Unlocking al qaeda by Mohamed Rahumathulla Mohamed

Quilliam is the world’s first counter-extremism think tank. Located in London, our founders are former leading ideologues of UK-based extremist Islamist organizations. Quilliam aims to generate new thinking through informed and inclusive discussion to counter the Islamist ideology behind terrorism, whilst simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to governments for related policy measures. Our strategic communications work involves research projects, public events, specialist roundtables and media campaigns to empower civil society to work towards improved community cohesion, Muslim integration through respect for scriptural diversity, and encouragement of political pluralism. For further information contact: Quilliam Email: information@quilliamfoundation.org Tel: +44 (0)207 182 7280 www.quilliamfoundation.org

Sources: Frontispiece Abû Qatâdah, ‘An Address to the Muslims’, At-Tiby n Publications, 23rd March 2009. <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-fromabu-qatadah-‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/>.

‘Interview with Abu Hamza’, Cageprisoners, 6 June 2008. http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=24793.

Babar Ahmed, ‘Three Years in Captivity’, Cageprisoners, 17 August 2007. <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=21502>. Unlocking Al-Qaeda: Islamist extremism in British prisons Quilliam, November 2009 © Quilliam 2009 – All rights reserved

ISBN nu mb er:

Disclaimer: The views of individuals and organizations used in this report do not

necessarily reflect those of Quilliam.

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

We see the great signs of Allah within these prisons, as I have seen ... how young men

enter into Islam and then they turn into students of knowledge and they learn Arabic and the Sharia in a short number of months along with an understanding of the reality

of Tawhid â&#x20AC;Ś Verily, the greatest favour, which your brothers here are living in, is their conviction in Allah and their conviction regarding this religion and in the methodology

of Jihad.

Abu Qatada, HMP Long Lartin 2009

I have not seen even a tree for four years. I cannot even see the sky due to the mesh

wires. Even our Windows computer version has bars on it. Nonetheless, no one and

nothing can crack you or terrify you, if your heart is full of Allah and fear of Allah.

There is no room left for anything else. Abu Hamza, HMP Belmarsh 2008

There is no time to rest; that will come later. Prison is not a place of rest. Babar Ahmed, HMP Long Lartin

2007

Contents

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

Contents Foreword by Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones

2. Methodology

1. Introduction

3. History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons Part 1: Radicalisation in prisons

7 11 23 26

4. ‘Pull’ factors:

Initial approach by extremists

Assumption of leadership

Gangs

Prison conversions

Deepening radicalisation

Radicalisation through friendship groups Radicalisation through literature

44 ??

48 56

5. ‘Push’ factors

Violence by non-Muslim prisoners

Perceived hostility from staff

Perceived discrimination

Halal food

Strip searches

Islamic prayers

Searches with dogs

Other issues

Imprisonment without trial

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

Content

Part 2 Radicalisation outside prisons:

6. Supporting al-Qaeda’s narrative

Imprisonment as evidence of ‘war on Islam’ Theological defences of al-Qaeda

Adel Abdel-Majid Abdel Bary

Abu Qatada

How has this happened?

7. Conclusion

8. Recommendations: Part 1: For all prisons

Part 2: A de-radicalisation centre

Appendix 1: The psychological effects of imprisonment without trial Appendix 2: Suggested books for Muslim prisoners

101

103

111

119

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Unlocking Al-Qaeda

Foreword by Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones

Foreword by Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones Mosques and educational establishments have traditionally attracted attention as vulnerable locations that extremists can exploit to propagate their ideas and draw vulnerable individuals down the path of willingness to condone or even participate in violence for political ends. It is increasingly recognised that the internet is a potentially significant mechanism for radicalisation. And it has been known for some time that prisons could also be incubators of extremism, but this study is one of the first published reports of its kind. This report illustrates how extremists are able to exploit for their own ends the psychological and emotional shock that individuals experience on entering the prison system, as well as the difficulties individuals experience in coming to terms with daily life and the confined social interaction possible within the prison environment. The challenge this poses increases with the number of terrorist-related convictions being secured by the police and security services. The Government and its agencies are certainly aware of this. The Prison Service has set up an Extremism Unit and, within the Counter Terrorism Strategy, the Government has sought to improve the intelligence infrastructure across the prison estate, develop intervention approaches for extremists in prisons and put in place post-prison supervision procedures. In so doing, it has experience to draw on from dealing with the IRA and also an understanding of the ways in which organised criminal and gangs operate within and from prisons. From this it is clear that the Prison Service will not be successful in isolation. The police have a role as does the Probation Service. The Islamist threat does, however, pose some unique challenges. The value of this report lies in part in the way in which it is based on the direct testimonies and accounts of prisoners themselves, which bring out some of the differentiating features. Such evidence has its own limits since statements of this kind can have been deliberately exaggerated for propaganda purposes. But it does help highlight the fact that there are some issues, such as the religious needs of the prisoners concerned, where some fairly simple practical solutions would, as the report recommends, alleviate a source of complaint. The Prison Service recognises this and is producing guidance as a result. So far, roll out and implementation has not been even, which is partly to be explained by the sheer diversity of the prison system. There is considerable ‘learning on the job’ going on which means that a contribution to the knowledge base and advice from the research community should be welcome. The other primary recommendation of this report relates to the ideological management of Islamist extremists in the prison system: how to contain them and how to de-radicalise them. Here it draws on the experience of countries that have already developed innovative – and ostensibly successful – programmes for the de-radicalisation and rehabilitation of extremists. 5

Foreword by Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

These programmes are themselves still relatively new, so it is difficult to judge their overall success and effectiveness over time. Do individuals who have been through such programmes remain genuinely de-radicalised? Quilliam suggests a potential model of a single de-radicalisation centre adapted to conditions in the UK. Though it will pose practical challenges for the Prison Service, the suggestion deserves serious consideration and much further investigation of best practice and experience elsewhere. At present the value of the idea lies more in my view in provoking a necessary debate than in claiming to be the definitive answer. Keeping extremists among the wider prison population gives them access to a larger number of vulnerable people. But concentrating extremists in one centre could unwittingly lead to the creation of the incubator and consolidator of radicalism rather than its intended opposite. Whatever the format for de-radicalisation, the careful selection of imams and other partners involved in such programmes is crucial and great care – greater care based on greater knowledge than has always been the case – is needed here. A point well made in the report. The report contains its own pointers for further worthwhile research. One of the aims of the Government’s ‘Prevent’ strand is to foster resilient communities. This should also be reflected in the approach to tackling extremism in prisons. Do mainstream Muslim prisoners themselves counter the activities of extremists in prison? If so, what motivates them? If not, why not? We need to know. Through this report, Quilliam has made some practical recommendations and launched a constructive and thought provoking contribution to the policy debate about tackling radicalisation in the closed environment of the prison system. It does not provide complete answers, but it points to areas that policy makers should be looking at closely and puts forward ideas they should be considering. Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones DCMG, Shadow Security Minister and National Security Adviser to the Leader of the Opposition, the Rt. Hon. David Cameron, M.P.

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

Introduction

Introduction For over half a century, extreme Islamist movements have been nurtured in prisons around the world. From the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1950s to al-Qaeda in Jordan in the 1990s, Islamist individuals have used their time in prisons to radicalise and recruit followers and to refine and revise their ideologies. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine the evolution of modern jihadist thought without reference to the prison writings of Sayyid Qutb in Egypt or Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi in Jordan. It is likewise impossible to conceive of modern jihadist movements without al-Qaeda’s Ayman alZawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, both of whom were radicalised during their imprisonment. In the UK too, no narrative of Islamist terrorism is completed without the stories of Richard Reid, the ‘shoe-bomber’, or Muktar Said Ibrahim, the leader of the failed 21/7 bombings of 2005, both of whom adopted extreme Islamist beliefs as a direct result of their time in prison. In light of the role that prisons have historically played in incubating modern Islamist extremism, it should be a matter of urgent concern for the British government that there are currently record numbers of Muslims in British prisons at a time when the UK is under sustained threat from Islamist terrorism both at home and abroad. Recent estimates put the total number of Muslim prisoners in England and Wales at around 10,000 or 12 per cent of the total prison population.1 While this disproportionately high number is a major concern in its own right, the large number of Muslims in prison raises additional concerns given that it occurs alongside three other important national trends related to Islamist extremism: Growth in number of prisoners jailed for terrorism. There are now around 100 Muslims held in British prisons on charges relating to Islamist terrorism – the majority imprisoned since 2005. Some of these individuals, who are mostly held in a small number of Category A prisons, are serving their sentences after being convicted in British courts. Others are held awaiting trial or while appealing against deportation or extradition to face trial abroad. Many of these individuals are in prison for their role in inciting, inspiring and organising terrorist violence. Continuing terrorist threat to UK Despite recent successes by the British security services, a significant number of terrorist and pro-terrorist Islamist groups, both domestic and foreign, remain 1

For example, in December 2008, the Ministry of Justice estimated that there were 9,975 Muslims in prisons in England and Wales out of a total prison population of 81,636 (12.2 per cent). It is worth noting, as shall be seen later in this report, that non-Muslim prisoners are also vulnerable to Islamist recruitment and radicalisation. Source: Ministry of Justice internal report ref. AHAPris089-09. 7

Introduction

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

active in the UK. These groups are actively seeking to recruit British citizens willing to conduct and facilitate terrorist attacks at home and abroad. Al-Qaeda and other groups have made clear that they continue to regard the UK as a legitimate target for jihadist operations. The large numbers of convicted extremists in British prisons is direct evidence of this continuing threat. Growing appeal of Islamist groups nationally Throughout many British Muslim communities, Islamist movements and extremely socially conservative Muslim organisations are becoming more popular – particularly among young people. The growing number of Muslims joining such groups or adopting their ideologies, even if they are presently non-violent, poses substantial long-term challenges to building and maintaining national cohesion in the UK. These converging trends make tackling prison radicalisation a priority for the British government as part of its broader effort to combat Islamist terrorism and build greater national cohesion. The government has already acknowledged the dangers of prison radicalisation – as evidenced by the creation of the Prison Service’s ‘Extremism Unit’ as well as a range of other initiatives.2 However, the challenges remain considerable and it is therefore vital that any measures to tackle prison radicalisation are firmly grounded upon a solid knowledge of how radicalisation occurs actually within British prisons – as well as on a robust understanding of Islamist ideology. This report therefore aims to examine how radicalisation is presently occurring in British prisons – with a particular focus on studying how large numbers of convicted and suspected Islamist terrorists in British prisons have sought to influence other inmates and incite them towards hatred and, ultimately, violence – as well as suggesting ways in which this radicalisation can be halted and ultimately reversed.

Some of these measures, such as improving ‘the intelligence infrastructure across the prison estate to aid the management of prisoners suspected, or convicted of terrorist-related offences’, refining ‘post-prison supervision’ procedures and developing ‘intervention approaches for extremist offenders’ are outlined in the Home Office’s March 2009 ‘Contest 2’ strategy document. ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (Home Office, March 2009, <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publicationsearch/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf?view=Binary>.

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

Methodology

Methodology This report focuses primarily on the role and influence of the large number of convicted and suspected extremists presently held in British prisons. Due to the obvious difficulties of accessing prisons, and of interviewing convicted Islamist extremists there, this report relies largely on prisoners’ own testimonies and accounts that have been smuggled out of prisons and distributed through supportive organisations and individuals. This has several advantages, the greatest of which is that in these accounts extremists are often talking or writing candidly to people whom they already know and trust, many of whom are sympathetic to their causes, which provides a substantial guarantee of their honesty. Another significant advantage is that many of these accounts by individuals range across several years, providing important insights into how these individuals have been changed (or not) by their time in prison. Of course, this method is as fallible as any other research methodology: the more loquacious and self-aggrandising prisoners who have sought to pro-actively publicise their experiences and ideas are inevitably quoted more often in this report than less gregarious or egocentric individuals. In other cases, prisoners, through their writings and interviews, have either sought to exaggerate either their own importance in prison or, alternatively, to exaggerate the trials they have faced at the hands of the Prison Service. In addition, many of the organisations distributing such statements, particularly Cageprisoners have a clear political agenda and overtly aims to inspire sympathy for imprisoned extremists and suspected extremists. While this report has generally excluded many of the most transparently self-serving and exaggerated accounts, it occasionally includes some self-important and propagandistic statements made by prisoners in order to show how these individuals have sought to speak to Muslims outside prison or to convey insights into their own states of mind. Where possible this report has corroborated these numerous first-person accounts with official reports and surveys conducted by the Prison Service and other branches of government.

Many of the accounts from imprisoned extremists cited in this report come from English- and Arabic-language websites which aim to draw attention to the condition of Muslims imprisoned in relation to terrorism. The most useful of these has been the website run by the Cageprisoners organisation, a registered company which was established in 2003, ‘to raise awareness of the plight of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and other detainees held as part of the War on Terror’. Its most prominent member is Moazzam Begg, a former Guantanamo detainee, who has personally interviewed many terror detainees held in British prisons. Although Cageprisoners is clearly a campaigning organisation, the website’s vast archive of interviews with former and current prisoners, as well as the large numbers of their letters and communiqués from them, appear of unquestionable provenance. The website’s content has additionally

Cageprisoners’ website, ‘About us’., <http://www.cageprisoners.com/page.php?id=2>.

Methodology

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

been endorsed by a number of prominent human rights lawyers who have represented a number of terror-related detainees, suspects and convicts in the UK and the US including Clive Stafford Smith and Louise Christian. The website’s content has been also endorsed by many families of extremist prisoners and detainees.

‘What others have to say about cageprisoners.com’, Cageprisoners’ website, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/page.php?id=13>.

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons

3. History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons During the last 50 years, many modern Islamist and jihadist movements around the world have been dominated and led by individuals who have been radicalised while in prison (See Factbox: ‘Definitions of Islamism and Jihadism’). An examination of the most prominent of these cases reveals that these individuals were usually radicalised through a combination of ‘push’ factors such as routine mistreatment from the prison authorities, unfair trials and harsh prison sentences, and by ‘pull’ factors such as the deliberate recruitment and radicalisation of prisoners by other extremists whether inside or outside prison. A brief overview of some of the most prominent such cases reveal substantial similarities, even when the cases are seemingly separated by considerable gulfs of time and space. Case Studies:

Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), Egypt

Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian, is today seen as being one of the most important ideologues of the global Islamist-jihadist movement. His prison writings from the 1950s and ‘60s directly inspired al-Qaeda and other similar movements.

Sayyid Qutb spent much of his life as a literary critic, writer and civil servant. However, from the late 1940s he became increasingly radical, partly as a result of his deeper involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood, a revolutionary Islamist group, and partly as a result of his experiences in prison between 1954-66 when he was jailed, along with hundreds of other Brotherhood members, after the group attempted to overthrow Egypt’s government. During his time in prison, Qutb was tortured and witnessed the murder of several other Muslim Brotherhood members by prison guards.5 This experience, together with his enforced proximity to many other radical Islamists, quickly led to the radicalisation of his views, which became increasingly focused around the idea that life is a violent struggle between a minority of true Muslims on one hand, and the forces of unbelief dedicated to the destruction of Islam on the other. While in prison he wrote Milestones, a short work that has since provided the core theo-political ideology for many jihadist movements, which his followers smuggled out of prison in instalments and secretly published.6 In 1966 Qutb was executed in prison. His death made him a martyr in the eyes of his followers, both in and outside prison, and greatly strengthened the impact of his prison writings on future generations. Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951- ), Egypt

Ayman al-Zawahiri is presently the second-in-command of al-Qaeda after Osama bin Laden. He was imprisoned and tortured in Egyptian prisons in the early 1980s. 5

A key incident occurred after Qutb was moved to the prison hospital in May 1955. Here he saw wounded Islamist prisoners being brought in after being shot by guards for taking part in a strike. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 29. Paul Berman, ‘The Philosopher of Islamic Terror’, The New York Times, 23 March 2003. 11

History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

An Egyptian doctor, Zawahiri was formerly a leader of Islamic Jihad, an Egyptian revolutionary Islamist movement founded in the 1970s in order to overthrow the Egyptian government and establish an Islamic state. Following Islamic Jihad’s role in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981, Zawahiri was arrested along with many other members of his group. During the next three years in prison, Zawahiri and his associates were repeatedly tortured while also witnessing the mistreatment of other prisoners.7 This brutal and deliberate mistreatment allegedly led him to betray his colleagues, one of whom was arrested and executed.8 In 1984 Zawahiri was released, following which he travelled abroad. Although he had entered prison as an already intolerant and violent jihadist, his views now became even more extreme – leading some to view his jihadist career as an elaborate attempt to take revenge on the West and the Egyptian government for the treatment that he endured in prison.9 After leaving Egypt, Zawahiri travelled extensively in the Middle East, seeking allies in his attempts to unseat the Egyptian government and becoming involved in pan-Islamic causes, most notably the Afghan jihad against the USSR. In the early 1990s, he began working closely with Osama bin Laden, helping him to establish al-Qaeda, into which he gradually merged his own Islamic Jihad organisation. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966-2006), Jordan

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who eventually became the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, was largely radicalised during his two long periods in Jordanian prisons in the 1980s and 1990s.

A drug-dealer and petty-criminal, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was first imprisoned in Jordan for petty crime in the 1980s. In prison he adopted a Wahhabi form of Islam which he learnt from other prisoners. On his release, al-Zarqawi was recruited by militant Islamists to fight in Afghanistan against the USSR and their Afghan Communist allies. After returning to Jordan from Afghanistan, he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in 1993 after planning to attack Western targets in Jordan. In prison for a second time, he fell under the influence of Abu Muhammad alMaqdisi, a leading jihadist ideologue.10 Together the two men formed a prison gang which sought to intimidate guards and other prisoners with the aim of spreading alMaqdisi’s jihadist ideology throughout the Jordanian prison system. Abdullah Abu Rumman, a Jordanian journalist who was imprisoned with him in 1996, later recalled 7

8 9 10

During his trial, Zawahiri described the abuse, saying ‘we suffered the most inhumane treatment. There they kicked us, they beat us with electric cables, they shocked us with electricity. And they used wild dogs ... Where is freedom? Where is human rights? Where is justice? Where is justice? We will never forget! We will never forget!’ Wright, The Looming Tower, p. 55. Ibid. p. 53

For example, see Chris Zambelis, 'Is There a Nexus between Torture and Radicalization?' Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, volume 6, Issue 13, 26 June 2008.

Gary Gambill, 'Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: A biographical sketch', Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, volume 2, issue 24, 15 December 2004. 12

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons

that ‘Zarqawi basically controlled the prison ward: He decided who would cook, who would do the laundry, who would lead the readings of the Koran. He was extremely protective of his followers, and extremely tough with prisoners outside his group. He didn’t trust them. He considered them infidels’.11 After his early release from prison in 1999, al-Zarqawi travelled to Afghanistan and then Iraq, where he led al-Qaeda’s Iraqi wing for three years before being killed in a US airstrike in 2006.

The experiences of these men in prison not only helped radicalise them as individuals, and allowed them to radicalise other prisoners, but also provided a motif of martyrdom and suffering which has in turn helped to inspire and motivate future recruits to Islamist and jihadist movements alike. Islamist organizations active in the UK have frequently sought to eulogise high-profile Islamist prisoners from the Arab world and to promote them to British Muslims. For example, in 1994 the Islamic Foundation, an Islamist organisation based in Leicester that works closely with a number of British government departments,12 translated and published a book called Return of the Pharaoh: Memoirs in Nasir’s Prison by Zainab al-Ghazali, a prominent female Muslim Brotherhood activist who was frequently imprisoned in Egypt in the 1950s and ‘60s on charges of seeking to overthrow the government. Muhammad Manazir Ahsan, the long-serving director of the Islamic Foundation, wrote the book’s foreword in which he presented al-Ghazali as a model Muslim and portrayed her steadfastness in prison as proof of the validity of her beliefs. He wrote that ‘one of the outstanding leaders of the Islamic movement in Egypt and the pace-setter of courage, piety and dedication to Islam, Zainab al-Ghazali was a victim of this savagery and inhuman persecution ... her courage in the face of unimaginable odds and her many qualities of head and heart remind us of the life and time of many of the Companions of the Prophet and virtuous people in the earlier generations of Muslim history’. He further referred to her book as ‘a source of inspiration and guidance for millions of people who want to see Islam thrive and flourish as a world religion, as a viable new world order and as a source of peace and happiness for all mankind’.13 The book remains in print and is offered for sale on the Islamic Foundation’s website.14

11 12

13 14

Mary Anne Weaver, ‘The short, violent life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’, Atlantic, 8 June 2006.

For example, in 2007, the Islamic Foundation’s educational wing, the Markfield Institute for Higher Education, produced a report commissioned by the government entitled ‘Islam at universities in England: Meeting the needs and investing in the future’. In July 2009, David Lammy, Minister of State for Higher Education, said that the Higher Education Funding Council for England was ‘commissioning research into Islamic Studies in higher education, building on Dr. Siddiqui's report on Islam at universities in England’. See; Dr Ataullah Siddiqui, ‘Islam at universities in England: Meeting the needs and investing in the future’ (London, DFES, 2007); House of Commons Written answers and statements, ‘Islam: Higher Education: Business, Innovation and Skills’, 15 July 2009, <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2009-07-15a.286114.h&s=islam#g286114.r0>. Zainab al-Ghazali, ‘Return of the Pharoah: Memoirs in Nasir’s Prison’, (Leicester: 2006), p. viii

Text available for purchase online at the Islamic Foundation bookstore <http://sitecreator.siteberry.com/Appdata/build/paltop.asp?GoForFeature=Store&GoForAction =DETAIL&Product_Id=1206&W_ID=1&P_ID=3>. 13

History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons

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In the UK, there are four main cases of individuals being radicalised as a direct result of their experiences in British prisons and subsequently being imprisoned (in one instance without trial) for terrorism-related reasons: Richard Reid

Richard Reid, a black, London-born convert to Islam who in 2001 attempted to blow up a trans-Atlantic airliner using a bomb concealed in his shoe, converted to Islam in prison and was subsequently radicalised soon after his release.

Born in South London, Reid was jailed several times in the 1990s for petty crime. While serving his sentence in Feltham Young Offenders’ Institution, he converted to Islam after his father, a Christian who had had positive experiences with Muslims, had advised him to look into the religion.15 It is not known which individuals in prison inspired him to convert, however during this period there was a considerable radical presence at FYOI.16 On his release in 1995, Reid began spending large amounts of time at Brixton Mosque, a conservative Wahhabi establishment. Abdul Haqq Baker, the imam of the mosque, told the BBC that Reid was subsequently ‘tempted away’ from the mosque by even more extreme individuals ‘who set up a few years ago away from the mosque’.17 Baker also observed that Reid was ‘very, very impressionable’. Three years after leaving prison, he stopped attending the mosque in 1998. Baker said that it was likely that by then Reid had met Zacarias Moussaoui, a Moroccan who was later convicted for his role in the 9/11 attacks, as well as a number of other extremists. Baker said that ‘at the end of Zacarias Moussaoui being in the community and spouting off his views, it was true that Mr Reid was attending at the same time … I'm pretty confident they were attending the extreme scholarship classes being held by some of the extremists who could not attend our centre’.18 Not long after he stopped attending the Brixton Mosque altogether, Reid travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan where he received training from al-Qaeda, before returning to the UK to attempt to carry out his attack on a trans-Atlantic airliner. Muktar Said Ibrahim

Muktar Said Ibrahim led and organized the attempted bombings which took place in London on 21 July 2005. He was initially radicalized through his time in the British prison system. 15

16 17 18

Alan Cowell, ‘A nation challenged: jailed Briton; the shadowy trail and shift to Islam of a bomb suspect’, The New York Times, 29 December 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/29/world/nation-challenged-jailed-briton-shadowy-trailshift-islam-bomb-suspect.html?pagewanted=1>. Ibid.

‘Who is Richard Reid?’, BBC News, December 28 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1731568.stm>.

Chris Gray, ‘Richard Reid: How eager convert was turned into a suspected terrorist’, The Independent, 27 December 2001, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/homenews/richard-reid-how-eager-convert-was-turned-into-a-suspected-terrorist-621237.html>. 14

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons

Ibrahim arrived in the UK from Eritrea in 1990 aged 12. In June 1993 he was convicted of indecent assault against a 15-year old schoolgirl. Two years later he was involved in two robberies, one of which involved robbing a 77-year old woman in a tube station.19 After taking part in a gang-related attack in Hertford, Ibrahim was sentenced to five years imprisonments in Young Offenders’ Institutes in 1996. He spent the next two and a half years at a variety of such institutions including Feltham, Aylesbury and Huntercombe (Henley-on-Thames) as well as Woodhill prison.20 Ibrahim was released in 1998, having reportedly become interested in radical Islamism during his time there.21 Soon after his release, Ibrahim began attending Finsbury Park mosque and listening to pro-al-Qaeda sermons by Abu Hamza and Abdullah al-Faisal (whose tapes were later found at his flat) – while also working in restaurants and as a market trader.22 Further radicalized by exposure to individuals like Abu Hamza and al-Faisal, Ibrahim subsequently travelled to Sudan in 2003 where he claimed to have received weapons training and also to Pakistan.23 On a trip to Pakistan in 2005 (which coincided with a trip there by the two leading 7/7 bombers) he is believed to have received instruction in bomb-making military training from Islamist militants – possibly including members of al-Qaeda. Mohammad al-Figari

Mohammad al-Figari, a convert to Islam who was convicted in 2008 for attending ‘terrorist training camps’ organised by followers of Abu Hamza, was initially radicalised during his time in prison for drugs-related offences in the late 1990s.

Mohammed Al-Figari was born in Trinidad as Roger Michael Figari to mixed Catholic and Hindu parents. He arrived in the UK in 1989 and initially studied in London. Within a few years however he had become involved in drugs and crime, leading to him being convicted of deception, assault and cocaine smuggling in 1997 and sentenced to eight years in prison. Ten days before he was sent to prison, he converted to Islam, having been previously influenced by the Nation of Islam, a predominantly African-American US-based sect. Shortly before going to prison, he also met Mohammed Hamid, a charismatic salafi preacher and former drug addict, alongside whom he would later be convicted.24 Once in prison, al-Figari seems to have abandoned his interest in the Nation of Islam in favour of more mainstream 19 20 21 22 23 24

Sandra Laville, ‘Refugee children who turned against Britain’, The Guardian, 9 July 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jul/09/terrorism.world1>. Sandra Laville, ‘Key events in the July 21 bomb plot’, The Guardian, 9 July 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jul/09/terrorism.world>. ‘Do prisons radicalize inmates?’, BBC News, 29 July 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4727723.stm>.

‘Profile: Muktar Ibrahim’, BBC News, 11 July 2007,<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/email_news/6634901.stm>. Ibid.

Owen Bowcott, ‘Profile: Mohammed Hamid and his followers’, The Guardian, 25 February 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/feb/26/uksecurity.july7>. 15

History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons

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forms of Sunni Islam. Unfortunately, however, he soon gravitated towards the most extreme forms of Sunni Islam –salafi-jihadism. Part of the blame for this lies directly with the Prison Service. For example, during his trial the prosecution produced a booklet found in al-Figari’s possession entitled ‘How Can I Train Myself for Jihad?’25 Inside, the book had a stamp from the Wandsworth prison’s library. At the same time, indicative of further oversights by the Prison Service, al-Figari was receiving hard-line Islamist literature sent to him in prison by Mohammed Hamid who meanwhile was becoming a keen follower of Abu Hamza and was regularly attending Abu Hamza’s Finsbury Park mosque.26 The Prison Service is therefore doubly at fault – firstly for allowing hardline Islamist literature to be mailed into prison by Hamid and secondly for stocking pro-jihadist books in the prison library. On his release from prison in December 2002, Figari swiftly re-joined Hamid and began regularly attending Finsbury Park Mosque with him. In February 2008, Figari was convicted of attending ‘terrorist training camps’ at locations around the UK which had been organised by Hamid. Martin Mubanga

Martin Mubanga, the son of Zambian immigrants, is a Black-British man who converted to Islam while in prison. Although Mubanga has never been convicted in relation to terrorism, the US has previously accused him of being involved in extremist - and possibly terrorist-related activities - during his time in Afghanistan in 2000-1.

Martin Mubanga, who was born in Zambia but was brought up in London, left school with five GCSEs and an NVQ in construction. At around the same time, when Mubanga was 16, his mother died (his father had already died while he was young).27 After leaving school, he failed to find a job and was arrested in 1992 and convicted for trying to steal a car. Imprisoned in Feltham Young Offenders Institute, aged 19, he became interested in Islam and soon converted while still in prison.28 Soon after his release, in 1995, he travelled to Bosnia, where the US government later said that he had received military training (Mubanga, however, has denied this and said that he went to Bosnia to work for a charity).29 In October 2000, he travelled to Pakistan to attend a hard-line madrassa. After spending time in Peshawar, he travelled to Afghanistan where he attended two further madrassas in Kabul and Kandahar, the spiritual home of the Taliban, leaving Afghanistan soon after the US invasion but 25 26 27

28 29

Ibid. Ibid.

Declaration of James R Crisfield, Judge Advocate, United States Navy, in 'Martin Mubanga et al. v. George W. Bush, (Civil Action No. 04-CV-1144)'. Transcript available online at: >http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonialsproject/testimonies/testimonies-of-the-defense-department/csrts/csrt_isn_10007.pdf>. David Rose, ‘How I entered the hellish world of Guantanamo Bay’, The Observer, 6 February 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/06/world.guantanamo>. U.S Department of State, ‘The United States’ response to questions asked by the committee against torture’, 8 May 2006,<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68562.htm>. 16

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before the Northern Alliance’s capture of Kabul.30 He was arrested by local police in Zambia in 2002, while en route to the UK, after the US discovered that he had spent time in Afghanistan (US forces had by then discovered Mubanga’s British passport, which he had reported as being stolen, in an al-Qaeda cave complex in Afghanistan). The US accused him of receiving training from al-Qaeda and of being an al-Qaeda member.31 These charges were never proven and Mubanga was released from Guantanamo in 2005 – without ever having been put on trial. He is now believed to live in the UK.

In addition to these four main cases, there are many examples of other, lesser-known Islamist extremists who may have been radicalised – at least in part – through their experiences in UK prisons. One of these is Mohammed Hamid (mentioned above for his role in radicalizing Mohammed al-Figari) who was convicted in 2008 of training would-be terrorists.32 Hamid, a former drug addict, had previously served as least two jail sentences for robbery, one of them in a Young Offenders’ Institution.33 Omar Khyam, who dressed as a suicide bomber at extremist protests against the Danish cartoons of Mohammed in February 2006, had likewise recently spent several years in prison on drugs-related charges.34 Another individual who possibly adopted extremist beliefs as a result of his time in prison is Sulayman Keeler (aka Simon Keeler), a white convert and a former member of al-Muhajiroun jailed in 2008 for supporting terrorism.35 Keeler had previously served a short sentence for assaulting a police officer, converting to Islam not long after his release.36 Another extremist whose prison experiences pushed him towards radical Islamism is David Myatt, formerly a prominent neo-Nazi who is now known as Abdul-Aziz ibn Myatt. He converted to an extremist form of Wahhabi-influenced Islam soon after leaving prison.37

30 31

32 33

34 35 36

David Rose, ‘How I entered the hellish world of Guantanamo Bay’, The Observer, 6 February 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/06/world.guantanamo>.

The Guantanamo Docket, ‘Summary of evidence for combatant status review tribunal: Martin John Dubanga’, The New York Times, 25 January 2005, <http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/10007-martin-john-mubanga>. ‘Top extremist recruiter is jailed’, BBC News, 26 February 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7256859.stm>.

Duncan Gardham, ‘Mohammed Hamid is evil personified’, The Telegraph, 26 February 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1579915/Mohammed-Hamid-'is-evilpersonified’.html>. ‘Protestor is returned to prison’, BBC News, 7 February 2006. ‘Six guilty of terrorism support’, BBC News, 17 April 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7352969.stm>

‘Hate-filled Muslim heckler faces life in jail’, The Scotsman, 18 April 2008 http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/topstories/Hatefilled-Muslim-heckler-faces-life.3995983.jp, ‘Al-Muhajiroun, BBC News, 29 April 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/3670007.stm> David Myatt, ‘David Myatt: From Neo-Nazi to Muslim’, <http://www.davidmyatt.info/convert2.html> 17

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The most significant recent case of prison radicalisation, however, is that of Kevin Gardner, a paranoid schizophrenic in his early twenties who converted to an extreme form of Islam in Stoke Heath Young Offenders' Institution and HMP Featherstone in 2006-7.38 In 2009, Gardner was jailed indefinitely on mental health grounds for, while in prison, having planned to carry out bomb attacks on a Territorial Army base in Chesterfield, carrying out primitive bomb-making experiments in prison and writing statements such as ‘the deaths of British soldiers on home soil will encourage the believers’. Gardner’s case is important because, even though his bombing plans were not at an advanced stage (and would perhaps never even have come to fruition), this is one of the first occasions when Islamist terrorist attacks are known to have been planned by individuals while in British prisons. In most previous cases, individuals adopted extreme Islamist beliefs in prison but only took concrete steps towards terrorism after being released.

