South asian militant groups and global jihad in 2015

South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015

By Nikita Malik & Eleanor Beevor F or e wor d b y Har as Ra fi q

QUILLIAM

Quilliam is the world’s first counter-extremism think tank, set up to address the unique challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalized world. Quilliam stands for religious freedom, equality, human rights, and democracy. Challenging extremism is the duty of all responsible members of society. Not least because cultural insularity and extremism are products of the failures of wider society to foster a shared sense of belonging and to advance democratic values. Quilliam seeks to challenge what we think and the way we think. It aims to generate creative, informed, and inclusive discussions to counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism, whilst simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to governments for related policy measures.

For further information contact: Quilliam Email: information@quilliamfoundation.org Tel: +44 (0)207 182 7280 www.quilliamfoundation.org

South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015, June 2015 © Quilliam 2015 – All rights reserved ISBN number – 978-1-906603-11-3 Disclaimer: The views of individuals and organisations used in this report do not necessarily reflect those of Quilliam.

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South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS Glossary

5

Foreword

6

Executive Summary

8

PART 1

12

PROFILING OF MILITANT GROUPS

12

Nature of threat

12

Jammu and Kashmir

15

Pakistan

18

Afghanistan

20

India

22

PART 2

24

GLOBAL JIHADIST FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA

IS as an ideological destabiliser PART 3

24 24 30

STATE OF PLAY

Interaction between terrorist groups and national, regional, and international forces 30 PART 4

35

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

35

Jammu and Kashmir

38

Pakistan

40

Afghanistan

43

India

46

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AUTHORS’ NOTE The authors would like to thank David Rapp for this assistance on this report, as well as our colleague Jonathan Russell for his support, assistance, and input.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS Centre for Disease Control (CDC) Al Qaeda (AQ) Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Ansar al-Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AUT) Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) Harket-ul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Islamic State (IS) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) National Investigation Agency (NIA) National Security Guard (NSG) NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) United Jihad Council (UJC) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

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Afghan Military Forces (AMF) Jamaat ul-Furqan (Juf) Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) National Action Plan (NAP) World Health Organisation (WHO) Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Jamrat-e-Islami (JEI) Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) Hezb-i-Islami (HIG) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Indian Mujahideen (IM) Defence Framework Agreement (DFA) Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) National Commission for Peace and Reconciliation (PTS) Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) Jam’at-ud-Dawa (Jud) Khaddam-ul-Islam (KuI) Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS Barelvi: A movement within Sunni Islam, of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, originating

in Bareilly with over 200 million followers in South Asia. Followers of the movement prefer to be known by the title of Ahle Sunnat wal Jama'at. The movement is influenced by Sufism and the traditional Islamic practices of South Asia, having formed as a reaction to the reformist attempts of Deobandi movement, which was influenced by the Wahhabi movement in Arabia.

Deobandi: A term used for a revivalist movement within Hanafi Islam. Centred primarily in

India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, it has recently spread to the United Kingdom, and has a presence in South Africa. Many Pakistani terrorist outfits including the Taliban (TTP), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and Jundallah follow the Deobandi interpretative tradition of Islam. As a result, they share common organizational infrastructure in the form of mosques and madrassahs.

Extremism: An ideology, which when implemented, would significantly and negatively

impact the human rights of certain sectors of society, such as women, religious or ethnic groups, persons with disabilities, and so on. By extension, violent extremism is an ideology that would justify the use of violence against such sectors of society.

Hawala: Also known as hundi, hawala is an informal value transfer system based on the

performance and honor of a huge network of money brokers, operating outside of, or parallel to, traditional banking, financial channels, and remittance systems.

Islamism: The belief that Islam is a totalitarian political ideology. It claims that political

sovereignty belongs to God rather than the people. Islamists believe that their reading of Shariah should be state law, and that it is the religious duty of all Muslims to work towards and pledge allegiance to an Islamic state that reflects these principles.

Jihad: Literally ‘to struggle’ but often used to refer to armed struggle.

Jihadism: Non-state violence used in the cause of Islamism. Just as Islamism is the

politicisation of Islam, jihadists take the traditional concept of jihad and use it as a political and military tool to achieve a political end.

Radicalisation: The process by which individuals and/or groups come to adopt extremist

ideologies. Scholars often distinguish between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violent radicalisation’ to highlight the difference between engaging in violent activities and radicalised nonviolent thinking.

Terrorism: The use of violence or illegal force targeted at civilians by non-state actors,

which seeks to bring about political/societal changes.

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FOREWORD 2015 has been a tumultuous year for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Al Qaeda’s position as the most feared global jihadist network has been usurped by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, who have claimed to have formed the Islamic State (IS). Although Al Qaeda has expanded into India with the launch of a new branch, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), assessments of its strength vary, with some analysts arguing it will lose recruiting ground to IS. That said, the threat that AQIS presents in Pakistan and Afghanistan remains significant, less in terms of sheer fighting capacity, and more in terms of its stature as an ideological banner, propaganda arm, trainer, mediator, and dispenser of the “global jihadist narrative” or “global jihad”. IS’ gradual encroachment into South Asia can be considered in similar terms.

In December 2014, NATO formally ended combat operations in Afghanistan, transferring full security responsibility to the Afghan government. The war came to an official, yet ambiguous conclusion.

Although the majority of NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops will withdraw, a mission titled Resolute Support, also led by NATO, will see 12,000 troops remain in a non-combat role.

Furthermore, although the new Government of National Unity, led by President Ashraf Ghani and CEO (of Afghanistan) Abdullah Abdullah, shows signs of greater willingness to work with its neighbours to combat regional terrorism than that of President Ghani’s predecessor, President Hamid Karzai, its potential was hampered for several months by difficulties in forming a Cabinet. While the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban is not yet off the table for President Ghani, incentives to talk will depend on them being prevented from gaining the upper hand in military affairs after the ISAF withdrawal. In 2015, two rounds of informal talks between the Taliban and representatives of the civil society may improve confidence in President Ghani’s Government of National Unity.

Meanwhile Pakistan is reeling from the Pakistani Taliban’s attack on a military-run school in December 2014 that left 146 people, most of which were children, dead. This was the deadliest attack that the Pakistani Taliban have ever committed. Nevertheless, there are high hopes that this attack will mark a turning point in Pakistan’s history of selectively tolerating militant groups. This would be a key step in ensuring durable regional peace. However, not only does this depend on 6

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Pakistan’s domestic policy, but also on the future actions of its neighbours Afghanistan and India as well.

India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), raised hopes of better relations with Pakistan when he invited Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend his swearing-in ceremony in May, 2014. However, disputes with the Pakistani Government over which nation the Muslim majority Kashmir ought to belong to, either India, or Pakistan, remain far from resolved, and India is increasingly having to deal with ‘home-grown’ threats from Islamist extremist groups as they seek to influence the decision making processes at an executive level. These threats will not be quelled so long as there is the perception that Muslims are being subjugated by the Indian Government.

Global jihadism can be considered a culture, a network, and a cause. It is a culture in the sense that it contains a shared set of ideals, values, and beliefs that motivate and shape the actions of its members. However, despite several significant cultural similarities that exist between different global jihadist groups, the reasons why people are attracted to the idea of global Jihadism vary, dependant on the geographical location of the individual in question, the socio-political context within which said individual is operating, and the disposition of that individual.

Interestingly, global jihadism is also in many ways a youth culture, and it attracts young, adventurous, and disaffected people in search of purpose.

In this atomized but networked landscape, unaccountable military violence, particularly against civilians, will only entrench support for the jihadist cause. Therefore, Quilliam recommends fostering regional and local civil society and grassroots initiatives, promoting counternarratives that focus on anti-extremist messages, and increasing focus on mental health policy and care distribution. This report will serve as field guide on the strategies of, and interactions between, major actors within both IS and Al Qaeda, as well as the other major militant groups in the region during a turning point in South Asian geopolitics.

Haras Rafiq Managing Director of Quilliam 7

QUILLIAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report is designed as a field guide to the most significant militant groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It illustrates regional and international trends, and it explains the strategies that have been used by various global jihadist actors at a turning point in South Asian geopolitics.

Due to a combination of military operations against them, internal fractionalisation, and the shifting influence of “global jihad”, terrorist groups in South Asia are far from structured, cohesive units. As such, Quilliam advocates a new approach in policy. It is now crucial to revisit and reemphasise the potential for counter-radicalization strategies, as well as mental health policy to reduce the risk of radicalisation. Moreover, we maintain that by coupling civil society initiatives with local, regional, and international policies, the affected Governments will be able to counter these violent ideologies.

Based on our findings, Quilliam has developed the following set of counterterrorism and counter-extremism recommendations:

To the International Community:  

 

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Make counter-extremism and human rights principles the cornerstone of all related aid that is provided to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Continue to focus on human rights as a core aim. Strongly insist on greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be created in the process in response to perceived injustices.

Support grassroots reconciliation efforts and civil society initiatives which offer positive, sensitive, and sustainable forms of post-conflict solutions.

Better engage with Muslim communities in India, Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Afghanistan to decrease the appeal of an Islamic caliphate by promoting democratic cultures and addressing grievances to prevent militant ideologies exploiting them.

Help foster stronger micro-finance charity relationships, banking systems, and schemes in South Asia in order to provide conduits to micro-credit for smaller villages and communities that will facilitate economic and social development, and reduce the risks of radicalisation within the relevant communities. The informal 8

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

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‘value transfer’ system that is known as the hawala system, tends to thrive when the banking sector is weak. We recommend requirements on hawaladar, such as licensing and registration.

Support economic policies that will reduce income inequality in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, and avoid the implementation of financial measures that disproportionately impact the poor in the way that structural adjustment schemes have done so in the past.

Critically review the legal, moral, and military arguments for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in operations over Pakistan and Afghanistan. Associated grievances can be exploited by extremists to radicalize or recruit local populations.

To the Governments of Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan: Reduce corruption to legitimize state institutions. This includes implementing different policies (education, training, job search assistance) to provide livelihoods for citizens.   





Increase focus on prisons and prison care, where staff should be trained to tackle arguments of extremists, and inmates can be recruited to help in this process.

Encourage the implementation of new education measures within schools and universities that focus on more secular curriculums and the role of civil tolerance.

Promote the rule of law and investigate the role of a dual-justice system within Pakistan, whereby the state legally recognises dispensers of, and decisions by, more traditional justice systems, provided they follow proscriptions to bring them under the remit of state law1.

Take steps to establish a non-profit initiative that harvests Afghan opium at prices beneficial to Afghan producers, and redistributes its constituent medical products to hospitals in need, an initiative that has potential for conflict appeasement and palliative care. As we illustrate in this report, one of the main challenges governments face is competing with terrorist organizations that also offer effective social services. One way of doing this is by filling the gap of legitimate philanthropic organisations.

Restructure and increase transparency of hawala systems of finance, which are often used for the financing of terrorism, by encouraging regulated banking structures that are shariahcompliant, charities such as FINCA, and charitable arms of banking systems, to provide low-interest loans, and implement minimum regulation standards to be in line with rules imposed on conventional banks.

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Reform laws on blasphemy, as they strengthen the stance of Islamist extremists.

