NJIA Winter 2007

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SPECIAL THANKS TO PRESIDENT HENRY BIENEN AND

PROVOST STEPHEN FISHER

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NJIA Staff Members

OPERATIONS Haimu Sun, Director EDITING Caley Walsh, Editor Tara Jayant Derek Thompson Amanda Craig LAYOUT AND DESIGN Farah Ahmed ILLUSTRATOR Peter Golovin BUSINESS Shyaam Ramkumar Derek Moeller OUTREACH James Wang Ana Valenzuela George Brandes TECHNOLOGY Tyler Perrachione

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To get involved or for more information visit: groups.northwestern.edu/njia

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Table of Contents

1.Interview, Marshall Bouton

HAIMU SUN

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2.Bringing the World Home

DEREK THOMPSON

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3.Torture: A Necessary Evil?

SHANKAR MURUGAVELL

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PETER H. MERKL

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DR. PHILIPPE R. GIRARD

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EVAN MICHELS

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NICOLAS PETER

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Absolutely Not 4.Promoting Democracy Around the World 5.White Man's Burden? The International Community's Role in Haiti 6.Challenging the System: Investigating the Emergence of Nonprofit Drug Development Organizations 7.A New Paradigm in TransAtlantic Space Relations

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Marshall Bouton President of Chicago Council on Foreign Relations INTERVIEW BY HAIMU SUN BIOGRAPHY Marshall Bouton became president of The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in August 2001. Prior to that, he served twenty years at the Asia Society in New York, most recently as executive vice president and chief operating officer. Previous positions include director for policy analysis in the office of the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near East, Africa and South Asia, special assistant to the U. S. ambassador to India, executive secretary for the Indo-U.S. Subcommission on Education and Culture, and program director for India affairs at the Asia Society in New York. Mr. Bouton earned a B.A. (cum laude) in history at Harvard, an M.A. in South Asian studies from the University of Pennsylvania, and a Ph.D. in political science at the University of Chicago in 1980.

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INTERVIEW WITH MARSHALL BOUTON

1) As the president of Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, how do you perceive U.S. leadership across the world? What do you think caused the resentment from some parts of the world to US leadership in recent years?

I think it is clear that the international opinion of US is at the low end in most of the world, not just the Muslim countries. There are some exceptions such as India. That has to do with the post 9/11 administration’s unilateral policy: not taking international opinion into sufficient consideration. That said, much of the world is still looking up to U.S. I think with a change of administration and policy, this phenomenon shall go away in the long term.

3) Why has the US lost some of its powerful European allies such as France and Germany? Will this pattern continue in the near future?

As far as Europe is concerned, Iraq was a big blow to US-Europe relations. I also think there is a trend in USEurope relations in recent years, as there is no single enemy, like the Soviet Union. The agendas of the two often diverge. Europeans are focused on how to develop a better future for Europe. With Iran, they were trying to build communication and understanding between Iran and Europe and so forth. The agendas of the two have been diverging, yet the historical connections have been so deep, which would ensure relations would not go into some sort of rapture.

2) What do you think of the impact of recent hurricanes on the image of the U.S. across the world?

Hurricane Katrina, not so much Hurricane Rita, lets people realize that the US government is impotent in dealing with some domestic issues. It shows again that this administration, which is ambitious and not willing to admit doing wrong, is incompetent in dealing with certain issues: first the international ones, now domestic ones. There is some impact across the world, however it is not likely going be a lasting impact.

4) What do you think of quickly growing countries such as China and India? Will they pose threats to the US leadership?

China and India are sort of like the US and Germany of the 21st Century.

The rise of China in the long term can be a far more important issue to the US than the threat of terrorism. The central question is how to integrate this emerging power into the global community, in terms of questions on pacific issues, China-Japan relations, etc., whether through means such as WTO or otherwise. The challenge of the US is how to not put China into a corner which would WINTER 2006 XX

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provoke Chinese emotions. For India, the task is to try not to go too far too fast, and not to cause China to feel that US is supporting India’s development to counter China.

5) As for college students, is there any way we can get involved or work with the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations?

Of course, we have had many Northwestern students working here as interns in the past. As a matter of fact, we have a few right now. Northwestern students are welcome to attend our events. The best way to do this is to ask a professor to call to the Council and let us know the details, such as number of students and which event, etc.

Many NU professors including Mr. Bienen have been active with our Council. We look forward to having more students involved with the Council.

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BRINGING THE WORLD HOME

Bringing the World Home

by DEREK THOMPSON BACKGROUND AID was established in September of 2002 by Marshall and Rhodes scholars at Oxford University who sought a new vehicle to bring the world home to Americans and it has quickly grown, attracting new student audiences, prominent partner NGOs and local, national and international media attention because it fills a niche in foreign policy and student activism. AID has now trained more than 2,000 student leaders on over 400 U.S. campuses to carry out its mission in their communities.

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On the morning of September 11, 2001, Seth Green was in Princeton, New Jersey, to say goodbye to friends before leaving for a two-year postgraduate program in England. Hours later, four hijacked jetliners crashing along the East coast stunned the world and cast Green’s send-off in shock and solemnity.

When he arrived in England, Green could not have anticipated his new classmates’ reactions. The shockwaves from 9/11 rippled across the Atlantic and outpourings of sympathy for the United States’ tragedy found new homes in Europe, especially in England.

“From the dining hall to the classroom, my peers from around the world displayed constant sympathy in the aftermath of that horrific September morning,” Green said.

But within a year, the sympathy Green found in England vanished.

Classmates who once considered the United States a righteous victim reacted to President George W. Bush’s aggressive foreign policy with fear and indignation. Green’s friends questioned what they saw as inappropriate U.S. unilateralism—America’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocal, its rejection of the International Criminal Court, and the controversial XX VOLUME VII

campaign to invade Iraq.

America’s fall from grace was swift and disturbing for Green and other international students. The same country that welcomed American students with sympathy in the months after September 11 now skewered U.S. graduates as products on a cultural monolith of rash, Hummer-driving unilateralist cowboys.

“I was spit at by kids yelling, ‘Don’t attack Iraq,’” Green said, “and harassed by a drunkard who declared that he gladly would blow himself up to kill me.”

Disillusioned by Europe’s change of heart, yet galvanized to repair America’s image abroad, Seth Green joined with fellow Oxford University graduate students David Tannenbaum and Jason Wasfy to establish a non profit organization to inspire a new generation of world leaders. They called it Americans for Informed Democracy.

AID BECOMES A REALITY Initially, AID aimed to stem the rising tide of anti-Americanism by publishing op-eds and organizing email campaigns to alert both Congressman and common Americans about the effect the Bush

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administration’s policies was having overseas. What began as international damage control became something much more: a multi-national organization bringing light to cultural stereotypes and biases by coordinating town hall meetings on America’s role in the world and hosting leadership retreats for young multilateralists.

In June 2002 at Oxford, AID notched what Green called their most memorable forum on perceptions of the U.S. media. American, European, and Muslim students came together to experience the full spectrum of American media in a conference that featured a diverse range of American pundits and TV personalities.

“We included outlandish segments of cable TV shows like Pat Robertson’s 700 Club was well as segments from Meet the Press and NBC Nightly News,” Green said.

The response was inspiring.

Non-Americans were shocked to see the variety of views. By shining light on the dynamism of U.S. political coverage, AID brought to England a dynamic, even incongruous, America so different from the Western monolith Europeans feared.

The success of the June con-

ference convinced Green that AID would be most successful by organizing similar “town hall” meetings on relations between the U.S. and the Islamic world, including conferences on more than a dozen college campuses. The meetings targeting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were especially poignant and moving.

During one meeting, Sue Rosenblum, an American who lost her 28-year-old son Joshua on 9/11, spoke movingly about her unique, implicit relationship with the Muslim world.

“It is entirely possible that a member of the Islamic community sitting here today might have a distant relative who was directly or indirectly involved with the 9/11 attacks that killed my son,” she said. “It is also possible that as an American and as a Jew I might have a distant relative who caused pain to a member of his family. But even if that is the case it will not stop me from reaching out my hand in friendship.”

INFORMED DEMOCRACY COMES TO NU Terrorism, like nuclear proliferation, climate change, and disease, is a multinational issue requiring multinational cooperation. The United WINTER 2006 XX

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States, Green says, cannot go it alone, but the world needs U.S. leadership as the U.S. needs the world’s support.

“AID is a pioneer in ‘reverse public diplomacy,’” Green said, “using the knowledge and passion of young Americans, especially those who have studied abroad, to bring the world home to fellow Americans.”

Northwestern student Sarah Bush heard the message loud and clear. During her junior year at Oxford University, she heard about AID through an e-mail from NU’s Political Science Department.

“The experience of living and traveling abroad during such tumultuous times made me extremely passionate about bringing the world I had seen in Europe back home to my community in the States,” Bush said.

After attending an AID sponsored leadership conference in Vermont, she was convinced the organization’s mission reflected what she had always thought about the international political scene. Bringing that internationalist tradition to Evanston, Sarah Bush started the AID chapter at Northwestern at the start of the 2004-2005 school year.

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and videoconference events in campuses across the country. AID is currently working on four national initiatives as part of their campaign to “bring the world home.” AID’s first successful event at Northwestern was its national “Hope not Hate” program on the future of U.S.-Islamic relations.

In response to the summer bombings in London, Bush said, the upcoming conference will address not only American-Muslim challenges, but also the continuing conflicts between the Western World and the global Arab-Islamic community.

According to Bush, the series will include more than one hundred town hall meetings across the country to evaluate the Western-Islamic relations.

“I think that the United States should promote democracy by being a shining example of democracy to the world,” Bush said, “and by using its soft power to support democratic leaders around the world.”

AID BY CONSENSUS Restoring the kind of international cohesion that followed September 11 may be years if not decades away, but Seth Green, Sarah

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Bush, and the members of Americans for Informed Democracy are working to form the first links in a chain of international consensus on peace and freedom. As Green said, non-Muslims and Muslims at every town hall meeting expressed a determination to eliminate organized terrorism and promote freedom and democracy in the Middle East through more peaceful means.

It will take more than videoconferences to solve the epidemic of terror in the Arab-Islamic world.

Americans for Informed Democracy recognize that deepest wound is not within the Middle East but rather between the Arab-Islamic community and the West. By fostering understanding rather than sanguine promises, AID takes a small, significant step toward bridging the rift.

Maybe they will find that consensus is contagious.

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Torture: A Necessary Evil? Absolutely Not

by SHANKAR MURUGAVELL BIOGRAPHY Shankar Murugavell, from Eastchester, New York, is a Junior at Northwestern University and a Double Major in Economics and Political Science. He is a member of Habitat for Humanity, several intramural teams in various sports and also a research assistant in the MORS department of Kellogg.

ABSTRACT The use of torture has become a politically heated debate in the United States since the attacks of September 11th. Proponents of torture argue that it is a necessary tool in the "war on terror," while opponents argue that it undermines the values of America. This article takes a deeper look into the issue and concludes that torture, under any circumstance, should not be legalized.

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TORTURE: A NECESSARY EVIL? ABSOLUTELY NOT

For much of the past halfcentury, there has been a prevalent bias against torture in American society; it has been widely viewed as a barbaric and inhumane practice that violates the principles of a moral society. However, following the attacks of September 11th, many Americans have second-guessed or reversed their “gut-feeling” regarding this matter. The torture of humans is no longer seen as egregiously unethical or ineffective. Instead, many Americans are willing to condone torture all in the name of national security. This change of mind is very disconcerting. Torture, I believe, even when viewed from a post 9/11 lens, is still un-American.

Consider the following “ticking bomb terrorist” hypothetical, found in almost all torture debates: A terrorist has placed a bomb at an undisclosed location in New York City. Police are able to arrest the terrorist but are unable to locate the bomb. The terrorist refuses to voluntarily reveal the location of the bomb. Should law enforcement/intelligence officials torture the ter-

rorist in order to extract the necessary information? Should this practice become legal?

Many Americans will not hesitate to answer those questions with a resounding “yes.” I strongly disagree; torture may reap benefits in the short term, but it will certainly lead to adverse effects in the long term.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS1 The main practical problem with torture is that it is very unreliable as an information-producing tactic; there are absolutely no guarantees that the terrorist will “crack” upon torture. This is especially true among the terrorists of the world today. If they are willing to strap bombs onto their chests and die for the jihad, why would they not endure physical pain for the jihad? These individuals have a complete disregard for human life and their sole objective is the mass murder of civilians and military personnel. It seems implausible that such terrorists, who are more than willing to die for their cause, could be “cracked” through sheer physical pain. After all, who would expect Osama bin Laden, if captured, to reveal the next terrorist attack to the “infidels?”

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Even if intelligence officials were somehow able to elicit a response from terrorists through torture, there are no guarantees that what the terrorists reveal will be truthful. It seems more than likely that terrorists would intentionally provide false information so as to lead law enforcement officials on dead-end trails and consequently waste resources (both monetary and manpower) and time.

“SPHERES OF INFLUENCE” PROBLEMS The decision to legalize torture will almost certainly have adverse spill-over-effects in other fields. I will discuss the negative effects in four crucial areas: (1) international relations (2) American sentiment worldwide (3) the moral balance of the world and (4) future military operations.

International Relations Under the Geneva Convention accords ratified in 1949, the United States cannot torture prisoners of war (POWs). “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.

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Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”2 In addition to the accords, the United States ratified in 1994 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (from here on: CAT). CAT prohibited the torture of any human being by the government (including terrorists and enemy combatants who were otherwise not protected under the Geneva Convention accords).

In order to legalize the practice of torture, the United States would have to withdraw from the Geneva Convention accords and dissolve CAT. This would have tremendous backlash. Nations that currently follow the Geneva Convention protocols would be unlikely to follow them in the future if they were to enter a war with the United States (and would consequently torture American POWs). After all, if the United States was going to torture POWs, why should these other nations not be allowed to do the same? Withdrawal would also tremendously weaken international law and establish a terrible precedent.

Again, if the United States could

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abandon international treaties in the name of “national security,� why could other nations not do the same?

