The Primary Source

a collection of history theses from the class of 2023

Carolina Lucas

Gianna

Michael Cai Julian Hough Iliana Weisberg Zou

the primary source

Vol. 18, Winter 2023

A Kultural Blow: The Mechanisms Behind German-American Assimilation Michael Cai

The Perpetual Foreigner: The Effects of Orientalism on United States Race Relations with Asians and Asian Americans During the Cold War (1945-1991) Julian Hough

The New Jersey Exception: How Political Interests in the State Allowed Women to Vote from 1776 to 1807 Carolina Lucas

The Scythe of Progress: Lincoln Center and the Complexity of Urban Renewal in New York City Iliana Weisberg

The Losing War on Drugs in Colombia: An Analysis of the Failure and Detrimental Effects of United States Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia Gianna Zou

Edited by: Michael Cai and Carolina Lucas

A Publication of Montclair Kimberley Academy Department of History 6 Lloyd Road, Montclair, NJ 07042

The Junior Thesis is not just a culmination of research and analysis conducted junior year— it is also a representation of the authors’ interests and future aspirations. From topics ranging from Urban Renewal to the Post-Civil War Opioid Crisis, the Junior Thesis enables students to dive deep into the nooks and crannies of the past, embracing the all-encompassing nature of history.

For the Class of 2023, junior year arrived after a semester of online classes, a year of hybrid school, and the loss of academic enthusiasm over the course of the pandemic. Our class was not only drained, but also falling behind in skills not thoroughly tested for two years. At the same time, the Class of 2023 embarked on one of the greatest academic challenges at MKA: the Junior Thesis. While the Thesis always represents a mountain to climb, for the Class of 2023, it was a steep and arduous journey. However, the climb to the completion of the Junior Thesis was not only one that resulted in a research paper. It also restored our once excited, driven, and intellectually curious class.

While the entire class persevered, some students thrived. The Primary Source comprises the accomplishments of five of these individuals. From cultural clashes within America to U.S. intervention abroad to the complex past of New Jersey itself, this year’s theses successfully crafted nuanced arguments that epitomize the wide scope of perspectives history has to offer. But more importantly, they characterize growth on the part of the authors, offering narratives more complex and compelling than the research papers written in Freshman or Sophomore year.

To the writers who seek out this book for advice, we hope that you find it. But it is also vital to remember your own strengths, perspectives, and trust in your process. It may seem like the top of the mountain is remarkably far away, but you will be there before you know it.

To the US History Department, thank you. Without the countless hours spent in your offices, your seemingly endless patience with us and our ideas, or invaluable feedback, you made the trek up the mountain possible.

Finally, to the entire Class of 2023, we did what once seemed impossible. You should be proud of your achievement and remember the lessons you learned along the way. Never cease being curious, believing in yourselves, or pursuing history in the way MKA has taught us.

Carolina Lucas ’23 Michael Cai ’23

Editors’ Note

A Kultural Blow: The Mechanisms Behind German-American Assimilation Michael Cai ............................................................................. 11

The Perpetual Foreigner: The Effects of Orientalism on United States Race Relations with Asians and Asian Americans During the Cold War (1945-1991) Julian Hough .......................................................................... 42

The New Jersey Exception: How Political Interests in the State Allowed Women to Vote from 1776 to 1807 Carolina Lucas ........................................................................ 78

The Scythe of Progress: Lincoln Center and the Complexity of Urban Renewal in New York City Iliana Weisberg ........................................................................ 98

The Losing War on Drugs in Colombia: An Analysis of the Failure and Detrimental Effects of United States Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia Gianna Zou ............................................................................115

Contributors’ Notes

Michael Cai

Michael Cai lives in Short Hills, New Jersey, and has attended MKA since eighth grade. At MKA, he leads the Asian Cultural Society, Junior Classics League, and Linguistics Club. He’s also a part of the Student Committee for Extracurricular Organizations, as well as Global Leadership Committee, in which he helps design the Chinese pen-pal program. Michael is a selfproclaimed “language nerd,” having studied Chinese, Latin, Attic Greek, and Korean throughout his high school career. He has also learned a surprising amount of German (i.e. a couple words here and there—which is still surprising) by researching his paper on German-American culture, a topic which was inspired by his fondness towards world languages and cultures. Outside of school he volunteers at the National Museum of Language, enjoys reading Greek mythology, and engages in partially-productive rabbit holes related to linguistics and etymology. Michael would like to thank Dr. Jacobs, whose enthusiasm for scholarship constantly serves as an inspiration for him to delve deeper into research, and Dr. Korfhage, who provided invaluable help during his research process and molded his way of analytical thinking and argumentation. Additionally, Michael would like to thank Ms. Mueller, who in passing mentioned that her name was an anglicized German name, a remark which ended up giving Michael inspiration for one of his paragraphs.

Julian Hough

Julian Hough lives in Wyckoff, New Jersey, and has attended MKA since ninth grade. He has been a trombonist in MKA’s Jazz Band, a long-distance swimmer in MKA’s Varsity Swimming, and a member of MKA’s Student Ethics Committee for all four years of high school. He is also co-leader of MKA’s Entrepreneurship Club, working on a business idea that rewards environmentally-friendly actions. In addition to being a student at MKA, he is a graduate of the 2022 New Jersey Scholars Program, where he continued his research in cultural diplomacy during the Cold War period, and a member of the 2022 West Point Summer Leadership Experience, where he got up at 5:30 every morning for physical drills. His research paper about the Cold War vaccine diplomacy was named one of the national finalists at 2022-2023 National History Day. Outside of school, he is an avid collector of war photo books and a fan of history documentaries. Julian would like to acknowledge that this Junior Thesis was inspired by his grandfather, who served in the Korean War. Julian would like to thank Ms. Salkin for her encouragement and help on his National History Day project as well as his Junior Thesis. He would also like to thank Dr. Korfhage for his guidance throughout his four years of high school.

Carolina Lucas

Carolina Lucas lives in Montclair, New Jersey, and has attended MKA since the sixth grade. Carolina is a Co-Chair of both the Student Diversity and Leadership Committee and the Global Leadership Committee. During the spring of her junior year, Carolina spent a semester in Washington, DC, studying and living at the School for Ethics and Global Leadership. Additionally, she serves as a Captain of MKA’s Mock Trial Team, a leader of Unidos @ MKA (the Latin Affinity Group), and a Co-Editor in Chief of the Lattice, a publication of analytical student writing at MKA. She is also a member of the Girl’s Soccer and Track and Field teams. In her free time, Carolina enjoys watching movies with her family, visiting New York, and traveling. Carolina first came across the topic of women’s suffrage in NJ during her summer assignment for US History, and was immediately interested. In her pursuit of uncovering how and why women were able to vote in colonial New Jersey, she spent hours researching at the New Jersey Historical Society’s newspaper and election poll archives. In doing so, she found a love for archival research and getting one’s hands dirty in the pursuit of history. Carolina would like to thank her parents and sister for many late nights of unwavering support, and their fostering of her love of history. She would also like to thank Dr. Korfhage for his steadfast support and invaluable advice in pursuing a topic that was not easy or simple.

Iliana Weisberg

Iliana Weisberg lives in Short Hills, New Jersey, and has attended MKA since eleventh grade. She is a co-leader of the Jewish Cultural Society, a member of Linguistics Club, and a member of Library Leadership. She is a dedicated performer in dramatic and musical productions at MKA and elsewhere, as well as a ten year member of and section leader in the New Jersey Youth Chorus. Iliana also pursues advanced studies in Shakespearean acting, music theory and composition, and classical voice. It was this lifelong love for the performing arts that led her to an interest in researching Lincoln Center. Although this was what initially appealed to her, in the process of writing she gained a deeper understanding of bureaucracy, urban policy, clashes between cultures, and Cold War attitudes in the United States. Iliana hopes that people come away from her paper with a more nuanced appreciation for what culture can mean and a willingness to question the invisible costs of great achievements. She would like to thank Ms. Salkin for her constant support, guidance, and encouragement, and especially Peter Clark, the archivist at the Metropolitan Opera House, for allowing her to take advantage of the resources in the Met Opera Archives.

Gianna Zou

Gianna Zou lives in West Orange, New Jersey and has attended MKA since 7th grade. She is the leader of the STEM Team, co-chair of the Global Leadership Committee, and a member of the Student Ethics Committee, Student Council of Extracurricular Organizations, and Model UN. Outside of school, Gianna dances for a company, competing in regional and national competitions annually. She also dedicates much of her time to the youth engineering program she created in West Orange, Girls Engineering the Future. Gianna first became interested in the US-Colombia cocaine trade after watching a documentary about the notorious king of cocaine, Pablo Escobar. Aware of the dangers of the cocaine trade and use, she decided to research the preventative measures taken by the US government to decrease the flow of cocaine into the nation. Early on in her research, Gianna discovered that counternarcotic policies targeted cocaine production in Colombia, rather than rising cocaine demand in the US. With her paper, Gianna hopes that readers will be more conscious of not just the consequences of cocaine on health but also of the ineffective and harmful anti-drug policies implemented in Colombia. Gianna would like to thank Dr. Korfhage for his thoughtful feedback and guidance throughout the research process and Mr. Bosc for his advice and expertise in Latin American studies.

A Kultural Blow:

The Mechanisms behind German-American Assimilation

On the night of November 1901, Charles Hexamer, president of Pennsylvania’s German Society, held a large “all-German bazaar.”

Before it commenced, he began with a speech framing the celebration as a “comingtogether of the Germans of the city … dedicated to brotherly love and beneficence.”1 Indeed, during the late 19th to early 20th century, German-American culture was pervasive in society. But by the late 1900s, German-Americans maintained a remarkably low-profile cultural standing, with only 20% considering themselves German.2 Within less than a century, a once prolific ethnic group had virtually dissipated into nothing. The current literature on assimilation indicates that such a profound cleansing would emerge from the desire to adopt a more Americanized culture, and that external pressures would only drive the community farther away. To an extent, this model was initially accurate. During early WWI, the public’s attacks on German identity sparked heightened cultural expression and anti-patriotism. However, the effects of government intervention after U.S. involvement in the war contradicted this notion of assimilation. To promote a unified, “American” culture, the government used top-down force to override the group’s natural reactions. It then intensified suppression over fundamental aspects of German culture, forcing communities to assimilate even more. What ensued was a decline in the group’s oncelively ethnic identity. While the public’s anti-German movement sparked cultural backlash from German-Americans, the government’s crusade against the ethnicity ultimately fueled their dramatic Americanization by suppressing such resistance and other fundamental means of cultural expression, thereby triggering a sharp decline in ethnic prevalence.

Ca i

The current literature on guided assimilation indicates that successful methods embrace a mingling between immigrant and American culture.

1 Russell A. Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 17.

2 Steven L. Schlossman, “Is There an American Tradition of Bilingual Education? German in the Public Elementary Schools, 1840-1919,” American Journal of Education 91, no. 2 (February 1983): 155, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/1085040; Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 1.

Michael

It primarily maintains that Americanization succeeds when immigrant groups are encouraged to genuinely love both their native home and adopted country. This mindset would prompt them to combine the two cultures and assimilate in the process.3 Conversely, because the process of assimilation rests chiefly on ethnic groups’ willingness to adopt American culture, the literature holds that if society antagonizes that ethnicity, it would discourage them from adopting the culture of the people who effectively alienized them.4 As one Russian newspaper wrote in 1919,

Many Americanization Committees only exist on paper. They make much noise, get themselves in newspapers, but do not do much good. They mostly laugh at the poor foreigners. If Americans want to help the immigrants, they must meet them with love. The immigrant is by no means stupid. He feels the patronizing attitude the American [Americanizers] adopts towards him, and therefore never opens his soul.5

Studies have also cited that past immigrants generally embraced liberal Americanizers who promoted the mixing of cultures and rejected those forcefully pressuring Americanization.6 As such, it would be reasonable to consider tolerant methods of Americanization as the superior mode of guided assimilation.

In contrast to this strategy, the public engaged in an anti-German movement as a response to German threats early in WWI. For instance, attacks fueled anti-spy hysteria among the people, prompting them to

3 June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004), 10, http://books.google.com/ books?vid=ISBN9781592137800.

4 Many studies have referenced this idea. See, for example, Nathan Glazer, “Is Assimilation Dead?,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530 (November 1993): 122, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/1047681; Otto Hieronymi, “Identity, Integration and Assimilation: Factors of Success and Failure of Migration,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 24, no. 4 (January 1, 2005): 138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdi095; Edward George Hartmann, The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1948), 23.

5 Alex Nowrasteh, “The Failure of the Americanization Movement,” Cato Institute, last modified December 18, 2014, https://www.cato.org/blog/ failure-americanization-movement.

6 John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 18601925 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 253-254.

brand German-Americans as potential traitors through cartoons and propaganda. This hysteria mostly originated from domestic threats, including German professor Eric Muenter, who in 1915 attempted a Senate bombing, and emigrant workers, whom Germany encouraged to stop producing Ally goods.7 In response to these threats, one cartoon depicted strong ties between German espionage and Kultur (the traditional language and culture of Germans and German-Americans) by portraying the German-American population as a minefield of spies and dubbing the situation as “the new intensive Kultur” (Appendix A).

Other attacks on German identity explicitly branded German immigrants as spies and terrorists. A cartoon titled “His Shelter” in The Chicago Daily News was a manifestation of the previously mentioned paranoia against German emigrant workers. It portrayed them as spies who used citizenship as a disguise while they sabotaged American industry (Appendix B). Beside domestic attacks, the 1915 German sinking of a passenger steamer called the Lusitania also incited vilifying cartoons. One cartoon from The New York Herald depicted a German-American providing “inside information” to Germany in light of the Lusitania’s sinking (Appendix C). Indeed, events such as these had sparked an overreaction from the American populace that evolved into outright spyhysteria against the German-American population.

The public’s reaction to wartime attacks was not limited to spy-hysteria, as society also began associating German identity with uncivilized barbarism. In fact, after the sinking of the Lusitania, most Americans began to identify Kultur with brutality, a sentiment which was again especially pronounced in cartoons.8 On May 22, 1915, The Literary Digest published a cartoon in which an attacking submarine representing Kultur was juxtaposed to its supposed victim, a ship resembling the Lusitania labeled “Civilization” (Appendix D). German Kultur was thus associated with a type of barbarism that “sank” civilization and the principles it stood for.9 In another cartoon, The Columbus Dispatch went as far as to pressure citizens to sever all connections to German heritage

7 Melissa D. Burrage, The Karl Muck Scandal: Classical Music and Xenophobia in World War I America (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2019), 350, https://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN9781592137800.

8 Katja Wüstenbecker, “German-Americans during World War I,” Immigrant Entrepreneurship: 1720 to the Present, last modified September 19, 2014, https://www.immigrantentrepreneurship.org/entries/german-americansduring-world-war-i/.

9 Frank Trommler, “The Lusitania Effect: America’s Mobilization against Germany in World War I,” German Studies Review 32, no. 2 (May 2009): 250, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574799.

(Appendix E). This cartoon depicted “The Mother Country” as wearing a pickelhaube, a German war helmet with a protruding ornament mounted on top. Since the pickelhaube was commonly used to associate Germany with ferocity, the newspaper effectively likened ties to Germany with ties to barbarism.10 German violence during the war additionally served as inspiration for Thomas Dixon Jr.’s silent film, The Fall of a Nation, in which foreign soldiers and immigrant traitors attacked the U.S. Not only did the film’s slides mention the invaders’ “looting of New York,” “rape of its women,” and “murder of its men,” but it also brought attention to their “strong Germanic names.”11 Once again, through visual propaganda, German identity had been associated with brutality.

In addition to visual means of promoting anti-German hysteria, the public also employed rhetorical tactics to vilify the German-American population for wartime attacks. For instance, in the aftermath of the Lusitania’s sinking, newspaper headlines inflamed existing antagonism. In 1915, New York’s The Evening Telegram highlighted the sadistic nature of the German New Yorkers in the headline, “Germans Make Merry Over Sea Disaster: Teutons [a derogatory term for Germans] gather in favorite restaurant where toasts are drunk to commander of submarine which sunk the Lusitania—German ‘Kultur’ is lauded.”12 Around 1915 to 1916, the term “hun” also emerged as a rhetorical tactic to disparage Germans and German-Americans.13 In 1916 The New York Times used the term in reaction to wartime catastrophes, publishing an article titled, “Tells of Leaving L-19 Crew to Die: ‘Remembered what the Huns have done,’ says British skipper, explaining his act.”14 This anti-German hysteria became so widespread that prominent citizens gave speeches vilifying German-Americans as “hyphens,” a diminishingterm used for immigrants. In October 1915, former president Theodore Roosevelt even stated:

10 Peter Doyle, The First World War in 100 Objects (Stroud, England: History Press, 2014), 35-36.

11 Peter Conolly-Smith, “Casting Teutonic Types from the Nineteenth Century to World War I: German Ethnic Stereotypes in Print, on Stage, and Screen,” Columbia Journal of American Studies 9 (Fall 2009): 66, http://www.columbia. edu/cu/cjas/conolly-smith-1.html.

12 “Germans Make Merry over Sea Disaster,” The Evening Telegram (New York, NY), May 8, 1915, https://www.loc.gov/resource/2004540423/1915-05-08/ed-1/.

13 Harold D. Lasswell, “Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919. James Morgan Read,” The Journal of Modern History 14, no. 4 (December 1942): 17, https://doi. org/10.1086/236676.

14 “Tells of Leaving L-19 Crew to Die,” The New York Times (New York, NY), February 5, 1916, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1916/02/05/ issue.html.

There is no room in this country for hyphenated Americanism … The men who do not become Americans and nothing else are hyphenated Americans; and there ought to be no room for them in this country… He has no place here; and the sooner he returns to the land to which he feels his real heart-allegiance, the better it will be for every good American. There is no such thing as a hyphenated American who is a good American. The only man who is a good American is the man who is an American and nothing else.15

Though Roosevelt extended the discrimination to all “hyphenated Americans,” he nonetheless further fanned the flames of the wartime anti-German hysteria.

In response, German-Americans heightened their already strong cultural presence as an initial form of backlash against these nativist sentiments. By the early 20th century, the ethnicity already had a prominent cultural standing. Having resided on American soil before the country’s founding and immigrated in large waves during the 1800s, they had already grown to be the largest ethnic population by the turn of the 20th century.16 The population’s numbers translated into many other facets of cultural prevalence. By 1850, for instance, Gemütlichkeit, or “sociability,” festivals and German picnics attracted tens of thousands of GermanAmericans.17 Some schools in cities such as Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and Milwaukee even offered German as a primary language of instruction.18 The group’s pervasiveness also extended to the press; in fact, by the end of the 19th century, 4 out of 5 foreign language newspapers were written in German, and by 1890, the United States saw over 1,000

15 Nancy Mae Antrim, Seeking Identity: Language in Society (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2021), 88-89, https://books.google.com/ books?vid=ISBN9781592137800.

16 Don Heinrich Tolzmann, “German-American Studies: History and Development,” Monatshefte 80, no. 3 (Fall 1988): 279, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/30161608; Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Table 4. World Region and Country or Area of Birth of the Foreign-Born Population, With Geographic Detail Shown in Decennial Census Publications of 1930 or Earlier: 1850 to 1930 and 1960 to 2000.,” table, February 2006, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/ Census/library/working-papers/2006/demo/POP-twps0081.pdf.

17 Heike Bungert, “The Singing Festivals of German Americans, 1849–1914,” American Music 34, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 149, https://doi.org/10.5406/ americanmusic.34.2.0141.

18 Schlossman, “Is There,” 155-156.

German newspapers.19 By the beginning of the first World War, the GermanAmerican community was already a prevalent force within society.

During the 1915-1917 period, German-Americans expressed an even stronger, pro-German public identity to combat the pressures of abandoning their heritage. During this time, German newspapers began pushing back against discriminatory attacks.20 The Süd California Deutsche Zeitung published articles promoting culture and heritage organizations “to awaken and strengthen the sense of unity among the people of German origin in America with a view … to check nativistic encroachments.”21 In a similar vein, the Illinois Staats-Zeitung published a piece called “We Protest,” in which it combated the dissemination of anti-German material from the American press:

Some newspapers continue to publish articles with the object of inciting hatred against the German-Americans … The German language press has … warned against hysteries and against, what is worse, frame-ups of which there have been a good number … it has warned the German officials in this country not to allow themselves to be, as some of them unfortunately were, misguided by such frame-ups.22

German-Americans also held speeches denouncing the pressure to abandon Kultur, such as the following address given by second-generation immigrant George Seibel in 1916:

During the past two years a new disease has made its appearance in the United States, a malignant malady which no one had ever suspected before. It originated in

19 Barbara Burnaby and Thomas Ricento, Language and Politics in the United States and Canada: Myths and Realities (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 222, https://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN9781592137800.

20 James M. Bergquist, “German Communities in American Cities: An Interpretation of the Nineteenth-Century Experience,” Journal of American Ethnic History 4, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 12, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27500350; Frederick C. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974), 285.

21 “National German Alliance and its Purposes,” Süd California Deutsche Zeitung (San Diego, CA), July 21, 1916, https://cdnc.ucr. edu/?a=d&d=SCDZ19160721.2.6.

22 “We Protest. (From ‘Illinois Staats-Zeitung’.),” Süd California

Deutsche Zeitung (San Diego, CA), August 3, 1917, https://cdnc.ucr. edu/?a=d&d=SCDZ19170803.

something that seems to be harmless enough—a mere mark of punctuation … If you are a German-American… the hyphen is as dreadful as the brand of Cain … but [German-Americans] know that the hyphen is a mark of union, not of separation … Still as a rock of granite will they stand, amid the storm of calumny and defamation, to save our country from a new British Conquest.23

Besides employing counter-rhetoric, Germans also flocked to organizations such as the National German-American Alliance (NGAA), whose intentions were openly to “preserve German culture in America” and resist “forces of assimilation.”24 The fact that membership growth peaked around 19161917, with numbers essentially doubling in two years, indicated that wartime discrimination pushed German-Americans to engage in a pattern of proGerman defiance against Americanizing pressures.25

Wanting to further resist the societal pressure to Americanize during the early war era, German-Americans also reinforced this sense of Kultur within their private lives. To accomplish this, in 1917 more GermanAmericans began giving distinctively German names to children, as measured in GNI (German Name Index), which determines the “Germanness” of a name by comparing its frequency among German populations as opposed to the rest of society. Specifically, the GNI of German-American children’s names grew by about 4-5% more than that of a pre-war control study.26 Similarly, more members of the ethnicity became devoted German Methodists during the war to further the extent of Kultur within their personal belief systems. In fact, members peaked in early 1917 at 60,000-70,000 across 740 congregations.27 Personal letters expressed an even more combative sentiment, as expressed in a letter from Eugen Haas to his uncle on October 1915:

23 George Seibel, “The Hyphen in American History,” speech, August 31, 1916, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=loc.ark:/13960/ t9x06gh7t&view=1up&seq=1&skin=2021.

24 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 98; Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 130; Charles T. Johnson, Culture at Twilight: The National German-American Alliance, 19011918 (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 1999), 3.

25 Johnson, Culture at Twilight, 15.; Andreas Hübner, “A People of ‘Patriotic Hearts’: German-Americans, U.S. Neutrality, and the Building of an Inclusive Coalition in New Orleans, 1915,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 60, no. 3 (Summer 2019): 268, https://www. jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26864714.

26 Fouka, “Backlash: The Unintended,” 39.

27 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 40.

This is a time when we have to say farewell to all pleasures … all strength has to be gathered together … to contribute so that the German oak is not smashed. And it will go on existing; for it draws its strength from the home ground and, thank God, does not depend on outside help. With things German everything is strong, brazen, made of iron and genuine … We do not talk with protests and assurances, with empty words, but here the German fist preserves its right and crushes the lying and deceiving brood of vipers.28

Indeed, the backlash signified not only a heightened sense of cultural identity within the personal life, but also an increased expression of hostility towards Americanization as well.

After the U.S. joined the war in 1917, the government intensified efforts to quash these platforms of cultural resistance, fueling Americanization within the German-American community. The government especially censored dissent in the press, forcing a homogeneous sense of patriotism within German communities. The Espionage Act of 1917 enabled the Postmaster General to remove from circulation any newspaper which threatened the war effort, combating the spread of cultural newspapers that advocated for a unified German identity.29 For instance, under the act federal agents arrested high-ranking staff of the German newspaper Tageblatt, crippling the company and limiting its voice in a rapidly Americanizing population.30 Later, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 forced foreign language newspapers to be approved by the Post Office. The resulting financial and technical obstacles that came with these mandates led to a 47% decline in German-American presses by the end of the war.31 The 1918 Sedition Act gave Post Offices the similar right to intercept deliveries of radical “nonmailable material”; the government considered many German-American newspapers as radical, and thus they comprised a sizable portion of the 320 newspapers lost by 1920.32 On the other hand, other ethnic groups’ newspapers suffered minimal

28 Eugen Haas, “Eugen Haas to Eugen Klee, October 7, 1915,” 1915, in Eugen and Emma Klee Letters, 1, PDF.

29 Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase and Ursula Lehmkuhl, Enemy Images in American History (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997), 199, http://books.google.com/ books?vid=ISBN9781592137800.

30 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 188.

31 Robert Justin Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America from 1870 to 1976 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 109.

32 Fiebig-von Hase and Lehmkuhl, Enemy Images, 199.

effects. The Irish press, for instance, lost minor magazines and about 80% fewer newspapers than the German press.33 Rather, the government had particularly targeted and removed platforms of German expression.

