Israel palestine the peace process and global extremist discourse

Israel-Palestine: The Peace Process and Global Extremist Discourse

Introduction Incompatibility of opening positions As Palestinian and Israeli negotiators continue talks in Jerusalem and Jericho that began in August 2013, expectations that the latest round of negotiations will bring about a solution remain exceedingly low. This is largely a result of the fundamental incompatibility of opening positions of the negotiating partners. For example, the Palestinian side insists that the 1967 Green Line be recognised as the basis of the future state, whereas Israel has not agreed to respect this principle and has continued settlement construction beyond the Green Line since the commencement of the talks. In addition, the relevance of any agreement signed by the Palestinian side is in doubt due to the ongoing political division of the Palestinians and legitimacy crisis of its leadership. Despite these obvious impediments, negotiations continue with the ostensible aim of reaching a final agreement by March 2014, holding high the principle of visible continuation of the ‘peace process’, even at the expense of establishing conditions which might have a greater chance of leading to peace.

Problem of positions over interests Previous peace agreements have been reached on the basis of an evaluation of the strategic interests of both sides, for example, the negotiations at Camp David in 1978 and Oslo in 1993, were able to reach an accord because both parties recognised that an agreement served their interests. In the intervening time, the conflict has increasingly become one of positions over interests, influenced by extremist views on both sides that view the conflict in absolutist historical and religious terms and negate completely the rights of the other.

Where positions take priority over interests, it is clear that no solution is likely to be found, because the positions of the two sides are mutually exclusive, for example both sides hold the position that East Jerusalem is an integral part of their state. In the debate, ideology frequently takes precedence over practicality, as can be seen in the words of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shortly before the resumption of talks: “the real issue is how to get a demilitarized Palestinian state to finally recognize and accept the one and only Jewish state”1. Instead of trying to force the other side to accept ideological positions, the focus should be on defining and negotiating the strategic interests of each side, both political and economic. Moving back from a conflict of values to one of strategic interests is a prerequisite for a successful peace agreement.

Serving extremist narratives While the Israel-Palestine conflict is fundamentally a conflict of interests over local land and security issues, the conflict has been internationalised by its central role in the foreign policy agendas of many states and organisations worldwide. Extremist narratives seek to internationalise the conflict further by representing it as a manifestation of a wider, more existential value-based conflict between the West the Muslims. A number of factors enhance the value of the Israel-Palestine conflict in an extremist narrative. These include the significance of Jerusalem as a holy city and the false notion of an age-old conflict between Muslims and Jews. Such inaccurate interpretations are supported by the ideologically based rhetoric of positions and values on which discourse around the conflict has more recently been based. Simultaneously, the lack of confidence in a credible process which has a realistic possibility of leading to a mutually acceptable solution leaves open a space of hopelessness and despair which is exploited by extremists on both sides, who propagate fantasised narratives of the conflict to their own ends.

The two-state solution as a primary model While the continued applicability of the two-state solution has been called into question by some commentators, it continues to hold by far the greater consensus of opinion as the most appropriate and realistic outcome, among both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships and publics, and among foreign governments. Therefore, it is assumed as the basis of a solution in the present discussion.

Part 1 - New discourse around strategic interests Gradualism The current peace process is based on an ‘all or nothing’ approach to resolving the conflict, the nine-month timetable for current negotiations theoretically leading to a ‘final status agreement’ by March 2014. Such a conclusion is unlikely given the incompatible starting positions of the two sides, and so the ‘all or nothing’ approach sets the process up for another failure. The long history of repeated failure of negotiations then adds to a general perception of hopelessness which pushes away all participants, making all parties less willing to engage in such negotiations in the future and supporting the extremist viewpoint that armed struggle is the only way to solve the conflict. Recent declarations by both sides that any agreement must be ratified by a referendum further demonstrate the immediacy with which the current peace process attempts to operate. While clearly public ratification is desirable, influencing public opinion towards the acceptance of difficult concessions will be a gradual process, which must be based on a reestablishment of trust between the two sides.

