NJIA Fall 2009

Northwestern Journal of International Affairs Volume X, Issue I

Cover Image “The Unisphere [173/365]” Courtesy of Flickr User Lab2112

Northwestern Journal of International Affairs

Editors-in-Chief Daniel Andreeff

Andrew R. Celis

Staff Editors Loriana Crasnic, William Feinberg, Hannah Kim, Richard Murphy, Anderson Penix, Elizabeth Phillips, Nandita Seshadri

Content Editor Jamie Weissmann

Founded in 1997, the Northwestern Journal of International Affairs (NJIA) is an endowed, undergraduate research journal that seeks to expand knowledge and raise awareness of contemporary topics in international affairs. The Journal publishes exceptional articles, papers and theses submitted by scholars, experts, and students of relevant disciplines for an international audience.

Š The Northwestern Journal of International Affairs Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies Northwestern University 1902 Sheridan Rd. Evanston, IL 60208

Table of Contents Editor’s Note: The World in Review Daniel Andreeff and Andrew R. Celis Editors-in-Chief, Northwestern Journal of International Affairs

1

Humanitarian Imperatives are Transforming Sovereignty Roberta Cohen Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

2

Aging and Rising World Orders Dr. Burak Akçapar Head of Strategic Planning Department Directorate General for Policy Planning, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

13

An Assessment of Deception: The 2007 National Intelligence Mis-Estimate of Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities Matthew Jacobs J.D. Candidate, New York University School of Law M.P.A. Candidate, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School

29

Tilting the Scales: Balancing Security and Liberty in Antiterrorism Frameworks of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France Elizabeth Nielsen J.D. Candidate, Yale University

49

Sustaining Authoritarian Rule: The Rise of the Business Class and Descent of the Ulama in Saudi Arabia Kira D. Baiasu M.A., American University in Cairo, Egypt

92

The Indus Waters Treaty: Its Persistence and Prospects Rahl Reddy Undergraduate, University of Pennsylvania

110

Terrorist Organizations and the Use of Non-Violent Tactics Jennifer Lickteig Undergraduate, University of Iowa

116

The New World Order: An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era Dr. Muzaffer Yilmaz Professor, Balikesir University, Turkey

136

Appendix I: Bibliographies

147

Editor’s Note

THE WORLD IN REVIEW

T

he Northwestern Journal of International Affairs was founded in 1997 by an enterprising group of undergraduates dedicated to expanding knowledge and raising awareness of contemporary topics in international affairs. Today the Journal attracts submissions from scholars and public officials around the world.

This issue of the Journal presents a collection of articles that explore the conceptual, ideological and historical backgrounds of a variety of international issues.

Although the information age has amplified the quantity of information available, our tendency to focus on the intricacies of daily events means that context is often lost in the process. By presenting this body of articles, we hope to provide new perspectives on challenges facing the international community. As always, the views expressed by the authors are their own and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board.

The articles in this issue reflect a wide range of concerns. Roberta Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explores the ways that humanitarian imperatives are transforming the institution of sovereignty while Dr. Burak Akçapar, head of the Strategic Planning Department at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reflects on the coming redundancy of world orders. Matthew Jacobs makes a provocative argument about the nature and policy implications of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran and Elizabeth Nielsen presents her research on efforts to balance security and liberty in antiterrorism frameworks in the United States, United Kingdom, and France.

Also in this issue, Kira D. Baiasu investigates the ways that authoritarian rule has been sustained in Saudi Arabia, Rahl Reddy examines the history of the crucial Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan, and Jennifer Lickteig explores the use of non-violent tactics by terrorist organizations. In keeping with this issue’s emphasis on context, we conclude with an article written by Dr. Muzaffer Yilmaz of Balikesir University, Turkey that rewinds to the end of the Cold War to reflect on modern threats to international peace.

The Journal has also had a successful past quarter organizing events. After organizing a panel on immigration reform, the Journal was honored to invite Nobel Peace Prize nominee and former political prisoner Wei Jingsheng to campus for a public lecture ahead of the twentieth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Mr. Wei, who is regarded by many as the father of the Chinese democracy movement, shared his thoughts on the past, present and future of democracy in China and answered questions from students and faculty about his experiences. We’re proud of what the editorial board has accomplished this year and we hope you enjoy reading this issue as much as we enjoyed producing it.

Sincerely, Daniel Andreeff and Andrew R. Celis Editors-in-Chief, NJIA Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 1

Humanitarian Imperatives are Transforming Sovereignty Roberta Cohen, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution1 In these first years of the 21st century, it is not unusual to find hundreds, even thousands, of humanitarian workers providing material aid and protection to people caught up in internal conflicts and strife within their own countries. Dispatched by international agencies, non-governmental organizations and donor governments, humanitarian field staff, sometimes joined by peacekeeping contingents, are a constant reminder that the international community has begun to assume a degree of responsibility when governments fail to provide for the security and well being of their populations in humanitarian emergencies.

This emerging international responsibility to protect and assist persons within their own countries reflects new and evolving concepts of sovereignty. For much of the 20th century, traditional notions of sovereignty prohibited an international role in most internal situations. To be sure, since the 1950s the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had a special mandate to protect civilians in armed conflicts, and beginning in the 1970s could explicitly act in non-international armed conflicts. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also began in the 1970s on a select basis to assist people displaced inside their own countries. But basically sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs were strictly applied, as set forth in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. It was not until the end of the Cold War that the international community began in a concerted way to try to assist and protect people uprooted and at risk inside their own countries. Internally displaced persons (IDPs), those forced from their homes by civil war, generalized violence and human rights violations who remain within their own countries, became a leading entry point for international humanitarian action. As former UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar observed in 1991, “We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents.�i But the humanitarian imperative of saving lives had to be reconciled with the most cardinal principle of international affairs, respect for non-interference in internal affairs.

Whereas the humanitarian imperative calls for immediate aid to people whose survival is threatened, respect for state sovereignty can mean leaving large numbers to die should their governments refuse entry to the international community. The United Nations Charter did not resolve this dilemma, calling as it did for both the promotion of human rights internationally (Arts. 55-6) and respect for non-interference in internal affairs (Art. 2 (7)). A 1991 General Assembly resolution on humanitarian assistance in emergencies 1

Roberta Cohen is a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution where she specializes in humanitarian and human rights issues. She is also a senior associate at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migration.

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failed in this respect as well. Resolution 42/182 said that aid should be provided “with the consent of the affected country,” although it added “in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country [emphasis added],”ii suggesting that there may be times when the UN would take the initiative. For UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the problem of internal displacement constituted a test case for a new balance that was needed between respect for sovereignty and acceptance of humanitarian action. The uprooting of people within their own countries, he wrote, “created an unprecedented challenge for the international community: to find ways to respond to what is essentially an internal crisis.”iii A Shift in Attention from Refugees to Internally Displaced Persons The explosion of civil wars following the Cold War brought into view large numbers of persons uprooted inside their own countries. When first counted in 1982, 1.2 million could be found in 11 countries, whereas by 1995, the total number of IDPs had surged to 20 to 25 million.iv Most had little or no access to food, medicine and shelter and were often found to have higher mortality rates and higher malnutrition rates than others in the population. Being uprooted from their homes, livelihoods and communities, they were also particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse, forced relocations, and other manner of violence. Although their destitute condition and need for international protection made it imperative to support them, the international system created after the Second World War focused almost exclusively on refugees -- those who fled their countries to escape persecution. UNHCR, created in 1950, and the 1951 Refugee Convention provided international protection to those outside their countries deprived of the protection of their governments. Largely in deference to traditional notions of sovereignty, the system did not extend to people uprooted inside their countries.

That the system was inadequate to the humanitarian crises of the 1990s quickly became evident when IDPs began to outnumber refugees two to one or more in most emergencies. Indeed, Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 1990 to 2000 took the decision to expand the “operational coverage” of UNHCR in different internal war situations to include IDPs and other affected populations, especially when they were mixed in with refugees. In her memoirs, she posed the following question to herself: “Should we follow the legal dictate of not exercising our mandate inside the border and thereby refrain from helping those prevented from crossing or should we stand more on realistic humanitarian grounds and extend whatever support we could?”

Ogata chose “to take the realistic humanitarian course.” v This meant that UNHCR, despite its refugee mandate, would protect displaced Kurds inside Iraq in the safe haven created by a US-led coalition, and in the former Yugoslavia became the lead agency on the ground for refugees, IDPs and other affected populations.

The UN General Assembly and Security Council backed UNHCR’s actions, reinforced by the warning of UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Sergio Vieira de Mello that helping refugees but not others in an emergency could produce “second class victims” and spawn more conflict.vi Indeed, Security Council resolutions, beginning in 1991, began to demand access to internally displaced persons and other affected populations, and to authorize the establishment of relief corridors and cross-border operations to reach people

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in need. In some cases the Council even authorized the use of force to ensure the delivery of relief and provide protection to IDPs and other affected populations, such as in northern Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia.vii But it was not the humanitarian imperative alone that underpinned the decisions of the international community to become involved in countries of origin. There was also the fact that millions of people caught up in wars in their own countries without the basic necessities of life could disrupt the stability of these countries and undermine regional and international security.viii Whether in Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda in the Great Lakes region of Africa, or in Sierra Leone in West Africa, conflict and internal displacement could be seen to be spilling over borders, overwhelming neighboring countries with refugees and helping to ignite regional wars. A growing worldwide inhospitality to refugees also brought with it greater willingness to help people uprooted within their own countries.

As IDPs moved to center stage in international debates about how to protect persons caught up in internal conflicts, the Secretary-General in 1992 appointed a Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng, to monitor displacement situations worldwide and identify ways to promote better protection and assistance for them. But states, especially in the Third World, were wary of this mandate, making it essential for the Representative to develop a conceptual framework to reconcile the tension between a state’s jurisdiction over its population and international involvement in situations of internal displacement.ix Sovereignty as Responsibility Deng’s answer to situations of internal displacement was the concept of “sovereignty as responsibility,” which effectively recast sovereignty as a form of state responsibility to one’s displaced population. If a state did not want international involvement with its IDPs, it should provide for the security and well being of its population.x States after all have the primary responsibility to provide IDPs with life-supporting protection and assistance, but if they are unable to do so, they are expected to request and accept outside offers of aid. If they refuse, or deliberately obstruct access, and put large numbers at risk, the international community has a right and even a responsibility to assert its concern and become involved. International involvement can range from diplomatic dialogue to negotiation of access, to establishing humanitarian presence, to political pressure or sanctions, and in exceptional cases as a last resort, to military action. In his dialogues with governments, Deng repeatedly pointed out that no state claming legitimacy could quarrel with its commitment to protect all of its citizens. Sovereignty must mean accountability to one’s population and also to the international community in the form of compliance with international human rights and humanitarian agreements.

The human rights and humanitarian communities contributed substantially to this concept. For decades, human rights advocates had been championing the view that the rights of people transcend frontiers and that the international community must hold governments to account when they fail to meet their obligations. Indeed, since the UN’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and subsequent human

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rights treaties, an evolution in thinking began to take place from a strictly state-centered system in which sovereignty was absolute to one in which the behavior of states toward their own citizens became a matter of international concern and scrutiny. Systematic monitoring, reporting and exposure of human rights violations began in the 1970s, reinforced by the initiatives of governments, in particular the United States under President Jimmy Carter, who declared that “no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business.”xi By the 1980s humanitarian organizations were also insisting that when governments deny access to populations at risk and deliberately subject them to starvation and other abuses, the international community must find ways to reach those in need. Whereas in 1988, the international community stood by and watched while 250,000 Sudanese starved to death because their government denied international access, soon thereafter UN agencies used hard diplomatic bargaining to persuade Sudan’s government and rebel forces to accept Operation Lifeline Sudan.xii Humanitarian organizations in particular became emboldened after the Cold War when access became easier and possibilities opened up to cross borders and reach populations at risk. A right to humanitarian assistance and even a right to intervention (‘le droit d’ingerence’) were proposed although the latter term initiated by France was considered too bold and as a result was frequently challenged as violating the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. The concept of sovereignty as responsibility proved a far more persuasive packaging of the idea that sovereignty had limits: if it were used to justify neglect or mistreatment of one’s population, steps by the international community would be in order. Put another way, “states are entitled to full sovereignty so long as they abide by the norms established by the international community.”xiii The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the first international standards for IDPs, xiv have as their foundation the concept of sovereignty as responsibility. Introduced

by Deng into the United Nations in 1998, they assert that primary responsibility for the displaced rests with their governments, but that the international community has an important role to play when governments fail to discharge these responsibilities. The Principles make clear that offers of international aid cannot be regarded “as interference in a State’s internal affairs.” Indeed, states have a duty to accept international aid, are not “arbitrarily” to withhold consent and must grant “rapid and unimpeded access” to IDPs. The Principles further assert that IDPs have certain rights and claims when it comes to protection and assistance. They have the right to request and receive protection and humanitarian aid from their governments, but that when national authorities are “unable or unwilling” to provide the required aid, international organizations have the right to offer their services. The Principles also call upon humanitarian organizations to “give due regard to the protection needs and human rights” of IDPs and “take appropriate measures in this regard.” Such action goes beyond the provision of food, medicine and shelter to enabling international organizations to play a role in protecting the physical security of the displaced from violations of their human rights. A 2000 UN policy paper, adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (composed of all the major humanitarian

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organizations) reinforced this international protection role of IDPs as set forth in the Guiding Principles.xv Although not a legally binding document like a treaty, the Guiding Principles in a relatively short period of time have gained considerable international recognition and standing. UN resolutions regularly refer to them as an “important tool” and “standard,” and the World Summit Outcome document of 2005, signed by 192 heads of state and government, recognize them as “an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons.”xvi Regional organizations use them as an authoritative document, UN humanitarian staff rely upon them as a framework, and a small but growing number of governments have begun to incorporate the Principles into their national policies and laws on internal displacement.xvii Currently, the African Union is developing a legally binding instrument based on the Guiding Principles while the member states of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region have already adopted a legally binding Protocol on internally displaced persons that obliges states to accept the Guiding Principles by incorporating them into domestic law. That sovereignty is increasingly being viewed as a form of responsibility towards one’s citizens, especially one’s displaced population, is reflected in this growing application of the Guiding Principles.

The Responsibility to Protect The concept of sovereignty as responsibility also became the foundation for the new landmark concept – the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). In 2004, the UN SecretaryGeneral’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change affirmed that, Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own people and meet its obligations to the wider international community. But history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own people and avoid harming its neighbours. And in those circumstances, the principles of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community...xviii The World Summit Outcome document formally endorsed the responsibility to protect in 2005. The document asserts that states are expected first and foremost to protect their own populations, but if they are unwilling or unable to do so, and their citizens are subjected to genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity, then responsibility shifts to the international community, which is expected to take collective action.xix The document’s articulation of R2P is a clear affirmation that sovereignty cannot acceptably serve as a barrier behind which governments can commit crimes against their population. The concept instead reflects the view that when large numbers of people are in desperate need of the basic necessities of life, their situation goes beyond being an

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internal matter and becomes one in which the international community must play a role.

Indeed, concepts of security have broadened to include “human security” in addition to state security,xx reaffirming former Secretary-General’s Annan’s view that while respect for sovereignty offers vital protection to small and weak states, “it should not be a shield for crimes against humanity.”xxi There is, however, no international consensus on how to apply R2P. In fact, R2P is often mistakenly equated with military intervention without sufficient thought given to the diplomatic, humanitarian, political and economic measures that need to precede more robust action. In an effort to give greater attention to the non-military steps that could be taken, the Secretary-General appointed in 2004 a Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities and in 2007 a Special Adviser on the responsibility to protect. Both advisers have sought to raise international awareness to the need for prevention as well as protection of civilians and to map out the strategies to take prior to coercive action.xxii In cases where military action is needed, there is as yet no agreed upon criteria for when to use force in humanitarian or human rights emergencies; nor does a ready UN capacity for enforcement exist. Whereas some insist that the responsibility to protect must be decided with Security Council approval, others maintain that if the Security Council fails to act, humanitarian action can be undertaken by coalitions of the willing who will secure international approval thereafter (as in the case of Kosovo). The World Summit Outcome document doesn’t indicate what road to take if the Security Council fails to act. Nor does it create structures to help implement R2P, such as “strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly” as called for by Annan.xxiii In the World Summit Outcome document, heads of government urged only the “further development of proposals” to create such capacity. They did, however, ask regional organizations to “consider the option” of placing their military capacity under UN standby arrangements and endorsed a standing police capacity, which if formed, could prove valuable for protection.xxiv Over the years, some influential members of the Group of 77 have strongly opposed international humanitarian action on the grounds that it could be a cover for the interference of powerful countries in the affairs of weaker states. Egypt, Sudan and India even initially raised objections to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement on grounds of sovereignty,xxv although in the end they voted for the World Summit Outcome document and other UN resolutions supporting the Principles and R2P. China has regularly insisted that no state should interfere coercively in the internal affairs of another state in the name of humanitarian action.xxvi In the case of Darfur, China has regularly weakened Security Council resolutions despite the genocidal acts of Sudan’s government against its African tribes.xxvii Indeed, the case of Darfur brings out the difficulties of making R2P operational. Bowing to international pressure, Sudan allowed in more than 16,000 humanitarian workers (about 1,000 are international staff) to assist the more than two million IDPs in camps. It also allowed in more than 7,000 African Union troops and police in 2004-2005 not only to monitor the cease-fire but also to provide a modicum of protection for the IDPs.

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Further, Sudan’s government agreed to the terms of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement that, although not in force because of rebel objections, authorized African Union troops to create buffer zones around the IDP camps, accompany displaced persons to areas of return as well as perform other protection functions. But at the same time Sudan made it extremely difficult and even dangerous for humanitarian staff to operate in Darfur, failed to disarm Janjaweed militias responsible for attacking non-Arab villagers and IDPs, and took all possible steps to thwart the African Union mission from protecting IDPs.xxviii The UN Security Council has been hard pressed to resolve the crisis. Its resolution 1706 of August 31, 2006 did take the bold step of authorizing the deployment of a UN force to Darfur of 20,000 military and police, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (which is mandatory) and empowered it to “use all necessary means” to “protect civilians under threat of physical violence,” “prevent attacks and threats against civilians” and protect humanitarian workers. However, the same resolution, at China’s insistence, also “invite[d] the consent” of the government of Sudan. This clause largely emasculated the Chapter VII requirement (UN staff therefore dubbed it “Chapter 6 and a half”), and emboldened Sudan to reject the UN deployment. For more than ten months, as a result, the UN Secretary-General and numerous governments sought to persuade Sudan to accept an international force or at least a hybrid UN/AU force. In June 2007, the Sudanese government finally relented, agreeing to a 26,000 strong hybrid force (with mostly African troops and under African operational command) with a Chapter VII protection mandate under Resolution 1769 of July 31, 2007.

Controversy also arose over whether international actions on Darfur could be framed in terms of the responsibility to protect. Security Council Resolution 1706 was the first resolution to cite and thereby apply the R2P concept to Darfur but the reference to R2P was omitted from Resolution 1769 at the behest of China and Sudan. Many sub-Saharan African governments, it bears noting, strongly defended the R2P concept in the case of Darfur. In the UN Security Council, Ghana objected to asking for Khartoum’s consent on Resolution 1706,xxix on the grounds that African governments under the AU charter have an obligation to intervene in the affairs of another state when its people are at risk.xxx Liberia’s President called upon the UN to exercise Chapter VII authority in Darfur because “the world must not allow a second Rwanda to happen.”xxxi But international divisions in the Security Council have undermined strong collective action. In the face of objections from China, Russia and the Arab League, as well as US preoccupation with Iraq, there has been no coalition of governments ready to stand firmly behind R2P and ensure that Resolution 1769 is effectively carried out. Although China did in the end press Sudan to accept the hybrid force, any reference to sanctions was removed from the text. Nor is there a UN rapid reaction military force or standby police capacity to carry R2P forward. The UN is still trying to assemble all the troops in the hybrid force for Darfur and adequately equip them even though two years have gone by since the adoption of the resolution. Without international enforcement machinery, these and other Security Council resolutions, such as number 1296 that speaks of creating security zones and safe corridors and identifying situations where IDPs may be endangered in camps,xxxii could remain largely unenforced. International concepts of

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protection outpace the ability to implement them, leading many to turn to prevention as a more effective first step. At the same time, efforts are underway to identify the specific steps needed to implement R2P.xxxiii Working with Sovereignty Although Sudan is often presented as the R2P worst “test case,” with governments like Myanmar and Zimbabwe following close behind,xxxiv R2P was applied effectively in the case of Kenya in 2008, halting the violence and forced displacement following postelection ethnic clashes. Political mediation and pressure were relied upon, with former Secretary-General Kofi Annan concluding that his own success as a peace-broker in Kenya “owed something to the existence of R2P as a moral instrument.”xxxv Indeed, a broader and longer-term perspective is needed. A growing number of governments are now ready to cooperate with the international community in addressing conflict and displacement in their countries. In fact, most countries today allow some form of access to their displaced populations, and some even welcome international engagement, including peacekeepers and humanitarian workers.xxxvi The Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs, Walter Kalin, has more invitations from governments to visit their countries than he can manage. His reports on Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uganda, Ivory Coast, Colombia, Nepal and others reveal that a number of these governments have been working closely with the UN to develop policies and laws on internal displacement and set up institutions to enforce them.xxxvii The government of Turkey, for example, which for decades refused entry to the international community, invited the Representative to visit on several occasions and has been cooperating with international organizations in developing plans for the return and reintegration of its displaced population. The government of Georgia has developed an IDP policy in line with the Representative’s recommendations.

International humanitarian organizations have also been working to create a more predictable international system for IDPs based on the assumption that these organizations have a right and responsibility to work in countries beset by conflict and displacement. In 2006, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, who serves as focal point for coordinating assistance and protection to IDPs, introduced a new system, the ‘cluster approach’ to increase international accountability to IDPs.xxxviii Under this arrangement, specific responsibilities for IDPs are assigned to international agencies with expertise in these areas. Thus, UNHCR became the lead for IDPs when it comes to protection, camp management and emergency shelter while UNDP has assumed responsibility for early recovery and other organizations have taken the lead in health, sanitation, nutrition and other sectors. Although China, Russia and governments in the G-77 sensitive to international involvement with internally displaced populations have at times questioned the new system, UNHCR as the main protection lead believes it can remain committed to greater involvement with IDPs.xxxix UN peacekeeping forces also are being increasingly called upon, in emergencies around the world, to protect internally displaced persons and other civilian populations, accompany humanitarian aid convoys, and help refugees and IDPs return home safely.xl Regional organizations, moreover, like the African Union and European Union are working to develop rapid response capabilities for emergencies.

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Conclusion The end of the twentieth century has witnessed a shift in thinking about sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. For centuries, both were considered stabilizing elements in international relations. But when exercised in absolute terms, they were seen to produce holocausts and other humanitarian and human rights disasters. While continuing to recognize sovereignty as the basis for the international system, the new thinking emphasizes that when governments fail in their obligation to provide for the security and well being of their populations, and large numbers are at risk, the international community has the right, even the responsibility, to become involved.

The power of these new ideas is evident. States today can expect limits on their sovereignty when they blatantly refuse to live up to their humanitarian obligations.

International involvement with internally displaced persons has become an increasingly accepted course of action and most governments do not regard people at risk inside their countries as strictly a national problem. In fact, internally displaced persons and other people in acute need of humanitarian assistance and protection are increasingly seen as having certain rights and claims on the international community when their governments do not act responsibly or where there is a disintegration of the state. Greater humanitarian and peacekeeping presences in the field in emergency situations reflect this, bolstered by documents like the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the World Summit Outcome document’s R2P. Nonetheless, concepts of sovereignty as responsibility and the responsibility to protect remain far ahead of international willingness and capacity to enforce them. Assuring action by the international community to assist and protect civilians inside countries and hold their governments to account will remain a major challenge for the twenty-first century.

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Endnotes i

Javier Perez de Cuellar, as quoted in Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement, Brookings Institution, 1998, p. 1. ii United Nations General Assembly, “Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations,” A/RES/46/182, 19 December 1991. iii Kofi Annan, Preface, in Cohen and Deng, Masses in Flight, p. xix. iv Cohen & Deng, Masses in Flight, p. 3. v Sadako Ogata, The Turbulent Decade, W.W. Norton & Company, 2005, pp. 19, 25, 38, 170. vi Sergio Vieira de Mello, Briefing before the UN Security Council, Inter-Office Memorandum, New York, 3 June 1999. vii See Walter Kalin and Robert K. Goldman, “Legal Framework,” in Cohen & Deng, Masses in Flight, pp.

118-120, and pp. 362-3, note 200. viii Annan, Preface, Masses in Flight, p. xix. ix Thomas G. Weiss and David A. Korn, Internal Displacement: Conceptualization and its Consequences, Routledge, 2006, pp. 27-8. x See Cohen & Deng, Masses in Flight, pp. 275-280. See also Roberta Cohen, “Human Rights Protection for Internally Displaced Persons,” Refugee Policy Group, June 1991. The RPG report affirmed that sovereignty “does not have to mean that a state can behave in any way it wants toward its own citizens without consequences. Sovereignty carries with a responsibility on the part of governments to protect their citizens.” See also Francis M. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed, Brookings Institution, 1993. xi Jimmy Carter, Address before the United Nations, New York Times, March 18, 1977. xii See for example, Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear, The Challenges of Famine Relief: Emergency Operations in the Sudan, Brookings Institution, 1992. xiii Amitai Etzioni, “Sovereignty as Responsibility,” Orbis, Winter 2006, p. 83. xiv United Nations Commission on Human Rights, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc. E/CN.4.1998/53/Add.2, 1998, reprinted as OCHA/IDP/2004/01. xv United Nations, Inter-Agency Standing Committee, “Protection of Internally Displaced Persons,” IASC Policy Paper Series, No. 2, New York, October 2000. xvi United Nations, World Summit Outcome, para. 132, Resolution A/RES/60/1, September 15, 2005; see also Walter Kalin, “The future of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” Forced Migration Review, special issue, December 2006. xvii Jessica Wyndham, “A Developing Trend: Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement,” Human Rights Brief, Washington College of Law, American University, Winter 2006. xviii United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004, p. 17. xix United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, para.139. See also Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001. xx Ibid. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, p. 15. xxi Kofi Annan, Statement to the General Assembly, on presenting his Millennium Report, New York, 3 April 2000. xxii Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has reinforced this approach by emphasizing that R2P “could involve any of the whole range of UN tools, whether pacific measures under Chapter VI of the Charter coercive ones under Chapter VII, and /or collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements under Chapter VIII.” See UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect, A/63/677, 12 January 2009. xxiii United Nations, In larger freedom: toward development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/2005, para. 112. xxiv United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paras. 92-3, 170. xxv See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Sovereignty,” in No Refuge: the Challenge of Internal Displacement, United Nations, 2003, pp. 47-8; and Roberta Cohen, “The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: An Innovation in International Standard Setting,” Global Governance, Vol.10, No.4, Oct-Dec 2004, pp. 472-475, 477.

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xxvi

See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, No Refuge, p. 47.

Only recently in response to international criticism of China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics has China begun to press Sudan’s government to accept an international force in Darfur, see “Chinese To Deploy Soldiers To Darfur,” Washington Post, May 9, 2007. xxviii See William G. O’Neill and Violette Cassis, Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, November 2005. xxix William G. O’Neill, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Christian Science Monitor, September 28, 2006. xxx The AU’s Constitutive Act of July 11, 2000 establishes “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” Indeed, the AU is the first regional organization to recognize the right to intercede in a member state on humanitarian and human rights grounds. xxxi UN News Service, September 20, 2006, as quoted in Eric Reeves, “A Spectacle of Impotence at the UN: Darfur Security Remains Solely with AU,” September 24, 2006. xxxii UN Security Council, Resolution on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/RES/1296, 19 April 2000. xxxiii In addition to the proposed appointment of a Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on R2P, the Secretary-General has issued a report on ways to implement R2P, see UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect.There are also several studies on how to apply R2P. See Victoria K. Holt & Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate: Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006; and Lee Feinstein, “Darfur and Beyond: What Is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 2007. xxxiv Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2006, Norwegian Refugee Council/IDMC, April 2007, pp. 13-20. . xxxv “An Idea whose Time has Come and Gone?” The Economist, 23 July 2009. xxxvi See UNHCR, “Internally displaced persons,” The State of the World’s Refugees, Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 160-1. xxxvii See Walter Kalin, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/71, 12 January 2006, pp. 7-9; “UN Expert on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons Concludes Visit to Azerbaijan,” UN Press Release, 6 April 2007; “UN Expert Calls for Adoption and Implementation of Georgian National Strategy for IDPs,” UN Press Release, 18 December 2006; Working Visit by the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons to Turkey, 28 September –2 October 2006, Conclusions and Recommendations, www.brookings.edu/idp; “Special Efforts Now Needed to Implement Uganda’s National Policy for IDPs, UN Expert Says,” UN Press Release, July 2006; “Cote d’Ivoire Facing Protection Crisis in Terms of Human Rights of IDPs, Experts says,” UN Press Release, 25 April 2006. xxxviii Dennis McNamara, “Humanitarian reform and new institutional responses,” Forced Migration Review, special issue, December 2006, pp. 10-11. xxxix Erika Feller, “UNHCR’s role in IDP protection: opportunities and challenges, “Forced Migration Review, special issue, December 2006, pp. 11-13. xl See William G. O’Neill, “A New Challenge for Peacekeepers: The Internally Displaced,” The Brookings Institution-John Hopkins SAIS Project on Internal Displacement,” April 2004; and Security Council Resolution 1674, May 2006 which recognizes the important role peacekeepers can play in ensuring humanitarian access, protecting IDPs in and around camps, and creating conditions for safe and dignified returns. xxvii

Cohen ! Humanitarian Imperatives

Aging and Rising World Orders Dr. Burak Akçapar, Head of Strategic Planning Department, Directorate General for Policy Planning, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs1 People the world over have entered 2009 in doom and gloom. The economic crisis that spread from the collapse of sub-prime mortgages in the United States quickly turned towards the end of 2008 into a bush fire engulfing all developed economies and most of the rest of the world. The violent street protests in Greece added to the pessimism as the Director of National Intelligence warned in February 2009 that global economic turmoil and the instability it could ignite had outpaced terrorism as the most urgent threat facing the United States. Amidst global economic calamity the calls for a new international order became in vogue, again.

However, there is no convincing argument that the ongoing global economic crisis amounts to a dramatic and episodic moment the likes of which in history produced what Robert Gilpin called the “systemic shift” in the global order. 2008 is in no way akin to 1453 when the Ottomans defeated the Eastern Roman Empire or 1918 when the US broke its taboos about military engagement in the Old Continent. It is not 1989 when the US was left without any competing power with a rival ideology. There was no war. No major state or bloc disappeared. There was no political and military game changing change of circumstances. Despite the fact that the US Intelligence Community did warn that security risks would be aggravated by the economic crisis, there is room for skepticism even on that point. The economic crisis did not create new failing states; it might have exacerbated the situation in the already failing ones.

It is true nonetheless true that it all could have been different. To the credit of the Bush administration the vitalization of the G-20 was a masterful move. To the credit of the Obama administration, they continued the US support behind it. As in the 1930’s Great Depression, this crisis could have hastened the fall into an international political abyss, even a global war. After all, there is already enough political problems, geopolitical rivalries, shifts in power balances, economic imbalances, and almost everything else that triggered not only economic but also political and military crises. That is not happening.

The fact is 2009 is different from 1930’s, as Fareed Zakaria observed: “There is much greater and more widespread wealth in Western societies, with middle classes that can withstand job losses in ways that they could not in the 1930s. Bear in mind, unemployment in the non-farm sector in America rose to 37 percent in the 1930s.

Unemployment in the United States today is 8.9 percent. And government benefits— nonexistent in the '30s—play a vast role in cushioning the blow from an economic slowdown.”1 Yet, perhaps more importantly, during the Great Depression there was an adolescent world order. In 2009 that world order is mature after umpteen amendments 1

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and cannot be ascribed to the government and associations with which the author is affiliated."

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and revisions, and a record of insufferable pain inflicted by mankind on mankind in the last one hundred years.

That said, the same mature world order may also be senescent. The current economic crisis may have produced an instance to highlight the fact that has been almost universally expressed but hardly acted upon: the current order of things in the world, whichever way one defines it, is manifesting serious wear and tear. It is maintaining a minimum order today yet should not be expected to live up to the challenges of tomorrow. At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the international community finds itself in a flux in which almost every aspect of the international order is being challenged from the top down and from the bottom up. Irrespective of the economic crisis, multiple transformations are underway that are global in scope and historic in impact. Faced with a daunting agenda, even in the absence of a war, these may be the times when it is legitimate to ask hard questions and take bold actions. These are the sort of times when historic leaders, whether political or intellectual, are made.

Against that background, the economic crisis may be an opportunity to revamp the world order. Debates already galore. Nevertheless, realistically speaking, no new world order, for better or for worse, will replace the current one this time around. Rather the next world order will be incubated in the human civilization’s collective womb and tested gently in reality. If history is any guide, the basic contours of the international system to come may have already made their debut. The old and the new are living together, one shaping up, and the other struggling to hang in.

Bar historical determinism: History did not happen in a preordained way; future will also be shaped by the vagaries of human action and follies. It will be a product of an unpredictability that humans have not as yet comprehended and unlocked. What we think is clearly visible is only that which is permitted by our limited knowledge and comprehension. Truth is what we create and believe in. Knowledge is not absolute but partial. Therein rests the human dilemma: We need to understand. And, we need to participate in the shaping of the future global environment that will surround our destinies. This is no easy feat. The task to assess global change involves questions that have no easy answers. It also concerns both the academic and policy worlds in a way that neither can deny. Every International Relations position comes from some conception of the world system in which we live. Every international policy needs to take account of the existing and arising world system.

The current world order was shaped since late 19th century when Europe was beginning its decline, the US was quickly rising, Ottomans were dissolving, and much of the rest of the world except Japan was largely colonized. The world order in which we live has been a product of insufferable pain inflicted by humans on humans, world wars, economic and political collapses, and environmental degradation. This order has also engendered for the people who lived within its broadening center immeasurable prosperity, stability and progress.

A marked characteristic of both the senescent and nascent world orders is globalization. It is hard to find a conclusive definition of globalization as scholars seem to disagree on the

Akçapar ! Aging and Rising World Orders

scale and causation, as well as development, impact, and policy results of this phenomenon. There is disagreement even on the historical trajectory and chronology of globalization although there seems to a consensus on the point that in the past half century globalization has intensified. The journey might be traced back to the Islamic Golden Age, when traders and explorers from Muslim lands have established a “global” links expanding trade, scientific and social interactions across the known world. The Silk Road later further advanced this integration. The territorial and particularly maritime expansion of Europeans into new continents also culminated in the discovery and colonization of America. The first multinational corporation, The Dutch East India Company, helped cultivate globalization as a business strategy in the 17th century.

During the 19th century globalization was a fact of life through intensive international trade and investment between European imperial powers, their colonies and the United States. These links continually expanded to include sub-Saharan Africa and the Island Pacific. A world economic order was thus being created. The experience of protectionism during the 1930’s depression engendered deliberative planning to promote international economic integration and trade liberalization. By then China had also entered the world economic system. It is hard to negate Noam Chomsky’s assertion that globalization is beneficial to its designers: Multinational corporations and the powerful states to which they are closely linked. However, as capital became more multinational and its operations and investments geographically widespread, globalization also came to empower the target markets.

Anthony Giddens offers a particularly insightful definition of globalization “as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”2 This emphasis on “social relations” more accurately depicts the multilayered impact of globalization. Thus it is no longer about a powerful country sapping the natural resources of a weaker one and trading the processed goods back to the initial producer of the natural resource. The interaction is profusely and intimately social including political.

The vector of the relationship continues to flow more from the powerful towards the weaker but it is no longer one directional. The expansion of globalization is therefore no longer merely economic expansion. It is also cultural, sociological, political and even psychological. Values and institutions are passed on as much as goods and capital. As such the reach of the world order is congruous with the reach of the multiple layers of globalization. A country that is fully within the world order is protected to a large degree against the torrents of being excluded. That is the zone of modernity, prosperity, liberty, and security. That is the first world. A country starts entering the globalized world order when it starts benefiting from the governing arrangements and adopting some of the economic, political, institutional fabrics worn in the first world. This includes democratization, constitutionalism, rule of the law, accountability, collective security, free trading, financial liberalization including through stock exchanges and the like. I will use this explanation in the remainder of this essay when talking about countries and regions in or out of step with the world order.

The aging and rising world orders are cohabiting, one caving in, the other moving in. The following is an admittedly bird’s eye view of the general contours of this asynchronous

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process or phenomenon. I call this the mutual existence of nascent and senescent world orders.

President Lula of Brazil at the G-7 Summit held in Evian in 2003 reportedly said: “Gentlemen, I would like to suggest to you that next year maybe you would like to meet in Brazil to get yourself ready for 20 years from now when 5 of you will not be here.

Because you should understand that in that period of time, 20 or 30 years from now, the number one country in the world will be China, number two will be the United States, number three will be India, number four will be Japan, and I regret to say that none of the rest of you will be here. I'll be here,' he said. 'But it would still be nice to have you around, so come get used to the developing world.”3 What President Lula’s intervention whimsically underscored was that the power structure of the world is under change and this is creating a new reality that will be recognized in due course.

The fundamental actors are the hyper power US, which is at the top of the global power structure, but may have reached the peak of its power potential; Europe which despite its painful and long decline still belongs at the top layer of the global power scala thanks to the EU, but is seriously lacking vision and direction. Discovering that vision and also admitting particularly Turkey, by itself Europe’s sixth largest economy, but also Croatia and the other remaining Southeast European countries as well is likely to replenish the EU’s potential to hang on to its position within the top layer. Together, the US and Europe form the top of the global power structure in almost every way. They also make up three of the five permanent posts in the worlds top multinational (or even supranational except for the permanent members) global organ, namely the UN Security Council. That Europe is not represented by a single seat at this forum is a relic of the war of half a century ago.

After having amassed attributes of power that no other mortal power has been able to assemble, the US has entered a relative stagnation the course and result of which is yet to be seen. That said, US will continue to be the dominant global power during the lifetime of anyone alive on this day. Obviously, US power cannot be easily matched although the EU has already superseded American economic power. In the military realm, Washington spends almost half of the entire global defense expenditures. The US defense budget is exceeds the combined spending of the next 46 countries. The US spends six times more than China, 10 times more than Russia and no less than 99 times than Iran. All the potential US rivals put together spend some $205 billion annually that is little over one third of US defense expenditures. However, even these numbers do not show the full picture. If one adds the defense expenditures of NATO allies, Japan, South Korea and Australia one reaches over 70% of all military spending in the world. One ought also to consider that all of the top ten defense companies in the world are from NATO countries.

In terms of strategic culture, the US is accustomed to its leadership role and its elites are not likely to give up this position. The Obama administration is no exception.

Furthermore, the current economic crisis can even produce the effect of a certain cleansing of the financial system thereby mitigating or even halting long term US economic decline. The financial crisis in Turkey in 2001 had exactly this sort of effect rendering Turkish economy one of the fastest growing in the world. The counter example

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of course is Japan which has not been able yet to recover fully since 1997. Whether the effect of the current crisis on the fate of the world’s leading superpower will be along the Turkish or Japanese examples will have to be watched and seen.

Russia is no longer the top contender against these two powers, but it has every resource to be on the rise and is thus considered to be part of the BRIC. Russia’s influence is curtailed by the loss of its political appeal but it is using its position in the energy market to recover ground lost since the end of the Cold War. It has also launched an open challenge against US-European primacy by attacking Georgia and recognizing the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. However, Russia is a systemic power in almost every other field.

China, like Russia, already belongs in the post World War II top layer of the global power structure including by virtue of its UNSC permanent membership. However, it is currently forming the second layer together with Russia. China is careful in not openly launching an anti-systemic challenge to the US primacy although it is not shy in drawing its own redlines including in Taiwan and Nepal. China is a major benefactor of globalization and thus far has been particularly lucky in staving off its inevitable challenges and problems.

I have essentially recounted the UNSC’s permanent members which is illustrative of which countries the current world order, as an institutional global compact, has codified as the top powers. Clearly, this list is not totally representative of what actually forms the top of the power chain. Although all the listed powers are in the actual top layer, there are others which exert significant leverage. In a recent study the Stanley Foundation concluded that ten countries will form the top layer of the global major powers layer.

These are the US, EU, Turkey, South Africa, Russia, India, China, South Korea, Japan.

Obviously, this list is subject to debate. For instance, it takes for granted that Turkey will remain outside the EU. However, with perhaps a few additions the list also reflects more or less a general consensus as to the top achievers in the world. If that scenario is realized, it would have ramifications for the global economic, political, institutional structures.

It is interesting to note that at first side, leaving aside Russia’s indecision, all the actors are in fact conforming to the global order that is shaped under the US lead. All act within the system, protect it, try to improve its position within the system, and aim to reform it without jeopardizing its fundamental parameters. They also show reflexes that try to keep the US within the order that US itself has pioneered. Furthermore, all of these powers shun the prospect of armed conflict between them. It can be said that the domestic dynamics of these countries, the type of the relationship that they will develop among them and how they would related to their close neighborhoods will be important from the perspective of the evolution of the coming world order.

The reason why all the current and likely future major powers appear to support the current world order could be mainly economic. First of all being an anti-systemic power is unbearably expensive even for a country like China that holds around $2 trillion in

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reserves. Secondly, all these powers rise by benefiting from the current world order albeit in different degrees. Thirdly, the level of interdependence among US and China is such that historian Neill Ferguson talks about a Chinamerica, which smacks of Brzezinski’s one time Amerippon idea. At any rate, a version of the nuclear strategic doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction that formed the underlying logic of the US-Soviet balance during the Cold War is probably now applicable between China and America which can shatter each other’s economies.

Needless to say, acting against the system is also risky given that it would spark not only US but also the fellow small and large powers’ potential resistance. Therefore, a free trading capitalist system has been anchored along the US-EU-China-India-Brazil axis and this forms the infrastructure of the evolving world order. This economic system will likely see specific amendments but will probably be resilient in its basic form beyond the horizon. However, there is already an old tension resurfacing between state control and the market this time with stronger vigor on the part of the proponents of state control.

On the one side is the astounding achievement of the private business in the world. The free market has produced a dramatic reorientation of the power relationship between the nation state and the private enterprise. In our day and age the US defense budget is only half of the annual sales of two companies, Walmart and ExxonMobil. The latter’s annual sales is approximately on par with the GDP of the 19th largest economy in the world.

Top 250 companies have annual earnings that form one third of the global GDP. One third of all assets in the world are controlled by the top 50 financial institutions. There are around 100 companies that have sales worth over $50 billion whereas only 60 nation states have GDP of similar power.4 Private business is a powerful force. Ian Bremmer points out that the free market tide has receded: “Across the United States, Europe, and much of the rest of the developed world, the recent wave of state interventionism is meant to lessen the pain of the current global recession and restore ailing economies to health. For the most part, the governments of developed countries do not intend to manage these economies indefinitely. However, an opposing intention lies behind similar interventions in the developing world: there the state's heavy hand in the economy is signaling a strategic rejection of free-market doctrine.”5 The 13 largest oil companies in the world, which Bremmer measures by their reserves, are owned and operated by governments. He thus argues that state capitalism in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain is replacing free market policies. And, that signals a global competition not among rival political ideologies but between competing economic models. This observation is interesting yet not necessarily novel. The free market has always been in tension with the state. What may be new is that the global economic crisis has increased this tension and created a backlash against neoliberalism also in the US and European markets. Therefore, Bremmer is right from his point of view in taking the nation-states’ resurgence in the economic field seriously, because that trend can fundamentally influence economic policies and balances and thus the future place of private business in world order.

