NJIA winter/spring 2010

NJIA

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Sikhism & Jurisprudence

by Satvinder Singh Juss

PLUS: Tertiary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa

by Sarah Zoutendam

Corporate Social Responsibility & the Global Economic Crisis

by Johan Viklund

NJIA NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS VOLUME X, ISSUE II Founded in 1997, the Northwestern Journal of International Affairs (NJIA) is an endowed, undergraduate research journal that seeks to expand knowledge and raise awareness of contemporary topics in international affairs. The Journal publishes exceptional articles, papers and theses submitted by scholars, experts, and students of relevant disciplines for an international audience.

WINTER/SPRING 2010 VISIT US ONLINE AT http://groups.northwestern.edu/njia

COVER IMAGE: “Holy Dip,” Courtesy of Flickr user, Koshyk

EDITOR’S NOTE Dear Readers,

While memories of watershed moments in the past decade linger in the international consciousness, the fresh decade has already struck with a slew of its own surprises: two major earthquakes, tiffs over cyberspace, religious riots, and tumultuous elections. But with the daily deluge of breaking news and the public’s increasing desensitization, certain issues slip under the public’s radar.

Against the backdrop of the twittersphere, blogopshere and 24-hour news networks, pinpointing the greater issues becomes increasingly challenging. This round of NJIA attempts to revive discussions on some of these underlying themes through in-depth research and a variety of international voices.

In light of the earthquake in Haiti which warranted further considerations of international aid, “Evaluating Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance” addresses the impact of a particular kind of foreign assistance. And at the same time the role of religion resurfaced in the recent Christian-Muslim riots in Nigeria, “Sikh Theology” delves into the less frequented territory of Sikh religion in secular society.

Some material will surprise, some will not; some may cause disagreements, some may not. Nevertheless, we expect to leave you with lasting questions and set the ground for further discourse on pressing issues.

Sincerely, Sisi Tang Editor-in-Chief, NJIA

NJIA Editor-in-Chief Sisi Tang Managing Editor Katherine A. Jacobsen Content Editors Gregory Mendoza Natalie Noble Shasha Zou Design Editor Thomas J. Johnson Director of Programming Aleksandr Sverdlik Directors of Public Relations Elise De Los Santos Visraant Iyer Editor-in-Absentia Daniel Andreeff Staff Editors Dan Rockoff Eleni Barefoot Heidi Kim Loriana Crasnic

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CONTENTS

Tertiary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Developing a Middle Class Sarah Zoutendam, Peace Corps Uganda

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Evaluating Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance

Richard Lappin, Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium

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Sikh Theology and Jurisprudence Satvinder Singh Juss, King’s College

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Corporate Social Responsibility amidst the Global Economic Crisis Johan Viklund, University of Melbourne, Australia

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Child Labor and Government Investment in Primary Education Craig Stalzer, New York University

From Vietnam to the Congo: Rape as a Weapon of War

Beth Kacel, Northwestern University

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IMAGE COURTESY of Flickr user, WorldIslandInfo.com

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Find us online: Web site: http://groups.northwestern.edu/njia Twitter: www.twitter.com/NJIA_NU

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Sub Saharan African Empowerment: Developing a Middle Class through Tertiary Education

by Sarah Zoutendam

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espite seemingly large inflows of foreign development aid, most nations in the region of sub- Saharan Africa have not achieved great economic growth. The ineffectiveness of present development aid has been attributed to several factors, among them a lack of institution building (Birdsall 2004). The development of a middle class, however, is crucial to institution building and development. Without a middle class, there is great income inequality, impeding economic growth. Furthermore, the equal distribution of income is an important factor in sustainable growth as the share of income residing in the middle class greatly affects a nation’s income per capita (Birdsall 2007, Easterly 2000). The middle class’s share of national income is also correlated with measures of human rights, democratic institutions, and human rights (Easterly 2000).

Institutions are best “homegrown,” built not by foreign NORTHWESTERN

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aid agencies but by local citizens (Birdsall 2007, 582). The middle class provides the tax base, the political pressure, and the human capital to engage in institution building (Birdsall 2007).

The importance of tertiary education in developing a middle class is not presently emphasized in much of developmental literature. Many scholars focus on the attainment of primary, not secondary and tertiary education (Birdsall and Levine 2005). In fact, it seems as though support for tertiary education has been abandoned and lower forms of schooling promoted in its stead (Crowley and Kapur 2008). This is partially due to past studies finding primary schooling to affect income per capita more quickly and dramatically than tertiary education (Psacharopoulos 1986).

Collegiate education, however, is necessary for sustained growth (Bekele and Gutema 2004). Investment in

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tertiary education, moreover, yields higher returns for economic growth than investment in primary education or secondary education alone (Gyimah-Brempong, Paddison and Mitiku 2006).

Birdsall documents the need for financial support of sub-Saharan African entrepreneurial activity through fewer taxes to encourage a middle class (Birdsall 2007). However, business development among indigenous Africans in the region is strongly associated with the entrepreneur’s attainment of a university degree (Ramachandran and Shah 2007). The importance of tertiary education in the building of human capital, and the resulting growth of professionals comprising the middle class is documented along with specific phenomena in sub- Saharan African collegiate education by Megan Crowley and Devesh Kapur (Crowley and Kapur 2008).

There is also a correlation between the presence of a middle class and greater governmental accountability toward citizens. The importance of middle class growth in relation to the growth of de8

mocracy, stability, and human rights is highlighted by Walter McMahon and William Easterly (Easterly 2000, McMahon 1999). The repression of citizen civil liberties, conversely, is found to decrease as the middle class grows (Cammack 2007, Easterly 2000, McMahon 1999). Nancy Birdsall argues that the middle class has power as a tax base to hold governments accountable in provision of basic services (Birdsall 2007). Easterly adds that government involvement in public health, expanded opportunities of secondary and higher education and in the building of key infrastructural components, such as sanitation and roads, correlates with increased middle class wealth (Easterly 2000).

Middle class growth, through tertiary education, is crucial to sub-Saharan African economic, institutional, and political development.

Private sector growth, public institution building, and increased governmental accountability to citizens are all functions of a college educated middle class.

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III. Collegiate Education and the Development of a New Middle Class in Africa Sub- Saharan Africa must be equipped with the means to produce economic and institutional development. A neglected but critical component of such measures is tertiary education. In 2000, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan stated: “The university must become a primary tool for Africa’s development in the new century.

Universities can help develop African expertise; they can enhance the analysis of African problems; strengthen domestic institutions; serve as a model environment for the practice of good governance, conflict resolution and respect for human rights, and enable African academics to play an active part in the global community of scholars (United Nations Information Service 2000).”

growth. Business growth, technological growth and the increase of professionals are all examples of the effects of tertiary education on economic and middle class growth. Through institution building, the middle class enhances public services, societal equality, measures of democracy and human rights.

A. Collegiate Education in sub- Saharan Africa

The number of universities in sub- Saharan Africa has increased dramatically, from the 52 available in 1960 to 316 in 2000, but they face low enrollment as a percentage of population, low quality, and high inequity. Enrollment has increased significantly, from 181,000 students, or one percent enrollment, in 1975 to approximately 1, 750,000 University, or tertia- students, or five percent enry, education increases the rollment by 2006. High enamount of human capital, rolment levels in Nigeria and which facilitates the develop- South Africa, however, skew ment of a middle class and is these statistics, and among many sub- Saharan African necessary for economic NORTHWESTERN

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nations, tertiary enrollment is at only one percent (Bloom, Canning, and Chan 2006; Sawyerr 2004). This is the world’s lowest rate of tertiary enrollment, defined as the percentage of people within five years of secondary school completion age who are enrolled in a tertiary institution. The closest region is South Asia at ten percent enrollment, and enrollment in OECD nations provides a sharp contrast at sixty five percent (Bloom, Canning and Chan 2006).

This low enrollment occurs despite increased primary and secondary education rates and a greater pool of secondary school graduates seeking collegiate admission. The region’s average rate of secondary school enrollment is 31 percent, with considerable variation among nations. South Africa and Mauritius have gross enrollment rates (GER) at and above 85 percent while Uganda and Zambia have secondary enrollment rates of only 19%. Even in the latter two nations, rates of secondary school completion and higher education enrollment 10

diverge sharply (Balwanz,, DeStefano, Schuh Moore, Terway 2008). In Uganda, for example, only 15% of secondary school students go on to attend university, indicating that a greater number of students are qualified to gain admission to higher education programs than those that presently do so. A faculty member at Martyrs University in Uganda stated that students were turned away primarily because of a lack of funding, not because the students were unqualified (Martyrs University 2009).

The low availability of collegiate funding and growing numbers of admissions applicants have resulted in greater selectivity, ultimately favoring elite candidates.

The development of private universities and the introduction of student fees at public universities favor elite students because of their better qualifications and abilities to pay for tuition. Students who have attended private secondary and primary schools, have educated, wealthy parents, and who live in urban areas in closer proximity to good schools are more likely NJIA

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to gain admission to universities (Sawyerr 2004).

Quality has deteriorated over the past four decades in sub- Saharan African universities. Originally tied to international universities and maintained at the standards of universities with expatriate teaching staff and international funds, post- independence era African universities had ample resources to adequately train the small number of students in attendance.

The University of London, for example, controlled class syllabi and exams in former British colonies, often training future African faculty members in London. France and Belgium imposed similar regulations on universities in former colonies, allowing for African universities with world- class reputations.

Research, similarly, was reputable and widely acknowledged in many universities such as the Tanzanian University of Dar-es-Salaam and the Ugandan Makere Institute of Social Research (Sawyerr 2004) In the 1970’s and 1980’s however, many African governments lost the ability to NORTHWESTERN

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sustain such high quality in the face of a precipitous drop in international funding and increased enrollment levels (Sawyerr 2004). The percentage of World Bank loans for tertiary education dropped from 2.3 percent of all loans between 1980 and 1989 to 1.5 percent of loans between 2000 and 2005. The International Development Bank decreased its loans for tertiary education from 1.2 percent between 1980 and 1989 to 0.2 percent between 2000 and 2005 (Crowley and Kapur 2008, 83).

The decline of former Soviet Union also put a halt to generous higher educational opportunities in nations comprising the Soviet Bloc. The rising costs of higher education in Western Europe and the United States have also discouraged African governments from continuing to provide scholarships for graduate study abroad (Sawyerr 2004).

Concurrent budget cuts and increased applicants have forced African universities to compromise quality for quantity. The Makere University in Uganda, for exam-

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ple, has experienced growth from 3,500 students to 21,000 in only ten years. A decrease in international funding and a lack of increased state funding have forced the once internationally recognized university and research institute to increase enrollment and to rely on student fees. The number of facilities have not increased and more than half of students fail to attend class due to overcrowded class rooms with little personal attention from professors (Sawyerr, 2004). Research is allocated only ten percent of the funding requested by the institution. A senior professor at the university stated that professors are not compensated for research, and instead take on secondary jobs such as teaching evening classes (Makere University 2009).

Makere University, however, is not alone in its decline; the University of Ghana, similarly, has been forced to crowd dormitories, housing as many as five students officially, and in some reports, eight or nine, into rooms originally built for only two (Sawyerr, 2004).

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By 1995, sub- Saharan Africa was ahead of only the Middle East, having produced almost 6,000 research papers.

Research across sub-Saharan Africa, however, grew by only 33 percent between 1981 and 1995, while the number of Middle Eastern research papers doubled. South Asia, conversely, was responsible for almost 16,000 papers in 1995 and Latin America and the Caribbean for more than 14,000 (Bloom, Canning, and Chan 2006).

In its readjustment loan policies regarding subSaharan Africa, the World Bank recommended privatization (Kapur and Crowley 2008). Indeed, private universities account for much of the region’s growth in universities. Uganda, for example, has seen the growth of numerous private universities since 1997. A faculty member at Makere University stated that a recent reduction of students in the public university was due to this proliferation of private universities (Makere University 2009).

In such settings, universities cater to the elite, relying on student fees due to lack of NJIA

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capacity to fund financial aid and scholarship programs. A dean of Martyr’s University in Uganda, a private Catholic university, stated that of the 350 students at his university, about one third are receiving financial help, and that for the others, there is no assistance available (Martyrs University 2009).

Although it enjoys a history of excellence and internationally renowned quality, present day tertiary education in sub-Saharan Africa is burdened by a loss of funding, increased enrollment and unequal opportunities.

Expanding the opportunity, equity, and quality of tertiary education in Sub- Saharan Africa, however, is needed to develop human capital and fuel economic growth and political reform in the region.

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and Mitiku 2006). An increase in a sub-Saharan African nation’s average years of higher education by one percent increases the level of economic growth by 0.9 percent. SubSaharan Africa’s critical lack of a tertiary educated population gives college education a significant impact on growth.

Currently, the average years of higher education in subSaharahn Africa total 0.16.

Nearly doubling this figure to 0.3 is projected to cause double economic growth from 0.1 percent annually to 0.2 percent. (Gyimah-Brempong, Paddison and Mitiku 2006).

Two examples illustrating the impact of tertiary education on economic growth include technological advancement and business development.

Technological Advancement

Tertiary education allows nations to increase their technological capacities, Due to its impact on spurring economic growth. human capital, African ter- According to Bloom, Cantiary education is estimated ning and Chan, the bento increase economic growth efits a nation derives from at a rate three times that of technological advancement physical capital alone (Gy- correlate with the difference imah- Brempong, Paddison between its current producB. Human Capital and Economic Growth

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tion levels and its projected upper limits of production.

Currently, sub-Saharan Africa has the largest disparity between its current production and its projected production ceiling.

Therefore it follows, that increased technological training will spur economic growth. Such technological growth consists of an African technological “catch up” to the knowledge used in OECD nations (Bloom, Canning and Chan 2006, 27).

An increase in the average attainment of tertiary education in sub-Saharan Africa by one year would not only generate the eventual 12.2 percent growth projected to follow an increase in all forms of education, but would also spur technological advancement, leading to nearly 0.4 percent of additional growth during the first year of increased tertiary education and continued yearly growth as the technological gap is bridged (Bloom, Canning and Chan 2006).

economic growth is the role of university education in promoting successful entrepreneurial activity. Tertiary education is proven to provide individuals with the information and the networks necessary to develop large businesses, a key component of economic growth.

Vijaya Ramachandran and Manju Kedia Shah, in a study of five post colonial sub-Saharan African nations (Benin, Uganda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Kenya), found that the majority of businesses owned by indigenous Africans were considerably smaller than firms owned by non-indigenous (often European or Indian) owners.

They also discovered that the enterprises owned by indigenous persons started on smaller scales and often did not grow considerably, having insufficient capital for loans and greater obstacles in establishing trade credit (Ramachandran and Shah 2007).

The solution to these grave disparities was found in collegiate education among inBusiness Development digenous business persons.

Another example of colle- Among indigenous African giate education’s effect on entrepreneurs, those starting 14

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and owning large businesses were equipped with tertiary education. The effect of a university education upon the factors of business size, startup size, access to credit, and trade credit, while substantial for indigenous entrepreneurs, was not found to be significant for the elite non-indigenous entrepreneurs. The elite non-indigenous groups had networks of information, allowing openings to credit, trade credit, and business savvy, while indigenous groups without college educations had no such networks.

This evidence suggests that university education is particularly critical to the success of indigenous Africans, helping them move from poverty to successful middle class or upper class entrepreneurship. While a tertiary education equips such individuals with necessary skills, it also provides networking connections with others in the business world.

This facilitates opportunities for acquiring the finances, business relationships, and additional expertise needed to develop large, successful NORTHWESTERN

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firms (Ramachandran and Shah 2007).

In addition to the number of entrepreneurial endeavors, collegiate education also affects the quality, size and success of new businesses. In a study by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor from the period of 1998 to 2003, entrepreneurship correlated positively with income per capita in wealthy countries, but had an inverse correlation with income per capita in developing nations (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2005).

Explanation for this phenomenon is found in the prevalence of small, numerous and relatively unsuccessful businesses by entrepreneurs in developing nations.

Again, the lack of education among such entrepreneurs, part of an overall lack of human capital, restricts their activity to marginal shops.

The absence of large businesses hinders employment, forcing unemployed persons to open small enterprises for survival’s sake (Global Entrepreneruship Monitor 2005). Collegiate education, a principal component of in-

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vestment in human capital, can equip individuals to start large businesses that create jobs and produce a positive correlation between entrepreneurship and annual growth.

are often under the international poverty line of one dollar per day (Birdsall 2007).

The Emerging Middle Class

Studies of ApartheidC. Middle Class and Equal- era South Africa, in which a ity large segment of the population were excluded from Entrepreneurs rising many educational opportunifrom poverty to create busi- ties until 1994, illustrate the nesses and generate new effects of education upon the income become the middle wages of different population class. Through the growth groups.

Furthermore, the of professionals and entre- constitution of South Africa’s preneurs, tertiary education emerging Black middle class builds the middle class, less- illustrates the need for terening the gap between Af- tiary education, as its growth rica’s small group of wealthy has been primarily composed elites and impoverished . of educated professionals.

Signs of a burgeoning midBlack women, the dle class include institution most disadvantaged group building, democracy, and studied, benefitted the most public human capital. from each additional level of Nancy Birdsall defines education. Wages for Black the earnings of people in the women rose 6.2 percent after three middle fifths of a na- the completion of each year tion’s income dispersal to be of primary schooling, 24.9 the income of its middle class percent after the completion (Birdsall 2007). Presently, in of each year of secondary sub-Saharan Africa, there is schooling, and 39.6 percent a very small middle class. following each year of postSub-Saharan African middle secondary schooling. This is class incomes fall below the almost three times the returns middle class incomes of other gained from tertiary educaunderdeveloped regions and tion by White women, whose 16

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wages did not increase for primary school completion.

Wages for White women rose by 8.4 percent following each year of secondary education and by 13.9 percent following each year of tertiary education. Similarly, Black men’s wages increased by 8.4 percent for each year of primary education, 15.8 percent for each year of secondary education, and 29.4 percent for each year of tertiary education. White men, however, did not see returns for each year of primary schooling: a wage increase of 8.4 percent for each year of secondary education and a 15.1 percent increase in wages for every year of tertiary education, nearly half the returns gained by black men. The institutional inequities present during Apartheid placed a greater emphasis on the gains of education, especially tertiary education, for the Blacks (Mwabu and Schultz 2000).

Great gains as a result of education are still a factor in South African society today, contributing to its postApartheid phenomenon of a rising Black middle class. A study done in conjunction NORTHWESTERN

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with the South African University of Stellenbosch on this new middle class, defined by middle income and by profession, finds it to be heavily dependent on education (Kotze, Rivero and Du Toit 2003).

In 1994, at the inception of democracy and the dismantling of Apartheid, only 3.3 percent of Blacks were part of the middle class.

Of South Africa’s middle class at the time, 29 percent were Black and 53 percent were White. In 2000, six years after Apartheid, 7.8 percent of Blacks were in the middle class, over twice the percentage in 1994. As of 2000, half of South Africa’s middle class was composed of Blacks and 34 percent was composed of Whites. The middle class had also grown substantially in the interim between the two dates. (Kotze, Rivero and Du Toit 2003).

The most marked area of growth was Black professionals. In 1994, only 1.7 percent of blacks were professionals, while by 2000, 4.9 percent had become professionals. Although Black unemployment has increased in South Africa’s unskilled

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trades, it has decreased in professional areas such as finance, which require higher education.

Substantial increase in black employment within other middle class sectors that do not require tertiary education, such as sales and secretarial work, has not been found. The increase in access to tertiary education for Blacks following the fall of Apartheid can therefore be used as an explanatory factor for both the rise of Black professionals in post-Apartheid South Africa and in the rise of the South African Black middle class (Kotze, Rivero and Du Toit 2003).

Middle Class Growth: Outcomes If freely provided, tertiary education can reduce inequality between the wealthy elites and the impoverished majority. Outcomes of middle class growth include economic growth, the building of democratic institutions, and the public human capital necessary for infrastructure, education, health, and human service institutions.

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Economic Growth The growth of a middle class is correlated with increased economic growth, as it is tied to a nation’s economic equality. William Easterly and Nancy Birdsall both find that the share of income held by the middle three fifths of a population (the middle class) has strong bearings on a nation’s economic growth (Birdsall 2007; Easterly, 2000).

Income per capita is found to increase by 1.2 standard deviations when the middle class share of a nation’s income increases by one standard deviation. Economic growth also increases by 0.42 standard deviations when the middle class’ share increases by one standard deviation (20-21, Easterly, 2000).

IV. Institution Building Democratic Institutions Institution building is now recognized to be a key component in third world, including sub-Saharan African development (Bardhan 2005, Birdsall 2007). Broadly stated, institutions encompass a NJIA

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society’s “rules of structured social interaction” (Bardhan 2005) and determine the degree of democratic and property rights. Growing from a society’s norms, they include financial markets, processes of government, educational systems, and health care systems. Good governance and an atmosphere conducive to economic growth, therefore, are dependent on democratic institution building, a process that involves the presence of a middle class.

The growth and maintenance of a middle class provide the link between per capita income and the building of democratic institutions.

With greater interest in individual freedoms, the educated middle class is equipped to facilitate organization and to become informed of political happenings through communications media (Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1993; McMahon 1999).

Worldwide comparative analysis by McMahon reveals a direct relationship between per capita income and measures of democratic institutions, according to the Freedom House’s four meaNORTHWESTERN

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sures of democratization.

These include free elections, candidates with full competition rights and impartial press coverage, checks preventing totalitarianism, and decentralized political authority (McMahon, 1999).

Nations with per capita incomes of six hundred dollars per year or less are the least democratic, their economies most likely to be rural and based on subsistence agriculture and traditional authority structures. Landed elites and political leaders often control both the economic and political rights of citizens. Nations experiencing transition and a growing middle class mostly fall between $600 and $3,000 of income per capita. They are characterized by increasing middle classes, which support the spread of basic education and challenge the power of traditional elites.

Measures of democracy in this group are higher than that of the previous group and growing. Nations with $3 to $10,000 of annual income per capita are characterized by slower, more erratic, but positive democratization.

For nations with more than

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$10,000 per capita, there is a high rate of democratization in all nations except Singapore (McMahon 1999).

Easterly finds the share of income held in a nation’s middle class to correlate with decreased suppression of both political and civil liberties and fewer instances of coups and constitutional changes (Easterly 2000).

The presence of a middle class is also tied to decrease in political instability, while higher economic inequality correlates with sociopolitical instability (Odekun and Round 2004).

Public Institutions The middle class provides financial resources and government pressure to build physical institutions. Birdsall finds that a large middle class can challenge government and elite power and advocate for sound institutions.

As a tax base, a middle class can ideally provide the necessary resources to invest in infrastructural projects and hold government accountable (Birdsall 2007). William Easterly finds that increased middle class income is associated with growth in promoting economic policies, better 20

institutions, increased enrollment in secondary and tertiary school, and the construction of key infrastructural components (Easterly 2000).