Given current conditions, we need to ask, not what can be done for an immediate final status peace agreement, but what can be done now to facilitate such an agreement in years to come, perhaps even generations to come. Although the Oslo accords are now widely considered to have failed, a critical element of their structure that should be maintained was that of gradualism, recognition that the most problematic areas of conflict cannot be ignored, but also that realistically an immediate solution cannot be found. Instead of attempting to coerce sides into an all or nothing approach, we should focus pragmatically on creating an environment conducive to a future agreement. As part of a gradualist approach, the first steps which should be taken are those to prevent an agreement becoming even more difficult; for example by protecting the territorial integrity of land which is considered likely be part of a future Palestinian state, by halting settlement construction.

Pragmatic co-operation In order to shift the discourse from a conflict of values to one of interests, we have to examine carefully what the interests of each side are and what prevents these interests from exerting due influence on the debate. On the part of the Israelis, who are well on their way to their ambition of an economically successful national homeland, a key strategic interest is co-operation. This co-operation applies to a number of areas: first in terms of the development of a normal relationship with the Palestinian people in order to secure an improved long-term security situation for Israel, but also the improvement of economic relations with neighbouring Arab states, and the improvement of the international image of Israel, which suffers from its role as being cast as an occupying power.

Pragmatic co-operation with the Palestinians and neighbouring Arab states formerly played a key role in Israeli political discourse. In a recent speech at the 2013 World Economic Forum, President and former Prime Minister Shimon Peres emphasised the importance of increased economic cooperation as both a driver towards and a consequence of a peace agreement, echoing a common theme from his tenures as Prime Minister2. However, such a discourse is largely absent from the newer generation of Israeli leaders and the Israeli public, by whom the prospect of rapprochement with Arab neighbours is viewed with suspicion. This reluctance to engage with the wider region is exploited by a rejectionist core in the Israeli political establishment who wish to simply maintain the political status quo and position Israel as an exclusively Western-oriented state, and who are able to claim that that the majority of the Israeli public are indifferent to greater integration into the Middle East region.

It is regularly commented by those on each side that there is no honest intention to reach a settlement on the part of the other. Reluctance and hesitation on the Israeli side to pursue an agreement is symptomatic of the general lack of faith of Israelis that the peace process will lead to any kind of co-operation. In part this is due to the limited economic and security benefits that have resulted from peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, and sporadic rocket attacks that have taken place since the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Faced with

such precedents from previous resolutions, maintaining the status quo has become the more attractive option for Israel. Therefore, there needs to be a comprehensive guarantee that a peace deal will lead to an improvement in security and economic relations for Israel.

A workable solution to these concerns is the involvement of the international community in helping to assuage security concerns. For example, by means of an international presence in a future Palestinian state to assist in building the policing and security capacity necessary to ensure that security threats to Israel do not emanate from its territory3.

Previous agreements have also proved disappointing from the point of view of the Palestinians, among whom the perception is widespread that the Oslo accords merely facilitated the further entrenchment of the occupation of the West Bank. After 45 years, Palestinians are also inured enough to occupation to be able to continue in their current situation indefinitely, rather than cooperate in a process which does not give them confidence that they have something to gain.

The Arab Initiative Amid the focus of attention on the most recent round of US-mediated talks, another, potentially very significant development which took place earlier this year has been somewhat overlooked. The announcement of representatives of the Arab League in Washington in April that they are willing to update the long-standing Arab Peace Initiative to include the possibility of land-swaps was highly significant, since it represents the first time that the Arab League has indicated acceptance in principle of Israel keeping land captured in 1967. This departure from a previously held red line demonstrates a clear movement on the part of the Arab League to move towards a negotiation based on interests. The movement was also publicly welcomed by high-level Israeli politicians such as Tzipi Livni and Ehud Olmert, and Netanyahu himself hinted at the possibility of the initiative forming a basis for negotiations, stating in the Knesset that “the Arab Initiative has been mentioned and we are prepared to discuss initiatives that are proposals and not edicts”4.

The challenge of Israeli public opinion Although there is a historic lack of trust in Arab initiatives on the part of the Israeli public, polls have shown that a majority of Israelis support the principles behind the Arab Initiative, (in addition to the principle of a two-state solution in general)5. However, the underlying lack of faith on the part of the Israeli public that any agreement will truly lead to a solution to Israel’s security problems has made the discussion of concessions such as the dismantlement of settlements, or even of the issue of the Palestinian conflict itself, politically poisonous across the Israeli political spectrum. This is demonstrated by the campaigns leading up to the January 2013 Israeli general election, which were dominated by internal economic concerns, and in which the ‘security question’ took no part in the debate, except among fringe left-wing parties such as Meretz.