However, the political dimension of the tension between state and private business can be equally if not more fundamentally important and game changing.

Akçapar ! Aging and Rising World Orders

The main ideology that supports the current world order is shaped by liberal or even neoliberal economy that promotes global access over national boundaries, social and individual freedoms that encourage creativity and skilled migration, and multi party democracy and rule of law regimes which maintain stability and facilitate resolution of differences within a society with other means than physical violence. Following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the rivaling ideological model, the idea of global governance has gathered increasing momentum. The principle and structures of global governance and globalization are mutually supportive. In this picture, just as there is the issue of state control over economy, there has always been a comparable tension between state control and individual liberties. For at least a few generations it will not be realistic to expect China, Russia and scores of other countries to adopt a Western style liberal and pluralistic democratic political model.

That will have at least three implications: Firstly, an ideology is ultimately only as powerful as the body in which it can insert itself. Read in reverse, whatever ideological model powerful countries adopt will find its admirers in other countries. A state controlled market economy, global trade liberalism matched with enlightened illiberal policies at home may well be an alternative model for a significant portion of the world.

Variations of this model is likely to compete with Western models around the world and especially in countries that are outside the inner ring of the global order. Secondly, the liberal model has an evangelical tendency which would add tension to relations with countries which resist political liberalization. The colored revolutions of the 2000’s have significantly soured the perceptions in Russia, Egypt and scores of other countries against the West which was suspected of instigating these popular movements. Thirdly, demands for liberal approaches will limit the reach of the West and ideas and values associated with it. The US has yet to invite the leader of Turkmenistan to Washington for an official visit despite the overwhelming interests in forging good relations with this key energy security player.

As I have explained, geopolitical shifts are underway both in terms of the configuration of the biggest powers that take leading roles in defining and upholding world order and those who remain outside the relatively stable order. At the same time, there are shifts that are ideational. This relates to a dynamic already unleashed that pulls away from the only remaining comprehensive and successful economic, political and social governance model, which finds its ideal form in neoliberalism. The “only course, no alternative” approach underlying the “end of history” thesis is now strongly contested around the world.

However, this reaction to neoliberal, pro-globalization and world governance policies remain sporadic, disorganized and incoherent both intellectually and organizationally.

How long it would take for this underlying opposition to find its wholesome ideological voice and example can only be guessed not foreseen. There is every reason to believe that China’s economic success is already producing ripples that as long as China continues its rise will attract increasing proponents and advocates as well as theoreticians.

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A process may already be underway in which liberal democracy-free market economy nexus supporting globalization is strongly contested at the popular level. The violent street protests are a common sideshow to the high level gatherings of the world’s prosperous and powerful nations. These however do not as yet form a coherent whole and include a diversity of viewpoints including nihilists and anarchists. As Paul Rogers notes: “The aspiration to what might be called the internationalisation of dissent has not yet been fully realised. But there are more than glimpses of the phenomenon in social, environmental and workers' movements - reflecting the fact that one result of globalization is the much wider understanding of the transnational nature of marginalization and exclusion. There is every chance that the early 2010s will indeed see the rise of fully transnational anti-elite movements triggered by wholesale deprivation, fuelled by anger, and armed with the hunger for an inclusive and just world. In time, they may be as or even more potent than the anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s.”6 In fact, the very formula that is touted as the agent for the transformation of the world into prosperous, peaceful, liberal and civic minded global community may just not be working that way.

Amy Chua argues for example that “the global spread of markets and democracy is a principal aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic violence throughout the nonWestern world.”7 Scores of people who thrived within the system including such prominent names the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz and George Soros criticize the process of globalization and seek to reform it. The idea of social justice and social security are once again in ascendancy. It remains to be seen whether the social democratic movements, long puzzled by the strength and vigor of neoliberalism, may regroup and find a discourse befitting the current realities. They would be in search of such a discourse that would channel some of the popular discontent into a positive and non-destructive political agenda that also safeguards democracy and economic opportunity. Obviously, these are not developments that China can inspire, but the message here is that the stuttering of neoliberalism is likely to challenge more liberalism as a panacea against all ills and create an ideational fracture.

Whether the ideational fractures will lead to institutional consequences is a question worth asking. It is hardly so that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) led by China and Russia or the Collective Security Treaty Organization lead by Russia amount to an organized illiberal front or even aspire to that. Their main focus is security and although the CSTO occasionally makes rather exaggerated self comparisons to NATO it simply is not in the same league. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization deserves greater attention. Comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the SCO dates back to 1996. Its original purpose was to establish confidence and help demilitarize China-Soviet Union border. Its focus and visibility have been increasing in recent years. The SCO has no economic dimension and its political dimension is currently secondary to its security focus. Even on the latter front the level of integration of the SCO is rather limited. The organization in 2005 openly called for US to end its military bases in Central Asia. The SCO is not an organization that can be overlooked and history is replete with examples of nucleus organizations eventually sprawling and assuming additional tasks and missions. However, the strength of the SCO, namely having China and Russia as members, is also its potential weakness. The real

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world may just be too complicated with these two giants to demonstrate a lasting common front.

On the other side, of course there are powerful and well established western led institutions already in place. The prime example is the NATO which is exclusively Europe and America and not global in membership. But, the idea is already out to develop an institutional framework that would transcend geographical limits and be based on ideological orientation. Although not the best example because of its different intention, Anne Bayefsky of the Hudson Institute called for a United Democratic Nations, “an international organization of democracies, by democracies, and for democracies” to replace the ineffective United Nations.8 More to the point is the work by the Princeton Project on National Security under the lead of John Ikenberry and Anne Marie Slaughter, which called for the creation of a Concert of Democracies.

The proposed Concert of Democracies would work towards the institutionalization of democratic peace. Thus, “if the United Nations cannot be reformed, the Concert would provide an alternative forum for liberal democracies to authorize collective action, including the use of force, by a supermajority vote. Its membership would be selective, but self-selected. Members would have to pledge not to use or plan to use force against one another; commit to holding multiparty, free-and-fair elections at regular intervals; guarantee civil and political rights for their citizens enforceable by an independent judiciary; and accept the responsibility to protect.”9 Thus, the Princeton Project’s 2006 report Forging A World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century also argued that America would be safer, more prosperous and healthier if governments around the world were more popular, accountable, and rights regarding; if existing international institutions were reformed and new ones created to reflect liberal principles; and if the role of force was reconsidered in light of the threats of the 21st century. In the 2008 US elections Republican candidate John McCain also espoused a League of Democracies.

While not carrying much wind currently it should be seen totally within the realm of the probable that these ideas resurface also in the near future. They may even form the nucleus of the thinking behind the institutional makeup of the next world order either as a replacement to the United Nations, as the proponents on the left and right seem to suggest, or as a complement to it. Either way, another element of the senescent and the nascent world orders is again probably alive today.

This brings up the issue of the institutions of the current and next world order. The power, ideological and economic foundations of the world order are protected by a comprehensive network of international organizations, which have been updated in due course. This network has the UN and UNSC, Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, NATO, and from another angle EU and ASEAN. All of those should be expected to remain beyond the horizon but go through minimal reform, minimal in the sense that barring complete disintegration, the necessary far reaching reforms will be politically unachievable.

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Institutions obviously do shape the environment. However, more importantly international law and multinational structures are formed by the codification of what already exists or can exist. This codification is achieved in close proximity to the common denominators and under the lead of the dominant power or powers. For the future institutional makeup a number of questions about the future nature of international relations should first find their answers. These include whether the US is prepared to share power or resist; whether ascendant actors will engage in attritive and/or violent struggles among them or with others; how the medium and smaller size countries will relate to the regional major powers; how a possible anti-systemic “revolutionary circumstance” in a major power would impact on the global system and other major powers. Under an optimistic scenario, the current world order may expand beyond current overrepresentation of the West to bring China and India but also potentially Turkey and other key states more into the decision shaping and decision making positions within the international organizations. At any rate, there is little doubt the future global institutions would be based on much more power sharing between America, Europe and Eastern Eurasia.

This is certainly the case with regard to the so-called Bretton Woods institutions. Since the Nixon administration severed the dollar-gold parity in 1971, the biggest reform drive may actually be approaching the IMF and the World Bank. This should involve more appropriate representation of the emerging powers like China, India, Brazil and Turkey.

Similarly, a new revenue model would be required to secure new lasting sources of revenues without levying additional burden on the indebted countries whose interest payments help sustain the IMF. But of equal importance may be the criticism that these institutions have failed to promote development. The recipes advanced by the IMF and the World Bank could be revised.

A process holding particular institutional promise is the G-20 which represents the world’s leading economies. The Group was established in 1999 with the purpose of promoting the integration of the major emerging economies into dialogue with the G-7 countries comprising the most developed, namely the US, Germany, Japan, UK, France, Italy and Canada. The G-20 format thus includes all the G-7 countries, Russia (which is a member of G-8 for broader political interactions), and Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey, as well as the EU. The G-20 between 1999 and 2008 met annually at the level and within the mandate areas of the national finance ministers as well as central bank representatives. This group of twenty leading economies has been energized at the Heads of State and Government level by the US in November 2008 in order to create a broad global platform to tackle the current economic crisis. The G-20 did indeed make a good start in that regard when it pulled together a trillion dollars in support of the IMF when it met for the second time at the Summit level in London in April 2009. The Group also led the way to reform global financial management by calling for the regulation of hedge funds and other means of shadow banking system that defied any control despite the trillions of dollars under their belt.

Akçapar ! Aging and Rising World Orders

However, for the G-20 to reach its full potential it needs to be conceived not only as a financial gathering but as a global political-economic forum that supports minimum world order and helps harmonize national policies of the twenty leading powers in the world. The G-20 rather than G-8 or any version of it is the institution of the future.

However, in the meantime there will be reactionary inertia to hold on to the obsolescent G-8 or circumspect G-7 plus 5 (BRIC) frameworks as agreed at the G-7’s Heiligendam meeting. Here again the rule of redundancy until death is likely to apply because of the lack of zeal to end what is outdated and put in place that whose time has come.

On the international security side, a critical question is whether it is possible to return from the current point where the erosion of the nuclear non proliferation regimes is a reality. Henry Kissinger at a speech referred to this question: “If proliferation is not stopped now, it will project us into a world that will become morally and strategically unmanageable. There will be too many countries with nuclear weapons with too many varied incentives. We are reaching a point where we are running out of time, and we have to be honest with ourselves. What price are we willing to pay to stop an Iranian nuclear weapons program? Failing that, how do we propose to organize a world of rampant proliferation?”10 Although the emphasis on Iran is obvious, the question is more diffuse and profound. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is actually premised on the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons and President Obama has referred to the zero option.

That is probably not achievable. There is a realistic chance that a gradual if long slide may occur towards a world where nuclear proliferation is accepted and regulated to the extent possible by potentially new instruments. However, it is also likely that in the process several countries which have nuclear weapon ambitions face serious problems, one or two even military interventions.

The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is already continuing its existence thanks to the life support it receives from numerous other nuclear non proliferation agreements, such as the Nuclear Supplier Group and several others. It is also around because it is basically impossible to negotiate anything new that would adequately answer the call with regard to how the nuclear monster is to be restrained.

NATO is the most impressive military alliance in history. If the US is the predominant military hyperpower that is unique in history, NATO is even more than that. It is among the the most successful post-World War II constructs. This organization is however perennially mired in debate about its relevancy. Since the 1960’s when this questioning first began, NATO has continued its existence and even expanded its base of operations.

This is an alliance which binds the first and the second ranking economies of the world together in a one for all, all for one treaty. There is no other defence community and organization that fulfils that function. Whatever the possible scenarios for the future of global governance and the place of cooperative security arrangements within world order, NATO’s alternative does not as yet exist. The same cannot be said for the EU foreign and security policy whose meaningful existence is strictly contingent upon its liaison to NATO. That said EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities are form niche and the most important security contributions to the world. One would be safe to assume that NATO will undergo reforms and transformations, but these will fall short of what is

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necessary and instead will reflect what is politically and bureaucratically possible. But, it will stick around into the next world order although the currently faltering mission to stabilize Afghanistan, obviously in which NATO is just one player along others and particularly the UN, poses a further risk to how the Alliance is perceived among its constituent peoples.

The main natural resources supporting world order are hydrocarbons, mainly oil but increasingly natural gas; as well as uranium that is needed for nuclear energy. This is likely to continue for at least two more human generations. In the meantime, alternative energy resources will rapidly enter the field. The transition will not be abrupt but gradual.

A new divide will emerge between the states which lead and fall behind in investing in the development of future energy resources and generation means. It is now widely accepted that the next world order’s energy and production base will have to be green (and blue). The future energy base will also be more technology intensive and distributed and utilized through more integrated and efficient networks. At any rate, as Jared Diamond explains in Collapse and Thomas Friedman in Hot, Flat and Crowded, the American model of development that is ecologically destructive is now implemented in China but it is not globally sustainable. The efforts to detract attention and focus from the impending global environmental catastrophes are not only counter factual but also inexcusably immoral.

On the other hand, although the initial American experience with oil and the propelling effect it had on American takeoff tells otherwise, ultimately it is more essential to have access to energy resources and technologies than to own them. This is particularly true for countries which are vulnerable to foreign interventions and have feeble political structures. Oil is now the curse of a good deal of countries. Nuclear energy should also be expected to see a boost despite the potential negative implications for non proliferation.

Even in the optimistic scenario of the world order’s transformation without a major war, the turmoil will continue within and with regard to areas that will not be able to adjust to globalization. This also means that fierce struggles will continue over natural resources including water. Areas that have been intentionally left outside contest, such as Antarctica, space, oceans and their beds are likely to face increasing competition.

Geopolitics is therefore back with a vengeance. As Robert Kaplan aptly describes: “rather than eliminating the relevance of geography, globalization is reinforcing it. Mass communications and economic integration are weakening many states, exposing a Hobbesian world of small, fractious regions. Within them, local, ethnic, and religious sources of identity are reasserting themselves, and because they are anchored to specific terrains, they are best explained by reference to geography. Like the faults that determine earthquakes, the political future will be defined by conflict and instability with a similar geographic logic. The upheaval spawned by the ongoing economic crisis is increasing the relevance of geography even further, by weakening social orders and other creations of humankind, leaving the natural frontiers of the globe as the only restraint.” At any rate the order of globalization is expanding inexorably towards the areas it has little touched.

Globalization with its economic, political, social and institutional precepts must to expand. And, that expansion is not a bad thing. However the transition is not easy.

Akçapar ! Aging and Rising World Orders

Remaining out of the system is the default position the inertia of which is hard to beat.

However, the cost of staying out is far too heavier for the countries concerned and the world at large. The geopolitics of world order expansion will have significantly diverse effects on the countries involved. Some will successfully adapt and prosper, while several others will likely be squeezed under failing state structures, economic and social backwardness, and external interventions. Overall, as before, also in the future, staying out will be significantly more costly than accomplishing transfer towards the center.

However, this geopolitics can also be tricky for the major powers. India and China are already competing in the Indian Ocean. Other races should be expected around the world.

Historically, the process of pulling in China into the global economic market and the USJapanese competition around 1917 produced deep shocks, even entry of the US into a World War. In our day and age, four regions in particular will be subject to strong currents and potentially shocks of globalization. These are Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan; former Soviet Union’s non-EU territories; former Ottoman Empire’s Middle Eastern territories; Africa.

Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan are situated in between major powers of the future and straddle key strategic resources or geo-strategic junctures. They are also grappling with anti-systemic movements that obstruct their change of tack towards the tight jacket of globalization and face significant violence potential. Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state, whereas Iran is progressing on that path. Although the dynamics in Afghanistan and Pakistan have come to show significant convergence, Iran is a separate issue in its own right. The future position of these three countries in any global or regional order will be the result of a major and trend setting struggle.

The countries that broke away from the Soviet Union were once part of a bloc that aspired to shape the world order in its own image. Since the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union those that were lucky to be the neighbors of the European Union were pulled into the Union and the tranquility of the globalized world order. This involved speedy enactment of reforms to make their governance more compatible with the rest of the Union. Europe acted decisively and rapidly to tie them in within both the EU and NATO, thus ensuring American guarantee over their place within the West, which Europe alone could not and would not venture. The small size of these countries also helped significantly in dissolving the ancien regime and adoption of a completely new set of political and economic fabric.

Those farther away from the EU and those which could not show the necessary resolve and sense of direction were not that lucky. Russia as the center of the old regional order also could not carry through its own reforms and maintained a half in and half out presence on the margins of both the EU and China. The Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia as well as all Central Asian Republics will be facing strong currents pulling them in all directions. Given the strong interests of Russia, Turkey, EU, US and China, including in terms of energy security, the future positioning of the countries of this basin stretching from Ukraine to Kazakhstan will be shaped by strong tremors.

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The broader Middle East is mostly the parts of the former Ottoman Empire that have remained behind in adapting to a regional and world order. The region displays the scars of the fact that the Major Powers failed to agree on what regional order would best reflect their interests. The design failed miserably also thanks to the fact that the Turkish War of Independence and the ensuing Ataturk reforms disrupted the model where a subservient and much weakened regional foreman would maintain a pithy minimum order subject to the direction and manipulation of the stronger external powers. Lausanne Treaty of 1923 defeated this design mainly pushed by the earlier Treaty of Sevres. What Ankara proved then was that no viable regional order can be established that would not take Turkey into account. But, Turkey itself could not impose an order either. Oil complicated the efforts to establish a benign order as did the failure to incorporate the reality of Israel into regional thinking.

Initially the League of Nations, in the wake of the failure of the Sevres design, struggled to regulate the competition of the World War I victors through mandates. In the wake of World War II, the countries of this region ran about without any coherent sense of direction behind different politico-economic models. They could not overcome the fractures among them. They developed a pattern of vacillation between authoritative regimes and opposition movements either detached from local realities or bereft of comprehensive and viable governance models.

The US primacy also could not translate into a substantive US control of regional dynamics and did not engender a transformation that would help the region embark on a journey towards adopting the precepts of globalization. In nearly a century since the collapse of Pax Ottomanica, no stable order could have been established to replace the Ottoman order. Instead, the region is mired in conflict, backwardness, authoritarianism, extremism, and external manipulation and intervention. The US efforts since 1990’s to apply the example of Eastern Europe in this region intensified in the wake of September 11 terrorist attacks and produced ventures such as the invasion of Iraq and the Broader Middle East initiatives, which are different in content and approach. In fact, the victory of Hamas in 2006 Palestinian elections has resulted in an upset for the US-led efforts. A new status has been created in Iraq the future of which is yet uncertain. And, Iran has been isolated as the only remaining point of resistance, except of course the resilient non state actors, and tightly put in a bind or potentially on a collision course. That said there is currently no lasting dynamic that would force liberalization and democratization of politics and economy and modernization of the social structures; except the example of Turkey. This region which has been resisting all change expects strong quakes in the near future.

Post-colonial Africa is almost entirely out of step with globalization. It is instead enmeshed all in but name within a deal that is but a leftover of their colonial past.

However, the fact of the matter is that these are now independent countries with resources and the continent has new players including China and the US entering the field in addition to the lingering Europeans. The strongest naval power in the Indian Ocean and an emerging major power India should also be seen within this context. The

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competition over Africa will be more intense in comparison to the colonization experience of the last two centuries. Difficult times may indeed be ahead for the continent whose local progressive dynamics are scattered and as yet underdeveloped.

Conclusion The current economic crisis is unlikely to force a wholesale world order change. It may even reinforce the position of the central players simultaneously while bringing in more powers from the periphery to the center of globalization. Several regions will experience significant volatility. However, as the saying goes, the news of the demise of American dominance is grossly exaggerated. Similarly, neoliberal economic model is neither triumphant nor dead. But it is significantly challenged. The axis of contention will be between state capitalism and illiberal democracy on the one side versus free market economy -as mitigated by renewed vigor of social state- and pluralistic democracy on the other. Both sides in the above equation would be contained within the system and will stand separate from those failing state structures that will not be able to adjust and take part in globalization. In terms of institutions, no major institutional structure is likely to disappear in this crisis. The current economic shock is great enough to stimulate the growth of a new order; but not strong enough to obliterate the old/existing one.

However, this should not obscure the fact that a new set of arrangements which future generations will call world order are already in development and incubation. Until the old is replaced by the new, there is a coming positive redundancy of world orders. It is realistic to expect the current system to linger while the elements of the new order take stronger hold.

The rise of new players may be inevitable and mostly irreversible. But economic strength does not automatically translate into actual political, military, cultural or even economic power and influence. In terms of the global systemic order and the architecture of influence among its power players the jury is still out.

At any rate though, there are new and capable potential actors including representative international groupings like the G-20 which can make significant contributions to maintaining a minimum world order and fulfilling universal human aspirations. The world should benefit from the fact that interconnectedness is a source of strength in a world where human wrongs cannot be hidden and a global conscience and consciousness could well be in the making.

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Endnotes 1

Fareed Zakaria, “The Sky Isn’t Falling: Our world is more stable than we think”, Newsweek, 16 May 2009.

2 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), p.64 3 Reported in http://risingpowers.stanleyfoundation.org/ 4 Figures are selected from: David Rothkopf, Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008).

5 Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009.

6 Paul Rogers, “A world in revolt”, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/ a-world-in-revolt 7 Amy Chua, A World on the Edge, Wilson Quarterly, Autumn 2002, Vol. 26, Issue 4 8 Anne Bayefsky, Enough of the UN, 13 September 2006, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm? fuseaction=publication_details&id=4195.

9 G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging a world of Liberty Under Law U.S. National Security in the 21st Century: Final Paper of the Princeton Project on National Security, September 27, 2006, The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. P.7 10 Henry A. Kissinger, 15 January 2009, Christopher J. Makins Lecture, Atlantic Council of the United States. http://www.acus.org/event_blog/ kissinger-delivers-atlantic-councils-annual-makins-lecture

Akçapar ! Aging and Rising World Orders

An Assessment of Deception: The 2007 National Intelligence Mis-Estimate of Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities Matthew Jacobs, J.D. Candidate, New York University School of Law M.P.A. Candidate, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School

ABSTRACT On December 3, 2007 the United States intelligence community made public certain key judgments of a classified national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The estimate’s surprising conclusion—that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003—clashed with the prevailing consensus that Iran was determined to develop nuclear weapons. This paper seeks to shed light on the flaws in the NIE that led to its erroneous conclusion. The paper deconstructs the language of the NIE, examines the implications of Iran’s ongoing uranium enrichment activities, explains how Iran would benefit from nuclear weapons, and discusses how Iran’s history of illicit nuclear development belies the claim that its nuclear program is intended exclusively for civilian purposes. The paper concludes by discussing the impact of the NIE in both the United States and Iran and proposing a simple, but essential, policy prescription for the Obama administration.

INTRODUCTION On December 3, 2007 the United States intelligence community made public certain key judgments of a classified national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The estimate’s surprising conclusion—that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003—clashed with the prevailing consensus that Iran was determined to develop nuclear weapons. This paper seeks to shed light on the flaws in the NIE that led to its erroneous conclusion.

The NIE’s most significant flaw is its failure to characterize Iran’s ongoing “declared civil” uranium enrichment activities as proliferation-sensitive.1 All enrichment activities—whether declared or undeclared—present a proliferation threat because the processes and technology used to enrich uranium for civilian purposes are nearly identical to those used to enrich uranium for weapons purposes. In other words, by mastering the enrichment process at a “declared civil” facility, Iran will be capable of producing weapons-grade fissile material at that facility or at a similar facility elsewhere.

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A second major defect in the NIE is its deceptive style of presentation. By opening with the bold proclamation that “in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program,” the NIE drafters ensured that the estimate’s subsequent conclusions would be largely ignored.2 Although the factual findings contained within the 2007 NIE do not differ significantly from those in prior assessments, the 2007 estimate’s sensational headline led to the widespread belief that Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities had changed dramatically.

A third failing of the NIE is its refusal to assess whether or not Iran ultimately intends to develop nuclear weapons. Iran’s long history of secret nuclear activity, its refusal to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its ongoing enrichment activities strongly suggest that Iran is determined to develop a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Iran stands to benefit greatly from nuclear weapons. Nuclear status would make Iran the predominant state in its region, strengthen its national security and foreign policy interests, provide an optimal (if imperfect) deterrent, and validate Iran’s self-perception as a sophisticated global power.

The impact of the NIE within the United States was immediate and profound. As the New York Times noted, “Rarely if ever has a single intelligence estimate so completely, so suddenly and so surprisingly altered a foreign policy debate.”3 Publication of the NIE effectively precluded the Bush administration from using military force against Iran and reduced U.S. diplomatic leverage, making it more difficult to marshal international support for economic sanctions.

The NIE’s impact was felt equally in Tehran. Although Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hailed the report as a “victory against the great powers,” the subsequent reduction in tensions severely weakened his internal standing.4 The nuclear issue and the specter of war with the United States were popular rallying cries for the Iranian leader.

When the saber-rattling quieted, Iranians began to focus more of their attention on Ahmadinejad’s domestic failings. More importantly, the cooling of tensions exposed a rift between the president and his former backer, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

The United States, in cooperation with the international community, must present Tehran a package of incentives and sanctions that convinces it to forego nuclear weapons development. Although the likelihood of diplomatic success at this point in time is small, failure is certain if the Obama administration does not adopt the following simple, but essential, policy recommendations.

First, the Obama administration must work behind the scenes to convince the international community that the putative conclusion of the 2007 NIE is wrong and that Iran is continuing its drive to develop nuclear weapons. Second, the administration must persuade important world leaders that a nuclear Iran is not in their best interests. Finally, the Obama administration must refrain from using unnecessarily aggressive rhetoric toward Iran. The use of such language has only served to entrench the domestically unpopular arch-conservative regime in Tehran. If tensions between the United States and Iran—along with oil prices—remain at current low levels, it is likely that Ahmadinejad

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and his fellow hardliners will be replaced in the June 2009 national elections by reformists or pragmatic conservatives more willing to engage diplomatically on the nuclear issue.

THE 2007 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE DECONSTRUCTED The Redefinition of “Nuclear Weapons Program” The opening sentence of the NIE proclaims “with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.”5 That judgment, however, is qualified by a complex footnote which restricts the definition of “nuclear weapons program” to include only “nuclear weapons design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversionrelated and uranium enrichment-related work.”6 The footnote explicitly excludes from the definition all “declared civil” enrichment activity—that is, all non-secret enrichment activity that Iran claims to be for non-weapons purposes. The NIE drafters were able to proclaim that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons production in 2003 not because Tehran actually suspended its drive for nuclear weapons, but because the NIE drafters fundamentally changed the definition of “nuclear weapons program.”

This artificially narrow definition of “nuclear weapons program” belies the fact that enriching uranium—whether declared or undeclared—is the most difficult step in the production of nuclear weapons. Weaponization—the actual construction of warheads and delivery systems—is a far simpler process. There is near unanimous agreement in the policy and scientific communities that uranium enrichment is the hardest part of building a nuclear weapon: for example, nuclear experts at the Council of Foreign Relations assert that “uranium enrichment capability…is the vital technology needed for the production of nuclear weapons”;7 Barry Posen, director of the Security Studies Program at MIT, states that highly enriched uranium [HEU] is the “key element” in the production of a nuclear weapon;8 Daniel Poneman, senior fellow at the Forum for International Policy, remarks that “bomb-making is easier than getting the HEU”;9 the International Institute for Strategic Studies states that “from a nuclear proliferation standpoint, the most significant aspect of Iran’s nuclear programme is its development of…uranium enrichment technology”;10 former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explains that “heretofore, production of fissile material has been treated as by far the greatest danger”;11 and the New York Times argues that “perfecting the process of enriching uranium or making plutonium is far more difficult than designing warheads or building missiles to deliver the weapons.”12

Iran’s Enrichment Activities The NIE acknowledges that Iran continues to enrich uranium at “declared civil” facilities.13 Its refusal to include this “declared civil” enrichment activity in its definition of “nuclear weapons program,” however, erroneously suggests that such activity presents no proliferation threat. To appreciate the danger associated with Iran’s “declared civil” enrichment activities, it is necessary to understand the ease with which civilian enrichment can be diverted to the production of weapons-grade fissile material.

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The technology used to enrich uranium is considered “dual-use” because it can be used to produce both civilian-grade nuclear fuel (low enriched uranium or LEU) and weaponsgrade fissile material (highly enriched uranium or HEU).14 Iran insists that its enrichment activities are limited exclusively to the production of civilian-grade nuclear fuel. It is for this reason that the NIE declares “not to know whether [Iran] currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.”15 Uranium enrichment is the process by which uranium-235 (U-235) and uranium-238 (U238) isotopes—both present in raw uranium ore—are separated from each other.16 After the raw uranium is converted into the intermediate product uranium hexafluoride, spinning rotors in centrifuge tubes segregate the heavier U-238 from the lighter U-235 isotopes. Magnets and thermal currents then expel the U-238 as byproduct while the remaining U-235 is carefully removed and combined with U-235 streams from other centrifuges linked together in a cascade. This process continues until the desired concentration of U-235 is reached. When the concentration of U-235 reaches three to five percent (LEU grade) the product is considered sufficiently enriched to be used as nuclear reactor fuel. When the concentration of U-235 surpasses approximately ninety percent (HEU grade) it can be used in a nuclear weapon.

The centrifuge technology required to produce HEU for nuclear weapons is essentially the same as that required to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel.17 According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, no mechanical reconfiguration of Iran’s “declared civil” nuclear facilities would be necessary to transition from LEU production to HEU production—a process known as “nuclear breakout.”18 Iran could produce HEU simply by “recycling” the LEU product through the centrifuge cascade as feed.19 For a cascade configured to produce LEU from non-enriched uranium hexafluoride feed, only several additional cycles would be needed to yield HEU.20 Though this “rinse and repeat” process is not optimally efficient, experts estimate that failure to reconfigure would only add months to the breakout schedule.21 In other words, by mastering the LEU enrichment process technology at its “declared civil” plant, Iran will be capable of producing weapons-grade HEU at that facility or at a similar facility elsewhere.22 As the discussion above underscores, the distinction drawn in the footnote to Key Judgment A between “covert” and “declared civil” nuclear activities is arbitrary and deceptive. In fact, the NIE explicitly acknowledges the breakout danger associated with Iran’s “declared civil” enrichment activity later in the report where it explains that “Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example, Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing.”23 The NIE also proclaims that “only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons.”24 It is difficult to reconcile these two statements with the headline finding that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. All uranium enrichment activities, including Iran’s “declared civil” enrichment, must be considered extremely proliferation-sensitive.

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Weaponization Weaponization entails the production of nuclear warheads and delivery devices. The NIE’s declaration that Tehran halted weaponization work in 2003 is inconsistent with the fact that Iran continues to develop dual-use military technology—that is, technology that can be used for either conventional or nuclear weapons. The NIE acknowledges this reality in Key Judgment D where it states that “Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.”25 Although the NIE reports that Iran halted development of missile delivery systems specifically designed to carry nuclear warheads, Iran continues to test sophisticated conventional missile systems. Iran possesses hundreds of Scud missiles and other shortrange ballistic missiles, including the flight-tested Shahab-3, with a range of 1,300 kilometers.26 Iran tested its new Ashura missile in November of 2007—a 2000-kilometerrange weapon that could potentially reach U.S. allies in Southeastern Europe.27 In January 2008, Iran launched a research rocket into space, further demonstrating the advance of its missile technology.28 Modifying one of these conventional missiles to house a nuclear warhead would be substantially less difficult than enriching HEU or constructing an actual warhead.29 Iran also possesses knowledge, acquired before the supposed halt in 2003, that would allow it to weaponize rapidly. Between 2001 and 2003, for example, Iran attempted to modify its Shahab-3 missile to house an unidentified “black box” whose specifications closely match those of a nuclear warhead.30 Prior to 2003, Iran admitted to having conducted experiments with the chemical agent Polonium-210—a rare synthesized element used to construct the neutron initiating core of a typical nuclear warhead.31 The NIE acknowledges the advanced state of Iranian weapons technology, “assess[ing] with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.”32 Furthermore, in March 2008, IAEA representatives declassified a “trove of evidence” gathered from Iran’s military laboratories that revealed extensive Iranian research and experimentation “not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon.”33

COMPARISON OF THE 2005 ASSESSMENT AND THE 2007 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE The 2007 NIE was widely hailed as a repudiation of the intelligence community’s 2005 assessment of Iran’s nuclear program. The day after its release, for example, the New York Times led with a front-page article entitled, “How did a 2005 Estimate Go Awry?” while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed “victory against the great powers.”34 A close comparison of both assessments, however, leads to the conclusion that they are more similar than different.

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The timelines contained within the 2005 and 2007 assessments, pertaining to both uranium enrichment and weapons production, are essentially identical. Key Judgment C of the 2007 NIE predicts that “the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but this is very unlikely” and judges “with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.”35 Similarly, the 2005 assessment states with “moderate confidence” that Iran is unlikely to produce a nuclear weapon “before early-to-mid next decade.”36 The 2007 NIE declares “not to know whether [Iran] currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.”37 Likewise, the 2005 estimate “expresses uncertainty about whether Iran’s ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear arsenal.”38 The 2007 estimate clearly clashes with the Bush administration’s aggressive rhetoric and posture toward Iran. Similarly, the “carefully hedged [2005] assessments…contrast with forceful public statements by the White House.”39 The 2007 NIE concludes that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, but admits to having only “moderate confidence” that the suspension is still in force. Though the 2005 assessment mentions “credible indicators that Iran is conducting clandestine work,” it hedges this finding by stating that “there is no information linking those projects directly to a nuclear weapons program.”40 In other words, the 2005 NIE did not affirmatively conclude that Iran was engaged in nuclear weapons activity—at least as such activity is defined in the 2007 NIE. There are two substantive differences between the 2005 and 2007 assessments. First, the 2005 assessment, unlike the 2007 NIE, considers the enrichment of HEU to be “the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon.”41 Second, the 2005 assessment judges that “left to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear weapons,” whereas the 2007 NIE asserts that “only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons.”42 In other words, the 2007 NIE states that Iran can, but might not, produce a nuclear weapon before 2015 whereas the 2005 assessment concludes that Iran can, and probably will, produce a nuclear weapon by that date. The real difference between the two assessments, therefore, “is not in the hard data but in the psychological assessment of the mullahs’ motives and objectives.”43

DECEPTIVE PRESENTATION AND THE MIXING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH POLICYMAKING The NIE’s factual findings do not support the sea-change in public opinion that resulted from its publication. By opening with the bold proclamation that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, the NIE drafters ensured that the estimate’s subsequent conclusions would be largely ignored.44 That the headline finding is immediately qualified by a footnote which excludes Iran’s most prolific uranium enrichment activities lends credence to this argument. Why, then, did the U.S. intelligence community present the NIE in such a misleading manner?

Jacobs ! Assessment of Deception

One possible explanation is that the intelligence community intended for the NIE to influence public opinion and U.S. policy toward Iran. Immediately following publication of the NIE, Deputy Director of National Intelligence Donald M. Kerr, admitted that the assessment was intended to do more than provide policymakers with raw intelligence.

According to the New York Times, Kerr stated that “since the new estimate was at odds with the 2005 assessment—and thus at odds with public statements by top officials about Iran—‘we felt it was important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is available.’”45 This advocacy approach to intelligence reporting helps explain why the 2007 NIE—based on much of the same intelligence as the 2005 assessment—was presented in a way that led the public to believe that the underlying facts had changed dramatically.

The NIE is also misleading because it conflates intelligence reporting with policymaking.

For example, it asserts “with high confidence that the halt…was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.”46 From this judgment, the NIE infers that Tehran “is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005” and “may be more vulnerable to influence on the issues than we judged previously.”47 As Henry Kissinger notes, these statements “blur the line between estimates and conjecture.”48 Perhaps, suggests Kissinger, the geopolitical context and American involvement in the region from 2003-2005 provide better explanations for changes in Iranian behavior.49 Moreover, the NIE’s prediction that some combination of international pressure and diplomatic compromise “might…prompt Tehran to extend the current halt of the nuclear weapons program,” even if true, reads more like a policy prescription than an intelligence estimate.50 Certain experts believe that the NIE was intended as a “preemptive strike” by the intelligence community on Bush administration officials pushing for military intervention in Iran.51 Iran expert Ray Takeyh, for example, views the NIE as part of a “larger narrative” in which “formal institutions of government determine[d] to resist the White House” in ways they did not during the run-up to the war in Iraq.52 Takeyh goes on to say that it was the intention of Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell to “undermine[] the president’s attempt to have a military option.”53 Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, goes even further, alleging that the NIE was drafted and approved by former State Department officials, recently transferred to the Directorate of National Intelligence, who held “relatively benign” views of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In Mr. Bolton’s opinion, these outsiders simply “recycled the policy biases they had before…as ‘intelligence judgments,’” presenting them as if they were “wisdom received from on high.”54 It is not necessary to subscribe to Mr. Bolton’s theory to acknowledge that the 2007 NIE was intended to influence public opinion and government policy. In fact, “Mr. McConnell told Congress [in February 2008] that he now has regrets about how the intelligence estimate was presented, saying it had failed to emphasize that Iran is moving ahead with the hardest part of any bomb project: producing the fuel.”55 In a February

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2008 radio interview, McConnell backpedaled even further stating bluntly that, “Our estimate is [that] they intend to have a nuclear weapon.”56 The question that remains—and one that the 2007 NIE left explicitly unanswered—is whether Iran actually plans to develop nuclear weapons.57 An examination of how Iran would benefit from nuclear status leads to the conclusion that it does indeed intend to develop a nuclear arsenal.

HOW IRAN WOULD BENEFIT FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS Iran is a medium-sized, pragmatic, and opportunistic power seeking to become the predominant state in its region. The NIE implicitly acknowledges this reality, stating that “Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit analysis rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs.”58 Although a “cost-benefit analysis does not exclude a rush to weapons on a systematic basis,” it does suggest that Iran would be very unlikely to use nuclear weapons offensively.59 It does not follow from this that the international community should ignore or excuse President Ahmadinejad’s assertions that Israel “be wiped off the map.”60 His aggressive rhetoric toward Israel combined with his disavowal of the Holocaust is a legitimate cause for concern in Tel Aviv and Washington.61 Moreover, Ahmadinejad is not the only Iranian politician to threaten the existence of Israel. In 2001, former President Rafsanjani remarked that it would only take one nuclear weapon to destroy the state of Israel whereas Iran could survive Israel’s retaliation.62 Even more disturbing is the fact that Rafsanjani is considered a top contender to succeed the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

Ahmadinejad’s belligerent rhetoric must, however, be understood in context. The nuclear issue and his opposition to the West serve to deflect attention from his dismal economic performance and unpopular social policies. His anti-Israeli rhetoric also helps win him acclaim on the Arab street at a time when many Arab leaders fear Persian ascendance.63 Despite Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric, Iran is highly unlikely to attack Israel. Israel possesses approximately two-hundred nuclear weapons, extensive second strike capability (including ballistic submarines), and intermediate-range missiles capable of reaching all of Iran’s major population centers.64 More realistically, Iran seeks nuclear weapons because of the “linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives.”65 Ray Takeyh summarizes the largely consensus belief that “Ahmadinejad and his allies view the acquisition of nuclear weapons as critical to consolidating Iran’s position and helping the country eclipse U.S. influence in the region…a prize worth suffering pain and sanctions to achieve.”66 More moderate Iranian leaders also recognize the strategic benefits of nuclear status.67 It is interesting to note, however, that Iran already enjoys a superior position vis-à-vis its neighbors. If an

Jacobs ! Assessment of Deception

Iranian bomb were to spur a regional arms race, the result may be strategic parity between Iran and its smaller, weaker neighbors.

Iran might also value nuclear weapons for their deterrent capacity, though it is unlikely that a small nuclear arsenal would immunize Iran from conventional military attack.

Israel’s nuclear arsenal, for example, did not prevent it from being attacked conventionally in the Yom Kippur War or during the 2006 conflict with Lebanon.

Furthermore, U.S Cold War military planning and present-day war plans for a potential conflict with China, suggest that even large nuclear retaliatory capacity is not a perfect deterrent against conventional attack.68 Still, there is an “inordinate sense of paranoia” among the leaders in Tehran and nuclear weapons provide a better deterrent than any other type of technology.69 Nor should psychology be discounted in the nuclear calculus. Modern-day Iran is heir to the ancient Persian Empire—one of only three pre-colonial nations in the Middle East (along with Egypt and Turkey). The fact that Pakistan, a younger and—in the opinion of many Iranians—inferior country, possesses nuclear weapons is a mark of shame. Iran’s nuclear program is increasingly a matter of national pride, closely associated with the nation’s identity as a sophisticated global power.

PROOF OF IRAN’S INTENTION TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS Before the release of the 2007 NIE, there was broad consensus in both the intelligence and academic communities that Iran’s nuclear program was not intended exclusively for peaceful purposes.70 Although the NIE called that conclusion into question, Iran’s long history of clandestine nuclear development, its record of forced and reactive diplomacy, and its refusal to halt enrichment activity in the face of Security Council sanctions suggest that it is determined to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran’s nuclear program began in the 1950s under the auspices of the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program and continued until the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Following the Revolution, many of the country’s nuclear scientists fled and Ayatollah Khomeini—who opposed nuclear development on religious grounds—showed little interest in reviving the program. Upon Khomeini’s death in 1989, the new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, embarked on an ambitious nuclear program with civilian and military applications.71 During the 1990s, Iran purchased nuclear equipment and material from China and Russia and obtained “aid packages” from A.Q. Khan’s black market nuclear supply network.72 Throughout this period, Iran went to great lengths to conceal the military component of its nuclear program.73 The election of the reform-minded President Khatami did little to alter the trajectory of Iran’s secret nuclear program, which remained under the close watch of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iran began single-centrifuge enrichment experiments in the late 1990s and started constructing pilot and industrial-scale centrifuge installments soon after. During this period, Iran consistently informed the IAEA that it had no plans to develop an Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 37

indigenous fuel cycle or enrich uranium domestically.74 At the same time, however, Iran “made no secret of its ambitions to build large rockets and warheads—with the explicit help of the North Koreans—that were ideally suited for delivering nuclear arms.”75 After eighteen years of secret nuclear development, Iran’s program was exposed in 2002 by a dissident exile group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran.76 Shortly thereafter, President Khatami acknowledged the existence of several nuclear sites but claimed that the nuclear program aimed only to produce LEU for civilian purposes.77 The IAEA issued a statement criticizing Iran for failing “to report material facilities and activities as required by its safeguards obligations,” but stopped short of threatening or censuring Tehran.78 Aware that it could not leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and still claim a legal right to enrich, Iran agreed to cooperate with the IAEA by allowing inspectors to visit certain nuclear facilities.79 Following these visits, the IAEA concluded that “Iran had failed to meet its obligation under its Safeguards Agreement.”80 Rather than strongly sanctioning Iran, as the United States advocated, the IAEA Board of Governors expressed concern over Iran’s failures, urged Iran to cooperate with IAEA inspectors, and encouraged Iran not to introduce fuel into the new enrichment cascades.81 On the heels of the Board’s statement, IAEA inspectors discovered that Iran’s nuclear activities were far more extensive than Khatami had disclosed. Inspectors reported that Tehran began its centrifuge program as far back as the mid-1980s and had purchased extensive designs and hardware from A.Q. Khan’s underground nuclear network.82 As a result, the IAEA demanded that Iran take “essential and urgent” actions to “ensure verification of compliance with Iran’s safeguards agreement”—namely the suspension of “all further uranium enrichment-related activities.”83 After threatening to withdraw from the NPT, Iran—faced with the prospect of a Security Council referral—partially relented. In a joint statement with the EU-3, Iran agreed to “engage in full cooperation with the IAEA…sign the IAEA Additional Protocol,” and “voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.”84 During this three-month voluntary suspension period, however, Iran’s centrifuge inventory actually increased by fifteen percent.85 Still unsatisfied with Iran’s cooperation, the EU-3 implicitly threatened Security Council referral again in January 2004. In response, Iran agreed to halt centrifuge activity “to the furthest extent possible.”86 Although, this agreement averted a diplomatic meltdown, it did little to slow Iranian nuclear progress. Within three months, Iran had assembled an additional 285 centrifuge machines, enough to complete its pilot centrifuge plant at Natanz.87 In September 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted another consensus resolution “deplor[ing]…the fact that Iran’s cooperation has not been as full, timely, and proactive as it could have been.”88 Iran responded by notifying the IAEA of its intention to resume manufacturing, assembling, and testing centrifuge technology.89 The same back-and-forth

Jacobs ! Assessment of Deception

continued into November 2004 when Iran, again fearing referral to the Security Council, agreed to suspend “all enrichment related and reprocessing activities” and allow IAEA inspectors to place seals on certain nuclear equipment.90 In a surprising twist, the United States announced support for the EU-3 negotiations with Iran, thereby increasing pressure on Tehran.