Despite considerable differences between the individuals radicalized in prisons in the Arab world and in the UK (for instance, many prominent Arabic radicals, such as Zawahiri, have been well-educated individuals from prominent and well-connected families), and despite wide differences in their conditions in prison (torture is widespread in prisons in the Arab world), there are some themes that are common to many of those who have adopted extreme Islamist ideologies as a result of their time in prison. Extremism seen as a logical solution to other problems

In many cases, the adoption of extremist ideologies by prisoners appears not to have been an irrational, involuntary or unconscious act. Instead, for individuals like Richard Reid or Martin Mubanga and perhaps even Zarqawi, it seems to have been consciously perceived as a drastic but necessary solution to a variety of other problems, ranging from criminality to drug abuse to personal identity crises. Extremism as a ‘new start’

Similarly, conversion either to extremist Islamism or, in the case of converts, initially to Islam in general, is seen by many prisoners as allowing them a ‘new start’ – both spiritually and in relation to their own identity, friendship circles and way of life – as a way of breaking with a past that was often associated with crime, drugs and failure that is comparable with ‘born again’ Christianity. Prison deepens radicalisation

While some individuals first adopt extremist ideologies only while in prison, in other cases individuals who entered prison as extremists become more radical as a result of their experiences there. Sayyid Qutb is a classic example of this phenomenon; severe mistreatment in prison transformed him from a relatively progressive political dissident into the creator of modern jihadist ideology who saw the world as divided exclusively into good and evil. Prison mistreatment is a key factor

In both the Arab world and the UK it seems likely that individuals’ perceptions of 38

‘‘Sick’ bomb planner is locked up’, BBC News, 28 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8172933.stm 18

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their treatment in prison is a hugely important causal factor in their radicalisation. Individuals with anti-state ideologies who feel mistreated or victimised in prison on account of their religious or political beliefs often conclude that their mistreatment only validates the truth of their beliefs - strengthening a person’s radical beliefs and provoking greater feelings of anger towards the state and towards wider society. Extremism as an extension of earlier behaviour

The adoption of a confrontational Islamist ideology in prison can sometimes be seen as an extension of earlier ‘anti-social’ behaviour which, in the case of Muktar Ibrahim included sexual assault and robbing an elderly woman or, in the case of Simon Keeler, assaulting a policeman. Signing up to Islamist beliefs can therefore potentially act as a systemisation and vindication of an earlier antipathy and resentment towards mainstream society and towards symbols of the state. Extremism causes dramatic behavioural changes

Radicalisation (i.e. the adoption of an extremist ideology and worldview) can dramatically transform a person’s behaviour. Many extremists such as Muktar Said Ibrahim and Richard Reid arrived in prison after leading somewhat aimless lives. On becoming radicals they become highly-motivated and disciplined - saving money, travelling abroad, learning languages and undertaking physical training. Such transformations may become more likely if a person deliberately adopted extreme Islamism to break with a past that they were ashamed of or that they associated with failure or unhappiness. Post-release radicalisation

Not all the extremists listed above joined radical groups while actually in prison. Instead a number of them, such as Richard Reid, became consistently involved in such groups only after their release. This however strongly suggests that they had adopted radical ideologies while in prison or that their prison experiences made them susceptible to extremists’ messages. Alternatively they may have been recommended to such groups through their prison contacts and friendship circles.

In regard to the UK specifically, an examination of high-profile cases of prison radicalisation reveals other trends: Converts more vulnerable to radicalisation

The cases of Muslim converts like Richard Reid, Mohammad al-Figari and Simon Keeler suggest that converts are significantly over-represented among those who adopted extremist or jihadist ideologies as a result of their prison time. Converts’ experiences in prison can be seen as heightened versions of the experiences of other prisoners: questions of identity and group loyalty are even more important to new converts than to those born and brought up as Muslims, for example. Absolutist Islamist ideologies meanwhile offer converts simple solutions to complex questions of identity and belonging. At the same time, most new converts are naturally less able to differentiate between rival interpretations of Islam than Muslim-born individuals and may thus be more likely to unquestioningly buy into extremists’ 19

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arguments. This is partly because most hard-line Islamist theologies are straightforward, un-nuanced and highly literalistic – in contrast to many syncretistic and often less explicitly articulated forms of traditional interpretations of Islam. Time lag between radicalisation and action

The four most prominent British cases of prison radicalisation outlined above suggest that there is often a significant time lag between a person being radicalised in prison and either carrying out a terrorist attack or being prosecuted or arrested for terrorism-related offences. In the case of Reid, Mubanga, Ibrahim and Al-Figari this time-lag is around five to seven years. This lag makes it harder to measure the full extent of prison radicalisation or conversely to fully assess the impact of counterradicalisation initiatives. Such a lag may mean that individuals who are being radicalised in prisons today might not commit violent acts for another seven years (i.e. until around 2015).

It should be noted, however, that, with the possible exception of Kevin Gardner, in no case did radicalisation occur exclusively as a result of these individuals’ experiences in the prison. In all cases, experiences both before and after imprisonment were key in making individuals adopt radical ideologies.

Factbox Definitions of Islamism and Jihadism

Islamism is a modern 20th century ideology that blends traditional Islamic teachings with twentieth century communist and fascist ideologies. Islamism is primarily problematic in the UK because it advocates a separatism between Muslims and non-Muslims based on a concept of eternal military, moral and cultural conflict between these two groups. This confrontational ‘us’ and ‘them’ logic, augmented by a supremacist worldview, undermines national cohesion, creates social, mental and geographical ghettoisation and sows distrust and suspicion between different ethno-religious groups. Modern jihadists are Islamist who believe they are religiously obligated to carry out terrorist attacks in order to further Islamism’s objectives. Key feature of Islamism:

Islam is a political ideology

Islamists believe that Islam is not just a religion but also a political ideology. They believe that Islam contains clear instructions not only on spiritual or ritualistic matters but also on all other issues such as the foreign policy, the banking system and governmental structures. Islamists typically aim to ‘Islamise’ society; to make all aspects of society such as the government, courts, schools, the police, banks and restaurants follow these ‘Islamic’ practices.

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons

Factbox continued Sharia law as state law

Islamists want secular law to be replaced by the Sharia, which they regard as being a single set of fixed laws which are purely divine in origin. Islamists generally interpret the sharia as instituting discriminatory laws for men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims. In addition, ‘sharia’ punishments advocated by Islamists often include stoning women for adultery, executing apostates and killing those who seek to overthrow or question Islamist political systems. ‘Ummah’ as a political bloc

Islamist think that the traditional concept of the Muslim ummah, the collective description of Muslims around the world, should be redefined to imply the creation of a political bloc. To Islamists, this means that Muslims should be loyal to other Muslims, whoever they are and wherever they are, ahead of being loyal to non-Muslims. Creation of an expansionist caliphate

Following from their re-interpretation of ‘ummah’, Islamists believe that all Muslim majority countries (and areas formerly ruled by Muslims)should be united in a single super-state called the Caliphate. This caliphate would, according to most Islamists, be a non-democratic state which would make the Islamist version of Sharia into state law, effectively making non-Muslims and women second-class citizens. Most Islamists also believe that the Caliphate should also wage expansionist wars against surrounding non-Muslim states. Jihadism and Wahhabism

Jihadists are Islamists who believe firstly in using violence to advance Islamism’s objectives and secondly that Muslim individuals anywhere in the world have the right to carry out violent attacks against any state, organisation or individual which they believe to be “oppressing” Muslims or to be actively hostile towards Islam. Most jihadists follow the Wahhabi school of thought which originates in 18th century Arabia. Such Wahhabi teachings, in addition, to usually promoting the above Islamist tenets, put a great emphasis on dressing and acting in imitation of Mohammed and his followers, for instance by growing beards of a certain shape and length, wearing traditional clothing etc. At the same time, however, not all those who similarly seek to imitate Mohammed and his followers are Wahhabists or Islamists. Similarly, not all Islamists are Wahhabists.

Part 1: Radicalisation in prisons

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

Part 1: Radicalisation in prisons Radicalisation in prison needs to be seen in the context of the growth of religion in prisons in general. It is widely known that the prison environment is conducive to reawakening the spiritual and religious feelings of individuals. In addition, however, there are specific reasons why the atmosphere in many British prisons is conducive to fostering political and religious radicalisation. Why people turn to religion in prison: Life-crisis and spiritual need

Going to prison is often a psychological and emotional shock; individuals are confronted with concrete evidence that their life is ‘not working out’. The boredom, isolation and purposelessness of much of prison life additionally leads many people to question their life, their values and their purpose on earth. The relative abundance of religion in prison, combined with the relatively large numbers of prisoners of all faiths who are visibly observant, leads many to begin practicing religion for the first time. For many inmates, adopting strict religious beliefs can also seem a solution to previous failings and a spiritual vacuum as well as offering a chance to start afresh. Need for protection

Entering a prison – particularly for the first time – is typically an unnerving experience. New inmates are not sure how prisons function, or which gangs, groups and individuals are potentially friendly and which are hostile. Muslim prisoners (even those who are religiously unobservant) may gravitate towards Muslim groups and individuals for friendship, emotional support and protection against other inmates or rival ethno-religious groups – consciously becoming more religiously observant as result. Opportunism

Many prisoners believe that being an observant Muslim offers benefits which are not open to other prisoners and which may help to relieve the tedium of prison life. Examples of this are taking part in Friday prayers or celebrating Ramadan, meeting with Muslim chaplains, receiving literature from Muslim groups outside prison or receiving halal food (which many prisoners claim is superior to regular prison food).

In many cases prisoners adopt extremist versions of a religion for roughly the same reasons as they adopt religion at all – namely for similar spiritual, social and pragmatic purposes. These broad factors likewise echo the reasons that individuals are attracted to extremist ideologies outside prison. However, as this report will show, there are also specific reasons why some prisoners adopt a extreme Islamist ideology while in British prisons.

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

Part 1: Radicalisation in prisons

In general, an individual’s adoption of extremist ideas occurs as the result of two fairly distinct but simultaneous and overlapping processes: ‘Pull’ factors

These factors explain how existing extremists in prison pro-actively seek to recruit or ‘pull’ other Muslim individuals into their belief system. This is generally done by incentivising the adoption of extreme religious beliefs – whether through offering physical protection, spiritual nourishment, social support or even prospective rewards in the afterlife. ‘Push’ factors

These are many aspects of prison life that ‘push’ individuals away from mainstream society and towards extremist individuals and groups. Such push factors include racist violence, maltreatment, discrimination or social exclusion that make Muslims or vulnerable individuals feel excluded from the mainstream.

‘Pull’ factors

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

4. ‘Pull’ factors Islamist extremists, whether in prison or not, pro-actively seek new recruits in order to materially strengthen their cause and because they believe that such recruitment is a worthy, divinely-sanctioned end in itself which will bring them rewards in the afterlife. At a psychological level, some individuals may also regard the recruitment of other prisoners to extreme Islamism as a moral and material victory over their enemies as personified by the British state and more specifically its employees in the Prison Service.

For decades Islamist organizations around the world, from the Muslim Brotherhood to al-Qaeda, that are dedicated to overthrowing governments and replacing the current status quo with an “Islamic state”, have been aware not only that many of their members are likely to spend time in prison but also that such prisons are the ideal place to recruit new members. As a result, a number of these organizations have explicitly advised their followers on how to best spend their time in prison. For example, AlQaeda has produced material which advises its supporters how to resist interrogation and pressure from the authorities, how to use their time in prison to educate themselves and how to spread their ideology among other prisoners. See ‘Factbox: Al-Qaeda advice for prisoners’.

The deliberate recruitment of individual inmates into extremist groups takes a variety of forms in British prisons. Such radicalisation typically begins, not with a radical preacher delivering fire-and-brimstone sermons, but rather with extremist individuals offering their friendship, advice and support to others. This often takes the form of extremist prisoners approaching other Muslims, or even non-Muslims, who are new to the prison and who are vulnerable, friendless and insecure. Once the extremist has reached out to such an individual, winning his trust and establishing the basis for friendship, he will begin explaining his ideas, often in the guise of offering religious and spiritual guidance. Once a prisoner has begun to adopt such ideologies, his new ideological believes may become increasingly fortified through additional meetings and through socialising with other extremists, reading extremist books and literature – while simultaneously becoming isolated and detached from mainstream prison society (which naturally includes many moderate Muslims). Extremist ‘outreach’

The core element of extremist recruitment, both inside and outside prison, is proactively approaching potential recruits and making contact with them. Once this initial contact is made, extremists emphasise with their new followers, offering them support and advice on day-to-day issues as well as progressively exposing them to a comprehensive politico-theological ideology which appears to explain the world around them and their place in it.

In many cases, Islamists casually approach new Muslim prisoners soon after they enter prison, offering them friendship and re-assurance. From these small beginnings, the Islamist recruiter may soon begin to offer spiritual advice and to recommend reading material – as well as telling their new friend which people in prison (whether prisoners 26

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or prison staff) to trust and which people to avoid. Sometimes such approaches are preplanned and deliberate. On other occasions such approaches to new or existing prisoners are more ad-hoc. Extremists are often motivated as much by a genuine desire to help their fellow Muslims onto the ‘straight and narrow’ (as they see it) as by a conscious desire to ‘recruit’ them to a particular ideology. This overall process is most usually described by Islamist extremists as giving dawa, a word which is more widely understood among Muslims as meaning inviting non-Muslims to accept Islam and encouraging Muslims to practice their faith more completely. Islamist extremists typically believe that giving such dawa a religious duty and as an act that will further empower their movement and cause. In some cases extremist outreach is strikingly deliberate. ‘Abu Abdullah’, who was held in Belmarsh for several months on suspicion of financing terrorism before being acquitted, has described how he was approached by radicals in the prison on his first day there: ‘On that same day [that I arrived in prison], I went to the exercise yard. I had all these thoughts in my head: What do I do? Is anyone going to bully me? I don’t know what to expect. Alhamdulillah (Praise be to Allah) I was fortunate. On that day, some brothers approached me and said that they had been expecting me. Some were brothers held without charge. There was a Palestinian brother, and an Algerian brother ... These brothers were very friendly. At first I was a bit apprehensive as to whether I should trust them or not ... But afterwards I felt comfortable. One of the brothers Masha’Allah he packed some fruit and a chocolate in a bag and handed it to me before I went back to my cell’.39

It is from such small beginnings relationship between ordinary Muslim prisoners and extremists often begin. The effectiveness of this gradualist approach has been recognised by jihadists overseas. For example, a 51-page al-Qaeda manual, published online in 2009 in Arabic, entitled ‘A Course in the Art of Recruitment’, has specifically recommended that terrorist recruiters should invite their targets to lunch, give them gifts and contact them frequently. The manual recommends that extremists seek to radicalise no more than two people at a time – in order to give them their full attention.40 Such approaches are often effective because, contrary to most media depictions, Islamist extremists are rarely un-hinged, irrational, ranting fanatics – most are sociable, charming and articulate individuals who are quick to make friends and win others to their own point of view. Islam4UK, a website run by former members of al-Muhajiroun (a number of whom have spent time in prison), notes this in an online essay on radicalisation in British prisons: ‘Inmates in prison hear the most incredible and implausible stories about terror suspects in the newspapers, TV programmes and magazines and had they never met these suspects in person, they may very well have believed them anyway.

Javaid Iqbal, 'The 'Terrorist' Label never wears off', Al-Istiqamah online magazine (January 2008)<http://al-istiqamah.com/Archive/Newsletter/IstiqNewsletter2-2.pdf>. 27

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However, upon observing, meeting and speaking with these Muslims, they realise that, far from being ‘dangerous', ‘fanatical', ‘irrational', ‘hate-mongering', ‘racist', ‘sexist', ‘ignorant', ‘brainwashed', ‘uneducated', ‘violent', ‘vicious', ‘militant' ‘thugs', they are actually intelligent, educated, level-headed, calm, collected, reasonable family men that are nothing like the public portrayal of ‘extremists’. This discovery causes a lot of people to question their understanding of politics, war, Muslims; reconsider their stance on British foreign policy and take a serious interest in discovering Islam. This also prevents them from being so easily fooled or affected by popular hysteria and propaganda’.41

There are numerous accounts of how well-known extremists have influenced others in British prisons simply through their charm and acts of spontaneous kindness and concern for others. For example, Omar Khyam, a British-Pakistani convicted of planning terrorist attacks in the UK, has described the extraordinary influence over other inmates enjoyed by Rachid Ramda. Ramda, a French Muslim, was imprisoned in the UK, mainly in Belmarsh, from 1995-2005, while fighting extradition to France (where he was later convicted of organising the 1995 Paris metro bombings). Khyam writes: 42 ‘The first thing that struck me most about Rachid was the way he greeted me and the new Muslim arrivals, three hugs and a huge smile. He made me feel as if I had known him for years, such a warm personality and character, making everyone feel wanted and important, as if you are his best friend. Even now, a year has passed but he still has that way of making your day, where ever you meet him; in education, Friday prayers, gym, or during the main moves along the corridor, his warm smile will always accompany him … He is a shining example to both Muslims and non-Muslims of what the people of patience look like’.43

The 51-page handbook by Abu Amr al-Qaidi has been distributed widely on Arabic-language jihadist websites. It lists five stages in recruitment: selecting a potential recruit, making their acquaintance, awakening their faith, implanting jihadist concepts and forming a cell. For further information, see Brian Fishman and Abdullah Warius, 'A Jihadist’s Course in the Art of Recruitment', The Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, February 2009. Available online at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss2.pdf>.

‘7 Reasons why people become Muslim in prison’, Islam4UK website, 18 May 2009 http://www.islam4uk.com/current-affairs/uk-news/46-uk/289-7-reasons-why-people-becomemuslim-in-prison>.

Khyam has also written of how Fahad Hashmi, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, who was held in Belmarsh prison in 2006-7 while awaiting extradition to the US in relation to charges of providing material support to al-Qaeda, similarly provided spiritual and moral support to other prisoners. Khyam writes: ‘He was one of those brothers who would walk around with a smile on his face day-in day-out. When some brothers would feel down or stressed out due to being separated from loved ones, or the situation of their individual cases was not going well, you would always see brother Fahad Hashmi speaking to them, encouraging them to be patient and steadfast’. Source: Omar Khyam, ‘My memories of Fahad Hashmi’, Al-Istiqamah online magazine (June 2008) <http://al-istiqamah.com/Archive/Newsletter/IstiqNewsletter32.pdf>, p.16. ‘Statements on Rachid Ramda from Prison’, Cageprisoners website, 25 May 2005, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=7500>. 28

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‘Abu Abdullah’, imprisoned in Belmarsh for several months in 2003, similarly wrote of how Ramda sought out other Muslim prisoners and sought to inspire and encourage them: ‘The first Jumah I prayed, brother Rachid said to me ‘A person will be rewarded in spite of whether it [his situation] is to his liking or not’. Seeing brothers like him who had been in Belmarsh for so many years really inspired me. I felt ashamed to even feel weakness’. 44

Amar Makhlulif, an Algerian nicknamed ‘Abu Doha’ who is alleged to be a leading member of an Algerian jihadist group, was imprisoned in Belmarsh for several years while fighting deportation to Algeria, has also written of how Ramda also offered him advice: ‘When I need courage or I feel sad and everything in my life seems as though it has been turned upside down, I think of Rachid and reflect upon his advice. Rachid is a symbol of love, a brother in time of need … If there are people better than angels, then Rachid is one of them’.45

Makhlulif’s anecdote illustrates how easily casual friendships can lead a prisoner habitually taking spiritual and personal advice from a leading Islamist extremist – and can even lead to a terrorist mastermind being seen as a ‘symbol of love’.46 This danger increases when ordinary Muslim prisoners who lack detailed religious knowledge encounter extremists who are better-versed in theology and Islamic scriptures.

At the same time, there are social barriers which can prevent extremists from easily influencing others in prison. For instance, some extremist prisoners have noted that other Muslim prisoners initially feared them when first encountering them – perhaps because of the extremists’ reputation or because they feared that they might be stigmatized by the prison authorities for associating with extremists. For example, Mustapha Taleb, who worked in the bookshop at the Finsbury Park Mosque under Abu Hamza and who has been held in a number of prisons while fighting deportation to Algeria, has written of how ordinary Muslim prisoners initially avoided extremists, like himself, who were held at Long Lartin prison47: ‘When we came here first, it was harsh, harsh treatment and harsh life. Even the prisoners were like scared of us, because the [prison] system here told them that these people are very dangerous you can’t mix with them’.48

44 45 46

Javaid Iqbal, 'The 'Terrorist' Label never wears off', Al-Istiqamah online magazine (January 2008, )<http://al-istiqamah.com/Archive/Newsletter/IstiqNewsletter2-2.pdf>.

‘Who is Rachid Ramda?’, Caeprisoners website, undated, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/page.php?id=15>.

In 2007, a French court found Ramda guilty of being a key member in the GIA who had financed the 1995 Paris Metro bombings which killed 8 people and injured over 100. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison. Jon Boyle, ‘French court convicts Algerian of Paris bombing’, Reuters, 26 October 2007, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L25825836.htm>. Duncan Campbell and Rosie Cowen, ‘Terror trail that led from Algeria to London’, The Guardian, 14 April 2005, < http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/apr/14/terrorism.world2>. 29

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However, he notes, ordinary Muslims’ initial fear of the extremists soon evaporated: ‘With the brothers here, our Muslim brothers in the prison, it’s ok ma sha’Allah [it is as God wills]. There is some kind of harmony, connection between brothers in here, al hamdulillah [praise be to God]’.

An almost identical situation is reported by Abu Hamza in Belmarsh, who said in a June 2008 interview that many Muslims became more sympathetic to imprisoned extremists as they found out more about them:

‘Most of the brothers [i.e. Muslims] are sympathetic, even the ones who are not political prisoners but who have been charged with the [ordinary crimes] are shocked at the difficulties which I face. Others have converted to Islam Alhamdulillah [praise be to God]. Many give respect even if they disagree with my opinions’.49

For many extremists, their notoriety can therefore become a means to intrigue and impress other Muslims – as well as providing them an opportunity to become a leader or figurehead for Muslim convicts. Extremists seek leadership of Muslim prisoners

As well as often being personable, friendly and charming, and offering religious and moral advice, many individuals convicted of planning terrorism or preaching extremism have also actively sought to become the leaders and representatives of all Muslim inmates – something they may see as being a religious duty. For example, Abdullah elFaisal, imprisoned in Belmarsh prison between 2003 and 2007, told Jamaican TV after his release and deportation, that he had seen it as his duty to lead and inspire other Muslim prisoners. He told Jamaican TV: ‘If you’re a cleric you have to set an example for other Muslim prisoners to follow, you’re not supposed to crack up under pressure’.50

Detainee ‘KM’ who was in Belmarsh for over a year in 2002/3 attested how Faisal had indeed gained leadership over Muslim inmates and was able to force the prison “to give in to our demands”: ‘Once, they tried to stop us from Jumuah [Friday] prayers whilst we were in the holding rooms and tried to send us back to our cells. There was a collective sit-in, led by Shaikh Faisal. The prison had to give in to our demands but then we were later cautioned, starting with Shaikh Faisal’.51

This incident evidently enabled Faisal to position himself as a man who was standing up 48 49 50

‘The Long Lartin Interviews: Moazzem Begg Interviews Mustapha Taleb’, Cageprisoners, 11 March 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=23748> ‘Interview with Abu Hamza’, Cageprisoners, 6 June 2008 <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=24793>

‘The Mufti of Jamaica? The Recent Media Frolics of (‘Sheikh’) Abdullah Faisal’, December 2007, Salafimanhaj website: <http://www.salafimanhaj.com/pdf/SalafiManhaj_MufteeOfJamaica> 'Inside 'Hellmarsh' - An Interview with a Former Belmarsh Detainee, Cageprisoners, (1 December 2004) <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=4449>. 30

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for the religious rights of ordinary Muslim prisoners – an act which doubtlessly won him further respect from his fellow inmates. This is probably typical of how many extremists gradually extend their influence over other prisoners. Faraj Hassan Al-Saad, a Libyan Islamist who was held in several prisons including Brixton, Belmarsh, Leicester and Long Lartin in 2002-7 while fighting deportation to Italy to stand trial on terrorism charges,52 has described how ordinary Muslim prisoners at Brixton looked up to him, perhaps because of his status as a terrorism suspect. He relates one incident where he took charge of a protest against a “racist” prison officer: ‘Inmates were refusing to have their lunch or go back to their cells unless the Governor No.1 came to speak to them. As a Muslim I too joined this peaceful demonstration to demand our rights. The brothers all wanted me to speak on their behalf, so I explained everything to the staff, but the staff started to mobilize from other wings. They started attacking the brothers and four of the officers came and held me on one side. The officers knew that all the Muslim inmates respect me and would not tolerate seeing me on the floor, so they were telling them to stay where they were. While all this was happening I was speaking to the brothers in Arabic and telling them not to use any act of violence, even though the staff were so violent they broke one of the brother’s arm[s]’.53

In this case, prison staff seem to have empowered Al-Saad because they believed that he could help them prevent an outbreak of violence – albeit at the cost of probably empowering him more widely and of strengthening his reputation among other Muslim prisoners.

It is not clear that the Prison Service has yet come up with a formula that enables them to effectively reduce the influence of jailed extremists while also keeping the peace in prisons and minimising disturbances. It is often clearly very tempting for prison authorities to turn to influential extremists for help in dealing with other Muslim

‘Delays Prevent Terror Extradition’, BBC News, 31 October 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4392194.stm>. According to the United Nation, Al-Saad was ‘sentenced to five years of imprisonment by the Court of first instance of Milan on 18 Dec. 2006. Sentenced in absentia to five years and ten months of imprisonment for membership of a terrorist association by the Appeal Court of Milan, Italy, on 7 Feb. 2008’. The Consolidated List established and maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to alQaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them. He was released without charge in 2007 and is presently living in Leicester. Sources: 'The Consolidated List established and maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them', United Nations (Updated 10 August 2009) , <http://www.un.org/spanish/sc/committees/1267/consolidatedlist.pdf>, Ben Goldby, ‘Muslim terrorist living in the Midlands’, Sunday Mercury, 22 March 2009, <http://www.sundaymercury.net/news/crime-news/2009/03/22/muslim-terrorist-living-in-themidlands-66331-23201047/>. ‘Interview with Faraj Hassan al-Saad’, 18 August 2007, Cageprisoners <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=21612>. 31

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prisoners – as has reportedly happened in Belmarsh with prison authorities using one high profile terrorist convict to help calm and control Muslim prisoners.54 While this approach might bring short-term peace to prisons, it risks further empowering extremists in the long-run.

There are also worrying indications that the Prison Service does not fully understand how Islamists recruit followers in prison. For example, Amar Makhlulif (a leading member of a number of Algerian militant groups who is also known as ‘Abu Doha’) was in 2005 reported to have received training to become a ‘listener’, a prisoner who gives advice to other prisoners. Wendy Lisaboa, a British woman who corresponded with Makhlulif and has visited him in prison, has said that: ‘He has become a listener - the Samaritans trained him - he listens to the other prisoners when they are down. He is a kind man’.55

Given that Maklulif is believed to have been a key figure in al-Qaeda’s operations in Europe, who helped plan and organise attempted attacks by al-Qaeda in Los Angeles and the UK, as well as helping European jihadists travel to Afghanistan and Chechnya for militant training,56 the Prison Service’s decision to train him as a ‘listener’ who gives advice to other prisoners seems somewhat odd. In future it would be wise to ensure not only that suspected or convicted terrorists are not trained as ‘listeners’ or mentors, but such training is only given to individuals who have liberal, tolerant understandings of Islam.

In other instances, the Prison Service has empowered extremists by allowing them to lead Friday prayers. For example, it has been reported that Rachid Ramda – who, as described above, was seen by other extremists as being unusually quick to influence other prisoners - was allowed to lead Friday prayers in Belmarsh during his time there. Ann Alexander, a Scottish campaigner for Muslim prisoners who has frequently met and corresponded with Ramda, related in 2005 that ‘he does the call to prayer and sometimes takes the service on a Friday’ – an account separately confirmed by Babar Ahmed.57 This is apparently corroborated by the 2003 prison inspection of Belmarsh which reported that “the Imam had left to take up another job elsewhere and in the

54 55 56

Author interview with independent researcher who has interviewed prisoners and prison staff at HMP Belmarsh. September 2009. ‘An interview with Wendy Lisaboa’, Cageprisoners, 16 May 2005, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/print.php?id=7501>.

Special immigration appeals commission, ‘A - APPELLANT and Secretary of State for the Home Department –RESPONDENT’, Appeal No: SC/1/2002 <http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/outcomes/documents/sc12002A.pdf>

‘Interview with Ann’, Cageprisoners, 07 September 2005, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=9411>. Babar Ahmed has also referred to Ramda being allowed to give the call to prayer in Belmarsh, writing that “the pain in Rachid’s soul is evident when he makes the Adhan (Call to Prayer) every Friday during the Muslim Service’. Source: ‘Who is Rachid Ramda?’, Caeprisoners website, undated <http://www.cageprisoners.com/page.php?id=15>. 32

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meantime Muslim prayers were led by visiting Imams or by Muslim prisoners’.58

The Prison Service has now belatedly put in place measures designed to prevent such situations from re-occurring. For example, on 19 April 2009, the Prison Service issued an amendment to ‘Prison Service Order 4550 – Religion’ which that ‘in the non HSE [High Security Establishment], in exceptional circumstances, for example, an unplanned absence by the Muslim Chaplain, for a time bound period and subject to risk assessment and appropriate supervision, a Muslim prisoner (designated by the Muslim Chaplain) may lead Friday prayers. In the HSE, contingencies need to be in place to ensure there is a Muslim Chaplain available to lead Friday prayers. Establishments should contact Chaplaincy HQ if there is any difficulty with providing cover. Muslim prisoners in the HSE must not be permitted to lead Friday prayers’.59 These are sensible recommendations. However, it remains to be seen whether they will be systematically enforced throughout the Prison Service. The regulations also assume that the regular chaplains are not only not extremists but also that they are actually preaching an understanding of Islam that is tolerant and inclusive. Given that the Prison Service’s chaplains are (as a result of decisions taken by the Prison Service’s Muslim advisor) overwhelmingly from the highly conservative Deobandi school of thought, this is by means no certain. Gangs

Gangs are an inescapable fact of prison life around the world, typically taking the form of protection rackets, mutual support networks or as foci for trade in contraband ranging from drugs to weapons. While Muslim-centric prison gangs may evolve for protection against other prisoners, Islamist prison gangs often additionally promote an exclusive, separatist ideology that glorifies violence and intolerance. Islamist extremists who are already keen to assume a leadership position among Muslim prisoners will also seize on such gangs as a vehicle for radicalising others. For this reason, there is a considerable risk that Muslim-centric prison gangs may act as incubators for terrorist groups and ideologies.

Various forms of Islamist gangs – based around a shared ideology or a loose sense of Muslim or ethnic solidarity – are successful in British prisons for several reasons. Group loyalty

Islamist prison gangs often have a strong sense of group loyalty based on a shared and exclusivist religious identity. In addition to this sense of brotherhood, Islamist gangs often have a doctrinal hostility towards non-Muslims or Muslims of other persuasions. Glorification of violence

Prison gangs with an Islamist outlook often put a strong emphasis on the importance of violence, which they may perceive as a religious duty. Violence, whether political or criminal, can be perceived not only as a legitimate method for correcting perceived ‘injustice’ but also as an acceptable technique for gaining 58

H.M Chief Inspector of Prisons, Report on a Full Announced Inspection of Belmarsh Prison, 26 - 4 June 2003, <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/Belmarsh/belmarsh032.pdf?view=Binary>. 33

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dominance over others.

Moral superiority and purpose

Joining an Islamist gang and adopting an Islamist ideology can give inmates who have previously been drifting in a cycle of petty crime, drugs, violence and imprisonment a sense of purpose and direction. Often this takes the form of rejecting western culture and is presented as ‘returning to Islam’.

Together these factors can provide Muslims who join such gangs with a sense of solidarity, physical safety and moral purpose. Joining Islamist gangs can also help ‘born again’ Muslims to overcome problems with drugs, delinquency and crime by encouraging them to reject former habits and lifestyles and “return to Islam”. At the same time, prison gangs based on an Islamist ideology may not always be strikingly distinctive from other associations or groupings of individuals united by their Muslim beliefs or Islamic upbringing or culture. Similarly, unlike in the cases of deliberate recruitment outlined above, Islamist gangs may not deliberately aim to ‘indoctrinate’ their members, ideology instead spreads through collective ‘group think’ rather than as the result of any fixed plan by the gang’s leaders. The Prison Service has itself recognised the growing challenges posed by Muslim gangs in some prisons – including in several prisons holding extremists convicted for their role in organising, carrying out or inspiring terrorist attacks. For example, the 2005 Inspection of Belmarsh prison reported that: ‘We were told by staff that there were examples of intimidatory behaviour amongst the younger Muslim prisoners, and that these appeared to have the characteristics of gang-related behaviour’.60

The HMP Inspectorate’s 2008 report of Whitemoor reported prison staff’s concerns that intimidating, ‘bullying’ behaviour was becoming less confined to small groups of individuals and was becoming a more widespread problem, reporting that staff had ‘noted a move away from small groups of perpetrators into ‘gang culture on the wing’’. More troubling, the report said that prison staff were reluctant to intervene to tackle bullying or gang behaviour among Muslims, and quoted an officer as saying that Muslim prisoners ‘policed themselves’. The report also noted “a reluctance to engage with Muslim prisoners and challenge inappropriate behavior”61. The Independent

Prison Service Instruction, ‘Amendment to PSO 4550 – Religion’, 16 April 2009. Nb. The Order is due to expire on 15 April 2010. <http://psi.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/psi_2009_16_amendment_to_religion_pso_4550.doc>. HM Inspectorate of Prison, ‘Report on a full un-announced prison inspection of H.M Belmarsh Prison, 3-7 October 2005’, p. 32. <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/Belmarsh/belmarsh.pdf?view=Binary>.

HM Inspectorate of Prisons ‘Report on an unannounced full-return prison inspection of H.M Whitemoor Prison, 3-7 October 2008’, p.43.<http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/whitemoor/Whitemoor_2008.pdf?view=Binary>. 34

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Monitoring Board’s 2007-8 inspection on Whitemoor echoed these findings, similarly reporting that: ‘The main wings (A and B) have seen a continued increase in the number of prisoners from different gangs becoming resident in HMP Whitemoor. One has a significant element of followers of Islam, which is being used as a 'smoke-screen' for territory building and intimidation. The gang presence has caused control difficulties at times and both wings have experienced periods of unrest’.62

The 2008 Inspection of Long Lartin prison, another Category A prison where almost a quarter of inmates are Muslim, quoted a number of prisoners who identified Muslim gangs as being an increasing concern (almost half of those interviewed identified gangs in general as a problem that threatened their safety)63 : ‘There are issues with Muslim gangs wanting to overpower others’.