Undertake research based on public health frameworks to investigate the causes and consequences of violent and non-violent extremism, following new initiatives to treat violent extremism as a public health issue. The WHO’s Violence Prevention Alliance has recently provided a public health framework to investigate and understand the causes and consequences of violence. These include individual, relationship, community-based, and societal approaches to prevent violence. Extending such work to tackle violent radicalization and terrorism is a natural next step, though not yet done. Routine health surveys and censuses might ask about aspects of violent radicalization and group cohesion as relevant health and social issues, and not only as criminal justice issues2.

This is crucial in an environment of widespread violence, where there are low levels of social and political education.

Foster and facilitate counter-narratives in countries where Islamism as an ideology is more potent, such as in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The main risk behind the power of the IS brand is that its narratives on apostasy (takfiri) will go mainstream and exacerbate the sectarianism that is presently growing in South Asia. This is IS's market niche, and given that Jundullah - a traditionally sectarian, newly declared ally of IS - has claimed credit for the Shia mosque bombing in January 2015, as well as several other attacks on the Shia community, it is increasingly a theme that is coming to the fore, and one that counter-narratives could address specifically.

Encourage cooperation between the states of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to defeat the new transnational terrorist force of the Islamic State, which differs ideologically from entrenched and established terrorist groups in the region. Sharing of information, and social and political initiatives between bordering states, would reduce the threat of extremism spilling over from one nation to another.

T o C i v i l S o c i e t y C o m m u n i t i e s a n d G r o u ps : 

The threat to civil society activities and activists in Pakistan and Afghanistan is becoming increasingly worrying. Following the murder of Sabeen Mahmud in April 2015, we strongly encourage governments to assume responsibility for increasing the security of its citizens as well as to provide the institutional and financial support to help develop initiatives that create safe spaces for activism, engagement and debate, such as Mahmud’s The Second Floor (T2F).

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 

 

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Deny sectarian preachers unchallenged platforms in mosques in order to avoid the propagation of ideologies that incite violence.

Treat Islamist extremism as a damaging political ideology, not a religious one. Similarly, treat jihadist violence as criminal, not religious violence. We encourage civil society to not only condemn acts of terror, but also to reject ideology that legitimizes terrorism as ‘jihad’.

Deny extremists a platform in the media, in the form of column spaces or interview slots.

Set up deradicalisation and mental health rehabilitation centers in South Asia where extremist ideology can be countered, and pluralistic interpretations of Islam can be promoted. Encourage uniting people with differing religious preferences on the basis of a common opposition to Islamist extremism. Educate about the differences between the faith of Islam and the political nature of Islamism, emphasising that rejecting an Islamist agenda does not mean rejecting Islam.

Focus attention on university campuses as well as institutions of Islamic learning, called madrassahs, in all three countries where ideological drivers of Islamist extremism are likely to be active.

Empower educated youth and civil society actors to foster social movements that challenge Islamist extremism through the promotion of pluralistic values.

Direct international assistance to strengthen the capacity building of civilian institutions.

South Asia cannot be analysed as a monolithic whole for the presentation of policy and programmatic interventions. However, countries and groups with shared roots benefit from allying on different issues if such approaches are kept multi-pronged. For example, recent efforts to strategize the use of shared resources such as water development plans in Pakistan and India3 require a physical and psychological paradigm shift to end hostilities, and a change in the way in which resource sharing, trust, cooperation, and social and economic development is managed. In order to reduce the long-term financial and opportunity costs of persistent non-cooperation, we advocate synergies and cooperation between countries wherever possible.

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QUILLIAM PART 1 PROFILING OF MILITANT GROUPS

Nature of threat The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the Coalition forces, have generally succeeded in both fracturing and weakening the centralised structures of principal Taliban groups. However, it is unclear whether or not structural integrity is needed for either the survival of these groups’ ambitions, or their capacity for violence. This is the case because:  Multiple social networks permeate different jihadist groups.

Moreover, the new ‘wave’ of global jihadist enthusiasm (Part IV of our longer report) has been energized by the success of IS, allowing groups to latch onto its symbolic capital.  The groups that are profiled in the sections below have an unstable and ambiguous central structure that makes them difficult to defeat. This is what has made it unlikely that military action alone will end jihadist violence; unaccountable military violence will entrench support for the jihadist cause. Therefore, we recommend: a) Fostering both local and regional civil society and grassroots initiatives, and guaranteeing their safety, whilst also providing them with financial support in order to provide effective counter narratives to the Islamist ideology, b) Monitoring the use of video and propaganda as a product of influence. Prior to 2001, the Taliban declared suicide bombing unIslamic. However, it has become a regular component of their attacks and propaganda over the last ten years4. As such, we suggest that the media, the government, and the civil society should be enlisted to build awareness on counter-extremism responses within media outlets, and to prevent the circulation of these videos and to stop them from garnering appeal. 

Difficulties in isolating militant groups and determining the forces they represent become clear in our profiles, which document webs of complex relationships between fighters (see Figure 2). Judging the “significance” of a group is equally difficult since there are numerous criteria by which a group might present a security threat. Furthermore, there are hundreds of armed groups across our chosen areas of focus: Afghanistan, Pakistan, J&K, and India.

These groups fracture, merge, and change their names on a regular basis, and can also seek out, or be courted by, globally oriented

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

jihadist organizations. An attempt to present a group as a static, and easily quantifiable, security threat, would be misleading.

Our aim is to give accurate portraits of the most significant militancy’s in these nations, and assess the regional significance of “global jihad”, rather than make a theoretical or a comparative argument. This report is principally a product of qualitative research: groups profiled are identified as most dangerous via a methodology of cross-checks, qualitative indicators, and assessments of groups.

An overview of the size, structure, and influence of the major Islamist terrorist organisations that are currently operating in J&K, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India will be offered below. Prominent attacks and the relationships between the relevant terrorist groups will be commented upon.

This section will provide the reader with a broad understanding of the operations and nature of the various terrorist groups that operate within this region, and it will provide a contextual base for the proceeding discussions on both IS as a destabilising force in South Asia, and policy recommendations to combat Islamist extremism. This section is a brief summary of our longer report that can be referenced for further detail and analysis on each terrorist group mentioned forthwith.

Given that the majority of South Asian countries have experienced some degree of jihadist violence in recent years, our focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan and India should certainly not be read as an exhaustive survey of the continent. Originally, we intended to focus on Pakistani groups alone, but we recognised that an attempt to explain the encroachment of global jihadist ideologies into Pakistan without examining India or Afghanistan would be futile. The inter-connected borders of these nations form the political nervecentre of the region; arguably, this has been the case since the partition of India in 1947, and it will continue to be so long after the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan. However, in spite of their overwhelming influence within the region, excluding some of the surrounding countries from our analysis was somewhat problematic. For example, we predict that Bangladesh will be a potential “hotspot” for radicalization in the immediate future; and as is evinced by the fact that some militant Pakistani outfits targeting India prefer to enter India through the poorly guarded Bangladeshi border, its logistical significance to groups in Pakistan and India should not be overlooked5. Furthermore, Al Qaeda has named Bangladesh as a country whose Muslims would be ideologically

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QUILLIAM targeted by its newly established branch in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) 6, and the recent murder of a secular blogger has raised national concern about Bangladesh’s future with Islamism7. However, while Bangladesh does have some militant groups, they have not yet committed many significant attacks, and the attacks that have been committed are certainly not on the scale that would place them alongside the groups that we profile in this report.

Although Bangladeshi groups are not profiled here, its strategic significance to militants should not be ignored by policy-makers.

Figure 1: Map of South Asia

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Jammu and Kashmir 1. In theory, Kashmir-oriented jihadists operate under the umbrella of the United Jihad Council (UJC). However, several offshoot members are significant in their own right, and occasionally fight each other. As such, the UJC does not have the power to control them, and is of questionable importance in directing their actions.  Numerous UJC members have strong links with AQ, as well as with IS.  UJC regularly changes its position on the Kashmir issue, moving from pro-accession to Pakistan, to a pro-separatist stance.  Its principle relevance comes from its close ties to the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, the principle political organ advocating Kashmiri separatism.  UJC is officially headed by Syed Salahuddin, who is also the leader of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.  Militants that operate within the UJC and declare J&K status a principle motivation do not only operate there; many operate in Pakistan and simply carry out attacks in Kashmir.

2. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) is an influential terrorist group that redefines the ‘Kashmir question’ as one of Islamic identity:  HM initially gained Kashmiri Muslim support for its Islamist message, but the group’s condemnatory stance on Sufi traditions such as praying at shrines alienated some of its following.  Despite setbacks, HM is a well-disciplined, well trained force. Its most recent activity includes nineteen attacks on hard targets in India in 2013.8  The group has roughly 1,500 fighters.9  HM is purportedly funded by numerous charities, through a system of hawala and cash couriers. Jammu and Kashmir Affectees Relief Trust (JKART) is said to have funded approximately $16 million.10 HM also has a female wing, Dukhtaran-e-Millat (Daughters of the Faith) who run an Islamic relief organisation.11  They have recently been accused of being behind the intimidation and shutdown of J&K’s telecommunication sector, an allegation they deny. Another suspect is a new and little known group, Lashkar-e-Islam (this group is unrelated to the TTP offshoot of the same name)12.

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3. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) stems from its above-ground parent organisation, Jam’at-ud-Dawa (JuD). It has recently shifted focus from J&K and India to an international audience:  This group is feared for its links to AQ and the Taliban. Some see LeT as a part-time ally of AQ, others see the two as great rivals. The group has several cells in Middle Eastern countries, as well as in the US and in Germany. The majority of LeT operatives are Pakistanis (often Punjabis) and it is cited as the most ‘lethal’ terrorist group that is operating from South Asia.13  JuD leader Hafiz Saeed lives freely in Pakistan, to the chagrin of India, and, although he denies his association with LeT, he maintains that LeT leader Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi was not involved in the Mumbai attacks14.  The group is purported to have carried out reconnaissance missions intending to target a Danish cartoonist.15 They began operations in India in 1993, and since then, they have been implicated in hundreds of attacks in India; the most famous of which are the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, where LeT killed over 164 people in a series of 12 targeted attacks that lasted a total of four days.  LeT is said to have a force of approximately 750 fighters.16  LeT is also a widespread social welfare organization, with more than 50,000 registered members spreading its influence and raising funds.17 It also operates several important social welfare programmes, including but not limited to the development and maintenance of hospitals, blood banks, and food banks.  Within Europe, Britain is a major centre for its fundraising among the Pakistani immigrant population18. LeT's illegal fundraising activities include false trade invoicing, counterfeiting, extortion, and involvement in the drug trade.