The government also brought about the dissolution of German cultural organizations in response to their popularity as vessels for resistance. In 1918, the Senate threatened to repeal the charter of the now infamous NGAA, pressuring the association to accept the inevitable and disband. With it dissolved one of the most influential platforms of German cultural expression and preservation.34 Charles Hexamer even stressed its importance in this regard: “It has been plainly proved that only a united and powerful Germanism strengthened from within, such as is presented in the National German-American Alliance, can attain the many objects whose accomplishment is our ideal and most honorable task.”35 To avoid further government persecution and public harassment, other German organizations had little option other than to similarly reincarnate themselves as entirely new, Americanized organizations. For instance, Wisconsin’s Deutscher club and Chicago’s Germania Club, fearing the worst, became the Wisconsin Club in 1917 and Lincoln Club in 1918, respectively.36 Cultural platforms were not all dissolved willingly, however. A federal committee headed by Senator William King revoked state charters for some German cultural organizations and stripped the legal foundation away from others, forcing them to wither away. Consequently, between 1917 and 1918, cultural platforms like the Connecticut German bicycle club and shooting club had entirely dissolved.37 In the end, the government had prompted the dissolution of countless platforms for German resistance and expression.

Motivated by general anti-pacifist sentiments, the government even countered German-American resistance to war efforts by persecuting individual dissenters, thereby replacing any cultural distinction with an

33 Horace C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War: 1917-1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 95.

34 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 182.

35 Bill to Repeal the Act Entitled “An Act to Incorporate the National German-American Alliance”: Hearings on S. 3529 Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918). https:// curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/immigration-to-the-united-states-1789-1930/ catalog/39-990067876840203941.

36 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 270; Melvin G. Holli, “German-American Ethnic Identity from 1890 Onward: The Chicago Case,” The Great Lakes Review 11, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 8, https://doi.org/10.2307/20172720.

37 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 269-270.

Americanized sense of patriotism. For instance, the American Protective League (APL), established by the Department of Justice, intensified their treatment of German-Americans, illegally searching through their mail and arresting individuals to limit resistance.38 When recounting a community meeting in April 1917, the German Elk City News-Democrat described the hysteria as something “all but one of the speakers … were against.”39 The APL’s Philadelphia chapter nevertheless targeted more than 18,000 people in 1917 and 1918, most of whom were arrested for unpatriotic or defamatory speech. Eventually, according to a 1918 APL newsletter, “there was little or no disturbance and few attempts to resist the authority of the League,” indicating that the APL had quashed German-American resistance.40 Furthermore, on July 1917, GermanAmericans held an anti-draft rally in Minnesota, but in response, the governor suspended officials who partook in the gathering. He also initiated a “resistance-suppressing brainwashing program,” consisting of a rally during which German-Americans were forced to exhibit patriotic loyalty.41 German Mennonites and other German religious groups who adhered to pacifism were additionally imprisoned; some were even targeted by the military and forced to kiss flags.42 In turn, 1917 saw an intense decline in German Mennonites: some terminated parochial schools and over 1,500 emigrated to Canada, leaving behind a less defiant and less culturally distinctive German-American population.43

In addition to overriding German-Americans’ cultural backlash, the government also Americanized fundamental elements of German culture by strengthening America’s nativist environment. The large-scale restriction of foreign languages within daily life, for instance, forced the German-American community to Americanize through speech. To promote linguistic assimilation, Iowa passed the Babel proclamation in 1918 which banned any public use of foreign language, and some states required children to recite a “Watch Your Speech Pledge:”

“I love the United States of America. I love my country’s language. I promise: 1) that I will not dishonor my country’s speech by leaving off the last syllables of words;

38 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 175.

39 Elk City News-Democrat (Elk City, OK), April 12, 1917, sec. 1, PDF.

40 Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 45, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335491.001.0001; Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 175.

41 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 239.

42 Fiebig-von Hase and Lehmkuhl, Enemy Images, 202-203.

43 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 289.

2) that I will say a good American “yes” and “no” in place of … a foreign “ya” or “yeh” or “nope;” 3) that I will do my best to improve American speech by avoiding loud harsh tones, by enunciating distinctly and speaking pleasantly, clearly and sincerely; 4) that I will try to make my country’s language beautiful for the many boys and girls of foreign nations who come here to live; 5) that I will learn to articulate correctly one word a day for one year.”44

These anti-foreign language attitudes were especially stern when concerning German. Steeleville, Illinois, for instance, passed an ordinance prohibiting the use of German at all times, with any violation resulting in arrest.45 South Dakota followed suit, forbidding any public use of German except in emergencies.46 Consequently, out of sixteen major foreign language-speaking ethnicities, the number of secondgeneration German speakers grew the least by 1920 (Appendix F), leading to the gradual Americanization of German-American posterity.

Government restrictions over foreign languages were equally prevalent in education, which helped to further assimilate the German-American youth. The Smith-Towner Act of 1918 prohibited states from benefiting from federal funds “unless [the state] enacted and enforced laws requiring that the chief language of instruction in all schools, public and private, be English.” The act prompted monolingual environments in the fifteen states that met its demands, some of which restricted all foreign language education before a certain grade, while others—such as Colorado, Indiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Dakota— particularly banned the teaching of German in its entirety.47 Indeed, many states emphasized the restriction of German. For instance, the governor of Montana, stating “there shall be no temporizing with treason in Montana,” prohibited German instruction in any educational facility and the distribution or use of any German textbook, an action which was later imitated in Louisiana.48 Nebraska and other state councils of defense

44 Stephen J. Frese, “Divided by a Common Language: The Babel Proclamation and Its Influence in Iowa History,” The History Teacher 39, no. 1 (November 1, 2005): 1, https://doi.org/10.2307/30036745; Dennis E. Baron, The EnglishOnly Question: An Official Language for Americans? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 155.

45 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 16. 46 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 252. 47 Amanda K. Kibler, “Speaking Like a ‘Good American’: National Identity and the Legacy of German-Language Education,” Teachers College Record 110, no. 6 (2008), https://www.tcrecord.org/Content.asp?ContentId=14725.

48 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 252.

even banned the teaching of German in Lutheran schools. Lutheran churches described this decision as “detrimental to the future of the Lutheran Church in this country.”49 By the early 1920s the number of students studying German had already declined from 24.4% to less than 1%; meanwhile, instruction of other languages experienced little if any drop among schools (Appendix G). Government restriction had once again incited linguistic assimilation.

German names were even anglicized in the wake of this governmentperpetuated hysteria. Many of these changes emerged as the war progressed and the government began to intensify its defamation of German-Americans, stressing particularly the duty to avoid or sabotage German-American “traitors.” This environment was exhibited through propaganda, such as posters that inflamed the existing spy-paranoia (Appendix H), and speeches, such as a 1918 speech by the former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, in which he claimed that German-Americans “bite and squeal and scratch” more than any other animal.50 While earlywar newspaper rhetoric mirrored this situation, the more authoritative government propaganda actually inspired individuals to take action. The frenzy sparked rumors of supposed spies, and citizens began organizing boycotts of German stores.51 As a result, a spokesman for GermanAmerican salesmen commented that, “[sauerkraut] consumption had decreased about 75 per cent … there has been a peculiar prejudice against it; to such an extent … we thought of changing the name.”52 German product names were thus anglicized due to the government’s movement against Kultur: sauerkraut became “liberty cabbage” and hamburgers became “liberty sandwiches.”53 The Kaiser-Huhn grocery store of St. Louis, Missouri, renamed itself the Pioneer Grocery

49 The Lutheran Witness, Volume 37 (Cleveland, OH), 1918, https://www.google. com/books/edition/The_Lutheran_Witness/LyEsAQAAMAAJ.

50 James W. Gerard, “Loyalty,” speech, 1917, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ ED475784.pdf.

51 Liesl K. Miller, “The Great War: Ethnic Conflict for Chicago’s GermanAmericans,” OAH Magazine of History 2, no. 4 (Fall 1987): 50, https://www. jstor.org/stable/25162568.

“Sauerkraut May Be ‘Liberty Cabbage,’” The New York Times (New York, NY), April 25, 1918, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1918/04/25/96864971.html?pageNumber=10.

53 Daniel J. Leab, “Screen Images of the ‘Other’ in Wilhelmine Germany & the United States, 1890-1918,” Film History 9, no. 1 (1997): 55, https://www.jstor. org/stable/3815291.

Company after people began throwing stones at its drivers.54 This trend even extended to surnames; in 1917 The Washington Herald stated, “scenting peril to their business interests from having Teutonic names, several persons of German birth or ancestry have applied … to change their names.”55 Eventually, names such as Müller and Schmidt were Americanized into Miller and Smith.56

Government antagonism even influenced classical music, forcing German communities to restrict a significant medium of cultural pride. German classical music was considered a cultural staple at the turn of the century. In fact, composer Robert Schumann stated:

When the German speaks of symphonies [it represents] his joy, his pride. As Italy has its Naples, France its Revolution, England its Navy, etc., so the Germans have their Beethoven symphonies. The German forgets in his Beethoven that he has no school of painting; with Beethoven he imagines that he has reversed the fortunes of the battles that he lost to Napoleon; he even dares to place him on the same level with Shakespeare.”57

However, after German conductor Karl Muck of the Boston Symphony forgot to play the Star Spangled Banner before his performance, Governor Warfield of Maryland helped agitate a rally against people of German descent, proclaiming, “I would gladly lead the mob to prevent the insult to … the birthplace of the ‘Star Spangled Banner.’”58 In response the Metropolitan Opera in November 1917 canceled their German repertoire to “contain nothing

54 Chris Richardson, “With Liberty and Justice for All?: The Suppression of the German-American Culture During World War I,” Missouri Historical Review 90, no. 1 (October 1995): 86, https://digital.shsmo.org/digital/collection/mhr/ id/47762.

“Many German Names Changed Since War,” The Washington Herald (Washington, D.C., WA), May 13, 1917, https://www.loc.gov/resource/ sn83045433/1917-05-13/ed-1/.

56 Robert E. Bartholomew and Anja Reumschüssel, American Intolerance: Our Dark History of Demonizing Immigrants (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2018), 120-121.

57 Celia Applegate, “What Is German Music? Reflections on the Role of Art in the Creation of the Nation,” German Studies Review 15 (1992): 1, https://doi. org/10.2307/1430638.

58 Bartholomew and Reumschüssel, American Intolerance, 132-133.

to cause the least offense to the most patriotic American.”59 Heavy restrictions were placed on classical German pieces, with almost a third of the entire repertoire being eliminated.60 For the same reason, in 1918 the Metropolitan Opera reluctantly banned all works of cultural figureheads like Wagner and other German composers.61 That same year, the city of Pittsburgh outlawed Beethoven’s music in its entirety, and as a result of these actions, German operas greatly fell in prominence (Appendix I).62 Therefore, by agitating hysteria and directly enforcing restrictions, the government once again reduced a cultural staple of the German-American community.

The classical oeuvre was not the only victim of musical persecution, as the government’s anti-German environment also brought about the decline of more common cultural pieces. German singing societies, for instance, were primary communicators of folk songs, but as officials continued to intensify anti-German rhetoric, these societies saw less traction, translating to a decline in songs that defined the culture’s distinctiveness.63 The Houston Sängerbund stated that during the 1917-1918 era, “not only the world war, but also the various state legislators … have added to our discomforts … our total membership stands at 454 as against 622 for the previous year.”64 The state of California later issued a 1918 ban prohibiting the teaching of German songs in textbooks, so the dissemination of these cultural hallmarks also declined during the war.65 Even contemporary music abandoned German traits. According to musicologist Charles Hamm, before the war contemporary songs “resemble[d] Ländler, with beer and garden oom-pah-pah accompaniments.”66 But as the government’s Committee on Public Information used propaganda to incite a movement

“Halt German Opera at Metropolitan,” The New York Times (New York, NY), November 2, 1917, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1917/11/02/102374059.html?pageNumber=13.

60 J. E. Vacha, “When Wagner Was Verboten: The Campaign Against German Music in World War I,” New York History 64, no. 2 (April 1983): 174-175, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23173920.

61 Burrage, The Karl, 367.

62 Erik Kirschbaum and Herbert W. Stupp, Burning Beethoven: The Eradication of German Culture in the United States during World War I (New York, NY: Berlinica, 2015), 132.

63 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 19; Burrage, The Karl, 115.

64 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 199; Theodore G. Gish, The History of the Houston Sängerbund (Houston, TX: The Institute of Texas-German Studies, 1990), 9, https://www.houstonsaengerbund.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ Houston_Saengerbund_History.pdf.

65 Kirschbaum and Stupp, Burning Beethoven, 133.

66 Charles Hamm, “Irving Berlin’s Early Songs as Biographical Documents,” The Musical Quarterly 77, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 12, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/742426.

of anxiety within the music industry, musicians abandoned German styles for more patriotic music.67 German-American composer Ted Snyder, for instance, who composed culturally-influenced songs like Herman, Let’s Dance that Beautiful Waltz (1910) and Oh, How That German Could Love (1910), would instead publish patriotic pieces like Teddy (1919) (Appendix J) and Let’s All Be Americans Now (1917).68 This shift in the music industry characterized the general decline of common German pieces in society, and on a larger scale, the decline of German-American culture as a whole.

In the aftermath of such an extensive crusade of suppression, GermanAmericans saw a significant decline in cultural prominence. For instance, throughout the post-war era, the German-American population’s use of language experienced dramatic Americanization. By the end of the war in 1918, most Philadelphian German-Americans avoided speaking German in public. As Minna Werner, daughter of Tageblatt editor-in-chief Louis Werner, recalled, “the use of German on the streets dropped off very considerably.”69 In fact, out of several other ethnicities between 1910 and 1940, the percent decrease of total native language speakers was the largest for German-Americans (Appendix K). Though 9 million people spoke German in the U.S. during the early 1900s, by the mid 20th century, out of all descendants under 18, only 50,000 were native speakers. In fact, the number of German speakers under 18 declined around 98% from 1920.70 Moreover, ever since German students declined from 24.4% of foreign-language students to 0.6% between 1915 and 1922, they have never comprised more than 3.3% of enrollments, which again points to the dramatic Americanization of younger, post-war generations.71

This government-incited hysteria also led to a precipitous decline in German religion after the war. Many government officials openly

67 Barbara L. Tischler, An American Music: The Search for an American Musical Identity (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), 70.

68 Jane Mathieu, “Let’s All Be Americans Now: Patriotism, Assimilation and Uplift in American Popular Song of World War I,” Journal of Music Research Online, September 19, 2019, 2-3, PDF.

69 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 192.

70 The Census Bureau, Age of the Foreign-Born Population, by Mother Tongue and Sex, for the United States, by Regions: 1960-Con., table, 1966, PDF; The Census Bureau, Mother Tongue of the Foreign White Stock by Nativity and Parentage, for the United States: 1920 and 1910., table, 1922, PDF; Kibler, “Speaking Like.”

71 Bernd Hüppauf and Andreas Gardt, Globalization and the Future of German (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2004), 282, https://doi. org/10.1515/9783110197297.

promoted resentment towards German religious groups. In 1918, Iowa Senator Lafayette Young proclaimed, “We have more trouble with preachers who preach in German than with anybody else. They are public enemies whether they intend it or not.”72 The Governor of Idaho agreed, deeming the group a “menace.”73 Though the resulting boycotts had little notable influence during the war itself, effects began revealing themselves in the aftermath. The impact on German Catholic parishes was visible by 1930, with memberships dropping by 17% due to a steady wartime decline.74 Participation in German Lutheran churches was worse, dropping 20% between 1920 and 1930 alone.75 In response, churches began Americanizing the already declining German Lutheran church system by using English in order to, as the Lutherischer Herold put it in 1929, “retain young members of the congregation.”76 The German Methodist Church faced similar issues, as it dropped 52 congregations by 1919. In 1924, it responded by merging with the main body of the Methodist Church, and by the dawn of the second World War, it ceased to exist.77

German organizations also suffered a drastic decline after the war. Within 20 years after the crusade against foreign press organizations, the GazetteDemocrat, Philadelphia’s largest German-language daily newspaper, saw readership fall by 20%.78 The Tageblatt also continued to suffer after the war from the government raid it experienced, with prints dropping from 17,500 to about 3,000 between 1920 and 1930, ultimately 7.3% of what it had been before the war.79 Lingering effects from the government’s anti-German defamation also resulted in a decline in sports organizations called Turnverein.80 A writer for the newsletter American Turner Topics

“Curb German Press, Demand Of Governors,” New York Tribune (New York, NY), April 5, 1918, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/data/batches/dlc_allen_ ver01/data/sn83030214/00206532257/1918040501/0074.pdf.

73 “Governors to Wage War on Disloyalty,” Newport News, Virginia (VA), April 5, 1918, https://www.newspapers.com/image/189536029/.

Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 206-207.

Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 209.

76 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 209.

Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 291.

Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 200-201.

79 Alexander Waldenrath, “The German Language Newspress in Pennsylvania During World War I,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 42, no. 1 (January 1975): 28, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27772255; Karl J. Arndt and May E. Olson, The German Language Press of the Americas: German-American Press Research from the American Revolution to the Bicentennial (München, DE: K.G. Saur, 1980), 575.

80 Annette R. Hofmann, “The American Turners: Their Past and Present,” Revista Brasileira De Ciências Do Esporte 37, no. 2 (April 2015): 123, https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.rbce.2014.11.020.

even claimed Turnervein to be “tied to the apron-strings of a paternalistic government” and that “[we were unable] to live our own lives according to our own intellect and according to our own conscience.”81 After the war, membership dropped from over 68,000 to less than 16,000. In 1927, they changed their slogan to “Turnerism is Americanism” to garner a better image and switched their language of choice from German to English to appeal to a broader audience.82 As such, not only did Turnverein dwindle in number, but they had also Americanized themselves in the process.

It is important to note that while the mid-20th century decline in GermanAmerican immigration may have contributed to this phenomenon, it was not the primary factor. Italian immigration, for instance, also dwindled in the early-to-mid 1900s, mirroring that of German-Americans (See Appendix L). However, by 1940, the number of native Italian speakers rose, unlike the number of native German speakers (Appendix K).

Immigration also seemed to have a minuscule effect on the IrishAmerican population, whose immigration rates were even more similar to German-American ones (Appendix L). While German religious bodies were dissolved or absorbed by American churches, Italian and Irish churches remained distinct. In 1930 Italian churches even regarded Irish ones as socially inferior, indicating a strong sense of cultural identity among the two groups.83 Around the Great Depression, many Italian-Americans also moved into the food industry, resulting in more authentic Italian restaurants throughout the mid-1900s as well as the expansion of Little Italy.84 Meanwhile Irish entertainers kickstarted broadcasting shows interspersed with references to Irish culture. One example was the satirical The Fred Allen Show (1939), which featured an Irishman named Ajax Cassidy as a recurring character who even appeared in advertisements (Appendix M). This stark contrast between the cultural prevalence of German-Americans and that of other ethnic groups indicates that the former’s cultural decline was less of an immigration issue, but rather one sparked by hysteria.

81 “The American Turners After 90 Years,” American Turner Topics (Pittsburgh, PA), December 1937, 2, https://indianamemory.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/ collection/TurnerTopic/id/145.

82 Annette R. Hofmann, “Lady ‘Turners’ in the United States: German American Identity, Gender Concerns, and ‘Turnerism,’” Journal of Sport History 27, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 385, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43609776.

83 Caroline Farrar Ware, Greenwich Village, 1920-1930: A Comment on American Civilization in the Post-war Years (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 317-318.

84 Vincenza Scarpaci, “Ambiente Italiano: Origins and Growth of Baltimore’s Little Italy,” Italian Americana 25, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 104, https://www.jstor. org/stable/41330582.

So in the end, the precipitous post-war decline in German-American culture mainly stemmed from the government’s suppressive tactics. They quashed expressions of resistance and suppressed remaining hallmarks of German-American culture, effects that the public’s unorganized earlywar discrimination failed to achieve. The ultimate effect of the U.S.’s cultural crusade serves as a stark contrast to the current scholarship on Americanization, which oftentimes portrays forced assimilation as a counterproductive strategy. In fact, the ramifications of the government’s anti-German movement extend beyond the early-to-mid 20th century.

Although some traces of German culture, like Oktoberfest, remain in America today, signs of the previously vibrant culture have been largely subdued. Many even fail to recognize that people of German descent still comprise the largest ethnic group in America.85 The current state of the German-American population serves as a cautionary reminder that with the proper environment and enough government intervention, a prominent, lively ethnic group can be rendered into what Charles Hexamer eventually described in 1918 as “nothing but an unknown quantity in the great racial scramble of this land.”86

85 Wayne C. Thompson, Nordic, Central, and Southeastern Europe 2012, 12th ed. (Lanham, MD: Stryker-Post Publications, 2012), 196, http://books.google. com/books?vid=ISBN9781610488914.

86 Bill to Repeal the Act Entitled “An Act to Incorporate the National German-American Alliance”: Hearings on S. 3529 Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918). https:// curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/immigration-to-the-united-states-1789-1930/ catalog/39-990067876840203941.

Appendix A: The New York Herald, November 12, 1915: “The New Intensive Kultur.”

Source: Rogers, W. A. The New Intensive Kultur. 1915. Illustration. https://www.loc.gov/item/2010717739/.

Appendix B: Chicago Daily News, 1915: “His Shelter.”

Source: Luebke, Frederick C. Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974.

Appendix C: The New York Herald, May 8, 1915: “Vell, Ve Varned ‘Em!”

Source: Luebke, Frederick C. Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974.

29 APPENDICES

Appendix D: The Literary Digest, May 22, 1915: “As the World Sees It.”

Source: “America’s Response to Germany’s Challenge.” The Literary Digest, May 22, 1915. https://www. google.com/books/edition/The_ Literary_Digest/ahI8AQAAMAAJ.

Appendix E: Columbus Dispatch, 1915: “Half-Way Americans Not Wanted.”

Source: Luebke, Frederick C. Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974.

Appendix F: The Percent Growth of Native-Language Speakers among 16 Ethnic Groups’ Second Generations

Source: The Census Bureau. Mother Tongue of the Foreign White Stock by Nativity and Parentage, for the United States: 1920 and 1910. Table. 1922. PDF.

Appendix G: Percent of Public School Enrollments for Spanish, French, German, and Latin in 1914-1915 and 1921-1922.

Source: Snyder, Thomas D., ed. “120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait.” National Center for Education Statistics. Last modified January 1993. https://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93442.pdf.

Appendix H: “Don’t talk, the web is spun for you with invisible threads, keep out of it, help to destroy it—spies are listening”

Source: Don’t talk, the web is spun for you with invisible threads, keep out of it, help to destroy it--spies are listening Illustration. 2017. https://www.loc.gov/ resource/ppmsca.53575/.

Appendix I: Percent of Operas in Italian, French, and German during 1916 and 1917-1918 (N.B. the percent of German operas during 1917-1918 is unknown; the largest possible percent is given).

Source: Vacha, J. E. “When Wagner Was Verboten: The Campaign Against German Music in World War I.” New York History 64, no. 2 (April 1983): 17188. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23173920.

Appendix J: Teddy: A Song Version of the Famous Motion Picture of the Same Name.

Source: Teddy. A Song Version of the Famous Motion Picture of the Same Name. 1919. Illustration. https://levysheetmusic.mse.jhu.edu/ collection/008/119.

Appendix K: Change in Native Speaker Population for Several Ethnicities between 1910 and 1940.

Source: Mother Tongue of the Foreign White Stock by Nativity and Parentage, for the United States: 1920 and 1910. Table. 1922. PDF; Nativity and Parentage of the Total White Population, 1940, and of the Foreignborn White, 1930, by Mother Tongue and Sex, for the United States, Urban and Rural. Table. 1943. PDF.

Appendix L: Immigration to the U.S. from Germany, Ireland and Italy.

Source: “Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Region and Selected Country of Last Residence: Fiscal Years 1820 to 2019.” Table. March 30, 2021. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigrationstatistics/yearbook/2019/yearbook_immigration_statistics_2019.pdf.

Appendix M: The Fred Allen Show’s Advertisement for Ford Cars.

Source: LIFE Magazine. Ford’s out Front in Allen’s Alley. April 19, 1948. Illustration. https://books.google.com/ books?id=bEEEAAAAMBAJ.

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The Perpetual Foreigner:

“Every empire … tells itself and the world … that its mission is not to plunder and control but to educate and liberate,” historian Edward W. Said sardonically criticized the US for using “the War on Terror” as a cover for American imperialism in his LA Times article entitled “Blind Imperial Arrogance” in 2003.1 In the same article, Said lamented the “woefully inadequate” knowledge the US had of Arabs and Islam while protesting that such inadequacy unjustly placed anyone sympathetic to the Arab culture under attack.2 This scathing critique of the US approach to the Middle East brought to light Orientalism, which Said himself first defined in 1978 as a system by which “the West was able to manage and even produce the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively.”3 While complex and continuously evolving, Orientalism can be described in three essential characteristics. First, it dichotomizes the world into a mutually-exclusive dyad composed of the “Self” (the “West” or the “Occident”) and the “Other” (the “East” or the “Orient”).4 Then, it allows the “Self” to construct and produce knowledge about the “Other” in a way that serves the interests of the “Self.”5 Based on the self-constructed—hence often “woefully inadequate”—knowledge, it provides cultural and political discourses through which the “Self” defines its own “power and superiority” over the “Other” and self-grants a “mission to enlighten [and] civilize” the “Other.”6 With these distinct features, Orientalism undergirded the postwar imperialism of the US, which proclaimed its “manifest duty” to democratize the decolonizing world with a particular interest in Asia at the dawn of the Cold War in

1 Edward W. Said, “Blind Imperial Arrogance,” Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA), July 20, 2003, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-jul-20-oesaid20-story.html.

