Northwestern Journal of International Affairs Vol. 9 by Sisi Tang

Volume 9 Spri ng 2008

Vanishing Borders:

The Rising Impact of Globalization on Human Rights

The “Genocide” Label in Northern Uganda, 45

How Importing Countries Can Block the Importation of Illicitly Exported Resources from War Zones, 83

Sold into Slavery: Counteracting Globalization’s Effects on Trafficking Women, 125 1

Founded in 1997, the Northwestern Journal of International Affairs (NJIA) is an undergraduate research journal that seeks to raise awareness and expand knowledge of contemporary topics in global affairs. The journal accepts strong academic works including academic articles, co-authored papers and theses submitted by scholars and experts in various fields, both nationally and internationally. Submissions can be sent by mail to The Northwestern Journal of International Affairs, 1902 Sheridan Rd. Evanston, IL 60208 or by e-mail to: njia.submissions@gmail.com. Any questions or further inquiries can also be forwarded to our e-mail address. Thank you for your interest!

Current Staff & Board of Editors: Daniel Andreeff, Cathay Bi, Andrew Celis, Loriana Crasnic, Skye Gao, Shalyn Hockey Richard Murphy, Diana Nielsen, Elizabeth Nielsen, Gauthami Soma

ÂŠ The Northwestern Journal of International Affairs Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies Northwestern University 1902 Sheridan Rd. Evanston, IL 60208

Contents Overlooking Transnationalism? The Challenges Faced by the French Republican Model Ana-Maria Sinitean, University of Chicago

Destruction by Deprivation? The “Genocide” Label in Northern Uganda Adam Lichtenheld, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Never Again: The Case for the International Criminal Court Jennie Keohane, Northwestern University

The Kimberley Process, Conflict Diamonds and Lessons in the Battle Against Genocide Former United States Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel

Turning the Tables : How Importing Countries Can Block the Importation of Illicitly Exported Resources from War Zones Harris Gleckman, Ph.D. Project Director UN/UNCTAD project on Corporate Social Responsibility in Zones of Conflict

What Makes Them Tick? The Individual, Strategic, and Tactical Logics of Female Suicide Terrorism Rebecca Brocker, University of Chicago

Sold into Slavery: Counteracting Globalization’s Effects on Trafficking Women Elizabeth Nielsen, Northwestern University

127

Foreign Policy and Identity: Human Rights in the Sino-American and Sino-Canadian Relationships Josh Jorgensen, University of Michigan

141

Bridging the Chasm: Modeling the Implementation Gap in Health Resources and Health Outcomes for HIV/AIDS through the Experience of Health Workers Gauthami Soma, Northwestern University

167

Editor’s Note

As we close the first decade of the twenty-first century, the modern era seems filled with debate over the effects of globalization and instantaneous cross-border information exchange. As witnesses to this new age, we find a number of continuously evolving challenges surrounding this international phenomenon. But where does the individual enter into this narrative of seemingly endless internationalization? Do human rights have a place in this increasingly complex environment? In our spring 2008 issue, the Northwestern Journal of International Affairs is proud to offer a diverse set of articles that attempt to address these very questions. The dialogue begins with Ana-Maria Sinitean’s “Overlooking Transnationalism”, which reminds readers that conflicts of globalization are not merely limited to emerging powers, but exist in today’s well-established Western nations. By observing the growing Romanian working community within France, Sinitean evaluates the national government’s ability to deal with globalization’s growing effect not only on the ethnic community but also on individual members of that community. Through a second case study analysis, Adam Lichtenheld sets out to explore the theoretical label of genocide for the conflict within Northern Uganda. Through an investigation of Ugandan society and political atmosphere, the article provides significant insight into a situation that is all too often ignored. While ultimately asserting that the classification of genocide may not be entirely accurate, Lichtenheld does not hesitate to staunchly criticize the Ugandan government’s

failure to protect its own citizens and does not settle for any simple excuses for that failure. Following Lichtenheld’s piece, the question of international authority surfaces: who, if any one, is responsible for mitigating global conflicts? Jennie Keohane, in a brief editorial piece displays the ongoing debate over the establishment of the International Criminal Court. While taking up a few controversial positions, Keohane’s piece expresses the continual frustration over the lack of U.S. involvement in what has been described as a body with vast potential, especially in the area of human rights. From a unique perspective, Former United States Ambassador James D. Bindenagel presents a narrative of the creation of human rights policy though diplomatic channels. The former Ambassador’s account of the struggles involved in the establishment of the “Kimberley Process”, a system which attempts to prevent the trafficking of ‘conflict diamonds’ by strict regulation their trade, allows for a clear view into the diplomatic efforts to protect the rights of exploited regions. Dr. Harris Gleckman describes what in the modern era seems to be an ever present issue of international economic responsibility within conflict zones. Through a theoretical analysis of the process in which national governments can avoid inadvertently supporting the funding of further conflict, Gleckman displays a framework from which the reader can begin to consider the effect of international trade on the process of human rights. “What Makes Them Tick?” by Rebecca Broker, is a riveting, eye-opening article that explores the origins and motivations of female suicide terrorism. By systematically analyzing the unfortunate circumstances that surround these events rather than simply dismissing them as acts of ‘irrational radicals’, Broker guides readers to explore the contexts in which acts of female suicide terrorism takes place. Elizabeth Nielsen presents a concise and informative piece centering on the issue of human trafficking during the twenty-first century. Her theoretical analysis of its characteristics highlights human trafficking as one of the most debated topics among human rights advocates worldwide. While many claim that human trafficking is on the decline, Nielsen argues for the growing importance of such a controversial issue. Exploring the diplomatic sensitivities which nations have towards issues of human rights, Josh Jorgenson studies

specifically the diplomatic and trade relationships between the United States, Canada and China. By analyzing the contrasting methods in which the two North American neighbors approach the Chinese State, Jorgenson sheds light not only on the differences in policy but also the international implications of those differences. Finally, Gauthami Soma’s “Bridging the Chasm” is a substantive examination of the discrepancies in healthcare infrastructures between developed and underdeveloped nations. Specifically targeting treatment of the HIV/AIDS virus, Soma argues that while medical knowledge of such diseases are advancing, the shortage of human resources for health within struggling regions are a large part of an intensely growing gap—a problem that must be dealt with by the global community. The views expressed by the authors of these articles are of course their own and the presentation of these pieces is certainly not aimed at persuading the reader to agree with any one opinion. In the same instance, this presentation by no means attempts to objectify the difficult issues of globalization or distance the reader from the significance of such challenges. Rather, it is the hope of the editorial board that the work presented within this journal can foster a new dialogue involving the future position of human rights on the global stage.

Andrew R. Celis Editor-in-Chief Northwestern Journal of International Affairs

Overlooking Transnationalism? The Challenges Faced by the French Republican Model By Ana-Maria Sinitean

I met Victor the summer of 2006 at the Romanian Baptist Church in Paris. Victor had been living in Paris for the past two years, having come as an 18 year old from Romanian Moldova to find work abroad. He quickly hooked into the larger Romanian network in Paris, he works for Romanians, lives with Romanians, and attends church events. Victor is also enrolled in a language school to learn French and attends classes after work. Just recently, he took an entrance exam to the Music Conservatory, and his results were in the highest range for those wishing to enroll, quite an impressive accomplishment. When I asked him if he planned to enroll, he answered, “No. I don’t have my legal papers, and it takes too long in France. I can’t enroll. I’m moving to Spain in a few months. I have some siblings there.” Despite Victor’s passion and talent for music, he decided to move to Spain where, according to him and the majority of Romanian migrants, citizenship and integration into society were easier to achieve than in France. Victor’s story exemplifies many of the characteristics pointed to in the growing literature on transnationalism: highly mobile, willing to move through nationally based networks across state borders, and looking for a socio-economic situation that best fits his desires and capacities. Rather than struggling with the difficulties of the French system of immigration and integration policy, he picks up and moves on. The last time I had spoken to Victor, he had safely arrived in Spain. This article will explore what a world of expanding transnational migration networks means to the question of integration. Do current immigration laws and integration policies overlook the growing trend of transnationalism? I will be focusing on France’s model of integration in relation to immigrants from within the European Union, particularly Romanians. With about 14% of Europe’s foreign population,1 France has a long history of being a migrant receiving country, especially due to its ties with former colonies. Much research 1

Salt, 17

Introduction

Do current immigration laws and integration policies overlook the growing trend of transnationalism?

has been previously done on the situation of African migration to France and the lack of immigrant integration. The recent riots shed some light on an inherent characteristic of France’s attitude towards immigrants and integration—a rejection of the threat posed by outsiders to the ideal conception of the French Republic and what it really means to be French. However, as more Eastern Europeans are joining the labor markets in Western Europe (64% of “foreigners” in the European Economic Arena are Europeans according to the Council of Europe2), a different dynamic between immigrants and the host society is being created. In the face of these diasporas, integration policies fail at taking into account these communities since it seems rather paradoxical to integrate a group that is defined by its mobility. However, while integration policies do not explicitly deal with transnational communities, these communities themselves serve as a form of integration into society. The problem of integration touches all aspects of the well-being of a nation since nations strive for unity and the harmonious functioning of all of its members. While debates about integration pose many unanswered questions, integration itself is a suggested solution to the integration specialist’s, Adrian Favell, inquiry, “How can a political system achieve stability and legitimacy by rebuilding communal bonds of civility and tolerance—a moral social order—across the conflicts and divisions caused by the plurality of values and individual interests?”3 The weighty issue of integration stands at the forefront of immigration policies and derives much attention because the consequences of ignoring this question can bring about alienation and discord. The importance of integration is directly linked to a healthy nation state in which all members of society participate in all processes—“Creating the city of the democratic age requires first and foremost achieving full participation of all citizens in the public debate and promoting integration through social well targeted policies.”4 In this article, I argue that the new phenomena of transnational migration networks poses a challenge to French theories of integration since France’s model of assimilation does not account for the maintenance of strong links to the country of origin, nor does the French Republic model take

2 Ibid, 21 3 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, 3 4 Auriat, Nadia and Rochet, Lubomira in Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship, preface x

into account the mobility of migrants when upholding the goal of integration as a nation-building process. The paradigm of French integration is outdated since transnationals have “tricked” the system by belonging to two places at once and partaking in both cultures simultaneously. This can either pose a threat to the ideal of the French citizen, or it can question the relevance of integrating transnational communities. Furthermore, I argue that transnational migration networks are themselves a model of integration. First I will present a working definition of what transnationalism is and how it is viewed today. I will bring together different perspectives on what it means to be transnational and how transnational communities differ in their economic, social, and political activities from what have formerly been characterized as immigrant communities. Transnationalism poses new questions for the concepts of integration since mobility must now be taken into account as migrants in these networks can be integrated into multiple societies at the same time. Furthermore, transmigrants may have different expectations regarding integration than those of the state, and the existence of transnational communities allows immigrants to integrate into society in a unique way. The assumption to be made is that transnational communities pose a challenge to integration policies in that they are a distinct form of immigration. The question then to ask is if transnational communities, beyond challenging established policies of integration, serve to influence ways of integration. This article argues that beyond challenging the French integration model, transnational migrant networks serve as a form of integration themselves. Secondly, I will present different models of integration that governments can adopt. These different views of integration will serve to identify the tensions between different outlooks on this issue. Difference of opinion range from the full acceptance of immigrants and their integration into society to the exclusion and isolation of foreigners. It is important to take into account the contextualization of models of integration since governments have adopted one or more of these theories throughout history depending on the political, social, and economic situation of the country. One common view is that integration is “full participation in political, economical, and social domains of society.”5 A general overview of theories of integration will allow me to present the distinction of the 5

Rogers and Tillie, 6

Transnationalism poses new questions for the concepts of integration since mobility must now be taken into account as migrants in these networks can be integrated into multiple societies at the same time.

While in the past citizenship has meant cultural identity with the nation, it is no longer the case that simply having a French passport makes one French nor does having citizenship imply integration into society.

Why Romanians?

republican model that France embraces in order to place it in the context of other existing philosophies. While in theory, “French society does not distinguish citizens on the basis of race, ethnic origin, or religion,”6 the French immigration policies do not necessarily bring this ideal into fruition. The question of ideology versus practice arises. While in the past citizenship has meant cultural identity with the nation, it is no longer the case that simply having a French passport makes one French nor does having citizenship imply integration into society. If bestowing citizenship upon a foreigner does no longer symbolize their integration into society, then other processes must be taken into account which would allow a foreigner to identify with the culture and norms of the country of his citizenship. The French solution to this citizenship and integration problem is assimilation, that once immigrants become citizens, they have already adopted the French culture. Integration allows them to become citizens, not the other way around. I choose to particularly focus on the Romanian transnational community in France because it is a particularly good example of transnational migration networks emerging all over Europe. The recent entry of Romania into the European Union allows for a different relationship between migrants from Romania and French society. Using Romanians as an example will also serve to bring about a new perspective of observing migrant minorities that have previously been focused on non-white, non-European migrants. Some may believe these commonalities will serve to foster integration. Because Romanians are white, Christian, European, have a common Latin language, and are now EU members, looking at this community allows me to examine the question of these networks, migration, and relationships between “home” and other countries in ways that are unburdened by the questions of integration regarding France’s more visible “others” (i.e. Africans and Muslims). Although there are many similarities between North African networks and Romanian networks, both being transnational, the whiteness and Europeanness of Romanians makes for much easier and more dense traffic of people, goods, and money between Romania and the rest of Europe. In effect, this influences the nature and purpose of transnational communities. 6

Moore, 124

Massive Romanian emigration began with the fall of Communism in 1989 and has continued to increase ever since. Dana Diminescu, a sociologist specializing in Romanian migration patterns, explains that between 1990 and 1994, Romanians were involved in ‘transfrontier’ migration, that is to say, migration to neighboring countries such as Turkey.7 The early 1990s witnessed Romanian ‘suitcase travel’ in which migrants would go to different countries such as Turkey, Poland, or Yugoslavia trading merchandise and reselling it.8 Between 1994-2000, labor migration began with the fall of the Iron Curtain. Many Romanian migrants applied for asylum in order to be allowed in a different country. As entering the labor markets became more difficult due to increased migration, most used their political asylum status to be able to legally work abroad.9 This ‘short-cut’ of migration decreased when countries were realizing that asylum seekers were there just to look for work and when, in 2002, the visa regulation was abolished in the Schengen area, a different pattern of Romanian migration began to emerge. Without need for a visa to travel within the Schengen area, thus including the countries receiving most Romanian migrants such as Germany, France, Spain, and Italy, migrants took advantage of this frenzy of circulation. Romanian labor migration increased by 70% between 2002 and 2003.10 With the increase of movement followed the increase of informal networks between these migrants. Looking particularly at Romanian migrants and their process of forming transnational networks should be reflective of the ease or difficulty of integration in the French context. I will present the characteristics of Romanians abroad and the activities they engage in so that I can situate the transnational community in its proper context throughout the entire article. I will use data from surveys and personal stories taken from my ethnographic research in Paris to serve as analysis and support for this paper. Finally, I will bring transnational processes into conversation with French integration policies. I wish to assess what is prioritized and what is overlooked by analyzing the logics of belonging presented in the discourse. I want to examine how French law puts into practice the republican model of the French citizen and what this means for the implementa7 8 9 10

Diminescu video “Notes on Migration and Delocalization” Diminescu video “Notes on Migration and Delocalization”

tion of the law itself. I will be examining the most recent law regarding immigration and integration passed in July 2006. I will conclude by presenting different views challenging the necessity of transnational integration. Models of Integration

Nation-state approaches to integration are essential for controlling migration flows as well as for maintaining a sense of national identity. There are three general strategies of responding to immigrant integration and participation as presented by Stephen Castle, a migration expert, and these are: differential exclusion, multiculturalism, and assimilation. While other strategies may exist that emphasize various degrees of these three, I choose to focus on Castleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s categorization since it presents a general picture of the extreme strategies as well as the middle ground.

Differential Exclusion

Differential exclusion, better known as isolationism, is a model in which migrants are only accepted for a short stay. There is a time limit on their welcome and no incentives exist in order to help them integrate into society. There is no encouragement for permanent settlement and most are simply seen as workers, not settlers. In this model, â&#x20AC;&#x153;immigrants are temporarily integrated into certain societal sub-systems such as labor markets and some aspects of the welfare system, but excluded from others such as political participation.â&#x20AC;?11 Countries which have adopted this strategy regarding immigration include Germany and Switzerland during the 19th century when large numbers of foreign workers crossed their borders. Most European nations, such as Austria and Sweden, also had a guest worker program after WWII to help them industrialize. Since the welcome of these guest workers is limited, the hostility they are faced with after a longer period of time leads to the creation of their own communities and networks of support. Inevitably, these communities are founded on a common language and culture which seems to clash with the other culture. This isolation is oftentimes a result of inequality and injustice on behalf of the host society. Fundamentalism and nationalism may arise as communities learn to revalorize their ethnic, national or racial identity as a reaction to discrimination. Some argue that transnational communities are partly a result of societal hostility, thus giving immigrants the opportunity of looking amongst themselves for networks. This view brings up a valuable point

Castles

about the causes of transnationalism and will be further looked at later in the article. The second model of dealing with immigration is multiculturalism, a newer paradigm developed later in the 1970s, but especially relevant to today’s era of globalization. Multiculturalism is somewhat of a middle ground between isolationism and assimilation. This strategy is very different from the other two in that “the assimilation and differential exclusion models share an important common principle: that immigrants should not bring about a significant social and cultural change in the receiving society.”12 Multiculturalism does away with the idea of a monoculture state and strives more towards a heterogeneous society rather than a homogenous one. Moments of migration are not only seen as temporary but as long term and permanent. As a result, immigrants need to be accepted and integrated into their new society. According to Castles, “Multiculturalism maintains the idea of a primary belonging to one society and a loyalty to just one nation state,”13 while sustaining that immigrants can still preserve their heritage and cultural identity without posing a threat. Examples of countries that have adopted a multiculturalism strategy are the United States and the United Kingdom.

Multiculturalism

Immigrants threaten ideals of a homogenous society. In order to prevent conflict between natives and foreigners, many nations have adopted a strategy of assimilation in which immigrants are absorbed into the new society. In such states, immigrants are encouraged to quickly learn the new language and to involve themselves in activities which would teach them the new culture, such as immediately enrolling their children in school. This strategy was very common to many European nations which needed labor migrants, while at the same time upholding values of a concrete national identity and culture. In this model, immigrants are welcome, but they eventually have to transform into the natives of the land, thus resulting in a complete break with the original culture and adopt a new national identity. Assimilation is backed and supported by the government, and it is the nation on the federal level which encourages this policy. It is assumed that immigrants are welcomed into society and that they adopt a new national

Assimilation

12 13

Castles Ibid

identity through immersion. Alongside this model of assimilation exists the possibility of losing the native language, loss of culture, and loss of identity since the underlying belief (and goal) of assimilation is that in the future, immigrants’ descendants will be indistinguishable from the native population.14 It is this trade-off between adopting the new culture and losing the old that defines assimilation. France is a primary example of past and present enforcement of assimilation. What is formally known as the French Republican model of integration, a model based on equality so there is no distinction of origin, is in fact the assimilation of immigrants in order for them to become ‘real French citizens.’ France adopted an “assimilatory nationbuilding process in solving the problem of integration.”15 By emphasizing the importance of belonging to the nation as a whole and identifying with French culture, the French hoped to achieve economic, social, and political integration of immigrants which would result in unity among all of society. Of course, this integration would be reflected through French citizenship after a process of demonstrating a will to integration. The growing belief that “citizenship should be based on a loyalty to French territory, culture, and history, and impose a strong cultural assimilation as a condition of political incorporation: ‘etre francais, cela se merite’ (to be French, you have to deserve it),”16 was crucial to French politics in the 1980s since it allowed for immigration reform, making it more difficult to acquire citizenship. According to the French model, integration must first start on the cultural and social level before one can be fully integrated into society by also having political rights. Some indicators of integration provided by the Haut Conseil à L’intégration include a change of status, professional promotion, access to jobs, improved living conditions, mixed marriages, geographic mobility, and involvement in public life.17 This also shows the mentality that one must do something to be French. It is not simply a naturally given thing, but the concept of ‘Frenchness’ implies certain behaviors, values, and morals. The emphasis on deserving to be French is directly tied to how the nation states goes about to foster integration into French society. The French universalist model of belonging upholds

14 15 16 17

Castles Favell, Philosophies of Integration, 45 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, 54 Haut Conseil a L’Intégration, 38

that immigrants are integrated by teaching them virtues of the Republic. Thus, one achieves citizenship by firstly adhering to a certain moral code of integration through education “ The republican philosophy of citoyenneté (citizenship) is a political theory of integration that goes well beyond the determining of boundaries and membership, and goes to the heart of theorizing moral and social order and political transformation of individuals into constitutive elements of the democratic nation–state.”18 It is not enough that an immigrant has French nationality simply through legal paper and citizenship, but the immigrant must first adopt all the other values of society in order to receive that citizenship as a final characteristic of his identity. The French integration model is not simply a legal question, but a cultural and social question. Furthermore, the French philosophy of integration emphasizes the immigrant’s will to belong and integrate.19 By choosing to integrate, the immigrant chooses to belong and this is the first step in the process towards being French. One must identify with the group as a whole, thus a precondition for integration is a willingness to integrate. Much importance is put on the agency of the immigrant as will later be examined with the current immigration policy in France. “The autonomy to choose and become one’s (French) nationality is thus the first precondition to the possibility of integration, since it is only through this act of individual volonté that the moral requirements of political and social integration can become possible.”20 Thus, in order to deserve “being French,” you must demonstrate that you want to be French because receiving citizenship means there are certain expectations of behavior that accompany this new identity. The growing popularity of the concept of transnationalism in the social sciences has caused much ambiguity in immigration discourse due to inadequate definitions as well as to its overuse. What is transnationalism and who exactly can be a transnational? Is this a new phenomenon or simply a re-labeling of pre-existing patterns of migration? Furthermore, are all immigrants transnationals, and if not, what sets transnationals apart? These are the kinds of questions that are now being asked when discussing new developments in 18 19 20

Favell, Philosophies of Integration 62 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, 64 Ibid, 69

It is not enough that an immigrant has French nationality simply through legal paper and citizenship, but the immigrant must first adopt all the other values of society in order to receive that citizenship as a final characteristic of his identity.

Transnationalism

immigration studies. Not only is transnationalism growing in popularity, but it is also become more visible as the intensity of migration and technology is increasing. While the intent of this article is not to provide another definition of transnationalism, I do present a summary of existing definitions on transnationalism and what experts regard as characteristics of this process. I intend to establish a general understanding of what I will be referring to as transnationalism in order to have a framework for analysis. The following viewpoints are used to explain why transnationalism has emerged as a special topic of analysis and what is considered new about this phenomenon. Characterizing Transnationalism

The term “transnational” took root only recently in the era of globalization, first being popularized in the late 1970s by companies who wanted to expand on the international level.21 What is currently referred to as ‘transnationalism from above’ refers to this cross-border movement of transnational corporations and government organizations, such as McDonalds or the United Nations.22 While it can be argued that transnationalism has its roots in capitalism and a desire for profit by expanding corporations, the term now reflects the movement of people, goods, and capital. With the increased interdependence between countries, technological advances to facilitate travel, and the asymmetry of national labor forces, social scientists began referring to the phenomena of transnationalism. While immigration is by far nothing new to the global community, the accelerated speed and larger scale of movement is a distinguishing factor when speaking about transnationalism. These past decades have witnessed a significant increase in the flux of people moving from one place to another, more particularly, from one country to another due to these technological advances and economic opportunities. Although huge labor migrations existed during the 20th century and many sought asylum during wars as well as post-war migration, transnationalism today has the added element of a voluntary choice to migrate. Terms such as ‘mobility,’ ‘fluidity,’ and ‘flexibility,’ have become the adjectives which characterize transnationalism. “A degree of mobility, strong social and cultural roots, strong cross-border exchange, and sometimes even political participation in more than one society characterize this new 21 Ong, 21 22 Portes, The Debates and Significance of Transnational Immigration, 185

type of immigrant.”23 This back and forth movement made possible by rapid transportation and technological progress has created a migrant who, “although working in a foreign country, has access to sources of information from the home society, related social networks, and the continued possibility of commuting between the two national worlds.”24 The ties and interactions of transnational communities link people and institutions across increasingly eroding national boundaries. Transnational communities are based in two or more countries and engage in constant exchange, travel, and transactions over prolonged periods of time. Data collected this summer from Romanian migrants in France show that out of those who responded, 48% said they went back to Romania once or twice a year. 12 % stated they went back three to four times a year. A rather large percentage of those surveyed, 36% claimed they rarely went back. We can assume that this last group is not characteristic of a transnational migrant but more as an immigrant not really maintaining connections and trans-border mobility. This data also goes to show that not all migrants are transnationals, but that activities that are considered transnational are not practiced by all. They consist of two different languages, societies, and cultures since there exists networks of social relations with the homeland as well as with the new country. Furthermore, it is important to note that transnationality is not simply the movement of people and communities across nations, but also the movement of capital and institutions. A distinguishing factor of transnationality, both the term itself and what the term implies, is that there is a questioning of directionality. While immigration implies directionality both in and out of a particular country, transnationality challenges the certainty of that directionality and implies more of a flow rather than a specific direction. In the past, and certainly still relevant to the present, immigration consisted of leaving the homeland and starting anew elsewhere. It involved a process of exiting and entering. What is rather new about transnationality is this lack of directionality. Yes, one migrates elsewhere but there is no definite exit and entry, but rather a continuous flow. Being a transmigrant consists in belonging to two places at once. “The empowering paradox of diaspora (or for this paper, transnationalism) is that dwelling here assumes 23 24

Schmidtke, 6 Ibid, 8

Transnationality is not simply the movement of people and communities across nations, but also the movement of capital and institutions.

a solidarity and connection there. But there is not necessarily a single place or an exclusivist nation. It is the connection (elsewhere) that makes the difference (here).”25 Examining the terms in this distinct way helps to understand the implications of the process that these terms describe. Transnationals are often referred to as “having two homelands.”26 Thus, not every immigrant is considered a transnational; involvement in transnational processes is still rather limited although sociologists believe it will expand in the future with continued globalization. Previous studies done on transnational communities found that not all immigrants took part in activities that are considered transnational, such as participation in hometown civic associations, or took part in them infrequently.27 In order to be considered a transmigrant, one must have transnational activities as a central part of life. A transnational is one who, through the processes of daily activity, “forges and sustains multi-stranded social, economic, and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields that cross national borders.”28 There exists something in the daily existence of a transnational migrant that continually links him/her to their country of origin while at the same time creating a separate community with other immigrants who are part of this linkage across space. The next question to ask is: why would an immigrant choose to become a transnational? If there is in fact this continued link among migrants and their home country, what are the reasons for maintaining this connection? A possible answer is fairly simple and direct: “At the grass-roots level, economic transnationalism offers an alternative to some immigrants and their home country counterparts against low-wage dead-end jobs; political transnationalism gives them a voice that they otherwise would not have; and cultural transnationalism allows them to reaffirm their own self-worth and transmit valued traditions to their young.”29 This suggests transnationalism as a means of adaptation for the immigrant and a unique model of integration. This article will further

25 Referenced in Vertovec, 450 26 Povrzanovic, 8 27 Portes, “The debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism,”182 28 Quoted in Portes,“ The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism,” 182 29 Portes, “ Towards a New World-The Origins and Effects of Transnational Activities,” 469

support this idea and argue that those who choose to partake in transnational processes are indeed choosing an alternative way of dealing with integration. An important and distinguishing factor of transnationalism is also its dependence on human agency.30 It is not the government or other institutions which form and sustain these communities, but migrants themselves. This is now know as ‘transnationalism from below.’31 Because these processes are created by non-institutional actors, “the key aspect of transnational activities is that they represent goaloriented initiatives that require coordination across national borders by members of civil society.”32 The creation of these informal networks is fueled by migrants helping each other out in a new environment. Be it providing a place to live in, a place of work, or traveling together back to their country of origin, these migrants are a support group which creates a middle ground between two or more nation states. Since transnational communities are not attached to one specific territory, the network created by transnational communities provides stability and somewhat of a consistency in the state of flux that transnationals find themselves in. Dana Diminescu, a sociologist on Romanian migration, describes these Romanian patterns as “European integration from below,”33 thus meaning that their integration is not institutionalized but rather fostered by friends. She explains that “where the state says no, society and individuals say yes.”34 Sociological studies on the patterns of Romanian migration, often focusing on the gypsy population, show that in France they start off selling things on the street, such as newspapers, and little by little they get to know other people, including French people, which ends up with the formation of friendships and some kind of integration into society. Given the large percentage of Romanians who are abroad or who periodically migrate, the existence of these networks is unquestionable and important for analysis when regarding transnationalism. Data collected from surveys of Romanians in Paris show wide range of reasons for migration to France. Out of those who responded to the questionnaire of why they came 30 31 32 ism,” 186 33 34

It is not the government or other institutions which form and sustain these communities, but migrants themselves.

Castles Smith, Michael Peter and Guarnizo, Luis E Portes, “ Debates and Significance of Immigrant TransnationalDiminescu, video Diminescu, video

The process of transnationalism uses the economic, political, and sociocultural stage in order to allow for the migrant’s mobility across borders.

Economic Activity of Transnationals

to Paris, 23% gave work as a specific reason, 15% simply said for a better life and better opportunities for their children, 18% said for family reunification including marriage with a French citizen, 17% gave school as reason for migration, and a very small percentage listed political reasons under the Communist regime. This data shows that although there is much variation to the reasons for migration, the greatest percentage of those who I questioned were in France for economic reasons and family reunification. The image of this new migrant who is not bound by nation state borders but is constantly “moving” between the motherland and the host land can be especially descriptive of labor migrants. Labor migrants create economic transnational communities and oftentimes work with each other and for each other. Migrants that had arrived earlier facilitate the job search for newcomers and are able to provide a network of connections. The importance of having a network upon arrival is crucial for many of the migrants, especially those arriving in search of work. The ease of accommodation into the new society is oftentimes dependent on these informal networks. Many transnationals are involved in the informal economy due to lack of a legal work permit. Working for each other and setting up their own businesses provides jobs for those who have migrated illegally. It is in the practices or activities that being transnational gain force and real definition. The process of transnationalism uses the economic, political, and sociocultural stage in order to allow for the migrant’s mobility across borders. There is an economic support system created by transnational communities. Oftentimes, this tie to the homeland is maintained by sending wages back to the remaining family, especially if the purpose for migrating were economic reasons. Almost 80% of Romanian migrants abroad send money back home.35 In 2003, remittances sent to Romania from abroad made up 20%-30% of the nation’s GDP.36 A clear example of an economic activity of transnationals is enterprises that are set up by immigrants to facilitate the export/import of goods and capital from their country to their home country. Oftentimes these enterprises take the form of immigrants themselves. It is common for someone visiting Romania to be loaded with 35 36

Ferro, 387 “Notes on Migration and Delocalization”

packages from others in order to deliver them back home. At the Romanian church in Paris, it is a custom to either present yourself with a greeting from abroad if you are a visitor, or more importantly, to say your farewells from the congregation if you are leaving to Romania anytime soon. This allows for others to entrust you with money or gifts for their family and friends back home. A more formal system of this economic activity also includes bank transfers through Western Union. When considering the economic activity of immigrants, it is also important to note that there are two different kinds of groups migrating: highly skilled individuals and low skilled laborers. Globalization has generally allowed for the migration of low skilled labor while high skilled labor and business entrepreneurs have often been referred to as cosmopolitans trotting the globe. However, both low and high skilled migrants are incorporated into transnational communities which link them back to their country of origin. Some believe that â&#x20AC;&#x153;immigrant communities with greater economic resources and human capital (education and professional skills) should register higher levels of transnationalism because of their superior access to the infrastructure that makes these activities possible.â&#x20AC;?37 The picture of a highly skilled transnational is one of a business entrepreneur who uses his transnational links to maximize profit. While these high skilled laborers do form transnational links and networks, the picture of transnational communities that I present and analyze is not one of businessmen. While entrepreneurs government officials could be, and are in fact, included in transnational communities, the focus of this article rests on the formation of networks for lower-skilled labor and immigrants which form these networks not only for economic reasons but also for social and religious reasons This brief distinction between low skilled and high skilled labor is important when looking at transnationalism and observing that even within these communities, there are different levels of migrants and different scopes to their activities. However, this is not to isolate higher class transnationals from lower class transnationals, but simply to show that there are different degrees of transnationalism and different activities that members of a transnational community partake in depending on their skills. This in turn, raises the question of what effect high-skilled versus low-skilled transnationals have on their 37 Portes et al. â&#x20AC;&#x153;The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an emergent field.â&#x20AC;? p. 224

process of integration. Political Activity of Transnationals

It is similarly important to look at political activity of trans-nationals to see how they are characteristic of these communities. One of the survey questions for Romanian migrants in Paris was “Do you still vote in elections in Romania?” Out of the 35 people that answered the question, 16 respondents said yes. This is about 46% of the sample. Although it was a random sample which did not account for French citizens, migrant laborers, or long-stay migrants, it does support the claim these migrants are still maintaining connections with their motherland and are still participatory members in often unconventional ways- unconventional in the sense that these migrants are participating in quotidian activities done by nationals in their country of origin but they are doing these same activities in another country. It is also interesting to see how many of those who still vote in elections in Romania also vote in French elections. From the surveys, only two respondents vote both in French and Romanian elections. The majority that still vote in Romanian elections do not vote in French elections, even some that have French citizenship. This result can be accounted for by the fact that those who do not vote in French elections do not have French citizenship to partake in this political right, but they still have the right to vote in Romania. Furthermore, sending countries are benefiting from immigrants abroad “not only as sources of remittances, investments, and political contributions, but also as potential ‘ambassadors’ or lobbyists in defense of national interests abroad.”38 According to previous studies, there are three types of transnational claims making in the political arena which link them to their country of origin.39 Transnationals can participate in transplanted homeland politics in which they would provide financial support to friends and relatives back home for protesting against a regime. A second kind of political participation is when transnationals in their country of settlement become activists regarding a homeland issue. Their goal and ultimate political purpose is directed towards their homeland. The last type of political activism is when transnationals lobby and intervene on behalf of their homeland government to 38 Referenced in Portes, “ The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism,” 190 39 Koopmans et al, 126-128

officials in their country of settlement. This type is seen as the transnational as an ambassador for homeland interests. Another means of characterizing transnationals is by observing their socio-cultural activities. One such way of maintaining a link to the country of origin is through use of the internet. Migrants are always using the internet to communicate with family back home as well as to find networks of other migrants through chatrooms or online discussions.40 This interconnectivity between people and places allows transnationalism to be a process in which back and forth movements create a diaspora of migrants sharing a common background while creating a new community that transcends national borders. Besides communication, the internet can also be seen as a means for cultural reproduction, especially amongst younger immigrants.41 For example, there are many Romanian transmigrants which log onto the internet to listen to sermons from their old preachers in Romania. Many of the church services are now uploaded on the internet and it is not unusual for families to listen to speakers from conventions and other religious events. Alejandro Portes, a leading scholar in the field of transnational communities, gives a few examples of socio-cultural activities that characterize transnational communities such as charity organizations helping children in the country of origin or performing groups in immigrant communities which partake in hometown festivals. Both of these activities characterize the Romanian transnational community abroad. There are multiple organizations started by Romanian immigrants that raise money for orphans and poverty alleviation measures in Romania. It is very common for the children of Romanian immigrants to spend their summers at an orphanage camp in Romania or to participate in different short term trips with the scope of helping those in need. One of the youths I met in Paris had just spent the summer in Romania at camp with other young people. Along the same lines, there is money being sent back to Romania not as just remittances but as donations to building social institutions such as a school, a church, or a camp. These are specific activities purposely designed around maintaining links. Transnational Romanians are more open to support a 40 41

Ferro, 388 Vertovec, 452

Socio-Cultural Activities of Transnationals

This interconnectivity between people and places allows transnationalism to be a process in which back and forth movements create a diaspora of migrants sharing a common background while creating a new community that transcends national borders.

charity or ministry that is directed to their homeland than to another one in a different country. This demonstrates their attachment and sense of responsibility towards their motherland. It is not unusual for Romanians to visit immigrant communities abroad and ask for money regarding a new project relating to national development. It is especially common for different choirs or instrumental groups to visit a Romanian community abroad and sell their cds as fundraising for some project. Hosting cultural events such as â&#x20AC;&#x153;Taste of Romaniaâ&#x20AC;? or concerts with Romanian Christmas carols are also activities which reflect the immigrantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; link to their country of origin and their desire to maintain that network with others. These activities and behaviors characterizing transnational communities are composed of multiple relationships. It is not only on the level of immigrants abroad with those back home, but also immigrants abroad with each other, and immigrants abroad with those of their current society. This interesting interplay between characters and societies is at the heart of transnationalism. Transnational communities seek to maintain their homeland heritage and language.42 The Institut Culturel Roumain is a socio-cultural vehicle through which the transnational Romanians in Paris maintain links to their culture and become part of a larger network of Romanian immigrants in France. I became quite acquainted with the Institut Culturel Roumain, which is conveniently situated next to the Romanian Consulate and Embassy in Paris. The mission of the Institute is to educate French society about Romanian culture, but it also serves as a meeting place for Romanians themselves. The Institute offers Romanian language and culture classes for anyone interested. When I visited for the first time, there were posters promoting a new film called Cum am Petrecut Sfarsitul Lumii (How I spent the End of the World), a Romanian movie about the fall of Communism. The Institute also has a library filled with books in Romanian as well as in French ranging from history to literature to art. A main objective of the Institute is to organize events which would bring Romanians in Paris together as well as to attract French citizens to join in these events. I had the opportunity of partaking in two events organized by the Institute and had the pleasure of getting another perspective on the Romanian transnational community in Paris.

Castles

One of the events was a conference presented by a famous Romanian author who was an active intellectual during the Communist Regime. She came to present her project of the transformation of a former prison in Romania to a modern-day museum serving as a memorial to all the intellectuals who were imprisoned and suffered while speaking out against the regime. The audience at the conference was split about fifty-fifty, half Romanian immigrants, half French citizens. Those that were Romanian were educated and part of a more intellectual community of Romanians in Paris. I spoke to a man who was a journalist in Paris as well as to the director of the Institut. The other people I talked to at the event were either Romanian students studying in Paris or more established Romanians which had been in Paris for a longer time. The second event sponsored by the Institute was an improv jazz concert and art exhibit with a Romanian pianist and a Romanian artist. Yet again, the people that did come to this event were more educated, intellectuals interested in praising art and enjoying good jazz music. It seemed like most of the Romanians present there, besides the handful of the students that were studying abroad, were established into the French society. The Institut Culturel Roumain is however a bit different from the previously mentioned socio-cultural activities of transnationals. Whereas donating to charities and participating in summer camps in Romania allows the immigrant to maintain direct links with their origin, the Institut allows for Romanian immigrants to experience their origin in a French context. Many of the events at the Institut are conducted in the French language and part of the goal is to attract French people in order to promote collaboration and encourage learning. One can go as far as to say that activities sponsored by the Institut present Romania in a “Frenchified” way, and allows both the Romanian immigrants and the French to experience Romania in this particular way. While the cultural institute does provide a place for commonality among transnationals, it does so in a way that presents their culture through French lenses. On the other hand, the fact that these transnationals experience their origin in this French context and through a “Frenchified” way, it also allows them in turn to experience French culture in a “Romanianized” way through these activities of transnationalism. It did not take too long for me to realize a stratification

of the Romanian transnational community. I spent my days at the Consulate passing out surveys and interviewing people waiting in line outside the building. Most of those I spoke to were not legal, or had married a French person, or were students, or were just trying to get their legal papers in order so they can get a visa to visit Romania. The people I talked to on the streets were a much different crowd from the people I talked to at the events sponsored by the Institut. Just as in a society where there are different classes and strata, the same is experienced within these transnational communities. This observation of the fact that my surveys and interviews convey two different groups within this transnational community links to the distinction between low skilled and high skilled labor that are both present in fostering the growth of transnationalism. The Importance of Transnationalism

Immigrant transnationalism is thus a result of the causal relationship between globalization and immigration.

Understanding transnationalism carries major consequences into the future since transnationalism will only continue to grow and expand. These same questions addressed in this article will still be asked as further expansion of these communities is expected. Alejandro Portes, gives three reasons for the importance of giving this phenomena attention. These reasons are: expected growth in the future, that knowledge of transnational communities can change the way we think about immigrant integration, and the possible consequences transnationalism has on the development of the migrant sending countries.43 Portes states, “Immigrant transnationalism is not driven by ideological reasons but by the very logic of global capitalism.”44 He describes this process of expansion as almost inevitable given the continued spread of capitalism and globalization. Immigrant transnationalism is thus a result of the causal relationship between globalization and immigration, not something forced upon by governments or other pressures; it stems from within global capitalism as opposed to an outside force. Given this statement, it is implied that transnationalism is almost inevitable as long as globalization will continue to take place. Transnationalism and globalization seem to go hand in hand, and both are on a course of expansion. The second reason given by Portes is most significant to 43 Portes, “The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism.” 44 Portes, “The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism,” 187

the purpose of this article. The significance of transnationalism in understanding immigrant integration is very important and influential to policy changes. Portes suggests that transnationalism can have an affect and change the process of integration experienced by immigrants and in doing so, offers “a viable alternative to bypass both labor market constraints and nativist prejudice.”45 A transnational could bypass labor market constraints given the economic opportunities he finds in the transnational community. As previously mentioned, newcomers are helped by other transmigrants when it comes to finding jobs or working for each other. Furthermore, since some transmigrants do not have a legal work permit, they participate in the black market, oftentimes by working within the transnational community. The second part of the statement presents transnationalism as an alternative in that migrants bypass nativist prejudice since they find a social and cultural support group in the transnational community. Even though one might experience prejudice and rejection from the receiving society, transnational communities are a support system that helps immigrants move beyond the early troubles of adjustment. This hints to the previously mentioned idea that participating in transnational processes and being part of a transnational community is a unique way of integrating into society while maintaining links to one’s place of origin. Transnationalism as an alternative method of integration is seen as offering a middle ground between assimilation and isolation. I further analyze and incorporate this idea in the next section, but it is important to note that transnationalism can be seen as a means to some level of integration. The third significance of transnationalism mentioned by Portes, although not as relevant for this article but important to mention either way, is the developmental affect on the sending countries. As previously mentioned regarding remittances and political participation, transnationals are influential in their native countries. “For sending country governments, their migrants have become increasingly important, not only as sources of remittances, investments, and political contributions, but also as potential ‘ambassadors’ or lobbyists in defense of national interests abroad.”46 The importance of this transnational link helps foster economic growth and political solidarity for the sending country. 45 Ibid, 188 46 Referenced in Portes, “The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism,” 190

Transnationalism as an alternative method of integration is seen as offering a middle ground between assimilation and isolation.

