Quilliam Report Turkey’s Role as a Regional Power: Its Scope, Challenges and Future Executive Summary Amid the recent instability across much of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Turkey has emerged as a newly assertive economic and political regional player. The impact of this emergence, however, is somewhat unclear and for the sake of global security, it is critical to determine what future the country holds in a region which it is slowly beginning to dominate. This report seeks to provide an overview of significant changes within Turkey and the country’s engagement with the MENA region over the last ten years, the Turkish population’s changing attitudes towards politics, the likely future direction of Turkish foreign policy, and how all of this will strategically impact activities in the MENA region. Through analysing the actual footprint of Turkish resurgent power and appeal across the MENA region and the limitations and opportunities Turkey has faced since the beginning of the Arab Spring in December 2010, this report will help to develop an understanding of the strategic impact of Turkey’s regional activities on its own future. The key findings of this study are as follows:
The emergence, rise and public appeal of the Justice and Development Party (known as ‘AKP’ in its Turkish short form) show that the party is forward thinking and has evolved beyond 20th century Islamist thought.
Over the past ten years there has been no tangible change in the role of religion in Turkish public life and there is no evidence to show that Turkey has been Islamicised or further radicalised under the AKP.
The government still has an unprecedented level of public support, which will likely remain in the next local elections (scheduled for October 2013) and national elections (taking place in 2015), despite the considerable civil unrest and anti-government protests that were sparked by demonstrations held near Istanbul’s Taksim Square in May 2013.
Under the current government, Turkish engagement with the MENA region has significantly strengthened. While the Arab Spring and regional tensions have meant that Turkish ambitions were short-lived, Turkey still plays a much more important role in the region than it has since the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.
Turkey faces dramatic regional challenges from a crumbling Syria, a precarious situation in Iraq and turmoil in Iran. The country now has two viable foreign policy options for its future, neither of which will affect the country’s close relationships with the United States of America (USA) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
1. Take a Muslim-centric stance by deepening its ties to the Sunni community in general and to the emerging Muslim Brotherhood block within the MENA region in particular. 2. Take a more neutral stance, scaling down regional ambitions and focusing instead on economic rather than political involvement within the MENA region. In both cases, Turkey will remain close to USA and NATO.
Turkish civil society and religious groups are becoming increasingly mobile and discovering sophisticated methods to engage with those across the MENA region. Whilst most of these groups and individuals play positive humanitarian roles or challenge the growing influence of Salafist groups with more balanced Islamic views, this development is likely to cause more Turks partaking in regional conflicts and developments.
A New Turkey? Turkey’s increasing influence and growing power in the MENA region is the result of two key factors: 1. Domestic changes within Turkey. 2. Regional opportunities within the MENA region. The country’s ability and desire to seize the opportunities available in the MENA region is largely driven by its domestic changes and it is therefore critical to analyse these changes. It is also important to understand the so-called “Turkish Model”, what it actually is and how it might help or hinder Turkey in making decisions on the way the country engages with the complex MENA region in the future. The Changing Face of Turkish Politics In 2001, political chaos in Turkey, caused by tensions between the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, Bulent Ecevit, and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, triggered a serious economic crisis that saw the devaluation of the Turkish Lira by nearly 50%. In the lead up to this crisis, a series of weak coalition governments, formed by experienced politicians, became increasingly out of tune with the demands of the Turkish public, causing growing political disillusionment among the Turkish population. Neither the Turkish left, centre, right nor Islamist parties seemed to be able to understand public needs and could therefore not offer them a suitable and alternative vision for their country’s future. The political vacuum was spotted by a group of young reformers emerging from influential Islamist social and political movements, who formed the AKP in 2001. The AKP had no ties to the political elite who had ruled in Turkey for decades and was instead able to have a deep cultural reach in the country through its finely tuned combination of religiosity and non-elitism. The party was led by the energetic and charismatic Tayyip Erdogan, who had previously won considerable respect as mayor of Istanbul between 1994 and 1998. Erdogan did not advocate the establishment of Shari’a law, the creation of an Islamist state or the enforcement of public devoutness but instead promised democratic reform for all citizens, a focus on economic recovery and a true commitment to Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU). Only a year after the formation of the AKP, in 2002, the party managed to attract a majority of 34% of votes in the national elections.1 The elections proved to be disastrous for all other parties, eventually causing 1
For a breakdown of 2002 election results see; Election Resources on the Internet; Elections to the Turkish Grand Assembly: http://electionresources.org/tr/assembly.php?election=2002 The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
some of them to disband. The party of the incumbent Prime Minister Ecevit saw a huge decrease in public support, receiving only 1.22% of all votes, compared to the 22% received by the party in 1999. In the same elections, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) lost more than half of its votes and the Islamist Felicity Party, from which the AKP’s founders had emerged, saw its votes fall to 2.48% from the 15% it won in 1999.2 The AKP’s victory reflected both public disillusionment with the ruling elite and a desire for reform in the country. From the start, it was clear that the party’s future was based on economic performance. Although a miraculous economic recovery for Turkey seemed implausible, the party in fact followed sensible recovery policies with aggressive attempts to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result of the AKP’s efforts, Turkey’s economy underwent a fast recovery from 2003 to 2006; with a substantial 6.2% growth rate in 2006 (the average growth rate between 1992 and 2001 had been 3%). 