4. Harket-ul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) is a parent organization of several important offshoots (see Figure 2):  At one point, HuJI had merged with its own offshoot Harkat-ulMujahideen (HuM) under the name Harkat-ul-Ansar, however the two groups eventually parted.  HuJI is an AQ member and founder of Brigade 313, Al Qaeda’s military arm in Pakistan.  Comprising of 700 cadres, HuJI has not claimed the most casualties, nor is it the largest group; however, it is recognised as the parent

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organisation of several important offshoots. Brigade 313 is a coalition of three militant organisations: HuJI, LeT and LeJ.19 5. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM):  In 1997, HuM was proscribed a terror organization by the US due to its links with AQ. Its leader, Fazal ur Rehman Khalil, is a signatory to Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa that declared war on both the US and Israel.20 HuM works closely with the head of AQIS, Asim Umar, and in conjunction with JeM, they are believed to be responsible for training militants for operations in Jammu and Kashmir.21  HuM’s most notorious attack was the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Flight IC814 on Christmas Eve, 1999.  HuM currently runs training camps in east Afghanistan, and may be part of an AQ “syndicate” of Pakistani militants. It may have several thousand members in Jammu and Kashmir.22 6. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)  JeM split into two separate factions in 2003. One is led by Mualana Abdul Jabbar, and is called Jamaat ul-Furqan (JuF), the other is led

by Mufti Abdul Rauf Asghar, and is called Khuddam-ul-Islam (KuI).

Both offshoots have since been banned, but continue to be referred to as JeM.  JeM has well-known “suicide attack” modus operandi; their most famous attack was on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in 2001, which also involved LeT militants.  JeM is a core faction of the “Punjabi Taliban Network.”23 Other core factions are LeJ and SSP24 (see Figure 2). The collection of militants inside JeM is believed to comprise of 300-400 fighters25 though they may have a larger membership beyond their core fighters.

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QUILLIAM Pakistan 1.

Originally a sectarian militant organization in Pakistan, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), has become largely a political pressure group.  However, this group is eclipsed by its more radical offshoot, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). SSP uses religious politics to tie its history with the history of Sunni-Shia, Deobandi-Barelvi tensions, in Pakistan in general and in Punjab in particular. SSP wishes to establish a Sunni Islamic state in Pakistan, of its own Deobandi kind, raising fears that its purist view of Sunni Islam will see it ideologically aligned to IS and trigger mutual cooperation (it may already, at least in name, be supporting them.26,27)  The SSP has been linked to Ramzi Ahmed Yousuf, the mastermind of the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York.

2.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is explicitly militant. Ideologically, its hard-line Deobandism is similar to the Taliban’s ideology:  LeJ worked closely with both Afghan and Pakistani factions of AQ.  LeJ remains a core of the Punjabi Taliban (a faction that offers logistical support to the TTP).  Both SSP and LeJ militants fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.  Their takfiri ideology has seen a number of their cadres form close alliances with IS elements in Pakistan28. Indeed, some analysts say they have been operating in Iraq since 2013. They are now the prime suspects in the May 2015 attack on a bus in Karachi, in which gunmen killed 45 members of the Ismaili Shia community, an attack that was initially claimed by a TTP splinter, and new IS loyalists Jundullah; (LeJ have previously avoided claiming credit for their own attacks). It is feared that the attack amounts to a plea for IS attention and funding29.  In 1999, LeJ attempted to assassinate Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif twice, and they were responsible for the 2009 attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team.  The LeJ are also reportedly close to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and they have attended their training camps in Jammu and Kashmir.30 The group has roughly 1,000 fighters.31

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3.

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, is the greatest threat to the security of the Pakistani state:  Historically, TTP fighters were members of the Afghan Taliban; however, they parted ways in 2007 due to disagreements over their policy toward the Pakistani government. Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar maintained a degree of cooperation with Islamabad, while TTP founder Baitullah Mehsud and his cadres had developed a consuming hostility to the Pakistani state under the rule of Pervez Musharraf. However, Afghan Taliban and TTP continue to cooperate closely, and the TTP maintains loyalty to Mullah Omar. As such, the TTP’s existential reasoning remains the overthrow of the Pakistani state32.  In the past year, TTP cohesion has been severely compromised due to leadership changes. Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a UAV strike in 2009 and was succeeded by his Mehsud clan-mate, Hakimullah Mehsud. Hakimullah was also killed in a UAV attack in 2012 and was controversially succeeded by a non-Mehsud, Maulana Fazlullah. This provoked a clan-based split, and Mehsud leaders broke away with their own followers. There are currently two main Mehsud breakaway factions. A further split occurred in August 2014, when Jammat ul-Ahrar, led by Maulana Kasim Khorosani, emerged, (as well as a number of other splinters, some of which have now pledged allegiance to IS, such as Jundullah).

However, Al Qaeda has taken on a mediating role, leading to the reconciliation of Jamaat ul-Ahrar with the main TTP umbrella earlier this year. (This mediation may have been an attempt to buffer IS influence)33.  The TTP is not as hierarchical as it may appear, and may be more accurately understood as a coalition of militant clusters, each of which has different connections to other local militant groups.  The current size of its force ranges from 500-8,000 fighters.34  TTP militants claimed responsibility for the December 2014 attacks in the Army Public School in Peshawar, which left 145 people, 132 of which were children, dead.  TTP has extensive involvement in criminal enterprise, and may be involved in the sale of narcotics to fund its activities.35

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QUILLIAM Afghanistan 1.

After the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami (HIG) is the second largest terrorist group in Afghanistan:36  The group’s ideology stems from both the ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Abul A’la Maudadi’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI). The group seeks to emulate the Ikhwan of Saudi Arabia, and replace various tribal factions with one unified Islamic state. This ideology is in direct contrast to the Taliban’s approach in Afghanistan, which focuses on the sustenance of tribal structures and orientations.

Today, the non-violent faction of HIG is registered as a political party in Afghanistan.  HIG has been responsible for two major attacks: a suicide attack in Kabul in 2010, carried out by a young woman who killed nine people, and an attack in Kabul in May 2013, which killed 16 people.  It is estimated that the group’s military component consists of 1,000 fighters, including part-time fighters.37

2.

Haqqani Network is an Islamist insurgent group:  Initially, the group was nurtured by the CIA and ISI during the 1980’s Soviet War in Afghanistan. It was banned by Pakistan in January 2015, following the Peshawar school attacks by the Taliban in December 2014. The group is seen as an important Taliban ally, and has collaborated with Al-Qaeda.38 Al-Qaeda’s goals are global and use global means; whereas Haqqani Network is interested in Afghanistan and the Pashtun Tribal regions.  Previous attacks have included suicide bombings in the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul in 2011, and bombings in Kabul in late 2014 that killed two US soldiers. In total, the group has conducted 66 terrorist attacks from September 2006 to September 2013.39  The number of fighters within the Haqqani Network varies between 4,000 and 12,000 people, with up to 10,000-15,000 fighters claiming allegiance.40  The New York Times reported that in September 2011, the Haqqanis have set up a "mini-state" in Miranshah with courts, tax offices and madrassahs, and that the network runs a series of front companies selling automobiles and real estate.41 They also receive funds from extortion, kidnappings, and smuggling operations throughout eastern Afghanistan.

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3.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) operates through militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas:  The group’s headquarters are located in Afghanistan, and they are linked with the Taliban and AQ. Last September, leaders of IMU reportedly announced that the group was joining IS.42 However, given a lack of IMU activity under the IS banner, and a later declaration of IS allegiance by IS commanders, this is unlikely to be a blanket policy for the movement43.  The IMU has conducted 9 attacks between 2000 and 2013, and they often couple with Hizb-al-Tahrir-al-Islami in order to execute attacks.  The number of fighters in IMU is unclear. With each consequent reshuffle of leadership, members of IMU have left the movement and partnered with groups in Afghanistan: some of them retain the IMU name, others have mixed with the Taliban, the AQ or other groups.  The group likely obtains its funds through drug trafficking.44

4.

The Afghan Taliban focuses on national rather than international goals, and contrary to perceived wisdom, should not be characterized by its conservatism alone:  The influence of AQ and that of “global jihad” has rubbed off on the Taliban, which is now attempting to muster these narratives for support in Islamist-nationalist goals. There are fears that the youth will not succumb easily to the nationalist sentiments of mujahedeen predecessors, particularly with glamorously radical and globally oriented alternatives such as IS.45  Despite the remaining international forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban remains a highly active force that mounts attacks on a regular basis. Having once condemned suicide bombing as unIslamic they have now embraced the technique and its accompanying opportunities for propaganda. It is likely that this is due to AQ influence. In the last few months, its forces may have been boosted by foreign fighters from Chechnya and Central Asia.

Their territorial ambitions are not diminished, as was shown in a June 6th 2015 attack in which they overran Badakhshan Province46.  There are over 36,000 Afghan Taliban fighters.47 These fighters are led by the elusive Mullah Omar, who founded the Taliban from a group of former mujahedeen-turned-vigilantes in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. The Taliban were eventually able to take over the majority of the country thanks to their ability to restore order;

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however, they were ousted in 2001 by a joint U.S. and Northern Alliance effort. Mullah Omar has not been seen in public since that invasion. That reclusiveness helped him cultivate a charismatic mystique that aided Taliban cohesiveness for much of the past decade. However, recently it appears to be working against him.

Though the Taliban is theoretically presided over by the Quetta Shura council, it may in fact have split into factions as well. A group of IMU fighters formerly allied to the Taliban recently declared their allegiance to IS on the grounds of Omar’s lack of visible authority48.

There are strong divisions in attitudes to negotiation within the movement. There are ongoing unofficial talks in Oslo between Taliban members, female civil society and government representatives, to discuss the rights of women under a possible power sharing agreement - a significant concern for the architects of a prospective peace deal between the Taliban and the Afghan government. In the talks, the Taliban have indicated that they would allow female education, and that they would allow women to work in “male dominated professions”. However, such views are unlikely to hold true across the whole of the Taliban, which has seen divisions among its leadership about whether or not to participate in government proceedings before49.

The Taliban was originally provided arms by the United State due to their opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the weapons are still in the hands of many insurgents today.50 Pakistan also supported the Taliban heavily during their 5-year control of Afghanistan, providing millions in aid money and ISI assistance.51 Much of the Taliban's current finances come from drug trade.

India

1.

Ansar al-Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AUT) acts within India and across the borders of Kashmir, though its precise location, whereabouts, and scope of activity is unknown:  It is likely that group is based in Afghanistan, and it threatened India shortly before their consulate was attacked in Afghanistan in May, 2014.52  It is unclear whether the group has successfully carried out any operations, or whether it is part of an umbrella group in Central and Southern Asia. In October 2013, the group released a video through its media arm in order to appeal to Indian Muslims. The video was titled, ‘In the Land of the Hind: Lions of India – ‘Usud 22

N E W A G E N T S O F G L O B A L J I HA D

al Hind ‘’ and it stated that Muslims in India have been living 



2.

3.

under ‘fear and dread of the Hindus, who worship cows.’

It is uncertain exactly how many fighters occupy its ranks, and it is unclear whether or not these members overlap with other jihadi factions.

The group is linked to AQIS, and it is likely that it receives funding from that source.53

The Indian Mujahideen (IM) has engaged in several terrorist attacks in India and had regional aspirations with the ultimate aim of creating an “Islamic caliphate;”54  The group has more regional than international aims.