Shortly after the election of President Ahmadinejad in August 2005, Iran declared its intention to remove the seals on its nuclear equipment and resume the enrichment activity it had previously foresworn.91 Eight months later, President Ahmadinejad announced, and the IAEA confirmed, that Iran had successfully enriched uranium past the LEU threshold (to 3.5 percent).92 After nearly four years of failed negotiations, the Security Council unanimously voted to sanction Iran, targeting the import and export of materials and technology used in uranium enrichment and weapons production.93 A second round of sanctions further restricting the import of nuclear-related products and freezing the financial assets of key Iranian officials was unanimously approved several months later.94 In March 2008, four months after the publication of the NIE, the Security Council voted to impose a third round of sanctions on Iran, authorizing the inspection of cargo suspected of containing nuclear equipment as well as travel bans and asset freezes on individuals and companies involved in Iran’s nuclear program.95 The Security Council sanctions have not had a significant impact on Iran’s nuclear policy. In fact, the production of fissile material has accelerated rapidly since 2006.96 IAEA Director General Mohammed El-baredei reported in November 2007 that Iran was successfully operating a (three-thousand centrifuge) cascade capable of producing enough HEU for a nuclear weapon in twelve months.97 Iran began operating a new generation of advanced IR-2 centrifuges in February 2008 which enrich uranium at more than twice the speed of the original centrifuges.98 As of November 2008, Iran was successfully operating five thousand centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear plant and had produced enough LEU (630 kilograms) to make a nuclear weapon if enriched further.99 In addition to Iran’s illicit nuclear history, there exist other indications of weapons intent.

Iran has spent large sums of money to develop a domestic mining capacity even though “the depth of its ore deposits and the ore’s low uranium content, [mean that] the cost of yellowcake is likely to exceed current world market prices several times over.”100 Moreover, Iran’s indigenous uranium stores are sufficient to sustain a weapons program but inadequate to power even one civilian nuclear reactor.101 Amidst the uncertainty surrounding the future of its nuclear program after its revelation in 2002, Iran rushed to produce quantities of uranium hexafluoride grossly inadequate to power a fuel reactor but sufficient to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for six to eight simple implosion devices.102 The IAEA also possesses evidence which strongly suggests that Iran has experimented with nuclear weapons construction. At an emergency meeting convened by the United Nations nuclear inspector at IAEA headquarters in February 2008, the IAEA unveiled

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documents, sketches, and video of work conducted at Iranian laboratories that it said was “not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon.”103 Characteristically, the Iranians dismissed the evidence as “baseless and fabricated.”104 Lastly, it is revealing that the Ayatollah has blessed his country’s nuclear program by taking personal responsibility for its revival. Supreme Leader Khamenei associates Iran’s nuclear program with national pride and has asserted that when “the enemies wanted to take advantage of our temporary and voluntary suspension to undermine our nuclear program…I insisted that I would step in if they continued with their demand, and I did, and so our process began.”105

IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE The NIE’s headline finding had an immediate and profound impact within the United States. As the New York Times noted, “Rarely if ever has a single intelligence estimate so completely, so suddenly and so surprisingly altered a foreign policy debate.”106 The estimate thoroughly delegitimized the Bush administration’s hawkish posture toward Iran. In the days following publication of the NIE, it became clear that the use of military force was no longer a viable policy option. It would have been inconceivable for the United States to attack a country that its own intelligence services said did not have a nuclear weapons program.107 The NIE also handicapped U.S. diplomatic efforts, making it more difficult to marshal international support for sanctions against Iran. Immediately after publication of the NIE, for example, China withdrew its approval for a third round of economic sanctions. Two weeks later, Russia delivered the first of eight batches of nuclear fuel for use in Iran’s Bushehr reactor.108 Although the Security Council eventually approved a third round of sanctions in March 2008, publication of the NIE significantly slowed diplomatic momentum on the nuclear issue.

The most interesting, and perhaps counterintuitive, consequence of the NIE was its impact within Iran. Although President Ahmadinejad hailed the NIE as a “victory against the great powers,” the ratcheting down of tensions actually served to weaken his internal standing.109 The nuclear issue and the specter of war with the United States were popular rallying cries for the Iranian leader. When the saber-rattling quieted in the NIE’s wake, Iranians began to focus more of their attention on Ahmadinejad’s glaring domestic failings.

Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005 promising to reinvigorate the economy and distribute oil revenues to Iran’s poor. Despite record oil prices in 2006 and 2007, however, his economic reforms resulted in failure. Annual inflation stands at thirty percent, one out of every four Iranians lives in poverty, and ninety percent of the population receives income from the state.110 Unemployment is also rampant; less than half of the one million young Iranians who enter the job market each year find work.111 These economic woes, combined with Ahmadinejad’s unpopular conservative social Jacobs ! Assessment of Deception

policies, have created widespread disaffection with his regime, especially among Iran’s young and relatively pro-Western population. The poor performance of Ahmadinejad’s party in the December 2006 Majlis elections and large-scale student protests throughout the country are signs of his declining popularity.

Publication of the NIE also exposed a growing rift between Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei, which suggests that the president no longer enjoys the same level of support from the Ayatollah that he received during his 2005 presidential run.112 The reduced threat of U.S. attack created the conditions necessary for these dormant political tensions to surface. In January 2008, National Security Council leader and close aide of the Ayatollah, Ali Larijani, was dispatched to Egypt—a country with which Iran does not have diplomatic relations—indicating that the Ayatollah is taking a more direct role in affairs usually reserved to the president. Four months later, Larijani—a political rival of Ahmadinejad—was elected Speaker of Parliament with the Ayatollah’s full backing.

These political schisms reflect a growing divide between members of the conservative “old right”—for whom Ahmadinejad is the standard bearer—and the “new right”— represented by conservative, yet pragmatic, figures such as Larijani.113 In the words of Ray Takeyh, the “new right” prizes “nationalism over Islamism, pragmatism over ideology.”114 One difference between these two factions is their position vis-à-vis the United States. Whereas diplomacy with Ahmadinejad has proven futile, it may be possible for the Obama administration to engage pragmatists like Larijani.115 In fact, Larijani—Iran’s former chief nuclear negotiator—has stated that “it may be that the U.S. is the enemy, but working with the enemy is part of politics.”116 Behind its sham democracy, absolute power in the Islamic Republic rests with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and his Council of Guardians. Any diplomatic progress with Iran on the nuclear issue would require the Supreme Leader’s approval.

Although the Ayatollah’s personal virulence toward the United States is no secret, he has stated that Iran’s current lack of contact with the U.S. “does not mean that we will not have relations indefinitely.”117 Khamenei has also asserted that he “would be the first to approve resuming ties with the United States the day it is to the benefit of the nation.”118

POLICY PRESCRIPTION FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION The United States, in cooperation with the international community, must present Tehran a package of incentives and sanctions that convinces it to forego nuclear weapons development. The specific content of such a package is not discussed here. Rather, this paper is concerned with a more preliminary matter: creating the necessary preconditions for diplomatic progress. The proposal outlined below will in no way guarantee the success of any particular diplomatic strategy. In fact, at this late juncture, it is highly unlikely that any amount of diplomacy will succeed in persuading Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Refusal to adopt the following recommendations will, however, result in the certain failure of diplomacy.

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First, the Obama administration must quietly convince the international community that the putative finding of the 2007 NIE is wrong, that Iran’s nuclear weapons program is ongoing, and that Tehran ultimately intends to produce nuclear weapons. Only if the international community believes that Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons will it rally behind an incentives-sanctions package that may convince Tehran to halt proliferation activities. There are promising indications that, despite the 2007 NIE, the international community still believes that Iran is driving forward with its nuclear weapons program. In March 2008, for instance, the IAEA presented compelling evidence that Iran remains engaged in activities “not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon.”119 Shortly thereafter, the Security Council voted nearly unanimously to authorize a third round of sanctions against Iran (only Indonesia abstained).

Second, the Obama administration must convince the international community that Iran should not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons. Although it is unlikely that Iran would use a nuclear weapon offensively, a nuclear Iran would unfavorably alter the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and increase instability in the region. To those countries—namely Russia and China—not particularly bothered by a geopolitical rearrangement in the Middle East, the Obama administration should emphasize that a nuclear Iran would represent the defeat of nonproliferation as a guiding norm of the international system. Iran’s successful production of a nuclear weapon might spur proliferation throughout the Middle East and beyond.120 Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, for example, would likely seek nuclear weapons to offset the Iranian threat (or demand broad U.S. security guarantees). Other states, including those not directly threatened by Iran, would draw the conclusion that the benefits of nuclear status outweigh the risks associated with disobeying international nonproliferation laws. Extensive proliferation, especially within developing nations in volatile parts of the world, would increase the risk of nuclear theft and black market sale, thereby raising the threat of nuclear terrorism.121 Lastly, the Obama administration must refrain from using highly charged rhetoric when speaking publicly to Iran. The use of threatening language has proven counterproductive with leaders in Tehran. President Bush’s hawkish rhetoric on the nuclear issue, for example, has not succeeded in slowing Iranian nuclear progress and has even helped to entrench Ahmadinejad’s domestically unpopular arch-conservative regime. If the Obama administration can keep tensions between the United States and Iran at current levels (and low oil prices continue to damage the Iranian economy), it is likely that Ahmadinejad and his fellow hardliners will be replaced in the June 2009 national elections by reformists or pragmatic conservatives more willing to engage diplomatically on the nuclear issue.

This is not to suggest that the Obama administration should tolerate Iran’s extensive proliferation activities. Plans for counterproliferation air and missile strikes must be developed and the costs and benefits of the use of military force should be vigorously debated behind closed doors within the Obama administration.122 In public, however, the Obama administration should emphasize the president’s oft-stated willingness to engage Tehran, while downplaying the possibility of military action. Direct diplomacy with the

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Ayatollah and more pragmatic Iranian leaders is the last best chance to avoid disaster. If talks ultimately fail, President Obama and the United States Congress will be forced to choose between two potentially catastrophic alternatives: accept an Iranian bomb or use military force to prevent Iran from going nuclear.

See Bibliography for An Assessment of Deception: The 2007 National Intelligence Mis-Estimate of Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities in Appendix I: Bibliographies

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Endnotes 11

National Intelligence Estimate: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities 2007 [hereinafter NIE 2007], Key Judgment A. 2 Ibid.

3 Myers, Stephen Lee. 2007. An Assessment Jars a Foreign Policy Debate. The New York Times. Dec. 4.

4 Fathi, Nazila. 2007. Iranian Leaders Call Report U.S. Confession of “Mistake.” The New York Times.

Dec. 6.

5 NIE 2007, Key Judgment A. 6 Ibid.

7 Council on Foreign Relations. 2006. Summary: A Symposium on Iran’s Nuclear Program [hereinafter CFR Symposium 2006].

8 Posen, Barry R. 2006. A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult but not Impossible Policy Problem. A Century Foundation Report.

9 Council on Foreign Relations. 2007. Backgrounder: State Sponsors: Iran [hereinafter CFR Backgrounder 2007].

10 Samore, Gary, ed. 2005. Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: a Net Assessment. International Institute of Strategic Studies [hereinafter IISS 2005], at 42.

11 Kissinger, Henry. 2007. Misreading the Iran Report: Why Spying and Policymaking Don’t Mix. The Washington Post. Dec. 13.

12 Broad, William J. and David E. Sanger. 2008. Meeting on Arms Data Reignites Iran Debate. The New York Times. Mar. 3.

13 Key Judgment C states that “Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them” (NIE 2007, Key Judgment C).

14 Before enrichment can begin, two preliminary stages must be completed. First, raw uranium ore must be mined from the Earth. Second, that uranium ore must be converted into the intermediate product uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Iran has long since completed both the acquisition and conversion stages.

15 NIE 2007, Key Judgment A. 16 Unenriched UF6 is comprised of approximately 99.3% U-238 and 0.7% U-235 (IISS 2005).

17 CFR Symposium 2006; IISS 2005.

18 IISS 2005.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., at 54.

21 Ibid.

22 NIE 2007; IISS 2005. Alternatively, small modifications can be made—in the configuration of the cascades and the linkages between the individual centrifuges—that could double the rate of HEU production. Using partially enriched LEU feed material, instead of non-enriched UF6, would also reduce the time required to achieve breakout. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies notes, the “feed material used to produce HEU has a major impact on the time required to achieve ‘break-out.’ Producing HEU from feed that has already been enriched to LEU is approximately seven times faster than producing HEU from natural uranium” (IISS 2005, 53). The head-start gained by beginning HEU enrichment with LEU feed more than compensates for any time delays associated with efficiency losses or the secret reconfiguration of a civilian-use plant. For this reason, deliveries of LEU fuel by Russia to Iran in January 2008, for use in its Bushehr reactor, are especially troubling (Russia Completes Fuel Delivery with Eighth Batch. 2008. Islamic Republic News Agency. Jan. 28).

23 NIE 2007, Key Judgment D. 24 NIE 2007, Key Judgment E. 25 NIE 2007, Key Judgment D. 26 CFR Backgrounder 2007.

27 Szrom, Charlie. 2007. After NIE, More BMD. American Enterprise Institute. Dec. 21.

28 Fathi, Nazila. 2007. Iran Launches Rocket to Commemorate New Space Center. The New York Times.

Feb. 5.

Jacobs ! Assessment of Deception

29

CFR Backgrounder 2007; Council on Foreign Relations. 2007. Media Conference Call: Takeyh and Nasr on Iran [hereinafter CFR Media Conference Call 2007].

30 Robbins, Carla Anne. 2005. As Evidence Grows of Iran’s Program, U.S. Hits Quandary. The Wall Street Journal. Mar. 18.

31 Iran initially claimed that the Polium-210 experiments were designed to produce radioisotope batteries but later admitted that they were also for studying neutron initiating devices. An IAEA investigation into the matter ended when Iran discarded evidence of the experimentation and claimed that no relevant documentation could be located. The IAEA concluded that it had “no information contrary to Iran’s explanation,” but remained “somewhat uncertain regarding the plausibility of the stated purpose of the experiments, given the very limited applications of short lived Po-210 sources” (IISS 2005, 63-64; IAEA Nov. 15, 2004).

32 NIE 2007, Key Judgment H. 33 Broad and Sanger 2008 (quoting Olli Heinonen, IAEA Chief Inspector).

34 Broad and Sanger 2008; Fathi Dec. 2007.

35 NIE 2007, Key Judgment C. 36 Linzer, Dafna. 2005. Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb: U.S. Intellgience Review Contrasts with Administration Statements. The Washington Post, Aug. 2. In a February 2008 radio interview, Director of National Intelligence McConnell stated that “when you go back and look at our estimates from 2001, 2005, and 2007 about nuclear weapons in Iran, each time the basic bottom-line conclusion was the same. On the current path, it [Iran] would have enough fissile material to produce nuclear weapons between 2010 and 2015” (Interview of Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence. 2008. WTOP Radio).

37 NIE 2007, Key Judgment A. 38 Linzer 2005.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 NIE 2007, Key Judgment E. 43 Bolton, John. 2007. The Flaws in the Iran Report. The Washington Post. Dec. 6.

44 Ibid.

45 Mazzetti, Mark. 2007. With New Data, U.S. Revises Its View of Iran. The New York Times. Dec. 4 (quoting Deputy Director of National Intelligence Donald M. Kerr).

46 NIE 2007, Key Judgment A. 47 Ibid.

48 Kissinger 2007.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid; NIE 2007, Key Judgment E. 51 Council on Foreign Relations. 2008. U.S.-Iran Relations: Past, Present, and Future [hereinafter CFR 2008].

52 CFR Media Conference Call 2007 (quoting Ray Takeyh).

53 Ibid.

54 Bolton 2007.

55 Sanger, David E. 2008. Nuclear Agency Confronts Iran With Evidence on Weapons. The New York Times. Feb. 22.

56 Interview of Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence. 2008. WTOP Radio.

57 NIE 2007, Key Judgment E. 58 Ibid.

59 Kissinger 2007.

60 CFR 2008 (citing Barbara Slavin).

61 Ahmadinejad professes to believe that the return of the twelfth imam (the messianic redeemer of Islam) will be expedited by global chaos and the suffering of the faithful—a belief that does not augur well for responsible weapons management (Ross, Dennis. 2006. A New Strategy on Iran. The Washington Post.

May 1).

62 CFR 2008 (citing Barbara Slavin). “In 2001 Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president of Iran, speculated that in a nuclear exchange with Israel his country might lose 15 million people, which would amount to a

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small ‘sacrifice’ from among the billion Muslims worldwide in exchange for the lives of 5 million Israeli Jews” (Fields, Suzanne. 2004. Confronting the New Anti-Semitism. The Washington Times. July 25).

63 CFR 2008 (citing Barbara Slavin).

64 Ibid. (citing Trita Parsi and Barbara Slavin); Posen 2006.

65 NIE 2007, Key Judgment E. 66 Takeyh, Ray. 2007. Time for Détente with Iran. Foreign Affairs. March/April.

67 According to deputy head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Hosseinitash, “the nuclear program is an opportunity for us to make endeavors to acquire a strategic position and consolidate our national identity” (Ibid.).

68 Posen 2006.

69 Brzezinski, Mark F. and Ray Takeyh. 2008. Forging Ties with Iran. The Boston Globe, Jan. 11. Even if Tehran presently seeks nuclear weapons for deterrence, it is possible that after acquisition it will see them as enabling offensive action. The case of Pakistan is instructive. Originally, Pakistani leaders sought nuclear weapons to deter an Indian nuclear strike. Once in possession of nuclear weapons, however, Pakistan “decided that they were so effective as a deterrent that it could ratchet up its offensive insurgent operations against India in Kashmir—which sparked the Kargil crisis of 2000 and nearly led to an IndoPakistani war” (Pollack, Kenneth. 2005. The Persian Puzzle, at 34. New York: Random House).

70 CFR Symposium 2006.

71 IISS 2005.

72 Ibid.; Albright, David and Corey Hinderstein. 2004. The Centrifuge Connection. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Vol. 60, at 61-66. Mar./Apr. 73 For example, as the research program grew in complexity, it was transferred from the highly visible Tehran Nuclear Technology Center to a secret location on the Kalaye Electric Company campus— “presumably to reduce the risk of detection by IAEA inspectors” (IISS 2005, 14).

74 IISS 2005, 16.

75 Broad, William J. and David E. Sanger. 2007. How Did a 2005 Estimate Go Awry? The New York Times.

Dec. 3.

76 CFR 2008 (citing Trita Parsi and Carla Anne Robbins).

77 Hefezi, Parisa. 2003. Khatami Say Iran Mines Uranium for Nuclear Plant. Reuters. Feb. 9. Iran sought to justify its secrecy by claiming that the United States, Israel, and Europe would have denied it its rights under the NPT if the program had been disclosed (Broad and Sanger 2007).

78 International Atomic Energy Agency. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. June 19, 2003. [Hereinafter IAEA --/--/--].

79 CFR 2008 (citing Trita Parsi and Carla Anne Robbins). It is important to note that, around this time, Iran made a secret overture to the United States to begin discussions about the normalization of relations, including concerns over its nuclear program. The United States, buoyed by its recent military successes in Iraq, spurned this overture and instead decided to increase pressure on Tehran (IISS 2005, 17).

80 IAEA June 6, 2003.

81 IAEA June 19, 2003.

82 IISS 2005; IAEA Aug. 26, 2003.

83 IAEA Sep. 12, 2003.

84 IAEA June 19, 2004. This agreement was doomed from the start because the scope of proposed uranium enrichment suspension was never explicitly defined. Iran declared that the suspension was limited to Natanz, thereby “creating suspicion that the suspension might not apply to other centrifuge facilities” (although Iran denied that such facilities existed) (IISS 2005, 21). Iran then informed the IAEA that it would apply the suspension only to “new contracts,” thereby permitting the continued manufacture of centrifuge machines under existing contracts (IAEA June 1, 2004).

85 IAEA Feb. 24, 2004.

86 Ibid.

87 IISS 2005, 22.

88 IAEA June 18, 2004.

89 IAEA Sep. 1, 2004.

90 IISS 2005, 23-24.

91 Traynor, Ian. 2005. EU Warns Iran: No Talks if Nuclear Freeze Ends. The Guardian. Aug. 3.

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92

Fathi, Nazila, David E. Sanger and William J. Broad. 2006. Iran Says it is Making Nuclear Fuel Defying U.N. The New York Times. Apr. 12; Sciolino, Elaine. 2006. U.N. Agency Says Iran Falls Short of Nuclear Data. The New York Times. Apr. 29.

93 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, Dec. 3, 2006.

94 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747, Mar. 24, 2007.

95 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803, Mar. 3, 2008.

96 Kissinger 2007.

97 Ferguson, Charles D. 2007. Iran Making Substantial Nuclear Progress. Council on Foreign Relations.

May 18.

98 Iran Stepping Up its Uranium Work. 2008. Associated Press. Feb. 28.

99 IAEA Nov. 19, 2008.

100 IISS 2005, 35.

101 Ibid., 38.

102 Ibid., 43.

103 Broad and Sanger 2008 (quoting Olli Heinonen, IAEA Chief Inspector).

104 Broad and Sanger 2008.

105 Fathi, Naila. 2008. A President’s Defender Keeps His Distance. The New York Times. Jan. 8.

106 Myers 2007.

107 Takeyh 2007.

108 Russia Completes Fuel Delivery with Eighth Batch. 2008. Islamic Republic News Agency. Jan. 28.

109 Fathi Dec. 2007.

110 Beehner, Lionel. 2006. Backgrounder: What Sanctions Mean for Iran’s Economy. Council on Foreign Relations, May 5.

111 Ibid.

112 Fathi Jan. 2008; Christopher, Warren. 2006. Welcome to the Bazaar. The New York Times. June 13.

113 Takeyh 2007.

114 Ibid.

115 It bears repeating that, at this point in time, achieving a diplomatic breakthrough with a more pragmatic leader like Larijani is still extremely unlikely. Since his election as Speaker of Parliament, Larijani has only reaffirmed Tehran’s hard-line stance on its nuclear program.

116 Ibid.

117 Fathi Jan. 2008.

118 Brzezinski and Takeyh 2008.

119 Broad and Sanger 2008 (quoting Olli Heinonen, IAEA Chief Inspector).

120 Pollack 2005.

121 There are many other tools of statecraft that the United States can employ to achieve Russian and Chinese cooperation. For example, the United States can encourage Saudi Arabia to condition its oil export agreements with China on China’s support for an incentives-sanctions package (Ross, Dennis. 2007.

Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World, at 306-18. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux).

122 Military options are tactically limited. A ground invasion followed by military occupation and regime change is entirely unfeasible and must be categorically rejected. Counterproliferation—massive air and missile strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, conventional military installations, and other strategic assets—is the only viable military option.

Although President Obama may ultimately authorize the use of military force, the consequences of military action in Iran should not be underestimated. Following an attack, Iran would target U.S. interests throughout the region, increase support for terrorist proxies (particularly Hezbollah and Hamas), and intensify destabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran would move to close the Straits of Hormuz— through which twenty percent of world oil is transported—potentially bringing the global economy to a standstill. Anti-Americanism would surge throughout the Muslim world and international criticism would be fierce. An American attack would ensure the indefinite survival of Iran’s hard-line leadership. Mass civilian causalities would undoubtedly result (especially in the aftermath of a surprise daytime attack intended to kill nuclear scientists and other human assets associated with Iran’s nuclear weapons program).

Expectations for military success should be also realistic. The U.S. will not be able to completely destroy Iran’s widely-dispersed and well-hidden nuclear infrastructure. A successful counterproliferation

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operation would likely retard Iran’s nuclear progress by five to seven years (Pollack 2005). Since military action would destroy any hope of organic regime change and make future diplomatic engagement with Iran nearly impossible, it is conceivable that subsequent attacks would be necessary.

Despite the damaging consequences and limited efficacy of military force, U.S. strategic interests and the overarching imperative of nonproliferation might ultimately compel its use. But military force, if compelled, can only be justified after the exhaustion of all available diplomatic remedies.

This brief analysis of the projected costs and benefits of the exercise of military force pertains only to the United States. The pros and cons of the use of military force by other nations—namely Israel— is a separate matter, not considered in this paper.

Jacobs ! Assessment of Deception

Tilting the Scales: Balancing Security and Liberty in Antiterrorism Frameworks of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France Elizabeth Nielsen, J.D. Candidate, Yale University Introduction When attacked intimately, each culture reacts in its own way, thus exposing its collective representations. – Antoine Garapon, SecretaryGeneral of the Institut des Hautes Etudes sur la Justicei In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, democratic nations around the world struggled to adapt their antiterrorism frameworks to the new security environment.

While the attacks took place on American soil, the threat that militant Islamic terrorism also poses to European countries was underscored by bombings in London, the discovery of planned chemical and biological attacks in France,ii and rising casualty rates from terrorist attacks across Europe.iii Open societies, such as those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, were particularly affected because they present a "targetrich environment" and are thus "inherently vulnerable" to acts of terrorism.iv In response, the American, British, and French legislatures rushed to action, passing, respectively, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Patriot Act) on October 26, 2001, the AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Emergency Bill (ATCSA) on December 13, 2001, and the Loi de la SĂŠcuritĂŠ Quotidienne ('Day to Day Security Law') on October 31, 2001. These laws were designed to strengthen antiterrorism measures so as to provide each government with the tools necessary to fulfilling its duty to protect its citizens.

However, the decision of the American, British, and French governments to restrict the liberty of their citizens in the name of security may place both liberty and security at risk.v While acts of terrorism threaten to undermine effective governance and public confidence, an overly restrictive response threatens liberal democratic traditions and weakens the government's legitimacy with local populations, ultimately furthering the goals of terrorist organizations.vi For example, although portions of the antiterrorism frameworks adopted by each country have arguably served to lessen the risk of future attacks, the post-September 11 legislation has also met with significant opposition on human rights and civil liberties grounds.vii As a result, democracies that confront the threat of terrorism are forced to balance between inaction and overreaction, liberty and security.

The resulting balance differs in each country based on the interpretation of the security threat, in this case international terrorism as exemplified by the September 11 attacks, and the framework adopted in response. Historical, political, and cultural factors can tip Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 49

the scales by influencing the interpretation of the threat of terrorism as either an internal, permanent threat or as an external, temporary threat. Each interpretation corresponds with an antiterrorism response framework. As defined by J. Large, national antiterrorism measures tend to fall within one of two areas: either a military model, which views terrorism as an act of war and the state's military as the appropriate source of response; or a criminal justice model, which views terrorism as a crime and the state’s criminal legal system as the appropriate source of response.viii For example, in the United States, a military model would place the counterterrorism response under the purview of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the military, while a criminal justice model shifts the responsibility to the Department of Justice and law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).ix Either framework may also include a focus on addressing the causes of terrorism so as to erode its support.x Both the interpretation of the events of September 11, 2001, and the larger threat of terrorism and the choice of response framework varied in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Literature on the subject tends to focus either on the ways in which the events of September 11 were interpreted and portrayed or on the corresponding legislative and policy decisions, without analyzing the link between the stages. A number of case studies have recently emerged in the field of social psychology that explore the ways in which acts of terrorism are interpreted by those who experience them personally and by the general public, but do not evaluate the implications for counterterrorism policies adopted in response.xi Similarly, rhetorical analyses of the way that terrorism is defined in public debates or by political figures mention the policy ramifications of these definitions but do not elaborate on their effects.xii When the "rhetorical trajectories"xiii of definitions of terrorism are considered, they are done so in broad terms and not in regards to specific counterterrorism policies. On the other side, works that examine the legal responses to terrorism tend to focus on their relation to the larger normative debate over the appropriate balance between security and liberty in counterterrorism legislation and policies.xiv While some studies suggest cultural or political reasons for the variations in counterterrorism measures in different countries, these explanations are generally not the focus of the work and are not fully evaluated.xv My thesis attempts to bridge these gaps in the existing literature.

While the events of September 11, 2001, impacted antiterrorism policies in each country, I contend that divergent historical and political factors in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France led to differing interpretations of the terrorist attacks and the larger threat of terrorism, resulting in the adoption of different counterterrorism response frameworks by each country. Consequently, the United States adopted and maintained a military framework, the United Kingdom initially adopted a military framework and then transitioned to a criminal justice framework, and France adopted and maintained a criminal justice framework. In order to establish the trajectories present in each country, I analyze the experience of each country separately. I begin with a discussion of the United States as the country that suffered the most immediate and direct impact of the September 11 attacks. I then proceed to the United Kingdom, whose response framework was heavily influenced by the United States, and finish with France, whose response

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framework was developed partly in opposition to the framework proffered by the United States.

In my analysis of each country, I will begin by evaluating the historical and political factors that affected the interpretation of the attacks and the threat of terrorism, focusing on past experience with terrorism, the level of preparedness at the time of the attacks, and standing in the international community. To determine the ways in which the attacks and the larger threat of terrorism were interpreted, I then analyze the framing of the issues in political discourse in each country. Finally, I consider the counterterrorism frameworks adopted by each country. In evaluating the responses, I will not conduct an analysis of the full extent of the antiterrorism measures adopted, an endeavor that is beyond the scope of this paper. Similarly, I do not attempt a normative analysis of the efficacy of various counterterrorism policies, a subject which has been described as both "untestable"xvi and "beset by an obscure and uncertain state of knowledge and understanding."xvii Instead, I use the detention policies adopted by each country after the attacks as case studies to illustrate the differing response frameworks.

United States: On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. – President George W. Bushxviii Experience with Terrorism The events of September 11, 2001, shocked and horrified a nation unaccustomed to attacks on American soil and confronted policymakers with an issue that had previously been relegated to the periphery of national security. U.S. security strategy had identified the threat of international terrorism for several decades, although presidential interest varied.xix High profile acts of terrorism in the 1970s, such as the murder of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, first caught the attention of the American officials. However, the Nixon and Ford administrations initially viewed terrorism as a low priority criminal justice issue, best handled by law enforcement agencies and institutions such as the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

International terrorism gained prominence on the presidential agenda under the Reagan administration, which identified terrorist organizations as proxies of the Soviet government. By addressing terrorism through the lens of the Cold War, the Reagan administration shifted from a criminal justice framework to a military framework and established a precedent of focusing primarily on state-sponsored terrorism. Presidential interest in terrorism fluctuated under the Carter and George H. W. Bush administrations, "reaching its nadir" following the end of the Cold War.xx International terrorism regained high-level interest under the Clinton administration when Islamic terrorist groups began targeting American interests, both abroad and at home. The Clinton administration recognized Al-Qaeda as a threat to the United States following the 1992 bombing of a hotel frequented by American military personnel in Yemen and the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. However, American policymakers were slow to

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respond. No effective safeguards were implemented to prevent terrorists from entering the United States or from recruiting and fundraising within the country.xxi The laissezfaire position of the American government towards international terrorism in the 1990s was reminiscent of the position of the French government in the early 1980s, which allowed terrorists to operate on French territory as long as they did not target French interests.xxii American policymakers became increasingly more concerned with international terrorism throughout the 1990s, as increased terrorist activity prompted policy responses. The Clinton administration became more engaged in antiterrorism efforts as American interests abroad continued to be targeted and terrorist organizations expanded their tactics to include the use of chemical or biological weapons, as seen, respectively, in the 1996 bombing of U.S. Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia and the 1995 Sarin gas attack by the Japanese terrorist organization Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subway. Following these events and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the U.S. Congress passed the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which allowed the government to target designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by seizing their assets, denying visas to their members, and prosecuting those who provided them with "material support."xxiii Counterterrorism advisors on the National Security Council (NSC) raised further concerns after Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa in February 1998,xxiv which declared that "the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it."xxv The Clinton administration responded with an attempt to protect critical national infrastructures with the 1998 Presidential Decision Directive-63, resulting in the creation of the National Infrastructure Protection Center, and with the development of a Key Asset Program with similar goals.

The FBI and the CIA also devoted more resources to counterterrorism efforts following the coordinated bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, after which the director of central intelligence, George Tenet, "declared war" on AlQaeda as "the most immediate and serious threat" to the country.xxvi However, in the summer of 1998, the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) had only one analyst working full-time to track Al-Qaeda.xxvii Overall, the Clinton administration viewed international terrorism and the threat posed by Al Qaeda as "a serious but not grave threat to the United States."xxviii Even after the first the World Trade Center bombing demonstrated the plausibility of a foreign terrorist organization perpetrating a successful attack on U.S. soil, most American policymakers continued to believe that "international terrorism was something that happened elsewhere, in places like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan."xxix These sentiments arose partly from the difference in the American definition of terrorism as opposed to those definitions applied by other countries. Terrorist attacks perpetrated by Americans, such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the later anthrax cases, were not defined as terrorism because, in "the American collective conscience, internal violence is never characterized as terrorism."xxx Additionally, American policymakers continued to view terrorism in the external, Cold War terms earlier adopted by President Reagan, despite evidence of the evolutionary and increasingly transnational nature of terrorism. Terrorism analysts, both within and outside of the government, continued to view terrorist organizations as highly

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organized, hierarchical groups operating as proxies for hostile governments, neglecting the rise of independent terrorist groups organized in cells with horizontal command structures."xxxi As a result, American counterterrorism policy focused primarily on targeting state sponsorship of terrorism by the Iranian and Syrian governments, overlooking the threat posed by non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda.xxxii While the Clinton administration defined terrorism in Cold War terms consistent with a military framework, the administration was reluctant to use military force against terrorist organizations and the "overall US response was desultory and uncommitted."xxxiii In the absence of a Cold War threat, President Clinton had emphasized a strategy of democratic engagement and a differentiation between security and defence. This shift is evidenced by the emphasis of the 1999 National Security Strategy (NSS) on those threats that required a soft power response, such as cyber-vandalism and information warfare, the proliferation of dangerous technologies, environmental and health threats, and trafficking in narcotics.xxxiv As a result, the Clinton administration focused on law enforcement as a largely unsuccessful means of addressing international terrorism. As stated later by a former Reagan administration official commenting on Clinton era policies, "When it came to legal action . . . we pulled out all the stops. We eventually indicted bin Laden on 224 counts of murder. Characteristically, he failed to show up for his trial."xxxv When President George W. Bush entered office, he inherited a Cold War framework for defining terrorism, a history of ineffective criminal justice responses, and an increasing threat to American national security that had yet to be fully recognized.

Preparedness American policymakers and the American public were unprepared for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on both a policy and a psychological level. President George W. Bush had largely continued the counterterrorism policies established by his predecessors, focusing instead on China and national missile defense as national security priorities.xxxvi The dramatic paradigm shift between these policies and post-September 11 security strategy is evidenced in the striking difference between the national security strategies issued before and after the attacks. While President George W. Bush had not yet issued a national security strategy at the time of the attacks, terrorism had been mentioned in general terms in the George H. W. Bush administration's 1993 National Security Strategy (NSS) and more specifically in the Clinton administration's 1995 and 1999 national security strategies. However, the 2002 National Security Strategy focused primarily on terrorism, emphasizing the threat of Islamic terrorist groups and the "Axis of Evil."

The Bush administration was aware of the threat posed by international terrorist organizations, and specifically by Al Qaeda, prior to September 11, but not of its scale and immediacy. By the summer of 2001, counterterrorism experts were convinced that a large terrorist attack was approaching, but believed that it would most likely take place abroad.xxxvii The Bush administration had recently developed a new strategy of combating Al Qaeda, which sought the destruction of the entire group instead of the targeting of individual cells.xxxviii The strategy also included an increased emphasis on addressing the sanctuary that Afghanistan provided for terrorist organizations.xxxix However, while a

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national security meeting on September 4, 2001, had determined that the Defense Department and CIA should develop options for accomplishing this strategy, specific plans had not yet reached President Bush at the time of the attacks.xl Although also cognizant of the threat of international terrorism, the American public was psychologically unprepared for the severity of the attacks and the national psyche was traumatized as a result. The unexpected nature and direct impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11 shattered illusions of invulnerability and profoundly affected the American public. The attacks ended a unique historical span in which the United States acted as a great power but conducted warfare solely in other countries, protected from homeland attacks by geographical position and an unrivaled industrial technological base.xli American soil had been untouched by war since 1941 and the similarities between the two attacks seemed to end at their description as "unprovoked and dastardly."xlii Although both attacks came as a surprise, were incredibly costly, and altered American history, the enemy that the United States confronted after September 11 did not fit traditional schemas. Unlike the attack on Pearl Harbor, which was perpetrated by a state, the September 11 attacks were committed by a transnational, non-state actor that practices untraditional warfare.xliii While the use of terrorism as a tactic "has rarely been absent from history,"xliv the scale of the September 11 attacks was a new phenomenon. As stated by Richard Faulk, The European terrorist incidents, however traumatic and cruel in their impacts, were minor in comparison with the 9/11 attacks, which were spectacular events of an unprecedented symbolic and substantive magnitude. The World Trade Center and the Pentagon were the prime symbols of American power, economic and military, and by striking them so effectively in a manner suitable for TV, the terrorists shockingly and undeniably established America's vulnerability. Beyond this, the real-time image of the plane crashing into the WTC tower created an unforgettable image of the attack that was repeated over and over for tens of millions of TV watchers.xlv As a result, after September 11, Americans reported increased feelings of vulnerability at both the group-level and personal world level.xlvi Even many Americans who would not fulfill the conventional definition of exposure to a traumatic event exhibited symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).xlvii While extremely high levels of anxiety increase risk aversion, a "perceived threat increases a desire for retaliation & promotes animosity toward a threatening enemy."xlviii Although a minority of Americans experienced high anxiety in response to 9/11 and favored isolationist policies, the majority of Americans perceived, but was not highly anxious of, a future threat and therefore supported aggressive military action and domestic counterterrorism policies.xlix As stated by President Bush in his address to the nation on September 20, 2001, "grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution," l and the transition affected both foreign and domestic counterterrorism frameworks. As demonstrated in Table 1, following the attacks, a majority of Americans was willing to sacrifice some civil liberties in order to shift the balance from liberty to security.

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Table 1: American Civil Liberties

Public Opinion Poll: Pew Research Center In order to curb terrorism in this country, do you think it will be necessary for the average person to give up some civil liberties, or not?

Yes No Don't know/refused Sept. 17, 2001 55% 35% 10% Jan. 22, 2002 55% 39% 6% June 27, 2002 49% 45% 6% The psychological vulnerability of the American public was accompanied by a surge of patriotism. This powerful combination provided the political leverage required for the Bush administration to dramatically alter American counterterrorism strategies.

Standing in the International Community At the time of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States occupied a unique position as the sole superpower, or "hyperpower," of a unipolar international system.li While academics and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic continued to debate the possibilities and limitations of globalization, they generally accepted that globalizing forces had extended American power and influence across the globe.lii At the dawn of the century, the "reach of American military might, economic influence, and cultural impact (was) so great that it would make the world its condominium without declaring itself emperor, except to proclaim in Jeffersonian overtones an 'empire of liberty.'"liii As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States could afford to act unilaterally and at least entertain the notion that "a nation as strong as the United States need not worry about what others think of it."liv In contrast, the United Kingdom and France had relinquished their former empires and had begun to accept less prominent roles in the international community with increased reliance on cooperation with other states. These "(d)iffering levels of power" set the stage for a "difference in attitudes" regarding counterterrorism policy by allowing the United States to take a more active, offensive role in combating terrorist groups abroad.lv Concerns that the United States had reached the apex of its power also encouraged American policymakers to use that power to positively impact the world before the moment had passed.lvi An active role in combating the evil of terrorism also "comports well with the historical trajectory of American foreign policy," particularly in its role as a great power in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century.lvii Since the days of John Winthrop's city on a hill, Americans have considered "themselves to be an exceptional nation, a chosen people, destined to extend the fruit of freedom to an enslaved world." lviii This doctrine of American exceptionalism has informed U.S. domestic and foreign policy throughout the nation's history. Today, it combines the Wilsonian promotion of universal values with the advancement of foreign policy objectives, so that it "reflects both Christianity's proselytizing imperative and functions as a legitimizing salve for the pursuit of narrow national interests."lix American exceptionalism also encourages the

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development of an adversarial, often demonized "other" against whom the American selfimage is defined, such as the fascist and communist threats of the twentieth century.

When the United States engages the "other," American political culture requires that it does so reluctantly and in support of a just cause. As a result, "every contest is a moral crusade, a just war of absolute good against absolute evil in which victory must be righteous and complete."lx This combines with the American history of regard for a lex talionis concept of justice, echoing back to experiences on the American frontier.lxi Once the United States enters a war, particularly one initiated by an "evil" adversary, its geographic position, history, and self-righteous political culture incline the country towards resorting to unrestrained behavior.lxii Terrorism in Political Discourse During the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, American political leaders struggled to identify and interpret the events in order to fit the unimaginable into a more traditional framework. The chosen framework of the Bush administration and American congressional leaders from both political parties was almost entirely that of a military model, wherein the attacks were viewed as acts of war. While President Bush's instinctive reaction to the second attack on the World Trade Center was to declare a war,lxiii he initially failed at establishing a successful rhetoric to describe the events. He was criticized for missteps such as referring to the terrorists as "folks" and for calling for a "crusade" against them.lxiv However, most notably in his address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, President Bush was eventually successful in framing the American discussion of terrorism and counterterrorism by portraying the terrorist attacks as "acts of war" committed by "enemies of freedom."lxv Although the eventual term Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was criticized as a "misnomer,"lxvi the impact of the warfare definition is demonstrated by the acceptance of the terminology by congressional leaders. Analysis of floor speeches delivered by congressional leaders in both the Republican and Democratic parties between September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2001, reveals an acceptance of the frames proffered by the Bush administration.lxvii As seen in Figure 1, although the Republican congressional leaders used the terms "act(s) of war" and "new war" slightly more frequently than the Democratic congressional leaders, both terms were used by both parties. Democratic congressional leaders also used the term "war on/against terrorism" more often than their Republican counterparts.