A brief yet worthwhile thing to note before moving on is the question of who assigns these immigrants the label of transnationals. Is the government aware of these transnational activities and characterizes certain immigrants as belonging to transnational communities? If it is not the state referring to certain immigrants as transnationals, are these immigrants themselves aware that they are partaking in what sociologists call transnational processes? Do they refer to themselves as transmigrants? It is very easy to overlook the directionality of who labels who a transmigrant, but it is important to address. If it is not the government that differentiates transmigrants from general immigrants, then there will also be no distinguishing of this phenomenon in their policies regarding immigration. In the case of this article, I present that the French government does not refer to these migrants as transmigrants nor do policies single out this group of people. Furthermore, while the government is aware that transnational processes are taking place, given their acceptance of cultural diversity, this recognition does not become politicized in as far as shaping integration policies specifically for this group of people. Analysis of Current Situation

While a general theory of integration is always helpful in understanding the overall context, the basis of analysis is the practice of the theory. Knowing that the French system promotes assimilation of immigrants as means to integration into society, how is that played out in policy and what does that look like in everyday life? I will be examining the new French immigration law adopted on July 25, 2006, Loi Relative à L’immigration et à L’integration, which is to take effect this year. The new law has four main components dealing with controlling immigration flows including, the recruitment of skilled workers, the facilitation of foreign students’ stay, and tightening the rules of family reunification.47 I will focus on the last component of this law, the limitation of access to residence and citizenship which deals mainly with immigrant integration.

The Role of the Individual

The new immigration and integration policy of France is reflective of its preference towards permanent installation of foreigners.48 Measures are taken to ensure that a residence in France accompanied by state-led integration process will

47 48

Murphy Zappi

result in permanent residence and eventual French citizenship. Article 4 of the new law requires all foreigners entering the country for the first time and wishing to remain must sign a welcome and integration contract upon arrival.49 By signing this contract, immigrants demonstrate a partnership with the state regarding integration into French society. This “welcome policy” offers foreigners free French language classes and courses on French institutions and republican values, such as equality between men and women and laïcité (secularism).50 France presumes the responsibility of the state to engage immigrants in learning the language, in their civic formation, and in learning about the French way of life. This is seen as the first stage of integration. Upon completion of these language and civic courses, the foreigner is issued a 10 year residence permit under the condition that he/she satisfies 3 integration conditions: “To commit personally to abide by principles governing the French Republic, to demonstrate that they are indeed complying with them, and to have adequate knowledge of the French language.”51 Once promising to integrate and demonstrating that they have integrated into society, a foreigner is issued a long-term residence permit which eventually would allow for naturalization. Only after integration has taken place can a foreigner hope to further establish themselves in society. Learning French is a priority of the integration policy. Government funds are allocated to provide French classes for immigrants who signed the welcome and integration contract. Adequate knowledge of French is seen as necessary for integration since it directly affects every aspect of life such as education, employment, and housing. The second aspect of the contract deals with learning “values of French society.”52 This is directly tied to the Republican model of assimilation since the goal of integration is to make the immigrant a French citizen which stands for the values of French culture. “Easy access to French citizenship has created increasing numbers of faux francais (fake French) who are French by nationality but not by culture.”53 The aim of this new law and particularly this emphasis on integration is to prevent these faux francais who are only French by nationality. 49 50 51 52 53

Assemblée Nationale Ibid Embassy of France Zappi Koopmans et al., 14

This is the first time that a French law ever explicitly states the integration responsibilities on behalf of the immigrants54 as well as sheds some light on what is meant by integration. The Haut Conseil a L’intégration, the national body responsible for promoting and assessing the state of integration in France, describes integration as, “un parcours individual dans un processus collectif”55 (An individual route in a collective process). Integration is primarily seen as a result of the individual’s life choices with the support of the state. Naturalization as a result of societal assimilation can be impeded if applicants “live at the margins of society” or if they practice polygamy.56 The Role of the State

While the first step of integration is a willingness on behalf of the immigrant, the French government has five pillars that they adhere to in order to provide the support needed for integration. The Haut Conseil a L’intégration lists government responsibilities regarding integration as reception politics, compensation of inequality, the fight against discrimination, politics of participation, and the access to full citizenship.57 The reception politics refers to the welcome contract signed by the immigrant and the civic and linguistic development sponsored by the state. The compensation of inequalities refers to the opportunity for less-privileged immigrants to access professional instruction and qualification training. The politics of compensating inequalities deals with the economic and educational level of the immigrant and reflects the state’s attempt to provide social mobility to lessen the inequality gap. Fighting discrimination on the national level is the only pillar which takes into account the origin of the individual. As previously mentioned, France does not register ethnicity and race, yet in claims of discrimination, the state must interfere and take these into account. The promotion of the participation politics refers to immigrant activity in the school system, social organizations, and cultural centers. Encouragement by the state in this kind of participation is intended to make the immigrant an active member of society. The last pillar of integration is access to French nationality which constitutes the immigrants exercise of democratic participation. One measure of integration consists of examining the immigrant’s participa54 55 56 57

Murphy Haut Conseil a L’integration, 38 Koopmans et al. 52 Haut Conseil a L’integration

tion in the democratic process, thus seeing if the immigrant is registered to vote and if they have voted in elections.58 This participation based on citizenship is used as an indicator for measuring the extent of integration. While the Haute Conseil a L’intégration emphasizes the importance of the partnership between the immigrant, the government, and the rest of society, it is difficult to measure integration. According to French policy, the immigrant must demonstrate their integration into society in order to be eligible to gain citizenship and to become French in the full meaning of the word. The Haute Conseil à L’intégration’s responsibility with assessing integration has resulted in what they refer to as an “integration barometer.”59 Examining the following criteria would serve as indicators for measuring the extent of integration: civil status, socio-economic situation (employment, housing), level of education and qualification, participation in democratic processes, adoption of republican principles, cultural aspects such as language, religion, the use of new technologies, and the openness to new cultures, and finally, questions regarding belonging (the importance of origin in defining self-identity). While the Conseil does not make the statement that integration can be fully measured, it does claim that integration is a result of multiple factors and it is a process started by signing the welcoming contract, following its conditions, respecting laws, principles, and values of the Republic, and all of the above leading to the event of naturalization. In the Conseil’s report on indicators of integration, it is explained that, “L’integration ne se résume pas à une simple insertion socioprofessionnelle ni à l’obtention d’un titre juridique, ni à la présence d’une certain durée sur un territoire. Elle participe de tout cela et, plus encore, d’un ensemble complexe d’interactions et de références qui ne valent que par leur combination”60 (Integration is not summarized by a simple belonging to a socio-professional level, nor by receiving a legal title, nor by the having spent a certain number of years on the territory. Integration is a participation of all that, and more, it is a complex ensemble of interactions and references which are not worth anything but through their combination).

58 59 60

Ibid., 40 Haut Conseil a L’integration, 39-40 Ibid

How to Measure Integration

Transnationals and Integration

Having briefly presented the newest policies and what French government upholds of immigrants in order to assimilate into society, it is time to bring transnationals into the process. This poses a unique case for the analysis of integration policies because â&#x20AC;&#x153;transnational migrants do not leave their origins and pasts behind, they take them with them; and by maintaining their networks, they begin to act as conduits between the two or more nations where they have connections.â&#x20AC;?61 There is something about transnational migrants which challenges nation state policies of immigration and integration because of different expectations of the state and their unique mobility and state of flux. To add transnationals into the process of French integration presents somewhat of a paradox: transnationals can be and oftentimes are integrated into French society (through language and values) while at the same time still strongly rooted into their culture, society, and values of origin. While to the French government they can be viewed as integrated and assimilated based on the requirements of the law, they are partaking in a network that is not even acknowledged or address in integration policy. For example, I met a Romanian woman this summer that has been in Paris for the past 16 years. She explained to me that she came to Paris with her husband, but both of her daughters were born in France and are enrolled in French schools. She oftentimes visits her neighbors and has coffee with her French friends. Her husband works for and with French people and by all means, they consider themselves well-integrated and accepted into French society. This is what the government sees as well, and using the new integration policy as a standard of measurement, they demonstrate immigrants which have succeeded at the goal of assimilation. However, I also met a woman at the Romanian Baptist Church in Paris. She weekly partakes at services, and her daughters are involved in various activities there and are bilingual in Romanian and French. She had recently visited Romania and maintains ties with her family and friends there. She keeps her Romanian culture and heritage a central part of her life and donates money to various missions and charity projects in Romania. While this woman and her family are perfect examples of immigrants integrated into French society, they are also a perfect example of many that are part of a larger transnational community. This particular example is reflective of transnationals which, on the surface, the French state 61

Koopmans et al. 109

can claim to be integrated into society, but on a different level are in fact part of two societies and maintain two identities. This transcends beyond the question of cultural diversity, a notion which France does recognize. This phenomena touches on a deeper level the ideology of integration and what it means to be assimilated into a French citizen. The woman’s second identity as a transnational challenges conceptions of immigrant integration that are limited in addressing how to deal with transnationals in the French Republican model. Given the uniqueness of the French integration model and its immigration policies, transnationalism is not addressed in policies nor as legislation since France uses status identities when categorizing foreigners. “Status identities based on the receiving state’ policy categories are most frequent in France, where policies and public discourse are constructed around the individualized category of immigré and particularistic collective identities are regarded with suspicion within the context of the universalist republican conception of the nation.”62 In France, laws, policies, and rights are crafted based on status identities such as illegal, legal, student, or worker, and not on nationality or race. A Romanian is not seen as a Romanian with the potential to be a transnational migrant but simply as an immigrant. Using this system, the government does not leave room for the questioning of a legal or illegal migrant being a transnational when it comes to formulating policies of integration as well as taking transnationals into account when measuring the extent of integration. Furthermore, the French model of integration paves the way for immigrants to receive citizenship. Citizenship is more closely tied in with political rights, thus receiving French citizenship gives the immigrant political rights that were not available to him, or highly restrictive, as a non-citizen resident. However, according to the French model, citizenship is an end result of a process of assimilation where the immigrant has already integrated into society. Members of transnational communities may not even wish to have French citizenship, thus there is no need for gaining political rights and no incentive to demonstrate social and cultural assimilation. This further questions what the French government should do in the case of immigrants not wishing to receive citizenship, not fully integrating into society, but living in France and maintaining links to their country of origin. The French immigration policies 62

Koopmans et al. 117

Members of transnational communities may not even wish to have French citizenship, thus there is no need for gaining political rights and no incentive to demonstrate social and cultural assimilation. 37

do not take into account those who opt out of participating in the formal integration system. Oftentimes, these are the same people that partake in transnational communities. All this goes to say that the French system of integration awards the migrant with legal citizenship which comes with certain political rights. However, a non-citizen resident is still entitled to social rights and protection regardless of their citizenship and desire of integration. French policies of immigration provides protection for newcomers either way, such as anti-discrimination laws, policies on public housing, policies and laws on tolerating cultural practices, or funding for cultural organizations.63 The transmigrant fits into the category of an immigrant which has certain basic rights regardless of their intent of integration. In this case, citizenship is used as political exclusion and not necessarily as social exclusion. The French model uses citizenship as an incentive to receive certain benefits when in fact the model aims at the assimilation and transformation of immigrants into French citizens. How does France react to migrant groups that do not seek integration nor citizenship? This is often the case for many transnationals in Paris. It seems as though these transnational groups are ignored when dealing with immigration and integration policies. France’s neglect of transnationals in models of integration can be simply explained by their lack of time or space to incorporate them into policies. “Since integration is premised on full citizenship, there is simply no space in the official theory for these cases.”64 The state may not consider transnationals as relevant since they are a rather small percentage of the immigrant population. Furthermore, transnationals do not pose a threat to the country itself or to society or to their place of work. They pose a threat to the theory of French citizenship and to expected patterns of adaptation. The French government lacks a detailed process of how to deal with transnationals since in the long-run they encourage full assimilation and integration to the level of citizenship. Transnational communities challenge this model since some may benefit from social and cultural protection without the intention of gaining political rights as long as they can maintain their trans-border networks. In this case, the state has no control over implementing assimilation and neither

63 64

Favell, “Integration Policy and Integration Research in Europe” Favell. Philosophies of Integration, 66

does it really acknowledge that these communities do not fit into their ideal French republic. This makes the current assimilation model irreconcilable with the practices of transnational communities. These communities challenge this model of integration in the sense that activities of transnationals inherently go against the French republican model which idealizes full citizenship and participation by all. Transnationals are not recognized as having this status when dealing with integration policies and furthermore, they are unnoticed because their identity is in opposition with assimilation ideals. Transnationalism is a unique way of immigrant adaptation that is not considered in the French assimilation model. The greatest significance of transnationalism in relation to integration is that “transnational communities represent a phenomena at variance with conventional expectations of immigrant assimilation.”65 The expectation of France regarding its immigrants is that through education and assimilation, they would become full French citizens upholding the culture and values of the Republic. The contract of integration that they sign upon their entry is taken as an incentive of the immigrants to participate in society. However, Romanian transmigrants in France have proven that they can be on their way to French citizenship and upholding values of the Republic while maintaining their own culture and heritage. Complete assimilation has failed when looking at transmigrants.“66 Whereas, previously, economic success and social status depended exclusively on rapid acculturation and entrance into mainstream circles of the host society, at present they depend ( at least for some) on cultivating strong social networks across national borders.” There is no need for abandoning the language and culture of origin when there is a network that survives based on the maintenance of such things. It is no longer the case that immigrants must fully integrate into society in order to partake of the benefits of being in France. Transnational communities now provide a different alternative to assimilation in that they themselves are a support network that allow for immigrants to integrate into society through the means of transnationalism. There are two opposing views on the question of transnationalism and its relevance to cultural integration. Some believe that transnationalism leads to further segrega65 Portes et al. “The Study of Transnationalism:Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field,” 227 66 Ibid, 229

Transnationalism as Integration

There is no need for abandoning the language and culture of origin when there is a network that survives based on the maintenance of such things.

tion since remaining in one’s comfort zone of nationals and being involved in a greater network of transnationals excludes the necessity of interacting too much with the host society. Especially when the government of the host society is not welcoming, immigrants are more likely to “draw a protective boundary around the group, identifying it with traditions and interests rooted in the home country and separating it symbolically, and at times, physically, from the host society.”67 In effect, transnationalism would slow down the process of assimilation. “Once integrated into networks that operate beyond the national context, the migrant finds that even the necessity to learn the language of the new country and to engage in a multitude of social interactions with the host society becomes far less pronounced.”68 There is no pressure for assimilation and integration when an immigrant can get by interacting with fellow countrymen. France’s integration ideal overlooks this increasing option that migrants have which can impede them from becoming full citizens of the republic. In the case of the transnational Romanian community in France, the participation in transnational networks does not seem to impeded them from integrating into society. Multiple examples have been given in which immigrants are integrated based on French standards yet still maintain strong links to their country of origin. A good example of this is the Institut Culturel Roumain which portrays transnational activities yet fosters integration with French society. While transnational networks do provide a comfort zone and support system in which the immigrant may adapt more easily, they do not completely isolate transnationals from integration but rather fosters integration through Romanian means. Another perspective suggests that “transnational activities may actually accompany and support successful adaptation to the host society.”69 Having a network of support in the midst of possible discrimination and alienation helps the immigrant survive within society by providing an alternative means of adaptation since the existence of transnational communities can be seen to “bypass both labor market constraints and native prejudice.”70 Thus, transnationalism can

67 Portes, “Towards a New World- The Origins and Effects of Transnational Activities,” 465 68 Schmidtke, 6 69 Portes, “The debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism,” 188 70 Ibid, 188

be seen as a middle ground taken by immigrants. If transnationalism helps with the adaptation to the new country, then transnationalism should not be seen as a threat to integration. Those who argue this point of view state that “the cultivation of strong networks with the country of origin and the implementation of economic and political initiatives based on these networks may help immigrants solidify their position in the receiving society and cope more effectively with its barriers.”71 However, this argument only refers to economic and political activities and does not account for cultural accommodation, the most important thing for the French model of integration. As previously mentioned, transnationalism firstly gains force in its definition through practices and activities. Political participation in various ways-like voting- reflect and reproduce an orientation towards a homeland, and is likely encouraged by the Romanian state. Charity practices and volunteer activities direct one towards Romania, as does the practice of sending remittances. The existence of a network of Romanians, made possible by the internet, institutions like the church and cultural centers, cafes and kiosks where Romanian is spoken, all act to integrate newly arrived Romanians into France, but in a very particular ‘Romanianized’ way. The relative ease and frequency of travel itself materializes being transnational in a very particular way. These transnational communities do indeed help immigrants with adaptation, but not through the same practices and activities that are supposed to make one French. Transnational networks, through various way of orienting the immigrant to Romania, allows adaptation and integration in a ‘Romanianized’ way instead of the ideal path outlined by French integration policy. One becomes integrated through a network which in itself is not assimilated fully to reflect the ideal Republican model. This contrast between the ways transnational networks allow for integration and the practices that are supposed to make one French presents transnational communities as an alternative path to assimilation. Not only are they a means of integration and adaptation in a unique, Romanian way, but the existence of these communities and the methods that makes them transnational, works against the upheld belief of French assimilation. The aim of this article has been to examine the relationship between the French model of integration and transnational 71

Ibid,189

Conclusion

The French model of integration leaves no room for the possibility of transnational communities offering an alternative model of belonging.

communities. Current French integration law overlooks transnational modes of living and belonging firstly by not seeing that people may not want to integrate, thus creating different horizons of expectations which do not include permanent settlement and belonging in France. Secondly, French integration law overlooks transnational modes of living because it inherently goes against the republican model of fully being â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;French.â&#x20AC;&#x2122; The French model is based upon what may now be an outdated idea of citizenship and the one-way permanence of migration. Furthermore, the French model of integration leaves no room for the possibility of transnational communities offering an alternative model of belonging. The stakes of the fact that the French model of integration does not seem to account for the kinds of transnational communities that the French society is home to are necessary to acknowledge and relevant to the question of EU integration, the future of globalization, and peace in French society. The question of integration and the increased arrival of foreigners from other EU-countries are posing difficult questions to the traditional French model of citizenship. The fact that the French system itself, together with European Union mobility regulations, might actually be making possible a transnational population of immigrants that can exist and even thrive in the short-term without integrating in the terms expected by the French system. The inability of the French system to take into account the phenomena of transnational communities and adapt to the expectations and desires of these migrants might be at the root of further social unrest and threaten the project of EU integration itself. Further research on this topic can continue to explore the question of the visibility of transnational communities. If transnationalism is ignored on a national policy level, do local communities address the question of integration? It would be interesting to see if there is a necessity for this distinction between the micro and the macro level of governance dealing with transnational communities. This distinction is particularly important when looking at multilevel governance within the European Union and its immigration policies. The overarching policies that govern the EU might come into conflict with French policies. While this article has briefly examined the differences between high and low skill labor of immigrants and their role in forming transnational communities, further research should focus on the difference in activities between low and

high skilled labor. The social class distinction would provide an interesting picture of who participates in transnational practices more and the role of transnational communities for different social classes of transmigrants. Furthermore, the question of second generation transnationals also arises. Are there second generation transnationals and if so, how does the role of transnational communities change if facilitating integration is no longer the scope for second generations? Further research would add to this current examination of the role of transnational communities in integration policies. Both integration and transnationalism are seen as processes in which the immigrant is responsible for belonging to the group. Where and how they coincide sheds light about the potential need to update policies and models of integration.

Works Cited Assemblée Nationale. Projet de Loi Relatif a L’immigration et a L’intégration Document 2986. (March 29, 2006). http://www. assemblee-nationale.fr/12/projets/p12986.asp. Castle, Stephen. “The Myth of the Controllability of Difference: Labour Migration, Transnational Communities, and State Strategies in East Asia.” Presented at the International Conference on Transnational Communities in the Asia-Pacific Region, Singapore, August 7-8, 2000. http://www.unesco. org/most/apmrcast.htm Diminescu, Dana. “Les circulations migratoires roumaines.” Video posted on http://cefisem.scola.acparis.fr/page.php?es pace=video&nom=dana1&vid=dana1-hd. Embassy of France. “Immigration and Integration.” Excerpts from the Communiqués issued following the Council of Ministers’ meeting (March 29, 2006). Favell, Adrian. Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998.

—— “Integration Policy and Integration Research in Europe: A Review and Critique.” In Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices edited by T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Doug Klusmeyer, 349-399. Washington, DC: Brookings. Institute/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001. Ferro, Anna. “Romanians Abroad: A Snapshot of Highly Skilled Migration.” Higher Education in Europe Vol.29, No.3 (October 2004): 381-391. Haut Conseil a L’Intégration. Les Indicateurs de L’Intégration. Opinion to the Prime Minister, January 17, 2007. http://www. hci.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/AVIS_Indicateurs_integration.pdf Koopmans, Ruud, and Statham, Paul, eds. Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Moore, Damian. “Marseille: Institutional Links with Ethnic Minorities and the French Republican Model.” In Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship, edited by Alistair Rogers and Jean Tillie. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001. Murphy, Kara. “ France’s New Law: Control Immigration Flows, Court the Highly Skilled.” Migration Policy Institute (November 2006). http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/ Backgrounder2_France.php “Notes on Migration and Delocalization.” http://lab.dyne. org/MiGration. Ong, Aihwa. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999. Portes, Alejandro. “The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism.” Global Networks 1,3 (2001): 181-193. ——. “Towards a New World: The Origins and Effects of Transnational Activities.” Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol.22, No.2 (March 1999): 463-477.

Portes, Alejandro, Guarnizo Luis, and Landolt, Patricia. “The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field.” Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol.22, No.2 (March 1999):217-237. Povrzanovic, Maja Frykman, ed. Beyond Integration: Challenges of Belonging in a Diaspora. Lund, Sweden: Nordic Academic Press, 2001. Rogers, Alistair, Tillie Jean, eds. Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001. Salt, John. Current Trends in International Migration in Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2005. Schmidtke, Oliver. ”Transnational Migration: A Challenge to European Citizenship Regimes.” World Affairs Vol. 164, Issue 1.(Summer 2001): 3-17. Smith, Michael Peter, and Guarnizo, Luis. “Transnationalism from Below.” Comparative Urban and Community Research 6(1998):1-33. Vertovec, Steven. “Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism.” Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 22, No.2 (March 1999): 447-462. Zappi, Sylvia. “French Government Revives Assimilation Policy.” Migration Information Source October, 2003, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display. cfm?ID=165

Destruction by Deprivation? The “Genocide” Label in Northern Uganda By Adam Lichtenheld

While ongoing atrocities in Darfur, Sudan receive due labels of “genocide” from the international community, controversy and confusion continue to surround attempts to classify violence occurring 150 miles south of the Darfur border. In northern Uganda, nomadic rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have terrorized citizens in an ongoing 21-year insurgency, the longest standing conflict in Africa. The situation’s unique character—and why it proves so difficult to label—stem from the fact that it encompasses two conflicts in one. Victims face a dual threat; caught between a rebellion that claims to fight in their name but targets them for violence, and a government that uses its power to perpetuate, and not prevent, the suffering of its civilians. In an August 2006 issue of Foreign Policy, Olara Otunnu, the former U.N. Under-Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict and a native Ugandan, published “The Secret Genocide”, which makes the case for a recent uprising of scholars and activists who claim that the situation in northern Uganda deserves to be labeled “genocide”. The regime of President Yoweri Museveni, they allege, has crafted a “carefully scripted narrative” of war that is being “employed to mask more serious crimes by the government itself.”1 Otunnu declares that the impunity of Ugandan soldiers, coupled with an overt failure to prevent the slow wasting away of the 1.7 million people herded into deplorable displacement camps—which he calls concentration camps—reflect a deliberate attempt to destroy the Acholi, a northern ethnic group and the primary bearers of the war’s suffering.2 These allegations demand closer examination. Does the conflict in northern Uganda possess characteristics of a deliberate campaign of extermination? Do the government’s actions—or, perhaps its inaction—amount to genocide? In analyzing patterns of violence and applying relevant theories 1 Olara Otunnu, “The Secret Genocide”, Foreign Policy (Washington: July/August 2006, Issue 155): 44 2 Ibid

In northern Uganda, nomadic rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have terrorized citizens in an ongoing 21-year insurgency, the longest standing conflict in Africa.

of genocide and mass killing, this article finds weak evidence that the Ugandan government is performing a calculated, methodical campaign of discriminate extermination. While highlighting Museveni’s blatant inability to protect his citizens, Otunnu’s accusations fail to acknowledge the complex dynamics that underpin the conflict and other contributory factors behind the government’s actions; proving to be an overly simplistic way to explain the situation in northern Uganda. My examination will address only allegations of genocide against the Ugandan government. The LRA’s atrocities have received no such credible charges, and the nature of the rebel movement—a sporadic and unpopular insurgency that persecutes members of its own ethnic group and displays a clear intent to punish, not exterminate, its victims—clearly lack the characteristics of “genocide” as it is conceptualized under the 1948 U.N. Convention. The intent of this article will be to analyze whether the actions (or inaction) of the Museveni regime amount to an “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” by acts listed under Article II of the Convention, subsections (a) through (d), which include: • • •

•

Killing members of the group Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group3

I will concentrate on the third subsection, as Otunnu points to the government’s indifference towards northerners’ harsh living conditions as the main weapon by which Museveni has waged a deliberate campaign of destruction. Another point to note is that I spent the summer of 2006 conducting research in Uganda, focusing on the humanitarian relief structure for civilians displaced by the northern conflict. While my particular fieldwork did not focus on the war’s genocidal dynamics,

3 Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948. Entry into force: 12 January 1951.

I spoke with numerous citizens, government officials, journalists, and aid workers regarding the situation on the ground there. The genocide topic arose more than once. Where appropriate and necessary, I will draw on my personal interviews and firsthand experiences to provide supplementary evidence for my argument. The rise to power by President Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1986 spawned a rebellion of former government soldiers and disaffected citizens in the northern regions of Uganda. Led by a local witchdoctor, Alice Lakwena, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) united dissidents and marched within 100 kilometers of the capital, Kampala, before being quickly crushed by Museveni’s army. While the HSM dissolved soon afterwards, the movement set the stage for the emergence of another, more formidable insurgent campaign— the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by a self-proclaimed spirit named Joseph Kony. Initially a popular uprising, the LRA quickly lost its support among local populations, and began abducting citizens to fill its ranks. The guerillas accused civilians of conspiring with the very regime they pledged to fight, and started committing killings, mutilations and rape against civilians in the northern regions of Gulu, Pader, Kitgum and Apac; districts that are dominated by the ethnic Acholi.4 Operating out of the bush, the LRA raids nearby villages and towns; snatching children, burning homes and murdering civilians along the way. They indoctrinate their abductees with violence; turning the boys into child soldiers and taking females as concubines and wives. The rebels’ rampages have led to the deaths of tens of thousands of people and the enslavement of over 30,000 children, while fear of abduction has spawned a phenomenon of “night commuters”—40,000 rural Ugandan youths who embark on nightly walks to local towns to hide in bus parks, hospitals and other public areas.5 In 1996, the Ugandan government implemented a policy of “forced displacement”, herding endangered northerners into “relocation camps” to protect them from 4 Justine Nannyonjo, “Conflicts, Poverty and Human Development in Northern Uganda”, The Round Table, Economic Policy Research Centre (Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda, Vol. 94, No. 381 September 2005) 5 Uganda Conflict Action Network, “The Conflict: Background”, 2006, www.ugandacan.org; Human Rights Watch (HRW), Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda, September 2005: 17

History and Patterns of Violence

The Ugandan government’s failure to provide victims with adequate relief resources and its inability to stop the LRA militarily or diplomatically has sparked an array of accusations against Museveni that range from political apathy to murderous conspiracy.

rebel attacks.6 Following the exile of 1.8 million people from their homes, by 2003 nearly 95 percent of the population in the three Acholi-dominated northern districts was residing in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps.7 While the camps have become vulnerable targets for LRA attacks, their living conditions are, according to World Vision, “nothing less than disastrous.”8 A report by the Ugandan Ministry of Health and the U.N. revealed that 1,000 IDPs continue to die each week from disease and hunger; a mortality rate well above emergency thresholds and nearly three times greater than the death rates in Darfur.9 Outbreaks of cholera and AIDS are prevalent, illiteracy is rampant, sanitation services are scarce and malnutrition is reaching epic proportions.10 Neither an adequate amount of soldiers nor substantial police forces have been provided, fitting the camps with skeleton security to protect citizens from the rebels. Camps range from 20,00065,000 inhabitants, yet the average protection per camp is 170 government soldiers and ten to twelve police officers.11 The Ugandan government’s failure to provide victims with adequate relief resources and its inability to stop the LRA militarily or diplomatically has sparked an array of accusations against Museveni that range from political apathy to murderous conspiracy. In 1987, journalists and activists began reporting that Ugandan soldiers were committing violence against civilians in the north.12 These charges faltered over the course of a decade, however, and in 1997 Robert Gersony, an American researcher and expert on civil conflict, conducted one of the most comprehensive field studies of the northern situation. He observed: The UPDF’s human rights conduct, despite some recurrent problems, appears to have made a significant, sustained improvement since about 1992, a view in which even some of President Museveni’s most strident critics concurred. In comparison with LRA conduct, for

6 HRW 2005: 18 7 HRW 2005: 18 8 World Vision, Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda, 2004: 15 9 “Uganda: Year in Brief”, www.irinnews.org; ”Relief Efforts Hampered”, www.internal-displacement.org 10 Ibid 11 HRW 2005: 4; Roger Bolton, “War in Uganda”, World Affairs, 29 Sept. 2004, http://www.brlsi.org/proceed05 12 Omara-Otunnu 1992: 451

example, the author received no allegations of massacres or major incidents.13 Documentation of civilian maltreatment remained sporadic until 2003, when Human Rights Watch released Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda, to be followed up in 2005 by Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda. Both of these reports describe various human rights abuses by Ugandan soldiers and their unlawful killing of civilians, mostly in their roles as “protectors” of the IDP camps.14 Restricted in movement by a harsh curfew, citizens discovered outside the camps have been commonly assumed to be LRA or LRA collaborators and shot on the spot by the army.15 This has presented a disastrous conundrum for encamped civilians. Northern Uganda is a fertile region that depends on an agricultural economy; if farmers are prevented from cultivating their fields, it forces them to rely on aid resources that have proven to be horrendously inadequate.16 Meanwhile, the army routinely abuses civilians within the displacement camps, subjecting them to beatings, rape, and unlawful detentions. Yet no effective accountability structure holds soldiers responsible for their crimes; reports of abuse rarely result in criminal investigations or prosecutions.17 While significant and well-documented, the army’s cruelty has lacked a systematic element, and the most potent source of destruction for displaced northerners has been the deprivation of food, water, medicine and other basic living necessities. Unlike archetypal cases of targeted extermination, like the Nazi’s death machine or the hundred-day massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda, it is difficult to infer intent from the patterns of violence in northern Uganda. Victims are dying at the hand of mass deprivation—not mass slaughter—and those in Otunnu’s camp claim that the deprivation is not only intentional, but part of a secret campaign to annihilate the Acholi. Applying theories of genocide—which identify the prevalent elements and causal factors of genocides and mass killings throughout 13 Gersony, Robert, The Anguish of Northern Uganda, USAID Kampala, August 1997: 52 14 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda, July 2003: 12 15 Ibid 16 World Vision 2004 17 Ibid

Application of Genocide Theories

history—to northern Uganda can help indicate whether the conflict possesses distinct genocidal characteristics. In virtually every academic, humanitarian, and journalistic analysis of northern Uganda, the conflict is portrayed as the manifestation of national fragmentation and a consequence of political tribalism. Accusations of genocide, then, argue that the Ugandan government has “stoked ethnic racism” to provoke discrimination and division, laying the foundation for genocidal policies and targeted destruction.18 Therefore, my analysis will focus on applying theories that relate to ethnicity and racial divisions: fragmented societies, cultures of prejudice, elite manipulation, institutionalized discrimination and organic nationalism. Fragmented Societies

Leo Kuper, hailed by many as the founder of genocide studies, argues that culturally and politically plural societies possess the dynamics of division that can lead to genocide.19 From an ethnic standpoint, Uganda is very diverse, with over 73 different ethnic groups and 43 native languages.20 Much of the country is racially segregated, as ethnic groups are congregated into four regions—west, central, east, and north—with the greatest diversity being found in the central regions near the capital, Kampala.21 Intermixing and intermarrying are common, and most Ugandans practice the same religion—83% are Christians.22 The cleavages that exist are primarily political divisions set along ethnic lines, which were embedded in the country’s colonial history under British rule and perpetuated by its political dynamics following independence in 1962. The geographical and cultural separation of the country’s population is a direct result of colonialists’ “divide and rule” policies that split Uganda into functional regions for maximal administrative efficiency and economic profit, using the south as an agricultural and industrial base while the north was seen as “disturbed, hostile territory, in which there were some tribes powerful enough to offer stiff and prolonged resistance.”23 18 Otunnu 2006: 2 19 Michael Mann, “The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing”, New Left Review, May-June 1999, http://www.newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=1990 20 James Okuku, Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratization Process in Uganda, Discussion Paper No. 17 (Uppsala, Sweden: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2002): 6-7 21 Okuku 2002: 6-7 22 CIA World Factbook: Uganda, https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html#People 23 Refugee Law Project (RLP), Behind the Violence: Causes,

Members of the southern Buganda tribe were rewarded for their cooperation with British rulers, and the country’s entire infrastructure—including its capital city, parliament, university, hospitals and railroad—was built in the south.24 While southerners were viewed as intelligent and capable political rulers, Ugandans from the north were viewed as barbaric and brutal, which made them fit to dominate the ranks of the national army.25 When Museveni, an ethnic Banyankole from western Uganda, took power by building a coalition of western and central groups to overthrow the regime of Milton Obote, it broke a chain of northern domination of the government that had persisted since the country’s independence. In the midst of change in the mid-1980s, as remnants of Obote’s regime and Museveni’s NRM troops clashed in the Luwero Triangle, Obote’s Acholi-dominated army committed massacres against the NRM and scores of innocent civilians.26 After Museveni ascended to power, he retaliated by breaking off a 1985 powersharing agreement and sponsoring cattle raids in the north; actions which left northern groups, particularly the Acholi, with a significant loss of political and economic power.27 Northern discontent was furthered as Museveni began delving out jobs and favors to western ethnic groups while political and economic power continued to remain concentrated in the southern part of the country. While many people view this history as a simple tension between two regions, as Uganda’s Refugee Law Project—a local NGO based in Kampala— contends, “The north-south divide is symptomatic of the other regional divisions that exist throughout Uganda.”28 Indeed, the LRA has not been the only rebel uprising in Uganda since 1986; fourteen other guerilla groups picked up arms to resist Museveni within a half-decade after he seized power. Many hailed from other regions than the Acholi-dominated areas in the north; for example, the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), which remained active until 2004, mobilized in the southwestern part of the country.29 While fragmented along ethnic Consequences and the Search for Solutions in the War in Northern Uganda, February 2004: 10 24 RLP 2004: 11 25 RLP 2004: 11 26 Ibid 27 Ibid 28 RLP 2004: 10 29 “Group Profile: West Nile Bank Front”, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 1 July 2007, http://www.tkb.org

lines, these insurgencies reveal that the functional divisions within Uganda are not merely the remnants of archaic tribal hatreds. According to James Okuku in his essay Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratization Process in Uganda, the problem in Uganda “is not of ethnicity in itself,” but that ethnicity “is more intimately linked to political and economic conditions, that is, the unequal distribution of and competition for power and wealth.”30 Cultures of Prejudice

Daniel Goldburg argues that genocide is likely in societies where a prejudicial culture has taken root, portraying certain citizens as inferior, even inhuman. Have Uganda’s ethnic and political schisms manifested a specific prejudicial culture against northern groups, particularly the Acholi? Many nonnortherners view the LRA conflict with indifference, perceiving it as an isolated event among one group of people. According to the Refugee Law Project: Political upheavals become geographically localized or ‘regionalized’, and are perceived by other Ugandans as distant and unimportant, “as long as it doesn’t come here!” As one interviewee in Luwero said, “Those Acholi are killing each other up there, and they always will. Why should we be concerned? We have our own worries here at home.” Some of this attitude may be beginning to change, however. According to interviews in Soroti, most people said they knew very little about the LRA because for 17 years it was not affecting them. “When they came here, we knew what the Acholi have been going through, and we now feel we need to look at this as a national problem.”31 A well-known local journalist, Peter Mulira of Kampala’s New Vision, also explored the populations’ views towards the suffering of their northern countrymen: Yes, the war in the north is seen as a thing which should not concern us, and unfortunately it also evokes sad memories of their own kind in many peoples’ minds. The attitude of many was captured by my friend, John, who, in an angry voice [said] “Those people killed us

30 31

Okuku 2002: 7 RLP 2004: 15

when they were in power!”32 The sentiments that “they killed us!” and “those Acholi are just killing themselves up there” indicate prejudicial attitudes, but racism is not the overlaying theme of Ugandans’ indifference towards the war. Apathy appears to be the result of distance and disconnect more than a reflection of overt hatred for the Acholi or other northern groups. When a small part of the population is victimized in a regionally-fragmented country that suffers from rampant poverty (requiring citizens to focus on day-to-day survival), effective national engagement with an isolated event is unlikely. But once civilians are affected by the conflict—as the Refugee Law Project found in Soroti—their perspectives change dramatically. This reality, and the prevalence of ethnic integration through intermingling and intermarrying, provides evidence that any existing racism in Uganda is neither deep-seeded nor pervasive enough to constitute a “culture of prejudice.” Indeed, amplified racial and political fragmentation has primarily been a product of manipulative governing by political elites. This has remained consistent throughout Uganda’s history. Exploiting ethnic tensions allowed the British to rule efficiently and effectively during the colonial era, and the practice was mimicked and maintained by post-independence regimes. Each successive government failed to focus on nationbuilding and built their policies around narrowly-tailored political interests that included the exclusion of opposition groups.33 Like their British masters, post-colonial Ugandan leaders have used such calculative tactics to maintain their authority; hoping to minimize disloyalty and potential revolt. Ugandan scholar Mahmoud Mamdani notes this pattern in declaring that the country’s various regimes “have rested on distinctly ethnic political foundations” allowing them to “reproduce themselves on the basis of definable, and in most cases, narrow ethnic alliances.”34 This has been characteristic of the Museveni regime as well, which has exacerbated the 32 Peter Mulira, “Do Ugandans Have Any Compassion?” The New Vision, 25 June 2005, http://www.newvision.co.ug 33 RLP 2004: 11 34 Qtd. in Amii Omara-Otunnu, “The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 451

Elite Manipulation & Institutionalized Discrimination

Amplified racial and political fragmentation has primarily been a product of manipulative governing by political elites. This has remained consistent throughout Uganda’s history.

cleavages between former elites of the north and the centralwestern dominant government. Since taking power, Museveni has become notorious for relishing the display of thousands of skulls of people killed by the Acholi-dominated army in Luwero during the NRM’s 1986 rebellion, a symbolic exhibit that he uses to invoke images of cruelty and barbarity: The skulls were publicly displayed on the main roadside leading to Northern Uganda ostensibly to show the evils of Milton Obote’s army. But now in hindsight, it seems the skulls were displayed strategically to demonize Northerners, especially the Acholi, and set them up for revenge killings and extinction so that the unfolding genocide in the IDP Camps and lack of protection from LRA attacks. 35 According to Africanist Amii Omara-Otunnu, the NRM “has bolstered its position by manipulating ethnic factors” and therefore “it is evident that the rise of Alice Lakwena was due to [Museveni’s] repressive policies and to the inability of the educated elite to articulate and organize the aspirations of those living in northern and eastern Uganda.”36 But there is a significant difference between exacerbating cultural and social differences to cripple all opposition, and using it to deliberately institutionalize oppressive policies directed only at one particular group of people. A characteristic of Museveni’s ethnic alliances and tight grip on power in the early days was an indiscriminate crackdown on all dissent and opposition, regardless of ethnicity or individual affiliations. Upon entering office, the president implemented a no-party system that outlawed any organized political opposition, allowing for “the monopolization of state authority by one powerful group.”37 His reasoning was an innate fear of the social phenomenon that he exploited—Museveni claimed that a multiparty system would lead to host of rival political factions based on tribal units. In reality, he was paranoid of any formidable opposition, and began taking harsh measures to preserve his power and reduce large sections of the populace

35 Rev. Benoni Ogwal-Abwang, “Resolution on the genocide in Northern Uganda”, made to the Episcopal Diocese of New York, Church of St. John, 19 November 2005 http://www.radiorhino.org/htm_material/ crime.html 36 Omara-Otunnu 1992: 449-450 37 Omara-Otunnu 1992: 463

to mere “spectators of politics.”38 As early as October 1986, critics were incarcerated for “acting against the government” and the secretary-general of the Uganda Human Rights Activist Organization was thrown in jail after beginning to criticize the regime’s failure to address the developing situation in northern Uganda.39 While Museveni was undoubtedly inspired by the threat of resistance, his oppressive policies did not target a specific ethnic or political group. He feared opposition from various actors, particularly from within—as Mamdani said in 1988, “Never before in our history have state employees been penalized so severely for being Ugandans” (italics inserted).40 Although the one-party system was indicative of pure political oppression, Museveni finally adhered to a national referendum in July 2005 and allowed the open registration of opposition groups, leading to challenges of the incumbent leader from six contesting parties in the February 2006 elections.41 Despite the shift in policies of political mobilization, there is no denying that the north continues to bear the brunt of underdevelopment in Uganda, suffering from a stagnant and marginalized economy that lags behind the rest of the country with a 66% poverty rate, compared to the national average of 46%.42 Many Museveni critics argue that this is purely a result of NRM policy and a characteristic of the current regime and its desire to exclude the north. But in his field report, Robert Gersony found that many Acholi “blame their area’s lack of development in great part on Colonial policies”, and acknowledges that “even under Obote and Amin the fruits of development had not reached the Acholi to the degree that they reached other areas.”43 The isolation of the northern economy, then, is not just a hallmark of the current administration, but a distinctive element of a fragmented country that persisted even when northerners were in power. In fact, the current regime has implemented several programs in the northern region to spur development, including the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), which includes institutional and infrastructure development.44 One policy that has led to disastrous results, however, is the NRM-enforced policy of forced 38 Omara-Otunnu 1992: 448 39 Omara-Otunnu 1992: 449-451 40 Omara-Otunnu 1992: 453 41 “Uganda to Re-introduce Multi-party System”, Afrol News, 29 July 2005, http://www.afrol.com/articles/16880 42 Nannyonjo 2005: 482 43 Gersony 1997: 18 44 Ibid

displacement. In Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Benjamin Valentino argues that governments engaged in counterguerilla warfare, like Uganda’s, may find mass killing attractive as a potential option to help “drain the sea”: Some regimes have found it easier…to wage war against a guerrilla army by depriving it of its base of support in the people than by targeting the guerrillas directly…frequently resulting in mass killing”… strategies included “massive programs of population resettlement.45

Speaking with aid workers from World Vision in Kampala, I was told of the heavy resentment among the displaced population in the Apac district because they lacked the extensive relief resources distributed to the Acholidominated regions.