‘Muslim gangs; if you have a problem with one [individual], you have a problem with them all’.

Others additionally linked these Muslim gangs to conversions to Islam:

‘Yes there is a gang culture here which is becoming an issue. A lot of people are becoming Muslim just because it’s a bigger gang’.

‘All violence is gang related. Long sentences leading to more violence...turning into an American style jail e.g. if you’re not in a gang you're in trouble. People are converting to Islam for protection’.64

Unlike, for example, many US prison gangs, Islamist gangs rarely operate under specific names. The most prominent exception to this rule is the Muslim Boys, a gang that was active in South London and whose members are now mostly in prison.65 This gang, whose allegiance to any recognisable version of Islam is actually highly questionable, have carried out forced conversions to Islam and have killed at least one individual who refused to convert.66 62

64 65

Independent Monitoring Boards, ‘HMP Whitemoor: Annual Report 2008’, p. 7 <http://www.imb.gov.uk/annual-reports/08-annual-reports/Whitemoor_20072008.pdf?view=Binary>

HM Inspectorate of Prisons, ‘Report on an announced inspection of HMP Long Lartin, 14-18 July 2008’, p. 90 <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/550993/Long_Lartin_(2008).pdf?view=Binary>. Ibid., p.92.

Reports on the ‘Muslim Boys’ gang generally give the impression that the gang is ‘Muslim’ in name only, using very lose concepts of Islam to justify their ‘criminal jihad’. A number of the gang’s founding members are reported to have converted to Islam while at Feltham Young Offenders Institute. See, for example, ‘Special Investigation: Are Muslim boys using profits of crime to fund terrorism?’, The Independent, 14 August 2005, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/special-investigation-are-muslim-boys-usingprofits-of-crime-to-fund-terrorist-attacks-502831.html> Ibid.

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Other Muslim prison ‘gangs’ are much more informal, being groupings of like-minded people than formal gangs. In either instance, there is often a clear link between gangbehaviour and Islamist ideologies. For example, in 2004 Babar Ahmed wrote from Woodhill prison that: ‘Most of the other [Muslim] prisoners are OK, there being like an informal ‘brotherhood’ between [Muslim] prisoners. Some of them actually sympathise with the Muslim political prisoners [i.e. terror suspects] and curse the establishment when they see the injustice under which Muslim political prisoners are held. There is always a minority of racist inmates but since the Muslims always stick together, they are too afraid to openly display their racism, resorting instead to quiet mumbling among themselves’.67

While individual Muslim extremists often seek out potential recruits themselves, some individuals deliberately and pro-actively seek out and join Islamist groups and individuals in prison. For example, Andrew Ibrahim, a white convert to Islam who was later convicted for planning to carry out terrorist attacks in Bristol, told a court that he was ‘ excited’ to be sent to Belmarsh because ‘I thought that would give me status to go there’, adding that: ‘I was excited about it yeah. I knew people like Abu Hamza were in the unit famous people were there’.68

The court also heard that, once in Belmarsh, Ibrahim made statements such as ‘I am a terrorist, Allah will prevail’ and ‘the English should be killed’ in order to impress other Muslim inmates. This account indicates how the adoption of extremist attitudes in prison – and the selection of extremist friends and friendship groups – is often done deliberately and voluntarily rather than being the result of ‘brain-washing’ or due to threats or pressure from extremists.

The formation of Islamist gangs has important consequences not only for Muslims but also for non-Muslims and for a prison’s social dynamics in general. Joining an Islamist gang can make Muslim prisoners hostile to non-Muslim individuals. For example, HMP Inspectorate of Prisons’ 2008 report on Belmarsh quoted a prisoner (whose religion and ethnicity is unknown) as saying that: ‘The Muslim [groups] are very bad here. They recruit young black [non-Muslim] guys, and if you don't agree with them or follow them, you get threatened. Officers are naïve to the full extent of the problem’. 69

67 68 69

Barbar Ahmed, ‘Prison Conditions at HMP Woodhill’, Cageprisoners, 26 October 2004, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/print.php?id=3704>.

‘Student said he was a terrorist’, BBC News, 29 June 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8124537.stm>.

HM Inspectorate of Prisons, ‘Report on full announced inspection of H.M.P Belmarsh Prison, 8-12 October 2008’, p. 104. <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/Belmarsh/Belmarsh-2007-full_report.pdf?view=Binary>. 36

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The interviewee’s characterisation of such apparent conversions as ‘recruitment’ is telling. It illustrates that prison conversions are often perceived by other prisoners as joining a gang or an organisation – rather than merely reflecting a change of belief or spiritual outlook. Needless to say, conversions to Islam are not in themselves necessarily problematic per se. However, if individuals in prison are converting to Islam purely for their own safety or because they are attracted to the perceived violent or intolerant message of Islamism then this has important wider implications – not least because it may lead to terrorism. The creation of religious gangs inevitably leads to the creation of an ‘us and them’ outlook that can too easily lead to intolerance and physical violence not just in prisons but also in wider society.

In many cases, the formation of Muslim or Islamist gangs is a response to hostility or violence from non-Muslim prisoners. For example, in February 2009, the ‘Help The Prisoners’ organization also reported on the conditions in Manchester prison faced by Rengzieb Ahmed, a convicted member of al-Qaeda who was allegedly tortured by Pakistani intelligence officers after his arrest there70 : ‘Rengzieb Ahmed is currently on Hunger Strike within HMP Manchester, having been subjected to a series of intimidatory actions by the prison staff … Whilst serving his sentence at HMP Manchester, he has continued to suffer abuses whilst in custody. He alleges that these have included threats by inmates and staff to such extent that he fears for his safety. The latest incident has been HMP Manchester attempting to force Rengzieb to share a cell with an unknown inmate despite being a Category A prisoner which surely raises security concerns. Rengzieb is concerned that this is an attempt to physically harm him, as the Prison Service has been found to be indirectly culpable in the past via the Zahed Mubarak Enquiry. Rengzieb has been concerned to such an extent that he has engaged in a hunger strike within the segregation unit, which is now on its fifth day’.71

In such a context, it is easy to see why extremists might be tempted to form a gang for their own protection – particularly if prison staff are not seen as responsive or sympathetic to extremists who are at risk of racist or anti-Muslim violence. One of the most troubling instance of violent gangs led and inspired by convicted terrorists comes from Frankland prison. Here, tit-for-tat violence and hostility between Muslims and white prisoners led to massive violence, including attacks carried out with boiling oil, knife attacks and even a full-scale riot which left a number of prison officers injured (SEE PAGE <ADD NUMBER> FOR DETAILS].

The rise of Islamist gangs in prisons presents multiple problems. These include: Violence and bullying

The most obvious and immediate problem is that the creation of Muslim gangs can lead to intimidation of non-Muslim prisoners and of Muslim prisoners who

70 71

Ian Cobain, ‘MI5 accused of bride offer in Rangzieb Ahmed case, The Guardian, 6 July 2009

'Inmate on Hunger Strike - UPDATED', Helptheprisoners.org, 21st February 2009 (Updated 23 February 2009), <http://www.helptheprisoners.org.uk/index.php?alertid=39&cat=alerts>. 37

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are not members of such gangs, potentially resulting in large-scale bulling and violence. Accelerated radicalisation

The creation of Islamist gangs can also accelerate the transfer of Islamist ideology to gang members, who are often obliged to adopt (or pretend to adopt) the ideologies of the gangs’ leaders. Such individuals could be easily recruited by extremist or even terrorist groups on their return to society – just as Richard Reid and other convicted terrorists were recruited soon after they left prison. Isolation from moderating influences

Members of prison gangs are often purposefully isolated from other prisoners and possible moderating influences. The creation of gangs, due to their frequent hostility to outsiders, therefore makes it harder for potentially positive interventions, for example by moderate Muslim chaplains, to succeed and to challenge their ideologies. Barriers between Muslims and non-Muslims

Perhaps the most damaging long-term consequence of Islamist gangs is to create long-lasting barriers between Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims and nonMuslims who leave prison and return to society, as many thousands do every year, after being exposed to rivalry between religious/ethnic gang rivalry may in prison have adopted a confrontational, ‘us and them’ worldview that will negatively colour their future interactions with their fellow citizens.

Prison conversions

A number of prominent jihadists, such as Richard Reid and Mohammad al-Figari, convert to Islam as a result of their experiences in British prisons. This possibly indicates that such converts are often susceptible to radicalisation in British prisons.

Government bodies have reported on the growing trend of prisoners converting to Islam. For example, the Independent Monitoring Board’s 2007-8 report on Wandsworth prison noted, in somewhat un-nuanced language, its ‘concern that attempts are being made by some Muslim prisoners to convert predominantly ethnic minority prisoners to Islam, reflecting a national problem’.72 The Independent Monitoring Board’s 2007-8 report on Whitemoor also noted the large numbers of prisoners converting to Islam and linked this to ‘unrest’, ‘bullying’ and gang behaviour: ‘A major concern during the year has become the rapid increase in prisoners claiming to have converted to the Muslim faith. IMB have been approached by some prisoners concerned that bullying has been involved in the conversion. Unrest amongst prisoners has, on some occasions, been attributed to religious differences. This has been viewed very seriously by the prison management and

Independent Monitoring Board, ‘Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Board: HMP Wandsworth June 2007 – May 2008’, p.18.<http://www.imb.gov.uk/annual-reports/08-annualreports/Wandsworth_2007-2008.pdf?view=Binary>. 38

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all members of the chaplaincy. They are concerned it has exposed some weaknesses in the confidence of staff to manage assertively allegations of religious discrimination in the observance of rules and practices. This highlights once again the urgent need for improved cultural awareness and guidance for staff .... Nearly a quarter of the population attend Muslim prayers. The staff require a great deal of skill to identify those prisoners who are using their faith as a ‘smokescreen’ in order to influence other prisoners or convert them to Islam; they may view it as the ‘strongest gang’ and to be a member will suit their purpose’.73

Most prison conversions probably occur for relatively prosaic reasons as a result of loneliness, disillusionment and as part of a desire for friendship, brotherhood and support. An article on prison conversions posted on the radical Islam4uk website says many prisoners are attracted by the apparent solidarity of Muslim prisoners: ‘A painful lesson learnt by many prisoners is that, those who they once thought of as family or loyal friends are the first to desert them as soon as they go to prison. However they see the genuine loyalty and brotherhood between Muslim prisoners and yearn for something similar. They see how Muslim inmates share all of their food and favour others over themselves; they make sure that new prisoners have every essential thing they might need from extra clothes to food without ever expecting repayment. They see Muslims showing genuine love and concern for each other and see how people of any race or colour is accepted into Islam and treated as family. They see how, even if they argue or dispute, they make up and forgive each other and they wish for something similar’.74

Many prison conversions are positive and allow convicts to turn their backs on their old life of crime and substance dependency. For example, a black convert interviewed for a 2006 study of prison conversions said that:

Independent Monitoring Board, ‘HMP Whitemoor Annual Report 2008’, <http://www.imb.gov.uk/annual-reports/08-annual-reports/Whitemoor_20072008.pdf?view=Binary>.

‘7 Reasons why people become Muslim in prison’, Islam4UK website, 18 May 2009, <http://www.islam4uk.com/current-affairs/uk-news/46-uk/289-7-reasons-why-people-becomemuslim-in-prison>. Such sentiments are echoed by Babar Ahmed who, although not a convert to Islam, has written of his own feelings about Islam in prison – which may reflect the feelings of many converts, writing that: ‘Captivity for Allah teaches you not to expect anything from anybody, except from Allah. The one who is abandoned by the people always has Allah there for him. When all the doors are shut, Allah’s door remains open. When all paths are blocked, the path to Allah’s Mercy remains open. Prison for Allah also teaches you to find Divine Company when alone, to find comfort when ill, to find strength when weak and to feel superior when conquered. You find that not only can you survive with enough possessions to fit under a single bed, but that you can be happy – without family or friends, without a house or car, without money or a bank account, without a computer or a phone and more. You learn how to conquer your fears with courage and determination through your Iman (faith)’. Babar Ahmed, ‘One Year in Captivity’, 6 September 2005, Cageprisoners, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=9398> 39

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‘If you follow Islam correctly it helps with life in, in everything; as in you pray, it keeps you away from bad intentions, that’s one of the main things and having morals, like people need morals in life or you have nothing init? It gives you respect and all your cleanliness and to sort of look after your surroundings ... You know I don’t really want to go back out there and be mixed up in the same sort of thing’.75

As this account suggests many Muslim prisoners associate converting to Islam with a rejection of bad habits, such as drug-taking, criminality and selfishness. Babar Ahmed in 2008 describes the changes he had witnessed in converts in Category A prisons: ‘During the last four years I have personally witnessed the worst of men turn into the best of men. I have seen gangsters, drug barons, armed robbers and murderers, of all faiths and races, convert to Islam in prison. I have always been inspired by converts since every conversion is a miracle, but seeing a hardened criminal accept Islam is something else. Only the true religion is able to cause genuine, lasting change in an individual in a short space of time’. 76

Although, many prison conversions produce solely beneficial results, this is not always the case. While conversions often help individuals to cope with prison life as well as giving up crime, drink and drugs, there is also the risk that prison converts will adopt hardline interpretations of their new religion. For example, in 2007, a number of Islamic websites published an open letter allegedly from Abdul Hakim, a white convert previously known as Shevon Smith, who had adopted Islam as a result of his experiences in several Category A prisons, including somel housing prominent extremists such as HMPs Full Sutton, Whitemoor, Long Lartin and Frankland. He wrote that he was inspired by watching other Muslim prisoners ‘practising Islam seriously’ and living ‘their lives under Islam’. More significantly, he added that his adoption of what seems to be a fairly hardline interpretation of Islam had a radical effect on how he views and treats other prisoners: ‘Now, as for the personal change that I have gone through over the last year or so. I’d say that alhamdulillah, my eeman [faith], taqwa [piety] and birr [righteousness/goodness] has increased. This in turn has changed my whole way of life. From the way I walk and talk to the people who I walk and talk with. The crazy music that I used to listen to and drink to and dance to and do drugs to has

75 76

B. Spalek, S. El Hassan, ‘Religion in Prison: Conversion to Islam’, Prison Service Journal Is sue 163, 2006 (p. 13 20) Babar Ahmed, ‘Four Years in Captivity’, Cageprisoners, 8 August 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=25773>. 40

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all changed. And where before I use to respect what I did and the people who did what I did, I no longer have that respect for it or them’.77

The writer’s references to giving up music and to no longer ‘respecting’ people who are not similarly conservative Muslims, strongly suggests that he has adopted a relatively hard-line and probably Wahhabi-influenced form of Islam. There are several reasons why new converts in prison might be drawn to Wahhabism (a highly conservative interpretation of Islam originating in 18th century Arabia) or to Islamism: Clear religious rulings

Wahhabi and Islamist interpretations of Islam are generally very rigid and are based on clear set of rules. It therefore often appeals to converts looking for clear guidance on their new religion. Apparent authenticity

Wahhabi Islam frequently focuses on outward expressions of piety as expressed through beards, ‘Islamic’ dress codes, use of religious greetings etc. This emphasis on cultivating a traditional Arab appearance may lead converts to see this as ‘the real Islam’. Wahhabi denunciations of other Muslims as deviants or heretics may also lead new converts to view Wahhabism as more authentic than other interpretations. Concept of ‘Allegiance and Enmity’

The related Wahhabi doctrine of al-wala wa al-bara (literally ‘Allegiance and enmity’) advocates a rejection of both non-Muslims and Muslims who considered to be lapsed or heretical. This deliberate distancing from ‘non-Muslims’ may be attractive to new converts looking to disassociate themselves from ‘western’ problems of alcohol-abuse, drugs and crime. Glorification of violence

Wahhabist and Islamists routinely legitimise violence. Violence deemed acceptable may include state violence towards homosexuals, women and non-Muslims. In prison culture where violence is often admired and respected, a religious sect that openly endorses violence may appear attractive.

Abdul Hakim, ‘From Kufr to Islam, From Imprisonment to Freedom’, 1 December, 2007, Available on ‘Prisoners of Faith’ website: <http://prisonersoffaith.wordpress.com/2007/12/01/from-kufr-to-islam-from-imprisonment-tofreedom/>. ‘Abu Abdullah’ who was imprisoned in Belmarsh in 2003 after being arrested on suspicion of funding terrorism, was given similar accounts of sudden behavioural changes by converts: ‘When inmates see that someone has converted, they immediately see the change that comes over their character. The person stops lying, or blasting their music in the middle of the night, they stop bullying people and they start giving their fellow inmate free food. When the inmates see these changes and compare it to what they read on the news, many do realise that something’s going on’. Source: Quoted in Javaid Iqbal, 'The 'Terrorist' Label never wears off', Al-Istiqamah online magazine (January 2008)<http://alistiqamah.com/Archive/Newsletter/IstiqNewsletter2-2.pdf>. 41

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Books and literature

Because Wahhabi prosletisation is massively funded by countries such as Saudi Arabia, books and literature promoting wahhabist interpretations are usually cheaper and more plentiful than ones promoting more tolerant forms of Islam. Even in prison it is likely that individuals seeking information about Islam will end up relying on wahhabi literature.

In addition, many prison chaplains are from the deobandi movement, which historically had a degree of overlap with aspects of Wahhabism. The result of these factors together help explain why many prison converts have adopted radical Islamist or Wahhabi beliefs while in prison. For example, Abu Qatada, one of the world’s most influence jihadist theologians, has written that: ‘We see the great signs of Allah within these prisons, as I have seen this religion and how young men enter into Islam and then they turn into students of knowledge and they learn Arabic and the Sharia [Islamic law/ethics] in a short number of months along with an understanding of the reality of Tawhid [monotheism], which one who lived as a Muslim in the Muslim countries is ignorant of’. 78

Abu Qatada’s reference to these new converts ‘understanding of the reality of tawhid’ strongly suggests that these men have adopted hardline wahhabi beliefs while his approving reference to them learning ‘the sharia’ suggests that they have embraced Islamist beliefs similar to his own pro-al-Qaeda ideology. More troublingly, he also writes that the conversions to Wahhabi-style Islam have been prompted by extremists’ teachings about ‘martyrdom and jihad’: ‘I wished to be able to detail the names of the young men and how they entered into Islâm and sold themselves to Allah, due to the news of martyrdom and Jihad. I wished to be able to give detailed accounts of the young men who lived in Jahiliyyah [unbelief] for a long time and then when the Jihad in the path of Allah came, they turned into worshippers and people who prayed the night and memorizers of the Book of Allah and they learned Arabic. I wished to be able to explain to you about the anxiety, angst and confusion of those British criminal authorities regarding these events, which were strange to them, as they did not know what to do with this extraordinary faithful outpouring’. 79

It is deeply disturbing that a proven pro-jihadist extremist like Abu Qatada is apparently pleased that prisoners are converting to Islam after hearing about “martyrdom and jihad”. There are no statistics on how many people have converted to Islam in prison – the 78

Abû Qatâdah, ‘An Address to the Muslims’, At-Tibyān Publications, 23rd March 2009, <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-from-abu-qatadah‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/>.

Abu Qatâdah, ‘An Address to the Muslims’, Al-Tibyan website, 23 March 2009, <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-from-abu-qatadah‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/>. 42

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government does not collect them and they cannot be extracted from other surveys of ethnicity and religious affiliation. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the numbers are considerable. For example, in addition to the observations of the Independent Monitoring Boards at Wandsworth and Whitemoor (quoted above), there are former prisoners such as ‘Abu Abdullah’, who was imprisoned in Belmarsh in 2003 on suspicion of funding terrorism, who has written that: ‘Prisoners, like the rest of the population, are indoctrinated by the media, yet prisoners are still converting to Islam. One brother said he was in Belmarsh for nine months and there were conversions every month’.80

Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of those who convert to Islam are black. For example, a 2006 study suggested that because nearly 20 per cent of Black Caribbeans in prison were Muslim, this could be evidence of a disproportionate propensity by black prisoners to convert to Islam (outside prisons, the report noted, less than 1 per cent of Black Caribbeans are Muslim).81 Similar trends have been observed in other countries such as the US where famous black prison converts to Islam include Malcolm X and Mike Tyson.82 Abu Qatada has himself referred to a black prisoner converting to Islam, referring to a brother ‘from Jamaica’ in the Long Lartin segregation unit who ‘recently entered Islam and [has] taken the name, Bilal’.83

As will be seen, those who adopt Islamism or join Muslim gangs in prison, often do so in order to seek protection from violence or threats from white individuals or gangs. In this context, it is significant that that non-Muslims who are particularly likely to suffer disproportionate prison violence (such as paedophiles) may also be disproportionately likely to convert to Islam. For example, in 2008, the Scottish Daily Record newspaper reported that two men, a paedophile and a rapist, had both recently converted to Islam in Scottish prisons.84 In such cases it is likely that the seemingly solidarity and protection offered by Muslim gangs is the main motivation for conversion – although such converts may also be motivated by a belief that by accepting Islam their sins will be erased and

80 81 82

Quoted in Javaid Iqbal, 'The 'Terrorist' label never wears off', Al-Istiqamah online magazine (January 2008)<http://al-istiqamah.com/Archive/Newsletter/IstiqNewsletter2-2.pdf>.

B. Spalek, S. El Hassan, ‘Religion in Prison: Conversion to Islam’, Prison Service Journal Issue 163, 2006 (pp. 13 20)

For example, Dr J Michael Waller, in his 2003 testimony to the US Senate’s subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security stated that prison converts to Islam ‘are overwhelmingly black with a small, but growing Hispanic minority’. Source: Senate Testimony of Dr. Michael Waller, 14 October 2003. See also ‘Black America, prisons and radical Islam’, Centre for Islamic Pluralism (US), August 2008. Abu Qatâdah, ‘An Address to the Muslims’, Al-Tibyan website <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-from-abu-qatadah‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/>.

Amy Devine, ‘Paedophile Changes Name and Converts to Islam’, The Daily Record, 7 April 2008, <http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/2008/04/07/paedophile-changesname-and-converts-to-islam-in-jail-86908-20375133/>. 43

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they can start afresh. It seems likely that in many cases converts who adopted Islam in prison for protection will abandon their faith once they are released.

Similarly, prison authorities should be aware that a number of conversions to Islam may be opportunistic attempts to access services which are perceived to offer better treatment for Muslims. For example, Ian Brown, formerly the lead singer of the Stone Roses, ‘converted’ to Islam while in prison in 1998 for an ‘air rage’ incident. He later said that becoming Muslim ‘was the only way I could keep alive, foodwise. It was all dogfood pies, so I went Muslim and I got lentils, chickpeas, rice and chicken curry on Friday. They told me that half of Manchester [is] Muslim in Kirkham nick. It's the only way you can be guaranteed chicken’.85 Prison authorities should be aware, however, than even those who convert initially for purely practical reasons can be radicalized through contact with charismatic Islamist prisoners. Deepening radicalisation and consolidation of beliefs

The initial adoption of radical beliefs by Muslim prisoners, whether through individual recruitment or through joining an Islamist group, is often only the start of a much longer period of radicalisation.

Radicalisation is rarely an overnight occurrence. More often it is a lengthy process that may take months or years. The adoption of radical beliefs usually occurs within the framework of friendship groups of extremist prisoners or within gangs – although it can also occur alone, for example through reading radical literature. Radicalisation through friendship groups

Although radicalisation is often thought of as a one-way process with an extremist ‘brain-washing’ others, the reality is more complex. Radicalisation often involves debates, discussions and conversations about complex issues of theology that may lead to all parties in the discussion adopting new – and perhaps more radical - views. Individuals who are in the process of adopting radical beliefs are also generally conscious that they are doing so (although they might not themselves describe this process as ‘radicalisation’). A number of extremist prisoners have written of the debates that they have had on Islam in prison with other inmates. For example, Babar Ahmed has written that: ‘Common topics of conversation do not revolve around shallow pleasures like careers, homes, food, money or cars. Instead we focus on how we will be re-united for eternity with our families, friends and loved ones and how we will remember and joke about our good times in prison when we reach Paradise. Insha-Allah. For in Paradise there are no shackles, no restrictions, no basic diets, no locked doors, no rules and no time-limited visits with one’s family’.86

85 86

Dave Simpson, ‘The Rebel Inside’, The Guardian, 4 February 2000, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/friday_review/story/0,,240083,00.html>.

Barbar Ahmed, ‘One Year in Captivity’, Cageprisoners, 6th September 2005, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=9398>. 44

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Abu Qatada has similarly written of the conversations that took place between extremist detainees in Belmarsh: ‘We remained with the brothers in this prison for three years and regretfully, I did not complete very much [writing] in it, because the prison was communal with the [Muslim] brothers (i.e. everyone was together) and discussions with them were deep’.87

In such discussions it is likely that well-read theologians like Abu Qatada will have exercised a large degree of authority over other prisoners – as well as encouraging and persuading them to adopt more radical theological positions (which Abu Qatada will regard as a religious duty and a form of dawa). Indeed, once prisoners have shown themselves to be receptive to radical ideologies, seasoned extremists will do almost anything to entrench and deepen such latent radicalism. For example, in April 2009, Hani al-Sibai, a former member of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad group who lives in London and runs a popular pro-jihadist website, posted a briefing about Muslims held in Belmarsh prison. In it he described Abu Hamza’s determination to radicalise fellow prisoners by speaking through the pipes between cells, writing: ‘For the purpose of teaching the youth in the adjacent cells Sheikh Abu Hamza has had to resort to reciting the Quran through the pipes that link the cells – which is a tiresome procedure!’88

The Prison Service has periodically attempted to crack-down on radicalisation carried out through small friendship groups – although how this is done often varies between prisons. For example, Dhiren Barot has also complained that the Prison Service has been keeping him at ‘arm's length from other inmates’ and writing that he is ‘nearly always being placed on the wings where there are next to no practicing Muslims, Asians or black persons’: ‘Any time the prison feels that I may have found a 'friend' that I may be 'overly' socialising with, more often than not the individual/s concerned are promptly shipped out to other establishments. Why? For irrational fear of 'sermonizing' or 'talent scouting' of course because they believe I have an arresting personality! The same goes for physical training with other inmates’.89

Similar allegations have been made by Abu Hamza in an interview from Belmarsh in June 2008: ‘I pray in my cell. If we call the adhan [call to prayer] we are punished and we lose more of our freedom and utilities. If we try to pray in congregation, we get disciplined. We get strip searches. If we speak in our own languages, they call it

Abu Qatâdah, ‘An Address to the Muslims’, Al-Tibyan website <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-from-abu-qatadah‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/>.

Hani Sibai, ‘Sheikh Abu Hamza and his brothers in Belmarsh...their life is in danger’, 22 April 2009. Available on website of Al-Maqreze Centre for Historical Studies’, <http://hani.phpnet.us/bayanat/artcl080.html>. 45

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preaching. If I try to teach, even the art of reading the Qu’ran or anything helpful, we get a very hard time in prison’.90

Abu Hamza additionally claimed that the policy of moving prisoners who have become close to Abu Hamza is so well-known that inmates who wish to be moved to another cell simply have to claim that he has influenced them: ‘Whenever they want to be moved from the H[igh] S[ecurity] U[unit], the inmates shout ‘Allahu Akbar, give me a Qu’ran, I am a friend of Abu Hamza’. They then get moved from the HSU, they do not need to waste time in legal proceedings as this is a quick way to get a transfer’.

On occasion, the Prison Service has even feared that groups of detainees may even substantially influence prison staff. For example, HM Inspectorate’s 2007 report on Long Lartin’s segregation unit, which houses a number of intelligent and charismatic detainees such as Abu Qatada, warned that “support for staff was necessary to prevent their conditioning by a strong and united detainee group.” This is a powerful indication of how persuasive a gang of ideologically driven and highly-committed extremists can be and an important recognition that, over a long period, even non-Muslim prison staff risk being won over to an extreme Islamist worldview.91 In some instances, the Prison Service has quietly begun attempting to limit the interaction between convicted or suspected extremists and ordinary Muslim prisoners in order to minimise the risks of radicalisation. At Long Lartin prison, for instance, suspected extremists detained while fighting deportation are kept in a separate unit where they only rarely meet other prisoners (for example in the gym or while being moved to other prisons). Babar Ahmed has remarked on the lack of interaction with other prisoners at Long Lartin, writing: ‘There is only one major drawback at Long Lartin in comparison to other prisons that I have been held in, and that is the limited interaction between detainees and prisoners on the main population. There is some interaction but on the whole detainees are kept isolated from other prisoners’.92

At the same time, however, this segregation is not complete. For instance, HM Inspectorate of Prisons’ 2007 report on the Long Lartin detainee unit said that detainees had ‘some access’ to mainstream prisoners in ‘gym, education and visits’.93 This is corroborated by ‘Detainee DD’, a Libyan terror suspect who was also held at Long Lartin 89 90 91

Eesa Barot’s letter to the ummah, Al-Istiqamah online magazine, November 2007, <http://alistiqamah.com/IF/Barot3.htm>.<http://www.al-istiqamah.com/IF/Barot2.htm>.

‘Interview with Abu Hamza’, Cageprisoners, 6 June 2008 <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=24793>.

'An inspection of the category A detainee unit at HMP Long Lartin - July 2007', HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2008. p.18, <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/thematicreports1/Long_Lartin.pdf?view=Binary>

‘Interview with Babar Ahmed’, Cageprisoners, 7th May 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=24383>. 46

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and who has since been released on a control order, who said that:

‘In sports etc, they [non-Muslim prisoners] like to choose us [terror detainees] to be part of their teams. Our friendship with them is so good that at times the security guard has intervened to separate us’.94

Despite such interventions, the Long Lartin procedures to ‘contain’ extremist detainees appear to have, on occasion, been strikingly ineffective. For example, Abu Qatada has written that while supposedly ‘secluded’ in Long Lartin, he managed to meet and converse with Bilal Abdullah, who was later found guilty of attempting to explode carbombs in London and Glasgow, and Mohammed Asha, who was cleared of involvement in the same plot,95 – even though both Abdullah and Asha were then being held in Belmarsh: ‘Here in the solitary wing, where we have been secluded away from the world and the rest of the prisoners, Allah has decreed that I was able to meet, for a short time, with the doctor Muhammad Asha. And he was the one who was charged along with the Iraqi doctor, Bilal Abdullah. And he [i.e. Abdullah] was a brother whom I met in the Masjid [mosque], while I was secluded alone in Belmarsh, on the day of Jumu’ah [Friday], and then I met him (again) within the prisoner transport van, which was taking him to the trial’.96

Attempts to prevent extremists from mixing with others have also sporadically taken place in other prisons’.97 For example, in 2007 that Omar Khyam’s wife reported her husband was being preventing from attending educational courses in Frankland prison.

From the perspective of preventing further radicalisation, limiting the interaction

94 95 96

'An inspection of the category A detainee unit at HMP Long Lartin - July 2007', HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2008. p. 26, <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/thematicreports1/Long_Lartin.pdf?view=Binary>. ‘Interview with Detainee D.D’, Cageprisoners, 8th April 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=24043>.

‘Doctor Guilt of Car Bomb Attacks’, BBC News, 16th December 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7773410.stm>.

Bilal Abdullah clearly made a good impression. Abu Qatada wrote that ‘this doctor, Bilal Abdullah is truthfully a man from the men of Islam, in knowledge, action, steadfastness and manhood, as he has memorized the Book of Allah. He is a scholar in Fiqh and Hadith and he took faithful stances, during his trial, in which he said words that can be raised up with the words of the Salaf – may the pleasure of Allah be upon them. I felt insignificant, while he was saying (to me): ‘I have been influenced by your audio tapes a lot. And all praise is due to Allah, the Lord of all the worlds’. Source: Abu Qatâdah, ‘An Address to the Muslims’, AlTibyan website <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-from-abu-qatadah‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/>. ‘Statement from Mrs. Khyam about mistreatment of Omar Khyum in H.M.P Frankland’, Cageprisoners, 30th September 2007, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=21926>. 47

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between extremists and other prisoners is often wise. But at the same time, this isolation threatens the mental health of prisoners and makes them more frustrated at the prison system – as well as limiting their opportunities, in this instance, to take part in education programmes that may help them to reform. It also means that the chances of such extremists recanting their views through being exposed to new ideas or perspective is almost minimal. The obvious inconsistencies in such a policy towards Islamist extremists alone can also create the impression that Muslims are being victimised by the government – and in turn create further radicalisation. Mustapha Taleb (‘Detainee Y’) has written from Long Lartin that: ‘We were not allowed to mix with other prisoners in the beginning, we were not allowed to go to education; we were not allowed to go to the gym, only we have a gym room in here, a small gym room. The treatment, it’s awful … Everything is bad. The visits have to be cleared by the security services and it takes a long, long time. So if someone wants to visit you, when you start telling him about the process and the timing, he’s just scared, you know. And no one comes to visit’.98

Prisons have a choice: they can segregate extremist prisoners to a greater or lesser degree, thereby causing further anger and frustration, or they can let them mix with the general prison population, knowing that it will be impossible to stop radicalisation from occurring among small groups of prisoners or in one-to-one interactions. The only substantial alternative to these choices is to attempt to ‘de-radicalise’ extremists in order to make it possible to allow them to mix with the other prisoners. Radicalisation through literature

Reading extremist literature (pamphlets, books etc) plays a key role in systematising and solidifying an individual’s extremists beliefs. There is evidence that extremists in British prisons have enjoyed access to a range of extreme Islamist and pro-jihadist texts. This is unacceptable.