Taking this logic to the extreme,

SALT I (Russia), START I (Russia) and an array of other international treaties. The precedent established could set forth a grave set of events.

nuclear nations could withdraw Moral Balance Torturing the terrorist would themselves from Nonproliferation Treaties, International Atomic signify the deterioration of the Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, United States as the moral leaders of WINTER 2006 XX

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the world. The United States has long been a champion of human rights and basic freedoms; how would the other nations of the world look upon the United States knowing it readily and willingly tortures prisoners? How would other nations look upon the United States knowing that it promotes democracy, human rights and equality across the globe while at the same time it tortures humans in its own backyard? The United States would be viewed as a hypocrite and we would lose some, if not most, of our leverage as the moral leaders of the world. As Joe Messerli put it: “The things that put us [United States] above these monsters [Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, terrorists] are our high value (sic) we put on human rights and our Bill of Rights freedoms. We shouldn’t lower our moral ideals to the point where we’re no better than the terrorists.”3 Anti-American Sentiment The legalization of torture would lead to a rise in anti-American sentiment worldwide. According to the Pew Research Center, which conducted a worldwide study of American sentiment in March 2004, the United States’ approval rating has undergone a steady decline over the XX VOLUME VII

past four years.4 In many of the Muslim nations polled, suicide attacks against U.S. personnel and other Westerners were deemed justifiable by a majority of respondents (Pakistan, which is a US ally in the war on terror, had a 46% justifiable rate).5 This pattern would continue if torture was legalized. The Abu Ghraib scandal and the Koran scandal in Guantanamo Bay validate this claim. There were revolts, protests in the streets and increased insurgency attacks in Iraq after the the Arab media released pictures of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal.

Similarly, the false accusation that a U.S. intelligence officer flushed a copy of the Koran down the toilet once again led to revolts, protests and ultimately 17 deaths in the Arab world.6 Such occurrences would become the norm.

Military/Intelligence Operations The use of torture tactics would also jeopardize the lives of U.S. military personnel in combat areas in the future. If terrorists and war combatants knew that they would face unrelenting torture upon capture, then they would be less likely to surrender and more likely to

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fight till the death. This results in a double negative: (1) the lives of U.S. personnel are now at a greater risk and (2) U.S. intelligence officers lose access to potential information. Had these terrorists and war combatants not fought to the death, intelligence officers could have humanely interrogated them for information.

COUNTER-ARGUMENTS A common rebuttal by proponents of the legalization of torture is that: “Pain is a lesser and more remediable harm than death; and the lives of a thousand innocent people should be valued more than the bodily integrity of one guilty person.”7 The problem with this argument is that this logic can lead to a “slippery slope” where torture is abused and the “morality by numbers” principle takes over. Would it then be okay to torture 999 convicted terrorists, some of whom have no relevant information, to save 1000 innocent lives? Would it be okay to torture the family of the terrorist, all of whom were innocent, to save 1000 innocent lives? What about the terrorist’s entire village? The problem with this logic is evident: it violates the harm principle and causes physical harm to innocent civilians. All the while, there

is still no guarantee that (a) the terrorist has the necessary information or (b) the terrorist will provide the information upon torture.

Proponents will also make the argument that since the United States is waging an unconventional war against a ruthless enemy, unconventional methods of interrogation are acceptable. I do not buy this argument. First off, the United States can not simply ignore international law when it is convenient; it cannot suspend the Geneva Convention accords for the current war and then reinstitute them once the war is over.

That would obviously diminish the purpose of international law. Once the practice has been used, it must be legalized (and will subsequently bring all the consequences I have mentioned earlier). Additionally, the nature of this war should not be justification for torture. The moral principles that separate the United States from terrorist organizations should not be manipulated in times of conflict. Rather, they should be sought after for guidance.

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protect such a precedent. I counter this argument by pointing out that in the past, innocent American lives have been sacrificed to protect a precedent that the government deemed vital.

An example of this would be the United States’ refusal to negotiate with terrorists in the event of a hijacking or kidnapping. In the past two years, the government has refused to negotiate with the captors of Daniel Pearl, Nick Berg or a host of other kidnappers in Iraq. Why? If the government had negotiated, it would have reversed a long-established precedent that the United States would not be bullied or blackmailed by any country or terrorist organization. That precedent, the government calculated, was more valuable than any single life. The same argument applies to torture; lives must be sacrificed when the precedent the United States is defending is superior.

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard Law School professor and advocate of torture, outlines three alternative ways that torture can be implemented without universal legalization: (1) permit intelligence and law enforcement officers to operate in “a twilight XX VOLUME VII

zone which is outside the realm of law” (2) insist that anti-torture is the official policy, but turn a blind eye to torture or (3) establish a system of “torture warrants.”8 I believe that all three are fundamentally flawed.

Enabling any official, even law and intelligence officials, to operate without limits would be unprecedented and ill-advised. These individuals still need to be held accountable for their actions under some form of law. Otherwise, there will almost certainly be an abuse of power (Abu Ghraib occurred even with guidelines in place; one can only imagine the atrocities that would take place when there are no guidelines or consequences). Additionally, implementing such a policy would undermine the democracy that has governed this nation for over 200 years. Up to this point in American history, no individual, not even the President of the United States, has ever been above the law. When society starts handing out such rights, democracy will crumble.

A similar argument can be made for turning a blind eye to torture. In a healthy democracy, it is a prerequisite that all political and military actors behave according to and within the law. If actors begin to turn

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a blind eye to certain laws, it will not be long before they begin to turn a blind eye to all laws. Dershowitz makes a similar point: “No legal system operating under the rule of law should ever tolerate an ‘off-thebooks’ approach to necessity. Even the defense of necessity must be justified lawfully. The road to tyranny has always been paved with claims of necessity made by those responsible for the security of a nation” (emphasis added).9 When the nation’s leaders start to ignore laws, democracy will crumble.

Dershowitz’s “torture warrant” suggestion is far more difficult to dismiss. This plan requires that law enforcement/intelligence officials present compelling evidence to a judge that a terrorist has certain information. Once the judge deems that the evidence is sufficient, then and only then is a torture warrant issued. The prisoner is then presented with the torture warrant and given several more opportunities to reveal all information. If he/she refuses again, then he/she is tortured. At first, this plan seems to be ideal because it places several checks before a terrorist is tortured and also ensures that only “real” terrorists are ever tortured (it assumes that judges will reject a high percentage of cases

where evidence is borderline/questionable). However, a closer look at this plan reveals that it too is vulnerable to several downfalls. First and most important, it will require the universal legalization of torture. The United States cannot operate a torture system in the legal arena without withdrawing from the Geneva Convention accords. Secondly, it does not provide a universal system/guideline for judges. What constitutes sufficient and compelling evidence? Can there be variance on a case to case basis? After all, issuing a torture warrant is far different from issuing a search warrant. And finally, there are no safeguards in place to ensure that judges and law enforcement/intelligence officials do not abuse this system. Since there is no place in this system for the defendant (i.e. the prisoner) to defend himself/herself, it would be very easy for the judge and other officials to abuse the system. In that scenario, who checks the power of these judges and officials (since these trials will all be conducted in secret)?

CONCLUSION Jeff Jacoby once said: “Torture is never worth it. Some things we don’t do, not because they WINTER 2006 XX

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never work, not because they aren’t ‘deserved,’ but because our very right to call ourselves decent human beings depends in part on our not doing them. Torture is in that category. Let us wage and win this war against the barbarians without becoming barbaric in the process.”10 The issue of torture is certainly a complicated and controversial one for American society. It is true that we are fighting a ruthless enemy, but that should not change what the United States stands for. We are a nation built on principle and morality. We are a nation built on basic human rights. We are a nation of hope. To legalize torture would be to reverse all that; then the terrorists have won.

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Works Cited A Year After Iraq War.” The Pew Research Center. 16 March 2004. 20 May 2005. <http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206>.

Dershowitz, Alan. “Should the Ticking Bomb Terrorist be Tortured?” Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2002.

Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 20 May 2005. <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm>.

Jacoby, Jeff. “Why not torture terrorists?” Townhall.com 21 March 2005. 20 May 2005. <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/jeffjacoby/jj20050321.shtm l>.

Messerli, Joe. “Should high-ranking captured terrorists be tortured to obtain information?” 21 March 2005. 20 May 2005. <http://www.balancedpolitics.org/prisoner_torture.htm>.

Stout, David. “U.S. Presses Newsweek to ‘Repair’ Damage from Flawed Report.” The New York Times. 17 May 2005. 20 May 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/17/international/middleeast/17cndkoran.html?ei=5065&en=8220bf74f67fe5a5&ex=1116993600&partner=MYWAY&pagewanted=print>.

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References 1For purposes of practicality, I define the term ‘terrorist’ as those individuals acting in a jihad against the United States. I acknowledge that not all terrorists participate in a jihad, but the current focus of the United States is on those who do, so I will as well. The logic I use can also be applied to nonArab, non-jihad terrorists (e.g. Timothy McVeigh).

2 “Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm.

3 Messerli, Joe. “Should high-ranking captured terrorists be tortured to obtain information?” 21 March 2005. http://www.balancedpolitics.org/prisoner_torture.htm.

4 “A Year After Iraq War.” The Pew Research Center. 16 March 2004. http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206.

5 Ibid.

6 Stout, David. “U.S. Presses Newsweek to ‘Repair’ Damage from Flawed Report.” The New York Times. 17 May 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/17/international/middleeast/17cndkoran.html?ei=5065&en=8220bf74f67fe5a5&ex=1116993600&partner=MY WAY&pagewanted=print.

7 Dershowitz, Alan. “Should the Ticking Bomb Terrorist be Tortured?”

Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2002.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Jacoby, Jeff. “Why not torture terrorists?” Townhall.com 21 March 2005. http://www.townhall.com/columnists/jeffjacoby/jj20050321.shtml.

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PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AROUND THE WORLD

Promoting Democracy Around the World

by PETER H. MERKL BIOGRAPHY Peter H. Merkl is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is the author of many books, including Origins of the West German Republic (Oxford, 1963), Political Violence under the Swastika (Princeton, 1975), and A Coup Attempt in Washington? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) and editor of many others, including Developments in West German Politics (Macmillan, 1992) and The Federal Republic at Forty (NYU, 1989).

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In his Second Inaugural Address, President George W. Bush proclaimed the promotion of “democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in the world,” as a major goal of his second term, directly connected to the war on terrorism and to his rationale for invading Iraq. There is no question that this goal is intimately related to American traditions going back to the Declaration of Independence and, in fact, to the aspirations and progress of liberal democracy in the West and throughout the developing world. Scholarly literature examining the growth of democracy on different continents has grown since the 1980s. A recent multi-national survey of the German Marshall Fund, a U.S.-European think tank in Washington, has revealed that the new policy of promoting and supporting democracy is welcomed, in principle, by nearly three-fourths of European adults polled. Barely more than half of the American respondents expressed similar sentiments, which probably reflects their political suspicions and hostility towards the controversial president and the distortions of truth they associate with his partisan propaganda machine. It XX VOLUME VII

may also be a sign of growing isolationism in reaction to the doubtful progress of American-sponsored democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The idea of helping to establish and support democracies around the world is indeed an inspiring one, even if the great optimism of the 1980’s about the march of democracy has long given way to big doses of skepticism and pessimism. Dashed hopes among post-communist regimes and major reverses, for example in Africa, have taught us to lower our expectations. We continue to tolerate grim dictatorships among our allies and friends abroad. The threat (and major assaults) of international terrorism on some democratic regimes including the U.S. have further darkened the horizons of new and old democracies with regard to the expansion of individual freedom. At the same time, we must also examine the practical and logical limitations of such a policy of promoting democracy. The Marshall Fund survey cited earlier was at pains to establish that the respondents supporting world-wide democratization generally intended such promotion to involve only “soft tactics” such as critical publicity and election monitoring, and not CIA manipulations or

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military intervention as in Iraq. The shadow of the continuing controversies over the invasion of that country without UN authorization lies heavily over most public discussions about democratizing foreign countries. But there are also at least three major groups of further caveats or limits on this topic that call for examination before such a course of action should be considered.

MATTERS OF DEFINITION A large group of criticisms of the announced campaign for promoting democracy hinge on the definition of a democratic regime, of democracy itself. Are we speaking of a settled regime or of future intent and comments to that effect? In political statements, alleged recent steps and developments are often so painfully vague and lacking in specifics, as in “nascent democracies,” “steps in the right (democratic) direction,” or “challenges of democracy” as to amount to mere eye-wash, or worse, white-wash meant to deceive the gullible. Conducting an occupation-sponsored election of political leaders, especially one marred by ongoing violence or major boycotts, falls far short of establishing a democratic regime. Elections

are a necessary but not a sufficient test of democracy unless a number of other criteria are met as well: An Iraq election under civil-war-like conditions and with most Sunnis boycotting or being intimidated from voting is at best a first step. Even theocratic Iran has had its elections which produced, for a while, a considerable reformist majority in parliament, but this has made little difference to the nature of its regime. Did post-communist Russia become a democracy by virtue of its elections?

Quite a number of post-communist states had elections but are far from democracy today. Did Hosni Mubarak’s contested elections turn Egypt into a democracy? Finally, there have been so many elections vitiated by fraud or gross manipulation all over the world that we hardly need to give any more examples.

One of the criteria for the value of elections as a measure of stable democratic regimes is the nature of the party system behind the recurrent contests. Only a truly competitive system in which a viable, democratic opposition awaits its turn will do, and this is a rarity among aspirants to democratic status.

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Switzerland, present great difficulties to majority rule unless they can adopt special arrangements such as federalism or the Dutch verzuiling system of another day to protect minority groups from the onslaught of majorities. Such devices tend to be difficult to establish and maintain, as the Lebanese civil war demonstrated.

The crucial requirement of a national constitutional order for lasting democratic stability has long been recognized, for example in the writings of Seymour Martin Lipset, Juan Linz, Larry Diamond and others, and reaffirmed in the studies of Freedom House, the Encyclopedia of Democracy, and journals devoted to democratic studies. All of these have also confirmed that it usually takes a democratic regime decades of stability – no “nascent democracies” – to be recognized as such.