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Figure 1: Administration and Congressional Definitions of the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attackslxviii

In addition to using warfare terminology to describe the terrorist attacks, congressional leaders did not successfully adopt alternative frames. As seen in Figure 2, Democratic congressional leaders were slightly more willing to describe terrorists as "criminals" than their Republican counterparts. However, while this terminology would seem to indicate a criminal justice framework, as is the case in France, congressional leaders of both parties tended to frame the issue as involving "terrorists and criminals." The distinction between the two categories implies that terrorists can be held subject to a different response framework than that which applies to criminals. Also seen in Figure 2, American congressional leaders frequently spoke of values, such as "liberty," "freedom," and "democracy/human rights," that would traditionally be viewed as in opposition to restrictive antiterrorism measures. However, as is the case in British and French counterterrorism discourse,lxix the Bush administration and the Republican Congressional leaders were successful in reframing the debate in terms of negative rights instead of positive rights so that preventative measures became not an infringement of freedoms, but the only means of preserving freedom.

Figure 2: Alternative Congressional Frames for the "Global War on Terror" 200 180

Liberty

160 Freedom

140 120

Democracy/Human Rights

100 80

Civil Rights

60 40

Criminals

20 0 Rep.Totals

Dem. Totals

The difference between the willingness of Republican and Democratic congressional leaders to invoke the values of "liberty," "freedom," and "democracy/human rights" in Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 57

support of counterterrorism policies indicates an ideological division between the two parties regarding the framing of the threat of terrorism. However, as seen in Figure 1, Democratic congressional leaders were still willing to publicly support the frames proffered by the Bush administration in the wake of the September 11 attacks, when public support for the administration was at its highest.

While the traumatic nature of the attacks seemed to make the adoption of the military model "an almost foregone, politically unchallenged conclusion,"lxx it was not the only available possibility.lxxi The use of warfare terminology corresponding to the military model was a conscious rhetorical strategy. As the "Interpreter-in-Chief," President George W. Bush's decision to adopt the military model and eventually the Global War on Terror (GWOT) terminology impacted not only national policies, but also the national self-identity.lxxii As argued by David Zarefsky, during periods of uncertainty, "rhetoric has the ability to reshape our world by altering our sense of who we are, by replacing the narrative structure in which we understand events, by changing our hierarchies of value and importance, and by causing us to see old realities in a new light."lxxiii The adoption of warfare terminology was politically useful for the Bush administration. It was consistent with the precedents set by previous administrations; throughout American history, there has been "something about the presidency that loves war talk," ranging from Andrew Jackson's on the Bank of the United States to the more recent wars on poverty, crime, and drugs.lxxiv The primary reason for this use, or overuse, of war rhetoric is its impact on the American public. For example, War focuses people's attention, steels determination, forces bipartisanship, justifies expending unlimited resources, and prepares the population for a long, costly, complex campaign that will subordinate American foreign and domestic policy to the struggle, necessitate changes in government organization, and result in some--perhaps substantial--casualties in the armed forces.lxxv War terminology also answered the American desire for a strong, retributive response to such a catastrophic event and responded to the nationalist strain in American culture, which "more than any other factor," "divides the United States from a largely postnationalist Western Europe."lxxvi As stated by a high level official in the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks, even if the United States had the capacity to eliminate the top ten greatest terrorist threats without resorting to war, this would not have been "sufficient compensation for the culture."lxxvii Even years after the attacks, it is impossible to "stand up politically in America and talk about soft power" instead of "macho, hard power."lxxviii The GWOT terminology also serves a negative purpose. While the general language has been criticized as justifying a "global war on things that annoy us,"lxxix it is also intended to avoid accusations that the United States is at war against Islam.lxxx The war rhetoric corresponded with American historical and cultural traditions by framing the possibility of a future terrorist attack as an existential threat similar to those that the United States faced in World War II and particularly the Cold War. Many

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American political leaders have drawn explicit historical comparisons; for example, Congressman Benjamin Gilman described September 11 as "Another Day of Infamy"lxxxi and Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld compared counterterrorism with the struggle to defeat the "expansionist, empire-seeking effort of the Soviet Union."lxxxii As seen in Figure 3, Republican and Democratic congressional leaders have also made similar analogies to previous conflicts.

Figure 3: Republican and Democratic References to Previous Conflictslxxxiii 40 35 30 25

World War

20

Pearl Harbor

15

Cold War

10 5 0 Rep. Totals

Dem. Totals

The counterterrorism frames proffered by the Bush administration are reminiscent of the Cold War counterterrorism rhetoric employed by President Reagan and they serve to fill the same need. As argued by James Sperling, "Americans require a palpable existential threat to conduct a purposeful security policy; there appear to be no permanent interests independent of the threat posed by a malevolent 'other'."lxxxiv Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has struggled to redefine its security policy without relying on the framework of a Manichean struggle between capitalism and communism, which had focused the security effort and reinforced national unity. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the threat of terrorism supplanted communism in this schema, replacing the previous ambiguities of the post-Cold War system. For example, by the 2006 NSS the administration had "adopted and then modified the Cold War syllogism, substituting terrorism for communism: democracy was 'the opposite of terrorist tyranny' and that terrorism presents a threat to democracy everywhere."lxxxv The result of the warfare terminology is a "clash of civilizations" framework that supports the image of the United States locked in a perpetual war against a malevolent external force, justifies the strengthening of counterterrorism measures, and discourages attempts to address the root causes of terrorism. It reinforces the attitude among American political leaders that any attempt to address the motivations of terrorists and their supporters is futile, serving instead to signal weakness and divert resources from the effort to exterminate the threat.lxxxvi The Bush administration and American congressional leaders have avoided discussing possible causes of terrorism. While political leaders in other countries have discussed links to the Islamic faith or American policy in the Middle East, especially support of Israel, statements by the Bush administration or congressional leaders have focused almost entirely on disassociating terrorism from Islam and reaffirming support for Israel. As seen in Figure 4, very little attention has been paid by

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either group to factors such as global inequality and poverty, which are commonly considered to contribute to support for terrorism.

Figure 4: Addressing Causes of Terrorismlxxxvii 40 35 30 Muslim/Islam

25

Israel

20

Inequality

15

Poverty

10 5 0 Administration

Republican Totals Democratic Totals

War terminology also serves to totalize the division between good and evil, turning patriotism into "a public exercise in extreme Othering."lxxxviii As argued by Nietzsche, "Every society has the tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures."lxxxix This "'usthem' dichotomy" is a powerful technique used by both terrorists and those who engage in counterterrorism efforts, simplifying the conflict to "Jihad vs. McWorld. xc The result is a "dangerous construction," which can lead to "abandonment of the rule of law and established rules of engagement. If the 'enemy' is beneath contempt, the war against it can be unconditional."xci The military framework removes many of the restraints that a criminal justice framework imposes, which can lead to a more effective process but also governmental abuse of power.

Legislative Response: Detention Measures The American counterterrorism response to the September 11 attacks was consistent with the war terminology and military framework advocated by the Bush administration. The interpretation of terrorism as an external threat posed by a malevolent "other" is demonstrated by the clear division between citizens and noncitizens in American detention policies and by continued attempts to reduce the rights of detainees. The power of the executive to detain an individual is a severe measure that has been described by Winston Churchill as "in the highest degree odious"xcii and

by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stevens as "the hallmark of the totalitarian state."xciii However, detention power was expanded considerably following the September 11 attacks in the form of the Patriot Act and a series of executive branch actions. As Cofer Black, formerly of the CIA, later testified before Congress, "After 9/11, the gloves came off."xciv The Patriot Act served both to expand the definition of terrorism activity so that a greater number of non-citizens qualify for detention and to revise the rules governing

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executive detention. Section 411 alters the previous definition of terrorist activity as premeditated and politically-motivated violence against a civilian population, expanding it to include any crime involving "a weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain)."xcv Under this definition, a non-citizen who uses a provisional weapon in the heat of the moment during an argument could be considered a terrorist and deemed removable.xcvi Section 411 also broadens the definition of engaging in terrorist activity to include soliciting funds or membership or otherwise providing material support for a terrorist organization, even if the support was only intended to further legitimate political and humanitarian goals.xcvii The definition of a terrorist organization was expanded to include groups that are composed of "two or more individuals, whether organized or not," who engage in specified terrorist activities.xcviii Additionally, Section 411 bars admission to non-citizens who "endorse or espouse terrorist activity" in ways that the Secretary of State has determined would undermine U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.xcix This runs contrary to previous Supreme Court decisions that allow for free speech that advocates terrorist activity but is not intended and likely to produce imminent lawless action.c Section 412 of the Patriot Act increases the power of the Attorney General to detain those non-citizens who qualify under the expanded definitions. Prior to September 11, 2001, non-citizens in removal proceedings were subject to the same standards for preventative detention as were defendants in criminal proceedings; they were entitled to release on bond unless the government could make a show in a hearing before an immigration judge that they posed a danger to the community or a risk of flight.ci Section 412 of the Patriot Act removes the requirement for a hearing or any demonstration of proof that a non-citizen is a threat to national security or a flight risk.

Instead, the Attorney General need only certify that he "has reasonable grounds to believe" that a non-citizen is engaged in terrorist activity.cii Following certification, the non-citizen is taken into custody and can be held without charge for up to seven days, at which point the government must initiate deportation proceedings, bring criminal charges, or release the non-citizen.ciii If the government issues deportation proceedings, detention is continued until the Attorney General decertifies the non-citizen.civ If the non-citizen is determined not to be removable, he must be released.cv If the non-citizen is deemed removable, but removal is not likely in the "reasonably foreseeable future," he may continue to be detained for up to six additional months if he presents a threat to national security.cvi However, while the Patriot Act implies that detention is not permitted past the six month limit, the language of the statute only requires the Attorney General to review the certification every six months. Therefore, the Patriot Act allows for the indefinite detention of a non-citizen as long as the Attorney General renews the certification every six months.cvii Under the new definitions and requirements, a non-citizen who picks up a weapon to defend herself against an abusive husband could be held indefinitely as a suspected terrorist without any proof of a threat to national security.cviii In addition the potential indefinite detention of non-citizens in the United States, a series of executive measures also created the possibility for the detention of "enemy combatants" outside the United States who were not subject to regular civilian or

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military courts. A month after the terrorist attacks, President Bush issued a Military Order entitled "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism."cix The order allows the Department of Defense to detain suspected terrorists and subject them to trials by military commissions without any right to "seek the aid of" of any U.S. courts or international tribunals.cx The next day, Vice President Cheney, a strong supporter of restrictive counterterrorism policies, delivered a speech before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, declaring, The basic proposition here is that somebody who comes into the United States of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent Americans, men, women, and children, is not a lawful combatant. They don't deserve to be treated as a prisoner of war.

They don't deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process. This -they will have a fair trial, but it'll be under the procedures of a military tribunal and rules and regulations to be established in connection with that.

We think it's the appropriate way to go. We think it's -- guarantees that we'll have the kind of treatment of these individuals that we believe they deserve.cxi In December of 2001, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld announced the transfer of detainees from Afghanistan to the American naval base in Guantรกnamo Bay, Cuba.cxii The Bush administration continued to strengthen its policies towards suspected terrorists. On January 25, 2002, Vice President Cheney's lawyer wrote a memo under the name of White House counsel, Alberto R. Gonzales, which further solidified the administration's position.cxiii The memo reiterated President Bush's statement that "the war against terrorism is a new kind of war" and concluded that the Geneva Conventions, described as "quaint" and "obsolete," should not apply to suspected terrorists.cxiv The Bush administration went a step further on August 1, 2002, when the Justice Department delivered a classified opinion under the signature of Assistant Attorney general Jay S. Bybee. The opinion states that U.S. law against torture "prohibits only the worst forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" and restricts the definition of torture to suffering "equivalent in intensity" to the pain of "organ failure . . . or even death." The same day, Deputy Assistant Attorney General John C. Yoo issued a second classified opinion approving a series of interrogation techniques requested by the CIA, including waterboarding.cxv The only technique that was not approved was threatening to bury a prisoner alive.cxvi While the American federal court system has historically shown reluctance to curtail the powers of an executive during wartime, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered three consecutive decisions that sought to check presidential authority. The decisions allowed the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over the challenges of Guantรกnamo detainees, upheld the power of the executive to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants with a hearing before "a neutral decision maker", and held that the military commissions violated the Uniform Code for Military Justice.cxvii However, despite the

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judicial reversals and growing opposition both at home and abroad, the Guantånamo Bay detention camp is still operational. Many controversial policies continue unchanged or in a slightly different form; for example, the Military Commission Act of September 2006 exempts CIA case officers and other governmental employees from prosecution for torture or war crimes and secret prisons run overseas by the CIA, know as "black sites," have reopened.cxviii While President Bush has been "forced into public retreats," Vice President Cheney has "quietly held his ground. Most of his operational agenda, in practice if not in principle, remains in place."cxix United Kingdom Yes, whatever the technical or legal issues about the declaration of war, the fact is that we are at war with terrorism. . . it is a war, if you like, between the civilised world and fanaticism. – Prime Minister Tony Blaircxx Experience with Terrorism The British interpretation of the events of September 11 was largely informed by their long experience with terrorism during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. While the British public and policymakers were shocked by the unprecedented scale of the September 11 attacks, terrorism itself simply "wasn't new" to the United Kingdom.cxxi The British had been aware of the threat of terrorism as more than a vague phenomenon occurring overseas; instead, it had been an immediate threat to the British homeland, resulting in over 3,200 deaths since 1966.cxxii Many of the advances that the British made in confronting this issue came over time and at a great cost that deeply impacted British culture and legal traditions. Therefore, as argued by Todd Landman, "the post-9/11 response to terrorism must be seen in light of a legacy of Counterterror measures and policies, particularly in relation to the Troubles in Northern Ireland since 1969."cxxiii The British experience in Northern Ireland cautioned against relying on a military model of counterterrorism. A key theme in modern forms of terrorism is the use of Malatesta's model, or the propaganda of the deed, in which physical violence is used by terrorist organizations with an emphasis on political gain rather than inflicting a military loss on the enemy.cxxiv The goal is often to provoke an overreaction from the government that can translate into public support. The Irish Easter Rising of 1916 became the classic example in this strategy when the British inflicted a decided military defeat on their opponents but ultimately lost the propaganda war.cxxv The actions that the British took to defeat the uprising ultimately "created so many republicans that the British loss of Ireland was thereafter almost a foregone conclusion."cxxvi More recently, the British employed a series of severe measures in an attempt to quell the violence and dissent in Northern Ireland, many of which are now considered to have been ultimately counterproductive. The public, both in Northern Ireland and in London, was strongly affected by the severe tactics and images of the campaign, such as those of hunger strikes, Long Kesh, and H block, that often served to bolster support for the IRA and other paramilitary organizations.cxxvii

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Even some of the less repressive security precautions taken by the British government under the military framework aided the terrorists by increasing the symbolic value of and causing the terrorists to appear more powerful."cxxviii By the end of the conflict, the British had learned that treating those who engaged in terrorism as anything greater than common criminals was counterproductive because it produced martyrs and led legitimacy to their cause. Instead, many legal experts and policymakers championed the adoption of a criminal justice framework of counterterrorism. As argued by Lord Goldsmith, Attorney General of the United Kingdom, Strengthening the criminal law has been a key part of our strategy for dealing with the heightened terrorist threat. The first line of defence should be the criminal law. If crimes have been committed or plotted then they are crimes notwithstanding that they are politically motivated.

Terrorists are criminals. We should neither dignify their cause by denying that fact nor complicate our legal thinking by doing so.cxxix As a result, even though some of the security forces continued to behave in ways more consist with wartime, using tactics such as coercive interrogations, the United Kingdom, "after some initial ambiguity, was careful to construct a narrative of its behavior in terms of a criminal-justice-based response to 'terrorist criminality.'"cxxx Preparedness While the United Kingdom had experience in dealing with terrorism, the British government and public were unprepared for the scale of the September 11 attacks and the simple means with which they were carried out.cxxxi The threat posed by militant Islamicist groups, or Salafist insurgents,cxxxii had been largely overlooked by the British government. They had struggled to adapt to the post-Cold War global security environment and had attempted to modernize their security policy with a 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR). However, the SDR identified the primary threats to security as ethnic conflict and civil war and proposed a largely defensive approach to security. "The attacks of 11 September 2001 fundamentally changed the UK outlook," illustrating the importance of transnational security threats.cxxxiii The effect on British policy was almost immediate. Less than a year after September 11, 2001, the government added "A New Chapter" to the SDR, which focused specifically on terrorism and proposed a more proactive strategy. The New Chapter also altered the British understanding of terrorism.

Terrorism had previously been interpreted as a tactic or a means to an end. Instead, it became "an essential threat which could potentially shape and determine the outcome of a conflict."cxxxiv The New Chapter was followed in 2003 by the Defence White Paper Delivering Security in a Changing World, which reemphasized transnational security threats, reversing the order of previous threats and listing international terrorism as the primary security concern.

These alterations were reflected in public opinion. Following the Cold War, public opinion considered the threat to the nation's security to be greatly diminished, neglecting

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to consider the presence of new, evolving threats.cxxxv After September 11, the threat of international terrorism became an important security concern. Although British public opinion polls did not demonstrate as high a concern over international terrorism as those in the United States, a large majority of the British population indicated that it was an "extremely important" threat, as demonstrated by Table 2.

Table 2: Threat Perceptions of International Terrorism Public Opinion Poll: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations June 5 - July 6, 2002 Sample Size: U.S. 2,862 telephone and 400 personal in-home; Great Britain 1,000 telephone; France 1,001 telephone I am going to read you a list of possible threats to the vital interest of (the U.S./Great Britain/France) in the next ten years. For each one, please tell me if you see this as an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all.

International Terrorism United States critical threat important but not critical Not important Other

91% 7% 2% 0%

Great Britain Extremely important Important Not important other

74% 23% 2% 1%

France extremely important important not important Other

60% 37% 3% 1%

The confusion and insecurity experienced by the British public following the September 11 terrorist attacks ultimately strengthened the political position of the British government, creating the possibility of public acceptance of restrictive antiterrorism measures.

Standing in the International Community The United Kingdom's standing in the international community is heavily influenced by the British colonial legacy, nuclear capability, and "special relationship" with the United States, all of which inclined the British towards an active role in global counterterrorism efforts following the September 11 attacks.cxxxvi As a result of their colonial legacy, the British have inherited both an interest in and sense of responsibility for global security.cxxxvii British nuclear capability also serves to reinforce the position of the United Kingdom as a major power with a subsequent moral obligation towards maintaining international security. cxxxviii Initially, the "special relationship" with the United States seemed to offer a means with which the United Kingdom could fulfil these obligations.

However, differing interpretations of the September 11 attacks on each side of the Atlantic complicated the relationship and forced the Blair government to decide between maintaining the criminal justice counterterrorism framework that emerged from Northern Ireland and adopting the military framework proffered by the American government in order to preserve the transatlantic friendship.

While the Anglo-American relationship is longstanding, its continuation into the 21st century was not guaranteed. In the past, the "special relationship" has been strengthened by events such as wartime cooperation; for example, following the Arcadia conference with President Franklin Roosevelt in January 1942, Winston Churchill informed King George VI that Great Britain and the United States "were now married after many months Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 65

of walking out."cxxxix The relationship has been mutually beneficial and has included strategic advantages for the United Kingdom such as high-level political interaction and shared intelligence and technology.cxl The relationship has weathered fallings out over issues such as Suez, the Vietnam War, and the American invasion of Grenada.cxli However, following the end of the Cold War, questions were raised about the value of maintaining the relationship in the absence of a common threat. Officials like the United States Ambassador to London, Raymond Seitz, believed that Anglo-American cooperation during the 1991 Gulf conflict would be "the last hurrah of the old regime."cxlii Despite these predictions, the "special relationship" continued and was strengthened by the September 11 attacks. In the wake of the terrorist attacks, Prime Minister Blair rushed to Washington, D.C. to declare his country's support for and solidarity with the United States, causing President Bush to declare that "America has no truer friend than Great Britain," thanking Prime Minister Blair for "(crossing) an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America."cxliii As stated by UK Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon, "11 September and its aftermath have underlined the importance of the transatlantic relationship. From the outset, we demonstrated by our actions our wish to work closely with our most important ally, the US."cxliv The continuation of the Anglo-American relationship is the product of historical, cultural, and political factors, as well as the personality of British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. The longstanding history of the relationship creates a form of inertia that inhibits change.

While seemingly trivial, the power of inertia results from "institutionalised deep-seated and multi-level bureaucratic interweaving," which causes transatlantic relationships to "develop their own logic, vested interests and drive to self-preservation."cxlv This is supported by the common Anglo-American culture that originally contributed to the establishment of the relationship. This shared culture is based on a common language and history and continues to operate both on the level of political and diplomatic elites and on the level of popular culture.cxlvi The "special relationship" has also maintained its political importance for the United Kingdom. As stated by Lord Hurd, former secretary of state for foreign affairs, when describing the British self-image, Britain is "a medium-sized power with a developed sense of international responsibility" that must punch above its weight in order to ensure that it will have influence in the world.cxlvii As a result, the additional resources and influence that the Anglo-American relationship provides has become "important to the very self-image of the UK."cxlviii According to the Manning doctrine of maximizing influence, advocated by David Manning, Ambassador to Washington and Blair's foreign policy link to then US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, "At the best of times, Britain's influence on the US is limited. But the only way we exercise that influence is by attaching ourselves firmly to them and avoiding public criticism wherever possible."cxlix The Anglo-American relationship also ultimately benefited from the strong support of British Prime Minister Blair. Blair was personally affected by the September 11 attacks; as stated before the House of Commons in March 2003, Blair believed that "September 11 changed the psychology of America. It should have changed the psychology of the world."cl He accepted the Manning doctrine of maximizing influence and quickly adopted the role as "a species of global ambassador for the US administration" or an "Atlantic

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bridge-builder" whose goal was to soften the message of the Bush administration and gain multilateral support for counterterrorism efforts.cli Blair also maintained a deep regard for American President George W. Bush. While Blair arguably preferred the company of President Clinton, he was impressed by President Bush and his image as a "pretty straight guy."clii This relationship was politically costly to Blair. On an international level, it placed the United Kingdom on the minority side of the "crucial dividing line in intra-European politics . . . between those who wish to be part of the American imperium and those who don't."cliii He also drew criticism from a domestic audience for what was seen as his subservience to Washington, "an internet search for pairings of the words 'Blair' and 'poodle' might be instructive in this regard."cliv As stated by an unnamed top official in the British Ministry of Defence, many members of the British elite and the general public felt "like a favourite at the court of a king or dictator who has to resort to more and more flattery to terrain his position."clv However, Blair maintained his loyalty to President Bush; as he described in February 2003, "It's worse than you think, I believe in it."clvi As a result, despite the British experience in Northern Ireland in support of a criminal justice framework, the British government made a policy decision to adopt the military framework proffered by the Bush administration in order to preserve the Anglo-American alliance after the September 11 attacks.clvii This decision ultimately proved to be politically costly for the Blair government.

The Discourse of British Antiterrorism British political discourse on domestic counterterrorism measures reflects both the public reaction to the September 11 terrorist attacks, which initially strengthened the political position of the Blair government, and rising opposition to the military model of counterterrorism. British counterterrorism discourse reflects many of the trends that were also present in the United States, such as a reframing of the balance between security and liberty and the concept of an external threat. In a study comparing British and French political discourse, Anastassia Tsoukala conducted thematic content analysis of relevant articles published in nationally distributed daily newspapers.clviii Tsoukala found that proponents of counterterrorism measures were largely successful in reframing the tension between security and liberty so that preventative measures became not an infringement of freedoms, but the only means of preserving freedom. For example, as stated by the Home Secretary of the United Kingdom, John Reid, "we may have to modify some of our freedoms in the short-run in order to prevent their abuse by those who oppose our fundamental values and would destroy our freedoms and values in the long-term." This trend is similar to those found in French and American discourse. However, unlike those in French discourse, discussions of terrorism in the British newspapers are in accordance with American views in that they overwhelmingly viewed terrorism as a strictly external threat. Both countries initially structured their discourse and their policies in opposition to an external "other."

In a further study, Tsoukala analyzed official statements quoted in British newspapers between 2001 and 2004.clix Tsoukala found references to both the military and the criminal justice framing of the counterterrorism response. The war comparison theme occurred in 15 statements, of which 53.3% were made immediately following a terrorist

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attack. Notably, unlike American counterterrorism rhetoric, the association of terrorism with war made by British officials is restricted to the actions taken by each side; "It does not cover the terrorist themselves, who are never considered combatants."clx As seen in Figure 5, the majority of these statements were made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office.

Figure 5: War Comparisons in British Official Statementsclxi Prime Minister 7%

7%

Foreign Office

7% 39% 7%

Security/Intelligence Experts Chancellor Home Office minister

13% Attorney General 20%

member of the opposition

However, although the Foreign Office accounted for 75% of the statements made in 2001, it then disappeared from public debate. By 2003, the Prime Minister was the only source of war comparisons. In contrast, 9 statements were made that established a connection between terrorism and crime between 2001 and 2004, 88.8% of which were made by the Home Secretary. None of these statements were made in the aftermath of a major terrorist attack, illustrating the impact of a public sense of vulnerability in strengthening counterterrorism rhetoric.clxii Despite public support for some of the frames proffered by the Blair government, opposition to the military model of counterterrorism was exhibited by many different sectors of British society. British academics, particularly in the field of security studies, had identified the threat posed by militant Islamic terrorism before it was recognized by the government and were thus more prepared and less inclined to overreaction. After September 11, they argued against what they saw as a government exaggeration of the threat and generally opposed a military-based response.clxiii The British legal community reacted strongly to the argument that the criminal law would not be sufficient to counter the terrorist threat.clxiv Members of Parliament also voiced concerns that were not limited to the opposition party. A cross-party committee established by the Home Secretary in April 2002 to review the operation of British counterterror measures concluded "terrorists are criminals, and therefore ordinary criminal justice and security provisions should, so far as possible, continue to be the preferred way of countering terrorism."clxv Members of the British public, particularly university students, also rejected the decision to replace a criminal justice framework with a war framework that justified military responses and implied that counterterrorism was a war that could be won. A study of British university

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students found that when they were offered a range of possible responses to the terrorist attacks they interpreted non-military responses, such as negotiation and diplomacy, as deterrence and more severe military sanctions as revenge. Additionally, none of the possible responses were considered to communicate that the threat of terrorism would be eliminated.clxvi In addition to support for a criminal justice framework, British political discourse revealed a commitment to addressing the root causes of terrorism. The British experience with terrorism in Northern Ireland had demonstrated the necessity of combining prevention and enforcement policies with those designed to address the root cases of terrorism. Both British policymakers and the British government sought to continue this strategy after the September 11 attacks. Government officials, such as former British Conservative Prime Minister, John Major, who had been involved with the response to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, drew explicit comparisons between the two counterterrorism efforts. At a small gathering in 2005, Major described how important it had been for him to recognize that successful counterterrorism policies in Northern Ireland must be supplemented with responsible efforts to address the root causes, an approach which he contrasted with the strategy that the American leadership had developed after September 11.clxvii The Defence Committee in Parliament had previously indicated a willingness to address the sources of terrorism, arguing in documents such as the SDR for a broader understanding of security concerns that would include an emphasis on environmental, developmental and population issues.clxviii The British public also supported addressing factors such as global inequality and poverty, which contribute to terrorism. As seen in Table 3, comparing public support for counterterrorism polices, the British public was closer than the French public to the American positions on every counterterrorism response except for "attacks by ground troops against terrorist training camps and other facilities," which drew strong support in all three countries. However, the largest difference between British and American positions appears in the response to "helping poor countries develop their economies."

Table 3: American, British, and French Support for Counterterrorism Responses

Public Opinion Poll: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations June 5 - July 6, 2002 "In order to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favor or oppose each of the following measures."

Helping poor countries develop their economies: United States Great Britain France Favor 78% 91% 93% Oppose 19% 7% 6% Restricting Immigration: United States Great Britain France Favor 77% 74% 62% Oppose 21% 23% 34% Assassination of terrorist leaders: United States Great Britain France Favor 66% 56% 50%

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Oppose 26% 39% 46% Air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities: United States Great Britain France Favor 87% 76% 75% Oppose 10% 19% 22% Attacks by ground troops against terrorist training camps and other facilities: United States Great Britain France Favor 84% 78% 80% Oppose 11% 16% 16% Since addressing the root causes of terrorism runs contrary to the military model of counterterrorism as advocated by the Bush administration, strong public support indicated the potential for public opposition to the policies advocated by the Blair government.

Detention Policy The tension between the criminal justice framework supported by the British experience in Northern Ireland and the war framework advocated by the American government, as part of their "special relationship" with the United Kingdom, is reflected by the counterterrorism measures adopted after September 11, 2001.

Prior to the terrorist attacks, the British government had been criticized for adopting a series of "temporary" emergency measures in response to terrorism in Northern Ireland that were continually renewed regardless of the threat level, curtailing rights and liberties. However, the Labour Party under Blair had advocated and pursued a progressive agenda, including constitutional reform, devolution, freedom of information legislation, and the enactment of the Human Rights Act.clxix As part of this agenda, in 2000, the British government codified previous counterterrorism regulations for the sake of consistency and as a good government measure, removing or altering some of the laws that had been the most offensive to civil liberties groups.

However, the terrorist attacks in the United States and the policy decision to support American frameworks combined with the reaction of the British public to alter government policy. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001 undid many of the achievements of the 2000 terrorism bill and added additional restrictions in a variety of areas. The most controversial measure in the bill regards the detention of foreign nationals, ironically resulting in part from British treaty obligations. British immigration laws allow for the deportation of foreign nationals who pose a threat to national security, provided that they have no immigration right to remain in the country. However, following a judgment by the European Court on Human Rights, the British government cannot deport foreign nationals to a country where they will face a risk of death, torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment.clxx Supported by the British interpretation of the threat of terrorism as one posed by external sources, the ATCSA resolved this dilemma by providing for the indefinite detention of foreign nationals who could not be deported on these grounds.

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Indefinite detention runs contrary to previous British counterterrorism experience and international treaty obligations. The British had previously used internment as a security tactic, particularly in times of war or crisis. An often cited example is the now infamous Regulation 18B, which allowed for the internment without trial of enemy aliens in the United Kingdom where the Secretary of State had "reasonable cause to believe" that they were of hostile associations.clxxi Such measures had since been repudiated as counterproductive and contrary to British traditions and values. Reversing this policy required the United Kingdom to become the only European country to derogate from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which requires a public emergency. The European Convention on Human Rights was created in response to the atrocities committed in the Second World War and provides for the protection of the values and liberties inherent to a free democratic society. Britain was a "key architect" in its development and the Human Rights Act of 1998 served to give effect in domestic law to its provisions.clxxii However, all of the rights contained in the convention had already been recognized in the United Kingdom and were part of British legal traditions. clxxiii Therefore, the choice to derogate from the ECHR was particularly significant.

The ATCSA prompted public outcry and the legislation, particularly the detention provisions, were challenged in the courts. The Court of Appeal initially held that the legislation was compatible with British obligations under the ECHR.clxxiv However, while finding that the threat of terrorism constituted a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, the House of Lords determined that detention without trial was not a necessary response. The House of Lords responded largely to the discriminatory aspect of the law, which applied only to foreign nationals.clxxv The argument that foreign national pose a greater danger as part of the external threat of terrorism has since been further undermined by evidence of the involvement of British nationals in terrorist plots.clxxvi The British principal of parliamentary sovereignty does not allow the courts to strike down an act of Parliament even if it offends the ECHR, and the reactions of several political actors reflected those of Home Secretary Charles Clarke. Clarke declared, "If people start to believe that decisions at the European Court, in operating the European Convention, are not broadly in accordance with a consensus about how rights should be defended, then there will be some very difficult questions about the convention itself in Britain."

However, counterterrorism measures proved to be a politically decisive issue, handing Tony Blair the first Commons defeat of his political career. The 2005 Prevention of Terrorism reflected this pressure by replacing the detention provisions with those allowing for "control orders" to restrict a suspect's movements.

While the ATCSA represented a change in course by the British government, Prime Minister Blair would later argue that "We, of course, wanted far tougher laws against terrorism. We were prevented by opposition and then by the courts in ensuring it was done."clxxvii The "special relationship" with the United States succeeded in convincing British political leaders to adopt the framework of a war against an external threat and Prime Minister Blair supported American military responses. However, the effects of the previous British experience with terrorism in Northern Ireland weakened support among political actors, academics, and the public. As a result, the counterterrorism effort in the

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United Kingdom ultimately became "a problem of criminality and criminal justice and . . . the response has shifted to one of "proactive policing and the management of risk," where Counterterror laws are "normalized" to be more in line with existing legislation."clxxviii France I don't know whether we should use the word 'war, but what I can say is that now we are faced with a conflict of a completely new nature. – President Jacques Chiracclxxix Experience with Terrorism France has been recognized by both American and British officials as the first country to recognize the extent of the threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists and to craft a successful response.clxxx As noted in its report to the UN Security Council at the end of 2001, France had faced threats posed by a variety of different terrorist organizations for many years.clxxxi French encounters with terrorism are most often equated with its tumultuous experience in Algeria, which devolved into an unrestrained struggle against urban revolutionaries. The experience in Algeria does impact antiterrorism policies today by counselling restraint as the country seeks to recover from episodes of torture "practiced in incredible proportions, as a veritable policy" without judicial restraint and from French leaders who "declared states of emergency and practiced administrative detention in proportions that impose humility today."clxxxii However, although Americans interpreted pre-September 11 acts of terrorism in France "as a consequence of French colonialism that the French would have to face alone,"clxxxiii French antiterrorism policy today is also shaped by previous encounters with forms of terrorism unrelated to Algeria or other colonial legacies.

The French understand terrorism as existing in three separate categories, or running in "trois cercles de terrorisme."clxxxiv The categories include: ethno-nationalist separatist terrorism, such as the Corsican separatist FLNC, the left-wing "Action Direct," and groups in the French Basque region; anti-colonial violence, practiced by Algerian groups like the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC); and transnational terrorism.clxxxv In the 1980s, France became the first country to experience the new form of transnational terrorism and to distinguish between it and the previous threats posed by internal political and territorial terrorist groups.clxxxvi Following the 1985 and 1986 terrorist attacks in Paris by the Hezbollah network of Fouad Ali Saleh, the French government restructured their antiterrorism efforts, focusing on the centralization and specialization of the process.clxxxvii French antiterrorism efforts evolved over the coming years, resulting in a coordinated system of operational mechanisms and legislation and an emphasis on international cooperation.clxxxviii This system was reinforced after the 1995 and 1996 attacks by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA).clxxxix While France was threatened by transnational terrorism before the United

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States and the United Kingdom, it "had the 'chance' of being confronted early on" with the new form of terrorism and therefore more time to develop an effective response.cxc Preparedness As a result of previous experience with the threat of transnational terrorism, French intellectuals, political actors, and the French public had a higher level of preparedness at the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks than did their counterparts in the United States and the United Kingdom. Following a "short period of euphoria around the concept of a New World Order," French public discourse in the early 1990s had largely focused on the threats posed by the new security environment and the corresponding preparedness levels of the state.cxci Academic literature of the time emphasized the rising importance of non-state actors and transnational issues, such as Badie and Smouts in E Retournement du Monde and SalamÊ in Appels d'epire. In the later part of the 1990s, leading scholars, such as Delmas, Murawiec, and Vennesson, focused on the new forms that wars would take. As a whole, French "intellectuals were quicker to see terrorism as a new paradigm, a sign of the transformation of democracy, and likely to last," than were American intellectuals.cxcii These views were shared by French political actors and were exemplified by the 1994 defense White Paper. The White Paper was written on the initiative of Prime Minister Édouard Balladur under the cohabitation system and thus reflects opinions from both the Socialists and the Right. The White Paper emphasizes the unstable nature of the European security environment and the transnational nature of evolving threats to French security.cxciii The White Paper also identifies the proliferation of WMD as a serious security challenge and identifies four sources of "new vulnerabilities:" terrorism, religious extremism and nationalism, drug trafficking, and the globalization of security and communication strategies.cxciv During the 1990s, France identified events such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the civil wars in Algeria and Albania, and the development of Islamic fundamentalism as threats to French security that confirmed these understandings.cxcv Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, there was not a significant push for fundamental changes in French security policy or even for a new defence White Paper to address the situation.cxcvi Public opinion in France reflected these trends. During the 1990s, polls showed that the French public was increasingly attentive to and concerned about new security threats, such as those posed by terrorism or religious fundamentalism.cxcvii In 2001, when asked to identify a country from which a threat would originate, the majority (27 per cent) named Algeria, followed by Iraq (between 12 and 30 per cent).cxcviii French public opinion was not largely altered by the September 11, 2001, attacks. In a 2000 poll, 36 per cent of respondents identified terrorism as the "first danger for France," a number which increased to 41 per cent in 2002.cxcix As a whole, "threat perceptions and trends within the French population are more confirmed than modified or reversed post-September 2001."cc Standing in the International Community

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France's standing in the international community also impacts its antiterrorism policies.

Since World War II, "French security strategy has been the result of an unfailing anchorage in the West, its alliances and values, and a certain propensity to cultivate independence and non-alignment vis-Ă -vis the American superpower."cci The French tendency towards non-alignment is both a product of French culture and practical considerations. Since the days of de Gaulle, French self-image and foreign policy has been influence by the concept of the "grandeur" or greatness of France.ccii France considers itself as a great power, as evidenced by its seat on the UN Security Council and its position as a nuclear power, and this status "is a precious asset of which France must show itself worthy."cciii France maintains this status by following the concept of "French 'exceptionalism', simultaneously reality and fiction, contained in the conviction that France has special responsibilities, that it has a rank to hold, a particular role to play."cciv The result is a desire to maintain defence strategies that are not tied to those of their allies, particularly the American hegemon.

The desire to focus on French security strategy instead of joining or imitating an American-led war on terror also benefits practical concerns. Engaging in counterterrorism efforts abroad, particularly military measures, is extremely expensive and perhaps beyond French means. As argued by Jeremy Shapiro, the French focus on domestic efforts and non-military means also makes reason out of necessity.ccv By the time of the 1986 terrorist attacks, France had largely lost its capacity for foreign interventions and the United States had far surpassed it as a great power.ccvi The differing levels of power thus impact not only France's ability to respond to the threat of terrorism, but also its interpretation of that threat. While America offers a more hopeful attitude concerning the prospects of defeating terrorism, the "American perception may also be the sign of a country that accepts its place as a stakeholder in history, just as France is leaving it."ccvii The Discourse of French Antiterrorism Public discourse in France following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, describes terrorism as a permanent, internal threat, corresponding to a criminal justice response that also addresses the sources of terrorism. The terrorist attacks were treated "as a brutal confirmation of a pre-existing threat rather than the discovery of a previously unknown one."ccviii French security experts largely agreed that the attacks served to illustrate the increasing powerful role of non-state actors and to accelerate previously existing trends that had originated at the end of the Cold War.ccix François Heisbourg, French security expert and director of the Fondation pour la Recherche StratÊgique, described the result as 'hyper-terrorism,' a combination of the mass destructive potential of the means and the apocalyptic nature of the perpetrators.ccx However, as argued by President Jacques Chirac in January 2002, while the "destructive capacity" of the terrorists had increased, terrorism itself was not a new phenomenon.ccxi Additionally, "terrorism is not the only threat" and "the world should not organize itself solely around the response to the challenge posed by 11 September."ccxii

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French public opinion echoed his sentiments. Unlike the American and British public, the French public did not become overly concerned with their potential vulnerability to terrorist attacks and largely rejected the idea that France could be at war against terrorism.ccxiii French experience with terrorism and previous adaptations of the French legal system had served to normalize the threat. While the Bush administration vowed to win the war against terrorism and Blair sought "to act to eliminate" the threat,ccxiv the French public was willing to accommodate a level of threat in their daily lives. As observed by an American journalist living in Paris, "Though Parisians believe they are superior by birth, they do not believe, as Americans do, that they are invulnerable by right."ccxv As seen in Table 4, the French public was also less worried about the threat of terrorism than the general public in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Table 4: Public Concern about Terrorism

Public Opinion Poll: Ipsos-Public Affairs How worried are you about the threat of terrorism in your country?

March 5, 2004 United States Great Britain France very worried 17% 21% 13% somewhat worried 46% 45% 31% not too worried 28% 26% 47% not worried at all 9% 7% 9% Rather than focusing on an external war, French political discourse emphasized the internal sources of terrorism. French intellectuals largely rejected the clash of civilizations approach advocated by Samuel Huntington,ccxvi along with descriptions of the relationship between the "West" and the Islamic World or the amalgamation of terrorism and Islam.ccxvii While American and British policies distinguished between internal and international and between nationals and foreigners, the French considered these distinctions to have been "rendered partially obsolete by terrorism."ccxviii As shown

by Tsoukala's comparison of statements reported in the British and French press from September 2001 to June 2003 regarding antiterrorism measures, the primary difference between the two countries was the French belief that the origin of the threat is both internal and external.ccxix As seen in Figure 6, counterterrorism discussion in support of emergency measures in each country focused on the exceptional nature of the threat, the importance of protecting public safety, and efforts to discredit the arguments offered by the legislation's critics. However, French counterterrorism proponents largely disregarded arguments portraying asylum seekers as potential terrorists or those emphasizing the goals of protecting democracy and freedom. Instead, they emphasized the exceptional nature of the threat, which they defined as including both external and internal components.ccxx

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Figure 6: Discourse of French and British Counterterrorism Proponentsccxxi

The emphasis on internal sources of terrorism largely stems from France's ethnic composition, which includes the largest Muslim and African populations in Europe and Islam as the second largest religion.ccxxii France struggles to maintain its tradition of assimilation over multiculturalism, originally initiated as a response to racial policies under the Vichy regime,ccxxiii although factors like the achievements of the xenophobic political party Front National questions its success. The large, discontented Muslim youth population in France raises the issue of both the offer and the demand of transnational terrorism: "an ideological offer emanating from radical Islamism, but also a demand on the behalf of a group of youths craving to come to blows with a society they feel to be unjust."ccxxiv As stated by the head of the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), "the French jihadist is less cultivated, younger and more radicalised," and can therefore be considered as dangerous as the recruiting force.ccxxv As a result, French antiterrorism policies seek to target this youth population in order to decrease the demand.

French antiterrorism discourse does not dismiss external sources of terrorism, but describes the causes, such as a unipolar international system and globalizing forces, as having a long-term nature. The Le Monde article in the wake of the terrorist attacks that professed a "profound solidarity with those people, that country, the United States, to whom we are so close and to whom we owe our freedom," also proffered a suggestion for a possible cause of terrorism: American hegemony and foreign policy.ccxxvi France identifies as a security threat a unipolar international system dominated by the United States, a country that French Foreign Minister Hubert VĂŠdrine describes as a "hyperpower."ccxxvii The Le Monde article echoes these concerns by stating the dangers of "a world with no counterbalance, physically destabilized, and thus more dangerous," dominated by a nation that "in certain parts of the globe, it seems to draw nothing but hate."ccxxviii The article continues with a discussion of CIA training of Bin Laden, asking whether, "Might it not then have been America itself that created this demon?"ccxxix While French discussions of terrorism are not all this pointed, they consistently oppose a

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unilateral response. In his opening speech to the UN Security Council on September 12, 2001, France's UN Ambassador Jean-David Levitte stated, 'in deciding upon any appropriate action to combat those who resort to terrorism, . . . (a) global strategy is needed."ccxxx French Foreign Minister Hubert VĂŠdrine later remarked to the Security Council that, "combating international terrorism means acting simultaneously on many fronts. The mobilisation must be universal."ccxxxi While France is unwilling to tie its security policies to those of its allies, it is also unwilling to approve of unilateral action by its allies, particularly when it threatens to further destabilize the balance of the international system. In addition to the balance of power in the international system, French political actors identify the globalization process as a source or terrorism. Foreign Minister Hubert VĂŠdrine stigmatizes globalization as developing a fertile breeding ground for the creation of the new threats." ccxxxii French intellectuals also share these concerns. French scholar Doninique David discusses the results of accelerating globalizing forces that make the world more open while developing "abscesses," echoing the description of globalization as a possible fertile ground for the new threats.ccxxxiii Since neither the balance of power in the international system nor the spread of globalization is predicted to halt in the near future, the threat of terrorism will continue as a result.

