대뉴욕지구 경기여고동창회(회장 강용진) 경운장학회(회장 양인영)
는 2024년 4월 27일 맨해튼에 있는 코리아 소사이어티 강당에서 제14회
웅변대회를 가졌다.
이번 웅변대회의 주제는 한국전쟁(The Korean War)이다.
미 전역 고등학생을 대상으로 하는 경운웅변대회는 올해 46명의 한
국계 및 비한국계 학생들이 참여하여 원고를 제출했는데, 원고 심사를
통해 14명의 결선 진출자가 결정됐다.
결선 진출자들은 장학회가 진행한 스피치 워크샵을 통해 스피치의
다양한 측면에 관해 지도를 받은 후 본선에서 경합 했다.
△대상 1명($1,500) Ean Soh △1등상 1명($1,200) Chloe Woo △2등 상 2명(각 $1,000) Sean Yoo, Jack Murdock, △3등상 3명(각 $500) Kaylee Kim, Aspen Meyer, Ryan P. Kim, △결선 진출상 7명(각 $200), △원고상 2명(각 $500)이 압상했다. 이날 그레그 브래진스키 교수(조지 워싱톤 대)가‘한국 전쟁: 중국 과 북한과의 관계(The Korean War:China and North Korea)’를 주제 로 기조연설을 했다.
뉴욕일보는 예년과 같이 경운장학회 영어웅변대회의 가치를 높이 사 입상자들의 원고를 전재한다.
TheKoreanWar: FailureonAllFronts
EanSoh[LeoniaHS, NJ]
When we teach the origins of the Cold War, we teach George Kennan’s “Long Telegram”—how it defined U.S. foreign policy with containment (“The Long Telegram”). We teach the Truman doctrine and the NSC 68—how the U.S. military expanded alongside the escalation of political tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (“Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian”). The most common historical narrative today presents the eventual military struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the inevitable manifestation of fundamental ideological differences between the two nations. Contrary to what you might have been led to believe, however, the aforementioned post-World War II developments were not guarantees of military conflict between the U.S and the Soviet Union. The real year of decision was no year but 1950, and took place nowhere but Korea.
I propose, to all of you, that the phenomenon of the Cold War, the way it was fought, and why it was fought that way, were all decided over the course of the Korean War. By extension, I posit that the Korean War, following Cold War conflicts, and their corresponding death and bloodshed could have been prevented had the U.S. and the Soviet Union chosen a peaceful path in 1950.
Firstly, I would like to give background to the war.
For centuries, Korea endured invasions and conflicts with China and Japan (“Korea - Unified Silla, Dynasty, Culture”). With these more powerful states, Korea moved from one form of subordinate relationship to another (“Korea - Unified Silla, Dynasty, Culture”). From 1897–1910, the Korean Empire enjoyed quasi-independence, but in 1905, 1907, and 1910, Japanese representatives coerced Korean officials into signing treaties that ultimately made Korea a formal colony of Japan, where Korea remained under Japanese rule until the end of World War II (“Korean Empire”). After World War II, Korea was divided on the 38th parallel into spheres of influence where Soviet forces took the northern half of the peninsula and the U.S. took the southern (Pruitt). As the relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. deteriorated, so too did the relationship between North and South Korea (Pruitt). There were frequent clashes at the border (Pruitt). Neither government was willing to recognize the other as legitimate, yet both sought re-unification. On June 25, 1950, North Korea broke the tension, storming the 38th parallel with the goal of defeating South Korea and absorbing its territory (Weathersby). A war in Korea, however, was not inevitable.
NJ]
The U.S. was already hesitant to start a war in Asia, and even more so with the emergence of Soviet nuclear power and SinoSoviet alliance (Weathersby). Indeed, in 1950, just two months before the war, the National Security Council published the top-secret report titled “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” or the NSC 68 (“Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian”). The report addressed the growing crisis in Korea, but by no means did it urge a declaration of war. Instead, it presented four potential courses of action, only the third of which was war (“Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian”). On the topic of negotiation, the report stated, “In the first place, the public in the United States and in other free countries will require… that the free world be continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union on equitable terms,” indicating a willingness to engage in negotiation on fair terms to address the present world crisis (“Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian”).
In fact, negotiation efforts had already taken place regarding Korea. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, the U.S. and the Soviet Union explicitly agreed that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent” (“The Cairo Declaration”). The original wording of the declaration was even more resolute, stating that Korea would be liberated “at the earliest possible moment after the downfall of Japan” (Caprio).
In private, the Soviet Union was initially also wary of going to war. In several exchanges between North Korea and the Soviet Union, Stalin asked to postpone any military action (Lee 190). Furthermore, the Soviet Union would never admit to any involvement in the war to deter a direct confrontation with the U.S. (“North Korea, China and the USSR - Anzac Portal”).
Yet on June 25, 1950, any reservations about military engagement held by the U.S. and the Soviet Union were cast aside. As mentioned, North Korea’s assault on South Korea was postponed multiple times by the Soviet Union. The U.S. was just, if not more, averse to war than the Soviet Union. So why, then, did both countries commit such great military assistance once the fighting began? It was not because of any drastic shift in American or Soviet political or military objectives. Rather, the U.S. and the Soviet Union joined the war effort to protect their reputations. Truman worried that passivity would convince the Soviet Union to spread communism throughout the rest of the American sphere. Likewise, Stalin couldn’t ignore the war because he believed that would encourage the U.S. to continue encroaching the Soviet bloc with hostile, pro-Western government installments.
In other words, the Korean War can be described as a misunderstanding. Neither the U.S. or the Soviet Union necessarily sought war, but once the crisis grew out of control, they both had to prove their willingness to retaliate to prevent future wars.
This misunderstanding was irreparably damaging to Korea. By the end of the Korean War, more than 2.5 million people had been killed, 1.6 million of whom were North or South Korean civilians (Millett). China suffered around 600,000 military deaths, and the United States 36,000 (Millett). It is impossible to completely grasp the quantity of destruction and devastation that occurred with just words and numbers. Life expectancy in Korea dropped by 25 years during the war (Millett). Adjusted for inflation, total war damages were approximately $6.9 billion (Lee). Every single major Korean city was leveled (Millett).
I want you to ask yourselves: who could have possibly benefited from the war?
The war was wildly unsuccessful for the U.S. and the Soviet Union. After three years of fighting in a war neither of them truly wanted to begin with, the Korean Armistice Agreement returned the borders back to roughly the same exact position along the 38th parallel (Millett). No real progress was made by the U.S. or the Soviet Union towards their country’s objectives.
How is this possible? The Korean War was a failure on all fronts. It locked the U.S. and the Soviet Union into a relationship that replaced diplomacy with war, one that favored secretive plotting over open and truthful negotiation. This dynamic exactly brought the U.S. and the Soviet Union to the Vietnam War, Cuban Missile Crisis, Middle East conflicts, and others. The Korean War was not simply the death of Koreans, it was also the death of prospects for an era of peace and stability.
Had either the U.S. or the Soviet Union taken the initiative to openly, truthfully, and diplomatically address the growing crisis in Korea which they were both aware of, the entire Cold War could have been averted.
For Korea that would mean the pain brought to countless Korean families and lives would never have happened. Other third world countries could have prevented their own Cold War traumas. Ultimately, the Korean War serves as a stark reminder of the devastating consequences that arise when diplomacy gives way to armed conflict. Its tragic legacy underscores the imperative of seeking peaceful resolutions to geopolitical tension.
No war can be a war to end all war.