2 Said, “Blind Imperial Arrogance.”

3 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 3.

4 Said, Orientalism, 12.

5 Shehla Burney, “Orientalism: The Making of the Other,” Counterpoints 417 (2012): 26, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42981698.

6 Said, Orientalism, 256; Edward W. Said, “Preface to the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Edition,” in Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), 3.

The E ec ts of Orientalism on US Race Relations with Asians and Asian Americans during the Cold War (1945-1991) Julian Houg h

1945 (Appendix A)7. For the next five decades of the Cold War (19451991), Orientalism served as the reductive system by which the US defined and built a new world order in three phases, each with a distinct impact on US race relations with Asians and Asian Americans. During the formative phase (1945-1947), the US defined the genesis of Communism as “Oriental,” grouping Asians with the Soviet Union as the antithetical “Other” to democracy.8 In the integration phase (19471980), the US exploited Orientalist stereotypes of the refugees from Asia to integrate them into American society in a show of its “racial egalitarianism,” casting Asian Americans as the naturalized yet different “Other.”9 Finally, amid escalating fears spurred by the economic war against Asia in the 80s, Orientalism challenged this trans-racial integration in the final phase (1980-1991), relegating the Asian American identity to the inimical “Other” through cultural appropriations and political discourses.10 A culturally-entrenched discursive instrument that enabled the US to lump Asians with racialized Communism as the “Other” and to exploit stereotypes of Cold War refugees from Asia to bolster the image of the “Self” as a racially tolerant society, Orientalism reinforced the perception of Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners in American society during the Cold War.

During the formative phase of the Cold War (1945-1947), Orientalism underpinned a political discourse for Washington to racialize Communism as “Oriental” and to define it along with Asians as the antithetical “Other” determined to subvert the US mission of democratizing the world. In defining Communism as the Cold War enemy, the US government employed the familiar Orientalist discourse, which is rooted in a binary logic of unequal opposites: the “Other”

7 Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” Life Magazine, February 17, 1941, 65, https://oldlifemagazine.com/february-17-1941-life-magazine.html; Jodi Kim, Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 18.

8 Kim, Jodi, Ends of Empire, 57.

9 Madeline Y. Hsu and Ellen D. Wu, “‘Smoke and Mirrors’: Conditional Inclusion, Model Minorities, and the Pre-1965 Dismantling of Asian Exclusion,” Journal of American Ethnic History 34, no. 4 (2015): 60, https://doi. org/10.5406/jamerethnhist.34.4.0043.

10 Jason Crum, “‘Out of the Glamorous, Mystic East’: Techno-Orientalism in Early Twentieth-Century U.S. Radio Broadcasting,” in Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, ed. David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 51; Yao Li and Harvey L. Nicholson, “When ‘Model Minorities’ Become ‘Yellow Peril’—Othering and the Racialization of Asian Americans in the COVID19 Pandemic,” Sociology Compass 15, no. 2 (January 16, 2021), https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7995194/.

characterized as “irrational,” “backward,” “uncivilized,” “childlike,” “depraved,” and “different,” and the “Self” characterized as “rational,” “virtuous,” “mature,” and self-evidently “normal.”11 In 1941, Henry R. Luce, an American media mogul, published an era-defining manifesto entitled “The American Century,” which advanced a widespread sentiment that the US must take on the global responsibility to lead the world of “conflict, disruption, and war” toward a peaceful future by democratization.12 As a shakeup of the world order loomed with the end of World War II, Luce’s vision for the US world leadership became realizable. To lead the world as the new superpower, the US swiftly “othered” its rival, the Soviet Union, by reductively lumping the Soviets with Asians, who had long been “othered” through a series of immigration restrictions starting with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.13 “In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy, possibilities of distorting and poisoning sources … are infinite,” US Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan wrote of the Soviet government in his famous 1946 telegram from Moscow to Washington.14 Calling the genesis of Communism “oriental,” Kennan conveniently co-opted the familiar formation of the Orientalist dichotomy composed of “Anglo-Saxon” (the “Self”) vs. “Russian-Asiatic” (the “Other”) in an article entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”:

[The Soviet] brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces.15

11 Said, Orientalism, 40, 206.

12 Luce, “The American Century,” 61.

13 An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to the Chinese, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58, (May 6, 1882), https://catalog.archives.gov/id/5752153; Bruce Cumings, “American Orientalism at War in Korea and the United States: A Hegemony of Racism, Repression, and Amnesia,” in Orientalism and War, by Tarak Barkawi and Keith Stanski (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 43.

14 George F. Kennan to Secretary of State, “Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946 (History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, 861.00/2-2246), 7, https://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/116178.

15 George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs. An American Quarterly Review 4, no. 25 (July 1947): 3, https://www.cvce.eu/obj/ the_sources_of_soviet_conduct_from_foreign_affairs_july_1947-en-a0f03730dde8-4f06-a6ed-d740770dc423.html.

In the same article, Kennan derided the Soviet’s political personality using such Orientalist tropes as “immature, controlled by ‘instinctive desires,’ ‘impatience,’ and ‘impulses and emotions.’”16 With great enthusiasm, Washington received Kennan’s scathing diagnosis of the Soviet Union and his proposal of “firm and vigilant containment” of Communism.17 Upon his passionate advice, President Harry S Truman effectively declared the Cold War in a 1947 speech, now known as the Truman Doctrine, by placing “great responsibilities” upon the US to help the third world nations defend themselves from the “totalitarian regimes … [which] spread and grow on evil soil.”18 Subsequently, the National Security Council issued Report 68 (NSC 68), which echoed the construction of Communism as “antipathy … to freedom” standing at the “opposite poles” against democracy and further cast the Soviets as the “Other.”19 NSC 68 laid out concrete recommendations, including military means, against Communist forces, promulgating US world leadership and granting the US the task of democratizing—or imperializing—the world.20

To its detriment, the US was so steeped in Orientalism that it reductively grouped the people of decolonizing nations along with the racialized Soviet Union as the “Other,” resulting in its failure to gain popularity among the people of the decolonizing nations during the formative phase of the Cold War. An examination of the first major “hot” proxy Cold War battleground in Korea, regarded as one of “the biggest calamities of the Cold War” according to historian Odd Arne Westad, elucidates how Orientalism dictated the US democratization mission.21 On September 7,

16 Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 2.

17 Robert C. Tucker, “The Long Telegram: An Act of Political Leadership,” The Princeton University Library Chronicle 66, no. 2 (2005): 295-6, http://www. jstor.org/stable/10.25290/prinunivlibrchro.66.2.0295; Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 6, 9.

18 Harry S. Truman, “Address of the President to Congress, Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey,” speech presented at Congress, Washington, DC, March 12, 1947, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/ address-president-congress-recommending-assistance-greece-and-turkey; National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 403-4 (July 26, 1947), https://www. dni.gov/index.php/ic-legal-reference-book/national-security-act-of-1947.

19 National Security Council, National Security Council Report, NSC 68, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, US National Archives (April 14, 1950): 7, http:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116191.

20 John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,” International Security 4, no. 4 (1980): 167, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/2626672; National Security Council, NSC 68,” 7.

21 Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2019), 159.

1945, only three weeks after World War II ended, the US military began its occupation of Korea, a decolonizing nation of twenty-six million. Even before he set foot in Korea for the first time, however, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the newly-appointed military governor of Korea, publicly declared Korea “the enemy of the state” based on his Orientalist preconception that the Koreans were “backwards,” “unruly,” and so susceptible to the Soviet Communist indoctrination that they had to be suppressed.22 To that end, he quickly instituted “power inequalities and prejudices inscribed in the basic discourses” in his government and subjected Korean civilians to extreme repression, foreshadowing McCarthyism.23 Widely known to be disinterested in and dismissive of Korean history and culture, Hodge resorted to such Orientalist tropes as “impetuous children” in describing the Koreans and subscribed to blind loyalty to anti-Communism in decision-making.24 Historian Charles Kraus writes, [Hodge’s behavior was] a bellwether of the deeply entrenched attitudes and beliefs common among American policymakers … [and] also emblematic of the unequal power relations American observers developed and deployed in their rhetoric about Korea. These negative discourses about Koreans, as expressions of Orientalism, … created a ‘cultural distance’ or power imbalance between Koreans and Americans.25

To the detriment of the US relationship with the decolonizing nation of Korea, the Hodge government embodied American “imperial arrogance”—undergirded by the archetypal Orientalist process of knowledge construction and power anointment—causing an antiAmerican sentiment among many Koreans who wanted independence from all hegemonic forces after 36 years of exploitative colonial subjugation by Imperial Japan.

Meanwhile, in northern Korea, the Soviet Union invested heavily in building relationships with the Koreans, imbricating Communist indoctrination with anti-imperialist sentiments, with which to “enlist

22 James I. Matray, “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945—1948,” Korean Studies 19 (1995): 20, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/23719137; Charles Kraus, “American Orientalism in Korea,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 22, no. 2 (2015): 147, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/43898414.

23 Kraus, “American Orientalism,” 148.

24 Matray, “Hodge Podge,” 22.

25 Kraus, “American Orientalism,” 149-50.

the sympathy of the population.”26 In stark contrast to the Hodge government, which shunned Koreans for “[not being] ready for self-government,” the Soviets allowed “autonomy by entrusting the administration to the Korean Communists” by appointing exclusively Koreans in government posts, according to a 1947 CIA report entitled “The Situation in Korea.”27 At the same time, the Soviets built a close relationship with the Koreans through cultural exchanges in music, film, and literature—Soviet cultural policies in northern Korea “gave much more space and encouragement to Korean cultural expression,” garnering local support for the Soviet Union and Communism (Appendix B).28 Adequately informed that the Korean people desired independence above all else, the Soviet government backed Kim Il-Sung, an independence fighter-turned “national hero.”29 Meanwhile, relying exclusively on its own Orientalist image of Korea, the US spurned Kim Ku, a wellrespected independence veteran and President of the Korean Provincial Government, calling him the “wrong horse” on suspicion of his Communist ties.30 Instead, Washington backed anti-Communist, USeducated Rhee Syngman, whose recalcitrant penchant for dictatorship later proved to be antithetical to US desire to instill democratic values in Korea—a costly failure of US intelligence that became a symbol of its reductive Orientalist logic.31 In 1948, after the mysterious assassination of Kim Ku, Rhee became the first President of the Republic of Korea by excluding (“othering”) the people in the north for their ties with Communism in the nation’s first-ever election.32 By 1948, when the US military government handed the government of the Republic of Korea to

Byung-Moo Hwang, “Revolutionary Armed Struggle and the Origins of the Korean War,” Asian Perspective 12, no. 2 (1988): 124, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/42703920.

Central Intelligence Agency, The Situation in Korea, ORE 5/1 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1947), 1. https://catalog.archives.gov/ id/6924248; Mark P. Barry, “The U.S. and the 1945 Division Of Korea: Mismanaging the ‘Big Decisions,’” International Journal on World Peace 29, no. 4: 40, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24543683.

28 Charles K. Armstrong, “The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945-1950,” The Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 1 (February 2003): 83, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/3096136.

“Soviet Report on Communists in Korea, 1945,” 1945, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AGShVS RF. F. 172. OP 614631. D. 23 (1945): 26, accessed July 2, 2022, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/114890.

Kraus, “American Orientalism,” 149.

31 Edward C. Keefer, “The Truman Administration and the South Korean Political Crisis of 1952: Democracy’s Failure?,” Pacific Historical Review 60, no. 2 (1991):146, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3640489.

Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2010), digital file.

the Rhee regime, a civil war between the north (Soviet-backed “Other”) and the south (US-backed “Self”) seemed all but inevitable. In sum, the US Orientalist Manichaeism manifested itself in the creation of two Koreas—a dismal outcome reflected with a “considerable self-criticism” according to historian Charles Armstrong.33

After leaving Korea in a highly polarized state that embodied Orientalist Manichaeism in 1948, the US officially suffered its first major “loss” of the Cold War in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won the Chinese Civil War by defeating the US-backed Nationalists (Kuomintang or KMT). During World War II, the US Secretary of War Patrick Hurley had characterized the CCP as “not truly Communist” because of its espousal of “democratic ideals.”34 In an effort to save China as an ally, Hurley proposed to Washington in 1945 to help create a unified government in China, including the Communists, but the proposal was spurned by Washington, who viewed the CCP as the uncompromisable “Other” by association with the Soviet Union.35 After this breakoff, the Chinese Civil War resumed for four more years, ending in KMT’s loss in 1949. In less than a year after this “loss” of China and less than two years after the US celebrated the establishment of US-styled democracy in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the first major “hot” Cold War proxy war—the Korean War (1950-1953)—erupted in June 1950. Six months later, the Communist Chinese army entered the war in support of North Korea, fighting directly against the US military in the bloody conflict that took millions of lives, including those of forty thousand American soldiers. In his book The Cold War: A World History, historian Odd Arne Westad expresses the irony that the US, a country founded on its anticolonial heritage, “failed to prioritize decolonization” over fighting Communism during the postwar period and attributes the failure to the heavy influence of the “sense of a racial hierarchy” and the reductive Orientalist worldview held by the US government.36 Even before the destructive force of war befell the Korean peninsula, the US failure to appeal to the hearts and minds of Koreans on the cultural front of the democratization mission, coupled with intensifying Soviet propaganda against America’s “Achilles

33 Armstrong, “The Cultural Cold War,” 75.

34 Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 110.

35 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 1945 (Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII 893.00/1–1049: Telegram, Document 135), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v07/d135; Michael M. Sheng, “America’s Lost Chance in China? A Reappraisal of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States before 1945,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 29 (1993):135-6, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2949955.

36 Westad, The Cold War, 157.

heel” of racism, overdetermined the new US strategy of integrating Asians from decolonizing nations into American society (the “Self”).37

During the integration phase of the Cold War (1947-1980), Orientalism served as a hierarchical framework for integration, exploiting cultural differences to position Asian Americans as the naturalized “Other,” rather than an instrument of domination as it had during the pre-war period or the formative phase of the Cold War.38 The immigration reform was the first site of integration, but the relaxation of Asian immigration restrictions only masked the stubborn Orientalist undercurrent in US cultural diplomacy purported to appease the decolonizing nations. On the surface, the US swiftly proceeded with reforms. For example, Congress passed the Smith-Mundt Act to promote “mutual understanding” between Americans and the people of the rest of the world in 1948.39 Subsequently, the first broad Cold War legislation to ease Asian immigration exclusion was advanced by Representative Walter Judd, who appealed to bring fairness to immigration laws to appease the third world.40 Judd’s efforts led to the Immigration Act of 1952 (McCarranWalter Act), which repealed the “Asian Barred Zone” established in 1917.41 While these reforms promoted more Asian integration, they were hardly free of deeply-ingrained Orientalism.42 Even Judd himself wasaverse to an influx of Asians into the US, so he introduced a provision that limited persons of Asian ancestry in addition to keeping the quota low at 185 and 205 immigrants per year from Japan and China, respectively.43 The full removal of limits on Asian immigration finally

37 Michael G. Davis, “Impetus for Immigration Reform: Asian Refugees and the Cold War,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 7, no. 3/4 (1998): 143, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23612917; Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 37.

38 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 10-11.

39 US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80402, 62 Stat. 6 (Jan. 27, 1948). https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/oversight/ legislation/smith-mundt/.

40 Hsu and Wu, “‘Smoke and Mirrors,’” 49.

41 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. (June 27, 1952). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-66/pdf/STATUTE66-Pg163.pdf; Ellen D. Wu, Color of Success - Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 99; Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 20.

42 Davis, “Impetus for Immigration,” 129.

43 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 227; Davis, “Impetus for Immigration,” 130.

came with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (the Hart–Celler Act).44 However, even these removals had hidden barriers to entry. For example, worried that Asians might become a social liability, US immigration officials enforced preferential prioritization to skilled and educated Asian immigrants with political background checks to enter the country.45 In many cases, Asians had to wait for five years or more because of the low immigration quota compared to the large number of refugees trying to flee from political instability and economic woes of the third world.46 In sum, the immigration reforms made in support of the new integration strategy allowed Asians to become naturalized citizens, eligible to join the “Self” for the first time in US history; however, even these immigration measures were subjected to Orientalist hierarchization that kept Asians as the “Other” even after their joining the “Self.”47

Along with immigration relaxation, with the belief that true integration of Asians into the “Self” must happen at a family level, the US government promoted adoption programs of war orphans, yet only within a strict Orientalist construct of white parents raising Asian children. In 1950, Loy Henderson, US ambassador for India, publicly attributed the US’ weaker ties to Asia than to Europe to the fact that most Americans traced their ancestry to Europe and lacked such family ties with Asia.48 With a number of other political figures echoing his sentiment, the belief that the US must adopt war orphans into American families in order to build a sense of connection and sympathy between the US and Asian countries spread quickly among philanthropic organizations.49 For example, the Christian Children’s Fund (CCF), founded by Presbyterian minister J. Calvitt Clarke in 1918, flourished during the Cold War with its sponsorship programs designed to improve, at least virtually, the “family” relations between America and Asia.50 Millions of Americans participated by donating “$10 a month” to save children from the brutal hands of Communism (Appendix C).51 A government agency called the International Social Service was reformed to collaborate

44 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (Dec. 1, 1965). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/ STATUTE-79-Pg911.pdf.

45 Davis, “Impetus for Immigration,” 141; Hsu and Wu, “‘Smoke and Mirrors,’” 52.

46 Davis, “Impetus for Immigration,” 141.

47 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 225.

48 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 145.

49 Arissa H. Oh, “From War Waif to Ideal Immigrant: The Cold War Transformation of the Korean Orphan,” Journal of American Ethnic History 31, no. 4 (2012): 35, https://doi.org/10.5406/jamerethnhist.31.4.0034; Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 145.

50 Oh, “From War Waif,” 35.

51 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 158.

with volunteer programs on supporting children refugees from the Cold War battlefields.52 After the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, these sponsorships blossomed into full-fledged adoption programs, which were promoted as “missionary work through which ordinary Americans could support their government’s efforts to display racial liberalism in the face of Soviet propaganda and thus win the allegiance of newly decolonizing countries in Asia and Africa,” according to historian Arissa H. Oh.53 While adoption programs had humanitarian purposes, Orientalist imagery was still prevalent in their promotions by the media, which represented Asians as “backward-thinking people … in need of rescue by a dynamic and progressive United States of America” according to ethnic studies researcher Catherine Ceniza Choy.54 Further, historian Christina Klein believes that these adoption programs garnered enthusiastic participation from the American public because “the figure of the white parent to the non-white child” was already familiar Orientalist imagery that represented “‘natural’ relations of hierarchy and domination” (Appendix D).55 In a way, the adoption program was a microcosm of the US influence on Asia, reflecting America’s “manifest duty” to teach Asia to be a democratic region mirroring its American “parent.”56

During this integration phase, the US media played a crucial role in increasing cultural sensitivities through various forms of cultural production—a key aspect of Orientalism—further influencing the new Asian American identity as the inferior part of the “Self.” One of the most symbolic Orientalist productions that conjured anti-Asian image at the height of the Asian exclusion period (1882-1952) was the villain Fu Manchu in the 1932 movie The Mask of Fu Manchu (Appendix E). A diabolical “Oriental” villain “steeped in tradition yet extremely modern, proficient with Western technologies, ingenious at weapons development, and committed to expansionism,” Fu Manchu was one of the original cultural manifestations of the Asian fear, often dubbed “yellow peril,” according to media studies scholar Abigail De Kosnik.57

52 Catherine Ceniza Choy, “Race at the Center: The History of American Cold War Asian Adoption,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 16, no. 3 (2009): 165, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23613053.

53 Oh, “From War Waif,” 36.

54 Choy, “Race at the Center,” 166.

55 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 174.

56 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 176.

57 Abigail De Kosnik, “The Mask of Fu Manchu, Son of Sinbad, and Star Wars IV: A New Hope: Techno-Orientalist Cinema as a Mnemotechnics of TwentiethCentury U.S.-Asian Conflicts,” in Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, ed. David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 93.

However, at the beginning of the integration phase (the early 50s), cultural production about Asia shifted accordingly to reflect the sense of connection. One notable example is the 1951 musical by Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein II, The King and I, in which a British teacher, Anna, replaces local knowledge of Siam with Western—and implicitly superior—knowledge by teaching local Siamese children who are subordinate to her (Appendix F).58 Reflecting the new US strategy of integration, Anna is interested in “forging connections” with the children—by sitting together and enjoying the process of getting to know each other, “they create a new community that includes Asians and Westerners” on the same floor, according to Klein.59 This scene also illustrates the ideal approach to integration—proposed by Said in his book Culture and Imperialism—in which a well-integrated world appreciates the “hybrid” nature of different cultures and thinks “sympathetically” about other cultures.60 Despite its portrayal of amicable integration between the West and the East, this scene is still redolent of Orientalism: it clearly establishes an Orientalist hierarchy between Anna, representing the West (“Self”), who plays “an adult who dispenses knowledge,” and her Siamese students, representing the Orient (“Other”), who are “ignorant children subordinate to her authority.”61 The play, which was later made into a popular film in 1956, vividly idealized the naturalization process of the people of Asia into the Western “Self,” but the apparent undercurrent of Orientalism left a lasting image of Asians as the ignorant “Other” reinforced in the audience’s mind.

Long preconditioned to America’s conspicuous practice of racism and ostracization, the nascent Asian Americans themselves contributed to the perpetuation of their status as the “Other” by staying politically silent. Many years of racist and exclusionary policies and practices had sowed the fear in the Asian American mind that the US government could abruptly reverse its new friendly policies around Asia and AsianAmericans as it had in the past.62 For example, many Japanese Americans sported their military service during World War II in order to be accepted and recognized as Americans (Appendix G), but they kept rather silent about the injustice they had suffered through the Japanese internment—

58 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 12.

59 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 12.

60 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), 317, 336.

61 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 12.

62 Robert G. Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture, Edited by Thomas C. Chen (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1999), 151.

the epitome of racial injustice executed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt through Executive Order 9066 in 1942.63 Likewise, the Chinese Americans were gripped with fear of retaliation by association when they heard that Communist China (the People’s Republic of China) entered the Korean War to fight directly against the US in 1950.64 Their fear turned true when the US government adopted the Chinese Confession Program, a race-profiling measure targeting the Chinese Americans on an Orientalist supposition—redolent of Fu Manchu’s famous Oriental witchcraft—that they were susceptible to indoctrination by Communist China (Appendix H).65 In constant fear of a resurgence of such racially targeted policies, the newly-formed Asian Americans picked up a “survival strategy” to portray themselves as outstanding American citizens by promoting stories about their traditional values as the cause of their success.66 Buttressed by such self-imposed social behavior, ethnic studies researchers began to attribute the Asian Americans’ apparent success to their cultural “difference”—or “ethnic virtue” such as “stoic patience, political obedience, and self-improvement”—according to ethnic studies scholar Robert G. Lee.67 The first of such research reports to gain notoriety was published in the New York Times with the title, “Success Story: Japanese-American Style,” written by sociologist William Petersen in 1966.68 While the article served as a Bildungsroman of the new minority group—Asian Americans—it unintentionally reminded the readers of the Orientalist imagery of Asians as “hyperefficient competitors,” with explicit comparisons to other racial groups: “By any criterion of good citizenship that we choose, the Japanese Americans are better than any other group in our society, including

U.S. President. Executive Order No. 9066, “Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 3 C.F.R. 1092 (Feb 19, 1942):1092-3, https:// www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/executive-order-9066; Mikiso Hane, “Wartime Internment,” The Journal of American History 77, no. 2 (1990): 572, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2079186.

64 Wu, Color of Success, 111.

65 Lee, R., Orientals: Asian, 153.

66 Jeff Guo, “The Real Reasons the U.S. Became Less Racist toward Asian Americans,” The Washington Post (Washington, D.C), November 29, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/29/the-real-reasonamericans-stopped-spitting-on-asian-americans-and-started-praising-them/.

67 Robert G. Lee, “The Cold War Origins of the Model Minority Myth,” in Asian American Studies Now: A Critical Reader (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 256.

68 William Petersen, “Success Story, Japanese-American Style,” New York Times (New York, NY), January 9, 1966, 1, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1966/01/09/356013502.html?pageNumber=180.

native-born whites.”69 In reality, Asian Americans’ collective penchant to succeed and to do it quietly resulted from their self-representation colored by mistrust and fear of the US government. In a way, Asian Americans’ political silence as a survival mechanism backfired, contributing to the perpetuation of their own status as the unassimilable “Other” in American society.

In the 60s, to further showcase the strength of American racial egalitarianism to the Soviet Union and buttress its claim to world leadership, the US government exploited Orientalist stereotypes through the “model minority” myth. As the war of propaganda and psychology escalated and the competition with the Soviet Union heated, the US government started to valorize Asian Americans in an attempt to counter Soviet propaganda with a message: “people of all races can make the same achievement as Asian Americans do through hard work, which proves the United States is not a racist society.”70 In their book Empire, authors Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri introduce an imperial instrument that “integrates others with its order and then orchestrates those differences in a system of control.”71 Deploying this exact method, the US government integrated the Asians (“Other”) into American society (“Self”) across color lines. Once the integration started—forming Asian Americans—the US harnessed the “difference” of the Asian Americans for its hegemonic war against the Soviet Union. Educator Nicholas D. Hartlep asserts that the US government “intentionally selected” Asian Americans as a self-made, hardworking “model minority” to insulate itself from domestic and international “accusations that AfricanAmericans were unsuccessful due to racism and discrimination in the United States.”72 The intention of the US government aside, media

69 Petersen, “Success Story,” 180.

70 Eun Hee Kim and Kay Ann Taylor, “The Model Minority Stereotype as a Prescribed Guideline of Empire: Situating the Model Minority Research in the Postcolonial Context,” Journal of Southeast Asian American Education and Advancement 12, no. 2 (June 8, 2017): 2, https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/jsaaea/ vol12/iss2/4.