The college educated middle class provides the private human capital necessary for economic growth and spurs the development of democratic institutions.

While promoting intangible democratic institutions, however, they also provide the personnel necessary for tangible public institutions, such as health, education, social services, and increased infrastructure. While governments are pressured by the middle class to provide such public institutions, they also depend on educated middle class professionals to staff them (Birdsall 2007).

With a life expectancy of only 46 years, the world’s lowest, the region of sub- Saharan Africa is in dire need of sound public health institutions. Increased numbers of doctors, nurses and other health professionals are necessary (UN News 2008).

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child and infant mortality, as rates of child mortality drop with increasing numbers of health care workers. To reach critical Millennium Development Goals (MDG) regarding health, the region must increase its number of healthcare workers threefold. This translates to an addition of nearly one million healthcare professionals (Chen, et.al.

2004).

HIV/AIDS poses a significant threat to sub-Saharan Africa’s existing health care structure, creating an additional demand for personnel. The increase in HIV/ AIDS along with accompanying hepatitis, diarrhea, pneumonia, and malnutrition all increase the need for patient care (USAID 2003). Better education of doctors, nurses and other health care professionals is necessary to fill the void in service, but donors currently focus only on HIV/ AIDS training for existing workers. This increases shortages in health care workers for other needs, threatening the overall sub-Saharan African health systems (Bernstein, Ooman, and Rosenzweig 2008).

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Educational institutions rely on the availability of quality primary and secondary school teachers. Universal primary education is now a goal for many Sub- Saharan African nations but the necessary teachers are found to be few and underprepared.

The quality of instruction, the number of teachers and the student-to-teacher ratios are found to greatly inuence the rates of primary school enrollment. The presence of a school, if it is not adequately staffed with competent teachers, does not raise the rates of enrollment. This evidence suggests that the building of educational institutions is more dependent on teacher quality and quantity than on the construction of physical school buildings (Filmer 2005).

Public institutions of higher learning are also dependant on educated middle class professionals: researchers and teaching professors.

African agriculturalists are needed to research regional crops, which are critically under-researched (Crowley and Kapur 2008). Researchers are also needed to combat diseas-

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es such as malaria, hepatitis, and HIV/AIDS that disproportionally affect Africans.

Professors for the instruction of math, science and engineering are sorely needed, as the training of new professionals in these areas is imperative to infrastructural improvement (Boroughs 2008).

Administrators for government programs at the core of institution building are lacking in many sub- Saharan African nations. Currently, governments and international aid organizations compete over the few skilled administrators available. The presence of international aid organizations often decrease the quality of government bureaucracy, as government administrators are lured into employment through international aid organizations offering better pay (Birdsall 2007).

Critical public infrastructural demands, such as access to clean water, transportation, and electricity, underlie the importance of engineers in Sub- Saharan Africa.

A shortage of such professionals forces African nations to hire expensive first world 22

personnel. For example, the current cost of road building in sub- Saharan Africa is equal to that in OECD nations and nearly three times the price of road building in middle income nations.

This is partially due to the lack of local engineers and technicians, and the need to hire international personnel (Bloom, Canning and Chan 2006).

This dilemma has been realized by the South African government, which places increasing the number of engineering graduates as a priority for universities.

Engineers are needed to renovate and expand South Africa’s current infrastructure while filling positions left by eeing educated whites.

Consequentially, the government has invested almost one hundred million dollars in engineering institutions in efforts to increase engineering graduates from 1,400 to 2,400 annually (Boroughs 2008).

The challenges of disease, hunger, poverty, illiteracy, and inequality are great.

Tertiary education empowers private individuals and public entities in subSaharan Africa to overcome NJIA

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these challenges. Through tertiary education, individuals experience the opportunity to generate private wealth through business and professional careers while nations realize both economic growth and the rise of a middle class.

The middle class, moreover, provides the political pressure, financial backing, and professional expertise necessary for the growth of public institutions, leading to increased democracy and improved public services.

V. Counter Arguments and Refutations African tertiary education has suffered in the past several decades due to two widespread misconceptions: first, that tertiary education deepens social inequities, and second, that support of primary education can be exclusionary of tertiary funding. Tertiary education, however, only perpetuates class divisions when there is a lack of public and international funding. Successful primary education, furthermore, cannot be instituted without college educated administrators, NORTHWESTERN

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accountants, and teachers.

A. Higher Education and Inequality Sub- Saharan African tertiary education’s disproportionate benefits for elites have been a primary argument against its support.

Walter McMahon argues that tertiary education perpetuates rural class divides, and George Psacharopoulos cites increased scholarship attainment for elite students (McMahon 1999, Psacharopoulos, 1993).

These arguments are based upon fact, as tertiary education in Africa presently excludes many groups, including women, the poor and rural populations, while it favors elites. In Ghana, for example, the best four percent of secondary schools provided 40 percent of admissions to the University of Ghana and 46 percent of the admissions to the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology.

In Mozambique, although only three percent of the general population has attained secondary education, 70 percent of students at Universidade

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Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) had fathers with a university degree. Scholarships based on performance in Nigeria and Uganda were also found to target elite students indirectly, because students with elite backgrounds had better primary and secondary educations, enabling them to attain the grades necessary for government scholarships (Sawyerr 2004). Men have also been favored over women, as women represent only 35 percent of students enrolled in sub-Saharan African universities (Chisenga and Van Brakel 2003).

These inequities demonstrate not the failure of African tertiary education, but the effects of discontinued public university funding.

African Universities, in their post-colonial beginnings, made concerted efforts to include students from all social classes and national regions (Sawyerr 2004). By 1980, six out of ten African university students had uneducated parents employed in farming, trade, and manual work (Caffentzis and Federicci 2000).

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ever, the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) included a devaluing of tertiary education; allegedly because of the greater efficiency of primary education and the inequity perpetuated by collegiate education. In Financing Education in Developing Countries, George Psacharopaulos highlights the objectives of SAPs. They include retrieval of the public funds used in higher education, emphasis on primary schooling, development of loans and scholarships for tertiary education, and decentralization of university education (Psacharopaulos 1986, Alidou, Caffentzis, and Federici 2000).

Such plans see increased inequities. Loss of public funding has rendered universities incapable of expanding to accommodate students. Instead, they must place high restrictions on applicants, a system which favors elites because they are often best prepared (Sawyerr 2008). Loss of African university positions, furthermore, encourages African students to study abroad, thus a greater percentage of African colNJIA

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lege students study abroad than students from any other region. These elites, furthermore, often do not return home, depriving their nations of educated leaders, as nearly one third of college educated Africans now live abroad (Crowley and Kapur 2008). The decentralization of tertiary education, furthermore, led to a rash of private universities. Students at such universities must pay tuition and fees, something only elites can afford (Sawyerr 2008).

Investment in tertiary education models that focus on marginalized groups, instead, can bolster equity.

Distance learning, in particular, can increase access to education for marginalized groups such as women and persons in rural areas (Siaciwena 2000). Vista University, a South African distance education program, for example, is composed of 70 percent women. In Namibia, three of every four distance learners are women. Such women are able to study while fulfilling family obligations. Other excluded communities, such as people living in rural areas NORTHWESTERN

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or refugee camps, can also be reached through subsidized distance education (Chisenga and Van Brakel 2003).

B. Primary Education Use of tertiary education by elites and the significant immediate returns of primary education can lead to the exclusion of funding for sub-Saharan African universities. McMahon advocates for the funding of primary school education to achieve universal primary enrollment before funding secondary and tertiary schooling (McMahon, 1999).

Psacharopoulos focuses on the primacy of primary education, showing diminishing private economic returns to higher education, especially in sub- Saharan Africa (Psacharopoulos 1993). However, Psacharopoulos does not emphasize technological catch up and the region’s lack of college educated individuals, which, when considered, increase the national economic returns for tertiary education above that of primary and secondary schooling (Gymah-Brempong, Paddi-

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son and Mitiku 2006, Bloom, Canning, and Chan 2006).

McMahon and Psacharopoulos’ logic provides the reasoning for funding primary education at much higher levels than tertiary education. Administrative, quality and equality issues faced by primary education, however, necessitate the provision of tertiary educated administrators, accountants, and teachers.

to complete primary education if they come from poor households.

The authors cite several problems leading to this phenomenon: poor educational management, teacher absenteeism, poor accounting and corruption.

The authors then identified several needs for success, including higher quality of curricula, teaching materials and in- service teacher training (Birdsall and Levine 2005).

Primary School Problems

Quality and Enrollment

In a Center for Global Development Policy Brief, Nancy Birdsall and Ruth Levine highlight several challenges facing primary school enrollment. Educational inequality between boys and girls in sub-Saharan Africa is a key issue, as 56 percent of the sub-continent’s boys complete primary school and only 46 percent of girls are able to do the same. Of girls from rural households in Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Niger, not even 15 percent are able to complete primary schooling. Children worldwide are also less likely

These serious primary schooling problems cannot be addressed in the long term without increased provision of tertiary education, as educated administrators and head teachers are needed. Increased primary school enrollment is correlated with the increased quality of accessible schooling. Quality of instruction, lowered class size, and permanent school buildings are all found to correlate positively with increased school enrollment (Filmer 2007). Furthermore, increased enrollment in primary school is meaningless unless there is a benefit de-

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rived from it. In Uganda, an insistence upon primary education has resulted in nearly universal primary school enrollment. Poor quality, however, results in fewer than half of students graduating from primary school and a meager 19 percent enrollment in secondary school (Balwanz,, DeStefano, Schuh Moore, Terway 2008). Regarding this phenomenon, a public school teacher taking courses at the Nkumba University in Uganda stated that universal primary education has become “ghost students, ghost classes, and ghost resources (Nkumba University 2009).”

The benefits of primary education are not found merely in the quantity of schooling, but in its quality, as Birdsall found in a 1983 study of private returns. Measuring personal income increase to primary education in Brazil, she found that the quality of education comprised three fourths of the benefits of schooling (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983).

the necessity of tertiary educated personnel. Administrators and accountants, missing in many educational institutions in sub- Saharan Africa, are needed to supervise teachers, organize salaries and distribute funding effectively (Birdsall and Levine 2005).

Secondly, teachers themselves need adequate training. Teacher training, while shortened or completely overlooked in attempts to quickly increase the quantity of teachers, is necessary to the provision of quality in education. In Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Senegal, a study has been conducted comparing the effects of traditional civil service teaching—in which teachers have civil service careers and more extensive training—with contract teaching—in which teacher training is reduced and teachers do not have career opportunities. The four nations studied all needed to nearly double their number of teachers. Mali and Niger chose to use contract teachers, while Senegal hired contract teachEducated Personnel ers who could transition into Quality concerns for civil service positions, and in primary education highlight Burkina Faso, contract teachNORTHWESTERN

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ers were not used. Although Burkina Faso did not experience dramatic growth in student enrollment and teacher supply, its students had the highest rates of passing grade during the standardized PSCE examination. Burkina Faso was also alone in decreasing rates of grade repetition (Dembele and Melloukl 2007). Even in the adoption of a middle course in which teachers initially receive minimal teacher training but are subject to training sessions and the tutelage of senior level teachers, tertiary training is needed for the upper level teachers and for the personnel conducting trainings. In total, an estimated 1.6 million primary school teachers are needed in sub-Saharan Africa (Institute of Developing Studies 2007). The quality of these professionals depends upon the tertiary education opportunities available to them.

Equity Issues: Rural Schools Equity is a second problem in the fight for universal primary education.

The grave disparities between 28

boys’ and girls’ rates of primary school completion and the greater lack of education for children in poor households necessitate increased equality in the provision of primary education. In West and Central Africa, according to Birdsall and Levine, the poorest 40 percent of the population completes on average less than one year of schooling. These people are often located in rural areas far from adequate schools (Birdsall and Levine 2005).

Schooling must be perceived as extremely valuable for parents to forgo farm labor in such areas. Key factors include quality of instruction, especially in core subjects, adequate numbers of teachers, and sound school buildings (Filmer 2007). Behrman and Birdsall find, moreover, that to make the outcomes, or personal income benefits, of schooling equitable between rural and urban students, equitable quality of education is crucial (Behrman and Birdsall 1983). New rural schools need college educated administrators and, if possible, teachers, to ensure this quality.

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Gender Disparity A significant factor in male and female educational rates is the presence or absence of female teachers. According to findings by UNESCO, equality of male and female teachers is correlated with equality between female and male students, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Conversely, in schools where there is a disproportionately low percentages of female teachers, (below 20 percent), there are bound to be low enrollment levels for girls (UNESCO 2003). The presence of female teachers is positively correlated with the academic achievement of female students. Some of the obstacles to female education, including concerns about sexual exploitation at school, conservative parental views, and the need for female role models, are all addressed by the provision of female teachers (UNESCO 2000, 2006). Increased numbers of high quality female teachers, however, necessitate the funding of higher education. When women are excluded from higher educaNORTHWESTERN

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tion due to the imposition of fees and low university admissions rates, there are fewer well-trained female teachers.

Conclusion The two main arguments against increasing tertiary education— its role in reflecting socio-economic and gender disparities, and the primacy of funding primary education—do not stand the test of further investigation. The causes of African tertiary education’s perpetuation of social disparities are the decrease of international and public support.

Such support, furthermore, must be divided between primary and tertiary education.

Without adequate funding for inclusionary programs such as distance learning and tuition assistance, university education becomes increasingly focused on the elite.

VI. Synthesis Sub- Saharan Africa can no longer be given only aid. The region, instead, must be empowered with the ability to sustain economic

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growth and the development of sound democratic and public institutions. Tertiary education in sub- Saharan Africa promotes economic development and the building of democratic and public institutions, and is therefore a central component in the development of sub-Saharan Africa both economically and politically.

Examples of the relationship between tertiary education, human capital, and economic growth are provided by statistical studies of tertiary education’s positive impact on indigenous African entrepreneurial activities. Africa’s technological lag and the projected economic growth fueled by increased collegiate technological education also illustrate the economic implications of increased tertiary education.

The rise of the professional Black middle class in post Apartheid South Africa is central to explanation of the role of tertiary education in middle class growth. Democratic institutional outcomes are explained by statistical

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correlation between middle class income shares and measures of democracy, along with a theoretical framework for the correlation between gross domestic product, the middle class, and democracy.

The effect of the middle class on institutional development is evidenced by the need for middle class professionals in different public institutions and the role of the middle class in advocating for sound public institutions.

African universities used to be world-renown centers of learning and research.

Today, they are needed to address the grave developmental difficulties facing sub- Saharan Africa. They can provide the human capital necessary for economic growth and the middle class necessary for democratic and public institution building.

Sarah Zoutendam is a Master’s International student of Public Policy and Administration through the Peace Corps and Rutgers University. She also serves in Uganda at a rural technical school.

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Evaluating Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance: An Exercise in Applied Political Development

by Richard Lappin

ost-conflict democracy assistance is gaining prominence as a means of promoting peace, development and human rights to states devastated by violent conflict. However, the stagnation and even reversal of democratisation in states as far spread as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Rwanda has fostered the realization that post-conflict democracy assistance is neither a straightforward process nor a guarantee of positive outcomes. As such, evaluating the impact of democracy assistance has become a key topic in the donor community with a growing recognition that donors need quality research evaluating democracy assistance as a means to assess the effectiveness of programmes and to guide future assistance (Crawford 2003a: 77; Green and Kohl 2007: 152).

Moreover, in a time when the very utility of post-conflict democracy assistance is beNORTHWESTERN

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ing questioned, an enhanced understanding of its impact can help to “establish a dispassionate intellectual framework within which the more emotional debates – over how much blood and treasure [the international community] should spend in this area – can be fought” (Rose 2000/01: 189).

This article integrates current thinking on the evaluation of post-conflict democracy assistance, and is composed of four main sections.

It begins by briefly outlining the exercise of post-conflict democracy assistance, its chief proponents and its basic mandate. In the second section, attention is given to the emerging body of work that has sought to evaluate the impact of democracy assistance with consideration given to the difficulties inherent in measuring its impact. The third section presents, and largely critiques, the methodology that currently dominates

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evaluations of post-conflict democracy assistance. The article concludes with a review of the core recommendations that have emerged in the literature and makes a special claim for the inclusion of participatory models of evaluation and the necessity to strengthen the link between evaluation and future strategy.

What is Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance?

Since the end of the Cold War, one of the most striking characteristics to emerge in post-conflict peacebuilding has been the prime position assumed by democratisation; an approach we can term post-conflict democracy assistance. This focus has hinged on an unerring belief that democratic governance, embodied by periodic and genuine elections, offers the most effective mechanism for managing and resolving societal tensions without recourse to violence (Annan 2001; BoutrosGhali 1992, 1996). Indeed, the benefits of post-conflict democracy assistance have been promulgated for its capacity to advance peace, development and human rights (Lappin 2009), and it has been embraced at the 32

highest stratums of peacebuilding with, for example, BoutrosGhali declaring that “peace, development and democracy are inextricably linked (1996: 116).”

By the end of the 1990s, the term “democracy assistance” had acquired increasing and extensive usage in academic literature and become a natural part of the rhetoric of foreign policies and the development programmes of Western countries. Nevertheless, despite this growing recognition, the term has rarely been clearly or comprehensively defined. Typically, the term is used with the assumption that the reader will automatically understand the meaning; however, such casual usage can cause confusion, especially as other terms can be used to describe similar phenomena, such as the often used label of “democracy promotion,” as well as a host of other variants including “development aid,” “political aid,” “democracy support,” “democracy aid,” and “support for democratic development” (Burnell 2000b: 3). As such, it is critically important that researchers are cognizant of the breadth of meaning attached to democracy NJIA

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assistance by different people and practice precision in their own usage and definition of the term. Indeed, if we are unable to achieve accuracy in our terminology, the utility of any evaluation will ultimately be undermined.

Democracy assistance, therefore, can be defined as “the nonprofit transfer of funds, expertise, and material to foster democratic groups, initiatives and institutions that are working for a more democratic society” (De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006: 20) These transfers are usually funded through governmental development agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID). The programmes themselves are undertaken by a diverse group of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and, to a lesser extent, through bilateral agreements.

Chief amongst the IGOs are the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Organisation of American States (OAS). The most prominent NGOs include the NORTHWESTERN

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Carter Center, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Centre for Electoral Promotion and Advice (CAPEL). In addition, within a given country, there will also be a range of local counterparts who receive democracy funding including electoral commissions, state institutions, civil society groups, media groups and political parties.

Furthermore, it is essential that the distinction between democracy assistance and democracy promotion is established. Although democracy promotion is often used interchangeably with democracy assistance, the latter should be recognised as only a small and distinct part of a much broader democracy promotion approach.

As the table below (fig.1) illustrates, democracy promotion comprises several instruments, both positive and negative, both explicit and implicit, of which democracy assistance is only one distinct part. On the negative side, you have direct military action, which includes armed intervention to promote democracy and can be either explicit (to install a democratic regime, as in Afghanistan) or implicit (to curb an anti-dem-

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ocratic regime, as in the first Iraq war). In addition, there is also the explicit tool of negative political conditionality, or ‘naming and shaming’, in which membership from international organisations may be suspended, economic sanctions applied, and embargoes enforced.

On the positive side, there is the implicit instrument of classical development aid which seeks to foster improved socioeconomic conditions which may consequently lead to democratic developments.

Additionally, there is the positive instrument of international interim administrations, as was the case in East Timor, where the democratic transition is directly controlled and managed in its entirety by international actors. There is also the explicit instrument of positive political conditionality, which can include offers of membership in intergovernmental organisations, security guarantees, or economic and trade benefits.

Finally, on the positive side, there is the distinct instrument of democracy assistance.

Democracy assistance differs from all other forms of democracy promotion in several ways.

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First, it is distinct from military action insofar that it does not ‘enforce’ democracy, and from international interim administration insofar that it does not ‘manage’ democracy.

Second, democracy assistance is directed exclusively at fostering democracy, as opposed to classical development aid where democracy is usually only a secondary concern.

Third, democracy assistance is distinct from positive political conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct and active measures, rather than passive tools. Democracy assistance can be further differentiated from political conditionality insofar that it is neither a reward nor a punishment, neither a carrot nor a stick, but rather a ”booster” to internal groups already working towards democratisation. Indeed, democracy assistance explicitly recognises that “the primary motive force for democratisation is and must be internal to the country in question” (Burnell 2000b: 9), and that the exclusive intention is “to help domestic actors achieve what they have already decided they want for themselves” (Carothers 2007: 22).

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The Impact of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance An initial review of the literature illustrates that opinion is divided on the impact of democracy assistance, from positive to negligible to negative.

De Zeeuw and Van de Goor (2006: 281) claim the impact of democracy assistance has been “mixed but predominantly positive,” Finkel et al. (2007: 436) claim there has been “a moderate but consistent worldwide effect,” whilst McMahon (2002) has argued that assistance may be effective in some aspects, some of the time. On the flipside, Knack (2004: 251) has categorically claimed that ”no evidence is found that aid promotes democracy.”

The fact that such a division in opinion exists nevertheless represents a significant movement from traditional perceptions of external democracy assistance which were typically highly pessimistic. Indeed, in 1984, Huntington (1984: 218) declared that “the ability of the US to affect the development of democracy elsewhere is limited.” Furthermore, Dahl (1971: 209-210), explained that: Policy makers in a NORTHWESTERN

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country like the United States who may wish to transform a country from a hegemonic or mixed regime into a polyarchy [i.e. a liberal democracy] face formidable and complex problems, not least of which is our lack of knowledge about the long causal chains running from outside help to internal conditions to changes of regimes.

Dahl was astute in his concerns about cauality; however, the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the seeming triumph of democracy contributed to a widespread ideological consensus that democracy, irrespective of internal preconditions, was the best political system available. This viewpoint found its most famous expression in Fukuyama’s The End of History thesis (1992) and its emphasis on democracy as the optimum form of governance was broadly accepted and seamlessly translated into peacebuilding strategies. As Brahm (2004) has written, “once warring sides have reached a ceasefire, democracy is seen as uniquely suited to provide a peaceful means for power and influence.” Nevertheless, despite widespread acceptance of the importance of democracy to post-conflict

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peacebulding, the impact of external democracy assistance remains contentious.

One area of consensus has been the call for more restraint in assessing the impact of democracy assistance.

Carothers (1999: 351), for example, claims that “no dramatic results should be expected from democracy promotion efforts.”

Moreover, many have directed blame at the democracy assistance organisations themselves, for inflating expectations about their impact. Several authors point to a tendency amongst organisations to claim substantial credit for a democratic transition in which they played only a minor role. For example, Mendelson and Glenn (2002a: 234), have noted how organisations typically “talked only about their successes in order to generate greater resources [which] raised undue expectations about their effectiveness.” Indeed, the USAID website, until recently, declared (cited in: Knack 2004): There were 58 democratic nations in 1980. By 1995, this number had jumped to 115 nations. USAID provided democracy and governance assistance to 36 of the 57 nations that successfully made the tran36

sition to a democratic government during this period.