The role of a constitutional order in democracy is less a matter of particular constitutional arrangements, such as a parliamentary or presidential executive, or federalism versus centralization, than it is of an abiding faith in the desirability and rule of law. A society really needs a legalistic political culture, a pervasive and universal belief in law and courts of justice to sustain constitutional XX VOLUME VII

democracy for any length of time.

Many existing democracies indeed have such a legalistic or contractual culture, if not always free of lapses and historical discongruities. Many new or aspiring democracies still lack this basis of legal thinking and may require decades of institutional development to acquire it.

Democratic revolutions alone, even if repeated periodically, as Thomas Jefferson has suggested, are no lasting foundation for democratic stability.

A belief in law and legal relationships among governmental institutions and between citizens and their government, of course, also focuses on the role of courts and their crucial function of deciding disputes between contending interests.

While it may be less important to maintain a separation of powers between executive and legislature – the latter being of course central to representative government – the independence of the judiciary from either of the other major branches is absolutely essential to securing democratic stability and the rights and freedoms of citizens. The very complexity of all these relationships and arrangements alone demonstrates the extraordinary difficulties of the

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establishment of democratic regimes by a hegemonic power. But this discussion of the definitions and dimensions of real democracy at least keeps us from wishful thinking and the loose word usage of inspirational political speeches. We must stop speaking of democracy as loosely as of “freedom,” without further specifics, as in “the terrorists hate us because we are for freedom.” Whose freedom, and freedom from whom or what? Are we speaking of the freedom of elites to exploit their underlings or of the freedom of the latter?

If we were to ask Iraqis in occupied Iraq today, they would probably demand freedom from the AngloAmerican occupation and its deceptive promises.

THE REPUTATION OF THE MESSENGER A campaign to promote democracy around the world inevitably draws attention to the reputation of the messenger. It is not necessarily his true character that may be questioned but strong impressions and appearances of his democratic flaws and lapses the outside world has glimpsed. We Americans think we are the epitome of a democratic country and only

evil, anti-American propaganda could make it appear otherwise. But for some time now, a large part of foreign media opinion around the world, especially in Europe and the Middle East, has been very critical of American democracy, and this on several concrete occasions. The cries from abroad about the apparent inability of the American government to cope promptly with the dismal aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans have not yet died down: unclaimed bodies lying on sidewalks and floating in floodwaters for more than a week, endless delays in supplying medical care, food, drinking water and ice to the stormstricken, the breakdown of timely evacuation from flooded residences and the New Orleans Superdome.

All were seen abroad as a spectacular failure of democratic government to take charge of the crisis in the biggest superpower in the world.

America had been perceived as a beacon of government serving all people, its own and also others overwhelmed by natural catastrophes. But now, as the media in the U.S. and abroad reported, it looked like Haiti during the worst natural and revolutionary crises. The many foreign journalists present during the debacle of WINTER 2006 XX

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hurricane relief also picked up quick- lame left behind in the exodus from ly on the appearances that prompt the stricken city.

This negative view of foreign emergency relief seemed to be available mostly for white middle and opinion about American democracy,

upper-class victims of the disaster and that the floating bodies belonged mostly to African-Americans, the elderly poor, and the halt and the XX VOLUME VII

of course, is not new. From the days of the Cold War and Vietnam War, America has often been viewed as a frequent supporter of dictators and

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corrupt regimes – for example in Latin and Central America, but also in the Middle East – rather than democracies and democratic movements. To be sure, such judgments often sprang from Cold War confrontations and from diametrically opposed definitions of democracy that would, for example, juxtapose allegedly more democratic Castro’s Cuba and Sandinista Nicaragua with the preceding, exploitative dictatorships and their capitalistic American supporters. After the end of the Cold War, such stereotypical distinctions shifted to the right and became somewhat more sophisticated, sometimes juxtaposing the ways of oldstyle liberal democracies, like Labour’s Britain or Sweden, to a kind of Reaganite “conservative democracy,” as in the U.S. and Margaret Thatcher’s Britain. President Reagan himself tried to make the word “liberal” into the suspect “L-word,” and the general denigration of liberalism caught on among the self-styled conservatives in America. Critical foreign (and domestic liberal) opinion was reluctant to accept some of the idiosyncrasies of this new American conservatism and the new language that came with it. It refused, for example, the worship of tax cuts for the

wealthy, private gun ownership, the gutting of the welfare state, and the abandonment of the separation of church and state as hallmarks of democracy.

With the decline of communism and its so-called “people’s democracies” at the end of the 1980s, democracy became the icon of political development around the world. Americans shared the enthusiasm about the presumably unstoppable march of democracy, but they also tended to link it to other aspects of the American self-image that were incompatible with a universal icon of democracy. One was the myth of American military invincibility, slightly damaged by Vietnam but still a challenge for new, imperial assertion.

Another took the form of a religious, Judeo-Christian crusading spirit that further distorted the democratic thrust. How could a Christian military super-power crusade hope to impose democracy on Islamic societies (that were themselves already in religious turmoil)? Given the prevailing struggle for Middle Eastern oil, how could America avoid the impression that its sudden desire to democratize the region – while supporting dictatorships right and left – was not a mere pretense hiding a set of ulteWINTER 2006 XX

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rior motives?

Skepticism about the sterling qualities of American democracy as a model was reinforced by the worldwide reception of major recent American political crises. The visibility of American problems from abroad has probably also risen exponentially with the globalization of communications; the foreign press presence in the U.S. has increased in step with the hunger for political news about America all over the world. Electronic media everywhere has been revolutionized, and nowhere more than in the Middle East. In the age of Al-Jazeera, there is now the beginning of free media and a huge and growing television audience eager to see and judge the stumbling of American democracy, as well as images of American violence in Iraq and Israeli violence against Palestinians.

One of the most widely publicized democratic crises of America was the impeachment of President Clinton by the newly victorious conservative Republican Congress of the mid-1990s. The attendant media circus in America and the contrived nature of the constitutional charges against the president were duly noted by a critical foreign press led by The XX VOLUME VII

Guardian, Le Monde and Le Figaro, La Repubblica, Süddeutsche Zeitung and many others. The whole world was treated to the quasi-pornographic Starr Report of the appointed prosecutor, Kenneth Starr, sent over the Internet at the expense of the House of Representatives to every point of the globe in a transparent attempt to shame the maligned president into resignation. Almost without exception, however, foreign media opinion judged this impeachment as a fraudulent abuse of the relevant constitutional clauses, high crimes and misdemeanors, and as a manifestation of an extreme state of political polarization in the U.S.—two factors that are deadly for a functioning democracy. Starr became a globally despised villain while American democracy received a black eye around the world. A second black eye came only a few years later following the presidential election debacle of 2000. By this time, the world-wide audience was ready to ridicule the workings of American democracy.

The Guardian wrote: “The fix is in” in Florida while scores of editorials from obscure (and often non-democratic) nations offered to help Florida election authorities to count the butterfly ballots. In the end, the foreign

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media may have been barking up the wrong tree, and they largely missed the real fraud: the Republican manipulation of the voter rolls (felon purge) and the partisan intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court. But the damage to the icon of American democracy had been done. Now who would buy democracy from America?

A third crisis universally reported was the headlong rush towards the invasion of Iraq. In this case the decision to go to war was supported by Congress and a popular majority, but overwhelming evidence later revealed the heavy-handed manipulation of intelligence for Congress and public opinion, hardly the democratic way to make such an important decision. Americans have largely forgotten these crises, but the outside world has not. It has come to regard the messenger of a worldwide campaign to promote democracy as rather unsuited to tell them how to run their own governments.

EMPIRE OR DEMOCRACY ?

For decades, American foreign policy has been suspended in clouds of assumptions and deliberate deceptions that often hid naked aggressions and imperial ambitions from the American public. Few

media outlets or politicians told us, for example, about the brutal realities of our Central American policies under President Reagan and few are telling us today about our strategic goals in the Middle East. The Pentagon and White House propaganda machine of course denies that the pursuit of empire is the name of the game, or that the promotion of democracy may be incompatible with imperialist ambitions. Fortunately, the neo-conservative or imperialist faction in American foreign policy has left a clear and public documentary record of its imperialist plans and ambitions ever since the collapse of our Cold War enemy, for example with the 1997 Project for a New American Century (PNAC) and more recent manifestoes. There is no mention of the goal of promoting democracy and democratic institutions although, with a little spin, they could easily be added as a veil for imperialist intentions and “the rebuilding of America’s defenses.”

The conflicts between the pursuit of empire and democracy need not even depend on the benign or imperialistic motives in the minds of the conquerors. A good example is Iraq. The biggest mistake of the Anglo-American “liberators” was not WINTER 2006 XX

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to anticipate the Iraqi insurgency, even though British colonial occupiers before World War II had faced a similar nationalist insurgency against them. With the first manifestation of the insurgency, President Bush naively responded: “Bring them on!” He evidently never understood that a sizeable insurgency automatically turns benign liberation into a hostile, military occupation, and that relations between the occupiers and the civilian population could only get worse from that point on. In the myopia of battle, both sides will only see “the enemy” and make little distinction between the real foes and the uninvolved population. Every occupation raid and investigation to ferret out insurgents from the Iraqi people inevitably creates deep resentments and, the unavoidable civilian damage and casualties will also highlight also the thousands of civilian casualties caused by the original conquest. The Pentagon planners and presidential advisers completely misunderstood the often-cited precedents of the occupation of Germany and Japan which in time had resulted in the development of democratic regimes.

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return to democracy which they had enjoyed before their Nazi or imperialistic/militaristic lapses. There were also no significant insurgencies in the two countries and the American tutelage proceeded under the most auspicious conditions.

Aside from a full-blown insurgency, whether home-grown or fanned by jihads from the outside, the conduct of the occupation forces and their government is also a major factor that can kill democracy before it really has much of a chance: In Iraq, for example, assigning reconstruction and other services mostly to American companies and at outlandish rates makes them appear like greedy carpetbaggers. Lavishing reconstruction funds voted on by Congress on these companies rather than on the natives obviously convinced the latter – among whom unemployment is very high and economic opportunity scarce – that the American occupier had no intention to empower them economically either. Even if local occupation troops do some reconstruction, the insurgents will soon destroy or sabotage their efforts too. The uncertain availability of the basic services, such as clean water, power, and gasoline for the natives to carry on, not to

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mention the pervasive insecurity, also weakens their resolve to participate in democratic self-government.

One of the most devastating blows to Iraqi’s budding democracy, finally, was the Abu Ghraib scandal and subsequent revelations of military prisoner abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at Guantanamo Bay. From the Iraqi point of view, it is less a matter of whether AngloAmerican soldiers and prison guards follow the Geneva Convention or their uniform code of military conduct, or even whether they get punished in the end. Nor is it a question of whether they misbehave for lack of training or of proper leadership, or because “they need to release their tension,” although Iraqis must surely be aware that no American officers of any account are ever held accountable under the leadership of Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.

What does matter for the pupils of Anglo-American democratization in Iraq is the utter contempt for their persons that is conveyed in the shameful mistreatment of prisoners, as with the accidental killing of civilians. The common excuse that the prisoners deserve no better because they are AlQaeda members, Taliban, or hostile insurgents is not only

unconvincing to Iraqis in the absence of obvious proof, but even if they were, they are still fellow Muslims and do not deserve to be treated like dogs or vermin. The occupiers’ denial of the humanity of the victims stems from their racist or imperial arrogance and is hardly a basis for teaching democracy. The pursuit of empire simply is incompatible with the pursuit of democracy, and is made even more so by the overwhelming callousness of the imperial conquerors.

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White Man’s Burden?

The International Community’s Role in Haiti

by DR. PHILIPPE R. GIRARD BIOGRAPHY Philippe R. Girard is an Assistant Professor of Caribbean history at McNeese State University (Louisiana). He obtained his Ph.D. from Ohio University and specializes in Haitian history. He is the author of Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004) and Paradise Lost: Haiti’s Tumultuous Journey from Pearl of the Caribbean to Third World Hot Spot (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming 2005). He is currently working on a monograph on the 1802-1803 Leclerc-Rochambeau expedition to Saint-Domingue.

ABSTRACT The author takes a critical look at the international efforts over the past 30 years to democratize Haiti and develop its economy. He argues that Haiti has fallen under a quasi-protectorate based on the colonialist assumption that Haitians are not competent enough to rule themselves. Foreign meddling, far from improving the lot of average Haitians, breeds dependency, inspires nationalist resentment, and serves as a convenient excuse for Haitian rulers’ own shortcomings.

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Haiti is a small country of nine million people occupying the western one-third of the island of Hispaniola. It is politically unstable, overpopulated, and poor. Its farming sector, which employs a majority of the workforce, suffers from deforestation, soil erosion, fragmented land ownership, and minimal productivity. It has few natural assets save its people. Abroad, it is known mostly as a place hellish enough for millions of boat people to risk their lives in the dangerous crossing to Florida in a desperate attempt to leave.

Haiti also happens to be one of the most assisted societies on the planet. For the past thirty years, foreign aid has poured in by the billions.

Private and public projects have vaccinated children, fed the hungry, planted trees, run schools, and organized elections. The U.S. military sent 20,000 men and two aircraft carriers in 1994 for the sole purpose of returning a Haitian president to power. Foreign peacekeepers occupied the country from 1994 to 2001, then again from 2004 on. Per capita, there are few countries on which so much international attention and money have been lavished.

This international involvement in Haitian affairs has had two

goals: fostering political stability within a democratic framework and jump-starting economic development, all of this with the unspoken assumption that emigration pressures would be alleviated. Yet, thirty years later, Haiti is still politically unstable, overpopulated, and poor—as well as deeply resentful of the very foreigners who bankrolled this international campaign. What went wrong is one of the most interesting puzzles of our time, and a case study for which the conclusions should serve as a cautionary tale for the many other Western attempts at democratization and development in the Third World.

Given the magnitude of the failure, there is blame aplenty to apportion.

Some should go to Haitian rulers themselves; some should go to misguided policies on foreigners’ part; finally, some is inherently linked to the neo-colonialist belief within international policy-making circles that non-Haitians have a “white man’s burden” to constantly intervene in Haitian affairs.