In addition to receiving religious instruction from extremist prisoners, individuals in the process of adopting radical beliefs also carry out a large amount of private reading. Islamists in prison frequently refer to their reading and also to their belief that prison time should be used productively. Babar Ahmed, writing from Long Lartin, has summarised how many Islamists see their time in prison, writing that ‘There is no time to rest; that will come later. Prison is not a place of rest’ and that ‘now I understand why prison is known as the University of Islamic Knowledge’.99 Historically, books and other literature have frequently played a key role In Islamist radicalisation worldwide. Extreme Islamism is not a knee-jerk response to current affairs or an individual’s experiences. Instead it is based around a complex theological understanding of Islamic scriptures and traditions. Extremist texts are important in

98 99

‘The Long Lartin Interviews: Moazzam Begg Interviews Mustapha Taleb, Cageprisoners, 11th March 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=23748>. Babar Ahmed, ‘Three Years in Captivity’, 17 August 2007 <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=21502>. 48

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prison radicalisation because they allow individuals to systematise their views in private and introduce new ideas to group discussions – while the printed and published nature of such texts may also seem to apply a stamp of approval to a ‘prison Islam’ that might otherwise seem insufficiently weighty. The books that prisoners have access to are therefore crucial in shaping their understanding of Islam and correspondingly their attitude to the world around them. There are numerous indications that extremist prisoners have access to a variety of radical Islamist literature – and that this literature is concretising the radical worldview of imprisoned Islamists. For example, Babar Ahmed in 2005 wrote that: ‘This past year I read ‘Milestones’ by Sayyid Qutb (RH) for the first time and realised why he was executed for writing this masterpiece. It answered many of the questions in my mind about prison, and the wisdom behind victory and defeat. I read, for the first time, ‘Return of the Pharaoh’ by Zainab Al-Ghazali (who recently passed away in August 2005, May Allah have Mercy on her)’.100

Qutb’s Milestones is widely seen as the book that directly led to the creation of modern jihadism, being described by Gilles Kepel for instance as ‘a manifesto for radical Islamism in the last quarter of the twentieth century’.101 Even hardline Saudi preachers have recognized Qutb’s role in creating jihadist thought – for example in September 2009 Sheikh Al-Sahaimi al-Harbi, a prominent Saudi preacher in the main mosque in Medina and advisor in the Saudi Ministry of Religious Affairs, called for Qutb’s books to be banned because of their role in encouraging terrorism.102 Zainab Al-Ghazali’s book meanwhile (referred to in Chapter 3) is an autobiographical work written by a senior female Muslim Brotherhood member about her time in prison in Egypt in the 1960s – in which she additionally glorifies Qutb as a martyr. Babar Ahmed is most likely referring to the book’s English-language edition which is published and sold by the Islamic Foundation, an Islamist organization based in Leicester. It is unclear how such books got into a Category A prison (Ahmed was imprisoned at Belmarsh and Woodhill prisons during this period). Were these books owned by individual prisoners? Or were they in the prison library after being purchased by the Prison Service or donated by external organisations? Separately, were they sent into prison to Ahmed by individuals or organizations outside prison? Or even brought into prison by sympathetic lawyers? Books that support violent jihad or which idealize and promote hardline Islamist figures should not be in British prisons. Several Muslim organisations currently provide books to Muslim prisoners. Some of these, such as the Muslim Youth Helpline, are well-respected organisations that have consistently opposed extremism.103 Other organisations that claim to supply books to

100 101 102

Barbar Ahmed, ‘One Year in Captivity’, 6 September 2005, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=9398>.

G. Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 175. 'Suhaimi: Fighting terrorism requires a clear outline and calling a spade a spade', Al-Riyadh (Arabic-language Saudi newspaper), 7 September 2009. <http://www.alriyadh.com/2009/09/07/article457669.html>. 49

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prisons are perhaps less mainstream. One such organisation is the Al-Ikhlas Foundation (which also operates under the name of the ‘Muslim Prisoner Support Group’). Until 2009, one of this organisation’s trustees was an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist, Mohammed Al-Ghabra, a Syrian whose assets have been frozen by the UN and HM Treasury and who has been accused of acting as a ‘fixer’ for the 21-7 bomb plot.104 In 2009 another of the charity’s trustees, Abbas Taj, was convicted for taking part in the firebombing of the London home of a publisher whose company had published a controversial book on the wife of Muhammed, Islam’s founder.105 In its incarnation as the Muslim PrisonerSupport Group, the Ikhas Foundation claims to ‘distribute funds amongst Muslim prisoners to purchase phone cards and tuck-shop items, etc., and enrol on study programs’ and to ‘purchase and deliver Islamic resources to Muslim Imams and Prisoners’.106 Similarly, As-Sabeel, a Wahhabi bookshop based in Reading that distributes books by major pro-jihadist writers such as Abdullah Azzam and Anwar al-Awlaki, also appears to be involved in sending books to Muslims in prison.107 For example, an individual claiming to be from As-Sabeel has written on the pro-jihadist ‘Islamic Awakening’ website appealing for readers to donate books which can be sent to Muslim prisoners – and also saying that if Muslim prisoners request specific books they will send them.108 It is not known which, if any, books have been sent into prison by this organisation. To its credit, the Prison Service seems to be partially awake to this potential danger and to have made a number of apparently adhoc decisions about which books which prisoners have access to. For example, Dhiren Barot, an experienced jihadist convicted 103 104

105

106

107

108

‘Prison campaign,’ Muslim Youth Helpline website, <http://www.myh.org.uk/donations.php?id=4>.

Bank of England, ‘News Release: Financial Sanctions: Terrorist Financing & Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban’, 21 December 2006, <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2006/161.htm>. David Leppard, 'Fixer for 21/7 plot free in London', Sunday Times, 15 July 2007, < http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2076241.ece>. Paul Jump, 'Commission removes trustee with Al Qaeda link', Third Sector Online, 23 October 2008, < http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/news/Article/856238/commission-removes-trustee-al-qaedalink/>.

Duncan Gardham, ‘Muslim extremist firebombed home of man who published book on Prophet Mohammed’, Daily Telegraph, 16 May 2009, < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/5330042/Muslimextremist-firebombed-home-of-man-who-published-book-on-Prophet-Mohammed.html>. The Charity Commission has deleted from its website all records of Abbas’s involvement with the Ikhas Foundation. ‘Muslim Prisoner Support Group’ <http://www.facebook.com/MuslimPrisonerSupportGroup#/MuslimPrisonerSupportGroup?v= info>. http://www.assabeel.net/store/Products/ViewProductDetails.aspx?CategoryID=1&ProductID=27479&ID=0>; <http://www.as-sabeel.net/store/Products/ViewProductDetails.aspx?ProductID=28866>. Forum discussions: ‘Books for Prisoners’, Islamic Awakening website, 19 April 2009, <http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f47/books-prisoners-23804/>. 50

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of planning terrorist attacks in the UK, has complained that:

‘[I am] being denied suitable Islamic literature/ CDs for several years under some excuse or another, save for the most elementary of titles. These are mostly from the Indo/Pak subcontinent, paralysed and jaundiced due to Government influence’.109

From the perspective of preventing radicalisation, Barot’s complaints about not receiving “suitable” (i.e. extremist) literature are welcome. However, the Prison Service could arguably go beyond providing ‘the most elementary of titles’ to prisoners such as Barot. Instead it should perhaps consider supplying him and other prisoners with more complex theological works by tolerant and progressive Muslim scholars that will, over time, help to counter the intolerant Islamist ideology of al-Qaeda and other groups.

Factbox FACT BOX: Al-Qaeda advice for prisoners

Jihadist and extreme Islamist groups are aware that governments will aim to use prison to pressure captured individuals and to seek to make these prisoners inform on their colleagues. An Al-Qaeda manual seized by police in Manchester in May 2000 gives extensive details on what sort of treatment captured prisoners should expect and tells them how to survive imprisonment and even to use it to their advantage.110 The manual says that interrogations can be compared to ‘psychological warfare and intellectual combat between the intelligence agent and the suspect through questions and answers ... The interrogation uses all kinds of physical and psychological techniques to break the will of the suspect and lead him to a total collapse’. Use time to educate themselves and others

The manual tells readers that they should use their time in prison to educate themselves and others, while also resisting the prison authorities: ‘The brothers should create an Islamic program for themselves inside the prison, as well as recreational and educational ones, etc. The brother in prison should be a role model in selflessness. Brothers should also pay attention to each other’s needs and should help each other and unite vis a vis the prison officers’.

109 110

Eesa Barot’s letter to the ummah, Al-Istiqamah online magazine, November 2007, <http://alistiqamah.com/IF/Barot3.htm>. The Arabic-language al-Qaeda training manual, ‘Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants’, was discovered by British police during a search of the Manchester home of Anas Al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda member, in May 2000. A translated version is available on the website of the US Department of Justice: <http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf>. 51

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Factbox continued Warns of prison strategies

The manual says that prison authorities may use solitary confinement against suspected terrorists, saying that typical tactics include ‘isolating the brother socially, cutting him off from public life, placing him in solitary confinement, and denying him news and information in order to make him feel lonely’. It adds that they might also control ‘everything the brother does, even in private, whether he is awake or asleep, to convince him that they are in charge. They would force him to bow his head and look down while talking with the guards’. Mental preparation

The manual also tells al-Qaeda members that they should be mentally prepared to face ‘psychological coercion (threats and harsh words)’ and warns them that ‘every word that the brother utters ... makes a negative impact on him, on his colleagues, and later, on the [court’s] judgement’.

Resist prison authorities

It also tells readers that arrest and imprisonment can be turned to the suspect’s advantage. ‘The interrogation is a major opportunity for the [Islamic] group as long as the brother is tactful, bright, and observant’ and advises that ‘from the first moment in captivity, the brother should proudly take a firm and opposing position against the enemy and not obey the orders. The more firm and opposing the reaction, the more beneficial it is. These reactions will not lead to harsher treatment’. Waste time and make false allegations

The manual also says that prisoners should make allegations of torture and mistreatment in order to complicate the task of the prosecution: ‘Once in the prosecution center, however, he should say that he was tortured, deny all his prior confessions, and ask that the interrogation be repeated’.

Factbox Key Islamist groups

Al-Qaeda

Global jihadist movement headed by Osama bin Laden. Since carrying out the 9-11 attacks, the group has relocated from Afghanistan to Pakistan from where it has continued to plan and co-ordinate jihadist attacks - the leaders of the 7 July 2005 bomb attacks in London were trained by al-Qaeda in

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Factbox continued Pakistan while other British Muslims have been convicted of being al-Qaeda members. The group has affiliated off-shoots in Iraq, Somalia and North Africa which have also carried out terrorist attacks. Egyptian Islamic Jihad

An Egyptian Islamist movement which was established in the mid-1970s to overthrow the Egyptian government and establishing an Islamic state. In the early 1990s, several of the group’s key members, including Ayman alZawahiri, helped to found al-Qaeda. Since the 1990s, a number of the group’s senior leaders have been based in the UK. Some of these were subsequently imprisoned pending deportation to Egypt; others continue to live freely in London. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group was founded in the mid-1990s with the aim of creating a hardline Islamic state in Libya. In the 1990s the group’s leaders were forced to flee Libya, resettling primarily in Sudan, Afghanistan and the UK. After the group began working with al-Qaeda, the UK arrested a number of its members intending to deport them; in most cases, they appealed successfully against their deportation and they presently live freely in the UK.

Al-Muhajiroun

A UK-based organisation established in the mid-1990s by former members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a worldwide organisation dedicated to establishing a global Islamic state. Led by Omar Bakri Mohammed, a Syrian, the group promoted the idea of a global caliphate and supported al-Qaeda’s Jihad. AlMuhajiroun influenced a number of British Muslims to carry out terrorist attacks in the UK and Israel.

Supporters of Sharia

An organisation formerly based in Finsbury Park mosque in London and led by Abu Hamza, an Egyptian. It campaigned for the establishment of hardline Sharia law in the UK and actively supported hard-line Islamist movements abroad including terrorist organisations such as the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Abu Hamza’s sermons in Finsbury Park mosque inspired a number of Muslims to travel to Afghanistan, Chechnya and Yemen to join terrorist groups.

‘Pull’ factors

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

Factbox Cageprisoners and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust

Cageprisoners, run by Moazzam Begg, a former prisoner in Guantanamo Bay, is heavily funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, one of the UK’s pre-eminent charitable foundations. In June 2007, for instance, Cageprisoners received £50,000 from the JRCT “to support Moazzam Begg's work in educating, advocating and inspiring people about the possibilities of reconciliation between the values of the west and Islam”.111 In November 2008, Cageprisoners received an additional £120,000 grant from JRCT to support its “core costs”. Since then Cageprisoners has: Acted as a conduit between convicted extremists such as Abu Hamza and their supporters and sympathisers outside prison. Many of these communications from within prison aim to make British Muslims believe that the British government and British people are opposed to Muslims and their religion and amount to pro-extremist propaganda.

Sought to host active supporters of Al-Qaeda and other jihadist movements. For example, in August 2009, Cageprisoners planned to hold an event in London which would include an video address from Anwar Awlaki, a US-Yemeni preacher who is openly supportive of AlQaeda.112 Although Awlaki’s speech was not aired (following intervention by anti-extremism campaigners) it was later released online by Cageprisoners and featured Awlaki quoting Abu Mohammed Al-Maqdisi, the world’s most influential pro-jihadist theologian, and praising him as “one of the greatest scholars of our time”.113

Given that the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust is explicitly based on “Quaker values”, its financial support for Cageprisoners is hard to explain, particular as the Trust claims that it “does not invest in armaments,

111

112

113 114 115

Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, ‘Grants Database. Source: < http://www.jrct.org.uk/past_grants_results.asp?from=1103&go=Search+Grants+%BB&k=&p= o&pp=30&r=&section=000100040005&to=>.

Nefa Foundation, ‘Anwar Al-Awlaki: Pro-Al-Qaeda ideologue with influence in the West’, 5 February 2009, <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefabackgrounder_alawlaki.p df>. ‘Cageprisoners: Banned Speech by Anwar al-Awlaki - Part 2 of 3’ [01:40]. Available on youtube.com. Source: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T_lQu1p5SiE&feature=related>. Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, ‘Trust Finance’. Source: <http://www.jrct.org.uk/text.asp?section=000100030007>.

Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, ‘Trust Finance’. Source: ‘Grants Database’ <http://www.jrct.org.uk/past_grants_results.asp?from=0301&p=&r=Islamic%20Human%20Ri ghts%20Commission&section=000100040005&to=>. 54

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Factbox continued gambling, tobacco or alcohol, and takes a range of other ethical factors into account in our investment policy”.114 Disturbingly, however, these are not the only idiosyncratic funding decisions made by the JRCT: In November 2005, the Trust gave £60,000 to the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) towards covering their “core costs for implementing a communication strategy”.115 The IHRC is an Iranian-backed lobby group that organizes an annual pro-Hezbollah event called ‘Al-Quds Day’ in Trafalgar Square. The September 2009 Al-Quds Day, involved a number of Islamist groups such as Islamic Forum Europe and the Muslim Association of Britian, while advertised speakers included Daud Abdullah who had recently endorsed jihadist attacks on the Royal Navy.116

116

Islamic Human Rights Commission, ‘PRESS RELEASE: UK / Palestine – Annual Al-Quds Day March and Rally, 13 September, 2009 ‘ <http://www.ihrc.org.uk/activities/press-releases/9051press-release-uk-palestine-annual-al-quds-day-march-and-rally-13-september-2009#>. Jamie Doward, ‘British Muslim Leader urged to quit over Gaza’, The Observer, 8 March 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/08/daud-abdullah-gaza-middle-east>. 55

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5. Push factors Islamist extremists who actively try to convert others to their interpretation of Islam represent only one half of the picture of radicalisation. There are also ‘push’ factors which make ordinary Muslim prisoners (and some non-Muslims) susceptible to extremists’ messages by ‘pushing’ them away from mainstream society and towards extremists.

One of the most important of these ‘push’ factors are the essentially spiritual crises, mentioned in earlier chapters, which arise as a result of an individual’s imprisonment. An article on the radical ‘Islam4UK’ website writes that such factors push people towards adopting basic religious and spiritual beliefs which may be the first steps towards radicalisation: ‘It is only natural (i.e. part of the Fitrah [man’s innate nature]) that in difficult circumstances and hardship, people remember their creator and Lord. It is in the hardest of times, when nobody else can help, that even the ‘atheist' remembers that he has a Lord that he can call upon for help’.117

In addition to such spiritual crises, however, there are specific issues in prisons that create grievances among ordinary Muslims which can then be exploited by extremists looking to recruit followers to radical Islamist ideologies. Violence by non-Muslim prisoners

Muslim prisoners, both extremists and ordinary Muslims, frequently perceive themselves as being targeted for violence or otherwise victimized by non-Muslim prisoners on account of their faith. This can lead to such Muslims either joining or creating Muslim or Islamist gangs for protection. It can also lead to them adopting Islamist ideologies which portray such violence as evidence that non-Muslims are innately hostile towards Muslims and Islam.

Violence and hostility towards convicted extremists is commonplace in many British prisons. There are many recorded instances of extremist prisoners being specifically targeted by other prisoners. For example, Abu Rideh has said that‘ My detention at Belmarsh was characterised by constant abuse, ritual humiliation, derogatory comments about my wife’s clothes and racist taunts’.118 He also reported physical attacks by other inmates in Broadmoor prison, writing that ‘on 17 March 2003, I was visited by members of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Degrading Treatment. Whilst they were on the Ward, they witnessed an unsolicited attack on me by another patient’. This attack was confirmed by the committee’s report which stated that ‘the 117

118

‘7 Reasons why people become Muslim in prison’, Islam4UK website, 18 May 2009 <http://www.islam4uk.com/current-affairs/uk-news/46-uk/289-7-reasons-why-peoplebecome-muslim-in-prison>.

'Statement by Mahmoud Abu Rideh to the Mental Health Review Tribunal', 1 March 2005. Available on website of 'Luton Muslims' organisation. <http://www.lutonmuslims.co.uk/letteraburdh.htm>. 56

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delegation itself witnessed such an unprovoked attack, which might have led to injury had its members not been able to intervene’.119 Unsurprisingly such treatment, combined with being imprisoned without trial for over a year before being released on a stringent control order, has led Abu Rideh to believe that Muslims in the UK are routinely victimized, telling one interviewer in 2008 that “The animals are [treated] better than Muslims in this country“.120 Such statements show that not only has Abu Rideh turned against the UK but also that he is perhaps keen to persuade other British Muslims that the UK is against them.

One of the most disturbing sequences of violence between Muslim and non-Muslim prisoners comes from Frankland prison. Here tensions between convicted extremists and non-Muslims exploded into violence in 2007-8, leading to inmates being dowsed in boiling oil or stabbed and individual cells being set alight; a cycle of violence that led to a riot in which a number of prison staff where injured (See case study box for full details). This incident illustrates how initial violence against convicted terrorists can lead to them forming gangs for mutual protection, resulting in retaliatory attacks against non-Muslims which in turn lead to further violence that polarizes inmates along religious and ethnic lines.

CASE STUDY Violence in Frankland prison

One of the most striking example of violence between Muslims and nonMuslims comes from Frankland prison where four high-profile convicted terrorists, Dhiren Barot, Omar Khyam, Kemal Bourgass and Hussein Osman, along with other Muslim prisoners, became involved in an increasingly tense stand-off with white non-Muslim gangs from mid-2007 which erupted into violence shortly afterwards.

On 30 July 2007, Omar Khyam, recently convicted of leading the ‘Crevice’ bomb plotters, was moved into Frankland prison, co-incidentally on the same day as the attempted bombing of Glasgow airport.121 White prisoners immediately sought to intimidate and threaten him. Khyam’s wife described him telling her by phone that “It’s gonna kick off. It’s just a matter of time

119

120 121 122

European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Report to the Government of the United Kingdom on the visit to the United Kingdom carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 14 to 19 March 2004' (Strasbourg: CPT, 9 June 2005). 'Moazzam Begg Interviews Mahmoud Abu Rideh', Cageprisoners, 17 June 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=25056>.

BBC Online, ‘Five get life over UK bomb plot’, BBC News, 30 April 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6195914.stm>. ‘Muslim prisoners under attack’, Al-Istiqamah, August 2007, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=21472>. 57

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CASE STUDY CONTINUED before something happens”.122 She said Khyam was also warned by “other Muslim brothers” in the prison that they had “heard inmates talking and saying that they’re going to get you. They’re saying that they’re going to burn you alive, to stab you.” Khyam soon entered solitary confinement, at his own request, for protection.

On 6 July, Dhiren Barot, another jihadist convicted of planning terrorist attacks in London, was attacked by a 22 year-old white non-Muslim inmate, who threw a pan of boiling oil over him.123 Barot suffered extensive secnd and third degree burns to his head and body, causing him to become temporarily blind and in urgent need of hospital treatment (which he received only after a three-day delay).124 Two weeks later, on 22 July 2007, white-non-Muslim prisoners torched the cell of Hussein Osman, convicted of involvement in the 21-7 bomb plot, destroying his clothes, books and personal possessions. Osman was immediately put into segregation – at his own request.

In segregation, Khyam and others continued to be threatened by white-nonMuslim prisoners. His wife said that even when Khyam takes exercise in the prison yard “he is sectioned off by fencing” but that “Barot’s attackers are in the yard at the same time, and they have called across the fence to my husband, ‘Who are you? Why are you here?’ I think they’re trying to work out which Muslim prisoner is Omar Khyam.” She also reported that Barot’s attackers had been ‘gloating’ over their successful attack and that Khyam “heard them loudly gloating about having attacked Eesa [Barot], shouting across to the other prisoners in nearby cells.”

On 17 October, having left segregation to re-join the main prison population after being refused a move to another prison, Khyam himself attacked a white-non-Muslim inmate, throwing boiling water and oil over him, causing extensive burns. The man related later that Khyam “just poured a whole pan over my head. Then he just walked up to [the guards] with his hands up. The pain I felt was unreal. The next thing I know I was put in a shower with cold water until the ambulance came. It was agony. I still had all my clothes on. I

123

124

125

Gary Moody, a convicted mugger, was charged in relation to this attack but charges were later dropped when Barot refused to press charges. See ‘Terrorists moved to new jail after death threats’, The Daily Telegraph, 20 March 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1582243/Terrorists-moved-to-new-jail-afterdeath-threats.html>.

Charges against Moody in relation to this attack were later dropped – reportedly at the request of Barot. BBC online, ‘Bomb plotter admits jail attack’, BBC News, 2 June 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/wear/7432038.stm>.

‘Man wounded by Crawley terrorist tells his story’, This is Sussex.co.uk, 13 October 2008, <http://www.thisissussex.co.uk/letters/Man-wounded-Crawley-terrorist-tells-story/article395756-detail/article.html>. 58

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CASE STUDY CONTINUED didn't want to take them off because it would rip my skin off”.125 Khyam was tried for this attack and sentenced to an additional four years imprisonment after claiming that he had acted in self-defence.126

Barot interpreted Khyam’s attack on Malcolm Cruddas as a revenge attack and as evidence that ‘the prison brotherhood’ was ‘fighting back’, writing that “it comes as no surprise that the prison brotherhood is starting to defend themselves and fight back using the same means and methods as employed by the white racists/ Islamaphobes ... Alhamdulillah [praise be to God]’.127 The Independent Monitor Board reported additional violence, reporting ‘a concerted effort by Muslims and influenced white prisoners to smash nine cells during a night period’ and adding that prisoners were acting ‘under the mistaken belief that if they were a problem they would be transferred to another preferred prison’.128 In March 2008, Khyam was finally moved to Full Sutton prison and Barot to Belmarsh.

Violence between Muslim and non-Muslim white prisoners at Frankland continued, however. In March 2008, an Islamist website reported that one Muslim inmate had been attacked twice in three days. The first attack reportedly left him requiring stitches to his head while in the second attack ‘two prisoners bit off part of his ear, leaving it virtually hanging loose by a thread’.129 A few months later, in July 2008, a group of white-non-Muslim prisoners set fire to the cell belonging to Kemal Bourgass, an Algerian convicted of murdering a police officer during police investigations into the ‘Ricin Plot’ (for which Bourgass was also convicted).130 In response to the attack on Bourgass, a Muslim prisoner slashed a white inmate with a homemade knife, causing a full-scale riot to erupt between rival groups.131 A 126

127 128

Neil Hunter, ‘Boiling oil bid was not prompted by jail move bid’, The Northern Echo, 4 June 2008, <http://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/news/2316842.boiling_oil_attack_was_not_prompted_b y_jail_move_bid/>. Eesa Barot’s letter to the ummah, Al-Istiqamah online magazine, November 2007, <http://alistiqamah.com/IF/Barot3.htm>. Independent Monitoring Boards, ‘HMP Frankland: Annual Report, 1 December 2007 – 30 November 2008’, <http://www.imb.gov.uk/annual-reports/08-annualreports/Frankland_2008.pdf?view=Binary>, p.15.

Further racist attacks in Frankland Prison’, ‘Help the Prisoners’ website and Arani Solicitors, 18 March 2008. This is available on the website of ‘Help the Prisoners’: <http://www.helptheprisoners.org.uk/index.php?alertid=8&cat=alerts>.

129 ‘

130 131

BBC online, ‘Killer jailed over poison plot’, BBC News, 13 April 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4433709.stm>.

‘ Prison officers hurt in jail riot’, Worcester News, 2 July 2008, <http://www.worcesternews.co.uk/uk_national_news/3191414.Prison_officers_hurt_in_jail_riot/>. 59

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CASE STUDY CONTINUED number of prison officers were injured before they restored order to the prison. In August 2008, Abdul Muhid, a member of al-Muhajiroun arrived in Frankland from Belmarsh. Within a month white-non-Muslim gangs had discovered his identity, leading to his cells and his possessions also being burnt in September 2008. Two weeks later, according to al-Muhajiroun supporters, Abdul Muhid was physically attacked by a convicted murderer – although without sustaining any serious injuries.132

The events at Frankland prison, and the violence perpetrated there, show how tensions between rival religio-ethnic groups can quickly escalate into a cycle of extreme violence if not tackled in time. This case also shows how initially isolated attacks on a small number of convicted extremists can swiftly evolve into a much wider conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, leading to inmates becoming polarised along religious lines.

FACTBOX

Timeline - Violence at Frankland prison

Early July 2007 – Threats issued against Omar Khyam 6 July – Dhiren Barot attacked with boiling oil 22 July - Hussein Osman’s cell burnt

17 October – Omar Khyam attacks white inmate with boiling oil

Late October – Muslim prisoners vandalise segregation unit March 2008 – Muslim prisoner attacked twice in three days

2 July – Kemal Bougass’ cell is attacked and burnt. Riot between Muslim and white prisoners September – Abdul Muhid’s cells is burnt

September – Abdul Muhid attacked by white prisoners Disturbingly, it is not only convicted extremists who feel threatened by non-Muslim prisoners and who therefore risk being pushed into forming gangs for protection or towards adopting the facile certainties of Islamist ideologies. Official government that surveys of Muslim prisoners’ attitudes have repeatedly indicated similar fears of racist and violent attacks are widespread among Muslim inmates – and not only among those convicted of terrorism and related offences. For example, the 2007-8 annual report by the HM Inspectorate of Prisons included a comprehensive survey of 415 Muslim prisoners and 2,973 non-Muslims. This found that only 64 per cent of Muslims ‘felt safe’ on their first night in prison (compared to 83 per cent of non-Muslims), that 24 per cent 132

‘Prisoner TT6649’, Islam4UK website, March 2009, <http://www.islam4uk.com/currentaffairs/latest-news/44-latest/258-prisoner-tt6649>. 60

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felt unsafe in prison ‘at this moment’ (compared to 16 per cent of non-Muslims) and that 10 per cent felt they had been ‘victimized’ on account of their ‘religion/ religious beliefs’ by others prisoners (compared to 2 per cent of non-Muslims). The same survey also showed that Muslim prisoners were significantly less likely than other prisoners to believe that they would be adequately assisted by the prison authorities. In addition, only 58 per cent of Muslims believed that they had a ‘member of staff’ that they ‘could turn to for help’ (compared to 69 per cent of non-Muslims) while also being substantially less likely to feel that their complaints were ‘sorted out promptly’ or ‘sorted out fairly’ by the prison authorities.133 Taken together, these figures – showing a fear of attack and a lack of trust in the prison authorities help explains why many Muslims may turn to Muslim gangs or Islamist groups for protection. The social dynamics of prison (particularly in regard to tribalistic loyalties or the creation of gangs) are notoriously difficult to change. However, it is clear that the Prison Service needs to do more to tackle this. A good place to start is to make Muslim prisoners feel that their concerns and their safety are taken more seriously than they feel they are at present – for instance by responding more quickly when a prisoner reports that they are afraid of being attacked by other prisoners. Recruiting more Muslims to work in front-line roles in prisons will also be useful in tackling negative perceptions of the Prison Service. Perceived hostility from prison staff

Muslims in prison who suffer discrimination or prejudice from prison staff are more likely to be susceptible to Islamist ideologies that argue that non-Muslims are innately hostile to Islam and Muslims.

It is therefore troubling that surveys by the government and by independent organizations consistently indicate that Muslim prisoners are more likely than almost any other group to feel discriminated against, victimized or ignored by prison staff. This appears to be the case across the Prison Service and not just in high-security units which hold large numbers of terrorists and terrorist suspects. For example, the 2007-8 annual report by HM Inspectorate of Prisons reported that in its survey of 1,000 Muslim and non-Muslim prisoners in a variety of establishments, 38 per cent of Muslims believed they had ‘been victimised (insulted or assaulted) by a member of staff’ (compared to 24 per cent of non-Muslims) and that 30 per cent felt that they had been ‘threatened or intimidated by a member of staff’ (compared to 20 per cent of nonMuslims).134

Reports of alleged institutional racism and discrimination within the Prison Service are not new. Issues of racism within British prisons were most strikingly brought to public attention after Zahid Mubarek, a 20 year-old petty criminal, was killed in Feltham Young Offenders Institution in 2000 by his cell-mate Robert Stewart, a racist psychopath 133

134

HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 'HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales: Annual Report 2007–08', 28 January 2008. All figures from, <http://www.justice.gov.uk/inspectorates/hmi-prisons/docs/annual-report-2007-08.pdf>, p.159-162. HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 'HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales: Annual Report 2007–08', 28 January 2008, <http://www.justice.gov.uk/inspectorates/hmiprisons/docs/annual-report-2007-08.pdf>, p. 92. 61

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who had 19 separate convictions for 73 offences.135 The subsequent public inquiry into Mubarek’s death (published in 2006) reported numerous individual and institutional failings at Feltham and issued 88 recommendations to the Prison Service. This publication was preceded by an influential report by the Commission for Racial Equality which similarly listed a number of ways in which the Prison Service could do more to tackle religious inequality and discrimination in prisons.

The Prison Service’s leadership has taken substantial and significant action to acknowledge and address such concerns. For example, in December 2008, the Prison Service published ‘Race Review 2008: Implementing Race Equality in prisons – Five years on’. This lists the numerous ways in which British Muslims " and Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) prisoners in general " may feel discriminated against within British prisons. It also details the numerous initiatives that the Prison Service has taken to tackle these problems. Important initiatives undertaken throughout the Prison Service include increasing the number of BME staff in prisons, training staff in order to increase their understanding of Muslim-specific issues (such as the importance of halal food and Friday prayers) and making it easier for prisoners to report racist incidents.136 However it is unclear whether these initiatives are fully translating into changes at ground-level. One former prison chaplain, who was instrumental in setting up the Prison Service’s Muslim chaplaincy, in early 2009 described the Prison Service as ‘institutionally racist and institutionally Islamophobic’ and added that ‘I have not seen any real progress in twenty years’.137

Such perceptions are at least partly borne out by the government’s own reports into prisoners’ perceptions of their treatment – including surveys carried out at prisons where there is a notable concentration of extremist inmates. For example, the 2008 inspection of Whitemoor prison by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons found that Muslim prisoners were disproportionately likely to cite problems with prison staff. For example, 80 per cent of Muslims surveyed there reported that they had been ‘insulted or assaulted by a member of staff’ – compared to 72 per cent of BME prisoners in general and only 40 per cent of white prisoners. Similarly, only 40 per cent of Muslims, compared with 65 per cent of non-Muslims, said that staff treated them with ‘respect’.138 The 135 136

137

138

Dominic Casciani, ‘The murder of Zahid Mubarek’, BBC News, 29 June 2006 ,<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3198264.stm>.

Ministry of Justice,'Race Review 2008: Implementing Race Equality in Prisons – Five Years On', 2008 <http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/assets/documents/1000439CRace_Review_part_1.pdf>. Author interview, London, February 2009. Such perceptions are apparently long-standing and widespread. For example, in early 2001 34 of 38 Muslim groups questioned by the Home Office said that they believed that Muslims in prison were being treated unfairly by prison staff. Source: Paul Weller, Alice Feldman &Kingsley Purdam, 'Home Office Research Study 220: Religious discrimination in England and Wales', Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, February 2001, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors220.pdf>, p. 53. HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 'Report on an unannounced full follow-up inspection of HMP Whitemoor - 7–11 April 2008', 2008, <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/whitemoor/Whitemoor_2008.pdf?view=Binary>, p.19. 62

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report itself identified numerous problems with the prison but said that ‘worst of all were the relationships between staff and the 120 Muslim prisoners. Staff appeared to have little idea of, and to have been given no support in, how to relate to this group, except as suspected national security risks or extremists – even though only eight of the 120 Muslims [in Whitemoor] had been convicted of terrorist offences’.139 This lack of specialized training is undoubtedly critical in explaining the tensions between Muslim prisoners and staff at the prison. Similarly, HM Inspectorate of Prisons’ 2007 report on Belmarsh reported that ‘survey responses from black and minority ethnic prisoners were significantly more negative overall than those from white prisoners, and this was even more the case in comparing responses from Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims responded significantly more negatively to 43 out of 56 key survey questions, and only responded more positively on one’.140 Although such surveys often reflect prisoners’ perceptions, rather than the reality per se, this is still disturbing. It is perceptions of discrimination and victimization that can drive Muslim prisoners into accepting Islamist arguments that non-Muslims are inevitably hostile to Islam and Muslims and that their treatment in prison is part of the government’s deliberate and organized ‘war on Islam’.