Although the need to emphasise the positive aspects of their work to secure future funding may be understandable, such statements can severely skew the reality of democracy assistance. As Knack (2004: 252) explains, “obviously the fact that many aid recipients have become more democratic does not by itself imply cause and effect.” Indeed, the reality is that measuring democratic outcomes is a highly problematic area and, even if progress is achieved, it is difficult to attribute specific outcomes to particular stimuli (McMahon 2002).

As the likes of Green and Kohl (2007) have explained, identifying programme impact in a context of multiple programmes, donors and national and global political and economic conditions presents major difficulties.

As Green and Kohl (2007: 157) ask, “how can the impact or effectiveness of a programme be evaluated when the political and social context is a moving target at best?” Moreover, there is also the problem of counterfactuals, making it difficult to justify claims of success, when it is unknown what would NJIA

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have happened in the absence of a programme. For instance, should democracy assistance organisations be credited for certain developments, or would such developments have occurred regardless of any intervention? As Carothers (2004: 60) reminds us, democracy assistance “is at most a facilitator of locally rooted forces for political change, not the creator of them.” As such, the impact of democracy assistance is highly dependent on the context of the given country, both in terms of its socioeconomic conditions and the extent of its government’s commitment to genuine reform. With these issues in mind, Crawford and Kearton (2002) declare that the best that can be hoped for are “plausible linkages.”

Nevertheless, a difficulty in establishing causation and attribution does not necessarily mean that democracy assistance efforts should be abandoned due to a lack of impact. At a minimum, as De Zeeuw and Van de Goor (2006: 282) observe, “many institutions conducive to democracy, like elections, civil society organisations, print and broadcast media, as well as human rights NGOs, would probaNORTHWESTERN

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bly not have existed or survived in many post-conflict countries” without international democracy assistance. Moreover, the most significant impacts of a programme are often difficult to measure and involve the transmission of ideas that impact upon culture, psychology and morals. As Burnell (2000a: 341) states, “project results are often invisible – what’s left at the end of the programme is a change of mind, an altered attitude, a new concept and way of doing things.”

Moreover, and specifically on the issue of postconflict transition, there is an argument that critics have been overly harsh in evaluating the impact of democracy assistance.

According to Lyons (2002) and Stedman (2002), post-conflict democracy assistance should be judged primarily by its ability to ensure war termination rather than in establishing a fully functioning liberal democracy.

As Lyons (2002: 216) states, “in the most difficult cases, ending the war is the only goal that can be accomplished in the short run.” It is argued that the bar of what determines a success has been set too high and that, within peace agreements

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for post-conflict countries, the priority is always peace and that democracy is included as a support mechanism to the peace process. Lyons (2002: 230-231) argues: Policymakers charged with addressing the massive challenges that face post-conflict societies cannot afford to make successful democratisation the criterion for all policies and must accept that in many of these hard cases war termination may be the only available short-term option that at least provides for long-term stability and eventual transition to more liberal and democratic governance. To set expectations too high may lead policymakers to miss opportunities to assist in managing conflict.

Support for this viewpoint is given by Reilly (2006) and Kumar (2000: 202), with the latter arguing that “the overall progress in war-torn societies has to be judged not by the prevailing standards of western democracies but with reference to the conditions that existed prior to elections.” Therefore, within a post-conflict context, democracy assistance may have to play a subordinate role to the aims of the broader peace pro38

cess. As Kumar and de Zeeuw (2006: 14) remind us, “the promotion of democracy is not necessarily the only goal, and there are circumstances under which the international community has to make compromises in pursuit of competing objectives, such as avoiding a resumption of war.” From this perspective, it is evident that a clear distinction emerges in how the impact of post-conflict democracy assistance can be assessed. Based upon Galtung’s (1990) negative and positive concept of peace, post-conflict democracy assistance can be said to comprise of (a) the “negative” tasks of ending violence and establishing the formal procedures of elections, and (b) the “positive” tasks of deepening democracy, aiding inclusiveness and expediting a self-sustaining mechanism to handle conflicts without recourse to violence. Predictably, the balance between these two objectives remains contestable.

Evaluation Methods Perhaps the biggest problem with measuring the impact of democratisation lies in the very methods used in NJIA

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evaluating democracy assistance. A review of the literature reveals that six core problems can be identified; namely, a lack of standardised evaluations, an over-reliance on quantitative methods, a lack of precise and comparable data, a lack of flexibility, a neglect of qualitative methods, and a tendency to evaluate too soon after programme completion.

The first significant issue that should be noted is that evaluations of democracy assistance programmes are not a standard and consistent practice and, even when conducted, they are often informal, internally managed, and unpublished (Burnell 2000a: 339). A belief permeates within democracy assistance circles that their work is of unquestionable value and does not warrant evaluation. It is also notable that when evaluations are undertaken, they are rarely shared outside of the sponsoring organisations for fear of revealing weaknesses in a competitive market and losing future work (Crawford 2003a).

Moreover, painstaking retrospective analysis can be seen as an unaffordable luxury when there is always another crisis to address and assist (CarothNORTHWESTERN

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ers 1999: 285). Furthermore, as Green and Kohl (2007: 163) contend, the lack of credible evaluations can also be attributed to “a fundamental difference in orientation between the retrospective approach of academics (interest in what was) and the prospective approach of donor agencies (concerned with what could be).” On an operational level, therefore, democracy assistance “remains one of the most opaque areas of Western foreign policies” (Youngs et al.

2006: 8).

Second, donors have illustrated an unabashed preference for quantitative, highly visible and politically attractive outcomes of democracy assistance programmes (Crawford 2003a). For instance, it is much easier to assess the number of voters registered, election turnout, and number of polling staff trained than it is to measure levels of accountability, civic involvement and representation.

However, although quantitative data can be helpful in measuring aspects such as the number of NGOs assisted or number of polling staff trained, reducing democracy assistance analysis to a few quantitative indicators can be superficial and danger-

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ously misleading. For example, data on the number of judges trained tells us little about whether any improvements occurred in the application of the rule of law. Mendelson and Glenn (2002b: 10) stress that “numbers tell only a limited story,” whilst Rose (2000/01: 199) asserts that “simplistic bureaucratic checklists – the political equivalents of Vietnamera ‘body counts’ – are inappropriate and ineffective.”

Third, the difficulty with quantitative indicators is compounded by the imprecise nature of the available baseline data and the difficulty that this poses for accurate disaggregation (Crawford and Kearton 2002; Green and Kohl 2007: 159; Knack 2004). Different countries use different indicators and classifications to record democracy assistance; moreover, these figures are often merged into wider, standard development projects. Indeed, in one of the few detailed crossnational studies of democracy assistance, Youngs et al. (2006: 21) lamented that “no standard or easily comparable classification of political aid existed across states,” and, more worryingly, that several countries 40

had to compile the data upon request. Furthermore, because democracy has become increasingly viewed as central to postconflict peacebuilding, almost any international assistance effort that addresses perceived or real peacebuilding or development issue can arguably be labelled “democracy assistance.” In their study, Youngs et al. (2006: 21), note that “many states included in their democracy and governance categories aid projects that could not be reasonably said to have any meaningful bearing on political reform.” Similarly, Burnell (2000a: 339) has posited that some development agencies simply rename their traditional development programmes as “democracy assistance” to demonstrate that they were in tune with fashionable governance themes. As such, seemingly comparable data, such as that from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of OECD-DAC, can be decidedly misleading due to the inability to accurately disaggregate the data.

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ity. Indeed, the very design of programmes become limited to what can be measured through quantitative indicators, and it becomes difficult to change direction mid-programme due to a need to fulfil preset quantitative objectives. As Carothers (1999: 270) bemoans, “projects become locked into meeting predefined objectives and indicators, making it more difficult for people working on the ground to modify projects as they learn or as circumstances change.” In short, quantitative evaluations are deemed unsuitable as they are oriented to tracking progress to pre-established objectives and are unable to capture the dynamic political context in which democracy assistance activities are embedded (Crawford and Kearton 2002). Post-conflict democracy assistance is a highly context dependent activity and requires the acknowledgement that similar approaches will produce different results in different political environments (Burnell 2008: 425).

Fifth, even when qualitative analysis is included, it typically “ends up being supplementary at best, with little time and energy usually invested in NORTHWESTERN

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it either by those producing it or those reviewing it” (Carothers 1999: 293). The lack of attention given to this type of analysis also reduces its quality significantly. For example, those interviewed are unlikely to give negative feedback for fear of losing future aid and damaging working relations.

As Green and Kohl (2007: 159) explain, “interviews with government agencies or NGOs that receive aid tend to be biased in favour of their programmes.”

Meanwhile, Carothers (1999) notes how those conducting the interviews tend to be part of the democracy assistance paradigm and, by virtue of this, carry with them the values and assumptions standard of those working in the field. Moreover, they are disinclined to be overly critical for fear of not being selected for such work again.

Sixth, and finally, the value of evaluations is often undermined by the fact that they typically occur immediately once a programme is completed.

This is problematic because, as Burnell (2000a: 340) notes, “the true significance of investments in democracy building and their efforts may not become fully apparent until long after the

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event.” In a similar vein, Finkel et al. (2007) have described the dividend from democracy assistance as possessing a “lagged effect.” In essence, there is an inherent contradiction between the long-term process of democratic change and the short-term necessity donors place on agencies to report results quickly (Rakner et al. 2007).

Recommendations Despite the drawbacks in evaluating the true impact of post-conflict democracy assistance, few have called for democracy assistance to be curtailed, but have rather suggested ways in which the approach could be improved. Broad recommendations aimed at the donor community have centred on the evaluation methods themselves, including suggestions on coordination, timing, relations with target country, consistency, and relations with “high” politics. Although Green and Kohl (2007) are quite right in noting that recommendations are often general and vague, it is of worth to briefly review the most common recommendations cited and what they can tell us of the state of post-conflict democracy 42

assistance evaluations.

Beginning with evaluation methods, it is widely agreed that donors should make better use of qualitative methods as a means of placing assistance efforts within a political context and to acquire a more textured evaluation. Moreover, it is contended that donors must accept, as a fundamental basis, “that many of the most important results of democracy programmes are psychological, moral, subjective, indirect, and time-delayed” (Carothers 1999: 340). As Mendelson and Glenn (2002b: 10) note, donors must acknowledge that they are “engaged in a long term incremental process of changing behaviour and perceptions that is simply not linear or quantifiable.” Independent and public analysis should also be encouraged because self-evaluation is not reliable (McMahon 2002) and in-house “standards of democratic performance are liable to be too low” (Whitehead 2004: 153). Indeed, recent institutional evaluations criticised the UK based Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) of not conducting enough self-evaluations (River Path Associates 2005) and the NJIA

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Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) of treating assessment as an end in itself (European Centre for Development Policy Management 2005). It is of note that positive steps have been taken in this direction through the promotion of Conflict Impact Assessment (CIAS) and the Aid for Peace frameworks by Paffenholz and Reychler (2007). However, a donor reluctance to move away from numbers remains evident (Mendelson and Glenn 2002a: 236).

Perhaps the most commonly cited recommendation is for enhanced coordination and harmonisation amongst donors (Ellis et al. 2006; Rakner et al.

2007; Wood 2001). As Green and Kohl (2007: 157) explain, “whereas in other field of development assistance, cooperation among donors is the norm, donor coordination and cooperation is not a standard practice as far as democracy assistance is concerned.” Overcoming donor fragmentation would increase the cost-effectiveness of aid by avoiding duplication of efforts and by allowing for a deeper understanding of the local dynamics (McMahon 2002).

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also called for a longer engagement with the target country, asserting that “it can take years, even decades, to nurse political and social institutions that can promote and strengthen democracy” (Kumar 2000: 205).

McMahon (2002) has stressed that for assistance to be credible it must be sustained and that “one-shot” assistance is usually not well-absorbed. Additionally, Ellis (2006) has noted that assistance should not only last longer, but should arrive earlier in the transition process.

Even though the call for a more sustained engagement is worthwhile, De Zeeuw (2007: 97) notes that such recommendations are “tantamount to wishful thinking.”

There has also been an allied call for better targeting of democracy aid, with the claim that “less is indeed more.”

For example, Steele and Scott (2005: 20-21) have observed how general aid is largely ineffective, but “much smaller amounts of assistance directed at more specific democracy support projects” are infinitely more effective.

Several authors have further noted how the sense of ownership of democratisation is

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often weak in many post-conflict countries (Kumar 2004), with critics arguing that processes can often become donor led and donor dependent (Newman 2004: 197). As such, it has been stressed that links between donors and the recipient country should be improved, particularly in terms of explaining their work better and increasing genuine indigenous involvement (Wood 2001: 50). Rakner et al. (2007) emphasise that a democratisation effort will only be successful if it is internally driven, a factor especially pertinent as high donor investment is unlikely to be sustained for long periods of time. Rose (2000/01) Crawford and Kearton (2002) and Burnell (2008) have all recommended participatory approaches to evaluation, as a means to highlight the perspectives of domestic actors on external efforts. The benefit of participatory evaluation is not simply a means to better justify programmes or even to improve future strategies, but, as Burnell (2008: 427) explains, “to exercise, display and share the democratic ethos.” Indeed, by fostering joint ownership of both the process and evaluation of democracy assistance, the 44

exercise of evaluation becomes an exercise in democratisation in itself (Crawford 2003b: 17).

In addition, several calls have been made for more consistency in the focus of democracy assistance. Smith (2007: 129), for example, notes that “the incoherent and inconsistent pursuit of aims such as democracy promotion” does not contribute positively to the image of external assistance. A lack of consistency and integrity in application can not only adversely affect perceptions of democracy assistance, but it can also have practical disadvantages in terms of lessons not being learned and “reinventing the wheel” on every mission.

Burnell (2000a: 343) notes that assistance should retain a flexibility to adapt to local context, but that “this is not an argument for amateurism, for a wasteful duplication of effort or the kind of collective amnesia that would allow remediable weaknesses in emerging democracies to ‘fall through the cracks’.”

Finally, the argument has been made for a stronger relationship between democracy assistance and “high” politics.

It has been argued that a significant degree of the problems NJIA

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faced in transitional countries are not because of lack of technical know-how, but a politicisation of key institutions such as the media and electoral commissions. Burnell (2007) and Santiso (2002) both note a need to deliberately engage with the power relations in a target country, and De Zeeuw (2007) questions “the extent to which democracy can be enhanced through the ‘positive’ route of aid projects without attendant critical diplomatic purchase.”

However, as we have seen in discussions on the definition of democracy assistance, such moves could drift into the broader domain of democracy promotion and, although perhaps valid recommendations, should be treated with high caution when linked to the more neutral tools of democracy assistance.

Conclusions The increased attention paid to issues of post-conflict democracy evaluation is both welcomed and necessary. As Burnell (2000a: 353) explains, “the political costs of failed or misguided interventions can be high, even when the expendiNORTHWESTERN

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ture has been small. Not just a democracy provider’s reputation but the relations between states can be placed in jeopardy.” It has also become clear that democracy assistance does not submit to a simple positive/ negative analysis and that there is a need for more textured qualitative analysis to acquire an improved understanding of the possibilities and limitations of assistance. An acknowledgement that external assistance is only one factor amongst a complicated mixture of influences is also perceptible, prompting Cousens (2001: 15) to claim that organisations and donors alike need ‘to be ruthlessly modest about its ambitions.’

Perhaps most critically though, a recognition is emerging that evaluations are not exercises confined exclusively to measuring impact. Rose (2000/01: 189) once described democracy assistance as “an exercise in applied political development,” and these sentiments should be extended to the evaluation process too. Indeed, the promise of enhanced evaluations of postconflict democracy assistance are not restricted to the appraisal of a given programme; rather, the true potential rests in the

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capacity to improve strategy in advance, to extend democratic values to the very exercise of evaluation itself, and to continuously prompt the international community to consider why post-conict democracy assistance is such a valued approach.

Richard Lappin is a Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies at the University of Leuven in Belgium. He has participated in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE and Carter Center in Sierra Leone, Lebanon and Romania.

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Reections on Sikh Theology, Philosophy, and Jurisprudence

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by Satvinder Singh Juss

hat impact can Sikhism have on matters that concern the law?

How can it help shape issues of issues justice, forgiveness, community, discipline, love, human rights, secularism and the State? The answers, crucial to the relevance of law in society, remain as elusive as ever. The Sikh religion’s fundamental premise is that all people are equal and that life is altogether simpler than orthodox religion would have one believe. This article provides an overview of the central tenets of Sikh belief.

Can modern law benefit from

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such belief-based practices?

Can it integrate into policy?

The purpose of this article is to suggest that it can.

The Basis of Sikh Jurisprudence Sikh religious tradition1 begins with Guru Nanak (1469-1539), the founder of Sikhism. He used the medium of devotional religious songs to spread his message of personal love for God2 and the universal 1 For an excellent account, see Hew McLeod, The Evolution of the Sikh Community, (OUP, 1976) 2 Satvinder S. Juss, Ency-

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brotherhood of mankind.

These songs of simplicity, clarity and rustic beauty comprise the foundation of Sikh religious tradition, binding the faith and its followers together into a community (panth).

The Three Pillars of Sikhism Sikhism’s “Three Pillars,” as formalised by Guru Nanak, are based on the idea of mandatory active service in the community.

The Sikh principles are meditation (Simran or Naam Japna), self-reliance, industry, thrift (Kirat Karni), and sharing and breaking bread together (Vand Chakko). These are the basis for peaceful co-existence among fellow human beings and for mutual respect for others through the application of universal love, tolerance and harmony. The Pillars are ultimately linked, as illustrated in the Hymn by Guru Nanak: clopedia of Religious Freedom [Associate Editor; forthcoming in 2003; published by Routledge, New York] 48

“[On] The twelfth day of the lunar cycle: Dedicate yourself to giving charity, chanting the Naam and purification. Worship the Lord with devotion, and get rid of your pride. Drink in the Ambrosial Nectar of the Lord’s Name, in the Saadh Sangat, the Company of the Holy. The mind is satisfied by lovingly singing the Kirtan of God’s Praises.

The Sweet Words of His Bani soothe everyone. The soul, the subtle essence of the five elements, cherishes the Nectar of the Naam, the Name of the Lord. This faith is obtained from the Perfect Guru. O Nanak, dwelling upon the Lord, you shall not enter the womb of reincarnation again.3 Meditation (Simran or Naam Japna), the first of the Three Pillars, means reciting God’s name (Waheguru) in daily remembrance (Nitnem) of the grace (kirpa) of the Almighty. The term Naam (literally “name”) refers to 3 299)

Guru Granth Sahib (at p.

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the various names given to God or the Almighty that Sikhs use. The names given to God refer to the attributes of the Almighty and His various qualities. Naam Simran (literally “name recitation”) incorporates the singing, quiet meditation, or the listening of sacred text or sacred words in the Guru Granth Sahib. Naam Japna refers to the meditation and vocal singing of Sabads or hymns from the Sri Guru Granth Sahib or the chanting of the various names of God, especially of the word “Waheguru” (Wonderful Lord). Such is the critical importance of this form of meditation that the concept of Nam Simran or Naam Japna is seen in the hymns of the Guru Granth Sahib as the route by which humans can conquer the Five Evils of greed, attachment, anger, lust and hubris that upset the delicate spiritual balance of the mind, soul and body.

Nam Simran, or Naam Japna, brings peace and tranquility in meditation.

The second of the Three Pillars: Self-reliance, industry, and thrift (Kirat NORTHWESTERN

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Karni), admonishes Sikhs from becoming a charge on the community by living as a recluse4. It is a principle that encourages involvement rather than withdrawal from society.

Wihdrawal was the hallmark of many bhagats and sufis in India during the time of Guru Nanak. Sikhism lays emphasis on meditation but does so in the midst and grist of the community.

Sikhs are enjoined to live as householders (and not celibate, austere, wandering holy men) and to practise “Kirat Karni,” which means to make a living by one’s own hard work, while accepting God’s gifts and blessing. Kirat Karni allows Sikhs to devlop the skills, abilities, and talents that God has given them through acts of hard work for the benefit and improvement of both themselves as individuals, their families and the wider 4 see, Guru Granth Sahib (at p. 317) where Guru Nanak says: “As the True Guru directs them, they do their work and chant their prayers. The True Lord accepts the service of His GurSikhs.”

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society at large. Kirat karni and Naam Japna are indivisble. Kirat karni is in fact a derivative of Naam Japna . By laying emphasis on the sweat of one’s brows, Kirat (i.e. application) becomes an extension of prayer or meditation. In the religion of Guru Nanak, there is no nobler a life on this earth than that which has been spent in both meditation and hard work5.

The third of the Three Pillars, namely, to share and break bread together, is Vand Chakho (sometimes also referred to as “Vand Ke Chakna”). This is designed to ensure that Sikhs share their wealth within the community and is the basis of charity in Sikhism. Every Sikh is required to give in whatever way that they

can to the community at large. Vand Chakho is also the basis of free kitchens (langar) in Sikhism where eating together (pangat) is as important as praying together (Sangat). Sikhs are required as an article of faith to help others in the community. A general rule is that a Sikh must give at least 10 percent of his wealth to people in need or to a worthy cause in lieu. The act of giving cleanses the soul and forms the route to salvation6.

Guru Nanak’s rejection of religious ritual in turn paved the way for Sikhism’s fundamental premise that all people are equal and that life is altogether simpler than orthodox religion would have one believe:

5 see, Guru Granth Sahib (at p. 8) where Guru Nanak says: “Those who have meditated on the Naam, the Name of the Lord, and departed after having worked by the sweat of their brows -O Nanak, their faces are radiant in the Court of the Lord, and many are saved along with them!”

6 see, Guru Granth Sahib (at p. 718) where Guru Nanak says: “Contemplating my Lord and Master, my True Guru, all my affairs have been resolved. / The urge of giving donations to charity and devotional worship come from the Kirtan of the Praises of the Transcendent Lord.”

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“With this belief that religious ritual is unnecessary went the belief that all people are equal in the sight of God, and that the divisions of society, above all in the systems of varna and caste, should be ignored and in practice abolished.

There is no spiritual or religious elite in the world.

In fact, Guru Nanak realised that the true ‘battlefield’ is in the world and in everyday life: by meditating on the Nam, people can overcome the Five Evil Passions within them, and this can only be demonstrated by the way in which they live and work.

In Guru Nanak’s belief, much that happens in existing religions is thus an impediment in the way of people reaching God.”7 Guru Nanak was a major religious reformer of the medieval world who changed the basis of religious belief. His idea of a personal devotion to a personal god was expressed through meditation (bhakti “ie “fervent devotion to God”), the utterance of the name of 7 133.

John Bowker, op cit at p.