Investigators believe that the IM is one of many groups composed of lower-tier Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) members. IM is linked by training to al-Qaeda in Pakistan.  The IM has executed at least 11 major terrorist attacks. It is responsible for orchestrating a bombing that killed 16 people in Hyderabad in 2013, as well as a bomb blast in New Delhi’s high court that left 15 people dead in 2011.55  The number of fighters in IM is unknown, but is expected to be growing rapidly.56  IM secures funding from its affiliations with both AQ and IS.57 Deendar Anjuman is an Islamist group based in Hyderabad, India: The group claims it is a response to mass Muslim conversion to Hinduism in the 1920s. The goals of its founder, Hazrath Syed Siddique Hussain, was that “All India will embrace Islam” and that India would be the capital for the next Islamic Caliphate.58  The group has very little recent activity.  Deendar Anjuman has claimed responsibility for the role of its followers in the church bombings in India in 2000.  The group has committed robberies to secure funds for its activities.59 

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QUILLIAM PART 2 GLOBAL JIHADIST FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA Building on the analysis of the aforementioned Islamist terrorist groups in J&K, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, Part 2 of this report will explore the influence of the “global jihadist” network that is being propagated by IS throughout South Asia, and it will analyse the role of IS as an ‘ideological destabiliser’ within the region. In this section, particular attention will be paid to the relationship between Al-Qaeda and IS within Afghanistan and Pakistan. The implications of this changing power dynamic for the security of South Asia will be explored. Furthermore, Al-Qaeda’s newest branch, AlQaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) will be introduced.

Introduction Global jihad, i.e. the jihadist aim of creating a global caliphate, is a galvanizing force behind jihadist recruitment and radicalization. However, while current jihadist movements are becoming increasingly globalized, they do not represent an ideologically unified or coordinated force. The global caliphate is a primary and strategic objective during periods when a charismatic global jihadist leader or force makes it appear tangible. This report maintains that while global actors such as IS and AQ profoundly impact the security situation in South Asia, “global jihad” is not an irreversible mind-set. When local concerns loom large, so do opportunities for counter-radicalization and counter-narrative strategies at the local level.

IS as an ideological destabiliser Given that there is a regional precedent of jihadist groups acting as proxy forces, either for states, or for organizations that act as ideological “brands” such as the Taliban or Pakistani Taliban, the security implications of the global jihadist (and particularly IS) presence should be considered as an “ideological destabiliser” rather than a coordinated force. It is important to keep in mind that high levels of propaganda released by IS may exaggerate their range of influence, and that IS has a precedent of accepting international pledges of affiliation, even without practical mutual support (as in the case of Boko Haram). As a result, militants adopting their ‘brand’ are able to gain symbolic power, and this can provide momentum to their cause that subsequently exacerbates security concerns for international government agencies. This must not be read as downplaying the security concerns IS presents. Its ideological influence risks invigorating a sectarian jihadist cause, and inspiring fighters to mimic its notoriously violent tactics.

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Below, the key areas of concern for South Asia as IS expands its global influence will be outlined. As noted above, particular attention will be paid to the relationship between Al-Qaeda and IS, and the implications of this shifting balance of power for the greater South Asia region. This section will also introduce Al-Qaeda’s affiliate group, Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS).

1. IS is challenging AQ’s presence as the architects of global jihad:  AQ has a historical and territorial advantage in South Asia, but this has not discouraged IS’ efforts in the region.  IS recruiters hailing from the Middle East are focusing more on recruiting Pakistani fighters for the war in Syria and Iraq. Local sources in Peshawar say IS started recruitment in Pakistan in 2012 even before they emerged as IS themselves, and more than 200 fighters have left from Pakistan to join IS. Most of these fighters were from the Pakistani Taliban, LeJ, and other militant groups, who went to fight Bashar al Assad in Syria, and eventually joined IS.60  A worrying number of home-grown Afghan and Pakistani militants are beginning to operate locally under the IS brand. The first to pledge allegiance to IS was former Guantanamo detainee Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, and he continues to work as a recruiter and propagandist. He is currently described as leader of IS affiliates in Afghanistan.  There is now a leadership council, or Shura, for IS Khorosan Province (ISKP) (Khorosan referring to both Afghanistan and Pakistan) that was established in January 2015 by a group of former TTP commanders, including their former spokesman Shahid Shahidullah. However, the Shura’s power over regional IS affiliates in questionable.  Recently, Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost warned that the Taliban fought on behalf of ISI, and he issued a warning to those seeking to fight IS61. However, he isn’t known to be a member of the ISKP Shura. An IS spokesman officially recognized the group and its new Emir, Hafiz Saeed Khan, another ex-TTP fighter. However, the Shura itself now contains a mix of ex-TTP and Afghan Taliban62.

Shahidullah has announced that all IS’s regional affiliates, including Dost, had consented to the Shura’s leadership.  ISKP has had setbacks; it lost its deputy emir to a UAV strike in March, and a month later it lost that deputy’s replacement63. It is not known if the Shura has links to other self-declared IS affiliates, such as TTP splinter Jundullah, which declared allegiance last 25

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2.

November. Some other TTP local emirs such as that of Bajaur Agency have also declared allegiance, and are attempting to turn over their local authority to IS64.

So far, the picture suggests the Shura has little control over scattered IS affiliates. Despite Shahidullah’s claim that Dost is at least ideologically within ISKP, confusion over the perpetrator of an April 2015 suicide attack on a Jalalabad bank, which killed 35, suggests otherwise. Hafiz Saeed Khan tweeted a photo of the bomber responsible and he claimed that the attack was ISKPs first.

However, Dost later refuted the claim and they stated that IS wasn’t involved, but rather, that the attack was the work of Pakistani intelligence and was implemented in order to “damage the reputation of IS”65. This incident is indicative of militants capitalizing on a common brand, rather than sharing a common strategy.

There are increasing reports that fighting between the Taliban and IS in Afghanistan has become common, such as 15 IS fighters and 12 Taliban militants killed over declarations of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in May 2015.66

The fracturing of the Taliban in Pakistan has provided the Islamic State with the opportunity to gain a foothold in the region.  The Islamic State has peeled off disaffected or marginalized Taliban commanders from various Taliban groups to boost the leadership cadres of ISKP. However, until the ISKP Shura gains greater control of the vast number of largely independent IS affiliates in the region, IS will not exercise any significant territorial control. As such, an IS coordinated insurgency is unlikely.  The limited IS “leadership” in Pakistan is unable to extract the same levels of control its Middle Eastern counterpart can in the short tomedium term; however, IS’ symbolic capital does have potential to galvanise and change Pakistani militant dynamics.  While IS has led military offensives in Afghanistan, the group must contend with powerful and competing regional presences, including the Taliban. The Taliban has condemned the IS-led Jalalabad bombing in April 2015.67  Though IS will not be able to annex South Asia into its “caliphate” in the foreseeable future, if new agents in Pakistan are successful, they will be able to rally support and further deteriorate the security situation.

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3.

IS has launched some offensives in the region (albeit fairly small ones in Afghanistan), and established training camps and recruitment centres to bring local fighters to Syria. This has left a mark on Afghan and Pakistani national consciousness by instilling fear and a new wave of global jihadist inspiration.  The takfiri ideology speaks to overtly sectarian militant groups.  IS propaganda attracts some civilian support, and taps into the regional precedent of jihadist groups acting as proxy militants for larger forces.  If IS “soldiers” are successful, they may galvanize a new, globally oriented, and increasingly sectarian, wave of violence.  Forces that now identify with IS are examined in our longer report (Chapter IV).

4.

Meanwhile, AQ is attempting to consolidate and expand its hold in Asia in response to the influence it has lost to IS in the Middle East.  The most significant move by al Zawahiri in September 2014 was the establishment of a new branch of AQ: Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Ayman al Zawahiri intends to recruit within India, Bangladesh, and Burma, increasingly fertile recruiting grounds for radicalization. In May 2015, AQIS claimed responsibility for the deaths of secular bloggers in Pakistan and Bangladesh.68  Burma has experienced Buddhist-led attacks on the Rohingya Muslim minority for the last two years, and the Islamist minority in Bangladesh increasingly clashes with the secular Muslim majority.69 As such, both countries must be considered as potential “hotspots” for radicalization in the immediate future, and their logistical significance to groups in Pakistan and India should not be underestimated. Some militant Pakistani outfits targeting India prefer to enter India through the poorly guarded Bangladeshi border.70 Al Qaeda named Bangladesh a country where Muslims would be ideologically targeted by AQIS.  India’s election of a ruling party with Hindu nationalist sympathies, in tandem with increasing home-grown Islamist extremism, may play to AQ’s advantage as increasing numbers of Indian Muslims feel marginalized in Indian society. The issue of coercive conversions to Hinduism is one that has particularly exacerbated fears of Muslim subjugation71.

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5.

It is possible that the LeT will compete with AQ for prominence in South Asia; LeT may use AQ silence on Kashmir to focus on Indian targets in Kashmir.72 AQ is also taking steps to consolidate its connection to the TTP, and the two organizations have made their relationship increasingly public in the last few months. It is likely that this decision has been made in order to emphasise their opposition to IS. For instance, the TTP eulogized two AQ leaders killed in UAV strikes in early 201573.

AQIS’ structural differences to IS include the following advantages:  Legitimacy in controlling territory from first-mover advantages.  Close partnerships with networks who have fought in the region.  Powerful allies in the TTP, Mullah Omar, and the Afghan Taliban,74

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Figure 2: Jihadist Networks in South Asia

Legend W h i te b o xe s i n d ica te g r o u p s in Ka s h m ir , Y e l lo w in P a k is t a n , B lu e i n I n d ia a n d P in k in A f g h a n is ta n B lu e a r r o ws s ho w o f f s ho o t gr o u ps ( a r ro w po i nts f ro m pa re n t o rga n i s a t io n to s p l in t e r) R ed l in e s il l us tra t e o pe ra tio na l l i n ks a n d /o r m u tu a l a s s is ta nc e G r e en l in es s ho ws u m b re lla o r ga n is a tio n a s s o c ia tio n a n d no t ne c e s s a ri l y o pe ra t io n a l c o o r d i na tio n B r ow n li n es i ll us t ra te a n i de o lo g i c a l a f f i li a t io n , w he re a po s s i bl e o pe ra tio n a l a s s o c i a t io n is un k no w n Y e ll o w li ne s re p re s e n t a ta c tic a l a ll ia nc e un d e r a n u m br e l la o r ga n is a t io n T ex t i n g r ee n a re gro u ps t ha t ha v e ma de t he i r na me o n s e c ta r ia nis m T ex t i n pi nk a r e gro u ps th a t s ta rt e d o ut a s Ka s h m ir f o c us e d

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QUILLIAM PART 3 STATE OF PLAY

I n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n t e r r o r i s t g r o u ps a n d n a t i o n a l , regional, and international forces In this section, the ways that Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India are combatting the threat of Islamist extremism will be outlined. In particular, this report will provide a brief summary of the counter-terrorism, judicial, educational, military, and finance orientated policies that are being implemented within the aforementioned regions. Due to the status of Jammu and Kashmir as a contested territory, it will be subject to a different set of analytical criteria.

From our findings, gaps will be identified in the counter-extremism policies that are being used by each country - or state, as is the case in Indian and Pakistani administered Jammu and Kashmir - in order to combat the spread of Islamist extremism; a series of region specific policy suggestions will be made in Part 4 of this report.