71 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 195, quoted in Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 10.

72 Nicholas D. Hartlep, “The Model Minority Myth: What 50 Years of Research Does and Does Not Tell Us,” Diverse Issues in Higher Education, April 29, 2013, https://www.diverseeducation.com/opinion/article/15093076/the-modelminority-myth-what-50-years-of-research-does-and-does-not-tell-us; Kenneth Hough, “Demon Courage and Dread Engines: America’s Reaction to the RussoJapanese War and the Genesis of the Japanese Invasion Sublime,” in TechnoOrientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, comp. David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 33.

outlets started touting Asian Americans as a “model minority,” ostensibly influenced by the Cold War political climate. For example, concomitant to Peterson’s New York Times article, the widely-read 1966 U.S. News and World Report article entitled “Success Story of One Minority in the US’” extolled the success of Chinese Americans in “business, science, architecture, politics and other professions.”73 Despite anecdotal evidence that pointed to the progress of Asian integration, the claim of Asian Americans’ asymmetrical success was overblown with an aim to bolster the US claim of world leadership as a multiracial society.74 For example, the fact that only 3.4 percent of Chinese Americans took part in federal welfare programs in the 60s—a rate well below the national average—was frequently cited as a sign of their economic independence, but the metric did not tell the whole story because a full 15 percent of Chinese Americans lived in poverty at that time.75 Regarded as a “contemporary [and] contextual representation of the West’s latent view of Asia and Asians rooted in Orientalism” according to authors Eun Hee Kim and Kay Ann Taylor, the “model minority” myth flourished for the next two decades throughout the integration phase.76 Numerous reports were published, and reports were published, setting a popular discourse in ethnic studies around anecdotes of Cold War refugees selfsufficiently achieving their American dream after fleeing the brutalities of Communism, instilling firmly in the American mind Orientalist imagery of the “model minority” possessing an “inhuman” capability to succeed.77

The Orientalist construction and subsequent proliferation of the “model minority” myth resulted in cementing the Asian American identity as the “Other” in American society and creating a fissure in race relations among minority groups. In their book Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, authors Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein introduce the concept of reward hierarchy as a form of social control.78 According to this hierarchy, the “model minority” label appeared to be a “reward” and an upgrade compared to “yellow horde,” a common Orientalist trope describing Asians during the Asian exclusion period (1882-1952);

73 “Success Story of One Minority Group in U.S.,” U.S. News and World Report, December 26, 1996, 7, https://www.dartmouth.edu/~hist32/Hist33/US%20 News%20&%20World%20Report.pdf.

74 Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 2.

75 Lee, R, Orientals: Asian, 151.

76 Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 2, 15.

77 Erika Lee, The Making of Asian America: A History (Simon & Schuster, 2015), 374.

78 Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London: Verso, 1991), 32-33, quoted in Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 11.

however, this “reward” must be only contrapuntally interpreted because it was predicated on the Asian Americans’ cultural difference, which perpetuated their image as the “Other.”79 Further, the harmful effect of such labeling manifested itself in tension between Asian Americans and other minorities, especially Black Americans. In ethnic studies scholar Timothy P. Fong’s words, the “model minority” myth became conservative propaganda with the message: ‘‘all racial minority groups can succeed just like Asian Americans if they work hard, don’t cause trouble, and assimilate into mainstream American life.”80 Unfortunately, this propagandic myth of Orientalist origin was dissonant with the costly rehabilitation programs that the government was promoting for Black Americans as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s “war on poverty” initiative in the 60s.81 In 1965, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Assistant Secretary of Labor, led a government report on the economic plight of the Black Americans at the direction of President Johnson. Moynihan believed that the way to correct the “cultural deprivation” suffered by Black Americans was to rehabilitate the families—a stance widely unpopular among the American public.82 The 1966 U.S. News and World Report article reflected the public opposition to Moynihan’s proposal by specifically comparing the success of Chinese Americans to the poverty of Black Americans: “At a time when it is being proposed that hundreds of billions of dollars be spent uplifting Negroes and other minorities, the nation’s 300,000 Chinese Americans are moving ahead on their own with no help from anyone else.”83 Ethnic studies scholar Robert G. Lee believes this article presented a pivotal point at which the “model minority” myth started to create tension among minority groups by casting Asian Americans as the inimical “Other.”84 In sum, the Cold War strategy to showcase America’s racial liberalism resulted in the formation of Asian American identity as a “model minority,” which represented the new form of Orientalism with far-reaching consequences on race relations among minority groups after the 70s.

During the last phase of the Cold War (1980 - 1991), when the fear of Japan’s economic dominance reached its peak, Orientalism re-emerged as the central discourse regarding Asian Americans in the US, evolving

79 Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 11.

80 Timothy P. Fong, The Contemporary Asian American Experience: Beyond the Model Minority, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2002), 57.

81 Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 2.

82 US Department of Labor, Office of Policy Planning and Research, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1965), 4, https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/webid-moynihan.

83 “Success Story,” 6.

84 Lee, R., Orientals: Asian, 150; Kim and Taylor, “The Model Minority,” 2.

into a form that stereotyped Asian Americans as automata that could subvert white supremacy. The rapid economic rise of Japan, one of the closest US Cold War allies and the exemplary protege of the larger democratic “Self,” caused a revival of anti-Asian fear that extended to Asian Americans during the 70s.85 As the US economy worsened, countless politicians and scholars started publishing materials on Japan’s eventual economic conquest of the world.86 Ironically, with their own “love affair” with Japanese products, the Americans felt betrayed that Japan was outpacing the US—the mentor in the Orientalist representation of racial hierarchy—who had helped Japan’s economy revive from the rubbles of World War II.87 According to historian M. J. Heale, the Americans internalized Japan’s rapid economic expansion as “an attempt to do financially what they had been unable to do through military means” during the colonial period.88 As Japanese electronics and automobile products started to overtake their American counterparts, the old Orientalist images of the Russo-Japanese War, in which the “demonic” and “machine-like” Orientals are fanatically “charging en masse” to defeat the West, crept back into the American psyche (Appendix I).89 This fear revived a particular form of Orientalism, dubbed techno-Orientalism, a cultural “phenomenon of imagining Asia and Asians in hypo or hyper-technological terms in cultural productions and political discourse” for effecting an image of “automaton whose inhuman efficiency” would displace white supremacy.90 In 1980, as beleaguered President Jimmy Carter dubbed the nation’s economic woes “a crisis of confidence,” his presidential opponent Ronald Reagan demanded Japan to halt the “deluge” of car exports, calling

85 M. J. Heale, “Anatomy of a Scare: Yellow Peril Politics in America, 1980–1993,” Journal of American Studies 43, no. 1 (2009): 20, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/40464347; Lee, E., The Making, 402.

86 Stanford M. Lyman, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Discourse,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 13, no. 4 (2000): 722, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020056.

87 Heale, “Anatomy of a Scare,” 22.

88 Brandon P. Seto, “Paternalism and Peril: Shifting U.S. Racial Perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese Peoples from World War II to the Early Cold War,” Asia Pacific Perspectives, Summer 2015, 72-73, accessed December 27, 2021, https://www.usfca.edu/center-asia-pacific/perspectives/v13/seto.

89 Hough, “Demon Courage,” 33.

90 David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu, “Technologizing Orientalism: An Introduction,” Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 2; Lowe, Immigrant Acts, 18.

Japan “a part of the problem.”91 Sociologist Ezra Vogel published a bestseller entitled Japan as Number One, fueling the public fear of Asian economic hegemony and colonization in a reversal of the Orientalist worldview.92 Between 1980 and 1982, the percentage of Americans who had unfavorable sentiment toward Japan almost tripled.93 The fear was corroborated by the record US trade deficit of $50 billion against Japan in 1985.94 With inflation increasing out of control and the massive illegal immigration on top of the social agenda, the US public began to put the Cold War strategy of integrating Asian allies into the “Self” into question and started “othering” Asian Americans for the economic ills by Orientalist association.95

The Orientalist cultural production took a similar turn, depicting Asia, Asians, and Asian Americans in the revived techno-Orientalist light and constructing the Asian American image as the “Other” within the “Self.” The massively-popular 1977 movie, Star Wars IV: A New Hope, for example, is filled with Orientalist tropes and symbolism.96 Most notably, the Imperial spaceships, representing the US military, are many generations ahead in their technological firepower compared to the Rebel’s counterparts, which represent the Communist Vietnamese guerrilla fighters.97 This hypo-technological representation of Asians in the 70s quickly reversed into a hyper-technological representation in the 80s, as the focus of the American public shifted from fighting Communism to fighting an economic war, especially in ways that Japan was depicted as the greatest “challenge to the US economic hegemony.”98 Primary examples include Ridley Scott’s 1982 film Blade Runner and William Gibson’s 1984 Neuromancer, both of which depict the Japanese

91 Lou Cannon, “Reagan Vows to Try To Halt ‘Deluge’ of Japanese Autos,” The Washington Post (Washington, DC), September 3, 1980, 3, https://www. washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/09/03/reagan-vows-to-try-to-haltdeluge-of-japanese-autos/823d292a-e017-42ef-9db2-ad38f43e93f4/.

92 Timothy Yu, “Oriental Cities, Postmodern Futures: ‘Naked Lunch, Blade Runner’, and ‘Neuromancer,’” MELUS 33, no. 4 (2008): 46, http://www.jstor. org/stable/20343507.

93 Heale, “Anatomy of a Scare,” 22, 23, 24.

94 Heale, “Anatomy of a Scare,” 24

95 Heale, “Anatomy of a Scare,” 22.

96 De Kosnik, “The Mask,” 97.

97 De Kosnik, “The Mask,” 98.

98 Aimee Bahng, “Cruel Optimism of Asian Futurity,” in Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, ed. David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 164; Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 98.

as “unfeeling aliens[,] … cyborgs and replicants,” who are expeditiously adaptive to technology and influential as the “largest creditor and the largest net investor in the world.”99 Blatantly showing the fear of the times, Blade Runner depicts Los Angeles in the gloomy, technoOrientalist imagery of a multicultural dystopia inhabited by “hordes of Asian immigrants.”100 Similarly reflecting the anxiety spurred by Japan’s technological advancement, Neuromancer casts Japan, represented by the “Night City,” as a space of “freewheeling and lawless exchange, the competitive market reduced to its most brutal form.”101 In its sequel, All Tomorrow’s Parties, Gibson portrays an Orientalist caricature of the Asian store clerk in a character named Mr. Park, who appears “unfeeling, profit-driven, [and speaking] broken English.”102 In sum, the focus of the Orientalist cultural productions evolved according to the shift of public fear from the geopolitical dominance of the Soviet Union and Communist China to the economic dominance of Japan. The 80s posed a real test to American society whether the Cold War measure of integrating Asians into the “Self” could transcend the Orientalist lineage of the Asian American identity.

In the 80s, reflecting the economic war within the “Self” waged against the Asian Cold War allies, primarily Japan, American society experienced various racially-motivated hate crimes against Asian Americans. The most noteworthy is the 1982 hate-motivated murder of Vincent Chin, a Chinese American, who was brutally bludgeoned to death for “job stealing” by two displaced white autoworkers in Detroit.103 Emblematic of its times when the US auto industry was facing growing threats from Japanese competitors, this incident caused an uproar in the nascent Asian American community, especially after Judge Charles Kaufman let the two perpetrators of the heinous hate crime walk away with a $3,780 fine on probation.104 Kaufman, who had been a POW at a prison camp in Japan during World War II, stated the reason for the effective acquittal of the two murderers:

99 Bahng, “Cruel Optimism,” 164.

100 Lowe, Immigrant Acts, 85.

101 Yu, “Oriental Cities,” 61.

102 Julie Ha Tran, “Thinking about Bodies, Souls, and Race in Gibson’s Bridge Trilogy,” in Techno-orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, by David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta Niu (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 141.

103 Mia Tuan, Forever Foreigners or Honorary Whites?: The Asian Ethnic Experience Today (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999. (AE98/99)), 40; “Racial Violence against Asian Americans,” Harvard Law Review 106, no. 8 (June 1993): 1928, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1341790.

104 Tuan, Forever Foreigners, 46.

We’re talking here about a man who’s held down a responsible job with the same company for 17 or 18 years, and his son who is employed and is a part-time student. These men are not going to go out and harm somebody else. I just didn’t think that putting them in prison would do any good for them or for society.105

Missing in Kaufman’s Orientalist logic was justice for the slain American, Vincent Chin, interred in American history as the permanent “Other.”106

In 1989, in Stockton, California, a white man named Patrick Purdy killed five and wounded thirty Southeast Asian refugee children on their school playground with his semiautomatic rifle (Appendix J).107 As the then California Attorney General John Van de Kamp announced, his motive was “festering hate” of Asians, but the post-incident activism was focused on gun control, not anti-Asian racism.108 In fact, both of these events were dismissed as isolated incidents—first committed by two “responsible” men and second committed by a “deranged” person with a love for guns—under the pretense that Asians were a “model minority” free from racism.109 These events, including the Orientalist construction of the “model minority” myth itself, were manifestations of Asian American identity as the perennial “Other” even as part of the extended “Self.”

By the late 80s, the source of American anxiety was replaced by an ongoing economic war, which reframed the Asian American identity from the Cold War-conscious “model minority” to the fear-led, technoOrientalist “yellow peril.” The era-ending event that bared the stature of Asian American identity was the 1992 Los Angeles Riot, which began as a protest of the brutal beating of a Black motorist named Rodney King by four white cops but ended in mass violence following the acquittal of the cops. The event that symbolized police brutality somehow ended up destroying more than 2,300 local businesses owned mostly by Korean Americans and inflicted almost half-billion dollars of property damage on Korean American business owners.110 The event, known as “Sa-i-gu”

105 Chris Fan, “Vincent Chin: Some Lessons and Legacies,” Hyphen: Asian America Unabridged, June 25, 2015, https://hyphenmagazine.com/ blog/2012/6/25/vincent-chin-some-lessons-and-legacies.

106 Li and Nicholson, “When ‘Model Minorities’ Become.”

107 Gustavo Arellano, “Column: A Deranged White Man Aiming His Bullets at Asians: The Urgent Lesson of 1989 Stockton Massacre,” Los Angeles Times (USA), March 20, 2021, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-03-20/ stockton-school-shooting-atlanta.

108 Arellano, “Column: A Deranged.”

109 Arellano, “Column: A Deranged.”

110 Lee, R., Orientals, 375-6.

(“April 29,” the day of the LA Riot, in Korean), was cast by countless media reports as a fait accompli of ongoing racial tension between Black Americans and Korean Americans rather than as a result of LAPD’s abandonment of Koreatown for three days while the Koreatown stores were getting destroyed by rioters.111 Some reporters even rationalized LAPD’s failure by evoking the familiar techno-Orientalist image of Korean Americans, such as that of mercenary Mr. Park in All Tomorrow’s Parties: “foreign intruders deliberately trying to stifle African American economic development,” according to Elaine H. Kim, a Korean American faculty member at the University of California at the time.112 Upon protesting such a skewed media focus, Kim herself received many hate mails, one of which read, “If you are so disenchanted, Korea is still there. Why did you ever leave it?”113 A year after the LA Riot, only 28% of the burned businesses reopened while a number of the victims repatriated to South Korea—back to where they were not considered “aliens” and taunted to “go back.”114 One victim interviewed in a Sa-igu documentary states, “I realize that they [the US government] don’t feel any obligation to help us … because we are Koreans.”115 All the interviewed victims describe the revelatory event, in which their own law enforcement (LAPD) abandoned them, in terms of “misrecognitions, misrepresentations, and cognitive dissonance”—evoking questions about whether Sa-i-gu was a chilling reminder that the people of Asian descent would never be integrated into American society (Appendix K).116

In 1992, after the Cold War was officially over, the US media took on a distinctively Orientalist voice, relegating the status of Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners. Legal scholar Lisa Ikemoto describes the voice as a “master narrative” and defines it as “white supremacy’s prescriptive, conflict-constructing power, which deploys exclusionary concepts of race and privilege in a way that maintains intergroup conflict.”117 That

111 King-kok Cheung, “(Mis)interpretations and (In)justice: The 1992 Los Angeles ‘Riots’ and ‘Black-Korean Conflict,’” MELUS 30, no. 3 (2005): 35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30029771.

112 Elaine H. Kim, “Home Is Where the Han Is: A Korean American Perspective on the Los Angeles Upheavals,” Social Justice 20, nos. 1/2 (51-52) (1993): 3, http://www.jstor.org/stable/29766728; Lee, R., Orientals, 376.

113 Kim, E., “Home is Where,” 9.

114 ‘Sa-I-Gu’: From Korean Women Perspectives, directed by Catherine Choy and Dai-Sil Kim-Gibson, produced by Elaine H. Kim, Center for Asian American Media, 1993, https://search.alexanderstreet.com/view/work/ bibliographic_entity%7Cvideo_work%7C3155438; Kim, “Home is Where,” 9.

115 ‘Sa-I-Gu’ From Korean Women Perspectives.

116 Jinah Kim, Postcolonial Grief: The Afterlives of the Pacific Wars in the Americas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), 53.

117 Cheung, “(Mis)interpretations and (In)justice,” 4.

seemingly objective and deftly non-engaging “master narrative” not only fuels “minority vs. minority” conflicts but also reinforces the archetypal Orientalist positioning of whites as the normative master that mediates as the adult, according to language critic King-kok Cheung.118 A landmark case of “master narrative,” Sa-i-gu was analogous to the 1966 US News and World Report article that had pitted Chinese Americans against Black Americans—that which had ignited the “model minority” myth in the first place. One key difference is that in 1966, the Chinese Americans were valorized as part of the extended “Self,” reflecting the Cold War strategy of integration at the time, while, in 1992, the Korean Americans were scapegoated for the plights of Black Americans, reflecting the Asian fear of the times bolstered by techno-Orientalist cultural productions cementing their image as mercenary “poison-pushing merchants.”119 From the perspective of these Cold War refugees, the Cold War did not end with the Berlin Wall crumbling down; rather, it ended in the streets of Los Angeles with a stark realization that their role as a pawn in the war of showoff of superiority was no longer needed—that they had been duped into joining the “Self” only in the US ostentation of racial integration and now abandoned after the war as useless “Other,” forever deemed alien and ineligible for true integration.

A progenitor of American imperialism, Orientalism enabled the US to identify itself as a superior “Self” while defining the Soviet Union as the Manichaean “Other” in the formative stages of the Cold War. In further defining the “Other,” the US government reductively grouped people of decolonizing nations with Communism as the enemy on Orientalist presupposition that they are susceptible to Communist indoctrination. In fortifying the “Self,” US policymakers, with help from scholars and media, strategically formed the Asian American identity as a “model minority,” showcasing Asian Americans’ success in countering Soviet propaganda against US racism. In so doing, the US exploited the cultural differences of Asian Americans, perpetuating their “otherness” even amidst the glorification of their status. As the waning Cold War gave way to economic war against Japan as the main source of American anxiety in the 80s, Orientalism took the most pernicious form, re-instilling in the American psyche an image of Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners trying to subvert white supremacy. In conclusion, Orientalism played a significant role in US race relations with Asians and later-formed Asian Americans, whose vacillating images during the 45-year span of the Cold War—ranging from the primitive people susceptible to Communism, to the “model minority,” and back to the “yellow horde” aiming to take over the world with inhuman technological prowess—must be contrapuntally

118 Cheung, “(Mis)interpretations and (In)justice,” 5. 119 Cheung, “(Mis)interpretations and (In)justice,” 11.

interpreted. Consistent throughout the period was the way in which the US viewed itself as the “Self” and people of Asian descent as the perpetual “Other.”

APPENDICES

Appendix A: A 1947 map showing the locations of decolonizing nations contested between the US and the Soviet Union for hegemony.

Source: Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 35.

Appendix B: Cho-So Chin-Sun (Korean-Soviet Friendship), a newsletter published by the Soviet Union in Korean to build close friendships with the Korean people, January 1950.

Source: Charles K. Armstrong, “The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945-1950,” The Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 1 (February 2003): 84, https://www.jstor. org/stable/3096136.

Appendix C: Advertisement for Sponsorship of a Child in Asia for Christian Children’s Fund. Courtesy Christian Children’s Fund

Source: Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 169.

Appendix D: A white parent is “forcefully” teaching her adopted children from Asia how to mind her in the 1958 film, South Pacific.

Source: Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 167.

Appendix E: Fu Manchu in the 1932 movie, The Mask of Fu Manchu.

Source: Clarence Sinclair Bull, Boris Karloff as Dr. Fu Manchu in ‘The Mask of Fu Manchu’, 1932, photograph, https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/ search/portrait/mw169833/BorisKarloff-as-Dr-Fu-Manchu-in-TheMask-of-Fu-Manchu

Appendix F: Anna, presenting the “Self,” is imparting the Siamese children, representing the “Other,” of the Western Knowledge in the 1956 Film, The King and I.

Source: Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 2.

Appendix G: A 1945 photograph features a Japanese American soldier, holding a pamphlet highlighting the “patriotism of Japanese American soldiers.”

Source: Ellen D. Wu, Color of Success - Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 84.

Appendix H: A 1951 photo showing a parade by the San Francisco Six Companies’ Anti-Communist League, holding anti-Communist placards, one of which says, “Chinese Americans are Loyal Citizens.”

Source: Ellen D. Wu, Color of Success - Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 117.

Appendix I: Japanese pilots chasing German airplane crew in H. G. Wells’ novel War in the Air (1908), reflecting the Asian fear spurred by Japan’s unexpected victory in the Russo-Japanese war.

Source: Kenneth Hough, “Demon Courage and Dread Engines: America’s Reaction to the Russo-Japanese War and the Genesis of the Japanese Invasion Sublime,” in Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, comp. David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 37.

Appendix J: The New York Times article reporting the 1989 Stockton Massacre, California, juxtaposed with another article that focuses on the weapon used by the gunman as opposed to the hate-based nature of the crime.

Source: Robert Reinhold, “After Shooting, Horror but Few Answers,” The New York Times (New York, NY), January 19, 1989, sec. B, 6, https://timesmachine. nytimes.com/timesmachine/1989/01/19/issue.html.

Appendix

Source: ‘Sa-I-Gu’: From Korean Women Perspectives, directed by Catherine Choy and Dai-Sil Kim-Gibson, produced by Elaine H. Kim, Center for Asian American Media, 1993, https://www.pbs.org/pov/watch/saigu/

K: A Korean-American shop owner after her shop was burned down by rioters in the LA Riot, 1992.

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Roh, David S., Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu. “Technologizing Orientalism: An Introduction.” Introduction to Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, 1-22. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015.

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The New Jersey Exception:

How Political Interests in the State Allowed Women to Vote from 1776 to 1807

Ca r olina Luca s

The Scythe of Progress:

Lincoln Center and the Complexity of Urban Renewal in New York City

Iliana We isber g

The Losing War on Drugs in Colombia:

An Analysis of the Failure and Detrimental E ec ts of US Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia

Gianna Zo u

A Kultural Blow:

The Mechanisms behind German-American Assimilation

Michael Ca i

The Perpetual Foreigner:

When the passage of the John Lewis Voting Rights Act was defeated by the Senate filibuster, Republicans chose their party over necessary voting reforms that would assist in the enfranchisement of people of color; several Democrats chose allegiance to outdated systems instead of supporting their constituents. As demonstrated by the Senate in 2021, the history of voting in the United States has been consistently plagued by one ill: the rampant effects of partisan interests on who is entitled to the franchise. No other example of this ill is clearer than the New Jersey Exception (Appendix A).1 Accurately named due to its unparalleled nature, this period in New Jersey was the first instance in the world of English-speaking women voting in government elections.2 In the midst of the radical idealism fostered by the American Revolution, New Jersey’s State Legislature crafted its first constitution in 1776, enfranchising unmarried and widowed women with two remarkable words: “all inhabitants.”3 New Jersey would be the only state in the country to expressly enfranchise women less than fifteen years later, with the Election Law of 1790.4 The law emerged as the result of an intense election between political factions, and served to manipulate the voting demographic in favor of Federalist counties. The year 1790 served as a turning point, as the decades that followed saw the constant grasp that political groups held on the evolution of female suffrage. While the roles of women shifted as America transitioned from the Revolutionary Periodto the Victorian Period, the return of women to domestic duties instead of battlefronts was not primarily responsible for New Jersey’s voting legislation in this

The E ec ts of Orientalism on US Race Relations with Asians and Asian Americans during the Cold War (1945-1991)

Julian Houg h

1 Howard Pyle, Women at the Polls in New Jersey in the Good Old Times, 1880, illustration, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/local/history/newjersey-women-vote-1776-suffrage/.