3 Similarly, FDI to Turkey increased between 2001 and 2006 from less than $2 billion to around $20 billion. The AKP maintained economic growth and increased FDI during the global economic crisis to $15.9 billion in 2011, higher than the world average. Similarly, the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita increased from $3,500 in 2001 to $10,444 in 2011. These figures made Turkey’s growth rate of 8.5% the second highest in the world in 2011, after China. With such tremendous economic recovery between 2001 and 2011, all international credit rating agencies upgraded Turkey’s credit ratings and the AKP was able to strengthen public support significantly, giving the party and the country the confidence it needed to engage successfully with the MENA region. However, between 2003 and 2008, Turkish politics and public life had plunged into chaos.4 Well-organised marches began taking place across the country in defence of the secular legacy of the Republic and against what the public saw as a “dishonest agenda” deployed by the West to destroy Turkey from within through the appointment of an Islamist government. This “Western agenda” was thought to involve the distribution of books which had become best-sellers, claiming that Prime Minister (PM) Erdogan and President-to-be Abdullah Gul were secretly Jewish. In response to the perceived Western interference within their country, the Turkish public started displaying their national flags wherever possible and dangerous calls were made by civil society to defend the Turkish Republic from the West. Well-organised fatal attacks on non-Muslims started taking place by ultra-nationalist youth with shady links in military and security circles, although the international media often misread these as signs of the Islamicisation of Turkey. Due to the turbulence across the country, no-one expected the AKP to emerge again as a strong winner in the July 2007 Turkish elections. However, the AKP received a record breaking 47% of votes and 340 seats in the Turkish parliament.5 While the election result once again came as a shock to the old secularist elite, their attempts to put an end to the AKP’s rising public appeal were clearly not successful. In March 2008, following the appointment of Abdullah Gul as President and the party’s moves to ease the ban on headscarves, and in a final attempt to bring down the AKP, the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals brought a closure case against the AKP on the grounds that it had become a “focal point for antisecular votes”. Although hardly any factual evidence was provided, speeches made by Erdogan and media reports were cited as evidence. Turkey was able to escape from the brink of a major crisis when the Court ruled against the closing of the party in July 2008. 2
For a breakdown of 1999 election results see; Election Resources on the Internet; Elections to the Turkish Grand Assembly: http://electionresources.org/tr/assembly.php?election=1999&constituency= 3 For an accessible English resource on FDI and growth rates in Turkey; see www.invest.gov.tr 4
For a detailed background study of the chaotic 2003-2008 period in Turkey, see Ziya Meral Prospects for Turkey, Legatum Institute, pg. 23-27 5 For a breakdown of 2007 election results see; Election Resources on the Internet; Elections to the Turkish Grand Assembly http://electionresources.org/tr/assembly.php?election=2007&constituency= The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
After being rejected through two consecutive elections by the Turkish public, the unsuccessful closure case against the AKP was the last blow to the armed forces and the old elitist rulers of Turkey and their undemocratic projects and efforts. After the summer of 2008, emboldened by the court decision and the previous two elections, the AKP government gave the green light for arrests in military and civilian circles (referred to as ‘deep state’), suspected of being involved in the previous social unrest and violence. These arrests were a shock to large sections of Turkish society and the international community, as the previously untouchable Old Guard were clearly now vulnerable to being brought before the courts. In fact, as soon as the permission to make such arrests was announced, all attacks on non-Muslims, protests and dangerous ultra-nationalist calls ceased. Despite providing successful economic recovery and growth, reinforcing secular attitudes and taming the unhealthy and often dangerous influence of military in politics, the AKP has still not managed to achieve democratisation in Turkey. Between 2001 and 2008, the AKP followed a clear pro-democratic reform path. As many analysts note, the party’s survival was dependent on not only being seen by the public as a proreform yet conservative party, but also as one which had structural and legal safeguards. From 2008 onwards, the public reaction against the party shifted from focusing on “Islamicisation” to the party’s lack of commitment to democracy. The media which had once widely debated whether or not Turkey was becoming an Iran-like state were now debating whether or not, under the strong rule of Erdogan, Turkey was becoming more like Russia. Questions about the party’s commitment to maintain its drive for democratic reform led to a drop in votes for the AKP in the 2009 local elections, although the party still retained a 38% majority.6 As a result, the party was able to pick up on the public attitude towards it and, following its initial promises of democratic reform, launched various initiatives to address concerns of Kurdish and Alevi minorities. While most of these initiatives did not result in an ultimate solution to the social problems which had been developing over decades, from 2010 onwards the arrests of suspected ‘deep state’ figures as well as members of an illegal Kurdish political and social organization, Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), drew immense attention to the party’s performance. Given that some journalists were detained in the waves of arrests, the issue of the freedom of the press also became a point of contention. Critics drew attention to growing government pressure on media outlets and the arrests of journalists as evidence. In the lead up to the 2011 elections the AKP promised to re-galvanise its commitment to reform and had already attracted support for its plans to change the constitution in the 2010 referendum. The AKP emerged as victorious once again with 49% of the votes in 2011.7 However, the landslide victory was short lived because of the re-emergence of terror attacks by militants in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and due to the political deadlock caused by the cases of individuals who had been under detention due to suspected involvement in ‘deep state’ coup attempts but had now won seats as MPs in opposition parties. Throughout 2011 and 2012, the AKP government found itself having to focus on boosting military response to a serious increase in terror attacks and momentarily place democratic reform and the political compromise process on the back burner in order to address Kurdish issues. The ‘deep state’ and KCK trials attracted much criticism because of the wide number of arrests made and the prolonged detentions of those arrested.