Jammu and Kashmir Although Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state in its own right up to the conclusion of British rule in the Indian subcontinent in 1947, it has been a heavily contested territory ever since, with both India and Pakistan vying for its ownership.75 It is currently under Indian administration, as a federal state with a degree of autonomy guaranteed under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. A small proportion of it, known as Azad Kashmir, is under Pakistani administration. As such, the interactions between terrorist groups and national, regional, and international forces have been complicated, and in many ways dictated, by the wars that have been, and are being fought between the Indian army, and proxy militant groups such as Hizb-ulMujahideen (HM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) (see Part 2 of this report).76 As such, the counter-terrorism initiatives that are taken within this region are divided amongst the Indian and the Pakistani administrations. The details of these initiatives are not explicitly relevant to this report, however, an analysis on how these Governments can directly develop their policies in order to restore peace to the region, and to mitigate the proliferation of said militant groups, will be offered in Part 4 of this report.

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Pakistan Counter-terrorism policy: Pakistan’s new national policy to combat terrorism, the NAP, was released in 2014. Part of this plan includes Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a military offensive by the Pakistan Armed Forces against various militant groups: TTP, LeJ, Jundallah, AQ, IMU, and the Haqqani Network. The operation in North Waziristan (part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border) is a renewed effort against militancy in the wake of the 8 June attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, for which the TTP and the IMU claimed responsibility.

Judicial system: Pakistan has lifted the death penalty moratorium for terrorists, ordered the military to escalate attacks on terrorist hideouts, and targeted ‘extremism’ in Karachi and Punjab.

Education: The NAP has emphasised the need to study the role of Pakistan’s education system in developing extremist mind-sets. Fiscal constraints have meant that the government partly relies on religious institutes to fill a vacuum in education and governance. Pakistan’s counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategies hinge on Afghanistan’s cooperation, as well as the promotion of a clear narrative that unequivocally condemns terrorism and suicide bombings on both sides of the border. The Pakistani government has mandated the regulation of madrassahs. It has also forbidden banned groups to operate under different names, and strengthened the country’s National Counter Terrorism Authority. However, clerics who openly challenge the government, preach extremism, and sympathize with the Taliban are actively countering these initiatives.

Military: Pakistan’s intelligence is focused on increasing cooperation between federal intelligence agencies and provinces, and on a newly launched anti-terrorism helpline.

Funding (internal and external): The Pakistani government has implemented a ban on hate speech, and on literature preaching sectarianism and extremism. Furthermore, it has evoked sanctions on those spreading sectarianism. However, the implementation of these counter-extremism policies remains ineffective because of a low terror conviction rate; for example, the leader of the JuD/LeT, Hafiz Saeed, remains a free man in Pakistan.

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QUILLIAM Afghanistan Counter-terrorism policy: As far as the Taliban is concerned, the immediate future of Afghanistan’s counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy depends on whether or not Mullah Omar resurfaces, how hawkish he will be upon his return, and how much authority he has left over his Taliban.

Judicial system: A recent study in the Anti-Terrorism Prosecutors’ Department (ATPD) of Afghanistan found weaknesses in critical thinking, indictment drafting, and case preparation. Because judges did not necessarily understand changes that were made to the legal framework in 2013 and 2014, there were a high number of failed prosecutions, and cases vulnerable to appeal. Some of these changes included the passage of a new Criminal Procedure Code, as well as the implementation of anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering legislation. Over 30% of the prosecutors surveyed reported that they did not have the training that was necessary in order to do their job to a high standard.77

Education: Despite efforts to change the national school curriculum, and replace textbooks containing extremist teachings with new ones, policy remains to be finalized. There remains no standard curriculum for secondary school textbooks, and high school textbooks remain inadequate in both number and in content. For many years, the Taliban and other groups have attacked schools, teachers, and students. In May, 2012, the Ministry of Education reported that more than 590 schools were closed in areas at risk; most of these schools were in the Helmand, Kabul, and Kandahar provinces.78

Military: The Taliban will be the chief factor in the ISAF/NATO strategy for reducing troop levels in Afghanistan. Factions have emerged among the Taliban in recent years, largely due to Mullah Omar’s invisibility, and this appears to be leading to a stagnation of loyalty, particularly among younger fighters.79 Although the Taliban “brand” risks being seen as tired, in contrast to the wave of fear and publicity that has greeted the rise of IS, the Taliban may be able to recover some of their former prestige if they make significant gains in the wake of the ISAF force withdrawal.80 It is feared that this is a real possibility.81 Levels of terrorist activity along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border are also contingent on the relationship between India and Pakistan.

For example, an active effort to resolve the Kashmir issue could result in a reduction of Indian and Pakistani security forces along common borders, and a bilateral agreement on nuclear and conventional forces. This would bolster Pakistan’s ability to act against militants in border areas between

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Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it would significant improve the success of counter-terrorism efforts.

Funding (internal and external): Afghanistan benefits from a US special operation force to conduct counterterrorism missions as part of new NATO training and advisory mission. The training mission will focus on the larger Afghan Army and police headquarters, as well as the ministries of defense and interior in Kabul. Afghanistan still requires assistance in working within a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, online and health) where there are risks of radicalization.

India Counter-terrorism policy: No comprehensive national policy on countering radicalization exists. This creates gaps in long-term effectiveness. India’s upper house of Parliament banned IS in December 2014, after detaining IS operative Mehdi Biswaas who ran the popular Twitter account @ShamiWitness from Karnataka, Bengaluru82. However, India is studying the applicability of an ‘extremism counseling hotline’ set up by Austrian authorities in India that would enable parents, teachers, and friends of “vulnerable and indoctrinated” youth to seek help.83

Judicial system: The 1987 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act was India’s first attempt at a counter-terrorism law. It was replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. Under these statutes, individuals were prosecuted for, amongst other things, the use of hawala for the financing of terrorism. However, both these statutes have since been repealed, and it does not look as though India has a specific anti-terrorism law, although the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act (2008) makes it illegal to support both secessionist movements, and any claims to Indian territories that are made by foreign powers.84

Education: Following fears that Bangladeshi nationals were radicalizing Indian Muslims in two madrassahs in West Bengal, a recent report by the BJP released in November 2014 found that “the main danger" of radicalization comes from foreign teachers employed in madrassahs, not madrassahs where Indian Muslims teach children.85

Military: States along India’s border, namely in North-East India, Punjab, and J&K, have aired grievances by taking up arms against the central Indian government. The central government has responded with mostly military action. India’s counter-terrorism program is intelligence heavy: it 33

QUILLIAM incorporates agencies such as the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the National Security Guard (NSG), and the National Investigation Agency (NIA), as well as implementation of the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)86.

Funding (internal and external): India’s counter-terrorism strategy is reliant on its relationship with its neighbors: the nation’s borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh, especially in rural areas, remains extremely porous and susceptible to illegal border crossings. According to the Institute of Conflict Management, 27 youths were arrested or detained in 2014 for attempting to join IS, with 10 Indians fighting amongst IS ranks.87

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PART 4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Having reviewed the efforts that are being made on behalf of the Pakistani, Afghan, and Indian administrations in order to combat the proliferation of Islamist extremism, this report will now provide a series of nation-specific policy recommendations that ought to be implemented in order to expedite this process. Again, Jammu and Kashmir present a special case, and in light of the balance of power that exists within this region, this report has differentiated between Indian and Pakistani administered Jammu and Kashmir, and has made policy recommendations accordingly. However, before our nation specific policy recommendations are presented, a series of general policy recommendations will be made that can be used to inform the development of future counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts in South Asia.

It is important to remember that this affects policy makers in Britain because 43.4% of Muslims in Britain are of British Asian descent88, making issues in India and Pakistan of particular importance to a large segment of Britain’s population.

General Policy Recommendations We recommend governments reinforce legitimate state institutions to counter the appeal of radicalisation: 

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We believe that one of the main causes of radicalization in South Asia, besides ideological appeal and group networks, is disillusionment with the state. According to Transparency International, South Asia is the most corrupt region in the world,89 and until steps are taken to improve Governmental transparency, culture, and accountability, counter-extremism efforts will be significantly limited.

Additionally, there is a strong positive correlation between poverty and a susceptibility to extremist narratives, and because corruption undermines the propensity for individuals to cross the “barrier of poverty,”90 the need for a reduction in institutionalized corruption is stressed.

The appeal of movements such as IS is financial as well as ideological: for many in rural, low income areas of South Asia the IS wage of $400 per month91 could be attractive. If this monetary incentive is extended to IS’ self-declared allies in South Asia, 35

QUILLIAM countering the group’s appeal will be more difficult, unless incomes and employment opportunities are improved throughout.

To understand this financial incentive, the mean monthly incomes (real GDP per capita/12; USD) for India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Jammu and Kashmir are provided below: Country/ State*

Monthly income (real GDP per capita/12), USD 2013 (1 dp)92 India 124.9 Afghanistan 55.4 Pakistan 106.3 Jammu and Kashmir* 43.1†93 †A different dataset for 2011 was used for these figures

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The disparity between mean monthly incomes and the $400 salary that is offered by IS is significant.

Even well-off and well educated youth can be attracted to jihadist causes due to a sense of injustice and frustrated expectations. This attraction is emphasized if these individuals feel that their education will not bring them opportunities. LeJ (a potential IS ally) is known for having a significant number of university graduates among its fighters.94 We suggest that education, training, and job search assistance should be extended to tackle economic and labour inactivity in South Asia.

As part of its state-building project, IS in the Middle East includes all of the services one might expect from a local government: distribution of water, collection of charity, and the provision of health care services. If the relevant South Asian administrations do not improve service infrastructure, then this element of the IS campaign may appeal to economically disenfranchised individuals, and help to explain the attraction of joining the fight in Iraq and Syria: “extremist violence is more likely to arise wherever governments are unable to provide for their citizens.” 95 However, in certain countries such as Pakistan, there is a negative correlation between poverty and the support of terrorism. 96 This is because the elites find that some of their interests align with those of the terrorist organisations (for example, the annexation of Jammu and Kashmir), and – unlike the poor - they are not as exposed to the violent implications of their decisions.

In order to ameliorate this occurrence, ‘track II diplomacy’ – i.e.

Diplomacy that is either overseen, facilitated, or carried out by ‘non-state actors’ - should be encouraged. Studies on track II diplomacy97 have illustrated that dialogue of this kind usually 36

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encourages groups of influential elites to think in cooperative ways, and it could encourage them to consider the implications of their decision to support certain terrorist organizations on poorer Pakistani communities. As such, track II diplomacy would help to close the gap of individuals in Pakistan that are affected by terrorism. Such discussions could focus on the religious inconsistencies that are advocated in terrorist rhetoric, and the role of terrorists in the killings of civilians.

We suggest that counter-extremist narratives should be presented in local languages such as Urdu, and that the true cost of terrorism are highlighted by informing sympathisers of all economic classes that these groups do not provide social benefits, (or exaggerate their provision), or the possibility of increased positive representation.