VOODOO ECONOMICS (1971-1986) Western involvement—mostly French, Canadian, and American—began in earnest in 1971 when François “Papa Doc” Duvalier WINTER 2006 XX

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died and was replaced as Presidentfor-Life by his son Jean-Claude “Bébé Doc” Duvalier. Following the death of the murderous Papa Doc, the United States decupled its foreign aid program (to $35.5 million a year by 1975) with the hope that Bébé Doc would use the money to improve his countrymen’s economic lot, fight as a loyal ally in the Cold War, and dismantle the repressive apparatus of Tontons Macoutes he had inherited from his father.

The 18-year-old Bébé Doc was the world’s youngest head of state and was widely rumored to be dim-witted and thus easily manipulated; but he proved his political acumen by turning down demands that he liberalize his regime, pocketing the money intended for his starving subjects, and still obtaining a total of $1 billion in aid from France and the United States during his 15 years in power (his financial acumen was less developed; he is now a penniless alien in a suburb of Paris).

One assistance program consisted in sending used clothing from the United States to the Haitian poor; donated clothing became so ubiquitous as to be called kenedi in Creole (after the American president)—and to seriously undermine the local garXX VOLUME VII

ment industry, which could not compete against foreign products offered for free. Rice was another example of aid’s unexpected consequences. A staple of the Haitian diet, rice was exported at low or no cost to Haiti to relieve European and American agricultural surpluses while feeding hungry Haitians. But the native rice industry, in which production costs were already high due to inadequate irrigation and poor soil, could not withstand foreign competition. To make matters worse, later Haitian governments lowered tariffs after Bébé Doc’s downfall in the hope of reducing food prices for the Haitian poor, thus exposing Haitian farmers to even greater competition. Rice production fell—quite a paradox for a program designed to combat hunger.

An oft-cited example of poor aid management took place in 1982, when the United States offered to kill local Haitian pigs threatened with swine fever and to donate larger, fatter breeds as a replacement. The generous offer backfired, however, when the foreign pigs failed to adapt to the meager feed and spartan facilities available in Haiti, leaving the peasants with no pig, foreign or otherwise.

Outside aid can provide temporary

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relief in cases of natural catastrophes; but it has too many long-term unintended consequences (not the least of which is that it bolsters tyrannical regimes like Bébé Doc’s) to make it a lasting solution.

CHAMPIONING DEMOCRACY (19861994) Bébé Doc’s years in office should have discouraged foreign donors, but it did not. Foreign involvement, still designed to combat poverty and democratize Haiti, increased rather than diminished after Bébé Doc was ousted in 1986.

Foreign observers were there to monitor elections in 1987, which were cancelled when election-day violence left 22 would-be voters dead. New elections were held in December 1990 with international assistance, this time successfully, and they brought to the presidential palace a 37-year-old priest named Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

There were many aspects of Aristide’s personality that should have made foreigners wary. He shared the theology of liberation’s critical view of Western democracies as greedy and imperialistic. He obliquely thanked his supporters when they responded to far-right

political violence with lynching. But he was the closest thing to a champion of democracy foreign powers could find, and he was able to enlist foreign support for the next ten years of his career.

Aristide’s first presidency was short-lived. His calls for revenge worried army leaders who overthrew him seven months after his inauguration.

But Aristide, while in exile, mounted a massive lobbying campaign to convince France, the United States, and other Security Council members to support the return of democracy (that is, himself) at any cost. The result was a three-year international embargo meant to punish the military junta that failed in its main objective but destroyed Haiti’s export-driven assembly sector in the process.

The public mood was isolationist in the United States in 1994.

During that year, the Clinton administration evacuated its troops out of the Somali morass and refused to end genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda. But, in keeping with the inordinate amount of international attention aimed at Haiti, Bill Clinton sent 20,000 men to Haiti in September 1994 in an intervention that cost U.S. taxpayers over two billion dollars.

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The international coalition put Aristide back in the presidential palace, created a new police force, and lingered on until the last United Nations peacekeepers left in February 2001. Foreign occupation was accompanied by a massive aid package totaling $625 million for 1994-95 alone (or 25% of Haiti’s GDP), to which must be added money spent by occupation troops in Haiti, aid distributed by non-governmental organizations, and workers’ remittances sent by the Haitian Diaspora. Few knew at the time that Operation Restore Democracy, as it was called, would fail to create a functioning democracy in Haiti, that it would also fail to combat poverty, and that its only perceptible impact would be to feed anti-Americanism in the very population it was supposed to help.

THE WORST FRIENDS MONEY CAN BUY (1995-2004) France and the United States bankroll many of Haiti’s aid programs and are the favored destination for Haitians leaving their country, yet Haitians generally harbor strong antiAmerican and anti-French feelings.

As early as the 1970s, Haiti was rife with conspiracy theories that the XX VOLUME VII

USAID was a front for the sinister American Plan, of which the end goal was to destroy Haitian agriculture and force peasants to work in big city sweatshops exporting to the U.S. market. Bébé Doc exploited such xenophobia and portrayed his voracious dictatorship as a nationalist black revolution that proudly stood up to foreign imperialists, yet at the very same time, he lobbied his backers for an upsurge in foreign aid.

Haitian leaders, who find themselves in the difficult position of relying on foreign support for their survival while leading a people suspicious of any hint of foreign support, have demonstrated much expertise in this delicate balancing act. No one has been more adroit in that regard than Jean-Bertrand Aristide, best known during his political ascendancy as a leftist priest of the poor who railed against capitalist, imperialist countries, particularly the Yankee hegemon he dubbed “the cold country to our north.”1 His radical and nationalist credentials turned into a liability when he was overthrown in 1991 and U.S. diplomatic and military help became his only hope of ever returning to power. Aristide thus swallowed his pride, moved to Washington, D.C., and changed his

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rhetoric to appeal to his new American friends. After a meeting with Bill Clinton in 1993, he declared that “we are with you; in the future, we will be with you, and you will be welcome in Haiti when I will be there after the restoration of democracy.”2 This sudden change of heart proved short-lived. Within a year of his return to Haiti in the footsteps of a U.S. military intervention, Aristide delivered an angry speech warning that he would “send back to his country” any foreigner who challenged his authority.3 Anti-Western rhetoric resumed its place as a central feature of Aristide’s rhetoric for the years to come despite his regime’s reliance on foreign aid.

One key bone of contention between Aristide, his Lavalas Party deputies, and international institutions like the IMF was the privatization of Haiti’s inefficient public monopolies. Privatization was listed as a prerequisite before many foreign monies could be disbursed; but it also was unacceptable to Aristide’s nationalist backers. Lavalas legislators thus preferred to forgo billions of dollars in aid rather than come across as unpatriotic by meeting a foreign demand.

Both Aristide (served 1991,

1994-1996, 2001-2004) and his friend René Préval (1996-2001) were elected president, but these elections—particularly ones in 2000—were routinely marred by irregularities. The Creole vocabulary in the 1990s reflected the troubled nature of Haitian democracy with such terms as dechoukaj (manhunt aimed at killing supporters of the old regime), Père Lebrun (burning someone to death by throwing a tire filled with gasoline around one’s neck), FRAPH, attachés, and chimères (paramilitary groups of various obediences).

By 2003, Aristide had been in office on and off for 12 years and had yet to make good on his oftrepeated promises to provide every Haitian with electricity, a job, and one meal a day. He was also reeling from a scandal involving cooperatives backed by his government that had ruined thousands of Haitian investors. But he knew he could tap into his country’s nationalist tradition, especially as the celebration of Haiti’s bicentennial approached. As he delivered a speech celebrating the 200-year anniversary of the death of independence martyr Toussaint Louverture, Aristide reminded his audience that Haiti had had to pay a 150 million franc indemnity to WINTER 2006 XX

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France in 1825 before France would recognize her former colony’s independence. This indemnity, he explained quite incongruously, was

paid the $21 billion requested of her; but the fantastic claim took attention away from the cooperatives scandal and allowed the Aristide regime to

still a major drag on the Haitian economy 178 years later. “Restitution and reparations for us, victims of slavery!” he demanded.4 For Haiti to ever develop itself, France would have to repay the full amount, which, thanks to the magic of compounding interests and creative accounting, came to the most scientific amount of $21,685,155,571.48. France never

limp along for another year while his supporters debated what they would do when the promised windfall materialized.

When he was finally overthrown by right-wing rebels in 2004, the relationship between Aristide and the foreign powers that once heralded him as a champion of democracy had soured so much that France and

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the United States were happy to provide him a plane to facilitate his exile.

The offer probably saved Aristide’s life, but it did little to ingratiate the two countries in Aristide’s eyes. As soon as he landed in the Central African Republic, he announced that he had in fact been kidnapped by U.S. and French troops who had taken him out of the presidential palace at gunpoint. Aristide’s following is larger than that of any other Haitian politician, so one may assume that his various barbs and conspiracy theories against the United States and France echo many Haitians’ own misgivings.

This, after 30 years of foreign support, is most unexpected.

A MODERN-DAY PROTECTORATE (2004-2005) Aristide and his party members were re-elected in two fraudulent elections in 2000, so envoys from the United Nations and the Organization of American States remained a permanent feature in Port-au-Prince even after the end of the foreign military presence. Their mission to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Aristide and his opponents failed when Aristide was ousted in February 2004, but it did not deter the UN and the OAS from continu-

ing their so far frustrated meddling in Haitian politics. The chaos that followed Aristide’s departure prompted the creation of yet another peacekeeping force (this time led by Brazilian troops) that is currently running parts of Haiti, including the capital.

Following this latest political convulsion, Haitian expert Gabriel Marcella went so far as to ask publicly that Haiti be turned into a UN protectorate. The suggestion was plausible enough to spark a passionate debate, but one may argue that Haiti is already a de facto protectorate since the Haitian treasury, police, schools, hospitals, electoral system, and roadbuilding programs are completely reliant on foreign charity for their survival, and, in many cases, actually run by foreigners. So complete is the Haitian reliance on foreign financing and advice that the Haitian Ministry of Cooperation received a $1.2 million grant from the Inter-American Development Bank to learn how one should ask for and manage international subsidies.5 Without foreign aid, one million Haitians who live off donated foreign rice would go hungry. The schools run by U.S. churches would close. There would be no one but priWINTER 2006 XX

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vate militias to patrol the capital. The interim government led by Prime Minister Gérard Latortue would run out of funds and most likely be overthrown. Haiti is, quite literally, on life support.

So far, how successful has the thirty-year international effort to change Haiti been? Two foreign military interventions and several billion dollars in aid later, little political progress can be seen. During Bébé Doc’s time the aid (designed to entice the dictator to lessen repression) was squandered on his wife’s multi-million dollar wardrobe while democratization remained an elusive dream.

The 1986-1990 era that followed his downfall was particularly unstable, with no less than six different governments in five years. Aristide, the first democratically elected president in Haiti’s history, was overthrown twice and is currently living in South Africa, while his supporters fight daily battles with foreign peacekeepers and right-wing militias in the slums of Port-au-Prince.

Lack of progress on the political front has had dramatic economic consequences. Massive emigration sent two million Haitians abroad. This brain drain was accompanied by deforestation, land erosion, XX VOLUME VII

and an AIDS epidemic, none of which the political class had time to address because of its sole-minded focus on preservation. In its 2001 report, the United Nations Development Program ranked Haiti 134th worldwide based on his Human Development Index (HDI) and noted that over half of the adult population was illiterate, that 62 percent of the population was undernourished, that less than half of the population had access to potable water, that 5 percent of adults lived with AIDS, and that the life expectancy at birth was a mere 52 years. Embezzlement of public funds has become so endemic that Haiti was ranked first in 2004 in Transparency International’s annual survey of the world’s most corrupt countries. Haiti, the richest colony in the Americas when its war of independence started in 1791, was by far the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere as it celebrated the bicentennial of its independence in 2004. That same year, when two tropical downpours destroyed Mapou and Gonaïves (killing at least 3,500 people), local warlords refused to offer help to the population, choosing instead to raid trucks from the World Food Program and sell the

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food to the highest bidder.

WHAT WENT WRONG? Many of the problems in Haiti are self-inflicted. The emigration movement, which has cost Haiti so many educated citizens, started as a Duvalierist campaign to rid the country of any person smart enough to mount a political opposition.

Political infighting between ambitious Haitian officers in the wake of Bébé Doc’s downfall precipitated a sudden drop in the tourism industry.

Similarly, the failure to make good use of the sudden bonanza of foreign aid that followed the 1994 U.S. invasion can be traced back to the controversy within Aristide’s Lavalas Party in 1997-1999 over the privatization issue that resulted in a gridlocked parliament, an ineffectual prime minister, and the cancellation of many donations for lack of a legitimate government to administer them.

But the foreign strategy of initiating change from the outside is itself not adapted to the Haitian environment. Haiti, because it was the first independent black republic and the only example of a successful slave revolt in the history of the world when it was created in 1804, is

a unique society in which one’s race and a prickly sense of nationalism cannot be ignored. Foreign aid programs, however well intentioned, will never bridge the gap between the predominantly white officials who administer them and black nationalists such as Bébé Doc and Aristide who benefit from them. Any French or American advice on how best to run Haiti, however correct, will always be met by sullen distrust because it emanates from a country that served as colonial ruler in 16971803 and another that served the same role in 1915-1934. Such missteps are often unintentional on outsiders’ part, but they can undermine even the most selfless act of charity.

It is difficult for an American church member to understand that he is despised, not because he donated a former school bus to a local hospital, but because he brought his dog along (French General Donatien Rochambeau used Cuban bloodhounds to chase rebellious slaves in 1803, and seeing a white man with a large dog is considered offensive to Haitians to this day). This potent nationalism, verging on xenophobia at times, has undone many a foreign plan.

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eign-inspired reform agendas is their lack of sustainability. Roads that are built with foreign aid remain foreign in Haitians eyes despite their usefulness and are frequently ruined because of neglect within years of completion. Trees planted by foreign NGO’s are not watered by locals despite the environmental devastation brought by soil erosion.