Valentino cites displacement as a potential strategic pursuit that “may stem from more ‘pragmatic’ concerns, such as the effort to eliminate specific kinds of political or military threats…”46 It is clear that the Ugandan government justifies the use of IDP camps as a protective measure for civilians and a strategy to deprive the LRA of the food and support from the local population.47 But, in accordance with Valentino’s theory of “cumulative radicalization”, could the NRM’s policy of forced displacement reflect a conscious, strategic, and evolutionary decision by Museveni to promote the destruction of the Acholi? Evidence would be more conclusive if not for the fact that the Acholi, despite being the primary war victims, are not the only ones suffering from rebel atrocities and government policies. The history of Museveni’s ascent to power, and his exacerbation of the divide between the previous government and his own, indicate that his only grievances are with those from Acholiland. Yet other ethnic groups, including the Lango, the Karamojong, and the Teso—which have larger national populations than the Acholi—are also succumbing to death, deprivation and general destruction of their way of life. In fact, representatives from these other regions have submitted complaints to government and humanitarian officials that they do not receive the material relief that Acholi in the Gulu, Kitgum and Lira are afforded. Speaking with aid workers from World Vision in Kampala, I was told of the heavy resentment among the displaced population in the Apac district because 45 Benjamin Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004): 81-82 46 Valentino 2004: 73 47 HRW 2005: 34

they lacked the extensive relief resources distributed to the Acholi-dominated regions.48 Although the scope of distress does not detract from the victimization of the Acholi, the north as a whole has been marginalized. In addition, the government has implemented several policies and strategies that would be inconsistent with a systematic and deliberate attempt to exterminate northerners. In the 1990s, Museveni began providing weapons to local militias in the north to help them protect their villages, sometimes deploying them with official army units to protect civilians, particularly in rural areas.49 But, as history has shown, one of the first steps a regime takes before committing mass murder is to disarm the soon-to-be victimized population. Why, then, would the Ugandan government equip northern militias with weapons that not only empowers local villages, but gives them the means to wipe out the very rebel force whose existence allows the continual destruction of northern societies? Later, around the year 2000, the government implemented a new law that gave blanket amnesty to all LRA fighters who voluntarily returned from the bush. 50 The “Amnesty Act” prioritized ending the conflict over ensuring modern forms of justice for rebel perpetrators. But if Museveni is determined to annihilate the Acholi, allowing combatants from an Acholi-dominated force to return to their homes and villages with no repercussions or legal punishment seems to be an ill-advised policy. In The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann contends that developing, multi-ethnic countries are most susceptible to mass violence and genocide.51 Uganda certainly fits that bill. Mann claims that “organic nationalism” perverts democracy and perceives the state as belonging to a biologically connected population group, causing an inherent exclusion of other political, ethnic, or national groups as the socially-constructed “other” and laying the foundation for genocidal violence.52 According to Mann:

Organic Nationalism

Many developing countries possess a dominant ethnicity or religion; many possess minorities with strong regional implantation, some of which form the majority 48 49 50 51 52

Interview with World Vision aid worker Walter S. 18 June 2006 RLP 2004: 38 RLP 2004: 6 Mann 1999 Ibid 35

in a neighboring state. Many experience some degree of exploitation by foreign imperialism [in combination with] small-arms which enable small groups of young men to coerce their own community into the prisonhouse of organic nationalism...All this is the recipe for intermittent organic nationalism, occasionally surging into murderous cleansing.53 While it does not automatically ensure “murderous cleansing”, organic nationalism has been a consistent factor in the incidence of genocide in the 20th century. Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire used the state to push for the advancement of pan-Turkism during the early 1900s, helping formulate the idea that the “other”—minority Christian Armenians—needed to be eradicated. Through incessant propaganda, the Nazis bolstered German nationalism by declaring that any nonAryan citizens—particularly Jews—were impure and inferior, setting the state for Hitler’s “Final Solution.” In the 1970s, The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia emphasized “original people” and the “ethnic ideal” in purging “unclean” minorities, intellectuals and city dwellers from the population. Extremists in the Rwandan government in 1994 positioned the state as being an organic Hutu mechanism that needed to rid the country of unclean Tutsi “cockroaches”. One year later, Slobodan Milosevic’s nationalist fervor of a “greater Serbia” helped inspire ethnic cleansing and massacres against Muslims by Bosnian Serbs. And in present-day Sudan, the Khartoum government has utilized its “Arab” appeal to exacerbate ethnic tensions and sanction the slaughter of “inferior” black Africans in Darfur.54 With the exception of Bosnia, each conflict entailed a dominant majority sharing “virtuous ethnic and/or political characteristics” discovering in the state “a sympathetic instrument for the advancement of their own interests” conceiving of a “perfect union” that required the “exclusion of minority communities and political opponents from full membership in the nation.”55 Yet in Uganda, ethnic diversity has made it difficult for one dominant group to retain a sustained and unwavering command of political authority. The country lacks

53 Mann 1999: 41 54 These explanations are, to a degree, overly simplistic and fail to account for the multitude of other factors relevant to each individual case. But my attempt here is only to establish that organic nationalism is one of the more sound theories of genocide, and that elements of it appear is most cases of genocide in the 20th century. 55 Mann 1999: 21, 29-30

a clear ethnic majority—in fact, no single group lays claim to more than 20% of the population.56 Museveni’s Banyankole ethnic group make up a mere 9.5%—not a very large demographic to rally an entire organic nationalist movement.57 The makeup of the Museveni regime encompasses the entire country—including representatives from the north—and the use of the state as a tool stems not from an attempt to “purify” Ugandan society, but as a result of the current leadership’s awareness that, according the Refugee Law Project, “If one’s ethnic group is not in power, one’s security is not guaranteed.”58 In most cases, for the seeds of organic nationalism to come to fruitation, leaders require an ideology of purity or general push for utopianism59 that, according to Eric Weitz, “necessitates population purges.”60 Valentino argues that “the ideology of ruling elites played a crucial role in past instances of mass killing”, and highlights that one of the most dangerous ideologies is one “seeking national purification”61 Although the NRM has used the Ugandan state as an instrument for the advancement of its own interests, there has been no rhetoric from Museveni or other public officials indicating that the government harbors a racist ideology. In addition, there is no evidence of any racially- or ideologically-charged propaganda campaigns undertaken by the NRM—a fact to which, as a Ugandan resident for three months, I can personally attest. In public declarations and writings, including his biography Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda, Museveni has demonstrated that his idea of utopianism depends upon national integration, not ethnic purity; and that his 1986 revolution was inspired by a need to cleanse the government, not the nation.62 There are other complex workings that contribute to the government’s inept failure to eradicate the LRA and protect 56 Okuku 2002: 6-7 57 Ibid 58 RLP 2004: 11 59 I am blending two different theories here—Mann’s “organic nationalism” and Weitz’s “utopia of race and nation”—but this seems appropriate considering the way that these two related concepts pertain to the Uganda case. 60 Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias Of Race And Nation (New Jersey: Princeton University, 2003): 58 61 Valentino 2004: 72 62 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Book Review of Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda by Yoweri K. Museveni, Foreign Policy, Summer 1998: 452-454. Also see Gersony and Omara-Olunnu

Yet in Uganda, ethnic diversity has made it difficult for one dominant group to retain a sustained and unwavering command of political authority.

Other Contributory Factors

northern victims; dynamics that transcend ethnicity and tribalism and offer alternative motivations for Museveni’s inaction. The war’s profitability, bolstered by donor aid and local corruption, has helped render the regime complacent, and the complex dynamics of the LRA rebellion make it difficult to achieve what many herald as an easy solution. War Profiteering

The U.S.’s strategic alliance with Uganda strengthened after the 9/11 attacks, as Washington officially labeled the LRA a terrorist organization and mandated increased military aid to the NRM regime.

An often underlooked element of the northern conflict is the fact that, as the Refugee Law Project highlights, “there are individuals and groups who are benefiting financially from the war.”63 For Museveni’s government, profitability has swelled after September 11, 2001. International donors fund some 50 percent of Uganda’s budget, and in 2005 alone, the Ugandan government set aside a budget of $200 million for defense—a funding inflation that leaders are able to easily justify by invoking threatening images of the LRA.64 The U.S.’s strategic alliance with Uganda strengthened after the 9/11 attacks, as Washington officially labeled the LRA a terrorist organization and mandated increased military aid to the NRM regime.65 Yet, while the Ugandan government has garnished its budget with donor aid and committed extensive financial resources to the military, money has vanished in the process. Several investigations into the government’s bankrolling revealed numerous “ghost soldiers” cases—where paychecks were distributed to individuals who did not exist. For example, in December 2003, local media outlets in Kitgum and Gulu reported that budgetary funds were being set aside for combat units missing up to 60% of their troops.66 Between being released from central administration and arriving to troops on the ground, large sums of money have disappeared. Many humanitarian aid workers I spoke with in Kampala described how local officials and military commanders had used donated resources, including food, to sell for their personal profit. Corruption has prohibited IDPs from receiving material aid, while giving government and military officials an incentive to exacerbate the war and the suffering of its victims. The Refugee Law Project found similar allegations to be rampant throughout the north: [There were] deep suspicions about smaller-scale war profiteering on the part of a number of different indi63 64 65 66

RLP 2004: 29 Ibid Uganda Conflict Action Network 2006: 1 RLP 2004: 28

viduals or groups who are thought to be benefiting from the war…various actors were accused of benefiting financially from the war and actively encouraging it to continue. There was frequent reference to large sums of money given for defense, which were not reflected in increased military capacity on the ground. In particular, there is a strong belief among civilians that senior army commanders were benefiting financially from the war, something that the recent ghost soldiers’ inquiry confirmed.67 All this has contributed to a widespread belief that “certain elements within the UPDF are actively working against resolution of the war”, based not on a deep-seeded desire to destroy the Acholi but because people are making money off the conflict.68 But northerners are not the only victims of corruption. NGO reports in 2004 and 2005 revealed that soldiers on the ground “were not getting their allowances and had to beg for food”, which compelled them to steal humanitarian resources from aid convoys and rob civilians.69 While officers and local officials reap the benefits of bloated defense budgets and fraudulent divergences of funding, those in the lower ranks have become “resentful because they don’t get anything, but it is their lives that are exposed every day…That is why they run when there is an attack and do not protect civilians.”70 While war profits have inspired many leaders’ contentment with the war’s continuation, it has also deprived many soldiers on the ground and helped inspire them to commit violence and steal from civilians in the IDP camps. This is why, when analyzing the intentions of the NRM and its motivations for perpetuating the LRA conflict, the profitability aspect cannot be understated. The fact that the LRA, a nomadic insurgency with little local support, has survived for over twenty years is often pointed to as a sign of government complicity. However, many advocates and human rights group underestimate the formidability of the rebel campaign. In one field report, a former fighter commented that “Kony has no plan, but he has lots of weapons and soldiers,” while a local analyst explained that the LRA “has 67 68 69 70

RLP 2004: 27-28 RLP 2004: 43 RLP 2004: 31 Ibid

Dynamics of the LRA & Government Solutions

90% of the rebel group is comprised of child combatants that have been abducted and forced to kill against their will; a disturbing fact that confronts the Ugandan government with an “impossible military dilemma.”

marvelous internal organization and management. They keep records when they abduct children – who their parents are, etc.”71 Although the government’s lack of effective engagement with the northern conflict has enhanced the LRA’s ability to survive, the dynamics of the rebellion makes defeating it extremely challenging. 90% of the rebel group is comprised of child combatants that have been abducted and forced to kill against their will; a disturbing fact that confronts the Ugandan government with an “impossible military dilemma.”72 These individuals are heavily indoctrinated and possess an allegiance that is unquestioned.73 The RLP explains how the guerilla’s exploitation of young soldiers renders military campaigns by the NRM ineffective: LRA commanders avoid government Mi-24 helicopter gunship attacks by passing uniforms over to child abductees and immediately dispersing into groups of 2-3. While children are disposable porters in the LRA’s overall strategy, and the LRA loses nothing militarily when they are gunned down by UPDF troops, the government risks political backlash for killing children.74 This, and the fact that fighting in the bush caters to the rebels’ strengths has made the LRA a formidable opponent. As one local official admitted, “even a small number of LRA fighters can overcome a very large UPDF force.”75 While the rebellion has received no support from the Ugandan government or the local population, its strength was maintained from 1994 until early 2006 by material and military aid from the government of Sudan, which retaliated for Kampala’s longstanding support of its insurgents, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Until they were forced to seek refuge in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2006, the LRA operated out of bases in southern Sudan, and the constant supply of food and weapons from Khartoum bolstered the rebel force.76 In fact, Kony worked with the Sudanese army to attack strategic locations within Sudan,

71 72 73 74 75 76

RLP 2004: 21 RLP 2004: 13; 31 RLP 2004: 20 RLP 2004: 22 RLP 2004: 30 RLP 2004: 19

and the National Islamic Front regime considered him to be a “long-term strategic partner.”77 The harboring and supplying of the rebels by the Sudanese government presented another challenge to the NRM and its attempts to defeat the LRA militarily. While the loss of external support has severely weakened the guerilla force in the past year, newfound hope for peaceful reconciliation and amnesty continues to be undermined by the International Criminal Court, which refuses to withdraw arrest warrants for Kony and his top commanders.78 Whether militarily or diplomatically, a solution becomes more elusive as the government’s failure to achieve peace fuels greater discontent and distrust in the north, causing civilians to refuse cooperating with the army or supporting its counterinsurgency campaign.79 Such hostility has in turn inspired resentment among Ugandan soldiers so that they “don’t want to fight properly and end the conflict once and for all.”80 This vicious cycle of mutual antagonization has helped perpetuate the violence in northern Uganda. While divided societies, difficult life conditions and opportunistic ambitions have been identified as contributing factors in genocides of the 20th century, the Uganda case lacks clear evidence of the ideological, national or ethnic radicalism that would supplement greed and frustration, aggravate national divisions to construct a culturally-identifiable “Other” and promote the most extreme measures of ensuring their exclusion. The government’s “stoking of ethnic racism” is not so distinctly nationalistic or culturally, politically, and institutionally pervasive to indicate that Museveni, through a calculated effort of selective deprivation, has intended to “bring about the physical destruction in whole or in part” of the Acholi or other northern groups. There exists no ideological pursuit of “purity”; no clear ingrained ideals of ethnically-based organic hyper-nationalism; no campaign of racist propaganda and no prevalent cultural hatred. The patterns of deliberate harm inflicted by the Ugandan army is too sporadic, too indiscriminate and lacking the systematic element of genocidal persecution. Finally, although the north remains politically and economically marginalized, the policies of the current regime are not solely to blame—as regional separation 77 78 79 80

Ibid RLP 2004: 42 RLP 2004: 33 RLP 2004: 24; 33

Conclusion: The “Genocide Label” in Uganda

The patterns of deliberate harm inflicted by the Ugandan army is too sporadic, too indiscriminate and lacking the systematic element of genocidal persecution.

This does not excuse the Ugandan government’s failure to protect its citizens

and isolation continue to be endemic to the entire country. The multi-layered and multi-faceted dynamics of the situation in northern Uganda makes it one of the most complex conflicts in the world—and one of the most daunting, which has prompted U.N. Emergency Relief coordinator Jan Egeland to call it “the world’s most underreported humanitarian crisis.”81 This article concludes that there is weak and insufficient evidence of “genocide”, and that to label the conflict as such is brazenly presumptuous and overly simplistic. Of course, this does not excuse the Ugandan government’s failure to protect its citizens; nor does it absolve Museveni and his regime from responsibility for the north. Meanwhile, while Olara Otunnu’s allegations are inaccurate, they do provoke perplexing questions relating to the way that genocide is currently conceptualized. The term has been coined to classify proactive, positive actions that seek to exterminate a group of people. But can genocide be viewed as passive inaction that indirectly serves the same end? Can apathy or indifference to destruction be genocidal? As the international community watches northern Uganda with fresh hope for a peaceful resolution, these questions do—and should—remain.

References Baker, Delbert W., From Exile to Prime Minister: How Samson Kisekka, a Christian Physician, is Successfully Leading Uganda from Ruin to Restoration (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1988) Baker, Wairama, “Uganda: The Marginalization of Minorities”, Minority Rights Group International, Bolton, Roger, “War in Uganda”, World Affairs, 29 Sept. 2004, http://www.brlsi.org/proceed05 CIA World Factbook: Uganda, https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html

HRW 2005: 4

Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948. Entry into force: 12 January 1951. Gersony, Robert, The Anguish of Northern Uganda, USAID Kampala, August 1997 “Group Profile: West Nile Bank Front”, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 1 July 2007, http://www.tkb.org Khadiagala, Glibert M., Book Review of Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda by Yoweri K. Museveni, Foreign Policy, Summer 1998 Haynes, Jeffrey, “Religion, Ethnicity, and Civil War in Africa: The Cases of Uganda and Sudan”, Round Table (Rutledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Vol. 96, No. 390; June 2007) Human Rights Watch, Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda, July 2003, Vol. 15, No. 12, www.hrw.org Human Rights Watch, Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda, September 2005, Vol. 17, No. 12, www.hrw.org Mann, Michael “The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing”, New Left Review, May-June 1999, http://www.newleftreview.org/?page=articl e&view=1990 Mulira, Peter, “Do Ugandans Have Any Compassion?” The New Vision, 25 June 2005, http://www.newvision.co.ug Nabudere, Dennis, Hidden War, Forgotten People: War in Acholiland and its ramifications for peace and security in Uganda, Makerere University, Human Rights and Peace Center: Kampala, 2003 Ogwal-Abwang, Rev. Benoni, “Resolution on the genocide in Northern Uganda”, made to the Episcopal Diocese of New York, the cathedral Church of St. John the Divine, 19 November 2005 http://www.radiorhino.org/htm_material/crime.html

Okuku, James, Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratization Process in Uganda, Discussion Paper No. 17 (Uppsala, Sweden: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2002) Omara-Otunnu, Amii, “The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda”, Journal of Modern African Studies, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) Otunnu, Olara, “The Secret Genocide”, Foreign Policy (Washington: July/August 2006, Issue 155) Nannyonjo, Justine, “Conflicts, Poverty and Human Development in Northern Uganda”, the Round Table, Economic Policy Research Centre (Makerere University: Kampala, Uganda, Vol. 94, No. 381 September 2005) Refugee Law Project (RLP), Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions in the War in Northern Uganda, February 2004 ”Relief Efforts Hampered”, www.internal-displacement.org Uganda Conflict Action Network, “The Conflict: Background”, 2006, www.ugandacan.org/background “Uganda to Re-introduce Multi-party System”, Afrol News, 29 July 2005, http://www.afrol.com/articles/16880 “Uganda: Year in Brief”, www.irinnews.org Valentino, Benjamin, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004) Waller, James, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) Weitz, Eric, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race And Nation (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003)

World Vision, Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda, 2004

Never Again: A Case for the International Criminal Court By Jennie Keohane

As the United States relentlessly pursues the war on terror, concerns for international human rights, while never a high priority, have been relegated to the very bottom of the list. Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, the torture memos, indefinite detention without trial, warrantless eavesdropping, and secret CIA prisons are just some of the violations uncovered thus far (“Straightening the Record”). Internationally, events of the twentieth century have also shown a flagrant disregard for human rights. Take for example Bosnia, Rwanda, the Holocaust, and Srebrenica (to name a few). In recognition of the failure of the global community to deal with and prevent these atrocities, an International Criminal Court has been created and is currently in operation. However, the United States has refused to ratify the ICC treaty. The United States must sign the Rome Statute for both strategic and humanitarian reasons. This will become clear after an examination of how the ICC will improve the US image abroad, how failure to ratify it will undermine US power, and how perceived threats to US sovereignty are exaggerated. First, the United States is not exactly well-liked in the international arena. Blatant unilateralism in the war on terror and flagrant disregard for international institutions like the UN do not equate to popularity. As more human rights abuses are made public, international approval of the United States plummets further. In fact, as Senator Patrick Leahy points out, Guantánamo Bay is “the primary recruiting tool for our enemies” (qtd. in “Straightening the Record”). Hypocrisy is not making the United States friends either. For a nation constantly pointing fingers at over countries for violating rights, the US would do well to take their own advice. Kenneth Roth expounds, “As a nation committed to human rights and the rule of law, the United States should be embracing an international system of justice, even if it means that Americans,

like everyone else, might sometimes be scrutinized” (358). Additionally, in the context of the war on terror, it is becoming increasingly clear that the United States cannot continue this large-scale military operation alone. A strained economy and overextended military have become symptomatic of the current lack of international support. Dean of the Yale Law School, Harold HongJu Koh argues, “Even as the United States was using stunning military technology to bomb Baghdad, it could not diplomatically secure the Security Council votes of even its closest allies on a matter that the president deemed of highest national importance.” Simply, this double standard has diminished American power and support abroad. By ratifying the International Criminal Court, the United States will send a message to the international community that it is willing to accept and abide by the rules of international engagement. This important, symbolic gesture will demonstrate that the US does not feel it is above the law. In the wake of September Eleventh, one hardly needs to discuss the problems with and manifestations of global AntiAmerican sentiment. Undoubtedly, taking a less aggressive, more multilateral approach would go far in appeasing our allies. Second, failure to ratify the International Criminal Court will ultimately undermine US power and hegemony. Like it or not, the sixty ratifications required to create the court have been received. The prosecutor and judges have been selected. The ICC is now a global reality. However, by failing to become a party to the Rome Statute, the United States will be unable to influence the implementation of the court. Failing to ratify the Rome Statute prevents the US from proposing and voting on amendments to the statute, nominating judges for the court, and participating in judge and prosecutor selection (Seguin). The United States will bar itself from shaping the court by refusing to ratify the treaty. Since (unlike the US) most countries that have signed the treaty do not intend to unsign it, the ICC is here to stay and the US would be wise to deal with it and get involved in shaping it. W. Michael Reisman points out that other countries can use the fact that the US is not party to the treaty to their advantage. Because the ICC ultimately reduces the power of the UN Security Council by taking over responsibility for policing rights abusers, other countries, like France, are given new opportunities to compete with the US by wielding diplomatic power in the Court’s Assembly of States.

Thus, contrary to the arguments of many political realists and opponents of the ICC, it is to the strategic advantage of the US to ratify the treaty (49). Finally, with the understanding that ratification of the International Criminal Court would greatly help US image abroad and would allow opportunities to shape its direction; it would be remiss to ignore the humanitarian objectives that could be achieved. Similar to the League of Nations of the First World War which collapsed due to the United Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; refusal to participate, the ICC will be considerably less effective without US cooperation. Experience has shown that when the United States does not act to protect human rights, other countries also stay silent. In Rwanda and Bosnia, for example, the lack of US leadership to promote human rights led to massive atrocities (HongJu Koh). Thus, the ICC could make more progress battling human rights abusers with US help and resources. Additionally, the permanence of the ICC is a definite benefit to the international arena. The Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law explains, â&#x20AC;&#x153;A permanent institution, properly managed, means efficiency, expertise, and respect. As an institution, the Court has a level of authority, competence, and respect that could never be gained by an ad hoc tribunalâ&#x20AC;? (King and Theofrastous). Creating an ad hoc tribunal is logistically difficult and expensive. With a permanent court willing and ready to step in when needed, more international perpetrators would likely be deterred from committing egregious acts of violence. By focusing on the expedient resolution of conflict, those apt to commit crimes against humanity may be encouraged to think again. Even if the court does not prove a strong deterrent, it is still important for the international community to take a strong stance against genocide, aggression, and crimes against humanity. Thus, the court has symbolic value as well. It signifies that the nations of the world are finally willing to commit themselves to enforcing a global ideal of justice. While it has long been recognized that leaders and individuals need to obey basic moral laws, this is the first attempt to internationalize these concepts. The international community must take a stand. Leaders should not be immune to the laws of war, and criminal regimes should not be allowed to massacre their citizens by pretending to be states. Of course, lofty humanitarian goals sound great theoretically, but opponents of the International Criminal

Court have raised real, political, and strategic objections to the permanent treaty. First, those opposed to the ICC argue that the treaty would limit US sovereignty (Kissinger 93). Clearly, this is a risk that is required for global governance to succeed. Moreover, the ICC is a court of last resort. It will only begin investigating a case if the government of the suspect is unwilling or unable to conduct their own investigation. Therefore, the United States should not hide behind the excuse that American citizens could be taken and tried. As long as the US undertakes a good faith investigation, the ICC will have no power to step in (Roth 356). In addition, the Courtâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s subject matter jurisdiction is limited to the most severe of all international crimes. The Court can only investigate genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. For a United States soldier or citizen to be brought before the tribunal, they would have had to commit grave violations. However, the US military prosecutes alleged war crimes committed by its own troops which removes ICC jurisdiction; so once again, it is unlikely that the court would greatly undermine the sovereignty of US courts (Seguin). Finally, the definition of war crimes used by the ICC is very similar to the one the Pentagon uses, and the working definition of genocide is taken from the Genocide Convention of 1948 which the US has ratified. Thus, while Kissinger and others arguing against universal jurisdiction claim vagueness of international law, the ICC has taken steps to ensure concrete standards and operating procedures are put in place. While the ICC is far from perfect, the loss of sovereignty is not a substantial reason to oppose its ratification. In fact, as previously pointed out, ratification of the ICC could have strategic benefits for the US. Finally, opponents of the ICC are concerned that the prosecutor or other countries could use the court to carry out political warfare. In reality, such fears are unfounded and greatly exaggerated. The ICC has safeguards to prevent politically motivated cases from reaching the court. Kenneth Roth outlines checks included in the Rome Statute: the prosecutor can be removed if misconduct is suspected, and judges can also be removed by a two-thirds vote (356). Further, all indictments require confirmation by a Pre-Trial Chamber of judges who scrutinize the evidence supporting the indictment. This Pre-Trial chamber also has to approve any investigation initiated by the prosecutor. Similarly, all judges and prosecutors undergo strict examination before elected and appointed

to the court. Steve Crawshaw summarizes, “Americans might be right to fear that there will be attempts to bring politically motivated cases, but the court has a solid panoply of safeguards, which make it difficult to imagine that malicious and frivolous cases could get past judicial first base.” Ultimately, after examining the benefits of the ICC and turning attention to opposing views, it is clear that the United States must ratify the ICC. To fail to do so would be to shirk a vital global responsibility. Only by ratifying the ICC will the United States be able to combat charges of hypocrisy and improve its global image as well as maintain an active, healthy role in the international arena. It is also clear that the International Criminal Court is far from perfect. However, as global atrocities continue it is the best defense the world currently has. Thus, only after the United States decides to shoulder its duties and ratify the International Criminal Court can the global arena truly look back on atrocities like the Holocaust, the genocide in Rwanda, and the massacre in Kosovo and truly say, “Never again.”

Works Cited Crawshaw, Steve. “ICC: the US and the ICC.” Human Rights Watch. 13 June 2003. 24 May 2006 <http://www.hrw.org/ campaigns/icc/us.htm>. Hongju Koh, Harold. “On America’s Double Standard.” The American Prospect Oct. 2004. King, Henry T., and Theodore C. Theofrastous. “From Nuremberg to Rome: a Step Backward for US Foreign Policy.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 31.47 (1999). Kissinger, Henry A. “The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction.” Foreign Affairs July-Aug. 2001: 86-96. Resiman, W. Michael. “The United States and International Institutions.” American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays. Ed. G. John Ikenberry. New York: Longman, 2002. 40-58.

Roth, Kenneth. “The Case for Universal Jurisdiction.” Foreign Affairs Sept.-Oct. 2001. 24 Mar. 2004 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010901faresponse5577/kenneth-roth/the-casefor-universal-jurisdiction.htm>. Seguin, John. “Denouncing the International Criminal Court: an Examnination of US Objections to the Rome Statute.” Boston University International Law Journal 18.85 (2000). “Straightening the Record.” The Economist 13 May 2006: 3639.

The Kimberley Process, Conflict Diamonds and Lessons in the Battle Against Genocide By Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel Speech at Freie Universität Berlin Jour Fixe Collaborative Research Center February 7, 2008

For those of us who have confronted the issue of genocide, whether as students, scholars, public officials or concerned citizens, the film “Blood Diamond” speaks vividly to the horrors of the war in Sierra Leone financed by trade in illicit diamonds and the human cost. We know that peace is no easy task; peace did not break out with the end of the cold war as we had hoped. Instead, we descended quickly into a world of terror, genocide and war. Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Darfur have wrecked that dream of peace and have led us into moral outrage over continued genocide. The key to confronting genocide is to understand that it must be conceived, planned and implemented. We can end genocide, if we can turn moral outrage of genocides to muster the political will to move from silence to speech to action that will prevent genocide or end it. The facts from the Angola and Sierra Leone conflicts were chilling. In Angola, Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA (Union Nacional Independencia Total de Angola) rebels exported $3-4 billion in diamonds in 1994-98. Diamond sales helped finance a civil war that cost over half a million lives, displaced over 3.5 million and forced 300,000 refugees to flee the country. In Sierra Leone, the diamonds-for-arms trade helped transform the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from a band of 400 to an army of thousands that gained infamy from the magnitude of its atrocities. The civil war in Sierra Leone killed more than 50,000 people, displaced over one-third of the country’s 4.5 million people, and drove over 500,000 to neighboring countries.

We can end genocide, if we can turn moral outrage of genocides to muster the political will to move from silence to speech to action that will prevent genocide or end it.

Reports also circulated that government forces, African-based Lebanese diamond traders, and the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were trading in conflict diamonds. World Security Network reported that “Africa with its huge networks of informal economy is furthermore an environment for terrorist groups to finance themselves.” There were rumors that Al-Qaeda profited from the informal economic structures in Africa. Although we never had enough evidence, many analysts thought it was plausible that Al-Qaeda was involved in the diamonds trade in Sierra Leone and in gems trafficking in Tanzania, thus prolonging the conflicts. The Kimberley Process contributed to ending war in Sierra Leone by cutting financing through a ban on conflict diamonds. That ban is now a world-wide process that denies funding for genocide, war and terrorism through trade in rough diamonds. There are lessons in that process for helping to end genocide. I will refer to the on-going genocide in Darfur as an example. At the outset, let me define “Conflict or Blood Diamonds” as those diamonds used to finance wars and conflict in Africa – Sierra Leone, Angola and Liberia. For those of you who have seen the film “Blood Diamond,” you will have seen that it ends with the opening of the Kimberley Process negotiation. As a veteran negotiator of Holocaust issues from 1998-2002, I was asked to lead the conflict diamonds negotiations for the United States in 20022003. Why is ending genocide or civil war not as easy as we may like? How did the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone grow from a band of 400 to an army of thousands? Why did we not intervene in the 1990’s to end the civil war in Sierra Leone that killed more than 50,000 people, displaced over one-third of the country’s 4.5 million people, and drove more than 500,000 to neighboring countries? I will try to answer some of these questions and look forward to our discussions. Despite public awareness, civil war and rebellion raged for years in Sierra Leone, as it has in Darfur. There was been insufficient moral outrage to muster the political will to intervene earlier. • Public awareness of the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone civil war came slowly until the conflict

inspired the James Bond film “Die Another Day” to show how diamonds laundered through a fake mine and allegedly coming from Iceland financed conflict. The diamonds in that film came from Sierra Leone via Cuba and through a putative reputable company. • Frustrated leaders of international NGO’s also took up the cause and, in an eye-catching demonstration, threw blood on Tiffany’s windows in New York to bring attention to the role diamonds had in financing the war in Sierra Leone. • Outrage was also rightly stimulated by films like the award-winning “Cry Freetown” (by Sorious Samura), which documented some of the RUF’s (and the government’s) worst actions. Slowly moral outrage generated by RUF atrocities in Sierra Leone began to help stir the involved stakeholders – diamond dealers, consumers, human rights activists, and governments -- to understand that ‘conflict diamonds’ were the financiers of atrocities. Only when the diamonds we knew as a unique resource evoking beauty and eternal love were becoming tainted, did action to end the killing begin to stir. The image of beauty could not withstand pictures of maimed children digging for diamonds or child soldiers impressed into armies. The image of blood threatened to overwhelm traditional positive images of diamonds, as rebel groups in Africa used them to finance their wars and commit unspeakable brutalities again civilian populations. That fateful move from outrage to action was to follow in the United Nations and later as shown in the “Blood Diamond” film’s final scene, African stakeholders convened a negotiation that became the Kimberley Process. Those countries with abundant diamond deposits needed to end the Sierra Leone conflict and protect the trade in legitimate diamonds, if they were to receive the benefits of their country’s natural resources. How did the ban on “conflict diamonds” help end the conflict? And, are there lessons for other genocides such as Darfur or is the Blood Diamonds story an exception that cannot help us end genocide elsewhere? I will share my story of the negotiations and my findings on what it took to end the trade in conflict diamonds

Slowly moral outrage generated by RUF atrocities in Sierra Leone began to help stir the involved stakeholders–diamond dealers, consumers, human rights activists, and governments--to understand that ‘conflict diamonds’ were the financiers of atrocities.

that had sustained the war in Sierra Leone and see if you agree that there are lessons for Darfur. First, the world needed to become aware of the importance of blood diamonds for financing the civil war in Sierra Leone. It took until the late 1990’s after years of conflict for the public, the United Nations, national governments, NGO’s, and the diamond industry to understand the crimes were important to them. Second, stakeholders in diamond jewelry, in diamond mining, in African governments with diamond mines were the first to begin to develop the political will and to come together to end the illicit trade in blood diamonds used in the Sierra Leone, Angola and Liberia. The diamond industry also accepted that governments would need to regulate trade in the rough diamond industry after the industry’s long-time opacity; trade in diamonds would change fundamentally Third, the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Robert R. Fowler, fought against trade in blood diamonds with an urgent demand the world community ban trade in blood diamonds from Sierra Leone, Angola and Liberia. Finally, the United Nations in 2000 passed UN Security Council Resolution 1306 that imposed a ban on the importation of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone, Angola and Liberia to help end the killing. Parallel to the Kimberley Process, on December 1, 2000, The UN General Assembly pushed the Kimberley Process forward with a consensus resolution that called on Kimberley Process participants to devise “effective and pragmatic measures to address the problem of conflict diamonds.” The United Nations General Assembly enacted Resolution 55/56 (2000), which called on the international community to give urgent and careful consideration to devising effective and pragmatic measures to address this problem. After negotiations the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 56/263 (2002), which welcomed the detailed proposals for an international certification scheme for rough diamonds developed in the Kimberley Process and urged its finalization and subsequent implementation as soon as possible. Fourth, concurrently, organizations such as World Vision, Global Witness, Amnesty International, Oxfam, Catholic Relief Services, and Partnership Africa Canada turned to the media to help ensure that the world would know about blood diamonds. When NGO-action threatened the diamond

trade worldwide, the South African government mustered the political will to convene in Kimberley, South Africa, a unique grouping of governments, diamonds industry leaders as well as engaged NGOs, in negotiations which became the “Kimberley Process.” Fifth, these multi-stakeholder negotiations began with the goal to create an internationally recognized certificate of origin for “clean diamonds” that would protect both the diamond exporting countries and the industry and assure consumers of diamond jewelry that they would not be buying blood-tainted diamonds that had helped finance war in Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia or elsewhere. Sixth, National governments needed to develop and apply internal customs, policing, and administrative mechanisms to participate fully in the Kimberley Process and to enforce criminal penalties through a “Clean Diamond Trade Act” that needed to be passed in Congress and signed by President Bush. Although international negotiations continued for 18 months, reached a tentative agreement requiring national implementation, and were encouraged by the UN General Assembly, they broke down in 2002. In the United States, legislation banning trade in conflict diamonds stalled in the legislative process. It was then that I was asked to step in and overcome the obstacles blocking the national and international acceptance of the Kimberley Process, which included: • Finding a confluence of interests to implement the draft plan: the Process was a complex, multi-stakeholder negotiation whose success depended on satisfying the diverse interests of international organizations, governments, industry, and NGOs. • Overcoming the resistance of the many agencies of the U.S. Government to a new import/export control or sanctions. • Moving beyond the self-regulation of the industry through warrants to a new government-validated certificate and, • Keeping the efforts of NGO’s to seek more provisions than accepted in the negotiations – statistics, monitoring, miners’ labor rights – from obstructing the legislative process in the United States. • Passing legislation – the Clean Diamond Trade Act.

I set out to forge an implementation process that adhered closely to the proposed Certification Scheme and to minimize the bureaucratic requirements as well as to win industry support. Countless meetings in Johannesburg, Washington, New York, London, and Antwerp finally led us to Interlaken, Switzerland in November 2002, where the Interlaken Declaration was negotiated and signed. Through intensive negotiations we were able to craft an implementing strategy to change the American import/ export rules for uncut diamonds that won the support of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, which became the importing authority, and the Bureau of Census, the exporting authority. These U.S. Agencies “validate” the U.S. Kimberley Process Certificate. The industry, with the support of NGOs, created a non-profit organization – “United States Kimberley Process Authority” – to issue licenses to companies based on a legally binding contract according to the Kimberley Process and stating that diamonds listed on the Certificate are conflict free. These certificates, validated by the importing/exporting authorities then become the basis for conflict free diamond trade. Trade in rough diamonds without such certificates, is banned and enforced by U.S. customs law. Having looked at the possibility of another UN Security Council Resolution banning trade in conflict diamonds worldwide and finding that strategy with little chance of winning support, I turned to a Congressional strategy. That process was problematic as the days in the fall of 2002 passed without movement toward Congressional action. The passions of 2001 had run their course before the Senate could act and the legislations that had passed in the House of Representatives, Congressman Tony Hall’s legislation, stalled in the Senate. The House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee had also raised objections to the trade ban on conflict diamonds. Trade bans are in contravention to U.S. obligations under the WTO. Working closely with the committee’s legal counsel, we looked to a WTO trade ban waiver proposed by the Canadians to exempt the conflict diamonds ban from the WTO obligation. Seeking a parallel approval process to Congressional action, I explored the possibility of a presidential executive order to launch the Kimberley process in the United States, to bridge the time until legislation could be enacted. Time was

running out as we prepared for the Kimberley Process signing ceremony in Interlaken, where we expected all the participating countries to agree to simultaneously launch the Certification Scheme on January 1, 2003, consistent with international trade rules. With this strategy in hand, the U.S. delegation went to Interlaken, Switzerland, to join the international debate on the Kimberley Process. Meeting in Interlaken, we achieved our goal to bind every country signing the declaration to implement minimum standards by January 1, 2003. I told the press that the United States was dead serious about implementing the Kimberley Process in the United States and we informed our embassies of that plan. Of course, as former Secretary of State George Shultz loved to tell us: â&#x20AC;&#x153;In Washington, no question is ever finally decided.â&#x20AC;? My triumph upon return to Washington was short lived as the House Ways and Means Committee Chairman, Representative Bill Thomas, called the then-US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to question the idea of a proposed presidential executive order, which would circumvent congressional action, and also asked whether the proposed ban would keep the U.S. in line with its WTO obligations. As you can imagine, my friend Bob Zoellick called me in to get an answer. Shortly afterward, a committee of deputy secretaries met at the White House; I briefed them on the progress we had made at Interlaken and sought authority to precede with implementation through a presidential executive order. Reporting to the committee, I was pleased to say that we had a system to implement the Kimberley Process, which would contribute to ending diamond financing for rebels in Africa, reduce illicit trade in rough diamonds and make it more difficult for Al Qaeda to use diamonds to finance its terrorism. While the committee approved of the implementation plan, they had no desire to by-pass the legislative process, especially if Chairman Bill Thomas could pass the Clean Diamond Trade Act in short order. My trump card of the presidential executive order was pulled from the table, and I needed to get the U.S. Kimberley Process implementation plan passed in legislation quickly. It was obvious on that December day that January 1, 2003 would come and go without the United States fulfilling its Interlaken pledge.

Under the U.S. system, all rough diamonds shipped into the United States must be accompanied by a Kimberley certificate.