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God (Nam), and the singing of hymns (shabads). Guru Nanak advocated that any person, irrespective of sex, status or creed, could read the sacred text of the Sikhs and officiate as a priest in Sikh congregations. This is not dissimilar to the reformist zeal of Martin Luther (14831546) who lived in Europe around the same time as Guru Nanak, and who had also made Christianity’s religious text, the Bible, accessible to ordinary people by translating it into the vernacular. Like Nanak he had also attached importance to God rather than the Church, thereby arousing papal ire. Luther did not set out to challenge the papacy in a doctrinaire way but like Nanak, only to raise legitimate questions about religious practices. On a visit to Rome in 1510, Luther had been appalled by the power, wealth and corruption of the papacy. Nanak too disagreed with the dogma, ritual and hierarchy of religious practices around him (as the janamsakhis make only too clear). In 1517 Luther protested publicly against the

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sale of papal indulgences for the remission of sins in his “95 Theses,” nailing a copy to the door of a Wittenberg church. Nanak on a visit to the holy Hindu city of Hardwar in the foothills of the Himalayas in 1558 saw people performing the ritual of throwing water to the rising sun in the East, which they believed would give sustenance to their dead ancestors. In rejection of this ritual, Guru Nanak began throwing water to the West in the cup of his hands. As the worshippers began to reprimand him for dishonoring an age-old practice, Nanak issued a retort that if their water could reach their dead ancestors behind the sun in the East, his water could surely also reach his thirsty cows grazing in the West.

Similarly on a visit to the holy Muslim city of Mecca, Nanak lay down exhausted on arrival, with his feet pointing towards the qibla (the directions of prayer for Muslims). When an angry worshipper rebuked him for his alleged sacrilege, Nanak calmly asked him to pull 52

his feet around and to point them in a direction where God was not to be found, thus making the subtle point that God existed everywhere and not just in the hallowed cloisters of mosques and temples.

The big difference between the two, however, was that Pope Leo X eventually excommunicated Luther, dismissing him as “a drunken German who will change his mind when sober.” Guru Nanak, on the other hand, was universally acknowledged even in his time by Hindus for teaching them how to be better Hindus and by Muslims for teaching them how to be better Muslims.8 At the 8 Unlike many other religions which exploded on the world scene, the legacy of Guru Nanak’s theology was not to set up one community against the other but to bring them together on the basis of their own religious principles. Indeed, a popular couplet describes Guru Nanak as a symbol of fraternity between to the two religious communities of the day, the Muslims and the Hindus, as “Guru Nanak shah Fakeer NJIA

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same time, he paved the way for the new religious faith of Sikhism.9 Similarly on a visit to the holy Muslim city of Mecca, Nanak lay down exhausted on arrival, with his feet pointing towards the qibla (the directions of prayer for Muslims). The historian, W.H. McLeod, holds that whereas it is certainly the case that Guru Nanak was widely traveled, it remains unproven how far away he traveled from the Punjab: “It was possible to affirm that Baba Nanak had traveled extensively, but it was quite impossible to establish the / Hindu ka Guru, Mussulman ka Peer.” which means, “Guru Nanak, the noble ascetic/ a Guru to the Hindus, a Sage to the Muslims” (see, Khushwant Singh & Raghu Rai, The Sikhs, (2nd edn., India, Roli books, 2005 at p. 7) 9 Although Pope Benedict XVI, the current pontificate, looks now set to rehabilitate Martin Luther on the grounds that he did not intend to split the Christianity but only to purge the Church of corrupt practices. (see, Richard Owen, “That Martin Luther? He wasn’t so bad, says Pope”, The Times, 6th March 2008 at p.37).

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route that he took or his experiences along the way.”10 The Five Virtues of Sikhism This new faith was based on the active cultivation of the five virtues that are also the basis of Enlightenment Secularism, namely, peaceful co-existence and mutual respect through a message of universal love, tolerance and harmony. These resonate with the ‘Five Vows’ (vrata) of Jainism. However, as with the ‘Five Evils,’ the emphasis is different. In Jainism they are (i) not to injure any living being (ahimsa); (ii) not to utter falsehood (satya); (iii) not to steal (asteya); (iv) to lead a celibate life; (brahmcharya); and (v) to renounce the world (aparigraha). 11 Sikhism abjures sensual excess but is very much against leading a celibate life; it 10 W.H. McLeod, Discovering the Sikhs, Autobiography of a Historian (Permanent Black, New Delhi, 2003) at p. 144.

11 M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (10th impression, London, Allen & Unwin, 1975) at p. 166.

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encourages spiritualism, but is fundamentally opposed to the idea of renunciation of the world.

In Sikhism, the five virtues are independent yet interdependent attributes.12 This is clear from Sabads in the Sikh scriptures: “First, is the Lord’s Praise; second, contentment; third, humility, and fourth, giving to charities.

Fifth is to hold one’s desires in restraint.” The Sikh scriptures also say that “the armor of self-restraint, truth, contentment and humility can never be pierced.” Then again they remind Sikhs that if “you do not practice truth, abstinence, self-discipline or humility, the ghost within your skeleton has turned to dry wood…..”

The Five virtues, truth (Sat), contentment (Santokh), compassion (Daya), humility (Nimrata) , and love (Pyar) begin with Truth.

The virtue of “Truth” (or Sat) is a fundamental 12 See Guru Granth Sahib (at p.1234) which states that the key to salvation is that that: “They practice truth, selfrestraint and good deeds; their comings and goings are ended.”

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precept in Sikhism: “The virtuous obtain Truth; they give up their desires for evil and corruption.” It enjoins Sikhs to practice Truth in a truthful life because this is the Hukam (ie. Order of being) in an orderly living: “Those who do not have the assets of Truth—how can they find peace?” It means acting in a spirit of co-operation with fellow human beings; treating others as equal; and avoiding duplicitous behavior. Just as God is defined in the mul mantra, Sikhs must work toward God-like qualities themselves by doing good deeds: “Make good deeds the soil, and let the Word of the Shabad be the seed; irrigate it continually with the water of Truth.”13 Love of God is not just a feeling but always a showing of love for God by selfless service to God’s creation.

The second of the Five Virtues is contentment (Santokh). This also is a fundamental precept of Sikhism as “Contentment patiently holds the earth in its 13 24).

See Adi Granth, (at p.

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place.” Contentment takes an individual away from the indulgent satisfaction of personal desires. As the Adhi Granth states, “Practice truth, contentment and kindness; this is the most excellent way of life.” It teaches one to learn to live within one’s circumstances and in accordance with God’s will or the Order of Being (Hukam). This results in freedom from care, fear and worry. Contentment lies in a realisation of fundamental universal truths.

Contentment is a divine quality in that it eliminates harmful desires. When these vanish a state of Sat Santokh is acquired, namely, a liberation from our sorrows and pains which seek instant gratification in the fulfilment of our desires.

The third of the Five Virtues in Sikh thought is compassion (daya). It is considered the highest virtue, thus, the Adi Granth contains the Sabad that“the merit of pilgrimages of holy places…… equal not 14

14 Adi Granth (at p. 3) which reads: “santokh thaap rakhi-aa jin soot” NORTHWESTERN

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compassion to living beings.”

However, daya also means Truth in action. Adi Granth explains that“Truth dawns when truthful counsel is accepted. Seeking familiarity with compassion one gives away virtuous charity.” Daya is, in reality, action or true action (karni Sar) as are truth and contentment. This means that they must have Daya, the divine virtue of humanity that is a gateway into three other truthful attributes.

Daya in Sikhism is therefore a an all-encompassing moral requirement. It takes the form of a moral vow.15 The fourth of the Five Virtues is Nimrata. Nimrata is a virtue that is vigorously promoted by the Guru Granth Sahib. The literal translation of this word is “Humility” or “Benevolence.” Sikhism states that “the fruit of humility is intuitive peace and pleasure.” Just as 15 Adi Granth (at p. 299) enjoins Sikhs that they should, “Keep your heart content and cherish compassion for all beings; as this way alone will your holy vow be fulfilled.”

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Christianity declares that “the meek shall inherit the earth,” Sikhism teaches that “the God-conscious being shall never perish. The Godconscious being is steeped in humility,” and “lacking truth and humility, they shall not be appreciated in the world hereafter.” A virtuous person is described in the following manner: “He chants and meditates, and practices austerity and good deeds. He keeps to the Dharma, with faith, humility and contentment.”

The fifth and final of the Five Virtues is Pyar (love). Sikhism vigorously promotes the love of God. This includes love for God’s creation. Love is necessary in the quest for union with God or with the cosmic force. Since Sikhism asks all believers to take on godly virtues, Pyar is the perhaps the most godlike characteristic of all. The Adi Granth said that Waheguru (“the almighty force”) is a “loving God”, full of compassion and kindness.

It is the duty of the Sikh to take on these qualities.

Consequently, Sikhs will 56

often chant Sabads such as, “My mind is imbued with the Lord’s Love; it is dyed a deep crimson. Truth and charity are my white clothes.”16 Indeed, the search for God can only be undertaken by an act of love for God: “Join the Sat Sangat, the True Congregation, and find the Lord. The Gurmukh embraces love for the Lord.”17 Secularism and the Sikh Gurus Guru Nanak, who lived until 1539, was followed by nine other Gurus of the Sikh faith.

Each one of these nine Gurus took practical steps to follow through with Guru Nanak’s message of humility, love, compassion, and service to humanity.

Guru Nanak’s service to mankind is epitomized in the story of when, as a boy, his father gave him 22 rupees and asked him to go to town to do business and 16 16) 17 22)

See Adi Granth, (at p.

See Adi Granth, (at p.

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return with a handsome profit. The young Nanak happened upon a group of holy men who were hungry and destitute. The young Nanak continued to town where he bought food and other necessities with all the money and returned to distribute it amongst the holy men. When his angry father demanded an explanation Nanak said that there could be no better use of the money than using it to feed the hungry.

Guru Angad (15041539) was originally called “Lehna”. Yet such was his devotion to Guru Nanak that he was renamed “Angad,” meaning ‘part of me.’ After Guru Nanak’s death, his expanding band of followers (known as ‘Nanakpanthis’) were led by Guru Angad (and not by Guru Nanak’s two sons) for thirteen years as ‘Sikhs.’ He taught them by example, undertaking the lowliest tasks with humility and good humor.

He encouraged physical fitness to affirm the Sikh virtue of “seva” (service in the community). He also collected Guru Nanak’s NORTHWESTERN

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hymns and scriptures, which would later be included in the Guru Granth Sahib. He was married to Mata Khivi (Sikhism’s first matriarch) and had three children.

None of them, however, succeeded him.

Guru Amar Dass (1479-1574) introduced free kitchens (Langar) in the service of the poor. There is a remarkable story in relation to this. In 1567 the Emperor, Akbar, was on his way to Lahore when he decided to visit the Guru.

Guru Amar Dass said that he would only meet the Emperor if he first took food in the Langar with him. The Emperor did so and was so impressed that he resolved to collect revenue from the surrounding villages for the regular upkeep of the Langar. The Guru forbade him to do so.

The institution of the Langar was based on the principle of voluntarism, designed to bring people together. The objective was to break down distinctions of caste, status and wealth.

Therefore, revenue for the Langar could not be forcibly

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collected. Guru Amar Dass, however, also set out to emancipate women, condemning Purdah (the veil), female infanticide and Sati (the burning of a widow on her husband’s funeral pyre). Whilst instituting distinctive Sikh ceremonies for birth, death and marriage, he also made the faith more inclusive by borrowing three festival days from the Hindus (i.e.

Vaisakhi; Lorri and Diwali) and transforming them into Sikh celebrations in their own right. He was particularly concerned that caste and status distinctions would not predominate in the life of the community.

Thereafter, Sikh gurus followed a family line. Guru Ram Dass (1534-1581) was the son-in-law of Guru Amar Dass. The town of Amritsar was founded and he started construction on the Golden Temple, which was completed in 1601. Less known is the fact that he was the first person in India to have founded a home for lepers at nearby Taran Taran. Like his predecessor he continued to collect 58

the hymns and prayers of previous gurus before eventually putting them in one book. However, the growth of this new faith began to arouse the ire of jealous Muslim Moghul leaders. Guru Arjan Dev (1563-1606) was arrested, tortured, and put to death for refusing to convert to Islam. His son Guru Hargobind (1595-1644) and the great-grandson of Guru Amar Dass consequently found it necessary to instill greater political and military organization among the Sikhs. His grandson Guru Har Rai (1630-1661) opened hospitals that offered free treatment. He is also credited with having uttered the well-known Punjabi moral that “a broken temple can be re-built, but a broken heart cannot,” thus emphasizing that God lives in people’s hearts and not in Temples, Churches and Mosques. His work was continued by his young son, Guru Harkrishan (1656-1664) who died after devoting himself to the care of smallpox victims in Delhi.

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1675) became the second Sikh guru to be martyred when, in the face of rising religious persecution by the Mughals, he insisted on the rights of Hindus to worship as they pleased.

He was actually most astute at making peace, which he accomplished with the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb and other rival rulers.

However, Aurangzeb still sought the conversion of Hindus to Islam, imploring the Guru to act as a peace envoy to Aurangzeb with the goal of finding a peaceful way of coexistence. The Guru went to Delhi but was himself arrested, detained, tortured, and eventually killed for his refusal to accept Islam.

Guru Gobind Singh (1666-1708) came to prominence against the backdrop of a rising Sikh state in the Punjab. He continued to fight for the rights of others, but also founded a brotherhood based on strict religious and moral codes. All surnames would be changed. Men would be known as “Singh” (meaning ‘lion’) and women NORTHWESTERN

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would be known as “Kaur” (meaning ‘queen/princess’).

The aim was to bind Sikhs to their faith and to each other. He created the central institution of the Sikhs, the Khalsa (‘the Pure’). At a time of unrelenting persecution of the Sikhs by the Mughals, he also installed the notion of the Dharma Yudh (the just war) or the ‘war of righteousness.’ Such a war could only be waged, however, subject on the basis of five principles: War is a last resort after all other means of dispute resolution have first been tried and failed; War must not be waged as an act of revenge or retribution; War must not be accompanied by looting or seizure of territory; War must be waged only by an army of disciplined Sikhs; and War must be waged through the deployment of minimum force. Khalsa Sikhs were also enjoined to abstain from adultery, alcohol and tobacco. There was no successor to Guru Gobind Singh; instead, he decreed that the Guru Granth Sahib should be the spiritual guide for future

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generations.

In the 18th Century Sikhism was formalized by Guru Gobind Singh Ji, the tenth Guru. When upon discovering that it is often necessary for new faiths to fight for their beliefs, he baptized his followers into the Khalsa Panth, (“The Order of the Pure”) with strict rules of personal discipline, by combining both the spiritual and martial sides of human nature, and enshrining the duality of the Sant/Shupai – or Saint / Soldier. The closest analogy in the West would be the Knights Templars of Medieval Europe, who also had to fight for the survival of their faith. The creation of the Khalsa in 1699 is the defining moment in Sikh history. Justly regarded as Guru Gobind’s greatest and most controversial achievement. A question that has most perplexed the observers of Sikhism is how a religion that began as a system of interior devotion in the 16th Century became by the end of the 18th century associated with a martial tradition.

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To understand this, it is necessary to understand both how and why the Khalsa Panth was set up.

Secularism and the Legacy of Guru Gobind Singh Ji The martyrdoms of two of the ten Sikh Gurus under Mughul rule were two of the most cataclysmic events in Sikh religious history. On both occasions, the Sikhs were driven to take arms against their oppressors. The first time was in the seventeenth century, when the egalitarian ideals of the Sikh faith began to question the social and political structure of the Punjab. At this time, the Moghul emperors in New Delhi saw this as a threat to their authority.

In 1606, Emperor Jahangir ceremoniously burned alive the fifth Guru, Guru Arjan, who had completed the scriptures, when he refused to convert to Islam.

It is remarkable that Jahangir should have behaved in this way for he was the son of Emperor Akbar, the grandson of the NJIA

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founding Mogul emperor, Babur. Coming to the throne in 1557, when he was only 13, Akbar ruled for 50 years.

Akbar’s rule was the high point of Moghul power in the 16th century. Yet, Akbar ruled without the power of the sword. Instead, he emphasized tolerance and peaceful coexistence, so that it has been said of him that as “[a] man of extraordinary energy, vision, culture and tolerance, he is the closest India has come to a philosopher king – a man who attempted a synthesis of Islamic and Hindu culture, who laid down rules for the peaceful co-existence of the two religions, and who encouraged learning.”18 Religious historian Karen Armstrong explains that unlike Emperor Akbar,“who made bigotry impossible”19 and even had a Hindu vizier, his son the Emperor Jahangir 18 Binyon, Michael.

(2003) “Tales of the East” in The Times, 5th February 2003, pp.12-13 at p.12.

19 Karen Armstrong, (1993) A History of God . Mandarin, London, UK. at p. 303 NORTHWESTERN

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was intent on forcibly converting Hindus to Islam.

Thus, after the Martyrdom of Guru Arjan in 1606, only two years after he had completed the compilation of the Sikh Scriptures in 1604, Guru Hargobind (the Sixth Guru) took up arms to defend the Sikhs against the Moghuls.

He did not have to set up an Order, however.

Therefore when Guru Tegh Bahadur (the ninth Guru) was publicly beheaded in 1675 by Emperor Aurangzeb, Guru Gobind Singh (the tenth Guru) felt the need to create a new Order when he realized his Sikhs were so demoralized that none had dared to step forward and claim the body of their Guru.

And it happened that “Sikh tradition reach[d] a climax in the execution of Guru Tegh Bahadur.”20 Thus, the creation of the Khalsa Panth has to be understood in the context of changes in the 18th century when Moghul rule embarked on a 20 McLeod, H, (1997) Sikhism. Penguin Books, London. England at p. 47

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particularly virulent policy of religious persecution under Aurangzeb. The Emperor Aurangzeb’s intolerance of other faiths was so pronounced that even his own sister Jahanara, together with many liberal Muslim fakirs, were in full sympathy with Guru Gobind’s plan of bringing Hindus and Muslims together.21 It seems that “the Moghul Empire never recovered from the destructive bigotry he had unleashed and sanctified in the name of God,”22 and it was not long before the Khalsa Panth defeated the Moghul Empire and led to its rapid disintegration thereafter.23 However, it 21 H Banerjee H. (1990) “Bengali Perceptions of the Sikhs: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” In Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century, edited in Toronto by Joseph T. O’Connell, Milton Israel, and Willard G. Oxtoby. Manohar Publications Daryaganj, New Delhi, India at p. 119 22 Karen Armstrong, A History of God, (1993) at p. 304 23 M Alam., (1986) The 62

is the way in which Guru Gobind inaugurated the Khalsa Panth that is most instructive and revealing.

Guru Nanak had taught that the function of initiating novices into the faith was not the exclusive province of the priest. Guru Gobind went one step further and established that it was not the province of the guru either. Everyone was born with the same rights. Unique in the world of religion, Guru Gobind insisted that he take the baptismal water (Amrit) from his first five disciples. He would take it just as they had taken it from him. In this way, he too would get baptized into a Singh (lion). The only difference was that it was his own disciples who would baptize him. In recognizing the collective body of disciples as guru, Guru Gobind abolished personal guruship, merged himself into the Khalsa, and invested the whole Panth (“Order”) Crisis of empire in Mughal North India, Awadh and the Punjab 1707-1748. Oxford University Press. Oxford.Alam: 135, 144, 153, 315 NJIA

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with the dignity of gurudom.

The abolition of the caste system had been a cardinal principle of the Sikh religion since its birth.

Guru Gobind now logically insisted on the remodeling of Sikh society on that principle. To that end, the traditional surname (which signified caste) would be abolished for all religious purposes and replaced with the common surname “Singh” for men (meaning “lion”) and “Kaur” for women (meaning “queen”) to denote a uniform religious status. In this way, contrary to any suggestion that Guru Gobind had deviated from the path of early Sikhism by establishing the Khalsa, Guru Gobind Singh Ji climaxed the teachings of Guru Nanak by taking them to their ultimate and logical conclusion and establishing the principle that the guru (teacher) and the disciple (student) were equals in matters of both personal and spiritual worth. This is a religious revolution unprecedented in the annals of religious history.

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beliefs of genial irreverence, anti-foundationalism, lack of deference and dislike of hierarchical structures that are the basis of a secular age. More importantly, however, it resonates with the principles of equality and justice that lie at the heart of modern democratic society today. As such, Sikhism is made centrally relevant to the fundamental values of a liberal democracy with its emphasis on human dignity and individual worth. This was quite a revolution when it is remembered that secular society only recognized these values later for the first time in 1789 as Liberty, Fraternity and the Rights of Man. In its time period, Sikhism forged a new path.

Such is the importance of Guru Gobind Singh in the development of the Sikh faith and in the completion of its ideals that Sikhs see in the tenth guru the ideals by which they can live their lives. These are the ideals of the fellowship of man and the defense of the rights and beliefs of others, regardless of the race, religion or creed, a right that secular

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instruments on religious human rights, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1947 and the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 now enshrine in law. Sikhs remember that in 1675, at the tender age of 9, Guru Gobind Singh had asked his father, Guru Tegh Bahadur, to help 500 Kashmiri Brahmins.

They were being denied the right to practice their Hindu faith by the Moghul Emperor. When Guru Tegh Bahadur defended their right as Hindus to religious worship, he was ceremoniously beheaded at Chandni Chowk, in what is now Old Delhi by Aurangzeb. Sikhs remember that this was the guru who, even after the execution of his father by a militant Muslim ruler, refused to denounce the Muslim faith and to deviate from the path of Nanak to bring Muslims and Hindus together. In fact, the Guru had many Muslim friends, most of whom were of the liberal Sufi persuasion and disagreed with the Emperor’s religious persecution as much as 64

the Guru did. Thus, a particularly good friend was Budhu Shah, the Syed of Sadhaura, who had read the Granth sahib and sympathized with the teachings of the early gurus. Early in his life, Guru Gobind began by enlisting 500 Muslim Pathan soldiers in his army. He had four Muslim officers, Hayat Khan, Kale Khan, Najabat Khan, and Bikhan Khan. He did not discriminate against his Muslim soldiers and paid them well.

Such is the contribution of Guru Gobind Singh to the modern era that his teachings have been used by secularist writers and thinkers in the reconstruction of modern India in the quest for independence from colonial rule. Malcolm, writing in 1806, is the first western author western scholar to have quoted extensively from primary Sikh sources, such as the Adi Granth and the Vars of Bhai Gurdas , the Dasam Granth, and the earlier Rahit Namas.

He described Guru Gobind’s Sikhs as being “…obnoxious to the Brahmins , and NJIA

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higher tribes of Hindus as it is popular with the lower orders of that numerous class of mankind.”24 Joseph Davey Cunningham, writing in 1849, improved upon the analyses of Malcolm and described the transformation of Guru Gobind’s Sikhs as follows: “Gobind… abolished social distinctions, and took away from his followers each ancient solace of superstition; but he felt that he must engage the heart as well as satisfy the reason, and that he must give the Sikhs some common bond of union which should remind the weak of their new life, and add fervor to the devotion of the sincere.