2 Edward Raymond Turner, “Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey 17901807,” Smith College Studies in History 1, no. 4 (July 1916): 166, https:// dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10929/54916/J324.3t945.pdf

3 Constitution of New Jersey, A. (NJ 1776). http://hdl.handle.net/10929/50466.

4 An Act to Regulate the Election of Members of the Legislative Council and General Assembly, Sheriffs, and Coroners, in the Counties of Bergen, Monmouth, Burlington, Gloucester, Salem, Hunterdon, and Sussex., 1790 NJ Laws 669 (Nov. 18, 1790). Accessed October 21, 2021. https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/ cgi-bin/diglib.cgi?collect=njleg&file=015&page=0001.

period.5 Instead, the fate of female enfranchisement became inextricably linked with the tide of political fortunes, and whether political groups viewed female voters as an asset or threat to their power. This struggle ultimately met its end in 1807, when the necessity to control who voted outweighed any support of female suffrage. Although the radical idealism of the American Revolution inspired gender neutrality in New Jersey’s first state constitution, the evolution of female enfranchisement in New Jersey between 1776 and 1807 was primarily driven by partisan interests, rather than shifting perceptions of gender roles during the period, as demonstrated by political groups’ use of female enfranchisement as a tool to manipulate the voting demographic in their favor.

In the lead up to 1776, New Jerseyans expressed radical tendencies in favor of revolution, which would later influence the state legislature to act in accordance with their views while drafting the state’s first constitution. As demonstrated in publications by the state’s assembly, New Jersey fiercely opposed Britain’s suffocating grasp on the colony. In 1765, they wrote, “Resolved... that it is... essential to the freedom of a people, and the undoubtable right of Englishmen, that no taxes be imposed on them but with their consent.”6 Their publication of the well-known slogan “no taxation without representation” demonstrated New Jersey’s early desire for a truly representative government. In contribution to the revolutionary zeal of the state, students at The College of New Jersey intercepted a 1770 letter from New York merchants, in which they said that they would be breaking their policy of nonimportation with Britain, to Philadelphia merchants.7 This action was taken to prevent merchants in Philadelphia from doing the same. In 1774, in another example of revolutionary behavior, students burned the steward’s supply of tea in support of Boston’s protest of the Tea Act.8 These acts in protest of colonial rule demonstrate the extensive scope and power of revolutionary ideas in New Jersey in this period.

In correspondence with the revolutionary idealism exhibited by its citizens, in May, 1776, the New Jersey State Legislature took its first

5 Marcela Micucci, interview by the author, Video Interview, USA, October 25, 2021.

6 Maxine L. Lurie, “New Jersey: Radical or Conservative in the Crisis Summer of 1776?,” in New Jersey in the American Revolution, ed. Barbara J. Mitnick (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ Press, 2007), 35.

7 Dennis P. Ryan, New Jersey in the American Revolution, 1763-1783: A Chronology (Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975), 13, http:// hdl.handle.net/10929/18632.

8 Ryan, New Jersey, 14.

concrete steps towards enacting radical change in the state in favor of independence. At this crucial time for the Revolution, William Franklin, the Royal Governor, was arrested and forced to leave his gubernatorial post.9 His Assembly and Council were also removed from power.10 This decision solidified New Jersey’s position in support of the Revolution. In June, the state legislature replaced all of its Delegates to the Continental Congress with ones “favorably disposed toward Independence.”11 They continued their steadfast support of the Revolution on June 22nd when the state legislature directed the new Delegates to vote in favor of independence.12 Both the appointment and direction of these delegates were drastic steps, and demonstrated New Jersey’s commitment to the cause of Independence and a willingness to act on their belief.

The radical political idealism supported by New Jerseyans not only resulted in the state legislature’s steadfast support of independence and revolution, but it also caused the suffrage clause of New Jersey’s first constitution to be remarkably inclusive. While some historians argue that New Jersey was not entirely radical and instead somewhat conservative during the Revolutionary Period, 1776 represented a distinct and radical shift in the state, as demonstrated by the state constitution.13 Prior to 1776, the most recent voting provisions were established by Queen Anne in 1702. They referred to voters using “he,” and only permitted freeholders who owned an estate of one hundred acres to vote.14 In June, 1776, the Third New Jersey Provincial Congress met in Burlington to begin work on the state constitution. However, the Provincial Congress had been discussing voter eligibility requirements for more than a year prior to June.15 Although one proposal in February, 1776 refersto votersas “he,” the final draft of the constitution used gender neutral language in

9 Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (NY: Knopf, 1997), 64.

10 Lurie, “New Jersey,” 34.

11 Maier, American Scripture, 64.

12 Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey 1775-1776 (Trenton, NJ: Naar, Day & Naar, 1879), 473, accessed January 5, 2022, https://archive.org/details/minutesofprovinc00newj/page/472/ mode/2up.

13 Lurie, “New Jersey,” 33.

14 Julian P. Boyd, “The Instructions from the Queen in Council to the Governor of the Province of New Jersey: November 16, 1702,” in Fundamental Laws and Constitutions of New Jersey, The New Jersey Historical Series (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964), 17:131, accessed January 20, 2022, https:// dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/handle/10929/27383.

15 Marc W. Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 105.

reference to voters.16 This was a distinct and intentional shift from the language used in 1702 in and the February 1776 clause. The 1776 New Jersey State Constitution was adopted on July 2, 1776, and included the following voter eligibility clause:

All inhabitants of this colony, of full age, who are worth fifty pounds, proclamation money, clear estate in the same, and have resided within the county in which they claim a vote for twelve months immediately preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote for representatives in council and assembly; and also for all other public officers that shall be elected by the people of the county at large.17

This provision expanded suffrage significantly compared to previous requirements. Neither race nor gender were mentioned, and the new law permitted residents who had only lived in New Jersey for one year to vote. Of the three other states which made no reference to race or gender in their constitutions, only two had greater liberalized requirements for voting eligibility.18 This 1776 provision places New Jersey as one of the three most radical states in the nation in terms of voter qualifications, even prior to the explicit reference of suffrage for women.

The revolutionary atmosphere of New Jersey in the 1770s produced a desire for inclusive suffrage requirements, and New Jerseyans generated demand for these provisions. Many New Jerseyans favored universal suffrage for all taxpayers during the Revolution, while many others favored expanded suffrage, but to a lesser extent. As published by the New-York Journal in March, 1776, one Essex County resident desires, “widows paying taxes to have an equal right to vote, as men of the same property.”19 Similarly, the Trenton True American published the argument that the legislature needed to act “from a principle of justice, deeming it right that every free person who pays a tax should have a vote.” 20 These demands are what made the usage of the phrase “all inhabitants” a clear intentional calculus by the legislature. By using this phrase, New Jersey officials could draw more support for the Revolution and independence

16 Minutes of the Provincial, 373.

17 Constitution of New Jersey (1776).

18 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New York City, NY: Basic Books, 2000), 327-8.

19 Kruman, Between Authority, 105.

Rosemarie Zagarri, Revolutionary Backlash: Women and Politics in the Early American Republic (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 32.

from those who would fight in and fund the war.21 Thus, to meet the demands of the populace and retain political popularity, the legislature drafted an inclusive constitution that followed the revolutionary ideals and attitudes of its citizens.

Although the immediate effects of the 1776 Constitution were not dramatic in regard to women, its signing opened the door in New Jersey to female suffrage. The legislature referred to voters as male in the years following 1776, and the concept of female suffrage was neither publicly supported nor criticized. 22 However, the vast importance of the State Constitution of 1776 cannot be underestimated. A poll list from an election in 1787 for members of the Assembly and Council includes the names of two women, Iona Curtis and Selvenia Lilvey.23 Although they are the only known recorded women to have voted prior to 1790, their presence suggests that the state constitution must have been interpreted to include women. In addition, those outside New Jersey viewed the constitutional language radically, expressing their support for the female enfranchisement they believed it granted. Abigail Adams remarked in regard to New Jersey’s constitution, “If our State Constitution had been equally liberal with that of New Jersey and had admitted the females to vote I should certainly have exercised it...”24 Adams’ interpretation of the constitution was echoed decades later by Lucy Stone, a prominent New Jersey feminist in the mid to late 19th century. In 1867, Stone delivered remarks on women’s suffrage where she makes it clear to her audience, the state legislature, that the 1776 State Constitution opened suffrage to all and was crucial in the history of female enfranchisement.25 New Jersey’s first state constitution was the key to the future of female suffrage in the state, unlocking the door to enfranchisement for women that had never been opened before.

21 Irwin N. Gertzog, “Female Suffrage in New Jersey, 1790-1807,” Journal of Women, Politics and Policy 10, no. 90 (1990): 48, accessed October 18, 2021, https://cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/ femalesuffrageinnj1790_1807.pdf.

22 Jan Ellen Lewis, “Rethinking Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey, 17761807,” Rutgers Law Review 63, no. 3 (Spring 2011): 1020, accessed October 9, 2021, http://www.rutgerslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/archive/vol63/ Issue3/Lewis.pdf.; Turner, “Women’s Suffrage,” 167.

23 Henry C. Shinn, “An Early New Jersey Poll List,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 44, no. 1 (January 1920): 77, http://www. jstor.org/stable/20086404.

24 Abigail Adams to Mary Smith Cranch, November 15, 1797, https://founders. archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-12-02-0166.

25 Lucy Stone, “Woman Suffrage in New Jersey,” address presented at A Hearing Before The New Jersey Legislature, March 6, 1867, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.rbc/ rbnawsa.n2760.

Although idealism shaped New Jersey’s first constitution, when political factions began to emerge in the 1780s, political interests soon took control over the evolution of women’s suffrage. Due to the state’s history of sectional conflict, the strength of these factions when they first appeared was immense. The political factions that emerged in the 1780s resulted from the previous, longstanding divide between East Jersey and West Jersey, as their separation dated back to their origins of existing as two different colonies.26 From the very beginning of the settlements, Western New Jersey, dominated by Quakers, was more conservative and favored “hard currency.” Eastern New Jersey, however, favored a “mercantile” economy with a mix of paper money and bartering.27 This conflict reappeared in full force as New Jersey began to find its political footing as a state in the new nation. This divisiveness lead one historian to remark that New Jersey’s unification in its support for the US Constitution in 1789 was an “illusionary oasis” of unification.28 Such dramatic language exemplifies how fractured New Jersey had become politically by the end of the 1780s. The political turmoil that was natural to the state by 1789 set the stage for that year’s congressional elections, and the necessary voting reforms that would follow.

When conflicting interests between powerful political factions grew in the late 1780s, groups employed drastic measures to ensure their victory, and as a result they ushered in the legislation that extended the vote to women explicitly. The widespread election fraud of 1789 due to the creation of the Junto ticket represented such measures, and illustrated a shift in party politics in New Jersey. In that year’s congressional elections, a group of conservative businessmen, almost all Quakers, put together the slate known as the “Junto” ticket. The slate was comprised solely of future Federalists, who would soon describe themselves as such.29 During the election, the creators of the Junto ticket kept the polls open in the South long after the North had closed theirs, as they had control of all Southern polling locations.30 By waiting to close their polls until after the North had, the supporters of the Junto ticket could determine the amount of votes they would need to win the state. This clear tactic of manipulating the vote also included getting the vote in Essex County dismissed due to how long

26 Carl E. Prince, New Jersey’s Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine 1789-1817 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 6.

27 Prince, New Jersey’s, 7. 28 Prince, New Jersey’s, 6. 29 Rudolph J. Pasler and Margaret C. Pasler, The New Jersey Federalists (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975), 27. 30 Lewis, “Rethinking Women’s,” 1023.

their polling sites had stayed open.31 During the same election, polling places were even moved around to favor one faction over another. The disastrously evident fraud of this election generated by political greed and power seeking caused the turn in New Jersey politics that led to the introduction of voting reforms in 1790.32 The election was a clear indicator of the polarization New Jersey politics experienced by the end of the 1780s, and made evident the need for election reforms.

The following year, members of the Junto ticket put forward the Election Law of 1790 to explicitly grant women the right to vote in majority Federalist and Quaker counties, and standardize voting in those counties to prevent future fraud. The remarkable phrase “he or she” referred to voters in those seven counties.33 This crucial placement of “she” along with “he” marked the first time American women, or any Englishspeaking woman, would explicitly be granted the right to vote.34 The law also expanded the number of polling places in the state by introducing township voting, it ensured public knowledge of upcoming elections, and finally standardized elections in those counties as a whole.35 Some historians argue that the Election Law of 1790 was put forth by Quakers due to their belief in social and political equality for women.36 While this is a possibility, its basis in specific individuals isn’t concrete. A clearer answer follows the logic that by giving women the right to vote in their counties, conservatives could ensure future success.37 This was made clear by the specifics of the reform. The Election Law of 1790 only applied to the following counties: Bergen, Monmouth, Burlington, Gloucester, Salem, Hunterdon, and Sussex.38 Of these counties, four had extremely high concentrations of Quakers, and all seven were heavily Federalist leaning.39 Five of the seven counties were also in West Jersey and five were southern (Appendix B). 40 These show clear inclinations toward assisting Quaker, conservative, and future Federalist counties in elections, cementing partisanship as an integral factor to the New Jersey Exception. Following the Election of 1789 and the enactment of Election Law of 1790, the Junto faction was extremely successful, and by the early 1790s

31 Gertzog, “Female Suffrage,” 51. 32 Prince, New Jersey’s, 8. 33 An Act to Regulate (1790). 34 Turner, “Women’s Suffrage,” 166. 35 An Act to Regulate (1790). 36 Zagarri, Revolutionary Backlash, 31. 37 Gertzog, “Female Suffrage,” 51-2. 38 An Act to Regulate (1790). 39 Gertzog, “Female Suffrage,” 51. 40 Ryan, New Jersey, 3-4.

New Jersey became a Federalist stronghold.41 This was in large part due to their political strategies, including the utilization of women voters.

Following 1790, both the Federalist and Republican parties began to vie for female votes in earnest, entangling the right to vote with partisan tactics to gain power and retain it over time. Having expanded the right to vote to women across predominantly Federalist counties, the Federalists attempted to gain popularity and votes from women in the early 1790s. A large aspect of this campaign relied upon newspapers. Newspaper propaganda was instrumental to the tactics of party leadership, and as such they began to revitalize Federalist papers and increase their quantity during this time.42 Published in the Burlington Advertiser were articles that supported women’s rights and expressed fondness towards female voters. In addition, the paper published articles written by women in support of causes of importance to them.43 As seen in these publications, Federalist interests were clearly in favor of using the female vote as a political tool. Such tactics can also be seen in an oration by Elias Boudinot, a prominent New Jersey Federalist and Hamiltonian, to the Society of the Cincinnati of New Jersey on July 4th, 1793.44 During the address, he paid careful attention to the female listeners and directed several minutes towards them. He remarks, “Have you not at all times and do you not still continue to participate deeply in the multiplied blessings of our common country?” Boudinot then continues, harking on the importance of women to the Federalist cause and to the country.45 In conjunction with these expressions of support, a Newton Township polling list records one woman, Hope Carpenter, as a voter in a 1793 election, marking this beginning of more widespread female participation at the polls.46 While Boudinot’s tone of support demonstrates the view of the party at the time, this excitement by the Federalist party towards women would not last.

41 Prince, New Jersey’s, 9-10.

42 Pasler and Pasler, The New Jersey, 118-9.

43 Judith Apter Klinghoffer and Lois Elkis, “The Petticoat Electors: Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807,” Journal of the Early Republic 12, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 173, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3124150.

44 Prince, New Jersey’s, 11.

“Oration before the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of New Jersey -- ‘A Star in the West’ -- Other Publications,” in The Life Public Services, Addresses and Letters of Elias Boudinot, LL. D. President of the Continental Congress, ed. J.J. Boudinot (Cambridge, MA: University Press, 1896), 2:374.

46 “Newton Township Election Records,” table, 1793, MG 608, Box 17, Folder 4, Anderson Family Papers, The New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.

By the mid-1790s, the emergence of the Republican Party lead to the expansion of women’s suffrage across the state. The foundation of several anti-Federalist groups beginning in 1793 produced desires to implement legislation to standardize voting across the state. Several of these groups joined to form the Essex County Democratic Society, the most prominent precursor to the Republican Party that would appear beginning in the elections of 1796.47 This allowed for a unified stance against Federalist policy for the first time. The political strife over Jay’s Treaty in 1795 proved critical to the Republican cause, as the treaty marked a turning point in New Jerseyan perceptions of Federalist policies and generated support for the new party.48 That same year, almost 900 Essex County residents signed a petition complaining over their lack of township voting.49 Township voting was an electoral system that ensured there were polling places in every town, and that citizens could only cast a ballot in the town that they resided in. The previous system divided polling places by county, making voting much more tedious and inaccessible.50 The Essex County petition served as an indicator of statewide attitudes, and it demonstrated the power that dueling political groups had on the implementation of new voting legislation.

By 1797, women’s suffrage expanded across New Jersey as a result of Republican interests in the statewide standardization of election procedures and the voting demographic. This legislation would allow for township voting throughout the state, satisfying earlier demands from Republican constituents.51 In addition, due to Republican gerrymandering enacted by the law, they would gain three of New Jersey’s five congressional seats in 1798. 52 The Election Law of 1797 extended suffrage to women across New Jersey, due to its inclusion of the terms “she” and “her” when referring to voters. This language was entirely deliberate, as demonstrated by the clerk using carrots to insert the words in the draft (Appendix C). 53 Including

Prince, New Jersey’s, 12-13.

48 Prince, New Jersey’s, 16-17.

49 Jack Richon Pole, The Reform of Suffrage and Representation in New Jersey: 1744-1844 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1975), 121.

50 Lewis, “Rethinking Women’s,” 1023-4.

51 Klinghoffer and Elkis, “The Petticoat,” 165.

52 Pasler and Pasler, The New Jersey, 93

53 An Act to Regulate the Elections of Members of the Legislative Council and General Assembly, Sheriffs, and Coroners in This State, NJ Laws (Feb. 21, 1797). Accessed November 8, 2021. https://www.amrevmuseum.org/ virtualexhibits/when-women-lost-the-vote-a-revolutionary-story/pages/1797electoral-reform-enrolled-law-2.

women to ensure its similarity to the Election Law of 1790, this piece of legislation directly emerged as a result of increased interest in election standards due to the heightened political atmosphere of the state.

Following the passage of the Election Law of 1797, female suffrage increased substantially in New Jersey, and New Jerseyans no longer viewed it with ambivalence, as it was publicly treated as political tool by both parties. When women began voting across the state, Federalists quickly realized that female participation at the polls would actually greatly favor the Republicans, due to two major factors. First, wealthy and educated women were not necessarily more likely to engage in politics, and second, it was much easier to get residents in towns to the polls, which were emerging as Republican leaning.54 As the New Jersey Federalist Party began to decline rapidly after 1797, a desire to revoke the right to vote from women as a means of regaining power emerged. The party was already fracturing internally, and due to the way that the new legislation divided congressional districts, Federalists began to suffer at the polls beginning in 1798.55 Their misjudgment of who the female vote would benefit soon demonstrated the political expediency of female voters.

In a final attempt to revitalize their party, Federalist legislators proposed a revision to New Jersey’s state constitution in 1799 which would disenfranchise women and remove them as a political threat. The measure displayed their growing desperation to cling to power. 56 William Griffith, a prominent New Jersey Federalist, wrote in his 1799 critique of the constitution in regards to female voters:

The great practical mischief, however, resulting from their admission, under our present form of government, is, that the towns and populous villages gain an unfair advantage over the county, by the greater facility they enjoy over the latter, in drawing out their women to the election.57

Although Griffith labels women as domestic earlier in the piece, his main qualm is not with their gender, but rather where their votes are

54 Klinghoffer and Elkis, “The Petticoat, ” 177-8.

55 Pasler and Pasler, The New Jersey, 92.

56 Klinghoffer and Elkis, “The Petticoat,” 178.

57 William Griffith, Eumenes: Being a Collection of Papers, Written for the Purpose of Exhibiting Some of the More Prominent Errors and Omissions of the Constitution of New-Jersey, as Established on the Second Day of July, One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-Six: and to Prove the Necessity of Calling a Convention, for Revision and Amendment (Trenton, NJ: G. Craft, 1799), 33, http://hdl.handle.net/10929/53061.

cast. Griffith’s description of the power of women voters, and therefore his charge to dispense with them, shows how changing political tides directly affected female enfranchisement.

The 1799 campaign for a constitutional revision was unsuccessful, and therefore Republicans advocated for the votes of women to use female enfranchisement as a political weapon to benefit their party. Similarly to their Federalist counterparts, Republicans demonstrated their support of female suffrage through newspaper publications. The Centinel of Freedom, a key Republican outlet, published an article titled “Female Festivity” in July, 1800. In the “Ladies Toast,” a line reads: “The rights of women -may they never be curtailed.”58 An oration by a male “Citizen” published by the Genius of Liberty, another Republican newspaper, in August, 1800, celebrates equality between the sexes.59 Notably, celebrations of Jefferson’s presidential victory thank women most graciously. Toasts recorded in the Centinel of Freedom in March, 1801 from various meetings read: “[to] the Republican fair of New Jersey... [to] the fair daughters of Columbia; may they always stand unrivalled in their love of freedom and virtue... [to] the rights of women; may they equally participate with men in the rights of man.”60 These sudden Republican interests in appealing to women demonstrate how changing political fortune controlled the favorability of women’s suffrage in New Jersey.

When Republicans began viewing consistent women voters as a threat to their dominance among the voting population, rather than as an asset to capitalize upon, this phase of Republican support of female suffrage soon ended. After 1800, women started voting consistently, with several polling lists between 1800 to 1807 listing women as electors.61 This includes a December, 1800 election where 29 women voted for the members of Congress, making up roughly 13% of all the voters

58 Clara, “Female Festivity: The Ladies Toast,” Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), July 29, 1800, ID 721, The New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.

59 Citizen, “An Oration, Delivered by a Citizen of the United States, on the Fourth of July,” The Genius of Liberty (Morristown, NJ), August 7, 1800, North Jersey History and Genealogy Center, The Morristown and Morris Township Public Library, Morristown, NJ.

60 Centinel of Freedom, “Republican Festivity,” Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), March 24, 1801, ID 721, The New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.

61 Museum of the American Revolution, “When Women Lost the Vote: A Revolutionary Story,” The Museum of the American Revolution, last modified October 2, 2020, accessed November 4, 2021, https://www.amrevmuseum.org/ virtualexhibits/when-women-lost-the-vote-a-revolutionary-story.

(Appendix D).62 When women truly began to utilize their right to vote, both parties chose to label them as a liability rather than a benefit: in 1799 by Federalists, and in 1802 when Republicans lost a seat in the state legislature. In the 1802 election, the Republican candidate lost his race by a slim margin. In an effort to place blame, many Republicans claimed that their candidate only lost because of a married or enslaved woman voting.63 Soon after, William Pennington, a Republican, proposed “An Act Relating to Female Suffrage” to the legislature.64 This proposal, which had the goal of revoking the right to vote from women, was dismissed by the legislature before it could be called to a vote.65 In almost identical fashion to the Federalists, Republicans wanted to rid women of the voting populace when their growing presence was no longer in their favor.

By 1807, the political turmoil present in New Jersey resulted in another entirely fraudulent election, not dissimilar to that of 1789, which cast women as expendable members of the voting demographic in an attempt to restore political order. The beginning of the end of female suffrage started at the turn of the century. As New Jersey entered the late 1790s, accounts of voter suppression were considerable.66 These mostly stemmed from complaints about the county voting system, and the difficulty it posed to voters. However, in 1800 these allegations shifted into ones of voter fraud. Some of these allegations blamed men dressed as women running between multiple polling sites, but the vast majority cited poll inspectors or other election officials in their complaints.67 Although election dishonesty occurred across New Jersey, the fraud reached its peak at a disastrous election in Essex County over the location of the courthouse.68 Eventually, the immense polarization

62 Poll List Upper Penns Neck Township Salem County, New Jersey December 23 and 24, 1800, accessed November 8, 2021, https://www.amrevmuseum.org/ virtualexhibits/when-women-lost-the-vote-a-revolutionary-story/pages/upperpenns-neck-township-salem-county-new-jersey-poll-lists-1800.

63 Klinghoffer and Elkis, “The Petticoat,” 183.

64 Journal of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the State of New Jersey (Trenton, NJ: Wilson and Blackwell, 1803), 169, accessed January 20, 2022, https://books.google.com/ books?id=aVhNAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_ summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

65 Klinghoffer and Elkis, “The Petticoat,” 183-4.

66 Micucci, interview by the author.

67 Museum of the American Revolution, “When Women,” The Museum of the American Revolution.

68 Turner, “Women’s Suffrage,” 181-2.

and partisanship of the state and nation that crept into the state’s elections caused a referendum that proved devastating for women’s suffrage.

The Essex County election, between moderate and liberal Republicans, served as a final catalyst for women losing the right to vote due to negotiations over voter requirements in its aftermath. Moderate Republicans from southern Essex County favored Elizabeth Town, while liberal Republicans from northern Essex County supported Newark for the courthouse location. Although voting was honest when the election began, the situation devolved quickly. The Centinel of Freedom described it as the “most spirited” election in the county’s history, or even in that of the state.69 The fraud was glaring, as the amount of ballots cast were, in some cases, ridiculously high. In Newark, where 1,600 ballots had been cast in an 1806 election, 5,000 were cast in the 1807 referendum. In Springfield, 300 ballots were cast in the previous election while over 2,400 were counted in the referendum.70 Although the Newark liberals came out of the election victorious, their attitudes towards women voters were still quite unfavorable. One Newark Republican claimed that women and girls were “used,” characterizing them as the ones who swayed the election.71 Following the election, a group of conservative Republicans petitioned against the results of the referendum because they were so skewed. They demanded not only a new election, but an entire overhaul of the state’s election process.72 The fraud and ballot stuffing of this election would have grave consequences for the future of female suffrage in New Jersey.