6
For an analysis of 2009 local elections, see Ali Carkoglu, “Turkey‟s Local Elections of 2009: Winners and Losers”, Insight Turkey, Vol.11/No2/2009, pp. 1-18: http://files.setav.org/uploads/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_11_no_2_2009_ali_carkoglu.pdf 7 For a breakdown of 2011 election results see; Election Resources on the Internet; Elections to the Turkish Grand Assembly: http://electionresources.org/tr/assembly.php?election=2011&constituency= The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
With Erdogan confirming that this will be his last term as Prime Minister and leader of the AKP, rumours have started to spread about his health and the Turkish population has begun speculating as to who will replace him as the leader of the party. Erdogan has regularly spoken about his desire to expand the power of the Presidential role in Turkey, which has been interpreted as his attempt to maintain power beyond his premiership. As Turkey approaches the local elections in 2013 and the presidential elections in 2014, the debates on who will replace Erdogan as Prime Minister and leader of the AKP and the nature of the role that Erdogan will play in government after his retirement will intensify. Added to this, critics raised concerns that the AKP is increasingly shifting from the centre to the right and slowly merging religious visions with Turkish nationalism. A number of recent developments have led to the emergence of this new attitude:
The merger between the AKP and the People’s Voice Party (HAS), which has much closer ties to Islamist visions than the AKP. Heavily religious appeals in Erdogan's speech at the AKP's annual party conference in September 2012. Delegates from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia and the head of Hamas attending the AKP's annual party conference in September 2012 and addressing the congress' main session.
Given its track record of the last ten years in power, it is too early to tell if such worries are justified. However, it is clear that the AKP has entered a new phase which has significantly shifted public opinion and support. Social Changes and Trends Given the widespread marches, demonstrations and protests against Islamism and for secularism in Turkey between 2003 and 2008, it is possible to interpret the emergence and subsequent landslide electoral victories of the AKP as results of their attempt to Islamicise Turkish politics and public life. However, neither Turkish voting patterns nor social and religious trends in the country provide a legitimate basis for such an accusation and it seems that the AKP and Turkey are more focused on secular modernity than Islamism. As discussed above, the AKP’s public appeal and support during its two terms in office were inherently linked to the pro-EU, pro-democratic and pro-economic reform values of the party. In the results of the 2002 Turkish general election, all other parties – nationalist, centre, conservative right and even Islamist – lost large numbers of votes. This shows how public support for the AKP, which had first emerged from the conservative right and Islamist circles, eventually expanded and included support of those from centre right and liberal cohorts in line with an increase in anti-democratic actions by the military and judicial establishment against the AKP. Numerous surveys have shown that the state of the economy was a key public concern in Turkey and, during this time, the AKP was able to gain the support and the confidence of both the Turkish public and the business world because of its ability to bring economic prosperity back to the country.8 In the last ten years, Shari’a law has never been a public demand in Turkey (in fact, as a study by Sabanci University has shown, demands for Shari’a law in Turkey dropped from 27% in the late 1990s to just 9% in 2009).9 Instead the majority of the country’s population would like to practise Islam as a faith but still have 8
Even in 2010, when discussions of an „Islamist‟ take over and court cases against military officials were dominating domestic and international press and it seemed that the main public concern in Turkey was secularism, polls showed differently. In its 2010 study, the International Republican Institute found that 85% of Turks believed that unemployment is the biggest concern in the country, followed by 46% terror and 10% Kurdish problem. (See; Turkish Public Opinion Survey; May 8-16 2010, International Republican Institute). 9 “Turk halkına göre „dinsel esitlik‟ teori duzeyinde kaldıgı surece sorun yok!”, Radikal, 18 November 2009 The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
full freedom of religion - something the previous elitist governments did not allow. This dichotomy has played a significant role in social and political changes in the country in the past decade. Indeed the decrease in demand for Shari’a law is a common trend across the Muslim-majority world. Rather than becoming more religious or radicalised under a conservative Muslim government, Turkish society is losing its radical edge and assuming a more centrist view of society and personal freedoms. In fact, the 2012 study of the Open Society and Bogazici University on conservatism in Turkey revealed a significant trend: in comparison with its own findings in 2006, Turkish society in 2012 had increasingly internalised personal, social, political, religious and economic freedoms and Turks have become more tolerant towards people with different lifestyles even though there has been no difference in levels of religiosity in the country.10 It is clear that the vast majority of Muslims in Turkey want to live in a secular state, that allows them to follow their faith freely and upholds a high level of public morality. It is therefore no surprise that the public reacted very negatively when they assumed that their Republic was about to fall into theocracy. These assumptions and reactions have had a long-term effect on Turkish society and continue to haunt the country, having:
prompted xenophobic and anti-American feelings in the country to rise to unprecedented levels, after the rumours that foreign powers were trying to establish the AKP in Turkey as a means to destroy the country from within, or that foreign powers were trying to cause chaos to undermine the AKP. polarised the country, not so much through the imagined fault line of secularists versus Islamists, but through: o those supporting reform and those who want to protect the status quo. o those who believe in an inclusive and pluralist Turkey and those who want to maintain the homogenised nation state vision. o those who see themselves as ‘civilised moderns’ and the rest as ‘villagers’ who are threatening their lifestyle and those who see themselves as ‘righteous’, ‘authentic’, ‘Anatolian’ Turks. o those who have affinity to the AKP and those who do not.