It would be comforting for the Prison Service to believe that such problems only occur at Category A institutions such as Belmarsh which hold a large number of convicted and suspected terrorists. Disturbingly, however, such problems are also replicated in other prisons which hold a large number of ordinary Muslims but few, if any, terror suspects or convicts. For example, HMP Brixton, a Category B prison where in 2008 176 out of 727 prisoners identified themselves as being Muslim (i.e. around 25 per cent), a 2008 survey by HM Inspectorate of Prisons also reported that ‘Muslim respondents were consistently more negative than non-Muslims’.141 For example, Muslim prisoners were generally more likely to complain of unfair treatment and also much more likely to say they had been ‘victimised’ by a member of staff on account of their ‘religion/religious beliefs’ compared to ordinary prisoners (8 per cent versus 0 per cent). At the same time, however, Muslim prisoners were more likely than other prisoners to feel that their religious beliefs were ‘respected’ and that a suitable ‘religious leader’ was accessible to them. This would seem to indicate that while prison institutions and procedures have become more responsive to Muslims’ needs, staff attitudes to Muslim prisoners have not always advanced as quickly.

Actions by prison staff that can be perceived by Muslim prisoners as evidence of discrimination or latent hostility can take a number of forms. For example, the HM Inspectorate of Prisons’ 2008 report on Belmarsh quoted a Muslim prisoner as saying that:

139 140 141

Ibid. p. 5 Ibid. p. 6

HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 'Report on an unannounced full follow-up inspection of HMP Brixton - 28 April – 2 May 2008', 2008, <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/547854/Brixton_2008.pdf?view=Binary>, p. 34. 63

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‘I've had a racist joke made about my prayer mat — an officer called it a ‘magic carpet’ — even the other officers were not happy [with the joke]’.142

In other instances, Muslim prisoners have expressed frustration that staff are not following prison rules and guidelines. For example, HM Inspectorate of Prison’s 2007 report on the Long Lartin segregation unit meanwhile reported that, while relations between detainees and the unit’s staff were generally good, ‘staff around the rest of the prison had little understanding of their issues’ and that ‘some detainees felt that staff were discriminatory towards them as Muslims’.143 Most of the Long Lartin detainees additionally believed that their complaints were not adequately investigated, with one detainee quoted as saying: ‘I have made a complaint a few times; it takes up to a month to get a response and then it is brushed off’.144

More disturbingly, Mahmoud Abu Rideh has told the Mental Health Review Tribunal that at HMP Broadmoor ‘certain members of staff consistently act in a way which ranges from disrespectful to discriminatory and racist. I have been called a terrorist by one staff nurse, who has also taunted me on several occasions saying that I was going to be locked up forever and that I should be put in seclusion’.145 Abu Rideh’s account was supported by a 2005 report by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which stated that ‘in Broadmoor, this person has endured frequent episodes of verbal abuse by members of staff (a fact acknowledged by other staff members)’.146 Overt abuse of Muslim prisoners by prison staff should be seen as totally unacceptable.

Other reported incidents, although often difficult to confirm, are potentially much more serious. For example, in 2006, the Cageprisoners website reported on a disturbance at Woodhill prison in November 2006, alleging that: ‘About 30 prison officers stormed Friday prayers and attacked one Muslim prisoner following a dispute over the searching of a Qur’an in which officers claimed that

142

143

144 145

146

HM Inspector of Prisons, 'Report on a full announced inspection of HMP Belmarsh - 8–12 October 2007', 2008, <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/547854/Brixton_2008.pdf?view=Binary>, p. 104. HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 'An inspection of the category A detainee unit at HMP Long Lartin - July 2007', 2008, <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/thematicreports1/Long_Lartin.pdf?view=Binary>, P. 18. Ibid.

Mchmoud Abu Kideh, ‘Statement by Mahmoud Abu Rideh to the Mental Health Review Tribunal', 1 March 2005, 'Luton Muslims' organisation website, <http://www.lutonmuslims.co.uk/letteraburdh.htm>.

European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 'Report to the Government of the United Kingdom on the visit to the United Kingdom carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 14 to 19 March 2004' (Strasbourg, 9 June 2005) 64

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the prisoner allegedly spat at them. A stand-off ensued between prison officers and up to 60 inmates until the situation was brought under control by the imam.

‘A little while later a gang of officers assaulted a category A Muslim alleged terror suspect Farid Hilali after he refused to be transferred to another prison stating that he had social and urgent legal visits booked for the week commencing 20th November 2006. Also, that the Governor of Woodhill Prison has been notified by his solicitors of the request not to transfer him. Mr Hilali was assaulted for merely stating to officers to check the position with the Governor. The inmate was heard shouting ‘Allahu Akbar (God is Great)!’ in pain as he was beaten. His solicitors have reported this assault to the police for proceedings to be bought against the officers concerned’.147

The Cageprisoners report alleges that prison officers then ‘purposefully served ham to Muslim inmates’. It has not been possible to confirm how much of this is true.

In other instances, convicted terrorists have credibly made claims of suffering repeated abuse and neglect by prison staff. One of the most disturbing examples of apparently officially sanctioned disregard for the safety, health and welfare of Muslim prisoners occurred after Dhiren Barot was attacked by other prisoners and severely burned with boiling oil in Frankland prison (as described on page ???). Despite the severity of the injuries to Barot’s head and shoulders it was three days before the prison authorities took him to hospital — and only then after his lawyer intervened to request immediate hospital treatment. Barot later wrote: ‘Although in unspeakable agony as well as being initially blinded in both eyes due to massive swelling caused by the severe head trauma, I was not even rushed to hospital, as any other prisoner would have been, regardless of category, since in my case security and financial niggardliness remains their 'first' priority and concern’.148

It is hard to see why it took three days for this badly injured man to be taken to hospital. It seems highly likely that at least some prison staff believed that because he was a convicted terrorist, he was not entitled to the same standard of care as other prisoners. Barot additionally alleges that individual prison staff knew of the planned attack and allowed it to happen: ‘It is far too convenient that although normally I am oppressively monitored around the clock — sometimes every fifteen minutes, every single movement recorded, be it exiting/ entering my cell, shower, kitchen area etc — on the black day itself there were next to no staff around. There are many indications that show there was a treacherous trickle down from top to bottom, from government to prison establishment to the trailer park trash that descended on me’.

Although this claim cannot be corroborated, the wife of the convicted terrorist Omar 147 148

Cageprisoners, 'Woodhill Prison Officers in a Day of Islamophobic Frenzy', 22 November 2006, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=17660>.

Eesa Barot, ‘Letter to the ummah’, Al-Istiqamah, November 2007, <http://alistiqamah.com/IF/Barot2.htm>. 65

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Khyam has made similar statements about conditions in Frankland prison, claiming that “even the black non-Muslims feel threatened and claim it is a racist prison” and that “there are racist slogans plastered all over the walls’.149 Such perceptions are partly echoed in official government reports on prisoners’ perceptions of the prison. For example, the Inspectorate of Prisons’ 2008 report on Frankland found that many prisoners believed that there was ‘underlying racism’ among many of the staff: ‘Prisoners we spoke to reported little overt racism but some sensed an underlying racism on the part of staff and other prisoners’.150

The report goes on to say that ‘half the black and minority ethnic prisoners were Muslim and many believed they were victimised because of their religious beliefs’.151 Distrust between prisoners and staff can lead to Muslim prisoners adopting confrontational and polarized worldviews. For example, in 2004, while imprisoned in Woodhill, Babar Ahmed wrote that that he believed that a majority of prison officers are ‘racist and Islamophobic’: ‘Many of the prison officers are racist and Islamophobic. They have cold hatred in their eyes towards the Muslims. However, since they are in a system that regulates them, they cannot be and are not overtly racist. Therefore, they resort to showing their hatred by making little routine things difficult for the Muslims. In some cases, they do this to try and provoke a situation in which the prisoner reacts and then they have an excuse to assault him and then send him to the isolated punishment block. This happened to a Muslim prisoner on our wing a few weeks ago and he was beaten up by prison officers who burst into his cell. Obviously, nothing happened (in terms of disciplinary action) to the officers concerned. Otherwise, they will do things like playing around with visit booking, gym usage, trying to delay medical appointments and trying to introduce rules insisting on stripsearching some Muslim prisoners before and after Friday prayers’.152

149

150

151

152

Of course, such statements need to be seen in context – Omar Khyam is a convicted terrorist and his wife gave this information as part of a speech intended to galvanise a mainly Muslim audience into feelings of outrage and anger towards the prison authorities, ‘Statement from Mrs. Khyam about mistreatment of Omar Khyum in H.M.P Frankland’, Cageprisoners, 30th September 2007, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=21926>. HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 'Report on a full announced inspection of HMP Frankland – 4-8 February 2008’, 2008, <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/549497/Frankland_2008.pdf?view=Binary>, p. 35. HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 'Report on a full announced inspection of HMP Frankland – 4-8 February 2008’, 2008, <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/549497/Frankland_2008.pdf?view=Binary>, p. 12. Babar Ahmad, 'Prison Conditions at HMP Woodhill', Cageprisoners, 26 October 2004 <http://www.cageprisoners.com/print.php?id=3704>. 66

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A perception of discriminatory treatment can lead inmates to adopt and repeat the Islamist view that the British government and its employees are systematically opposed to Muslims, both in the UK and abroad. For example, Abu Rideh, after being released on a control order in 2005, explicitly compared the behaviour of prison staff with British military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan: ‘I have too many problems, too many incidents with the officers in Belmarsh, not [just with] one [individual]. I believe these people who work in Belmarsh and all the prisons in England, these people are [the] same people who go [to] Iraq, go [to] Afghanistan, the same family, the same neighbour, the same people, the English people, the same officer, the same’.153

Adel Abdel Bary, a member of the leadership council of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group, has apparently come to similar conclusions. In a poem from prison, released in July 2007 while he was held in Long Lartin, he compares prisons to ‘coffins’ and concludes cynically: ‘The guard has a heart of stone. He knows neither mercy nor pity. He doesn’t believe in any religion. He only knows one colour, And he scorns all the other colours. That is why he becomes the anti-racism officer’.154

Even suspected extremists recognize the consequences of such alienation, suspicion and disaffection. Babar Ahmed, for example, has written: ‘It can also safely be said that Muslim political prisoners do not leave prison with an increased ‘understanding’ and ‘tolerance’ of their fellow British compatriots, especially when they see them in the figures of racist, skinhead prison officers’.155

He added that such trials have strengthened his faith and his belief in the rightness of his cause, even making him see Muslim prisoners as ‘heroes’ comparable with the earliest Muslims: ‘Many today say that these are dark days for the Muslim ummah [people]. I beg

153 154 155

'Moazzam Begg Interviews Mahmoud Abu Rideh', Cageprisoners, 17 June 2008, <http://freedetainees.org/1239/comment-page-1>.

Adel Abdel Bary, ‘High Security Graves’, Cageprisoners, 1 July 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=25255>.

Babar Ahmed, ‘Three Years in Captivity,’ Cageprisoners, 17 August 2007 <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=21502>. In regard to ordinary crime, some recent official surveys show that Muslim prisoners are more likely than non-Muslims to believe that they will re-offend after leaving prison. For example, the 2007-8 annual report by HM Inspectorate of Prisons included a comprehensive survey of 415 Muslim prisoners and 2,973 non-Muslims which found that only 37 per cent of Muslim prisoners surveyed (compared to 43 per cent of non-Muslims) believed that their experiences in prison would make them ‘less likely to re-offend in the future’. HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 'HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales: Annual Report 2007–08', 28 January 2008, <http://www.justice.gov.uk/inspectorates/hmi-prisons/docs/annual-report-2007-08.pdf>, p. 164. 67

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to differ. These are glorious days that will be sorely missed once gone. Successive generations of Muslims will look back to these days as the days in which Islam was revived and heroes were made as dreams turned into realities. History is repeating itself as we have returned to the early days of Prophethood in Makkah [i.e. Mecca]. The Muhajireen (Emigrants) of today are those who have been forcibly expelled from their homes and estranged from their loved ones. The Ansar (Helpers) of today are those who are helping them and their families. It is precisely at times like these that nations discover their quest for mission and moment’.156

Ahmed’s references to Islamic history explicitly equate imprisoned Islamist extremists with Muhammad and his earliest followers who fled Mecca to avoid persecution – a highly emotive comparison that aims to make ordinary Muslims sympathetic towards such extremists – and which illustrates his own state of mind.

Other imprisoned extremists and suspected extremists have also said that their experiences in prison have only strengthened their religious-political beliefs. Adel Abdel Bary, the leading member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement who is presently imprisoned in Long Lartin, has written that hardships experienced in prison are part of God’s will: ‘Prison is an inescapable fate from God. It occurs as a result of obeying God, disobeying God, or no reason other than injustice and aggression [towards Muslims by the enemies of God]’.157

Significantly, he also says that true Muslims should resist such pressures and should remain loyal to their ideologies, writing that true radicals ‘are not harmed by such threats or promises, because they are known to be afraid of nothing other than what God and the Prophet pronounced’. Abu Hamza, writing from Belmarsh, has also described how his imprisonment has only deepened his convictions and given him a sense of invulnerability: ‘I have not seen even a tree for four years. I cannot even see the sky due to the mesh wires. Even our Windows computer version has bars on it. Nonetheless, no one and nothing can crack you or terrify you, if your heart is full of Allah and fear of Allah’.158

Such accounts show that victimising Islamist prisoners in order to make them ‘recant’ their views are likely to seriously backfire by making them more committed to their 156

157 158

Babar Ahmed, ‘Three Years in Captivity,’ Cageprisoners, 17 August 2007, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=21502>. In 2005 he had also wrote in a similar vein that ‘on the Day of Judgement, when mankind will stand before the Lord of the Worlds, the only regret the Muslim captive will have is those days of his life which he did not spend in captivity for Allah’s Sake’. Barbar Ahmed, ‘One Year in Captivity’, Cageprisoners, 6 September 2005, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=9398>. ‘Egyptian Islamist Leading Member Imprisoned in Britain Since 1988 Replies to the 'Jihadist Theoretician' and His Criticism of Al-Qa'idah’ Al-Hayat, 28 August 2008.

‘Interview with Abu Hamza’, Cageprisoners, 6 June 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=24793>. 68

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Islamist ideology and to make them more convinced than ever of the rightness and righteousness of their cause. Ordinary Muslim prisoners who witness such treatment are also more likely to be receptive to Islamist ideas. More generally, Muslim prisoners as a whole are already more likely than other prisoners to feel mistreated or discriminated against – perceptions which risk pushing them towards adopting radical ideologies or banding together to form prison gangs. In light of this, the Prison Service clearly needs to take all possible steps to prevent further mistreatment or abuse by staff towards Muslims inmates – and to take steps to address the distrust that so many Muslim prisoners feel towards and from prison staff. Perceptions of institutional discrimination

In addition to deliberate racism and discrimination within prisons by non-Muslim inmates or individual staff which can increase support for Islamist ideologies, there are other institutional factors within prisons which can increase a sense of alienation and mistrust among Muslim inmates which can be exploited by Islamist recruiters. Halal food

The provision of halal food for Muslim prisoners has been a point of friction between the Prison Service and Muslim prisoners (and organizations seeking to represent them) for at least two decades. Many Muslim prisoners remain unconvinced that the Prison Service is fully committed to providing them with halal food.

Eating halal food (i.e. meat slaughtered according to traditional Islamic teachings) is seen by observant Muslims as a religious obligation.159 However it is usually impossible for Muslim prisoners to tell from a food’s taste or appearance whether it has been prepared in accordance with the appropriate religious guidelines. As a result, Muslim prisoners are obliged to trust the Prison Service’s assurances that they are indeed being served authentically halal food. In prisons where trust between Muslim inmates and the prison authorities has broken down, problems may therefore arise. It has not helped that there are instances where prisons have accidentally served non-halal food to Muslim prisoners. Islamists can easily use such genuine mistakes for their own ends, for example, by portraying the lack of halal food as evidence of an official prejudice against Islam or by saying that non-halal food is being deliberately fed to Muslim prisoners as part of a broader anti-Islamic strategy. 159

It is worth noting, however, that many of the most prominent conservative and Islamist scholars o recent decades have ruled that it is acceptable for Muslims to eat the food of the Ahl al-Kitaab (lit. ‘the people of the book’, a term usually used to refer to Christians and Jews). For instance, Sheikh Mohammed Al-Uthaymeen, one of the most prominent Wahhabi scholars of the 1980s and 1990s, ruled that eating such food “is permissible because that which is slaughtered by the Ahl Al-Kitaab today is just as what was slaughtered by Ahl AlKitaab in the time of the Prophet”. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the most influential living Islamist cleric has similarly ruled that the “meats, produce, and other foods [of the Ahl al-Kitab]. All of these are halal for us excepting what is haram in itself, e.g., the flesh of a dead animal, pork...” Sources: ‘Questions and Answers concerning the meat of the Ahlul Kitaab’, 2 December 2004. Available online at <http://islamicknowledge.com/Books_Articles/Food_Ahlul_Kitaab__Sh_Ibn_Al_Uthaymeen.pdf>. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited. 69

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The Prison Service is well aware of the importance of providing Muslims with halal food. The Prison Service’s Religion Manual says that ‘Muslims are only allowed to eat Halal Food. The term “halal” is defined as that which is permissible under Islamic Law’.160 The Service’s order for prison catering services meanwhile says that ‘Muslim prisoners must be provided with a Halal diet’.161 Despite this, however, many prisons face serious problems in convincing Muslim prisoners of the permissibility of prison food.

HMP Belmarsh has arguably seen the greatest problems arise from the halal food issue. Many of the problems at Belmarsh date to one occasion in 2004 when pork chops at Belmarsh prison were erroneously labeled as being halal.162 Disturbingly this happened after the Prison Service had taken steps to address the halal issues - the Inspectorate of Prisons’ report on Belmarsh in 2003 had reported that ‘Pork was stored in separate refrigerators and Halal foods were stored correctly’.163 Since then, however, the situation appears to have markedly improved. The Independent Monitoring Board’s 2005 report on Belmarsh, for example, found that ‘the Board is as satisfied as it possibly can be that the Halal meat is genuine and conforms to the required standard’.164

At the same time, however, the Independent Monitoring Board’s 2007 report on Belmarsh, three years after the ‘halal’ pork chops incident, reported that suspicions over the prison’s halal food remained widespread. The report noted ‘a lack of confidence in the authenticity of the Halal meat’ which ‘unfortunately neither Imam feels able to dispel completely’ and reported that the prison had involved ‘more Muslim prisoners in food preparation’ which it hoped ‘will prevent some of the problems that have happened in the past’.165 Muslim prisoners’ enduring suspicions towards Belmarsh food are undoubtedly a result of attempts by extremists within the prison to create tensions between the prisoners and the staff. This can easily lead to a wider dissatisfaction with the prison system. For example, an anonymous Category AA High 160 161 162 163

164

165

‘Prison Service Order No. 4550 – Religion manual’. Available online at <http://pso.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/PSO_4550_religion_manual.doc>.

‘Prison Service Order No. 5000 – Prison Catering Services’. Available online at <http://pso.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/PSO_4550_religion_manual.doc>.

Sean O’Neill, 'Jail anger over 'halal' pork', The Times, 21 August 2004 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article472415.ece>.

'Report on a full announced inspection of HM Prison Belmarsh 26 May – 4 June 2003’. HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2003, p. 125 <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/Belmarsh/belmarsh032.pdf?view=Binary>. HMP Belmarsh - Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Board - July 2004/June 2005’, Independent Monitoring Board P. 25 <http://www.imb.gov.uk/annual-reports/06annual-reports/185734/2005-belmarsh.pdf?view=Binary>.

‘HMP Belmarsh - Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Board - July 2006/June 2007’, Independent Monitoring Board, p. 43 <http://www.imb.gov.uk/annual-reports/07annual-reports/Belmarsh_Annual_Report_20001.pdf?view=Binary>. The report also stated that ‘the numbers of prisoners working in the kitchen has risen to about twenty, up from the lowest point of just two. A fifth of these are Muslim prisoners. It is hoped that they will inspire more confidence amongst the Muslim prisoner population in the food that Belmarsh provides in accordance with their religion’. 70

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Risk Muslim prisoner in Belmarsh, whose account was posted on a Muslim website in January 2008, wrote that dissatisfaction with the food lead to the prison chaplain becoming discredited among the prisoners: ‘The Governor has told us that the food at Belmarsh is only 50% halal and he could not guarantee that the food would be 100% halal ... Around 200 inmates signed a petition saying that we wanted halal food, [but] nothing has come of this. We were going to go on a hunger strike which we later decided not to go through with. The Imam in the prison is not very good, he said that if he was in our position he would eat the halal meat’.166

There are numerous reports of hunger strikes actually taking place in Belmarsh as a protest against the food as well as incidents of Muslim prisoners giving up meat altogether.167 Many of these protests appear to have involved high-profile Islamist extremists – who perhaps also orchestrated the protests. For example, in March 2006 the BBC reported that ‘Abu Hamza and other inmates at Belmarsh prison have refused to eat their lunch in a protest at the jail's high security wing’ in a one-day protest against the quality of food on offer.168 Three years later, in 2009, such problems apparently continued. For example, on 22 April 2009, Hani al-Sibai, a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad living freely in London, posted a report on his website that Abu Hamza had been on hunger strike for 12 days in protest at prison food and other issues that amounted to ‘ongoing persecution by the guards and the prison administration.169 It is through such stunts that extremists are able to gain influence over other Muslim prisoners. For instance, in 2004, a Muslim prisoner formerly held in Belmarsh said that he had turned to a senior Islamist extremist in the prison for advice on halal food: ‘The diet is a bit confusing … there’s a menu, and we had on this menu, some things were suitable for Muslims and some were not suitable for Muslims. But then there was always this doubt that it was not halal, so even though they said it was halal, the brothers always had veg. Then we asked Sheikh ‘A’.’170

According to Cageprisoners, ‘Sheikh A’ is ‘one of the foreign nationals detained under the ATCSA [Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act] 2001’. This anecdote illustrates how many Muslim prisoners are confused about halal meat and turn to potential extremists 166 167

168 169

170

Letter from Anon. Detainee in Belmarsh', Help the Prisoners website, 9 January 2008 <http://www.helptheprisoners.org.uk/index.php?articleid=8&cat=articles>.

Audrey Gillan, 'For detainee M, still no explanation why he was locked up for 16 months', The Guardian, 23 April 2004<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/apr/23/terrorism.humanrights ‘Abu Hamza in ‘jail food protest’’, BBC News, 14 March 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4806820.stm>.

Sibai wrote that he had received this information ‘from the family of Sheikh Abu Hamza’. ‘Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri and his brothers in Belmarsh ... their lives are in danger’, AlMaqrezi Centre for Historical Studies, 22 April 2009 <http://hani.phpnet.us/bayanat/artcl080.html>. ‘Inside 'Hellmarsh' - An Interview with a Former Belmarsh Detainee’, Cageprisoners, 2 December 2004. <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=4449>. 71

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for advice – as well as the extent to which extremists are sought for guidance on religious issues. These and other incidents strongly suggest that Islamists in prisons have been able to successfully use prisoners’ legitimate concerns over halal food in order to simultaneously increase Muslim suspicion towards the Prison Service and also to gain the support of other prisoners by seeming to stand up for their religious rights. Similar problems involving halal food have occurred in prisons around the country.171 The Prison Service clearly needs to take action to definitely resolve the halal food issue (as many individual prisons have now sought to do). This will deprive Islamists of a key recruiting tool for mobilising ordinary Muslims against the Prison Service and given them fewer opportunities to position themselves as being the leaders and representatives of Muslim prisoners. Strip searches

Just as Islamists in prison can use the issue of halal food to argue that British prisons are ‘anti-Muslim’, so the issue of strip searches is also used by some extremist prisoners to promote their own ideology – and in particular their thesis that the British government is at war with Islam and Muslims. At the same time, strip searches are a necessary part of prison security.

Strip searches are potentially contentious because, according to most Islamic traditions, Muslims are required to dress modestly – which is usually interpreted to mean that a Muslim man should not be naked in front of other men in order to protect his awrah (a term which describes both a person’s private parts and the concept of modesty and honour) . For many Muslim prisoners this need for ‘modesty’ is an important issue. Babar Ahmed has described how many Muslims feel contradictions between the demands of their religion and those of life in prison, writing that: ‘There is no concept of awrah (shame, etc) in prison and you are regularly stripsearched. Showers are communal so you have to wear shorts and ideally go when they are empty. When you first arrive at the prison, or leave it, or arrive from court etc. you are strip searched. Likewise, you are also strip-searched before and after a visit from a relative, lawyer, etc. Every month, your cell is searched and you are strip-searched. Strip-searching is only carried out by male officers (two on average), in a private room. They never touch you and you are never naked of all your clothes at any one time. Obviously, your awrah is exposed at some point during the strip search. The above only applies to ‘A-Category’ prisoners; others are strip-searched maybe once in several months’.172

171

For instance, the Inspectorate of Prisons’ 2008 report on Whitemoor prison reported that ‘far fewer Muslim than non-Muslim prisoners considered the food to be good’ while the Independent Monitoring Boards’ 2008-9 report on Long Lartin reported that ‘one especially intractable religious problem has been the supply of Halal meat’. Source: HM Inspectorate of Prisons ‘Report on an unannounced full-return prison inspection of H.M Whitemoor Prison, 3-7 October 2008’, p.12.<http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/whitemoor/Whitemoor_2008.pdf?view=Binary>, ‘HMP Long Lartin - Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Board - July 2006/June 2007’, Independent Monitoring Board, p.7 <http://www.imb.gov.uk/annual-reports/09-annualreports/Long_Lartin_2008-2009.pdf?view=Binary>. 72

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Being made to strip in front of others commonly provokes mixed feelings of shame, anger and humiliation. For example, Detainee ‘A’, an Algerian terrorist suspect, has told Amnesty International that: ‘Following my arrest, the police took me to Woodhill prison where my property was taken from me and I was strip-searched twice. As a Muslim, this was a deeply humiliating experience for me’.173

Such feelings, often felt by extremists and ordinary Muslims alike, are accentuated when strip searches involve female guards. For example, an ordinary Muslim inmate in Whitemoor prison wrote to the Muslim News newspaper in 2008 to say that one such search had left him feeling ‘de-graded, humiliated and deeply embarrassed’. Islamists in prison frequently seek to portray such strip searches not as a necessary security measure designed to protect prisoners and staff alike but rather as being part of a wider institutional effort to persecute and humiliate Muslim prisoners – and part of the West’s wider war on Islam. For example, in 2006 a Libyan detainee known as ‘AS’ spoke to the Islam Channel by phone from Long Lartin prison, drawing comparisons between the prison and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, saying: ‘We always get strip-searched in our daily routine; when we come back from our legal visits and our domestic visits, and if anyone refuses then they use force against him to take all his clothes off, the same as Abu Ghraib prison. It's very stressful’.174

Strip searches are frequently referenced in prisoners’ statements to Muslims outside prison and are frequently cited as evidence that the British government is involved in a global war on Islam. For example in mid-2006, Faraj Hassan al-Saad, a Libyan detainee who would later be convicted on terrorism charges in Italy in absentia, wrote an ‘open letter’ from Long Lartin describing his transfer from Belmarsh prison to Long Lartin: ‘On the 18th January, at some time after 7 pm, they came to my cell and forced me to strip. I refused, and told them that this was against my religion. The officer said: I don’t give a f***. I refused again, so I was beaten up. They put me on the floor, stripped me by force and I was taken to the van. I was very sad that night, I remembered all that happened to my Muslim brothers in Guantanamo & Abu Ghraib prisons’.175

Similarly, a joint letter from anonymous Muslim prisoners in Belmarsh, which was 172 173

174

175

Babar Ahmad, 'Prison Conditions at HMP Woodhill', Cageprisoners, 26 October 2004 <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=3704>.

‘United Kingdom: ‘I want justice’, Amnesty International, 9 December 2005, P. 9 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR45/056/2005/en/1f572c51-d47d-11dd-8743d305bea2b2c7/eur450562005en.pdf>. ‘Interview with Detainee AS’, [Transcript of Islam Channel interview], 12 October 2006. Available on website of ‘Scotland Against Criminalising Communities’. <http://www.sacc.org.uk/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=290&catid=36>. Open letter by Faraj Hassan Al-Saadi. Available online at Cageprisoners website: <http://www.cageprisoners.com/windows/letter.php?id=157>. 73

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distributed online through Yassir al-Sirri’s ‘Islamic Observation Centre’ in 2004, stated that: ‘Attempts at humiliating your brothers and destroying them still take place [in prison], and the most crucial and dangerous of them, are the continuous attempts at searching your brothers and causing them to undress in every movement they do; even when they are visited by their families, and they perform this in a sadistic manner that is no less than what you hear from what their soldiers do in Iraq … The undressing of your brothers here, and their insistence on it is a calculated policy by which they wish that the imprisoned Muslims attain diseased conditions by it’.176

Abu Qatada has likewise described strip searches as being one of the ‘severe trials’ that Muslims face in British prisons, saying that ‘the searches are extreme and the removal of clothing is complete and the restrictions are the most harsh’.177 At the same time, however, many detainees and prisoners see strip-searches as a test – for which they will be rewarded in the afterlife. Babar Ahmad, for example, has written that: ‘Needless to say, as a Muslim imprisoned for your religion, Allah rewards you every time they humiliate you by this strip search’.178

The Prison Service is aware that strip searches may present problems for Muslim prisoners – and has taken action to address their concerns. Although the Prison Service’s Security Manual already says that a prisoner (whether Muslim or not) may not be completely naked during a strip search, the Prison Service has issued additional specific instructions to its staff regarding the searching of Muslims prisoners. Prison Service Order 4550 (Religion Manual) tells staff that Muslim men may object to being searched by females and says that they should be searched by male staff instead: ‘Searches of male prisoners with a religious or cultural objection to being searched by a female member of staff must be carried out by a male member of staff’. The manual also invokes Islamic theology in order to pre-empt arguments from Muslim prisoners that strip-searches are not permissible: ‘There have been specific enquiries regarding the strip-searching of Muslim prisoners, as the Qur’an forbids the nakedness of Muslims in front of others. Strip searches are allowed under Islamic law when such a search is necessary for the security and safety of the prison or of individuals’.179 Although wellintentioned, however, such theological references can backfire and only further convince Islamists that they are the targets of an elaborate and nefarious plot – by the British government and by other Muslims. For example, Faraj Hassan Al-Saad, a Libyan 176 177

178 179

'A Witness and A Call - A Letter From A Belmarsh Prisoner’. Available online at Islamicawakening.com: <http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewarticle.php?articleID=1157. An address to the Muslims from Abu Qatada, ‘Umar ibn Mahmud Abu ‘Umar, Al-Tibyan website, 23 March 2009, <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-themuslims-from-abu-qatadah-‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/>. Barbar Ahmed, ‘Prison Conditions at HMP Woodhill’, Cageprisoners, 26 October 2004, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/print.php?id=3704>. ‘Prison Service Order No. 4550 – Religion manual’. Available online at <http://pso.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/PSO_4550_religion_manual.doc>. 74

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terrorist suspect who was later found guilty by an Italian court on terrorism-related charges and who currently lives freely in Leicester, has said: ‘The thing that astonished me was that one day in Belmarsh, I refused to be strip searched as it was against my religion. Officers showed me a fatwa signed by the Muslim Council of Britain saying that it is permissible for the staff to strip search us. So this is how we get supported in prison by the Muslim Council of Britain [MCB]’.180

The MCB has denied issuing such a ‘fatwa’, however, and has said that it would be writing to the Ministry of Justice to ‘verify this claim’.181 Islamic prayers

Issues of perceived discrimination against Muslims become even more pressing when the issues of Friday prayers arises. Taking part in a weekly communal prayer is seen by most observant Muslims as obligatory for men while the Friday prayers are also often seen by many Muslims as barometers for the health of their communities.

As with strip-searching, the realities of prison life mean that there are sometimes occasions when Muslim prisoners are prevented from attending Friday prayers – for example, for security reasons. For instance, HM Inspectorate’s report on the Category A Unit at Long Lartin said that on one occasion a Muslim prisoner was removed from Friday prayers in order to be searched: ‘There had recently been an incident in which security requested detainees to be taken out of Friday prayers for screening to detect whether they had items secreted internally. After objections, this was not pursued, but the lack of sensitivity to the timing of this request had undermined much of the trust that had developed between detainees and staff’.182

In addition, Friday prayers are frequently seen by the authorities as places where radicalisation can potentially occur. The result of this is that in some prisons, Muslims held in high security units have been entirely prevented from attending communal Friday prayers. For instance, HM Inspectorate of Prisons’ 2007 report on Manchester prison reported that: ‘The arrangements for Muslim worship were poor and there was insufficient space to enable everyone who wanted to attend to do so. No prisoners in the high security unit were allowed to attend any corporate worship’.183

180 181

182

‘Interview with Faraj Hassan al-Saad’, 18 August 2007, Cageprisoners <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=21612>.