While the French agreed that September 11, 2001, "marks the ushering in of a new age," the immediate French response was not a rush to restructure security policy, but a realization that "America is going to change."ccxxxiv As argued by Antoine Garapon, Secretary-General of the Institut des Hautes Etudes sur la Justice, While the United States believes it can solve the problem of terrorism and put an end to it one day, French counter-terrorist policy seems to accommodate the phenomenon. . . . In France, terrorism is seen as a permanent, internal phenomenon, while in the United States it is understood to be a temporary, external phenomenon.ccxxxv The concept of terrorism as a permanent, internal threat supports a response that relies primarily on the criminal justice system and on efforts to address the sources of terrorism.

As stated by the Head of the Head of the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), the French "response is judicial and not military."ccxxxvi Detention Policy French antiterrorism measures reflect support for a criminal justice framework, which views terrorism as a crime and places the responsibility for a response primarily on the criminal legal system. Rather than resorting to emergency legislation, French lawmakers have "been able to conserve judicial treatment of terrorism through regular adaptation of the law," by reacting "on a case-by-case basis to enrich their legislative arsenal with whatever provisions proved to be necessary."ccxxxvii Based on previous experiences with terrorism, the French government created a centralized and specialized judicial process to deal with the international nature and complexity of terrorist offenses. ccxxxviii Following the French Code of Criminal Procedure, acts of terrorism are handled by the procureur de la Republique, the juge d'instruction, the Tribunal correctionnel, and the Cour d'assises of

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Paris instead of by local prosecutors, magistrates, or courts.ccxxxix Magistrates who specialize in handling terrorist offenses operate from Paris, which allows them to access all of the relevant information in one place and to work closely with the French Secret Service (DST), the External Intelligence Service of the Defense Ministry (DGSE), and the Anti-terrorist Operational Coordination Unit (UCLAT).ccxl A Cour d'assises for terrorism cases is comprised of professional judges, who are better prepared to understand the complexity of terrorism cases than the ordinary citizens who serve on a Cour d'assises that hears criminal cases.ccxli The French system is also unique in that terrorism offenses are classified within criminal statutes based on the intent with which they were carried out. When otherwise ordinary offenses are determined to be terrorist offenses, the courts can apply stricter sentences; for example, imprisonment for thirty years becomes life imprisonment, twenty years in prison becomes thirty, fifteen years becomes twenty, etc.ccxlii The French criminal justice system allows for two forms of detention before an individual has been convicted of a terrorist offense: pre-charge detention and pre-trial detention. Pre-charge detention policy initially allows the police to detain an individual, with cause, for up to 24 hours. A prosecutor can then authorize detention for 24 more hours, after which judicial authorization is required. A judge can authorize detention twice more at increments of up to 24 hours, resulting in a maximum pre-charge detention time of 96 hours.ccxliii At the end of this preliminary inquiry, a prosecutor must determine whether to release the individual or to begin the investigation phase by handing the case over to a juge d'instruction. The juge d'instruction can then order pre-trial detention if necessary, for example, to protect people or evidence or prevent collusion. To do so, the juge d'instruction must charge the individual in precise terms that specifically include the offense charged and the relevant details. The case is then referred to another judge on the same court, who decides whether to affirm the pre-trial detention after hearing from the individual, the juge d’instruction and the prosecutor.ccxliv There is no legal limit to the length of pre-trial detention, an issue that has generated some controversy. Antiterrorism advocates argue that pre-trial detention has successfully thwarted bombing plots,ccxlv while detractors oppose its impact on civil liberties and on the individuals involved.ccxlvi However, an individual being held in pre-trial detention can ask to be freed at any time and all of the decisions of the juge d’instruction can be appealed before a special division of the court of appeal.ccxlvii Individuals held in police custody on suspicion of terrorist offenses are also entitled to lawyers after seventy-two hours of detention.ccxlviii Finally, an individual who was held in pre-trial detention as part of an investigation that does not result in a conviction is automatically entitled to full compensation for professional and financial losses.ccxlix While still open to criticism on human rights grounds, the French detention policy stands in marked contrast to the corresponding measures adopted by the American and British governments. Perhaps most notably, in addition to maintaining less severe detention procedures, French antiterrorism legislation post-September 11, 2001, did not strengthen either immigration or asylum regulations,ccl underscoring the French understanding of a threat with both external and internal components.

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Conclusion To understand how states perceive security threats is to know something about how they define their security environment and what value priorities they project onto their environment. – Susan E. Penskaccli The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, demonstrated the emergence of a new global threat posed by transnational, non-state actors that do not conform to traditional principles of interstate warfare. Since September 11, more than 4,300 al Qaeda operatives, originating from 49 countries, have been arrested in 97 countries.cclii Democratic nations around the world have struggled to respond to the evolving threat while taking into consideration the appropriate balance between liberty and security.

Their responses generally fall into one of two categories: either a military model, which is based on war terminology and indicates a militaristic response; or a criminal justice model, which views terrorism as a crime and relies on the state's criminal legal system for a response.ccliii Despite their common liberal democratic traditions, differing historical and political factors have led to varying interpretations of the threat of terrorism in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, resulting in the adoption of different response frameworks in each country.

At the time of the attacks, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had varying experiences with terrorism and levels of preparedness. American policymakers had limited experience with terrorism on U.S. soil and had inherited both a Cold War framework for describing terrorism and a history of ineffective criminal justice responses.

They were generally aware of the threat posed by international terrorist groups, but were unprepared for the scale and immediacy of the attacks on both a political and a personal level. This amplified the psychological impact of the attacks, which strengthened the political position of the Bush administration. British policymakers had a long history of dealing with terrorism stemming from the Troubles in Northern Ireland, which included a series of negative experiences with counterterrorism policies based on the military model.

However, they had overlooked the threat posed by international terrorism in a post-Cold War world and were similarly unprepared for the scale of the attacks. In contrast, France had experience not only with ethno-nationalist separatist terrorism and anti-colonial violence, but also with transnational terrorism. At the time of the September 11 attacks, French policymakers had already created a centralized and specialized process within the French criminal justice system to address acts of terrorism. While French policymakers and the French public were similarly shocked by the scale of the September 11 attacks, they viewed them as a confirmation of a pre-existing threat as opposed to the indication of a new threat that confronted their American and British counterparts.

The position that each country occupied in the international system also influenced their interpretation of the threat and the resources they could devote to their response. The United States was in the unique position as the sole remaining super power in the international community with an unprecedented level of power and influence. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States had faced the absence of an existential threat to focus American foreign policy and shape the national identity. This combination created

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an existing framework to which international terrorism could be adapted and the resources with which to address it on an international scale. The United Kingdom had inherited a sense of global responsibility as a result of its colonial legacy and its status as a great power. However, it had fewer resources to devote to the effort. The United Kingdom also had historical, cultural, and political incentives to maintain its "special relationship" with the United States, which would best be accomplished by adopting the counterterrorism frameworks proffered by the Bush administration. French resources were similarly limited, precluding the possibility of foreign interventions without international cooperation. While France was similarly committed to fulfilling its obligations as a great power, French policymakers were inclined to respond to security threats in a way that demonstrated their independence from American hegemony.

In response to the attacks, American policymakers reverted to the Cold War military framework, substituting terrorism for communism as an existential threat. The Bush administration defined the attacks as acts of war, indicating a temporary, external threat that could be eradicated with military action. American counterterrorism discourse was largely framed in the terms of a Manichean struggle, which discouraged attempts to address the sources of support for terrorism and encouraged increasing demonization of the enemy. Consistent with this terminology, the Bush administration adopted a military model of counterterrorism, including expanded detention policies for non-citizens and continued attempts to reduce the rights of detainees. British counterterrorism discourse demonstrated an acceptance of terrorism as an external threat, as well as the psychological impact of the September 11 attacks on the British public. However, it also revealed an adherence to the criminal justice framework supported by British experience with terrorism in Northern Ireland. Contrary to these sentiments, the Blair government initially decided to adopt the military framework advocated by the Bush administration.

British policies similarly discriminated against non-citizens, requiring a derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights. Ultimately, however, a series of court decisions, political defeats, and increasingly vocal public opposition forced the Blair government to alter counterterrorism policies so as to begin to return to the criminal justice model. In contrast, France remained consistent with their counterterrorism approach. French counterterrorism discourse defined the threat as ongoing, with both internal and external elements. French policymakers largely maintained their preexisting criminal justice framework for addressing acts of terrorism and did not initiate any new restrictions regarding asylum or immigration.

The differing experiences of these three countries illustrate the variety of factors that can influence the ways in which a country interprets and responds to a threat to its security.

As stated by Martha Crenshaw, American counterterrorism policy is not just a response to the threat of terrorism, whether at home or abroad, but a reflection of the domestic political process. Perceptions of the threat of terrorism and determination and implementation of policy occur in the context of a policy debate involving government institutions, the media, interest groups, and the elite and mass publics.ccliv

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While Crenshaw's observations were limited to the American experience, her principles can be extrapolated to each country. The strong political positions of the Bush administration after the attacks attracted congressional support and the American separation of powers principle protected executive authority when approval ratings began to drop. The parliamentary system and doctrine of parliamentary supremacy allowed the Blair government to make significant changes following the attacks, but also increased Blair's vulnerability to a loss of power. A political agreement in France between the leftwing coalition government and the opposition prevented French antiterrorism legislation from being referred to the Constitutional Council, decreasing debate and encouraging the inclusion of unrelated measures in the legislation.cclv The political process in each country serves to amplify the effect of preexisting historical and political factors. That these factors incline countries towards various interpretive frameworks, in this case a military model and a criminal justice model, serves as useful purpose. As stated by H. Steinert, "metaphors, models or paradigms are ways of making sense of our experiences; they summarize whole networks of concepts by which we understand the world. In turn, such understandings in terms of a specific metaphor determine how we act in a situation."cclvi As a result, counterterrorism policy becomes a reflection of a nation's individual history and identity and establishes a trajectory for future action. Attempts to isolate this action from its causes lead to misunderstandings and frustration, discouraging international cooperation. Instead of determining that "it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world,"cclvii we should accept that, although Europeans and Americans are viewing the same world, they do so through the lens of their own metaphors.

See Bibliography for Tilting the Scales: Balancing Security and Liberty in Antiterrorism Frameworks of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in Appendix I: Bibliographies

Endnotes i

Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). iiii Kevin A. O'Brien, "France," in Europe Confronts Terrorism, ed. Karin von Hippel, 21 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). iii Since the introduction of militant Islamicism, casualty rates from European terrorist attacks have significantly increased: from an average 4.47 casualty per incident rate in the 1970s, to 4.87 in the 1980s, to 12.29 in the 1990s, and 14.49 in 2000-2003. Robert S. Leiken, "Europe's Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism," Center for Immigration Studies, Backgrounder 4 (April 2005). http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back405.pdf. iv Paul Cornish, "The United Kingdom," in Europe Confronts Terrorism, ed. Karin von Hippel, 150 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

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v

As stated by Benjamin Franklin, "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." vi J. Large, "Democracy and Terrorism: The Impact of the Anti," International IDEA Policy Paper (Stockholm: International IDEA, March 2005), 140. vii For example, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were, respectively, in first, second, and fourth place on a name-and-shame list published jointly by Human Rights Watch, Reporters Sans Frontières, and the International Federation of Human Rights. Le Nouvel Observateur, "Etranger, le 11 September, côté liberticide," 15 Jan. 2002. www.nouvelobs.com. viii J. Large, "Democracy and Terrorism: The Impact of the Anti," International IDEA Policy Paper (Stockholm: International IDEA, March 2005), 143. ix Martha Crenshaw, "Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd Edition, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 497 (Dubuque, Iowa: McGraw-Hill, 2006). x J. Large, "Democracy and Terrorism: The Impact of the Anti," International IDEA Policy Paper (Stockholm: International IDEA, March 2005), 143. xi Roy J Eidelson and Mary D. Plummer, "Self and Nation: A Comparison of Americans' Beliefs before and after 9/11," Journal of Peace Psychology 11, no. 2 (2005): 153-175; Robin Goodwin, "Terror threat perception and its consequences in contemporary Britain," The British Journal of Psychology 96, no. 4 (November 2005): 389-406; Jacqueline M. Gray and Margaret A. Wilson, "Understanding the 'War on Terrorism': Responses to 11 September 2001," Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 1 (January 2006): 23-36; Randall D. Marshall, "The Psychology of Ongoing Threat: Relative Risk Appraisal, the September 11 Attacks, and Terrorism-Related Fears," American Psychologist 62, no. 4 (May/June 2007): 304-16. xii Donald P. Haider-Markel, Mark R. Joslyn, and Mohammad Tarek Al-Baghal, "Can We Frame the Terrorist Threat? Issue Frames, the Perception of Threat, and Opinions on Counterterrorism Policies," Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 545-559; David Martin Jones, "The Commentariat and Discourse Failure: Language and Atrocity in Cool Britannia," International Affairs 82, no. 6 (Nov. 2006): 1077-100; John Mueller, "Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration," International Studies Perspectives 6, no. 2 (May 2005): 208-234; Anastassia Tsoukala, “Democracy in the Light of Security: British and French Political Discourses on Domestic CounterTerrorism Policies,” Political Studies 54 (2006): 602-627. xiii Leland M. Griffin, "When Dreams Collide: Rhetorical Trajectories in the Assassination of President Kennedy," Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (May 1984): 111-131. xiv W. Jason Fisher, "Militant Islamicist Terrorism in Europe: Are France & the United Kingdom Legally Prepared for the Challenge?" Washington University Global Studies Law Review 6, 255 (2007); Clive Walker, "Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom," Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 5, 1137 (November 2006); John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden, "Forfeiting 'Enduring Freedom' for 'Homeland Security:' A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's AntiTerrorism Initiatives," American University Law Review 51, 1081 (August 2002). xv Dirk Haubrich, “September 11, Anti-Terror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France, and Germany Compared,” Government and Opposition (2003). xvi Antonio Vercher, "Terrorism in Europe: an International Comparative Legal Analysis," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 69, no. 2 (April 1993). xvii Christopher Harding, "Special Feature: Terrorism, Security, and Rights International Terrorism: The British Response," Sing. J. Legal Stud. 2001, 16 (2002). xviii President George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," Office of the Press Secretary (20 Sept. 2001). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109208.html xix For a condensed history of U.S. counterterrorism policy, see William Rosenau, "US Counterterrorism Policy," in How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West, eds. Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, 133-156 (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007); For a more detailed history, see David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of the Empire: The United States and International Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997) xx William Rosenau, "US Counterterrorism Policy," in How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West, eds. Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, 135 (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).

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xxi

Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 231. xxii Jeremy Shapiro and Bénédicte Suzan, "The French Experience of Counter-Terrorism," Survival 45, 1 (Spring 2003): 69. xxiii Richard Falk, "Encroaching on the Rule of Law: Post-9/11 Policies within the United States," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 17 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); S/CT, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2004), 144. xxiv Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 256. xxv "Bin-Ladin, Others Sign Fatwa to 'Kill Americans' Everywhere." 23 Feb. 1998. http://www.mtholyoke,edu/acad/intrel/news/osama.htm. xxvi George Tenet, "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World," Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2001/UNCLASWWT_02072001.html. xxvii William Rosenau, "US Counterterrorism Policy," in How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West, eds. Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, 136 (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). xxviii Ibid. 135. xxix Ibid. xxx Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). xxxi Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004), 18. xxxii Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 222; James Sperling," United States: the Unrelenting Search for an Existential Threat in the Twenty-First Century," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 166 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). xxxiii William Rosenau, "US Counterterrorism Policy," in How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West, eds. Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, 137 (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). xxxiv James Sperling," United States: the Unrelenting Search for an Existential Threat in the Twenty-First Century," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). xxxv "Statement of Daniel Byman, to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." 31 March 2003. http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/liberty/congress/9-11_commission/030331byman.htm xxxvi William Rosenau, "US Counterterrorism Policy," in How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West, eds. Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, 138 (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). xxxvii Ibid. xxxviii Barton Gellman, "A Strategy's Cautious Evolution: Before Sept. 11, the Bush Anti-Terror Effort Was Mostly Ambition," Washington Post, A01, 20 Jan. 2002. xxxix Ibid. xl Ibid. xli Brigadier General Russell D. Howard (Ret.), "Understanding Al Qaeda's Application of the New Terrorism – The Key to Victory in the Current Campaign" in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd Edition, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 94 (Dubuque, Iowa: McGraw-Hill, 2006). xlii President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Pearl Harbor Address to the Nation," 8 Dec. 1941. http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrpearlharbor.htm xliii David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001). xliv Walter Laqueur, "Left, Right, and Beyond: The Changing Face of Terror," in How Did This Happen: Terrorism and the New War, ed. James F. Hoge Jr. and Gideon Rose, 71 (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

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xlv

Richard Falk, "Encroaching on the Rule of Law: Post-9/11 Policies within the United States," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 20 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). xlvi Roy J. Eidelson and Mary D. Plummer, "Self and Nation: A Comparison of Americans' Beliefs before and after 9/11," Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 11, no. 2 (2005): 153-175. xlvii Randall D. Marshall, "The Psychology of Ongoing Threat: Relative Risk Appraisal, the September 11 Attacks, and Terrorism-Related Fears," American Psychologist 62, no. 4 (May/June 2007): 304-16. xlviii Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav, "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (July 2005): 593-608. xlix Id. l President George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," Office of the Press Secretary (20 Sept. 2001). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html li Hubert VĂŠdrine, Face Ă l'hyperpuissance: textes et discourse, 1995-2003 (Paris: Fayard, 2003). lii For a discussion of the possibilities of globalization, see Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Fat: A brief history of the twenty-first century (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Girouz, 2005); Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). For a discussion of the limitations of globalization, see Niall Ferguson, "Sinking Globalization," Foreign Policy 84, no. 2 (March/April 2005): 64-77; Geoffrey Garret, "Globalization's Missing Middle," Foreign Policy 83, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2004): 8496. liii Anatol Lieven, America Right of Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism, 125 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 125. liv John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term," Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 2005). lv Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). lvi Richard N. Haass, The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course (New York : Public Affairs, 2005). lvii James Sperling," United States: the Unrelenting Search for an Existential Threat in the Twenty-First Century," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 161 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). lviii Anatol Lieven, America Right of Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism, 125 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). lix James Sperling," United States: the Unrelenting Search for an Existential Threat in the Twenty-First Century," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 161 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). lx Anatol Lieven, America Right of Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism, 125 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). lxi Anatol Lieven. Personal Interview. Kings College, London. 13 Dec. 2007. lxii Richard Falk, "Encroaching on the Rule of Law: Post-9/11 Policies within the United States," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 15-16 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). lxiii David Zarefsky, "George W. Bush Discovers Rhetoric: September 20, 2001 and the U.S. Response to Terrorism," in The Ethos of Rhetoric, ed. M. J. Hyde, 139 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004). lxiv William Safire, "On Language: Words at War," New York Times Magazine, 30 Sept. 2001, 26. lxv President George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," Office of the Press Secretary (20 Sept. 2001). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html lxvi William Rosenau, "US Counterterrorism Policy," in How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West, eds. Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, 133 (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). lxvii Remarks by Congressional leaders include all of the floor statements made in both the Senate and the House by the majority and minority leaders, majority and minority whips, chairs of the Armed Services Committees, and chairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Elizabeth Nielsen and Sarah Reichardt, "Framing the Counterterrorism Response:

Nielsen ! Titling the Scales

September 11, 2001, to the War in Iraq," Unpublished paper prepared for Political Science 395 "Framing Strategies in Politics," 17 March 2008. lxviii Administration statements include 15 speeches delivered by President Bush in 2001 following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Elizabeth Nielsen and Sarah Reichardt, "Framing the Counterterrorism Response: September 11, 2001, to the War in Iraq," Unpublished paper prepared for Political Science 395 "Framing Strategies in Politics," 17 March 2008. lxix Anastassia Tsoukala, "Democracy in the Light of Security: British and French Political Discourses on Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies," Political Studies 54, no. 3 (Oct. 2006): 607-627. lxx Richard Falk, "Encroaching on the Rule of Law: Post-9/11 Policies within the United States," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 23 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). lxxi For example, Robert Ivie and Philip Heymann dismiss simplifying terrorism to a crime because of its political motivations but also reject the warfare definition because of its purposeful targeting of civilians, instead proposing a hybrid of the two options. Robert L. Ivie, Democracy and America's War of Terror (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2005), 131; Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society, 6-7 (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998); Bruce Ackerman constitutes the terrorist attacks as an emergency, requiring an emergency constitution. Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Paul Pillar compares antiterrorism efforts to a continuous public health campaign.

Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 217-20. lxxii Mary E. Stuckey, The President as Interpreter-in-Chief (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991). lxxiii David Zarefsky, "George W. Bush Discovers Rhetoric: September 20, 2001 and the U.S. Response to Terrorism," in The Ethos of Rhetoric, ed. M. J. Hyde, 136-155 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004). lxxiv Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, 5 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). lxxv Richard H. Kohn, "A War Like No Other," Organization of American Historians Newsletter 29, no. 4 (Nov. 2001). lxxvi Anatol Lieven, America Right of Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1. lxxvii Quoted by Anatol Lieven. Personal Interview. Kings College, London. 13 Dec. 2007. lxxviii Joseph Nye, "The Powers to Lead," Address at Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. 9 April 2008. lxxix Quoted in Steve Kraske and Rick Montgomery, "Be Patient in Terror War, Rumsfeld Says." Kansas City Star, 3 March 2006. http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/archives. lxxx William Rosenau, "US Counterterrorism Policy," in How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West, eds. Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, 133 (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). lxxxi U.S. Congressman Benjamin Gilman, "Another Day of Infamy," Congressional Record – House 147, no. 117 (11 Sept. 2001). lxxxii Quoted in Katleen T. Rhem, "Rumsfeld: Ending Terrorism Could Take Long Time," American Forces Press Service, 9 Sept. 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/n09092004_2004090909.html lxxxiii Elizabeth Nielsen and Sarah Reichardt, "Framing the Counterterrorism Response: September 11, 2001, to the War in Iraq," Unpublished paper prepared for Political Science 395 "Framing Strategies in Politics," 17 March 2008. lxxxiv James Sperling," United States: the Unrelenting Search for an Existential Threat in the Twenty-First Century," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 188 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). lxxxv Ibid. 166. lxxxvi Richard Falk, "Encroaching on the Rule of Law: Post-9/11 Policies within the United States," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 24 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). lxxxvii Elizabeth Nielsen and Sarah Reichardt, "Framing the Counterterrorism Response: September 11, 2001, to the War in Iraq," Unpublished paper prepared for Political Science 395 "Framing Strategies in Politics," 17 March 2008.

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Robert L. Ivie, Democracy and America's War of Terror (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2005), 131; Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998), 127-129. lxxxix Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). xc Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism, 2nd edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 9-10; Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995). xci Phil Scaton, ed. Beyond September 11: An Anthology of Dissent (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 2. xcii A.W. Brian Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention without Trial in Wartime Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 391. xciii United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 723 (1990) (Stevens J., dissenting). xciv David P. Forysthe, "The United States: Protecting Human Dignity in an Era of Insecurity," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 38 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). xcv Nancy Chang, Silencing Political Dissent (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002), 62; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 411(a) (to be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182). xcvi Nancy Chang, Silencing Political Dissent (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002), 62. xcvii USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a) (to be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182). xcviii Ibid. xcix Ibid. § 411 (to be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182). c Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). ci David Cole, "Enemy Aliens," Stanford Law Review 54, 953 (2002): 971. cii USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a)(3) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). ciii Ibid. § 412(a)(5) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). civ Ibid. § 412(a)(2) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). cv Ibid. cvi Ibid. § 412(a)(6) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). cvii Ibid. § 412(a)(6), (7) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). cviii Dana Keith, "In the Name of National Security of Insecurity?: The Potential Indefinite Detention of Noncitizen," Florida Journal of International Law 16, no. 405 (June 2004). cix Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) cx Ibid. cxi Dick Cheney, "Remarks by Vice President Dick Cheney to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce," 14 Nov. 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/print/vp20011114-1.html cxii Peter Katel and Kenneth Jost, "Treatment of Detainees: Are Suspected Terrorists Being Treated Unfairly?" CQ Researcher 16, no. 29 (25 Aug. 2006). http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2006082500&type=hitlist&num=1 cxiii Barton Gellman and Jo Becker, "A Different Understanding with the President," Washington Post, 24 June 2007, A01. cxiv Alberto R. Gonzales, "Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban," Memorandum for the President, 25 Jan. 2002. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-svr/politics/documents/cheney/gonzales_addington_memo_jan252001.pdf cxv Barton Gellman and Jo Becker, "Pushing the Envelope on Presidential Power," Washington Post, 25 June 2007. cxvi Ibid. cxvii Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) cxviii Barton Gellman and Jo Becker, "Pushing the Envelope on Presidential Power," Washington Post, 25 June 2007. cxix Ibid. cxx "Prime Minister's Interview with CNN: 'We Are at War with Terrorism,'" 10 Downing Street, 16 Sept. 2001. http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1599.asp.

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cxxi

Michael S. Goodman. Personal Interview. Kings College, London. 13 December 2007.

Sir Hugh Orde, "Policing the Past to Police the Future," International Review of Law. Computers & Technology 20, no. 1/2 (March 2006): 37-48. cxxiii Todd Landman,. "The United Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and Counterterror," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 78 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). cxxiv Mark Sedgewick, "Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd Edition, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 194 (Dubuque, Iowa: McGraw-Hill, 2006). cxxv Anatol Lieven. Personal Interview. Kings College, London. 13 Dec. 2007. cxxvi Mark Sedgewick, "Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd Edition, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 194 (Dubuque, Iowa: McGraw-Hill, 2006). cxxvii Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith QC, "Symposium: Global Constitutionalism: Keynote Address," Stanford Law Review 59, 1155 (March 2007). cxxviii Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," Mark Sedgewick, "Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd Edition, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 61 (Dubuque, Iowa: McGraw-Hill, 2006). cxxix Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith QC, "Symposium: Global Constitutionalism: Keynote Address," Stanford Law Review 59, 1155 (March 2007). cxxx Colm Campbell, "Northern Ireland: Violent Conflict and the Resilience of International Law," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 71 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). cxxxi Paul Cornish. "The United Kingdom," in Europe Confronts Terrorism, ed. Karin von Hippel, 147 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). cxxxii General Wayne A. Downing (Ret.), "The Global War on Terrorism: Refocusing the National Strategy," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd Edition, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 439 (Dubuque, Iowa: McGraw-Hill, 2006). cxxxiii Elke Krahmann, "United Kingdom: Punching Above Its Weight," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 93 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). cxxxiv Id. p. 95 cxxxv Id. p. 96 cxxxvi Elke Krahmann, "United Kingdom: Punching Above Its Weight," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 94 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). cxxxvii Ibid. cxxxviii Ibid. cxxxix R. Jenkins, Churchill (London: Pan Macmillan, 2002), 676-77. cxl Marc Houben, International Crisis Management: The Approach of European States (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 122. cxli J. Dumbrell, "The US-UK "Special Relationship" in a World Twice Transformed," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (2004): 438. cxlii Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), 326. cxliii President George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," Office of the Press Secretary (20 Sept. 2001). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109208.html. cxliv Elke Krahmann, "United Kingdom: Punching Above Its Weight," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 100 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). cxlv J. Dumbrell, "The US-UK "Special Relationship" in a World Twice Transformed," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (2004): 442. cxlvi Ibid. 443. cxlvii Lord Hurd, "Speech to RUSI," 12 Oct. 1992. cxxii

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Marc Houben, International Crisis Management: The Approach of European States (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 122. cxlix Quoted in John Kampfner, Blair's Wars (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 117. cl W. Shawcross, Allies: The United States, Britain, Europe and the War in Iraq (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 50. cli J. Dumbrell, "The US-UK "Special Relationship" in a World Twice Transformed," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (2004): 440-441. clii Ibid. 446. cliii David Marquand, "The End of the Affair," New Statesman, 24 Nov. 2003, 20. cliv J. Dumbrell, "The US-UK "Special Relationship" in a World Twice Transformed," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (2004): 438. clv Marc Houben, International Crisis Management: The Approach of European States (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 122. clvi Quoted in John Kampfner, Blair's Wars (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 279. clvii Anatol Lieven. Personal Interview. Kings College, London. 13 Dec. 2007. clviii The British newspapers include: The Times, The Guardian, and The Independent. Anastassia Tsoukala, "Democracy in the Light of Security: British and French Political Discourses on Domestic CounterTerrorism Policies," Political Studies 54, no. 3 (Oct. 2006): 607-627. clix Anastassia Tsoukala, "Defining the Terrorist Threat in the Post-September 11th Era," in Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes: The (In)Security Games, eds. Didier Bigo, et al., 50-110 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006). clx Ibid. 56. clxi Ibid. 50-110. clxii Ibid. clxiii Elke Krahmann, "United Kingdom: Punching Above Its Weight," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 97 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). clxiv Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith QC, "Symposium: Global Constitutionalism: Keynote Address," Stanford Law Review 59, 1155 (March 2007). clxv Privy Counsellor Review Committee, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review: Report, 8. clxvi Jacqueline M. Gray and Margaret A. Wilson. "Understanding the 'War on Terrorism': Responses to 11 September 2001," Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 1 (Jan. 2006): 23-36. clxvii John Major and Kim Campbell, "Terrorism in Democracies," IXXI Breakfast Conversations, London School of Economics, 1 Dec. 2005. clxviii Elke Krahmann, "United Kingdom: Punching Above Its Weight," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 95 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). clxix Todd Landman, "The United Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and Counterterror," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 78 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). clxx Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996). clxxi Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith QC, "Symposium: Global Constitutionalism: Keynote Address," Stanford Law Review 59, 1155 (March 2007). clxxii Todd Landman, "The United Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and Counterterror," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 76 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). clxxiii Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith QC, "Symposium: Global Constitutionalism: Keynote Address," Stanford Law Review 59, 1155 (March 2007). clxxiv A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2002) EWCA (Civ) 1502, (2004) Q.B. 335 clxxv A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2004) UKHL 56, (2005) 2 A. C. 68 (H.L.) clxxvi Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith QC, "Symposium: Global Constitutionalism: Keynote Address," Stanford Law Review 59, 1155 (March 2007). clxxvii Todd Landman, "The United Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and Counterterror," in National Insecurity and Human Right: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 75 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

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clxxviii

Ibid. 78.

Office of the Press Secretary, "President Chirac Pledges Support: Remarks by President Bush and President Chirac of France in Photo Opportunity," The White House, 18 Sept. 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010918-8.html clxxx Roger Blitz, "Blair Looks to France For Lessons on Expelling Islamist Extremists: The Prime Minister Wants Similar Powers to Other Governments," Financial Times, 9 Aug. 2005. clxxxi UNSC, "Report submitted by France to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001," UN Doc S/2001/1274 – 27 December 2001. www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/1274e.pdf clxxxii Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). clxxxiii Ibid. clxxxiv Kevin A. O'brien, "France," in Europe Confronts Terrorism, ed. Karin von Hippel, 20 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). clxxxv Ibid. clxxxvi Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). clxxxvii Ludo Block, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of French Counter-Terrorism," Terrorism Monitor 3, no.

17 (8 Sept. 2005). http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369780 clxxxviii Kevin A. O'brien, "France," in Europe Confronts Terrorism, ed. Karin von Hippel, 20 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). clxxxix Ludo Block, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of French Counter-Terrorism," Terrorism Monitor 3, no.

17 (8 Sept. 2005). http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369780 cxc Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). cxci Thierry Tardy, "France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 27 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). cxcii Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). cxciii Ministère de la Defénsek, Livre Blanc sur la Defénse, La documentation Française. (1994). cxciv Ibid. cxcv Thierry Tardy, "France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 28 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). cxcvi Ibid. cxcvii See "Les Français et la Défense nationale," opinion polls conducted every year by the French Ministry of Defence Information Services (DICOD). cxcviii H. Mendras, "Les Français et l'armée," Revue de l'OFCE 86 (2003): 134-169. cxcix Thierry Tardy, "France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 30 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). cc Ibid. cci Ibid. 25. ccii Marc Houben, International Crisis Management: The Approach of European States (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 143. cciii Brigitte Stern, United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: A Guide to French Policies (New York: United Nations University Press, 1998), 8. cciv Thierry Tardy, "France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 25 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). clxxix

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ccv

Jeremy Shapiro & Benedicte Suzan, "The French Experience of Counter-terrorism," Survival (Spring 2003): 91-93. ccvi Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). ccvii Ibid. ccviii Thierry Tardy, "France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 29 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). ccix Ibid. 30. ccx François Heisbourg, Hyperterrorisme: La Nouvelle Guerre (Paris: Odile Jacob), 11-12. ccxi Jacque Chirac's speech, Elysée Palace, Paris, 4 Jan. 2002. ccxii Jacque Chirac's speech, Conference of the Ambassadors, Elysée Palace, Paris, 29 Aug. 2002. ccxiii Thierry Tardy, "France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 31 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). ccxiv Guardian, "Iraq: Blair Speech: 'A global threat needs a global response,'" 6 March 2004. ccxv Adam Gopnik, Paris to the Moon (New York: Random House, 2000), 20. ccxvi Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (New York: Touchstone, 1997). ccxvii Thierry Tardy, "France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy," in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 30 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). ccxviii Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). ccxix Anastassia Tsoukala, "Democracy in the Light of Security: British and French Political Discourses on Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies," Political Studies 54, no. 3 (Oct. 2006): 607-627. ccxx Ibid. ccxxi Ibid. ccxxii Jean-Benoit Nadeau and Julie Barlow, Sixty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong (Why We Love France But Not the French) (Sourcebooks, Inc. 2003), 296. ccxxiii Norma Claire Moruzzi, "Contextualizing Cultural Conflicts: The Headscarf Debate in France, Iran, and Turkey," Panel at the Northwestern University Conference on Human Rights, Evanston, IL. 11 April 2008. ccxxiv Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). ccxxv Le Monde. "Le djihadiste francias est plus fruste, plus jeune, plus radicalise (Interview with Pierre de Bousquet)," 9, 25 May 2005. ccxxvi Jean-Marie Colombani, "Nous sommes tous Américains," Le Monde, 12 Sept. 2001. ccxxvii Hubert Védrine, Face à l'hyperpuissance: textes et discourse, 1995-2003 (Paris: Fayard, 2003). ccxxviii Jean-Marie Colombani, "Nous sommes tous Américains," Le Monde, 12 Sept. 2001. ccxxix Ibid. ccxxx United Nations Security Council: 56th year 4370th meeting, New York, 12 Sept. 2001. S/PV.4370. www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/pv4370e.pdf ccxxxi United National Security Council: 56th year, 4413th meeting, New York, 12 Nov. 2001. S/PV.4413. www.un.org/Docs/sc/committeees/1373/pv4413e.pdf ccxxxii Hubert Védrine, Les cartes de la France à l'heure de la mondialisation (dialogue avec Dominique Moïsei) (Paris: Fayard, 2000). ccxxxiii Doninique David, "11 septembre: premières leçons strateégiques," Politique étrangère 4 (2001): 765775. ccxxxiv Jean-Marie Colombani, "Nous sommes tous Américains," Le Monde, 12 Sept. 2001.

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ccxxxv

Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). ccxxxvi Le Monde. "Le djihadiste francias est plus fruste, plus jeune, plus radicalise (Interview with Pierre de Bousquet)," 9, 25 May 2005. ccxxxvii Antoine Garapon, "Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: the Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms in France and the United States of America," Cardozo Law Review 27, 2041 (March 2006). ccxxxviii W. Jason Fisher, "Militant Islamicist Terrorism in Europe: Are France & the United Kingdom Legally Prepared for the Challenge?" Washington University Global Studies Law Review 6, no. 255 (2007). ccxxxix Code de procedure penale [C. pr. pen.] art. 706-17 (Fr.); Stephanie Dagron, "Country Report on France," in Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty? eds.

Christian Walter et al. (2004). ccxl Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, Confronting "the Enemy Within": Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 2004), 21. ccxli Code de procedure penale [C. pr. pen.] art. 706-25 (Fr.). ccxlii Code penal [C. pen.] art. 421-3 (Fr.). ccxliii Code de procedure penale [C. pr. pen.] art. 706-23 (Fr.). ccxliv House of Lords/House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, "Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention, Twenty-fourth Report of Session 2005-2006," HL Paper 240, HC 1576 (24 July 2006). ccxlv Bruce Crumley, "Targeting Terrorism," France Magazine (Spring 2004): 6. ccxlvi Calliope Makedon Sudborough, "Note: The War Against Fundamental Rights: French Counterterrorism Policy and the Need to Integrate International Security and Human Rights Agreements," Suffolk Transnational Law Review 30, 459 (Summer, 2007); Michael McColgan and Alessandro Attanasio, "La Porte Ouverte a L'Arbitraire, Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme," Mission Internationale D'Enquete: France, Rapport no. 271 (Jan. 1999). http://www.fidh.org/rapports/r271.htm. ccxlvii House of Lords/House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, "Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention, Twenty-fourth Report of Session 2005-2006," HL Paper 240, HC 1576 (24 July 2006). ccxlviii Code de procedure penale [C. pr. pen.] art. 63-4 (Fr.). ccxlix House of Lords/House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, "Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention, Twenty-fourth Report of Session 2005-2006," HL Paper 240, HC 1576 (24 July 2006). ccl Dirk Haubrich, “September 11, Anti-Terror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France, and Germany Compared,” Government and Opposition (2003): 8. ccli Susan E. Penska, "Defining the Enemy: EU and US Threat Perceptions after 9/11," in European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War, eds. Gärtner, Heinz and Ian M. Cuthbertson, 19 (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2005). cclii Brigadier General Russell D. Howard (Ret.), "Understanding Al Qaeda's Application of the New Terrorism – The Key to Victory in the Current Campaign," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd Edition, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 95 (Dubuque, Iowa: McGraw-Hill, 2006). ccliii J. Large, "Democracy and Terrorism: The Impact of the Anti," International IDEA Policy Paper (Stockholm: International IDEA, March 2005), 140. ccliv Martha Crenshaw, "Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd Edition, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 496 (Dubuque, Iowa: McGraw-Hill, 2006). cclv Anastassia Tsoukala, "Democracy in the Light of Security: British and French Political Discourses on Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies," Political Studies 54, no. 3 (Oct. 2006): 607-627. cclvi Quoted in Anastassia Tsoukala, "Defining the Terrorist Threat in the Post-September 11th Era," in Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes: The (In)Security Games, eds. Didier Bigo, et al., 56 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006). cclvii Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review, 116 (June-July 2002).

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Sustaining Authoritarian Rule: The Rise of the Business Class and Descent of the Ulama in Saudi Arabia Kira D. Baiasu, M.A., American University in Cairo, Egypt In 1980, James Piscatori asserted that the inability of the House of Saud to adapt to political trends had slowly worn away at the strength of the Saudi state. He wrote, “Most observers of the Kingdom have looked on its history and seen, not remarkable resilience and acceptable compromise, but internal contradictions and the steady wearing down of old ways. They believe that soon enough the tricky business of innovation and holding the ulama in check will become an impossible task even for the limberest Muslim mind and the most patient of technocratic characters” (Piscatori 1980, 137). At the time, Piscatori’s assessment was plausible. In addition to the ulama’s increasing obstinacy, the monarchy had recently faced Juhayman and his challenge to their legitimacy in the 1979 Siege of Mecca. However, if Piscatori’s claim of Saudi political stagnation were raised today, it would ignore the transformative potential of the regimes current attempts at reshaping institutions. Under the leadership of King Fahd and King Abdullah, the Saudi government has been able to slowly reform the state, its institutions, and the balance of power within its coalition of support, all at a pace that allows for relative political stability to persist. The sustainability of authoritarian regimes is dependent on the government’s flexibility in assuming a variety of political structures and policies. Over the past two decades, the Saudi rulers have proven their ability to adapt and survive.

Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy characterized by an authoritarian political system and rentier economy. In this paper, authoritarian rule is defined as, “an arbitrary and usually a personal government that uses law and the coercive instruments of the state to expedite its own purposes of monopolizing power and denies the political rights and opportunities of all other groups to compete for that power” (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 23). A rentier state, in this context, is defined as a state whose revenues consist largely of external rent, such as gas or oil revenues, foreign aid, and other kinds of direct payments (Winckler 2000, 237). Crippling of authoritarian rule may occur through a regime’s failure to acclimate to changing political tides. An inflexible state that is not adept at restructuring institutions and alliances runs the risk of collapse.

The objective of this paper is to explore the ability of the House of Saud to sustain authoritarian rule through an analysis of political reforms and the relationship between the state and the religious and economic elites. This paper identifies that the coercive capacity of the Saudi regime and its ability to maintain power lies in its access to oil rent, the continuous support of international patrons, its management of domestic coalitions of support, the authoritarian character of the state and its institutions, and the state’s ability to adapt to the changing political climate by shifting alliances. Political reforms enacted in the past two decades exemplify a remodeling of authoritarian rule in an effort to maintain the status quo. Through the establishment of the Basic Law and the inception of municipal elections, for a council that is confined to an advisory role, the House of Saud Baiasu ! Sustaining Authoritarian Rule

is able to quell calls for democratization and greater political participation. “The institutionalization of personal authoritarian rule entails the maintenance of a weak political system that is never fully institutionalized in comparison to the ruler’s own position” (Kassem 2004, 168). To the degree that the monarchy is able to repress the development of political institution outside of its control, Saudi Arabia will remain an authoritarian state wearing the mask of liberalization and reform.

The paper also attempts a paradigm shift from the traditional notion that the protracted relationship between the House of Saud and the ulama is immutable and crucial to the continuity of authoritarian rule within the Kingdom. Exploring the creation of nascent political entities, such as the Consultative Council and the Supreme Economic Council, in conjunction with the 2007 judicial reforms reveals a governmental objective aimed at modifying the coalition of politically relevant elite supporting the monarchy in order to ensure the survival of the regime. This design is carried out through an alliance shift that diminishes the political role of the ulama and increases the political participation of the business class.

The theoretical framework that will be used centers on the theory of politically relevant elites (PREs) presented by Volker Perthes in the book Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change. According to Perthes, the PRE encompass: Those top government, administrative, and political leaders who actually exercise political power or persons whose strategic position in large and powerful organizations and movements enables them to influence political decision making directly, substantially, and regularly. The PRE reaches, however, beyond the political elite to include groups and segments that contribute to political processes or influence them from various sidelines (Perthes 2004, 5).

