Pulling together to defeat terror

Contents Page

Preface

1. Reaching Out to Extremists – Rehabilitation Centres

2. Muslim Communities and Groups

3. Muslim Scholars and Leaders

4. Muslim Educational Establishments

2 3 5 7 9

5. Colleges and Universities

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7. Responsible Media

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6. Tackling Prison Radicalisation

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8. Joined-Up Government

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Preface

At Quilliam, we believe that there is now sufficient understanding among mainstream civil society of the causes of radicalization among young Muslims and, in some cases, overstepping the mark into acts of violence.

Those who are prepared to accept objective assessment, untarnished by ideological prisms, can grasp what factors lead to suicide bombings.

Regre:ably, most Muslim communities and leaders are yet to accept publicly the depth of this communal malaise.

Publications by Demos, Policy Exchange, Civitas, IPPR, and RUSI have enhanced our understanding of the nature of the Islamist threat, and the issues underlying Muslim a:raction to radical Islamism.

But what to do?

This paper will highlight key areas of action for major stakeholders in the field of British counter terrorism. Produced by Muslims, it is exceptionally candid about the task at hand. Some of our recommendations have already been made by colleagues at the above think tanks, and others are soon to become government policy. Nevertheless, this document will incorporate answers to questions from Muslim leaders, civil servants, journalists, think tankers and members of the public to Quilliam Foundation staff about practical steps to uprooting terrorism.

There are no quick fixes to terrorism. Just as Western policies in Afghanistan, coupled with the growth of an aggressive Islamist ideology over the last two decades have contributed to the creation of international terrorism it will take a similar amount of time to turn the tide. Assuming, of course, that we do not sow the seeds for future conflicts while a:empting to uproot current terrorism. Therefore the use of austere Saudi Wahhabite clerics, or less extreme Muslim Brotherhood offshoots (especially in Britain) to undermine al-Qaeda is a disastrous strategy that only strengthens the position of anti-West elements.

Extremism and scriptural intransigence in Muslims’ communal discourse are among the most important barriers to the emergence of a Western Islam, a fusion between traditional Islam and the modern West. The following recommendations will assist in creating a pathway for the emergence of an Islam at home in and with the West.

Finally, this paper will illustrate how the Quilliam Foundation can assist in counter radicalization work across Muslim communities, civil society, media, and the Government.

April, 2008 – Launch publication

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1. Reaching Out to Extremists – Rehabilitation Centres

In recent months, there has been a forced re-evaluation of some of the ideas advocated by Islamists. Normal Muslims, those not influenced by Islamists, are increasingly more comfortable in rejecting notions of a single Caliphate, ruling by one interpretation of Shari’ah law, and accepting their indisputable British heritage. Nevertheless, there remains a core of Wahhabite-Islamist activists and groups who continue to advocate separatist, confrontational ideas that, followed to their logical conclusion, lead to violence. At the very least, the rhetoric of radicals provides the mood music to which suicide bombers dance.

In terms of definitions, we consider Wahhabites who declare takfir (or excommunicate) fellow Muslims to be extremists because of their intransigence and misapplication of scripture. Moreover, those who uphold the ideas in Syed Qutb’s Milestones or Mawdudi’s books on jihad and believe in an Islamist state with an expansionist army are extreme because of their rigidity in understanding politics, and abuse of Islam for political ends. In Britain, whole spectrums of groups fall under both the above categories, and some in either of the above. Al-Qaeda is an offshoot of the above worldview, and suicide bombers are born from this milieu.

It is not enough to say that by arresting these people we can prevent the spread of their mindset. O8en, prisons are zones for greater radicalization of young Muslims and converts. Based on experiences of former radicals, and good practice in Muslim countries, we suggest the following:

▪ The immediate se:ing up of well-resourced deradicalisation centres in key cities across Britain, staffed by mainstream Muslim scholars of the highest repute who counter Islamist ideology with traditional, pluralistic Islam;

▪ Credibly refute the flawed argument of al-Banna, Qutb, Nabhani,

Maqdisi, Zawahiri and others’ arguments which underpin the desired ends of al-Qaeda and similar networks;

▪ Rather than arrest upon suspicion of crime, we should identify potential terrorists (with support from family members and mosque congregations) and expose them, hopefully voluntarily, to genuine religiosity, and explain to them their misunderstanding of Muslim scripture;