Programs that make use of foreign engineers and bureaucrats, even qualified ones, are doomed to collapse when the foreigners leave because their Haitian counterparts will find some odd pride in the failure of a foreign project initiated by a white foreigner, even one that directly benefits Haitians. Already in 1915-1934, the United States presided over a 19year protectorate that saw much economic progress, but had few lasting consequences because an antiAmerican nationalist movement born during the occupation portrayed all collaborators as traitors. Little has changed since.

Last, foreign-led reform programs reinforce the myth, already prevalent in Haiti, that any woe the country is suffering from should be attributed to outside influences.

Haiti’s colonial past in particular, even though two to five hundred XX VOLUME VII

years distant, is still referred to repeatedly as a credible explanation for unrelated current problems. “In fewer than fifteen years, Spain extracted fifteen thousand tons of gold here,” Aristide wrote in his autobiography with little regard for historical accuracy. “As for France, we would never finish if we tried to recite all that it took from us…. The colonial powers, including the United States, must make amends for the wrong inflicted on the colony or protectorate in those days. The debt experts, when they speak of our liabilities, need to add up the second column of their own 6 accountability.”

Blaming the colonial legacy is a convenient cure-all for populist politicians like Aristide. It can be entirely attributed to outside forces, cannot possibly be modified by any action on their part, and can serve as a negotiating tool to obtain financial compensation from the former colonial ruler, whose intercession will join the ongoing lore regarding the neoimperialist meddling that only further aid can cure. If successful, it can deflect all criticism regarding the current ruler’s inability to lift his country out of poverty while serving as a source of personal cash. The colonial

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legacy theory also leaves little room for original thinking on development strategies. Aristide may complain of the American and French imperialist legacies, but when pressed for a solution to his countrymen’s misery, his most potent remedies were to ask one former colonial ruler to send the 82nd Airborne in 1994, and the other to give $21 billion in 2003.

CONCLUSION: A SECOND DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE During the heyday of imperialist expansion in the late nineteenth century, Western powers like France, England, and the United States repeatedly intervened from the Caribbean to Africa and Asia so that they could “civilize” allegedly inferior races. Rudyard Kipling’s White Man’s Burden is a staple of history courses focusing on this era because it exemplifies the racist, selfless rhetoric that underpinned colonialism while offering a prescient warning that little success or gratitude was to be expected from people being civilized against their will.

What most people fail to notice, however, is that the colonialist mindset has far from disappeared from Western policymaking circles.

Still today, officials in the U.S. State

Department, the United Nations’ New York headquarters, and the French Quai d’Orsay consider it their duty to alleviate other people’s suffering by sending foreign aid, peacekeepers, and election monitors to nations that have been less blessed than they. These neo-colonialists no longer use the heavy-handed gunboat diplomacy of yesteryear, nor do they display the naked greed of their predecessors, nor do they claim that Darwinian evolution has made the white man naturally suited for global leadership, but they still believe that progress will not take place without Western intercession, presumably because local rulers do not have the required skills to choose what is good for their country.

The goal of spreading Western-style free-market democracy worldwide is as consensual today as colonialism was in its time. In an era of bitterly divergent diplomatic agendas, it is one of the few things on which France and the United States, or Republicans and Democrats, can agree. Even George W. Bush, who was initially reluctant to launch openended crusades when he was first elected, was setting for himself “the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” by the time of his 2 WINTER 2006 XX

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February 2005 State of the Union Address. Woodrow Wilson, who hoped to “make the world safe for democracy” in 1917, would be proud—though somewhat puzzled that his dream remains a pious wish 88 years after he formulated it.

This global campaign to end poverty and spread liberty is generous and idealistic. It is also misguided. Just like their imperialist forebears of centuries past, today’s anti-poverty and pro-liberty crusaders are suspicious of lesser nations’ ability to achieve meaningful progress on their own and tend to meddle in affairs that would be best left to local governments. Because of this paternalistic attitude, positive developments bought at high cost are often temporary for lack of local support. Also, little gratitude can be expected of populations that find modern-day foreign intercession eerily reminiscent of the colonial rule that they experienced in the past.

One may find examples of such pitfalls in nation-building projects from Iraq to Afghanistan, but nowhere is the odd mix of Western idealism, underlying racism, massive aid, constant political meddling, disappointing results, and eventual ingratitude more striking than in XX VOLUME VII

Haiti. No American would ever think of asking Canadians to fix their health care system; or of hiring UN observers to monitor electoral polls in Southern Florida. And yet, reliance on outsiders seems to be the solution of choice when Haiti faces similar challenges. What is needed for Haiti, 201 years after it won its independence from France, is a second declaration of independence—not from outright imperial rule, but from the colonialist mindset.

Benign neglect—letting Haitians make their own decisions, good or bad, and get the praise or blame they deserve—would be a truly color-blind policy, one that would respect Haitians as capable of self-government and give them an incentive to start bettering their lives.

It would also, incidentally, force Haitian rulers—who typically use xenophobic statements to conceal their own inability to turn their country’s fortunes around—to actively seek solutions to their own problems.

Such a second declaration of independence, if agreed to by both Haitians and their former donors, would finally allow Kipling’s poem to gather dust on the bookshelves of history.

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References 1Jean-Bertrand Aristide, In the Parish of the Poor (New York: Orbis Books, 1993), 59.

2Aristide and Clinton, "US Support for Democracy in Haiti," U.S. Department of State Dispatch vol. 4, no. 12 (22 March 1993), 163.

3Télévision Nationale d'Haïti, "Aristide Speaks at Funeral Ceremony, Urges Disarmament," Federal Broadcast Information Service (14 November 1995), 3-6.

Quoted in "1803-2003: restitution et réparation," Haïti Progrès vol. 21 no. 4 (9 April 2003): 1. The indemnity was later reduced to 60 millions, which Haiti was never able to pay in full.

4Paul Moreno-López et al. [Inter-American Development Bank], Haiti: Country Paper (October 1996), Annex III, 15, financial assistance collection, USAID library, Port-au-Prince.

5Aristide and Christophe Wargny, Jean-Bertrand Aristide: An Autobiography (New York: Orbis Books, 1993), 143. From 1500 to 1650, Spanish imports of gold and silver from all its possessions in the New World (including Mexico and Peru, two countries Spain invaded after failing to find much gold in the Caribbean) were 80 tons and 16,000 tons, respectively. See Henry Kamen, Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763 (2002; reprint, New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 287.

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Challenging the System: Investigating the Emergence of Nonprofit Drug Development Organizations BY

EVAN MICHELS BIOGRAPHY

Evan Michelson has a MA in international science and technology policy from The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, a MA in philosophical foundations of physics from Columbia University, and a BA in philosophy of science from Brown University.

ABSTRACT The development of new drugs to treat some of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most dangerous and deadly diseases has, traditionally, been the sole province of the for-profit pharmaceutical industry. However, it has become evident that this market based approach to drug development has created an unwillingness of firms to invest the required time and money if there is little chance that, in the end, they can recoup their investment. In order to fill this gap left by for-profit drug developers, the nonprofit health sector has begun to mobilize its resources and has started to seek out creative solutions to the problem. The purpose of this essay is to analyze the potential benefits, pitfalls, and challenges facing these new kinds of nonprofit drug development organizations. I will conclude by noting that the emergence of a viable, notfor-profit drug development sector is a clear and significant demonstration that creative, socially responsi oluns to the some of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most deadly diseases can be found and implemented when a number of mutually beneficial ideas are brought together and designed to work in conjunction with one another.

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I. INTRODUCTION: “MAKING DRUGS, NOT PROFITS” The development of new drugs to treat some of the world’s most dangerous and deadly diseases has, traditionally been the sole province of the for-profit pharmaceutical industry. Multinational giants, such as GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, Merck, and Novartis, spend hundreds of millions of dollars each year to develop products that address a range of diseases and health issues, from the life-threatening, such as cancer and heart disease, to the lifestyle, such as obesity and indigestion. However, it has become evident that this market based approach to drug development—which has allowed many companies to reap large profits from the sale of “blockbuster” drugs such as Viagra—can lead to a significant problem. In short, firms have demonstrated an unwillingness to invest the necessary time and money it takes to steer a drug through the research, development, and approval process if there is little chance that, in the end, they can recoup their investment and make from the endeavor. money Nevertheless, even though this kind of attitude should be expected in the for-profit world—where a company’s

survival is dependent upon receiving a high rate of return on its substantial financial investments—this approach ensures that if there is an insufficient consumer market that is incapable of purchasing and paying for a certain class of drugs, then the related diseases will get little attention from the pharmaceutical industry and will consequently remain untreated.

In particular, this kind of market failure has arisen with respect to diseases that unduly affect the poor, impoverished regions and populations of the developing world, regions and populations that tend to lie within the Earth’s tropical zones.

Along these lines, a recent article in The Lancet, a well-respected public health journal, has noted that “as Western interests drifted away from these regions, tropical diseases have become progressively neglected, mainly because they do not offer sufficient financial returns for the pharmaceutical industry to engage in research and development.”i In order to fill this gap left by for-profit drug developers, the nonprofit health sector has begun to mobilize its resources and has started to seek out creative solutions to the problem. In particular, there has been a growing realization throughout the sector of a WINTER 2006 XX

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need for a renewed focus on developing innovative drugs to treat and deal with tropical diseases, which include, but are not limited to, Chagas’ disease, visceral leishmaniasis, and tuberculosis and have, up to now, been ignored by for-profit pharmaceutical companies. As a recent Scientific American article points out, these new kinds of nonprofit organizations are aimed at “making drugs, not profits.”ii Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to analyze, assess, and evaluate the potential benefits, pitfalls, and challenges facing these new kinds of nonprofit drug development organizations and to provide insightful suggestions and recommendations that will help these organizations maximize their impact and ensure that they are able to effectively further their missions.

II. RECOGNIZING THE NEED: ANALYZING THE CONTEXT FOR NONPROFIT DRUG DEVELOPMENT The recent emergence of a sizable number of nonprofit drug development organizations occurred as a direct response to the failure of for-profit pharmaceutical companies to seek out drugs for diseases that disproportionately affect people living in the developing world. In order XX VOLUME VII

to provide quantitative support for the idea that pharmaceutical companies were ignoring the health needs of vast regions of the globe, including Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia, the authors of The Lancet article attempted to break down and investigate the rate at which new drugs were developed for diseases that affect these areas the most. They discovered that “only 1% of the 1393 new chemical entities marketed between 1975 and 1999 were registered for these diseases,” with only 13 dedicated to tropical diseases and only 4 dedicated specifically to tuberculosis.iii Moreover, it was determined that in 1999, out of the $35.3 billion invested by the pharmaceutical industry in drug research and development, only a mere $70 million was spent on these tropical diseases, regardless of the fact that these diseases kill a disproportionate number of people, up to 4 million, in these regions every year.iv,v However, because drugs for these conditions lack profitability, since the poor cannot pay for them, the tropical diseases of the world have become the “neglected” diseases of the world.

The for-profit pharmaceutical industry eschews investment in these areas in favor of designing drugs that

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either address diseases predominant and more common in the developed world or that address lifestyle conditions that these populations are willing to spend money to address.

In their article, “The Emerging Landscape of PublicPrivate Partnerships for Product Development,” authors Alison Sander and Roy Widdus note that the recent explosion of these nonprofit drug development organizations has been caused by a desire “to fill gaps which other organizations could not or would not meet.”vi Part of the reason why such “gaps” exist is that the cost of developing drugs, from undertaking basic scientific research to distributing final products, is prohibitively high with regard to both time and financial expenditure. In fact, the authors estimate that the cost of developing a single drug can reach nearly $600 million over an 812 year time span, while other industry analysts, such as Merrill Goozner of the Integrity in Science Project at the Center for Science in the Public Interest, place the figure closer to $800 million over a 15 year period.vii,viii To counter these costs, these nonprofit drug development organizations hope that by leveraging donations—in the form of money,

volunteered expertise, and intellectual property rights of previously created chemical compounds—from foundations, governments, and the private sector, they will be able to reduce these numbers and develop drugs quickly and cheaply.

However, it should be noted that while the overall missions and social goals of these organizations, such as helping the poor or assisting the sick, are somewhat typical of other social service organizations, it is clear that the novelty and uniqueness of the methods used by these “product development” nonprofits to reach their desired ends should not be overlooked. Of course, traditionally, there has been a wide variety of organizations involved in healthcare on a nonprofit basis. These range from local institutions designed to integrate health services within a broadly-defined mission to organizations like the Red Cross—large, international entities designed to provide specific healthcare service in a variety of countries throughout the world.

Still, the point is that historically, nonprofit, healthcare-related organizations have shied away from becoming directly involved in the drug development process itself and, instead, have restricted their involveWINTER 2006 XX

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ment to a few key areas.

III. SEEKING ADVANTAGES: EXAMINING THE BENEFITS OF NONPROFIT DRUG DEVELOPMENT Understanding the economic forces that have made these kinds of nonprofit organizations necessary is not enough to provide a full and complete rationale for why these organizations have become so popular and fashionable over recent years.

For instance, instead of deciding to undertake drug development in the nonprofit sector, interested parties could persuade the for-profit pharmaceutical industry to address the health needs of the developing world or advocate in favor of governmental regulation that would force the industry to do so. However, I contend that the reason why drug development nonprofits have emerged so quickly over the past few years is that the leaders of these organizations have begun to reconnect the respective scientists and researchers to their underlying love of scientific problem solving that led them to enter the business of drug development in the first place. In short, leaders in the nonprofit pharmaceutical sector should be praised as social entrepreneurs, capable of appealing to the XX VOLUME VII

passion and creativity of drug developers by encouraging them to partake in a movement that will help reduce the ultimate burden of disease in developing countries.

