Above:Photo by MC2 Christopher Janik Below: Photo by MCSA Oswald Felix Jr.
“TRIDENT 615 WAS ONE OF THE MAIN FLYERS AND HAD SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED NUMEROUS TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL MISSIONS. HOWEVER, WITH EACH FLIGHT AND EVERY ADDITIONAL HOUR FLOWN, A POTENTIALLY DEVASTATING MISHAP LOOMED ON THE HORIZON.”
Above: Photo by MCSN Caitlin Flynn Below:Photo by Seaman Juel Foster
28
MECH
Not Your Kid’s Lego “TRIDENT 11, SIDE NUMBER 615 OUTBOUND,” HAD BEEN A TYPICAL RADIO CALL FOR THE HELICOPTER SEA SQUADRON (HSC) 9 AIRCREW OVER THE PRECEDING FIVE MONTHS.” By LT Salmini Schuyler Trident 615 was transferred to HSC-9 from another squadron. The aircraft had come out of preservation and required an extensive rebuild that took over a year. To get the aircraft up required that all special inspections (7-546 days), a Phase “D” inspection, an acceptance inspection, a post-planned maintenance interval inspection, post-preservation inspection and unscheduled major maintenances be complete. One requirement of the 546-day Special inspection is to remove, inspect and reinstall the flight controls. Along the way, Trident 615 encountered a few unexpected hiccups, but otherwise, the aircraft was ultimately rebuilt and ready for a functional check flight (FCF). The whole process, including FCF, lasted 12 months. Trident 615 went begrudgingly into flight and did not want to stay there. Multiple maintenance issues arose over three months. One problem was a leaking primary servo. Replacing the servo requires detachment of flight controls. The work was assigned to the airframe shop and a seasoned aviation structural mechanic second class (AM2) was sent to the aircraft. He did what he had done many times before - pull out the inspection card and conduct the appropriate maintenance publication.
While working, he noticed the lateral pushrod was installed upside down. He immediately notified maintenance control and the aircraft was grounded for further investigation. The AM2 was well aware of the effects downing Trident 615 would have. The upside-down pushrod would diminish any chance of Trident 615 making an upcoming critical detachment. He knew that such an error would put the entire airframe shop in the spotlight and that someone could potentially lose his or her qualifications. Nevertheless, he was mature enough to make the tough call, without hesitation, preventing what could have been a fatal outcome. The discrepancy the AM2 discovered was potentially life-threatening due to a lack of redundancy in the control linkages. These linkages happen to be tough cylindrical rods connected by bolts, directing the 3,000 pounds per square inch servo pressure to change the pitch of rodor blades. Due to complex control mixing and helicopter aerodynamics, a missing input to the swashplate would render the entire rotor head uncontrollable. Therefore, material or mechanical failure in the linkages would likely result in the total loss of the aircraft and crew.