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▪ This process must be independent of government, and supported by

sincere and pious Muslim scholars from credible Muslim communities in Mauritania, Egypt, Yemen, parts of Saudi Arabia, and North Africa;

▪ The period spent in these centres must be substantial and exposure to

genuine piety intense, to the extent where residents question Islamist/Jihadist interpretations and are unable to defend, or at least express doubt in, Islamist ideology;

▪ Contact with former jihadists in Egyptian or Yemeni jails via video link

or Muslim sponsored visits with translation can aid the deradicalisation process;

▪ Coupled with religion, a be:er understanding of the political process, democracy and secularism in Western societies must be imparted;

▪ Success of the above, and augmentation of former radicals, will open the

public space for others to critique Islamist ideology and, more importantly, prevent more young Muslims from joining these networks.

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2. Muslim Communities and Groups

There is an abject lack of awareness among the vast majority of Britain’s Muslims about extremism in the name of Islam. The vast majority of mosque imams and congregations cannot distinguish a pious believer from an extremist. Ma:ers are made worse by the fact that organizations that claim to represent British Muslims have at their helm men who believe in foreign political ideologies that seek to usurp Islam for political purposes.

Sir Iqbal Sacranie, for example, has repeatedly refused to retract his comment that ‘death was too easy for Salman Rushdie’. Dr Abdul Bari, current leader of the controversial Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), has been a life-long activist of various offshoots of the Jamat-e-Islami movement, including the Islamic Forum Europe. Azzam Tamimi, a regular speaker at large Islamist events, has praised suicide bombing and in November 2004, told the BBC he was prepared to be a suicide bomber if the opportunity arose and ‘it was a straight way to pleasing my God’.

The Islamic Foundation, a Leicester-based think tank, continues to publish the works of Islamist ideologues, including the Pakistani journalist Mawdudi (d.1979) and Egyptian literary critic, Syed Qutb (d.1966) and places this and other literature in mosques and bookshops in Britain.1 Increasingly among young Muslims in Britain, we risk Islamism fast becoming Islam.

Unless Muslims make a stand and reclaim Islam from Islamists, then future generations of Muslims will adopt a political ideology as their religion. To halt this disaster, normal Muslims, who are concerned about Islam, should do the following:

▪ Apply pressure on Islamist groups to je:ison publicly and privately the ideas of Mawdudi, Qutb and other radical Islamist ideologues;

▪ Treat Islamist extremists with a propensity to violence as criminal murderers, not potential martyrs. Just as Muslims would hand over thieves, rapists, and others to the authorities, we must be the first to cooperate with law enforcement agencies on preventing murder in the name of Islam;

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The Islamic Foundation is increasingly a diverse body and there are younger, British voices that offer

us hope for the future direction of this important institution. Under the guidance of the current management, led by Dr Manazir Ahsan, the foundation has produced foreign and irrelevant literature

by authors cited above.

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▪ Ensure Islamists realise that Britain is a multi-faith, multi-ethnic secular country which is not open to Islamisation;

▪ Deny Islamists any unchallenged platforms in our mosques to propagate their separatist and confrontational ideology;

▪ Raise our children under the guidance of mainstream, flexible Muslim scholars and not through exposure to Islamist literature;

▪ Support Muslims who challenge Islamist paradigms by giving them access to your networks;

▪ Educate Islamists that the first group of people that called for the

equivalent of ‘political sovereignty belonging to God’ (as Islamists do) were the Khawarij, who killed Imam Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet;

▪ Provide financial and institutional support for initiatives that root Muslims to mainstream Islam and Britain;

▪ Create greater unity among Muslims from various factions who broadly

agree on scriptural flexibility, greater plurality, and see Britain as our home;

▪ Promote the works/scholarship of those Muslim academics such as

Abdul-Wahhab Effendi and others who have illustrated with their publications that it is possible to be fully Muslim in a secular, religiously neutral country.

Here, the Quilliam Foundation is prepared to deliver training sessions to mainstream Muslims, mosques, and community groups to explain how extremist Islamists recruit to their organizations, what methods they use to indoctrinate, and why people can leave these groups when the right circumstances arise.

There are already positive signs emerging in British Muslim communal discourse with groups such as the City Circle, JIMAS, Radical Middle Way, and sections within the Islamic Society of Britain pushing for a more Western Islam, relevant to our lives in the West, away from the influences of Indian and Arab cultural practices.