As the Israeli public is the electorate of the political actors who have the power to make the concessions necessary to achieve a solution, building Israeli public trust in the Palestinians must be a key objective of a long-term strategy to create more favourable future conditions for an agreement. In the current climate of opinion, and particularly in the context of a coalition government that includes parties representing the interests of settlers, the taboo nature of the peace process in public discourse represents a serious obstacle to the progression of negotiations.

It is equally true that a shift in Palestinian public opinion will be needed. For example, the acceptance that certain demands, such as the full return of all 1948 refugees and their descendants, are not likely to ever be accommodated by Israel in a peace agreement.

The effect of civil war in Syria and the evolution of the Iranian position While it is impossible to be able to accurately predict the long-term consequences of the civil war in Syria, there are a number of immediate consequences for Israel which are likely to affect its position in relation to the Palestinians. Although the rhetoric of Bashar al-Assad has previously been solidly anti-Israel, the country has not possessed the military means to pose a realistic threat, and Assad’s control on power has been sufficient to prevent Syria being used by extra-national groups as a base from which to attack Israel. With the future of the Assad regime in doubt, the Syrian situation represents a new uncertainty for Israeli security.

However, the civil war in Syria has also resulted in a shift in the position of Hezbollah. While in the years since the organisation’s foundation, its armed struggle against Israel has earned it widespread cross-sectarian Arab support, the entry of Hezbollah as a Shi’a paramilitary force in the Syrian civil war has entailed a repositioning of the organisation which will be likely to endure as long as the war in Syria continues, and it is yet to become clear how this will affect the threat it poses to Israel.

It has been suggested that Iran’s recent repositioning towards the West has raised the possibility of a scaling back in its support for Hezbollah. Recent announcements made by President Rouhani which have attempted to downplay anti-Israel rhetoric from the past should be considered in the light of events in Syria, in which the revolution against Bashar al-Assad poses a serious threat to a key centre of Iranian influence in the region. Faced with such a serious strategic threat, the importance of Palestine, which has never constituted a strategic interest for Iran, but rather a symbolic expression aimed at branding Iran as a defender of Muslims against ‘Western imperialism’, has diminished in Iran’s discourse.

The Israeli establishment has, however, not taken this view. In an October 2013 speech to the UN, Netanyahu went to great lengths to emphasise that, despite the overtures to the West and softening of rhetoric on Israel made by the new President of Iran Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s nuclear programme still poses as great an existential threat to Israel as ever,

underscoring the potential for an Israeli attack on Iran to take place at some point in the future. Hostility between Iran and Israel can be seen as an example of placing ideological positions above strategic interests. Indeed, veteran military correspondent Alon Ben David published an editorial in Haaretz which suggested that the reason for Israel’s participation in the latest round of peace talks with the Palestinians is simply in order to facilitate an attack on Iran, ‘If the Israelis want backing for an attack on Iran in the summer of 2014, they have to clear the table of the Palestinian issue’6.

Such a policy would ignore the reality that a solution with the Palestinians would in fact be the best way to neutralise the ‘existential threat’ from Iran, given that Iranian officials have in the past publicly stated that a peace agreement acceptable to Palestinians is also acceptable to Iran. Indeed, such an agreement would be a much more durable solution, given that the most likely result of an attack on Iranian nuclear installations would be their reconstruction with renewed vigour.

However, according to some commentators, the eventual decision made by the US and other Western governments not to intervene in Syria has reinforced the prevalent idea amongst the Israeli establishment that they must rely on themselves for protection as the will to act in their defence will be lacking7.

Part 2 – Extremist Exploitation of the Conflict Palestine in extremist rhetoric The direct impact of the conflict only affects those living in the State of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and refugees from these areas. Despite this, the conflict attracts a huge amount of polemic in which it is exploited as a part of a ‘clash of civilisations’ or a ‘war on Islam’. A ‘clash of civilisations’ rhetoric encourages others around the world to believe that their own interests are represented in the conflict, although in fact this is not the case. This polemic is a rallying cry to extremists, and is exploited as an opportunity to recruit others to the cause.

Significant research has documented a psychological process by which a sense of moral outrage at the individual level, when placed into the constructed broader context of ‘Islam versus the West’ becomes part of a ‘morality play’ which conflates local issues with international power relations, leading to the radicalisation of that individual8.

