even intended to happen. It has recently come to light that tense negotiations were being engaged in by senior IS leaders and Jordanian jihadist ideologues over the fate of Kassig, negotiations that evidently failed. It would be unhelpful to hypothesise too much about the specifics of what took place. Whatever the case, it was a deplorable waste of a good life.

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