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3. Muslim Scholars and Leaders

To date, there has been a reticence among parts of the British Muslim leadership and scholarly community to identify extremism and challenge it.

As a result, ordinary Muslims respond negatively to media discussions about extremism in Muslim communities.

When the chairman of a major Birmingham mosque argues that the 7th July 2005 suicide bombings in London were state orchestrated, or other Muslim leaders suggest that suicide bombers are ‘reprisal a:acks’, and young Islamists applaud 7/7 in public protests during the Danish cartoon controversy, Muslim leaders have a duty to speak out.

If Muslim leaders wish to remain relevant to the national debate surrounding Islam and Muslims, and have the best interest of Britain’s Muslims at heart, then they must:

▪ Not only condemn acts of terror unreservedly, but je:ison the IslamistJihadist ideology that legitimizes terror as ‘jihad’;

▪ Increase levels of encouragement for ordinary Muslims to handover

extremists or those who have a propensity to violence without stigma of ‘spying’ or ‘selling out’;

▪ End Arabic, Bengali, and Urdu prayers that call for the killing and destruction of contemporary non-Muslims (our neighbours);

▪ Help create a safe Muslim public space which does not fear challenging external ideological influences on British Muslims

▪ Support government and police initiatives to combat terrorism and extremism and not peddle conspiracy theories about ‘spying’ and ‘state orchestrated terrorism’;

▪ Cut ties with Islamist groups and funding agencies from Saudi Arabia; ▪ Allow for a new generation of home-grown Muslims to speak their minds without fear of recrimination and intimidation;

▪ Turn their a:ention to corruption issues within mosques, gender

inequality at community level, domestic violence, forced marriages, incest, drug abuse, abortion and low rates of educational a:ainment.

▪ Realise that the foreign policy of the British government will not be held hostage by any one community, though Muslims, like any other group in a free society, reserve the right to criticize government policies;

▪ End the ‘them-and-us’ mentality prevalent among elder Muslim leaders.

Britain belongs to all of us, non-Muslims and Muslims.

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Again, there are positive trends developing here. Over the last decade, in sections of the Muslim community there has been a maturity of debate that has led to the emergence of progressive, British voices. These include T J Winter, Dr Ghayasudin Siddiqui, Dr Musharraf Hussain, Dr Usama Hassan, Humera Khan, Asim Siddiqui, Haras RaďŹ q, Abu Muntasir, Abu Aaliyah, Khola Hassan, Dilwar Hussain, Yahya Birt, Fareena Alam, Abdul-Rehman Malik, and others.

Among Muslim scholars too, there has been a bolder identiďŹ cation of the nature of extremism. Here, Muslim scholars such as T J Winter, Imam BaBikr Ahmed, Dr Musharraf Hussain, Dr Usama Hassan have been crucial.

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4. Muslim Educational Establishments

Whether Islamic schools, or post-16 private institutions, there is cause for genuine concern about the teaching of Islam at these institutions. In years to come, graduates from these institutions will dominate our mosques as imams. It is vital, therefore, that these young minds receive training and education that allows them to undertake their roles as equals to, if not be:er than, priests and rabbis. Not only does this require training in broader philosophy and theology, but Islamic texts should be as Professor Tariq Ramadan suggests, taught in their historical context and points of invalidity highlighted.

To ensure that English-speaking imams do not become mouthpieces for alQaeda ideology, Muslim seminaries in Dewsbury, Manchester, Bury, London, and other cities should:

▪ Re-evaluate their syllabi to ensure that these are in line with the

expectations of lives for citizens in a 21st century liberal democracy, not British India in the 1850s;

▪ Explain religious texts of the past in their context and assess relevance to

today’s world (for example, the invalidity of notions of Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam);

▪ Encourage students and imams to wear clothes that ensure belonging to mainstream society, and not Pakistani ethnic a:ire designed for a different climate. Islam requires modesty, not Arab or Pakistani clothing.

We are not like Polish Jews that insist on wearing black clothes, unrelated to religion;

▪ Actively encourage more women to become students and teachers at these male-dominated environments;

▪ Establish strong working relationships with Jewish and Christian seminaries that lead to joint teaching activities and be:er understanding of other religions among imams, and vice versa.

The Quilliam Foundation is prepared to help seminaries assess their syllabi, arrange for contact between different religious institutions, and facilitate introductions to European Muslim scholars. We are also prepared to train seminary students on how to counter arguments of political extremists.