For example, in a recent interview with The New Scientist, Institute for OneWorld Health’s (IOWH) chief executive officer Victoria Hale, a highly regarded, visionary leader in the sector, points out that her main reason for starting the organization was because she felt “personally committed” to addressing the health needs of the poor around the globe.ix Moreover, she mentions that her hope is that others will come to share her transformational conception of how drug development should be practiced, thereby mobilizing and encouraging other scientists to join her in her quest by having them “get back to why they entered this profession” in the first place.x In other words, Hale has realized the main reason why most drug developers entered the field is their passion for discovery. Moreover, she understands that scientists who work for private pharmaceutical companies are becoming increasingly disenchanted and disillusioned with a profession that is characterized by incremental progress, that focuses its

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attention on somewhat trivial conditions, such as male pattern baldness, and that ignores more serious and severe diseases, such sleeping sickness and malaria. Hale’s ability to connect with a scientist’s desire to confront difficult challenges and, ultimately, discover cures for dangerous diseases demonstrates that she is not only capable of motivating individuals to commit to furthering the mission of her nonprofit organization, but that she is capable of harnessing the latent motivations underlying the scientific enterprise for the purpose of a social good.

In addition to appealing to the scientific community’s passion for drug development, the nonprofit pharmaceutical sector has also benefited from an increase in the willingness of foundations and private corporations to become involved in their endeavors. With respect to foundation support, this sector has benefited from a simultaneous rise in donations from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, both of which have become convinced that one of the best ways to solve the problem of neglected disease is to undertake drug development in the nonprofit sector. In fact, a recent workshop

sponsored by the Initiative on PublicPrivate Partnerships for Health (IPPPH) has estimated that with the help of these two philanthropic organizations, the nonprofit drug development sector as a whole has received nearly $2 billion in funding, much of which was distributed by these two foundations over the past five years.xi In fact, one of the largest recipients of this money has been Aeras, which was recently awarded $82.9 million in grant money from the Gates Foundation to develop a tuberculosis vaccine.

However, the corresponding rise in philanthropic giving from foundations would not be nearly as effective if it was not connected with an associated trend: the willingness of the pharmaceutical corporations themselves to assist the nonprofit drug development community by donating chemical compounds and other scientific resources that may have potential benefits for curing neglected diseases. In her interview, Hale notes that this nonprofit sector “can benefit from the wealth of the [for-profit drug development] industry, because they have such a huge R&D machine. They make so many more discoveries than they can possibly use.”xii Not surprisingly, because WINTER 2006 XX

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of the overwhelming number of chemical compounds generated by the for-profit pharmaceutical industry, private companies have become quite willing to donate some of the raw research that they cannot use to these nonprofit organizations in

nonprofit organizations, the driving force behind entering such partnerships with for-profit pharmaceutical companies is that they can have access to a large database of scientific information that may go unused, thereby cutting their own research

exchange for the positive public relations value that these partnerships can generate.

For instance, GlaxoSmithKline recently announced an agreement to provide Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) with access to a new class of anti-malarial drug, primarily because there was no financial incentive for the private firm to develop the compound any further by itself.xiii From the perspective of the

costs and creating the potential of generating a large amount of â&#x20AC;&#x153;community wealthâ&#x20AC;? that will have an ultimate benefit for society. However, in the end, while the support given to nonprofit drug development organizations from private companies benefits the former in many ways, these intellectual-property partnerships may ultimately benefit the latter even more so by having the effect of improving their public image and off-

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setting some of the backlash that has occurred against the pharmaceutical industry in the wake of a number of recent scandals, such as the Paxil and Vioxx debacles.

IV. THE COMPLEXITIES OF NONPROFIT DRUG DEVELOPMENT Nevertheless, even though the nonprofit drug development industry has begun to benefit from the renewed passion of research scientists and heightened levels of giving from foundations and the pharmaceutical industry, a host of questions and issues still remain with regard to the organization, management, and viability of these institutions. In order to understand some of these issues, I have broken my analysis into three broad categoriesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;leadership and governance, performance, and external relationsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;in order to group together similar and related problems. While I do not pretend that these categories cover the entire range of relevant issues that have emerged in this sector, I assert that they are useful in creating an agenda that will allow for an extended assessment of the challenges that these organizations are beginning, and will continue, to face, both now and in the future.

Leadership and Governance It is unclear how well the leaders of institutions in the nonprofit drug development sector are prepared to handle the challenges of working within the nonprofit framework. For instance, a quick inspection of Figure 1, which details the background of the management team and board of directors of a number of these organizations, shows that the individuals running these institutions have little to no experience within the nonprofit sector. At best, only a few organizations, such as Aeras Global TB Vaccination Fund (Aeras) and Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi), have some representatives from the donor/foundation world on their senior management team. Still, most organizations, including IOWH and MMV, are governed by management that faces the severe problem of lacking any nonprofit experience whatsoever, since their leaders have backgrounds, either predominantly or completely, from the for-profit world.

Conceivably, tensions could arise as the excessively business-oriented mindset of these executive directors, senior managers, and boards of directors comes into conWINTER 2006 XX

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flict with the mission, vision, and values of their nonprofit organizations.

Even Hale, who previously headed a private drug development company, does not seem capable of stepping outside of this for-profit mentality, as she continually referred to her organization as a “non-profit drug development company” throughout her interview (italics added).xiv In an article detailing the history of the nonprofit drug development sector, Widdus highlights the identity crises facing these organizations by pointing out that there is still little consensus regarding how these institutions should be named. He notes that “some describe themselves as ‘public-private partnerships,’ whereas others prefer to call themselves ‘not-forprofit pharmaceutical companies’ or ‘virtual pharmaceutical companies,’ and yet others ‘not-for-profit (R&D) initiatives.’”xv Even though all of these organizations are officially registered as nonprofits, part of the difficulty they have had, and will continue to have, in generating their mission statements and strategic plans is that they are using business means— the development of products—to further a socially conscious goal. On the brighter side, the hope is that these organizations can merge the XX VOLUME VII

positive characteristics of both sectors and, as Paul Light points out, “become business/nonprofit hybrids, members of a strange new league of organizations that may yet test the federal tax laws protecting charitable organizations.”xvi Performance An issue related to this problem of organizational leadership, governance, and identity is how these new kinds of institutions decide to measure and determine their success in relation to their missions. Along these lines, it is important to note that, as of yet, no drug developed by the nonprofit sector has been approved for distribution, though a number of compounds should reach this stage over the next few years.

Regardless, it is still unclear how these nonprofits will measure the performance and effectiveness of their organizations. Of course, forprofit companies have an easier time measuring performance; they can turn to product sales, profit margins, and dividend distributions. For nonprofits, however, the question is not so clear cut. Potentially, one of the best indicators may be the number of compounds stewarded through to approval and distribution. However,

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it may not be enough simply to count the number of compounds that have been approved for use if the drugs never end up reaching the intended populations, or if their eventual cost of development is so high that they provide little improvement over the efforts of the for-profit industry. On the other hand, drug development is already such an inherently risky process that it may be too rash to conclude that an organization has failed in achieving its mission if its compounds are not approved for distribution One solution is that an organization may want to rely on counting the number of lives saved due to their efforts as a method for evaluation. Still, this approach may fail because of the difficulty in attaining such data. A compounding problem is that people living in such poverty are severely at risk for a number of different health troubles, which could appear to override the eventual effectiveness of the drugs developed by the nonprofit sector. In the end, if drug development on a nonprofit basis proves to be unrealistic or unattainable, these organizations may have to be content simply with advancing research as far as possible or advocating in favor of sci-

ence directed towards neglected diseases.

Another possible way to solve this problem of performance evaluation is for these organizations to take a portfolio approach, which would allow them, simultaneously, to shepherd and steer a host of different projects at different stages of development. In fact, DNDi uses this approach to structure its research agenda, as it currently supports nine ongoing projects staggered in different phases. Moreover, since DNDi was initially established as a joint undertaking by a variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations based in a number of different countries, including Kenya, Malaysia, Brazil, and India, it has already established connections with possible distribution partners worldwide, thereby giving its potential drugs greater access to people in the developing world.

The point here is that this sector must resolve the difficulty of connecting outputs, such as the number of drugs approved and developed, with outcomes, such as the overall improvement of health in people living in the developing world.

Clearly, the issues of performance, effectiveness, and program evaluaWINTER 2006 XX

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tion should be dealt with as an integral part of any nonprofit’s strategic plan, and all agreed-upon solutions should be circulated amongst key personnel to encourage “buy-in” throughout the organization.

External Relations A final concern with regard to the management of these nonprofit drug development organizations is how they handle and shape their relationships with the external world. As I noted earlier, a number of these organizations have become close partners with companies that develop drugs on a for-profit basis, either by accepting grants, or by providing scientific support or marketing assistance. However, nonprofit drug development organizations must be careful to closely evaluate their association with these private corporations to ensure that the potentially damaging business practices sometimes associated with these firms do not come to tarnish their image or the image of the nonprofit drug development sector as a whole.

Organizations like MMV may not want to become associated with a company that is known for silencing potentially harmful data about a drug, as was the case in XX VOLUME VII

GlaxoSmithKline’s handling of evidence harmful to its drug Paxil, or with other corporations that have taken a hard-line stand against reducing drug prices for developing countries, as was the case with a number of companies that fought South Africa’s proposal to develop cheap AIDS drugs. Eventually, if the nonprofit drug development community is seen allying with the worst practices of its for-profit counterparts, it may be viewed by the public as having been compromised by either real or apparent conflicts of interest, making it appear to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

In addition, organizations in the nonprofit drug development sector must be sure to seek input from stakeholders in developing countries to ensure that their practices and their eventual products conform to the needs of the populations that they are trying to serve. Roy Widdus and Katherine White emphasize the importance of this issue with respect to the external relations component of the nonprofit drug development sector by highlighting “the importance of legitimate involvement of the various constituents from the disease-endemic countries.”xvii Along

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this line of reasoning, Ridley argues that without such participation from members in the developing world, the leadership of these nonprofit drug development organizations “may fail to understand the longterm value and indeed the social responsibility to engage equally with southern partners and to work to ensure that once a project is completed, there is a sustained residual capacity left behind to undertake similar work in the future.”xviii Ridley hopes that by creating “a sense of local ownership of data and products,” the nonprofit drug development sector will encourage “the participation of developing country scientists and institutions as equal partners” and, in turn, accelerate progress toward developing drugs for neglected diseases.xix This issue of ensuring participation by developing countries becomes even more acute when one realizes that a large majority of nonprofit drug development organizations, and their associated supporters, are located in developed countries, predominantly in the United States and Switzerland. Without taking proactive steps to guarantee that representatives from the developing world have a voice in directing how such drug development undertakings

are designed to meet the needs of their populations, these organizations run the risk of not only offending the people they hope to help but of also misdirecting the aims and goals of their own research projects.

V. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT Having identified some of the key organizational, managerial, and strategic issues that have emerged with respect to the nonprofit drug development sector, I will provide a short list of suggestions and recommendations that may help these organizations improve their chances for success. Once again, while this list is not meant to be comprehensive—for a number of additional options and solutions will arise as these organizations mature—the hope is that this outline will provide a few workable options that may help these institutions avoid some of the pitfalls, drawbacks, and downsides discussed earlier.

First, I recommend that the chief executive officer, senior management, and entire board of directors of these organizations make a point to get additional training and experience in how to lead a nonprofWINTER 2006 XX

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it organization. They should willingly invest in and attend training sessions, seminars, and other educational opportunities that will help provide them with the skills and expertise that is needed to head a mission-driven organization. Along these lines, the directors of these organizations may want to take the time to “shadow” leaders of different kinds of product and service-providing organizations in order to gain additional first-hand experience in nonprofit management. The point here is that even though a drug development organization has a different exact purpose than, say, a local soup kitchen or a homeless shelter, the underlying ideas of social responsibility and assistance are the same.

Nonprofit leaders like Victoria Hale could be well-served to learn about such issues as volunteer management, fundraising, personnel management, and board motivation from these other service and productdevelopment organizations.

Second, it is clear that the nonprofit drug development sector as a whole needs to diversify its funding base and become less reliant on grants from the Rockefeller and Gates Foundations. As Widdus and White note, it is already the case that XX VOLUME VII

a number of these nonprofit organizations are “under-resourced,” and there is concern throughout the sector that “the current base of funders is not sufficient to sustain the existing field.”xx One fundraising area that currently remains untapped is individual donors. Individuals have yet to be systematically targeted by this sector as a source of funds, and it is clear that these organizations have missions, such as curing tuberculosis or malaria, that would be attractive to many individual givers. Admittedly, part of the problem is that since drug development is so costly and requires a large amount of financial resources to be successful, it is unclear whether it is worthwhile to seek out individuals that may only be able to give a little bit at a time. However, any money raised from individual donors could be used to supplement other sources of income for capacity building programs, such as staff development and the maintenance of institutional infrastructure, thereby leaving more money from the foundations to go directly into drug development.

Third, throughout the sector, there must be improved coordination and communication between the organizations themselves and between the organizations and the

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respective donors. As Figure 2 shows, there are a number of organizations working on drugs for the same diseases, creating the potential for a redundancy of effort and the wasting of donor money at the same time.

One recommendation is that organizations in this field should consider consolidating or partnering with one another. If, say, DNDi and IOWH partner on a project to combat Chagas’ disease, they would both become more attractive to donors and, in turn, not end up duplicating research. Similarly, donors may want to encourage such partnerships and pressure watchdog groups, such as IPPPH, to host conferences and meetings that focus on how organizations can better coordinate their efforts. Once again, while this process of synchronization may have the effect of “weeding out” organizations that support a general, wideranging drug development portfolio, it may also push these all-purpose drug developers to operate more efficiently and enter niches ignored by the rest of the sector.

A fourth suggestion is that the sector as a whole should make a point to develop common performance measures that could help donors better evaluate the operations of

each organization. As I mentioned earlier, measuring performance and outcomes in this sector is a difficult process and may be hard to impose across a varied spectrum of organizations. However, as Widdus and White observe, even when one takes into account these differences, there are benefits for all parties—the organizations, the donors, and the public at large—in establishing a set of agreed-upon “quantitative and qualitative measures of performance.”xxi The authors suggest that such performance measures could include “estimates of potential public health impact, cost utility of new products, [and] quantitative productivity goals.”xxii Conceivably, these nonprofit pharmaceutical organizations would be willing to establish such benchmarks in order to provide involved parties with evidence that their model of drug development is not only successful, but that it may even improve upon the practice of the for-profit pharmaceutical industry.

