Policy Briefing: Instability in Libya By Noman Benotman 25 March 2014 The following is a policy recommendation to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament, as requested by its Chairman, Sir Richard Ottaway, to aid in the publishing of a report on extremism and instability in North and West Africa. This will act as a framework for the oral evidence given by Quilliam President Noman Benotman to the Committee on Tuesday 25 March at 2:30pm. The popular uprisings witnessed across North and West Africa reached Libya on 15 February 2011. For the Libyan protestors, the main objectives were in accordance with those set out in Tunisia and Egypt, predominately the overthrow of the long-standing dictatorial regime, in Libya’s case, that of Muammar Gaddafi. The non-violent protests turned violent within weeks following Gaddafi’s forceful response. The involvement of international diplomacy in Libya was officially instigated by the Arab League, where a diplomatic coalition involving the UK was seen as crucial to the provision of support for the Libyan people against Gaddafi. The UK took the lead in this coalition in the face of a potential humanitarian crisis and initially pressured Gaddafi to step down and respond to the Libyan people’s demands. The grounds for military intervention were quickly established when Gaddafi failed to respond to this diplomatic pressure and there was further evidence of his violent reaction to the Libyan people’s peaceful protests. The UK’s direct involvement was both legal and justified on humanitarian grounds and fully sanctioned by UN Resolution 1973. Had the international community not intervened when they did, we may have seen a massacre comparable to the more recent situation in Syria. Intervention was a moral imperative for Britain, was widely supported by the Arab League and was the correct decision. There was little possibility for non-intervention, given the strong international demand for UK involvement in the crisis and given Gaddafi’s intransigence in the face of diplomatic pressure. The military intervention was an overall success in that it provided the essential level of support for rebel forces to overthrow Gaddafi. The UK’s swift decision to support the rebel forces and provide diplomatic and military pressure in support of their cause did well to boost positive sentiment toward Britain throughout the Libyan population, particularly during the struggle to overthrow the regime. Gaddafi was eventually captured on 20 October 2011 during the Battle of Sirte and was killed shortly thereafter, marking the end of his 42 year rule.
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While the emergency response, laid out in UN Resolution 1973, was proportionate and effective, it has failed in its adaptability to the post-Gaddafi circumstances. The scaling down of military involvement contributed to the escalation of chaos. According to the resolution, a final political settlement to the crisis in Libya ought to have been achieved by the parties involved. Through bilateral relations with post-Gaddafi Libya, the UK Government expressed a commitment to rebuild the state and create the necessary building blocks towards democracy to achieve a representative constitution and the holding of free and fair elections. There is now scope for this commitment to be revised and revived in light of Libya’s current and changing situation. Currently Libya faces a disastrous lack of security and law and order, particularly in the southern region. This has much to do with the growing numbers of militia forces shaping the post-Gaddafi Libyan landscape. According to our sources, there are around 250,000 official militia members currently registered with the Libyan government and receiving a salary, understood to be employed to provide security to the vulnerable General National Congress (GNC). With the absence of a wellestablished, strong and effective national army, cooperation with select militia forces has become an imperative for the Government’s security. The GNC has been attacked more than 150 times since its establishment. This severely undermines any effort to centralise control of the country away from fractious militia forces. Libyan militias are also the main source of weapons in North and West Africa and, according to a UN report, they currently supply weapons to 12 different countries including Mali and Syria. The UK engaged in the post-Gaddafi Libya by helping to create some of the necessary building blocks towards democracy such as a national constitution and elections. However, a total failure in Libya’s defence and security sectors, both of which are essential for governments to exercise their power, means that militia have became more powerful and this is having significant implications for the Libyan political system. The UK and the international community must first acknowledge that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) are both inextricably linked and essential priority peacebuilding tasks. David Cameron is correct in his assessment that Libya needs stability, security and justice, but we must now develop a framework to provide this over the next 12 months. Adopting a framework of international aid, as Western governments tend to, requires the recipient to act in the best interests of its people. It also requires sufficient state structures to be in place in order to receive and distribute it properly, though these are clearly non-existent in Libya. Rather than flooding money into a transition, the priority should be in assisting in state-building to make sure that any future transition is robust and in the interests of the Libyan people. Moreover, this is not the time for diplomacy; instead, the focus must be on political intervention, where the international community talks to Libyans and assists them in building the security of their country and the necessary apparatus to strengthen it. It will be possible to build a democratic political process over time, but not when the majority of local stakeholders are currently focused on building political power. The constitution will naturally take three years to incorporate various tribal ideas and visions, rather than the unrealistic three month timeframe that was initially proposed, though this does not mean that the final political solution will be one based on tribal power-sharing. The constitution will require cooperation, 2
agreement and accordance including representation for many different ethnic, religious and tribal groups and must consider existing fault lines. We recommend the implementation of existing international legal frameworks to remove the obstacles to peace in Libya, and political intervention from the UK to provide advice to the Libyan government. Our recommendations are as follows: 1) Militias provide a significant obstacle to the security and stability of Libya and the establishment of its political process. Violent militias exacerbate the tribal divisions within the South of Libya and are often unwilling to engage in the formation of a representative constitution. If Libya were to issue power to a UN task force to list anyone regarded as an obstacle to national stability, in the same way that Yemen did earlier in 2014, and this list were to be submitted to the International Criminal Court, meaning that they were prevented from travelling outside of Libya, other militia leaders and members may be encouraged to reform their approach and stop the cycle of violence. 2) Provide international assistance and advice to Libya on how to draft a constitution. In 2012 there were 140 political parties in Libya. The UK could, for example, provide training to Libya on the system of the British parliament and Westminster-style democracy, models of governance including federalism, or even how to run political campaigns. 3) Give tribes an advisory role in a temporary transition phase to allow them to provide counsel on certain issues and to foster dialogue between them, encouraging them to move away from militia tactics and removing the perception of marginalisation. 4) Support Libya in the Reconciliation Initiative that is backed by the General National Congress (GNC), Libya’s legislative authority. This will engage with more than one million Libyans living abroad who have been unable to return due to being labelled as pro-Gaddafi. Reintegration of these people into Libya, and acceptance that the Gaddafi tribe members must be included in Libya’s future as they are a significant demographic and have skills that are important for the new Libya, is an essential step. 5) Develop Libyan civil society. The strategic partner to foster democracy in Libya is undoubtedly its civil society and the UK’s experience in this would be welcome. Libyan youth want to be part of political life and their skills must be developed through training if we are to connect Libyan southern NGOs with those in the north of the country.
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