I was determined to get the legislation as soon as possible and worked feverishly to get the plan to the House and Senate for them to re-craft the Clean Diamond Trade Act. The issue was then in the hands of the Congress. Representative Bill Thomas led a Congressional Delegation to Africa and pledged to work with the administration to enact legislation quickly, adhering to our obligations under WTO. The industry had worked hard to get the first certificates ready for January 1, 2003 and I turned to my Canadian colleagues and asked if Canada would recognize the American Certificates, even though the U.S. could not legally enforce them until legislation passed. The Canadians agreed, and the U.S. was given a grace period to comply, while waiting for legislation. The Canadians introduced a trade ban waiver for conflict diamonds to the WTO in February, which addressed the Congressional concern. When February passed without legislation, I called Stephen Morrison at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington and proposed two conferences on the Kimberley Process, one at CSIS in Washington and another in Chicago at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. He agreed, and we invited Representative Thomas and Senators Grassley and Durbin to join the negotiating partners from Africa, the industry, NGOs and governments. In the lead up to those conferences, the House introduced the Clean Diamond Trade Act. By the time of our two conference meetings concluded, the legislation was passed and shortly afterward, on April 25, 2003 President Bush signed the implementing legislation. It was not until July 29, 2003, however, when the president certified that the Clean Diamond Trade Act had gone into effect that the United States became a full participant, joining 54 countries in this important effort to ban conflict diamonds. Under the U.S. system, all rough diamonds shipped into the United States must be accompanied by a Kimberley certificate. When rough diamonds are exported, the U.S. Customs Service validates Kimberley Certificates that are produced by the â&#x20AC;&#x153;United States Kimberley Process Authority,â&#x20AC;? a non-profit organization working with the industry. Seventh, Ultimately, this negotiation shows that all parties in these multi-stakeholder negotiations finally agreed to accept the Kimberly Process Certificate (KPC) system banning trade in conflict diamonds and protecting the purity and the

image of diamonds; and therefore, to deliver diamond income to its rightful owners, particularly in Africa. The Interlaken Declaration made on November 5th 2002 committed governments to implement and enforce The Kimberley Process. Eighth, successful implementation rests on national enforcement of the agreement. In the United States the “Clean Diamond Trade Act” enforces the agreement banning trade in Blood Diamonds. • WTO rules against trade bans were waived to allow national governments to implement a global trade ban against ‘Blood Diamonds’. Ninth, future, continued success requires continuing monitoring of the trade. By the end of 2005 some 56,791 shipments of rough diamonds were controlled. The Kimberley Process ban on blood diamonds was a long step forward to end war in Sierra Leone and to help in it reconstruction. This past year (2005) alone Sierra Leone exported nearly $200 million dollars in rough diamonds. This patrimony is now going to the people. The rest of the story is similar; in 2004 rough diamond production totaled $10 billion dollars with Botswana the largest mining producer (from kimberlite pipes) ($2.32 billion) followed by Russia ($1.98 billion), Canada ($1.4 billion) and South Africa ($1.05 billion). It is the alluvial production that has caused the most concern with illicit trade, but legitimate trade now represents some 25-30% of the world’s output, which comes from Angola ($0.9billion), Democratic Republic of Congo ($0.9 billion), Namibia ($0.7 billion), and Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Guinea, Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and others. One major positive lesson learned from the Kimberley Process is that multi-stakeholder negotiations can actually work. The next step is to understand the underlying factors which enabled agreement and apply them to future negotiations. The progress achieved by Kimberley participants is clear today, as countries around the world regulate trade in rough diamonds. The process must be continued to be refined and made more effective to make Africa a more secure place and to ensure that the patrimony that belongs to the people is mined and sold for their benefit, not for illicit traders Tenth, what remains to be done is to learn the Blood Diamond lesson. The film “Blood Diamond” gives us the

One major positive lesson learned from the Kimberley Process is that multi-stakeholder negotiations can actually work.

opportunity to emphasize the Kimberley Process story of successful conflict resolution and prevention. We need a sequel depicting the end of the killing in Darfur. The Blood Diamond movie in many ways was a wake up call for Darfur. In the last scene in the “Blood diamond” movie the victim of the war in Sierra Leone stands before the world and tells his story, the story of genocide. The Kimberley Process worked. As I began this talk, the key to confronting genocide is to understand that it must be conceived, planned and implemented. We can end genocide, if we can turn moral outrage of genocides to muster the political will to move from silence to speech to action that will prevent genocide or end it. So often has the international community said: “Never again.” So often we have witnessed more genocide. It is possible to remember the lessons of the Kimberley Process and end the murder in Darfur, if we want to do so. Do we?

James D. Bindenagel, is a former United States Ambassador with 28 years of experience in the American diplomatic corps. Bindenagel served the State Department in Germany and Washington, D.C., in various key capacities from 1975 to 2003. In 1999, President Bill Clinton appointed Bindenagel to U.S. ambassador and special envoy for Holocaust education and remembrance issues. From 2002 to 2003, Ambassador Bindenagel led a U.S. government negotiation team that banned trade in “conflict” diamonds used to finance rebellions against legitimate governments in Africa. His diplomatic work has been recognized through numerous awards. He received the State Department’s Distinguished Service Award in 2001, the Commander’s Cross of the Federal Order of Merit from the President of Germany in 2001, the U.S. Secretary of State’s Lifetime Achievement Award in 2002 and the Presidential Meritorious Service Award from President George W. Bush in 2002.

Turning the Tables: How Importing Countries Can Block the Importation of Illicitly Exported Resources from War Zones By Harris Gleckman, Ph.D.

Over the past forty years, natural resource exports have increasingly helped finance and sustain bloody conflicts in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia. This has cost millions of lives and is wreaking havoc on development. Natural resource wealth, which should improve the lives of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s poorest people, has become a resource curse and a source of civil unrest. The export of natural resources from conflict zones can provide significant illicit resources to purchase weapons, to enhance private fortunes, and to provide an economic motive to perpetuate armed conflict. The common point of departure is that in pre-conflict, conflict, and immediate post-conflict areas, there is no effective state. Without a functioning state, there are no pre-conditions for sound business activity. There is no office for corporate registration, no foundation for legitimate contracts for property rental or natural resources extraction, no operative social or environmental laws or regulations, no basis for legitimate state tax collection and no peaceful method of contract dispute resolution. Without a clear set of enforceable business rules, high-value transactions are very likely to be carried out in an illegal, illicit, or uncertain market. During and before a conflict, these transactions provide both financial resources to arm and re-arm combatants as well as create an incentive to maintain a conflict for short-term financial benefits derived from the grey and black markets. The elephant-in-the-room is that this creates a significant political and legal vacuum. Inside the territory there is no effective state to regulate business practices and inside the international market there is no governing business rule of law. The vacuum provides a black hole for any range of commercial transactions. The various solutions that have been proposed to deal with this issue have to date cumulatively failed to significantly

obstruct the illicit flow of war-related natural resources exports and the objectionable flow of arms and wealth back to conflict areas. It is now worth examining methods by importing and transit countries that might be more effective in the long run. Solutions in receiving countries might be more effective because there is a functioning state and administrative system to block and seize the illicitly exported war assets. Were combined OECD countries to deter just 40% of the exports it would be significantly reduce black and grey market transactions and the motivation for them. Four types of public and private policy tools could be used importing and transit countries, and firms, to prevent the transformation of illicit war-based exports into apparently legitimate business assets. Customs seizures States can use customs services to block the importation of illicit or illegal goods and confiscate assets whose provenance is likely to have been illegitimate seizure in a war zone. For a given shipment of goods, states can be direct actors in challenging the importation by instructing their customs officers to act under a new set of rules. These instructions would need to be based on a modification of WTO rules of origin that could permit custom authorities to have different procedures for the importation of goods from zones of conflicts. This modification, which would require a WTO waiver, would need to define in a neutral manner those areas which were in a state of conflict, probably by invocating pre-existing decisions of the Security Council, the European Community, or a foreign ministry.

Criminalization A state can complement customs blocking by using its criminal justice system to apprehend the importers and their goods once they have entered national territory. In principle, appropriate authorities could use the facilities of Interpol to track and capture criminal assets and then jail or fine the perpetrators of the crime of selling stolen war-related natural resources. This approach would probably take the form of an international treaty, perhaps similar in character to the new anti-corruption agreement. It is also possible for individual countries to set conditions in their discretionary law to permit a declaration by a senior government official or the Security

Council that declares that imports from a specific war zone should be considered criminal goods. Such unilateral action by a state would most likely also require an explicit waiver from the WTO. This criminalization option is quite difficult because the underlying action is not really a crime in the conflict zone. Without an effectively functioning state in the war zone, there is often no clear law to violate, no one to issue indictment, no court to hear evidence, and no judge and jury to convict. Without a conviction, there is no recognized international arrest procedure or seizure warrant. In all these cases, the importing and transit state will need to make a series of prosecution decisions that will inevitably be driven by wider domestic foreign policy concerns. Business civil laws on contested assets Another option, which is being developed as a new project under the auspices of UNCTAD and UNU, is to employ civil business law systems and corporate social responsibility practices outside the zone of conflict. This approach focuses on using the court and administrative systems of the importing and transit countries (the places where the natural resources are turned into fungible commodities and cash) to de-legitimize the illicit acquisition of the natural resource in the conflict zones. This does not require the war-related party to accept to the binding authority of an arbitration panel; it does not depend on the extreme level of violence overcoming the economic self-interest of individual firms; it does not require the political intervention by a minister of justice to start a criminal proceeding. It does have the potential to work in concert with any state-based certification system that is a second-generation Kimberly process, and it does have the potential to engage civil society organizations in the exporting and importing countries in joint activities using existing business rules of law. One clear limitation is that it is impossible to track most export ships with cargo from war-zones. Voluntary business sector undertakings A market-based option is the introduction of voluntary corporate social responsibility standards for trade, manufacture, license, export, and service agreements for a given commodity in a given conflict area. Some groups of firms have voluntarily taken steps to avoid or to minimize dealing

with products from countries with extreme human rights and violence histories. Such a declaration would be a reasonable extension of the use of conflict assessment tools developed by International Alert. A generic voluntary CSR standard for war-zones might open some new doors for industrial trade associations. Yet it is quite clear that only extreme depravations and very high levels of violence can provide the economic motivation for self-declared systems from firms or associations of firms. Potential Precedents

A range of international legal regimes and programmes already exist where the administrative and court systems in importing and transiting countries are used to seize illicit, illegal, and otherwise not appropriately owned assets. Perhaps the oldest is the agreement regarding the trade of endangered species and fauna crossing international borders under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). CITES subjects international trade in specimens of selected species to certain controls of movement through the use of licensing by responsible Management Authorities, and Scientific Authorities to advise on the effects of trade on the status of the species. Today, it accords varying degrees of protection to more than 30,000 species of animals and plants. A second ‘older’ scheme involves the return of antiquities ‘stolen’ under prior periods of colonialism and imperialism. Developing countries, frequently through their museums and supported by their consulates in the ‘host’ country, are now pursuing ‘looted’ items based on the argument that they were and remain a part of their cultural history.1 A ‘new’ scheme is the recent assertion by the G8 that intellectual property rights can include trade restrictions against the exports of products, even from those countries that are not members of the international intellectual property regime. The existing regime, particularly the WIPO and the Paris Conventions require, as most conventions do, that national states sign and approve the conventions for them to be bound by the terms of the convention. The dilemma for those governments and private firms is that some countries accept 1 “An ideal museum would observe all laws and treaties, including the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. There are no statutes of limitation. In the U.S. , Customs and the FBI are charged with enforcing the law against anyone bringing stolen goods from abroad.”

knock off-goods, locally produced ‘patented’ medicines, and use of ‘registered’ trade names by local companies and these countries are not inclined to sign on to the existing patent protection system. In a manner that is not too dissimilar to the lack of legal definitions in war zones over products, some firms are seeking to criminalize products produced without royalties through an international agreement without the involved of the producing State. This initiative has been supported in the most recent 2007 G8 statement from Germany: “We recognize the need for continued study by national experts of the possibilities of strengthening the international legal framework pertaining to intellectual property rights enforcement.” A fourth arena is the set of already in place trade and financing obstacles to the movement of assets associated with drugs, terrorism and corruption. In the U.S. “War on Drugs,” law enforcement agencies often seize and retain the assets of those arrested. Confiscated property can include houses, cars and money. In the ‘war on terror’, banks and financial institutions around the world were asked to freeze or block terrorist ability to access funds in foreign accounts. The recent G8 statement in Berlin this year is again relevant. “Denying safe havens through our national laws to individuals found guilty of corruption and the return of illicitly-acquired assets with high priority and developing additional measures to prevent such individuals from gaining access to the fruits of their criminal activities in our financial systems” (bold added for emphasis). Another area that could provide a model is the current effort to stop the involuntary movement of humans. Legally speaking, human trafficking faces many of the same obstacles as deterring illicitly exported natural resources, including corruption, underfinanced programs and a low priority for law enforcement. Strategic implementation of counter-trafficking policies and programs can impair the conditions that permit traffickers to thrive. Innovative, systemic strategies are being developed so that trafficking will become an unattractive opportunity for criminal groups A demand-focused strategy reduces the overall size of the industry while decreasing profits for traffickers. In a transnational context, focusing on destination countries is, along with strategies like increased awareness of the problem, can be more effective than exclusively source-country initiatives.

These five existing schemes all share an international consensus that the normal rules of the market should be set aside for broader public goals. These schemes can be legal precedents for a new legal and administrative systems that block the transformation of illicitly seized natural resources in a conflict zone into legitimate business assets in the importing country. At minimum, the legal vacuum needs to be closed. The challenge is to develop a system that allows current experience in using political, economic, and social tools in other arena to support the efforts to reduce violence in war zones. While this may seem rather straightforward, there are challenging legal, businesses, procedural and political issues to resolve before it can be put in place. These include the administrative procedures for granting standing to bring an action before a civil court on behalf of those in a third country at war; an acceptable trade definition of naturalresource-exports-from-conflict-zones; rules of evidence and the change in the burden of proof in criminal proceedings, and rules for administrating the trust to hold the recovered assets or to re-direct them to peacekeeping in the region. It may well be appropriate that these items are clarified in an selfstanding international convention or a decision of the Security Council. There is clearly a shift in social, corporate and governmental awareness about natural resources and war that provides opportunities to address these issues in a new manner. In addition to an awakened public consciousness has been awakened because of the recent movie, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Blood Diamondâ&#x20AC;?, we have noted a new governmental political willingness to use trade and asset-related policy tools for broader political objectives. Lastly, the economic and social development agencies of the UN system are starting to examine how the practical aspects of business trade and investment can be used for make a significant contributions to peacemaking field. Dr. Harris Gleckman is the principal and co-founder of Benchmark Environmental Consulting, a firm that specializes in environmental problems through a practical business and technical approach. Over the past twenty five years, he has worked extensively with the United Nations, serving as the New York Office Chief for the UN Conference on Trade and Development (2005,2005) and as Chief of the Environmental Unit at the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (1989-1993), in an effort to strengthen equity, transparency and

accountability in institutions of global governance.

What Makes Them Tick? The Individual, Strategic, and Tactical Logics of Female Suicide Terrorism By Rebecca Brocker

Female suicide terrorism is on the rise worldwide. There were six suicide attacks known to have been perpetrated by women during the 1980s. Then, between 1990 and 2000, female suicide bombers committed 30 suicide attacks, and between 2000 and 2006, they committed over 40 suicide attacks. Female suicide bombers have detonated in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, and represent 15% of all suicide bombers.1 In the past, the majority of scholarly attention has been given to suicide terrorism as a general phenomenon. Suicide terrorism has been largely attributed to extremist religious or nationalist beliefs on an individual level, combined with the strategic advantages offered by suicide bombers on the group level in reaction to the external circumstances caused by a foreign occupation or a war. Conversely, the specific phenomenon of female suicide terrorism has not until recently received special attention. Within the past few years, though, the available information regarding female suicide bombers has advanced substantially. By taking a closer look at female suicide terrorism, we have come to realize that over seven hundred people have died and two thousand have been injured by eighty-two female suicide bombers.2 These attackers have represented insurgent groups in Iraq; the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP) in Lebanon; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka; the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey; Chechen separatists in Russia; reportedly, al-Qaeda in Somalia; and Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Palestine.3 While many point to Islamic

Introduction

Note: This paper’s title was drawn from the works of Robert Pape and Joshua Brilliant. 1 Lindsey A. O’Rourke, “Why do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?” (Draft for Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism Workshop, December 2006), 4. 2 O’Rourke, “Why do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 4. 3 O’Rourke, “Why do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 9.

Under what conditions do terrorist organizations that launch suicide bombers use women for such attacks?

fundamentalism as a main cause for suicide terrorism, 85.4% of female suicide bombers acted on behalf of secular organizations rather than on behalf of religious ones, a point that will be addressed further below.4 The fact that the number of female suicide bombers is steadily rising draws our attention to this topic. Unfortunately, we currently lack the operational understanding of female suicide terrorism that would be necessary to curb female suicide terrorism. This article therefore addresses the question: “Under what conditions do terrorist organizations that launch suicide bombers use women for such attacks?” Since female suicide bombers are often believed to have significantly different motivations than male suicide bombers, this article also addresses the following sub-question: “why do individual women decide to become suicide bombers?” These two questions will allow us to place female suicide bombers in a context that not only considers the women’s personal motivations, but also the external factors (such as a foreign occupation or a war) that ultimately contribute to their decision to become ‘martyrs’. It is vital to explore these issues because it is in the best interest of governments and individuals around the world (particularly those that are the targets of terrorist actions) to minimize the number of people who commit acts of suicide terrorism. We cannot hope to prevent these attacks until we know why they happen in the first place; consequently, it is necessary to understand both the individual and group motivations that lead to female involvement in suicide terror campaigns. For example, if the main reason that female suicide bombings occur revolves around the individual motivations, while we likely would not be able to eradicate the root causes of such acts, we could at least begin to recognize signals and perhaps predict when or where these attacks would be likely. Conversely, if the main issues seem to lie at the group level rather than that of the individual, we could redirect our attention and efforts to concentrate on understanding the situation at that level. Overall, only with knowledge of all of the conditions that come together to cause female suicide terrorism can we begin to comprehend the issue on a global level and develop strategies to prevent such attacks. It is argued that two of the most important coun4

O’Rourke, “Why do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 4.

terterrorism goals are to defeat the “current terrorists” and to prevent a “new generation” of terrorists from rising up.5 Since the use of female suicide bombers is a relatively new phenomenon, they could be considered to be this “next generation” of suicide bombers. To achieve the goal of preventing a new generation from rising up, a focus must be placed on female suicide terrorists in order to gain an understanding of the specific logic of that particular group’s involvement in campaigns of suicide terrorism. Further, if we understand the strategic and tactical reasons why women are being accepted into terrorist groups, we might be able to prevent women from successfully completing their suicide missions or predict which demographics may be likely candidates for the “new generation” of suicide bombers. This article is organized as follows: Under what conditions does female suicide terrorism arise? Foreign Occupation War

Under what conditions do women choose to become suicide bombers?

Escapism

Redemption

Under what conditions do terrorist organizations employ women as suicide bombers?

Strategic Advantages

Tactical Advantages

Scholarly work on this topic revolves around one main debate: whether female suicide terrorism is motivated primarily by internal or external factors. One school of thought argues that internal factors, such as the personal motivations listed below, are the main reason that women choose to become suicide bombers. However, it is also argued that the motivations for female suicide bombers are primarily external and that it is vital to place the stories of female suicide bombers into the appropriate context of war or foreign occupation. Following this logic, then, a woman who commits an act of suicide terrorism often has personal motivations, but would not have become a suicide bomber if her environment had not been one 5 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House, New York: 2005), 238.

of conflict. In other words, it is not enough to have internal factors; there must also be external factors in place in order to yield female suicide terrorism. Therefore, the first section explores the existing explanations of the internal factors that explain why individual women become suicide bombers. Reflecting common wisdom, Mia Bloom argues that female suicide bombers are typically motivated by personal reasons, while male suicide bombers are motivated by religious or nationalist fanaticism.6 Some commonly cited personal motivations for female suicide bombers include: • • • • • • •

Though many writers have focused on one particular group or the individual story of one suicide bomber, there is no single characteristic that unites all of the female suicide bombers.

Societal pressure Inability or lack of desire to marry or bear children Aspirations to achieve gender equality Desire to seek revenge for the loss of a loved one Harassment or embarrassment by opposition forces Financial problems Any combination of these factors7

For individual women, these personal motivations can be further sorted into the categories of “escapism” or “redemption.” Two women can be motivated by the same factor, such as the inability or lack of desire to marry or bear children, so it is essential to differentiate them based on their actual motivation (that is, to either escape their situation or to redeem themselves by committing an act of suicide terrorism). However, it is not always possible to sort the actual motivations into these two categories, since some women share the same problem or factor yet commit the act of suicide terrorism for different reasons. Though many writers have focused on one particular group or the individual story of one suicide bomber, there is no single characteristic that unites all of the female suicide bombers. Additionally, these personal motivations cannot fully explain why women become suicide bombers, because although many women throughout the world face the same difficulties and challenges, they do not all become suicide 6 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 145. 7 Based on the work of experts such as Barbara Victor and Mia Bloom.

bombers (e.g., many women are divorced or infertile, but very few become suicide bombers). Thus, the second section of the article takes this issue to a higher level of aggregation and examines the external reasons for female suicide terrorism. This section considers the reasons why terrorist organizations utilize female suicide bombers. These group-level motivations can be split into two main categories: strategic advantages and tactical advantages. Strategic advantages include women’s ability to: • Capitalize on the glorification and admiration of female suicide bombers • Mobilize other potential suicide bombers into action Tactical advantages include the women’s ability to: • Pass more easily through security checkpoints • Feign pregnancy in order to avoid scrutiny • Serve as accomplices to male suicide bombers • Get closer to soft targets (for example, public figures whose deaths would have a strong impact and receive a great deal of publicity)8 The strategic and tactical motivations listed above, if accurate, can be beneficial to terrorist organizations whose goals are to incite a societal reaction large enough to generate a following for their group or to scare as many people as possible. As such, these organizations must constantly develop new ways of attack to ensure that their target population never feels safe. Thus, the inclusion of female suicide bombers opens up another group of potential suicide bombers and makes it harder for security officials to screen for possible terrorists. “[In Palestine], all four who died, plus the others who had tried and failed to die a martyr’s death, had personal problems that made their lives untenable within their own culture and society.”9

Why Do Women Become Suicide Bombers?

Some scholars consider female suicide bombers to be fundamentally different than male suicide bombers. In order to understand why this is the case, it is necessary to examine the factors that lead women to become martyrs and to determine 8 Based on the work of experts such as Robert Pape and Lindsey O’Rourke. 9 Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Rodale: 2003), 7.

whether (and, if so, how) these motivations differ from those of male suicide bombers. Some female suicide bombers may also harbor religious or political motives, but oftentimes those motives are downplayed in the media while personal reasons, which will be discussed below, are given center stage. Regardless of each womanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s reasons for committing acts of suicide terrorism, it is important to note that the tendency of many authors has been to paint a picture of a woman with a plethora of problems who turns to suicide bombing to give meaning to her life. While men are portrayed as brave warriors fighting for a cause they passionately believe in, their personal problems that may have led them to become a suicide bomber are ignored or downplayed as reasons for their actions. The actions of female suicide bombers tend to be interpreted as a way to either: 1) escape the factors that make them unhappy, or 2) to empower or redeem themselves in response to their problems. Overall, female suicide bombers are perceived to take their lives literally into their own hands in the face of societal pressure or personal problems. However, it is important to note that there are varying degrees of societal pressure placed upon countless numbers of women in virtually every country. Therefore, while societal pressures including the inability to marry or have children or gender inequality may be strong factors that lead certain women to consider â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;martyrdomâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, it is impossible to link any one of these conditions directly to martyrdom. Even when it is possible to connect the conditions to the outcomes, these conditions are necessary but not sufficient. In other words, women typically must have problems to become suicide bombers but not all women with problems do become suicide bombers; clearly there are also external factors that must be addressed in order to construct an accurate argument. This section will examine all of the personal factors that are cited as reasons why women choose to become suicide bombers. Societal Pressure

Societal pressure in a general sense is often cited as a reason why women become suicide bombers. In Palestinian society, for example, women are generally expected to get married and have children, and when that expectation is not fulfilled, suicide bombing becomes an acceptable replacement as a contribution to society. One Palestinian female suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, was a paramedic for the Red Crescent and cared for Pales-

tinians injured by the Israelis. She is an example of a female suicide bomber who faced societal pressure, as one expert, Dr. Mira Tzoreff, explains: If we take Wafa Idris…the ultimate shahida [martyr], who is she after all? She is a talented young woman, married and divorced because she was sterile, desperate because she knew perfectly well there was no future for her in any aspect of the Palestinian society. She knew better than anyone else that the only way for her to come out against this miserable situation was to kill herself [emphasis added]…She knew her own society and the limitations they put on her and on women like her and she understood better than anyone else that she had nothing left, no hope, no future.10 It seems, then, that Wafa saw suicide bombing as the only way out, because living in her society meant a life of unhappiness and unfulfilled potential, while the prospect of becoming a martyr held the promise of a better existence in the afterlife. In fact, the cousin of Darine Abu Aisha, the second Palestinian female suicide bomber, believes that some women owe it to Palestine to become suicide bombers. Perhaps more importantly, she also believes that as mothers, Palestinian women must encourage their children to become suicide bombers. She explains, “I adore my children, but if I help them achieve martyrdom, it only means that Allah has chosen them because he loves them more than I do.”11 Thus, she believes that it is not only socially acceptable but encouraged for women to become martyrs or to raise their children to become martyrs. Divorce or the inability to bear children is frequently cited as a reason why women decide to become suicide bombers. For example, Wafa Idris, the Palestinian suicide bomber discussed above, was married at a young age to her first cousin, but could not conceive. Eventually, she did get pregnant, but gave birth to a stillborn infant. After that, Wafa became depressed and refused to do anything (such as cooking, cleaning, and other household tasks) and her husband, angry and frustrated, 10 11

Victor, Army of Roses, 47. Victor, Army of Roses, 102

The Inability or Lack of Desire to Marry or Bear Children

divorced her.12 After the divorce, her mother explains, “Wafa knew she could never marry again because a divorced woman is tainted…She was young, intelligent, and beautiful and had nothing to live for.”13 This story reflects an escapist motivation for ‘martyrdom’ and is representative of women who, unable to tolerate the idea of a future without a husband or children, choose to martyr themselves. On the other hand, the second Palestinian female suicide bomber, Darine Abu Aisha, allegedly chose to become a martyr not because she could not marry, but because she did not want to marry. She had several prospects for marriage, all of which she turned down in order to concentrate on her studies, saying that “she had no intention of ever marrying because she had no intention of becoming a slave.”14 Darine’s cousin explains that Darine was teased and her family suffered because she did not want to marry. However, after her death her family was happy to find out that she had finally come to serve “a higher purpose.” They believe that Darine knew she would become “the bride of Allah in paradise.”15 The decision to become a martyr empowered Darine to perform a task viewed as more important than any earthly role she could have ever hoped to fill. Thus, the same factor (marriage) led to two very different outcomes. Wafa, who could not marry again, became a martyr to escape her life on earth. Conversely, Darine did not want to marry, so she became a martyr in an attempt to empower herself to be a part of something bigger than the role carved out for her by her society. Aspirations to Achieve Gender Equality

In many of the societies in which suicide bombings take place, women struggle for rights and recognition. Mia Bloom, author of the book Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, explains that according to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, African and Middle Eastern women suffer the most from gender inequality.16 As a result, the desire to achieve gender equality is sometimes cited as a reason why women commit acts of suicide terrorism. Clara Beyler writes, “When women become human bombs, their intent is to make a statement not only in the name of a country, a religion, a 12 13 14 15 16

Victor, Army of Roses, 42-43. Victor, Army of Roses, 41. Victor, Army of Roses, 103. Victor, Army of Roses, 100. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 142.

leader, but also in the name of their gender.”17 For example, Darine Abu Aisha’s best friend, Nano Abdul, believed that Darine became a ‘martyr’ because she had gone as far as she could within her society. Even though she was extremely bright and attended university, “her fate as a Palestinian woman was sealed – an arranged marriage, six or seven children, a husband who probably wouldn’t have the same hopes or curiosity about life that she did.”18 As a result, she chose to martyr herself to escape her certain fate on earth. Therefore, the aspiration to achieve gender equality is another factor that helps to explain Darine’s desire to become a suicide bomber. Furthermore, many of the women who become suicide bombers are either recruited or “handled” by men. Thus, one could argue that women are still being categorized and treated as subordinates rather than being empowered. Even though these women are being “allowed” to make what they view as a great sacrifice, in the end, they are being sent off to die by men, perhaps in the place of men. This suggests that their lives continue to be valued less than those of the men, which directly contradicts the argument that women are able to achieve gender equality as a result of their actions. Clara Beyler asserts that in some groups, such as the Palestinian Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades or the Chechen rebels, female suicide bombers do not achieve gender equality because they are not given the same opportunities to participate in the terrorist group as men are. However, there are groups, such as the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey or the Tamil Tigers of Liberation Eelam in Sri Lanka, which do allow women to play an active role in the terrorist organizations. In those cases, suicide terrorism is arguably “the next logical step” of involvement.19 For example, during the period of 1980-2003, ten of the PKK’s fourteen suicide attacks (71%) were carried out by women.20 The PKK case is unique because it is believed that none of their suicide bombers were walk-in volunteers; the men and women who committed acts of suicide terrorism on behalf of the PKK were “long-serving members” of the group.21 17 Clara Beyler, “Messengers of Death – Female Suicide Bombers.” Institute for Counter-Terrorism Report (12 February 2003):3. 18 Victor, Army of Roses, 104. 19 Beyler, “Messengers of Death,” 3-4. 20 Pape, Dying to Win, 208. 21 Pape, Dying to Win, 153.

These facts do support the idea that women formed part of the group and were not recruited for the sole purpose of becoming suicide bombers. However, this case does not necessarily reflect gender equality. There were more women than men deployed to martyr themselves (ten women as opposed to four men). This may actually suggest that men are more highly valued within terrorist organizations and, as a result, the women are sent to die instead. Though the fact that so many women were “allowed” to die could be seen as a reflection of gender equality, it could also be viewed as gender inequality since they are martyred at a higher rate than the men. Another group that has used female suicide bombers is Hezbollah. From 1982 to 1986, six women carried out suicide attacks on behalf of Hezbollah against American, French, and Israeli forces in Lebanon. These women represented 16% of the 37 total suicide attackers whose gender was identified.22 It is important to note that during this period, most suicide bombers were volunteers, not part of the group. As a result, it is possible that the numbers of men and women who became suicide bombers are not a result of the choices made by Hezbollah, but rather a reflection of simple supply and demand. Rather than reflecting any sort of gender bias, these data may simply illustrate the numbers of men and women who volunteered for suicide missions. Desire to Seek Revenge for the Loss of a Loved One

100

In many of the cases, a connection can be made between a female suicide bomber and a male loved one (such as a brother, a cousin, an uncle, a fiancé, or a father) that died in a particular conflict. This factor is most effectively illustrated by the Chechen case. Within that society, there is an entire group of female suicide attackers called the Black Widows who are said to become suicide bombers for the sole purpose of seeking revenge for the loss of family members killed as a result of Russian military action.23 For, example, in November 2001, a Chechen woman named Elza Gazuyeva killed herself and the Russian commander who was believed to have ordered the death of Elza’s husband in a suicide attack.24 Though she empowered herself to take revenge against the man she believed had ordered her husband’s murder, it is also possible 22 Pape, Dying to Win, 204. (Note: a total of 41 suicide attackers carried out 26 suicide attacks in Lebanon between 1982-1986.) 23 Pape, Dying to Win, 211. 24 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 156.

that she was attempting to escape life without her husband. It is impossible to definitively identify whether she was trying to escape or empower herself, but either way, it does seem that her husband’s death was at least part of the reason she became a suicide bomber. However, while these women are no doubt devastated by the loss of their loved ones, this factor alone cannot explain their actions. For example, even though the number of people killed during the First and Second Chechen Wars (1994-1996 and 1999-present, respectively) is widely disputed, the number of women who have become suicide bombers is much smaller. One Chechen official said on August 15, 2005, that between 150,000 and 160,000 people had died or gone missing over the course of those conflicts.25 Robert Pape, on the other hand, writes that from 2000-2003, 1.1 million people comprised the Chechen occupied population, while 50,000 deaths had occurred as a result of military presence (a rate of 50 deaths per 1,000 people). However, there were a total of 33 suicide attacks, and less than 14 suicide attacks perpetrated by females. Thus, for every 1,000 deaths related to the military presence, less than one suicide attack was committed by male and female suicide bombers combined.26 By examining this data, it becomes evident that this explanation alone is not sufficient because though many women have lost loved ones in this particular conflict, very few have reacted by becoming suicide terrorists. In some cases, women are believed to have been led to suicide terrorism as a result of harassment or embarrassment by members of opposition forces. Dr. Iyad Sarraj, a Palestinian psychiatrist from Gaza who has studied the phenomenon of suicide, explains: “The children who threw stones and Molotov cocktails and confronted Israeli soldiers in 1987 and who watched their fathers and other male relatives being beaten and humiliated by Israeli forces, are the young men [and women] who are the martyrs of today.”27 By this logic, as a response to past mistreatment, these people may become suicide bombers to empower themselves against the enemy. 25 “Chechen Official Puts War Deaths at 160,000.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 August 2005, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details_ print.cfm?id=12510 (accessed 19 February 2007). 26 Pape, Dying to Win, 59 and 208. (Note: this number includes all federal troops, rebel fighters, and civilians, and an estimated one-fourth of these people are ethnic Chechens.) 27 Victor, Army of Roses, 40.

Harassment or Embarrassment by Opposition Forces

101

Nowadays, in some conflict zones, women are humiliated as they pass through checkpoints. In one case, a Palestinian woman was forced by an Israeli officer to wait an hour to pass through the checkpoint and suffered verbal abuse and offensive sexual advances made by the guards while she waited. After describing that incident, the woman said that she felt that “[l]ife is worth nothing when [we] are being humiliated on a daily basis.”28 When the women feel this way, their decision to become suicide bombers allows them to escape this daily humiliation and to take revenge. Another example of humiliation by the opposition forces is the story of Darine Abu Aisha, who was discussed in previous sections of this article. On one occasion, Darine got very upset because soldiers at a checkpoint would not let a sick infant pass. When she tried to convince them to allow the infant to pass through, the soldiers told her that they would – if Darine kissed her cousin Rashid on the mouth. This incident was so severe that the two would have to marry because after having kissed her cousin, she would not be able to marry anyone else. Since Darine did not want to get married, Rashid promised to help her find another solution that would empower her to change the course of her life and protect the family’s honor, and that is how she is said to have started down the path to martyrdom.29 However, the abuses of opposition forces do not end with the spoken word. Both Tamil and Kurdish women have been known to join the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers Party), respectively, because they were raped by members of the Sinhalese or Turkish military.30 Mia Bloom writes, “What is incredibly compelling about delving into how and why women become suicide bombers is that so many of these women have been raped or sexually abused in the previous conflict either by the representatives of the state or by the insurgents themselves.”31 In these cases, the women could be motivated by either escapism (to escape humiliation or scorn) or redemption (to take action against the enemy) in order to become martyrs.32 Rape is unfortunately a frequent occurrence during

102

28 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 146-147. 29 Victor, Army of Roses, 107-108. 30 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 145. 31 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 143. 32 Jessica Davis, “Women and Terrorism in Radical Islam: Planners, perpetrators, patrons?” (paper prepared for the First Annual Graduate Symposium, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada), 5.

wars and is typically viewed as a negative consequence of conflict. However, rape has only led to female suicide terrorism in a handful of contexts in which suicide terrorism was already taking place. Since in many societies rape precludes a woman from marriage and compromises her honor, the combination of the internal anguish caused by rape and the external factor of an already-existent suicide terror campaign can come together to yield an act of female suicide terrorism – if a woman believes that her act will lead to redemption. Therefore, in order for a female suicide bomber to martyr herself in hopes of redemption, the precedent must be set by someone who comes before her. In other words, if suicide terrorism is already occurring within a conflict, and a rape victim sees that previous martyrs have been glorified, she may be likely to see martyrdom as a path to redemption. There is little strong evidence that financial motivations drive female suicide terrorism. For example, in Chechnya, one woman agreed to become a suicide bomber because the Chechen rebels promised to pay her relatives $1,000 to compensate for the cost of the jewelry that the woman had stolen from her family. However, this woman decided at the last minute not to complete her mission and turned herself in to the Russian police.33 It is clear that this woman was desperate for money – but not desperate enough to kill herself. Even though this woman did not go through with her assignment, it is worth noting that she was, at least temporarily, willing to commit an act of suicide terrorism in order to repay a $1,000 debt. This story is one example of a would-be martyr reneging on her agreement with the terrorist organization, and it shows that financial motivations may not be a strong enough factor to lead a woman to kill herself. Though it is difficult to imagine placing a value of a thousand dollars on human life, Dr. Emanuel Savin, an expert in terrorism, believes that economic factors are very influential in the decision-making process of potential bombers. Due to the dire circumstances in which many Palestinians find themselves as a result of the Israeli occupation, suicide bombing offers a way for women to take control of their family’s fate and earn money for their families.34 Even though a large amount of this money did not go directly to the families, they still received 33 34

Bloom, Dying to Kill, 145. Victor, Army of Roses, 39.

Financial Problems

Due to the dire circumstances in which many Palestinians find themselves as a result of the Israeli occupation, suicide bombing offers a way for women to take control of their family’s fate and earn money for their families. 103

about 10%, and considering the per capita income is $1,000 per year on average, it is conceivable that a family would sacrifice a child to attain financial security – especially if they believe that their child will live on forever in Paradise.35 Saddam Hussein gave $25,000 rewards to the families of each martyr, plus $25,000 to re-build houses destroyed by the Israeli army (which were destroyed to discourage future suicide bombers).36 However, Israeli forces do not solely destroy the homes of suicide bombers. In response to less than 100 suicide attacks, Israeli forces destroyed approximately 500 houses. As a result, many more families suffered as a result of the suicide bombers’ actions and ostensibly did not receive financial compensation for the destruction of their homes.37 Interestingly, Dr. Abul Aziz al-Rantisi, spokesperson for Hamas, admitted during an on-camera interview that male suicide bombers’ families are paid $400 per month, whereas the families of female suicide bombers receive half that amount. This money is paid each month for a lifetime to the families by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or the Palestinian authority, depending on who takes responsibility for the attack.38 Despite the fact that they are completing the same task and dying for the same cause, female suicide bombers only receive half the amount of money that their male counterparts do. If men are paid twice as much as women, but the money is not typically named as a motivating factor for male martyrs, it is difficult to believe that financial problems on their own serve as motivation for women. Additionally, if a family desperately needs money, it would be more economically advantageous to send a son instead of a daughter to become a martyr. Thus, while the financial aspect certainly may contribute to a woman’s decision to become a martyr, it seems that this reason is, at best, a secondary one. Without at least one other personal issue or problem present, it seems that even if a woman did enter into an agreement with a terrorist organization solely in order to earn money, she would be likely to renege on the agreement just as the Chechen woman did. However, if the woman presents other problems in addition to financial concerns, she may be more inclined to take into account the fact that her family will receive a fairly large sum

104

35 36 37 38

Victor, Army of Roses, 36-37. Victor, Army of Roses, 36-37. Robert Pape, personal interview, April 4, 2007. Victor, Army of Roses, 35.

of money upon her death and ultimately decide to become a martyr. Though all of the factors above, along with countless others, may be offered as explanations for the actions of female suicide bombers, it must be recognized that no single factor directly leads to suicide terrorism. Mia Bloom, who over the course of her book discusses many of these factors in extreme detail, acknowledges that, “Motives vary: revenge for a personal loss, the desire to redeem the family name, to escape a life of sheltered monotony and achieve fame, and to level the patriarchal societies in which they live…”39 However, in cases like Darine’s, we can see that a combination of life experiences and personal problems can come together to incite a woman to action. It was not just the incidence of humiliation at the checkpoint, or just the fact that she did not want to get married, or just the fact that she was being forced to marry her cousin. She became a suicide terrorist because of all of these reasons and possibly others as well. It is extremely difficult to ascertain the precise motivations of any suicide bomber because we oftentimes must rely on the insight of friends and family after she commits her act of martyrdom.

Combination of Several Factors

The length of the above list is indicative of a wide variety of personal motivations, and though many writers have focused on one particular group or the individual stories of each suicide bomber, there is no single characteristic that forms a nexus between all of the female suicide bombers. Additionally, these personal motivations cannot fully explain why women become suicide bombers, because though countless women throughout the world face similar circumstances or problems, very few of them become suicide bombers (the world’s current population includes approximately two billion women above the age of fifteen,40 but only eighty-two women have successfully completed suicide terrorist attacks.)41 In order to fully comprehend this issue, we need to examine it considering the external factors that lead terrorist groups to employ women. Since the decisions of terrorist organizations are founded upon concrete strategic and tactical goals associated with eliciting a particular reaction from their

Conclusion

39 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 143. 40 “World,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/geos/xx.html. 41 O’Rourke, “Why Do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 4.

105

enemies, evaluating these factors provides a more fruitful and objective way of arriving at a feasible explanation. Why Do Terrorist Organizations Allow Women to Become Suicide Bombers?

“Bombers work as parts of organizations, rarely as individuals. These organizations and their roles in the bombing must be understood.