'Setting the record right: www.cageprisoners.com', Muslim Council of Britain press release, 13 September 2007, <http://www.mcb.org.uk/article_detail.php?article=announcement674>. HM Inspectorate of Prisons, ‘An inspection of the category A detainee unit at HMP Long Lartin’, (July 2009) p. 34 <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/thematicreports1/Long_Lartin.pdf?view=Binary>. 75

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Similarly, a number of convicted and suspected terrorists at Belmarsh have routinely been prevented from attending Friday prayers.184

In other instances, prison staff have sought to prevent private prayers being held in individuals’ cells. These interventions, while sometimes necessary, can often give rise to a belief that prisons are systematically discriminating against Muslims. For instance, Cerie Bullivant, a convert to Islam who was placed on a control order in 2006 on suspicion of planning to join jihadist movements abroad, was detained in Belmarsh in 2007 after absconding from the Control Order. He later said that: ‘In Belmarsh, there are two sets of rules – there are the really strict rules which apply to the Muslims only, and then there are the relaxed rules which apply to everyone else. The clearest example of this is during the holy month of Ramadan. It is from God that we had just had a little bit to eat and praying our post-sunset prayer, just two people praying in a cell. Officers came into the cell and told the brother I was praying with, ‘get out, you are not allowed to be in here, get out’ – this was all while we were praying. The brother who was leading the prayer kept on reciting and ignored them, Praise be to God. Despite threats that he would be reported, he kept on praying. One of the large officers actually came in to the cell to grab him but one of the other officers held him back – the thing is, this was during our association time, the only time we get out of our cells in the day. The officers reported us for spending time in the same cell, but the thing is that for non-Muslim prisoners, you would see 7/8 of them sitting together, smoking drugs and generally just doing what they want. It was no problem for the non-Muslims, but for two Muslims to be praying together in the middle of their holy month was a problem’.185

Omar Khyam’s wife similarly reported in 2007 that her husband was being preventing from attending collective prayers or from holding prayers in his room – even though other forms of interaction where allowed: ‘On Monday 17th September Omar called and he was quite upset because the Governor said the Muslim prisoners can’t pray in congregation in their cells! So he spoke to the Governor and asked ‘Can prisoners sit together and play their Play Stations in their cells?’ The governor replied ‘Yes’. He asked ‘Can they sit together and smoke?’ The governor replied ‘Yes’. He asked ‘Can they sit together and talk and eat?’ The governor said ‘Yes’. He said ‘But two people can’t pray together?’ The governor replied ‘No!’ Omar has written a formal complaint and so have the

183

184

185

'Report on an unannounced short followup inspection of HMP Manchester 21–24 May 2007', HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2007, p. 11 <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/manchester/Manchester.pdf?view=Binary>. See, for example, Alan Travis, 'Belmarsh inspection reveals harsh conditions of July bomb suspects', The Guardian, 8 March 2006 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/mar/08/july7.uksecurity>. Dominic Casciani, ‘The Convict and the Control Order’, BBC News, 14 March 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/7293995.stm>. 76

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other brothers, he has also passed the message on to the brothers on the other wings to also write to the Governor and complain. And the saddest thing is, that it is Ramadan. So as he isn’t doing education anymore he is stuck in his cell all day’.186

Such incidents seem to indicate that the Prison Service does not have a clear formula for dealing with issues of religious practice – or of managing the inevitable clashes between the necessities of prison life and the requirements of a religion. It also shows that it is crucial that prison staff explain to prisoners why their actions are taken. For instance, in this case, Khyam may have been banned from holding private prayers for valid security reasons, however, this should have been clearly explained to him. In the absence of clear and systematically enforceable guidelines, the Prison Service is clearly creating fertile ground for Islamists to rally ordinary Muslims, recruit followers and to argue that the Prison Service is anti-Muslim. Searches with dogs

Tensions between Muslims and prison staff have periodically arisen from the use of dogs to search for drugs and other contraband as a result of some Islamic traditions teaching that dogs are ‘un-clean’.

The use of sniffer dogs, as with strip-searching, can distress ordinary Muslims as well as Islamists, who often seek to make ideological capital out of this distress. For example, the 2006 Inspectorate report on Whitemoor prison reported that: ‘Group sessions revealed a widespread concern that Muslim prisoners were searched by drug dogs on their way into services, which negated their cleansing before attending the mosque. The imam said he had raised this issue with the security department some months previously and that it was quickly resolved. However, some prisoners still thought it was current practice’.187

Islamists have, typically, however argued that the use of dogs in searches is part of a deliberate assault on Islam and on Muslim prisoners. For example, members of Abu Hamza’s ‘Supporters of Sharia’ organisation have portrayed the use of dogs to search Abu Hamza’s cell in Belmarsh, as a ‘humiliation’, writing that ‘guards raid his cell several times daily subjecting him to humiliation using dogs to conduct the raids and attack the Shaykh’.188 The article also says that such treatment is akin to ‘torture’ and compares the conditions in Belmarsh to those in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq: ‘The tactics used at Belmarsh are reminiscent of Abu Gharib where U.S. Lt. Gen.

186

187

188

‘Statement from Mrs. Khyam about mistreatment of Omar Khyam in H.M.P Frankland’, Cageprisoners, 30th September 2007, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=21926>.

HM Inspectorate of Prisons ‘Report on an unannounced full-return prison inspection of H.M Whitemoor Prison, 3-7 October 2008’, p.62 <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmp-yoiinspections.html/whitemoor/whitemoor.pdf?view=Binary>.

‘Abu Hamza attacked in prison’. Forum posting on ummah.com attributed to ‘Supporters of Shari’ah’, <http://www.ummah.com/forum/showthread.php?t=52074>. 77

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Ricardo S. Sanchez authorised several methods of physical and psychological torture such as ‘intimidating detainees’, ‘exploiting the Arab fear of Dogs’ (in fact Dogs like Pigs are unclean animals according to Islam)’.

Detainee ‘DD’, a terror suspect from Libya who has since been released on a control order, has said that he believed that dogs are used to search for drugs in the Long Lartin detainee unit in order to ‘insult’ the Muslim prisoners there: ‘They would at times come in with dogs to check for drugs. They know we don’t take drugs, but they only want to insult us’.189

The Prison Service has taken measures to reduce problems caused by using dogs to search Muslim prisoners. For example, the Prison Service’s Extremism Unit has advised front-line staff that Muslim prisoners should be offered clean clothing and bedding if it is searched by dogs, writing that ‘We are aware that if dog saliva comes in contact with the clothing or religious artefacts of a Muslim, it renders these items defiled. As such, a prisoner must be allowed to change clothing if this occurs’. It added that ‘Also, bedding should be changed where the prisoner feels that it has been defiled’.190 Although this is a sensible response to this problem it also raises other important questions. For example, one could legitimately ask why Muslim prisoners should receive preferential treatment over other prisoners (who may also dislike having their beds and clothing searched by dogs) and whether this will fuel tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in certain prisons. Similarly one might question whether such discriminatory treatment adequately prepares Muslim prisoners for their return to wider society? There is also the risk that by taking such action – even while trying to avoid empowering Islamists – the Prison Service will be empowering the most conservative interpretations of Islam. For example, while Muslim tradition does generally regard dogs, and in particular their saliva, as ‘unclean’, some jurists from Islam’s Maliki school of jurisprudence have ruled that dogs – and their saliva - are entirely pure.191 The Prison Service should avoid always taking the most hardline Islamic interpretation on such issues. Summary:

Islamist extremists are able to make political capital out of almost any issue which concerns or distresses ordinary Muslims – making it imperative for the Prison Service to minimize the number of issues and grievances which Islamists can exploit.

The Prison Service has shown awareness of how grievances over issues such as halal 189 190 191

‘Interview with Detainee DD’, Cageprisoners, 8 April 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=24043>.

‘Muslim inmates get new clothes if dog sniffs cell’, The Daily Express, 9 October 2008, <http://www.dailyexpress.co.uk/posts/view/65223>.

Islamonline, ‘Fatwa: ‘It is known to the majority of Muslims that dogs are ritually impure, but we see some Muslims pet them without hesitation and say that they are pure. What is the religious opinion on the matter? And what is the ruling of having dogs as pets in the home?’, Islamonline, 22 February 2007, <http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-ArabicAsk_Scholar/FatwaA/FatwaA&cid=1122528602140>. 78

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food, strip-searches or sniffer dogs can be used by Islamists to turn ordinary Muslims against the government and against mainstream society. However, the Prison Service’s often confused response to such issues points to a wider confusion in the Prison Service and in other branches of government.

The Prison Service clearly needs to find a way to systematically respond to complaints by Muslim prisoners and to address allegations that their religion is not being respected – while at the same time neither unfairly favouring Muslim or compromising the security and safety of prisoners and staff. So far, the Prison Service appears to respond to controversial issues relating to Muslims and their faith on a somewhat ad hoc basis that is sometimes based on an appeal to ‘common sense’, at other times based on deferring to religious authorities and individuals that are apparently selected at random.

For example, the Prison and Probation Ombudsman for England and Wales 2001-2 annual report reported on the case of a Muslim man who had refused to stand before a prison official, claiming it was against his faith. The PPO investigated this – but passed judgment only once it had consulted with ‘an imam’ – rather than attempting to arrive at an independent decision. The annual report related that: ‘Mr Y complained (12128/00) that he was required to stand before the adjudicator to give his name. He consistently refused to do so as, he said, it was contrary to his Muslim faith. As a result, a number of adjudications were carried out in his absence. My Investigator discovered that the Governor expected all prisoners and staff to stand at the beginning of an adjudication. I cannot take exception to this. It is, of course, the same procedure as in the outside courts. Nevertheless, I sought expert advice. An Imam advised my Investigator that a Muslim should stand before an adjudicator because they should respect the authority of both the hearing and the Prison Rules. I did not therefore uphold Mr Y’s complaint’.192

Who was this imam? And how was he chosen? Needless to say there are a large number of ‘imams’ in the UK whose rulings and opinions differ widely. In other cases, arguably of a similar religious nature, imams have apparently not been consulted at all. More recently, for example, it has been reported that Kamel Bourgass, a follower of Abu Hamza who was convicted of murdering a police officer in 2004, has demanded that female prison officers in Wakefield prison should wear a veil when they speak to him.193 His demand appears to have been quickly dismissed by the relevant prison authorities. However, one wonders how the Prison Service arrived at their decision? Was it dismissed out-of-hand by officers? Or did they too consult ‘an imam’? And what would happen if the imam agreed with Bourgass’ request? Would his opinion have over-ridden that of the prison authorities? The Prison Service needs to strike a difficult balance. Prison authorities should clearly

192

193

‘Incentives and Earned Privileges Scheme (IEPS),’ from Prison and Probation Ombudsman for England and Wales 2001-2 annual report. P. 76. Available online at <http://www.ppo.gov.uk/download/annualreps/part6ch13-15_02.pdf>. ‘Al-Qaeda killer makes veil jibes from prison cell’, The Daily Express, 28 January 2009 <http://www.express.co.uk/printer/view/82123/>. 79

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not ‘pander’ to any particular racial, ethnic or religious group. At the same time, however, it is imperative that they take action to address issues which create unnecessary and avoidable anger and resentment among Muslims and which will thereby facilitate extremist recruitment. Addressing such issues also needs to be done in such a way that does not empower extremists by allowing them to claim this as a victory over the Prison Service – while also removing issues that cause Muslim prisoners to become resentful of the Prison Service and of the British government. Imprisonment without trial

The imprisonment of a number of Muslims without trial on suspicion of extremism is a major factor in prison radicalisation.

During the last five years, several dozen suspected Islamist extremists have been held without trial in the UK. Some were foreign citizens held pending deportation to their home countries, others have been British citizens who were fighting extradition to foreign countries to stand trial on terrorism related charges. Individuals held without trial include some most of the UK’s most prominent Islamist extremists such as Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada.

The length of such imprisonments can be considerable. One such detainee, Khalid alFawwaz, who ran Bin Laden’s front-organisation ‘the Advice and Reform Committee’ from London in the 1990s, has been held in prison without trial since his arrest in 1998. Egyptian members of Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad organisation have similarly been held without trial since 1999. Others from Algeria, Palestine and other countries have been held for several years before being released or deported. Such lengthy imprisonments without trial have usually occurred as the combined result of human rights legislation, slow moving bureaucracy in the UK and abroad, and apparently deliberate attempts by some defence lawyers to repeatedly stall deportation proceedings.

The imprisonment of holding a number of high-profile extremists without trial has important consequences. Not only does this mean that there are additional prominent and charismatic extremists within the British prison system (in some cases even after they have served out the sentences they were given in British courts) but it also means that they are often angry at their treatment by the government and are all the more keen to radicalise others (and able to cite their own imprisonment without trial as evidence of the British government’s ill intentions towards Muslims). In addition, extremist organizations outside prison have sought to use the perceived victimisation of these individuals by the British government in order to stir up and radicalise the wider British Muslim community. Another major consequence of these detentions has been the psychological effect on the detainees. (See appendix for further details).

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Factbox Key individuals detained without trial

Khalid al-Fawwaz

Khalid al-Fawwaz, a Saudi national, has been detained in high security establishments in the UK since he was arrested in London in 1998 while working as bin Laden’s main representative in London. Since then he has been appealing against deportation to the US to face trial for his alleged role in al-Qaeda’s 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa.194 In 2001, the House of Lords rejected his supposedly ‘final appeal’ against deportation but, in 2005, the Home Office issued a statement on Fawwaz saying that ‘The overall process has taken longer than was ever anticipated’, blaming his lawyers and the US.195 UK officials did not sign documents ‘surrendering’ Fawwaz to the US government until March 2008. Since then al-Fawwaz’s lawyers have cited the European Convention on Human Rights to further argue against his extradition and have reportedly launched a fresh appeal against his deportation in the High Court.196 He is presently being held in the secure unit at Long Lartin. Abu Qatada

Abu Qatada, a Jordanian national of Palestinian origin, has been detained continuously since 2002 (apart from a few months in 2005 and 2008 when he was released on control orders). During the 1990s he issued propaganda and fatwas on behalf of a variety of North African jihadist groups. His preaching is believed to have influenced al-Qaeda operatives Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui and Mohammed Atta in whose flat in Hamburg police found tapes of Abu Qatada’s lectures. He is presently appealing against being deported to Jordan where his lawyers argue that he will be a risk of torture. Jordan has already sentenced him in absentia to life imprisonment for planning terrorist attacks in Jordan in the 1990s.

Abu Hamza

Abu Hamza, a British citizen born in Egypt, was convicted in 2006 of inciting murder and racial hatred during his time as the imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque.197 Since he has been imprisoned since 2004, much of this sentence

194

195

196

'US most wanted terrorist suspect in new extradition fight in Britain', Daily Telegraph, 12 Feb 2009 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/4602765/US-most-wanted-terroristsuspect-in-new-extradition-fight-in-Britain.html>.

'Documentation concerning the contested extradition of Khalid al Fawwaz, a Saudi National, to the United States' (Home Office response to Freedom of Information request, 12 August 2005)<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/freedom-of-information/releasedinformation/foi-archive-crime/859-khalid-al-fawwaz?view=Html>.

Craig Whitlock, 'Britain Pays to Keep Suspects From US Hands', Washington Post, 2 May 2009 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/01/AR2009050102919.html>. 81

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Factbox continued has now been served. However, Abu Hamza is additionally being detained while he appeals against deportation to the US where he would stand trial for attempting to set up a terrorist training camp in Oregon.198 He is presently held in Belmarsh while his appeal against deportation is heard by the European Court of Human Rights.199 Babar Ahmed

Babar Ahmed, a British-born Muslim, was arrested in 2004 at the request of the US on suspicion of running a number of important pro-jihadist websites from London and providing material support to terrorist groups in Chechnya and Afghanistan. His appeals against deportation have been rejected by all British courts, including by the House of Lords in 2007, and he is presently appealing through the European Court of Human Rights. He has been held in Belmarsh and Woodhill prisons and is presently detained at HMP Long Lartin. He has not been convicted of any terrorist related offences – either in the US or the UK. Adel Abdel Bary

Adel Abdel Bary, a senior Egyptian member of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad movement, was granted asylum in the UK in 1993. Once in London, he became involved in running bin Laden’s London office alongside Khalid al-Fawwaz as well as continuing to work for Islamic Jihad. He was arrested in London in 1999 at the request of the US which accused him of leading an Islamic Jihad cell in London and of being involved in al-Qaeda’s 1998 Embassy bombings.200 Abdel Bary had previously been sentenced to death in Egypt in 1995 for his role in an alleged Islamic Jihad plot to kill foreign tourists in Egypt. He is presently detained in Long Lartin prison and, after losing one appeal against deportation to Egypt, has recently launched a fresh appeal in the High Court.201

197 198 199 200

201

‘Abu Hamza jailed for seven years’, BBC News, 7 February 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4690224.stm>.

‘Abu Hamza loses extradition fight’, BBC News, 20 June 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/mobile/bbc_news/top_stories/746/74652/story7465239.shtml>. ‘Radical Muslim cleric’s extradition to US delayed’, USA Today, 5 May 2008 <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-08-05-al-masri_N.htm>.

‘U.S. Indicts Suspects in East Africa Embassy Bombings’, Statement from US State Department, 9 May 2000 <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2000/05/000509-terror-usia1.htm>. ‘Britain Pays to Keep Suspects From U.S. Hands’, Washington Post, 2 May 2009 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/01/AR2009050102919.html>. 82

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At present, most of the suspected extremists and terrorists who are being detained without trial or charge are being held at a special secure unit at Long Lartin prison (with the important exception of Abu Hamza). In 2008 Babar Ahmed, who is fighting extradition to the US where he is charged for terror-related offences, described the atmosphere among the detainees in Long Lartin: ‘Some are optimistic, some are despondent. When some fall into despair, they begin to blame everyone and anyone for their predicament: themselves, their families, friends, solicitors, communities, etc. They become paranoid that everyone is united to destroy them. That said, everyone tries their best to help each other’.202

A similar account of the detainees supporting each other was given by Detainee DD, a Libyan detainee who has since been released on a control order: ‘We are Muslims, in sha’Allah [God willing], we believe in Allah and we hope that all this shall be placed in our scale of good deeds. We spend our time in prayer. We encourage and give moral support to each other until we overcome this crisis’.203

HMP Inspectorate’s 2007 report on the Category A Unit at Long Lartin corroborates these accounts of the self-supportive, generally harmonious atmosphere that exists between the detainees, reporting that: ‘On the unit, detainees completed domestic routines, pursued their legal cases, used the small gym and/or exercise yard, read Arabic newspapers or watched TV, carried out regular prayers and associated together. They generally got on well and supported one another’.204

As has been shown earlier such an environment provides an ideal place for extremists to consolidate and deepen each others’ radical beliefs. Concentrating so many prominent and committed extremists in such a small space and denying them access to wider prison society also virtually guarantees that they will not change their ideological views. How can they change their outlook and ideas when they do not come into contact with other prisoners and if they are never exposed to new ways to thinking?

202 203 204

‘Interview with Babar Ahmed’, Cageprisoners, 7 May 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=24383>.

‘Interview with Detainee DD’, Cageprisoners, 8 May 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=24043>.

'An inspection of the category A detainee unit at HMP Long Lartin - July 2007', HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2008. p. 10. <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/thematicreports1/Long_Lartin.pdf?view=Binary>. 83

Part 2: Radicalisation outside prison

Supporting al-Qaeda’s narrative

Unlocking Al-Qaeda

6. Supporting al-Qaeda’s narrative For decades, Islamist extremists in prisons around the world have produced books and theological tracts that have galvanised Islamist and jihadist groups and individuals both inside and outside prison towards extremism and violence. From British prisons today, Islamist extremists write and distribute articles, fatwas (religious rulings) and even complete books promoting intolerance, extremism and terrorist violence.

For over 50 years imprisoned Islamists have used their time in prison to refine and systemize their ideology through writing books and articles which were then distributed to followers outside prison. Since the 1950s, the prison writings of Sayyid Qutb whose pro-jihadist tracts were smuggled out of Egyptian prisons in the 1950s and 60s, have directly inspired al-Qaeda and other modern jihadist movements. More recently in the US, Omar Abdel-Rahman, a jihadist preacher jailed for his role in the 1993 World Trade Centre attack, smuggled a pro-jihadist fatwa out of a US prison. This fatwa later helped to provide Islamic legitimacy for al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks.205

Communications from Islamists in British prisons have taken place in a number of formats: Statements Fatwas

Open letters Poems

Transcribed or recorded interviews Books

These are problematic when their content falls into two main categories: Portraying imprisonment as evidence of ‘war on Islam’

Many imprisoned extremists have deliberately sought to portray their imprisonment and their treatment in prison as being evidence of the British government’s war on Islam. This is often done with the explicit aim of making British Muslims angry at the actions of their government.

205

'Andrew McCarthy, ‘Egypt and militant Islam’, The National Review, 13 October 2004. In the article, McCarthy, the lead prosecutor in Omar Abdel Rahman’s trial for the 1993 attack, wrote: ‘In the days immediately after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, bin Laden explained to the media that his war on America had been justified by a fatwa issued from prison by the Blind Sheik. Upon being jailed, Abdel Rahman had indeed issued a decree urging Muslims to fight for his release and declaring of Americans that ‘Muslims everywhere [should] dismember their nation, tear them apart, ruin their economy, provoke their corporations, destroy their embassies, attack their interests, sink their ships,...shoot down their planes, [and] kill them on land, at sea, and in the air. Kill them wherever you find them’. 86

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Supporting al-Qaeda’s narrative

Writing theologically-based defences of jihadism

A number of high profile jihadists in British prisons have written extensive theopolitical defences of al-Qaeda’s ideology which aim to shore-up support for al-Qaeda and to refute and discredit Muslim critics of al-Qaeda.

While the first category of these can be carried out by low-level extremists, or even by Islamist individuals who have not been convicted of terrorism offences, the second category of writings can generally only be authored by individuals who already enjoy a certain amount of respect in Islamist circles as former jihadists or as ‘clerics’ (or sheikhs, as their supporters typically describe them) who are seen as being spiritual guides or theologians. As the example of Sayyid Qutb shows, such prison statements can be extremely dangerous – not least because they are often seen as more credible on account of the author’s imprisonment (which is often seen as evidence of his commitment and dedication to his cause). Imprisoned Islamist extremists typically regard their prison writings as a form of dawa, a religious obligation to spread their version of the Islamic faith to others. In many cases, extremist prisoners have only been able to communicate with individuals outside prison because of avoidable lapses and mistakes by the Prison Service. Extremists know that their imprisonment creates new opportunities to radicalise individuals beyond the prison walls and to stir up anger against western governments and society. Indeed their imprisonment may often give their theo-political arguments greater credibility. It is not clear that the Prison Service fully understands this. Imprisonment as evidence of ‘war on Islam’

Imprisoned extremists typically believe that the British government is at war with Islam and that the British public is intrinsically hostile to non-Muslims. They believe that they have a religious duty to communicate this to other Muslims in the UK and abroad – and accordingly to encourage them to oppose the British government.

A considerable number of imprisoned extremists and suspected extremists in the UK have sought to convince Muslim readers outside prison that that the British government is deliberately persecuting Muslims because of their religion. For example, in October 2004, Cageprisoners published part of a letter from Tunisian national Hedi Boudhiba who was then being held without trial while he contested his extradition to Spain on charges of providing logistical assistance to al-Qaeda: ‘I swear, I have done nothing bad to anyone, I am not a terrorist. They want to accuse me no matter what, I can't understand why. Is it because I am a Muslim or because I knew some people, and they have suspicions against these people? This isn't justice. This is not a war against terrorists; this is a war against Muslims’.206

Similarly, Reda Dendani, an Algerian terrorist suspect also known as ‘Detainee Q’, wrote to Cageprisoners in 2006 to say: ‘If this is not a Police State, what is one? A foreigner in this country is a synonym

206

Hedi Boudhiba was held without trial in the UK for 18 months before he was extradited to Spain in April 2006, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=3618>. 87

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for a criminal; a second class citizen. The facts speak for themselves and changing the name of things or giving them the cover of the law doesn’t changes their reality. That is: I’m a HOSTAGE in this country. I’m held against my will. I’m in [the] UK’s version of Guantanamo’.207

Babar Ahmed, who has been held since 2004 without trial while he fights deportation to the US (and who has never been convicted of any terrorism-related offences), has meanwhile described the police who arrested him as ‘torturers’ and said that ‘diversity and multiculturalism’ are just ‘fancy words for state racism’.208 Similar rhetoric has been used by Rachid Ramda, an Algerian terrorist who was convicted of financing the 1995 Paris metro bombings. He referred to his imprisonment as ‘a decade of continuous psychological and mental torture’ and said that ‘in some instances there was even physical torture disguised under the mask of the use of minimum force’.209 Abu Qatada, writing in March 2009, has meanwhile sought to portray his imprisonment as evidence of a war on Islam and Muslims. In his open letter, addressed ‘to the Muslims’ which was posted widely on Islamist websites, he describes his initial imprisonment in Belmarsh and then compares the British government with the mushrikeen, a reference to the ‘polytheists’ who Muhammad fought against and ultimately defeated in 7th century Arabia: ‘We were with our brothers in solitary cells wherein we remained for more than twenty-three hours of each night and day, as the person could not see anyone; rather he would be secluded by himself. This imprisonment - three years - was without any charges or trial. And also, reviewing the evidences, which were claimed as the basis of your imprisonment by the government, was not permitted, as their parliament approved a law, which permitted the state to imprison any strange foreigner who did not process British citizenship, for an indefinite period using secret evidence ... [the British government] claims that it respects the human (rights) regardless of his religion, his colour, his language or his citizenship. But here it is, eating its god. And it comes up with this law, which differentiates between one person and another’.210

Abu Qatada’s letter additionally equated the British government with pagans who Muhammad and his followers fought and eventually defeated. Fortunately, most such letters reach only the relatively small number of British Muslims who read the Wahhabiorientated websites such as islamicawakening.com which regularly reproduce such

207 208 209 210

'A Letter from Reda Dendani, HMP Long Lartin', 25 December 2006, Cageprisoners website <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=18090>. Babar Ahmed, ‘The Dark Night’, (18 February 2007), Cageprisoners website <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=19063>.

Rachid Ramda, '10 Years of Torture in the Civilised World', Cageprisoners, 12 May 2005, <http://cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=7224>.

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Supporting al-Qaeda’s narrative

material. In some cases, however, individuals detained on terrorism-related charges in high-security prisons have been able to reach mass audiences.

For example, one article written by Babar Ahmed from prison which was published by The Muslim Weekly, one of the UK’s largest circulation Muslim newspapers, in March 2005 also sought to persuade other Muslims that what happened to him could also happen to them: ‘So now we enjoy our own lives: money in the bank, children happy, stable job, house, family etc. Then we ‘do our bit’ for the Muslim captives by making dua for them and then we continue with our comfortable lives. But what if tomorrow it was our turn? What if our own door was kicked in tomorrow, our own husband, brother, son or father brutalised by armed thugs, then imprisoned to face extradition and a death behind bars in one of the worst countries of the world in their hatred of Islam and Muslims? Would things be different then?’211

In another instance, in October 2006, a Libyan detainee fighting deportation to Spain gave an interview to the Islam Channel from Long Lartin prison. In the broadcast, Faraj Hassan Al-Saad (then known only as ‘Detainee AS’) protested his innocence, portraying himself as a victim and saying that the British government was both persecuting Muslims and seeking also to cover up such abuses. He told the Islam Channel that: ‘Our situation in prison is very hard. We all have been classified as ‘A’ category – high risk prisoners. Therefore we are not allowed to get any domestic visits by anyone unless the Home Office approves the visitor's name, and this takes a very long time to be processed and get cleared. In this prison they don't want the reality to emerge to the public and the Muslim brothers and sisters around the world’.212

He also told the channel that:

‘Some of the brothers here have become mentally ill and they are under very heavy medication. We always get strip-searched in our daily routine; when we come back from our legal visits and our domestic visits, and if anyone refuses then they use force against him to take all his clothes off, the same as Abu Ghraib prison. It's very stressful. All our mail and phone calls are monitored, that's why it took me a very long time to pass this message on. The court we are appealing to now - called the special immigration and appeals commission which has been made specifically for the detainees - we call it the fascist court martial because they use so-called secret evidence’.

Since then the Prison Service has taken steps to ensure that imprisoned terrorists suspects are not able to phone the UK’s most-watched Muslim television channel and denounce the British judicial system as ‘fascist’. As a result of this interview with the Islam Channel,

211 212

Babar Ahmad: 'I Can Only Make Dua', 29 May 2005, (first published in Muslim Weekly). Available on Cageprisoners website http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=6092 ‘Interview with Detainee AS’, [Transcript of Islam Channel interview], 12 October 2006. Available on website of ‘Scotland Against Criminalising Communities’. http://www.sacc.org.uk/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=290&catid=36 89

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the ‘phonebox’ in the detainees’ area of Long Lartin was closed – according to a joint letter from the Long Lartin prisoners which was published in The Guardian.213 His suggests that Al-Saad had simply telephoned the Islam Channel from the prison’s payphone – which is intended to be mainly used by prisoners to contact their families and lawyers. Similarly, the government has signalled that it is aware that extremist prisoners’ communications to the Cageprisoners website are often problematic. In July 2008, Moazzam Begg, who conducts many of the site’s interviews with jailed individuals and their families, was quoted as saying that a court order had banned Abu Rideh (while he was released under a control order) from having contact with him.214

It is encouraging that the Prison Service now thinks that individuals detained on terrorism-related charges should not be allowed to deliberately inflame Muslim opinion and to turn British Muslims against the government. However the government’s slowness to act on this issue suggests that the Prison Service has grossly underestimated and misunderstood the threat posed by Islamist extremists. A number of the most highprofile extremists have made clear that they hope that their prison writings will inspire Muslims to turn against the British government. Abu Qatada, for example, has written that God, working through him, has enabled him to show British Muslims outside prison the British judicial system’s ‘racism’ and ‘hatred of Islam’: ‘Allah, the Most High, has blessed me in this case of mine, in that He exposed the British justice system, because some of the people, due to their heedlessness, declare that the British judicial system is free from the criminal element within it, in other words, the legislative and executive (branches). And I say: My case is one of the true cases in which the racism of the British judicial system becomes clear, along with its hatred towards Islam and the Muslims’.215

He added that he hoped that his prison writings on these subjects would be the ‘fuel’ for al-Qaeda’s global jihad.216 Abu Qatada added that he is confident that stories about Muslims in prison have succeeded in radicalising British Muslims and made more and 213 214

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‘Letter: We are being held as political hostages’, The Guardian, 26 April 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/apr/26/prisonsandprobation.mainsection>.

Moazzam Begg was quoted as saying that: ‘It seems evident to me that Mahmoud Abu Rideh - a man innocent of any wrongdoing - has once again been penalised for daring to tell his story. That they [the Home Office] have now decided that he cannot have any communication with me demonstrates - in addition to the new and ludicrous ban on burqaclad women entering his house - an astonishing level of fear of embarrassment for the way in which Mr Abu Rideh has been treated’. Source: 'Control order bans contact with exGuantanamo detainee', Institute of Race Relations, 31 July 2008, <http://www.irr.org.uk/2008/july/ha000022.html>. Abu Qatada, ‘An address to the Muslims from Abu Qatadah’, Tibyan website, (23 March 2009) <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-from-abuqatadah-‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/>.

He wrote that ‘I hope from Allâh, the Most High, that the day will come in which I will write some about that which I have seen and witnessed and felt, so that it may be a fuel for the Islâmic Ummah and the Mujâhidîn’.<http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-tothe-muslims-from-abu-qatadah-‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/>. 90

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more Muslims start to ‘hate’ the ‘English values’:

‘We have defeated the British government, by the virtue of Allah, the Most High, and in our imprisonment, there was an uncovering of their filthiness and their criminality and their false claims of humanism. And we were able to demonstrate to the Muslims in Britain specifically, that the British government is one which opposes Islam and the Muslims. And a fracture, which can never be set after that, took place by the virtue of Allah. The era of lies has finished and it has spread amongst the people, that there is a Guantanamo in Britain, just as there is a Guantanamo in America, and it is (called) Belmarsh. And a new generation of the Muslim youth has been raised, and especially amongst our brothers who originate from the Indian subcontinent, who were no longer mesmerized by the English authority, nor regarding the English values - rather they hate it and they know its enmity towards them, so they have become enemies towards it as well’.217

Babar Ahmad has similarly written of how he hopes that news of his and others imprisonments has helped to galvanise other British Muslims – sometimes in ways that are clearly problematic. For example, in 2004 he wrote that ‘the following good has already arisen from my imprisonment’ and then listed that ‘the Muslim community has been jolted, shocked and awoken from its slumber into a state of action’, ‘ordinary, nonpractising Muslims have been woken up and are now becoming stronger and better Muslims, in huge numbers’, ‘the Muslim community has closed ranks, united and told the authorities that we have stopped cooperating with you until you put an end to your terror, violence and abuse of laws and human rights against Muslims’ and that ‘the “British Muslim” myth has been destroyed as the Muslims with British passports have realised that their passport and citizenship is useless … The British passport does not mean anything as long as you are a practising Muslim’.218

Islamist and jihadist narratives are partly driven by a sense of victimhood and persecution. In the UK, these narratives are often specifically driven by a belief that the British state is racist and consciously anti-Muslim. Much of the propaganda produced and distributed by Islamist prisoners clearly aims to fortify and strengthen this narrative. It is therefore deeply problematic that propaganda designed to strengthen this narrative is being produced in British prisons and disseminated to Muslims outside prison through the internet and through media outlets such as the Islam Channel and the Muslim Weekly. Theological defences of al-Qaeda

In addition to prison communications which predominantly aim to make British Muslims angry towards the UK government and British society, there is also a separate strand of detailed theological prison writings. These provide the ideological and intellectual justifications for hostility towards the west and, in some cases, for jihadist violence. 217

218

Abu Qatada, ‘An address to the Muslims from Abu Qatadah’, Tibyan website, (23 March 2009) http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-from-abu-qatadah‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/ Babar Ahmad, 'A letter to all from Babar Ahmad', Cageprisoners, 24 August 2004. 91

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Jihadism is a complex intellectual doctrine based explicitly on often highly-detailed theological interpretations of Islam. Its core texts are by individuals who are capable of writing in a theological style referencing a wide range of Islamic sources and texts – or by individuals who have acquired a reputation in the jihadist world on account of their activism and experiences - rather than by low-level terrorist operatives. In the UK, such communications have been written and distributed from within British prisons by Abu Qatada, one of the world’s most influential jihadist theologians, and by Adel Abdel Majid Abdel Bary, a former leading member of Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad organization (which was the precursor to Al-Qaeda). Adel Abdel Majid Abdel Bary

Abdel Majid Bary is a leading member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group, a terrorist group that has been led by Ayman al-Zawahiri since 1991 and which has been allied with al-Qaeda since the early 1990s. Abdel Bary, an Egyptian, is a member of the group’s leadership council (Shura Council). In 1998 Abdel Bary was arrested by the UK police in 1998 after al-Qaeda’s bombing of two US embassies in East Africa. Up until then he had been living in London and working in an office with Khalid al-Fawwaz, bin Laden’s main representative in Europe. Between 1996 and 1998, their office received calls and faxes from bin Laden and issued fatwas and press-statements on behalf of al-Qaeda.219 Since 1998, Abdel Bary has been held in a variety of British prisons while fighting extradition to the US to face charges relating to the 1998 embassy bombings.220

In early 2008, Abdel Bary, imprisoned in Long Lartin while fighting deportation to Egypt, wrote an open letter to Dr Fadl, another former Islamic Jihad member who has since published damning indictments of its jihadist ideology and of Zawahiri and bin Laden. Abdel Bary’s open letter refuting Fadl’s arguments was passed to his associates outside prison and then circulated on a variety of Arabic pro-jihadist websites before being published in full in Al-Hayat, one of the largest circulation newspapers in the Arab world.221 The Prison Service’s failure to intercept this communication has been enormously damaging to global counter-terrorism efforts. Dr Fadl’s refutation of the jihadist ideology of Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda is seen as delivering a huge blow against jihadist movements. Abdel Bary’s attack on Fadl – with a view to defending al-Qaeda’s ideology - is the most important response to Fadl by any al-Jihad member (apart from Zawahiri himself).222 In particular, Abdel Bary questions Fadl’s denunciation of the 9-11 219

220 221 222

Sean O'Neill, 'Worldwide trail of bloodshed that leads to suburban London' The Telegraph (19 September 2001), Nick Fielding and Dipesh Gadhery, 'Al-Qaeda's Satellite Phone Records Revealed' The Sunday Times (24 March 2002) Craig Whitlock 'Britain Pays to Keep Suspects From U.S. Hands', Washington Post, (2 May 2009)

‘Egyptian Islamist Leading Member Imprisoned in Britain Since 1988 Replies to the 'Jihadist Theoretician' and His Criticism of Al-Qa'idah’ Al-Hayat (Arabic), 28 August 2008 Ironically, the other most significant assault on Dr Fadl also originates in the UK and comes from Hani al-Sibai, another former Shura Council member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad who published a 13,000 words refutation of Fadl on 25 December 2008. Al-Sibai, convicted on terrorism charges in absentia in Egypt, presently lives freely in London. 92

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attack on the Pentagon (saying that as a military installation, this was a permissible target) and describes Fadl as ‘ignorant’ of theology, writing that Fadl’s ‘ignorance lies in abandoning jihad for the sake of God, and abandoning the defence of the honour, the religion, and the countries of the Muslims’.