Finally, the nonprofit pharmaceutical sector must work to connect with the disease-endemic and developing countries early in the drug development process. These organizations must make a point to sponsor WINTER 2006 XX

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roundtable discussions in the affected countries to allow for interested stakeholders, including citizens, scientists, and disease advocacy groups, to voice their opinions, hopes, and concerns. These organizations should also meet with local pharmaceutical manufacturing and distributing partners to make certain that these players are willing to cooperate and participate as associates.

Additionally, these organizations should begin negotiating with various national and international regulatory bodies, including the World Health Organization and the World Bank, to help tackle questions related to intellectual property protection, the implementation of drug access programs, and the requirements for gaining drug approval. These steps toward open dialogue and transparency with all concerned parties will help these nonprofit organizations avoid some of the potential aforementioned public relations hazards and missteps.

foundly alter the landscape of the pharmaceutical industry in particular, and, eventually, the healthcare industry as a whole. If this model succeeds, diseases that have been traditionally neglected will be the subject of a new round of attention that could lead to their ultimate cures. In fact, a recent article in the Financial Times has pointed out that these nonprofit drug development organizations have already caused enough of a stir that their for-profit counterparts are taking notice. The article notes that “industry has responded with its own initiatives…[companies like] AstraZeneca have opened new infectious disease laboratories, while Novartis has set up a research institute in Singapore to work on TB and dengue fever.”xxiii While increased competition from the for-profit sector may threaten the viability of nonprofit drug developers, it does guarantee that a new level of responsiveness directed toward ignored diseases will emerge. The ultimate impact of these organizations may not be in the VI. CONCLUSION: CHANGING THE drugs that they develop but in the awareness they raise.

LANDSCAPE OF DRUG Hopefully, these organizaDEVELOPMENT It is clear that the move tions will be able to navigate through toward developing drugs on a non- the challenges posed by questions profit basis has the potential to pro- related to leadership and governance, XX VOLUME VII

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performance, fundraising, and external relations and, in turn, succeed in their missions of curing some of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most damaging and deadly diseases, which that affect the lives of millions of people annually.

Organizations like IOWH, MMV, DNDi, and Aeras have already begun this process, and there are high expectations that they will encourage other passionate individuals to join their causes in the future. Funders, such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Gates Foundation, must remain committed to these organizations, even as the organizations start to seek out new sources of revenue from individuals and governments alike. Stakeholders in developing countries must encourage these organizations to continue working toward fulfilling their missions and participate by providing input throughout the drug development process. If it continues to progress and adapt to its changing environment, the nonprofit drug development sector will improve the health of those in need throughout the developing world.

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FIGURE 1 (Sander and Widdus, “The Emerging Landscape of Public-Private Partnerships for Product Development,” p. 111)

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FIGURE 2 (Sander and Widdus, “The Emerging Landscape of Public-Private Partnerships for Product Development,” p. 104)

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References i Patrice Trouiller, et al., “Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a Public-Health Policy Failure,” The Lancet, Volume 359, June 22, 2002, pp. 2188-2194, p. 2188. ii Gary Stix, “Making Drugs, Not Profits,” Scientific American, May 2004, accessed November 15, 2004, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=0006B5F7-A926-1084A92683414B7F0000. iii Trouiller, et al., p. 2189. iv Trouiller, et al., p. 2189. v Alison Sander and Roy Widdus, “The Emerging Landscape of PublicPrivate Partnerships for Product Development” in Roy Widdus and Katherine White, ed., Combating Diseases Associated with Poverty (Geneva, Switzerland: The Initiative on Public Private Partnerships for Health, November 2004) p. 102, accessed November 18, 2004, available at http://www.ippph.org/index.cfm?page=/ippph/publications&thechoice=re trieve&docno=109. vi Sander and Widdus, p. 102. vii Sander and Widdus, p. 103. viii Merrill Goozner, The $800 Million Pill: The Truth Behind the Cost of New Drugs (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004). ix “Cures before Cash: Interview with Victoria Hale,” New Scientist, September 22, 2004, accessed October 1, 2004, available at http://www.newscientist.com/opinion/opinterview.jsp?id=ns24661. x “Cures before Cash: Interview with Victoria Hale.” xi “Not-for-Profit Approach Improves Prospect of Vaccines and Drugs for the Poor: US$2 Billion Investment Yields Significant Progress, but More Funders Required,” (Geneva, Switzerland: The Initiative on Public Private Partnerships, September 16, 2004), accessed November 10, 2004, available at http://www.ippph.org/index.cfm?page=/ippph/newsmedia/news&thechoice=show&id=521.

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xii “Cures before Cash: Interview with Victoria Hale.” xiii “Medicines for Malaria Venture and GlaxoSmithKline Collaborate to Fight Malaria,” (Geneva, Switzerland, Medicines for Malaria Venture, November 11, 2004), accessed November 20, 2004, available at http://www.mmv.org/FilesUpld/205.pdf. xiv “Cures before Cash: Interview with Victoria Hale.” xv Roy Widdus, “Historical Context: Why Public-Private Partnerships for Product Development Emerged and How?” in Combating Diseases Associated with Poverty, pp. 3-20, p. 12. xvi Paul Light, Pathways to Nonprofit Excellence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 24. xvii Roy Widdus and Katherine White, “Areas for Future Attention” in Combating Diseases Associated with Poverty, pp. 35-39, p. 37. xviii Robert Ridley, “Product Development Public-Private Partnerships for Diseases of Poverty” in Combating Diseases Associated with Poverty, pp. 196-205, p. 205. xix Ridley, p. 204 and 205. xx Widdus and White, p. 38. xxi Widdus and White, p. 35. xxii Widdus and White, p. 35. xxiii “Non-profit Groups Hunt for Cures,” Financial Times, March 1, 2004, accessed November 20, 2004, available at http://www.accessmedmsf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=4320041356293&contenttype=PAR A&.

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A New Paradigm in Trans-Atlantic Space Relations

by NICOLAS PETER BIOGRAPHY Nicolas Peter is a Master’s degree candidate in International Science and Technology Policy at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University (GWU). He is also Research Associate at the Laboratoire Communication et Politique in Paris and Research Assistant at the Space Policy Institute at GWU. ABSTRACT The United States since the 1970s has had a long history of significant cooperation with Europe on scientific and human space flight programs.

The pattern of trans-Atlantic cooperation has evolved over time. At the beginning of Europe’s space programs, cooperation was a scientific and technological necessity. Trans-Atlantic cooperation is not as mandatory today as it was 30 years ago. The European space context has changed dramatically since its pioneering times of space activities, and it is now entering its fourth institutional evolution with the emergence of the European Union (EU) as the main European space actor. After an initial period of European dependence vis-à-vis the U.S. due to an asymmetry in capabilities and resources, a recent reduction in this “capacity-gap” will change the traditional space cooperation relationship between the two powers. Europe has become a substantial space power with an increasing range of technological capabilities despite limited public money allocated to space programs. The U.S. is still Europe’s preferred partner for space cooperation, as long as that cooperation is carried out on an equitable basis, Europe is no longer interested in this asymmetric space relationship. With these recent developments in the European space landscape, new perspectives are arising that need to be taken into consideration by the U.S. as it develops its space strategy. Europe could be a capable partner or a serious competitor for the U.S. The next administration needs to define a clear policy both on the civilian and military agendas regarding Europe. That policy will have to oscillate between cooperation and competition, and that may have long-term consequences.

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INTRODUCTION Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the U.S.S.R, the United States has been the dominant geopolitical actor in the world, with the Western European states as its allies. Furthermore, trans-Atlantic relations were an important axis of cooperation in foreign policy, the economy, science and technology, and especially space activities. The U.S. policy regarding international space activities has in the last few decades evolved and fluctuated between cooperation and competition, depending on the topic and the times. The US has a long history of cooperation with the European Space Agency (ESA) and individual European countries on scientific and human space flight programs, including the space shuttle and the International Space Station (ISS).

However, the European space landscape is currently undergoing multiple changes that will need to be taken into consideration by the second Bush Administration. An understanding of these changes in policy, organizational structure, and funding at the European-level is important, since they will undoubtedly affect the nature of traditional European â&#x20AC;&#x201C; U.S. space relations.

A NEW GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT U.S.-European relations, which have for a long time been the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, have experienced significant strains in recent years. Recent geopolitical events, including the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the Kyoto Protocol, and the European Unionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s efforts to defend the International Criminal Court, have caused tensions between the U.S. and Europe.

Nevertheless, focusing on the contentious aspects of U.S.-European relations should not obscure the positive trans-Atlantic cooperation that still exists in many areas, including peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans and Afghanistan, the substantial trade and investment that link the United States to Europe, as well as the underlying commonality of democratic values and culture.

U.S.

AND

EUROPE

IN SPACE: TWO

DIFFERENT REALITIES

There is a wide range of reasons why governments engage in space activities. The basic justifications have differed for different countries at different times.

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The U.S. in Space The U.S. is currently the largest space actor. It combines a political vision of space with a financial commitment to space-related activities that is without parallel in the world. The U.S. has a coherent space policy, sharing responsibilities between two major public agencies which manage most of the space budget, namely the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DoD).

Although the DoD acts mainly as a client while NASA has historically been an agency for research and development, an important rapprochement between the two institutions is currently taking place. In addition to these two major actors, more specialized actors such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) play a dedicated role although closely coordinated with those of the two major players.

The U.S. is the country that invests the most money in space activities in both the civilian and military fields. The ambition of the U.S. is clearly to build and maintain a hegemony based on technical superiority, and space has a prominent role XX VOLUME VII

in this strategy. The U.S. space civilian budget for FY2003 was estimated to be $16.5 billion USD, of which $15.3 billion USD was for NASA, $762 million USD was for NOAA and approximately $400 million USD was for other organizations involved in space (DoC, DoE etc.) (1). It is estimated that the U.S. accounts for 96% of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s public funding in military space programs. Moreover, its technical capabilities allow the U.S. to be the only state to be involved in the complete spectrum of space activities.

EUROPE IN SPACE Space has become a new strategic challenge for Europe, since space activities have raised the technological and industrial capabilities of the Member states. European space activity is complex partly because there are a myriad of stakeholders.

The major institutional actors in the European space landscape today are split into three levels: the European Union , the European Space Agency, and the national space agencies.

Europe as a whole has become a substantial space power with an increasing range of technological capabilities despite limited public money allocated to space programs. Europe

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is the second largest space power according to budget. The total European public expenditure for civilian activities, which is the sum of the ESA budget, the EU contribution, the national budgets and the European countries’ contributions to EUMETSAT (the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites), is estimated at about €5.3 billion Euro in 2003.

The military space budgets for all of Europe totaled only €650 million Euro in 2003 including the countries that have declared military space projects (France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) (1).

Space activities are still organizationally and financially fragmented in Europe, but since the pioneering times of the various National Agencies, including the French space agency (CNES), the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) in the 1960s and the creation of ESA in 1975, the European space environment has changed dramatically. The European space sector is now entering its fourth institutional evolution with the emergence of the European Union as the main European space actor (2). Space technology and its

applications are now widely seen as key elements in EU policies and objectives. EU space policy currently focuses on Earth-oriented applications of direct public benefit, from the environment to agriculture to information technology to defense and security.

The second level, which was the top level of European space activity until recently, is occupied by the European Space Agency. The ESA was created in 1975 and originally aimed to be a research and development organization without any military implications. It developed independently from the European integration process.

Traditionally, the ESA has been the main framework for developing European space activity outside of the national space programs. It was established by European governments with the stated goal of developing a European space capability and promoting a European space presence. This organization pools the space interests as well as the financial and industrial resources of several countries, and has become the main authority in the European space industry.

The third level is made up of the national-level space programs.

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However, not all states have a dedicated space agency, and there are differing ambitions and capabilities among the existing national space agencies.

THE RECENT EUROPEAN EVOLUTION

While the ESA is not an agency of the European Union, the two organizations have forged a close working relationship in recent years due to the important role of space in maintaining Europe’s political and economic strength. The future of European space activity will be built on the growing relationship between the EU and ESA. The “EC-ESA Framework Agreement” that entered in force in May 2004 is an important step in developing a closer relationship between the current and the anticipated future dominant space authorities in Europe. This framework agreement, besides regulating cooperation in the years ahead, recognizes both parties’ specific, complementary, and mutually reinforcing strengths (for the EU, setting policy directives for Europe; for the ESA, providing the scientific and technological capabilities to implement space programs in the service of those directives).

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There is a consensus in the European space community that ESA will continue to be the organization for developing and implementing space and associated ground projects and for managing associated industrial contracts, while the EU’s role will be to identify user needs in support of European policies. This collaboration will allow the development of a coherent and progressive European space policy and supply space systems and infrastructure necessary to meet European Community demand. EC space policy will follow a user-driven approach focusing on Earth-oriented applications with direct public benefits, such as Galileo (the European Satellite Navigation System), GMES (the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security), the telecommunications initiative reducing “the digital divide,” the use of space capabilities in support of Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The real advantages of EU-ESA co-operation are already being seen in the global navigation satellite system Galileo, since it demonstrates the real synergies that can be developed between the ESA(coordinating supply-side access

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to space) and the EU (consolidating widespread, demand-side applications).

Furthermore, the proposed EU Constitution includes space among the EU’s shared competencies. The fact that space is referred to specifically in the Constitution reflects the growing recognition among EU leaders that space systems and related technologies can be used to provide beneficial products and services to European citizens while also delivering a powerful competitive edge to European industry in the global marketplace. This concrete step acknowledges that space activities are of strategic importance for the implementation of a wide range of more general European policies in areas like transport, information, environment, security, and foreign policy.

To underscore the EU’s new space interests, control over EU space matters has been transferred within the Barroso Commission from the Research Directorate to the Directorate of Enterprise and Industry, illustrating Europe’s new position that space activity goes beyond research into a strong industrial dimension, including defense and security policy.

In overall terms, the EU has seen its interests in space grow for two distinct reasons: in order to develop and maintain a solid industrial base in Europe and also to be more active on the international scene.

U.S.-EUROPEAN COOPERATION The U.S. from 1957 onward has used its achievements in space to symbolize its technological, economic, military and political strengths and has used space cooperative programs with its allies as one means of demonstrating its leadership.