Religion and Female Suicide Terrorism

Religion is often cited as the main motivation for suicide terrorism. Therefore, before discussing the specific strategic and tactical advantages that terrorist organizations may enjoy as a result of female suicide terrorism, it is essential to understand the role that religion plays in determining whether women are allowed to become suicide terrorists. The first female suicide bomber, Sana’a Mehaydali, was a 17-year-old girl “sent by the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP/PPS), a secular, pro-Syrian Lebanese organization, to blow herself up near an Israeli convoy in Lebanon in 1985.”43 Since then, however, there have been eighty-one suicide bombings perpetrated by women worldwide who represent both secular and religious groups. Islam is the religion that is typically linked to suicide terrorism. In actuality, only three of the groups that use female suicide bombers are religiously oriented: Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Al-Qaeda, and these groups are Islam-based.44 However, both Hamas and the PIJ initially rejected the use of women for suicide attacks. The reason they began accepting female suicide bombers is because the public response was “overwhelmingly positive” and they believed that great strategic gains could be made by utilizing women.45 It is clear, then, that suicide terrorism cannot be explicitly linked to religious motivations. In fact, out of the nine groups that have used female suicide bombers, six are secular

106

Some experts believe that we should view suicide bombers as guided missiles, carefully prepared and launched by some larger, organized group, instead of picturing them as driven to kill themselves and others out of a spontaneous surge of emotion.”42

42 Rosemarie Skaine, Female Suicide Bombers (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006), 3. 43 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 143. 44 The Iraqi insurgents are not included in either the religious or secular list of organizations based on O’Rourke’s argument that this group does not fit neatly into either category. It is difficult to ascertain the motivations of the individual Iraqi insurgent female suicide bombers because they represent a variety of different groups. See O’Rourke, “Why Do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 14-15. 45 O’Rourke, “Why Do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 13.

(the Syrian Socialist National Party, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, the Chechen separatists, and the Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades).46 Of all the women who have committed suicide attacks, 85.4% commit them on behalf of secular groups.47 Since religious groups tend not to use women, some argue that these groups do not believe that women are worthy of martyrdom. Following that logic, then, groups that do use women may be seen as more egalitarian. However, one could also argue that the reason religious groups use women is because women are seen as less important than men and should thus be sent to die in the place of men. It is impossible to ascertain which mentality these groups have and thus the religious versus secular examination of the involvement of women as suicide terrorists is not productive. Women who choose to become suicide bombers are likely to follow through with their decision regardless of which organization is sponsoring them, and oftentimes it contributes to the strategic and social goals of a terrorist group (whether secular or religious) to accept responsibility for a female suicide bomber’s attack. Thus, since we cannot generalize female suicide bombings as being particular to either secular or religious agendas, it is clear that something else is happening on an organizational level that has led groups to accept females as suicide terrorists. In order to examine these group-level motivations, we must first understand why terrorist organizations use suicide terrorism at all. Then, we must examine the specific factors that explain why some terrorist organizations employ female suicide bombers. In a general sense, Pape states that the purpose for suicide terrorism is, “to use the threat of punishment to compel a target democracy to change policy, and most especially to cause democratic states to withdraw forces from land the terrorists perceive as their national homeland.” He goes on to argue that suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion that attempts to force the target government to make policy changes.48 The crux of Pape’s argument is that democracies are “soft” and thus have populations who “have low thresholds of cost tolerance.” As 46 The lists of secular and religious groups were taken from O’Rourke, “Why Do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 10-12. 47 O’Rourke, “Why Do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 7. 48 Pape, Dying to Win, 28.

Theoretical Background

107

While all suicide bombers have an impact on the target populations, many scholars argue that female suicide bombers provide a particular advantage because the idea of a woman committing such severe acts of violence is seen as especially reprehensible.

a result of the public’s low tolerance for fatalities, especially civilians, suicide terrorists are able to affect the policies of democratic states.49 As of 2003, when Pape published his book, every population that had been targeted by a modern suicide bombing campaign was a democracy (the United States, France, Israel, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Russia).50 As a result, Pape makes a strong argument regarding the connection between the use of suicide terror and the willingness of democratic states to give in to “modest or very limited goals,” though thus far suicide terrorism “has…failed to compel target democracies to abandon goals central to national wealth or security.”51 For the purposes of this article, it is vital to take into consideration the specific advantages that the use of female suicide bombers provides terrorist organizations. While all suicide bombers have an impact on the target populations, many scholars argue that female suicide bombers provide a particular advantage because the idea of a woman committing such severe acts of violence is seen as especially reprehensible. To use Pape’s terms, the “cost tolerance” is seen as being lower within some societies when women are involved in the attacks due to the preconceived notions of what a woman’s role in society should be. Because the number of female suicide bombers is so much lower than the number of male suicide bombers, their specific strategic advantage (e.g. if the use of female suicide bombers allows terrorist organizations to demand more extreme actions or concessions from the target democracy) has not been examined thus far in depth. There are many factors that help to explain why it may be beneficial for terrorist organizations to employ female suicide bombers. Some of the reasons commonly given to explain why terrorist groups use women include: • The especially strong societal reaction to female martyrs • The glorification of martyrs • The ability of female martyrs to shame or inspire others to join the cause • The ability of women (especially those who feign pregnancy) to use societal taboos to avoid searches or

108

49 50 51

Pape, Dying to Win, 44. Pape, Dying to Win, 45. Pape, Dying to Win, 76.

scrutiny • The ability of women to serve as accomplices to male suicide bombers • The fact that women can access soft targets Some of these advantages, such as the glorification of martyrs and the ability of female martyrs to inspire others, are arguably equally relevant to male suicide bombers. Due to specific gender-related factors, though, the impact of females is argued to be significantly different. Since women may be viewed in the countries affected by suicide terrorism as weak or inferior, they may become role models not only because they are suicide bombers, but because of their gender, and are therefore entitled to a more highly glorified status. This argument will be expanded upon below and will be split into two sections: strategic advantages and tactical advantages. Mia Bloom explains, “Suicide attacks are done for effect, and the more dramatic the effect, the stronger the message; thus a potential interest on the part of some groups in recruiting women.”52 Suicide bombers in general inspire fear and shock within the target population; however, in societies where women are viewed as weak and subordinate to men, the “shock value” of a female suicide bomber is especially large. Rhiannon Talbot of the University of Newcastle in the United Kingdom adds,

Strategic Advantages Societal Reaction to Martyrs

All of these women undermine our idea of who and what a terrorist is. Our intuitive assumptions presume that terrorists and terrorism are a man’s preserve. Most people still believe that women would not kill in such a barbaric and indiscriminate way that targets innocent children equally with soldiers or police officers. This is why there is usually a public outcry of horror against women terrorists.53 The case of Wafa Idris supports this idea that female martyrs can cause a strong societal reaction. In an editorial praising her actions was published in Al-Sha’ab, an Egyptian Islamist weekly. This editorial deserves a close examination as it details 52 Bloom, page 144. 53 Foreign Policy Association. “Classifying Terrorism.” 2005. Online: <http://www.fpa.org/newsletter_info2478/ newsletter_info.htm>. 27 Sep 2006, page 4.

109

the strategic benefits that can be enjoyed by a terrorist organization as a result of a female suicide attack. The editorial begins: It’s a woman!! A woman, oh men of the [Islamic] nation; a woman, oh youth of the nation; a woman, oh women of the nation; a woman, oh those who call for the liberation of the nation’s women; a woman, oh soldiers of the nation; a woman, oh rulers, princes, and leaders of this nation; it is a woman, a woman, a woman.54 From this introduction, we can clearly see that the author is not referring to martyrdom as a general phenomenon; rather, the author is drawing attention to the fact that the author believes the fact that the bomber is female is an integral part of the reason she should be praised. Continuing, the author writes: It is a woman who teaches you today a lesson in heroism, who teaches you the meaning of Jihad, and the way to die a martyr’s death. It is a woman who has inscribed, in letters of fire, the battle of martyrdom that horrified the heart of the enemy’s entity. It is a woman who has shocked the enemy, with her thin, meager, and weak body… It is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths about women’s weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement.” “It is a woman who today teaches you, oh Muslim women, the meaning of true liberation, with which the women’s rights activists have tempted you… It is a woman who has now proven that the meaning of [women’s] liberation is the liberation of the body from the trials and tribulations of this world… and the acceptance of death with a powerful, courageous embrace…” “It is a woman, a woman, a woman who is a source of pride for the women of this nation and a source of honor that shames the submissive men with a shame that cannot be washed away except by blood… It is a woman in the spring of her youth who swore in the name of her

110

54 “Wafa Idris: The Celebration of the First Female Palestinian Suicide Bomber – Part I,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series – No. 83 (12 February 2002).

God, with every drop of her blood, with every limb of her body, and with every one of her cells that turned into coals that burned the hearts of the enemy with the fire of fear, loss, and pain…“ 55 In the body of this editorial, the author points out that Wafa had a particularly strong impact on the enemy because she was a female who committed this act of martyrdom. The author argues that Wafa breaks the stereotype for her gender, allowing women to be seen as liberated, empowered, and capable of fighting alongside men to achieve a set goal. According to the author’s logic, Wafa should serve as a role model for Muslim women and should shame the men who are not active participants in the conflict. Barbara Victor confirms that the general societal reaction to Wafa’s death aligns with the opinion asserted in the editorial above. While researching for her book, Victor visited Wafa’s home and was greeted by a crowd of people who, regardless of age or gender, praised Wafa, happy “that one of their own had become a heroine for the Palestinian struggle – a woman, a symbol of the army of women who were ready to die for the cause.”56 For them, Wafa was not merely a suicide bomber; rather, she was a hero, a model that all Palestinian women should aspire to emulate. Of course, male martyrs also elicit a societal reaction, and it is impossible to quantify which gender elicits a stronger societal reaction. This factor only reflects the perception that women get more attention, which may or may not be correct. However, a terrorist group may believe that a female suicide bomber is useful if there is simply a chance that she could receive more attention than a man. Continuing along those lines, it is also difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether female martyrs are more glorified than male martyrs. In Palestine, posters of both male and female martyrs are posted around their towns, leaflets about the terrorist organization that sponsored them are distributed, and people celebrate in the streets. In Sri Lanka, community support is cited as one of the main reasons that so many individuals are willing to commit suicide attacks on 55 “Wafa Idris: The Celebration of the First Female Palestinian Suicide Bomber – Part I,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series – No. 83 (12 February 2002). 56 Victor, Army of Roses, 6.

Glorification of Martyrs

111

A special emphasis may be placed upon female suicide bombers because the idea that a woman would go against tradition and kill herself in the name of their cause is very powerful and draws special attention to the issue.

112

behalf of the Tamil Tigers. Before their death, the bombers’ identities are hidden, but after their deaths, their identities are publicized and annual public ceremonies are held to celebrate the martyrs.57 Both male and female suicide bombers are glorified in this way. The case of Wafa Idris illustrates the glorification of a female martyr. After becoming a martyr, Wafa’s picture was posted all over the city and her mother distributed sweets to the children of the neighborhood in a widespread celebration of her actions.58 The press and the public compared Wafa to Jesus Christ, the Mona Lisa, and Joan of Arc, allowing her to become an instant celebrity upon her death and providing inspiration to other young women who would dream of one day becoming suicide bombers.59 In the media and in propaganda, terrorist organizations are argued to benefit greatly from women who martyr themselves. A special emphasis may be placed upon female suicide bombers because the idea that a woman would go against tradition and kill herself in the name of their cause is very powerful and draws special attention to the issue. As a result, some terrorist groups may be inclined to recruit women because “[s]uicide attacks are done for the effect, and the more dramatic the effect, the stronger the message.”60 The effect of female suicide bombers may be more dramatic, especially in more conservative societies, and thus the use of women would provide a specific strategic benefit to the terrorist organization that sponsors her.61 Furthermore, it is argued that “…this tactic makes them appear more threatening since it has erased the barriers between combatants and noncombatants, terrorists, and innocent civilians.”62 Following this logic, the target population becomes even more fearful in reaction to female suicide bombers because the line between combatant and noncombatant becomes blurred. At that point, anyone could potentially be an attacker. This allows the terrorist organization to achieve the specific goals of shocking the enemy and causing fear in the target population. Additionally, it may 57 Pape, Dying to Win, 143-144. 58 Victor, Army of Roses, 20-21. 59 Victor, Army of Roses, 25. 60 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 144. 61 Farhana Ali, “Muslim Female Fighters: An Emerging Trend,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor: 3:21 (3 November 2005), http:// www.jamestown.org (accessed 21 November 2006). 62 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 144.

help the group to recruit new members and, if membership is low, to incite other people into joining their ranks. Female suicide bombers can potentially both shame men into joining the cause and inspire other women to become martyrs, a factor which will be discussed further below. As mentioned previously, it is extremely challenging, if not impossible, to quantify the glorification of suicide bombers. Therefore, the argument that female suicide bombers attract more attention or are more highly glorified is not necessarily correct or incorrect, but simply not possible to verify. However, by doing a Lexis-Nexis search of the first four Palestinian female suicide bombers which Barbara Victor discusses in her book, and then a search of four Palestinian male suicide bombers, we can begin to see which gender gets more attention within the press. This sample may prove helpful since male and female suicide bombers with similar numbers of casualties and similar attack dates are examined, so we can begin to isolate the gender variable and determine whether being a woman helps a suicide bomber to attract media attention. Of course, this is an imperfect model because it only considers a small sample of all Palestinian suicide bombers and does not take into account news coverage that is not published in English.

113

Press Coverage of Male and Female Suicide Attacksi

i = Date of attack, group, attack location, and number killed were obtained from Pape, Dying to Win, 260-261. The names of the first four Palestinian female suicide bombers came from Victor, Army of Roses. The names of the male suicide bombers used for comparison were found by doing a Lexis-Nexis search for “suicide bomb*” for the five days following a given date of attack.

114

* = Multiple spellings were found for these women’s names, so the data given was calculated using the total number of hits using the various spellings. Though other suicide bombers’ names may also have additional spellings, these are the only two women for which the name cited by Barbara Victor yielded no hits.

This data set somewhat supports the argument that women receive more press coverage than men during the month following their suicide attack. The first Palestinian female suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, killed one person and received 45 hits in a General News (Major Papers) search.63 A male suicide bomber, Safwat Khalil, who detonated two days earlier and killed one person as well, only received one hit. Since Wafa Idris was the first female suicide bomber, her case may be special not necessarily because of her gender, but because her action represented something “new” in the field of terrorism. The next Palestinian female suicide bomber, Darine Abu Aisha, who killed two people, received ten hits, while a male suicide bomber who also killed two people 11 days prior only received one hit. Ayat al-Akhras, the third Palestinian female suicide bomber, especially supports the argument that women receive more attention than men. She killed two people, yet received 12 hits; a male suicide bomber who detonated two days before her and killed 28 people received only two hits. Though unlike the other cases, the number of people killed by this set of suicide bombers was not similar, this suggests that female suicide bombers may receive more media attention than male suicide bombers, regardless of the number of people killed by their attacks. The fourth Palestinian female suicide bomber, Andalib Suleiman Takata, does not support the argument that women receive more attention. Although she killed six people (more than the combined total number of people killed for the three female suicide bombers that came before her), she did not receive any hits in the General News (Major Papers) search. A male suicide bomber, on the other hand, two days earlier killed seven people and received ten hits. This could be explained by the difficulty in searching all possible variations on her name. However, Victor explains that her case did not receive a lot of media attention because she had no “sensational story”, but was simply “easily swayed and….caught up in her own fantasy of stardom.”64 In all of the cases, the World News – Middle East and Africa (Major Papers) results showed fewer discrepancies between males and females than the General News (Major 63 The numbers of “hits” given in this paragraph and the three subsequent paragraphs refer to the number of hits received using a General News (Major Papers) search of the month following each suicide attack. 64 Victor, Army of Roses, 247.

115

Papers) searches did. It is hard to determine the reason why this is the case, but it may be due to the fact that many of these names have a variety of spellings, or may have been misspelled by some media sources. Though on the whole this data set does seem to support the thesis that female suicide bombers receive more media attention than male suicide bombers, the limited size of the data set and the possible varied spellings of martyr names make it impossible to decisively conclude if that is actually the case. Moreover, the press coverage given to suicide bombers does not necessarily reflect public opinion, so it is impossible to tell whether men or women are more glorified within a society. Ability to Inspire Others to Join the Cause

116

Some authors believe that one of the most important aspects of the glorification of martyrs is that these female suicide bombers may be used to mobilize others into action.65 When women are used, it is argued that they not only inspire other women to take action, but also shame men into participating. This occurs in a variety of cases, one example being: “A propaganda slogan in Chechnya [that] reads: “Women’s courage is a disgrace to that of modern men.”66 Another example is that “[b]efore Ayat Akras blew herself up, she taped her martyrdom video and stated, ‘I am going to fight instead of the sleeping Arab armies who are watching Palestinian girls fighting alone,’ in an apparent jab at Arab leaders for not being sufficiently proactive or manly.”67 It is possible that some suicide bombers are inspired by the acts of the martyrs that died before them. For example, Andalib Suleiman Takata, the fourth Palestinian female suicide bomber, was fascinated by suicide bombers and had pictures of martyrs taped all over her walls.68 Andalib “believed that dying as a shahida would transform her into an instant superstar.”69 After Ayat al-Akhras martyred herself, Andalib went to her Ayat’s home and talked to a man that could help her become a martyr. She told him that she wanted to do what the other three girls had done, and sadly, she killed more 65 Itamar Marcus, “Encouraging Women Terrorists.” Palestinian Media Watch, Special Report #39: Palestinian Culture and Society (12 March 2002): 3. http://www.pnw.org.il/specrep-39.html, (accessed 21 November 2006). 66 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 145. 67 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 145. 68 Victor, Army of Roses, 250. 69 Victor, Army of Roses, 256.

people than those three girls combined.70 However, it is difficult to discern a causal link between the inspiration provided by one martyr and the actions of another. Andalib was not only influenced by other female suicide bombers, but was also extremely angry because she had watched her father and brothers suffer humiliation at the hands of the Israel military.71 Therefore, though a person may be inspired by a suicide bomber, if personal problems are not present, it seems unlikely that that person would become a suicide bomber solely because of that inspiration. From the perspective of the terrorist organization, though, perhaps even the possibility that female martyrs will inspire others to join their ranks is worth the effort of training a woman and allowing her to carry out an attack. One frequently cited reason that terrorist organizations use female suicide bombers is that women provide a tactical advantage. Females can more easily pass through security checkpoints and may not face the high level of scrutiny to which males are subject (especially in conservative societies in which physical searches of women are often seen as particularly offensive). According to Bloom,

Tactical Advantages Ability to Avoid Scrutiny

Israel’s restrictive checkpoints and border policy proved fairly effective against Palestinian insurgent organizations inside the Occupied Territories. Since the mid 1990s, it has been almost impossible for unmarried men under the age of 40 to get legitimate permits to cross the border into Israel – for any reason. Terrorist groups have therefore looked further afield for volunteers including women and even children. Women don’t arouse suspicion like men and blend in more effectively with Israeli citizens [emphasis added]. Attacks perpetrated by women have tended to be those where the terrorist planners needed the perpetrator to blend in on the Israeli “street.” These female terrorists…westernize their appearance, adopting modern hairstyles and short skirts. The use of the least-likely suspect is the most-likely tactical adaptation for a terrorist group under scrutiny.72 70 71 72

Victor, Army of Roses, 251. Victor, Army of Roses, 250. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 143-144.

117

This quote suggests that allowing women to become martyrs was necessary in order to ensure the success of suicide terrorist attacks. To be able to achieve their strategic goals (that is, to cause the greatest number of casualties possible and to instill the maximum amount of fear in the target population), groups had to adapt because men drew too much attention or were sometimes unable to cross through checkpoints. Consequently, they began to use “the least-likely suspect,” women, so that they could continue to execute successful suicide attacks. According to O’Rourke, on average, women do have a higher average number of victims than men (9.7 versus 3.6 killed). However, she points out that this discrepancy is largely due to the higher effectiveness of Chechen women as opposed to Chechen men.73 Ability to Feign Pregnancy to Conceal a Bomb

Terrorist organizations have also developed a clever strategy that allows female suicide bombers to cause the most casualties possible. This strategy, which has been used by several terrorist organizations to deflect suspicion from females, is the use of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), frequently referred to as a “suicide belt,” to feign pregnancy.

This photo shows an Improvised Explosive Device that could used to commit an act of suicide terrorism.74

In those cases, the women are particularly immune to searches because they are not only women, but also seemingly pregnant. This allows them to pass through security checkpoints and into crowded areas even more easily than women who do not appear to be pregnant without raising suspicion. Mia Bloom explains,

118

73 O’Rourke, “Why Do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 43. 74 “Counter-Terrorism – The Suicide Bomber,” Defender Training and Consulting, http://www.defender-consulting.com/Suicide_Bomber_Seminar.htm, (accessed 22 February 2007).

To complicate the notions of femininity and motherhood, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is often disguised under the woman’s clothing to make her appear as if she is pregnant and thus beyond suspicion or reproach. The advent of women suicide bombers has transformed the revolutionary womb into an exploding one.75 In one case, a thirty-four year old woman posed as the pregnant wife of a Sri Lankan soldier in order to gain access to a military hospital within a secure complex. Her gender combined with her apparent “pregnancy” allowed her to pass through those security checkpoints without arousing suspicion.76 The first female suicide bomber died in 1985, yet women continue to successfully commit suicide attacks. This suggests that even after years of experience with female suicide bombers, security officials are hesitant to search women (especially pregnant ones) because that practice is seen as offensive and improper. However, some countries, such as Israel, have responded to suicide attacks and have trained security officers to detect suspicious behavior in both men and women. Additionally, one company developed a laser device designed to detect explosives or chemical weapons from a distance.77 In countries that have been targets of suicide attacks, efforts have been made to train security personnel and develop antiterrorist technologies. It is clear that educational methods and technology are being developed to help detect potential suicide bombers and prevent them from completing their missions. Additionally, women are sometimes used as accomplices to male suicide bombers. For example, women may be assigned to accompany a male suicide bomber on his mission in the hopes that her presence will detract attention from the male. Acting as a romantic couple, a male-female duo may be able to avoid scrutiny at checkpoints equally as effectively as single women can. Therefore, women provide a strategic advantage not only when they commit acts of suicide terrorism alone, but also when they serve as accomplices to men attempting to 75 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 143. 76 Joshua Brilliant, “Analysis: What makes female bombers tick?”, UPI, 11 October 2006. 77 Iddo Genuth, “Israeli Company Develops Long Range Explosive Detector,” IsraCast: Israeli Technology News, 18 November 2006.

Women as Accomplices

119

complete their missions. Furthermore, when women comprise part of a team suicide attack, the attack is likely to yield more casualties.78 These factors help to explain why women have come to be employed for acts of suicide terrorism. Access to Soft Targets

Since women raise less suspicion than men, they are also able to access soft targets, such as politicians or other public figures that may be assassination targets. The most famous example of this is the case of “Dhanu,” a woman who belonged to the Black Tigresses (the female suicide bomber unit of the LTTE). In May of 1991, Dhanu was able to get within a few feet of India’s top political figure, Rajiv Ghandi, because she appeared so innocent that Ghandi actually brushed his security team away to allow her to pass through the crowd and approach him.79 Then, she pretended to drop a flower garland on the ground and detonated her suicide belt, effectively killing herself, the LTTE cameraman that was filming the assassination, and, most importantly, her target.80 Since she was able to reach her target without raising suspicion, she was able to kill this important political figure.

This photo shows Ghandi greeting a group of women seconds before Dhanu (the woman wearing glasses) detonated her suicide belt.81

The Dhanu case represents one of many assassination suicide attacks, and women have committed 72% of all such attacks for which the gender of the bomber has been identified.82 This supports the argument that female are able to access soft targets more successfully than men.

120

78 O’Rourke, “Why Do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 44. 79 Robert Pape, personal interview, April 4, 2007. 80 Pape, Dying to Win, 227. 81 “Prabakaran Unleashed,” The Hindu, 19:09 (Apr. 27 - May 10, 2002), http://www.hinduonnet.com/ fline/fl1909/19090210.htm, (accessed 22 February 2007). 82 O’Rourke, “Why Do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 45.

However, it is interesting to note that there have also been cases of men dressing up as women in order to carry out suicide attacks. 83 As such, it could be argued that from a strategic standpoint, women are not necessary to gain access to soft targets because men who make themselves look like women could potentially be just as effective. Of course, women would be more convincing and possibly less likely to get caught than a man pretending to be a woman. However, the fact that men are able to pass as women makes it impossible for this factor to explain why terrorist organizations are willing to use female suicide bombers. There are many reasons that terrorist organizations employ female suicide bombers. Strategically, female suicide bombers benefit their host organizations because they attract more attention and are glorified within their societies, which may inspire others to join their cause. Female suicide bombers also provide tactical advantages because they are able to pass through checkpoints with less scrutiny (especially when they appear to be pregnant) and thus can access soft targets. This makes their attacks more successful because they are able to kill greater numbers of people. All of these perceived advantages may enable terrorist organizations to more effectively fight their enemies or resist occupation. Even though some religious organizations may be opposed to the use of female suicide bombers in theory, these strategic and tactical advantages make the acceptance of female martyrs more palatable. Since women who want to become martyrs may do so regardless of who is sponsoring them, it is often beneficial for terrorist organizations to accept responsibility for the attack so that they can continue to reap the benefits long after the woman has martyred herself.

Conclusion

The topic of female suicide terrorism is extremely complex. Experts have examined both individual and group level motivations for female suicide terrorism and have come up with a wide variety of explanations. On an individual level, internal factors such as the inability or unwillingness to marry or humiliation by opposition forces are given to explain why these women choose to become suicide bombers – to escape their situation or to empower or redeem themselves. However, none of the commonly cited personal problems can explain

Closing Analysis

O’Rourke, “Why Do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 45.

121

why women become suicide bombers in and of themselves. Worldwide, a countless number of women face these same problems but do not commit acts of suicide terrorism. These personal problems can help to explain why some women become suicide terrorists, but they cannot explain why all female suicide bombers make that choice. Therefore, it is also necessary to examine the issue at a group level. Suicide terrorism is a phenomenon that occurs within both secular and religious groups in response to external factors such as war or occupation. The tactical and strategic advantages offered by women may allow terrorist groups to further their objectives and attract attention within society. Though more useful than speculation about personal motivations, group motivations still cannot explain every case of suicide terrorism. It is clear that some combination of these individual and group motivations must come together in response to particular external factors in order to yield female suicide terrorism. However, it is impossible to know exactly which set of circumstances will lead a woman to suicide terrorism, and equally difficult to prove which factors allow a woman to be accepted into or sponsored by a particular terrorist group. Thus, taken individually, none of the explanations given to explain female suicide terrorism are sufficient and it is impossible to construct a model in which certain individual and group factors, even when considered along with the external factors present, can be causally linked to the phenomenon of female suicide terror. Any combination can yield female suicide terrorism, and thus acts of female suicide terrorism are not predictable. One problem with this conclusion is that without fully comprehending the factors that lead to female suicide terrorism, it is impossible for police or counterterrorism forces to develop a profile of potential terrorists. After September 11th, 2001, the United States Department of Homeland Security created a terrorist profile to be used to issue visas – but that profile did not include women.84 As previously discussed, there are more male suicide terrorists than female suicide terrorists, but since females seem to more easily avoid suspicion and access soft targets, it is vital that terrorist profiles recognize that female terrorists are within the realm of possibility. This article has pointed out that terrorist organizations

122

O’Rourke, “Why Do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?”, 45.

have adapted their suicide terror tactics to include female suicide bombers in order to avoid suspicion and gain access to soft targets. It is quite possible that security officials will become increasingly wary of women trying to cross checkpoints. As a result, terrorist organizations will be faced with the challenge of developing new techniques for suicide terror operations, and female suicide bombers may no longer provide as much of a strategic or tactical advantage. As women become less effective, terrorist groups may turn to other demographics in order to achieve their goals. There is concern, however, that this is already happening. International human rights groups have stated that Palestinians are willing to use children as suicide bombers, even though according to an agreement signed by the Palestinian Authority, no child under the age of eighteen is allowed to participate in hostilities. However, at least three male suicide bombers under the age of eighteen have died over the course of that particular conflict, all representing the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade. One of these successful suicide bombers, Issa Bdeir, was only sixteen years old, which shows that the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade may be open to using increasingly younger individuals as suicide bombers.85 However, there are many reasons that terrorist organizations may not want to use children as suicide bombers. For one thing, a younger suicide bomber may not be savvy enough to choose an appropriate location or be able to talk his/her way out of a difficult situation. Furthermore, it is unknown what the population’s reaction to a child suicide bomber would be; the public might consider such actions too extreme and thus refrain from supporting such measures, leading the terrorist organization to lose public support. Finally, children cannot make the choice to become a suicide bomber, so child suicide bombers would be fundamentally different than adult ones. As a result, for the time being, it seems probable that terrorist organizations will continue to use adult suicide bombers as long as their strategic goals continue to be met. The further exploration of the topic of profiling and the contemplation of future terrorist demographics is not within the scope of this article, though both topics warrant more extensive research. However, the existence of female suicide 85 “Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,” Human Rights Watch Report, Section V (October 2002), http://www. hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002-05.htm, (accessed 20 February 2007).

As women become less effective, terrorist groups may turn to other demographics in order to achieve their goals.

123

bombers raises serious questions about whether profiling works. After all, terrorist organizations have used women to conduct suicide attacks because they raise less suspicion and can thus access soft targets. As soon as women are no longer effective, terrorist organizations may attempt to recruit from different demographics. In order to prevent suicide attacks from occurring, counterterrorism efforts must focus on identifying new potential suicide bomber demographics and continuing to develop technologies and ways to identify warning signs (such as behaviors) that a person may be a suicide bomber. The final point to be drawn from this study, though, is that neither male nor female suicide bombers have been able to cause foreign occupants to end their occupation or to respond with more military force. Both groups are also unable to provoke changes in the policies or practices of their target governments. Using this particular measure, since neither male nor female suicide bombers have been able to cause their enemies to grant large concessions, they are of equal value.86 However, when viewed through the lenses of individual, strategic, and tactical logics, female suicide bombers are inherently different than male suicide bombers, though perhaps only because they are interpreted to be so. Though impossible to quantify, the societal definitions of the roles of men and women may allow female suicide bombers to elicit a stronger reaction, garner more media attention, or become more glorified. Additionally, in conservative societies, where the modesty of a woman is of vital importance, women do offer tactical advantages to terrorist organizations because their gender allows them to avoid scrutiny by security guards and gain access to soft targets. Overall, although female suicide bombers may offer some advantages over men, neither group has been able to cause any significant change in the tactics of their enemy. Therefore, by some measures, female suicide bombers are different, but their value in terms of affecting the oppositionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s decision-making process is equal to that of male suicide bombers.

124

86 The idea of using the measure of concessions made, as well as the evaluation of whether concessions have been made, are taken from Pape, Dying to Win.

Works Cited Ali, Farhana, “Muslim Female Fighters: An Emerging Trend,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor: 3:21 (3 November 2005), http://www.jamestown.org (accessed 21 November 2006). Beyler, Clara, “Messengers of Death – Female Suicide Bombers.” Institute for Counter-Terrorism Report (12 February 2003). Bloom, Mia, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Brilliant, Joshua, “Analysis: What makes female bombers tick?”, UPI, 11 October 2006. “Chechen Official Puts War Deaths at 160,000.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 August 2005, http://www.isn. ethz.ch/news/sw/details_ print.cfm?id=12510 (accessed 19 February 2007). “Counter-Terrorism – The Suicide Bomber,” Defender Training and Consulting, http://www.defender-consulting.com/ Suicide_Bomber_Seminar.htm, (accessed 22 February 2007). Davis, Jessica, “Women and Terrorism in Radical Islam: Planners, perpetrators, patrons?” (paper prepared for the First Annual Graduate Symposium, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada). Foreign Policy Association. “Classifying Terrorism.” 2005. Online: <http://www.fpa.org/newsletter_info2478/ newsletter_info.htm>. 27 Sep 2006. “Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,” Human Rights Watch Report, Section V (October 2002), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ ISRAELPA1002-05.htm, (accessed 20 February 2007). Genuth, Iddo, “Israeli Company Develops Long Range Explosive Detector,” IsraCast: Israeli Technology News, 18 November 2006.

125

Marcus, Itamar, “Encouraging Women Terrorists.” Palestinian Media Watch, Special Report #39: Palestinian Culture and Society (12 March 2002): 3. http://www.pnw.org.il/specrep39.html, (accessed 21 November 2006). O’Rourke, Lindsey A. “Why do Women Become Suicide Terrorists?” (Draft for Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism Workshop, December 2006). Pape, Robert, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House, New York: 2005). “Prabakaran Unleashed,” The Hindu, 19:09 (Apr. 27 - May 10, 2002), http://www.hinduonnet.com/ fline/fl1909/19090210. htm, (accessed 22 February 2007). Skaine, Rosemarie, Female Suicide Bombers (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006). Victor, Barbara, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Rodale: 2003). “Wafa Idris: The Celebration of the First Female Palestinian Suicide Bomber – Part I,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series – No. 83 (12 February 2002). “World,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/geos/xx.html.

126

Sold into Slavery: Counteracting Globalization’s Effects on Trafficking Women By Elizabeth Nielsen

“I am trying hard to be the person I was before I came to the United States,” declares Inez, a teenage girl who was trafficked from Mexico into the United States, where she was forced into sexual slavery (Polaris). Her story is representative of the thousands of women who are trafficked around the world each year. The Department of Justice conservatively estimates that 600,000 to 800,000 people are trafficked globally each year, including 14,500 to 17,500 people into the United States. An estimated 80% of the victims are female, 70% of whom become part of the commercial sex industry (“Assessment”). Although most of these women leave home in search of a better life and greater opportunities abroad, in a cruel twist of fate they end up in situations that are much worse than anything they could have imagined. Ironically, many of the benefits of globalization, such as increased trade, communication, and transportation, have exacerbated this situation. These benefits have contributed to the feminization of migration, thereby creating a larger pool of potential victims, while at the same time equipping traffickers with new means of avoiding detection. However, along with the benefits of globalization came new opportunities for international cooperation, which can be used to counteract the increase in trafficking by creating barriers at the stages of supply, trafficking, and demand. Globalization contributed to the feminization of migration by uniting large populations of poor, unskilled women with a demand for labor and then facilitating their transportation. As countries take increasing advantage of competitive markets, the disparity increases between those countries more able to benefit from globalization and those that are not, which become left behind. Industrialized countries have more financial leverage, stronger infrastructure, less corruption, and more access to technology than developing

127

128

countries. Thus, they are better equipped to profit from the new information and communications technology than either Haass’ “race to the bottom” developing countries or Garrett’s “missing middle” countries. Women in these countries are often at an even greater disadvantage because of social structures that have traditionally excluded them from participating in their economies. In former Soviet states, for example, women were disproportionately impacted by the privatization of public property, economically excluded, and left without a social safety net (Everts, 156 and Shelley, 120). These poor, unskilled women, who are more vulnerable to traffickers, have increasingly begun to look abroad for economic opportunities, creating what has been termed the “feminization of migration” (Samarasinghe, 93-94). As globalization has spread, improvements in communication have helped to unite the excess labor supply of poorer countries with the demand in more affluent countries. A global demand for the “women’s work” of childcare, housework, and sex exceeds the supply of female citizens of wealthy countries willing to provide such work for the pay and working conditions present in the market (Macklin, 161). The increasing ease of communication between countries due to globalization allowed these affluent countries to turn to the poor, unskilled women in neighboring countries willing to satisfy the excess demand. This is illustrated by the flow of migration from South Asian countries with an excess labor supply to North Asian countries rich in capital (Samarasinghe, 95). The Internet in particular played a large role due to its speed and anonymity, which helped the international sex trade market to “grow exponentially” (Chollet). While globalization did not necessarily increase the number of jobs available for women, by uniting supply and demand, it created the perception of economic opportunities for poor, unskilled women abroad and encouraged their migration. Globalization has led to increasingly porous borders and improved transportation, facilitating this migration. Trafficking in women in the form of the “white slave trade” from China to the United States and from Eastern Europe to South America at the end of the 19th century was greatly impeded by the transportation barriers created by the Depression, World War II, and the Cold War (Shelley). Since then, ironically, globalization’s increased opportunities “for international trade, travel, communication, and intellectual enlightenment”

(Thachuk, 743) in turn increased opportunities for those who traffic in women. Open borders have led to an influx of migration; the EU in particular has experienced an increase in trafficking in women from central and eastern Europe since the states relaxed visa requirements (Beare, 29). Many states even encourage this migration in an attempt to court global capital. Several South Asian states, for instance, advertise labor and encourage work abroad so that migrants will send remittances home in foreign currency, helping to reduce the external debt (Samarasinghe, 97). These benefits provide little incentive for those governments to impede transportation. Even minimum constraints, such as a requirement in the Philippines that girls on entertainment (often a euphemism for prostitution) visas to Japan first complete a traditional Filipino dance course, are generally waived by corrupt officials (Samarasinghe, 98). This combination of porous borders, improved transportation, and government encouragement reduces traditional travel barriers, making migration possible for women in developing countries. The feminization of migration, particularly of poor, unskilled women, creates a larger pool of victims for traffickers. Since labor is not as free to move as capital, many victims first come into contact with traffickers in an attempt to circumvent migration restrictions (Marshall). However, illegal migrants are not the traffickers’ only source of victims. “Traffickers always fish in the stream of migration” (Samarasinghe, 96), whether legal or illegal. Merely the movement of women from one country to another makes them more vulnerable to traffickers, thereby increasing trafficking in women. Many of the same elements of globalization that have contributed to the feminization of migration, such as improved communication and transportation, have also aided the traffickers, especially those who are a part of organized crime. Similar forces encouraged and made possible the international migration of members of local and national organized crime groups, taking their business to a transnational level in response to expanding markets. These migrants play a large role in the receiving countries, often acting as both the members of the trafficking organizations and the employers who illegally use the trafficking victims’ labor (Koslowski, 342). Technological advances also help larger, more traditional, organized crime groups to downsize without decreasing the scale of their operation. Using modern technology, they can control and

The feminization of migration, particularly of poor, unskilled women, creates a larger pool of victims for traffickers.

129

Since trafficking in women has become a global economic problem, it requires a global economic solution.