Abdel Bary also claims that Fadl has recanted his pro-jihadist ideas only because of conditions in Egyptian prisons – condescendingly saying that he himself, in Long Lartin, has not however retracted his views, writing that, ‘we excuse you [i.e. Fadl], because prison has its circumstances and conditions, which are well known to your brethren who are living under similar conditions’. He also compares Fadl unfavourably with Sayyid Qutb, writing that Qutb was ‘firm on his principles, not submitting to the awe and power of prison’. Abdel Bary’s imprisonment in Long Lartin has therefore clearly not only failed to ‘de-radicalise’ him; instead it has given him a more powerful platform from which to attack Muslims opposed to al-Qaeda’s jihad and defend al-Qaeda.

Although the Abdel Bary statement was picked up by the Foreign Office in early 2008 – it was translated in full by the FCO-funded BBC Monitoring soon after its publication there is no evidence that the Prison Service was alerted to the full implications of his prison statement.223 Certainly the Prison Service did not take effective steps to prevent subsequent communications by the high-profile jihadists of Long Lartin. Indeed, Abdel Bary’s success in distributing his thoughts through the internet and through Al-Hayat seems only to have emboldened him and his fellow Long Lartin inmate Abu Qatada to produce further pro-jihadist statements and communications. Abu Qatada

In June 2008 Abu Qatada, one of the world’s most influential pro-jihadist theologians, was interviewed by Adel Abdel Bary in Long Lartin prison. The interview was then transcribed as a collection of fatwas – with Abu Qatada’s answers presented in form of a series of legal rulings supplied in response to specific questions by Abdel Bary. The transcription of this Arabic-language interview (or possibly even a recording of it) was then passed to an unknown person outside the prison who then posted it into a prominent Arabic-language jihadi website (www.tawhed.ws).224

The resulting document was a major declaration of support for al-Qaeda’s ideology and an attack on al-Qaeda’s Muslim critics. For example, Abu Qatada’s fatwas contained declarations of overt support for jihadi movements worldwide, his reflections on leading salafi scholars and theological arguments legitimising the murder of Muslims opposed to al-Qaeda. Abu Qatada also specifically denounced the Sunni ‘Awakening Councils’ which have helped defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq as ‘apostates’, thereby legitimising attacks against them by wahhabi jihadists, and described Dr Fadl (Zawahiri’s former colleague 223

224

Abdel Bary’s refutation of Dr Fadl was translated into English and distributed by BBC Monitoring on 31 August 2008 – three days after the original was published in Al-Hayat. See 'Egyptian held in UK replies to cleric's criticism of Al-Qa'idah', BBC Monitoring (Middle East), 31 August 2008. ‘Interview with Sheikh Abu Qatada, from inside British prisons’ (15 Feruary 2009, Available on the www.tawhed.ws website (Arabic). Available online at <http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=1502091r>. 93

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turned critic) as ‘ignorant’ and his writings as ‘outright lies’. He additionally described the police and army of Muslim-majority countries opposed to al-Qaeda as ‘kafirs and apostates’ - thereby also justifying jihadist attacks against them.

In January 2009, Abu Qatada issued another, shorter, statement on the Israeli attack on Hamas in Gaza in which he praised jihadist organisations, saying that Hamas’ fighters ‘were patient as the mountains and gave martyrs and the pure blood of children and women and elders and the youth’ and that ‘your death is like the death of your mujahideen brothers in Iraq and Afghanistan and Somalia, it is the death of martyrs. So this is a bounty that you should not cry over but strive towards’. This statement was posted onto the tawhed.ws website by Yassir al-Sirri, an Islamic Jihad member living in London who is a major conduit between Islamists in UK prisons and the outside world.

In March 2009, Abu Qatada issued yet another statement, this time titled ‘An address to the Muslims from Abu Qatada’. In this, he detailed his experiences with the British government, compared British prisons to Guantanamo, praised the ‘mujahideen’ and predicted that the British government would lose the battle against Islamist extremism (which he views as a battle between Islam and unbelief).225 He also aims to persuade Muslim readers that the treatment of him and other Muslim prisoners is evidence of the ‘contempt and hatred which the British government holds against Islam’. His statement was well-received by some English-speaking jihadists. One of them commented on a website where an English translation had been posted: ‘May Allaah free the Shaykh and humiliate and destroy the kuffaar [disbelievers] holding him captive, ‘Aameen [amen]’.226

These incidents indicate that there is clearly a major problem at Long Lartin. However, Abu Qatada and Abdel Bary sending statements and fatwas out from within prison is only part of the problem. In addition, Abu Qatada (and, potentially, Abdel Bary) have apparently been receiving feedback on their writings from jihadists outside prison. For example, in March 2009, Abu Qatada wrote that ‘Some of the comments about it [his most recent statement] have reached me’.227

Disturbingly, Abu Qatada is currently preparing to release even more significant works from prison. In March 2009, he wrote that he has used his time in prison to memorize the Quran “which helped me in writing a number of books.228 Most significantly, Abu Qatada mentioned writing one overtly pro-jihadist book: ‘While inside, I also wrote the book: ‘Limatha Intasarna?’ (‘Why Were We Victorious?’). I clarified in this book the meaning of victory from the Book of Allah,

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Abu Qatada, ‘An address to the Muslims from Abu Qatadah’, Tibyan website, (23 March 2009) <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-from-abuqatadah-‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/#more-635>. Abu Qatâdah, ‘An Address to the Muslims’, Al-Tibyan website <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-from-abu-qatadah‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/>. 94

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the Most High, and I discussed the status of the jihadi movements; specifically and its effects on the world in general. And in it, I came to the certain conclusion that we are living in a victory, because the grid line for the Ummah (nation) of Islam is on the rise and the line of Kufr (disbelief) is descending and falling. And within this book there are many hypothetical debates with the defeatist side within the Islamic ranks’.229

In other words, his book aims to help jihadists understand which tactics and strategies are productive and which are not – as well as reassuring them that extreme Islamism is gradually triumphing over ‘disbelief’ (which, for Abu Qatada, encompasses non-Muslims and moderate Muslims).230 Needless to say, such a book if released would help jihadist movements such as al-Qaeda to hone their military and political strategies as well as providing a morale boost to jihadist groups worldwide. Senior members of Quilliam have appealed to the Prison Service’s Extremism Unit to seize these works from Abu Qatada before they can be distributed to his followers outside of prison – however it is not clear if this has yet had any effect.

The government (including the FCO and the security services) should have been alert to the danger of Abu Qatada and others issuing pro-jihadist statements from prison. Back in 2005, Abu Qatada released a 118-page overtly pro-jihadist book from Belmarsh entitled Al-’Arbaun al-Jiyad li-Ahl al-Tawhid Wa’l-Jihad ’ (‘The Forty Steeds For the People of Tawhid and Jihad ’).231 Indeed, Abu Qatada’s distribution of pro-jihadist books and statements from within prison becomes more absurd in view of the conditions attached to his release on a control order in 2008 – which stated that Abu Qatada ‘is not 229

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He also described his other two books, writing that ‘the most beautiful of them, in my opinion, was the book: ‘Fann al-Qira’ah’ (‘The Art of Reading’), which is a book in which I hoped to narrate my experience with the great endeavour of reading, so that the person may reach through it, ... which I labelled: ‘Al-Qiraah al-Jadaliyyah’ [‘Forensic Reading’], in which I mentioned many of the dreams, advice and conclusions, so that the reader may reach to the exaltation of Allah, the Great, and His glorification. And I wanted to make the reading of religious material a scientific (style) of reading, just as I wanted to make reading any reading - to be a religious-based reading through its correct meaning. In other words, that the Ubudiyyah (servitude of worship) would be completed for Allah, the Most High’. The book probably relies heavily on the input of Abu Qatada’s fellow detainees at Long Lartin, Khalid al-Fawwaz and Adel Abdel-Bary, who were senior members of al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad respectively. This additionally illustrates the dangers of concentrating extremist prisoners together.

This book, only available in Arabic, was widely distributed through Arabic-language jihadist chat forums – principally www.tawhed.ws website run by followers of Abu Mohammed alMaqdisi. The book is a detailed analysis of 40 hadiths and an explanation of how they each vindicate and support jihadism. For example, Abu Qatada quoted one Hadith narrating that ‘I was ordered to fight people until they say there is no god but god, and whoever says is has protected his self and wealth except for what is due upon him and his judgment is upon Allah’. He then interpreted this as saying ‘this narration explains the goal for which people are fought and why swords are raised’ – i.e. that jihad should be conducted in order to forced non-Muslims to accept Islam. Abu Qatada, Al-’Arbaun al-Jiyad li-Ahl al-Tawhid Wa’lJihad’ (‘The Forty Steeds For the People of Tawhid and Jihad ’). Available online (in Arabic) at the www.tawhed.ws website: <http://www.tawhed.ws/c?i=39, http://ia301529.us.archive.org/3/items/40jyad/arba3onAljyad.pdf>/ 95

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permitted to publish or permit to be published any document or statement without the prior approval of the SSHD and shall not make any statement that he has reason to believe is likely to be published’.232 If the government believes that Abu Qatada should not be allowed to distribute documents while he is released on control order, then why has the Prison Service allowed him to distribute pro-jihadist texts from within prison?

These failures are indicative of a larger failure within the Prison Service and wider government to understand the nature of Islamist terrorism and the extent to which it is an ideas-driven theological movement. Allowing Abu Qatada and Abdel Bary to disseminate their views – and in particular to attack the ideas of anti-jihadist theologians – can potentially cause massive damage to worldwide efforts to combat al-Qaeda and related groups. The Prison Service’s current mismanagement of this issue risk strengthening jihadist movements around the world. Dr Fadl has been described by one leading terrorism analyst as dealing a ‘body blow’ to al-Qaeda and it is therefore clearly absurd that individuals imprisoned for being extremists are allowed to attack him from within British prisons – where their bed and board is provided by the British taxpayers.233 Putting extremists in prison does not undermine their ideology and may actually increase their credibility in jihadist circles. How has this happened?

It is largely unclear how so many imprisoned extremists, including convicted terrorists such as Dhiren Barot, have been able to pass such a large volume of written material to their supporters outside.

In the case of Long Lartin, it appears that there may be a shortage of suitably trained staff in key positions. For example, the Independent Monitoring Board’s 2007-8 report on Long Lartin wrote of the prison’s censorship department: ‘It has only a small staff and day-by-day its work attracts little attention. Yet it has a high level of importance to the security of the establishment and every single prisoner depends upon its efficiency. The Board therefore notes with concern the patently inadequate conditions under which the Censors operate. Assurances have been given over the last year or so that improved facilities are on the way; they cannot come too soon’.234

In addition, there are reports that not enough Long Lartin staff have the linguistic and cultural skills that would allow them to identify and tackle instances of extremism. For

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Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) Bail order: ‘Omar Othman aka Abu Qatada vs The Secretary of State for the Home Department’. Available on the website of The Guardian: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2008/06/18/qatadabailorder.pdf.pdf Daniel L. Byman, 'Al-Qaida at 20: Is the Movement Destined To Fail?' Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institute, 12 August 2008 <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0812_al_qaeda_byman.aspx>.

'Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Board - Long Lartin - 01.02.07 / 31.01.08', Independent Monitoring Board, http://www.imb.gov.uk/annual-reports/08-annualreports/Long_Lartin_2007-2008.pdf?view=Binary. 96

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example, the government’s Inspectorate of Prisons 2007 report on Long Lartin’s detainee unit reported that: The ‘staff [of the segregation unit where terrorist detainees are held] had been specially selected for their suitability for the unit, but they had received no training in the legal background, detention histories, or cultural and religious needs of the detainees, and there were no Arabic speakers among them’.235

The report added that:

‘A concern was that (apart from the Muslim chaplaincy) there were no Muslim or Arabic-speaking staff who had first-hand appreciation of important cultural differences or who could understand what the detainees were saying to each other. This made it more difficult to manage the detainees on a daily basis, as well as presenting some security concerns, as staff could never be certain what was being discussed between detainees’.

Further complicating the issue is that imprisoned extremists have used a variety of tactics that have probably been used in different UK prisons in order to distribute messages from inside. Internet

On some occasions, information may have been sent from within prisons using computers (which are sometimes allowed to help prisoners prepare their legal cases) and mobile phones (which are not allowed in prisons).

For example, in July 2007, prison officers discovered that Tariq Al-Dour, jailed for running jihadist websites from London, had been illicitly accessing the internet from within Belmarsh using his laptop (provided by the Prison Service) and a smuggled mobile telephone.236 The Guardian reported that at the time of his discovery, al-Dour was building a website. It is utterly inexplicable that the Prison Service allowed Al-Dour to access the internet and begin constructing a website. After all, only a month previously Al-Dour had been convicted of using the internet to encourage others to carry out terrorist attacks.237 In 2006 The Mirror reported that 28 Belmarsh prisoners had been given £1,000 laptops – and speculated that the laptops could be used for ‘subversive purposes’ and could allow inmates to illicitly access the internet – information that was repeated on the Cageprisoners website.238 Why was the Daily Mirror able to identify the 235

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HM Inspectorate of Prisons, ‘An inspection of the category A detainee unit at HMP Long Lartin’, (July 2009) p. 9 <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/thematicreports1/Long_Lartin.pdf?view=Binary>.

Raffaello Pantucci, 'Britain’s Prison Dilemma: Issues and Concerns in Islamic Radicalization' Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor (Volume 6, Issue: 6, March 24, 2008) <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4806> 'UK court jails trio who incited terrorism over Web', Reuters, (5 Jul 2007)<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L05690850.htm>

Greig Box, 'Exclusive: Terror cell', The Mirror, (14 July 2007)<http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2007/07/14/exclusive-terror-cell-11587519453764/>, Greig Box, 'Exclusive: Laptops for terror suspects', The Mirror, (8 March 2006) 97

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potential risks of giving laptops to extremist prisoners (including those convicted of inciting terrorism online) while the Prison Service was not?

In March 2008, the Cageprisoners website published a recording of Amar Makhlulif (an Algerian terrorist suspect also known as ‘Abu Doha’) who was then imprisoned within Long Lartin.239 The recording featured him describing his time in prison since his arrest. The poor quality of the recording possibly suggests that it was made on a computer or perhaps some sort of portable electronic device such as a mobile telephone – and that the electronic file of the recording was then then smuggled out of the prison and passed to the Cageprisoners website. It is not clear how this happened. Telephone

In other instances, prisoners have communicated through the prison telephones. Although the phones are supposed to be routinely monitored, there are instances where prisoners have used these to relay information to people outside.

The most striking instance of this occurred when an Algerian detainee spoke live on the Islam Channel through the prison phones (SEE ABOVE SECTION). In another instance, also in 2008, Mustapha Taleb gave a phone interview to Moazzam Begg of Cageprisoners from the secure unit at Long Lartin – which was then reproduced on the Cageprisoners website.2405 Other incidents reveal co-ordination between prisoners and their supporters outside. For example, according to the Cageprisoners website, Rachid Ramda’s solicitors have distributed a letter from Ramda appealing for financial assistance to allow him to take an Open University course while he was in prison.241 After the money was collected, Ramda wrote an open letter from prison to thank them, writing that ‘I thank you for helping me to transform Belmarsh's desert, sweltering with the heat of injustice and oppression, into an oasis of hope and freedom’.242 While appealing for funding for a legitimate Open University course was neither illegal nor problematic, such communications between prisoners and their supporters outside could be used for less benign purposes. Prison visits

It is likely that at least some material has been smuggled out of prisons through meetings between prisoners and their visitors.

In some instances, extremists who should have been known to the security services have been able to visit prisoners – potentially allowing them to swap documents and/or verbal

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240 241 242

'Cageprisoners Exclusive: Hider Hanani speaking from his cell in Long Lartin' (Audio recording’. Available on the Cageprisoners website: <http://www.cageprisoners.com/media.php?id=713>

‘The Long Lartin Interviews: Moazzam Begg Interviews Mustapha Taleb’ (11 March 2008), Cageprisoners, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=23748>. ‘Books Not Bars For Rachid Ramda’, (20 August 2004), Cageprisoners website <http://www.cageprisoners.com/campaigns.php?id=21>.

'Rachid Ramda Says Thank You From His Belmarsh Cell', Cageprisoners, 27 October 2004, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=3716>. 98

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messages. For example, Jamal Ben Miloud Amar Ajouaou, a Moroccan who had assisted Abu Qatada from 1999, was allowed to regularly visit Yassir al-Sirri and Abu Doha while they were being held in Belmarsh in 2002.243 Ajouaou was later arrested on terrorism charges by the British police but was allowed to leave the UK to live in Morocco.

Many statements from the most prominent extremists have also been distributed by Yassir al-Sirri, a member of the leadership council of Egyptian Islamic Jihad who was briefly imprisoned in the UK in 2001 on suspicion of helping organise the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massood, the leader of anti-Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. In June 2004, an open letter from ‘Muslim prisoners’ in Belmarsh which compared British prisons to Guantanamo and described the treatment of Muslim prisoners as part of a ‘preplanned evil and malevolent policy’ was distributed by Sirri’s organisation the ‘Islamic Observation Centre’ with an afterword from al-Sirri. It was first published on almarsad.net, al-Sirri’s now-defunct personal website, and then distributed further through the internet.244 Since then, Al-Sirri has released statements by Abu Qatada and others through Arabic-language jihadist websites – although it is unclear how these were smuggled out of highly-secure establishments such as Long Lartin. The Inspectorate of Prisons’ 2009 report on Long Lartin detainee unit reports that: ‘Detainees in the specialist unit had good access to their solicitors and use of a fax machine in the unit’.245

It is possible that either this fax-machine or solicitors have been used to pass messages from Long Lartin detainees to their supporters outside prison. In the US, lawyers and their assistants have been convicted of passing communications between convicted terrorists and their supporters outside prison.246 If lawyers or their assistants in the UK have similarly breached UK laws through facilitating the distribution of pro-terrorist material from imprisoned extremists, then they should be prosecuted appropriately. Some prisons have been much more effective than others at preventing imprisoned extremists from transmitting their messages to the outside world. For example, Belmarsh

243

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Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), 'Jamal Ben Miloud Amar Ajouaou and Secretary of State for the Home Department', (Date of judgement: 29th October 2003). Available on SIAC website: http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/outcomes/documents/sc102002ajouaou.pdf

'A Witness and A Call - A Letter From A Belmarsh Prisoner', Islamic Observation Centre, (4 July 2004). Available on the Cageprisoners website <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=2281>

HM Inspectorate of Prison, ‘An inspection of the category A detainee unit at HMP Long Lartin’, (July 2009) http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/hmpyoi-inspections.html/550993/Long_Lartin_(2008).pdf?view=Binary.

For example, in 2005, Lynne Stewart, a lawyer, and two of her assistants (a paralegal and an interpreter) were convicted of passing messages from Omar Abdel Rahman, the leader of the Gamaa Islamiya terrorist organisation, in defiance of federal rules designed to prevent Abdel Rahman from communicating with his supporters. The US Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, said the convictions would ‘send a clear, unmistakable message that this department will pursue both those who carry out acts of terrorism and those who assist them with their murderous goals’. Source: ‘Lawyer is guilty of aiding terror’ New York Times, 11 February 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/11/nyregion/11stewart.html>. 99

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has in recent years been highly successful at preventing convicted terrorists and supporters of terrorism from spreading their message beyond the prison. Abu Hamza, for example, has been able to pass almost no significant written or audio messages from within Belmarsh to his supporters outside.247 If prisons like Belmarsh are capable of preventing jailed extremists from passing inciteful, pro-jihadist messages to their supporters outside, then it stands to reason that all other prisons should also be able to do the same. Prisons such as Long Lartin need to take immediate steps to ensure that individuals imprisoned for inciting violence and hatred are not allowed to continue to incite such violence and hatred from behind bars. Prison like Belmarsh which appear to have solved this problem need to share their knowledge and expertise with other prisons which also hold significant numbers of extremists. .

247

The only exceptions are a short audio recording of Abu Hamza reading a poem which appeared on youtube and was possibly recorded on a mobile phone in prison and then sent to supporters outside â&#x20AC;&#x201C; and a short interview (quoted in this report) with the Cageprisoners organisation in which he discussed his time in prisonâ&#x20AC;&#x201C; neither these incited violence or hatred. Alastair Jamieson , 'Hate cleric Abu Hamza in YouTube poem from prison', 24 Sep 2008, The Daily Telegraph. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3073084/Hate-clericAbu-Hamza-in-YouTube-poem-from-prison.html>. 100

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7. Conclusion The dynamics of prison radicalisation are relatively straight-forward. Radicalisation occurs where prisoners are both ‘pulled’ towards Islamist ideologies through extremists’ deliberate recruitment methods while also ‘pushed’ towards such messages through racism, violence and mistreatment at the hands of prison staff and other prisoners. Unfortunately, such apparent simplicity does not mean that solutions to this problem are equally simple. Indeed, there are genuine questions about whether radicalisation in prisons can ever be entirely stopped. Prisons by their very nature create the acute feelings of loneliness, fear, anger and self-doubt which will always make individuals vulnerable to radical ideologies like Islamism which promote spiritual certainty, simplistic solutions to complex socio-economic problems and a powerful sense of belonging and group identity. Extremists who encourage hatred of the British political system will also always find an audience among prisoners incarcerated by the British state. The formation of gangs, whether Islamist or not, for mutual support and protection will similarly remain an almost inevitable feature of prison life as long as prisons remain places of fear and intimidation where violence often occurs along ethnoreligious lines. An additional challenge for those seeking to prevent Islamist radicalisation in British prisons is that, as this report has shown, extremists in British prisons are often highly motivated and charismatic individuals who believe it is their religious duty to convert others to their ideology.

While the Prison Service has taken several steps to address the substantial challenges of preventing prison radicalisation, there is little hard evidence that its initiatives have yet made a substantial impact. Even allowing for the propagandistic nature of some extremists’ accounts of prison life, there can be little doubt that incidents of racism and ethnic violence remain rife in prisons given that even the government’s own surveys report that many Muslim prisoners feel that their religious beliefs are trampled on and that they are not treated equally or fairly by prison staff. Crucially, many positive Prison Service policies have arguably been compromised by their poor implementation. For example, the much overdue recruitment of Muslim prison chaplains has risked being compromised by the recruitment of predominantly Deobandi individuals at the expense of other Islamic schools of thought which arguably have a better track record of promoting inclusivity and tolerance. Other lapses have actually facilitated radicalisation by actively empowering extremists. For example, prominent extremists have on occasion been given ‘mentoring’ courses, allowed to lead Friday prayers and treated as representatives of all Muslim prisoners. Other elemental problems also endure: projihadist books remain available in prisons, leading jihadist ideologues freely communicate with their followers outside prison and many prison staff lack the necessary training which will enable them to recognise or effectively tackle Islamist extremists. There is much that the Prison Service can do to tackle prison radicalisation within an overall framework of making ordinary Muslim prisoners less susceptible to Islamists’ messages while also challenging existing Islamists’ ideologies and reducing their ability and motivation to recruit others. Ordinary Muslims can be made less vulnerable to Islamist recruitment through addressing key grievances such as perceptions of an official 101

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bias against Muslims which help drive ordinary Muslims towards Islamists – as well as tackling anti-Muslim sentiment among non-Muslim inmates. This can also be done through raising awareness of inclusive and tolerant forms of Islam among prisoners and staff, breaking down social and psychological barriers between Muslims and nonMuslims and challenging perceptions that there is a contradiction between being British and being Muslim.

At the same time, it is increasingly clear that special measures will be needed to deradicalise existing Islamist extremists in the prison system. This can be done initially through initiatives such as exposing Islamists to alternative forms of Islam, arranging meetings between extremists and victims of terrorist violence and allowing prisoners to access Islamic texts which challenge and refute Islamists’ core ideologies. In the longrun, however, it seems sensible for the UK to establish a specialised de-radicalisation centre that can first isolate and then actively de-radicalise prominent extremists and convicted terrorists. Other countries such as Egypt, Yemen and Libya have previously achieved important successes in this field through setting up similar centres and there is much that the UK can learn from their example. Islamism in all its varieties will remain a threat to the UK’s secular, liberal and democratic society for many years to come – and this will continue to be reflected in British prisons (Dhiren Barot, for example, was sentenced in 2006 to serve a minimum of 40 years in prison). The Prison Service, and much of government as a whole, needs therefore to move beyond its present defensive posture and its habit of seeking quick fixes and instead adopt robust long-term strategies that will provide permanent solutions to the challenges posed by extremism Islamism in British prisons.

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Recommendations

8. Recommendations The Prison Service has undoubtedly taken important steps towards tackling extremism by adopting a range of measures and initiatives designed to limit the ability of extremists to radicalise other prisoners (as well as a range of measures to more effectively monitor extremists in prison). However the Prison Service now needs to extend and deepen these initiatives while also working with other relevant branches of government (such as the FCO) to explore new methods that will not only prevent future radicalisation but also help persuade existing extremists to renounce their former ideologies.

This report’s recommendations are divided into two sections:

Part 1: Policies that can be put into place throughout the Prison Service

There are a number of policies, co-ordinated by the Prison Service’s Extremism Unit, that can be established in order to make ordinary Muslims less susceptible to extremist recruitment and also to reduce the influence and zeal of Islamist recruiters. Some of these recommendations have already been implemented wholly or in part by the Prison Service – their inclusion in the recommendations aims to underscore that these are valuable initiatives that need to be continued, refined and in some cases rolled out and implemented more widely. Part 2: Creation of a specialised de-radicalisation centre.

The UK government needs to create a special de-radicalisation centre. This will isolate the most important and influential extremists presently held in the prison estate (thereby preventing them radicalising others) while also enrolling them in a programme which incentivises de-radicalisation with an aim to helping these individual to question and ultimately reject extreme Islamist and jihadist beliefs.

All counter-extremism efforts should not only aim to tackle radicalisation and extremist ideas but also actively promote positive and universal values of equality, freedom of religion and expression and of mutual tolerance. These shared values, and not merely the rejection of jihadist violence, are what are needed to ensure the success of the UK’s multi-faith, multi-ethnic democracy. Violent extremism should not be tackled at the expense of broader community cohesion. Preventing terrorism is not enough – the Prison Service must also contribute to making British society more cohesive and accepting of others.

Part 1: Policies relevant to the Prison Service as a whole

a. Making ordinary Muslim prisoners less vulnerable to Islamism

Steps need to be taken across the Prison Service to make ordinary Muslim prisoners less vulnerable to radical recruitment by making them aware of the dangers of extremism and by tackling the key grievances that make Islamist arguments attractive and which ‘push’ ordinary people towards extremists.