They should have one form of initiation…”25 Max Arthur Macauliffe, writing in 1909, 24 John Malcolm, Sketch of the Sikhs: Their origin, Customs and Manners (ed., by Subhas C. aggarwal) Chandigarh: Vinay Publications, 1981) , at p. 139-140, but also see pp.

121-122.”

25 J. D. Cunningham, A History of the Sikhs (1st edn, London, 1849) rev. edn. Oxford 1918, at p. 65-66, but also see at pp. 63-64.

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is the first western writer who took the trouble to represent the Sikhs own view of their evolution, basing this on traditional sources, and observing that the transformation of the Sikhs began even before Guru Gobind Singh when “one of Guru Arjan’s last injunctions to his son, Guru Har Gobind, was to sit fully armed on is throne and maintain an army to the best of his ability. This was the turning point in the history of the Sikhs” before stating that Guru Gobind Singh commanded that, “ Let the members of the Khalsa associate with one another and love one another irrespective of tribe or caste…”26 Perhaps the most insightful have been those

by Bengali writers, in the early years of the twentieth century at a time of a growing militant nationalist opposition to foreign rule in India. To many of these writers who were searching for a new Indian Identity, 26 M. A, Macauliffe, The Sikh Religion: Its Gurus, Sacred Writings and Authors (6 vols. In 3; Oxford, 1909) at vol.

V, at pp. 31 and 52”

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Guru Gobind’s Khalsa represented the best Indian traditions of fighting against tyranny, foreign invasion and exploitation of the poor by a ruling class. For them, the birth of Sikhism, the rise of the Khalsa, the Martyrdom of the Gurus, the resistance to the Moghuls and Afghans, and finally the bravery of the Sikh Army in the AngloSikh Wars, epitomized the strength of Sikhism.

The finest of the Bengali works on Guru Gobind Singh were written by the Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore.

Over a period of nearly 25 years (1885-1909), Tagore wrote about Guru Gobind’s moments of joy and sorrow, his triumphs and anguish, and his deep commitment to the cause of Sikh cultural heritage. In Bir Guru, his first work written in his twenties, Tagore wrote that the Guru fought for “oppressed humanity” and laid down his life to bring an end to Moghul authority in the Punjab.

Later, when Tagore was disillusioned with what he called the “degrading 66

mendicancy policy” of the Indian National Congress of the 1880s, he wrote “Guru Gobinda,” where he made no secret of his admiration for Guru Gobind Singh, who had spent 20 years of his life in obscurity before agreeing to lead his community at the age of 35. During those years of self-exile, Tagore wrote about how the Guru devoted himself to the study of sacred literature, selfanalysis and introspection that was hardly paralleled in contemporary politics.

Guru Gobind Singh learned the leading languages of the day: Persian, Sanskrit, Braj, and Punjabi. He wrote profusely, sometimes using all four languages in the same composition. From Qazi Pir Mohammed, he learned Persian; from the learned granthi Sahib Chand, he learnt Punjabi; and from Hindu poets and Bards who sought refuge at Anandpur he learnt Sanskrit and Braj. He had heard these poets recite the Vedas, Ramayana, Mahabharata and the other classical Hindu texts. Following Guru Nanak’s tradition of making NJIA

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wisdom and knowledge easily accessible to all, he rewrote a number of the Sanskrit texts in Hindi so that they could be read by the common man. Tagore visualized that his ideal leader, like Guru Gobind Singh, would pay very little attention to any short-term gain, fame and self-publicity.

Instead he would devote himself to the service of the community. In this work, Tagore recounts how when the Guru was requested by his closest disciples to come out of obscurity and take up the leadership of the Panth, he promptly turned them down. Until completion of his learning, he told them, he would remain in obscurity developing himself and gaining inspiration before serving the community. In Nishpal Upahar, Tagore notes the Guru’s contempt for wealth and projects him as his ideal Indian leader.

Indeed, the Bengali literary world was so enthralled by the spirit of martyrdom and self-sacrifice of the Sikhs that Bengali monographs like Sikher Balidan (1904), SikhIthias (1907), Sikher Jagaran NORTHWESTERN

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(1929) and SikherAtmahuti (1932) not only highlighted this tradition but provided an added stimulus to India’s fight for freedom. A few of them made a direct appeal to militant nationalists of Bengal to bring an end to the Raj following the path of the Sikh martyrs. Consequently, this led to the imposition of a ban on many of them. Sikher Athmuti, for example, was so effectively proscribed by the Colonial Government that not even a single copy can be found in any leading library in India.

Others, like Binaykumaran Sarkar, a noted sociologist and historian of the twentieth century, have argued that the transformation of Sikhism in the seventeenth century was dictated by the pressing needs of contemporary society that faced widespread religious persecution at the hands of India’s Mughal rulers at the time. In the changed conditions of that society something more was needed than what Guru Nanak had originally preached. The Khalsa symbolized this

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change. Thus, it could be said that Guru Nanak’s teachings had not been negated by Guru Gobind Singh but upheld in the face of overwhelming odds.

Another writer, Kartikchandra Mitra explained in the Sikh Guru that the “radicalisation” of Sikh politics provided a new lease of life for the Panth.

The Moghul persecution would have crushed the Sikhs had there been no Khalsa.

A comparison can be drawn here with another great Indian tradition, namely, Jainism. Time was when Jainism, like Sikhism, too had flourished. It had done so most notably under the royal patronage of the Mauryan Jain emperor Candragupta I (321-297 B.C.E.). Indeed, he was himself involved in the schism into communities of Svetambara and Digamdara Jains, which doctrinal difference was then formalized at the Council of Vallabhi in the fifth century C.E. Jain monks and advisers played prominent 68

roles in royal courts of Indian rulers throughout the early medieval period.

Royal patrons sponsored the building of impressive Jain temples. A remarkable array of literary and scholarly works were produced by Jain authors during this period. The high point of Jain culture was in the early medieval period when Jains were prominent in the arts, culture and commerce. But like the Sikhs later in their history, the Jains in the later medieval period were threatened in both northern and southern India when Islamic invasions spread in the north and the Hindu state of Vijayanagar began to dominate in the south.

Jainism then lost its royal patronage. It turned to introspection and selfsufficiency. The opening up of maritime commerce on the west coast of India enabled many Jains to become money lenders. But many others were forced to voyage across the seas to trade and sell their merchandise.

Today, their numbers are diminished in India. For the Sikhs, the creation of the NJIA

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Khalsa at a crucial period in their history meant that they were saved from obliteration in India. The Khalsa saved the Sikhs during the critical years of their jeopardy by offering them a symbol of unity without which they would have been vanquished by Moghul persecution. In short, the Khalsa was inevitable in Sikhism. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new era of religious intolerance well as violence, he remains an example to the rest of the world.

Professor Satvinder Singh Juss is a Professor of Law at King’s College London and director of its MA program in International Peace and Security. He is also a Fellow and Counil member of the Royal Society of Arts.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user, Koshyk.

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Different Interpretations of Corporate Social Responsibility and their Future Prospects amidst the Global Economic Crisis

by Johan Viklund Introduction he past few decades have seen an unprecedented increase in corporations relocating their pro-

T

tions in developed countries.

Such constraints have had significant impact on their capabilities to maximise proďŹ ts, in-cluding

duction and operations from developed to underdeveloped countries, corre-lated to substantial increases in the number and power of corporations worldwide. The increase in the rate of corporations relocating their operations can partly be explained by increases in different constraints on corpora

increases in competition, labour costs, input costs and taxes.

(Wallerstein, 2006:55). If these constraints explain the structural processes driving the expansion of corporations’ reach and magnitude, other factors such as improvements in technology have facilitated the process, enabling corporations to relocate their

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operations around the globe and making manufacturing and transport cheaper and more efficient (Reich, 2008: 86-7).

The relative ease with which corporations can move their operations from one country to another has also increased leverage against states since it has im-proved corporations’ ability to circumvent states that impose policies that constrain their profit accumulation (Bakan, 2005: 21-22). Another underpinning factor behind the increase in corporate power is the ideological discourse against state intervention as well as the so called neoliberal ideology abetting the increase in corporate power and encouraging a more passive approach by many governments toward their own societies (Steger, 2003:96-99).

A palpable governance gap has come about as a result of this increase in magnitude of corporations on the international level, since it is possible for corporations to take advantage of many countries with poor records in human rights, environmental compliance and labour rights.

There is evidence of corporate malpractice in poor countries, especially in regard to child labour, environmental NORTHWESTERN

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degradation, and inhumane working conditions (Fryas, 2003). The outrage expressed by consumers, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and governments has subsequently increased pressure on corporations to act responsibly and be held accountable for their actions both domestically and internationally (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004: 239242).

The debate on corporate accountability and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is multifaceted. It is important to elaborate upon two different initiatives that have been prominent in the CSR debate and analyze corporations’ responses to these initiatives. The two initiatives are Global Compact (GC), which promotes a voluntary under-standing of CSR, and UN norms, which promotes an international legallybinding version of CSR (UN norms, 2003) (GC, 2008a).

The outcome of this study will be analysed through the Modern WorldSystem (MWS) theory to see whether such theory can explain corporations’ response to the two different CSR approaches. It is also important

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to discuss the founder of the MWS theory and whether his analysis can shed light on the future prospects for the two CSR initiatives in relation to the recent global economic crisis.

The Global Compact The GC is one of the most prominent CSR initiatives, founded by former UN secre-tary general Kofi Annan at the world economic forum in Davos in 1999 (UN Press Release, 1999). There are approximately more than 78,000 multinational corporations today, but of which only 4,000 are members of the GC; thus the initiative may not be as effective as it would seem (Global Compact, 2008b) (UNCTAD, 2008).

One of the core characteristics of the GC is that it is a voluntary forum, thus corpo-rations may ask to join or not join at their own will.

The GC is based on ten different principles drawn from a range of international treaties dealing with issues such as human rights, environmental protection, labour rights, and corruption (Global Com-pact, 2008c). The punitive measures 72

to be used at the GC’s disposal are rather cur-tailed since it can only punish a corporation by suspending its membership. Corpora-tions suspended from the GC can reapply to the GC (Global Compact, 2008d).

The GC acknowledges that corporations do contribute positively to the countries in which they operate but that some corporations nonetheless breach some of the principles under the GC. The GC’s voluntary approach is therefore underpinned by what the GC has labelled corporations’ “enlightened self-interest,’’ which according to the GC is the best way to deal with corporate malpractice. This is related to the understanding that embedding the GC’s different principles into their conduct will strengthen PR for the corporations’ brand (Global Compact, 2008e).

The UN Norms The drafting of the UN norms in 1998 by five lawyers who had followed the debate on CSR was a response to the need for a change in the understanding of CSR as something that is voluntary. The draftNJIA

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ers recognised that although countries can ben-efit from these multinational corporations, many corporations also act in breach of human rights, contribute to environmental degradation, or engage in corruption. With this recognition they aimed to create a CSR regimen that would make it unlikely for corporations to act in such manner. This led to an international institution that would impose a uniform set of human rights, environmental regulations and labour rights laws on corporations. The drafters of the U.N. norms made it clear that their definition of a corporation encompassed a wide range of business enterprises (national or inter-national, state or privately owned, suppliers, contractors etc.), and emphasised the im-portance of due recognition of differences in the strengths and sizes of different cor-porations when establishing responsibility guidelines (Weissbrodt, 2003:901-7).

On August 13, 2003 the U.N. norms were approved by the United Nations SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, but came to an abrupt halt when the same U.N. NORTHWESTERN

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Secretary-General who had launched the GC ap-pointed a Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Business (SRSG) to continue the work concerning CSR on an international level. This meant the SRSG had a say in the establishment of the UN norms (Weissbrodt, 2003: 901). The SRSG was from the start of his mandate unfavourable toward the U.N. norms approach, and his biases (especially toward any internationally legally binding understanding of CSR) have been reinstated in all of the documents he has published since then (de Regil, 2008:20).

Corporations’ response to the Global Compact and the UN norms There is overlap between the GC and the U.N norms because almost all international treaties under the UN norms are also under the GC. Even though the UN norms were never implemented, there is empirical data on cor-porate response to the UN norms. No corporations have embraced the UN norms completely. Even the Business Leaders Initiative

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on Human Rights (BLIHR), which has up until today been the most supportive business organization of the UN norms, has also rejected the legally binding nature of the UN norms (BLIHR, 2006:19).

Other major business organizations include the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Organization of Employers (IOE), the United States Council for International Business (USCIB), and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). While only the first two are members of the GC (Global Compact, 2008e), the CBI and the USCIB have indicated their support for voluntary CSR initiatives, suggesting an overall voluntary understanding of CSR among these organizations (CBI, 2008) (USCIB, 2004:6).

In terms of attitudes toward the U.N. norms, all criticisms have been directed at its legally binding aspect. The main criticisms are as follows: Argument 1. One of the main arguments against the U.N. norms has been that it leads to the ‘’privatisation of human rights’’ and that corporations would be obliged to fulfil duties commonly understood to be under the discretion of 74

governments (Deal, 2004:6) (Guardian, 2004) (ICC/IOE, 2004:23). However, the first article of the U.N. norms clearly states that the primary defenders of human rights are governments, and the implementation of the U.N. norms falls therefore on governments (U.N. Norms, 2003).

Argument 2. It has also been proposed by different spokespersons for the different business organizations that the implementation of the U.N. norms would lead to less investment in poor countries, thus less development and less improvement in human rights standards that usually accompany increases in material living standards (Deal, 2004: 4) (Guardian, 2004). Many reports have been published on corporations’ mal-practice in poor countries where human rights standards are weak or absent, thus bear-ing this in mind, U.N. norms would eliminate a competitive advantage that poor countries have in relation to rich countries (Fryas, 2003).

Argument 3. The two concepts ‘’complicity’’ and ’’sphere of influence’’ are both mentioned in the U.N. norms.

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of these concepts and corporate actors argue that this makes the U.N. norms impossible to implement.

Argument 4. Some corporate actors have lamented that the drafters of the U.N. norms had a negative bias against the business community in general. However, drafters consulted extensively with corporations (and NGOs) during the drafting procedures and the U.N. norms clearly state that not all corporations act in an irresponsible man-ner (ICC/ IOE, 2004:33).

Analyzing corporations’ response with MWS theory The MWS theory’s two main pillars are the capitalist world economy and the interstate system. The inter-state system consists of multiple sovereign nation states, which means that there is no higher authority than the sovereign nation state. The inter-state system is divided up along an axial division of labour, which categorises each state as core, semi-peripheral or peripheral. The core states are the ones where the most prof-itable commodities are produced whereas the oppoNORTHWESTERN

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site is true for the peripheral states. The semi-peripheral states are mostly peripheral in nature but do nonetheless produce some core commodities. Within the inter-state system, there is an unequal exchange between the different states in which the core states can extract more surplus value from their trade than the peripheral countries.

This unequal exchange is the main pro-cess that facilitates the endless accumulation of capital in the capitalist worldeconomy. Since competition is rife in the world economy, only the actors who pursue this endless accumulation of profits will be able to thrive, whereas the actors who deviate from this pattern will not (Wallerstein, 2005:23-28).

A multitude of actors and institutions make up the world-economy, and the most important ones are corporations that compete within the world market, the different states within the interstate system, classes, identity groups, and households. Even though there is much external intervention in the world market (especially by states through different protectionist measures and subsidies), it

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is nonetheless possible to conceive of a world market that constantly impacts the different actors and institutions mentioned above. Although these external interventions distort the market process of the world-economy in several ways, they are intrinsic to the functionality of the capi-talist world economy. If the world market was completely free of any external inter-ventions consumers would be able to bargain down prices to such low levels that there would not be any economic incentives for corporations to produce.

It is therefore the endeavour of corporations to achieve monopolistic or at least quasi-monopolistic positions in order to make substantial profits. In order for this to happen, corporations need strong core states that can interfere in the processes of the world market on their behalf (i.e. uphold patent laws, protectionist measures such as subsidies and restric-tions on exports and imports), as well as have the ability to put pressure on peripheral states to not impose policies that are unpalatable to core states (Wallerstein,2005:24-26).

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The inter-state system provides corporations with the possibility to relocate from one state to another if the state implements policies that constrain their pursuit of prof-its.

The possibility for corporations to move from one state to another is a core feature of the MWS. There is an interest among the actors within the MWS to ensure the sys-tem continues to operate smoothly so that the process of endless accumulation of capital is not disturbed. Hence one can expect that the corporate actors would be very reluctant about any changes that would fundamentally alter the system (Wallerstein, 2005:59).

Even though Argument I against the UN norms stated above can be said to be the result of a misunderstanding of the UN norms, it nonetheless makes sense through a MWS perspective since corporations will not be able to move anywhere without being held responsible for at least some of their actions.

This means that the possibility to move between sovereign states without being under the control of one political institution would be fundamentally altered by the UN norms.

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All corporations that are part of the GC are of course also expected to follow the principles that are enshrined in the GC, but because these are not legally binding, the GC does not inhibit corporations in their endless accumulation of profits nor the sov-ereignty of states in the UN norms do.

Hence the corporations’ support for the GC (or voluntary CSR in general) makes sense from a MWS perspective.

In terms of Argument II, the MWS theory would assert that the corporate actors are against the UN norms because corporations would not be able relocate their oper-ations to poorer countries without being constrained by minimum standards. The overwhelming evidence of corporate misconduct gives this understanding more credi-bility than any notion that corporations would relocate their operations in order to improve human rights.

The third argument lucidly demonstrates that the GC is not seen as an impediment to the functioning of the MWS since it is voluntary whereas the UN norms are not.

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the fourth argument concerning the UN norms drafters’ negative attitude towards the business community is valid.

However, if the UN norms were to be implemented it would definitely render the contemporary world system less conducive for corporations to operate in, and it could therefore be argued that it has an inherent bias against the business community.

However, it is also important to point out the consequences the UN norms would have for the relations between states and corporations (as it is understood by the MWS theory) in order to expand understanding of corporations’ responses to the UN norms.

As was previously mentioned, core states have the capability to pressure periph-eral states’ leaders to implement policies that are conducive for the core states.

This function is important for corporations that reside in core states but are nonetheless op-erating in the peripheral states. If the UN norms were to be implemented, core states would not be able to exert this pressure to the same extent they do today. States also have power to decide which

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parts of corporations` operations would be externalised or internalised in relation to environmental guidelines. The UN norms would also limit states in their control over the relationship between employers and their employees since the UN norms’ ban on child labour would impact who would be deemed an eli-gible employee. Similar ramifications would also be true for standards on working conditions.

The economic crisis and its potential impact on the prospects for the GC and the UN norms The founder of the MWS theory Immanuel Wallerstein has predicted that the MWS will cease to exist within the next 25-50 years.

This prediction is based on the as-sumption that the MWS mode of operandi cannot be sustained as a result of structural constraints, which have increased since the system was created some 500 years ago. These structural constraints consist of increases in labour costs, increases in input costs (i.e. increases in costs that corporations have to in78

ternalise in relation to the environment and infrastructure) and increases in social costs (i.e. increases in welfare state functions which has lead to increases in taxes). The pressures of these constraints do of course uctuate, but have since the mid-20th century increased significantly. Wallerstein argues that the increase in pressure of these structural constraints has ush-ered the MWS into a systemic crisis and that we are therefore living in a time of tran-sition, which will eventually lead to another system to replace the MWS. Wallerstein also states that one cannot know in advance what the replacement system will look like and what the outcome will be, since the actors participating in creating the new system are all a part of the MWS. Wallerstein nonetheless stresses that the system to replace the current one will not necessarily be any more effective, even though it is possible that a more equitable and palatable system may replace it (Wallerstein, 2006:53-58).

Wallerstein’s understanding of a systemic crisis is applicable to the current global economic crisis. It is NJIA

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commonly remarked that the current crisis will lead to signifi-cant changes in many areas of the international political economy in both the short term and long term future (Rogoff, 2009) (Wolf, 2009).

There seems to be significant convergence on the understanding that the underlying pillars of neo-liberal ideology have been severely undermined and discredited as a result of the global economic cri-sis, which is partly illustrated in the criticisms of “deregulation” and the “efficiency of the market,” which has been compounded by calls for more regulation on both national and international levels (Stiglitz, 2009) (Bloomberg, 2009).

Without drawing any premature conclusions, it seems the GC’s voluntary model has been severely undermined as a result of the global economic crisis since it bases itself on the very notion which many would oppose, such as expecting markets and their actors to take care of problems without any legally binding measures.

(Bloomberg, 2009). This is not to say that the U.N. norms is likely to resuscitate any time NORTHWESTERN

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soon, but since the underlying foundation of the GC is being questioned, it would be safe to ar-gue that the legally binding aspect of the U.N. norms is more in line with the contem-porary mood concerning corporations and regulation than the GC. One should of course not expect the UN norms to be embraced by the world’s most powerful corporations just because the premise of the GC have been discredited, since the U.N. norms would obviously constrain them in many of their operations. How-ever, the UN norms were supported long before the global economic crisis (and still are) by many of the established International NGOs and human rights organisations. They have especially stressed the importance of placing international binding regula-tion on corporations as a way of making corporations accountable (FIDH, 2006) (Human Rights Watch, 2005) (Amnesty International, 2006) (Oxfam, 2004).

Drawing on Wallerstein’s understanding that all actors’ actions will be important in creating a new system (or at least contributing to significant change of the contempo-

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rary sys-tem), it seems plausible to suggest that with the current mood, the UN norms might work as a template for a fundamental change of the contemporary international politi-cal economy.

This scenario would need widespread support from large segments of the world’s population.

Unfortunately, much of the NGOs work on the U.N. norms has not reached them. But this widespread lack of knowledge can be overcome in the same way “global warming’’ has risen in the international consciousness, which means that it is up to the actors who support the U.N. norms to bridge this knowledge gap.

GC, would this system preserve some or most of its core charac-teristics and therefore try to accommodate the new changes? Would one expect (as Wallerstein suggests) another system to come into being that would be based on a completely new logic?

Johan Viklund is a Swedish citi zen who did his undergraduate degree in political science at The endless accumula- Södertörn University College tion of capital that underpins (Sweden) and Stellenbosch Unithe MWS would not be se- versity (South Africa). He did his verely undermined by the GC, Masters in International Politics but in contrast would be un- at the University of Melbourne dermined by the UN norms.