The PRE should not be confused with temporary elites, who may gain political relevance, but do not maintain it when their function is finished. The PRE may come from all segments of society, ranging from government to businessmen and the media, and use their position to influence national discourse and political agendas. PREs can be either opinion makers or decision makers. Not only can PREs be members of government, but they can also be opposition voices or groups, as long as they maintain relevance in the political process. According to the model outlined by Perthes, there are three concentric circles that indicate the degrees of PRE influence. The first circle is comprised of the core elites who decide on strategic issues. In the second circle are the ‘intermediate elite,’ or those who exert a large amount of influence or are responsible for lesser decisions on strategic issues unless larger ones are delegated to them. In the third circle are the ‘subelite’ who indirectly influence strategic decisions or national discourse through their position in the media, government, or interest groups. The circles are not permanently defined and people or groups may find themselves moving from one to the other.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the core elite is traditionally composed of the royal family, the ulama occupy the second circle of intermediate elite, and the business class are confined to the realm of subelite. This paper unveils the current renegotiation of the

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framework. The new, evolving formula allows the monarchy to retain its place in the first circle, but begins to raise the status of the business class to intermediate elite while simultaneously diminishing the ulama to the subelite.

The paper is divided as follows: the first section will provide a history of the relationship between the ulama and the monarchy, followed by an analysis of the demise of the partnership and the 2007 judicial reforms. The following section will canvass political reforms enacted in the past two decades to appease those calling for political liberalization. The subsequent section examines the historical association between the government and the business class and the recent creation of political institutions favorable to the economic elite, which will lead into a discussion of the political benefits gained by the monarchy through closer ties to the business sector. Next, the case study of Egypt’s political and economic reforms will serve as a comparison to the current Saudi political remodeling. The paper will conclude with an assay of the transformative potential of the current political restructuring.

The Saud-Wahhab Connection Since the eighteenth century the House of Saud has enjoyed its position as the keystone of the Saudi Arabian political system with the ulama acting as its primary domestic support and a foreign power, first the British and then the United States, acting as its primary external support. Many would say that without the backing of these two powers the royal family would collapse. However, what will be suggested is that while the royal family may continue to need both domestic and foreign buttressing to maintain its authority, the composition of its domestic coalition of support can be altered.

In order to comprehend the foundation of the twenty-first century Saudi State, it is crucial to understand the alliance and origins of the relationship between the Saudi royal family and the religious establishment and how this union has perpetuated the continuity of the Saudi royal family as heads of state and the religious establishment as top advisors.

While there is no consensus on the exact date marking the establishment of Saudi Arabia, many trace the beginnings of Saudi state formation to the pact between Muhammad ibn Saud, ruler of Dir’iyyah, and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd alWahhab was of the Banu Tamim tribe that occupied several oases in Najd. The family was not wealthy, but had many religious scholars amongst its ranks. In 1744 a pact was sealed between the amir and the religious reformer. One source recounted: Muhammad ibn Sa’ud greeted Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and said, ‘This oasis is yours, do not fear your enemies. By the name of God, if all Najd was summoned to throw you out, we will never agree to expel you.’ Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab replied, ‘You are the settlement’s chief and wise man. I want you to grant me an oath that you will perform jihad (holy war) against the unbelievers. In return you will be imam, leader of the Muslim community and I will be leader in religious matters (al-Rasheed 2002, 17).

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A symbiotic relationship was formed between al-Saud and al-Wahhab. Al-Wahhab provided al-Saud with the religious legitimacy that he was lacking. At that time, many strong tribal leaders in the region claimed to be descendants of the Prophet or could at least recount a prominent tribal history. Al-Saud was unable to affirm prophetic religious decent and was a member of a relatively insignificant tribe. Conversely, al-Wahhab, held religious legitimacy, but needed the support of a political force in order to spread his message. Al-Saud adopted al-Wahhab’s religious message and its promises of wealth through zakat and political expansion under religious guidance. “The Wahhabi reform movement certainly provided an alternative source of legitimacy for the Al Sa’ud” (alRasheed 2002, 18). The marriage between al-Wahhab and al-Saud gave birth to the eventual establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

Contemporary Ulama: Participation and Cooptation In 1970 the informal alliance between the Saudi royal family and the ulama was formalized. The Ministry of Justice was established and the most senior ulama became state functionaries. Thus, the ulama were co-opted under the rule of King Faisal, as part of his bureaucratic reforms. The ulama had the right to staff their own ministry but were now part of the state bureaucracy and under the direct control of the government who paid their salaries. The Ministry of Justice was responsible for administering the country’s more than 300 Shari'a courts. The minister of justice was appointed by the King and selected from amongst the most senior ulama. He was also the de facto chief justice and was assisted by the Supreme Judicial Council, a body of 11 members chosen from amongst the top Saudi religious scholars. The Supreme Judicial Council supervised the work of the courts, reviewed all legal decisions referred by the minister of justice, expressed legal opinions on judicial questions, and approved all death sentences, amputations and stoning. Since 1983, the minister of justice has also served as chief of the Supreme Judicial Council, which further increased his influence (Metz 1993, 202).

The ulama gained an immense amount of judicial authority through the founding of the Ministry of Justice because most laws were not codified and rulings were based on independent interpretation and precedent.

The ulama were placed in charge of specific realms of society, particularly culture and education. In the new partnership, the King was pressed to consult with the ulama on educational and cultural issues and seek their approval. The King was pushed to create a separate Ministry of Education for Girls run by the ulama before the religious authorities would support female education. Other official religious agencies included: The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice, the Religious Supervision of the Holy Mosque, the Ministry of Pilgrimage, the Directorate of Religious Research, Religious Decrees and Promotion of Islam, and the General Department of Women’s Education.

While the ulama gained formalized positions and symbolic power through becoming state functionaries, by acting as an arm of the state apparatus they lost their autonomy. In 1971, King Faisal created the Council of Senior Scholars or Council of Higher Ulama (hay’at kibar al-ulama) by royal decree with the King appointing its members. Its

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purpose was to produce fatwas, books, and sermons that would legitimize the political order. The council was comprised of twenty scholars primarily from the Najd region from where Wahhabi Islam derived. Chaired by the grand mufti, who is the highest religious authority, the Council’s fatwas took on an almost legislative effect (Vogel 2000, 93, 117).

The existing informal centers of learning at mosques were replaced by state-sponsored religious universities, and concessions to ulama were made by the Saudi royal family in exchange for fatwas. “Religious decrees casting authenticity and legitimacy on almost every aspect of social and economic reform…highlights the historical context whereby his [the King’s] private commitment to faith became a political strategy to counter a series of internal and external threats” (al-Rasheed 2002, 124-25). Islam is used as a tool or language in which to articulate ideologies and meet political objectives. While Islam and its belief system do play a real part in the lives of the royal family, Islam is also utilized as a means to reach political ends. It should be noted that the relationship between the ulama and the Saudi monarchy was not characterized as one of quid pro quo.

The monarchy did need the ulama to provide religious legitimacy to political actions and had to make some concession to them, but there was no equal partnership. The House of Saud was ultimately in control and the ulama were part of the state bureaucracy.

Religious scholars were crucial to the formation of the Saudi state, and the 1970s oil revenue allowed Faisal to increase their numbers and financially reward the most devout who were elevated due to lineage, education, and piety. At the same time, religious hardliners whose political leanings and ideas were deleterious to government stability were punished by being barred from becoming civil servants at a time when governmentpaid jobs were lucrative. Excluding the confrontation between the ulama and Faisal over the Islamic nature of television in 1965, the majority of the ulama supported the King, particularly because they had been educated by state-sponsored religious universities and were state employees whose livelihood depended on the monarch.

In the 1990s, following the Gulf War, those who gave their support to the royal family were rewarded. During the war, Abd al-Aziz bin Baz gave his blessing for international military deployment and denounced ulama who challenged the decision. In response to his efforts, the core elite appointed him grand mufti in July 1993. He was also given the presidency of the Senior Ulama Council and the Administration of Islamic Studies and Rulings (Idarat al-Buhuth al-Islamiyya wal-Ifta) (Kostiner and Teitelbaum 2000, 146).

Bin Baz was known for writing the weekly al-Majalla, calling for obedience to the rulers (Kostiner and Teitelbaum 2000, 146). Following his death in December of 1999, bin Baz’s deputy, Abd al-Aziz al-Shaikh was appointed grand mufti. Al-Sheikh continued to support the viewpoint of the core elite and refrained from any attempts at grasping political power. The core elite progressively gave preference to moderate, secondgeneration scholars who engaged in political quietism.

The primary strength of the ulama lies in their ability to share public opinion and mobilize the masses. Traditionally they have been able to legitimize as well as delegitimize the royal family by providing or withdrawing support. At the same time, they are often coerced into championing the endeavors of the royal family with rewards for endorsements and penalties for opposition. While the ulama had enjoyed a position of

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significant influence for ages, in October of 2002, following the September 11 attacks, the core elite decided that religion could no longer be solely managed by the ulama and the senior ulama lost ground (Glossemeyer 2004, 153). The core elite began to make statements condemning those who abuse Islam and damage Saudi Arabia’s image abroad.

In making such proclamations, the core elite were able to perpetuate the perception of the royal family being defenders of the faith and the King being the guardian of the two holy mosques, while simultaneously usurping some power from the ulama by assuming ownership of who defines Islam. “The religious, cultural, and historical reserves of Islam allow both legitimation and delegitimation of monarchy. It depends on who is doing the interpreting” (Halliday 2000, 292).

The past decade has seen many examples of attempts to reduce the ulama’s power initiated by the royal family. In 2001, Crown Prince Abdullah publicly warned the ulama to stop inciting radicalism. By making the association between the ulama and radicalism, the ulama became tied to a more violent form of Islam by affiliation. Additionally, when Sheikh Abdullah Al Turki, member of the Council of Senior Ulama and head of the Muslim World League, made a statement implying that the ulama viewed their position as equal partners in power with the royal family, Prince Talal bin Abd al-Aziz, member of the Royal Family Council, quickly responded to the comments, utilizing the national media to explain that scholars are advisors to the ruler but do not rule themselves (Glossemeyer 2004, 154). What will now be examined is the negative effect that the 9/11 attacks had on the ulama’s position and the manner in which the event expedited the process of diminishing the religious scholars’ political relevance.

The Ulama Post 9/11 Following the Gulf War, the royal family’s legitimacy was called into question because foreign troops had been permitted to be stationed on Saudi soil. Many questioned why the royal family had spent so much money in the 1980s on U.S. weapons, only to plead for U.S. military defense because the Saudis were not well trained to use all the equipment and weapons that had been purchased. While inside the Kingdom the ulama-controlled educational system promoted the evils of the West, after the Gulf War, the close relationship between the royal family and the U.S. government was exposed. Thus, the contradiction between a government that domestically defamed the U.S. but in foreign policy befriended them came to light. In order to regain its religious legitimacy, the royal family allowed for the promotion of even more dogmatic views in the educational system to reconcile with the ulama. “As they had done many times in their short history, when confronted with internal dissent, the Saudi rulers invariably compromised with religious authorities to strengthen Wahhabi influence in the Kingdom (Posner 2005, 145).”

There are some that believe that the concessions made to the ulama in the 1990s may have contributed to the fact that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers on 9/11 were Saudi nationals (Unger 2004). Following 9/11, many Saudi citizens as well as the royal family began to reexamine the educational system and the ideas that were being ingrained in children from an early age. Saudi Arabia also began to fall under international pressure to make domestic educational reforms and crackdown on extremism. On May 22, 2002, in

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the wake of 9/11, the US was questioning its relationship with Saudi Arabia demonstrated in the congressional meeting titled, ‘The future of U.S.-Saudi relations’ (United States.

Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia 2002). As recently as March 24, 2004, the U.S. Congress held a committee meeting titled, ‘Saudi Arabia and the fight against terrorism financing: hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia’ (United States. Congress.

House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia 2004), and on November 8, 2005 a more poignant example of American feeling on Saudi involvement in propagating terror is demonstrated by a Senate meeting titled, ‘Saudi Arabia: friend or foe in the war on terror’ (United States. Congress. Senate.

Committee on the Judiciary 2007). These meetings failed to place Saudi Arabia in a good light. In the theory of elite change, “Policy shifts are often externally induced, which may speed or otherwise affect elite change. Short of an inappropriate degree of force or outright war, however, such pressure will likely not succeed in bringing about a change in the political leadership of any country in the region” (Perthes 2004, 23). International pressure has not affected the position of the royal family, but has led to the demise of the ulama’s political status with both the international community and the House of Saud, who are beginning to view the ulama as risky partners.

In 2003 the Saudi government suspended 1,300 imams and preachers. Three hundred fifty-three were sacked for extremist preaching, hundreds had their licenses withdrawn, and 1,000 clerics were sent for retraining (Posner 2005, 187). An article related to the dismissal of clerics mentioned that critics of the regime have said that the Saudi government turns a blind eye to preachers who encourage hatred of the West and points out that “the Islamic establishment in Saudi Arabia espouses a doctrine, known as Wahhabi Islam, that is not fundamentally different from the ideas embraced by Osama bin Laden and his followers” (Abdelhadi 2003). The tough handling of clerics was also a response to the domestic bombings that had taken place that year. The retraining of 40,000 more clerics was announced in March of 2008 (Abdelhadi 2008), suggesting that the difficulties that the Saudi government is having with the religious establishment are not close to over. The House of Saud’s clampdown on the religious community is clearly a response to the negative depiction, by the international media, of Saudi Arabia as a haven for extremist thought.

Even prior to the 2003 suspensions of radical religious figures, the international media exposed the terrifyingly uncompromising views of some members of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. On March 11, 2002, it was reported that 14 girls died and more than 50 were injured at a girls’ public intermediary school in Mecca. A fire ripped through the school, but the girls were unable to escape the burning building because the school gate was locked. The gate was locked to ensure strict segregation of the sexes, but when the fire occurred, the male guard who held the key to the gate was nowhere to be found. When bystanders attempted to rescue the girls, members of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice obstructed rescue attempts, beating back the girls because they were not wearing proper attire (HRW 2002). Later that month, cleric Ali bin Murshid el-Murshid was dismissed and his ministry, the Ministry of Education for Girls, was merged with the Ministry of

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Education (BBC News Online 2002). As previously discussed, in the early 1970’s King Faisal had made a deal with the ulama to place women’s education under religious control. Thus, the two agencies had been separate for approximately thirty years.

Removing women’s education from ulama control less than a year after 9/11 is significant in two respects. Firstly, the action indicated that the Saudi government felt it could take no chances with international perception and that appearances on the world stage were more important to the regime than aggravating the ulama. Secondly, revoking the ulama’s authority over a prominent ministry signified a consequential shift in domestic policy.

The progressive decline of the ulama’s authority was exacerbated in October of 2007 with the government of Saudi Arabia announcing an overhaul of the judicial system.

Under the new reforms, a supreme court would be created along with an appeals court.

New general courts would be set to replace the existing Supreme Judicial Council.

Historically, Saudi laws were generally not codified and judges were able to issue rulings based on their own interpretations of Islamic Law, using precedent when making rulings on cases. The judicial reforms constructed a more fixed legal system.

Traditionally, defendants have not had legal representation nor have they had recourse to appeal rulings. Under the new system, appeals courts would act as safeguards. The decree establishes two supreme courts for the general courts and administrative courts, which would replace the Supreme Judicial Council. The Supreme Judicial Council would now be confined to reviewing administrative issues such as judge appointments and salaries (BBC News Online 2007). The new system also creates specialized court circuits for commercial law, labor and personal status cases. In addition, ministerial tribunals dealing with labor disputes will allow for internationally-recognized process of appeal. The head of the Supreme Court will be appointed by the King. Many say that these new reforms will “chip away at the unchecked powers of the conservative clerics, who lead the judiciary” (BBC News Online 2007).

The royal family of Saudi Arabia needs both domestic and international support to survive. While the government may be publicly distancing itself from the U.S. to preserve its image, its lack of a strong military in conjunction with regional threats such as Iran questioning its legitimacy, leaves no indications that the Saudi government will sever its ties with its U.S. protector any time soon. However, the status of the ulama is increasingly coming into question.

According to Volker Perthes, “The relationship between elite change on the one hand and the regional and international relations of Arab states on the other has crosscutting effects: Elite change affects these relations, and external factors affect the composition and behavior of local elites” (Perthes 2004, 19). It appears that elite change may be occurring due to international pressures and negative perceptions which were exacerbated by the 9/11 attacks and the involvement of Saudi nationals. As the ulama become a greater liability, promoting ideas that may have contributed to terrorism both within the Kingdom and abroad, the royal family may be attempting to replace this now

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questionable body of support with one more moderate, relevant, and conducive to promoting a cohesive domestic and foreign policy.

In the past two decades, the Saudi government has engaged in a number of political reforms. In the next section we will observe that the political reforms that occurred under King Fahd and the manner in which these new documents and institutions were utilized to perpetuate personal rule.

Political Reforms While King Faisal was known for economic and infrastructural modernization, the first prominent political reforms in the Kingdom were instituted under the reign of King Fahd.

The reason for the initiation of these changes was partly to quell the growing opposition voice that resulted from a backlash against the House of Saud following the Gulf War and the presence of U.S. ‘infidel’ troops on Saudi soil. The other reason for the changes, as in the case of the Supreme Economic, was to diminish the political relevance of the ulama and increase the political relevance of the business class.

In the 1990s, many sectors of the Saudi population were unhappy with the direction that the government was taking. There was opposition to the royal family’s close relations with and dependence on the United States, and growing numbers desired a larger role in the political process. In December of 1990, amidst the tension caused by the anticipated war in Iraq, 43 academics, writers, businessmen and government official of religious as well as liberal leanings circulated a petition appealing to the King for a revision of political and legal institutions. Their requests included the systemization of fatawi, the establishment of a consultative council, the creation of a basic law of governance and a revival of municipal councils, a reform of the judicial system, placing limitations on the activities of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice, and allotting greater freedoms for women within the framework of Shari’a (Kramer 2000, 263). This first, unprecedented petition emerged from secular segments of society demanding greater political freedoms and political liberalization.

The 1990 secular petition was followed by a religious petition, The Letter of Demands, signed by members of the ulama community and presented to the monarch. This May 1991 petition at the end of the Gulf War was signed by 400 ulama demanding the establishment of a Majlis al-shura (Consultative Council), an end to the economic monopoly of the royal family and elite families, and the ceasing of nepotism in government. The ulama challenged the royal family’s foreign and military policies stating that they were not Islamic and the royal family’s deportment was not in line with Shari’a (Kostiner and Teitelbaum 2000, 142).

Dated July of 1992 and published in September of 1992, more than one hundred lower level ulama, including faculty of Islamic universities, proselytizers, imams, and khatibs, published the Memorandum of Advice. The Memorandum of Advice reiterated the concerns of the earlier petition and criticized the government for not consulting the ulama in commercial, military and economic areas. The petition directly challenged senior

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ulama for failing to enforce religion and requested more Islamic programming as well as more access to media overseen by a body of ulama (Kostiner and Teitelbaum 2000, 1423). The petition continued by calling for justice and equality for all Saudi citizens before the law, the establishment of a consultative council, a strict application of Islamic law, and the abolition of all un-Islamic laws and decrees, dues and taxes. The Memorandum of Advice called for a revision of all treaties with non-Muslim and un-Islamic governments and security policies geared toward Muslim states and Muslim interests (Kramer 2000, 264). Many signatories to the Memorandum were members of an alliance called the Awakening Sheikhs, a group of imams born in the 1950s that set out to challenge the core elite.

For decades, Saudi rulers insisted that no constitution was needed because the Qur’an and Sunna were the law of the land. However, on March 1, 1992 King Fahd introduced the Basic Law of Government. While not an actual constitution, the Basic Law was the closest the country had ever come to one. The Basic Law was juxtaposed with the Consultative Council Law (Royal Decree No. A/91, dated 27-8-1412) (al-Farsy 2001, 180) and Law of the Provinces. The Consultative Council, the restructuring of the Kingdom’s Regional Government, which led to municipal elections, and the introduction of the Basic Law were major political developments for Saudi Arabia and coincided with the 10th anniversary of the reign of King Fahd.

The Basic Law has a pretense of being fixed. However, the nature of Islamic law is that it is not codified and the nature of authoritarian rule is that institutions can be bypassed and the ruler’s political decisions are not bound by law. Thus, while the Basic Law was a peace offering to various opposition groups and helped to alter the face of authoritarian rule, in terms of changing the governing political structure it was insignificant. As a whole, these new laws formally established the King’s right to appoint all those influencing decision-making on both the national and regional levels. While it may initially appear that the government is extending more political power to the people, what is actually occurring is the state’s utilization of new political documents and institutions to consolidate authority and renegotiate the rankings of who falls within the higher echelons of the politically relevant elite. The following segment will outline the growing relationship between the House of Saud and the business class and the significance of the increasing influence appropriated to the business elite.

The Emerging Business Class: Unseating the Ulama The 1973-74 oil embargo caused a large increase in oil prices, allowing Saudi Arabia to enjoy unprecedented wealth and permitting the government to extend social services, build infrastructure, and increase the population’s dependence on the state and its resources. Saudi society was transformed by the oil boom. In the 1970s Saudi Arabia earned $225 billion from oil, which was more than $60,000 per capita. In 1980 alone, oil income was $95 billion (Quandt 1981, vii). The oil boom intensified the rentier character of the Saudi state.

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The nature of a rentier economy is that a group or class may form consisting of those who profit from the beneficence of the government, generally in exchange for loyalty to the regime. Rent accrues to the government, not to individuals, and in the case of Saudi Arabia, where there is no distinction between the prince’s purse and public funds, the royal family was able to control the distribution of funds to influence government contracts and employment. The government sector was responsible for as much as two thirds of GDP (as expenditures) (Ayubi 1999, 225). Thus, the House of Saud was able to utilize oil revenues to consolidate its power by assuming the redistributive role of state wealth. Oil promotes social mobility, but “also consolidates the role of the traditional elites who have the right to allocate most of the society’s financial resources” (Ayubi 1999, 225).

Those who were co-opted by the regime’s oil wealth and prospered as members of the affluent elite included tribal nobility, those in the close circle of royalty, some of the old merchant families, a class of commercially successful, educated Saudis and Westerneducated technocrats who also entered the business domain. Some of the families that dominated the commercial scene in Saudi Arabia and benefited from the largess of the royal family were the Jufalis, Alirezas, al Rajhis, al Khashoqjis, al-Uliyans, and bin Ladens (Fandy 1999, 30). Throughout the history of Saudi Arabia, merchant families have had strong ties with the royal family and have even held government positions, particularly in areas related to the economy. The Alirezas have a tradition of political involvement in the Kingdom from Muhammad Alireza, Minster of Commerce in the 1950s, to Abdullah Zainal Alireza, who has served as head of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as Minister of State and Commerce and Industry Minister (Alireza 2008). However, families such as the bin Ladens and Alirezas lack Saudi tribal connections, originating from Yemen and Iran respectively. While these families are economically powerful, they do not pose a political threat to the regime in a country that places a high value on tribal descent.

The Saudi state is characterized by personal, authoritarian rule. The leader is all imposing and authority is based on the leader’s ability to successfully engage in co-optation and consultation, patronage, agreement and accord. Personal rulers practice clientalism in patron-client relationships “that bind leaders and followers in relationships not only for mutual assistance and support, but also recognized and accepted inequality between big men and lesser men” (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 39). For clientalism to be successful there must be weak institutionalized and highly personalized government, pluralistic societies and particularistic cultures. Another mode of support for the leader is loyalty based on ethnic or kindred bonds. When a ruler cannot rely solely on loyalty he looks to stronger patronage policies.

Oil rent has allowed the royal family to further consolidate its power by extending its patron-client relationship with the business and merchant elites. Those who have allied with the regime have been awarded large contracts. The Saudi Bin Laden Group was founded by Muhammad ‘Awad bin Laden, who emigrated from Yemen as a specialist in construction. Slowly building his fortune both in and outside of Saudi Arabia and establishing his relationship with the House of Saud, Muhammad bin Laden created a

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billion dollar business empire around engineering, construction, manufacturing, and telecommunications. While oil rent has increased clientalism, the patron-client relationship between the regime and the merchant and business classes can be traced back before the oil embargo. Two of the most prominent contracts that the Saudi Bin Laden Group won were the exclusive responsibility for the restoration of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, which they had until 1967, and the expansion of the holy places in Mecca, which is still a work in progress. More recently, in 2005 the company was amongst a consortium charged with building the $26.6 billion King Abdullah Economic City.

Clientalism hinders democratic reform and contributes to the longevity of authoritarian rule by using discretionary patronage to build a loyal base of support and weaken the opposition. Thus, the patronage offered to business elites ensures both their allegiance and their acceptance of the current political order.

In the past two decades, the political power of the business elite has increased significantly through the creation of the Consultative Council and the Supreme Economic Council. While the Consultative Council lacks legislative power, the fact that the King increased its numbers twice in nine years indicates that the core elite recognize the utility of this body, particularly as a means by which to manage coalitions of support and maintain the status quo.

The Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura), established by King Fahd in August 1992 with Justice Minister Sheikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Jubeir as its first speaker (alFarsy 2001, 182), acts as an advisory body to the government and the King. The Council gives a voice and more influence in the decision-making process to the growing professional class. The members of the Council may review domestic and foreign policy issues as well as initiate legislation. They can also summon and question government ministers. However, any government action not approved by the Council is referred back to the King. The Council has yet to attain lawmaking power. While major ulama and merchant families are included in the Council, descendants of Ibn Saud are excluded. The King selects the members of the Council every four years and for each term, half of the members must be newly appointed. In 1997 the King increased the number of Council members from 60 to 90 and in 2001 the number grew again to 120 members. The creation of the Council “illustrated that the core elite’s strategy of dealing with the growing number of highly qualified Saudi nationals who might challenge the family’s political and social position was one of appeasement and co-optation” (Glossemeyer 2004, 159-60).

Discussions that take place in the Council provide the core elite with a window into the general population and assist the royal family in identifying potential challengers. The Council also allows the core elite a chance to influence public discourse and aided in national integration in instances such as the 1993 appointment of a Shi’i member. The Consultative Council acts as a type of formalization of the traditional majlis and a channel for political communication between the new politically relevant business and professional class and the royal family (Fandy 1999, 41). Not only does it provide a forum for policies to be tested, but it also allots more political power to a growing, economically relevant social class. The constitution of the Council demonstrates the core

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elite’s dexterity in manipulating and engineering shifts within the politically relevant elite.

One of the most important aspects of the establishment of the Consultative Council is its relevance to elite change. “The establishment of the CC exemplifies the core elite’s strategy toward second and third-circle elites, as the council supplemented and even had the potential to inherit the function of legitimizing the core elite’s policies, heretofore held by the Council of Senior Ulama, thus reducing the core elite’s dependence on the religious elite. That the council’s presidency was reserved for the ulama could be seen as a kind of compensation” (Glossemeyer 2004, 159-60). The formation of the Consultative Council allows the royal family to reduce its dependency on the ulama while promoting a new class of business elite to legitimize their policies.

The influence of the business elite was further increased in August of 1999 when a thirteen-member Supreme Economic Council (SEC) was created. The SEC was chaired

by Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince Sultan, with participation from representatives of various ministries and agencies. The SEC provided the new class of business elite with access to the core elite and acted as a consultative body to represent the business class.

The purpose of the council was to unite the government and the economic establishment in a manner that would allow for greater interaction between the two parties. The establishment of the council signified the Saudi government’s acknowledgment of the importance of the economic community and their crucial role in the future of the country.

It appears that business elites are being given an increasingly louder voice in the decision making process and approaching the inner circles of the politically relevant elite. Why is this occurring? The government has been pressured by the Islamists to politically liberalize and relinquish more power to the religious elite. The institutionalized ulama have been vying to maintain their power, but have become a political liability because of the extremist, anti-Western views that they have allowed to permeate throughout the educational system, leading to Islamist political terrorism committed by Saudi citizens both domestically and internationally. According to Volker Perthes, “As a matter of fact, democracy is not high on the agenda of any group of actors that otherwise are forces pushing for change. Businesspeople in most Arab countries have become vocal in demanding economic reform and liberalization. As mentioned, however, they have in most cases abstained from openly calling for political liberalization, let alone democratization” (Perthes 2004, 26).

The business elite are comprised of merchants, technocrats, and an emerging middle class who gained education and opportunities from the rentier economy intensified by the oil boom. Many lack strong tribal alliances and rely completely on the regime for their economic and political power. Because their survival is tied to the regime, they neither demand nor want democratization, preferring economic liberalization and a say in economic policy decision making. “The Saudi merchants are in many ways captives of the regime, for it is inconceivable that they could fare as well under any alternative regime, and chances are they would do much worse” (Shaw and Long 1982, 78). Thus, the business elite are content with the political arrangement that ensures their status. The

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business class is the new ideal aggregation from whom the royal family can co-opt support through the distribution of oil wealth in their direction in the form of lucrative contracts. Conversely, the ulama are no longer an attractive group with which to ally.

New Economic Initiatives Saudi Arabia’s 2005 accession into the WTO as its 149th member contributed to a move toward development and privatization. The WTO requires the Kingdom to adopt the organization’s legislation in its entirety and liberalize currently restricted sectors. As early as 2002, the IMF was urging Saudi Arabia to speed up reform and to strengthen its oil-dependent, volatile economy (BBC News Online 2002).

In June of 2006, Saudi Arabian Minister of State, Abdullah Zainal Alireza, made a speech stating, “Saudi Arabia is experiencing a transition from public to private sector growth and its strategy for achieving balanced development through privatization is founded upon building an effective public-private partnership. Its objectives are straightforward and designed to enhance human resource development, to diversify government revenue sources away from an overwhelming dependence on the oil sector, to promote privatization of government owned entities, to use the private sector to enhance the bureaucratic efficiency and effectively controlling the public sector…In order to pursue these ambitious economic initiatives Saudi Arabia remains committed to building an ever more dynamic free market economy” (Saudi-US Relations Information Services Online 2008). The current economic reforms in Saudi Arabic reflect a similar process that occurred in Egypt where, beginning in the 1970s, the Washington consensus, IMF, and World Bank pressed for neo-liberal reforms and privatization. In order to participate in these internationally renowned organizations and enjoy their benefits, according to the international community, Saudi Arabia must reform its economy. Thus, as the Saudi economy takes a new direction, the importance and power of the business elite increases drastically.

Egypt: A Case Study in Political and Economic Transformation The Egyptian political and economic transitions serve as a key comparison to the case of Saudi Arabia. Both the Saudi and Egyptian regimes implemented tactics of replacing old, politically relevant groups with economically knowledgeable business elites to form a new support system to maintain authoritarian rule. Also, in both cases, economic liberalization was promoted, particularly due to prompting from the IMF and World Bank, but real political reform failed to take place. What can be learned is that the endurance of authoritarian rulers lies in their ability to adapt through transforming policies, political structures, and alliances.

The socioeconomic polices implemented by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1960s formed a social contract between the state and the masses. The basis for Nasser’s legitimacy lay in his ability to raise the standard of living of the working class and peasants. However, under President Anwar Sadat, a shift from economic nationalism and populist social policies to state-led development occurred. Sadat’s 1974 Infitah (open

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door) economic policy led to little economic structural change and even less democratization. “The aim of political liberalization was to encourage foreign capital investment in Egypt, and to rearrange ties and alliances in order to form the broadest possible front for the encirclement of Nasserist and socialist trends” (Kassem 2004, 53).

Thus, liberalization was a façade created to improve Egypt’s economic situation, as Sadat had inherited an underdeveloped economy in debt. Nasser’s objective of incomeredistribution conflicted with the economic need to increase investment and expand industry, and Sadat was left with a crisis of import-substitution industrialization and state-led development.

The Washington consensus in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank “began to promote a neo-liberal program of export-led development, private enterprise, and integration into the world capitalist market” (Beinin 2001, 145). However, stabilization and structural adjustment called for a reduction in state subsidies, which led to worker uprisings. While Sadat portrayed himself as more liberal than Nasser, he created Law 3 in 1977, which allowed government to punish strikers and imprison them with hard labor.

When Hosni Mubarak came to power in 1981, he refused to further reduce state subsidies because the policy led to political instability. However, after Egypt’s participation in the Gulf War led to a new agreement with the IMF and debt forgiveness, Egypt began to actively engage in privatization of state-owned enterprises and eliminated Nasser-era job security and striking abilities. Sadat had redistributed land upward and Mubarak continued the trend with national income being redistributed to self-employed individuals and corporations. He also implemented the law 96 land reforms. While Nasser’s land reforms were “intended to break any political opposition to the revolution from the ancien regime’s pasha class” (Bush 2002, 9), and populist policies were meant to gain the support of the masses, Mubarak’s law 96 served to reverse this trend. Law 96 of 1992 redistributed land upward, and robbed tenants of their tenure security. “Unlike Nasser’s legislation, which drew its strength and legitimacy from trying to redress the economic disparity between landholders and the political power that large landowners wielded, Mubarak’s legislation has rewarded the economic strength of landlords with increased financial and social power” (Bush 2002, 18).

The land reform was necessary because the IMF’s calls to cut government subsidies broke the social contract between the government and the people, established under Nasser, which allowed for the personal rule of the government to be sustained through mass support from the peasants and working class. With the government unable to maintain populist policies of subsidies, this redistribution of land allowed Mubarak to consolidate authoritarian rule through shifting patronage from the masses to a small, economically influential elite. This redistribution of income was sanctioned by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). “The legitimacy of the regimes and the extent of popular tolerance for authoritarian rule depended on making substantial progress towards this goal [of providing for the masses]” (Beinin 2001, 139). When the government could no longer gain legitimacy through populist means, it turned to faux democratization, economic liberalization, and a manipulated rule of law. Thus, the purpose of Egypt’s economic reform and shift from Arab socialism to economic

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liberalization under the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) was to bring the country out of debt, gain the patronage of a foreign superpower (USA) through cosmetic reforms and political acquiescence in terms of the Arab/Israeli conflict, and renegotiate the contract of control from patronage to and support from the masses, which proved to be too expensive, to a more sustainable patronage to and support from a small, powerful elite. Joel Beinin argues that “the imposition of the Washington consensus policies was accompanied by significant further repression and a decline in political freedom” (Beinin 2001, 165), and Maye Kassem elaborates saying, “A more common trend has emerged in which increased repression by specific authoritarian regimes is directly and indirectly encouraged by their Western democratic patrons” (Kassem 2004, 178).

In the case of Egypt, economic policies from Nasser to Mubarak were implemented to solidify the authoritarian system. Economic transition and liberalization has not lead to real democratization and serves to reinforce the status quo. These types of reforms are not meant to lead to political liberalization and will not be fully implemented if they pose a threat to the authoritarian system. However, economic liberalization does promote the political and social status of the business elites who are often accepting of the regime who provide them patronage. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are pursuing a policy of projecting an aura of political reform while transforming coalitions of support to maintain personal rule.

There is little international pressure on Arab states to politically reform. According to Volker Perthes, “The United States as well as the European Union will be content if new, friendly Arab regimes and regime elites do exactly what they have placed at the top of their agenda-modernize their economies and their administrations while refraining from risking domestic and regime stability and well-established international relations by putting themselves and the systems as such to a sudden democratic test of popularity. In fact, many governments, while often deploring the lack of democracy in Arab countries, have appreciated the continuity inspired by authoritarianism in the Arab world” (Perthes 2004, 27-8). The dichotomy of a country with a democratic initiative that supports an authoritarian regime is not extraordinary. The first rule of realism in international relations theory is that “individuals are organized in states, each of which acts in a unitary way in pursuit of its national interest, defined in terms of power” (Mingst 2003, 67). As long as authoritarian regimes engage in economic liberalization, lubricating the path to greater trade, many Western nations are satisfied.

Conclusion The House of Saud’s survival is contingent on its ability to maintain the patronage of a foreign superpower, in this case the United States, manage supporting coalitions and alliances domestically, and perpetuate personal rule through control of economic resources. In the past, the Saudi government has been able to separate domestic and foreign policy, manipulating both to its advantage. However, the actuality of a political strategy that engenders conflicting domestic and foreign policies has been impossible to sustain. The negative effect that US-Saudi relations had on domestic stability following

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the Gulf War has already been discussed. Counterpoising these national grievances, after 9/11 Saudi domestic policy has been under international scrutiny. With U.S. senate committee meetings questioning Saudi Arabia’s position on terrorism, the House of Saud is particularly under fire for its failure to control the preaching of extremist imams and its anti-Western curricula in an educational system run by the ulama. The Saudi government may be attempting to amend its image on the international stage through a reconfiguration of its political relationships.

The ulama, once nationally revered, were co-opted by the House of Saud to act as a rubber stamp for the royal family’s policies. Now that the newly formed Islamist movements question not only the legitimacy of the royal family, but also the credibility of the ulama who support them, the effectiveness of the ulama’s function has diminished.

At the same time, the Saud’s cannot gain religious legitimacy from the ever-growing number of Islamists without relinquishing a substantive amount of political power to a group that is not only ultra conservative and unwilling to religiously validate the government’s political decisions, but is also calling for a constitutional government.

As it becomes an increasingly difficult task to attain religious legitimacy, the House of Saud is seeking other means of support. Similar to the case of Egypt, where law 96 was enacted to change Mubarak’s political base of support from the masses to a smaller group of economic elite, the House of Saud is attempting to slowly reduce the influence of the ulama and increase the political relevance of the business class in order to reshuffle the order of politically relevant elite that undergird its domestic alliances. This business class will serve to move the nation forward economically and will not counter the government with demands for increased political power, as the business elite are dependent on the contracts from and largesse of the royal family who control the oil wealth.

The political reforms of the past two decades in Saudi Arabia hold a two-fold function.

Firstly, with a lot of fanfare and little real political change, they temporarily quiet the growing calls for political liberalization that were shouted with loud voices domestically and whispered from abroad. Secondly, these reforms serve as a new mask for the old face of authoritarianism. The longevity of an authoritarian regime is partly determined by its ability to be a chameleon. Maye Kassem eloquently expresses this concept in her discussion of Egyptian politics; “The adoption of a formal democratic framework does not necessarily imply a change in the fundamental nature of authoritarian rule. In fact, personalized authoritarian rule can prove to be so overtly flexible and resilient, that it can function over a long period of time, with successive rulers, and under the guise of various political structures and policies” (Kassem 2004, 167).

Because the ulama have become a political liability, the Saudi government has used its greater autonomy, derived from oil wealth, to dismantle the authority of the ulama and extend more political power to the business elite who are more interested in economic liberalization than political reform. The creation of the Consultative Council, the Supreme Economic Council, and a restructuring of the judicial system, amongst other reforms, do not indicate political liberalization, but function as a pretext for a new form of authoritarianism. Under the new structure, the business class will become a more

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politically relevant elite class, entering the intermediate elite circle, and the ulama will be relegated to a less politically relevant status, somewhere between the intermediate elite and subelite circles. The composition of its supporting coalition is vital to the sustenance of the regime. The House of Saud has demonstrated remarkable adaptability and foresightedness in its slow and calculated restructuring of its partnerships. It is the alliance shift away from the ulama, who have become a political impediment, and a turn toward the business elite, who offer economic growth and political compliance, that will ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.

See Bibliography for Sustaining Authoritarian Rule: The Rise of the Business Class and Descent of the Ulama in Saudi Arabia in Appendix I: Bibliographies

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The Indus Waters Treaty: Its Persistence and Prospects Rahul Reddy, Undergraduate, University of Pennsylvania Water is fundamental to human civilization. The first settlements emerged near river basins and many continue to depend on this access to fresh water. It is thus not surprising that water has long played a role in conflict between states." Yet despite two wars and an ongoing territorial dispute, the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan has remained in force since its implementation with World Bank support in 1960. The negotiation of the treaty and its history since then may shed some light on this paradox.

Yet what are the prospects for the future of the treaty? Pakistan, according to World Bank projections, faces an increasingly bleak water situation."" India meanwhile wants to generate hydroelectric power on rivers the treaty assigned to Pakistan.""" Understanding the process by which the Indus Waters Treaty was conceived and its history will be instructive. Similar situations such as the sharing of the Jordan River between Israel and Jordan and the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin between India, Bangladesh, China, Nepal, and Bhutan would also offer insights. In examining the Indus Waters Treaty along these lines, this paper seeks to explain why it has been respected thus far and whether it will continue to be respected.

The Indus and five tributaries – the Chenab, Jhelum, Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas rivers, are shared by India and Pakistan. In the Indus Basin, the semi-arid region that forms the backbone of Pakistan’s agriculture, there exists heavy dependence on irrigation."# However, the Partition of India resulted in the flow-controlling headworks remaining part of India even though the downstream, dependent canals were located in Pakistan. The implications of this arrangement became clear to Pakistan when in 1948, following the expiration of a temporary agreement, India’s state of East Punjab cut off all water flowing to West Punjab in Pakistan. The personal intervention of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, resolved the immediate problem but the threat of the upper riparian, India, turning Pakistan into a desert remained. Indeed, Jinnah spoke of Kashmir, from which many of these rivers originate, as Pakistan’s “jugular vein” in his last days.# India’s refusal to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice further reinforced Pakistani security perceptions that persist today, vis-à-vis India.#" As this dispute over the Sutlej and other rivers of the Indus Basin continued to fester, the World Bank offered to facilitate a solution in 1951.#"" Predicated on the assumption that enough water was available to meet the needs of India and Pakistan, the World Bank would offer financial assistance for developing water storage and management systems, provided both countries reached an agreement. One impact of the negotiating process, which culminated in the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, was the de-linking of this issue from the dispute over Kashmir. Nehru saw the rivers dispute as one that “started with and has been confined to the irrigation systems of East and West Punjab,” with agreement from Liaquat Ali Khan that both sides should “refrain from using negotiations in one dispute to delay progress in solving any other.”#""" Reddy ! Persistence and Prospects!

In 1954, the World Bank, in order to bridge the gaps between Indian and Pakistani plans, put forth its own plan where India received the three eastern rivers (the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) while Pakistan received the three western rivers (the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus).

Pakistan then persuaded the World Bank to give it storage facilities in a 1956 AideMemoire amended to the 1954 plan which India opposed as it was worried it would have to pay for these facilities. Ad-hoc agreements were negotiated every six or every twelve months until Ayub Khan’s 1958 coup d’état, when Pakistan unconditionally accepted the 1954 Plan with the 1956 Aide-Memoire. On September 19th 1960, the Indus Waters Treaty was finally signed, with ratification in January of 1961.

Once implemented however, the question of adherence remained and remains. The Indians did not violate the treaty during the 1965 and 1971 wars. In the 1999 Kargil Conflict and the 2002 standoff, they also refrained from cutting off the flow of rivers as they had done in 1948 with the Sutlej. Still, other problems remain, such as their dispute over the Wular Barrage or Pakistani’s objections in 1985 to India’s Tubul Navigation Project on the Jhelum River as a man-made obstruction and storage facility."$ Both are forbidden under Articles I (11) and III (4) respectively.$ Additionally India’s potential to cut off the flow of the Jhelum and its construction of the Baghliar dam on the Chenab remain troublesome for Pakistan, with the former issue arising regularly in talks.$" Nevertheless, the Indus Waters Treaty distinguishes itself when compared to the handling of other water-related disputes. Iraq and Syria for example, massed troops along their borders in 1974 as Iraq threatened to bomb Syria’s Al-Thawra dam because it had allegedly reduced the flow of the Euphrates River water to Iraq.$"" This happened again in 1975, a low-flow year, with conflict averted thanks to Saudi mediation.$""" The conflict over the river waters of the Fertile Crescent also involves the highest riparian, Turkey. A past Turkish president even went so far as to declare that “we have a right to do anything we like” since “neither Iraq nor Syria can lay claim to Turkey’s rivers, any more than Ankara could claim their oil.”$"# Perhaps it is because of its dearth of fresh water resources that the Middle East plays host to so many conflicts over the substance. In addition to the dispute over the Euphrates and Tigris, the Jordan River waters, which feed Israel and Jordan as well as Lebanon and Syria, are contested. In the early 1950s, Israeli water-diverting and hydroelectric projects in the Huleh marshes demilitarized zone and on the Jordan River led to Syrian protests.$# A joint Syrian and Jordanian hydroelectric and irrigation project on the Yarmuk River, a tributary of the Jordan River, has likewise provoked Israeli protests as much of the Yarmuk waters are used for Israeli agriculture downstream.$#" Yet in most of these Middle Eastern disputes, there is one key difference distinguishing them from the Indus Basin situation. Pakistan is absolutely dependent on the Indus Basin while India has other sources of fresh water such as the Ganges Basin or the Cauvery Basin in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, allowing India to compromise more easily. In the Middle East by contrast, water is usually scarce for all parties, making compromises difficult. Furthermore, the three western rivers whose waters were awarded to Pakistan are not in areas of India requiring large scale irrigation nor are irrigation projects to carry their waters to India’s agricultural belt geographically feasible.