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Warn new Muslim inmates of extremists

New Muslim prisoners need to be warned on arrival about the dangers of extremist prisoners. New inmates can be provided with theologically-grounded leaflets produced by the Prison Service, in conjunction with reputable Muslim organisations, which provide scriptural references warning about Muslim extremists based on the Quran and relevant hadiths. Resolve halal food concerns

The issue of halal food must not continue to come between Muslim prisoners and the Prison Service. Prisons need to take all necessary steps to tackle Muslim suspicion of halal food by fully involving Muslim prisoners and staff in the preparation of food and by involving external Muslim scholars or imams where necessary. ‘Zero tolerance’ approach on discrimination and bullying

There is a wide-spread perception among Muslims inmates that they are discriminated against by the Prison Service and by frontline staff. Whether or not this is empirically true, this is a perception that must be challenged as it leads directly to individuals adopting extremist narratives that the west is waging a ‘war on Islam’. Staff who treat Muslims prisoners in an abusive or discriminatory manner must be disciplined. Similarly, non-Muslim bullying or intimidation of Muslim prisoners must be firmly dealt with. Create and publicise clearer guidelines

There need to be clearer rules on what prisoners are and are not allowed to do – for example, in terms of associating, holding private prayers etc. The lack of clear rules can easily create an impression among Muslim inmates that regulations are arbitrarily applied – and often to the detriment of Muslim prisoners. These guidelines and rules need to be made clear to prisoners so that perceptions of mistreatment and discrimination are not allowed to fester. Increase out-reach to the vulnerable

Islamists often recruit by reaching out to individuals who are in crisis or feel under threat. The Prison Service needs to do more to pre-empt such Islamist outreach. For example, prisoners’ complaints about staff or prisoners need to be processed and addressed more quickly, prison chaplains and other prison staff need to be quicker to identify troubled individuals and offer them help and support. More mentoring and support

Charities, particularly faith-based ones and those dealing with young people, should be encouraged and helped to work in prisons with vulnerable individuals who may be at risk of radicalisation. Useful interventions can take the form of mentoring, education classes, arranging visits from ex-offenders who have reformed, letter-writing to inmates from outsiders etc – all aimed at making Muslim prisoners less hostile to British society while also preparing for their return to society. Charities such as Mosaic are already doing good work by using Muslim businessmen to mentor prisoners and even to offer them post-release employment. It is important that any such contact with prisoners, 104

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once initiated, is sustained or this can make prisoners feel even more abandoned, disillusioned and isolated – and ripe for radicalisation. Targeted post-release rehabilitation

The Prison Service needs to refine its programme to rehabilitate Muslim prisoners back into society after their release – a time when individuals are highly vulnerable to extremist influence. The Probation Service and the Youth Justice Board should be closely involved in such work. It may be necessary to use moderate mosques to help prisoners manage this post-release transition. Such mosques can provide spiritual support for former prisoners and also help them to become reunited and reconciled with their families. Much anecdotal evidence (which is outside the scope of this report) suggests that many Muslim prisoners are rejected by their close relatives after their release from prison for bringing ‘shame’ on their families – this often isolates ex-offenders and makes them more likely to turn to Islamist groups for sympathy, friendship and support. b. Challenging extremist thought in prisons

Until such time as a separate de-radicalisation centre is established (or indeed if one is not established) it will also be necessary to take a number of pro-active steps to tackle extremists throughout the prison estate in order to push back against Islamist ideologies. Provide more moderate literature for Muslim prisoners

Imprisoned extremists need to be provided with books that refute and challenge their ideology – and which promote a more tolerant ideology in its place. This can range from books by modern Muslim writers refuting Islamism such as by Khaled Abou ElFadl or Abdullahi al-Na’im to traditional authors such as the poet Rumi or the philosopher Ibn Arabi which promote a tolerant and spiritual Muslim identity. Muslimthemed magazines, such as Emel, which promote a modern and tolerant Muslim-British identify, can also be selectively stocked (including in women’s prisons] to help challenge negative perceptions of the relation between Islam, Muslims and British society. (A more completed suggested book list is included as an appendix to this report – see Appendix 2) Visiting Muslim theologians

Arrange for non-extremist Muslim theologians and clerics to visit and preach moderate and tolerant interpretations of Islam. Good examples of such are the Habaib from Yemen, descendents of Mohammed whose theological training is widely respected and whose teachings are tolerant and pluralistic. Former Islamists, either from the UK or from abroad, who have renounced extremism can also visit prisons to give talks. Such talks by theologians or former extremists can be done in lecture-formats to large audiences or else in smaller discussion circles with extremists and suspected extremists. Promote shared values/history

Shared values and identities can be promoted through literature, teaching, lectures, workshops. For instance, visiting academic lecturers could talk about the role of Muslim soldiers in the Second World War or the role of Muslims in the US civil rights movements, visiting successful British Muslim businessmen can also give lectures on how 105

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they succeeded in the UK. This will help to undermine and counter Islamism’s ‘them’ and ‘us’ worldview and the belief that UK society is ‘against Muslims’. Visits from victims of terrorism

Prisons could arrange for victims of terrorism, from both the UK and from Muslimmajority countries, to visit prisons and to give talks to extremist prisons and prisons with large numbers of Muslims. This could take the form of lectures to large audiences of Muslims and non-Muslims or small group discussions between these visiting individuals and prominent or influential imprisoned extremists. Ultimately, other individuals such as Holocaust survivors or refugees from Darfur could also be involved in this. Many of these visits could be arranged on a pro-bono basis. Psychologists’ visits

Trained psychologists, ideally non-Muslims, need to begin a systematic programme of meeting with convicted and suspected extremists in prison. The experience of being listened to and empathised with by sympathetic non-Muslims will help to undermine extremist perspectives. In the long term, it can also help address and resolve issues of anger and frustrations felt by many Islamist inmates. History classes

Extremists and terrorists are usually intelligent and curious people who are interested in learning about the world around them. History classes taught by visiting professors will help them understand British history and the nature and origins of the UK’s democracy and secular society. At present, their ignorance on these subjects contributes towards their failure to understand or appreciate British society. Art and activities

Some prisons have been mocked for giving extremists courses in art and comedy – leading to some such courses being discontinued. Such courses are useful however in rehabilitating extremists and can play a key role in encouraging them to see nonMuslims not as faceless enemies but as fellow human beings. Courses that challenge extremists’ perception of themselves and of wider society should be fully supported. Such courses are also useful for ordinary prisoners in inoculating them against extremist ideologies. c. Limiting Islamist outreach

At the same time as seeking to inoculate Muslim prisoners against Islamist thought and to raise their awareness of more moderate understandings of Islam, Islamists need to be prevented, where possible, from attempting to recruit other prisoners. This means the Prison Service must stop empowering extremists, disrupt their efforts to recruit new followers and remove Islamist literature from prisons. Stop empowering extremists

Prison staff should not use Islamists or extremist prisoners as ‘go-betweens’ between the Prison Service and Muslim prisoners. Likewise Islamists should not be accepted as spokesmen for all Muslims in prison. Even if empowering Islamists does sometimes bring short-term benefits, this will empower extremists in the long-term and thereby 106

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ultimately produce further problems. In addition, extremists should not be given courses (e.g. the Samaritan’s ‘listener’ courses) or training that will give them greater influence over other prisoners. Review prison books policy

There is evidence that a number of prison libraries still stock a number of pro-jihadist books. This needs to be addressed immediately. The Prison Service needs to comb all its prison libraries for extremist and pro-jihadist works and to have a central – and accountable – individual who can transparently vet books send to prison libraries or individual prisoners. Extremist books should be removed immediately and steps also taken to find out how they entered prisons in the first place (i.e. were they donated to prisons by particular organisations?). Review organizations working in prisons

The Prison Service needs to review all organisations working with Muslim prisoners to exclude any with an extreme Islamist agenda. This includes organisations offering mentoring to inmates, providing literature to prisoners or even simply presents in Ramadan. Organisations which are not willing to pro-actively promote secularism, liberalism and democracy should not be working in British prisons. Revise security

It is vital to prevent extremists from passing deliberately inciteful message to their supporters outside prison. Prisons (such as HMP Belmarsh) that have stopped most such communications need to liaise with those establishments (such as HMP Long Lartin) which have recently failed to prevent the flow of pro-jihadist messages to those outside. Front-line staff need to be made aware that preventing extremists from communicating with their supporters outside is a top priority. d. Central Prison Service

At the same time as the above initiatives are put into place across the prison estate, changes are needed at the heart of the prison service in order to entrench counterIslamist programmes and create a culture in which alliances can be built with moderate Muslim organisations and individuals. Safeguard existence of Extremism Unit

The Prison Service’s central Extremism Unit is doing valuable work co-ordinating and shaping the counter-extremism efforts across the Prison Service. At present however it is only funded on a temporary basis. Arrangements with the HM Treasury should be made for the Unit to receive permanent funding. Central authority on Islamic issues

The Prison Service needs to formalise its decision making process regarding Islamic issues. At the moment, decisions are often taken on an ad-hoc basis and often without adequate transparency or consistency. Communities and Local Government (CLG) currently maintains three Islamic affairs advisors; the Prison Service should possibly adopt a similar arrangement representing different strands of Muslim thought – while remaining alert to infiltration by Islamists and their sympathisers. 107

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Greater openness

The government’s overall counter-extremism policies have only developed through external criticism. The Prison Service’s unique situation has largely exempted it from similar scrutiny. It urgently needs to become more accessible to journalists and researchers examining prison radicalisation. Research application procedures need to be vastly simplified and streamlined. A wider variety of researchers, including those known to be critical of the government’s counter-extremism strategy, should be helped to conduct research in prisons. Maintain non-Muslim involvement

The Prison Service needs to ensure that non-Muslim staff remain fully involved with Muslim prisoners. Creating a situation where Muslim prisoners are dealt with primarily by Muslims risks creating long-term societal divisions (even though this may seem to have some short-term benefits). For the same reason, the Prison Service also needs to ensure that Prison Service, at all levels, does not treat its own Muslim employees (whether chaplains or regular prison staff) as go-betweens between non-Muslims staff and Muslim prisoners. e. Staff issues and training

There is evidence that both front-line and specialist staff in prisons often lack a necessary knowledge of both Islam, the religion, and Islamism, the political ideology. Raising staff awareness of these issues will help them understand the nature of the Islamist threat and give them the confidence to challenge Islamist extremism. Greater Islamic awareness training for staff

Frontline prison staff (particularly in key prisons such as Category A establishments and others such as Feltham and Aylesbury YOIs) need specialised training to give them greater awareness of Islamic and Muslim issues in general. In particular, they need a greater understanding of Islamist ideology (and how this differs from Islam as a faith) and how to identify potential Islamist extremists. Increase understanding of Islamist extremism

Prison staff (both front-line staff and those in other roles such as the Extremism Unit) need greater training in understanding and identifying Islamist extremism. In particular, they need to be able to distinguish radicalism from piety – i.e. to understand that having a large beard does not necessarily indicate political or social extremism. Increase staff awareness of individual inmates

There is evidence that front-line staff in prisons such as Belmarsh and Long Lartin are not always fully briefed on the known extremists in their care. In some cases (for instance for staff working in the Long Lartin detainee unit) specialised briefings on individuals and tailored extremism-awareness training is urgently needed to help them identify and tackle the specific threats posed by particular individuals. Greater diversity of imams

Due to the influence of the Prison Service’s current Muslim Advisor, the Prison Service now has a disproportionate number of Muslim chaplains from the Deobandi school of 108

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thought. This imbalance needs to be addressed in favour of chaplains from schools of thought that have traditionally been more moderate. The recruitment of more Somali and black imams will also be useful in reaching out to vulnerable inmates from these communities who are at risk of radicalisation. Specialised training for Muslim chaplains

Muslim prison chaplains should have specific training in radicalisation and extremism before starting work in prisons. The Prison Service should not automatically assume that imams understand the nature of extremism, the methods of extremist recruitment or the best ways to challenge extremist individuals and groups. This training will also help identify any chaplains who are not fully committed to preventing extremism. Muslim chaplains to support ex-offenders

Prison chaplains should be encouraged and enabled to keep in contact with exoffenders after they have been released from prison. It is vital that chaplains are able to support former prisoners after their release – not least because the immediate postrelease period is often when prisoners are most likely to fall into radical circles or to return to their old ways. At present, chaplains are officially discouraged from seeing former prisoners. More frontline Muslim staff

Employing more Muslim staff in prisons can help to undercut the belief, widespread among many ordinary Muslim prisoners as well as extremists, that the Prison Service and its staff are hostile to Muslims and their faith. At the same time, care should be taken to ensure that non-Muslims remain fully-involved with Muslim inmates – and that Muslim employees are not seen as intermediaries between Muslims and other prison staff. f. Legal options

There are a variety of legal measures that can be taken to tackle extremism in prisons and in wider society. This can range from prosecuting those outside prisons who empower extremist prisoners to taking steps to deter extremists from radicalising other prisoners. Prosecute pro-jihadist inmates

Prisoners who propagate pro-jihadist ideas in prisons, incite religious or racial hatred or who advocate or glorify terrorist attacks can and should be prosecuted. Just because individuals are in prison it does not mean that they are somehow immune from laws designed to prevent terrorism. Prosecuting existing prisoners for their activities in prison will send out a strong message that prison radicalisation will not be tolerated. If necessary, the cells of extremist prisoners should be bugged to facilitate successful prosecutions. Prosecute those who facilitate ‘glorification’ of terrorism

Individuals outside prison who help imprisoned extremists distribute written material that incites or glorifies terrorism should be prosecuted. A number of pro-jihadist individuals, such as Yassir al-Sirri, have distributed pro-jihadist prison writings by 109

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imprisoned extremists and others on the internet and elsewhere. Their activities are arguably in breach of the Terrorism Act 2006 which criminalises the making or distribution of any statement which “glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally)”.248 Lawyers who distribute such documents glorifying terrorism from within prison should also be prosecuted. They are not immune from prosecution in this regard. Speed-up deportations

The current legal process to expel or deport suspected extremists such as Abu Qatada takes far too long. This impacts on prison radicalisation as such individuals consequently remain un-necessarily detained in British prisons where they are able to further radicalise others. These lengthy imprisonments without trial also allow Islamists to portray the British government as ‘anti-Muslim’ to Muslims both inside and outside British prisons. There are several solutions to this: Include human rights guarantees in trade treaties

Future trade agreements with Middle Eastern countries should include clauses forcing these countries to recognising the rights of prisoners deported from the UK to fair and open trials and minimum standards of treatment in prison (including basic demands such as protection from torture and regular visits from lawyers and international human rights bodies). This should be done in the wider context of encouraging such countries to respect the human rights of all their citizens. This will make it much easier for the UK to deport foreign terrorist suspects to their countries of origin. Include detainees in de-radicalisation programmes

At present such detainees fighting extradition are often left out of deradicalisation initiatives since it is assumed that at some point they will be deported/extradited. In future, given that such detentions may be virtually indefinite in practice and may even result in the individual’s release into the UK, such detainees should be fully included in de-radicalisation initiatives (and particularly enrolled in the de-radicalisation centre recommended by this report).

Increased use of indeterminate sentences

Judges involved in terrorism cases should make the use of powers to issue ‘indeterminate sentences’. Failure to do so increases risk of potentially dangerous terrorists and Islamist recruiters being released while still holding extremist views – and subsequently posing a risk to themselves and wider society. This would mean recognising, as in the case of paedophiles, that the imprisonment of extremists is as much for public protection as for the punishment of the guilty. Parole boards should assess radicalization

Parole hearings for convicted extremists and possibly even regular prisoners suspected of holding extremist views should take into account whether inmates have rejected 248

Terrorism Act 2006, <https://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/plain/ukpga_20060011_en>. 110

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extremist views and disassociated themselves from other extremists - and whether they have displayed respect and tolerance towards others. This is not a question of policing prisoners’ thoughts: it is an issue of assessing to what extent such prisoners remain a threat to themselves and to wider society. Such use of parole boards will work much better if used in conjunction with greater use of indeterminate sentencing by courts.

Part 2: A British de-radicalisation centre

Quilliam believe that in order to effectively tackle the problem of extremism in prisons, it is necessary to establish a specialised de-radicalisation centre and associated programme run by dedicated and specially-trained full-time staff, jointly funded and run by the Home Office (OSCT) and the Ministry of Justice.

Such a centre will aim both at isolating known extremist prisoners, in order to prevent additional radicalisation of themselves and others, and also gradually incentivise extremist prisoners towards abandoning their radical ideologies in preparation for returning either to the general prison system or to wider society outside prison. It will therefore have several positive benefits, including: Leading extremists will be removed from mainstream prison society and thus become unable to radicalise others.

In the long term, key extremists can be de-radicalised. They can then be used to confront extremist thought both in prisons and further afield. Over time, a successful de-radicalisation programme will produce financial savings by reducing the resources needed to police, monitor and tackle Islamist extremism both in and outside of prisons.

What does ‘de-radicalisation’ involve?

De-radicalisation (i.e. the rejection of extreme Islamist ideologies and a related rejection of jihadist violence) can be seen as a process in which an Islamist or jihadist individual undergoes a number of experiences and realisations. These include: • Growing doubts about efficacy of jihadist tactics and the morality of jihadist attacks;

• Increasing doubts about theological legitimacy of both jihadism and wider Islamist ideology;

• Realisation that holding jihadist beliefs is harming one’s own personal interests –and a realisation that such suffering is neither noble, glorious nor respected or appreciated by others;

• Increased willingness to compromise initially on some minor aspects of Islamist ideology in order to improve quality of life in prison;

• Growing estrangement from other jihadists at a social and personal level;

• Growing tolerance for other ways of life and interpretations of Islam;

• A realisation that non-Muslims are not intrinsically hostile to Islam and Muslims; 111

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Successful de-radicalisation programmes aim to kick-start and then accelerate these processes – while also preventing further radicalisation either of the individual himself or of those around him. This means, for instance, shielding jihadists from new forms of Islamist ideology during the de-radicalisation process while also addressing key grievances (such as perceived racism or unfairness by prison staff) – both of which risk entrenching and deepening radicalisation and obstructing positive change.

Successful de-radicalisation programmes abroad, for instance in Egypt, have primarily worked because the authorities incentivised de-radicalisation. Such programmes were additionally built on a robust understanding of jihadism and the concepts that underlie it – principally the Wahhabi understanding of the concepts such as al-walaa wa al-bara (loving and hating for the sake of Islam), takfir (the right to declare other Muslims apostates) and the practice of ‘al-Nahyi an al-munkar’ (the ‘forbidding of evil’) – as well as a rounded understanding of jihadist psychology and the group dynamics of jihadist groups. A British de-radicalisation programme would only succeed if those running it achieved similar levels of knowledge and understanding and were able to similarly incentivise de-radicalisation. At the same time, however, a British programme would also need to be significantly different from such foreign de-radicalisation initiatives – not least because, unlike Egypt, Yemen and other Middle Eastern countries, the UK is a mostly non-Muslim country. What would a de-radicalisation centre look like?

Quilliam believe that the basic arrangement and structure of a British de-radicalisation centre should be based around the Egyptian one, the most successful in the Middle East, while the programmes within it are tailored to reflect the UK’s particular situation (for example, to reflect the UK’s status as a liberal, secular, multi-faith democracy). Key features of a British de-radicalisation centre:

A British radicalisation centre, housed either in a purpose-build facility or in the specially adapted wing of an existing prison, would need to contain the following basic structure:

1. Separation of extremist prisoners according to groups and ideology in order to slow the spread and exchange of jihadist ideology This policy, adopted successfully in Egyptian de-radicalisation programmes for instance, prevents prisoners from different groups from exchanging ideas and ideologies – instantly curtailing the present cross-pollination of jihadist ideologies. Sample groupings could be:

Arab jihadists (e.g. Abu Qatada, Khalid al-Fawwaz, Bilal Abdulla etc)

UK-raised jihadists focused on foreign conflicts (e.g. Babar Ahmad, Andrew Rowe, Sohail Qureshi) Terrorists focused on UK (21-7 bombers, Omar Khyam, Andrew Ibrahim, etc )

‘Fake’-jihadists convicted of relatively minor offences such as incitement or glorifying terrorism (e.g. Al-Muhajiroun members and Abu Hamza followers) 112

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Each grouping should contain no more than 10 members. This separation also allows each group’s distinct ideology and focus to be specifically tackled. There should be absolutely no contact between these groups or with any other prisoners. This does not breach the prisoners’ human rights.

2. Special staff overseeing each unit

Each of the above prison units should have a single, dedicated chief warden. He should be specially trained in jihadist ideology and how to counter it – as well as in the specific background of his detainees. Although, his religion and ethnicity is relatively unimportant, it is crucial that such a guard is firm but fair, and is sufficiently empowered to be able to reward or punish detainees (through the granting or removal of privileges) as he sees appropriate. He should also have direct access to government counter-terrorism specialists in the Foreign Office, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) and the security services. Other wardens working under him, would work exclusively in each of the above prison units, and would also have undergone specialised training in understanding extremism Islamism and to make them aware of the histories of each inmates.

Once this structure has been put in place, the de-radicalisation programme itself can be initiated. De-radicalisation programmes

Once de-radicalisation centres are established according to the structure outlined above, the following programme should be put into place in order to reduce the glamour and appeal of jihadist ideology, while simultaneously incentivising non-Islamist behaviour and progress towards de-radicalisation. The programme achieves this through encouraging inmates to become self-reflective, to question their position in prison and their achievements to date, to encourage tensions between convicted extremists and to make extremists bored (and therefore receptive to new experiences and ideas – as well as forcing them to examine themselves). Step 1a: Withdraw all privileges.

All phone-calls, special foods (except basic halal dishes), access to television, computers, newspapers, books, opportunities for learning, making money etc are withdrawn from the moment that the first prisoners enter the de-radicalisation units. This will make prisoners bored, fed up with prison life and provoke them to argue with each other. If maintained for a minimum of a month, this initial stage will slowly make prisoners eager for new ideas and experiences. This will also associate holding radical beliefs with boredom and frustration. Step 1b: Address key grievances.

Simultaneously with Step 1a, key grievances which bolster the Islamist worldview would be specifically removed and tackled in the de-radicalisation units. For example, there must be a zero tolerance policy towards any prison staff who are racist, discriminatory or un-supportive to prisoners who are undergoing de-

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radicalisation. The Prison Service and the government should aim to be seen as a neutral and disinterested arbitrator which treats Muslims fairly. Prison staff should also be trained to respond calmly to attempts by prisoners to create disturbances. Step 2: Incentivise good behaviour with access to de-radicalisation programmes.

After the withdrawal of all privileges for a fixed period, inmates are explicitly told that renewed access to privileges is made entirely dependent on their individual good behaviour and personal progress towards rejecting extremist ideologies. Crucially, all diversions and entertainments on offer from this moment forward will be de-radicalisation programmes specifically tailored to encouraging a renunciation of extremism. Thus extremists can only access de-radicalisation programmes by slowly and publicly abandoning extremist behaviour. This incentivises accessing de-radicalisation programmes.

The strength of this aspect of the de-radicalisation programme is that it not only incentivises change but also de-incentivises radicalisation. For example, while prisoners in each unit will undoubtedly initially be resistant to the programme, leading to them, for instance, to try to present a united front against the Prison Service’s staff, to exchange personal stories and even develop their own routine of prayer, teaching and meditation. In the long run, however, and in the absence of external props and stimuli such as books, television or new inmates, the unity between prisoners will give way – with some prisoners inevitably starting to argue that “no harm can come” from attending a few de-radicalisation schemes and improving their behaviour towards staff. At this point, the highly judgemental nature of wahhabi-inspired jihadism will start to work; the most extremist prisoners will begin to argue with other prisoners who wish to begin to accessing de-radicalisation schemes – thus causing further tensions between prisoners and gradually undermining the group’s unity. Similarly, disputes over leadership and seniority (regarding both spiritual and material issues) will break out between inmates with rival extremists, many of whom are highly egotistical, jockeying for power and influence. Once prisoners begin accessing the schemes, further disagreements will arise – as prisoners accessing the schemes start to doubt their own extremist ideology and worldview – as well as tangibly experiencing the benefits of giving up their extreme Islamist ideology, thereby bringing them into further conflict with their fellow extremist inmates. Such disputes and disagreements will grow more common, if prison staff are seen to act firmly but fairly – thereby meaning it is harder for prisoners to turn their anger and frustrations against the staff. In the same way, prison staff should respond calmly and patiently by prisoners to create disturbances rather than by reacting physically or punishing prisoners though putting them in solitary confinement – such measures will only excite prisoners and make them feel selfimportant. Instead the emphasis, again, should be on making prison life mundane and boring in order to de-glamorise the idea of being imprisoned on account of one’s Islamist or pro-jihadist beliefs and actions.

It is important to note that such that this de-radicalisation programme does not punish individuals for their ideology or for bad behaviour (which, as this report shows, risks entrenching and vindicating jihadist ideologies), but rather by incentivising positive 114

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change. If inmates chose not to change their behaviour to access these schemes, they will not be punished further, however they will remain bored and frustrated – and indeed will become increasingly so as they watch their fellow prisoners access more deradicalisation schemes and access more privileges. De-radicalisation initiatives:

De-radicalisation initiatives which are offered to inmates who show improved behaviour and gradually reject extremism. Evidence of rejecting extremism, measured for example through increased friendliness towards staff and tensions with other inmates, can lead to the following programmes being gradually accessed: Talks by outside speakers

Outside speakers brought into de-radicalisation centres can include respected and moderate Muslim scholars, former jihadists from the Middle East and the UK who have renounced violence, victims of terrorist attacks in the West and the Middle East, holocaust survivors, academics discussing key aspects of British and European history (including, for instance, the history of democracy, anti-slavery campaigns and the development of secularism). Such talks can be given to small groups of prisoners within each unit, or alternatively to individual prisoners in the form of one-on-one discussions. Given that initially the aim of such talks is to make prisoners re-think violent jihadism, Muslim speakers brought into prison could even include Islamists and Wahhabis who, while narrowly opposed to al-Qaeda’s terrorism, have views that make them unsuitable for promoting community cohesion outside prison.249 It is vital that such speakers are willing to make repeat visits to prisons or to maintain contact with inmates by letter – establishing personal contact and trust with inmates is vital. Counter-extremism books

The removal of all books, newspaper and televisions in de-radicalisation centres will have will gradually create a great hunger among extremist prisoners (many of whom are highly literate and intelligent) for new information and literature. Prisoners who show good behaviour and evidence of reform, can be gradually supplied with counter-extremism books, written either by more moderate Muslim authors (including books by former extremists from groups such as al-Gamaa alIslamiya). Such books should be supplied sparingly in order to force inmates to read them repeatedly (even if they disagree with them). Similarly, relevant films (for instance, positive historical narratives or videos about individuals leaving terrorism such as the Rachida, a 2002 Algerian film) can be shown occasionally in return for good behaviour. Even if extremists read or watch such material grudgingly (or, for instance, telling themselves that they are only reading such books in order to ‘refute’ them), well-chosen material will inevitably force them to rethink their assumptions – the more so if access to all alternative viewpoints is restricted. 249

Nb. This needs to be done in such a way so as not to empower such individuals in wider British Muslim communities. 115

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Arabic and Quran recitation lessons

Islamist extremists will be extremely keen to learn Arabic and to learn to recite the Quran. Access to classes on both can be used to incentivise good behaviour and progress towards abandoning jihadist principles and disruptive behaviour. Such courses could focus on Islamic texts and passages which promote tolerance and reject violence. Such initiatives could be provided for a low cost or free from the UK’s many progressive Muslim scholars who would regard it as an Islamic duty to help extremists to return to mainstream forms of Islam. Equally, Arabic teachers could be female or non-Muslim Arabs, both of which would help to challenge extremist inmates. Other de-radicalisation initiatives

Other de-radicalisation programmes which are offered to prisoners in return for becoming more co-operative with prison staff, or who are showing other signs of rejecting fellow jihadists and jihadist ideologies. Additional programmes can include access to psychotherapists, access to art courses or even writing courses where extremists (many of whom are well-read and intelligent) are encouraged to express themselves and to write about how they came to adopt extremist ideologies. Where possible such programmes could be done through universities, charities etc on a pro-bono basis in order to minimise the costs to taxpayers.

In addition to these specific de-radicalisation programmes, inmates whose behaviour improves and who show interest in de-radicalisation courses, can receive additional privileges. These can include receiving free extra phone minutes to talk to their families (which are extremely important to prisoners – particularly to those with family abroad), better food, more association time and more access to exercise opportunities (increased access to gym facilities is particularly important) and ultimately even conjugal visits in special cases. It is important that prisoners who de-radicalise are seen to receive more privileges than those who do not and who hold on to jihadist beliefs in order to incentivise change. Prisoners who refuse to alter their behaviour or beliefs should be denied all privileges indefinitely. This will inevitably cause friction between current and former extremists – this is the point. It is also key that privileges (such as an hour-long talk by an outside speaker) are dispensed only slowly – in order to increase their value in the eyes of prisons and to make inmates feel that these improvements have been truly earned.

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Summary:

The key aspect of this proposed de-radicalisation centre is to incentivize positive change while encouraging individual to access de-radicalisation events in return for improving their behaviour or rejecting aspects of extremist ideology. Prisoners in the deradicalisation centre are not forced to go on the de-radicalisation programmes: however, if they do not, they face spending their entire prison time without privileges and without any distractions – all of which is not in any way a breach of their human rights. Although many extremists will try to hold out against moderating their beliefs and practices, in reality, after experiencing months of boredom while becoming increasingly irritated by the judgemental and pedantic attitude of their fellow prisoners, most will eventually choose to take part in the programmes (even if they do so initially in order to ‘refute’ the programmes or after merely feigning deradicalisation). However, if such programmes are well-designed, it will be difficult for prisoners attending them over a period of time to come away entirely un-changed. Eligibility to access these programmes should be assessed, for example, through friendliness to guards (which can be seen as a measure of prisoners’ adherence to Wahhabi concepts of al-Baraa, the concept of displaying hostility or enmity towards un-believers), their interaction with other extremists and whether they are still attempting to promote jihadist thought and ideologies. The extent to which the prisoners become frustrated with each other over time should in particular not be under-estimated.

Once the prisoners have been de-radicalised, or are at least showing signs of moderating in order to access privileges, they should be left in the de-radicalisation unit for a further period of time in order to put pressure on other extremists and to entrench their own progress towards de-radicalisation. In the long-run, however, they can be relocated to other parts of the prison estate in order to tackle and undermine extremist ideologies there (although this obviously needs to be done in such a way that they do not ‘re-radicalise’). It is key that while going through this process, they are incentivised to continue de-radicalising in order to maintain their current level of privileges – in order to ensure that they have not made only a token rejection of a few aspects of extremism in order to marginally improve their quality of life in prison. Above all, consistency is key: extremists need to know, over the course of several years, that in order to access de-radicalisation they have to show certain improvements – and to know that if they do not their quality of life will not materially improve.

There are many aspects of such a programme whose details would need to be carefully refined. For instance, critical questions to be resolved are: which former jihadists or other prominent scholars should be brought into prison, which individuals should be sent to de-radicalisation centres (only those convicted for extremism-related offences or also ordinary prisoners who have been radicalised in prison?) or how the rewards offered to prisoners should be gradated to their process towards de-radicalisation. Another key question is whether some programmes (for example, meetings with outside scholars) should be only provided to extremist leaders or also to their supporters). It would also be necessary to decide what sort of individuals the deradicalisation centre should produce. For example, is the aim simply to get extremists to renounce terrorist violence in the UK or should they ultimately also disavow jihadist 117

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groups in the Middle East as well? The location of such a centre would also need discussing. Could existing prison facilities be suitably modified or would a purpose-built facility be necessary? The branding of the project would also be important with a positive sounding name such as ‘New Civilisation Project’ or the ‘Open Minds Programme’ potentially helping to reduce hostility and suspicion towards the project from Islamists both inside and out of prison.

It is important to realize that creating such a de-radicalisation centre that would involve concentrating a large number of known extremist is not without risk. It is also important to appreciate that de-radicalisation programmes will not achieve results overnight. However, it seems undeniable that over time most extremists in such a centre will begin to access de-radicalisation schemes. It equally seems like that such programmes, if effectively designed, will slowly encourage extremists to question their assumptions about Islam and about non-Muslims, and to slowly change their ideas as a result. The key to the strategy’s success is consistency over a long-period of time. Longterm strategies of this sort, especially ones that do not produce instantly quantifiable results, are always difficult to maintain given the inherent short-termism of democratic politics (this is particularly true in light of the often inconsistent and reactive nature of many recent British counter-extremism efforts). Once established, such as a centre would need to run for many years and perhaps for decades (particularly if future convictions continue to result in more Islamists entering the prison system over the coming years). In the long-run, however, the creation of such a centre would pay off both by helping to tackle extremism in British prisons and in wider society, which would both be vital towards building a more cohesive society but also by ultimately reducing the considerable financial costs of policing, monitoring and tackling such extremism.

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Appendix 1: The psychological effects of imprisonment without trial

One of the major consequences of these detainments without trial has been the psychological effect on the detainees. This is problematic at a moral level on account of the psychological damage that it causes people who might ultimately be found innocent and at a practical level in that it angers these prisoners against the British government and because their confinement without trial allows Islamists to depict the government as being discriminatory against Muslims.

Detainee M, a former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group who fought in Afghanistan in 1992250 and who was himself detained without trial, has said that: "As a friend, I knew some of them outside of the prison. Their behaviour and how they were when I saw them inside was completely different. They had lost weight and three or four of them had gone crazy."251

One of these prisoners, who was detained without trial from December 2001 to March 2005, was Mahmoud Abu Rideh, a Palestinian. Suffering from mental issues, he was admitted to Broadmoor psychiatric prison in 2002 from Belmarsh. In 2004, he was interviewed in Broadmoor in The Guardian and admitted to suffering from paranoia and hallucinations: "I hear voices. I put my radio off and the radio is still talking. It says you will stay in this hospital all your life. The hospital don't want me here. The Home Office don't want me to go back to prison. Give me an injection and I will be dead and they won't need to spend £140,000 a year on me being in this hospital."252

He also said that he had frequently attempted to commit suicide:

"I drink shampoo, I drink air freshener, I drink toilet cleaner ... Every week I try something. It's better than being here. The staff don't want me here. They hit me and the patients hit me. What I have been through in this place is worse than when I was detained in Israel when I was tortured. They have destroyed me."

In July 2008, Abu Rideh’s wife published an account that gave a similar account:

“My husband was a wreck, a shattered man. He could not sleep, he would sweat and shake, he would have nightmares and flashbacks. It was almost impossible to deal with him. He was ill and had complex psychological needs – I

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252

Audrey Gillan, 'For detainee M, still no explanation why he was locked up for 16 months', The Guardian, 23 April 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/apr/23/terrorism.humanrights>. Audrey Gillan, 'For detainee M, still no explanation why he was locked up for 16 months', The Guardian, 23 April 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/apr/23/terrorism.humanrights>.

'"Give Me An Injection and I Will Be Dead" - Interview with Detainee Mahmoud Abu Rideh', The Guardian, 5 May 2004. Available online at <http://www.cageprisoners.com/print.php?id=1488>. 119

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am not a trained nurse and he required specialist help. One week later he attempted suicide by taking an overdose of his depression and anti-psychotic medications. I found him on the floor unconscious, in a pool of vomit foam coming from his mouth. He was taken to the hospital and remained unconscious for three days.”253

Detainee ‘Z’, an Algerian who was detained for more than three-years without trial, before being released on a control order, also wrote of the problems that face those detained without trial: “Well for two and a half years as a hostage, I don't see it as a prisoner, because someone who is sent to a normal prison, he is someone who has committed murder or crime or a common law crime and he can have the chance to progress through the system, where he's in prison and at least he knows he maybe commit something, he commit something he is for that, I can't say he's guilty or not, it is not for me to judge, but at least he has been convicted by the court. For us it's different, we don't have any sort of mechanism. They say 'Okay, you are in prison for one year, or two years, or life' - you don't know when you are going to be released. For us, it's you are there, you don't know why you're there, so it's worse and we are put in small units, it's very claustrophobic, that affected all our mental health, we got all mental problems ... You are in a very small unit with a small number of people and this has been built as segregation - we were worse than someone who had committed something. So, it was like we were hostage, because when you put someone without any charge, without any reason, it's kidnapping; this hostage that you take from his family at 5 o'clock in the morning and they put you in jail and you go through an abusive legal system like this 'SIAC', it's very difficult to cope with.”254

Such problems appear to be widespread among detainees. In 2004, the Royal College of Psychiatrists reported that all of the eight detainees who were then held without trial under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Crime & Security Act were suffering significant mental illness as a result of their treatment. A report issued by the College, and based on interviews with the detainees in Belmarsh, said that:

“Having considered available evidence, the College is satisfied that the eight detainees examined do suffer from significant mental health problems. On balance, evidence points to the particular circumstances of this group’s detention contributing significantly to those health problems. Our best estimate is that indeterminate detention, lack of normal due legal process and the resultant sense of powerlessness, are likely to cause significant deterioration in detainees’ mental health.”255

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‘Life with a control order: A wife’s story’, The Independent, 3 July 2009, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/life-with-a-control-order-a-wives-story1729620.html>. Cageprisoners, ‘An interview with Detainee Z’, 28 May 2008, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=24642>. 120

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The College accepted that the “detainees have access to mental health services in prison, equal to that of other prisoners” but noted “that psychiatric treatment, however sophisticated it may be, cannot neutralize the deleterious impact on mental health of the particular nature of this group’s detention.”

Detaining individuals for years without trial – for whatever reason - is inhumane and immoral. It also damages the reputation and moral standing of the UK – making it easier for Islamists to recruit individuals to their cause.

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Appendix 2: Suggested books for Muslim prisoners

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Appendix 2: Suggested books for Muslim prisoners A full booklist is available from Quilliam on request.

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About the author:

James Brandon is a Senior Research Fellow at Quilliam where he is also Head of Communications. He has previously written reports for a number of thinktanks in the UK and the US on such diverse subjects as Islamist movements in the West and in the Middle East, extreme Islamist use of the internet, Kurdish separatist movements and honour-based violence in the UK. During 2002-7, he worked as a journalist, covering Islamic issues in Europe, the Middle East and Africa for a wide variety of British and US publications. In 2003-4 he was based in Baghdad, Iraq, where he worked for two start-up English language newspapers while also freelancing for a range of international media organisations. He has an MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London.