(Australia), and is now working If one accepts that in- as a Policy and Communication ternationally binding laws officer at the Smokefree Partner(along the lines of the UN ship in Brussels (Belgium). norms) stand a better chance of being recognized than the Photo courtesy of Flickr user, discredited voluntary ap- BlatantWorld.com proach promulgated by the Conclusion

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Effect of Government Investment in Primary Education on the Incidence of Child Labor in Developing Countries

by Craig Stalzer

T

he right of all children to a free and quality education is enshrined in international law in a variety of treaties. Established in 1990 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Education for All (EFA) program became a worldwide development goal, revealing the economic and social benefits of an educated population. Among the goals sought by the EFA program was expanding early childhood care and education, providing free and compulsory primary education for all children, and improving the quality of education by 2015. These goals are justified by two perspectives: economics and human rights. The economic development perspective states that sustained economic progress will never be made with inexpensive, low-skilled labor. Rather,

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it requires investing in human capital through education. The human rights perspective states that human rights considerations must be the primary focus of any continuing program.

Education should be viewed as a basic right for everyone, not just as a means toward greater economic welfare.

If reconciled, however, both perspectives can work together at eliminating child labor.

Child labor not only prevents children from acquiring the skills and education they need for a better future, but also perpetuates poverty and affects national economies through losses in competitiveness, productivity and potential income.

Withdrawing children from child labor, providing them with education, and assisting their families with training and employment

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opportunities contribute directly to creating decent work for adults.

There is a significant lack of literature regarding the effects of government investment in education on reducing child labor levels.

Previous research has only studied the positive effects government investment has had on increasing enrollment among children in primary school. Therefore, it is critical to establish a relationship between this investment and the number of children involved in economic labor in developing countries.

There is often debate about the economic benefits of child labor versus the costs of establishing programs intended to reintegrate former child laborers into school and society. At the microeconomic level, families often rely on the child’s wages to supplement their own, sometimes sacrificing the child’s education in favor of selling them for their labor services. Without legitimate and established welfare programs in many developing countries, removing the child’s wage from the family’s income 82

would only push the family further below the poverty line. Nationally, child workers also provide cheap labor in countries predominantly relying on extractive industries such as coal, iron ore, and diamonds.

Removing all children from these industries would wreak havoc on a country’s domestic growth, forcing only more families into poverty.

However, a recent study by the International Labor Organization, “Investing in Every Child: An Economic Study of the Costs and Benefits of Eliminating Child Labour,” estimates that future benefits of removing children from economic activity would be “seven times greater” than the costs. “Although the costs would almost certainly exceed returns in the early years…net economic flows would turn dramatically positive, however, as the effects of improved education and health take hold.”

Obviously, deciding on future gains at the expense of current consumption is not always the easiest decision. Many families, seeing dilapidated schools and untrained teachers, fail NJIA

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to see the future returns of sending their children to school. Therefore, it must be the responsibility of the government to invest in its infrastructure, its schools, and thus its future.

The aim of this paper is to see whether government investment in primary education has a positive effect on reducing the child labor levels of a country and whether this level of investment can explain why some countries see high levels of child labor while others at similar levels of economic development do not.

I. Determinants of Child Labor A. Supply and Demand Side Pressure In “The Determinants of Child Labor: Theory and Evidence,” Drusilla Brown, Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern examine the role of child labor as an insurance policy for many households in developing nations. The authors use historical and cross-country examples as well as current household NORTHWESTERN

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surveys to conclude that underdeveloped nations lack secure financial markets and private property rights.

This can cause alternate investments to be too risky for the family’s capital.

“DeVany and Sanches (1977) found that land reform in Mexico, which made it impossible for land to be bought, sold, leased, or mortgaged, resulted in large family size (Brown and Stern).” Included in these alternate investments is education. Parents are encouraged to have more children as a form of insurance in economic circumstances where no secure investment and insurance institutions exists.

Larger family size results in fewer resources available for human capital investment and a quicker entry of children into the labor force.

One solution to counter the uncertainty surrounding future household consumption is to increase the levels of parental education. The wage rate for skilled labor is higher than that of unskilled labor, allowing educated parents an opportunity to increase

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their household income and savings. Therefore, educated parents are more likely to have higher expected future incomes and also more likely to send their children to school. Educated parents are also expected to have time-consuming jobs, leaving less time to devote to childbearing and child-rearing activities. This smaller family size allows for more resources to be used for human capital formation for the children.

The importance of parental education highlights the transgenerational link between lack of schooling and child labor.

Higher expected incomes and higher esteem for education encourage parents to send their children to school.

Therefore, lack of appropriate education has negative long term implications for the nation’s child labor numbers.

However parents’ education affect future generations beyond household wealth.

Educated parents also have a greater appreciation for the value of education, instilling this appreciation in their children. Similar to how child labor may arise from being ingrained in local customs and 84

traditions, so can education become a social habit in poor villages. “In some cases, such as Cote d’Ivoire, the parent’s level of education overwhelms all other family characteristics”(Brown, Deardorff, Stern).

Educational investment also has a different impact on men and women. Prior literature establishes that the social benefits to educating women are much greater than those gained from educating men. Fertility rates decline with higher levels of education for women, while health and family welfare also improve.

Women tend to spend any increase in human capital resources on their children, while men spend it on themselves. “Child mortality is lower for educated mothers, thus requiring fewer costly births to achieve the targeted family size. More resources are left to invest in surviving children (Brown, Deardorff, Stern).” Among these resources is the amount of time available for education.

The authors also focus on market structures to determine the demand-side pressures for child laborers.

Cross-country analysis has NJIA

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shown that technological advances have important demand-side implications for a nation’s child labor rates.

“The availability of credit for Egyptian farmers lowered the cost of technology-intensive inputs…the demand for child labor, therefore, declined with mechanization(Brown, Stern).”Technological progression has two important implications. Skillbased change lowers the demand for unskilled labor, including labor provided by children. Concurrently, this demand for skilled labor increases the return to education, continually encouraging children away from peripheral and dangerous tasks toward schooling. Therefore, government must readily commit to supporting both physical capital formation and human capital attainment in the economy.

B. Wages, Income, and Investment The supply of child labor extends from the prevalence of family poverty, the costs of attending school, and families’ reliance on the NORTHWESTERN

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child’s wage to supplement their own income. In addition, the low quality of schools and high costs, both explicit and implicit, make education unaffordable for many households.

Households act to maximize utility, which is a function of the number of children, the school per child, the leisure time of both children and parents, and a composite consumption basket. A rise in wages will have many different effects on the decision to send the children to school. An increase in the parents’ wages will lead to a substitution toward the children’s education. Raising the child’s wage, however, causes unknown effects on the decision for schooling.

An increase in the wage will raise the opportunity cost of sending the child to school. It also encourages the parents to have more children to increase the future income of the household. Therefore, family size leads families to trade schooling for quantity of children. However, the child would need to perform less labor to attain the same income as before the rise in wages. Leisure would

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increase and allow for more schooling.

Sarbajit Chaudhuri subscribes to the theory that poverty, lack of educational facilities, and parental attitude determine the incidence of child labor. In “Incidence of Child Labour, Free Education Policy, and Economic Liberalisation in a Developing Economy (2005),� Chaudhuri addresses child labor as a problem that requires both short-term and long-term policies and objectives. Investment in education and infrastructure can help create the structural and demographic transition necessary to improve the standard of living and incomes. In the long-run, economic and educational alterations must be made to address the overall welfare of the household.

But even if policies are created to address this issue, they take time to alleviate the problem. Therefore, legislative approaches are required in the shortrun, both addressing the liberalization of trade and federal education policies.

It is important to address the issue of child labor from 86

both an economic and social human capital perspective.

Chaudhuri argues that one cannot adequately examine the results of a policy change without looking at the aggregate child labor numbers across all employment sectors of the country. The author shows that a subsidy policy on education and a change to liberalized trade may produce mutually incompatible results and invalidate each other’s progress. It is assumed that laborers in the informal sector of the economy, the market which falls outside of federal and legal regulations, earn a lower than subsistent wage.

It is safe to infer that the money value of such fringe benefits of schooling (better facilities, mid-day lunches, etc.) could raise the wage rate of the family to equal the critical level, the level at which family income is just sufficient enough to send the children to school.

The critical wage becomes a function of the income of the head of the household, the income the child would receive if involved in the labor market, the cost of schooling, NJIA

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and the money value of government investment and incentive program benefits.

The formal sector of the economy is comprised of households considered to be the wealthiest in the region.

As the formal sector increases and the wages of laborers expand, the number of households supplying child labor decreases. The positive effect of the wage rate on child labor rates is known as the labor reallocation effect.

This is in direct contrast to the direct effect, which states that an increase in trade will also raise the child’s wages, raising the cost of removing that child from the labor force. Evidently, because both policies produce mutually opposite effects, increasing investment in education and liberalizing trade markets may make the child labor trends uncertain.

In a “lean” year, workers in the informal sector are left unemployed.

Also, urban adult laborers lack employment security.

It has been observed that the market for child labor remains relatively stable throughout the year.

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often send out their children to work for the purpose of “consumption smoothing.”

The supply function of child labor by each poor working family is determined from the utility maximizing behavior of the representative altruistic household. The author assumes that each working family consists of one wage earning adult member and “n” number of children. The altruistic adult member of the family decides the number of children to be sent to the workplace. The rest of the children are sent to school. It is also assumed that only the public educational system is available to the children of poorer households and it is entirely financed by government subsidies. The wealthier of the workers do not send their children to the job market. In a society with a high fertility rate, parents’ perceptions about poor future benefits of children’s education, low quality of schooling and the household’s objectives to maximize present income are the main motives behind the education decisions of the poor households. The model concludes that child labor

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arises if adult household income falls below the aforementioned critical level.

Consequently, child labor is negatively correlated with the adult wage rate “W.� A rise in the adult wage produces a positive income effect so that the adult workers send a larger number of children to school and a lower number of children to the labor market.

Any policy change that affects the size of the informal sector or the adult wage rate will have an effect on the supply of child labor.

These policies include a change in the liberalization of trade and a government subsidy on education. The model assumes an increase in government investment in education, affecting the incidence of child labor in two ways: First, it lowers the effective price, or the direct effect of government investment; Second, a lower incidence of child labor will create a lower adult labor endowment as the economy contracts. This causes the formal sector of the economy to shrink, which would increase the number of child labor supplying families employed in the informal 88

sector. This is known as the labor reallocation effect, which tends to increase the child labor numbers in a country. Only if the direct effect outweighs the labor reallocation effect will the incidence decrease. The authors use this to explain why the empirical evidence from several countries in economic transitions has not been encouraging. If different trade liberalization programs and investment policies are adopted simultaneously, their overall effect on the supply of child labor may not be evident as they produce mutually opposite effects. An inow of foreign capital will make the economy grow, but the expansion of the informal sector caused by trade will increase the number of families supplying child labor.

It is important to expose the determinants of child workers. Child labor is a dependent variable contingent on the adult wage rate and trade policies. There are also explicit and implicit costs that a household must consider when deciding about enrolling their children into school. The implicit costs NJIA

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will decrease, as government investment raises the quality of educational facilities and the future economic returns from the human capital accumulation. Furthermore, it is important to focus more on the employment result of education, rather than on the educational quality and value itself. Chaudhuri examines the wage and employment opportunities available to skilled workers in a society, as a more educated workforce would increase the formal sector and diminish the informal sector. But Chaudhuri also admits that time is a limitation: “This is a static model. So the aspects of education and human capital formation and their role on the incidence of child labor have not been dealt with in this paper.”

Chaudhuri also fails to provide any crosssectional data to back up his conclusion. Since no longterm data measuring the incidence of child labor in different countries is used in any of the known published research, most research only examines the effects of government programs on the determinants of child NORTHWESTERN

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labor, rather than the child labor rates themselves. By using survey data from the International Labor Organization, this paper will be able to compare the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable (child labor) directly.

II. Government Intervention A. Cash Contingent Programs and Government Incentive Schemes Older literature has subscribed to the notion that poverty is an integral factor in the incidence of child labor in a developing country.

Research has examined some of the programs that governments have introduced in an attempt to increase enrollment in public schools. Most of these programs can be labeled as “incentive programs,” with the government providing cash stipends and/or food subsidies contingent on the family enrolling their children in school. Sajeda Amin and Gilda Sedgh in their paper “Incentive Schemes for School Attendance in Rural Bangladesh (1996)”

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highlight such programs and their success in raising the enrollment rates in two villages in which cash and food programs were established. The principal aim of the government-sponsored programs is to encourage better attendance rates by reducing the opportunity costs of enrollment. The indirect costs of school, such as the decrease in children’s time available for productive work, are also important considerations for most families. With cash stipends or food subsidies, the household income increases and parents are more likely to send their children to school.

The Food for Education program, which the Government of Bangladesh created in 1994, entitles the children of poor families to a certain amount of wheat if the children enroll in school and attend at least 85 percent of the time.

Only one of the two villages was the recipient of this federal program. The school enrollment in this village increased by 20 percent after only one year of the program’s implementation.

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was intended for families that enroll their daughters into school, and indeed sharply increased primary school enrollment rates for girls during this period (from 44 percent to 59 percent for girls, compared to 50 percent to 55 percent for boys. Data collected in 1992, 1995, and 1996). Since both federal programs were established after 1992, that year is used as a base to compare the statistics of the later years. After 1996, families participating in these programs were interviewed for an in-depth study of the work habits of the children, school quality, and school dropout rates if applicable.

The most striking finding regarding trends in enrollment is that the proportion of children who have never attended school had declined sharply since 1993 for both sexes. “While in 1992, 32 to 38 percent of children had never attended school, this figure dropped to 2 to 8 percent in 1996.”

The direct monetary incentives examined here, however, contrast with the independent variable of government investment in the model. The aforementioned NJIA

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programs directly increase families’ incomes by freeing up additional resources for investment in their children’s education. Conversely, government investment only lowers the cost of schooling by increasing the future returns of schooling, which in turn lowers the opportunity costs of the decision to send their children to school.

Recent literature has also attempted to show that low educational attainment along with high estimated rates of return to schooling in the developing world are justification for public investment in more and better quality schools. However, despite government spending, human capital investments are performing poorly with low school enrollments, high repetition of drop out rates, and child labor performed at the expense of education, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. “Public education spending in many developing countries is often inefficient and inequitable with education outlays misallocated across sectors (Amin, Sedgh).” Given budgetary constraints, many NORTHWESTERN

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developing countries trade educational investment and expenditures for more domestic infrastructure.

“Impact of School Quality on Qhild Labor and School Attendance: The Case of CONAFE Compensatory Education Program in Mexico” (2007)

by Furio Camillo Roasti and Mariacristina Rossi focuses on similar government programs developed to increase school enrollment.

Incentive schemes are introduced to enhance school quality and offer cash transfers to households.

“School quality is mainly measured in terms of students’ achievements…as returns to education are also a proxy for labor productivity.”

The success of cash contingent transfer programs has shown how to increase the demand for quality education and investments in human capital. The gaps from an earlier study (“Oportunidades”) can be filled by focusing on the impact of one specific school program, CONAFE. “Cash transfer programs (CCT) are regarded as better suited instruments for reaching the

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poor as they provide cash benefits conditional on them satisfying certain behavioral conditions.”

Mexico first addressed the need for quality education in the 1970’s by creating the National Council of Education Promotion (CONAFE). It focuses on schools with the lowest educational performance in highly disadvantaged communities, directly targeting schools by improving infrastructure, providing updated technology and supplies, and continuing professional development and training for all staff. Monetary incentives are also given to teachers in an effort to stem high teacher turnover and absenteeism rates. The final element of the CONAFE program provides grants to parents and teachers to be spent on educational resources of their choosing, while offering training classes to guide them through their spending. This transfer of public resources directly to poor families allows them to invest more money and time into their child’s education.

These benefits increased the recipients’ income by 22 92

percent.

The authors suggest a thorough decentralization of the schooling system in a country, offering a costefficient way to provide quality education tailored to the community’s needs.

For each school targeted by CONAFE, data is available on the type of infrastructures and services available, number of teachers, supplies, and whether and when each type of CONAFE program was initiated.

The second data set is the “Survey of Household Socio-economic Characteristics,” which is a questionnaire on the community and household level that attempts to collect information on school attendance and labor market participation trends. Data on the communities that are a part of both surveys are then combined to allow the CONAFE primary schools to be matched with its community. The set of CONAFE treatment schools is the set of schools that received programs in the years 1997-2000, while schools selected for future CONAFE programs are used NJIA

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as the control group. The sample consists of 141,940 respondent observations. The dependent variables are the binary variables of working and attending school. The variable for work takes the value of one (1) if the child worked during the past week, while school attendance variable is equal to one if the child attended school the past week. In the age group targeted by both data sets, 75 percent of the children attended school while only 8 percent performed some economic activity.

Most of the working children, however, also attended school. “CONAFE significantly decreases child work by 0.5 percentage points for children aged 8 to11…but reduced it by more than 1.5 percentage points for children aged 12 to 16, who are involved in more intensive labor sectors.”

An increase in household wages will result in higher school enrollment either through direct or indirect means. Child labor is also one of the dependent variables, along with school enrollment rates for the specified age groups. It is significant to NORTHWESTERN

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see the percentage change in these federal programs. A similar model will determine the correlation between the dependent and independent variables.

B. Direct Investment “Composition of Government Expenditures and Demand for Education in Developing Countries” (2002) by Era Dabla-Norris and John M. Matov examines the differential impact on household schooling decisions and human capital accumulation of alternative uses of public spending. The empirical study shows that the determinants of schooling decisions in developing countries depends greatly on household income and wealth, demand for child labor, and monetary costs of schooling. Because of these costs, parents must choose between asset accumulation and child schooling in an effort to smoothen their lifetime consumption. A child’s time allocated to school increases his or her human capital at the end of the school phase, but only at the expense of

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current household income and consumption. The authors’ model focuses on the implications of government investment on schooling decisions and educational attainment. It is found that wealthier households will optimally choose higher levels of schooling for their children.

It is not higher income itself that makes it easier for parents to choose more schooling, but the availability of resources to meet the opportunity costs of school, which is the foregone child’s production and earnings. The authors find that reducing the private costs of primary education has the largest impact on growth and poverty reduction in the short run.

The price of the child’s time is assumed to be equivalent to the unskilled wage rate, while the productivity of government spending on education can be regarded as a measure of school quality or the effectiveness of government education spending.

It is also assumed that the majority of human capital accumulation (more than 90 percent) is obtained through the public sector.

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Therefore, private education plays a minimal role in the attainment of human capital.

School drop-outs occur when the value of stopping school in period t (the value of the child entering the labor market plus the retained value that would have been spent on school) is greater than the current consumption of the household plus the additional consumption made possible by the child’s increased human capital accumulated from schooling. Therefore, the unskilled child labor demanded is the summation of the individuals who have dropped out of school during a certain period.

The authors equate the effects of different government spending policies on education. Therefore, enrollment in school is a function of parental income (the household’s constraint), physical capital available to a firm that increases worker productivity, and the demand for unskilled labor.

The authors examine policy experiments which show that an increase in primary education spending results in the most significant increase in the physical and human NJIA

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capital stock and output.

“First, a reduction in the costs of primary education affects household’s marginal schooling decisions by lowering their opportunity costs.” Families of lower income can now choose to invest in their children.

The authors argue that the production of the country, including household income, should increase after children transition from the schooling phase of their child to the production phase of their adulthood.

This policy issue should raise households’ overall lifetime asset accumulation and consumption, even if it declines during the schooling period. In contrast, government spending on infrastructure only increases the demand for schooling by raising adult worker’s productivity, and subsequently household income, rather than by improving the quality of schooling or lowering its costs.The model assumes that the government collects taxes and spends a constant proportion of revenue on transfers, consumption, NORTHWESTERN

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education, and infrastructure improvements. The authors use a baseline survey that closely resembles the government expenditures of Ghana. The benchmark state uses government expenditures as a share of GDP to be 26 percent, and government expenditure on public education is 6.8 percent of GDP. Infrastructure spending is 1.6 percent of GDP and transfer payments account for 1.5 percent of GDP. It is also assumed that the government continues to run a balanced budget each year.

Given this economic data, the authors’ model generates consumption and capital output values, wage rates, and poverty rates.

Most relevant is the 5 percent increase in government education spending cited in the benchmark statistics.

The results show that economic output in all sectors of the economy increase due to higher human capital accumulation. Prior experiments show that the elasticity of human capital to government spending is 0.12.

The lower costs of primary education as well as the

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increase in production output will make resources available for families to consider putting their children in primary, secondary, and even tertiary schooling systems.

The results also have an indirect positive effect on the wage rate of unskilled workers, as the supply of unskilled labor is reduce as more children enroll in school. The authors observe this increase in wages to lower the poverty rate to be approximately 2 percent.

The use of the initial baseline observation also makes it easier to see the effects of a change in the independent variable on the dependent variables (output, consumption, and wage/ poverty rate). In research done by Dabla-Morris and Motov, simulating a 5 percent increase in government spending on education causes the greatest increase in the capital stock of the nation. When compared to the steady-state statistics, the capital stock increases by 5 percent, leading to an increase in output of 2.3 percent and consumption of 1.2 percent. With this higher capital supply, the wage rates 96

of all types of labor increases, with the unskilled labor wage rate rising at 2.2 percent.

Another significant simulation assumes a shifting of government investment from infrastructure development to education.

The level of output, capital stock, and consumption increase at a lower rate compared to the first simulation. However, the poverty index decrease by a greater rate, from .24 to .2.

Thus, the impact on economic growth and poverty reduction depends greatly on the type and magnitude of government investment in education. The research, however, assumes perfect credit markets which may allow families to continue consistent consumption levels even without a child’s supplemental income. This assumption is unrealistic for many developing countries where credit constraints are prevalent. Although credit constraints will not be automatically assumed, further studies could examine the effects of changes in government investment and micro-credit initiatives.

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Prior research deals more with school enrollment, output, and wages as a dependent variable rather than the effects on child labor rates. Previous research has also focused only on specific federal incentive programs implemented to increase school enrollment. There has been no extensive literature documenting the effect on child labor due to direct government investment on improving school quality and increasing schools’ resources.

However, investment will have the same results as these federal incentives and cashcontingent programs: it will increase school enrollment and subsequently lower the amount of children being involved in economic activity.

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Model

The conclusion from most of the literature only deals with the positive relationship between federal incentive programs and school enrollment. There also exists a relationship between investment in education and an increase in the economic welfare of the nation. When household wages exceed the NORTHWESTERN

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level needed for subsistence, parents can choose a higher level of education for their children. They rely on current consumption and future expectations regarding the returns to a quality education. It is government investment that deals with the latter. From this theory, there is a correlation between higher levels of government investment and child labor rates in a country.

By placing an emphasis on raising the quality of schools, the government is encouraging households to choose a higher level of education.

Therefore, children will not only have less time available for work, but parents will see future gains from sending their children to school. This will have generational effects and help create the structural and institutional changes needed to deal with the prevailing problem of child labor.

From this theory lies the testable hypothesis: Hypothesis I: Greater government investment in education lowers the incidence of child labor.

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Null Hypothesis: The child labor rates in a developing country are not affected by the amount of investment in the public education system.