These fault lines have manifested in the unification of different classes, political parties, ethnicities and religions, which make it very difficult to assert exactly who sits on which side and why. As opposition parties previously sought to evoke negative reactions against the AKP through the use of identity politics and social fault lines as opposed to by identifying actual policy failures of the party, it has now become a matter of allegiance to defend or support the AKP’s policies. In this current context, political attitudes in Turkey are comparable to the USA: two parties predominantly represent cultural divides, clash on certain issues, evoke deep societal reactions and demand complete loyalty even though specific policies of the opposition candidate might be better at any given point. As the Turkish economy has grown, the government has enjoyed an unprecedented length of single party rule in the country and the strong dialectic pressure from the military and old elite of the country has declined. Opportunities and entitlements which were previously denied have now become accessible to conservative circles. While it is almost impossible to claim that Turkish social and political structures have become Islamicised, critics often point to nepotism and preferences to appoint AKP voters or conservative Muslims to civil service jobs as evidence of this. 10
For a brief account of the original report in Turkish, see “Survey shows Turkish study becoming less conservative”, Nazli Ilicak, translated by Al Monitor; http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2012/10/turkish-society-is-becoming-moremoderate.html The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
Kemalism, as referred to in today's Turkey, is not a clear or unified ideology of advancing Turkey to contemporary standards but it is a social, political and economic order. If used to refer to the entitlements of the Old Guard, it has in fact seen its end. However, the strong state structures and decades-long social engineering that have taught the public to uphold Kemalism remain as prominent as ever. Much of AKP’s domestic performance in 2011 and 2012 can be seen as the party’s reform agenda melting into Turkish power structures and its supporters showing the tendency to consider themselves the new ‘owners' of the country. The challenge for the new Turkey, with its new political and economic power brokers, is to advance the rule of law and socio-economic access for all of Turkey’s citizens rather than simply replay an old game with new actors. What is the ‘Turkish Model’? The complex political and social changes in Turkey make it extremely difficult to pin down the actual meaning of the ‘Turkish Model’. On the one hand, Turkey is now much more democratic and economically and politically vibrant than it has ever been before. On the other hand, the structural problems and social legacy of the last 80 years, and critical concerns over judicial processes and freedom of the press in the country, cast shadows over Turkey’s achievements. Thus, as Turkey’s structure emerges as a ‘model’ for larger countries in the MENA region, defining what exactly that model entails remains a challenge. In 2011 and 2012, numerous high-profile individuals across the MENA region were asked what they understood the ‘Turkish Model’ to be. Their responses show that there is no universal understanding of the ‘Turkish Model’.11 Furthermore, critical analysis of the model is incredibly limited, so the only real definition of the ‘Turkish Model’ must be drawn from the myriad of existing opinions in the MENA region, some of which are below:
The ‘Turkish Model’ is focused on rapid economic growth and economic recovery: Turkey has managed to move on from near bankruptcy to being one of the fastest growing economies in the world in merely ten years with no abundant natural resource revenue.
The ‘Turkish Model’ is focused on modernisation: most visitors to Turkey from the MENA region are impressed by the country’s modern standards in public services from health to transportation and its ability to balance this modernisation while maintaining its traditional culture.
The ‘Turkish Model’ is focused on the success of the AKP itself: a party that has been able to progress from a rigid Islamist heritage to a 21st century role model for Muslim conservative parties across the MENA region. The AKP’s economic and diplomatic success, and especially its independence, is a point of envy for many across the region.
The ‘Turkish Model’ is focused on the shifting balance of civilian and military relations, increasing influence in civil society groups and advancing democratisation.
And finally, the ‘Turkish Model’ is focused on the Muslims in Turkey that have negotiated a way of life that maintains their faith yet does not stop them from engaging with the world and enjoying freedom.