Groups that claim responsibility for terrorist actions selectively invoke religious rhetoric to justify politically motivated violence, but they do not generally represent Muslim populations.

Governments should focus on propagating counter narratives from within the Islamic framework in order to delegitimize their Islamist cause.

Government funding should focus on undertaking public health research initiatives in order to investigate and understand the causes and the consequences of violence. The WHO Violence Prevention Alliance (VPA) has recently provided a public health framework98 that examines the public health impact of terrorist acts arising from violent radicalization, including direct consequences such as deaths, physical injuries and psychological or mental trauma.99 These public health frameworks should be implemented in South Asia, and their findings on the implications of radicalization and terrorism should be publicized.

Current public health frameworks focus on individual, relationship, community, and society-centered approaches in order to prevent violence. We strongly urge governments to employ social development, therapeutic, and treatment programs to focus on people at risk of harming themselves and others, and use a group format to address issues such as anger management and drug abuse.

WHO VPA programs focus on training in relationship skills, family therapy, parenting, home visitation and mentoring. Similar approaches are used by the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States. These have positive, long-term effects in reducing

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violent and delinquent behavior. Extending such work to monitor and tackle violent radicalization and terrorism is a natural next step, but not yet done. We encourage governments to take steps to provide health surveys and censuses that ask about aspects of violent radicalization and group cohesion as relevant health and social issues, and not only as a criminal justice issue.100 The International Classification of Diseases and CDC now has codes for deaths and injuries from terrorist acts;101 this offers a system of monitoring that is closely aligned to other public health surveillance programs. Its implementation can offer governments in South Asia an objective, apolitical look at global terrorismrelated deaths and circumstances in which they occur. This is crucial in an environment of widespread violence, coupled with low levels of social and political education.

In the sections that follow, we provide region and country-specific approaches to monitoring the terrorist groups that have been presented in Part 1 of this report, and we outline how the problems that they present can be mitigated. This is not a comprehensive blueprint for the implementation of working policies, rather, it will serve to inform the relevant parties of the desired direction for future policy decisions.

N a t i o n - S pe c i f i c P o l i c y R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir 

With a high electoral turnout at the Legislative Assembly elections in December 2014, Kashmir has indicated that it is prepared to give democratic politics under Indian rule a chance. This is an opportunity to stabilize the situation in Jammu and Kashmir that must not be wasted. The new Legislative Assembly government, under Indian appointed governor Narinder Nath Vohar, and a power sharing agreement between the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) and the BJP must: a) Invest significant efforts in tackling unemployment. J&K has the highest rate of unemployment in North India,102 combining frustration, and poverty disenfranchisement. b) Implement policies to reduce poverty and inequality, as well as improve support for families, including but not limited to: increasing social assistance and economic development schemes, employment creation, improved education, parental leave, maternal employment and child care arrangements; all of which are likely to reduce the appeal of violence.103 38

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Local militancy is closely linked to political organs such as the prosecession Hurriyat Council. These political organs depend on popular opinion, and are prepared to use influence to quell militant activity. This is what occurred during the December 2014 assembly elections. The most effective way to guarantee security and avoid increasing sympathy for the secessionist cause is sustainable economic and social development. There may be opportunities to engage the Hurriyat and address some of the more immediate grievances of its supporters. Pro-independence or secession sentiments will not be erased in the short-term, but, given the Hurriyat’s reliance on public support and its close links with UJC, it may be able to help maintain peace if the citizens of J&K are confident their quality of life will improve.

The new Legislative Assembly government consists of the PDP and the BJP. The PDP are Kashmiri moderates, and their wish for “selfrule” in the philosophical sense can be accommodated under the terms stipulated in Article 370, and it could be used to guarantee J&K’s partial autonomy. We strongly encourage the BJP to quell the fear that they plan to rescind Article 370, a move which would infuriate Kashmiris and is likely to usher in a new wave of militancy.

Pakistan administered Jammu and Kashmir 

In Pakistan-administered Kashmir, efforts must be taken to: a) Ensure electoral freedoms of the Kashmir Legislative Assembly. b) Ensure adequate representation in Northern Kashmir, where demands for a more formal inclusion into Pakistan, or secession, will lead to a greater degree of accountability over Kashmir’s affairs.  The Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif recently pledged 11 billion Rupees for “mega projects” to develop Kashmir, including expressways between towns. Pains must be taken to ensure successful implementation and avoidance of corruption.104  We encourage both the media and state institutions in Pakistan to refrain from endorsing terrorist groups in Kashmir as “freedom fighters” who push democratic values, or provide social welfare. In fact, whilst groups such as JuD/LeT do offer social services, they are prone to exaggerating their social contributions through propaganda with the help of various media institutions.105

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A report that was published by the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development (PILDAT) in August 2014 indicates that 76% of Pakistanis see the Federal Government’s attempts to eradicate corruption as ‘bad; and ‘very bad’, while 55% believe there is very little or no chance that the government will be able to tackle terrorism. Interestingly, 71% see little or no chance that poverty can be alleviated.106 With that said, this report suggests that the Pakistani government should take significant steps to combat cynicism by engaging with grassroots organisations to reduce corruption, as well as the media to focus a campaign against terrorism.

Corruption and bad governance is indicative of a political system where access to justice is limited and the rule of law is weak. In 2013, Pakistan scored 127 out of 175 on the Corruption Perceptions Index. Therefore, we stress that an immediate priority for policy makers must be to aid judicial reform, provision and expansion. We also encourage the use of online corruption reports stemming from grassroots initiatives to increase transparency (such a ipaidabribe.com) The media should be encouraged to make a concerted effort to describe designated terrorist organisations as such, and to avoid branding these groups as charities or organisations that provide social services, as well as share statistics of disillusionment with these groups amongst the general population.

Recent large scale terrorist attacks against the Pakistani state have incentivized the Pakistani government to increase its campaign against terrorism, focusing on the use of military courts to speed up terrorism trials and accelerate the executions of those convicted. This approach has been largely ineffective in combating terrorism. Pakistan has more than 8,000 prisoners on death row, most of whom have exhausted the appeals process. The courts system is slow, there is a heavy reliance on witness testimony, and little protection for judges and prosecutors. In July 2014, 150 heavily armed Taliban easily overwhelmed prison guards and freed 25 dangerous terrorists.107 As such, efforts should be made to research justice systems and better prepare security forces to respond to domestic threats.

We recommend conducting research on legislation to link formal and informal justice systems, so that both deliver proportionate punishments for particular crimes. This research will also be used 40

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to ensure that the state retains the power to try the most serious offenders. Transferring more minor cases to the traditional system will relieve pressure on the justice sector, and help prevent cases of detention without trial. Culturally, this may not be easy given that customs such as Pashtunwali allow lethal violence as retribution. However, traditional justice practitioners have expressed a desire to be more closely linked to the state,108 and if effective links between formal and informal justice were established in the isolated and troubled regions of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it would be a valuable step towards greater state integration. Nonetheless, more research will be vital to assess how the Pakistani dual justice system might work. Examples of post-conflict nations that have implemented dual justice systems, such as Liberia, can demonstrate the benefits of such a system, and inform the challenges they face. Local justice could potentially be state-subsidised, so as to give local authority systems an incentive to work against terror networks rather than with them. Powerful anti-corruption measures would have to accompany any government subsidies, in order to protect the integrity of the traditional system.  The low conviction rate for terror in Pakistan is partly due to judicial fear of reprisal from militant groups; therefore, efforts should be made to improve the safety and security of these state institutions.  Another important area to focus on is in prisons and prison care: a) In Pakistan, 92,000 prisoners share 41,000 prison places,109 and juvenile and adult, as well as minor and hardened or politically motivated criminals are often mixed. There are few staff, and there is frequent mistreatment and torture. Therefore, state support and recognition of traditional justice is further recommended. b) The government’s recent successes in fighting domestic militancy have produced 4,000 additional inmates, 3,700 of which are thought to be affiliated with either AQ or the Taliban.110 Militants represent the fastest growing part of the Pakistani prison population, making overcrowding worse and exposing non-radical inmates to increasing numbers of battlehardened jihadists.111 As such, sending less serious cases for trial by traditional justice will speed up the process, meaning an offender’s punishment will not include disproportionate time in prison while they wait for trial, and there will be less exposure to radical militants.

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To reduce the appeal of extremism within schools and universities, we advise focusing on civic education, citizenship, pluralism, freedom of religion, and the mirroring of counter-extremism programs. We encourage content analysis of material within educational institutions, particularly entryism in tertiary education. Often, madrasah education can serve as a complement, and not as a substitute112 for tertiary education. The negative implications of extremism must be advertised within all levels of education.

Human rights should continue to be a core aim of the Pakistani Government’s initiative. Counter-extremism context should be promoted in Urdu, and be available in all vernacular languages.

Pakistan should continue to focus on promoting democracy, and on building on the work of PILDAT. Strengthening democracy will weaken the military establishment’s independence.

The Pakistani blasphemy law needs reform, as it strengthens the stance of Islamist extremists.

The international community should continue to give aid to Pakistan so long as counter-extremist and human rights narratives are the drivers of both domestic and foreign policy.

The Pakistani government must insist on greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be created in the process.

We recommend focusing on anti-sectarian counter-narratives.

This is IS's market niche, and given that Jundullah (one of their new allies, traditionally sectarian and an offshoot of the TTP) has claimed credit for the Shia mosque bombing in January 2015, it is a theme increasingly coming to the fore, and one that counternarratives could specifically address.

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We advise the state to focus on decreasing corruption, and increasing social assistance to families in need. Economic disenfranchisement increases the appeal of extremism. Although poverty is common throughout the Afghan population, it is most prevalent among rural Afghans. 44% say that there were times in the past year when they didn't have enough money to buy food for themselves or their families, whereas only 32% of urban residents found themselves in a similar position.113 Islamist violence remains a problem in Afghanistan, even though IMU and its splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union, have weakened.

With Islamists from the Haqqani Network, the Taliban, and Hizb-iIslami (HIG) still active, we urge the government to continue to devote more resources to intelligence and security efforts.

We argue that the distrust between rural Afghans and the local and central government bodies should be eased through increased collaboration and grassroots reconciliation.

We suggest that donors should be prepared to invest in projects that diversify the rural economy, and that promote reconciliation beyond a ‘grand peace plan’.

We encourage short term, state-led security improvements, particularly in the form of grassroots reconciliation between factions, and especially those ethnic factions that have become politicized at the national level.

While there are short term merits to be gained from disarmament programs, in the absence of alternative livelihood options and a ‘grand plan’ peace process with clear political direction, they will not create long-term security. A disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program has been implemented in Afghanistan before. The program yielded mixed results; 62,376 AMF members were demobilized, and 57,629 weapons were collected.114 We encourage repetition of a similar imitative, given a meaningful measure of success will be determined in the longerterm.

Permanent demobilization hinges on the success of militant transitions to civilian life, which, in turn, is contingent on the attraction of the alternative livelihoods that can be offered by the Afghan government.115 Although vocational courses were offered to those taking part in the previous program, a subsequent upsurge in insurgent activity, and a lack of economic stability, renders long-

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term success of a DDR initiative unlikely. Furthermore, the late implementation of the program, and the strategy of appeasing commanders by offering them high level government and security positions, allowed them to manipulate the DDR process, and entrench their personal power in the new government establishment. Moreover, the DDR program only targeted former Afghan Military Forces (AMF).