Evaluating the effects of government investment is not straightforward, as the current child labor data is only available for the highest abusers of child labor. The characteristics of countries surveyed by the International Labor Organization differ from those not included in the survey. Basic economic necessity and the threat of severe poverty drive higher proportions of children to work in developing countries than in economically developed countries. There are two sets of data on which to base these conclusions.

IV.

Data

The sample includes 97 countries, including 71 less-developed nations and 26 belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. To test the hypothesis that greater investment in education lowers the child labor rate, 98

the percentage of children of primary school age involved in economic activity is the child labor data.

The sample of 71 less-developed nations consists of consistent abusers of child rights and were surveyed by the “Understanding Children’s Work”(UCW) project.

This inter-agency research project was organized by the International Labor Organization to determine the rate of child labor occurring in these countries.

The survey comprises the child labor rates as a percentage of children aged 5 to14 that are involved in labor. This age range focuses on children who would otherwise be in primary school. The surveys provide the child labor trends from 2000 to 2002 for each country in question.

Since OECD nations were not included in the ILO’s survey, child labor rate in these countries have been given values of zero.

Although the OECD nations were excluded from the survey, less than 1 percent of the total child labor is found in the US, Europe, and other NJIA

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wealthy nations, according to the International Labor Organization. Therefore, the less-developed countries in this survey account for the strong majority of child labor abuses and can provide a comprehensive sample on which to base these conclusions.

The cross-sectional experiment examines countries at different stages of development. Therefore, it is necessary to control for these differences. The GDP per capita, poverty rate, and the log of GDP are control variables in this model.

The economic explanatory variables are those which prior literature has established as determinants of school enrollment and child labor.

GDP per capita is often used as a proxy for measuring the standard of living for a nation. It also is a function of the population of a nation, which is important as many less-developed nations have had rapid population growth in the past two decades.

The poverty rate uses the United Nation’s definition of subsisting on “less than two dollars per day,” which is the NORTHWESTERN

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dominant way of measuring poverty in very low-income countries. UNICEF estimates that nearly three billion people live on less than $2 per day.

Because of this, the poverty rate will help to explain the variation of child labor among the least-developed nations.

However, similar to the child labor variable, there exists no detailed survey measuring the poverty rate in the OECD nations using the United Nation’s threshold. Therefore, the poverty rate is removed as an independent variable when running the regression model on the full sample of the 97 countries.

Because of the law of diminishing marginal returns, the log of Gross Domestic Product will be used in the regression models. This is further explained by the fact that many less-developed nations encounter more structural and demographic changes as they move into the intermediate phase of development. A proportional change in GDP for a lowincome economy will have a greater effect on the nation’s standard of living and structural progress than it would for a high-income

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OECD nation.

Expenditure per student, gross investment in education and, most importantly, investment in education as a percentage of GDP are the independent variables used in testing this hypothesis.

Investment in education as a percentage of GDP provides a look into the effects investment has on education and child labor rates. Since it is as a percent of GDP, it takes into consideration the relative economic development of the countries in the sample.

It will also be able to show if different investment rates can help explain the different levels of child labor among the less-developed nations.

Expenditure per student examines the monetary value spent per child enrolled in school. It will be interesting to see if more resources devoted to students will encourage a shift away from economic activity and toward more education.

Gross investment in education measures the overall monetary value that is invested in the education 100

system. It is an absolute rather than relative variable and fails to account for the differing development positions of countries.

However, it does provide insight into the relationship between the resources devoted to education and the incidence of child labor. All the data used as the control and independent variables correspond directly to the countries and years used by the ILO in its survey for child labor rates. The educational independent variables for the primary education level were collected by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The poverty rates are obtained from the United Nations Statistics Division, while GDP and GDP per capita are from the Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania world table.

V.

Method

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in public education, the severity of any linear correlation is tested first.

Testing the independence of the independent variables’ variances gives the percentage of the educational variable that is independent of the other educational explanatory variables included in the regression analysis. The results from Table II show that the variance inflation factor (VIF) is small among the three independent variables tested. Eighty-six percent of investment in education as a percentage of GDP is independent of the other two independent variables, compared to 95 percent for expenditure per student and 83 percent for gross investment in public education. The lack of multi-collinearity allows for an OLS regression which includes all three educational independent variables in the model simultaneously.

Two OLS regressions are run on the dependent variable: 1) using the sample of just developing countries surveyed by the ILO and 2) using the sample of developing and OECD NORTHWESTERN

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nations. Because the child labor levels of OECD nations are assigned values of zero, a tobit model can be used on the full sample to consider the left-censored value of zero for these nations. Another tobit regression model will be used with the OECD dummy variable and the full sample to take into account the different treatment groups— nations that were surveyed and ones that were not.

A second analysis is done on predicted values to show the rate of change in the incidence of child labor numbers due to an increase in each educational independent variable. Each independent value was held constant at its mean value.

VI. Results Table III. Developing Only Ordinary least-squares regression models on only the developing countries, seen in Table II, indicates the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables in low-income countries at similarly low levels of development. The most significant correlation is seen with investment

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as a percentage of GDP. As expected, child labor rates decrease with higher levels of investment in primary education. The negative coefficient shows a significant correlation and helps to explain the difference in child labor rates among similarly developed nations. The strong relationship suggests that public funds shifted toward public education can play a critical role in improving the standard of living of children in developing nations. The GDPlog independent variable is also significant and shows a negative correlation with child labor rates.

It suggests that the overall economic welfare and output of the economy plays a significant role in determining the level of child labor. As developing nations progress, there is a substantial reduction in the rate of children involved in economic activity. This could be due to the fact that greater gross domestic product creates more formal markets, in which child involvement is strictly regulated. Informal markets, in which the greatest amount of child labor occurs, are restricted.

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public education shows a positive relationship with the dependent variable, the opposite direction than was predicted. Expenditure per student also showed a positive correlation, although not at a significant level. School enrollment trends may explain this variation.

The causal relationship between expenditure per student and child labor rates may be unknown, and low levels of enrollment might actually cause such high expenditure per student values in some countries. By investing more resources in each individual child, one would expect higher investment per student to decrease the number of children working.

However, as more students drop out of school to enter into the labor force, the expenditure per student would rise, even as government investment remains constant. Therefore, the causal relationship is unclear.

When using the sample of just developing nations surveyed by the ILO, GDP per capita and the poverty rate do not have a significant effect on the child labor rate.

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This could be due in part to the similar development and poor standards of living that are prevalent among all of the less-developed, low-income nations included in this particular regression sample.

But the coefficients’ directions suggest the intended relationships with child labor for both variables. The positive relationship between the child labor rates and the poverty rate and the negative correlation of GDP per capita and child labor was to be expected.

When running a regression for the full sample with both developing and OECD nations, it was necessary to account for the left-censored child labor data of the OECD nations. By running a tobit model for the full sample in addition to a standard OLS regression, the model will take into account the possible negative values of my dependent variable.

EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES from both developing and OECD nations. The sample of 97 countries includes those surveyed by the ILO and those for which child labor rates were not available. Therefore, three models are run to test the effects of my independent variables on the child labor rates. Along with the standard OLS regression, I use a tobit model to account for the leftcensored nature of the OECD nations as it pertains to the child labor rates. The child labor data is unobservable for the OECD nations.

An OLS regression model is run in which the dummy variable is included.

Countries are given a value of one for participation in the ILO’s child labor survey; OECD nations are given a value of zero. This will show the effect of being an OECD nation or a surveyed developing country on the child labor rates.

As seen in Table IV, investment in education as a percentage of GDP still shows Table IV. Full Sample the strongest correlation when running the OLS, The model runs on tobit, and dummy variable the full sample and combines regression models. The data negative coefficient of -2.35 when running the standard

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OLS model is slightly less than when regressed on just the developing country data (-3.9), although the significance level remains the same. The tobit model shows the lowest coefficient value for this variable for all the models I ran, although still at a negative value of -1.47 at a very high significance level. The regression model run with the dummy variable increases the value of the coefficient to -3.14 for the sample including OECD and developing countries.

GDPlog also shows similar results from the earlier regression model and among the models run within the full sample, with increasing levels of GDP resulting in lower levels of the child labor rate. GDP per capita shows different results pertaining to the coefficient direction compared to the earlier model run on just the developing nations.

Within the models run on the full sample, it also shows both positive and negative correlations to the dependent variable. Because the coefficient values are very low, it can be inferred that GDP per capita did 104

not have a significant effect on the dependent variable in this particular model.

Although GDP per capita is the standard overall measure of standard of living, it does not take into consideration the distribution of wealth in nations or wealthy outliers. This is of particular interest when studying developing nations, given their frequently high levels of income inequality in the world.

The results for expenditure per student and gross investment in public education run on the full model confirm the mixed results attained from the earlier regression model run on the sample of just developing nations. Although still showing a positive correlation (except for gross investment in the tobit model) with the dependent variable, the coefficients are slightly less from the three regression models run on this sample. The lower coefficient values were to be expected by taking into consideration OECD nations that are able to invest more dollars into the education system and per student.

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Table V. Predicted Probabilities The predicted probability values, run on the entire sample of data including the OECD dummy variable, show the significant impact that increasing investment as a percentage of GDP has on lowering the child labor rate. At levels of 2%, 4%, and 6%, the negative correlation is significant, with the mean predicted value at each level lying outside the 95% confidence interval of the preceding investment percentage. This shows a measurable reduction in the dependent variable caused by increasing the percent of GDP invested in education. Investment also has diminishing returns on the independent variable. As governments move to higher levels of investment, they can expect to see a greater variance on the effect it has on their child labor rates.

Moving from investment in education at 6% of GDP to higher investment, show greater standard errors and larger confidence intervals despite decreasing child labor levels.

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The predicted values for the expenditure per student variable reaffirm its small positive relationship it has with the child labor rates. Large increases in expenditure per student corresponds to a modest increase of less than 1% in the rate of child labor in a country. However, since the standard errors and the 95% confidence interval for all tested values of expenditure per student are very similar, it can be inferred that the results are inconclusive based on the data used for these predicted values.

Gross investment in public education shows the positive relationship with child labor. With $8 billion geared toward investment in education, the child labor rate can be expected to be between 8.5-16% of the primary school aged children in the country. When increased to $16 billion, 11.5-16.25% of children can be expected to be engaged in some form of labor.

Although showing a positive correlation, the increases are not significant at any 95% confidence interval.

Similar to the predicted

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values for expenditure per student, the standard errors and confidence intervals show that gross investment in public education in this model cannot provide an accurate measurement of the child labor rate.

Conclusion The majority of the evidence supports the findings of previous literature regarding the role that economic factors have on the prevalence of child labor. The educational variables that have not been comprehensively discussed in prior research are mixed. The main explanatory variable of this research paper, investment as a percentage of GDP, shows a strong correlation with child labor rates. As expected, higher levels of this investment have a strong effect on reducing the incidence of child labor in a country. The other two educational variables have mixed results from all models that were run.

Therefore, child labor is a problem which can be alleviated by a better allocation of government 106

resources. The significant results obtained from investment as a percentage of GDP have several positive implications regarding child labor. First, schools can receive the structural adjustments that are necessary for quality education. Teachers can be provided with continuing education, classrooms can be equipped with basic amenities such as heat and lighting, and students can be assured of necessary resources like books and pencils.

Second, there might be some psychological effect on increasing investment as a percentage of GDP. Households can be encouraged by the amount of public funds being shifted toward education, despite whether or not these investments provide for basic necessities or a higher quality of education. Households are inuenced by social events, and governments that place a higher priority on education may provide the social cue needed for households to choose higher levels of education for their children.

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importance of financial conditions on the prevalence of child labor, future research can examine government policies toward education that have been enacted in coordination with economic structural adjustments.

International financial institutions, like the World Bank and the IMF, have given ever-increasing aid through micro-finance programs and loans that are contingent on governments providing the necessary resources for public education. This allows households to choose a higher optimum level of education for their children without sacrificing their current level of consumption.

It would be interesting to note if this credit access can have a reinforcing effect.

Higher access, coupled with higher educational quality, should only further reduce child labor rates.

This research also sheds light on the fact that investment and GDP have decreasing marginal returns toward lowering child labor rates. Governments, upon reaching a certain investment level, can transfer public resources to other pressing NORTHWESTERN

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social issues like health, food, and gender equality.

This would allow them to maximize their nation’s welfare providing for other necessary public goods in addition to quality public education. Governments would have the needed resources to invest in programs aimed at increasing human capital, health, and educational quality. These investments will have positive generational impacts and transform nations’ infrastructure to support improvements in living standards, education, and income. Only with these improved conditions can people in less-developed countries be expected to lift themselves out of the poverty trap.

There are some drawbacks to this study.

Some of the results present a mixed picture about the impact that higher resources geared toward education has on the incidence of child labor. There exists no clear correlation between expenditure per student and gross investment in public education as it pertains to the dependent variable in this

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paper. The results show both small positive and negative relationships depending on which regression model is run. The unreliability of this data can account for part of the skewed results.

Child enrollment in school in developing countries uctuates depending on the health of the economy. Many children are forced to leave school during economic downturns to enter into the labor force and earn a supplemental wage. They then reenroll during periods when their wages are no longer needed. The data from developing countries is sometimes unreliable, and thus the conclusions obtained from this research paper must take into account the inability to accurately measure some statistical data from these nations.

This study is only the beginning of understanding the complex relationships that economic and political factors have on child labor. While the variables tested in this research underline the inuence that macroeconomic effects and national programs have on the rate of child labor, it is 108

of greater importance to research the household and local policies that determine the rate of children entering the labor force. Working children are essential to the survival of many households in developing countries.

Therefore, the eradication of a child labor economy is a long and painful process.

Only by understanding these households’ struggles can proper political and economic adjustments be made to ensure that children are afforded a quality education.

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Table I. Descriptive Statistics A. Developing Only Variable Child Labor Rate Investment as a % of GDP Expenditure per Student (Thousands, US Dollars) Gross Investment in Public Education (Billions, US Dollars) GDPlog

# of obs.

71

Mean 21.71

Std. Dev. 17.36

Min 0.90

Max 69.1

71

3.89

1.71

1.3

9.9

71

1.91

5.40

.01

28.49

71

12.36

5.95

2.1

36.3

71

2.12

1.72

-.87

6.47

3404.29

2945.82

359.15

14770.03

52.80

27.80

2.00

96.6

GDP per 71 Capita (Hundreds, US dollars) Povery Rate 71 ( less than $2 per day)

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B. Developing and OECD Nations

Variable Child Labor Rate Investment as a % of GDP Expenditure per Student (Thousands, US Dollars) Gross Investment in Public Education (Billions, US Dollars) GDPlog

# of obs.

97

Mean 15.89

Std. Dev. 17.69

Min 0

Max 69.1

97

3.92

1.49

1.3

9.9

97

11.32

45.14

.01

412.31

97

17.07

9.51

2.1

54.6

97

3.05

2.30

-.87

9.19

GDP per Capita (Hundreds, US dollars) Povery Rate ( less than $2 per day) OECD

97

8394.08

9410.13

359.15

34364.5

97

38.65

33.41

0

96.6

97

.73

.45

0

1

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Table III. Developing Only DV: Rate of Child Labor Regression

Expenditure per student

.31 (.30)

Gross Investment in Education

.78* (.40)

GDPlog

-2.57* (1.46)

GDP per capita

-.0016*** (.00052)

Poverty Rate

.037 (.09)

Constant

34.3

R-squared

.46

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* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 Robust country cluster standard errors within parentheses

Mean VIF

1.21 Gross Investment in Public Education

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.83

1.05 Expenditure per Student

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1.16 Investment as a % of GDP

.86

VIF Variable

1/VIF

Table II. Test for Multicollinearity

Investment in Education as a % of GDP

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Table IV. Full Sample

Regression Model

Tobit Model

Tobit Regression with Dummy Variable Included

Investment as a % of GDP

-3.14*** (1.14)

-1.69* (1.20)

-4.07*** (1.33)

Expenditure per Student

.063*** (.015)

.14 (.015)

.05*** (.02)

Gross Investment in Public Education

.19 (.20)

-.022 (.20)

.49* (.30)

GDPlog

-3.35*** (.79)

-2.64** (1.08)

-3.19*** (.78)

GDP per capita

-.00062*** (.00017)

0.0022*** (.0007)

.00019 (.00028)

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-14.23* (8.22)

Constant

38.80 (5.56)

R-squared

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N

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41.64 (5.56)

22.23 (.741) .58

97

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Table V. Predicted Probabilities A. Investment as a percentage of GDP

Quantity Investment of (% of Interest GDP)

Child Labor

Mean Predicted Child Labor Rate

Std. Error

95% Conf.

Interval

2%

18.43

2.21

14.17

22.58

4%

13.73

1.22

11.22

16.05

6%

9.03

2.57

3.93

13.95

8%

4.33

4.48

-4.88

12.93

10%

-.38

6.48

-13.68

12.31

B. Expenditure per Student

Quantity of Interest

Child Labor

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13.82

1.23

11.46

16.22

10

14.02

1.21

11.63

16.36

15

14.21

1.21

11.78

16.48

20

14.41

1.23

11.98

16.74

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14.60

1.27

12.09

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Interval

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C. Gross Investment in Education

Quantity of Interest

Child Labor

Gross Investment in Public Education (Billions, US Dollars)

Mean Predicted Child Labor Rate

Std. Error

95% Conf.

Interval

8

12.28

1.93

8.47

15.93

10

12.69

1.69

9.43

15.81

12

13.10

1.48

10.20

15.84

14

13.50

1.31

11.02

16.00

16

13.91

1.22

11.52

16.24

Craig Stalzer graduated magna cum laude from New York University in 2008 with a degree in Economics and Politics. He currently works at a law ďŹ rm in New York City.

Craig will be attending The London School of Economics and Political Science this fall for his masters in International Relations.

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From Rifles to Rape: Tearing Apart the Enemy in Vietnam

by Beth Kacel

n September 30, 2009, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton asked the United Nations to appoint a special task force to fight the widespread use of rape as a weapon of war against women and children in combat zones around the world. Clinton said “the dehumanizing nature of sexual violence doesn’t just harm a single individual or a single family or even a single village or a single group, it shreds the fabric that weaves us together as human beings.”1 Clinton’s statement about the danger of “shredding” apart communities with sexual violence captures the fact 1 Michelle Nichols, “Hilary Clinton Leads UN Fight Against Rape in War,” New York Times, September 30, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/ article/idUSN30208287 (accessed September 30, 2009).

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that while combatants have perpetrated sexual violence in war zones for hundreds of years, the escalation of such atrocities in modern sociopolitical conflicts demands attention and action. In recent decades, combatants brutalized tens of thousands of women in Rwanda, Bosnia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Clinton’s call to action reflects worldwide concerns that military practices explicitly and implicitly sanction the use of women’s bodies as enemy terrain. Various human rights activist groups around the world echo her concerns and articulate rape as “a very effective weapon because communities are totally destroyed.”2 Rape serves as 2 BBC News, “UN Classifies Rape a ‘war tactic,’” BBC News, June 20, 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7464462.

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a brutally efficient military tactic because it allows for rapid destruction of enemy society on a physical, emotional, and symbolic level. Clinton, as well as others, argues that by tearing apart women, the “carers of community,” combatants tear apart the fabric of enemy society.3 Soldiers have used rape to this effect to dominate, humiliate, pollute, punish, and torture women for centuries, but only recently has the idea of rape as a concrete military tactic become part of public and government discourse. However, while recognition of the use of rape as a weapon of war is increasing, advocates for a global coalition to stop violence against women in war zones have little documentation to support their arguments. Historians, stm (accessed September 30, 2009).

3 Laura Smith-Spark, “How did rape become a weapon of war?,” BBC News, December 8, 2004, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4078677.stm (accessed September 30, 2009).

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psychologists, and public health researchers have explored this link between rape and destruction repeatedly, but military officials systematically fail to document statistics and anecdotal evidence of the pervasive problem of sexual violence in war-torn countries. Thus primary source accounts of sexual war crimes, particularly those committed by American soldiers, remain extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find.

Although current awareness of militarysanctioned sexual violence may come too late for the thousands of women who have already been victimized, the work of human rights activists and political figures like Clinton may finally contribute to new practices in collecting and analyzing crucial statistics that reflect the realities of sexual violence worldwide. As reports from modern conflicts in places such as Rwanda, Bosnia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo reach the NJIA

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American public, a greater understanding of rape as a weapon of war may help elucidate the danger of allowing such violence to continue as well as expose the level of destruction that resulted from sexual violence in past conflicts. Recent examples of genocidal rape provide a useful framework for understanding the frequent sexual abuse of women during the Vietnam War and clarify the significant but often overlooked pattern of tearing apart women in order to tear apart enemy communities.

Furthermore, the examination of this type of violence as a function of the procedures included in basic training for new Vietnam recruits illustrates how the notions of power and virility are inextricably linked for American soldiers in Vietnam; this relationship between the stability of male dominance and sexual exploitation contributed to a mindset in which the act of tearing apart the enemy, through rifles or rape, became accepted means of destruction in Vietnam.

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Basic Training From the moment Vietnamera recruits entered basic training, they endured overwhelming verbal and physical tortures as a part of their transformation from civilian “maggots” to “real men.”4 This dramatic transformation required a re-learning of even the most basic behaviors such as how to dress, eat, and even when to relieve themselves. Drill instructors informed recruits of their worthlessness and suggested “if they are ever to become marines, they must acknowledge their total inadequacy. They must be torn down in order to be rebuilt, killed in order to be reborn.”5 Essentially, through the extreme conditions of their training, soldiers regressed emotionally and physically to childhood and then experienced re4 Christian G. Appy, Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers & Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 102.

5 Appy, 87.

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socialization into a culture that stressed masculinity as the only route to present and future self-worth and military success. Thus, they learned to equate failure with femininity. In training, men did everything they could to avoid derogatory labels such as “ladies,” “girls,” “cunts,” or “pussies.”6 Such a position would undermine their ability to survive both training and actual combat. By explicitly training men to associate femininity with failure, drill instructors promoted an implicit understanding of manhood, sexuality, and military prowess as dependent on the destruction of womanhood.

The soldiers grew to accept the idea that women represent “villains,” that they serve as the “epitome of all that is cowardly, passive, untrustworthy, unclean, and undisciplined.”7 It follows that the fierce training to destroy such aspects of femininity in themselves as a way to prevent failure would have a carry-over effect in 6 7 118

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priming American soldiers to view violence against women as an acceptable method of humiliation and destruction of enemy integrity.

Basic training “combined discipline and aggression, obedience and anger,” and often did so in chauvinistic, sexualized terms.8 Habitual themes of thrusting, penetration, insertion, and extraction contributed to overlapping conceptualizations of military missions and sexual conquest. This juxtaposition of sexuality and military progress served to beat the woman out of the soldier and to make him able to tolerate and perpetrate mass sexual violence. Furthermore, this emphasis on manhood and the strain of training led to an environment in which anticipation of violence became an experience parallel to the buildup of sexual tension.