Together, these opinions paint a complex picture of Turkey: a country which is a source of inspiration across the MENA region. The Turkish government has been keen to highlight that it never intended to create a model for others to follow, but that it is glad to see its soft power expanding across the MENA
11
Ortadogu’da Turkiye Algisi 2012, TESEV: Istanbul The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
region. However, the main challenge has been in translating this soft power into actual political influence in the region. Making sense of Turkish Foreign Policy Social and political developments, caused by a shift from passive and low scale Turkish involvement in regional affairs to overambitious and independent initiatives, have caused anxiety and worry over Turkey’s future direction, and created a direct tension between Turkey and a host of its long-term allies, including the USA. In the past, Turkey remained ambitious as its evolving foreign policy, its dynamism and its increasing regional impact have been an attractive asset for many of its partners12. But this attractiveness has given way to current concerns that 2011 and 2012 saw the collapse of Turkey's new ambitions in the MENA region. While much of the hype surrounding changes in Turkish foreign police was untimely, current forecasts of its ultimate demise are likewise premature. Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government Visible signs of damaged relations between the USA and Turkey emerged when the Turkish Government refused the USA’s request to use bases and routes in the country for the USA’s Iraq campaign in 2003. Following this incident, concerns that Turkey might in fact be loosening ties with NATO and the USA grew as Turkey began restoring official relations with Hamas, Iran and Syria. This all led to the strong belief worldwide that the Turkish Government was in fact pursuing a foreign policy based on Islamist principles. However, several prominent initiatives led by the Turkish Government between 2003 and 2010 have given the USA, NATO and the EU greater insight into the Turkish Government’s actual changing foreign policy objective: to provide balance and security in the volatile MENA region. This change in perception of Turkish foreign policy among Western policy makers was due to the increasing influence that a relatively unknown Turkish academic was exerting on the AKP. Ahmet Davutoglu's significance in the policy-making inner circle first became clear with his appointment as Turkish Ambassador in 2003 and then as the country’s Foreign Minister in 2009. Davutoglu’s vision entailed Turkey strengthening its ties both within the MENA region and globally, and reducing its unhealthy dependence on Western allies. Davutoglu believed that the country’s unique geopolitical location and historical, religious and cultural heritage were resources which had not been used to their full potential. He sought to address global and regional trends to make Turkey more proactive, neutralise the country’s diplomatic tensions and maximise its potential of being a bridge between conflicting parties, energy and trade routes and civil society fault lines. Turkey had suffered from a stagnant and non-visionary foreign policy and had neither engaged with its southern neighbours nor sought to maximise its trade opportunities and integration into global markets. In Davutoglu's vision, the AKP found a sophisticated matrix to pursue what was demanded by the general public - more independence from the West and a greater role for Turkey in global affairs. With dazzling energy and a record-breaking frequency of foreign visits, trade agreements and bilateral initiatives, Turkish foreign policy makers have in fact opened up a much larger playing field to Turkey than since before the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. On the one hand, the government pursued more EU alignment reforms and initiatives than any other previous government; on the other hand, the Turkish PM could be seen smiling and shaking hands with previously shunned leaders, including those from Iran, Syria, Libya, Russia and Israel. Turkey generated much hype in its attempts to normalise relations with Armenia, took positive steps to restore confidence 12
See the study European Perceptions of Turkish Foreign Policy, SETA: Istanbul, April 2012 The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
with Greece, and even fully backed the UN-proposed Annan Peace Plan for Cyprus. Turkey soon found itself as a negotiator in a host of tensions and standoffs across the MENA region and the Balkans. However, by 2011, there were a new set of reactions to Turkish foreign policy hyperactivity. Turkish attempts to provide an alternative way out for Iran from its nuclear strategy were unsuccessful and instead caused Turkey embarrassment. Turkey-Iran relations went from friendly to cold as Iran continued its support of Assad’s regime in Syria. After years of painstaking investment, Turkey had finally restored promising relations with Syria, only to see it shatter and cause hundreds of millions of dollars worth of investments to perish. Turkey failed to play a neutral negotiating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Turkey-Israel relations entered one of its worst phases. Turkey's EU membership bid reached a deadlock with neither side wanting to admit calling it off and its desires to open borders with Armenia stumbled on the importance of keeping Azerbaijan as an ally. Greek Cyprus turned down any chance of improving the current situation of the island and used its EU membership to continually block any advancement of the Turkish EU accession bid. Thus, when the Arab Spring developed, Turkish foreign policy objectives since 2003 were already strained and Turkey struggled to deliver its ambitious goals. While Turkey initially asked for calm and reform as protests began in the region, it was quick in shifting its policies to support the democratic demands of the people. Turkey thus emerged as a key supporter for change in Libya and Egypt, asking Gaddafi and Mubarak to step down, which, coupled with Erdogan’s harsh stand towards Israel, won Turkey a lot of plaudits among the people of the region. When the turbulence hit Syria, Turkey initially assumed that its newfound relations with Assad would enable it to influence Assad towards reform. Yet, as the violence escalated, Turkey had no choice but to distance itself from the regime and eventually decided to actively support Syrian opposition groups. Turkey's stance on Syria has gained approval across the region, yet at the same time showed the limits of Turkey's influence in the affairs of the region and the dangers of having a failed state on its borders. At