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Returning to South Asia, the failure to reach a comprehensive accord on the management of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin comparable to the Indus Waters treaty offers some insights. Here, as in the case of the Indus Waters Treaty, India is again the upper riparian vis-à-vis Bangladesh while Bhutan, Nepal, and ultimately China are the uppermost riparian states. This basin, “second only to the Amazon,” is home to “over 600 million people” and is at present only covered through bilateral treaties between India and each neighbor, with the exception of China.$#"" However, comprehensive treaties or cooperation on hydroelectric projects has proven difficult given the unstable nature of governments in Nepal and Bangladesh while India’s situation with China is rather precarious.

Given our examination of the Indus Waters Treaty and other treaties, what explanations emerge for the persistence of the Indus Waters Treaty? Most interestingly, why is it that India, the upper riparian, has adhered to the treaty, in effect ceding “its rights” to dam “its” rivers? Perhaps it was the financial incentive which the World Bank provided in brokering the 1960 accord that forced India’s hand. An amount nearing $1 billion in today’s terms was provided by the World Bank to aid both countries in developing irrigation systems that would be essential for the Green Revolution of the following years.$#""" Undala Z. Alam however discounts this explanation in favor of “water rationality.” In his view, it makes no sense for India and Pakistan to, because of financing issues, “take nine years to reach agreement on a comprehensive plan” when financing was easily obtainable for such a comprehensive plan.$"$ Water rationality in Alam’s words is “any action taken by a state to secure its water supply in the long-term, both in quantity and quality.” Alam feels that both countries acted along these lines as “war would not guarantee future resources – neither water nor international finance – to build the infrastructure needed to use the water.”$$ His explanation is a strong one in explaining how agreement was reached on the treaty but when one looks at the post-treaty period, after the World Bank’s financing had become a sunk cost, water rationality loses its explanatory power.

While Pakistan’s position is one of “absolute dependency upon the basin,” India’s is rather different.$$" No matter what agreements India made or will make, all of these rivers pass through or originate in territory she holds. Alam does not tell us what’s to stop India from reneging on its agreements after the World Bank-financed projects are built. The controversy in recent years over the Baghliar dam is something that cannot be explained in the context of water rationality.$$"" Such a measure is bound to provoke conflict with Pakistan, allegedly allows the Indians to cut the flow of water to Pakistan, and thus is not stable in the long-term. Alam mentions aggressive statements between Indian and Pakistani politicians but does not mention the backdrop of low-intensity conflict in Jammu and Kashmir since the 1948.

Another area in which his explanation is found wanting is the fact that Pakistan only signed onto the treaty after Ayub Khan’s 1958 coup. This would imply there was a lack of popular consensus on the treaty, meaning the agreement is not stable in the long-term and might have only been temporarily separated from the political dispute over Kashmir.

Indeed, the de-linking of the Kashmir dispute from sharing of the Indus Basin waters that Reddy ! Persistence and Prospects!

was achieved through the Indus Waters Treaty may also have been merely temporary. A young Brigadier Pervez Musharraf, in a 1990 research paper at the Royal College of Defence Studies, found in the Indus waters issue “the potential of future conflict.”$$""" Looking ahead, it may well be external factors outside the control of both India and Pakistan that decide the continued viability of the Indus Waters Treaty. Asia’s largest rivers, that provide sustenance to billions, originate in the glaciers of the Himalayas.

Their continued melting due to global warming will mean extremes of floods and droughts.$$"# In the eastern end of the Himalayas, there have already been flash floods, such as that caused by a landslide that collapsed a dam in Tibet in 2000. The resulting “26-metre wall of water” swept through India and “within a week, devastated parts of Bangladesh.”$$# In addition to these external factors, the water situation in Pakistan itself is quite troublesome. A World Bank brief begins by noting that “Pakistan is moving from being a water stressed country to a water scarce country.”$$#" Some problems, such as overexploitation of groundwater, are shared by Pakistan’s neighbors and other developing countries. The brief recommends a more managerial approach towards maintaining existing infrastructure (worth an “estimated replacement value of 60 to 70 billion U.S. dollars”) and improved financing, both of which are allegedly held back by bureaucratic inertia and inefficiency.$$#"" It is also conceivable that a lack of provincial autonomy and a truly federal structure may complicate water-sharing between Pakistan’s provinces.

The other party to the treaty, India, must also be taken into account for the treaty’s future prospects. In recent years, India has been attempting to build the Baghliar hydroelectric dam on the Chenab River, which it claims does not violate the Indus Waters Treaty.$$#""" During the 2002 standoff between the two neighbors following a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, the idea of abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty was discussed in the Indian Parliament.$$"$ Thus, it would seem both countries have reasons to be dissatisfied with the treaty’s provisions.

After having examined this issue, certain perspectives emerge. Alam’s thesis of “water rationality,” holds true in the period leading up to the negotiations and for some time after the 1960 signing of the Indus Waters Treaty. However, World Bank financing and the resulting infrastructure have since become a sunk cost. Also, de-linking of the rivers dispute from the Kashmir dispute was in great part possible because of the assumption that there was enough water for both countries. Also, unlike in the Middle East, access to these waters is not a matter of survival for all parties concerned. Even though it only received twenty percent of the waters, India could meet its needs through its other river systems and thus would have little reason to provoke Pakistan so long as it was guaranteed this share.$$$ Moreover, unlike the situation with some of India’s neighbors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin, the two governments, especially after Ayub Khan’s 1958 coup d’état, were able to negotiate the treaty without getting bogged down by domestic concerns.

Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 113

On the food/agricultural-security dimension, there was enough water for both countries though this is currently threatened by climate change. However, it is in the case of hydroelectric power generation projects that both countries find themselves increasingly at odds. India’s Baghliar dam on the Chenab and its installations on the Jhelum are evidence of a changing dynamic on the Indian side towards water for energy security as well agriculture, which deserves further study. Meanwhile, as Pakistan’s water situation deteriorates, the Indus Basin, its only major water source, and the basin’s headwaters in Kashmir, will become even more important.

The Indus Waters Treaty was agreed upon and persisted due to several factors which have since altered considerably. World Bank infrastructure financing is a sunk cost, climate change and population growth have thrown doubt on the assumption that there is enough water for both countries, and India’s energy needs, for which her other river systems do not suffice, have grown. On the Pakistani side, acute water scarcity has greatly increased the costs of any flow-reduction by India. This author agrees with onetime Brigadier Pervez Musharraf’s identification of the Indus headwaters as a potential flashpoint but believes the acquisition of nuclear weapons has negated any possibility of a “water war.”

Ideally, the Indus Waters Treaty would need to be amended to incorporate changes that have taken place since its implementation and future projections of climate change, complemented by more efficient water use within each country. Meanwhile, the Baghliar dam and other projects at the limits of the treaty’s provisions will continue. In sum, while the treaty has persisted due to the needs of the time being met, increased energy demand

by India and water demand by Pakistan amidst receding Himalayan glaciers will test the treaty and perhaps prompt its revision.

Endnotes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! "

Peter H. Gleick, Water Conflict Chronology Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security (March 2008) < http://www.worldwater.org/chronology.html> "" Better Management of Indus Basin Waters (World Bank January 2006) <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAKISTAN/Data%20and%20Reference/20805819/Brief-IndusBasin-Water.pdf> """ Gargi Parsai, Baglihar: no violation of treaty, says Dasmunsi (The Hindu 19 June 2005) <http://www.hindu.com/2005/06/19/stories/2005061906630800.htm> "# Undala Z. Alam, Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: A Case Study of the Indus Waters Treaty The Geographical Journal, Volume 168, No 4 (February 2003) pp. 342 ## Jinnah and Kashmir (Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir) <http://www.ajk.gov.pk/site/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2268&Itemid=126> “According to Dr. Riaz Ali Shah’s Diary (Publishing House, Bull Road publication 1950) the Quaid-eAzam was stated to have said, ‘Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan and no nation or country would tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword of the enemy’.” #" Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, Pakistan’s Security: Problems of Linearity “The popular perception amongst the decision-making elite makes the rivalry sound like a battle between good and evil with the Indian 'Goliath' forever trying to vanquish the Pakistani 'David'.” < http://www.southasianmedia.net/magazine/journal/pakistan_security.htm> #"" Undala Z. Alam, Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: A Case Study of the Indus Waters Treaty The Geographical Journal, Volume 168, No 4 (February 2003) pp. 344

Reddy ! Persistence and Prospects!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! #"""

Ibid pp. 345 Chietigj Bajpaee, Asia’s Coming Water Wars (Power and Interest News Report 22 August 2006) <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=545&language_id=1> $ Indus Waters Treaty (The World Bank) <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:2032 0047~pagePK:146736~piPK:583444~theSitePK:223547,00.html> $" Chietigj Bajpaee, Asia’s Coming Water Wars (Power and Interest News Report 22 August 2006) <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=545&language_id=1> “…on the agenda of the Indo-Pak talks at Lahore in February 1999, the Agra Summit of July 2001, and part of the Composite Dialogue initiated in January 2004.” and Shireen M. Mazari, The Baglihar Dam and the Indus Water Treaty (The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad 2005) <http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2005_files/no_1/comment/1c.htm> $"" Peter H. Gleick, Water Conflict Chronology Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security (March 2008) < http://www.worldwater.org/chronology.html> $""" Ibid $"# Undala Z. Alam, Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: A Case Study of the Indus Waters Treaty The Geographical Journal, Volume 168, No 4 (February 2003) pp. 347, quoting President Suleyman Demirel $# Abraham M. Hirsch, From the Indus to the Jordan: Characteristics of Middle East International River Disputes Political Science Quarterly, Volume 71, No 2, (June 1956) pp. 214 $#" Ibid pp. 215 $#"" Chietigj Bajpaee, Asia’s Coming Water Wars (Power and Interest News Report 22 August 2006) <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=545&language_id=1> $#""" Undala Z. Alam, Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: A Case Study of the Indus Waters Treaty The Geographical Journal, Volume 168, No 4 (February 2003) pp. 346 $"$ Ibid $$ Ibid pp. 347 $$" Ibid pp. 349, “…Pakistan’s absolute dependency upon the basin…” $$"" Gargi Parsai, Baglihar: no violation of treaty, says Dasmunsi (The Hindu 19 June 2005) <http://www.hindu.com/2005/06/19/stories/2005061906630800.htm> $$""" Ronojoy Sen, And a river runs through it (The Times of India March 12 2005) <http://www.strategicforesight.com/sfgnews_103.htm> $$"# Himalayan Glaciers ‘melting fast’ (BBC News 14 March 2005) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4346211.stm> $$# Sanjoy Hazarika, South Asia: sharing the giants (The UNESCO Courier October 2001) <http://www.unesco.org/courier/2001_10/uk/doss08.htm> $$#" Better Management of Indus Basin Waters (World Bank January 2006) <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAKISTAN/Data%20and%20Reference/20805819/Brief-IndusBasin-Water.pdf> pp. 1 $$#"" Ibid pp. 4 $$#""" Gargi Parsai, Baglihar: no violation of treaty, says Dasmunsi (The Hindu 19 June 2005) <http://www.hindu.com/2005/06/19/stories/2005061906630800.htm> $$"$ Ronojoy Sen, And a river runs through it (The Times of India March 12 2005) <http://www.strategicforesight.com/sfgnews_103.htm> $$$ An Atlantic Report: India and Pakistan (The Atlantic Monthly November 1960) <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/196011/india-pakistan> "Pakistan's share was, and is, the larger - 80 per cent of the flow. "$

Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 115

Terrorist Organizations and the Use of Non-violent Tactics !

Jennifer Lickteig, Undergraduate, University of Iowa International terrorist organizations can differ widely in structure, tactics, chosen victims and amounts of support. Throughout the world these groups use hijackings, kidnappings, suicide bombings and threats of worse to reach their goals, which can vary from state to state, continent to continent, or even leader to leader within the organization. While some groups rely solely on violence and fear to obtain the ends they seek, some choose to start walking a different path - they form political parties and utilize democratic institutions.

But why would an organization choose to use legitimate political means to reach their ends, rather than illegitimate force that may be easier or even more effective? To what extent does a political party help them reach their goals? Throughout this paper I will explore these ideas in the hopes of understanding why and when a terrorist organization changes its strategy from violent to non-violent political methods. With the prevalence of terrorist organizations of all different styles and nationalities, knowing when an organization decides to try using non-violent methods to achieve its goals can enable us to make policies or take actions that give incentives for groups to choose political methods.

In this paper I will discuss why a terrorist organization may decide, after doing a costbenefit analysis, that non-violence is more efficient than violence. It seems the leaders of a terrorist organization are more likely to decide non-violence is more efficient when the political regime of their country allows for an open political discourse for the airing of grievances, when public opinion supports peaceful negotiations over terrorist violence, or when forming a political party is already part of their end goal.

To apply my theory to real terrorist organizations I will look at the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) of Spain, Hizballah (Party of God) of Lebanon, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad of the Palestinian territories. Through these cases I hope to demonstrate the importance of regime policies toward terrorists and the effects of public opinion on their decisionmaking.

However, first it must be said that I have adopted Weinberg and Pedahzurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s definition of a terrorist organization as â&#x20AC;&#x153;any human group that relies on terrorist violence as its primary means of political expressionâ&#x20AC;? because it encompasses all forms of groups and includes the illegal activities along with their political goals.1 These illegal activities can include those actions stipulated by U.S. legal code, for example: hijacking, detaining an individual as ransom, attacking an internationally protected person, assassinations or the use of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. The political goals can range from economic to revolutionary, religious to secular. I will also adopt the rational choice theory as the reason why organization leaders choose to use terrorism. When an organization develops based on perceived grievances or on ideological ties, they will Lickteig ! Terrorist Activities and Non-Violent Tactics

have either a general or very specific goal. In attempting to reach this goal they have a choice of methods, broadly defined as legal or illegal. These actions can include those terrorist activities described previously in this paper or non-violent political activities such as forming political organizations, taking their grievances to a judicial system, appealing to outside organizations or foreign states, or working through nongovernmental institutions with similar interests and objectives. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler developed this theory in their book, The Political Economy of Terrorism by saying that terrorist organizations are essentially rational because, they have “welldefined preferences, which requires that the individual is able to rank, or order, the alternative feasible choices.”2 Given these preferences, they will use their scarce resources in a way that they perceive will “maximize the expected value of their utility.”3 These scarce resources come in the forms of terrorist or political activities. Organizations will then choose to use terrorist activities when they see violence as being more efficient and less costly to achieve their goals.

Why would organizations choose to use illegal, terrorist activity?

Five common goals and possible benefits of using violent and non-violent tactics have been briefly summarized in Table 1. When deciding which of these tactics to use to achieve each goal, an organization’s leaders may settle on that violence as a more effective strategy for numerous reasons. Generally terrorist activity is more cost effective for a smaller group that may not have the resources to achieve their goals any other way.

When faced with an occupying power with superior military capabilities, a smaller group can plan strategically randomized violence, assassinations, kidnappings, suicide bombings, and plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs). All require a relatively small amount of inexpensive materials and can be very effective—killing many, hurting the morale of the enemy and keeping the fight long and drawn-out, causing the occupying force to lose support at home.

Many organizations may choose to use illegal tactics, such as hijacking or assassinations, because it believed to be the more efficient way to achieve their specific goals. One major aspiration of terrorist organizations is to grab the attention of the public to influence their opinion. Violent acts very easily catch the interest of news reporters who then seek out reasons for the attacks and names of the perpetrators. Local public opinion can be swayed when they see violence increase in their neighborhoods or see civilians dying and no one being arrested or detained for the acts—in this way terrorist organizations are changing public opinion about the ability of the government to keep security. If the current regime was already considered illegitimate by the general population, a terrorist organization may gain favor by acting out and publically showing a widely held feeling of discontent. On a national level, violence can also instill fear in the general population; by making the populace fearful of carrying out their every-day activities, a terrorist group can provoke obedience by threatening more attacks.

Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 117!

Table 1 Goals:

Challenging or influencing public opinion

Challenging or influencing government policy

Challenging other groups

Act on a Divine Mandate

Effective Violent Instill fear and Tactics: provoke obedience.

Change public opinion about the ability of the government to keep security by disrupting everyday life.

Kidnappings, assassinations or threats of future attacks.

Disrupting events, forcing the government to spend more resources and time on dealing with terrorism than making legislation.

Provoking the government to react harshly or indiscriminately

Removing political or ideological opponents.

Publically claiming violent events of another group.

Destroying people Acting or monuments violently can perceived to be cathartic. symbolically represent something evil can be very effective in evoking emotions of victory and represent progress in carrying out a divine mandate.

Effective Nonviolent Tactics:

Once a political party is formed and gains power, an organization can directly change policy/legislation.

Non-violent protests can lead to political or diplomatic disruption. Media coverage on the illegitimacy of the party in power by exposing ineffective or unfavorable policies.

Having approval of a majority of the population can be leverage in an election.

Providing social services can gain public support

Ousting â&#x20AC;&#x153;evilâ&#x20AC;? occupying forces through political means like appealing to an international organization.

Increasing the number of converts through mission work.

Information disseminationâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; publicity for a cause, campaigning and advertising.

Encourage peaceful social movements.

Provide social services.

Revenge

Ousting a government from power through legitimate political means is a sustainable and morally admirable way to exact revenge, also can peacefully demonstrate or burn effigies.

Lickteig ! Terrorist Activities and Non-Violent Tactics

Organizations can also gain sympathy from the international community so that they can rally more recruits against their enemies. If the ‘enemy’ being attacked is perceived to be an adversary of the people, or if the government being targeted is already considered to be tyrannical or illegitimate by the international community, acts of terrorism may be a catalyst for a growing movement of discontent. Violence may also affect international public opinion enough to sway the elections of other countries. For example, as the population of the U.S. continues to see terrorist acts being carried out in Middle Eastern countries where U.S. troops are fighting, support wanes for military action and the people start to support candidates that will bring their family members back from these dangerous areas.

An organization may have the goal of provoking a change in government policy. Many states react to terrorist violence by clamping down on civil liberties, causing resentment among the population. This may lead to more problems as the populace questions whether security or individual rights are more important and whether the current power structure should be changed. The government might also be forced to change its policies by making concessions just so the terrorist organization does not carry out any more attacks, many of which may be disadvantageous to the local population, causing discontent to spread. Similarly, if terrorists are seeking to influence governmental decisions, they can kidnap someone with high authority to gain leverage that can be used to bargain for something they need or want.

If more than one organization is operating in the same territory, they may use violence to gain influence or power over the other groups. Political or ideological opponents can be assassinated or kidnapped for leverage. A competition may arise where organizations fight over claims of responsibility for well-publicized attacks—a tactic frequently used in the Palestinian Territories where suicide bombings lend legitimacy to newly developed militant groups.4 Terrorist acts may also work symbolically for an organization. A group’s members may ultimately seek to glorify a god they believe leads them to do these things. When unable to completely take-out a government or occupier considered “evil” or heretical, smaller acts of terrorism can be considered stepping stones in a broader holy war. In addition to symbolizing victory over an “evil” force, destroying figures emblematic of an enemy regime—which may be a building, monument or leader— can also have a cathartic effect for those seeking revenge. Many terrorists have lost loved ones to the enemies they seek to destroy and consider violence the easiest way to settle the score. Terrorist organizations that see the United States as an enemy to be destroyed still use images of the Twin Towers falling in New York City on 9/11 because they consider it a symbol of a declining empire.

Why would organizations choose to use non-violent activities to achieve their goals?

Terrorist groups can pursue objectives like influencing public opinion or symbolically bringing down their enemies by using violence, as already discussed. But it is also possible to reach their goals by using non-violent methods. Brutal tactics and reliance on Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 119!

violent strategies is not sustainable—eventually support would wane if violence continued, especially if the fighting took place among the civilian population. Frequently violence is considered morally reprehensible by the international community and an illegitimate way to reach ones goals, especially when the organization does not have the backing of a recognized nation-state which could be considered a legitimizing force.

Scholars have stated, “Although terrorism may cause immediate behavioral change, it is not advisable for insurgents because it does not result in wholehearted long-run ideological support.”5 In this way non-violence is more efficient and effective than violence because it is sustainable.

It is important to note that non-violent tactics mainly work through information dissemination and change in public opinion. This can be done through forming political parties, or the use of a number of international organizations—governmental and nongovernmental—for aid in publicity, equipment, logistics or legal representation. Many organizations, such as Hamas or Hizballah, choose to gain public favor through welfare programs. These have proven to be very effective in influencing public opinion, especially when the target population is impoverished or facing a high amount of unemployment or lack of educational opportunities.

Broader social movements can change public opinion through non-violent methods by bringing information to the local and international population. At the community level the people may be made aware of governmental corruption. Once they are aware, they can then be convinced to rise up against that regime through peaceful protests or by voting differently. At an international level, media attention is captured through violent acts, but this may have a negative effect on the reporting—the international community may not support the terrorist organization if it does not understand the cause they are fighting for. So by using non-violent political methods, such as forming a political party or working through a non-governmental organization, the group may influence the public by giving them information about their cause—convincing them of the importance of change and the significance of their end goals.

Similarly, political parties or peaceful social movements can be used by organizations seeking not just a change in public opinion, but a change in the regime. If they form a political group, campaigning for their cause and gaining favor among the people, then they can legitimately change the regime with the added support of the local population and the international community. They are also more likely to be recognized by international intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations if they come to power peacefully.

Social movements can bring a terrorist organization closer to its goals by mobilizing support for political transformation. If the regime transformation leads to a new government with a new policy on terrorism that leaves it open to negotiations, a dialogue may be created between the government and the terrorist organization. If this took place, then the terrorist organization would have more freedom to gather public support for their cause through tactics like creating welfare or education programs. The organization would be able to gather publicity for their cause through national media and provide Lickteig ! Terrorist Activities and Non-Violent Tactics

information to the population that will decide the next election, if the new regime is democratic. This will work to influence the decisions of the government through the changing opinions of the people.

It is important to note, however, the importance of freedom of speech and press within the new regime. Many goals an organization is attempting to achieve cannot be reached non-violently unless they have the means to do so—to disseminate information on a country or world-wide scale. This is perhaps why regime change may be vital to whether a terrorist organization uses non-violent methods. The political and social atmosphere must be open enough to allow them to make a political party and campaign or to hold peaceful demonstrations or protests.

When faced with another group contesting power among the same population, financial support and recruiting can be difficult. But gaining support and financial backing can be easier if non-violent methods are used. The group would not be ostracized by the international community, so it would also be easier to spread their message or inform the world of their cause without having the taint of the label “terrorist.” Organization leaders could negotiate with their counterparts in the country they wish to change, or even in the international community when the organization is political, rather than terrorist. Even groups that still retain under-ground terrorist wings can still see the benefits from forming above-ground wings, called “front organizations” by Weinberg and Pedahzur.6 Given the overall peaceful nature of most major religions, non-violence can work in the favor of these organizations when their objective is to act for a higher power. If an occupying force is considered the “evil” or “god-less” target, then religious organizations can appeal to international organizations, non-governmental organizations or other adherents of their same religion to pressure the occupier to leave. If the group is just seeking more converts to their religion, then a peaceful discussion or information dissemination is likely to be successful, considering faith does not usually develop through force.

The goal of revenge can also be realized through non-violent methods. Political change, as discussed before, is one way of exacting revenge against an illegitimate government.

But a group can also bring corrupt leaders to the judicial system to be tried for their crimes. On the international level war, criminals or corrupt leaders can be brought to The Hague to be tried. As their enemies lose legitimacy and support internationally and locally, organizations will witness the downfall of their adversaries—a cathartic effect that may not be as strong as violence, but still something that is being done to right a wrong.

When would organizations choose to change tactics?

Given all of these benefits of using non-violent methods to achieve their goals, I will argue that violent organizations will start using non-violent methods when the regime under which they are working changes, when they see public support turning against them or when forming a political party is part of their end goal. Having done a costNorthwestern Journal of International Affairs 121!

benefit analysis, these are the situations when the costs of non-violence tend to be lower and when the benefits of non-violence tend to be higher.

Many changes in the government of the country in which terrorist organizations work can cause the tactics the organization uses to shift. If the regime changes from using corrupt authoritarian measures to using more peaceful democratic rule, the organization may find it beneficial to form a political party, especially if they hold the support of a majority of the population. If the environment of politics has changed to be more open to dissidents and oppositional political parties, then groups that disagree with the status quo are able to speak out against the current government and form political groups with a base support from among the people. Similarly, regimes may decide that a terrorist organization is gaining power very quickly and in an effort to save their jobs, change their anti-terrorism policies. They may trade amnesty and safety from arrest for peace—what Weinberg and Pedahzur called “a chance to abandon the gun for the ballot box.”7 When the terrorist organizations see the regime providing opportunities such as this, they may see political action as being less costly or more beneficial than their current illegal methods.

Terrorist organizations may turn to using non-violent methods if they perceive the public opinion is turning against them. Unless the group has an extensive and effective public relations campaign using propaganda to convince the population that violence is necessary, a hostile organization will quickly lose favor and sympathy from the people if they continue to attack and cause bloodshed. If the terrorists see the public turning away from them they may choose to form a political party or start a peaceful grassroots campaign to reach their goals and again turn public opinion in their favor. Along these same lines, a terrorist group may enhance their violent actions if they perceive the public as supporting them with their current strategy. Many in the Palestinian territories support Hamas and Islamic Jihad in their acts of terror, mainly because of their disillusionment with the Palestinian Authority and pessimism about the promise of peaceful negotiations.8 An organization seeking political change may gather enough support for a coup and violently take out the government in power. But then they are left with a country to rule, so in many cases they will give up the former terrorist activity and rule the people as their ideology stipulates. Many homegrown revolutions could be realized through terrorist organizations first using violent methods, but then transforming into peaceful political parties once they finally reach their goal of changing the status quo. When political rule is part of an organization’s overall purpose, it is only natural that they begin to use politics as they see the opportunity arise.

But it is more likely that a terrorist organization will use both violent and non-violent methods in an effort to obtain the ends they seek. Many groups that use daily violence to instill fear in a certain population of people, will then turn around and start welfare programs for the others from whom they seek support—contributing to education, health, housing and the general well-being of a population that may consider itself forgotten by the international community. For example, Hezbollah and Hamas both have social and civic programs to aid the Lebanese and Palestinians affected by violence. When a Lickteig ! Terrorist Activities and Non-Violent Tactics

population is in dire straights and sees an organization handing out money or building homes, they may be more likely to support that organization, despite the violent methods used elsewhere. Then if an organization gains favor from the local community and wins seats in the local governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s parliament, it is unlikely that they will completely abandon their violent methods. They will most likely keep a militant wing underground to help maintain political power and to carry out attacks in other countries where they are fighting or seeking political change. Even if the organization is not actively using terrorist tactics, they may be financially supporting another organization that is using violence.

A Look at Four Terrorist Organizations Having discussed different theories on why a terrorist organization would choose to use political means rather than terrorist tactics to achieve their goals, I will look at four cases of terrorist organizations. These four groups are the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) of Spain, Hizballah of Lebanon, and Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) from the Palestinian Territories. The first three organizations have all developed relatively successful political wings while the PIJ has not. All have enjoyed increases in public opinion and all, except for Hizballah, have suffered widespread discontent with their violent tactics at one time or another. With histories of regime change and variations in public opinion, these organizations work well as illustrations of the differences in these important variables. Through historical summaries and public opinion polls, I will focus on the importance of public opinion and the type of regime in shaping the tactics organizations use to reach their goals. In addition, I will provide a brief description of each group to give historical background to their decision-making.

ETA From the 36-year rule of an authoritarian dictator to a parliamentary democracy, Spain in the 20th century provides a perfect example of a regime in transition. As the government changed policy and personnel, an ever-present terrorist force has challenged its legitimacy to rule. This force is called the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), (Basque Fatherland and Liberty). This separatist association developed out of the independenceseeking Basque region in 1959 as the authoritarian leader General Francisco Franco brutally repressed the Basque people. Totaling just under three million-strong, the Basque people have historically held themselves apart from the rest of Spain linguistically and culturally. They inhabit the geographical area by the shores of the Bay of Biscay and on two sides of the Western Pyrenees that separate Spain and France. It is this specific regional inhabitation and their use of Euskera, an ancient local language that gives the people motivation to claim independence from the Spanish state. This desire was first expressed in the late 1800s by the founding father of Basque nationalism, Sabino Arana, but has yet to be fulfilled.

Under Francoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s authoritarian regime the Basque people were severely repressedâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;forced to assimilate into the culture of the rest of Spain, prohibited from using their own language, banned from displaying their flag, and at one point even banned from Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 123!

giving their children Basque names. As can be expected, thousands of Basque citizens were arrested or tortured for refusing to conform into Franco’s mold of cultural homogeneity. It was in this atmosphere of cultural suppression that middle class university students came together to form the ETA. Originally created as a peaceful organization, the ETA soon became frustrated with a lack of progress in achieving their goals of Basque independence and the political ineffectiveness of the Basque nationalist party of the time, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). So in 1968, the ETA armed. Their first attack was on a train full of soldiers and civil war veterans and they continued to commit acts of terrorism such as blowing up monuments and setting bombs in front of Guardia Civil stations.9 Franco’s military was quick to react. Sensing the danger that may come from a violent separatist organization, Franco “pronounced the militarization of the Basque country.”10 This military occupation of the Basque country was in contrast to the rest of Spain, which enjoyed a relatively open political environment at the time. The Franco administration soon moved to the employment of extra-judicial violence targeted specifically at the ETA. Franco already had individual paramilitary groups targeting the huidos - Republicans who refused to surrender and hid in the hills to avoid capture. These groups easily transitioned into the formation of the Batallon Vasco-Español (BVE), (Basque Spanish Battalion) in 1975. The BVE used indiscriminate violence to attack the ETA, applying the same tactics the terrorist organization itself used. This group’s formation mainly had to do with the strategic planning of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s alter ego who was determined to wipe out the ETA. Ironically though, the ETA’s boldest act of terrorism to date was the assassination of Blanco in 1973.

But the BVE continued on despite Blanco’s death, until Franco died in 1975, beginning the transition to democracy for Spain. This change was led principally by Franco’s appointed successor, King Juan Carlos, and Adolfo Suarez (later elected Prime Minister in the democratic elections of 1977). Carlos’s rule began well enough, issuing three amnesty decrees which gave pardon to all Basques imprisoned for political crimes and set up reintegration programs for ETA members “ready to renounce their association with the organization’s terrorist activities.”11 Despite these clear efforts at reconciliation, the ETA was not interested. Terrorist activity actually increased—the number of ETArelated deaths rose from 43 in 1975 to 78 in 1978, the year after the first democratic elections since the civil war in 1936.12 Faced with continued violence from the ETA, the newly elected Suarez administration was forced to make a decision on anti-terror policy. It comes as no surprise that the Suarez government, littered with former Francoist insiders (Suarez himself was the head of Franco’s party, Movimiento Nacional) used tactics similar to those used in the years prior. In 1978 Suarez passed legislation allowing for the arrest of “anyone suspected of involvement in terrorism”, using his broad definition of terrorism that then included “any effort to secure independence of any part of [Spain’s] territory, even if nonviolent.13 The consequences of this policy were dire—because of this broad definition of terrorism, the leadership of Herri Batasuna (HB), (Popular Unity Party), widely known to be the Lickteig ! Terrorist Activities and Non-Violent Tactics

political wing of the ETA, were arrested and convicted. This cut the ETA off from any political action, leaving them without a choice. They continued to use terrorism to reach their goals.

General elections were held again in 1982, leading to the victory of Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), (Spanish Socialist Workers Party), led by Felipe Gonzalez. An important campaign message of this new socialist party was their dedication to dealing with the ETA better than the former administration. The PSOE mistakenly assumed they would be granted special reprieve from the ETA’s violent tactics because they were a socialist group without any ties to the Franco regime. This assumption was soon torn down as the ETA murdered a high-profile general within days of Gonzalez’s inauguration and killed five more military officials before the end of the year.

Faced with this continual problem posed by the ETA, the new party in power strengthened anti-terrorism laws imposed by the Suarez administration, while offering autonomy rights to Catalonia and the Basque Country in the hopes of eventually federalizing Spain. But while the PSOE continued to support regional rights, they needed a stronger policy to combat a continued threat from the ETA. This new course of action, developed through the military, was realized through the creation of a government-sponsored paramilitary force called the Grupos Anti-terroristas de Liberacion (GAL), (Anti-terrorist Liberalization Groups). Similar to its predecessor the BVE, the GAL used assassinations, kidnappings and bombings from 1983 to 1987 to attack the ETA and weaken their forces. This continued through the rest of Gonzalez’s 14-year reign. However, the extra-judicial nature of the actions taken by GAL caused uproar in Spain when it was made public, leading to the trials of socialist officials involved for terrorist actions.

While taking clandestine violent actions against the GAL, the public approved the Spanish constitution in 1978 through a referendum, which “guaranteed the protection of the nationalities and regions within its borders and their historical rights. These historical rights included the Basque peoples’ right to autonomy in the territories that are known today as the Basque Autonomous Community and Navarre.”14 During this time the ETA attempted to convince the Basque people to abstain from the vote because it did not include complete independence for the Basque country. However 54.4 percent of the Basque people did vote in support of the constitutional referendum, proving public support for the political process.

After this the ETA began to make concessions, like accepting the authority of the Basque political parties and their rights to negotiate with the Spanish government. Similarly the ETA was affected by public opinion in June 2005 after they again refused to disarm, leading more then 250,000 people to demonstrate against government negotiations with the ETA. By March 2006 the ETA had announced a “permanent cease-fire” claiming the “object of this decision is to drive the democratic process.”15 Effects of Regime Change on the ETA

Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 125!

The ETA is an excellent example of how regime change can affect the tactics a terrorist organization decides to use. It is not difficult to imagine the ETA using violent methods used under the previous oppressive regime, where Franco was trying to “eradicate every vestige of uniqueness of Basque culture.”16 However when the regime changed to a democracy in the late 1970s, opening up the political discourse and halting wide-scale repression of dissenters, one would expect the ETA to switch from violent methods to non-violence political tactics to achieve their goals of an independent Basque country.

This was not the case. ETA violence actually increased despite the new government under Kind Juan Carlos and the following under Adolfo Suarez. Even after the 1978 referendum allowing for autonomy in the regions known today as the Basque Autonomous Community and Navarre, the number of incidents attributed to the ETA jumped from 132 in 1978 to 188 in 1979.17 Many attribute this continuation of violence as a result of ETA’s stubbornness to gain complete independence for the Basque Country.

Similarly, with the next socialist government under Felipe Gonzalez in 1982, the ETA carried out 47 more attacks than it did in 1981, resulting in the death of 39 and injury of 48. This was because Gonzalez did not give them the concession they desired.18 This would seemingly undermine my theory on how regime change affects terrorist organizations’ choices of tactics, but that is why a description of the GAL was necessary.

Through the GAL the government themselves became a terrorist organization, using assassinations and kidnappings against the ETA similar to the methods the Franco regime used in their attempts to eradicate any organization showing Basque pride. In this way the regime structure changed, but the terrorist policy remained very similar. But when the government changed yet again under Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, so did some of the strategies of the ETA. In 1998, Aznar offered a dialogue between Spanish officials and the ETA. After some time and repeated calls for negotiations, the ETA began making concessions. The number of terrorist acts they carried out actually decreased from 30 in 1997 to nine in 1998, and even down to three in 1999.19 The effects of public opinion specifically were apparent after the demonstration of 250,000 people in June 2005, showing the ETA that a large number of Spanish residents were tired of their violent tactics. This eventually led the ETA to announce an unprecedented cease-fire so they could take part in the democratic process.20 Although the figures for the number of attacks perpetrated by the ETA during and following this announcement are not yet available, I predict that they will show a decrease in terrorist activity carried out by the ETA from 2005 to 2006.

Hizballah The 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah, a Lebanese militia consisting mostly of Shiites and faithfully backed by Iran, has proven the Party of God to be a formidable organization with the ability not only to use violence effectively, but also to win the hearts and minds of the Shiite community in Lebanon. Since forming a political wing ready for elections in 1992, Hizballah has gained an increasing number of seats in the Lebanese parliament and won the loyalties of many within Lebanon that benefit from

Lickteig ! Terrorist Activities and Non-Violent Tactics

their extensive social and civil welfare programs. These are a people who could greatly benefit from aid.

Historically, Shiites in Lebanon have been tossed to the wayside in the mélange of religious and ethnic affiliations inhabiting Lebanese territory. Since its independence in 1946 Shiites were facing poverty and a general lack of political power as they were considered a lower class than other groups like Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims.

Due to their high birth rates, the Shiite population tripled from 250,000 to 750,000 between 1956 and 1975.21 Now comprising around 30 percent of the total population, Shiite leaders believed they could possibly finally gain political power. In the 1970s Imam-Musa Al-Sadr used this growing resentment to form Harakat al-Mahroumin (the movement of the dispossessed). But the movement was unable to gain major ground as the Lebanese civil war broke out in 1975, mainly because of the growing number of Palestinian refugees who began launching attacks at Israel from camps in Lebanon.

Furthermore, the struggle between Palestinian refugees and Israelis took place in the southern Shiite region, forcing many in the Shiite community to move to the city of Beirut. There they ended up in the southern suburbs known as the “misery belt”—this was perfect breeding ground for a revolutionary movement.

That revolution sparked when Lebanese Shiites saw the success of their brothers in Iran during the Islamic Revolution of 1979. With these events bringing a Shiite to power, and later with the Israeli occupation of the Lebanese south in 1982, many Shiites mobilized.

Gathering in Bekaa Valley, they joined forces with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and formed Hizballah, or the “Party of God” based on the Qur’anic verse (V.56): “Lo! The Party of God, they are the victorious.”22 With Iran supplying the arms and a newly developed illicit drug trade providing other funds necessary to form a militia, Hizballah grew and consolidated its goals. First and foremost the organization set out to expel all foreign presence in Shiite regions, namely forcing Israel out of Southern Lebanon. They also sought to beat rival movements for control over Beirut neighborhoods and villages in the south.23 In the following decade Hizballah carried out terror acts like hostage taking and exploding car bombs. Slowly they developed into a disciplined militia capable of ending the Israeli occupation in 2000 and again defending Lebanon’s southern borders from Israeli incursions in 2006. But Hizballah developed more than just its military wing.

When Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, it left an opening for Hizballah’s spiritual leader Shaykh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah to transform a part of the organization into a political party. Previously unable to do so because of the need for an intense reliance on Iran (whose leaders were against the concessions that would need to be made to form a political party), Fadlallah’s decision led Hizballah to take part in the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 1992. They won eight of the 128 seats. But their ties with Iran still remained strong as they helped fund most of Hizballah’s growing welfare programs. With Hassan Nasrallah elected the Secretary General of Hizballah, the organization “expanded its social services sector in order to extend its political and social power base, increasing lobbying in parliament on behalf of the Shiite community and Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 127!

welcoming an Iranian infusion of humanitarian aid to the movement.”24 This network of civil services now not only provides public support and votes for parliamentary seats (they now hold 14 seats), but also gives good reason for many young Shiites to join the cause in Hizballah’s continually strong militant wing.

Effects of Regime Change and Public Opinion on Hizballah Hizballah as a terrorist organization and now a political party has been operating within Lebanese territory since its creation in 1982. Governments and prime ministers have come and gone but no political leader would arrest or force Hizballah out of south Lebanon just because of its anti-Israel agenda.25 In fact, the regime always openly allowed Hizballah to operate and disseminate information and civil services. One reason they may permit the organization to operate freely is the immense popularity Hizballah enjoys in the country as one of the major opposition parties willing to stand up to Israel.

Considering the openness the Lebanese regime has had towards Hizballah, this would not be a good explanation of their change towards a political party in 1989 and eventual election in 1992. Since Hizballah’s inception, however, they have been under a different power that oversaw their actions and, at times, dictated their strategy—namely: Iran.

When Khomeini died in 1989, this allowed Shaykh Fadlallah the opportunity to change a few things. He transformed Hizballah’s relationship with Iran, especially Khomeini’s successor Ayatollah al-Sayyid ‘Ali al-Khameini, to allow for differences in opinions. He changed Hizballah’s tactics to include a political party—that which Khomeini never would have allowed. In addition to this new openness in strategy, Fadlallah sought more legitimacy for the organization, which is inherently tied to the opinion of the public— both of the Lebanese population and that of the entire Islamic world. In a 1995 interview with Dr. Mahmoud Soueid, director of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Fadlallah showed this desire to use tactics other than violence to achieve his goals: “In my view, Hizballah should enter the electoral arena if only for the sake of Islamic legitimacy in Lebanon, which dictates the formation of a parliamentary party. This is not to say that the Islamists have embraced the parliamentary system, but parliament does provide a forum where they can express their views and urge others, if not to adopt those views, at least to be more accommodating toward them. Participation in this system may enable Hizballah to realize some transitional goals.”26 This legitimacy for Hizballah has developed with their election. However, it is interesting to note that the number of terrorist acts carried out by Hizballah does not correspond to their political actions. In 1991, Hizballah perpetrated 11 terrorist incidents, but during the year of the 1992 election, they carried out 32 incidents. Then in 1993 there are no recorded terrorist actions attributed to Hizballah. One would think that Hizballah would decrease their number of terrorist acts during an election year, but in fact, that number increased. This disconnection between political and violent action may be explained by the Lebanese belief that Hizballah was carrying out these violent acts on their behalf, to vanquish a common enemy—Israel. Or it could also be a function of Lickteig ! Terrorist Activities and Non-Violent Tactics

“crisis normalization,” whereby the Lebanese public has been psychologically desensitized to terrorist violence, and therefore does not react negatively to increases in terrorist acts.27 In a survey done by S. Haddad among Lebanese Shiites in 2003, it was shown that 80 percent actually approved of Hizballah keeping their arms. However, 75 percent said “they would side with the state in the event of confrontation between the party and the state.”28 This public support of the formal government possibly led Hizballah leaders to continue to develop their political wing to compete in 2005, when it won 14 of 128 parliament seats.29 Unique to Hizballah is the fact that they have achieved their main objective: forcing Israel out of Lebanon. When Israel suspended its occupation in 2000, many doubted the future viability of Hizballah as a terrorist organization or political party. But they still hold some power, especially among Lebanese Shiites. Many support Hizballah because they guarantee adequate services to a population that feels forgotten, like providing food and money for medical services or schooling. But public support for their violent activities is also high as Lebanese Shiites continue to feel threatened by Israel. This public approval has allowed Hizballah to continue as a political group without getting rid of their militant wing.