A separate program for illegal militias, the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups program (DIAG) attempted to use a mix of threats of coercion, and community development projects to get militants to disarm. Unlike the DDR program, it is widely agreed that the DIAG had failed because the government officials that had facilitated the process were generally reluctant to break their ties with local militias.116 A further difficulty that any future disarmament initiative will have to contend with is the arms culture of rural Afghanistan, where personal possession of arms is a given, and there is limited trust in the state.

Quilliam believes a more promising avenue than top down disarmament programs is that of grassroots reconciliation. The Afghan government and parts of civil society have already taken some initiatives to this effect. Thus far, grassroots initiatives have largely been in the form of organizing “peace jirgas” - councils between local warring factions. In 2007, the parliament created the National Commission for Peace and Reconciliation (PTS), in which officials in various provinces, coupled with civil society actors, aimed to reconcile the state with factions of the Taliban. We strongly urge the continuation of these collaborative efforts because they present an important opportunity for longer-term counter-extremism narratives to be fostered. An Afghan NGO called the Tribal Liaison Office has also attempted to facilitate such jirgas between local government, international forces, and local communities, to try and improve relations. However, grassroots reconciliation initiatives are generally unpopular with donors, since producing measurable output is difficult, and they have not, as hoped, facilitated departure of any high level Taliban commanders thus far. Nevertheless, they offer a sustainable form of positive reconciliation and collaboration, and we recommend they should continue to be supported wherever possible.117 Afghanistan’s vast opium trade has been a thorn in the side of ISAF forces as they attempted to balance meeting legal obligations to cease drug trade while building relations with communities for whom that trade is an economic lifeline. Threats of seizing or 44

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destroying opium poppy crops were not heeded, and when such threats were carried out, they were followed by a spike in local Taliban units, as locals flooded to join the insurgency.

Controversially, British forces in Helmand were eventually forced to back down and tacitly allow poppy growing, even sending some forces to attend demonstrations of how to process the crop as a goodwill gesture.118,119 Hopes of quasi-legalizing the crop to produce medical supplies such as morphine and codeine have been put forward.120 As appealing as this idea is, given the shortage of powerful painkillers in hospitals across the developing world, the unfortunate truth is that neither the opium poppy nor morphine in Afghanistan are particularly competitive. Strict regulations and security that guard legal opium crops, coupled with the fact that morphine is not patented and so cannot be sold very expensively, make for an uncompetitive drug. Afghanistan does not have the agricultural advantages in the way of machinery and manpower that legal producers such as Australia has. Furthermore, it cannot compete in terms of commercial production costs, and at present, there are several obstacles that stand in the way of making this crop a valuable way of helping its producers rise out of poverty.121 Despite lack of commercial incentive to legally harvest Afghan opium poppy, there is still demand for its presence in global medical markets. Therefore, we suggest a non-profit initiative to harvest Afghan opium at prices that are beneficial to Afghan producers, and to redistribute its medical products to hospitals in need; this way, potential for both conflict appeasement and palliative care will be fulfilled. Failing that, the temptation to engage in coercive narcotics restriction must be resisted in favor of a long-term strategy to make the opium trade less desirable by diversifying the Afghan rural economy.

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We urge India to co-operate with to Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan intelligence sharing initiatives in order to boost regional security.

India’s relationship with the US and the information sharing and synergy in security that is likely to result from it will have important positive implications for counter-terrorism. Equally important are the potential spillover effects that can be gained from increased security to India’s neighbors.

President Obama’s visit to India in January 2015 resulted in India and the United States moving towards joint production and codevelopment of weapon systems, along with intensifying counterterror cooperation and undertaking joint military exercises under the Defence Framework Agreement (DFA).122 Major developments include the United States and India “placing each other at the same level as their closest partners,”123 and discussions included strengthening process-related difficulties in defence trade, and collaborating with technology. Such initiatives would address India’s two prominent and overlapping terrorist groups – IM and SIMI, both of which focus on cybercrime.

We strongly encourage the Indian government to better engage with its Muslim community and to decrease the appeal of IS’ projections of an Islamic caliphate, as well as to reduce the appeal of militant ideologies that cater to Indian Muslims’ grievances. We ask the BJP to take swift, proactive steps to clamp down on coercive conversions to Hinduism, and allay fears that state welfare is conditional on Hinduism.

We advise the Indian government to focus on sources of corruption, including but not limited to, entitlement programs and social spending schemes. Corruption stifles economic growth and inhibits the output of state services. We ask that state government efforts to reduce corruption across India are fostered, and civic anti-corruption organizations such as Bharat Swabhiman Trust are supported.

The government should take steps to invest in long-term counterextremism work, focusing on cyber extremism as well. Such efforts would help combat the popularity and the ease of cyber-crime.

Quality education that focuses on integration within India, and on strengthening human rights commitments to religious freedoms, should be fostered within schools, colleges, and universities.

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There are myriad ways in which jihadist organizations can retain some of their original structure and character while under the banner of a would-be caliphate creator. Militant groups may declare allegiance to their chosen organization, while retaining the essence of their original organizational identity, and indeed the power of their leaders.

While IS is powerfully challenging, or, arguably, has already taken Al Qaeda’s crown as the architects of global jihad, Al Qaeda remains a significant entity for militants who are globally aligning themselves with a choice between the two. This report has illustrated that in South Asia, entrenched terrorist groups have a historical, and in some ways a territorial, advantage. However, this is unlikely to discourage IS’ efforts in the region in the future.

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Study on Informal Justice System in Pakistan, Sindh Judicial Academy, Available at: http://www.sja.gos.pk/Publicaiton/Misc/Report%20Informal%20Justice%20System%20in% 20Pakistan.pdf, Accessed: 15/02/15 2 Bhui, K. S., Hicks, M. H., Lashley, M., & Jones, E. (2012). A public health approach to understanding and preventing violent radicalization. BMC medicine, 10(1), 16.

3 Strategic Foresight Group. (2011) “The Indus Equation”. Available online at: http://www.strategicforesight.com/publications.php?page=8#.VW78AlLbJ2Y. Accessed on 3rd June 2015.

4 Now, one of the key types of Taliban propaganda video are “pre-martyrdom” films of suicide bombers. Suicide bombing is portrayed in these films as the ultimate form of martyrdom, and the domain of elite fighters. The videos are partly praises of the individuals who undertake it, mostly religious justifications for the attack, but also an opportunity to dispel ideas of what might drive an individual to suicide bombing, other than sheer religious devotion. The fiyadeen (those who sacrifice) take great pains in the video to say that they are sound of mind and welloff, and so are not undertaking the bombing out of desperation or madness. The reasoning for the attack is overwhelmingly religious rather than political, and where it is political, it is in the most general of anti-western and anti-imperialist terms.

5 The Subverted Indo-Bangladesh Border, May 7th 2014, VK Shashikumar, India Defence Review, Available at: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-subverted-indo-bangladeshborder-i/, Accessed: 23/03/15 6 New Al Qaeda Franchise Also Sets Sights on US , September 4th 2014, Lee Ferran, Yahoo News, Available at: http://news.yahoo.com/al-qaeda-franchise-sets-sights-us-175343212--abc-newstopstories.html, Accessed: 23/03/15 7 Prominent Bangladeshi-American blogger Avijit Roy killed, February 28th 2015, Ray Sanchez, CNN, Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/27/asia/bangladeshi-american-bloggerdead/, Accessed: 23/03/15 8 Incidents and Statements involving Hizb-ul-Mujahideen: 2014, South Asia Terrorism Portal, Available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/hizb_ul_muja hideen2014.htm, Accessed 08/01/2014 9 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, South Asia Terrorism Portal, Available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/hizbul_mujahi deen.htm, Accessed: 08/01/15 10 “Front charity JKART funds Hizbul Mujahideen”. (2013) Money Jihad. Available online at: https://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/2013/08/21/front-charity-jkart-funds-hizbulmujahideen/. Accessed on 17th April 2015.

11Demystifying Kashmir, Navnita Chadha Behera, 2006, Brookings Institution Press 12 Who Is Responsible For Attacks On Mobile Towers In Kashmir?, Jehangir Ali and Gowhar Geelani, 2nd June 2015, The Citizen, Available at: http://www.thecitizen.in/NewsDetail.aspx?Id=3848&Who/Is/Responsible/For/Attacks/On/ Mobile/Towers/In/Kashmir?, Accessed: 6th June 2015 13 Fair, Christine C. (2011) “Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State”. Survival. 53:4, 29-52.

14 Interview: Hafiz Muhammed Saeed, Hanne Couderé and Aftab Chaudry, 4 th June 2015, The Diplomat, Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/interview-hafiz-muhammad-saeed/, Accessed: 6th June 2015 15 India furious as UN calls Hafiz Saeed 'Sahib' , India Today, December 21st 2014, Available at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/nda-government-un-hafiz-saeed-sahib-jud-garyquinlan/1/408064.html, Accessed: 08/01/15 16 Muttahida Jihad Council, Pakistan: Perilous Outreach , Sanchita Bhattacharya, 18th August 2014, New Age Islam, Academia.edu, Available at: http://www.academia.edu/8150694/Muttahida_Jihad_Council, Accessed: 08/01/2015 1

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17 Tankel, S. (2009). Lashkar-e-taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai.

Political Violence, 6.

Developments in Radicalisation and

Kambere, G. Hock Go, P. Kumar, P., Msafir, F. (2011) “The Financing of Lashkar-e-Taiba”.

Available online at: https://globalecco.org/en_GB/ctx-v1n1/lashkar-e-taiba. Accessed on 28th April 2015.

19 313 Brigade, Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, Available at: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgibin/groups/view/453?highlight=taliban, Accessed: 08/01/15 20 US adds Harakat-ul-Mujahideen's emir to terrorism list , Bill Roggio, September 30 2014, The Long War Journal, Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/us_adds_harakat-ul-m.php, Accessed: 08/01/15 21 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkatul_muj ahideen.htm 22 Harakat-ul-Mujahideen 'operates terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan' , Bill Roggio, August 8 2014, The Long War Journal, Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/08/harakat-ul-mujahidee.php, Accessed: 08/01/15 23 Different from the Punjabi branch of the TTP 24 Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network, Hassan Abbas, April 2009, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, 25 Jaish-e-Mohammed, Australian National Security, Available at: http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/JaisheMohammedJe M.aspx 26 "They don't negotiate, they don't make partners ", 2014, Qantara.de, Available at: http://en.qantara.de/content/the-emergence-of-islamic-state-in-pakistan-they-dontnegotiate-they-dont-make-partners, Accessed: 08/01/15 27 Pakistan's Sipah-e-Sahabah militants recognizes Abu-Bakkar al-Baghdadi as Caliph, AhlulBayt News Agency, July 2 2014, Available at: http://www.abna.ir/english/service/centeral-asiasubcontinent/archive/2014/07/02/620755/story.html , Accessed: 07/01/2015 28 Pakistani Fighters Joining the War in Syria, Zia ur Rehman, CTC Sentinel, September 2013, Volume 6, Issue 9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/CTCSentinelVol6Iss93.pdf 29 Karachi bus attack points to growing IS influence, AFP, 5 th June 2015, The Express Tribune, Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/898184/pakistan-bus-attack-points-to-growing-isinfluence/, Accessed: 6th June 2015 30 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm 31 “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi”. Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University. Available online at: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/215. Accessed 17th April 2015.