In recent decades, the Israel-Palestine conflict has featured prominently in the communications of international extremist groups. Such communications, often issued by groups whose local concerns are far removed from Palestine, typically seek to internationalise the conflict and promote greater outrage among Muslims around the world.

For example, a statement issued by the Taliban in January 2009 declared that ‘the Islamic Emirate hereby urges the entire Muslim Ummah ... to work out ways so as to put an end to the Israeli invasion of Palestine and its savage aggression against the oppressed people’9.

In an interview shortly after September 11th 2001, Osama Bin Laden declared that ‘America will not have security until we have it in Palestine’10. This statement, often repeated in various forms, has long been a cornerstone of the Al-Qaeda discourse. The ‘we’ indicating the conflagration of Al-Qaeda and the Palestinians is false. Not only is there scant evidence for any kind of organisational ties between Al-Qaeda and any Palestinian groups; the objectives and interests of Al-Qaeda and its associated groups differ fundamentally in their ideological bases and objectives from all major Palestinian organisations, including the most extreme, because the Al-Qaeda agenda is international, while the ambitions of Palestinian groups of all kinds are limited to the local context.

Throughout its history, the existence of Israel has formed a central role in jihadi doctrine. In February 1998, shortly before Al-Qaeda came to widespread notoriety as a result of the East Africa US Embassy bombings, it published a manifesto of sorts entitled ‘Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders’ in the newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi. The statement conflates the existence of Israel, US aggression against Iraq, and the presence of the US military in the Arabian peninsula into a ‘Crusader-Jewish alliance’, arguing that ‘the purposes of the Americans … also serve the petty state of the Jews, to divert attention from their occupation of Jerusalem and their killing of Muslims in it’ 11. This assertion demonstrates how jihadi narratives deprive Palestinians of agency in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, describing them simply (and not taking into account their religious diversity) as ‘Muslims’. In this narrative, Israelis too are presented as simply an agent of the US. The removal of the individual agency on both sides reflects the perception that Israel is simply an extension of the US in the Middle East and that the Palestinians have no true national representation.

A specific tactic of Al-Qaeda and related groups has been to attract support by linking the Israel-Palestine conflict to other regional issues, in order to exploit widespread sympathy in the region for the Palestinian cause and build support for its own objectives in other countries. This continues to be a key strategy in relation to the ongoing revolutionary wave in the Arab World, for example, in an April 2012 public document by Ayman al-Zawahiri entitled ‘Move forward, O Lions of Sham’, Zawahiri makes constant references to Israel, conflating the fight against the Assad regime with the fight against Israel, stating ‘This is the regime … that has protected the Israeli borders for about forty years’, a description which conflicts with the fact that rejection of Israel has always been a central tenet of the foreign policy of the Assad regime12. The document also revisits some classic mythologising of medieval history in relation to Israel, ‘remember that Salah Ad-Deen’s liberation of al-Quds began with Nur Ad-Deen’s liberation of Damascus and Salah Ad-Deen’s liberation of Cairo’.

Such lyricism demonstrates the way in which Palestine plays a symbolic role between history and legend in jihadi discourse.

Geographical significance of Palestine to jihadis

Land and space are fundamental concepts of jihadi groups. For example, the concepts of Dar al-Islam (House of Islam) and Dar al-Harb (House of War), which regularly appear in jihadi literature, indicate the special areas where an interpretation of Sharia is enforced as law and where it is not. Alternatively, the concept of Dar al-Islam is equated to ‘a geographical zone, the broad Islamic belt from Morocco to the coast of East Africa to Indonesia that should be widened by jihad’13. Within this space, the Hijaz region of Saudi Arabia and Jerusalem are given particular prominence, as emphasised by Bin Laden in a speech in August 1996: “Utmost effort should be made to prepare and instigate the Ummah against the enemy, the American-Israeli alliance occupying the country of the two Holy Places [the Hijaz] and the route of the Apostle to the Furthest Mosque [the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem]”14.

The fact that the almost complete withdrawal of US forces from Saudi Arabia in 2003 was not noted in Al-Qaeda communication demonstrates the way in which jihadi doctrine presents information as divine guidance that always conforms with a pre-existing narrative, with scant relation to facts and developments actually taking place. It carries no practical considerations or recognitions of facts on the ground, and is therefore only acceptable within the realms of a fantasy which can only be believed in by those who have lost hope that a real solution can be found.