Hamas In 2006 many in the West were surprised by the land-slide success of terrorist organization Hamas in the Palestinian legislative elections. Created in 1987 following the first Intifada, Hamas had been carrying out terrorist violence for two decades, so it came as a surprise to many when they won 76 seats in a parliament of 132 over the opposing secular group, Fatah. However, given Hamas’ history of outreach to a Palestinian people that largely felt abandoned by the international community, their electoral success may not be such a surprise.

Hamas, an acronym for Harakat al-Mukawama al-Islamia (Islamic Resistance Movement), was originally an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, which works towards the goal of providing social services to Palestinians under Israeli occupation.

Hamas, however, decided to utilize terror tactics against Israel, whom they considered an “antagonistic totalitarian regime, not just an entity with territorial ambitions.”30 The organization was outlawed in September 1989 because of its subversive tactics that included the work of two main parts for their military wing. The first is called the Palestinian Holy Fighters (al-Majahadoun al-Falestinioun), which carries out the terrorist attacks. The second is Security Section (Jehaz Aman) is an intelligence organization, gathering information on suspected collaborators with Israel.

But through its growth, Hamas experienced variations in degrees of support from the Palestinians they wish to help. This led to a strategic overhaul in 1991 where leaders decided violence would not be the only effective method to reach their long-term goals of demonstrating discontent against the Israeli occupation, ultimately ending in the destruction of Israel and the promotion of an Islamic Palestinian state. When the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) met with Israeli leaders in Oslo, Norway in Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 129!

1992, there was an increasing amount of support for Hamas to enter party politics from within the organization and outside. This was because Palestinians became increasingly optimistic about the possible success of peace negotiations. Despite Arafat’s increased suppression of Hamas and similar religious terrorist organizations like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad following the Oslo Accords (resulting in the arrest of over 2,000 operatives and deaths of 20 leaders), Hamas continued to form a legal political party by November 1995.

This new political party, named the National Islamic Salvation Party, was created with a few primary objectives in mind: create a political movement to oppose the PNA, then thought to be ineffective and unable to bring about the changes the Palestinian people required; establish student unions, workers’ unions and a newspaper to garner support for the ultimate goal of creating an Islamic Palestinian Society; and reveal potential recruits and mobilize support for the organization. The immediate elections after the establishment of the party were in 1996; however, Hamas decided to abstain from taking part. This decision was made considering two major issues: the advantages Fatah would have because of the timing and election procedure planned by Yasser Arafat, and the detrimental effects that an early loss to Fatah would have on Hamas’ popularity. So the organization continued to grow, gathering support through its youth programs and propaganda.

An important factor to understanding Hamas’ eventual success in 2006 is its extensive network of charity and welfare associations. This is not surprising given Hamas’ original ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, a very charitable organization. But on top of fulfilling the Islamic Pillar of Alms giving (zekath), these welfare institutions provide many more benefits to the organization, one obviously being an increase in political support. The aid Hamas gives can act as a “screen for covert activities”31 and a means of transferring funds or identifying potential recruits throughout the occupied territories.

However, Hamas’ popularity began to decline in 1999 as funding was pulled and social service programs began to disappear. This loss of support eventually led Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin to participate in meetings with the Palestinian National Council, directly lending support and authority to Yasser Arafat, despite much opposition from individuals in the Hamas party.32 It also may have led to their drop in terrorist activity, from 10 incidents in 1999 to 3 in 2000.33 But by 2001, support was rising again for Hamas and their violent military wing, which many attribute to the corruption and poor performance of the PNA.34 Since 2001, by using a combination of violent tactics (especially suicide bombings) and peaceful political methods, Hamas has grown in popularity among the Palestinian people who increasingly consider the PNA to be an illegitimate puppet government used by the West to assert control over the territories.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Lickteig ! Terrorist Activities and Non-Violent Tactics

Created in 1979, just a few years before Hamas, was another organization with similar goals—the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Also like Hamas, the PIJ emerged as a radical outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the organization has remained solely a militant group offering no openness to dialogue, nor any social services. Led by Egyptian students Fthi Shaqaqi and Abd al-Aziz Awda, the organizations’ goals are based on the absolute destruction of Israel.

In 1981, PIJ was exiled to the Gaza Strip after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat.

They were later forced out of Gaza into Lebanon where they developed a relationship with Hizballah as they were training with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. One major difference between PIJ and other organizations mentioned in this paper is that it has remained only a series of loosely affiliated factions, which some may give as a reason for not creating a political wing. The PIJ remains dependent on Syria, Lebanon and Iran for land to plan their attacks and financial support. Among many others, their attacks have included the 1987 murder of a commander of the Israeli military police in the Gaza strip, the 2001 suicide bomb which killed 21 people in a Tel Aviv nightclub and the April 2006 suicide attack in Tel Aviv that killed 11.

Effect of Public Opinion on Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad These two terrorist organizations, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, operate primarily on behalf of the Palestinian people. They have each been affected differently by the varying degrees of support the Palestinian people give to violent organizations, which is inversely related to the optimism the population has about the potential success of peaceful negotiations. Hamas seems to react to public opinion changes by conceding to negotiations and opening up to the political process. This willingness to gather support through non-violent methods, however, is not shared by the PIJ. Still a loose network of relatively autonomous groups, the PIJ does not have the centralized infrastructure in place to form a political party. They are dedicated to using violence specifically to achieve their goal of the destruction of Israel, originally breaking off from the Muslim Brotherhood because they believed it was too moderate. This lack of infrastructure, dedication to violence, abhorrence for conciliation and negotiations with the Palestinian National Authority, or Israel, and lack of interest in eventually governing the Palestinian Territories, are reasons the PIJ may not be as reactive to changes in public opinion.

Hamas, however, has a demonstrated interest in gaining support and approval of the Palestinian people. This can be seen in their provisions of social and civil services to Palestinians when the PNA is unable to do it effectively, and also through their formation of a political wing that, by its nature, requires approval of the Palestinian people for election success. This reaction to public opinion, as predicted in my theory, can be demonstrated in concessions Hamas made closely following the Oslo Peace Process in the early 1990s. At that time, polls of Palestinians showed growing opposition to “martyrdom operations” which many attributed to a growing optimism about the peace process.35 The Palestinian people largely support peace but are desperate for relief from continued Israeli occupation and many times feel terrorism is their only option—what some might relate to the desperation theory of terrorism. During the Oslo Peace Process Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 131!

however, many Palestinians saw hope for a better future brought about through peaceful methods, and Hamas’ popularity fell below 12 percent, its lowest point ever. Similarly in 1993, when the Oslo Accords were signed, the number of terrorist attacks Hamas carried out fell to zero.36 Later in an extremely controversial move, spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin met with leaders of the Palestinian National Council—a decision he most likely would not have made had Hamas enjoyed widespread support for its terrorist activity.

Unfortunately, this optimism about the success of peace negotiations did not last long.

After the peace process ended, the Palestinian people waited for the PNA to keep its promises and provide the social services needed to bring them out of poverty. Possibly in an effort to discredit Arafat and prove he was unable to sustain peace he signed onto during the Oslo process, Hamas perpetrated 41 attacks in 1994 causing 68 deaths.37 This number decreased again to five incidents in 1995, even down to one in 1997. But as time passed and their situation did not change, many Palestinians became more and more frustrated and pessimistic about what Arafat could do for them. By 2001, Hamas’ approval was on the rise again as two-thirds of Palestinians supported suicide operations as a way to weaken Israeli military resolve in the Occupied Territories.38 As support for the organization increased, so did the number of incidents—from three in 2000 to 23 in 2001 to 28 in 2002—leading to the conclusion that public support for violent activity affects the decisions terrorist organizations make on their use of tactics.39 But this strategy of using a political party to achieve its goals stuck with Hamas leaders, who then decided to use this non-violent wing to their benefit. It could act as a cover for clandestine operations and military recruitment. They were winning the hearts and minds of Palestinians while carrying out deadly attacks against Israel. Public support for violence continued through the coming years as 80.7 percent supported the Intifada in 2002.40 However, this support for the Intifada, and therefore violent tactics used by Hamas, waned as the percentage of Palestinians in favor of violence decreased from 76.8 percent in 2003 to 69.7 percent in 2004.41 Similarly in 2004, 26.9 percent of the Palestinians surveyed opposed “military operations against Israeli targets and consider them a detriment to Palestinian national interests,” but by December 2004 that percentage had risen to 51.8.42 This majority opposition to military operations against Israeli targets continued through 2005. This trend can be seen in parallel with the growing level of optimism Palestinians felt in regards to the future—45.4 percent in June 2004 to 63.3 percent in December 2004.43 These trends also correspond to a growing level of support for Hamas’ political wing, leading to their eventual election in January 2006. Of those who voted for Hamas in that election, 43.0 percent said they did it “with the hope of ending the corruption”, 18.8 percent voted for them for religious reasons and 11.8 percent voted for Hamas because of its political agenda.44 In addition to this support for legal, non-violent action is the majority (66.3%) that said Hamas should continue to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority, whereas 29.6 percent said the political negotiations should stop.45 Lickteig ! Terrorist Activities and Non-Violent Tactics

Following this initial popularity, however, has been a steady decline in the Palestinian peoples’ trust of the Hamas party to keep their promises. In 2007 a poll was conducted by the Jerusalem Media & Communications Center which showed that 46.7 percent “generally believe that the situation in the Gaza Strip worsened following Hamas control over Gaza Strip.”46 But a poll taken as recently as March 2008 showed an increase in popularity of Hamas which some relate to the March incursion into Gaza by Israeli forces that left more than 130 Palestinians dead.47 This also may have been the cause of the increase in support for armed attacks against Israelis.

Based on this argument of the effects of public opinion, it might seem odd that Hamas called for a six-month “period of quiet” in April 2008, when the Palestinian public is showing an increase in support for armed attacks against Israelis.48 But this temporary truce could have been offered for other strategic reasons, such as temporarily lifting the Israeli blockade on Gaza that has left many families starving without heat, electricity or fuel within the past few months.

Conclusion Given the prevalence and potential destructiveness of terror organizations in the international system, the importance of understanding their strategies and decisionmaking cannot be overstated. Throughout this paper I attempted to reveal one facet of that decision making—the circumstances under which terrorist organizations may actually turn away from violence and go about achieving their goals in peaceful ways.

I argued that terrorist organizations are essentially rational—having pre-set goals they wish to obtain, they will do a cost-benefit analysis and act in the ways they believe will best help them reach that goal, using the tactics that are less costly or more efficient.

Taking this basic theory of decision-making, I looked at the costs and benefits of using violence or non-violence as they applied to five general goals terrorist organizations seek.

Based off this analysis, I concluded that terrorist organizations are likely to start using nonviolent tactics when the regime allows for an open political discourse, when the public supports peaceful negotiations over terrorist violence, or when forming a political party with the intent to govern a defined area is already part of the organization’s goal.

Considering these variables, I looked at four prominent terrorist organizations and how regime change and public opinion affected their strategies. I found that generally the openness of a regime to negotiate with terrorists and the amount of public support an organization has (as measured through elections or opinion polls) has pushed some of these organizations to use non-violent methods like forming political parties and providing social services.

The only case where this did not happen was that of the Palestinian Islamic jihad, but this can be explained by their lack of central infrastructure, their singular commitment to the use of violence, and their subsequent lack of interest in eventually governing the Palestinian territories. This information, then, leads to an exception in the theory: political party formation is not only a function of the regime type, public support and end Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 133!

goals of an organization, but it is also conditional on the type of organizationâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;whether they are structured well enough to form a political party or too spread out and decentralized.

Keeping these findings in mind, the effects of public opinion and regime type should be studied further, in more cases than just these four. If these findings are consistent, then the implications could be three-fold. First, it would continue to drive states like the U.S. to promote democratic governance and free speech throughout the world. Second, it would encourage policy-makers to be more open to a dialogue with organizations they consider to be terrorists. Frequently, a government that closes off any chance of negotiations can actually strengthen terrorist organizations. If the government refuses any dialogue and continues indiscriminate and sometimes harmful anti-terror policies, it gives terrorist leaders more resolve and fodder for recruitment. If the public sees the government refusing to talk to an organization that provides them with many services that the government itself does not, they are more likely to support the terrorist organization and therefore whatever methods that organization chooses to use. Thirdly, governments or international organizations would start advertising campaigns to rally the public against the organizations and their tactics, which may encourage the organizations to choose non-violent tactics.

Whether international actors believe in the viability of the U.S. â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;War on Terrorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; or if they agree with the objectives of terrorist organizations the U.S. targets, international terrorist activity threatens all of us. Along with current military efforts, convincing terrorists that violence is not the answer should be a priority concern for the leaders of countries and international organizations.

See Bibliography for Terrorist Organizations and the Use of Non-violent Tactics in Appendix I: Bibliographies

Lickteig ! Terrorist Activities and Non-Violent Tactics

Endnotes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! "

2003, 3 2006, 112 $ 2006, 113 % Bloom 2004, 61 & Hutchinson 1972, 390 ' 2003, 63 ( 2003, 62 ) Bloom 2004, 69 * Encarnacion 2007, 959 "+ Encarnacion 2007, 959 "" Encarnacion 2007, 956 "# Encarnacion 2007, 953 "$ Encarnacion 2007, 956 "% Idoiaga 2008 "& “Basque Fatherland and Liberty” "' Encarnacion 2007, 959 "( START ") START "* START #+ “Basque Fatherland and Liberty” #" Kramer 1994, 23 ## Kramer 1994, 24 #$ Kramer 1994, 34 #% Weinberg 2004, 71 #& Haddad 2006, 22 #' Soueid 1995, 69 #( Borell 2008 #) Haddad 2006, 28 #* Pan $+ Weinberg 2004, 75 $" Weinberg 2004, 77 $# Bloom 2004, 68 $$ START $% Bloom 2004, 69 $& Bloom 2004, 67 $' START $( START $) Bloom 2004, 65 $* START %+ Khader 2004-5, 88 %" Khader 2005-5, 89 %# Khader 2004-5, 89 %$ Khader 2004-5, 89-90 %% “Poll no. 57” %& “Poll no. 57” %' “Poll no. 62” %( “Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (27)” %) BBC News Online #

Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 135!

The New World Order: An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era Dr. Muzaffer Yilmaz, Professor, Balikesir University, Turkey ABSTRACT This article provides an analytical discussion on post-Cold War developments and the emerging world order in that era. In this regard, some of the main characteristics of the international system, basic trends, and new threats in international relations are addressed, in that order. It is argued that while classical inter-state wars tend to decrease in the post-Cold War era, there are many other serious threats to international peace beyond the full control of nation-states, most notably ethnic conflicts, religious militancy, terrorism, North-South conflict, and unfair economic competition. The future of the world is stressed to depend on whether major powers are able to, and willing to, work on these threats in a cooperative manner.

INTRODUCTION The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s has had a dual impact on international relations. On the one hand, the Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the Third World brought an end to the Cold War, allowed democratization to proceed in many states previously ruled by Marxist dictatorships, and led to significant progress in resolving several Third World conflicts that had become prolonged during the Cold War. The reduction in East-West tension also resulted in a great decrease in inter-state conflicts, some of which occurred due to the superpower ideological rivalry during the Cold War. Even it became fashionable to argue that force, used here as military power, has run its course in international politics. And it is true that defense budgets in many parts of the world radically decreased (See, for example, United States, Government Accountability Office, 2008). This trend, despite very few contrary examples (for instance China), appears to holding.

On the other hand, however, it would be rather unwise to argue that the world is now at peace. The collapse of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Soviet Empireâ&#x20AC;? was followed by the emergence, or reemergence, of many serious conflicts in several areas that had been relatively quiescent during the Cold War. Some of these new conflicts have been taking place within the former Soviet Union, such as the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over NagornoKarabakh, and the fighting in Chechnya. But some conflicts also erupted or intensified in several countries outside of it and many Third World conflicts in which the superpowers were not deeply involved during the Cold War have persisted after it, like the secessionist movements in India, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.

Ethnopolitical conflicts aside, there have been other threats to international order that are, indeed, beyond the full control of major powers, even the United States, the victor of the Yilmaz ! New World Order

Cold War. The most notable ones include religious militancy, terrorism, North-South conflict, and severe competition over scarce resources. Thus, the end of the Cold War can be said to have brought about both stability and instability to international relations. The purpose of this article is to evaluate nearly two decades of the post-Cold War era in terms of the elements of stability and instability. In this respect, the study will start with an overview of the general characteristics of the international system. This will be followed by a more detailed discussion on basic trends and new threats in international relations.

Several observations will also be outlined in concluding the study with respect to possible future directions of international affairs.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTER THE COLD WAR With the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the bipolar international system dominating the Cold War period disappeared, leaving its place to basically a unipolar system under the leadership of the United States, speaking especially from a military/political point of view. The former rivals of the United States, especially the Soviet Union and China, have either collapsed or jettisoned the central features of their ideologies that were hostile to the United States.

Other countries have turned to American military protection. The “American Empire” may best be seen operating in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and the Middle East, in general, where the armed forces of the United States have established a semi permanent foothold and thousands of soldiers deployed at bases keep a watch on Iran, Syria, and other “potential enemies.”

Albeit widely criticized, American military power serves a number of critical functions.

In some areas, in the Persian Gulf for example, it guarantees weak states against attacks by their stronger neighbors. In Asia, the presence of the United States stabilizes the region in which a number of states might otherwise feel compelled to develop much larger military forces than they currently have. American military power in Japan does only protect Japan against foreign enemies. It indirectly protects China and other Asian states against the consequences that might flow from a heavily re-armed Japan.

Moreover, American military power serves as an organizer of military coalition, both permanent (such as NATO) and ad hoc (such as peacekeeping missions). American military participation is often necessary to the command and control of coalition operations. When the Americans are willing to lead, other countries often follow, even if reluctantly. However, this is certainly not to argue that American intervention occurs in every large conflict around the world. But it means that almost any country embarking on the use of force beyond its borders has to think about possible reactions of the United States (See, Sanders, 2008).

From an economic/political point of view, on the other hand, the international system can be said to be multipolar, rather than unipolar. The United States certainly a great economic power, but it is not the only power. There are other power centers, most notably, the European Union, the Organization of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, as well as many nation-states outside of these integrations or organizations (See, Harrison, 2004). As a matter of fact, when the United States exercised military operations to

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â&#x20AC;&#x153;stableâ&#x20AC;? the world in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, it insisted on sharing the costs of the operations with other major powers or relevant countries. Thus, the international system of the post-Cold War era actually reflects a mixture of both unipolar and multipolar system in which at least five major powers, the United States, Europe, China, Japan, and Russia, dominate international affairs.

BASIC TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The general wish of the dominant powers in the post-Cold War era is to preserve the status quo from which they mostly benefit. Hence, international cooperation evidently increased among major powers, as exemplified by the increase of peace operations. To be more specific, while from 1948 to 1978, only a total of 13 peacekeeping forces were set up, and in the following ten-year period, no new forces were established, from May 1988 to October 1993, a further twenty forces were created. As of December 2008, the number of UN peacekeeping operations has reached 63, 18 of which are still operating in the field, involving 112660 military personnel and civilian police.1 The decreasing ideological clashes between the United States and Russia manifested itself most clearly in the decline of the veto at the Security Council. From 1945 to 1990, the permanent members of the Security Council cast the following number of vetoes: China, 3; France, 18; United Kingdom, 30; US, 69; and the Soviet Union, 114. Then between June 1990 and May 1993, there was not one veto. One exception occurred in May 1993 when Russia blocked a resolution on financing the peacekeeping force on Cyprus. With this exception, the post-Cold War capacity of the Security Council to reach agreement has survived and constituted a key reason for the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations (See, Yilmaz, 2005).

Another feature of the post-Cold War era is that since the West has become the victor of the East-West ideological rivalry, Western systems and Western influences, in general, started to dominate the whole world. For example, the United States has visibly enhanced its influence in the Middle East and in Caucasus since the end of the Cold War. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 and the following Gulf Crisis, in a way, created an opportunity for the Unites States to exercise its hegemonic power in the Middle East. In the following years, in the absence of a counter-power, the influence of the United States increased further. With the military operation to Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States perpetuated its dominance in the region.

The region of Caucasus was formerly under the Russian sphere of influence. But the United States managed to enter this energy-rich region with some new allies, used to be the part of the Soviet Union, such as Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Georgia. Although Russia certainly did not want the United States presence in the region, its ability to prevent it has remained limited.

1

Source: http://www.un.org.peace/bnote010101.pdf (December 16, 2008).

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Likewise, NATO expanded to involve Eastern Europe, a region also used to be under Soviet influence. Russia, in the beginning, tried to resist NATO expansion, posing several threats, including creating a counter defense organization. But it was eventually convinced with the project of “partnership for peace”, through which it preserved many of its privileges in Eastern European countries (See, US Department of State, 1996).

In the same way, the European Union expanded towards Eastern Europe, symbolizing, once again, Western dominance. Particularly with the 2004 expansion, eight formerly communist countries, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Check Republic (with the exception of Cyprus and Malta) joined the Union. In 2007, two other previously communist states, Bulgaria and Romania, became full members as well.

While all these dictate Western dominance in the post-Cold War era, the effects of this dominance have manifested itself in the world as both stability and instability. On the one hand, the hegemonic power of the United States and expansion of Western-originated organizations have an impact on decreasing international anarchy and thus, increasing international stability. On the other hand, however, growing Western dominance brought about many reactions and challenges towards the West. It seems that most of the reactions take place in the Islamic world as if it proves Samuel P. Huntington’s famous “clash of civilizations” thesis (See, Huntington, 1997). However, such reactions currently appear to be disorganized, less powerful, and thus they are far away from posing a serious challenge to Western dominance. But nonetheless, anti-Westernism in the Muslim world and elsewhere seems particularly to feed terrorism, a serious threat to peace in the post-Cold War period, as it will be discussed below.

NEW THREATS Although the ending of the Cold War clearly increased the willingness of governments to work through the United Nations and other international channels to resolve conflicts and keep peace around the globe, several new threats have emerged in the post-Cold War era that are, indeed, beyond the full control of nation-states, even major powers. One of the greatest threats, in this regard, is the prevalence of intra-national conflicts, conflicts occurring within the borders of states. These are mostly ethnically-driven conflicts over self-determination, succession or political dominance. Until the end of the Cold War, the conventional wisdom in the world was that ethnicity and nationalism were outdated concepts and largely resolved problems. On both sides of the Cold War, the trend seemed to indicate that the world was moving toward internationalism rather than nationalism. As a result of the threat of nuclear warfare, great emphasis on democracy and human rights, economic interdependence, and gradual acceptance of universal ideologies, it became fashionable to speak of the demise of ethnic and nationalist movements.

Despite contrary expectations, however, a fresh cycle of ethnopolitical movements have re-emerged recently in Eastern Europe (including the Balkans), Central Asia, Africa, and many other parts of the world. While wars fought among sovereign countries are increasingly the exception to the norm, intra-national conflicts have account for over 90

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percent of the major armed conflicts recorded in recent years worldwide.2 This trend appears to be holding.

Yet, the international community cannot be said to have well prepared to this trend.

Major international organizations, including the United Nations, were designed to cope with inter-state problems, historically the main source of threat to global peace and security. Besides, the fact that internal conflicts occur within the borders of states made major international actors reluctant to intervene, either for legal concerns or for concern to avoid probable loses. For example, during the Clinton administration, the United States government issued PDD-25 (Presidential Decision Directive-25), limiting the conditions that the United States can participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. (See, the Clinton Administrationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 1994).

In short, unless they really escalate, the international community has preferred not to involve themselves in intra-national conflicts.

But such conflicts could be as serious, costly, and intense as any in the past. And somehow they need to be resolved, or else international peace and security will not be in a stable situation. Although intra-state conflicts appear to be local, they can quickly gain an international dimension due to global interdependence and to various international supports. In fact, when external parties provide political, economic, or military assistance, or asylum and bases for actors involved in local struggles, these conflicts inevitably assume an international dimension (See, Yilmaz, 2007).

Undoubtedly, effective management of intra-state conflicts requires an understanding of the root causes of these conflicts, as well as application of proper strategies for stopping violence and building peace. By far, the international community has been relatively successful in deploying peacekeeping forces in violent internal conflicts, whereby such conflicts were tried to be controlled. As mentioned above, 50 peace operations were realized in the post-Cold War era, 18 of which are still on duty. And, generally speaking, thousands of civilian and military peacekeepers have been successful in keeping people alive and in preventing conflict escalation. However, it has not been well understood that United Nations peacekeeping is a â&#x20AC;&#x153;palliative,â&#x20AC;? not a cure. Peacekeeping forces do not directly resolve conflicts. That is not their purpose. All they can do is to manage the conflict for a period of time to allow the people who can resolve it to negotiate a resolution of their differences in an atmosphere not poisoned by death and destruction.

More problematic is the idea of expanded peacekeeping which leads to the militarization of peacekeeping. Rather than turn to increasingly militarized solutions -a habit that pervades thinking about conflict management at the international level- non-violent alternatives, which take account of the range of complex issues involved in violent conflicts and the people who experience them, should be considered. Hence, what is actually needed in intra-state conflicts is proper peace building efforts that complement peacekeeping. Although since the end of the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved to involve many peace building activities (such as monitoring, even running local elections, assisting in the reconstruction of state functions, and so on2

Source: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0904550.html (December 18, 2008).

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See, Serafino, 2005; Daniel et al, 2008), the ability of the international community, nevertheless, has still remained limited, in this respect.

Another threat to peace in the post-Cold War period is rising religious militancy. To some extent, it seems that religiously-driven conflicts have replaced the ideological zone of the Cold War as a serious source of international conflict. Some analysts even contended that it is now cultural rather than “iron” curtains that divide the world, and that religion fuels the conflict in a special way by inspiring intolerant and irreconcilable images of identity and commitment among competing civilizations. Even more than ethnicity, Huntington argues, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people …As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an “us” versus “them” relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity and religion (Huntington 1993, 40, 45).

Although Huntington’s thesis is a provocative one, in its support, one can point to governments in countries like Iran, Sudan, and to Islamic movements throughout the Middle East and elsewhere, which readily resort to the language of cultural confrontation.

In many of these places, a spirit of religious militancy, at times called “religious fundamentalism,” prevails. It often includes support for violence against the manifestation of sacrilege and oppression seen to be imposed upon Muslim peoples by the West or its sympathizers.

Though relations between Asia and the West have not been expressed in such violent terms, “civilizational tension” is frequently reported, nevertheless. Most of the Asian countries are now less inclined than they once were to acquiesce to Western cultural preference, as, for instance, in the interpretation of rights or the development of certain political and social institutions.

Many religious militants are strongly committed to the direct use of violence in pursuing their mission. There have been numerous widely publicized examples, such as the massacre by a Jewish zealot of two dozen Muslim worshippers in Hebron, the explicit blessing of violence by both Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholic Christians in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the September 11 attacks on the United States, and the July 2005 bombings of the London subway in which so many innocent people became victims.

Religiously-driven violent intolerance can also be connected to terrorism in many cases.

In fact, some of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations today, like Islamic Jihad and El-Kaida, are ideologically fed by religious fundamentalism. Most people in such organizations strongly believe that direct use of violence in the name of religion is obligatory. They are also convinced that if they die in their “holy struggle”, they will be rewarded in the next life; they will directly go to heaven. This belief removes fear or guilt feeling, making killing and dying much easier consequently (See, Yilmaz, 2002).

Terrorism, whether it is fed by religious fundamentalism or not, is another serious threat to peace in the post-Cold War era. While occasional terrorist activities have been part of

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human history, terrorism particularly became a serious problem after the end of the Cold War, especially after the September 11 attacks.

The term terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic, a reaction to oppression, and a crime. Obviously, the description depends on whose point of view is being represented. The Unites States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Outside the United States, there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasized in definitions. The United Nations, for instance, defined terrorism as “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, where -in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets,” 3 But it should be noted that the phrase “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is a view terrorists themselves would accept. Terrorists do not see themselves as evil. They believe they are legitimate combatants, fighting for what they believe in, by whatever means possible (See, Martin, 2006). On the other hand, a victim of a terrorist act sees the terrorist as a criminal with no regard for human life.

However it is defined, terrorism has become a serious problem in the post-Cold War era, though, as mentioned before, it is not limited to this particular period. Over the past twenty years, terrorists have committed extremely violent acts for alleged political or religious reasons. Political ideology ranges from the far left to the far right. For instance, the far left consists of groups, such as Marxists and Leninists, who propose a revolution of workers led by revolutionary elite. On the far right, dictatorships can be found that typically believe in a merging of state. Religious extremists, on the other hand, often reject the authority of secular governments and view legal systems that are not based on their religious beliefs as illegitimate. They also view modernization efforts as corrupting influences on traditional culture.

Above all, terrorism influences an audience beyond the immediate victims. The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draw the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. The terrorists plan their attack to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what they oppose. The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the public’s or government’s reaction to the act. For instance, the September 11, 2001 attacks killed about 3000 people. They were immediate victims. But their real target was the American people and the United States government.

After this terrorist attack, President,George W. Bush of the United States declared a war against terrorism and many states supported him (See, Mahajan, 2002). But the fact that terrorists do not fight on clear fronts and do not play according to the rules of war makes struggling with terrorism extremely difficult. The United States and its supporters have 3

For further information, visit http//en.wikipedia.org./wiki/terrorism (January 28, 2009).

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been relatively successful in defeating and punishing the governments in Afghanistan and Iraq claimed to be supporting terrorist acts. Yet it seems that it is not possible to terminate terrorism with these defeats. On the contrary, the United States invasions and its increasing influences in the Middle East and elsewhere brought about mass reactions, feeding, indeed, many terrorist organizations. Consequently, no matter how the United States and its allies can be militarily strong, the threat posed by various terrorist organizations will likely to continue in the years to come.

The post-Cold War period also witnessed the resurgence of North-South economic antagonism. Such confrontation is not new. It has occurred before in international arena.

But in accordance with the decline of ideological clashes, it has begun to occupy a more significant agenda in international affairs.

To understand the greater consequences of the present North-South conflict, some historical perspective is needed. In the early 1970s, developing countries at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) coalesced into what became known as the Group of 77 to press their demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). This aspiration grew out of the neo-Marxist political economy theory of the 1960s, which argued that the international trading system was condemning the â&#x20AC;&#x153;peripheryâ&#x20AC;? -Latin America and other developing countries- to poverty, exploitation, and dependency. Among other measures, the NIEO specifically called for a system of price supports for a number of key developing country commodity exports, indexation of developing country export prices to developed countries' manufactured exports, technology transfer, and the negotiated re-deployment of some developed country industries to developing nations. By the 1980s, the NIEO agenda at the United Nations had foundered due to divergences in developing country interests, the inability to replicate OPEC's success with other commodities and, most importantly, the discrediting of its command-based economic theories. This was evidenced by the astonishing success of Taiwan, South Korea and others that pursued trade liberalization and export-led growth.

Thirty years later, at Cancun, many officials opined that the harsh rhetoric employed by major developing countries, such as Brazil and India, as well as smaller African and Caribbean countries, was strongly reminiscent of the 1970s UNCTAD experience. The themes of Northern economic exploitation have become fashionably recurrent, even though the remedies demanded by the South at the WTO now differ from the NIEO. Rather than price supports for commodities and exports, developing countries at Cancun called for unilateral trade concessions and compensation by the rich countries.

While there were many reasons enumerated for the failure at Cancun, the common theme was that talks fell apart along a North-South divide. The G-21 opposed developed countries' agricultural subsidies. The Lesser Developed Countries (LDC) refused to lower their astronomical agriculture and manufacturing tariffs, which stoked the frustration of the United States and others (See, Sevilla, 2003).

With the talks having ended with no clear success, the conflict between the poor developing nations living in the Southern Hemisphere and the rich industrial countries of Northwestern Journal of International Affairs 143

the North has entered a new phase. The phenomenon of the economic dependence of the developing countries on the multinational companies from the industrialized countries is named today neokolonialismus, what refers to the economic exploitation of these countries, which resembles the conditions in the colonial age in various regards. With global problems like the climate change, a further dimension of injustice is added: Whereas the problems are caused over proportionality in the North, the consequences of the desertification or extreme weather conditions occur over proportionally in the South.

This extends to the threat to the existence of numerous small island states, which will no longer exist if the sea level continues to rise any further (See, Seligson and Passe-Smith, 2003).

It remains marking that the economic North-South conflict has not led so far to military conflicts. Many critics, nevertheless, see to the neokolonialismus as one main cause for the re-flashing of terrorism in the 21st century. Growing economic globalization in the post-Cold War era does not appear to be breaking the historical stratifications between the North and South. Rather, it is economic globalization that channeled by past grooves of strong and weak growth. The national units already integrated to the world economy become more integrated to the world economy; the less well-connected often stay that way. So far only a very small number of states have managed to break out of the lowgrowth ruts of the world system. The implications of this grim outcome for world political stability are stark. To the extent that poverty and underdevelopment facilitate continuing conflict between the North and South, we may expect to see international order as fragile.

Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, shattering the bipolar system, resulted in power gaps in some region and triggered struggles for influence. In the post-Cold War environment, states that seemed to be in the same bloc or former allies became competing rivals. For instance, the European Union, as well as Japan, rose as rival centers of power against established United States dominance. No doubt the rise of China and the resurgence of the Russian Federation as powerful rivals to the United States are also notable. States -or integrations- aspiring to become world powers (such as Russia, China, and the European Union), states seeking to strengthen their position as regional powers with burgeoning ambition to become global powers in the future (like Iran and Turkey), and the United States still holding onto its position are strategizing to reach their goals in Eurasia. Especially the newly independent states of Eurasia lie at the center of power struggles. The United States is pushing forward to not only maintain but strengthen alliances with various states in the region. Particularly three states, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, are at the center of much of this struggle. So as to promote their national interests in the region, major powers have often been motivated to take advantage of destabilizing conflicts between these states and alternatively have attempted to follow a path of reconciliation or proposing cooperation, fluctuating between these options based on a calculation of which would best fit their own broader agenda and vision for the region (See, Simons, 2008).

There are several reasons for why especially the South Caucasus represents a significant regional interest for major powers, in general, and for the United States, in particular.

Yilmaz ! New World Order

Controlling the region means to contain Russian expansion, to contain Iran, to control natural resources in the region, to secure safe transportation of the region’s natural resources to the global market, and to acquire bases for “war against terrorism” (See, Aslanli, 2008).

At present, the United States continues to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus.

However, resurgent Russia certainly does not welcome this development and feels compelled to punish both American military interventions in the region, as well as regional states that espouse pro-American policies (See, Kanet, 2007). The latest Georgian conflict is a clear indication of how far Russia is willing to go to defend its own interests in the complicated and unpredictable region.

CONCLUSION In discussing the post-Cold War developments and the emerging world order in that era, several concluding remarks can be drawn from the above analysis, summarized as follows: • •

•

•

•

The new international system in the post-Cold War period has been marked by a seeming contradiction: on the one hand, fragmentation; on the other, growing globalization. This trend will likely to be holding.

On the level of the relations among states, the new world order is based on major power cooperation. The international system contains at least five major powers – the United States, Europe, Russia, Japan, and China. There appears to be no serious challenger to these powers. That means the world politics in the near future will largely be shaped by the above-mentioned major powers.

Among major powers, the United States will continue to be the greatest hegemonic power in the short run, but its military and economic power will gradually decline. In the long run, some growing states or integrations will likely to get close to the United States’ power. Hence, the international system will possibly gain a multipolar character in the future, though it may take some decades to reach that point.

International relations have become truly global in the post-Cold War world.

Communications are instantaneous and the world economy operates on all continents simultaneously. A whole set o issues has surfaced that can only be dealt with on a worldwide basis, such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, the population explosion, and economic interdependence.

In conjunction with increasing international cooperation, inter-state wars have declined and “low politics” gained greater importance in international affairs. The years to come, however, are likely to witness severe competition of major powers on natural resources, particularly, energy resources. In this regard, disputes about unfair trade practices and worries about dependence on externally concentrated or monopolistic sources of goods, services and technologies will remain to be addressed. But the prospects for collective rules and regulations, rather than unilateral accusations and restrictions, will seem to be improved.

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â&#x20AC;˘

â&#x20AC;˘

With the spread of global market economy and rapid expansion of foreign investments, developing countries, though they are cautious about foreign investments, are likely to be doing better in the future. But structurally-rooted North-South inequalities will seem to remain as a potential source of international conflict.

The North-South conflict aside, the post-Cold War world faces several other threats, most notably, ethnically-driven conflicts, religious militancy and terrorism, supported by some revisionist powers. These are particularly challenging threats as they are beyond the full control of nation-states, calling for international cooperation if they are to be effectively dealt with. Thus, the future of the world will depend on whether major powers, in particular, and the international community, in general, are able to show the will to cooperate on these serious problems.

See Bibliography for The New World Order: An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era in Appendix I: Bibliographies

Yilmaz ! New World Order

Appendix I: Bibliographies ---

An Assessment of Deception: The 2007 National Intelligence Mis-Estimate of Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities Matthew Jacobs J.D. Candidate, New York University School of Law M.P.A. Candidate, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School Albright, David and Corey Hinderstein. 2004. The Centrifuge Connection. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist 60: 61-66. March/April.

Associated Press. 2008. Iran Stepping Up Its Uranium Work. February 28.

Beehner, Lionel. 2006. Backgrounder: What Sanctions Mean for Iran’s Economy. Council on Foreign Relations. May 5.

Bolton, John. 2007. The Flaws in the Iran Report. The Washington Post, December 6.

Broad, William J. and David E. Sanger. 2007. How Did a 2005 Estimate Go Awry? The New York Times, December 3.

Broad, William J. and David E. Sanger. 2008. Meeting on Arms Data Reignites Iran Debate. The New York Times, March 3.

Brzezinski, Mark F. and Ray Takeyh. 2008. Forging Ties with Iran. The Boston Globe, January 2008.

Christopher, Warren. 2006. Welcome to the Bazaar. The New York Times, June 13.

Council on Foreign Relations. 2006. Summary: A Symposium on Iran’s Nuclear Program. <http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/iran_symposium_final_wrapup.pdf> Council on Foreign Relations. 2007. Backgrounder: State Sponsors: Iran. August. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9362/state_sponsors.html> Council on Foreign Relations. 2007. Media Conference Call: Takeyh and Nasr on Iran. December 5. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/14987/media_conference_call.html> Council on Foreign Relations. 2008. U.S.-Iran Relations: Past Present and Future. January 7. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/15207/usiran_relations.html> Fathi, Nazila, David E. Sanger and William J. Broad. 2006. Iran Says It Is Making Nuclear Fuel Defying U.N. The New York Times, April 12.

Fathi, Nazila. 2007. Iran Launches Rocket to Commemorate New Space Center. The New York Times.

February 5.

Fathi, Nazila. 2007. Iranian Leader Calls Report U.S. Confession of ‘Mistake’. The New York Times.

December 6.

Fathi, Nazila. 2008. A President’s Defender Keeps His Distance. The New York Times. January 8.

Fathi, Nazila. 2008. Iran Raises its Enrichment Capacity. The New York Times. November 26 Fathi, Nazila. 2008. U.N. Nuclear Official Urges Iran to Clarify ‘Outstanding Issues’. The New York Times.

January 12.

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Ferguson, Charles D. 2007. Ferguson: Iran Making Substantial Nuclear Progress. Council on Foreign Relations. May 18. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13368/ferguson.html> Fields, Suzanne. 2004. Confronting the New Anti-Semitism. The Washington Times. July 2004.

Fox News. 2007. Ahmadinejad Calls Iran World’s ‘Number One’ Power, Attacks Domestic Critics.

February 28. <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,333532,00.html> Gootman, Elssa. 2006. Security Council Approves Sanctions Against Iran Over Nuclear Program. The New York Times. December 24.

Hefezi, Parisa. 2003. Khatami Says Iran Mines Uranium for Nuclear Plant. Reuters. February 9.

Hoge, Warren and Elaine Sciolino. 2008. Security Council Adds Sanctions Against Iran. The New York Times. March 4.

International Atomic Energy Agency. 2003. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. November 10.

International Atomic Energy Agency. 2003. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. June 6.

International Atomic Energy Agency. 2003. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. August 26.

International Atomic Energy Agency. 2003. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. September 12.

International Atomic Energy Agency. 2003. Media Advisory: Statement by the Board. June 19. <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/mediaadvisory/2003/medadvise200372.html> International Atomic Energy Agency. 2004. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. November 15.

International Atomic Energy Agency. 2004. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. June 1.

International Atomic Energy Agency. 2004. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. February 24.

International Atomic Energy Agency. 2004. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. June `18.

International Atomic Energy Agency. 2004. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. September 1.

International Atomic Energy Agency. 2008. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. November 19.

Islamic Republic News Agency. 2008. Russia Completes Fuel Delivery with Eighth Batch. January 28. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2008/iran-080128-irna05.htm> Kerr, Donald M. 2007. Statement by the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence: Dr. Donald M. Kerr. December 3. <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_statement.pdf> Kissinger, Henry. Misreading the Iran Report: Why Spying and Policymaking Don’t Mix. The Washington Post. December 13.

148

Linzer, Dafna. 2005. Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb: U.S. Intelligence Review Contrasts with Administration Statements. The Washington Post. August 2.

Lynch, Colum. 2007. U.N. Backs Broader Sanctions On Tehran. The Washington Post. March 26.

Mazzetti, Mark. 2007. U.S. Finds Iran Halted Its Nuclear Arms Race in 2003. The New York Times.

December 3.

Mazzetti, Mark. 2007. With New Data, U.S. Revises Its View of Iran. The New York Times. December 4.

McCain. 2008. The Candidates on Iran. Council on Foreign Relations. September 30. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/14764>.

McConnell, Mike. 2008. Interview of Mr. Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence. WTOP Radio. February 26. <http://www.dni.gov/interviews/20080226_interview.pdf> Myers, Stephen Lee. 2007. An Assessment Jars a Foreign Policy Debate Over Iran. The New York Times.

December 4.

Nasr, Vali and Ray Takeyh. 2008. The Costs of Confronting Iran. Foreign Affairs. January/February.

National Intelligence Estimate. 2007. Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. November. <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf> Pollack, Kenneth. 2005. The Persian Puzzle. New York: Random House.

Posen, Barry R. 2006. A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult but Not Impossible Policy Problem. A Century Foundation Report. December 6.

Rieff, David. 2007. But Who’s Against the Next War. The New York Times Magazine. March 25.

Robbins, Carla Anne. 2005. As Evidence Grows of Iran’s Program, U.S. Hits Quandary. The Wall Street Journal. March 18.

Ross, Dennis. 2006. A New Strategy on Iran. The Washington Post, May 1.

Ross, Dennis. 2007. Statecraft: and How to Restore America’s Standing in the World. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Samore, Gary, ed. 2005. Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: a Net Assessment. International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Sanger, David E. and Steven Lee Myers. 2007. Details in Military Notes Led to Shift on Iran, U.S. Says.

The New York Times. December 5.

Sanger, David E. 2008. Nuclear Agency Confronts Iran With Evidence on Weapons. The New York Times.

February 22.

Sciolino, Elaine. 2006. U.N. Agency Says Iran Falls Short of Nuclear Data. The New York Times. April 29.

Sciolino, Elaine. 2007. In Gesture, Iran Provides Nuclear Document. The New York Times. November 14.

Sciolino, Elaine. 2008. Security Council Adds Sanctions Against Iran. The New York Times. March 4.

Spetalnik, Matt. 2007. Bush: Threat of World War III if Iran Goes Nuclear. Reuters. October 14. < http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN1732974320071017> Szrom, Charlie. 2007. After NIE, More BMD. American Enterprise Institute. December 21.

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