130

monitor their operations without a large, hierarchal structure, thereby decreasing their chances of detection (Thachuk,747). Other byproducts of globalization also decrease the traffickers’ risk of detection. Many governments are preoccupied with trying to maintain control in the face of rapid social and economic changes while responding to an increasingly demanding middle-class (Thachuk, 744-746). This environment increases their susceptibility to corruption, which traffickers exploit with their increasing revenue (Koslowski, 340). The new conflicts also divert much needed resources from the enforcement of trafficking restrictions, which are often low priorities for governments. Globalization creates additional obstacles even for those governments attempting to actively enforce restrictions. Organized crime is often difficult to distinguish from big business, camouflaged among the vast number of international transactions taking place on a daily basis (Thachuk, 746). The globalization of financial markets facilitates both the traffickers’ financing for their smuggling operations and also the laundering of their profits through “legitimate” investments and businesses (Koslowski, 340). The longer that transnational crime groups operate, the more entrenched in the legitimate system they become and the harder they are to detect and eliminate. Since trafficking in women has become a global economic problem, it requires a global economic solution. Even though traffickers deal in human beings, “criminals are sound economists; they simply follow the market” (Everts, 154). Therefore, the best way to fight trafficking is to attack the market by creating barriers at every stage. Trafficking organizations follow very different models in different parts of the world, ranging from the Natural Resource Model controlled by organized crime groups in former Soviet countries to the Traditional Slavery with Modern Technology Model in Nigeria and West Africa (Shelley). However, they all contain three basic stages: supply, trafficking, and demand. Given the extent of the problem, global coordination and cooperation are required to create effective barriers at each of these stages. The best way to create a barrier to the supply of trafficking victims is to counteract the factors that make them more vulnerable. Although some of these factors such as natural disasters are not possible to prevent, it is possible to combat the poverty, hostile cultural attitudes, and lack of awareness

that make trafficking possible. Poverty is one of the largest contributing factors to human trafficking because it drives women abroad in search of economic opportunities. The effects of poverty can either be counteracted by creating more opportunities for legal migration or encouraging economic growth in developing countries that supply large numbers of illegal migrants. Bringing some of the illegal migration under a legal framework would decrease the supply of trafficking victims by preventing them from turning to traffickers in an attempt to avoid migration controls (Marshall). While this would require countries to be willing to further open their borders, which can be politically difficult because of the possibility of job loss, a joint effort would decrease the strain on individual countries. Encouraging economic development is long term solution that could require extensive resources. However, narrower efforts that just target potential trafficking victims can also be effective. A program in the Ukraine, which offered free economic training for women saw notable success and none of the women who participated in the program even mentioned the possibility of going abroad for work (Blumberg). Ultimately, since the major powers have humanitarian, strategic, and economic motivations to help developing countries (Haass), this strategy should be utilized even though its effects on the supply of trafficking victims will generally be long term. Cultural attitudes increase the supply of potential victims by encouraging women to migrate, making them more vulnerable, and further victimizing those who manage to escape. In communities where women are viewed as unequal and expendable, they are more likely to be encouraged to search for employment in high risk areas or even sold outright as part of their “duty to serve their family.” The higher standing women have in a community, the more protection they have and the less likely they are to become trafficking victims. For example, in Sri Lanka, where women have a more honored place in the family there are lower rates of trafficking than in neighboring countries where the status of women is much lower (Boonpala, 33). Cultures that reject trafficking victims as unclean further victimize them, leaving them with nowhere to go. Some victims who escape or are released return to the trafficking cycle, like Essmerelda Seferi, a teen who is unable to return her native Albania because “I know my family, I know our traditions. They would never take me back” (Polaris). While cultural attitudes are deep-seated and difficult to alter,

131

132

some progress has been made. In Thailand, for instance, a program introduced in 1992 includes work with families to reduce their willingness to direct girls towards sex work and initiatives to change societal attitudes towards prostitution (“Fighting”). Similar programs have been advocated in Africa to empower women in an attempt to decrease the spread of AIDS. Globalization’s effect on increased communication will also help to overcome cultural biases towards women as communities encounter other cultural standards. As globalization advances, so does the spread of democracy, bringing with it new concepts of individual rights. While poverty and cultural attitudes require longer term strategies to alter, raising awareness of trafficking among potential victims can produce more immediate results. Many women in the countries of origin are aware of the labor opportunities abroad but not of the accompanying risks. Some attempts have been made to correct this through public awareness campaigns in the countries of origin, such as a collaborative effort between the United States, European Union, and International Organization for Migration to create an education campaign in the Ukraine targeted at the women most at risk (Williams, 157). Even relatively small efforts by individual governments can be effective. In Laos, the Department of Social Welfare showed a video depicting the realities of migration to Thailand, based on the testimonies of girls who had returned. Hundreds of people from neighboring communities came to the viewing and their overwhelming response was that “they simply didn’t know that this could happen” (Marshall). Whether these efforts cause women to reconsider migration or to be more careful as they travel, awareness campaigns reduce the odds of their victimization. In the trafficking stage, the joint effort of members of the international community is required to create successful barriers. The trafficking stage can be disrupted by adding risk to the market in the form of greater penalties for traffickers and increased law enforcement. Some countries have no laws against trafficking in women or simply consider it a misdemeanor (Williams, 158). Those who traffic in women should at least face comparable penalties to drug traffickers. However, the danger of tightening border controls and asylum policies is that if not done effectively, it will change the nature of the problem instead of reducing it. While increased law enforcement can drive up the costs of trafficking, it also benefits the

traffickers by causing more immigrants to enter the illegal migration system. For example, although increased law enforcement caused the costs to rise for traffickers from China to the United States, their customer base also grew and actually led to higher profits (Koslowski, 351). Increased controls also mean “that the smuggling activity becomes dominated by the sophisticated and possibly more violent organized crime groups rather than independent entrepreneurs” (Beare, 38). Increased law enforcement must therefore be so effective that the costs rise higher than the customers can pay, whether they are migrants paying to enter the system or employers paying for the migrants’ labor, in order to avoid exacerbating the problem. The most effective law enforcement requires international cooperation. Some international efforts are already being made, such as the European Union’s 1997 Joint Action to combat trafficking in women and the commercial exploitation of children. The United States’ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, created by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, coordinates with other governments and produces an annual international report that assesses the efforts of other governments to fight trafficking and serves as a basis for sanctioning the worst offenders. However, the sanctions have been criticized because they are rarely enforced and can actually cause governments to refuse to recognize the extent of the problem and retaliate against the nongovernmental organizations who supply much of the information (Mattar, 172). Still, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act represents a large step forward by acknowledging the extent of the problem and opening diplomatic channels with other countries in an attempt to stop trafficking. Further efforts to foster international cooperation would improve law enforcement, especially when made through institutions like the United Nations for increased legitimacy. As it stands now, international and regional efforts are lacking, particularly in the area of research. Different agencies have incompatible information due to different definitions of trafficking and different resources and they are often unwilling to share their information because of government restrictions and a desire to protect their sources (Laczko). International initiatives to collect and coordinate information would allow for a better assessment of the problem. International institutions could also help by training criminal justice practitioners

133

134

(Boonpala) and providing developing countries with advice and technological help (McKinley). Clearer data, better trained prosecutors, and increased technology in the countries of origin will lead to more effective law enforcement. The final stage, demand, is often the least recognized but possibly the most important. Even with a diminished supply of victims and an increased risk to trafficking, “this is a very lucrative industry that will not ‘go away’ as long as the market remains” (Beare, 36). But without demand for their services, the trafficker’s profits would shrink and business would no longer be possible. While the demand itself may be a “necessary evil” (Samarasinghe, 101), a change in the focus of the restrictions in many countries could still reduce the number of customers. Many countries criminalize the selling of sex but not the purchasing of it, thereby targeting the “immoral” prostitutes instead of their clients. Some countries have resolved this imbalance by legalizing prostitution, thus bringing it under a legal framework so that the states can create regulations to protect the prostitutes. While this does provide additional options for trafficking victims, it has proved less effective than anticipated and strongly divides nongovernmental organizations. Although organizations like the Global Alliance Against Trafficking support prostitution as legitimate work that is often better than the alternatives for many women, many others disagree. The United States government and the Coalition against Trafficking Women and other feminist groups argue that prostitution is inherently demeaning for women and all prostitutes are forced into prostitution out of necessity. Such groups also highlight the message that legalizing prostitution sends to society, as in Australia where “a generation of men in Victoria have now learned that it is acceptable to treat women as objects for their sexual use” (Sullivan, 12). Considering the controversy surrounding the legalization of prostitution, a better solution is to criminalize buying sex. When Sweden criminalized buying sex in 1999, it saw a sharp decrease in sex trafficking (Samarasinghe, 102). This places the burden of enforcement on the destination countries, which are generally more advanced and have more resources and less corruption than the countries of origin and are thus more able to combat trafficking. Domestic laws that punish American citizens for exploiting women abroad, such as the businessmen that make up the customer base of the sex

tourism industry in Thailand, would also be more effective in reducing the demand for trafficking victims (Chollet). Changing the restrictions so that they do not punish the “immoral” prostitutes reflects an important shift in the recognition of trafficking victims as just that: victims. Just as there are many forms of trafficking, there are also many different types of victims. Arnowitz’s “continuum of victimization” illustrates this fact by including complete coercion, those who are abducted; deception, those promised legitimate jobs; halftruths, those who were aware of working in the entertainment industry; and prostitutes who were unaware of the extent of intimidation, debt, control, and violence (87). While there can be a fine line between a contract dispute and victimization, when that line is crossed victims should be afforded basic rights despite their legal status. Treating victims just as illegal immigrants does them an injustice and contributes to the trafficking. Women are often afraid to report abuses because of deportation, causing governments to lose valuable testimony and a chance of identifying and capturing traffickers. The American Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons has recognized this problem and responded by creating a hotline that victims can call with complaints, regardless of their immigration status. While there are some fears that programs for victims might be abused and encourage illegal migration, these have proved unfounded. If anything, these services are underutilized; from 2001 to 2003 only 500 T visas, designed for trafficking victims, were issued in the United States (Feingold, 30). Whether or not to send the victims home should also be considered. Many of the victims will be rejected by their communities as unclean or be returning to areas that are torn apart by conflict or without economic opportunity, both of which can cause them to reenter the trafficking cycle. Providing them with assistance in the form of counseling, health care, and vocation training in the destination country can be a much better option. In economic terms, the women are commodities, so removing them from the market will be beneficial in the fight against trafficking (Williams, 158). Since the feminization of migration and the new technologies available to traffickers have helped to turn trafficking in women into a global economic problem, it is essential that the international community unites to create a global economic solution. Barriers at the three stages of supply, trafficking, and

While there can be a fine line between a contract dispute and victimization, when that line is crossed victims should be afforded basic rights despite their legal status.

135

Whether trafficking in women is seen as a national security problem or a human rights problem, it is a problem which must be eliminated.

demand will be effective in reducing the problem, but only if joint efforts are made. This will require countries to sacrifice some of the sovereignty to which they have become accustomed in more isolationist time periods. While the United State in particular has been hesitant to sacrifice sovereignty in this area, refusing to take part in the Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (Mattar, 170), “we live in an age in which what takes place inside one country can easily affect developments within another” (Haass, 42). A trafficking problem in one country affects all of the countries with which it comes into contact, and there are very few countries today that do not have trafficking problems. Whether trafficking in women is seen as a national security problem or a human rights problem, it is a problem which must be eliminated. As stated by Thomas Friedman, “How we learn to strike the right balance between globalization’s inherently empowering and humanizing aspects and its inherently disempowering and dehumanizing aspects will determine whether it is reversible or irreversible, a passing phase or a fundamental revolution in the evolution of man.” The international community must make every effort to tilt the scales in favor of the empowering and humanizing aspects of globalization so that women like Inez may benefit from globalization, not suffer because of it.

Bibliography Aronowitz, Alexis. “Trafficking in Human Beings: an International Perspective.” Global Organized Crime: Trends and Developments. Ed. Siegal, Dina, Henk van de Bunt, and Damián Zaitch. The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. 85-95. “Assessment of U.S. Government Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons.” U.S. Department of Justice. June 2004 <www.usdoj.govt/crt/crim/wetf/us_assessment_2004.pdf>.

136

Beare, Margaret E. “Illegal Migration: Personal Tragedies, Social Problems, or National Security Threats?” Illegal Immigration and Commercial Sex: The New Slave Trade. Ed. Phil Williams. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999. 11-41.

Blumberg, Rae Lesser and Olha Shved. “Curbing Sex Slavery Abroad by Helping Women Earn a Living in the Ukraine: Assessment of the Economic-Empowerment Aspects of the Anti-Trafficking Project, USAID/KIEV.” Sept 2002 < http:// www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/wid/ pubs/ukraine_trafficking_0902.pdf>. Boonpala, Panudda and June Kane. “Trafficking in Persons: The Problem and Responses Worldwide.” International Labour Office: International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour. Dec. 2001 <www.ncjrs.org/spotlight/trafficking/publications. html>. Chollet, Derek. “E-Trafficking.” Foreign Policy. 123 (Mar/Apr 2001): 90. Academic Search Elite EBSCOhost. Northwestern University Lib., Evanston, IL. 10 Nov. 2005 <http://search. epnet.com>. Everts, Dan. “Human Trafficking: The Ruthless Trade in Human Misery.” Brown Journal of World Affairs. 10.1: (Summer/Fall 2003): 149. Academic Search Elite. EBSCOhost. Northwestern University Lib., Evanston, IL. 19 Nov. 2005 <http://search. epnet.com>. Feingold, David A. “Human Trafficking.” Foreign Policy. 150 (Sept/Oct 2005): 26. Academic Search Elite. EBSCOhost. Northwestern University Lib., Evanston, IL. 10 Nov. 2005 <http://search.epnet.com>. “Fighting AIDS by Empowering Women and Girls.” Foreign Affairs. 82.3 (May/Jun 2003): Supplement. Academic Search Elite. EBSCOhost. Northwestern University Lib., Evanston, IL. 21 Nov. 2005 <http://search.epnet.com>. Friedman, Thomas L. The Lexus and the Olive Tree (updated). New York : Anchor Books, 2000. Garret, Geoffrey. “Globalization’s Missing Middle.” Foreign Policy. 83.6 (Nov/Dec 2004): 84-96. Haass, Richard N. The Opportunity: America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course. New York : PublicAffairs, 2005.

137

Koslowski, Rey. “Economic Globalization, Human Sumggling, and Global Governance.” Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives. Ed. Kyle, David and Rey Koslowski. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press: 2001. 337- 358. Kyle, David and John Dale. “Smuggling the State Back In: Agents of Human Smuggling Reconsidered.” Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives. Ed. Kyle, David and Rey Koslowski. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press: 2001. 29-57. Laczko, Frank and Marco A. Gramegna. “Developing Better Indicators of Human Trafficking.” Brown Journal of World Affairs. 10.1: (Summer/Fall 2003): 179. Academic Search Elite. EBSCOhost. Northwestern University Lib., Evanston, IL. 19 Nov. 2005 <http://search.epnet.com>. Macklin, Audrey. “At the Border of Rights: Migration, Sex Work and Trafficking.” From the Margins of Globalization: Critical Perspectives on Human Rights. Ed. Neve Gordon. Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004. 161-191. Marshall, Phil. “Globalization, Migration, and Trafficking: Some Thoughts from the South-East Asian Region.” UN InterAgency Project on Trafficking in Women and Children in the Mekong Sub-region. Sept. 2001 <www.ncjrs.org/spotlight/trafficking/ publications.html>. Mattar, Mohamed Y. “Monitoring the Status of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Foreign Countries: Sanctions Mandated Under the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act.” Brown Journal of World Affairs. 10.1 (Summer/Fall 2003): 159. Academic Search Elite. EBSCOhost. Northwestern University Lib., Evanston, IL. 19 Nov. 2005 <http://search.epnet.com>. McKinley, Brunson. “There Are Ways to Curb the Worldwide Traffic in Migrants.” Trafficking in Migrants. Summer 2000 www.ncjrs.org/spotlight/trafficking/publications.html Polaris Project. HumanTrafficking.com: The Resource and Training Center for the Polaris Project. 7 Dec. 2005 <www. humantrafficking.com>.

138

Samarasinghe, Vidyamali. “Confronting Globalization in Antitrafficking Strategies in Asia.” Brown Journal of World Affairs. 10.1 (Summer/Fall 2003): 91. Academic Search Elite. EBSCOhost. Northwestern University Lib., Evanston, IL. 19 Nov. 2005 <http://search.epnet.com>. Shelley: Louise. “Trafficking in Women: the Business Approach.” Brown Journal of World Affairs. 10.1 (Summer/Fall 2003): 119. Academic Search Elite. EBSCOhost. Northwestern University Lib., Evanston, IL. 19 Nov. 2005 <http://search. epnet.com>. Sullivan, Mary and Sheila Jeffreys. “Legalizing Prostitution Is Not the Answer: The Example of Victoria, Australia.” Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (Australia). <http://action.web. ca/home/catw/attach/AUSTRALIAlegislation20001.pdf>. Thachuk, Kimberley. “The Sinister Underbelly: Organized Crime and Terrorism.” The Global Century: Globalization and National Security. Vol 2. Ed. Kugler, Richard L. and Ellen L. Frost. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001. 743-760. Williams, Phil. “Trafficking in Women and Children: A Market Perspective” Illegal Immigration and Commercial Sex: The New Slave Trade. Ed. Phil Williams. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999. 145-170.

139

140

Foreign Policy and Identity: Human Rights in the Sino-American and Sino-Canadian Relationships By Josh Jorgensen

China’s rise to power presents a quandary to many states around the world. Unlike most ascending great powers throughout history, China has risen with limited external conflict and in cooperation with the rest of the world, even though its political system differs greatly from the world’s most developed, powerful, and entrenched countries. How other states respond to China’s growing role varies depending on a host of factors, providing insight into the identity of each state. Specifically, how human rights as a norm of international relations1 plays a role (or does not play a role) in bilateral relationships with China sheds light on how states construct their own identities in terms of the importance placed on different state interests, or different goals for their foreign relations. This article studies two Western nations’ responses to the rise of China, examining the varying emphasis they place on human rights when dealing with China. I study the SinoAmerican and Sino-Canadian bilateral relationships seeking to determine the relevance of the “logic of consequences” and the “logic of appropriateness” for states’ decision-makers.2 These cases also bear on the importance of a longstanding debate between the universality of human rights and respect 1 In using the term “norm,” I refer to a shared understanding of legitimate behavior, in the words of K.M. Fierke, “Constructivism.” International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Ed. Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Herein I examine the norm rather than the substance of human rights. 2 My analysis therefore borrows its epistemology from the constructivist theory of International Relations scholarship. According to constructivism states’ behavior is influenced by their individual understanding of “national interest,” shaped mainly by an identity created by domestic factors or historical interactions with other states. A constructivist analysis entails finding and highlighting elements of domestic politics or national identity that reflect an understanding of given norms and which are linked to the formulation of foreign policy. On the inter-state scale, a constructivist analysis uses instances of the manifestation of such national conceptualizations to explain the interactions between states.

141

Comparing the Sino-American and Sino-Canadian relationships offers a glimpse at how two states react to the human rights situation in China in the context of China’s global political and economic rise.

142

for cultural relativism in foreign policy.3 The primary analytical tool I use in this article is the distinction between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness as approaches to foreign policy formulation. Though these dual “logics of action” described by March and Olsen are usually presented as competing subjective understandings of the international reality upon which the behavior of states is shaped,4 Ian Hurd and others have argued that the two logics of action—the logic of expected consequences5 and the logic of appropriateness—in fact work simultaneously and often cooperatively.6 I maintain, however, that it is legitimate to separate the two logics of action because they represent fundamentally different modes of shaping foreign policy: one considering the material or strategic ramifications of a policy choice for the individual state and one considering what is “right” or “legitimate” in the context of an international system. In utilizing the largely dichotomous nature of the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness my own analysis, while taking into account Hurd’s proposition, uses the distinction between the two logics of action to illuminate the character of these bilateral relationships and the role of human rights in international relations. Comparing the Sino-American and Sino-Canadian relationships offers a glimpse at how two states react to the human rights situation in China in the context of China’s global political and economic rise. The U.S. and Canada, though countries with similar historical backgrounds, geostrategic interests, and cultures, differ significantly in how they approach interactions with the rest of the world. Case studies of the Sino-American and Sino-Canadian relationships—focusing on the variable of American or Canadian identity and its effect on the choice between distinct logics of action—therefore 3 The tension between universal human rights and cultural relativism has lain at the very center of debate over human rights in the past half century. Human rights are universal in that they apply to and demand respect by all humans, yet universal application of moral norms often conflicts with cultural particularities. The following analysis will use the important and unresolved tension between universalism and relativism to understand how states construct their identities and their foreign policy stances. 4 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” International Organization, 52.4 (Autumn 1998): 943-969. 5 While the logic which considers the concrete ramifications of a foreign policy employed by a state is technically termed the “logic of expected consequences,” I will use “logic of consequences” as shorthand. 6 Ian Hurd. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.

provide the substance of my comparative analysis.7 I begin by providing brief descriptions of the role of human rights in each state’s foreign policy identity, pointing to important historical developments and themes in each country’s formulation of human rights policy. Next, I examine in detail the two bilateral relationships, focusing on the interplay of self-constructed identities revolving around human rights and informed by the logic of appropriateness, and the role of the calculation of consequences. I conclude with an analysis of the function of the human rights norm in these two important relationships, determining that varying emphases in the respective logics of action have concrete policy ramifications. This analysis will ultimately show that the SinoAmerican and Sino-Canadian relationships differ greatly regarding the role of human rights. The U.S. and Canada rely on significantly different power calculations and vastly divergent conceptualizations of national interest. While the U.S. adheres mainly to a logic of consequences, Canada leans toward the logic of appropriateness in guiding its foreign policy. Additionally, by studying the different bilateral relationships this article demonstrates that the debate between universalism and relativism extends beyond academic discourse to meaningfully inform relations between states. Whereas both the U.S. and Canada adopt a universalistic approach to human rights, China adopts a culturally relativistic perspective, establishing an important divergence between the identities of China and the Western states. The foreign policy manifestations of such distinct perspectives on the universality of human rights are implemented through differing logics of action on the part of states and varying strategies for human rights promotion. The link between a state’s domestic character and its foreign policy is apparent in the case of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Most observers agree that the current state of human rights, especially civil and political rights, in China

I. Human Rights in the Chinese International Identity

7 I use two types of data. First, previous research on the role of human rights in the bilateral relations at hand takes the form of books and articles on Chinese, Canadian, and U.S. foreign policy, human rights policy, and the history of their bilateral relations. Second, I use primary material such as official government policy, government reports, speeches, news articles or opinions, or empirical research on trends in human rights in foreign policy.

143

China’s human rights abuses lead to a foreign policy built upon, primarily, advocating an international relativism of norms and, secondarily, denying the salience of certain human rights.

144

is troubling.8 China’s human rights abuses lead to a foreign policy built upon, primarily, advocating an international relativism of norms and, secondarily, denying the salience of certain human rights. Though PRC leaders have engaged in some debate over human rights,9 the Communist-led government does not permit dissent to become legitimized in the eyes of Chinese citizens. The government of the PRC is effective in shaping the discourse around human rights in its favor. Internally, human rights in China are explicitly made secondary to political stability, and the two are largely perceived as mutually exclusive.10 According to Ming Wan, polls indicate that the Chinese show strong support for social order, political stability, and economic development. They consequently support the communist regime on the condition that it ensures stability and economic vitality, and as a consequence human 8 The 2006 Human Rights Watch report on human rights in China lists abuses of civil rights such as “surveillance of phone and Internet communications, visits and summons by the police,” extra-judicial arrests and confinement, coerced confessions, unfair legal procedures etc. Freedom of expression is severely curtailed by censorship of all forms of media and restriction of the Internet. All such activities violate or threaten civil human rights of citizens. Social and legal activists who attempt to curb the abuse of housing, reproductive, land, or labor rights, or work to end police abuse, are harassed, detained, or jailed. In addition, organ harvesting by dissidents or Falun Gong practitioners for medical uses “judicial executions are the major source of organs used in transplant surgery in China,” which, according to that organization as well as the U.N. Committee Against Torture, constitutes a human rights abuse in most cases. Political rights are curtailed in the form of oppression and imprisonment of any groups labeled as “separatists” or “terrorists” by Beijing, including activists from the Tibet semi-autonomous region where human rights abuses have sparked a global political movement. Human Rights Watch. Country Summary: China. (January 2007); Human Rights Watch/Asia. China: Organ Procurement and Judicial Execution in China, August 1994. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/china1/china_ 948.htm>. 9 Marina Svensson highlights a long debate over human rights in China which has inspired a degree of diversity of thought on human rights, including the fundamental source of rights and the ramifications of the right to development, and which has occasionally spurred activism among academics, especially in the late 1970’s. Marina Svensson. Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002. 236, 241, 273. 10 For example, President Hu Jintao’s 2007 “state of the nation” address uses language on development and human rights to defend PRC policies at home and justify them abroad. Hu’s doctrine of the “harmonious society” provides the most current direction behind the Communist Party leadership’s outlook on the balance between stability and individual rights. In his address, Hu called for a continued focus on development by the Party leadership and the government in general. It is “through development that we guarantee social equity and justice.” He did identify the need for limited political reforms but emphasized that the maintenance of the Communist Party’s control is vital for ensuring stability. “China’s Hu says Communist Party must stay in charge” 15 October 2007. Reuters. <http://www.reuters. com/article/worldNews/idUSPEK28373420071015?pageNumber=1>

rights are a secondary concern for the majority of Chinese.11 Though Wan makes a convincing argument, this expression of widespread contentment does not take into account those whose rights have been infringed upon the most. The polls presumably do not reach jailed dissidents, journalists, or others convicted based on laws which are contrary to international human rights norms. This domestic situation has important ramifications for the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China. The PRC’s general foreign policy stance on human rights centers on refuting the civil and political rights that Western states promote. The government emphasizes economic and social rights as more appropriate for developing countries. Additionally, in the eyes of the PRC, the developmentalist fervor in China does not eclipse the desire to retain Chinese particularity, meaning that modernization must take into account Chinese history and culture. Andrew J. Nathan provides an excellent overview of the role of human rights in Chinese foreign policy. “From its earliest days,” he says, “the PRC used human rights arguments to help justify its foreign policy, emphasizing the rights of sovereignty and selfdetermination against colonial rule.”12 In its early decades of existence the PRC, controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), bemoaned abuses of these rights on the part of the U.S., France, and other Western powers. In this way, China became an ally of many colonized, de-colonizing, or de-colonized states, especially in Africa, South Asia, and to an extent in Latin America. It also criticized the civil rights record of the U.S. government and America’s racist and sexist society in the 50’s and 60’s,13 and still does today.14 Thus, the Chinese utilize the issue of human rights to advocate for self-determination, independence, and economic development.15 Ming Wan suggests these rhetorical strategies allow the PRC to participate in the human rights discourse without internalization or implementation of Western-driven 11 Ming Wan. Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, 26-31. 12 Andrew J. Nathan. “Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy.” The China Quarterly, No. 139 (September 1994): 622-643. 624. 13 Nathan, 625. 14 “Human Rights Record of the US in 2006.” The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. March 8, 2007. <http://www.humanrights.cn/en/Whitepapers/Reports/t20070621_ 257032.htm>. 15 Nathan, 628.

145

China’s international identity in regards human rights, then, is a protector of cultural relativism and the struggle of developing states.

II. Human Rights in the American International Identity

146

(but internationally-accepted) norms.16 A prime example of this type of strategy is China’s diplomacy in the bilateral, closed-door talks on human rights begun in 1997. According to a Chinese defector, formerly a diplomat, “We all knew it was meaningless. Everyone at the consulate general knew the talks were just a way to avoid international criticism. The notion that China would play a constructive role in international affairs was very deceptive.” Other observers concur in this characterization: the talks were designed to allow individual states to express their concerns on human rights issues in China but without any public embarrassment.17 In multilateral fora, China fills something of a leadership position in challenging the Western discourse on human rights. Within the UN, the PRC has traditionally rallied Third World nations to its cause by strongly advocating non-intervention and the full set of rights related to development.18 However, “despite the resourcefulness of Beijing’s ideological and policy responses and its entente with like-minded Third World regimes, the government has so far been unable to regain the initiative” on human rights, but is instead relegated to a defensive posture, according to Nathan. 19 To some extent, this has changed in recent years with China’s newfound economic clout. The PRC more readily goes on the offensive, attacking the Western record on human rights and emphasizing the right to development, the particularities of nations, and the “harmonious society” concept in its dialogue with the international community. China’s international identity in regards human rights, then, is a protector of cultural relativism and the struggle of developing states. It defends its internal practices as necessary for economic growth and beyond the political domain of other states. We will see in the case studies how this identity on the international stage interacts in bilateral settings on the issue of human rights. The role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy has been irregular and partial at best. Although it is one of the wealthiest and most democratic states, the U.S. has not always been at the forefront of human rights promotion. When it has pressured 16 Wan, 6,8. 17 Charlie Gillis. “Canada’s Fruitless Human Rights Dialogue with China.” The Canadian Encyclopedia Historica. July 9, 2007. <http://www. canadianencyclopedia.ca/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM001311 5>. 18 Wan, 3; Nathan, 627. 19 Nathan, 643.

other countries on human rights, it has often been no more than a rhetorical strategy aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War, and at other perceived enemies in more recent years. American foreign policy has long been criticized for its inconsistency on international morality.20 After World War Two, the U.S. did play a role in the formation of the human rights regime, but failed to lead the international community in adopting stringent human rights standards due to continuing concerns about sovereignty and its own human rights abuses.21 Not until the Carter administration in the 1970’s did human rights become a significant feature of foreign policy.22 Under Carter, the U.S. dissociated itself with the cruelest dictators and supported individuals in other countries suffering from human rights violations. The application of human rights norms was still inconsistent, however, with abuses in the Philippines and China being overlooked.23 More debilitating for human rights promotion was Ronald Reagan’s White House. Like every Cold War president before Carter, Reagan collapsed human rights into an anti-Soviet strategy, designed to criticize the Soviet bloc but never used against allies of the U.S.24 This tendency, in another form, continues to be a hindrance to human rights advocacy. The U.S. now is quick to condemn human rights abuses in geostrategically or economically unimportant states, but ignores violations when political, military, or economic interests are at stake. According to Aryeh Neier, the former director of both Human Rights Watch and the ACLU, there is a new double standard (the Cold War practice mentioned above being the “old”).25 The Sino-American case I study here reflects these larger tendencies in U.S. foreign policy. 20 Frederick L. Schuman. “The United States and International Morality.” International Journal of Ethics, 43.1 (Oct., 1932): 1-19. 9. 21 David P. Forsythe. “Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect.” Political Science Quarterly, 105.3 (Autumn, 1990): pp. 435-454. 22 Jerome J. Shestack, “Human Rights, the National Interest, and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 506, Human Rights around the World. (Nov., 1989): pp. 17-29, 21-22. 23 Ibid, 23. 24 Forsythe. 25 Aryeh Neier. “The New Double Standard.” Foreign Policy, No. 105 (Winter, 1996-1997): pp. 91-102. 96. As I discuss later, the 1994 decision to grant most-favored-nation trading status to China was despite its substantial record of human rights abuses. Other examples of a potential “double standard” on the part of the U.S. foreign policy establishment include support for the Taliban in the 1980’s, the Pakistani military dictatorship after September 11th, 2001, Latin American dictators in the 1960’s and 70’s, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and so on.

The role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy has been irregular and partial at best.

The U.S. now is quick to condemn human rights abuses in geostrategically or economically unimportant states, but ignores violations when political, military, or economic interests are at stake.

147

Despite the inconsistency of American human rights promotion, it would be incorrect to suggest that the U.S. favors power calculations over international norms at all times. In fact, the case could be made that America’s double standard and partial application of human rights to its bilateral relationships are in fact results of an effort to blend the logics of action. That is, while the logic of consequences leads U.S. policy-makers to support human rights on an ad-hoc and partial basis, the logic of appropriateness has unmistakably influenced American support for human rights in the first place. As the case study on the Sino-American relationship will demonstrate, the human rights norm has crept into American identity and informs its perceptions of other states. III. Human Rights in the Canadian International Identity

Human rights play a large role in the articulation of Canada’s interests abroad, which is demonstrably influenced by its debates and success on human rights domestically.

148

Canada’s foreign policy is clearly different from that of its southern neighbor. Human rights play a large role in the articulation of Canada’s interests abroad, which is demonstrably influenced by its debates and success on human rights domestically.26 As former Prime Minister Paul Martin stated, “There is no contradiction between Canada doing well and Canada doing good.”27 As will be seen in this section, though the place of human rights in Canadian foreign policy is not problem-free, Canada has a relatively clear understanding of its role regarding human rights promotion and concrete foreign policy implementations of that understanding. Canadian scholarship and policy both display a trend towards a universalistic vision of human rights. Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt provide one example of Canadian thought on universalism when they write that “to make state sovereignty an absolute principle is to make the state of superior importance to the humans who comprise it.”28 They offer the observation: “Torture and detention without trial are features of how some dictators rule. They are not integral parts of any culture cherished by a people.”29 Within certain parameters Matthews and Pratt advocate a nuanced policy combining indirect interference with state violators 26 Ronald Manzer. “Human Rights in Domestic Politics and Policy.” Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy. Eds. Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt. Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988. 42-45. 27 “Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.” Ottawa, Canada. April 2005. <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/overview-en.aspx>. Preface. 28 Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt. “Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Principles and Canadian Practice.” Human Rights Quarterly, 7.2 (May, 1985): pp. 159-188, 162. 29 Ibid., 161.

of universal human rights with more direct intervention.30 Canada has attempted to adopt this foreign policy strategy and has demonstrated that it does indeed consider humans of superior importance to state sovereignty.31 For example, the debate between universal human rights and state sovereignty is central to the work of the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This body concluded in 2001 that states have the “responsibility to protect” their population from bodily harm, and when they fail to do this (or when they act to inflict harm) the responsibility to protect transfers to the international community.32 In 2005, the government of Canada wrote an International Policy Statement titled “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.”33 The statement (IPS) presents Canada’s perception of its own role in the international system and the trends that are shaping that role.34 The IPS endorsed the Responsibility to Protect and proclaimed its place in guiding Canadian foreign policy.35 Clearly, Canadian thinkers and their government are in agreement that universal human rights generally take precedence over sovereignty. Still, the transition to a foreign policy that implements this notion is not assured. Kim Richard Nossal asserts that the Canadian government has not always adopted a commitment to favoring human rights over state sovereignty, especially when its interests are at stake.36 Generally speaking, however, Canada’s work to establish the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Criminal Court, and several world conferences on diverse aspects of human rights37 has demonstrated its 30 Throughout this paper I will refer to intervention but use it as a broad category which can include “interference” in a sovereign state’s affairs. The hierarchy of intervention can involve anything from diplomatic sanction to military force. 31 Notably, however, Canadian governance has traditionally placed less importance on individual rights (civil and political rights) than that of the United States. See Seymour Martin Lipset. Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada. New York: Routledge, 1990,52. 32 The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Published by the International Development Research Centre, December 2001. 33 The same year, the World Summit broadly adopted the ICISS’s principle of the “responsibility to protect.” 34 Canada’s International Policy Statement. 35 Ibid., Ch. 1. 36 Kim Richard Nossal. “Cabin’d, Cribb’d, Confin’d?: Canada’s Interests in Human Rights.” Eds. Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt. Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy. Kingston, ON, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988. 57-58. 37 “Human Rights.” Canada and the United Nations website (Government of Canada). November 9, 2007. <http://geo.international. gc.ca/canada_un/ottawa/policy/human_rights-en.asp>.

149

Canadian policy utilizes both multilateralism and an activist policy of interference/ intervention to implement its universalist take on human rights.

150

commitment to centering international debates around human rights. Given an understanding of the human rights norm as vital to international peace and central to Canada’s identity as a member of the international community, Canadian policy utilizes both multilateralism and an activist policy of interference/intervention to implement its universalist take on human rights. Canadian foreign policy places great importance on international law and intergovernmental organizations and has expended much energy working through those institutions to promote human rights. Canada helped make multilateralism the hallmark of middle power diplomacy38 and a vital component of how the country engages across issues, including the promotion of human rights norms. This is different from the U.S. foreign policy approach, which is more likely to favor bilateralism and an ad-hoc approach to human rights promotion. The disadvantage of robust involvement in international institutions is that, according to Nossal, they are likely to restrict the ability of Canada to act independently in support of human rights.39 The Canadian government claims however that multilateral fora are vital for good global governance and promoting Canada’s interests, including rights norms. The IPS supports a proliferation and layering of multilateral institutions.40 As the same document makes clear, Canada is willing to intervene in support of core concerns, namely human rights and its own vital interests. Canada, like many Western countries, has deployed a number of tactics to influence or interfere with states that violate human rights or otherwise threaten its core interests.41 The IPS affirms Canada’s universalistic support for the Responsibility to Protect; in fact, its sole mention of relativism upholds the importance of national “autonomy,” but does not use the word “sovereignty.”42 The IPS recognizes and maintains the importance of a nuanced, experienced approach to foreign intervention, and Canada’s willingness to intervene depends to a large extent on multilateral support. The government of Canada, therefore, has developed a position within the international community and specifically within multilateral institutions of experience, expertise, and a degree of legitimacy on human rights issues. 38 Andrew Cooper, et al. Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993. 39 Nossal, 58. 40 Canada’s International Policy Statement, Ch. 4. 41 Matthews and Pratt (1988), 11-20. 42 Canada’s International Policy Statement, Ch. 3.

The Canadian rhetorical position and historical record on human rights promotion provide a sufficiently different model from the United States’ foreign policy to allow a comparison of the U.S. and Canadian relationships with China. This difference may not be entirely accidental, as conventional wisdom on Canadian identity suggests that Canada partially constructs its identity and its foreign policy in order to distinguish itself from U.S.43 If it is true that Canada constructs its identity in opposition to the U.S., it would follow that the universality and importance of human rights would play a central role in Canadian foreign policy. Canada clearly utilizes a logic of appropriateness when deciding how to act on human rights issues. The emphasis on multilateralism and a willingness to interfere or intervene in support of international norms also point to a significant tendency to consider the appropriateness of foreign policy above a logic of expected consequences. Therefore in describing Canadian international identity, we can point to universalism, opposition to U.S. identity, and appropriateness as key factors determining Canadian foreign policy. Given the differences between this identity and that of the U.S., the case studies below will compare, holding the role of China constant, these identities and their impact on bilateral relationships. In this case study I examine the role of human rights in the Sino-American relationship and how the interaction of selfconstructed state identities influences this relationship. I explore both the relevant recent history and pertinent themes, drawing attention to certain identities the two states espouse in relation to each other related to human rights and arguing that both logics of action are present in this bilateral relationship, though the logic of consequences generally takes precedence over the logic of appropriateness. 44

IV. Human Rights in the Sino-American Relationship

Normalization of relations between the U.S. and the PRC did not occur until 1979, though it was predicated on President Nixon’s famous visit to the communist country in 1972. Nixon’s own history is in fact important in his decision to visit China,45 and this first step led to eventual diplomatic recogni-

History 44

43 Will Kymlicka. “Being Canadian.” Government and Opposition. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. 44 For a more complete survey, see Wan, 40-65. 45 Philip Zelikow. “Ending ‘The Great Aberration.’” State Department Historian’s Conference on U.S.-China History. Washington, D.C., September 25, 2006.

151

The legacy of Tiananmen in China was therefore to spark a subtle but meaningful shift in the PRC’s strategy for dealing with human rights not only within its borders, but as an issue of foreign policy.

152

tion five years after he left office, during the Carter administration. The issue of human rights was largely ignored during this time; the rise of universal human rights as a foreign policy issue between the two countries occurred mainly in the 1980’s. Though Shestack points to the Carter administration as the impetus for human rights in foreign policy, China remained an exception to the rule until the decay of the Soviet Union. The fall of America’s sole competitor for global hegemony changed the dynamics of many aspects of international relations: one was that China was no longer as strategically important for the U.S. as a counterweight to the USSR. In addition, as China became more connected with the international community it became more open to critique from other governments and civil society actors. Though human rights became an issue, it was not yet an important one.46 It was the Tiananmen incident that brought human rights to the forefront. The 1989 crackdown on dissidents in Tiananmen Square strongly affected the world’s opinion of the Chinese regime. President George H.W. Bush used his links to China (he was de-facto ambassador to China in the mid-70’s) to express U.S. revulsion to the incident but remain engaged with China, and later renewed most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status despite the massacre.47 Internally, China specialist Harry Harding describes a “sharp” debate within CCP leadership after Tiananmen and in reaction to the U.S. economic and diplomatic sanctions. Conservatives in the CCP saw the U.S. response to the crackdown as a continuance of the capitalist undermining of their revolution, whereas more liberal party leaders held the opinion that further isolation would only hurt China and the party. This latter position had the support of many, including Deng Xiaoping, and influenced the primary strategy of engagement with the U.S. in the 1990’s.48 The legacy of Tiananmen in China was therefore to spark a subtle but meaningful shift in the PRC’s strategy for dealing with human rights not only within its borders, but as an issue of foreign policy. On the other side of the Pacific, this legacy was still felt in the early 90’s. The U.S. Congress and President Clinton considered the connection between human rights and trade with China. The debate over continuing MFN status was influenced by a number of factors, one of which was 46 Wan, 42. 47 Ibid., 43. 48 Harry Harding. “China’s American Dilemma.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 519 (January 1992): 12-25. 14-16

China’s human rights record. President Clinton granted MFN status in 1994, and in doing so “de-linked” human rights from trade. In the 1990’s the United States and China continued to exchange criticism over human rights but maintained the necessary economic and political ties regardless of their differences.49 Thus China has remained a key human rights exception in U.S. foreign policy. In building the Sino-American relationship, the two states have guided their foreign policy interests primarily along a logic of consequences, but appropriateness is a major factor as well. The U.S. (like other Western states) gradually decreased its human rights pressure on China as the latter became more important strategically and economically.50 When the U.S. has pushed for human rights, whether through diplomatic, economic, or military means, observers perceive it to be acting consistent with a logic of appropriateness, but it is often compatible with the logic of consequences as well.51 Regarding the Chinese response to U.S. foreign policy, increased pressure on human rights has resulted in augmented nationalist sentiments among Chinese citizens, further preventing potential support in Chinese society for the human rights promoted by the U.S. Wan says:

Themes

In fact, merely four years after the 1989 Tiananmen incident, independent Chinese intellectuals sharply reversed the very positive views of the United States they had had in the 1980’s… One key reason for such a reversal was that these intellectuals started questioning the motives of American human rights diplomacy and came to believe that the West was seeking strategic and economic advantages for itself without real concern for Chinese freedom.52 The rise of nationalism within intellectual circles, even extending to students in more recent years, increases the internal unity of the Chinese state and decreases the likelihood that the government will be opposed on a range of issues, 49 Wan, 47, 50-64. 50 Ibid., 8. 51 For example, although the granting of MFN status to China could be seen as a strategy for increasing U.S. leverage on human rights through enhanced engagement, it was certainly a decision that fits the larger trend of a foreign policy based on the logic of consequences. 52 Wan, 30.

153

The human rights norm is a dangerous one for Washington to push without concern for context.

154

including human rights. For its part, the government “tries to ride the tide of a growing nationalism” by highlighting U.S. hypocrisy on human rights and portraying China as a victim.53 The accidental 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade triggered “massive demonstrations” in front of the American embassy, which Wan argues were expressions of resentment against Western criticism on human rights that had been building for years.54 The human rights norm, then, is a dangerous one for Washington to push without concern for context. However, civil and political rights are a concern of the U.S. beyond being norms of international society. In the eyes of the United States they represent an important step towards stability, since robust civil and political freedoms are necessary for democratic governance, which is generally a stabilizing force. Not only does this logic challenge the developmentalist paradigm in China, it represents the American position on appropriate behavior and an additional motivation for the U.S. to promote such rights.55 This latter position is based heavily on a logic of appropriateness, and is constructed from the identity of the U.S. as a liberal, human rights-respecting state. Although recent history suggests a bilateral relationship built largely along the logic of consequences,56 I argue that, beyond material considerations, certain themes in the Sino-American relationship point to a national interest formulated along the logic of appropriateness. For example, the fundamental differences in political structures create a disconnect between the Chinese and U.S. governments on human rights. Andrew J. Nathan claims that “by failing to understand the cultural roots of Western human 53 Svensson, 313. 54 Wan, 30. 55 Banning Garrett. “US-China Relations in the Era of Globalization and Terror: a framework for analysis.” Journal of Contemporary China 15.48 (August 2006): 389-415. 398-399. 56 A formulation of national interest based on the logic of consequences is suggested by China’s historical power shift and the attempt of the U.S. to balance this development with human rights dialogue. As Asian neighbor states and the U.S. grew more suspicious of China’s rise throughout the 1990’s, Beijing was faced with a classic security dilemma: enhance military capabilities and cause further distrust on the part of other states, or exercise self-restraint and accept a weak position. This vital choice within the international context, as well as engagement on a bilateral level with the U.S. despite radically different human rights policies, is an important question for studying these relationships. In one way, these vast political and economic differences could be seen to greatly outweigh the human rights norm as an issue for diplomacy. Conversely, the U.S. uses the human rights norm as a useful tool for clarifying interests, positions, and allegiances among all the players in this historical shift in power, justifying its political pressure on China with human rights language.

rights policy and the power of the pluralistic public opinion that helps drive it, Beijing policy-makers underestimated the issue’s importance and overestimated its negotiability.”57 In the same way, the domestic political structure of the U.S. influences the government’s perspective on promoting human rights in China. The democratic nature of the American government leads to an interesting paradox: The promotion of human rights abroad and the desire for economic prosperity at home, precisely because they do not always align, conflict as elements of policy supported by the American public.58 Certain constructions of identity on the part of each state provide further explanatory power. The international community, led mainly by the UN and Western states, began to embrace the idea of humanitarian intervention in the last decade, and Nathan suggests that the very notion of human rights interventionism automatically divided the world into two camps: states that could be the targets of intervention in the name of human rights and those that could conceivably execute such an intervention.59 The U.S., through its rhetoric and history of intervention (in Somalia and Bosnia particularly), clearly falls into the latter camp. China, which has been on the defense for decades regarding its human rights record, may identify as a potential target of intervention. This is not to say that the division is meaningful in terms of predicting interventions; rather, the interplay between these differing conceptualizations of the state’s role in enforcing human rights through intervention is built on the historical actions of states and has ramifications for the Sino-American bilateral relationship: a degree of caution and perhaps distrust. The U.S. is the regional hegemon in the Pacific and arguably a global hegemon. Applying the logics of action, to the extent that the U.S. is a challenged hegemon it will obey the logic of consequences and feel threatened by the rise of another potential regional or global power. The constructivist framework which considers the role of appropriateness in shaping foreign policy supplements this understanding. America’s identity as the moral authority in the international 57 Perhaps an ironic twist on China’s supposed respect for cultural relativism. Nathan, 642. 58 Both economic security and human rights appear as top foreign policy concerns of American constituents, who in turn influence their representatives’ votes in Congress. Stanley Lubman. “The Dragon as Demon: images of China on Capitol Hill.” Journal of Contemporary China 13.40 (August 2004): 541–565. 59 Nathan, 629.