After the Essex County referendum, Republicans chose to revoke the right to vote from several marginalized groups, including women, to ensure the voting demographic remained in their favor. The election reflected the increasing political divide between liberal and moderate Republicans across the state, whose disputes were causing alarm to the party leadership. An emerging faction of conservative Republicans found themselves in between the more traditionally liberal Republicans and the highly conservative Federalist party.73 Essex County had a history of lacking party unity, as there was even a chasm between two Republican

69 Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), February 17, 1807, ID 722, The New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.

70 Gertzog, “Female Suffrage,” 55.

71 A Newark Republican, “To the Legislature of the State of New Jersey,” Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), November 15, 1807, ID 722, The New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.

72 Klinghoffer and Elkis, “The Petticoat,” 188.

73 Klinghoffer and Elkis, “The Petticoat,” 187.

news outlets, the Centinel of Freedom of Newark and the New Jersey Journal, which served the outer edges of the county.74 However, with the upcoming presidential election of 1808, the party required unity. In a desire to satisfy both factions of the party, the courthouse was built in Newark, but the liberal Republicans agreed to support a conservative measure to restrict voting parameters to white, male, taxpayers. Due to new law, Republicans would lose the votes of both non-taxpayers along with immigrants, two bodies that typically supported them. To retain a favorable voting demographic, they also removed two historically Federalist leaning groups from the voting populace: African Americans and women.75 Federalists supported the measure, and it passed easily with only five dissenting votes.76 In the name of restoring party unity for the Presidential Election of 1800, thousands became disenfranchised because of their political expendability.

After the New Jersey Exception met its conclusion, New Jersey women did not regain the right to vote for over a century. The importance of retaining a favorable voting demographic proved more important than retaining inclusive voting qualifications in 1807, which followed the decades long trajectory of female suffrage in New Jersey. On two separate occasions, two separate parties attempted to revoke the right to vote from women due to their partisan interests. The longevity of the New Jersey Exception is quite remarkable, considering the politically tumultuous conditions it endured. The Exception places the beginning of female suffrage at the same place in history as the dawn of the United States in 1776. The revolutionary ideas that accompanied the birth of America also ushered in the modern concept of female suffrage. However, the Exception also demonstrates a dangerous lesson in regard to voting rights. This period emphasizes the threat of partisanship to voting rights, a fault in the American electoral system that persists to this day. The ability for parties to disenfranchise slews of American citizens simply for their benefit is one of the greatest threats that democracy faces today. By looking to the New Jersey Exception, perhaps history’s lessons can prevent future disasters.

74 Prince, New Jersey’s, 73-80.

75 Klinghoffer and Elkis, “The Petticoat,” 188.

76 Pole, The Reform, 146.

Appendix A: Engraving titled “Women at the Polls in New Jersey in the Good Old Times,” published in 1880.

Source: Howard Pyle, Women at the Polls in New Jersey in the Good Old Times, 1880, illustration, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/local/history/ new-jersey-women-vote-1776-suffrage/.

Appendix B: Map of New Jersey, 1775, divided in two halves.

Source: Dennis P. Ryan, New Jersey in the American Revolution, 1763-1783: A Chronology (Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975), 13, http://hdl.handle.net/10929/18632.

APPENDICES

Appendix C: Page 7 of the 1797 Electoral Reform Enrolled Law of New Jersey. The addition of female pronouns can be seen in the gaps between the lines in Section 9.

Source: An Act to Regulate the Elections of Members of the Legislative Council and General Assembly, Sheriffs, and Coroners in This State, NJ Laws (Feb. 21, 1797). Accessed November 8, 2021. https://www. amrevmuseum.org/virtualexhibits/ when-women-lost-the-vote-arevolutionary-story/pages/1797electoral-reform-enrolled-law-2.

Appendix D: Several names of women can be found on this polling list from an election in Salem County, 1800, as highlighted.

Poll List Upper Penns Neck Township Salem County, New Jersey December 23 and 24, 1800, accessed November 8, 2021, https://www.amrevmuseum.org/ virtualexhibits/when-women-lost-the-vote-a-revolutionary-story/pages/upperpenns-neck-township-salem-county-new-jersey-poll-lists-1800.

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An Act to Regulate the Elections of Members of the Legislative Council and General Assembly, Sheriffs, and Coroners in This State, NJ Laws (Feb. 21, 1797). Accessed November 8, 2021. https://www.amrevmuseum. org/virtualexhibits/when-women-lost-the-vote-a-revolutionary-story/ pages/1797-electoral-reform-enrolled-law-2.

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Boyd, Julian P. “The Instructions from the Queen in Council to the Governor of the Province of New Jersey: November 16, 1702.” In Fundamental Laws and Constitutions of New Jersey, 126-54. Vol. 17. The New Jersey Historical Series. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964. Accessed January 20, 2022. https://dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/ handle/10929/27383.

Campell Curry-Ledbetter, Campell. “Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey 17761807: A Political Weapon.” The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 21, no. 705 (Spring 2020): 705-23. Accessed October 9, 2021. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/gender-journal/wp-content/uploads/ sites/20/2020/08/Womens-Suffrage-in-New-Jersey-1776-1807_APolitical-Weapon.pdf.

Citizen. “An Oration, Delivered by a Citizen of the United States, on the Fourth of July.” The Genius of Liberty (Morristown, NJ), August 7, 1800. PDF, North Jersey History and Genealogy Center, The Morristown and Morris Township Public Library, Morristown, NJ.

Clara. “Female Festivity: The Ladies Toast.” Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), July 29, 1800, ID 721, The New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.

Constitution of New Jersey, A. (NJ 1776). http://hdl.handle.net/10929/50466. DePauw, Linda Grant. Fortunes of War: New Jersey Women and the American Revolution. New Jersey Historical Society, 1975. Accessed October 9, 2021. https://dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/bitstream/ handle/10929/18676/h6731975e_v26.pdf.

Frost-Knappman, Elizabeth, and Kathryn Cullen-DuPont. Women’s Suffrage in America: An Eyewitness History. Updated ed. New York: Facts On File, 2005.

Gerlach, Larry R. New Jersey in the American Revolution 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975. http://hdl.handle.net/10929/48690.

Gertzog, Irwin N. “Female Suffrage in New Jersey, 1790-1807.” Journal of Women, Politics and Policy 10, no. 90 (1990). Accessed October 18, 2021. https://cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/ femalesuffrageinnj1790_1807.pdf.

Griffith, William. Eumenes: Being a Collection of Papers, Written for the Purpose of Exhibiting Some of the More Prominent Errors and Omissions of the Constitution of New-Jersey, as Established on the Second Day of July, One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-Six: and to Prove the Necessity of Calling a Convention, for Revision and Amendment. Trenton, NJ: G. Craft, 1799. http://hdl.handle. net/10929/53061.

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Keyssar, Alexander. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States. New York City, NY: Basic Books, 2000.

Klinghoffer, Judith Apter, and Lois Elkis. “The Petticoat Electors: Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807.” Journal of the Early Republic 12, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 159-93. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3124150.

Kruman, Marc W. Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.

Lewis, Jan Ellen. “Rethinking Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807.” Rutgers Law Review 63, no. 3 (Spring 2011). Accessed October 9, 2021. http://www.rutgerslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/archive/ vol63/Issue3/Lewis.pdf.

Livingston, William. June 1774 - June 1777. Edited by Carl E. Prince. Vol. 1 of The Papers of William Livingston. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Histor. Commission, 1979.

Lurie, Maxine L. “New Jersey: Radical or Conservative in the Crisis Summer of 1776?” In New Jersey in the American Revolution, edited by Barbara J. Mitnick, 31-44. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ Press, 2007.

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Micucci, Marcela. Interview by the author. Video Interview, USA. October 25, 2021.

Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey 1775-1776. Trenton, NJ: Naar, Day & Naar, 1879. Accessed January 5, 2022. https://archive.org/details/minutesofprovinc00newj/ page/472/mode/2up.

Museum of the American Revolution. “When Women Lost the Vote: A Revolutionary Story.” The Museum of the American Revolution. Last modified October 2, 2020. Accessed November 4, 2021. https:// www.amrevmuseum.org/virtualexhibits/when-women-lost-the-vote-arevolutionary-story.

Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), February 17, 1807, ID 722, The New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.

Centinel of Freedom. “Republican Festivity.” Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), March 24, 1801, ID 721, The New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.

A Newark Republican. “To the Legislature of the State of New Jersey.” Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), November 15, 1807, ID 722, The New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.

“Newton Township Election Records.” Table. 1793. MG 608, Box 17, Folder 4, Anderson Family Papers, The New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.

Norton, Mary Beth. Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-1800: with a New Preface. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.

“Oration before the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of New Jersey -- ‘A Star in the West’ -- Other Publications.” In The Life Public Services, Addresses and Letters of Elias Boudinot, LL. D. President of the Continental Congress, edited by J.J. Boudinot, 356-86. Vol. 2. Cambridge, M.A.: University Press, 1896.

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Pasley, Jeffrey L. The Princeton Encyclopedia of American Political History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. https://onlineinfobase-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/Auth/Index?aid=17980 &itemid=WE52&articleId=588884.

Pole, Jack Richon. The Reform of Suffrage and Representation in New Jersey: 1744-1844. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1975.

Poll List Upper Penns Neck Township Salem County, New Jersey December 23 and 24, 1800. Accessed November 8, 2021. https://www. amrevmuseum.org/virtualexhibits/when-women-lost-the-vote-arevolutionary-story/pages/upper-penns-neck-township-salem-countynew-jersey-poll-lists-1800.

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———.

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The Scythe of Progress:

Lincoln Center and the Complexity of Urban Renewal in New York City

“The scythe of progress must move north [from Columbus Circle to Lincoln Square]…”1

A Kultural

–Robert Moses to The New York Times

The Mechanisms behind German-American Assimilation

Iliana We isber g

Blow: Michael Ca i

The

Perpetual

Foreigner: Julian Houg h

The E ec ts of Orientalism on US Race Relations with Asians and Asian Americans during the Cold War (1945-1991)

Today, Lincoln Center in New York City stands as a cultural center of opera, music, and dance. The Metropolitan Opera, the New York Philharmonic, the Juilliard School, and the New York City Ballet all have homes there. But in the 1950s, it was people who had homes there. The neighborhood was home to seven thousand low-income families and eight hundred businesses.2 That all changed in the mid 1950s with the introduction of a slum clearance project that would result in the construction of Lincoln Center, called the Lincoln Square Renewal Project, after the neighborhood that the endeavor would demolish and build over. The project was spearheaded by Robert Moses, a New York City public official who had extensive experience with slum clearance. Although the Lincoln Square Renewal Project was presented to the public as a symbol of American high culture during the Cold War, Moses’s goal of slum clearance and visions of renewed local prosperity conflicted with the needs and attitudes of local residents, which brought to light the significance of the ideological dissonance between culture as art and culture as community in slum clearance projects.

In 1955, the city of New York designated a neighborhood of the Upper West Side known as Lincoln Square for urban renewal, the process of replacing or restoring urban areas considered blighted, in order to create a new cultural center in the city.3 Robert Moses had been discussing the possibility of providing a new home for the Metropolitan Opera as early as 1952, and when this area was designated, it became clear to him and the executives at the Metropolitan Opera that its size made it

1 Charles Grutzner, “Stevens Expands Lincoln Sq. Plans,” The New York Times (New York City, NY), October 27, 1956, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1956/10/27/88476576.pdf

2 Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 1014.

3 Edgar B. Young, Lincoln Center: The Building of an Institution (New York: New York University Press, 1980), XII.

98 Ca r olina Luca s

Gianna Zo u

a good place to see that project through.4 The New York Philharmonic realized around this time that they would also need to relocate soon.

Arthur A. Houghton, a director on the board of the Philharmonic, sought out the same architect as Moses and the Metropolitan Opera had, and it was this Today, Lincoln Center in New York City stands as a cultural center of opera, music, and dance. The Metropolitan Opera, the New York Philharmonic, the Juilliard School, and the New York City Ballet all have homes there. But in the 1950s, it was people who had homes there. The neighborhood was home to seven thousand low-income families and eight hundred businesses.5 That all changed in the mid 1950s with the introduction of a slum clearance project that would result in the construction of Lincoln Center, called the Lincoln Square renewal project after the neighborhood that the endeavor would demolish and build over. The project was spearheaded by Robert Moses, a New York City public official who had extensive experience with slum clearance. Although the Lincoln Square renewal project was presented to the public as a symbol of American high culture during the Cold War, Moses’s goal of slum clearance and visions of renewed local prosperity conflicted with the needs and attitudes of local residents, which brought to light the significance of the ideological dissonance between culture as art and culture as community in slum clearance projects.

The construction of Lincoln Center was largely funded by wealthy businessmen who were in communication with the executives of the various arts companies that would find homes at the new Center. Though the government did provide a noteworthy amount of funding through urban renewal legislation, it was not enough to cover the full cost of the ambitious undertaking, and further support from wealthy patrons was necessary.

John D. Rockefeller III, whose family contributed significant funds to the project, was chosen as chairman for the Exploratory Committee, a group of executives in charge of the initial planning.6 In addition to Rockefeller, this committee included executives from the Metropolitan Opera and the New York Philharmonic, as well as businessmen who were not involved in the arts, such as Devereux C. Josephs, the chairman of the New York Life Insurance Company.7

4 Letter by Robert Moses, January 21, 1952, The Metropolitan Opera Archives, New York City, NY; Memorandum, “Memorandum on Proposed New Opera House Site,” October 17, 1955, The Metropolitan Opera Archives, New York City, NY.

5 Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 1014.

6 Young, Lincoln Center, 19-20.

7 Young, Lincoln Center, 20-21.

It was through these executives and businesspeople that the board—and by extension, those working on the project as a whole—gained access to significant financial resources, as well as high profile social and press connections.8

The patriotism at the heart of Rockefeller’s support for the project in particular embodied the political concern with American culture that caused many of the project’s backers to get involved with the building of the Center. He himself had no professional knowledge of the arts, but he did believe in their significance to culture and specifically to American culture.9 To him, it followed that in the post-World War II era of American economic prosperity, it was important to look to the arts. He was concerned about the personal fulfillment of those American citizens who had the leisure time to think about such things now that their economic needs were being met, and that the arts such as those offered at Lincoln Center could offer this fulfillment.10 Rockefeller said that the place of the arts “is not on the periphery of daily life, but at its center. [The arts] should function not merely as another form of entertainment, but, rather, should contribute significantly to our well being and happiness.”11 He was also concerned about America’s cultural image in an international context.12 Since the 1920s, Europeans had often stereotyped American society as superficial, materialistic, and lacking any particular culture, a view that was still prominent in the 1950s when Rockefeller was considering Lincoln Center.13 He hoped that the creation of an American cultural icon would aid in improving that perception.14

Some saw the increased accessibility of American high culture and art as a measure of American freedom as a whole, which during the Cold War era was closely associated with the struggle against communism.

8 Samuel Zipp, “The Battle of Lincoln Square: Neighbourhood Culture and the Rise of Resistance to Urban Renewal,” Planning Perspectives 24, no. 4 (October 2009): 411, Taylor & Francis Online.

9 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 174.

10 Julia L. Foulkes, “The Other West Side Story: Urbanization and the Arts Meet at Lincoln Center,” Amerikastudien / American Studies 52, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 233, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41158305?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

11 Louis Calta, “Lincoln Center Honors John D. Rockefeller 3d,” The New York Times (New York City, NY), June 24, 1970, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1970/06/24/80031713.pdf.

12 Foulkes, “The Other,” 233.

13 Egbert Klautke, “Anti-Americanism in Twentieth Century Europe,” University College London (The Historical Journal), May 2011, 6, https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/ id/eprint/1303252/1/Americanization_Revised_May_2011_Historical_Journal.pdf.

14 Foulkes, “The Other,” 233.

100

Rudolf Bing, the director of the Metropolitan Opera, once said of the construction of the new Metropolitan Opera House, “[T]o build only an adequate and not the best opera house possible today in New York City would make the country the laughing stock of the world, and the opera a subject of Russian propaganda.”15 Even then President Dwight D. Eisenhower saw Lincoln Center as significant enough in the context of Cold War efforts to speak at its groundbreaking ceremony in May 1959. At the ceremony, he said this of the project: “The beneficial influence of this great cultural adventure will not be limited to our borders. Here will occur a true interchange of the fruits of national cultures. From this will develop a growth that will spread to the corners of the earth, bringing with it the kind of human message that only individuals— not governments—can transmit.”16 Eisenhower linked the building of Lincoln Center and the art it would contribute to society with the goal of spreading American culture across the globe. He saw the project as something that was ideologically working in tandem with the foreign policy of the time. While the government was working at a political level, trying to prevail in the Cold War through diplomatic and military measures, Eisenhower here argued that the cultural endeavor of Lincoln Center could showcase a positive aspect of America to the world, an aspect that the government could not convey.

Those working at Lincoln Center fully embraced its marketing as an accessible cultural icon with its inclusion of uniquely American repertoire throughout its opening season. The opening performance at the new location of the Metropolitan Opera House at Lincoln Center in the autumn of 1966 was a newly written opera, Antony and Cleopatra, based on the Shakespeare play of the same name. It was written by American composer Samuel Barber.17 Another opera that season was a new adaptation of the Eugene O’Neill play Mourning Becomes Electra This opera was written by American composer Marvin David Levy.18 In a similar vein, the opening performance of the New York Philharmonic at

15 Victoria Newhouse, Wallace K. Harrison Architect (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), 214.

16 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks at the Ground-Breaking Ceremonies for the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, New York City,” speech presented at the Groundbreaking Ceremony of Lincoln Center, Lincoln Center, New York City, New York, United States, May 14, 1959, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-ground-breakingceremonies-for-the-lincoln-center-for-the-performing-arts-new.

17 Theodore Strongin, “American Opera to Open New Met,” The New York Times (New York, United States), May 7, 1964, https://timesmachine.nytimes. com/timesmachine/1964/05/07/97389934.pdf.

18 Metropolitan Opera, Season 1966-1967 (New York: Metropolitan Opera, 1966).

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Lincoln Center included a world premiere of a piece called Connotations, commissioned by American composer Aaron Copland.19 These choices of repertoire for the various Lincoln Center opening seasons that year emphasized the cultural status of the Center as a beacon of artistic achievement that was specifically American, and how this narrative was pushed not only by the project’s backers, but by those directly involved in the arts at Lincoln Center. The emphasis on this idea even included a celebration of American racial diversity, an uncommon mindset at the time. Leontyne Price, a prominent African-American soprano at the Metropolitan Opera, starred alongside Justino Díaz, a Latino opera singer, as the titular characters in Antony and Cleopatra. 20 In a time when topics of race were highly controversial, including marginalized performers in the opening performance at the new Metropolitan Opera showed an attempt to broaden its audience, an effort to include all Americans and not just the elite.

The Lincoln Center backers launched a successful publicity campaign that leaned on the idea of increased accessibility to culture for all Americans. In 1960, they released a brochure quoting Eisenhower’s speech. The purpose of this brochure was to encourage the public to donate to Lincoln Center as it was being constructed: “Lincoln Center is everybody’s job. For everybody has a stake in the Center—government, business, labor, philanthropy, and above all the individual American. [...] Lincoln Center is your job, too—and your opportunity!”21 (Appendix C) This brochure marketed the Center as a trailblazer that was meeting “the demand for more opportunities for all Americans to enjoy concerts, plays, opera, ballet, and other musical and theater arts.”22 The Center had multiple incentives to market itself this way. Besides the need for donations, it was easier to justify such a large slum clearance project if they could defend the claim that what they were building on the area would benefit more Americans than it displaced. The brochure was not the only promotional material that took this angle. Other advertisements and articles, some of which were not produced by those affiliated with the Center, had already adopted this point of view by the time the groundbreaking ceremony occurred. For example, a 1957 New York Times article stated, “Lincoln Square is one of these [great rebuilding projects], [...] it is of such magnitude [...] such appeal in its cultural

19 Julia L. Foulkes, “Streets and Stages: Urban Renewal and the Arts After World War II,” Journal of Social History 44, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 418, https://www. jstor.org/stable/25790364.

20 Metropolitan Opera.

21 Lincoln Center - “A Mighty Influence” (New York City, NY, 1960), 5.

22 Lincoln Center, 5.

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purposes that it must succeed.”23 Nonetheless, although the reasons for supporting the Center were often tied to and marketed as an opportunity for American culture to flourish, the clearance project’s spearhead did not consider this as important.

Robert Moses, the urban planner who coordinated much of the project, concerned himself less with the geopolitical implications of the final outcome of Lincoln Center and more with the practical economic aspects of localized urban renewal. Moses saw urban renewal as a pragmatic effort to increase the profitability of the city.24 To further this goal, he took advantage of Title I of the Housing Act of 1949. Under this law, the federal government was authorized to allocate 500 million dollars in capital grants and 1 billion dollars in loans for the clearing of blighted urban areas.25 The Lincoln Square renewal project garnered $2.5 million in federal funds through this law.26 These funds were pooled with the funds from the wealthy sponsors to finance the project. Securing this grant was an important step in moving forward with the project. Though a 1954 revision of the Housing Act allocated additional funding for the rehabilitation of the tenements who lived in the cleared area, Moses did not take advantage of this. He viewed rehabilitation as overly idealistic, especially because he already had city planning projects under his belt by this time. He wanted to continue using the method that had been successful for him in the past, which meant private assurance for investors he trusted and full slum clearance without rehabilitation.27

In order to move forward with the project, Moses had to convince both the city’s government officials and its general public that the Lincoln Square neighborhood could indeed be classified as a slum. As the head of the Committee on Slum Clearance, he compiled a set of facts that were meant to show that the area had deteriorated to the point that clearance was the most logical course of action. He released excerpts from the Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Plan that supported this point to the public in 1956 (Appendix D). Much of Moses’s data focused on the physical state of the neighborhood and its buildings. Four hundred and

23 “Lincoln Square’s Future,” The New York Times (New York City, NY), July 19, 1957, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1957/07/19/84734524.pdf.

24 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 163.

25 Steven C. Forest, “The Effect of Title I of the 1949 Federal Housing Act on New York City Cooperative and Condominium Conversion Plans,” Fordham Urban Law Journal 13, no. 3 (1985): 724, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1267&context=ulj.

26 Foulkes, “The Other,” 228.

27 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 163.

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fifty two out of 482 residential structures between three and six stories were built before 1901.28 Additionally, the committee hired a real estate firm to conduct a survey of the houses. This survey found that most of the buildings in the area were in need of significant repairs. It is notable, however, that despite the firm’s claim that a high number of buildings had insufficient heating and plumbing, their figures showed that 54 percent of them contained hot water, central heating, and a complete bathroom, whereas only five percent did not have these things. Despite this, only four out of those 482 buildings were deemed up to the standards of the firm.29

In addition to the dubious evidence that the area was in need of redevelopment, further documentation focused on the minority status of residents as a reason for the adoption of slum status. Figures found in the documents included the following: 1,250 families, or twenty four percent, were racial minorities, composed of eighteen percent Puerto Ricans, four percent Black Americans, and two percent “other”, which may have been referring to residents of Asian descent.30 While it is possible that these demographic figures were not necessarily meant to prove in a direct way that the area was a slum that needed to be cleared, serving instead as basic information about the area, racist attitudes often played a part in urban renewal. Previously, Moses repeatedly had trouble securing slum clearance funds from banks and insurance companies in the city because these companies did not want to find themselves in a situation where they had to deal with new Black tenants in their housing.31 Given these attitudes, the included figures concerning the minority status of many Lincoln Square residents were likely a contributing factor to the perception of the area as a slum by the relevant authorities. Moses also underestimated the number of tenants who would have to be relocated, citing 6,018 while tenant activist groups estimated closer to 7,000.32

Although Moses gave assurances that Lincoln Square residents would be moved to suitable neighborhoods, he made it clear that the goal of constructing Lincoln Center outweighed the concern for local residents. The apartments he put on the redevelopment plan required a family income of at least $11,525 for a four-room apartment,33 whereas 62.6

28 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 219. 29 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 219. 30 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 219. 31 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 161-162. 32 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 219. 33 Memorandum by Herman E. Krawitz, “Applications for Lincoln Center Apartments,” December 15, 1958, 1000, The Metropolitan Opera Archives, New York City, NY.

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percent of Lincoln Square residents earned less than $4,000 a year.34 Though Moses repeatedly assured the city authorities that he would make sure the Lincoln Square residents were relocated into decent homes, his actual housing plans for the site did not take the neighborhood’s residents into consideration. Additionally, his words often showed that he saw the Lincoln Square residents as a means to an end, even though he sometimes purported to care about what happened to them. At the groundbreaking of Lincoln Square, he said, “You cannot rebuild a city without moving people [...] You cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs.”35 This metaphor shows that he viewed the original Lincoln Square neighborhood as nothing more than a slum with untapped potential that could only be realized by him.