The Quilliam Foundation, alongside other Muslim groups mentioned above, should help in the delivery of rehabilitation centres.

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5. Colleges and Universities

Throughout the 1990s in Britain, Islamist radicals were most successful in university campuses. Today, the picture is similar on campuses and, worryingly, at FE colleges.2 While numbers of radicals have reduced at university campuses, their message and social a:itudes have become prominent among student Islamic societies. Indeed, students from some of Britain’s most prestigious universities have gone on to commit terrorist atrocities.

Sadly, any visit to most British university campus prayer rooms will illustrate the grasp of Saudi-Wahhabite creed on Muslim students. For example, books published by Wahhabite publishing houses are widespread, as are books by Mawdudi and Qutb.3

Friday prayers in key institutions such as Imperial College London, Leeds University, Queen Mary and Westfield College, the London School of Economics and others a:ract huge crowds. In order to ensure that these young minds do not succumb to Islamist radicalism, we recommend that:

▪ Where there is a genuine concern of radicalisation on a given campus, university authorities should actively monitor which Muslim faction controls the Islamic society and content of Friday sermons;

▪ Radical sermonizers should be actively rejected by Muslim student bodies, and not given succour in the name of ‘Muslim unity’;

▪ Leaders of the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) have a duty to help integrate its student population into British life, not encourage Saudi-style gender segregation in Muslim gatherings at British universities; 4

▪ Muslim students should not takeover multi-faith prayer rooms, and then create ‘Muslim-only’ areas. Rather they should allow for other faith adherents to use these facilities;

▪ University authorities should ensure prayer rooms do not become an

Islamist underworld, a centre for Muslim students to withdraw between lessons and thus avoid extra-curricular interaction with other students;

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BBC Radio 4 Today programme report by Ed Husain on 18 July 2007. Interviews by Maajid Nawaz for

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This information is based on Quilliam directors visit to universities in London and northern cities.

Channel 4 News in November 2007 highlighting the deliberate targeting of FE colleges by extremists.

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For example Faisal Hanjera, a FOSIS leader, has personally been present at meetings at QMW college

where gender segregation was imposed throughout this academic year. And Muslim women reduced

to asking questions in writing, lest their voices prove lustful to the predominantly male audience.

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â–Ş Where Islamic societies have invited radical speakers/sermonizers,

university management should conduct spot checks on the content of Wednesday a8ernoon lectures/Friday sermons until suďŹƒcient trust in the Islamic society is re-established.

The Quilliam Foundation is creating a specialist unit tasked with assisting vice-chancellors and others understand the ways in which student Islamist cells operate and how to decipher radical and/or extremist content in materials. We intend to do this via our Radicalisation Awareneness Programe (RAP).

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6. Tackling Prison Radicalisation

Muslims are disproportionately represented in Britain’s prison population.

In reality, they are there for criminal offences commi:ed as young Asian men, disconnected from the teachings of their faith. While in prison, many are exposed to a ‘Muslim identity’ for a host of reasons. Criminality, guilt, confrontation, combined with literalist promises of salvation and global Muslim belonging allow for Muslim convicts to transfer their skills set to Jihadism.

In 2006, Omar Khayam, a supporter of Hizb ut-Tahrir who had been radicalized in prison a:ended a demonstration against the Danish cartoons dressed as a suicide bomber. In April 2008, the first official cry for help came from Anne Owers, chief inspector of prisons, who raised questions about the urgent need to train prison staff to deal with Muslim inmates, and differentiate normal Muslims from extremists. This problem is particularly acute at Belmarsh, where there are approximately 200 Muslim inmates.

We cannot engage in deradicalisation work in a vacuum. Successful deradicalisation inside prison can have a powerful impact to many on the ‘outside’, and vice versa. The experiences of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt illustrate that here are various success models, though not without their particular faults. In Britain, we should learn from their mistakes and create new programmes to deal with the challenges we face. Going forward, we suggest that:

▪ Muslim bodies and the Prison Service work together to help train prison staff urgently to combat extremism, and identify Muslim inmates who can help in this initiative;

▪ Put in place an incentive scheme to motivate non-extreme Muslim prisoners to assist the authorities to tackle the arguments of extremists;

▪ Facilitate contact between Jihadists in Belmarsh and former Jihadists in

Egyptian prisons. For example, Abu Qatada’s arguments are refuted by Dr Syed Fadl, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s former associate and author of works of recantation;

▪ Facilitate one-on-one contact with former Islamists and Jihadists from

key cities in Britain, who were colleagues of many of those currently in prison;

▪ In favorable terms, introduce extremist inmates to literature produced by former Islamists;

▪ Facilitate phone conversations, penpals, and buddy schemes with former extremist inmates of prisons in Riyadh, San’a, and Cairo; 12

▪ Create a deliberate deradicalisation course, much like the first

recommendation made in this document, delivered by former radicals in co-operation with respectable, independent Muslim scholars in which there is open, frank discussion about religious texts and current affairs.