The democratic nature of the American government leads to an interesting paradox: The promotion of human rights abroad and the desire for economic prosperity at home, precisely because they do not always align, conflict as elements of policy supported by the American public.

155

America’s identity as the moral authority in the international community is offended by opposition to the ideals upon which U.S. rhetoric is founded: universalism represents a vital concept defining the American set of international morals.

V. Human Rights in the Sino-Canadian Relationship History

156

community is offended by opposition to the ideals upon which U.S. rhetoric is founded: universalism represents a vital concept defining the American set of international morals. Additionally, the U.S. maintains its role of the sole superpower and its historic position as the world’s policeman. In this sense, recent rhetoric has conveyed the idea that America is still in control of China’s position in the world. Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Christensen has asserted that “China cannot be considered a fully responsible stakeholder and leader in the international system until it develops a more open, transparent, and free society.”60 Rhetoric such as this and the U.S. identity as a superpower and global authority have defined its relationship with China. In this regard, then, the logic of appropriateness reinforces the logic of expected consequences; therefore the U.S. reacts negatively to the perceived threat of China, for example by withholding equal recognition. This case study serves to illustrate the primary role of a logic of consequences and the secondary, but important, role of appropriateness and identities in shaping the respective interests of the U.S. and China in their bilateral relationship. Further analysis will be performed in the conclusion, but first we turn to the second case study, that of the place of human rights in the Sino-Canadian relationship. Canada and China have had an important recent history, yet one which is not as visible as the Sino-American relationship. Whereas the U.S. is the reigning superpower and thus its response to the rise of China is carefully observed, Canada has a less prominent place in the world. Certain historical trends and themes are apparent, however. Canada first recognized the PRC in 1970, nine years before the U.S. While the consequences of this less reluctant recognition of the newly formed PRC are not much evident in today’s relations, it was nevertheless an important step in garnering goodwill. In a word, the Canadians were friendlier than the U.S. toward China. Canada’s “four pillar policy” on the People’s Republic of China, developed in 1994, establishes “economic partnership; sustainable development; human rights, good governance and the rule of law; and peace and security” as Canada’s priorities 60 Thomas J. Christensen. “The State of U.S.-China Diplomacy.” Remarks before the U.S.—China Economic and Security Review Commission. Washington, D.C. February 2, 2007. <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ rm/2007/79866.htm>.

for its relationship with China.61 Of course, the four pillar policy does not rank these priorities, and thus the mention of human rights must be considered in the context of more material motivations and, therefore, in the context of the logic of consequences. The strong Canadian identity as a human rights promoter and as a state which shapes its foreign policy along a logic of appropriateness must therefore be taken in the context of the importance of consequences. For example, the 1997 shift to bilateral talks from public statements was likely a response to China’s growing importance as an economic partner and the necessity of good relations with the country. According to Charlie Gillis, the Liberal administration of Jean Chretien supported measures at the UN that condemned China on human rights, but in the late 90’s, “multilateral shaming was starting to lose support,” and private bilateral talks replaced public scolding. The justification was offered by foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy: “We concluded that Canada could have a greater influence on the state of human rights in China by pursuing and intensifying our promising bilateral measures.” Soon Canadian diplomats realized the meetings were “a joke” and that Canada had less influence than when it pursued multilateral, public shaming. Since 2003, Conservatives have pushed for and implemented a more vigorous policy of human rights promotion. Canadian policy-makers, at least in the eyes of Gillis, must revisit the dynamic between trade and human rights and re-emphasize the role of human rights promotion in the Sino-Canadian bilateral relationship.62 Regardless, this episode was a situation in which the logic of consequences may have influenced Canada’s tactics, but not its strategy of human rights promotion. A more recent shift in tactics has been the Harper administration’s emphasis on human rights over “the almighty dollar.” In 2005, Canada and China announced a “strategic partnership” aimed to connect the two states on a number of levels, but since 2006 the government of Stephen Harper has noticeably distanced itself from the PRC through a variety of diplomatic maneuvers.63 One such maneuver was to award the Dalai Lama honorary Canadian citizenship, a move which 61 “In Depth China: Milestones in Chinese-Canadian Relations.” CBC News. November 16, 2006. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/ china/china-canada-relations.html>; “Canada-China Relations.” Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. August 23, 2007. 62 Gillis. 63 “In Depth China: Milestones in Chinese-Canadian Relations.”

157

resulted in the following response by the Chinese embassy: This gravely violates the fundamental norms governing international relations… It is a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs and has severely hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and will gravely undermine the relationship between China and Canada… The Chinese side urges Canada to… stop supporting and conniving [with] the separatist activities of the Tibet independence forces, stop interfering with China’s internal affairs and take concrete steps to safeguard the China-Canada relationship.64 The relationship between Canada and China has therefore been a complex one, and one which must balance the necessity of engagement with the divisive force of radically different conceptualizations of appropriateness in terms of human rights and governance. Themes

158

The Sino-Canadian relationship is strongly influenced by a logic of action based on appropriateness and informed by the distinct identities of both states. Canada’s middle power status and support for human rights cause it to desire both economic cooperation with China and a certain diplomatic distance that will allow human rights promotion. According to the IPS, “while China is poised to become the most important national economy in the 21st century, it still represents only one-tenth of 1 percent of Canada’s direct investment abroad. We will increase the pace of our engagement with [this] new giant.”65 Canada’s need for expanded trade with China is clear, creating a tense dynamic alongside its explicit commitment to human rights. Moreover, China matters to Canada because it is vital to results on the issues Canada cares about. As Paul Evans stated to a subcommittee of Parliament, “The road to solving the world’s big problems… while it still runs through Washington, also runs through Beijing.”66 In promoting human rights, Canada cannot ignore the role of a government that 64 Statement of the Chinese Embassy in Canada. October 19, 2007. <http://www.chinaembassycanada.org/eng/xwdt/t376373.htm>. 65 Canada’s International Policy Statement, Ch. 3. 66 Paul Evans. “Human Rights and Canada-China Relations.” Presentation to the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. February 20, 2007.

represents (or controls) a quarter of the world’s population. Based on the idea of a “responsibility to protect,” the Canadian government claims the identity of a humanitarian intervener. China, perhaps the strongest advocate of non-interference, has publicly denounced the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and in doing so has claimed to speak for the developing world.67 China represents the type of human rights abuser that could be a target of intervention or at least interference. Language in Canada’s IPS asserts a foreign policy of promoting certain norms regardless of state particularities: “Although specific governance structures will vary by political and cultural context, Canada’s ultimate goal is to foster commitment on human rights, democracy and the rule of law that places individual citizens at the heart of society and creates a state committed to protecting their welfare.”68 Canada is faced with two possible modes of dealing with China’s human rights abuses. It can follow the U.S. model, engaging economically with China while quietly promoting human rights, an option supported by those who claim any Canadian voice on rights in China will come with a close relationship.69 Alternatively, it can forsake some amount of economic or strategic gain in favor of asserting its moral position. Evidence points to Canadian leadership favoring the latter option, demonstrating that for Canada, like other middle powers, international norms and an identity founded on the logic of appropriateness do indeed merit a visible manifestation in relationships with human rights violators, even if such a foreign policy comes at a material cost. Here I will draw together arguments regarding the concepts of universalism and relativism, as well as the constructivist application of the dichotomous logics of action. First, this study has shown that two perspectives on human rights, universalistic and relativist, readily translate into foreign policy decisionmaking and have concrete ramifications for bilateral relationships. States hold different understandings of human rights and international morality. The highly relativist position of the People’s Republic of China is demonstrated in its actions and rhetoric (both key elements of evidence) regarding the 67 Overview of Member States’ Positions: Responsibility to Protect.” Compiled by ReformtheUN.org. May 6, 2006. <www.reformtheun.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileId=797>. 68 Canada’s International Policy Statement, Ch. 3. 69 Evans.

VI. Conclusions

159

The logic of consequences may explain the relative continuity of economic engagement with China regardless of varying positions on human rights, but shifts in the domestic context are also important in reshaping perceptions of appropriateness.

160

right to development, non-intervention, and the economic and social rights that are aligned with its communist form of governance. Canada’s position, made clear in its International Policy Statement, is to promote the civil and political rights of the individual above all. The United States plays an interesting role somewhere between the Middle Kingdom and the largest middle power. Though its rhetoric is universalistic, U.S. actions have not shown as strong a commitment to universal norms over more material considerations.70 While this analysis has not explored all the texts which could offer insight into the role of universalistic or relativist tendencies in the rhetoric and actions of China, Canada, and the U.S, certain trends are clear from the case studies above, demonstrating that states’ foreign policies are substantially influenced by these foundational understandings of human rights and international morals. Second, by applying the dual logics of action described by March and Olsen, it is clear that the distinction between them has some explanatory power. The U.S. has a confused relationship with China for a variety of reasons, including its rhetorical support for human rights. As I suggested, this may be due to internal contradictions in the identity of the U.S.71 and the importance American policy-makers place on the logic of expected consequences versus the logic of appropriateness. The logic of consequences may explain the relative continuity of economic engagement with China regardless of varying positions on human rights, but shifts in the domestic context are also important in reshaping perceptions of appropriateness. 70 To say that this contradiction is due to relativism on the part of the U.S. would be misleading; instead, it is dependent on an approach to foreign affairs guided by the logic of consequences above the logic of appropriateness. 71 For example, since September, 2001, the U.S. has advocated heavily for other states to join the “War on Terror,” rendering that struggle a central piece of its foreign policy, an important consideration in all bilateral and multilateral relationships, and essentially a fundamental element of its image to the world. Although the U.S. rarely frames terrorism as a violation of human rights, the U.S. does promote its war on terror when defending its human rights record. Notably, many countries with dubious human rights records have categorized their repressive actions as counter-terrorism in the past six years, and in doing so they garner some degree of U.S. support for their actions. One analyst has described the war against terrorism as a “heaven-sent opportunity” for the PRC to justify its policies in Xinjiang (home to the Uighurs) and Tibet. The often-contradictory norms of human rights and counter-terrorism push U.S. foreign policy in divergent directions, and the logics of action provide an explanation for this dynamic. Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2006. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Washington, D.C., 2006, Preface; John C.K. Daly. “China’s Uighurs fight for rights.” ISN Security Watch, November 21, 2007. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/ details.cfm?id=18377>.

Nixon’s 1972 trip to the PRC was an event that may not have occurred under a different president, and the Carter administration’s foreign policy placed a greater focus on human rights than that of other presidents. Regarding the Sino-Canadian relationship, the logic of appropriateness helps to explain Canada’s emphasis on human rights which extends far beyond that of the United States, at least rhetorically. Canada has built an identity more firmly around universal human rights. According to a logic of consequences Canada would enthusiastically engage with China, especially economically. The tendency of Canada to hesitate rather than engage must therefore be based on an adherence to a logic of appropriateness which condemns China’s human rights record. The differences in the role of human rights in the SinoAmerican and Sino-Canadian relationships can be understood in part as a result of differing degrees of emphasis on the distinct logics of action in the formulation of foreign policy. In extending this lesson to the international community and to the future of China’s economic and political rise, the human rights norm represents an influential factor in forming states’ identities, and furthermore has clear effects on China’s bilateral relations. Understanding and applying the constructivist logics of action provides a powerful tool for studying the role of human rights in foreign policy. While the logic of expected consequences explains a state’s interest in material power and how human rights fits into a foreign policy based on economic or strategic considerations, the logic of appropriateness helps explains a state’s actions as dependent on its own identity as it relates to the human rights norm. And in determining how such an identity is formed, this paper has demonstrated the value of the universalism-relativism debate in characterizing practical bilateral disagreements on human rights in international relations.

161

Works Cited “Canada-China Relations.” Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. August 23, 2007. “Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.” Ottawa, Canada. April 2005. <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/overviewen.aspx>. Preface. “China’s Hu says Communist Party must stay in charge” 15 October 2007. Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/ worldNews/idUSPEK28373420071015?pageNumber=1> Christensen, Thomas J. “The State of U.S.-China Diplomacy.” Remarks before the U.S.—China Economic and Security Review Commission. Washington, D.C. February 2, 2007. <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/79866.htm>. Cooper, Andrew, et al. Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993. Daly, John C. K. “China’s Uighurs fight for rights.” ISN Security Watch, November 21, 2007. <http://www.isn.ethz. ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18377>. Evans, Paul. “Human Rights and Canada-China Relations.” Presentation to the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. February 20, 2007. Fierke, K. M. “Constructivism.” International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Ed. Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Forsythe, David P. “Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect.” Political Science Quarterly, 105.3 (Autumn, 1990): pp. 435-454.

162

Garrett, Banning. “US-China Relations in the Era of Globalization and Terror: a framework for analysis.” Journal of Contemporary China 15.48 (August 2006): 389-415. 398-399.

Gillis, Charlie. “Canada’s Fruitless Human Rights Dialogue with China.” The Canadian Encyclopedia Historica. July 9, 2007. <http://www.canadianencyclopedia.ca/index.cfm?Pg Nm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0013115>. Harding, Harry. “China’s American Dilemma.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 519 (January 1992): 12-25. 14-16 “Human Rights.” Canada and the United Nations website (Government of Canada). November 9, 2007. <http://geo. international.gc.ca/canada_un/ottawa/policy/human_ rights-en.asp>. “Human Rights Record of the US in 2006.” The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. March 8, 2007. <http://www.humanrights.cn/en/ Whitepapers/Reports/t20070621_257032.htm>. Human Rights Watch. Country Summary: China. (January 2007); Human Rights Watch/Asia. China: Organ Procurement and Judicial Execution in China, August 1994. <http://www. hrw.org/reports/1994/china1/china_948.htm>. “In Depth China: Milestones in Chinese-Canadian Relations.” CBC News. November 16, 2006. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/ background/china/china-canada-relations.html> Kymlicka, Will. “Being Canadian.” Government and Opposition. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Lipset, Seymour Martin. Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada. New York: Routledge, 1990,52. Lubman, Stanley. “The Dragon as Demon: images of China on Capitol Hill.” Journal of Contemporary China 13.40 (August 2004): 541–565. Manzer, Ronald. “Human Rights in Domestic Politics and Policy.” Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy. Eds. Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt. Kingston, Ontario: McGillQueen’s University Press, 1988. 42-45.

163

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” International Organization, 52.4 (Autumn 1998): 943-969. Matthews, Robert O. and Cranford Pratt. “Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Principles and Canadian Practice.” Human Rights Quarterly, 7.2 (May, 1985): pp. 159-188, 162. Nathan, Andrew J. “Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy.” The China Quarterly, No. 139 (September 1994): 622-643. 624. Neier, Aryeh. “The New Double Standard.” Foreign Policy, No. 105 (Winter, 1996-1997): pp. 91-102. 96. Nossal, Kim Richard. “Cabin’d, Cribb’d, Confin’d?: Canada’s Interests in Human Rights.” Eds. Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt. Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy. Kingston, ON, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988. 57-58. Overview of Member States’ Positions: Responsibility to Protect.” Compiled by ReformtheUN.org. May 6, 2006. <www.reformtheun.org/index.php?module=uploads&func= download&fileId=797>. Shestack, Jerome J. “Human Rights, the National Interest, and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 506, Human Rights around the World. (Nov., 1989): pp. 17-29, 21-22. Schuman, Frederick L. “The United States and International Morality.” International Journal of Ethics, 43.1 (Oct., 1932): 1-19. 9. Statement of the Chinese Embassy in Canada. October 19, 2007. <http://www.chinaembassycanada.org/eng/xwdt/ t376373.htm>. Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2006. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Washington, D.C., 2006, Preface

164

Svensson, Marina. Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002. 236, 241, 273. The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Published by the International Development Research Centre, December 2001. Wan, Ming. Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, 26-31. Zelikow, Philip. “Ending ‘The Great Aberration.’” State Department Historian’s Conference on U.S.-China History. Washington, D.C., September 25, 2006.

165

166

Bridging the Chasm: Modeling the Implementation Gap in Health Resources and Health Outcomes for HIV/AIDS through the Experience of Health Workers By Gauthami Soma

“The poorest parts of the world are by and large the places in which one can best view the worst of medicine and not because doctors in these countries have different ideas about what constitutes modern medicine. It’s the system and its limitations that are to blame.” – Paul Farmer, Founder, Partners in Health In the close of the third decade of the AIDS pandemic, the scope of knowledge concerning this disease is colossal. Achievements in both biomedical and behavioral research have lead to practical treatments and critical insights into the individual-level management of the disease. Indeed, the creation of proximate models of the cellular and molecular causes of the disease and the behavioral correlates of increased susceptibility have made possible the substantial reduction of AIDS related mortality and morbidity in the industrialized world (Fauci, 2003; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005). The proliferating epidemic in developing nations has also received significant attention. Statistical assessments complemented by similar models have comprehensively illustrated the gravity of the challenge faced in these regions. In light of this information, national and international bodies have committed funds in excess of what is required in the attempt to control the disease on a global level (Schwartländer; 2001; Garrett, 2007). Although the knowledge garnered through this proximate analysis has proven valuable, ostensibly it has not produced a satisfactory answer to the chasm in disease burden between the developed and developing world. Biomedical

Introduction

167

168

and behavioral advancements in medicine have dramatically reduced HIV-related deaths in the developed world to 169,000 annual fatalities, however 1.9 lives million continue to be claimed each year in Sub-Saharan Africa alone (Burden of Disease Unit, 2000). Armed with the current knowledge-base, even sustained commitments to relieve these resource-limited countries of financial burden by the United Nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Millennium Development Goals, the World Health Organizationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Three by Five Initiative, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, have been greeted by significant frustration in their ability to realize population-level AIDS control (Wagstaff & Claeson, 2004; WHO, 2005; Kvale, 2002). Indeed, a critical gap exists in the translation of AIDS treatment and prevention capabilities into tangible solutions for the crisis in the third world. Correspondingly, scholars of international public health and anthropology are abandoning the microscopicview of current research in search of grander mechanisms obstructing control of this vile disease. Through ecological studies of the external environment of AIDS, a substantial amount literature has been produced examining the historical, social and cultural contexts of disease proliferation. Although these studies are shedding critical light upon the nature of HIV/AIDS susceptibility and spread, surprisingly little attention has been afforded to developing strategies for translating treatment capabilities into health outcomes within these contexts (Moore et. al, 2000; Putzel, 2001). There are a number of compelling reasons to pursue an anthropological analysis of HIV/AIDS-related issues in implementation of treatment and prevention programs. Though figures of the staggering loss of life initially come to mind, these studies will have implications for sustainable development and efficient management of a variety of other public health programs. Furthermore, in order to realize the promise contained in the aforementioned global initiatives, the international community needs to address not only the tools of disease care and health promotion, but the actors involved in the functioning and reform of the entire system. Considerable evidence suggests that health workers are the prime-movers of addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The 2006 World Health Report, Working Together for Health, was the first international document to formally recognize that health workers are central to achieve positive health outcomes

(Tawfik, 2006; WHO, 2006A). It ably demonstrated that “health service providers are the personification of a system’s core values – they heal and care for people, ease pain and suffering, prevent disease, and mitigate risk – the human link that connects knowledge to action.” Indeed, it systematically explained that worker numbers and quality are positively associated with immunization coverage, outreach of primary care, and infant, child and maternal survival. However, it fell short in explaining their role in the context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. This article attempts to bridge the knowledge gap between our understanding of HIV and human resources for health (HRH), arguing that the contemporary shortage in HRH is the critical bottleneck of treatment and knowledge implementation, preventing achievement of effective HIV/AIDS management. The objective of this article is to probe the importance of implementation in affecting HIV/AIDS related health outcomes. It will model this issue through an investigation of the role and relative importance of health care workers, an agent of implementation, in HIV/AIDS management in three Sub-Saharan African countries. In order to assess the importance of historical, social, and cultural contexts, this paper will study the role of health care workers in Uganda and South Africa. These nations of comparatively low and high physician densities have respectively experienced tremendously variable success in their abilities to manage the disease. This unexpected patterning will reveal insights that will critically further our understanding of HIV management in the developing world while paying due respect to contextual aspects that might be in play. A meta-analytic review of current literature was conducted in order to complete this project. Figures of health worker density and access to HIV/AIDS treatment were respectively compiled from the World Health Organization’s 2006 World Health Report: Working Together for Health and UNAIDS’s 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (World Health Organization, 2006A; UNAIDS, 2006D). Further analysis and conclusions derive from the synthesis of several studies, national and international newspapers and government documents, as well as other relevant literature examining HIV/ADS, health systems, and health workers.

169

Background

“I’m in a great rage now, as I understand how many lives we have lost.” —Stephen Lewis, Former UN Special Envoy to HIV/AIDS in Africa

The Contemporary AIDS Crisis: An Overview

The HIV/AIDS epidemic has globalized and feminized at colossal proportions since it first appeared on the map twenty years ago (Piot, 2007). Today, 12,000 individuals around the world will contract the virus, and 90% will not be aware until they experience full-blown symptoms until 2015, unintentionally spreading the disease throughout an eight-year period of silence (Holbrooke, 2007). Another 5700 will die from AIDS, largely because of inadequate access to treatment and prevention services (Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2007). Despite sustained efforts by international, national, and non-governmental bodies, statistics indicate that more than 95% of the people who contract AIDS will hail from the world’s poorest countries, and more than 76% are living in Sub-Saharan Africa alone (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2002, 2007). Furthermore, in these regions where prevalence was thought to be stabilizing, new data has shown that HIV/AIDS is once again rapidly spreading. By an overwhelming magnitude, there is no indication that the number of HIV positive people is declining (Holbrooke, 2007). While the quantitative burden of disease in the third world is staggering alone, variation in the course of the disease is also of concern. Though AIDS eventually leads to death in almost all cases, disparities in the course of infection have rendered it a survivable and chronic condition in developed nations (World Health Organization, 2006E). In comparison, the prognosis for the disease in impoverished areas remains short and tormenting (Adler, 2001). The search for why this is the case has ranged from “mycoplasma and ulcerating genital lesions to voodoo rites and psychological predispositions but the only salient cofactor has been social inequality arising from poor access to therapy and improper infrastructures (Farmer, 1996).” Therefore, the obligation to address HIV/AIDS in the developing world takes upon a moral tone on the grounds of alleviating masses of human suffering.

Despite sustained efforts by international, national, and nongovernmental bodies, statistics indicate that more than 95% of the people who contract AIDS will hail from the world’s poorest countries, and more than 76% are living in Sub-Saharan Africa alone.

The Implementation Gap: An Overview

170

In recent years, the global battle against HIV/AIDS has entered a new phase of international philanthropy. In 2005, support from the United States government, the Global Fund, and the Gates and Clinton Foundations provided over two

million individuals access to life saving medication (Lewis, 2005). Advocates have praised the fifteen billion dollars in US aid since 2003 as echoing the Marshall plan in its grandiose humanitarian support (Radelet, 2003) 2008 Presidential Candidates even spoke of outdoing President’s Bush’s pledge to donate an additional thirty billion dollars (Halperin, 2008). Correspondingly, international political leaders and health experts gathering on the twentieth-annual World AIDS day on December 1st, 2007, resoundingly commented upon the “tangible” and “remarkable progress” on “all fronts” of the battle against the disease (Ki-Moon, 2007). Though this spirit is certainly deserved, success is not visible in the ever-increasing rates of incidence. Indeed, funding has not translated the possibility of resources into a reality in health outcomes, and a significant gap remains in achieving national and international treatment targets. Paradoxically, these generous donations exposed deep fractures within health systems across Africa. Increased funding reduced the price of antiretroviral medication to the affordable levels of $140USD per patient per year (Kober et. al, 2004; Crese et. al, 2002). Spurred on by the belief of sufficient financial resources, countries prepared large-scale treatment distribution plans aimed at increasing access to critical medication. South Africa, like many of its fellow Sub-Saharan peers, prepared for a 50-fold increase in two years (South African Department of Health, 2003). Ambitious for even the world’s most advanced health system, let alone one in a country already suffering from severe resource constraints, South Africa decided to rely upon its own human resources to implement the program. Not surprisingly, an enormous gap persisted between the number of people receiving antiretroviral treatment and the target numbers of its national plans (Kober et. al, 2004). Instead, South Africa’s HIV epidemic burgeoned into one of the most devastating examples in the world. Scholars have only recently begun to suggest that continued prevalence of HIV is not due to a lack of funding, but rather, an inadequate distribution of resources that emphasizes medication and treatment over health workers and systems (England, 2007; Heller, 2006). To put this analysis in perspective, 3% of the world’s health workforce in SubSaharan Africa is suffocating under 24% of the global burden of disease (Anyangwe et. al, 2006, Figure 1). The funding

171

A viciously perpetuating cycle, HIV/AIDS demands human resources for management while simultaneously robbing nations of this precious asset, incapacitating a nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to translate resources into health outcomes.

172

providing this much-needed treatment is exacerbating health system fractures by overburdening health workers. Antiretroviral treatment is a chronic-care service, and extremely high levels of adherence (at least 95%) are necessary to prevent the development of drug resistance and to ensure positive treatment outcomes (Hardon, 2007). In order to achieve the vision of these heavily-stricken nations, caregivers must be vigilant of each patient. This labor-intensive process involves pre-test and post-test counseling, and regular appointments that cannot be absorbed by the current capacity of human resources. Accordingly, policy makers and field workers recently surveyed in Malwai, Mozambique, and Swaziland claim that the most serious obstacle in alleviating HIV/AIDS rates is not limitations in funding but rather a lack of health workers available to translate national resources into sustainable outcomes. Even more, as rates of HIV incidence increase, the need for human resources becomes ever more paramount. Present human resource shortages must be addressed and concurrently scaled up in order to adequately control the crisis. If a sufficient response to this scarcity is not implemented immediately, it will become ever more difficult to control the disease grows older, affects more people, and demands more capital to sustain it (Ainsworth et. al, 2000; Lewis, 2000). A viciously perpetuating cycle, HIV/AIDS demands human resources for management while simultaneously robbing nations of this precious asset, incapacitating a nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to translate resources into health outcomes. Affecting all levels of a countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s response, it engages in a vicious cycle that drains already inadequate human and institutional capacities by exhausting the skills and labor markets necessary for an adequate reply. Furthermore, demographic assessments of human resources for health in these regions indicate that female health workers outnumber males (Abt. Associates, 2000). Disproportionately affected by the pandemic, higher mortality and morbidity rates among women continues to cripple the overburdened health infrastructure. The young age profile of health workers is also of concern since they are among the most vulnerable to contracting the disease. This manifold loss of human resources in health sector is particularly concerning because health workers are the primary agents of addressing and preventing the disease. Indeed, a meaningful response to AIDS crisis cannot be mounted if the disease is allowed to continue its sap of health-based human resources.

Figure One: (A) Global HIV Prevalence, Data Taken from the United Nations Development Programme’s “2004 Human Development Report.” (B) Global Physician Distribution, Data Taken from the World Health Organization’s 2006 “World Health Report: Working Together for Health” (WorldMapper. Org, 2006)

Despite their critical gap in human resources, some developing nations have mounted constructive responses to the disease. The Brazilian National AIDS Program, recognized as the leading example of an integrated HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment initiative in a developing country, decreased HIV related mortality by 50% between 1998 and 2006 (Berkman et. al, 2005). Similarly, Uganda experienced an unprecedented decline in their national AIDS levels during the early 1990s (Green et. al., 2006; Okware et. al., 2001). Neither program relied upon a quantitative mobilization of human resources, dispelling the link between institutional capability and HIV drawn above. However, both cite correspondingly significant behavioral change in promoting their extraordinary results they have seen. Indeed, their success suggests that something more is occurring. Perhaps translating health resources into health outcomes is not merely a quantitative game, and rather, a reflection of the ways social and economic relations are programmatically organized. In light of the severe human resource crisis and devastating effects of HIV/AIDS in the African continent, this investigation will focus upon the experiences of Uganda and South Africa to understand the role of implementation in translating available resources into positive health outcomes for HIV/ AIDS. Based upon statistics compiled from UNAIDS’s 2006 Report on the Global AIDS pandemic and the WHO’s Global Atlas of the Health Workforce, these countries were chosen because they displayed an inverse relationship between the density of physicians available and the population’s access to HIV treatment (UNAIDS, 2006A; UNAIDS, 2006B; UNAIDS,

The Investigation: Human Resources and Access to Treatment in Uganda and South Africa

173

2006C; UNAIDS, 2006D; WHO, 2006B). Uganda, possessing the fewest physicians, was the most successful in providing access to Antiretroviral treatment. Conversely, with the highest amount of physicians, South Africa had the lowest success in providing treatment to its constituents (Table 1, Chart 1).

Table 1: Physician Density Verses Access to HIV Treatment, Data Compiled from the 2006 WHO Global Atlas of the Health Workforce & the 2006 UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Pandemic (WHOA, 2006; UNAIDSD, 2006).

Figure Two: Physician Density versus Access to Antiretroviral Treatment in Uganda, and South Africa, Ibid.

Defining Human Resources in the Health Sector: Who are Health Care Workers?

174

Reckoning the size and determining the characteristics of health workers in a cross-cultural study requires a precise definition. Extending from analysis that health care workers are a key agent of health resource implementation, health workers will be defined as, “all people engaged in the promotion, protection or improvement of the health of the population” (Dal Poz et. al, 2006; Diallo et. al, 2003). Accordingly, this definition is consistent with the World Health Organization’s characterization of health systems as comprising all activities whose primary activities are improving health. Decidedly ambiguous, this description integrates professional physicians and nurses,

peer trained community health workers, and mothers caring for their sick children. However, the 2006 Global Atlas of the Health Workforce from which this study draws conclusions does not include figures of the latter unpaid cadres due to a lack of available data and the difficulties posed by establishing the boundaries of what it would call a health system (WHO, 2006A). Relevant sources will be drawn upon to illustrate the role of these invisible resources in each case study. Contextualizing the unique population of health workers in each country is necessary to establish the relationship between available health resources and health outcomes. Particularly in advent of AIDS, other cadres have become crucial to the delivery of relevant knowledge and information. Whereas previous studies of human resource capacities have drawn upon popular indicators such as the proportion of physicians or nurses to the total population, the goal of this investigation will be to use the established definition to study the range of health workers that might influence implementation activities in AIDS related health outcomes across countries (Tawfik, 2006). While a contextual examination of health worker types is necessary, it should be dually noted that data collection techniques countries vary, and comparisons across borders should be weary of this reality (Adams et. al, 2001). Unfortunately, due to a lack of data, the assumptions from which this article derives, relied upon quantities of physicians as a marker of health resources. “Indigenous South Africans were not a tabula rasa for White invaders for capitalists to civilize or victimize. Over many centuries they had been developing social forms and cultural traditions that colonialism, capitalism, and apartheid have assaulted, abused, and modified, but never eradicated.” –Laurence Thompson, A History of South Africa

SOUTH AFRICA

Almost fourteen years ago, South Africa abandoned the minority rule of a white and racist government. Since its independence, it has become a vision of “two worlds (Herbst, 2005).” The first is one of a remarkable country, in which the resilient South African people escaped the chains of Apartheid and created a democratic government that boasts an economy ranking amongst the highest of its Sub-Saharan peers (Schnieder et. al, 2001). In the second pale reflection of the first, South Africa is nation whose economic growth has failed to lift

Introduction

175

its population out of abject poverty. Socioeconomic inequalities have only increased while a decidedly paranoid dominant party has been inefficient to a fault (Hogeeven, 2005). Decidedly paradoxical, this setting has given rise to the world’s worst HIV epidemic despite a reservoir of human and financial capital. Analysis reveals that though numerically South Africa possesses considerable HRH, they are qualitatively limited in their capacity to implement HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention programs. South Africa’s inability to translate these human resources for health into tangible outcomes for HIV/AIDS treatment is a reflection of the social, political, and historical forces that have shaped the experience of this nation. South Africa in Crisis: Colonialism & Apartheid

176

The history of South Africa is entrenched within centuries of colonialism and apartheid. During a four-hundred year period of gradual social segregation and political domination, South Africa became unwittingly bound in a cycle of marginalization that it has not yet escaped upon all fronts. Indeed, this chronicle has framed the development of the South African health sector and influenced the national epidemiology AIDS. It is therefore critical in illuminating South Africa’s incapacity to translate its health resources into outcomes for disease control. South Africa was first colonized in 1652 by Dutch Settlers at the Cape of Good Hope (Karim et. al, 2002; Elbourne, 2002). The 1886 discovery of diamonds and gold gave this region a strategic value that was exploited by profitseeking miners like Cecil Rhodes. Leeching upon its natural and human resources, wealthy entrepreneurs transformed the lives of the indigenous Afrikaner farmers into the clutches of a workforce-oriented society. These individuals were converted into laborers that could be coerced into accepting an unfamiliar monetary economy. In order to survive in the new system, South African males were forced to leave their familial homes to live in single-sex barracks during their stints in mines owned by wealthy capitalists. The creation of this migrant-labor system laid the foundations for Apartheid policy. Indeed, European imperialism rapidly altered South Africa into a submissive agent of profit for the imperial government. The four-hundred years that stretched between South Africa’s first colonial settlement and the initiation of Apartheid can be characterized as a series of battles between imperial powers over this resource rich land. The British emerged

with sovereign control in 1902 (Magubane, 1996). Apartheid began in 1948, following the election of the historically White Nationalist party. The Nationalist party argued that peace in South Africa could only be maintained through racial segregation. Correspondingly, a policy of separate development was pursued in which certain areas were demarcated White and others Black. Black homelands came to be known as Bantustans and in these locations that constituted thirteen percent of South Africa, Blacks could exercise comparable but separate rights from those afforded to their White counterparts. Blacks were only allowed to transgress upon “White” South African soil for the purpose of labor and held no political rights outside of their Bantustan homelands – extending the grip of a migratory labor system created under colonialism. Intended to preclude White domination by the Blacks who formed eighty percent of the population, apartheid formalized White political and economic control of South Africa. The rhetoric of separate development masked a two-fold agenda of promoting White interests (Price, 1986). Primarily, Bantustans were integrated into a complex economic policy that provided cheap labor to wealthy Whites. White farm and mine owners were not ideologically compelled to provide wages to support families of Black migrant workers because they lived off the land. Furthermore, limited rights in White areas did not provide sufficient capital for Blacks to bargain against this abuse. Additionally, Bantustans functioned as dumping ground for the economically nonviable members of Black society. Placing the elderly, the sick, and the incapable in Bantustans absolved White society from the responsibility supporting them. Prompting unrest within and outside of Africa, this insidious system of institutionalized racism was taken apart fifty years after its institution. Amid increasing criticism from abroad and rising unrest if not violent resistance within South Africa itself, the first steps to end Apartheid were made in the 1990s when bans were lifted from the African National Congress (ANC) and other left-wing political organizations (Thompson, 1990; Terreblanche, 2002). South Africa finally cut ties with apartheid and imperialism in 1992, when sixty eight percent of the white electorate voted to dismantle Apartheid infrastructure. During the country’s first multi-racial elections in 1994, the ANC experienced a resounding victory and remains in power today. South

South Africa in Transition: PostApartheid

177

Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s transition to democracy, characterized by attempts at reconciliation and guided by a liberal constitution, is admired as a complete paradigm shift in the approach to human relationships Despite the transition to democracy, progress has not been made in alleviating human suffering (Benetar, 2004; Schnieder et. al, 2001). Modern South Africa is a wealthy nation of approximately forty five million people (Statistics South Africa, 2003). It boasts a GNP of $2500USD per person, an average income that is the highest among its African peers with the exception of Botswana (Schneider et. al, 2001). Though it is not dependant upon donor aid to fund its health and social services, it has received substantial international funding for its National AIDS Program. Despite this relative prosperity, South Africa still lags behind on a number of social indicators, an obvious manifestation of the apartheid legacy. Infant mortality in South Africa is considerably higher than countries with similar income levels such as Brazil and Mozambique, and even higher than Zimbabwe, a nation with a quarter subsisting at levels one-quarter of South Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s income. Though post-Apartheid South Africa inherited the economic wealth of its predecessor, the social and political damage wreaked by centuries of colonialism and apartheid would continued to hamper progress in South Africa for years to come. This legacy influenced the development of the health care system and the response to HIV/AIDS which prevented successful translation of its sizeable resources into the tangible outcomes for its people. The Evolution of Health Care Delivery & Health Workers: Introduction

178

It is within this complicated context that the South African health care sector developed and within which HIV proliferated. Indeed, these early events situated contemporary difficulties in implementing sustainable solutions to control the epidemic. Apartheid- era impregnation of systematic racism, fragmentation, and inefficiency rendered the post Apartheid health-care system incapable of translating resources to health outcomes. As the agents of a broken health sector, despite their quantity in numbers, human resources for health were invisible in terms of their capacity to address the disease.

The institutional goals of apartheid permeated the South African health system. Though it has been argued that in this era, inadequate distribution of health services was a symptom of the government’s political and economic reforms, recent analyses have suggested that health care disparity was a deliberate instrument used by the state to further its discriminatory goals (Price, 1986; De Beer, 1986; Williams, 2000). In order to ensure cheap labor for White South Africa and rid their obligation to serve the economically nonviable, five policy guidelines were pursued in framing the public health system (Price, 1996). These included restructuring White, Colored, and Indian health services, differential health expenditure for Whites, Blacks, Indians, and Coloreds, inequality between rural and African health services, particular structure and financing of rural health services, and a well funded family planning policy. Informed by apartheid ideology, the aforementioned structural mandates produced a health workforce that was socialized into a racist system and rendered ineffective to meet they country’s needs of translating resources into health outcomes. Restructuring the health sector along ethnic lines prescribed an administrative division of care services between White, Black, Indian, and Colored populations. Though health services were already divided between national, provincial, and municipal spheres, this absurd fragmentation further divided the responsibility for disease management upon racial lines (World Health Organization, 1983). Hours of human capital were lost in this inefficient process that prompted confusion about responsibilities, competition for scarce resources, and inadequate cooperation and wasteful duplication of administrative services (Price, 1986). Furthermore, bureaucratic division fostered racism within health professionals (American Association for the Advancement of Science et. al, 1998). By separating care for different racial groups, medical practitioners treated homogenous populations. These settings conditioned physicians to become complicit in Apartheid racism while rendering them ineffective at addressing the challenges faced by impoverished Black populations. In accordance with policy, when patients of a different race arrived at hospitals outside of their home communities, they were sent to different waiting rooms, seen in separate areas, and given lower priorities. This “us-them” mentality deprived physicians of providing equitable care. In extreme circum-

The Evolution of Health Care Delivery and Health Workers: Apartheid Era

In accordance with policy, when patients of a different race arrived at hospitals outside of their home communities, they were sent to different waiting rooms, seen in separate areas, and given lower priorities. 179

stances, such physician negligence resulted in patient deaths (Silove, 1990). Apartheid instituted division within the health sector prevented physicians from psychologically achieving their capacity as doctors. Fragmentation of medical care along racial lines provided ample space for Nationalist politicians to shift funding between health service branches and woefully undercut the Black community. The disproportionate expenditure on health for Whites as compared to Blacks was arguably the foremost example of blatant racial discrimination in South Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s health sector. In 1985, per capita health care spending was three times higher for whites as compared to blacks. (DeGruchy et. al, 1998) Visible in the number of beds allocated to Whites and Blacks (see table 3), this imbalance served to garner the vote of the white working class who kept the Nationalist party in power (Price, 1986). This distribution created a health system with the financial resources to provide expensive treatments for Whites who suffered from illnesses of the developed world while being unable to provide for the comparably large Black population stricken by diseases of socioeconomic marginalization. Government policies that prevented Blacks from accessing medical education only exacerbated this situation (BaldwinRagaven, 1999). Post-apartheid, medical practitioners were not skilled in the treatment and prevention models necessary to address the needs of its largely impoverished and Black populations.