32 Pakistan’s War on Terrorism: Strategies for combating jihadist armed groups since 9/11 , Samir Puri, 2012, Routledge.

18

33 Pakistani jihadist groups, Lashkar-i-Islam merge into the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan,

Bill Roggio, March 12th 2015, The Long War Journal, Available http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/03/pakistani-jihadist-groups-lashkar-iislam-merge-into-the-movement-of-the-taliban-in-pakistan.php, Accessed: 6th June 2015

at:

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan – Analyzing the Network of Terror, Sana Jamal and M. Ahsa, International Relations Insights and Analysis, Report no. 6, January 2015 34

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Miraj, N. (2014) “Funding TTP: ANF official rebuffs US allegations”. The Express Tribune.

Available online: http://tribune.com.pk/story/807507/funding-ttp-anf-official-rebuffs-usallegations/. Accessed 17th April 2015, 36 Hizb-I-Ismali Gulbuddin. Institute for the Study of War. Available at: http://www.understandingwar.org/hizb-i-islami-gulbuddin-hig. Accessed: 22nd January 2015.

37 Hizb-I-Ismali Gulbuddin. Institute for the Study of War. Available at: http://www.understandingwar.org/hizb-i-islami-gulbuddin-hig. Accessed: 22nd January 2015.

38 Brown, V., Rassler, D., (2013) Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Network, 1973-2012.

Columbia University Press.

39 Mullen, M. (2011) Pakistan ‘backed Haqqani attack on Kabul” BBC. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15024344. Accessed 26th January 2015.

40 Brown, V., Rassler, D., (2013) Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Network, 1973-2012.

Columbia University Press.

41 Gopal, Anand; Mansur Khan Mahsud; Brian Fishman (3 June 2010). "Inside the Haqqani network". Foreign Policy. The Slate Group, LLC. Retrieved 23 November 2011.

42 Isis recruiter goes on trial in Uzbekistan.

(2014) Available at: http://rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20141128/272672067.html. Accessed 26th January 2015.

43 Isis recruiter goes on trial in Uzbekistan.

(2014) Available at: http://rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20141128/272672067.html. Accessed 26th January 2015.

44 Stein, M. “The Goals of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and its impact on Central Asia and the United States”.

FMSO. Available online at: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/IMU-Goals.pdf. Accessed 16th April 2015.

45 David Drissel (2014): Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: new communication and mobilization strategies for the Twitter generation, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 46 Taliban Overrun Remote District in Northeastern Afghanistan, Joseph Goldstein, 6 th June 2015, The New York Times, Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/world/asia/taliban-overrun-remote-district-innortheastern-afghanistan.html?_r=0, Accessed: 7th June 2015 47 Hamilton, F.; Coates, S.; Savage, M.; (2010) "Major General Richard Barrons puts Taleban fighter numbers at 36000".

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48 Does Mullah Omar Still Matter?, Michael Kugelman, April 13th 2015, War on the Rocks, Available at: http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/does-mullah-omar-still-matter/, Accessed: 7th June 2015, and Uzbek Group In Afghanistan Pledge Allegiance To Islamic State, RFE/RL's Uzbek Service, March 30th 2015, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbek-group-in-afghanistan-behead-afghansoldier/26928658.html, Accessed: 7th June 2015 49 Afghan women hold historic talks with the Taliban, BBC News, 6 th June 2015, Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33035268, Accessed: 7th June 2015, Taliban admit holding informal Afghan talks in Norway, AFP, June 5th 2015, The Express Tribune, Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/898352/taliban-admit-holding-informal-afghan-talks-innorway/ , Violence, The Taliban, and Afghanistan’s 2014 Elections, Antonio Giustozzi and Silab Mangal, PeaceWorks, December 2014, No. 103 50 Ibid 51 Atkins, S.E., (2011) “The 9/11 Encyclopaedia”. ABC-CLIO: p. 540.

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53 Laskar, R. (2014) “Pakistani group with links to al-Qaeda calls on militants to join jihad against India” Daily Mail India.

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55 UK bans Indian mujahideen.

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56 “Indian Mujahideen has grown beyond imagination, see how” (2014) One India. Available online at: http://www.oneindia.com/india/indian-mujahideen-has-grown-beyond-imagination-seehow-1552177.html. Accessed on 16th April 2015.

57 Ibid 58 Deendar Anjuman declared unlawful. (2007). The Times of India. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/Deendar-Anjuman-declaredunlawful/articleshow/2481965.cms?referral=PM. Accessed on 26th January 2015.

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60 Stated by member of the jihadist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi said, on condition of anonymity.

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61 ISIS leader in Afghanistan says Taliban fights for Pakistani intelligence, Friday June 5 th 2015, Khaama Press, Available at: https://www.khaama.com/isis-leader-in-afghanistan-says-talibanfights-for-pakistani-intelligence-1172, Accessed: 7th June 2015 62 Islamic State appoints leaders of ‘Khorasan province,’ issues veiled threat to Afghan Taliban, LWJ Staff, January 27th 2015, Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/islamic_state_appoin.php, Accessed: 7th June 2015 63 Leader Of ISIS Khorasan Province Vows Revenge After Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim Killed In Airstrike, Alessandria Masi, March 17th 2015, International Business Times, Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/leader-isis-khorasan-province-vows-revenge-after-mullah-abdulrauf-khadim-killed-1850256, Accessed: 7th June 2015 64 Pakistani Taliban emir for Bajaur joins Islamic State, Bill Roggio, 2 nd February 2015, The Long War Journal, Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/02/pakistani_taliban_em.php, Accessed: 7th June 2015 65 ISIS Now Says It Didn’t Bomb Afghanistan, Nancy A. Yousef, 21 st April 2015, The Daily Beast, Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/21/isis-now-says-it-didn-tbomb-afghanistan.html, Accessed: 7th June 2015 66 Tammana, Z. (2015) “Taliban clash with Daesh over Afghan recruitment”. Turkish Weekly.

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67 USA Today. April 18th 2015. Afghan suicide bombing claimed by Islamic State kills 35.

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68 Shankar, S. (2015). “Al Qaeda's South Asia Arm Blames India's Modi, Charlie Hebdo For War Against Muslims”. IB Times. Available online at: http://www.ibtimes.com/al-qaedas-south-asiaarm-blames-indias-modi-charlie-hebdo-war-against-muslims-1906679. Accessed on 7th May 2015.

69 Southeast Asian Fronts Loom Closer to Jihad , Insite Blog on Terrorism and Extremism, 19th January 2014, Available at: https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/346southeast-asian-fronts-loom-closer-to-jihad, Accessed: 26/01/15 70 The Subverted Indo-Bangladesh Border, May 7th 2014, VK Shashikumar, India Defence Review, Available at: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-subverted-indobangladesh-border-i/, Accessed: 23/03/15 71 “India parliament uproar over conversions by Hindu groups, BBC News, 22 nd December 2014, Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-30573796, Accessed: 12th June 2015 54 Schweiger, M.

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78 UNAMA and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Afghanistan MidYear Report 2012 on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA and OHCHR: 33.

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88 "Datablog: UK Census: religion by age, ethnicity and country of birth". The Guardian. 16 May 2013. Retrieved 5 June 2015. Of British Muslims of British Asian ethnic group, 14% are Indian, 91.5% are Pakistani, and 90% are Bangladeshi, as per a census in 2011.

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91 Barel, Z. September 1st, 2014. “How the Islamic State buys power”. Haaretz. Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.613395. Accessed 5th February 2015.

92Google Public Data.

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93 Knoema. World Data Atlas. GDP per capita for Jammu and Kashmir. Accessed online at: http://knoema.com/atlas/India/Jammu-and-Kashmir/GDP-Per-capita-Income. Accessed on 10th June 2015.

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95 Pg. 77 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/3/confrontingpoverty-graff/2010_confronting_poverty.pdf 96 Fair, Christine C. (2011) “Lashkar-e-Tiaba beyond Bin Laden: Enduring Challenges for the Region and the International Community. Hearing on “Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”.

97 Kaye, Dalia D. (2007) “Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia”. RAND National Security Division.

98 WHO. 2014. “Global status report on violence prevention 2014” Available at: http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/. Accessed on 5th February 2015.

99 Bhui, K. S., Hicks, M. H., Lashley, M., & Jones, E. (2012). A public health approach to understanding and preventing violent radicalization. BMC medicine, 10(1), 16.

100 Bhui, K. S., Hicks, M. H., Lashley, M., & Jones, E. (2012). A public health approach to understanding and preventing violent radicalization. BMC medicine, 10(1), 16.

101 Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/icd/icd9cm.htm. Accessed 5th February 2015.

102 JK has highest unemployment rate in north India, Greater Kashmir News Network, Available at: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Mar/10/jk-has-highest-unemployment-ratein-north-india-42.asp, Accessed: 09/02/15 103 WHO. (2014) “Global status report on violence prevention 2014” Available at: http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/. Accessed on 5th February 2015.

104 PM issues Rs 11 billion for three mega projects in AJK, January 25 th 2015, The News Tribe, Available at: http://www.thenewstribe.com/2015/01/20/pm-issues-rs-11-billion-for-threemega-projects-in-ajk/, Accessed: 09/02/2015 105 Byman, D. (2013) “The Foreign Policy Essay: C. Christine Fair of “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Pakistan’s Domesticated Terrorists”.

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106 PILDAT 2014 “Public Opinion on Quality of Governance in Pakistan” Available online: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Democracy&LegStr/PublicOpiniononQuality ofGovernanceinPakistan_Sep2014.pdf. Accessed on 6th February 20145.

107 “150 heavily-armed Taliban members overwhelmed guards at Pakistan prison, freeing over 250 prisoners”.

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108 Study on Informal Justice System in Pakistan, Sindh Judicial Academy, Available at: http://www.sja.gos.pk/Publicaiton/Misc/Report%20Informal%20Justice%20System%20in% 20Pakistan.pdf, Accessed: 15/02/15 89

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110 Ibid 111 Ibid 112 See: Fair, C. C. (2012). The enduring madrasa myth. South Asia.

113 Crabtree, S. December 5th 2014. “Suffering in Afghanistan Hits Record High – for any country”.

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120 Peter van Ham & Jorrit Kamminga (2007) Poppies for Peace: Reforming Afghanistan's Opium Industry, The Washington Quarterly, 30:1, 69-8 121 Licensing Afghanistan’s opium: solution or fallacy?, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2 (2) 122 Chaudry, D.R. (2015) Obama in India: Counter-terror cooperation, military exercises also part of Obama-Modi agreement.

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123 India US Defence Relations (2015). Available on the Indian Embassy website: https://www.indianembassy.org/pages.php?id=53. Accessed 27th January 2015.

109

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