The Quilliam Foundation stands ready to assist in all of the above and other ideas proposed by mainstream Muslims inmates or the Prison Service.

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7. Responsible Media

Extremist groups and individuals plan vociferously to amplify their arguments in the mass media, and appear to be spokespeople for a silent Muslim majority. Extremist groups such as the fringe Hizb ut-Tahrir and others actively promote themselves in the media with regular press releases and follow-up contact with an aim to control the public agenda of a disorganized Muslim mass.

The BBC, ITN, Sky, CNN and British print press have a duty to assist mainstream Muslims in our fight against extremists. By giving our detractors airtime, you undermine our cause and strengthen/legitimise a minority discourse. Editors, producers, researchers, and guest invitation assistants can help by

▪ Extending the unwri:en no air-time rule for the far-right, to Islamist extremists;

▪ Avoiding groups that claim to represent all Muslims, since British Muslims are too diverse to be represented by any one group;

▪ Ending the media game of ‘good Muslim’ and ‘bad Muslim’ to produce exciting television;

▪ Stop hunting for ‘critics of Islam’ to bash Muslims (an episode of BBC

Newsnight during the Archbishop of Canterbury’s comments on Shariah law was particularly worrying);

▪ Liberal newspapers’ editors should think twice before allowing column space to Hamas and its supporters while they remain commi:ed to the destruction of Israel;

▪ Denying genuine Islamophobes, or Muslim haters, an unchallenged voice in column spaces or interview slots because they, like Islamists, have a particular warmongering mindset that undermines social cohesion.

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8. Joined-Up Government

With the establishment of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) there has been a concerted effort across Whitehall to co-ordinate counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism measures. The British Government, like emerging trends within its Muslim communities, is ahead of Europe and America in tackling extremism and terrorism. Nevertheless, the Government can do much be:er. In order to support the measure mentioned above, the Government should:

▪ Appoint Muslims to key public roles in counter terrorism operations to

strengthen the Muslim presence against Islamism and thus ridicule extremists’ claim that this is a fight against Islam;

▪ Be bolder in identifying the nature of the ideology that underpins

Islamist terrorism, failure to do so renders delivery agents confused about ‘the ideology’ and further strengthens Islamist radicals who sniff weakness in naming them as culprits;

▪ Continue engaging with a wide range of Muslim groups and individuals, and avoid awarding legitimacy to Islamists;

▪ Draw up a values-based approach to awarding funds to grass-root level organisations, in the absence of which extremist groups can (and in some instances already have) access to PVE funding via local government agencies;

▪ Put in place methods by which civil servants and Muslim bodies can

assess active promotion of liberal, democratic values by groups which receive taxpayers’ monies;

▪ Support and facilitate initiatives that counter Islamist extremism on the Internet and chat fora;

▪ End its plans for extending detention without trial to 42 days for terrorist suspects;

▪ Accept Lord Carlisle’s recommendations for applying for extensions on a need-only, evidential basis from judges;

▪ Facilitate British Muslim engagement with a view to counterradicalization with European Muslim communities – threat levels in Germany, Denmark, France, and Sweden are far higher than Britain;

▪ Facilitate sending British Muslim delegations to key Muslim countries to illustrate British Muslim life, and thereby help rid hostile a:itudes toward Britain in certain Muslim countries; 15

â–Ş Reconsider policies which lead to ghe:oisaton of communities and

devise measures which break-up social networks based on religion and ethnicity, and help create a genuinely pluralistic Britain in which overlap of colour, class, and creed becomes the norm;

â–Ş Assist normal Muslims as far as possible with recommendations outlined in this paper;

â–Ş Imprison and further legislate against terrorism only as a very last resort, a8er the above measures have been put in place.

April, 2008 Launch publication Quilliam Foundation

For further information please visit www.quilliamfoundation.org

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