Palestinian Islamism In rejecting the claim of jihadi groups to represent Palestinian interests, we must also recognise that an extremist Islamist narrative is present in Palestinian politics, both within Hamas and more extreme groups. This is particularly the case in the Gaza Strip, where the failure of governments to fulfil public expectations has led to loosely organised extremist organisations gaining influence15. It is also clear that extreme positions that view the conflict as an existential struggle between Muslims and Jews also have considerable currency in Palestinian society; jihadi groups operating within the West Bank and Gaza help to propagate such viewpoints. For Islamist Palestinian groups, as with international jihadis, Palestinian national interests cease to be the main objective, and the enemy becomes all those who do not share the Islamist vision for society, in addition to Israel. We must reject the influence of such groups in the debate as another manifestation of a conflict of values whose viewpoint cannot be incorporated into a peace agreement.

Hypocrisy of jihadi narrative By proposing the destruction of Israel by force as the only solution, the extremist narrative ignores the reality that the vast majority of Palestinian society supports a solution based on the coexistence of Israelis and Palestinians in the region16. This narrative also ignores the reality that Palestinian society comprises both Muslims and Christians, and that Palestinian culture has traditionally been religiously moderate and accepting of diversity.

Jihadi hypocrisy in claiming concern for the Palestinian people is demonstrated by its actions in the wider region. For example, the 2010 Baghdad Church Massacre, which left 58 dead, committed by the Islamic State of Iraq, an Al-Qaeda-linked Sunni insurgent group, took place one week after a significant official condemnation of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories by the Vatican. The massacre was one of a series of attacks against the Christian minority perpetrated by Al-Qaeda-related organisations in Iraq, aimed at promoting the narrative of eternal conflict between the West and Islam by sowing division between Christian and Muslim populations and thus accelerating Christian emigration from the region, including from Palestine. Such attacks add credence to the view, espoused by Israeli Ambassador to the US Michael Oren in a recent television interview 17, that emigration of Christians is a result of Islamist aggression rather than the effects of Israeli policies, as argued by a number of Palestinian emigrants themselves18.

Reactions to jihadism The nature of ideological extremism is to distort and fantasise real events in order to develop a false narrative that conforms to its pre-existing ideologies. Because of this, peace agreements and compromises in the Israel-Palestine conflict will not necessarily take away the fuel for the extremist narrative. Thus, it is also necessary to counter the ideology itself.

In shifting the discourse around the conflict, we need to look at practices developed in the field of strategic communications and establish what can be learned from this area. For example, in the adaptation of discourses that promote interests above positions, and that promote the nature of the conflict as a regional issue rather than part of a global clash of civilisations.

Part 3 – Proposals for a shift in discourse and representation Upgrading of Palestinian side The credibility of the current talks is damaged by the unequal status of the two partners, by which only Israel is a fully recognised state with unquestioned legitimacy to represent its people. The low level of confidence in Mahmoud Abbas is compounded by the fact that Palestinians still have no united leadership and no official status to their government.

Confidence is further undermined by the fact that that the Palestinians have halted the process of joining international organisations as part of a pre-talks agreement. The pursuit of talks outside of the context of international law emphasises the unofficial nature of the Palestinian leadership. In the current situation, institutions such as the International Criminal Court in the Hague have no jurisdiction over the Palestinian Territories, meaning that there is no opportunity to challenge Israeli actions in these territories other than through the Israeli courts. International legal accountability would go some way to maintaining checks and balances for Israel’s vastly superior economic and military power.

However, the upgrading of the Palestinian authority to the position of internationally recognised state also carries risks for the long-term resolution of the conflict, by potentially turning the conflict into a border dispute between two nations, sidestepping other critical issues.

It is important to emphasise that the upgrading of the Palestinian side to statehood would also contribute to Israel’s security, by conferring on the Palestinians the same international responsibilities for the security of its neighbours as those incumbent on other states. In addition, the increased international legitimacy of Palestinian political representation has the potential to damage the credibility of the jihadi narrative, since disagreement with a non-official position is by nature more damaging than disagreement with an official one.

Such an upgrade would also delegitimise the position of states such as Iran in relation to the conflict.