Figure Three: These figures exclude beds in self-governing and independent â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;bantustansâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; where the shortage is likely to be most severe. The figures are based upon 2 beds per 1000 members of the population. Adapted from Price, 1986

180

The third and fourth policy features created an axis of maldistribution between rural and urban areas. Bantustans were predominantly rural and few whites lived in these locales (Price, 1986). Correspondingly, rural health services were of little interest to the Nationalist Government. The creation of health services in urban regions satisfied the needs of the White

population while maintaining the critical Black workforce. In doing so, it also served to co-opt Apartheid opposition by creating a class Black workers whose access to health care and social services made them resistant to overthrowing the minority government. Finally, the concentration of physicians in urban areas created challenges in providing resources to the majority of the population. Population density in Bantustan homelands was ten to one in comparison to White lands creating a proportional imbalance in health service availability for the majority of the population (Percival, 1998). These maldistributions effectively propagated the ideals of separate development while creating a health workforce whose inaccessibility rendered it incapable of implementing successful treatment and prevention services for much of South Africa. The fifth feature of health policy, family planning, did not directly impact the modern health care system though it certainly exacerbated the HIV/AIDS pandemic by serving as a remnant of apartheid policy to be lashed out against. Family planning was promoted amongst Black South Africans as a means to control and limit the growth of their population. Dr. Johan de Beer, Director-General of the Department of Health in 1981, went as far as to publicly acknowledge the impending need to make sterilization and abortion compulsory among “certain ethnic groups (Price, 1986).” Fearful of being swamped by the black population, White policy makers took these steps to ensure that they would remain in economic and political power by indirectly promoting White population growth and while reducing the scale of a population in need of support. This created an aura of mistrust between the Black populations of South Africa and the health care workforce, limiting the ability of health care workers to address the needs of the population. Resilient even during the Apartheid era, opposition leader and Secretary General of the African National Congress, Alfred Nzo, spoke passionately in 1980 about his party’s intention to initiate a “health revolution in service of our people (Nzo, 1981).” The objective of the ANC was to construct a state-run preventative health system with free medical care and hospitalization for all while providing special care for the vulnerable populations of mothers, young children, the aged and the orphaned as well as the disabled. Following intention with action, section 27(1) of the new government’s constitution articulated that, “everyone

History of Health Care Delivery: Post-Apartheid

181

182

has the right to have access to health care services (Republic of South Africa, 1996).” Consciously aimed at responding to the two apartheid goals of separating the needed and dumping the rest, the ANC’s resounding victory in 1994 was a tribute to their recognition of the enormous devastation left by colonialism and apartheid. However, the ANC’s good intentions were marred by a health system deeply entrenched in the legacy of its past. Despite recognizing the need for overarching change in health, two critical challenges prevented the ANC’s bid for sustainable change in health care delivery (Schnieder et. al, 2001). The first was that the new government inherited the intact administration of the apartheid. As a component of the power hand-over agreement, the jobs of civil service agents were secure for five years after 1994. The ethos of racism and division upon ethnic lines continued in any task these public health care workers were set to while multiple levels of fragmentation continued to render the system ludicrously inefficient (Schnieder et. al, 2001; Rispel et. al, 1994) Financial and information systems were poor. Administrators were incapable of proper oversight and management from a lack of understanding (Human et. al, 1996). It was nothing short of an expensive system, inefficient and authoritative, that encouraged corruption rather than health care delivery. The second challenge in promoting health care was a policy instituted by the new government. In response to apartheid-era disenfranchisement, a quasi-federal political system was created to cater to minority interests (Schnieder et. al, 2001). The new government was divided into one national and nine provincial bodies. Each province was equally allocated funds and none was made to use it in any particular manner. Like many social services, health policy was not in the jurisdiction of the national institution. Correspondingly, no norms nor standards were developed regarding health service delivery and budgets varied widely across the country. Even more, cadres of human resources for health varied among the levels of governance and failed to coordinate, exacerbating inefficiency in government (Johnson, 2004). A tragic extension of past fragmentation and inefficiency, the good intentions of South Africa’s democratically elected government failed to extend past the grip of the Apartheid legacy. The result of South Africa’s commitment to universal health care delivery in a system deep-rooted in the discrimina-

tory practices of Apartheid was discouraging. Table 4 shows progress between 1998, when the nascent government first implemented its reforms, and 2004. Infant, child, and maternal mortality levels barely show signs of improvement. Though sweeping reforms were pursued upon a policy level, South Africa’s health sector possessed systematic inability to provide patient care. Health care workers could not escape the legacy of the Apartheid to treat their patients.

Note: Data From South African Department of Health Demographic and Health Surveys, 1998, 2004

These policy bottlenecks created a population of ineffective health care workers. Figure 3 shows the distribution of HRH cadres in South Africa in comparison to the African region (World Health Organization, 2006F). Though possessing significantly more human resources than its neighbors, South Africa’s seeming wealth masks a systematic incapacitation of the health system. In addition to issues of racism, fragmentation and inefficiency borne from the apartheid created substantial disparities in HRH quality and distribution amongst the rural-urban and public-private axes. In particular, the largely rural population of South Africa has had the least access to human resources (Abrahams, 2007). Furthermore, a skill-mix disparity between the public and private sectors exists. Due the White population’s selective reliance upon the public health system for expensive treatments as opposed to daily health management, human resources for health are not accustomed to the needs of Black South Africa. Indeed, despite a significant quantity of health workers, the lack of human resources qualified to treat illnesses endemic to impoverished populations has sustained a demand for HRH (Kober et. al, 2004).

The Evolution of Health Care Delivery and Health Workers: The Contemporary Human Resource Crisis

183

Figure Three: Health Care Worker Density in South Africa versus Uganda. Data compiled from the World Health Organization’s 2006 South Africa Country Report.

Systematic infiltration of the colonialist and apartheid legacy decimated the South Africa health system and its health workers. Through a five pronged system that deliberately curtained access to health for Black populations in Apartheid and a clause that prevented redress once independence was gained, human resources for health did not experience the transformation necessary to render them effective in the postapartheid period. The Evolution of HIV/AIDS in South Africa: An Introduction

During the death throws of the Apartheid, the HIV/AIDS epidemic was introduced to South Africa. Addressed by either a White government indifferent to the plight of the Black population or a transitioning administration focused upon gaining independence, like health sector, HIV/AIDS received little attention in its formative years. The enormous scale of contemporary the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa is the result of a systematic inability to control the disease. Once again, the epidemiology of and the response to the disease are bound to the history of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa.

Demographics

The modern HIV epidemic in South Africa is overwhelmingly described as “explosive” without signs of saturation or a plateau (Schnieder et. al, 2001; Karim et. al., 2002; ).” Though it is the wealthiest nation among its peers, recent examination of disease trends in the fifteen countries that compose Sub-Saharan Africa highlighted that South Africa possessed

184

the only HIV/AIDS epidemic that is increasing in prevalence (Parkhurst, 2004; Beyrer, 2007). To place in perspective, of the forty million people in the world that suffer from this disease, five million live in South Africa (Benetar, 2004). In 2000, HIV/AIDS accounted for 38% of total premature life years lost and disproportionately affects woman (Bradshaw et. al, 2003). Heterosexual transmission is the main pathway for infection. Indeed, rates of HIV/AIDS in South Africa are so unique in comparison to the rest of the world that without doubt the situation is one of the greatest challenges in the world today. The evolution of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa is bound to the historical and political forces that have shaped this nation. Records indicate that HIV/AIDS first appeared in South Africa during the Apartheid era in 1982. In the initial phase of the epidemic, prevalence was limited to the Black and gay communities (Karim, 2002). The predominantly White government was indifferent towards addressing the disease because it affected low priority Black and gay populations. Contrastingly, some Blacks denied the existence of HIV/AIDS, believing that it was another western ploy to gain power over their populations. They believed that it was an extension of the Apartheid governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s population-controlling family planning program (Price, 1996). This double blow thwarted any initial measures to control the disease Indeed, HIV/AIDS arrived in a social and political environment that ignored the devastation it was capable of reeking Anti-apartheid activists continued to cast HIV aside as late as 1989 in their endeavor to achieve independence from the White government. This early ignorance coupled with poor access to health care denied South Africans the critical window in which the could have been contained (Campbell et. al, 1999). Data has revealed that at least until 1987, HIV levels among the heterosexual population remained low (Mann; 1996; Stein, 1990). Indeed, the disease did not take hold of South Africa until approximately 1995 when incidence based upon antenatal surveys revealed an increase from .76% in 1990 to 10.44% (South African Department of Health, 2003). Migratory labor patterns created by the colonial government and propagated by the apartheid state transformed HIV/AIDS into a disease that rendered heterosexual partners and woman vulnerable en masse. These back and forth movements provided fertile ground for a sudden surge

The Evolution of HIV/ AIDS in South Africa: A Socio-epidemiological Anaysis

185

186

in the epidemic. Traveling out of the Bantustans to provide White South Africans with cheap labor, Black men sometimes took up “town wives” in mine compounds. Returning to their tribal wives during periods of leave, infection was transmitted between home compounds (Lurie et. al, 2003; Williams, 2000; Karim, 2002). Concurrently, the few Black women in White South Africa often subsisted by providing sexual favors for Black men at mines. This extensive sexual networking incited rapid disease proliferation. Indeed, one study of sex-workers at trucking stops in South Africa’s Kwa-Zulu Natal provinces illustrated the dynamics of this destructive relationship (Ramjee, 2002). In a natural extension of migratory labor, transportation between Sub-Saharan countries transferred disease between nations. As such, when HIV prevalence in Malawi reached 3% in 1985, it should have been assumed that South African miners were at risk for HIV/AIDS given the two nations’ interrelated economies (Dusheiko et. al, 1999). Epidemiological analysis of HIV in South Africa confirms that the pandemic did descended into this nation from East and Central Africa (Abdool-Karim et. al, 1997). While South African activists toiled arduously to gain independence from imperial rule, the legacy of colonialism seemingly continued to devastate the fabric of South African society by magnifying the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Even when independence was gained in 1992, surprisingly little attention was paid to addressing the AIDS pandemic. Nelson Mendela placed HIV/AIDS relatively low on his political agenda (Parkhurst, 2001). Isolated along with twenty other issues as a “Presidential Lead Project,” HIV/ AIDS was supposed to receive the attention and resources necessary to curtail its course (Karim, 2002; Schnieder et. al, 2001). However, when a National AIDS Director was appointed in 1994, the position did not receive the sort of intersectoral placement it needed. By assigning this role under the auspices of the Department of Health, the fragmented and inefficient division of labor was exacerbated. Following national footsteps, provincial AIDS Programmes were created within local health initiatives and were often headed by health care workers with strong ties to the Apartheid government. The local programs were weak and plagued with apathy. Fragmentation in health care delivery for HIV/AIDS persists even today. South Africa’s current national health plan to control HIV aims to offer care and treatment to eighty percent of all individuals in need

(Medecins Sans Frontiers, 2007). This program hopes to bridge the gap between the remaining 35,000 individuals that are still in need of Anti-Retroviral treatment on waitlists. Though this strategic plan recognizes that human resources for health will be critical in achieving its goals, neither it, nor the Department of Healthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Human Resources for Health plan takes into account the toll that HIV/AIDS has on health workers. Furthermore, despite the sizeable sums raised through fundraising, National AIDS Programs have not spent significant portions of the resources allocated to this disease, illustrating the inefficiency of South African HRH management (table 5). Exacerbating apartheid-era fragmentation, new cadres of health workers entered the bureaucracy and were made responsible for the organization of health care delivery in the post-apartheid government. Their subsequent integration of HIV/AIDS programming into the primary care sector reflected their aversion to selectively prioritize the disease, a response perhaps to lingering anti-Western biases. Indeed, this early infrastructure was plainly ineffective. Embracing a narrowly biomedical and health-based perspective, South African HIV/AIDS programs until 1998 were characterized by a hesitant start and multiple parallel measures that lacked the cohesion in time and among levels of government to successfully implement policy goals (Schnieder et al, 2001; Rosenbrock, 1993). Indeed, the HIV/AIDS policy of the immediate postApartheid government did not have any means of addressing the human-resource oriented inability of the health sector.

Table Adapted from Schnieder & Stein, 2001 Note: Recent Data regarding rates of expenditure are unavailable (Ndovlu, 2005; Hickey, 2003)

Despite dissidence within the government, South Africa emerged from colonial rule as the economic leader of its region (Parkhurst, 2001). Traumatized by the legacy of apartheid, national leaders felt compelled to set an example for their peers by ridding themselves of Western dependency. In the field of HIV AIDS, President Thabo Mbeki achieved this by opposing

187

Western dictates of disease etiology. In 2000, when AIDS levels achieved 22.6% incidence, President Mbeki convened an international meeting of AIDS dissidents and subsequently entertained “if not unequivocally endorsed” the theory that HIV and AIDS was not linked (South African Department of Health, 2003; Fassin et. al, 2002). The rhetoric of his denial echoed the pervasive will of the South African people to shed the chains of racism that marginalized their lives through colonialism and apartheid. In a speech to university students in 2001, Mbeki spoke against the western world stating, “Thus does it happen that others who consider themselves to be our leaders take to the streets carrying their placards, to demand that because we are germ carriers, and human beings of a lower order that cannot subject its passions to reason, we must perforce adopt strange opinions, to save a depraved and diseased people from perishing from self-inflicted disease.…Convinced that we are but natural-born, promiscuous carriers of germs, unique in the world, they proclaim that our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust (Mbeki, 2001).” Adding insult to injury, even the attempts to cast away colonialism prevented successful control of the disease. Though Mbeki publicly left the debate about the causes of HIV in 2002, the climate paranoia around HIV is still pervasive in South Africa. The legacy of colonialism and apartheid prompted the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic while destroying the ability of the system and its agents to control the disease. Imposed migratory labor patterns provoked the explosion in HIV/AIDS incidence while systematic racism and fragmentation prevented control.

188

UGANDA

“Rebuilding Uganda involves remaking all aspects of Ugandan society – from physical infrastructure to the soul and spirit of the nation.” - James Katorobo, Ugandan Professor and Author

Introduction

Although consistently placed upon the United Nation’s list of least-developed countries, in 1992 Uganda became the first

African country to report declining rates of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (United Nations, 2008; Okware, 2001; Low-Beer et. al, 2003). As years passed, Uganda’s radical transformation from 22.8% national HIV prevalence in 1992 to 9.8% in 1998 earned it the nickname the “African miracle.” Experts have cited this case as overwhelming proof that efficient resource management can control the spread of the disease (Green et. al, 2006; Stoneburner et. al, 2004). However, debate abounds in the attempt to understand this success story. Riddled by a chronic lack of funding and health care workers, Uganda’s tale suggests that control of HIV/AIDS is not simply about resource availability but rather resource management. Analysis indicates that the successful implementation of HRH reforms under the guidance of charismatic leadership united health workers and the Ugandan community in revolution to curb the spread of AIDS. Indeed, Uganda’s social and political context situated its ability to effectively translate its limited resources into substantial health outcomes.

Although consistently placed upon the United Nation’s list of least-developed countries, in 1992 Uganda became the first African country to report declining rates of the HIV/AIDS epidemic

Located in the interior of the African continent, Uganda did not experience colonial influences until the nineteenth century. Though the effects of British rule in Uganda incited substantial internal violence in the wake of independence, the comparatively less insidious influence of imperialism left this country devoid of infrastructure but also divorced from its colonial legacy. This setting framed Uganda’s ability to implement radical reforms in its health sector to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Uganda in Crisis: Historical and Political Context

Though considerably shorter, Uganda’s colonial history unfolded in a pattern similar to South Africa. First discovered by Arab traders, Uganda fell under the gaze of the British “sphere of interest” in the mid-nineteen century (US State Department, 2008). Indeed, Uganda is a young nation whose formation was propelled by a series of imperial wars amongst Great Britain, Germany, and France for control of the fertile soils around and the headwaters of the Nile River (Leggett, 2001). Following an announcement in the London Gazette, the several disparate tribes that lived within Uganda were unwittingly integrated as British Protectorate in 1894 (Library of Congress, 1990; US State Department, 2008). British governance over Uganda was primarily dictated by financial aims and consequently the state paid little attention to the social, political, and economic needs

Colonialism & Civil War

189

of the population. Instead, the British government pursued a policy of “divide and rule” that fostered inequitable patterns of development to maintain support when needed (Macrae, 1996; Brett, 1992). Nevertheless, Ugandan independence in 1962 came about peacefully (Leggett, 2001). In contrast to South Africa, the campaign for British withdrawal was not violent and could instead by characterized as a relatively harmonious transition. However, these diplomatic overtones were marred by the sectarian tensions inherited from Uganda’s colonial legacy (Brett, 1992). Once described as the “pearl of Africa” by Winston Churchill, in the three years following Milton Otobe’s election as Prime Minister, violence erupted in Uganda between those in favor of a centralized state and those in favor of strong local tribal kingdoms (Wakhweya, 1996; US Department of State, 2008). Civil conflict continued and reached its climax with the military coup of Otobe’s government by the famed dictator Idi Amin Dada. Once taking office, Amin dissolved the parliament and suspended the government, giving himself absolute power. Widespread violence characterized the Amin years during which an estimated 300,000 individuals were murdered (Silvard, 1993; Azam, 2002). A series of military coups ensued during which Otobe was reinstated and removed from power. In 1986, the National Resistance Movement led by Yowri Musevni seized power and remains in control today. Civil instability destroyed Ugandan social and economic fabrics. From 1973 to 1980, income per capita fell 6.2%, a rate that is ten times higher than anywhere on the African continent (Macrae, 1996). Concurrently, the state’s escalating military budget constrained the funds available to the public sector. In its efforts to maintain civil control, state-provided social necessities, including health care, eroded (Okuonzi et. al, 1996). Uganda in Transition: Museveni Era

190

Upon taking control, President Museveni outlined an ambitious ten-point program intended to rebuild national unity and to provide strong economic foundation for future development (Macrae, 1996). Greeted by an anxious bureaucracy, the NRM vigorously pursued consensus across party-lines. With the charismatic Museveni as leader, this vigilance was successful in a substantial portion of the country, creating a national coalition for the pursuit of Ugandan prosperity. Correspondingly, President Museveni’s regime has

been praised for prompting a fundamental shift in Ugandan politics. Spearheading “the best and most effective” government since independence, Museveni’s administration has paid due respect to human rights, free speech, and the plight of the poor (Ofcansky, 1996). Though criticism of corruption abounds, his administration propelled the reverse in the tide of economic misery. Figure 4 shows a decrease in the national poverty headcount between 1992 and 1999. In comparison to conflict era deflation, in 1995 economic growth was at 7.5% per year (Ofcansky, 1996). Unfortunately, lingering debt burden and the eruption of conflict in the North has forced Uganda to remain very poor and as of 2008, this nation continues to be on the United Nation’s list of the least developed countries (United Nations, 2008).

Although violence devastated the political and economic foundations of the Ugandan government, the divorce from colonialism in contemporary Uganda allowed the strong and efficient leadership of President Yoweri Museveni to propel the nation’s growth. Civilian conflict in Uganda nearly decimated the public health infrastructure as a whole. The result of this devestation was a tabula resa health sector that was readily capable of instituting reforms. Indeed, this flexible system produced health workers in Uganda that were readily capable of translating the nation’s limited national resources into substantial health outcomes for HIV/AIDS.

The Evolution of the Health System and Health Care Workers: Introduction

During the final years of British Colonialism, in 1960, The World Health Organization reported that Uganda was leading its African peers in various measures of population-level health (Macrae, 1996). In the twenty years of civil conflict that characterized the end of British imperial rule to the ascension

The Evolution of the Health System and Health Care Workers: Colonialism and Conflict

191

of President Yowri Museveni, health in Uganda fell to the fortieth position in the same examination. Civil instability had an overwhelming negative effect upon the health system, consequently rendering its health care workers lame and ineffective. Although analyses of health during this period are limited by the documentation capacity of conflict situations, the little data available emphasizes this hypothesis. Economic decline had a severe impact upon the Ugandan health sector (Lee et. al, 1987). The 1986/1987 fiscal year was allocated 6.4% of the budget it received for health in 1970 (Macrae, 1996). Even when relative peace was achieved in 1989, the budget only increased to 16.4% of 1970. In order to operate at levels similar to 1960, Uganda’s health system could not persist without increased financial resources. Unable to finance their employment, substantial human resources for health were lost (Dodge, 1985). Conflict exacerbated these structural cracks in Uganda’s health sector. Dwindling numbers of health workers were faced with a exponential increase in the burden of patient care as a result of violence (Dodge, 1985). Interviews with nurses and physicians in Uganda’s Soroti and Luwero districts suggest that these loads had a ripple effect that destroyed staff training and development opportunities (Macrae, 1986). In some cases, violence led to health worker injury and death. These then induced worker attrition and flight, all but destroying the capacity of the Ugandan health care system (Corkery et. al, 1999). All in all, instability delivered a double blow to the Ugandan health system by simultaneously destroying its financial and human resource capacity. Like South Africa, Figure 5 shows that infant mortality during Uganda’s period of conflict remained appallingly low (Okuonzi, 2004). By the early 1980s, the public health sector virtually collapsed (Dodge, 1985).

192

Figure Five: Ugandan poverty headcounts in 1992 and 1992. Data compiled from Economic Research Policy Council of Kampala’s “Growth and Poverty Reduction in Uganda” (Economic Research Policy Council, 2003)

In contrast to the “well-funded and technically functioning” health system inherited by South Africa, the Museveni government acceded to a health infrastructure deprived of funds, drugs, and human resources (Parkhurst, 2001; Ablo et. al. , 1998). In response to the dual constraints of financial and human resource shortage, a series of public sector reforms were subsequently implemented to improve the efficiency of its personnel (Parkhurst, 2001; Corkery et. al, 1999). By rapidly addressing the needs of the health sector, without the burden of a sunset clause, the enlightened government began to address the implementation challenge while providing ample room to pursue external funding mechanisms. Though three decades of political instability produced an “ineffective and demoralized” health workforce, draining the health sector of its human capital, systematic reforms created a viable corps (Corkery et. al, 1999). Prior to implementing any programs, the new government drew upon a series of commissioned reports to gain a holistic understanding of the situation (Macrae, 1996). Subsequently, a decentralized health care system was instituted (Hanson et. al, 1991; Parkhurst et. al.; 1999, Corkery et. al, 1999). With decentralization came a restructuring of the roles and responsibilities of the central and local governments. Keeping in mind the social and economic needs of health workers burnt-out from conflict, the reformations of Museveni’s government placed the delivery of health services central in its changes. In doing so, President Museveni created a workforce that was considerably more capable than the larger one employed by South Africa (Figure 6). Indeed, in the face of HIV, the rejuvenated health workforce was galva-

Museveni Era

193

nized with the rest of the population in the sprit of curtailing the disease.

Figure Six: Health Care Worker Density in Uganda versus Uganda. Data compiled from the World Health Organization’s 2006 Uganda Country Report

In order to build a financial repository for Ugandan health expenses, Museveni drew upon international aid. Whereas the South African government felt compelled to deny Western assistance, almost half the budget of Uganda’s Ministry of Health was provided by external sources (Ugandan Ministry of Health, 2001). In doing so, Museveni allowed available resources to be placed in the reformation of the health system while separate attention was paid to supplanting the financial capacity of the health sector. Not constrained by a formal health system like South Africa, President Musevni relied upon his creativity to build a health workforce by dividing the response to financial and human capital shortages. The Evolution of HIV/ AIDS in South Africa: A Socio-Epidemiological Analysis

194

HIV/AIDS in Uganda was dramatically curbed by one of the most successful resource-limited programs in the world. Not fearful of an orchestrated Western lie, the Ugandan government galvanized its health workforce and the nation into an overwhelming movement to reduce the spread of the disease. Prior to a socio-epidemiological analysis of AIDS in Uganda, it must be noted that in comparison to South Africa, the epidemic is old (Allen et. al., 2004). Though it was not formally recognized until the early 1990s, data has suggested that the disease understood as “Slim” during the early 1970s/1980s was HIV (Parkhurst, 2001; Allen et. al, 2004). This is important

because, like any infection in a population, virulence decreases over time. Though data of HIV incidence suggests a dramatic decline in accordance with governmental policies for HRH, this phenomenon might have instead occurred naturally. That being said, HIV/AIDS was first diagnosed in 1982 (Allen et. al, 2004). HIV/AIDS emerged in the death throws of the Ugandan civil war (Allen et. al, 2004; Macrae, 1996). The first suspected case of HIV occurred in the late 1970s in the Rakai district (Putzel, 2004). Social dislocation, economic collapse, and the development of illicit activities like smuggling and the sex trade contributed the proliferation of the disease during conflict. Like the South African apartheid, the disease was largely ignored by the government in this initial phase. Indeed, the second regime of Milton Otobe pursued a denialist agenda reminiscent of President Mbeki (Putzel, 2003). By the mid 1980â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s, HIV/AIDS in Uganda was in the stages of a full-blown epidemic. Whereas most Sub-Saharan nations were weary of HIV/AIDS in the face of democratic transition as another Western attack upon their independence, President Yoweri Museveni was the only leader to be vocal about addressing this disease almost immediately following his ascension power. Guided by the insistence of medical doctors, in 1987 President Museveni began a series of public speeches that drew attention to HIV/AIDS pandemic. Dually noting his reliance upon scientific and medical studies, Museveni called for the public delivery of HIV/AIDS medication while advancing the rights of women and children. Furthermore, in order to ensure the capacity of health care delivery, Museveniâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s HIV/AIDS programs was among the first in Africa to ration antiretroviral medication to physicians. The amalgamation of these policies resulted in a holistic program of advocating treatment and prevention, Museveni united the nation in a coalition to address HIV/AIDS. Finally, the diversity of populations integrated in Uganda precluded the formation of alternative disease explanations. Whereas the experience of Apartheid bound South Africans in a cohesive unit against Western etiologies, the very origins of Ugandan conflict prevented a similar patterning (Price, 1996; Allen et. al, 1999.) Though HIV/AIDS in Uganda also proliferated during the 1990s, a government that did not fear White attack was successful in controlling the disease. Lead by President Museveni, a coalition was built that united health workers and

The Ugandan government galvanized its health workforce and the nation into an overwhelming movement to reduce the spread of the disease.

195

national population in an overwhelming movement to address and conquer this devastating epidemic. CONCLUSION

196

Western attitudes towards Africa have tended to reduce the problems of this vibrant and diverse continent into the tragedies of a monolithic people. Though HIV/AIDS took hold of both South Africa and Uganda in the early 1990s as each underwent transformations in their political systems following periods of civil unrest, formidable differences in Uganda’s response to the disease altered the course of the epidemic in this is country. Though Uganda had significantly fewer health workers than South Africa, this nation’s ability to effectively manage its HRH shortage allowed it to effectively conquer the implementation challenge by translating the resources it had available into remarkable health outcomes for HIV/AIDS. Conversely, structural barriers in South Africa’s health system prevented it from galvanizing its health care workers to address the disease. Battered by four hundred years of colonialism and subsequent apartheid, when South Africa’s gained independence in 1982, despite the inheritance of a wealthy and technically functioning civil service, it did not escape the legacy of its past in the creation of services for its people. Therefore, its numerically sufficient distribution of health care workers was rendered obsolete by the continuing presence of fragmentation and racism amongst its ranks. In the face of HIV/AIDS, also exacerbated by the legacy of colonialism and apartheid, South Africa’s HRH could not respond to the crisis despite a wealth of financial resources. Indeed, the case of South Africa illustrates the implementation challenge in addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Contrastingly, Uganda’s limited human resources for health efficiently turned the tides of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in this country. Emerging from the civilian conflict that was its colonial legacy, this country was left virtually without a health system during the peak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Faced with a dire shortage of human resources for health, President Yoweri Museveni relied upon creative mechanisms to sustain and encourage Uganda’ health workers to become efficient providers of care. With the aid of charismatic leadership, President Museveni turned the tides of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in this nation despite limited resources. The case of Uganda illustrates that while health workers are critical

to addressing disease, their ability to translate resources into outcomes correlates to their efficacies. Though it would easy to claim that President Museveni’s example suggests that HIV/AIDS can simply be answered by a galvanizing and creative leader, these case studies have something more to offer. South Africa’s inability to mobilize its human resources for health is the result of systematic infiltration by a tragic legacy. Though it has the funds and the human resources to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS in its country, it could not have achieved Uganda’s success because of unwilling health service agents. In a recent development, The United States House of Representatives recently reauthorized HR 5501, better known as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS relief. If an additional fifty million dollars for HIV/AIDS relief is to be provided to the world, these studies demand a reflexive analysis of disease incidence to determine what sorts of changes are necessary to overcome the implementation in translating resources into outcomes for HIV/AIDS.

WORKS CITED Abt. Associates (2000). The Impact of HIV/AIDS on the Health Sector in Botswana. South Africa. Abdool-Karim, Q., Mathews, C., Guttmacher, S., Wilkinson, D., & Abdool-Karim, S. (1997). HIV/AIDS and STDs in South Africa. Pretoria: Medical Research Council. Ablo, E., & Reinikka, R. (1998). Do Budgets Really Matter? Evidence from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda. World. Abrahams, J. F., & Molefi, M. (2007). Implementing Telemedicine in South Africa: A South African Experience. International Hospital Federation Reference Book. Adams, O., Shengelia, B., Goubarev, A., Issakov, A., Kwankam, S. Y., Stilwell, B., et al. (2001). Human, physical and intellectual resource generation: proposals for monitoring. Geneva, World Health Organization.

197

Adler, M. W. (2001). ABC of AIDS. British Medical Journal, 322, 0. Ainsworth, M., & Teokul, W. (2000). Breaking the silence: setting realistic priorities for AIDS control in less-developed countries. The Lancet, 356(9223), 55-60. Allen, T., & Heald, S. (2004). HIV/AIDS Policy in Africa: What has worked in Uganda and What has Failed in Botswana?. Journal of International Development, 16, 1141-1154. American Association for the Advancement of Science & Physicians for Human Rights. (1993). Human Rights and Health: The Legacy of Apartheid. Anyangwe, S. C., & Mtonga, C. (2007). Inequities in the global health workforce: the greatest impediment to health in subsaharan Africa. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health, 4(2), 93-100. Azam, J. P. (2002). Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups: Lessons For State Formation in Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 131. Baldwin-Ragaven, L. (1999). An Ambulance of The Wrong Colour: Health Professionals, Human Rights and Ethics in South Africa. University of Cape Town Press. Benatar, S. R. (2004, July 1, 2004). Health Care Reform and the Crisis of HIV and AIDS in South Africa. The New England Journal of Medicine, 351(1), 81-92. Bennett, S., & Chanfreau, C. (2005). Appraoches to Rationing Antiretroviral Treatment: Ethical and Equity Implications. (Vol. 83). Berkman, A., Garcia, J., Munoz-Laboy, M., Paiva, V., & Parker, R. (2005). A Critical Analysis of the Brazilian Response to HIV/ AIDS: Lessons Learned for Controlling and Mitigating the Epidemic in Developing Countries. (Vol. 95): Am Public Health Assoc. Brett, E. A. (1992). Providing for the rural poor: institutional decay and transformation in Uganda. IDS Research Report, 23.

198

Campbell, C., & Williams, B. (1999). Beyond the biomedical and behavioural: towards an integrated approach to HIV prevention in the Southern African mining industry. Social Science & Medicine, 48(11), 1625-1639. Corkery, J. (1999). Public service reforms and their impact on health sector personnel in Uganda. Geneva WHO/ILO www. ilo. org. Creese, A., Floyd, K., Alban, A., & Guinness, L. (2002). Costeffectiveness of HIV/AIDS interventions in Africa: a systematic review of the evidence. The Lancet, 359(9318), 1635-1642. Dal Poz, M. R., Kinfu, Y., Dräger, S., Kunjumen, T., & Diallo, K. (2006). Counting health workers: definitions, data, methods and global results. Ginebra, Organización Mundial de la Salud. De Beer, C. (1986). The South African Disease: Apartheid Health and Health Services. Africa World Press. De Gruchy, J., London, L., Baldwin-Ragaven, L., & Lewin, S. (1998). The difficult road to truth and reconciliation: The health sector takes its first steps. SAMJ. South African medical journal, 88(8), 975-979. Diallo, K., Zurn, P., Gupta, N., & Dal Poz, M. (2003). Monitoring and evaluation of human resources for health: an international perspective. Human Resources for Health, 1(3), 1478-4491. Dodge, C. P., & Wiebe, P. D. (1985). Crisis in Uganda: The Breakdown of Health Services. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Economic Research Policy Council of Kampala., Deininger, K., & Okidi, J. (2003). Growth and Poverty Reduction in Uganda, 1992-2000: Panel Data Evidence. Development Policy Review, 21(4), 481-509. England, R. (2007). Are we spending too much on HIV? British Medical Journal, 334(7589), 344. Elbourne, E. (2002). Blood Ground: Colonialism, Missions, and the Contest for Christianity in the Cape Colony and Britain, 1799-1853. McGill-Queen’s University Press.

199

Farmer, P. (1996). Social Inequalities And Emerging Infectious Diseases. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2(4), 259-269. Fassin, D., & Schneider, H. (2002). Denial and defiance: a sociopolitical analysis of AIDS in South Africa. AIDS, 16, S45. Fauci, A. S. (2003). HIV and AIDS: 20 years of science. Nature Medicine, 9(7), 839-843. Garrett, L. (2007). Challenge of Global Health, The. Foreign Aff., 86, 14. Green, E. C., Halperin, D. T., Nantulya, V., & Hogle, J. A. (2006). Uganda’s HIV Prevention Success: The Role of Sexual Behavior Change and the National Response. AIDS and Behavior, 10(4), 335-346. Halperin, D. (2008). FW: Stephen Lewis, V-Day remarks, New Orleans, April 12, 2008 (G. Soma, ed.). Halperin, D. (2008). Putting a Plague in Perspective. New York Times (New York City). http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/01/opinion/01halperin. html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ei=5087&em&en=ce1dbc54a127e 131&ex=1199509200 Hansen, H. B., & Twaddle, M. (1991). Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment & Revolutionary Change. J. Currey; Kampala: Fountain Press; Athens: Ohio University Press; Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya. Hardon, A. P. (2007). Hunger, waiting time and transport costs: Time to confront challenges to ART adherence in Africa. AIDS Care, 19(5), 658-665. Heald, S. (2005). Abstain or Die: The Development of HIV/ AIDS Policy in Botswana. Journal of Biosocial Science. Heller, P. S. (2006). The prospects of creating ‘fiscal space’ for the health sector. (Vol. 21): Oxford Univ Press

200

Hoogeveen, J. G., & Özler, B. (2005). Not Separate, Not Equal: Poverty and Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa.

Holbrooke, R. (2007). Still Losing the AIDS Fight. The Washington Post (Washington DC). Human, P., & Strachan, B. (1996). Transformation of the Public Sector: An Assessment of Managerial Capacity and the Implications for Management Development. Cape Town. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS, human resources and sustainable development. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg 2002. UNAIDS/02.48 E. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIS, & World Health Organization. AIDS epidemic update, December 2007. UNAIDS/07.27 E| JC1322E. Johnson, K. (2004). The Politics of AIDS Policy Development and Implementation in Postapartheid South Africa. Africa Today, 51(2), 106-128. Kaiser Family Foundation (2005). HIV/AIDS policy fact sheet. The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the United States. Kalichman, S. C., & Simbayi, L. C. (2004). Sexual Exposure to Blood and Increased Risks for Heterosexual HIV Transmission in Cape Town, South Africa. African Journal of Reproductive Health / La Revue Africaine de la Santé Reproductive, 8(2), 55-58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3583177 Ki-Moon, B. (2007). Message on World AIDS Day. Geneva, Switzerland. Kober, K., & Damme, W. V. (2004). Scaling up access to antiretroviral treatment in Southern Africa: Who will do the job? The Lancet, 364, 103–107. Kvåle, G. (2002). Investing in health in a world that lacks implementation capacity. The Lancet, 360(9342), 1332-1332. Lee, K., Hull, W., & Hoare, G. (1987). The Cost and Financing of Health Services in Uganda. Entebbe: Ugandan Ministry of Health.

201

Leggett, I. (2001). Uganda. Oxfam. Lewis, Stephen. â&#x20AC;&#x153;AIDS in Africa.â&#x20AC;? United Nations. UN Press Briefing. Geneva. 22 June 2001. Na <http://data.unaids.org/ Media/Speeches01/sp_lewis_botswana_22jun01_en.pdf>. Library of Congress (1990). Country Studies: Uganda. Loewenson, R., & Whiteside, A. (1997). Social and Economic Issues of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa. Low-Beer, D., & Stoneburner, R. L. (2003). Behaviour and communication change in reducing HIV: is Uganda unique? African Journal of AIDS Research, 2(1), 9-21. Lurie, M. N., Williams, B. G., Zuma, K., Mkaya-Mwamburi, D., Garnett, G. P., Sturm, A. W., et al. (2003). The Impact of Migration on HIV-1 Transmission in South Africa: A Study of Migrant and Nonmigrant Men and Their Partners. Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 30(2), 149. Magubane, B. (1996). The Making of a Racist State: British Imperialism and the Union of South Africa, 1875-1910. Africa World Press. Mann, J., & Tarantola, D. (1996). AIDS in the World II. Oxford University Press. Mbeki, T. (2001). ZK Matthew Memorial Lecture at Fort Hare University. Medecins Sans Frontiers (2007). Help Wanted: Confronting the Health Care Worker Crisis to Expand Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment: MSF Experience in Southern Africa. Johannesburg. Moore, M., & Putzel, J. (2000). Thinking Strategically About Politics and Poverty. Progressio. Ndlovu, N. (2005). HIV and AIDS Allocations: A First Look at Budget 2005. Budget Brief.

202

Nzo, A. (1981). Address by Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of the African. National Congress International Conference on Health and Apartheid. Brazzaville. Ofcansky, T. P. (1996). Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa. Westview Press. Okuonzi, S., & Macrae, J. (1995). Whose policy is it anyway? International and national influences on health policy development in Uganda. Health Policy and Planning, 10(2), 122-132. Okuonzi, S. A. (2004). Dying for economic growth? Evidence of a flawed economic policy in Uganda. The Lancet, 364(9445), 1632-1637. Okware, S., Opio, A., Musinguzi, J., & Waibale, P. (2001). Fighting HIV/AIDS: is success possible? Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 79(12), 1113-1120. Parkhurst, J. O., & Lush, L. (2004). The political environment of HIV: lessons from a comparison of Uganda and South Africa. Social Science & Medicine, 59(9), 1913-1924. Patterson, D. (2001). Political commitment, governance, and HIV/AIDS. Can HIV AIDS Policy Law Rev, 6(1-2), 39-45. Percival, V., & Homer-Dixon, T. (1998). Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of South Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 35(3), 279-298. http://www.jstor.org/stable/424937 Piot, P. (2007). Message on the Occasion of World AIDS Day. Price, M. (1986). Health care as an instrument of Apartheid policy in South Africa. Health Policy and Planning, 1(2), 158170. Putzel, J. (2003). Interview with Dr. David Apuuli. (D. D. Apuuli, ed.). Putzel, J. (2004). The politics of action on AIDS: a case study of Uganda. Public Administration and Development, 24(1), 19-30.

203

Radelet, S. (2003). Bush and Foreign Aid. Foreign Affairs, 82(5), 104. Rispel, L., Price, M., & Cabral, J. (1994). Confronting need and affordability: Guidelines for primary health care services in South Africa. Centre for Health Policy, Johannesburg. Rosenbrock, R. (1993). The role of policy in effective prevention and education. Plenary Address to the IXth International Conference on AIDS and IVth World STD Congress, June 1993, Berlin. Schneider, H., & Stein, J. (2001). Implementing AIDS policy in post-apartheid South Africa. Social Science & Medicine, 52(5), 723-731. Schneider, N. Championing Health Care as a Human Right: An Interview with Paul Farmer. (P. Farmer, ed.). Davis: UC Press. Silove, D. (1990). Doctors and the state: lessons from the Biko case. Soc Sci Med, 30(4), 417-429. Silvard, R. L. (1993). World Military and Social Expenditures. World Priorities. Washington. South African Department of Health (1998). South Africa Demographic and Health Survey: Summary of Findings, 1998 South African Department of Health. (2003). Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS care, management, and treatment for South Africa. South African Department of Health (2004). South Africa Demographic and Health Survey: Summary of Findings, 2004 Statistics South Africa. (2003). Census 2001: Census in brief. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Stein, Z. A. (1990). HIV prevention: the need for methods women can use. (Vol. 80): Am Public Health Assoc.

204

Stoneburner, R. L., & Low-Beer, D. (2004). Population-Level HIV Declines and Behavioral Risk Avoidance in Uganda. (Vol. 304): American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Tawfik, L. (2006). The impact of HIV/AIDS on the health worforce in developing countries. Background Paper Prepared for the World Health Report 2006., .http://www.who.int/hrh/ documents/Impact_of_HIV.pdf Terreblanche, S. (2002). A history of inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002. University of Natal Press Sandton, South Africa: KMM Review Pub., Pietermaritzburg. Thompson, L. L. (1990). A History of South Africa. Yale University Press New Haven. Ugandan Ministry of Health (2001). Annual health sector performance report: Financial year 2000/2001. Kampala. United Nations (2008). List of Least Developed Countries. (UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, and Small Island Developing Countries, ed.). UNAIDS. (2006A). Epidemiological Fact Sheet: Botswana. UNAIDS. (2006B). Epidemiological Fact Sheet: South Africa. UNAIDS. (2006C). Epidemiological Fact Sheet: Uganda. UNAIDS. (2006D). Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. US Department of State. (2008). Background Note: Uganda. (Bureau of African Affairs, ed.). Wakhweya, A. M. (1993). Health care in Africa-which way? Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 9(3), 234-241. Wagstaff, A., & Claeson, M. (2004). The Millennium Development Goals for Health: Rising to the Challenges. World Bank Publications. Williams, J. R. (2000). The medical profession under apartheid. CMAJ, 162(8). WorldMapper.Org. (2006). Physicians Working. Available from http://www.worldmapper.org/display.php?selected=219

205

WorldMapper.Org. (2004). HIV Prevelance. Available from http://www.worldmapper.org/display.php?selected=227 World Health Organization. (1983D). Apartheid and health. Part I. Report of an international conference held at Brazzaville, Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Republic of the Congo, 16-20 November 1981. Part II. The health implications of racial discrimination and social inequality: an analytical report to the conference. World Health Organization (2006E). Chronic HIV Care with ARV Therapy and Prevention. World Health Organization. (2006C). Country Health System Fact Sheet: Botswana. World Health Organization. (2006F). Country Health System Fact Sheet: South Africa. World Health Organization. (2006G). Country Health System Fact Sheet: Uganda. World Health Organization (2006B). Global Atlas of the Health Workforce. World Health Organization. (2006A). The World Health Report: Working Together for Health. World Health Organization. (2006D). Treat, Train, and Retain: The AIDS and Health Workforce Plan: Report on the Consultation on AIDS and Human Resources for Health WHO, Geneva, 11-12 May, 2006. 13.

206

207

208