the same time, Turkey's support for democratic movements and its good links with Islamist movements across the region provided new opportunities to become a key player in the remaking of the Middle East. Turkish statesmen were welcomed in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt to unprecedented public warmth and attention. However, the new openings and disagreements with other key players in the region increasingly tightened Turkey's involvement and brought Turkey towards closer alliance with particular sectarian groups. With the vision of joining the EU completely absent from Erdogan's address to the AKP's convention in September 2012 and the apparent restriction of Turkey’s influence to just a handful of Sunni governments, worries emerged about the future of Turkish foreign policy. However, one does not have to be too alarmed or worried that Turkish foreign policy will follow a dangerous sectarian path. In the last ten years, Turkey has followed a pragmatic Realpolitik course beyond its cultural and religious appeals: it sought to advance its trade, diversify its partners, markets and energy sources and tried to position itself as a key player in the region. With each step, the government's initially worrying moves were followed by more conventional and level-headed action. Thus, Turkey continually found itself needing to maintain close working relations with NATO and the USA. Turkey's diplomatic capacities transformed from being dependent to being relatively independent and therefore needing more benefits offered from any partnership to maintain it rather than settling for presupposed alliance. This inspires confidence that Turkey will continue to follow a rational, measured and negotiable foreign policy, even if it might find itself in tension with key partners at times. Domestic and Regional Limits of Turkish Engagement in MENA Region Since the Arab spring, the gap between the ambitions and actual potential of Turkey's influence in the MENA region has become clear. It has showed the limits and scope of Turkish soft power in the region as The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
well as the difficulty of translating social and cultural appeal into tangible foreign policy results. Although the “Turkish Model” has been discussed across the region, Turkish culture is widely popular and Erdogan has been met with euphoria on visits to the region, this does not necessarily reflect the degree of influence Turkey yields in this complex part of the world.13 While the new governments in Tunisia and Libya warmed to Turkey, some – such as Egypt – were cautious and uneasy. Others major players in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran were equally tense about Turkey's increasing presence in the region. The AKP's main chance for an important role in the region was through its ability to talk to governments with divergent foreign policy interests such as Israel, Iran, Hamas and the Shiite Iraqi central government at the same time. However, changes in the region and tensions in which Turkey found itself resulted in Turkey losing its neutrality and taking sides often due to factors beyond the Turkish government's control. While moderate Muslim movements, especially the liberal end of the Ikhwan movement and AKP-style parties in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, viewed the AKP and the ‘Turkish Model’ positively, more radical groups in the region denounced Turkey and continued to see Islam in Turkey as too secularised.14 On a domestic level, while the Turkish public did enjoy Turkey’s increasing significance in global affairs, engagement with the Middle East reinvigorated cultural prejudices in Turkey towards Arabs and reinstated the debate of secularism versus Islamism. As Turkey was more deeply involved with crises in Syria and Iraq and their implications for Turkey became clear, even AKP voting circles, that saw Turkey's newfound impact across the region to be a point of pride, started demanding a deceleration of Turkish involvement.15 However, it would be incorrect to conclude that Turkey does not have an increased presence and impact throughout the region. While Turkish foreign policy might not have achieved its full vision, it has made Turkey a pivotal partner in regional affairs and a major economic player, capable of seizing investment opportunities. Even though Turkish foreign policy preferences may not be what dictate the outcome of elections and political developments in the MENA region, Turkey’s closer social and cultural engagement with other countries, easing visa regulations and reduced costs of flights and holidays to the country are opening new doors for Turkey. Turkey is now an indispensable trade partner for a significant sector of new investors across the region and its new cultural and social ties will play a healthy balancing role in a region dominated by strong opposing poles. Turkey's increasing foreign aid provision and desires to help in territories beyond its close borders, such as in Somalia, and to maintain its troops in NATO peace-keeping operations have played an increased role and will likely be more important in the future.
13
TESEV‟s 2012 survey in 16 countries across the region found that while 61% saw Turkish impact in the region increasing, only 53% saw Turkey as a model, which is slightly lower than the 61% recorded by the same survey in 2011. The drop is related to changing rates of favorability of Turkey in Iran, Syria and Iraq, yet favorability of „Turkish model‟ remains high in Tunisia and Libya with 71%, Palestine with 70%, Egypt and Yemen with 67%. 14 This became clear once more when PM Erdogan‟s call for a “secular” state in Egypt caused massive uproar among Islamist circles. See “Egypt‟s Muslim Brotherhood criticizes Erdogan‟s call for a secular state”, Al Arabiya, 14 September 2012 15 In its September 2012 survey on political attitudes, Turkish research company Metropoll found that 39% found AKP‟s Middle East policy unsuccessful in contrast to 37% who saw it as a success. This stands in contrast to 44 % who sees AKP‟s overall foreign policy to be successful. It is noteworthy that these are still lower than 47 to 50% vote ratings for the party. Yet almost 48% still sees FM Davutoglu as a success. The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