US involvement in conflict One of the most powerful and enduring facets of the jihadi narratives surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict is that of Israel as a proxy state for the US, and its occupation of Palestinian land as an extension of the US ‘war against Islam’. Factors contributing to this view include the military and aid budget provided to Israel by the US, and the perceived inequality in the treatment by the US of the two sides. As an impartial arbiter and broker in the peace process, there are a number of ways in which the US could potentially reduce the salience of this idea and emphasise its own impartiality by coordinating its reactions to events by both sides. For example, the US has officially criticised a number of actions taken by each side as unhelpful to the peace process. These actions include Palestinian attempts to gain recognition by UN agencies such as UNESCO, and Israeli settlement construction.

While the Palestinians have faced a significant cut in their US aid budget as a response to such actions, Israel has not faced similar sanctions. Applying equal and proportionate rewards and penalties to both sides would reduce the credibility of the jihadi narrative of Israel as a US proxy and demonstrate US impartiality, as well as providing an incentive for Israel to halt settlement construction.

In addition, the US, as well as other international partners, need to demonstrate that it is committed to providing the grassroots economic support essential to the viability of a Palestinian state. In its current economically dependent situation, even if an effective plan for a two-state solution were agreed, the prospect of a viable state seems distant, which enforces the widespread cynicism of the Palestinian public about negotiations.

Retaliation and collective punishment Policies of retaliation and collective punishment have also helped to shape the conflict as one of ideological and emotional rejection of the other, rather than the negotiation between the strategic interests of both parties. There are numerous examples of this,

including violent attacks on civilians in response to the occupation and settlement construction in response to specific acts of violence. Such policies of collectively ‘making the other pay’ are inherently nihilist, because they knowingly aggravate the conflict without any benefit, and are both symptomatic of and contributory to an attitude of hopelessness. Acts of retaliation and collective punishment also conform to the perception of the conflict as a clash of civilisations, because they attack the other without attempting to engage with the respective interests of each side. It is incumbent on both leaderships to ensure that they do not promote the politics of retaliation and collective punishment, neither as policy nor in the glorification of individuals who commit acts of violence. The policy of retaliation is a failure, both morally and strategically, and contributes to a global sense of outrage about the conflict, which in turn fuels international extremist narratives.

Role of historical events in the conflict Historical grievances have long carried undue influence in the discourses of both sides and acted as justification for present-day policies. For example, reference to actions that took place during Israel’s war of independence as a rationale for modern-day policies. While historical injustices must be recognised, a focus on past grievances in the conflict concentrates debate on those issues that are beyond resolution, rather than the achievable resolution of present-day land and security issues. It has been shown that some progress has been made by moving away from negotiating positions based on historical facts, such as the acceptance of the principle that it is in the interests of both sides to consider a border that varies to some degree from the 1967 green line.

Unilateral action High-level Israeli sources have indicated that serious consideration is being given to a unilateral withdrawal of some areas of the West Bank, in the event that, as expected, the current negotiations fail to lead to a resolution. This decision is based on the experience of the 2005 Gaza withdrawal, which allowed Israel to improve its international image by reframing the narrative concerning Gaza from one of occupation to one of conflict between opposing sides.

However, it is highly improbable that this option would be conducive to a sustainable peace.

Firstly, negotiation on borders is indispensible in order to ensure that variations from the 1967 Green Line are mutually agreed, as well as a large number of other security issues. As can be seen from the failure of the Gaza withdrawal to ensure security, a solution that denies any element of Palestinian agency cannot lead to pragmatic co-operation, because it cannot offer an answer to the large number of legitimate Palestinian grievances that extend beyond the occupation of territories captured in 1967.

Unilateral withdrawal, as demonstrated by the situation in Gaza, would provide a situation where Israel is allowed to absolve itself of responsibility for humanitarian conditions in its

formerly occupied territory, and leave a Palestinian population with no sense of reconciliation, which in highly unstable political circumstances could lead to future aggression against Israel, in turn provoking harsh retaliation. Such a sequence of events, already witnessed in Gaza, would further remove the prospect of a solution providing security for both sides.

Looking Ahead Although the current situation is widely considered to be one of impasse, the unlikelihood of achieving a final status peace agreement in the near future does not mean that it is impossible for both sides to shift their discourse around the conflict away from certain positions and narratives that render an eventual solution more difficult.