Drill instructors frequently expressed the coming war as another form of sex, furthering the association between striving for military 8

Appy, 97.

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success and searching for sexual gratification. Often times, to remove any doubt in soldiers’ minds about the weapons they had at their disposal, drill instructors required their men to “run around the barracks with their rifle in one hand, their penis in the other, chanting, ‘This is my rifle, this is my gun; one is for fighting, the other’s for fun.’”

Ironically, as historian Christian G. Appy argues, instead of serving as an exercise to distinguish between the uses of rifles and penises, this hazing ritual created an even firmer parallel between power and virility in soldiers’ minds.9 The internalized association between military power and sexual prowess had the additional effect of further blurring the line between “techno-war” and sexual violence.10 Sociologist James 9 Appy, 102.

10 James William Gibson, Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in Post-Vietnam America (Canada: HarperCollinsCanadaLtd, 1994), as cited in Tim O’Brien, The Things They NORTHWESTERN

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William Gibson asserts that “war was conceptualized as a kind of high-technology production process in which the officer corps were managers, the enlisted men were workers, and the final product was death: whoever had the biggest, most sophisticated apparatus was sure to produce the highest enemy body count and thus win.”11 This discussion of which country wields the “biggest,” most “sophisticated apparatus” contains obvious undertones of a phallic nature. As opposed to two countries debating which of their armies demonstrate greater readiness for the thrust of war, the banter about apparatus size could just as easily have taken place between soldiers talking about women back home and who would score first if they survived the war.

This metaphor emphasizes war as a methodical, matter of fact process in which Carried (New York: Broadway Books, 1990), 183.

11 Gibson, 27.

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skillful handling of “the biggest, most sophisticated apparatus” will result in the greatest victory.

Political leaders and journalists of the era further contributed to the nation’s processing of the war in sexualized terms both at home and abroad. Popular exposés employed gendered descriptions of Vietnam as “a feminized and weak society amenable to outside influence.”12 Americans thus inserted themselves into the problem territory in order to vanquish the delicate Vietnamese soldier deemed incapable of 12 Mark Philip Bradley, Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Post Colonial Vietnam, 1919-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 75. This description if the Vietnamese comes from Bradley’s chapter “Trusteeship and the American Vision of Postcolonial Vietnam,” which was included in an essay entitled “The Role of Language in Perpetuating US Involvement in the Vietnam War,” written in April of 2008 for Professor Charlotte Cahill’s seminar on the Vietnam War. 120

protecting his own country from foreign domination.

This sexualized language about an impending threat symbolizes the tension that comes with the hunt and subsequent release of a big American apparatus that has found its target. While on home soil, these conquests revolved around manhood and ego; in Vietnam, the ability to penetrate the enemy impacted a soldier’s chance for self-preservation and survival.

While a learned hatred of femininity broke down initial inhibitions about sexual violence, only when this mindset coalesced with the behavioral psychological methods used in training did soldiers truly become capable of committing atrocities against Vietnamese women. According to military psychologist David A. Grossman, the use of conditioning, desensitization, and dehumanization transformed men into killing machines. Many training camps attempted to provide as realistic a setting NJIA

as possible for training, including exercises meant to simulate real challenges soldiers could face in Vietnam. In appreciating the consequences of their efforts (both punishment for failures and rewards for accomplishments), drill sergeants conditioned soldiers to embrace proactivity, instant gratification, and the release of aggressive urges.13 This conditioning forged in recruits an association between increased violence and increased success at training tasks. The sense of relief and release that came with success in training tasks meant to simulate real engagements in Vietnam became a much sought after feeling. Internalizing such a relationship between killing and relief resulted in the attenuation of “psychological safeguards” that might have prevented soldiers from committing 13 David Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995), 254.

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some of the atrocities for which they were responsible in Vietnam.14 Furthermore, the feeling of relief associated with killing blended into the experience of release associated with sexual domination. Thus the methods used in combat training that destroyed the mental safeguards which may have prevented soldiers from committing violence had the additional effect of lowering their inhibitions about committing violent sexual attacks on Vietnamese women. While increased sexual aggression may have been an unintended side effect of turning those “maggots” into “real men,” this psychological re-birth led to the acceptance of rape as a weapon of war.

Two other psychological tools employed in basic training were desensitization and dehumanization, which work hand in hand to decrease a soldier’s inhibitions about killing.

Desensitization results from repetition and practice so frequent that an action turns 14

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into habit, free from deep thought. Recruits chanted “kill, kill, kill, kill”as a regular part of their physical training sessions.15 By naming the act repeatedly and associating killing with something as routine as the morning march, soldiers were desensitized to the actual potential for human destruction in Vietnam.

According to Grossman, by the time the soldier actually kills in Vietnam, he has practiced killing so many times that he can deny to himself, on some level, that he has actually killed another human being.

Additionally, the institutionalized rhetoric of dehumanizing the Vietnamese infiltrated the already transformed minds of American soldiers and further lowered their inhibitions about killing those they believed to be “simply another breed of animal to be hunted and killed.”16 Trained to believe in the worthlessness, femininity, and naiveté of the Vietnamese, some soldiers 15 16 122

Grossman, 251.

Grossman, 252.

(at least initially) believed in their role as representatives of the all-powerful American military.17 The more that soldiers accepted this conceptualization of Vietnamese people, the more easily soldiers lost sight of the enemy’s ability to suffer, particularly when Vietnamese civilians seemed ungrateful for American support in the fight against communism. As denial of the enemy’s humanity and practiced attempts at his destruction became more intertwined, soldiers became programmed to kill and destroy. They became automatic weapons, like the ones they carried, and 17 Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945 – 1990 (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 28. Propaganda resulted in two major metaphors for understanding the Vietnamese people. They were described as effeminate women needing protection, as well as children in need of guidance. American policy-makers thrived on the notion that they had the potential to protect Vietnam (and the rest of the world) from a communist take-over.

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often failed to distinguish between the pleasure of watching a stream of bullets fly indiscriminately from their rifles and the discharge of their own semen. This overlap between sex and death can be traced to the overarching themes of domination and symbolic destruction.18 Though sex often symbolizes the height of an intensely intimate relationship, the rape of Vietnamese women paradoxically allowed soldiers to further distance themselves from the humanity of their victims while accomplishing their goal of tearing apart the enemy’s community.

Gendered Violence in War While the dangerously chauvinistic values instilled during basic training prepared men to commit atrocities in Vietnam, these values are traceable to America’s traditional, male-dominated gender system. According to Shannon Heit, author of Waging Sexual Warfare: Case studies of rape warfare used 18 Grossman, 137.

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by the Japanese Imperial Army During World War II: “The attitudes and treatment of women in peacetime make a logical, though horrifying, progression towards how women are treated during war and armed conflicts.

War’s consequences on women prove to be one of the most tragic aspects of this progression, reaching beyond victims, becoming detrimental to the whole of society.”19 Heit suggests that a firmly rooted, gendered understanding of society contributes to the potential for violent sexual acts during war, which serves to reassert male power as well as the home country’s strength.

Additionally, defining the symbolic role women fill in society contributes a 19 Shannon Heit, “Waging sexual warfare: Case studies of rape warfare used by the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II,” Women’s Studies International Forum 32, (2009), 363-370.

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clearer understanding of the use of rape as a weapon of war. German historian and sociologist Theresa Wobbe suggests: “In many societies, a woman represents the symbolic system of a group, the construction of the community being produced and made visible in her person, body, and life ... but this also means that violence committed against women is directed against the physical and personal integrity of a group. The rape of women of a community, culture, or nation can be regarded-and is so regarded-as a symbolic rape of the body of that community.”20 The combined perspectives of Heit and 20 Theresa Wobbe, “Die Grenzen des Geschlechts.

Konstruktionen von Gemeinschaft und Rassismus” as translated by and cited in Ruth Seifert, “The Second Front: The Logic of Sexual Violence in Wars,” Women’s Studies International Forum 19, no. 1/2 (1996), 35-43.

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Wobbe demonstrate the progression from patriarchal society to violence to the rape and abuse of women in an enemy country during times of war. Based on perpetrators’ desires to tear apart the fabric of enemy culture, they exploit one of the most traditional structural aspects of society: the gender hierarchy.

Thus, tearing women apart allows soldiers to break, dehumanize, and pollute the enemy.

The destruction through pollution method allows for the symbolic and literal “redraw[ing] of ethnic boundaries” in that victims of rape lose a sense of personal integrity while being simultaneously forced to share in the destruction of their community by contributing to the future of the enemy’s race.21 Thus rape debases, humiliates, and dehumanizes women who, according to Wobbe’s 21 Gita Sahgal (Amnesty International), as cited in Smith-Spark, under “Spoils of War?” NJIA

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description, must guard the humanity and integrity of their cultures. Though they have little involvement in the “masculinist practice of war and military strategy,” women and girls suffer the most damage for the “military culture and environment that prepares and inures men to kill and exploit humans.”22 While the progression of violence in terms of tearing women apart to defeat enemy communities may occur on a subconscious level, on a much more explicit level, the rape of enemy women represents the ultimate form of military domination and humiliation.

Throughout history, the “defense of women has long been a hallmark of masculine pride, as possession of a woman has been a hallmark of masculine success. Rape 22 On gendered practices of war, see Heit, 364; on military culture, see H. Patricia Hynes, “On the battlefield of women’s bodies: An overview of the harm of war to women, ” Women’s International Forum 27, (2004), 431-445.

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by a conquering soldier destroys all remaining illusions of power.”23 In this sense, soldiers trained to defend their manhood (and their country) at all costs claimed victory both while raping a Vietnamese woman and while overtaking an enemy bunker. British psychiatrist Ruth Seifert elaborates on Wobbe’s ideas of the purpose of destroying femininity by discussing one particularly horrifying example of sexual violence.

She describes an attack in which “a woman’s breasts were cut off, her stomach was slashed open or her vagina torn apart with a weapon or military tool after she had been raped.”24 Seifert suggests that this case provides an example of a double penetration: a woman raped twice, torn apart inside and out. While this woman, if she survived, would suffer enormously, the perpetrator’s extreme violence threatened the 23 Susan Brownmiller, “Against our will: Men, women, and rape,” as cited in Heit, 364.

24 Seifert, 38.

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integrity of her entire community. This illustrates both the blurring of sexual and military violence, as well as the way soldiers used women’s bodies in order to demonstrate penetration and destruction of enemy communities.

The tacit acceptance of sex as a way to convey a political message places a great deal of responsibility on some defenseless women to protect themselves and their culture from injury and symbolic destruction.

Sexual Atrocities in Vietnam Basic training in the Vietnam era promoted a culture of hyper-masculinity and male bonding as well as a robotic ability to destroy human life.

Extreme loyalty to the bonds of country and camaraderie, compounded by the methods of combat training, contributed to extreme violence in Vietnam. Basic training removed soldiers’ “psychological safeguards” so that when dropped into the harsh realities of war-related pain, death, and disease, aggression of unpredicted levels extended the battlefield to 126

include women’s bodies in the already ambiguous definition of enemy terrain.

German psychologist Rolf Pohl further discusses the effect of the realities of battle on men trained to destroy: war, Pohl argues, becomes “an adventure where fantasies of destruction unconsciously directed against women are encouraged and acted out, brought to the surface in times of crisis and war when the concepts of order begin to crumble.25 In explaining the progression from civilian “fantasies” about women to violently destructive acts in war, Pohl’s argument serves as a helpful integration of both Wobbe and Heit’s conceptualizations of gendered violence and the realities of Vietnam-era combat training protocols.

The legitimacy of rape as a “war tactic” in Vietnam was an inevitable result of the learned interchangeability of 25 Rolf Pohl, “Mannlichkeit, Destruktivitat und Kriegsbereitschaft,” as translated and cited in Seifert, 38.

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the long hard rifle or penis in causing destruction.26 Since World War II, the bayonet also served as the phallic bridge between destruction and sex; Grossman argues that “thrusting the sexual appendage (the penis) deep into the body of a victim can be perversely linked to thrusting the killing appendage (a bayonet or knife) deep into the body of a victim.”27 Once soldiers accepted rape as a weapon of mass destruction, they found forced sexual intercourse to have many uses: to pollute, humiliate, dominate, and dehumanize the Vietnamese. Appy discusses one particular instance that captures the swift movement between technological and sexual violence. Jerry Samuels, a soldier in Vietnam in the late 1960s describes a mission in a village South 26 BBC News, “UN Classifies Rape a ‘war tactic,’” BBC News, June 20, 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7464462. stm (accessed September 30, 2009).

27 Grossman, 137.

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of Tay Nihn which results in total disaster: pregnant women running around and screaming, teenage boys kicking and biting American soldiers, and guns firing out of control. After the situation calmed down slightly, Jerry and three of his fellow soldiers raped four Vietnamese girls and then, although they had not originally intended to do so, shot the girls. He suggests that “firing his weapon brought an ‘instantaneous feeling of satisfaction.’”28 This scene demonstrates the rapidly escalating nature of combat violence and how quickly soldiers shifted from one weapon (their rifle) to the other (their penis). This scene also demonstrates how sexual violence ironically restored a sense of integrity in the attacker while destroying that conviction in his victim. This strategy, while serving a purpose for soldiers, seems a far cry from the American military goal of protecting Vietnam from a communist takeover. GIs strayed from the 28

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well-intentioned mission of protecting fragile Vietnam in order to relieve their fear and confusion about the war. Inducing terror in Vietnamese women and men allowed soldiers to experience this relief. One Vietnam Veteran went as far as to say â&#x20AC;&#x153;a gun is power. To some people carrying a gun was like having a permanent hard-on. It was a pure sexual trip every time you got to pull the trigger.â&#x20AC;?29 American soldiers suppressed their uncertainty about military visions of success as well as terrifying threats to their lives by raping and destroying defenseless Vietnamese communities.

While small-scale incidents such as those captured in Jerry Samuelsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; story remain highly significant examples of the extreme sexual violence carried out against women during the Vietnam War, the My Lai Massacre likely remains the most powerful example of atrocities committed in Vietnam. On March 16, 1968, Charlie Company, Twentieth 29 128

Grossman, 136.

Infantry, Americal Division attacked the small hamlet, and the number of estimated deaths ranged from 175 to 500. Within a few days of the attack, Viet Cong pamphlets circulated throughout the area describing the brutality of American soldiers. One such pamphlet included information about Nguyet, a 12-year-old girl who was raped and then bayoneted in the vagina and the rest of her body.30 In this case, a young girl was literally ripped apart as her village was torn apart. This large-scale attack demonstrates the use of rape as a weapon of war for the same reasons discussed above.

The justifications for the widespread use of rape as a weapon of war as presented thus far have not factored in the additional motivation of revenge.

Evidence exists that Captain Ernest Medina conveyed to his men that the assault on My Lai would be a chance for soldiers to avenge the deaths of buddies lost in 30 General William A. Peers, My Lai, as cited in Appy, 276.

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previous weeks. While he may not have explicitly ordered the killing and torture of the villagers, the psychological conditioning soldiers experienced in basic training had forged automatic associations in their minds between violent actions and a reestablished sense of relief and release which resulted in extreme violence as a way of coping with frustration and perceived lack of progress.

For many weeks prior to the My Lai incident, the unit had patrolled the area with little progress in engaging the enemy. However, a fair number of men were lost to booby traps and sniper fire.31 The level of frustration and the buildup of anticipation between firefights left soldiers feeling frightened, exhausted, and ineffective. Thus when they finally reached My Lai, soldiers needed to believe that they had come across a village full of Viet Cong members. The violent destruction of the hamlet allowed the company to reclaim a sense of control 31

Appy, 273.

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and potency at the expense of a few hundred civilians.

While the Vietnamese maintained control for the weeks Charlie Company had humped relatively uninterrupted, the attack on My Lai allowed soldiers to exact the most intimate form of revenge for their fear, boredom, and lost friends, a feeling which one American soldier linked to the satisfaction associated with masturbation.32 This issue of regaining control, both of the enemy and of fear, played a larger role in the commission of violent acts than soldiers or political leaders may have predicted. Research indicates that rape occurs most frequently in areas where women have threatened the stability of traditional male-dominated power structures.33 In the 1960s and 1970s, thousands of scared young men left home to fight in Vietnam in conditions for which even the harshness of training did not prepare them. In addition to the hardships brought on by the 32 33

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of masculinity or potency.

O’Brien discusses the shock felt by many young soldiers at the lack of glory and excitement they had hoped for upon arriving in Vietnam.

Instead of the adventures depicted in popular media at the time, soldiers faced a constant, overwhelming apprehension which Appy describes as

climate and conditions of battle, many soldiers either lacked conviction about the causes of the war or explicitly opposed it. The interplay between days of redundant humping and sporadic battles with serious consequences had a dramatic physical and psychological impact on soldiers. Fear alone, regardless of pain, disease, or the loss of close friends, could cause violent reactions in soldiers.

Tim O’Brien, Vietnam veteran and author of The Things They Carried, explains his experience with terror: “You’re not human anymore. You’re a shadow.

You slip out of your own skin, like molting, shedding your own history and your own future, leaving behind everything you ever were or wanted or believed in. You know you’re about to die.

And it’s not a movie and you aren’t a hero and all you can do is whimper and wait.”34 Uncertainty, chaos, and extreme terror plagued soldiers and produced sentiments that absolutely contradicted any feelings

Appy’s description of the exhausting state of constant terror captures the mental state of soldiers.

The emasculating terror induced by the particular unpredictability of the

34

35

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O’Brien, 211.

“So terrible because it is so complete and because it is suffered alone. Underlying all of these emotions is the jarring, disorienting recognition that one cannot even trust one’s own emotions; the war poses such surreal and unpredictable environments that one might feel most threatened precisely when one is ‘safe as a bay’ as (as soldiers would soon learn) most secure at times of greatest danger.35

Appy, 127.

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Vietnam War led soldiers to commit violent sexual acts as a way of reasserting their prowess and potency.

Understanding this perceived lack of control and inability to regulate even one’s own emotions plays a crucial role in interpreting the level of violent acts that soldiers committed.

Soldiers began “to feel that the whole war is a booby trap waiting to explode at his feet.”36 Though welltrained in following orders and killing the enemy, these young men did not receive practice on how to cope with the physical and emotional consequences of self-doubt. Appy claims that “the particular frustrations and terrors encountered

by GIs are central to understanding, without necessarily justifying, the range of violent acts they committed.”37 Seifert adds that while terror played a role in inspiring violent acts in soldiers, the perceived loss of power and control associated with such high levels of fear for 36 Appy, 191.

37 Gibson, 191.

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such prolonged periods of time appears to be just as significant, if not more important, in predicting the vast number of rapes in Vietnam.38 At this point in the war, no longer able to cling to glorified American ideals or to shake off the worry of eventual American defeat, soldiers felt a real threat to the stability of white male power. While American soldiers raped in order to destroy illusions of Vietnamese male power, lack of certainty in America’s ability to win the war resulted in a perspective shift in the metaphor. In that Vietnam was popularly conceived of as a woman needing the protection of the all-powerful America, losing the war would mean that Americans had allowed Communists to rape Vietnam. In basic training, soldiers learned that failure to perform would result in punishment and embarrassment. Drill instructors humiliated soldiers in front of their units to make them tough, capable, 38 Seifert, 41.

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and less likely to crack under the real pressure of war. These procedures directly impacted soldiers’ understanding of power and sex as inextricably linked.

Acts of sexual violence committed in Vietnam may have given soldiers a way to symbolically humiliate the enemy in order to exact retribution for the humiliation they had endured as new recruits.

As political activist Susan Brownmiller suggests, since the “defense of women has long been the hallmark of masculine pride,” rape seemed a viable option for scared young men to attempt to symbolically reestablish their own virility and white male power and dominance on a global scale.39 Conclusion Psychiatrist Judith Herman, a specialist in Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), suggests “equally as powerful as the desire 39 Brownmiller, as cited in Heit, 364.

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to deny atrocities is the conviction that denial does not work.”40 Although official reporting of sexual violence in international conflicts has been extremely limited for decades, this does not change the reality of the substantial number of women who have suffered sexual tortures while their country fought a war. The lack of attention given in previous years to sexual violence as a sanctioned weapon of war has had a devastating impact on women whose homes and bodies have become the site of international conflict. The myths of heroism and patriotism that surrounded American entry into Vietnam, and that often instigated international conflicts in general, contributed both to the normalization of sexual violence and lack of international understanding about the pervasiveness of the atrocities. According to public health researcher H. 40 Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 1.

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Patricia Hynes: “Few have noted that the greatest casualties of modern war are non-combatant civilians, not soldiers. Fewer still have acknowledged that, among civilian casualties, women and girls are deliberately targeted and disproportionately harmed by war and its aftermath.”41 In other words, the records do not reflect the casualties suffered by women who tend to serve, unwillingly, on the frontlines of wars initiated, fought, and concluded by men.

And even if the statistics did exist, these numbers could hardly capture the subjective experiences of these women. Only in recent years have academics and policymakers conceptualized and attempted to explore the realities of rape explicitly in terms of a weapon of war and “a threat to international security. ”42 41 Hynes, 431.

42 BBC News, “UN Classifies Rape a ‘war tactic,’” BBC News, June 20, 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7464462.

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While the problem of mass sexual violence in combat zones has finally gained international attention, the question of how to deal with the reality as well as prevent such destruction in the future remains unanswered. What makes the issue particularly complex is that the violence, while appalling, can be traced back to a cultural psyche in which a gender hierarchy serves as the basic structural unit of society. 43 While Hilary Clinton spoke on behalf of women of the world who live in war-torn countries, men have traditionally held her position as Secretary of State in a political system dominated by male leaders.

Does Clinton’s success as a political figure necessarily indicate the progress of American women or serve as an example of ambitious women willing to inherit male-oriented roles in order to achieve success?

The frightening idea, however, is that the more stm (accessed September 30, 2009).

43 Heit, 364.

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that women step up to claim their right, as described

by President Obama at the United Nations conference at which Clinton spoke, “to live free from fear and to realize their full potential, ” the more that males will perceive a threat to their power. But should women of the world bear the physical pain of men who feel threatened? The implication of research on the stability of male power and incidence of rape thus calls for men, as well as women, to accept the reality of sexual violence in war zones, to treat it as a problem, and to take a stand in order to fully have an impact on reducing the number of innocent women who are brutalized in international conflicts.

However, the ultimate conclusion about rape as a weapon of war centers on the most basic attempt to cope with international change by reestablishing tradition. Regardless of the cause of the conflict or the location of the battles, war tears communities apart and causes widespread chaos as new political ideas gain 134

traction around the world.

Sexual violence represents the ultimate attempt at restoration of traditional order. Gender hierarchies have governed many societies for thousands of years, so the use of rape still serves as a conscious and subconscious reassertion of male power and the desire to retreat from the possibility of international innovation.

Beth Kacel is a fourth year undergraduate at Northwestern University double majoring in History and Psychology.

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