Future Challenges and Possible Scenarios Taksim Square Demonstrations In late May 2013 civil unrest was sparked across Turkey when demonstrators, who were initially protesting against the government’s proposals to redevelop Gezi Park, close to Istanbul’s Taksim Square, were forced by the police to end their demonstration. Following the suppression of this initial protest, a wave of antigovernment demonstrations erupted across Turkey with individuals from a wide range of backgrounds taking to the streets to express their discontent with various government policies and issues. The most commonly cited grievances were the government’s infringement of democratic rights, Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian leadership style and that Erdogan was perceived to be abandoning the secular foundation of the Turkish Republic by imposing conservative Islam on the Turkish population. However, it became apparent that there was a distinct lack of uniformity amongst the demonstrators in terms of their political grievances and backgrounds. Despite the fact that Erdogan has achieved a number of resounding successes during his premiership, including facilitating Turkey’s considerable economic growth and successfully reducing the power of previously untouchable institutions such as the military, Erdogan has remained a polarising figure in Turkey. Although recent AKP rallies in Istanbul and Ankara have demonstrated that Erdogan can still rely on the support of much of the Turkish population, nationwide anti-government protests have also highlighted substantial anti-Erdogan sentiment. Domestic The next two years of Turkish politics will be turbulent and crucial for the subsequent decade in Turkey. Alongside the implications of recent demonstrations in Taksim Square, there are two main questions that will define this process. First, what will be the shape of Turkish politics? It is clear that Erdogan will seek to become Turkey's first publicly elected President in the 2014 elections. However, it is unclear whether he will achieve his desire to increase the powers of the President's office and maintain executive power with a Prime Minister with more limited power beneath him. It is also unclear whether the AKP will be able to gain enough public support for such a dramatic restructuring of the political system. Erdogan’s heavy-handed suppression of the demonstrations that began in May 2013 have irreparably damaged his reputation and therefore scuppered any chance of enacting a new constitution that would enable him to become President in 2014 with expanded presidential powers. Indeed, if Erdogan pushes his agenda of an enhanced role as the President, his popularity in the country and region as a Muslim democratic leader will suffer significantly. Although some analysts believe that the demonstrations dealt a fatal blow to Erdogan’s ambitions to become President, others suggest that Erdogan can still count on huge support throughout Turkey and that the AKP still benefits from a lack of cohesion amongst the opposition. Similarly, it is uncertain whether President Gul, whose ratings as a President are higher than Erdogan as Prime Minister, will run for a second term. Some analysts have suggested that Gul’s position within the AKP has been bolstered during the Taksim Square demonstrations, as his more conciliatory stance towards the demonstrators has been viewed more positively than Erdogan’s heavy-handed approach. It is therefore plausible that recent developments have encouraged Gul to run for a second term as President. Gul's
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decision is also linked to the question of who will lead the AKP after Erdogan.16 Gul seems to be the only possible candidate to keep the party united and attract wide public support. However, some analysts have suggested that any attempt to force divisive constitutional changes, such as enhanced presidential powers, through parliament, could cause turmoil within the AKP, as party members would be forced to pledge allegiance to either Gul or Erdogan. Secondly, what will happen next to the ongoing Kurdish issue in Turkey? In 2011 and 2012, there was a dramatic increase in attacks by the outlawed Kurdish militant group, which is classified as a terrorist organisation by the EU and USA. In response, the Turkish government adopted new military strategies to address the changing tactics of PKK militants. However, there are a number of factors that suggest that a military response alone will not solve this low-armed conflict that has lasted for 30 years and taken more than 35,000 lives:
The social and political grievances that enabled the PKK to easily recruit new members. The current regional situation including Assad’s collapsing regime in Syria that enabled a larger playing field for the PKK. the Iranian regime’s willingness to use the PKK to curb Turkish outreach in the region.
In 2013 there have been dramatic developments in the Kurdish situation that suggest Erdogan is willing to pursue alternative strategies to try and resolve the dispute. In recent months, the Turkish leadership has carried out discussions with the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, and has successfully managed to negotiate the withdrawal of PKK militants from Turkish territory in return for constitutional guarantees for the Kurdish population of Turkey. However, despite some positive developments concerning the Kurds, the general consensus is that the nationwide civil unrest in Turkey has jeopardised the prospects for resolving the Turkish-Kurdish dispute. First, many analysts suggest that Erdogan’s attempts to bolster presidential powers within the constitution, ahead of his anticipated candidacy for President, are closely entwined with the proposed constitutional amendments sought by the Kurds. Thus, Erdogan’s controversial handling of the demonstrations may well affect his ability to enact a new constitution that would amend crucial laws concerning the Kurds. Secondly, the heavy-handed tactics employed by Erdogan’s government against the demonstrators appear to have alienated elements of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and have compelled the party to increase its support for the demonstrators. Retaining the support of the BDP is crucial to the prospects of enacting a new constitution in Turkey as the AKP does not currently have enough representatives in parliament to force through a new constitution unilaterally. The increasingly bellicose rhetoric used by both Erdogan and Kurdish spokesmen during the demonstrations has leant further credibility to the view that peace negotiations are beginning to falter. This includes Erdogan again labelling Abdullah Ocalan a “terrorist”, as well as Murat Karayilan, a commander in the PKK, threatening to end the current truce with Turkey. Although the negotiations for a settlement on the Kurdish issue are currently in a precarious situation, it seems that the AKP are not willing to give up on negotiations altogether, with the government and President Gul announcing that reforms, including amendments to anti-terror legislation, will continue.