In the event that a peace agreement is finally reached, it will necessarily have to involve very painful concessions on both sides. There is little hope that an agreement will be reached in the near future, and there is no hope of reaching an agreement that will be unequivocally accepted by all on both sides – thus there will be unresolved issues that will continue to fuel extremist discourse. In addition, because the narratives of extremist groups are based on fantasised versions of events, rather than corresponding to the events themselves, it is certain that the Israel-Palestinian conflict will continue to represent an important part of jihadi rhetoric for the foreseeable future, regardless of whether or not any agreement is reached in the conflict.

The imperative to target the exploitation of the Israel-Palestine conflict in extremist discourse is thus clear. Since support for the Palestinian cause is widespread and heartfelt among Muslims and others, pro-Palestinian anti-Israel rhetoric constitutes one of the most persuasive elements of jihadi narratives and acts as both a recruiting tool and a mark of credibility. Depriving extremist groups of this salient point would work towards depriving them of support and capacity.

A strategic impartial brokerage by the US will help to dispel the notion of the conflict as an assault on Islam by the West. However, the current situation, by which the US is seen to be the sole active foreign mediator in negotiations, is not the clearest way to demonstrate a balanced international response to the conflict. In order to achieve this, the influence of other states and organisations such as the EU should also be promoted. As John Kerry recently suggested publicly, the greater involvement of Turkey in negotiations would also potentially provide reassurance in the impartiality of foreign influence, and recent reorientations in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East demonstrate the compatibility of this role with Turkish strategic interests19. However, the relationship between Turkey and Israel has yet to regain its former trust in the wake of a series of unfavourable diplomatic incidents. At the same time, it is not in the Turkish interest to take

part in a peace process that is doomed to failure, and therefore it will have to be demonstrated that there is something new being brought to the table to take negotiations forward.

Above other factors, international perception of the conflict is influenced by the inequality between the two sides, which makes it easier for the claim to be made that one side is oppressing the other. The continuation of the upgrading of the status of the Palestinian side by means of membership of and access to international organisations will be a gradual process by which this inequality can be addressed, giving Palestinians access to the same international support that other states enjoy, and an equal footing to challenge the occupation of the Palestinian Territories. A conflict between equals demonstrated in this way would have significantly less currency in an extremist narrative than the current reality of military oppression of a weak and unrecognised entity. In addition, a shift towards the politics of interests above positions will help to demonstrate that negotiations have a realistic possibility of making practical gains, and break down the attitude of hopelessness towards the conflict, a factor which lies close to the root of continuing support for extremism.

By Noman Benotman and Ed Swan

1

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/08/16/Netanyahu-Root-problem-Palestinian-failure-to-recognizeIsrael/UPI-71941376686817/ 2 http://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-shimor-peress-speech-at-the-world-economic-forum/ 3 Arthur Hughes, ‘Security Challenges in a Two-State Solution: Is an International Role the Key?’ http://www.mei.edu/content/security-challenges-two-state-solution-international-role-key 4 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/us-israel-palestinians-arabs-idUSBRE9540VK20130605 5 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/most-israelis-back-arab-peace-initiative.html 6

http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.540110# http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Weak-world-response-on-Syria-boosts-chance-of-strong-Israeli-action-on-Iran324912 8 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, Pennsylvania University Press, 2008 9 http://jihadology.net/2012/11/21/new-statement-from-the-islamic-emirate-of-afghanistan-regarding-israeli-aggressionagainst-gaza/ 10 http://aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=620854&issueno=11850 11 Bernard Lewis, ‘License to Kill: Usama Bin Ladin’s Declaration of Jihad’, Foreign Affairs 12 http://jihadology.net/2012/02/11/as-sa%E1%B8%A5ab-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-al-qaidahs-drayman-al-%E1%BA%93awahiri-onward-oh-lions-of-syria/ 7

13

Joseph J Hobbs, The Geographical Dimensions of Al-Qa’ida Rhetoric’, Geographical Review Ibid.

15 Danish Institute for International Studies, Gaza’s New Islamists, 2011 16 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2013/p47e.html#head4 17 http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7406238n 18 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-farah/palestinian-christians-against-the-occupation_b_1466027.html 14

19

http://www.todayszaman.com/news-311949‐israel‐dismisses‐turkey‐as‐mediator‐in-peace-process.html