Many members of the Lincoln Square community initially resisted the project on the grounds that the project did not include transparent plans to rehouse them. In mid-1955, two local protest groups formed: the Lincoln Square Businessmen’s Committee and the Lincoln Square Residents’ Committee. At the time of their formation, their goal was not to save the neighborhood.36 Instead, they fought for a program of lowrent rehousing, as they could not afford to move into the new housing structures that were planned for the site.37 They campaigned for the project to be set aside until a specific plan for this new housing was presented. Their tactics were not forceful: they petitioned the city mayor, Robert Wagner, they wrote to City Councilman Stanley Isaacs (who did come to support their cause), and they even tried (unsuccessfully) to organize a meeting with Rockefeller and other sponsors of the project.38

After a few months, these committees of tenants in opposition to the project sought out Harris Present, a New York City lawyer and housing activist, for help getting the attention of the city officials that they were failing to reach on their own. Present was the founder of an activist group focused on the issue of urban renewal, the New York City Council of Housing Relocation Practices. He galvanized the smaller protest groups of tenants into a more cohesive resistance effort, as well as doing his own

34 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 219.

35 Zipp, “The Battle,” 420.

36 Zipp, “The Battle,” 415.

37 Roberta Gold, When Tenants Claimed the City: The Struggle for Citizenship in New York Housing (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2014), 95; Hilary Ballon and Kenneth T. Jackson, Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2007), 102.

38 Zipp, “The Battle,” 415.

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work to support the movement.39 In a 1956 letter to the editor, he wrote:

What do [the Lincoln Center organizers] intend to do with the more than 6,000 families who are presently residing at the site? [...] I would also like to ask whether the members of the City Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate still would vote for this project even if they could not be shown that proper facilities were available for residents to be dislocated from this area. Although all serious-minded residents are concerned with the demolition of slums, many of us would oppose such demolition unless convinced that better housing facilities would be created for the dislocated tenants.40

This letter was written towards the beginning of Present’s involvement in the cause, when he and the involved Lincoln Square residents were still advocating for better relocation practices. He was trying to draw the public’s attention to the darker aspects of the Lincoln Center project through a medium that so often praised its vision. The residents, however, used more direct methods of protest.

Throughout most of 1956, resistance persisted in this direction of campaigning for publicized and accommodating relocation practices. Protests continued to get more intense. In the summer and fall of that year, there was a series of hearings before the Board of Estimate, the main decision making committee for New York City, that would decide whether the project would get preliminary approval.41 The activists hired a sound truck to drive through the Lincoln Square neighborhood, imploring the residents to join a planned picket outside City Hall.42 About fifty protesters attended the pickets for each hearing, many of them women and children. Their signs sported slogans such as “Shelter Before Culture”, “Humane Progress Means Decent Relocation”, “No Homes No Culture”, and others in this vein (Appendix E). They also conducted another protest during this period, a mass mailing campaign

39 Joel Schwartz, The New York Approach: Robert Moses, Urban Liberals, and Redevelopment of the Inner City (Ohio State University Press, 1993), 279-280.

40 Harris L. Present, “Relocating Slum Residents,” New York Times (New York City, NY), February 18, 1956, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1956/02/18/84875078.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0.

41 Zipp, “The Battle,” 421.

42 “Displaced Tenants to Picket City Hall,” The New York Times (New York City, NY), June 15, 1956, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1956/06/15/86612808.pdf.

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of postcards addressed to then New York City Mayor Robert Wagner and the president of the Borough of Manhattan, Hulan Jack, threatening not to vote for them that November if they voted in favor of the Lincoln Square renewal project.43 Despite these efforts, the Board of Estimate unanimously approved the request of Moses and the sponsors of the project to apply for federal funding.44 It was with these protests that the beginning of a shift in the goals of the protestors began to show.

As the advocates for Lincoln Square shifted their aim to ultimately stopping the project altogether, rather than reforming relocation practices, they focused the ideological core of their resistance on the intersection of physically losing their homes and culturally losing their community. In the winter of 1956-1957, the protestors picketed outside a newly opened relocation office to show their rejection of the whole relocation policy as it applied in the case of Lincoln Square.45 Then, in September of 1957, the City Planning Commission had a hearing that would either grant or deny final approval for the Lincoln Square renewal project. Twenty pickets went to City Hall that day with signs that read “Our Children Need Housing Not Promises”, “We Refuse to Move until Homes for Us Are Made Part of the Plan”, and “Moses Is Clearing People Not Slums”.46 It was in the hearing itself, where sixty speakers testified in an eleven hour debate, where the meaning that the project’s resisters were applying to culture truly came to light. At the hearing, Present stated, “I believe if we are going to talk about progress, we have to talk about human progress first. [...] I say no matter how impressive any cultural institution may be, or educational institution, there is nothing more important in a democracy than the human beings involved.”47 The residents of the neighborhood concurred with stronger language, making comments such as, “Why should we give up our homes for this conglomeration of culture?”, “I think it is a disgrace if anybody that professed to love the arts [...] could at the same time ignore human beings”, “What about our homes? Aren’t our homes beauty and culture?” and most scathingly, “But who cares for the little shopkeeper so long as we have culture? Who cares whether we have a home so long as the Philharmonic and the Metropolitan Opera have one? [...] I think you all know how inhuman the project is.”48 The culture that resonated with the

43 Zipp, “The Battle,” 421. 44 “Lincoln Square Advanced,” The New York Times (New York City, NY), October 1, 1956, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1956/10/01/84885122.pdf.

45 Zipp, “The Battle,” 422. 46 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 231. 47 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 235. 48 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 235-236.

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residents of the Lincoln Square area was a local network of interpersonal relationships that was heavily reliant on their homes and businesses all coexisting in the same neighborhood, rather than the idea of sophisticated American culture and art that Lincoln Center’s backers were relying on to justify the project. The Lincoln Square residents and their allies hoped that showing the emotional significance of this type of culture in their lives would convince the city authorities that their neighborhood was worth preserving.

By contrast, those who spoke in favor of the project at the hearing focused on the way that a new cultural center would revitalize the city, emphasizing the benefit to the community of New York City as a whole rather than the needs of the smaller community of Lincoln Square. Rockefeller’s endorsement touted the project as “a truly great civic development”, characterizing the project’s sponsors as people who were concerned with the “constructive development of our city for the benefit and enjoyment of all of its people”.49 Rockefeller did not directly evoke the concept of culture, but the references to the city’s “civic” and “constructive development” paired with the context of the ongoing Lincoln Center publicity campaign emphasizing what the Center would contribute to the arts was suggestive of traditional ideas of art and culture. His argument relied on assuming this definition of culture, while the Lincoln Square residents sought to challenge it. Notably, the City Planning Commission believed the Lincoln Square renewal project to be too significant to the comprehensive urban renewal efforts in New York City to delay further, demonstrating that they saw Rockefeller’s indirect argument for traditional culture as more valuable to the city than the argument of the Lincoln Square residents.50 A month later, a similar hearing took place before the Board of Estimate, and in November of 1957, the Lincoln Square renewal project got final, unanimous approval.51 The process of relocating the tenants began in 1958.52

Although the organizations behind the project provided some support for relocating tenants, they failed to address the idea of localized community that was at the heart of resistance. Lincoln Center and Fordham University (for which a campus was being built on the site of the Lincoln

49 Paul Crowell, “Lincoln Sq. Rivals Clash at Hearing before Planners,” The New York Times (New York City, NY), September 12, 1957, https:// timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1957/09/12/84759776.pdf.

50 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 239.

51 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 239.

52 Letter to Herbert Graf, July 28, 1958, The Metropolitan Opera Archives, New York City, NY.

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Square renewal project as well) hired a relocation firm, Braislin, Porter & Wheelock, to provide housing aid in the area.53 The firm set up a relocation office to help the residents search for housing, paying brokers for relevant listings. This office included representatives from the New York City Bureau of Real Estate, the civic body that oversaw relocation, and the New York City Housing Authority, which helped residents find public housing.54 While ultimately somewhat helpful, only 28.4 percent of tenants on the Lincoln Center site and 26 percent of tenants on the Fordham site moved into apartments found by a sponsor.55 Fifty two point seven percent and 58 percent of tenants respectively ended up “self locat[ing]”, and the whereabouts of the remaining tenants from these sites were “unknown (many of whom left owing several months rent).”56 Besides the way these efforts were less helpful to the residents than they may have appeared, the help that the relocation office provided did not even attempt to address the central problems with urban renewal that these residents brought to light. The goal of the aid provided to residents was to help them find new housing, not to help them keep a community even though the physical neighborhood was being destroyed, when their community was at the core of what they were fighting for by the time the relocation process started.

Lincoln Center is globally recognized today as a beacon of sophistication and art, just as its supporters hoped it would be in the 1950s. In modern society, however, it also has attained a widespread reputation for elitism. Though few know of the Lincoln Square area as it stood before the almighty Center took its place, the idea of the cultural icon’s elitism existed in their residents’ movement since its beginning. Their criticisms live on even though their homes do not, and the discussion of what makes meaningful culture is essential to that criticism. Today, the Center is sometimes lambasted as obsolete, its art a relic of a time long past, and sometimes praised as a masterful expression of works that can never lose relevance. Lincoln Center continues to be a complicated backdrop to larger debates over cultural values, just as it always has.

53 Ballon and Jackson, Robert Moses, 101.

54 Ballon and Jackson, Robert Moses, 101.

55 Dan W. Dodson, “Family and Agency Equity in Urban Renewal,” The Journal of Educational Sociology 34, no. 4 (December 1960): 184, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/2264349s.

56 Dodson, “Family and Agency,” 184.

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Appendix A: The site that would be cleared under the Lincoln Square Renewal Project is outlined in black.

Source: Lincoln Square: Slum Clearance Plan Under Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 as Amended, photograph, https:// digitalcollections.nypl.org/ items/99407f80-9ef0-0130f139-58d385a7bbd0.

Appendix B: An early site plan for the Lincoln Square renewal project, showing the Lincoln Center complex in the middle, the Fordham University campus immediately to its left, and Lincoln Towers in the top right.

Source: Samuel Zipp, Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 171.

110 APPENDICES

Appendix C: Pages 4 and 5 of the brochure Lincoln Center“A Mighty Influence.”

Source: “Lincoln Center - A Mighty Influence” (New York City, NY, 1960), 4-5. [Accessed in the Metropolitan Opera Archives.]

Appendix D: Some excerpts from the Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Plan. The Committee on Slum Clearance, led by Robert Moses, released these to the public.

Source: Samuel Zipp, Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 171.

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Appendix E: Protestors demonstrating in opposition to the Lincoln Square renewal project.

Source: Samuel Zipp, “The Battle of Lincoln Square: Neighbourhood Culture and the Rise of Resistance to Urban Renewal,” Planning Perspectives 24, no. 4 (October 2009): 422, Taylor & Francis Online.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ballon, Hilary, and Kenneth T. Jackson. Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2007.

Calta, Louis. “Lincoln Center Honors John D. Rockefeller 3d.” The New York Times (New York City, NY), June 24, 1970. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1970/06/24/80031713 pdf.

Caro, Robert A. The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York New York: Vintage Books, 1974.

Crowell, Paul. “Lincoln Sq. Rivals Clash at Hearing before Planners.” The New York Times (New York City, NY), September 12, 1957. https:// timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1957/09/12/84759776.pdf.

Dodson, Dan W. “Family and Agency Equity in Urban Renewal.” The Journal of Educational Sociology 34, no. 4 (December 1960): 182-89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264349.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Remarks at the Ground-Breaking Ceremonies for the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, New York City.” Speech presented at the Groundbreaking Ceremony of Lincoln Center, Lincoln Center, New York City, New York, United States, May 14, 1959. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ documents/remarks-the-ground-breaking-ceremonies-for-the-lincolncenter-for-the-performing-arts-new.

Forest, Steven C. “The Effect of Title I of the 1949 Federal Housing Act on New York City Cooperative and Condominium Conversion Plans.” Fordham Urban Law Journal 13, no. 3 (1985). https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi

Cooperative and Condominium Conversion Plans.” Fordham Urban Law Journal 13, no. 3 (1985). https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1267&context=ulj.

Foulkes, Julia L. “The Other West Side Story: Urbanization and the Arts Meet at Lincoln Center.” Amerikastudien / American Studies 52, no. 2 (Winter 2007). https://www.jstor.org/stable/41158305.

Foulkes, Julia L. “Streets and Stages: Urban Renewal and the Arts After World War II.” Journal of Social History 44, no. 2 (Winter 2010). https:// www.jstor.org/stable/25790364.

Gold, Roberta. When Tenants Claimed the City: The Struggle for Citizenship in New York Housing. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2014.

Grutzner, Charles. “Stevens Expands Lincoln Sq. Plans.” The New York Times (New York City, NY), October 27, 1956. https://timesmachine.nytimes. com/timesmachine/1956/10/27/88476576.pdf.

Klautke, Egbert. “Anti-Americanism in Twentieth Century Europe.” University College London (The Historical Journal), May 2011. https://discovery. ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1303252/1/Americanization_Revised_May_2011_Hi storical_Journal.pdf.

Krawitz, Herman E. Memorandum, “Applications for Lincoln Center Apartments,” December 15, 1958. 1000. The Metropolitan Opera Archives, New York City, NY.

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Letter to Herbert Graf, July 28, 1958. The Metropolitan Opera Archives, New York City, NY.

Lincoln Center - “A Mighty Influence.” New York City, NY, 1960.

Lincoln Square: Slum Clearance Plan Under Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 as Amended. Photograph.https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/ items/99407f80-9ef0-0130-f139-58d385a7bbd0.

Memorandum, “Memorandum on Proposed New Opera House Site,” October 17, 1955. The Metropolitan Opera Archives, New York City, NY Metropolitan Opera, Season 1966-1967. New York: Metropolitan Opera, 1966. Moses, Robert. Letter, January 21, 1952. The Metropolitan Opera Archives, New York City, NY.

Newhouse, Victoria. Wallace K. Harrison Architect. New York: Rizzoli, 1989. The New York Times (New York City, NY). “Displaced Tenants to Picket City Hall.” June 15,1956. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1956/06/15/86612808.pdf.

The New York Times (New York City, NY). “Lincoln Square Advanced.” October 1,1956.https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1956/10/01/84885122.pdf.

The New York Times (New York City, NY). “Lincoln Square’s Future.” July 19, 1957. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1957/07/19/84734524.pdf.

The Opera House. Directed by Susan Froemke. Metropolitan Opera House, 2017.

Present, Harris L. “Relocating Slum Residents.” The New York Times (New York City, NY), February 18, 1956. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1956/02/18/84875078.pdf.

Strongin, Theodore. “American Opera to Open New Met.” The New York Times (New York, United States), May 7, 1964. https://timesmachine.nytimes. com/timesmachine/1964/05/07/97389934.pdf.

Young, Edgar B. Lincoln Center: The Building of an Institution. New York: New York University Press, 1980.

Zipp, Samuel. “The Battle of Lincoln Square: Neighbourhood Culture and the Rise of Resistance to Urban Renewal.” Planning Perspectives 24, no. 4 (October 2009): 409-33. Taylor & Francis Online.

Zipp, Samuel. Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

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The Losing War on Drugs in Colombia:

Gianna Zo u

A Kultural Blow:

The Mechanisms behind German-American Assimilation

Michael Ca i

With the high demand for cocaine in the United States catalyzing its rise in prominence as a drug trafficking nation, Colombia transformed its status from a small cocaine smuggling country in the 1970s to an international cocaine empire by the 2000s. As Colombian drug cartels began fulfilling the growing US demand for cocaine in the 1970s, United States’ policymakers began implementing counternarcotic policies in Colombia – derived from the US-Colombia War on Drugs – to target the expanding US-Colombian drug trade.1 Without restrictions on drug demand, drug supply grows indefinitely, as suppliers, motivated by profit, develop endless ways to fulfill demand. United States anti-drug policies executed in Colombia – aimed to solely combat the growing supply of cocaine produced in Colombia – have continuously failed to significantly reduce cocaine production and exportation to the United States, as well as created devastating side effects in Colombia, including environmental damage and health issues in citizens from aerial fumigation. Additionally, as drug cartels in Colombia grew in both size and power during the ongoing drug trade through the late 20th into the early 21st century, drug trafficking lords acquired increasing power, being able to intimidate and bribe their way out of punishment and capture.2 Rebellions from Colombian paramilitaries and drug cartels opposed to US anti-drug policy and the Colombian government, established their growing power through violence, promoting the continuation of the drug trade, as well as chaos in Colombia. Because of its focus on supply rather than demand, along with its overall ineffectiveness in decreasing cocaine supply, United States’ counternarcotic policies in Colombia were not only unsuccessful in its primary goal to diminish the US-Colombian drug trade, but also destructive to Colombia, as it ravaged the nation with excessive violence, environmental issues, and health threats for civilians.

1 Paul Gootenberg, Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug (2008) (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 21.

2 Darian Singer, “U.S. Policy Towards Colombia: A Focus on the Wrong Issue,” in Cornell International Affairs Review (2008), 1:14, previously published in Cornell International Affairs Review, http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/ articles/1284/us-policy-towards-colombia-a-focus-on-the-wrong-issue.

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An Analysis of the Failure and Detrimental E ec ts of US Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia

The increasing demand for cocaine in the United States drove the rise of the US-Colombia drug trade and the need for US counternarcotic policies in Colombia. In June of 1971, as a result of the rapidly growing rate of drug use within the US, President Nixon proclaimed the start of the United States’ War on Drugs.3 Nixon began a campaign that portrayed drugs as “public enemy number one,” an evil that the US could not morally allow, and a security threat, which brought a military aspect into the issue.4 He declared, “The consumption of drugs has assumed the dimensions of a national emergency.”5 At the beginning of the war on drugs, Nixon’s administration openly tolerated cocaine, as they saw cocaine as just a minor issue compared to the more commonly used drugs at the time such as marijuana and heroin.6 With the strict legislation regarding marijuana, LSD, and heroin implemented at the beginning of the US War on Drugs, cocaine became the “replacement” drug in the mid-1970s.7 While other drugs were often negatively stereotyped to be primarily used within lower-class and minority communities at the time, cocaine was viewed as glamorous in US society; it was considered the “champagne of drugs.”8 Cocaine, obtained from the leaves of the coca plant, was widely regarded as a harmless drug used only by society’s elite and famous: Hollywood stars, businessmen, well-known singers, etc.9 This sense of high society and the lack of stigma surrounding the drug quickly attracted consumers and contributed to its rising popularity in the US.10 While its societal appeal drew in US consumers, cocaine’s highly addictive and stimulant properties retained them. In the 1980s, crack, which was formed by boiling baking soda with cocaine, became

3 Ed Vulliamy, “Nixon’s ‘war on drugs’ began 40 years ago, and the battle is still raging,” The Guardian (London, England), July 23, 2011, https://www. theguardian.com/society/2011/jul/24/war-on-drugs-40-years.

4 Richard Nixon, “41 Nixon Remarks Intensified Program for Drug Abuse,” Richard Nixon: XXXVII President of the United States, last modified June 17, 1971, https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/RFM/Readiness/ DDRP/docs/41%20Nixon%20Remarks%20Intensified%20Program%20for%20 Drug%20Abuse.pdf

5 Alejandro Gaviria and Daniel Mejia, eds., Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia, trans. Jimmy Weiskopf (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2016), 1.

6 Bruce Michael Bagley, “The New Hundred Years War? US National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 163, https://www.jstor.org/stable/165793.

7 United States, “Cocaine,” Drug Enforcement Administration, last modified June 2020, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/Cocaine-2020_1.pdf.

8 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 1.

9 United States, “Cocaine,” Drug Enforcement Administration.

10 Vulliamy, “Nixon’s ‘war.”

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the most common form of cocaine in the US.11 It provided a short-lived but extreme, euphoric high to its user and was sold in small amounts at a time. Crack cocaine was simple to make and cost-effective, which propelled its widespread use and production starting in the late 1980s (Appendix A).12

Throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s, Peru and Bolivia – who, by 1984, produced 65% and 25% of the world’s coca supply respectively – dominated the US cocaine market13; this drove the US government to primarily attack coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru, which eventually proved to be successful in reducing exportation from those two countries.14 However, with the fall of these two major drug trafficking countries, cocaine production quickly shifted to be predominantly based in Colombia by 1997 (Appendix B).15 At this point, US-Colombian relations started to become narcotized, setting the precedent for the countries’ relationship throughout the late 20th and early 21st century. The rising US demand for cocaine, along with the initial money earned from the rising US-Colombian drug trade, allowed Colombian drug mafias to establish well-organized trafficking operations and to grow exponentially.16 As a result, by the end of the 20th century, Colombia became prominent as not only the major US cocaine supplier but also as the dominant global cocaine producer.

In an attempt to reduce the growing influx of cocaine into the United States, the US government targeted cocaine supply in Colombia through the failed US-Colombia Extradition Treaty of 1979, which was too difficult to enforce to actually have any positive effect. Article 1 of the extradition treaty states that it allows “...extradition where the offense has been committed outside the territory of the requesting State by a national of that State.”17 This article authorized the Colombian government to

11 Mary Ann House, “Cocaine,” The American Journal of Nursing 90, no. 4 (April 1990): 42, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3426185.

12 United States, “Cocaine,” Drug Enforcement Administration.

13 Bagley, “The New Hundred,” 170.

14 Jonathan D. Rosen and Marten W. Brienen, New Approaches to Drug Policies: A Time for Change (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 60.

15 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 63.

16 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 123.

17 A. Claudio, “United States-Colombia Extradition Treaty: Failure of a Security Strategy,” U.S. Department of Justice, last modified 1991, https://www.ojp.gov/ ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/united-states-colombia-extradition-treaty-failuresecurity-strategy.

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extradite any drug criminals involved in the US-Colombian drug trade and have them tried for their crimes in the US.18 The goal of the treaty was to extradite as many drug traffickers in Colombia as possible to a better-developed governmental system. United States policymakers believed that in order to topple cartels’ cocaine production and exportation to the US, the governments needed to displace those necessary in carrying out trafficking operations.19 Without their roles in the cocaine trade, cartels would have little to no profit and would not survive. If the US and Colombian governments effectively enacted the treaty, they would both benefit by significantly limiting the cocaine trade through destroying the dominating drug cartels. Extradition eventually became the biggest fear of Colombian traffickers, especially drug lords; the US justice system was less susceptible to their tactics of bribery, manipulation, and intimidation that allowed them to escape punishment in Colombia.20 If they and their fellow cartel members were extradited to the US, they were almost guaranteed a US prison sentence and would not be able to prevent the demise of their cartels.21 Colombian drug cartels were used to leveraging their large sums of money and threats of violence over their national government to gain control.22 US policymakers also initially saw the extradition treaty as a solution that would significantly reduce the political corruption caused by the drug cartels in Colombia.

However, both the Colombian and US governments struggled to find and capture a significant number of traffickers to extradite to the US, causing the treaty to have little effect on cocaine production and thus be greatly unrealistic and ineffective in both of its goals.23 In fact, after the extradition treaty was ratified, the drug trade between Colombia and the US actually increased due to the lack of policy targeting US cocaine demand, which continued to rise throughout the 1980s. In 1980,

18 Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, last modified 1981, https:// web.oas.org/mla/en/Treaties_B/col_ext_usa_en.pdf.

19 Claudio, “United States-Colombia,” U.S. Department of Justice.

20 Bradley Graham, “Extradition Feared By Traffickers, Resented by Colombians,” Washington Post, last modified August 23, 1989, https://www. washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/23/extradition-feared-bytraffickers-resented-by-colombians/2d2b6a83-c665-478f-8cad-2916719c7c03/.

21 Joshua H. Warmund, “Removing Drug Lords and Street Pushers: The Extradition of Nationals in Colombia and the Dominican Republic,” Fordham International Law Journal 22, no. 5 (1998): 2386, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1648&context=ilj.

22 David R. Mares, Drug Wars and Coffee Houses: The Political Economy of the International Drug Trade (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006), 92.

23 Claudio, “United States-Colombia,” U.S. Department of Justice.

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before the treaty’s ratification, Colombia earned about $1.5 billion in the drug trade, which primarily consisted of cocaine.24 From 1985 to 1988, Colombian drug traffickers earned stratospheric profits, about $2.5-$3 billion annually from the trade, with cocaine still as the major earner.25 The extradition treaty was highly unsuccessful. It not only failed to extradite drug criminals in order to target supply (cocaine exportation to the US remained high and Colombian drug mafias obtained increasing power from growing wealth), but it also encouraged retaliation from the drug mafias. Colombian drug cartels would not let the government topple their mission to profit off of drugs, as they continued to grow in size, wealth, power, and status in Colombian society. In 1988, the Medellín cartel kidnapped Colombian president Miguel Pastrana Borrero.26 The cartel pressured Borrero into ensuring the prevention of the extradition of the notorious “King of Cocaine,” Pablo Escobar, and other drug lords. The cartel used Borrero as a bargaining chip in an attempt to gain further control of the government, but the Colombian police eventually found him a week later.27 After his return, he delivered a speech highlighting the escalating corruption within the country: “Last year I said we were on the verge of the abyss. Today, I think we are in the abyss.”28

With the balance of power in Colombia still greatly shifted towards the drug cartels, the US military intervened in the nation with the intention to end, or at least greatly diminish, the US-Colombian drug trade by attacking paramilitary groups connected to the drug trade, which would simultaneously bring back power to the Colombian government; however, the military aid and training provided by the US to the Colombian military were, in the end, unsuccessful in decreasing the size and power of the paramilitary groups. More and more Colombian citizens became increasingly attracted to paramilitary membership by the large profits from their illicit drug production.29 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which the US put in place to reduce political violence and promote economic development in Colombia, provided a limited US military presence in the nation.30 In the late 1970s, the US increased

Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 76.

Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 73.

27 Christopher Woody, “Why the fall of the Medellin cartel failed to stop the flow of drugs, according to a DEA agent who hunted Escobar,” Insider, September 11, 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/cartels-took-medellin-cartel-placeafter-pablo-escobars-death-2017-9.