16
Metropoll September 2012 political attitudes survey showed that 59% of the public think that President Gul should rerun for presidency. In question to whom they would choose if they had to choose between Erdogan and Gul, 51% said they would vote for Gul and 22% for Erdogan. The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
Without a robust multi-faceted strategy, a worsening armed conflict with the PKK has the potential to derail Turkey’s entire achievements over the last five years and undo years of democratisation efforts. The Iraqi central government has previously sent negative messages to Turkey stating that it will not allow any more Turkish military strikes on PKK targets in Northern Iraq, Iranian and Turkish security cooperation has weakened, and with the potential for the emergence of a new Kurdish region in Syria, unless Turkey addresses its domestic Kurdish issues, it will face a much larger regional challenge. International As the AKP has officially entered a new phase following the party convention at the end of September 2012, there are two primary routes its foreign policy can take. Route I: The AKP closely identifies itself as a leader of or key player in the Muslim Brotherhood movement across the region and places itself as an ideological supporter of Sunni groups - the AKP's choice of speakers for its annual party conference in fact caused worries that the AKP might be starting to follow this path. This tightly-bound Sunni cooperation will mean that Turkey's political investment in the future of Syria, Egypt, Gaza, Tunisia and Morocco will be closely tied to the performance of like-minded political movements in those countries. Beyond much of the public hype about the newly reformed Islamists of the MENA region that seem to follow the AKP's style, their future is unknown and just like the AKP, insofar as their fate depends more on economic recovery than whether or not they bring in or suspend Shari'a law. If Turkey's involvement in the region becomes deeply entrenched with Sunni groups, then Turkey will find itself at odds with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States as well as Iran. Given that Syria's future is unknown, a Turkey that supports the Muslim Brotherhood will be likely to sacrifice deeper relations with other groups and governments that will play an equally important role. Turkey's siding with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq has already been interpreted as a reaction to the Shiite bloc. As Turkish-Israeli relations remain frozen, tensions in Cyprus increase and worries continue over the energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, a Turkey that is closely linked with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood block will be likely to find itself amidst an escalation of tensions with Israel over Palestinian issues as well as over access to Eastern Mediterranean natural resources. If the AKP follows this course, it would add an additional layer to the sectarian tensions in the region, weaken USA-Turkey relations and cause continued concerns over Turkey's future, scaring investors and Western allies. In return, a decade-long desire to be a neutral partner, peace broker, energy route, attractive investment target and stable presence in a volatile region will slowly disappear. While Turkey will not be able to give up on EU membership publicly and will pay lip service to its commitment to accession, the EU will not be the main focus of its foreign policy. Turkey will seek to deepen economic ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in addition to China, Russia and particular European countries. Given the AKP's foreign policy development, it is unlikely that AKP will follow Route I completely and continually. The government is acutely aware of the implications of such a course and the international and domestic political reasons behind the need to balance its natural ties in the region with its ties with the USA and Europe. Route II: The AKP tries to pick up its neutral multi-faceted foreign policy, but scales down its ambitions. This is more likely than Route I and would be the more sensible option at this stage, as the AKP leadership is in transition, election preparations are under way and so much of the future of the MENA region and EU is The Quilliam Foundation is limited by guarantee and registered in England, company no. 6432342. Head office and registered address - Quilliam, PO Box 60380, London, WC1A 9AZ.
still unclear. In this framework, Turkey prioritises strengthening its economic engagement in the region in order to provide a base for its soft power in order to advance its interests. It reduces its rhetoric on Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian and Iraqi issues, while still maintaining public appeals for democracy, security and stability in the region. This route will see Turkey become increasingly powerful yet much more controlled in public regarding regional developments. With this ambitious yet more cautious policy, Turkey will seek to deepen its economic and diplomatic reach primarily in Africa, then in Latin America and East Asia. While Turkey will not be the partner to give up on EU membership and will pay lip service to its commitment to accession, the EU will not be a foreign policy priority. However, conjectural pressures will continue to bring Turkey and the USA closer. Turkey will also seek to enhance bilateral ties with particular European countries. Route II is more likely to be the next phase of Turkish foreign policy. However, future developments in Syria and Iraq will have direct implications for this option. Turkey may find itself forced to take sides in both countries, pursue limited-scope military action against Kurdish militants and take a stronger stance towards developments in the region. Nonetheless, an interest-based engagement with a keen focus on economic development will shape such policies. However it would be a mistake to only focus on the state-level impact of Turkish engagement with the MENA region. At the same time that Turkish policy on the KRG in Iraq has undergone a radical shift, Turkish businesses are fast advancing and opening new diplomatic avenues. Turkey's plan to expand its diplomatic representation in Africa follows in the footsteps of Turkish businesses. Unprecedented Turkish involvement in areas previously side-lined, increasingly sophisticated Turkish civil society and faith-based groups, and a developing culture of charitable giving to foreign causes show an increase in Turkish non-state involvement in the wider world. Most of these aspects do not pose a security threat and the increasing influence of Turkish Islam across the region provides a counterbalance to the spread of Salafism. However, there are incidents that might bring about inter-group tensions as well as unseen long- and short-term implications, such as the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident and the increasing trend of Turks fighting in support of Syrian opposition groups. 22 July 2013
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