Although the U.S. space program was established to meet a competitive challenge from the U.S.S.R, the National Aeronautics and Space Act identifies international cooperation as a fundamental U.S. goal. The “Space Act” of 1958 (4), which led to the establishment of NASA, codified international cooperation. In Section 205, it is stated that: “The Administration, under the foreign policy guidance of the President, may engage in a program of international cooperation in work done pursuant to the Act, and in the peaceful application of the results thereof, pursuant to agreements made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Since that time, WINTER 2006 XX

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the agency has engaged in thousands of cooperative arrangements, diverse in scope and complexity.

The U.S. and Europe have been cooperating in space for more than four decades. This history of cooperation has survived significant geopolitical, economic and technological changes including the end of the Cold War, the pressure of budget cuts, and the difficulties of cooperation in several projects. Both Europe and the U.S. have learned from one another, acquired and developed a knowledge base, and most importantly have established a legacy of cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic. The results of such cooperation are numerous, including the Solar & Heliospheric Observatory (a large mission managed at the agency level)and Topex-Poseidon (a smaller scale mission managed by various principal investigators). More than one hundred missions have involved various levels of US-European cooperation1 in space research which vary greatly in scope, complexity, and success.

space cooperation projects has been the ESA. However, that organization and the European space landscape in general are undergoing multiple changes with the emergence of the EU as the main European space actor. At the beginning of the European space programs, cooperation was a scientific and technological necessity. Today, trans-Atlantic cooperation is not mandatory as it was 30 years ago, but it is still considered an efficient means of diversifying flight opportunities, sharing cost and developing large and complex systems.

The pattern of cooperation between Europe and the U.S., particularly NASA, has evolved over time.

In the initial years of European space activities cooperation took the form of free launches provided by the U.S. in exchange for payload sharing on the spacecraft. The cooperation changed in the 1970s with the direct purchase of U.S. launches. With the increase of European capabilities, a period of more intense and complex cooperation began. Thus, roughly 50 percent of the ESA program was conducted in cooperation with A NEW TRANS-ATLANTIC SPACE NASA (ISPM, Hubble Space telescope etc.). While in general the CONTEXT NASAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s traditional European cooperation with NASA has been an partner since the 1970s on large essential element in the successful XX VOLUME VII

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development of European space science, it has also involved difficulties due to the unequal power of the partners.

However, after an initial period of European dependence vis-à-vis the U.S. due to an asymmetry in capabilities and resources, a recent reduction in this “capacity-gap” will change the traditional space cooperation relationship between the two powers. Europe has become a substantial space power with an increasing range of technological capabilities despite limited public money allocated to space programs.

European capabilities in expendable launch vehicles, space sciences, telecommunications and remote sensing satellites are often considered to be as or more successful than their U.S. counterparts. Therefore, cooperation with the U.S. may no longer be the preferred solution for Europe, especially with aspects of U.S cooperation are still framed in a Cold War mentality. Furthermore, the motivation on the part of the U.S. to reduce cost is often incompatible with external partners’ motivations to develop indigenous technological capabilities.

The U.S. is still Europe’s preferred partner for space cooperation, if that cooperation is carried out on an equi-

table basis. Europe is no longer interested in an asymmetric space relationship where its contribution is totally dependent on the U.S. for success.

FUTURE TRANS-ATLANTIC CHALLENGES

Several civilian and military space activities will test the solidity of the historical trans-Atlantic links in space affairs. Among others, the Vision for Space Exploration and the rise of Europe as a new security actor will be particularly challenging for the next U.S. administration.

THE VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION On January 14, 2004 President Bush announced a new vision for human and robotic space exploration named “A Renewed Spirit of Discovery”. This new space exploration policy called for “a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond” (5) and seeks also to “promote international and commercial participation in space exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests” (5).

However, as noted by a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) WINTER 2006 XX

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study, NASA will face a number of significant technical hurdles. The agency might not be able to achieve it alone (6). In this context European participation is an important asset for the U.S. President Bush’s “Vision for U.S. Space Exploration” encompass-

partners, have made ISS utilization the centerpiece of their planning for at least the next decade. Now they are being asked if they can join the U.S. in another new project while they continue their plans for ISS. Europe had some solar system exploration activities planned

es a major redirection of NASA’s objectives and budget to explore space and extend a human presence across the solar system. This plan poses both a challenge and an opportunity to all other space-faring countries. Other countries, particularly the International Space Station (ISS)

before President Bush’s announcement. Planetary exploration is not new to the ESA. Not only has the ESA successfully flown missions to Mars, the Moon, comets, Titan, Saturn and soon Venus, it also has significant experience in human spaceflight, currently focused on the

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ISS. Furthermore, the ESA initiated the Aurora program in 2001 to formulate and implement “a European long-term plan for the robotic and human exploration of solar system bodies holding promise for traces of life.” It is a decades-long program featuring multiple robotic missions to the moon and Mars, a Mars samplereturn attempt, and ultimately, astronauts to those bodies. However, now Europe has to decide whether or not it wants to join the U.S. exploration program, and if so, how they would do it.

Individual European countries through the ESA or even the EU could participate in the exploration initiative at many levels, such as providing launch capacity, building and operating robotic and human spacecraft, providing scientific instruments and astronauts, etc. But the possibility of European participation in the U.S. Vision for Space Exploration comes at a challenging period since the partners cannot duplicate their efforts. Characteristic of this issue is the debate over whether Britain can take part in the Aurora program. British scientists had considered investing in NASA’s Space Exploration Initiative, but that option was viewed as less attractive

because Britain’s small contribution would not afford it any leverage over the NASA program’s direction.

Future cooperation on exploration will also depend on the direction that the ISS program takes. The new space exploration policy says that the U.S. will complete its commitments to the ISS, but the Europeans would like to know what U.S. plans are after the completion of the ISS, in light of the retirement of the space shuttle. Moreover, the ability of European partners to benefit from their contribution to the station is currently totally dependent on how the U.S. fulfills its commitments to the ISS partnership. There are consequences to the delays in the assembly sequence of the ISS for the Europeans since they are dependent on the space shuttle for the launch of their contribution: the Columbus Module. The launch date for Europe’s contribution has shifted by at least two years from the planned October 2004 date because of delays in the return to flight of the U.S. space shuttle fleet. So the shift on U.S. policy may impact ISS utilization and Europe directly since they rely on the U.S. to access the station.

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cooperation to be sustainable, flexible and robust. In this context, European participation can be a critical enabler for the U.S. program since going to the moon, Mars and beyond will not be the journey of a single country. However, when thinking about future cooperation with the U.S., Europe wants to avoid finding itself in another situation where its success is totally dependent on the U.S. (as in the case of the ISS) and where its funds are used to support U.S. exploration objectives rather than European ones. If Europe is to become a significant cooperative partner in the Vision for Space Exploration, concerns with respect to the future of the space shuttle and the ISS have to be addressed. Europe will not enter into another partnership with the U.S. if such a partnership is not based on a solid and equitable foundation In this regard there needs to be an increased dialogue between Europe and the U.S.

has steadily increased. The first Iraq war highlighted the crucial contribution of military space systems; Arthur C. Clarke among others called it the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s first satellite war. Recent conflict has shown how space is useful for military activity. U.S. space assets were integrated deeply into various military operations. Space has now become the fourth dimension of the U.S. national security apparatus, along with air, ground and sea operations.

The diplomatic and military leverage that space technologies can provide did not go unnoticed by other countries, especially in Europe.

Recent events have demonstrated convincingly the importance of information supplied by space technologies, both in peace and in war.

Today, information superiority is an essential requirement for defense and security, and space is the best setting for worldwide observation and data collection.

Meanwhile, since September 11, 2001, security has been pushed to the top of the agenEUROPE AS A NEW SPACE SECURITY da in Europe and across the globe.

The EU is faced with a number of ACTOR Military activity in space has security challenges, including external been a constant for the U.S. since the border controls and peacekeeping beginning of the space age, and its duties. Whereas the current EU space use of space for military purposes strategy focuses on the areas of XX VOLUME VII

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transport, environment and research, the European leadership has acknowledged that space has a security dimension and has developed the political will to do act on it.

In a major shift, Europe now officially recognizes space as a strategic asset and views space not only as a tool for maintaining Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s political and economic strength but also as a support to its emerging security role, since space based systems and derived information can bring strategic capabilities and autonomous decision-making to support the CFSP and the ESDP. It is widely accepted that space-based technologies have a major role to play in ensuring the security of European citizens, including a better reinforcement of border control and conflict prevention as well as improving humanitarian missions and fighting crime and terrorism.

However, the argument that Europe should develop its own security related space capabilities is not new. In particular, France has been a consistent advocate since the 1980s of the need to have consistent spacebased Earth Observation capabilities independent of the U.S. (7).

Europe has significant assets which give it the credentials of a rec-

ognized civilian space power. Even though European governments have combined their non-military activities, since the 1960s defense programs and assets have remained essentially confined to national ventures. This means that space security activities have been fragmented both organizationally and financially and were accorded different degrees of importance in various countries. In Europe, to date, space security activities have always resided exclusively at the national-level along with some limited multi-lateral security space cooperation (e.g.: Franceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development of the optical observation systems Helios with participation from Italy and Spain). But as the cost of military systems continues to rise, no single European country can afford to develop a wide range of space assets on its own. As a result, European defense ministries are starting to realize that if they want access to a greater variety of spacebased military systems they need to share and develop some of these technologies together (8). Current coordination, harmonization, and consolidation efforts of the different space activities within Europe are now taking place (Galileo, GMES).

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most important evolutions of the European position regarding space security in recent years is the evolution of the ESA’s position on military activities. According to the terms of its founding convention (Article II), the purpose of the ESA shall be to “provide for and promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among European States in space research and technology and their space applications, with a view to their being used for scientific purposes and for operational space applications systems” (9). Traditionally, governments have interpreted this to mean that the ESA could not run programs with any military content and that ESA is solely a civilian space agency. But they have since revised this interpretation. Due to the absence of a clear definition of “peaceful purposes,” the phrase is now interpreted as “non-aggressive” rather than “non-military”, which means that military uses are allowed and lawful so long as they remain “non-aggressive”. European governments now agree that the ESA may develop systems and run space programs, such as those involving monitoring and surveillance satellites, which European armed forces could use for non-aggressive military activXX VOLUME VII

ities like peacekeeping (10). The growing “European” level approach to security may soon provide a link between the European and national levels of space activity; this would have important implications for trans-Atlantic relations (11).

CONCLUSIONS The Cold War competition for space has now almost totally disappeared; international cooperation driven by foreign policy and costsharing considerations have taken center stage, with international, political and economic competition also factoring into the equation. For NASA, cooperation was not only a policy decision, it was also a means to secure support for its mission in Congress. For Europe and the ESA in particular, cooperation with the United States offered more opportunities to participate in missions which they could not achieve alone. Hence, there was a mutual interest in cooperation. However, fundamental differences in current motivations and ambitions, as well as recent cooperative results, have led to trans-Atlantic cooperation difficulties.

With the re-election to a second term, U.S. President Bush has another three years to get his Vision

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for Space Exploration off to a solid start. But even with election results that put the Republican Party firmly in control of the Congress, the longterm space exploration strategy laid out in January 2004 still faces considerable challenges. One is convincing the U.S. Congress to continually approve the funding that NASA is seeking to complete the effort.

However, the short term challenge is to convince various international partners(especially Europe), to join this Vision for Space Exploration. A successful agreement on the future direction of the International Space Station is the prerequisite to any significant European participation in this program. If the U.S. wants to begin its journey it should seriously consider Europe as an important and equally capable partner.

Cooperation between ESA and NASA in scientific projects represents the traditional mode of transAtlantic cooperation. However, the evolution of the space context in Europe, especially with the ESAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s evolving position on security issues, will be challenging for future transAtlantic relations. This has been clearly illustrated by the tension between the United States and Europe over Galileo. The emergence

of new concerns regarding space and security within the EU and the ESA will thus involve a new axis of transAtlantic discussion involving a U.S. partner, the Department of Defense.

The changes in policy, organizational structure, and funding at the European level and the development of a European level security space architecture will affect the nature of traditional European â&#x20AC;&#x201C; U.S. space cooperation. The new European dipole consisting of the EU and the ESA could either be a capable partner or a serious competitor for the U.S., depending on the U.S. attitude. The second Bush administration needs to define a clear policy on the civilian and military agendas regarding Europe that will have to oscillate between cooperation and competition. The trans-Atlantic space relationship is at a crossroads.

Europe and the U.S. have been close partners in space activities since the 1970s. Yet key trends on how each side approaches space may pose significant challenges to this partnership that may reinforce or exacerbate existing structural differences between the U.S. and the EU. Will the 21st century see a growing transAtlantic rift in space policy?

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References (1) ESA, “The European Space Sector in a Global Context. ESA’s Annual Analysis 2003” January 2004 (2) Nicolas Peter, “What’s Next for Trans-Atlantic Space Relations?” Space News. Op-Ed. January 10, 2005. Volume 16 Issue 1 (3) Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, accessible at http://european-convention.eu.int/amendemTrait.asp?lang=EN (4) National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, accessible at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/spaceact.html (5) The Vision for Space Exploration, accessible at http://www.nasa.gov/missions/solarsystem/explore_main.html (6) Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “CBO Study: A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration”. September 2004.

(7) John M. Logsdon, “ A security space capability for Europe? Implications for U.S. policy”. Space Policy. November 2002 (8) Xavier Pasco 2004, “Ready for take off? European defence and space technology” in Europe in Space. Center For European Reform. October 2004 (9) ESA convention accessible at http://www.esa.int/convention/ (10) Carl Bilt and Matt Dillon, “Europe’s final frontier” in Europe in Space.

Center For European Reform. October 2004 (11) Stefano Silvestri (Ed), “Space and Security Policy in Europe”. Instituto Affari Internazionali. November 2003.

(12) ESA, “Agenda 2007” October 2003.

1 For the purpose of this paper cooperation is used as a generic term denoting international participation in a project.

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A NEW PARADIGM IN TRANS-ATLANTIC SPACE RELATIONS

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