28 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 74.

29 Singer, “U.S. Policy,” in Cornell International, 1:1.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), https://www.dea.gov/sites/ default/files/2021-04/1990-1994_p_67-76.pdf

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intervention in Colombia, as US-Colombian drug relations moved to the forefront of the US War on Drugs.31 In the late 1970s, paramilitary groups in Colombia, such as the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas) and ELN (National Liberation Army), began trafficking cocaine to fund their activities32; as a result, the US continued and increased counterinsurgency tactics in hopes of combating the drug and government conflict.33 In 1984 alone, the US sent over $50 million in arms and trained thousands of Colombian personnel, in hopes of attacking paramilitary groups suspected to be involved in cocaine trafficking.34 High levels of military aid were given to Colombia’s police and national armed forces to reduce the presence of the FARC, the largest guerilla group in Colombia, and their role in the cocaine industry.

Despite this, the FARC had continued to expand its role in the cocaine trade, controlling approximately 70% of Colombia’s coca crops by the 1990s (Appendix C).35 The group charged coca growers and cocaine producers high taxes of around $150 per kilogram of coca base, earning an estimate of $68 million annually in the 1990s.36 Additionally, from 1987 to 2004, the FARC had grown from around 3,600 members to 20,000 members, incorporating over 40% of the country’s population,37 indicating the complete ineffectiveness of the US military aid in decreasing the reach of the FARC. Members were promised protection and most importantly, money, which primarily came from their involvement in the drug trade.38 The increase in US drug policy in Colombia had not only expanded the reach of Colombian guerilla groups through increased membership but also fortified the US government and Colombian military roles as their primary enemy.

31 Matthew Knoester, “War in Colombia,” Social Justice 25, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 86, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29767072.

32 Central Intelligence Agency, Narco-Insurgent Links in the Andes, H.R. Doc. (July 29, 1992). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col24.pdf.

Durán-Martínez, The Politics, 15.

Central Intelligence Agency, Narco-Insurgent Links in the Andes, H.R. Doc. (July 29, 1992). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col24.pdf.

35 Jeremy McDermott, “The FARC’s Riches: Up to $580 Million in Annual Income,” InSight Crime, last modified September 6, 2017, https://insightcrime. org/news/analysis/farc-riches-yearly-income-up-to-580-million/.

36 McDermott, “The FARC’s,” InSight Crime.

37 Singer, “U.S. Policy,” in Cornell International, 1:2.

38 Thomas R. Cook, “The Financial Arm Of The FARC: A Threat Finance Perspective,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 25, https:// digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=jss.

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As the size and number of guerilla and paramilitary groups in Colombia grew, the long internal armed conflict within the nation also grew. From 1985 to 1988, paramilitary and guerilla groups assassinated one minister of justice, 50 judges, 12 journalists, and over 500 police officers/ military personnel.39 The assassinators targeted their newly solidified enemies – government officials and their partners – seeing them as a threat to their drug operations and their own lives.40 Despite the large amount of military aid provided by the US, the Colombian government and its officials still lacked power in their own nation and were unable to remedy the large-scale political conflict. Throughout the 1990s, drug mafias murdered up to an average of 3,000 to 4,000 Colombian civilians each year.41 The active US military presence was not only unproductive in reducing cocaine production within Colombian paramilitaries but also provoked increased violence against government workers, as the groups saw the US presence as a threat to their survival.

Through the ineffective application of US money aid in Colombia, billions of US dollars resulted in little effect at reducing the USColombian drug trade due to the policies’ focus on supply rather than demand. Throughout the 1990s, the US government provided almost $1 billion to the Colombian government to further their goals of reducing both drug exportation to the US and the power that organized crime held over Colombian society.42 Specifically, the US gave the majority of its aid to promote “international narcotics and law enforcement” in Colombia.43 With support and funding from the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Colombia developed the “kingpin strategy”: an initiative to mitigate drug trafficking by the death or capture of the leaders of drug mafias, also known as “kingpins.”44 United States and Colombian policymakers saw drug mafias as a hierarchical threat, characterized by command and control. Without their “critical nodes” –in this case, the cartel leaders – the most powerful drug mafias would be destroyed. The Colombian government employed this strategy, with

39 Forrest Hylton, “Plan Colombia: The Measure of Success,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 17, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2010): 101, https://www.jstor. org/stable/24590760.

40 Bruce Michael Bagley, “US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure Bruce Michael Bagley,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30 (August 1988): 191.

41 William Aviles, “US Intervention in Colombia: The Role of Transnational Relations,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 27, no. 3 (July 2008): 413, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27734044.

42 Rosen and Brienen, New Approaches, 51.

43 Aviles, “US Intervention,” 413.

44 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 58.

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help from the US, to obtain similar results as to what had occurred with the Medellín cartel after the assassination of their founder and sole leader, Pablo Escobar.45 Escobar, often considered the most powerful, feared, and successful narcotráficante of all time, was responsible for earning prodigious amounts of money, dying with a net worth of $30 billion, significantly expanding the scope and worth of the global drug trade, and monopolizing the US-Colombian cocaine trade in the 1980s through the early 1990s.46 Escobar was the epitome of a “kingpin” and one of the many drug lords that leveraged their money and threats of violence over government officials to succeed in their operations. After Escobar’s murder, the infamous Medellín cartel, which had once earned $2 to 4 billion a year and $420 million a week at its peak, quickly met its demise without the intelligence and correspondence from their leader.47 US foreign policy was put in place in the 1990s with the belief that drug cartels would be unable to carry out their operations without their kingpins48; as a result, the exportation of cocaine into the United States would be cut off or at least, significantly reduced.

Nevertheless, the kingpin strategy was in the end, ineffective due to the seemingly endless supply of cocaine produced in Colombia. When policymakers developed the kingpin strategy, they overlooked the fact that after the Medellín cartel fell due to the death of Escobar, the Cali cartel was quick to take control over the cocaine industry.49 This phenomenon is known as the “balloon effect”: when one producer is displaced, its competing producers quickly replace them to fulfill supply and keep the market alive.50 Similarly, with the implementation of the kingpin strategy, large-scale cocaine production decreased as a result of the loss of kingpins; however, due to the stable US demand, hundreds of smaller scaled coca producers were ready to replace the extensive production of larger producers.51 As a result, drug production and trafficking eventually became harder to track as it spread throughout vaster areas and the number of traffickers increased throughout the country.52 In fact, between 1996 and 1998, coca production in Colombia grew about 50% because of the difficulty of locating and preventing drug production.53 With the demand for cocaine in the US remaining fairly

45 Woody, “Why the fall” 46 Woody, “Why the fall” 47 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 70. 48 Rosen and Brienen, New Approaches, 31. 49 Woody, “Why the fall”. 50 Rosen and Brienen, New Approaches, 32. 51 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 57. 52 Rosen and Brienen, New Approaches, 60 53 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 147.

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stable, attempts to decrease cocaine exportation by targeting the supply proved to be unsuccessful, as the balloon effect will occur as long as US cocaine demand remains high. All in all, US money aid that was meant to reduce cocaine exportation was highly ineffective: cocaine production in Colombia became more widespread, allowing its producers to more easily escape capture.

With the growth of drug-based organized crime and as a result, persistent cocaine production and trafficking in Colombia despite US efforts to mitigate it, the US government and Colombian President Andrés Pastrana’s administration designed Plan Colombia – a six-year development and counternarcotic plan, alongside the already established US program, Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) – in 1999 in an attempt to achieve the goals that the US had previously failed to fulfill. In July of 2000, President Bill Clinton officially signed the US Plan Colombia aid package into law.54 From 2000 to 2005, the ACI funded approximately $2.8 billion for Plan Colombia,55 and from 2000 to 2008, the US provided, on average, $472 million per year in total for the plan.56 While the goals of Plan Colombia from the perspectives of the United States and Colombia overlapped, the US government was more focused on preventing the trafficking of illegal drugs, viewing the promotion of societal peace within Colombia as a side effect.57 Overall, Plan Colombia intended to eradicate cocaine production, promote economic and social development in Colombia, and end the violent arms conflict in the nation.58 The main goal of the US government was to limit, if not eliminate, significant amounts of cocaine from entering the US59; they believed that targeting the supply would affect the US demand by affecting the purity, availability, and therefore, the affordability of cocaine within the US.

The major legislation passed in Plan Colombia, the aerial fumigation of cocaine crops,60 was not only unsuccessful in significantly reducing

Aviles, “US Intervention,” 410.

55 “Plan Colombia”: Elements for Success, H.R. Doc. No. 109, 1st Sess. (Dec. 2005). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT25278/html/CPRT109SPRT25278.htm.

56 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 51.

57 “Plan Colombia”: Elements for Success, H.R. Doc. No. 109, 1st Sess. (Dec. 2005). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT25278/html/CPRT109SPRT25278.htm.

58 Justin Delacour, “Plan Colombia: Rhetoric, Reality, and Press,” Social Justice 27, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 65, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768036.

59 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 152.

60 Singer, “U.S. Policy,” in Cornell International, 1:1.

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the number of cocaine crops in Colombia, but also threatened the health of Colombian farmers and damaged Colombia’s environment with the dangerous chemicals released from the fumigation.61 Drug Enforcement Administration estimates show that after the initial implementation of aerial fumigation, overall cocaine production in the Andes– but primarily in Colombia – actually increased from 840 metric tons of pure cocaine in 2000 to 995 metric tons in 2001.62 The Cocaine Availability Working Group estimated that about 263 metric tons of 100% pure cocaine were readily available in the US in 2001,63 an 11 metric ton increase from 2000.64 This occurred even after the US provided Colombia with $231 million in aid, primarily for fumigation, in 2000.65 United States demand remained stable and fumigation was failing to reduce coca production efficiently enough. However, amplified coca eradication proved to be slightly effective when cocaine production decreased back to 880 metric tons in 2002.66 But still, overall cocaine production was higher in 2002 compared to 2000. Though fumigation may have been successful in slightly diminishing the continued growth of cocaine production, overall cocaine production was still higher two years after Plan Colombia’s implementation than before. The US Department of Justice estimated that Colombian drug cartels provided over 90% of the cocaine smuggled into the US throughout the early 2000s,67 a significant increase from 70% to 80% in the 1980s, displaying the long-term ineffectiveness of US antidrug policies in Colombia and the losing war on drugs for the US.68 This outcome can, once again, be credited to the “balloon effect,”

61 Singer, “U.S. Policy,” in Cornell International, 1:1.

U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf.

63 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment 2004, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-002, at 1 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ ndic/pubs8/8731/8731p.pdf.

64 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment 2004, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-002, at 1 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ ndic/pubs8/8731/8731p.pdf.

65 “U.S. Aid Over,” Washington Office on Latin America. https://www.wola.org/files/1602_plancol/content.php?id=us_aid.

U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf.

68 Bagley, “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” 70.

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as eradication resulted in the displacement of coca crops, rather than its permanent elimination.69

Additionally, cocaine exportation to the United States and the cocaine epidemic in the US continued to thrive in the years following the initial implementation of Plan Colombia. United States cocaine prices decreased and supply increased throughout the first stages of the implementation of the plan.70 Developing technology used by cartels to transport their products in innovative and sneaky ways was making it increasingly difficult for the US and Colombian governments to win this long-standing war on drugs. With drug mafias now extremely established, the mafias’ revenue was only growing; as a result, they were able to afford the highest-tech equipment to gain control over all parts of the drug trade.71 Cartels now had full control over the production, communication, exportation, and financial logistics of the drug trade.72 The US government was struggling to devise strategies to keep up with the changing nature of the trade.73 Based on estimates collected from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), between 2000 to 2006, cocaine production, along with cocaine exportation to the US, in Colombia remained fairly stable,74 despite the ongoing US aerial fumigation policies in Plan Colombia. Furthermore, in April of 2004, the Justice Department’s National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) published a report that declared that cocaine in both powder and crack is “readily available throughout the country and overall availability appears to be stable.”75 Over three decades after the initial declaration of the war on drugs, Colombia’s drug cartels were still fulfilling the high demand for cocaine with increasing levels of production and exportation of cocaine. Just a year before the aforementioned NDIC report, National Drug Threat Survey (NDTS) data indicated that 81.7% of state and local law enforcement agencies within the US reported powder cocaine availability as high or moderate, with 75% of these agencies saying the same for crack.76 This was a 5.5% increase from 2002,77 and a mere 0.5%

69 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 52.

70 Delacour, “Plan Colombia,” 68.

71 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

72 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

73 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

74 Gaviria and Mejia, Anti-Drug Policies, 52.

75 Veillette, Plan Colombia, 5.

U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf.

77 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf.

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of these local agencies indicated that powder cocaine was not available in their area.78 The steadily decreasing price of cocaine in the US in the early 2000s also reflects this increasing availability of cocaine (Appendix E).79 Even with Plan Colombia continuing its aerial fumigation throughout the early 2000s, fumigation policies proved to still not be enough to reduce cocaine production and diminish the US-Colombian drug trade.

Not only was aerial fumigation ineffective in its goal of reducing cocaine production in Colombia, it was devastating the lives of rural Colombians and Colombia’s environment. From 1999 through 2005, the US government employed aerial fumigation in Colombia by spraying a chemical herbicide called glyphosate over coca plants from the air to attack coca cultivation.80 When using aerial fumigation, the pilots’ distance from the crops can cause various issues during the spraying period: the wind may carry the chemical, which can kill any crop that it lands on, off to the wrong crops; pilots may accidentally designate the wrong crops as coca crops to spray; aerial fumigation can cause the wrongly targeted land to be unviable to grow any crops, and farmers may accidentally be hit by the chemical.81 It was later discovered in 2015 by the World Health Organization (WHO) that glyphosate could be considered a human carcinogen, a substance capable of causing or stimulating cancer risk in humans.82 After experiencing aerial fumigation firsthand, many farmers from local Colombian communities reported issues regarding their skin and respiratory and gastrointestinal system.83 In a report produced by the president of the Colombian government’s Special Narcotic Advisory Commission, Daniel Mejia, and a Professor of Economic Development, Adriana Camacho, it was revealed that

78 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Report 2003, H.R. Doc. No. 2004-Q0317-005 (Apr. 2004). https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/ pubs9/9108/9108p.pdf.

79 Adam Isacson, “Restarting Aerial Fumigation on Drug Crops,” Washington Office on Latin America, last modified March 7, 2019, https://www.wola.org/ analysis/restarting-aerial-fumigation-of-drug-crops-in-colombia-is-a-mistake/.

80 Daniel Mejia and Adriana Camacho, The Health Consequences of Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops: The Case of Colombia, 2, June 2015, https://www. cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-Working-Paper-408-Camacho-Mejia-HealthConsequences-Aerial-Spraying-Colombia.pdf.

81 Hylton, “Plan Colombia,” 102.

82 Keith A. Solomon et al., “Coca and poppy eradication in Colombia: environmental and human health assessment of aerially applied glyphosate,” review, Pub Med, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17432331/.

83 Adam Isacson, “The Many Lessons of Plan Colombia,” Washington Office on Latin America, February 4, 2016, https://www.wola.org/analysis/the-manylessons-of-plan-colombia/.

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fumigation significantly increased the likelihood of dermatological and respiratory problems and miscarriages (Appendix D) in Colombian municipalities with positive levels of aerial eradication.84 The report suggests that when there is one standard deviation increase (increasing the population of the study by a unit), aerial spraying will increase miscarriage rate by 10%.85 The various health consequences of fumigation on Colombians were not on par with the minor, short-term reductions in cocaine production caused by the dangerous spraying.

Moreover, the destruction of agricultural land and contamination of vital water sources from fumigation exacerbated economic difficulties and forced home displacement for many Colombian farmers that depended on their land and water sources to support themselves and their families with basic necessities. The accidental spraying of non-coca crops from aerial eradication has also damaged several bio-diverse regions in Colombia and promoted deforestation. Coca crop growers have expanded further as a result, deforesting four hectares for every hectare of field lost to fumigation, to avoid government intervention in their illegal activities.86 The desperate need to fulfill supply encouraged the expansion of cocaine production in Colombia, ultimately resulting in environmental consequences. Cutting down forests contributes to increased carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, and thus the urgent global warming issue, and the loss of habitat for animals.87 The unintentional killing of natural crops also causes changes in the ecosystem and interactions between plants and animals.88 While aerial eradication was intended to decrease coca production, it has instead damaged the health of Colombians, nature, and the environment.

In addition to using aerial fumigation to tackle major cocaine production, Plan Colombia increased US military aid to support Colombian police and armed forces to attack drug cultivation and trafficking in Colombia.89 The US was focused on preventing drug exportation into the US and promoting social development within Colombia, as it contributes to security in the Andes.90 However, the implementation of further military aid, in terms of military equipment, was highly susceptible to benefitting

84 Mejia and Camacho, The Health, 21. 85 Mejia and Camacho, The Health, 21. 86 Isacson, “The Many.”

87 Jonathan D. Rosen, Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2014), 22. 88 Rosen, Losing War, 21. 89 Marcella, PLAN COLOMBIA, 4.

90 Connie Veillette, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report, 1, June 22, 2005, https:// sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL32774.pdf.

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Colombian guerilla and paramilitary groups. From Borrero’s kidnapping in 1988 to the early 2000s, political corruption in Colombia remained prevalent. The US forwarded military equipment to Colombian armed forces, who, due to persistent political disorder in Colombia, often illegally transferred the equipment to Colombia’s paramilitary and guerilla groups in exchange for protection and money.91 Therefore, providing aid to Colombian armed forces risked exacerbating the human rights crisis and the growth of the drug trade in Colombia, as they could likely be aligned with the paramilitaries and guerilla groups.

Based on statistics, it can be concluded that the military aid did in fact increase violence within the country, as in the early 2000s, paramilitaries murdered over 370 journalists and 400 human rights defenders, and almost 500,000 women experienced sexual abuse.92 Compared to the mid-to-late 1980s, about 31 times more journalists were assassinated in the early 2000s. Mainly because of the corruption inside the Colombian armed forces and Colombia as a whole, Colombian officials often illegally allocated US aid to the enemy groups, making the policy useless and ultimately, counterproductive.

Amidst several other unsuccessful US policies in Colombia, the “high-value target” strategy adopted by the US government was also unsuccessful, as it failed to achieve its goals of decreasing insurgency and the drug trade, instead, contributing to avoidable violence. Similar to the kingpin strategy, the high-value target strategy was essentially a campaign to assassinate specific targets involved in the drug trade and considered a threat to society.93 This strategy fulfilled its goals to assassinate armed forces leaders such as Raul Reyes, who was suspected of helping promote trafficking activities within the FARC, and Victor Julio Suárez Rojas, also known as “Colombian Bin Laden” or Mono Jojoy, who was the second-in-command to the FARC and at the core of the group’s drug trafficking operations.94 Following these assassinations, the FARC did decrease in size due to fear of assassination,95 yet, there was no observed decrease in drug exportation to the US and political unrest in Colombia: the main goals of the high-value target strategy.96 Colombia did not gain any political peace from the deaths of these

91 Amnesty International’s position on Plan Colombia, 2, June 21, 2000, https:// www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/amr230492000en.pdf.

92 Gabriel Marcella, PLAN COLOMBIA: THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES (Scotts Valley: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 11, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11577.

93 “U.S. Aid Over,” Washington Office on Latin America. 94 Cook, “The Financial,” 26. 95 Cook, “The Financial,” 27. 96 Isacson, “The Many.”

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paramilitary leaders, and neither did the US achieve its long-standing goal of limiting the US-Colombian drug trade, solidifying this policy as both unnecessary and violent.

In retrospect, United States efforts to reduce cocaine production and exportation from Colombia throughout the late 20th and early 21st century were largely unsuccessful. US anti-drug policies in Colombia, which included an extradition treaty, military aid, aerial coca crop fumigation methods, and kingpin and high-value target strategies, failed to diminish the US-Colombian drug trade and bring about positive lasting effects in either country. Instead, the policies contributed to negative side effects, which have riddled Colombia with violence, environmental damage, civilian health threats, and even increased coca production and cocaine exportation. With US demand for cocaine and Colombian cocaine production and exportation remaining high to this day, it is clear that the measures taken by the US government were ineffective in accomplishing goals on both ends of the narcotized USColombian relationship and detrimental to Colombia’s citizens, land, and society. Almost four decades after the first US-Colombia Extradition Treaty, cocaine is now the second most widely-used recreational drug in the United States,97 and Colombia retains its reputation as the top global producer of cocaine,98 relatively unchanged since the beginning of the series of US counternarcotic policies implemented in Colombia. To this day, the drug epidemic still plagues the United States, with the US drug overdose rate most recently hitting a startling high peak – quadrupling since 1999 – at over 100,000 deaths in a year.99 Now accounting for tens of thousands of deaths annually in the United States, cocaine, once seen as a glamorous and harmless drug by US society, is not so glamorous anymore.100

97 Vulliamy, “Nixon’s ‘war”.

98 Vulliamy, “Nixon’s ‘war”.

99 Reynolds Lewis and Kaitlin Sullivan, “’A staggering increase’: Yearly overdose deaths tops 100,000 for the first time,” NBC (New York City), November 17, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/yearly-drugoverdose-deaths-top-100000-first-time-rcna5656.

100 Lewis and Sullivan, “’A staggering”.

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Appendix A: The approximated national population-weighted crack indexes from the years 1979 to 1999.

Source: Fryer, Roland G., Jr., Paul S. Heaton, Steven D. Levitt, and Kevin M. Murphy. Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact. April 2006. https://scholar. harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/fhlm_crack_cocaine_0.pdf.

Appendix B: The approximated value in metric tons of cocaine produced by Andean countries from 1995-1999.

Source: Marcella, Gabriel. PLAN COLOMBIA: THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES. Scotts Valley: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11577.

130 APPENDICES

Appendix C: FARC presence in Colombia and area of land covered with coca crops during the 1990s.

Source: McDermott, Jeremy. “The FARC’s Riches: Up to $580 Million in Annual Income.” InSight Crime. Last modified September 6, 2017. https:// insightcrime.org/news/analysis/ farcriches-yearly-income-up-to580-million/.

Appendix D: Effects of aerial spraying in nearby areas on miscarriages. (*** and ** are statistically significant, indicating that there is sufficient evidence in the data to indicate that the municipalities with positive levels of aerial spraying have high miscarriage rates compared to normal miscarriage rates at an alpha (type 1 error) levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively; R-squared indicates how well the model can explain the data between a range of 0 and 1 – 1 indicates that the model can account for all incidents relative to the data, while 0 indicates that the model can account for no incidents)

Source: Mejia, Daniel, and Adriana Camacho. The Health Consequences of Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops: The Case of Colombia. June 2015. https://www. cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-Working-Paper-408-Camacho-Mejia-HealthConsequences-Aerial-Spraying-Colombia.pdf.

131

Appendix E: U.S. Cocaine Street Prices (Dollars Per Gram) – Adjusted for Inflation (2016 U.S. Dollar Value)

Source: Isacson, Adam. “Restarting Aerial Fumigation on Drug Crops.” Washington Office on Latin America, March 7, 2019. https://wola.org/ analysis/restarting-aerial-fumigation-of-drug-cropsin-colombia-is-a-mistake//

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Huey, David. “The US war on drugs and its legacy in Latin America.” The Guardian (London, England), February 3, 2014. https://www. theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/ feb/03/us-war-on-drugs-impact-in-latin-american.

Hylton, Forrest. “Plan Colombia: The Measure of Success.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 17, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2010): 99-115. https://www.jstor. org/stable/24590760.

Isacson, Adam. “The Many Lessons of Plan Colombia.” Washington Office on Latin America, February 4, 2016. https://www.wola.org/analysis/themany-lessons-of-plan-colombia/. ———. “Restarting Aerial Fumigation on Drug Crops.” Washington Office on Latin America, March 7, 2019. https://www.wola.org/analysis/ restarting-aerial-fumigation-of-drug-crops-in-colombia-is-a-mistake/.

Knoester, Matthew. “War in Colombia.” Social Justice 25, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 85-109. https://www.jstor.org/stable/29767072.

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Livingstone, Grace. Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004.

Marcella, Gabriel. PLAN COLOMBIA: THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES. Scotts Valley: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11577.

Mares, David R. Drug Wars and Coffee Houses: The Political Economy of the International Drug Trade. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006.

McDermott, Jeremy. “The FARC’s Riches: Up to $580 Million in Annual Income.” InSight Crime. Last modified September 6, 2017. https://insightcrime.org/ news/analysis/farc-riches-yearly-income-up-to-580-million/.

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The Primary Source is published by the Department of History of Montclair Kimberley Academy.

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The Primary Source - Volume 18, Winter 2023

the primary source

a collection of history theses from the class of 2023

Carolina Lucas

Gianna

the primary source

Table of Contents

Contributors’ Notes

Michael Cai

Julian Hough

Carolina Lucas

Iliana Weisberg

Gianna Zou

A Kultural Blow:

The Mechanisms behind German-American Assimilation

Appendix M: The Fred Allen Show’s Advertisement for Ford Cars.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Perpetual Foreigner:

APPENDICES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The New Jersey Exception:

The Scythe of Progress:

The Losing War on Drugs in Colombia:

A Kultural Blow:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Scythe of Progress:

A Kultural

Perpetual

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Losing War on Drugs in Colombia:

A Kultural Blow:

Articles inside

Julian Hough

Gianna Zou

Carolina Lucas

Iliana Weisberg

Michael Cai